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Why Interpersonal Ties are Important for People: An Analysis of the Concept of Social Capital and Its Dimensions of Holism, Convertibility, and Conductibility

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WHY INTERPERSONAL TIES ARE IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS DIMENSIONS OF HOLISM, CONVERTIBILITY, AND CONDUCTIBILITY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
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in

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by
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Abstract

During recent years, social capital has become one of the most widely used concepts in sociological literature, and its popularity has shown itself in both sociological theory and everyday language. Its increasing popularity has mainly resulted from its conceptualizations by some of the most prominent social scientists, such as Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Nan Lin, and Robert Putnam and from its empirical applications to social problems and society afterwards. While many scholars have seen social capital as something of a cure for social problems and perceived social capital theories adequate as they are for their empirical applications, few scholars have approached social capital with a critical perspective and critically addressed the highly accepted social capital theories. I argue that the lack of critical perspective to the current social capital theories is a research gap. Therefore, to satisfy this research gap and to question the validity of these highly accepted social capital theories, this dissertation addresses the concept of social capital with an emphasis on its three dimensions: holism, convertibility, and conductivity. In three separate studies, this dissertation examines each dimension of the concept respectively with a critical approach, discusses what their main components are, presents who their most prominent thinkers are and what they have claimed, reveals their shortcomings, and finally offers plausible solutions to remove the shortcomings. Thus, this dissertation aims to provide an update to some of the highly accepted social capital theories and a unique contribution to the social capital literature.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Ever since its first known usage by L.J. Hanifan in 1916 as “those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit“ (cited in Putnam 2000:19), the concept of social capital has been widely used in the sociological literature to indicate the importance of interpersonal ties for a more productive social life and accepted as one of the most popular exports from sociological theory in everyday language (Portes 1998).

The concept of social capital has shown its major existence after 1970s, especially through the works of some of the most prominent social scientists, such as Pierre Bourdieu, James S. Coleman, Nan Lin, Mark Granovetter, and Robert D. Putnam. The first systematic analysis of social capital was produced by Pierre Bourdieu, who defined the concept as “the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986:248). Bourdieu’s work has paved the way for other social scientists to conceptualize social capital with different perspectives. Even though social capital has received much attention since 1970s through the works of the social capital experts mentioned above, there have been few theoretical analyses and critical approaches of the concept of social capital since then.¹ The diverse conceptualizations of social capital presented by the above-mentioned social scientists have been mainly perceived adequate as they are by many scholars and used as such in their research. However, I argue that even the highly accepted social capital theories by the most prominent social scientists such as Pierre Bourdieu, Nan Lin, and Mark Granovetter have considerable shortcomings. For instance, the Bourdieusian model of conversions and Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital for the conversion processes need further elaboration. Also, Granovetter’s understanding of weak ties is limited and his bridge concept needs further consideration. Even though Granovetter’s research is not directly related to the concept of social capital, a comprehensive perspective to his “Strength of Weak Ties” theory is argued to provide a better understanding of the network benefits of social capital. In addition to

¹ Examples of these few studies are: Portes (1998) who criticizes the usage of social capital with only its positive consequences while ignoring the negative consequences, and thus introducing the concept of negative social capital; Lin (2001) who criticizes Putnam’s (2000) understanding of social capital and how he measures social capital; Adler and Kwon (2002) who clarify social capital and help assess its utility for organizational theory; Feld (1981) who integrates the several aspects of social capital with focus theory; and Woolcock (1998) who associates social capital with development theory and economic development.

the shortcomings, I assert that these social capital theories have a common conceptual ground in terms of the solutions that they have presented to social problems. In this respect, I argue that a synthesis of the highly accepted and widely used social capital theories provides a common conceptual framework to understand the functioning of social capital more comprehensively. In light of these arguments, the aim of this dissertation is to critically analyze some of the highly accepted and widely used theories of social capital to address the concept of social capital with an emphasis on its three dimensions: holism, convertibility, and conductivity.

Composed of three studies, this dissertation addresses each dimension of the concept respectively with a critical approach, discusses what their main components are, presents who their most prominent thinkers are and what they have claimed, reveals their shortcomings, and finally offers plausible solutions to remove the shortcomings. Thus, this dissertation aims to provide an update to some of the highly accepted social capital theories and a unique contribution to the social capital literature.

Study 1 (Chapter 2): The concept of social capital, in the broadest sense of the term, refers to social relations that are expected to benefit the owners with both material and symbolic rewards in the marketplace. In other words, social capital in the form of interpersonal ties to others is an asset that is used to access others' resources and to benefit from them (Lin 2001). Sociological literature has widely examined the concept of social capital due to the increasing amount of theoretical and conceptual arguments addressing the importance and usefulness of the concept. From 1970s on, there have been many conceptualizations that have addressed social capital with diverse perspectives—as interpersonal ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983), community norms (Coleman 1988), group solidarity and trust (Portes 1998), participation in voluntary activities (Putnam 1995, 2000), or social resources embedded in social networks (Lin 2001). Despite the diversity in their conceptualizations of social capital, each of these scholars have actually taken similar approaches to understanding social capital in that they have considered similar social problems and presented similar solutions to these problems. Thus, it can be suggested that they have all pointed to the indispensability of social capital for people and called attention to the importance of how interpersonal connections are used for a more productive social life.

In line with the above arguments indicating how social scientists have approached social capital in the same vein and offered similar solutions to social problems, in Chapter 2, I examine the holism

dimension of the concept of social capital. I argue that a holistic approach to the concept of social capital gathers all the common points of different conceptualizations and provides us a perspective that we can see all the different views at the same time. In other words, we can see how one conceptualization of social capital coincides with another through the holistic approach. This leads to the argument that different perspectives to the concept of social capital might actually signify similar meanings.

In order to offer a holistic approach—that is, a common conceptual framework to the different conceptualizations of social capital, I will first review the works of some of the most prominent theorists of social capital such as Robert Putnam, Nan Lin, Mark Granovetter, and Alejandro Portes. Next, I will examine these theorists' works through mainly focusing on Lin's (2001) concepts of expressive-instrumental action and homophilous-heterophilous interactions, Putnam's (2000) bonding, bridging, and linking social capital, Granovetter's (1973, 1983) ideas on strength of weak ties, and Portes' (1998) negative social capital. Then, I will use Lin's (2001) typology of effort and return dimensions of social capital to synthesize these theorists' ideas and provide a common conceptual ground to see these different theorists' perspectives simultaneously. Finally, I will further the synthesis by including the S-shaped diffusion curve, the types of interpersonal relationships (symmetric-antisymmetric-asymmetric), and the types of settings (normal versus chaotic) to see how the common conceptual ground—the holistic perspective to social capital—can be elaborated under different conditions.

Study 2 (Chapter 3): In his inspiring study, *The Forms of Capital*, Bourdieu (1986) presents his argument on the concept of capital and provides a different perspective to the concept (different from Marx) by seeing it as not only in its economic form but also in its noneconomic form. This extension of the meaning of the capital concept has introduced numerous forms of capital, the most important of which are economic capital, cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital. Additionally, Bourdieu introduces the interconvertibility principle, which asserts the fungibility among economic, cultural, and social capital. For Bourdieu, this interconvertibility principle ensures a better understanding of the ongoing competition among individuals for valued resources and positions in societies via capital.

Despite his unique contributions to the understanding of the concept of capital, the forms of capital, and the interconvertibility principle among the forms of capital, I argue that the Bourdieusian model of conversions among the forms of capital has three major shortcomings. First, Bourdieu's model

of conversion processes focuses on the conversions within an individual while ignoring the conversions between individuals; second, his conception of the conversion processes does not include the functioning of symbolic capital; and third, his understanding of the concept of social capital throughout the conversion processes is not adequately theorized. In order to offer plausible solutions to these shortcomings, in Chapter 3, I address the convertibility dimension of social capital—the function of social capital for the interconvertibility of the forms of capital.

To do that, I will first discuss the concept of capital, beginning with Marx, and will focus on the difference between Marx's and Bourdieu's conceptions of capital. Then, I will focus on Bourdieu and his categorization of capital into economic, cultural, social, and symbolic. After that I will look into the process of conversion and reconceptualize the process with a broader perspective. Bourdieu's conceptualization of the conversion process is simple and occurs at the individual level. However, I argue that the conversion process occurs not only at the individual level, but also at the group level. Therefore, in order to support my argument, I will elaborate on Bourdieu's conversion process at both the individual and the group level by presenting example figures showing how conversion happens at both levels. The main purpose of this chapter will be to show that while for Bourdieu, economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital in terms of the conversion process at the individual level, social capital is at the root of all other types of capital in terms of the conversion process at the group level since without social capital, conversion of the forms of capital would not happen.

Study 3 (Chapter 4): *The Strength of Weak Ties* (SWT), written by Mark Granovetter (1973), is one of the most important and widely cited articles of the sociological literature. Through his unique perspective to the social value of interpersonal ties, Granovetter contributed a research vision to the sociological literature. Following Granovetter, many social scientists have confirmed the usage of interpersonal ties for the diffusion of resources, information, and influence (Friedkin 1980, 1982; Weimann 1980; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Brown and Reingen 1987; Burt 1992, 2004; Granovetter 1995; Crowell 2004; Yakubovich 2005; Kadushin 2012; Marsden and Campbell 1984, 2012)

Although these studies have investigated the network benefits of social capital through focusing on how an individual's interpersonal ties as a part of his/her social capital function as a conductive mechanism to provide him/her useful resources and non-redundant information (the conductivity

dimension of social capital), there are few studies that have tested the applicability of SWT theory; moreover there are few to no studies that have attempted to develop it. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I address the conductivity dimension of social capital by presenting a more developed version of SWT theory.

To accomplish this, I will first examine the “weak tie” and “bridge” concepts presented in SWT. Granovetter’s understanding of “weak tie” is limited and his conceptualization of “bridge” lacks clarity. Therefore, through elaborating on both concepts, I will present my conceptual framework through which I develop the SWT theory. Next, I will adapt my conceptual framework to the total network diffusion process by focusing on the S-shaped diffusion curve. Thus, I will show how my conceptual arguments on SWT explain the diffusion processes better than its original. Finally, in line with my conceptual framework, I will address the diffusion of information through interpersonal ties using cultural information and job information and test my hypotheses about interpersonal ties, bridges, and information diffusion (cultural and job information) using the 2002 General Social Survey (GSS). The main purpose of this chapter will be to provide a more comprehensive understanding of weak ties, compared to Granovetter’s limited understanding and to present an update to SWT through developing a new model on how bridges function throughout the diffusion process.

Chapter 2 – A Holistic Approach to Social Capital: Synthesizing the Works of Lin, Putnam, Granovetter, Portes, Martin, and Kadushin

2.1. Introduction

The concept of social capital was conceived in the early 20th century,² and has been used many times since then to call attention to the importance of how social connections between individuals are used for a more productive social life (Putnam 2000). The usage and application of social capital has varied over the years, and since the 1970s, it has been developed especially in the work of such prominent social scientists as Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988, 1990), Putnam (1995, 2000), Lin (2001), Portes (1998), and Fukuyama (2001). These social scientists have provided different conceptualizations and definitions of the term to the literature and lead researchers to apply the concept to society and social problems in different forms. The versatility in the definitions of the concept, however, has prevented the formation of a consensus on what social capital actually means (Kadushin 2012), how it should be measured (Fukuyama 2001), and how it should be applied to obtain optimal solutions to social problems and optimal results to social structural questions.

The idea of a more holistic concept of social capital comes from the assumption that the different conceptualizations of the concept by different social scientists actually consider similar social problems and present similar solutions to these problems. For instance, while social capital refers to community norms for Coleman (1988, 1990), group solidarity for Portes (1998), participation in voluntary and community organizations for Putnam (1995, 2000), and social resources embedded in social networks for Lin (2001), in essence, for all of these social scientists, social capital refers to an aspect of social structure that facilitates cooperation within and among groups and provides individuals both social and economic outcomes through social ties. In this sense, a theoretically re-conceptualized version of the concept of social capital with a more holistic structure that synthesizes the works of several social scientists would provide a more comprehensive, more useful, and more easily applicable concept to social problems and social structural questions, namely to society. Thus, this synthesis, which contains the different conceptualizations of social capital by several social scientists, would provide us a

² The first known use of the concept was by a practical reformer of the Progressive Era, L. J. Hanifan, state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia, who used the term to urge the importance of community involvement for successful schools (Putnam 2000).

perspective that we can see all the different views at the same time. In other words, we can see how one conceptualization of the concept coincides with another through the holistic approach.

Additionally, while social life is made more productive through the usage of social capital in the form of social connections, how this usage affects both individuals and exchange of resources in different settings³ needs theoretical analysis. Consideration must be especially paid to the diffusion of both material and symbolic resources through social ties and the interaction between diffusion and social capital in different settings.

In order to do this, I begin by considering the broader concept of “capital,” and examine the different conceptualizations of the concept of social capital by the most prominent social capital theorists. Next, drawing upon the works of Putnam (1995, 2000), Lin (2001), Granovetter (1973), and Portes (1998), I synthesize their ideas on the concept of social capital and introduce my own theoretical perspective by providing a more holistic concept of social capital. Finally, I further my theoretical perspective to the relationship between interpersonal diffusion and social capital and focus on the ideas of Kadushin (2012) and Martin (2009) to address the effects of differentiating social structures such as normal and chaotic settings⁴ on the diffusion of information and resources among individuals.

2.2. Social Capital Defined

“Capital” in its broadest form refers to an investment of resources with expected returns in the marketplace (Lin 2001). The concept of capital can be traced back to Karl Marx (Marx 1995) where two distinct elements are represented. On the one hand, for Marx, capital represents an investment on the part of the capitalists, with expected returns in the marketplace; and on the other hand, capital is part of the surplus value generated by an investment (Lin 2001). Lin (2001) calls the concept of capital described as by Marx the “classic theory of capital.” Lin (2001) argues that similar to the classic theory of capital, all subsequent theories of capital are based on the assumption that capital is the investment of resources for the production of profit. However, these subsequent capital theories other than the classic theory of capital eliminate the class explanation as a necessary theoretical orientation and place both capitalists

³ These settings include what I call the normal settings and the chaotic settings. I will use these two forms of settings throughout this paper.

⁴ A chaotic setting refers to a setting in which disorganization and lack of control are prevalent due to the occurrence of an unexpected event. A normal setting, on the other hand, refers to a setting without disorganization and major uncertainties.

and laborers as the utilizers of the investment made and the surplus value generated, while the classic theory of capital only involves the capitalists and neglects the laborers. This basic change in the theoretical orientation of the classic theory of capital reveals what Lin (2001) calls the “neo-capitalist theories.” These alternative theories focus on the forms of capital other than economic capital and include human capital, cultural capital, and social capital.

The concept of social capital has drawn great interest from social scientists since it focuses attention on the positive consequences of sociability and calls attention to how such nonmonetary forms can be important sources of power and influence (Portes 1998). While many of the underlying properties of social capital can be found in classical sociological texts such as Durkheim’s emphasis on group life as an antidote to anomie and to Marx’s distinction between an atomized class-in-itself and an effective class-for-itself (Portes 1998), and while the term turns out to have been independently invented several times over the twentieth century to draw attention to the importance of social ties for our lives (Putnam 2000), the first formal theoretical analysis of the concept of social capital was presented by French social scientist Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986). According to Bourdieu (1986:248), social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.” In other words, social capital is the accumulation of social opportunities by participating organizations and meeting with people.

Portes (1998:3-4) breaks down Bourdieu’s conceptualization of social capital into two elements: “first, the social relationship itself that allows individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates, and second, the amount and quality of those resources.” Different from Bourdieu’s (1986) conceptualization of social capital, which focuses primarily on positive outcomes as a result of reciprocal recognition of membership within social networks, Portes (1998) outlines several positive outcomes such as social control from the community, family support, and extra-familial networks without eliminating the negative outcomes of the concept that might cause the existence of a conflict between community norms, expectations, and individual freedom.

Coleman’s analysis of social capital focuses more specifically on functional aspects. For Coleman, social capital consists of two elements: “it is an aspect of a social structure, and it facilitates certain actions of individuals within the structure” (1990:302). For this reason, whether any aspect of

social structure can be considered capital depends on whether it serves a function for certain individuals engaged in particular activities (Coleman 1988) and whether these aspects of social structure can be used as resources by those individuals to attain their interests. For example, Coleman (1988) mentions the importance of the free exchange of stones for inspection among Jews in Diamond Trade Market in New York. Coleman (1988) argues that strong social ties among Jews make the possible transactions of stones in which trustworthiness is taken for granted. Thus, social capital among Jews facilitates the transactions of stones and maintains the usual functioning of the Diamond Trade Market. Without this function of the market, or in the absence of social capital among Jews, the market would operate in a much more cumbersome and much less efficient way.

Rather than Bourdieu, Coleman, and Portes, the focus of this chapter will be on the theories of social capital as conceptualized by Robert D. Putnam and Nan Lin. Putnam's and Lin's theories of social capital reflect the two bodies of literature developed to explain the theoretical analyses on the sources of social capital: first, a focus on network structure composed of relations among individuals represented by Lin, and second, a focus on the specific content, intensity, and frequency of the relations among individuals represented by Putnam (Adler and Kwon 2002).

Putnam (2000) argues that social properties of the community as collective assets affect the productivity of individuals and groups. For Putnam, social capital "refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (2000:19). Putnam suggests that social contacts acquired through engaging in civic organizations and participating in voluntary associations "facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved" (Putnam 1995:67); therefore participation in civic organizations and voluntary associations are the primary sources of social capital.

According to Lin, social capital refers to the "investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace" (2001:19). In other words, social capital is an asset that is acquired by individuals' connections and their access to resources in the network of which they are members (Lin 2001). Similar to Marx's classic theory of capital, Lin's (2001) perspective of social capital puts the concept into an effort-return continuum and focuses on the conscious investment as effort and surplus value generated as

returns. Thus focusing on the economic importance of social capital, Lin's conceptualization of social capital emphasizes the sources of social capital on the one hand, and the efforts and returns on the other.

Due to the increasing popularity of the concept of social capital and the endless definitions and re-conceptualizations of it (see also Fukuyama 2001), Claude Fischer noted that social capital "is not much different from saying that social capital is everything psychological and sociological about a person" (cited in Kadushin 2012:163). In line with this perspective, Kadushin (2012) states that the utility of social capital can often be negatively affected by its multiplicity of definitions and applications. This negative aspect of social capital is also mentioned by Fukuyama (2001) who argues that one of the disadvantages of the concept of social capital is the lack of consensus on how to measure it.

The lack of consensus on how to define the concept and how to apply social capital to society lead me to re-conceptualize theoretically the concept of social capital and develop a more holistic approach by synthesizing the ideas of Nan Lin (expressive-instrumental action and homophilous-heterophilous interactions), Mark Granovetter (the strength of weak ties), Robert D. Putnam (bonding and bridging social capital), and Alejandro Portes (negative social capital) for a better understanding of the application of social capital regarding the efforts invested and returns generated. I then focus on the works of Charles Kadushin (social networks and the S-shaped diffusion curve) and John Levi Martin (symmetric-asymmetric-antisymmetric relationships) to address the effects of social structure on the diffusion of information and resources.

2.3. Interaction and Action: A Different Approach to Social Capital

Lin (2001:29) asserts that social capital, as the resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions has three main components: resources, embeddedness, and action. Resources refer to material or symbolic goods that are needed to sustain and enhance human life. Embeddedness refers to the linkage of resources to hierarchical and network structures that are differentiated in terms of their degree of formalization of positions, authority, rules, and agents. Action refers to the mobilization and usage of resources in purposive action to either protect the available resources or gain additional resources (Lin 2001). According to Lin (2001), a theory of social capital should examine and explain three processes related to these three components. Those processes outlined by Lin (2001) are: (1) how resources take on values and are distributed in society; (2) how

individuals differentially obtain those resources; and (3) how resources can be used to provide further gains. All three processes work in a social structure in which actors occupy hierarchically controlled positions that share certain rules and procedures in the use of the resources.

In less formal social structures, or social networks as Lin (2001) calls them, there is little or no formality in delineating positions and rules and in allocating authority to participants. Therefore, in social networks, the interaction between actors to obtain resources differs from the one that occurs in more formal social structures. Persuasion rather than coercion determines the actors' participation and interaction, and defines the boundary among them (Lin 2001). At this point, the introduction of the concept of homophily is necessary since it provides a conceptual framework to the interaction process between actors in social networks. According to Lin (2011), the concept of homophily is present in social interactions, as they tend to take place among individuals with similar lifestyles and socioeconomic characteristics.

The concept of homophily traces back to the works of Homans (1950) and Lazarsfeld (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954) representing a direct relationship between sentiments and interactions. In his studies of small primary groups, Homans (1950) asserted a reciprocal and positive relationship between sentiment, interaction, and activity. Homans's (1950) hypothesis stated that interaction is based primarily on shared emotion. According to Homans (1950), the more individuals interact, the more likely they are to share sentiments and engage in activities. Likewise, the more they share sentiments, the more likely they are to interact and engage in activities. With the extension of Homans' work by Lazarsfeld (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954), the principle of homophily was developed which asserted that social interactions tend to take place among individuals with similar lifestyles and socioeconomic characteristics (Lin 2001). This leads to the assumption that individuals whose positions are situated closer to each other in social structures are more likely to interact.

Occupying a position in a network directly and indirectly provides potential access to other positions in the social network. Resources embedded in these positions become Ego's⁵ social capital. In consideration with the importance of the principle of homophily for interaction between actors in a social network, it is identified that resources can be accessed through direct and indirect ties. Resources may

⁵ An Ego refers to an individual or an actor in his/her social setting, the smallest unit of analysis in a social network.

be in alters⁶ possessions or in their social positions (Lin 2001). In other words, social capital refers to the resources currently available in the possession of the alters, or the resources which can be accessed indirectly through the alters.

Lin (2001) introduces two motives for action for the purpose of accessing resources through ties. The first motive dictates actions to preserve valued resources already at the individual's disposal, and the second motive promotes actions to acquire valued resources not yet at the individual's disposal (Lin 2001). Lin (2001) argues that the motive to maintain valued resources promotes expressive action. Expressive action is the recognition by others of one's legitimacy in claiming property rights to his/her resources or sharing one's sentiments. The motive to seek and gain additional valued resources promotes instrumental action. Instrumental action is the actions and reactions of others to lead the Ego to add more resources to his/her deposit (Lin 2001). According to Lin (2001), expressive action is expected to take precedent over instrumental action since losing resources in one's possession poses greater mental and physical threat to Ego's existence than not gaining additional resources. Additionally, Lin (2001) associates interaction with action and asserts that the purpose of expressive action is consistent with homophilous interaction, namely those relations between two actors who have similar resources, which can include wealth, reputation, power, and lifestyle. This is because expressive action such as sharing one's sentiments, which requires closeness and intimacy, tends to occur between individuals with similar characteristics through homophilous interaction. The purpose of instrumental action, on the other hand, is consistent with heterophilous interaction, that is, relations between two actors with dissimilar resources. It is because instrumental action such as gaining additional resources, which requires non-redundancy, tends to occur between individuals with dissimilar characteristics through heterophilous interaction. This is also consistent with Granovetter's (1973) "Strength of Weak Ties" theory, which asserts that weak-tie contacts that are expected to be dissimilar to an Ego are more likely to provide him/her novel and different resources.

Graphically,⁷ homophilous⁸ interactions and heterophilous⁹ interactions depending on the positionality of Egos in the structural hierarchy are shown in Figure 2.1. A social structure is likely to have

⁶ An alter refers to individuals who can be accessed through direct ties by the Ego.

⁷ Figure 2.1 is originally prepared for this chapter by the author.

more homophilous interactions than heterophilous interactions. Lin (2001) asserts that homophilous interactions prevail due to the principle of homophily which links sentiment, interaction, and similarity of resources in actors' reciprocal relationships. Heterophilous interactions demand more effort, cost greater, and therefore are relatively less likely to occur. Conversely, homophilous interactions are normative and ordinary interactions (Lin 2001).




Figure 2.1 Homophilous and Heterophilous Interactions

Both homophilous interactions and heterophilous interactions as in Figure 2.1 take place either within or between social clusters—groups of tightly-knit individuals. There are two main differences between homophilous and heterophilous interactions: first, a difference in terms of the effort needed by individuals to perform each and the return acquired once motivated either by instrumental or expressive action (Lin 2001), and second, a difference in terms of their structures, which promotes both in-group and out-group relationships (see Figure 2.1). These two differences between homophilous and heterophilous interactions bring four important concepts to the current discussion: bonding social capital, bridging social capital, linking social capital, and negative social capital.

⁸ Homophilous interactions are interactions depicted as 1-4, 2-4, 2-3, 5-6, 4-7, 6-10, 6-7, 6-8, and 13-14. These interactions occur between actors who have similar resources and are at similar hierarchical positions.

⁹ Heterophilous interactions are interactions depicted as 1-2, 1-3, 3-5, 7-9, 8-9, 3-12, 6-12, 10-11, 9-14, 12-15, 11-13, 13-15, and 14-15. These interactions occur between actors who have dissimilar resources and are at dissimilar hierarchical positions.

According to Lin (2001), there is a speculation that a social structure should have a balance between the two types of interactions that individuals use to acquire resources and opportunities. While extreme degrees of homophilous interactions might increase solidarity (e.g., closure) and decrease the chances of social mobility, extreme degrees of heterophilous interactions might increase the chances of social mobility and decrease solidarity in a social structure (Lin 2001). According to Lin (2001), there should be a balance between these two and he warns that the lack of a balance in a social structure threatens its integration and drags the structure into chaos, otherwise known as the negation of social capital (Kadushin 2012).

The importance of negative social capital (or the negative outcomes of the concept of social capital) comes to the forefront in Lin's (2001) argument of the homophily principle, the boundary between homophilous and heterophilous interactions, and the tension between group solidarity and social mobility. Since social capital is considered good for society, little attention has been given to what could be considered as the dark side of social capital. However, as Portes (1998) suggests, the same mechanisms appropriable by individuals and groups as social capital can have other, less desirable consequences. There are four potential consequences of negative social capital outlined by Portes (1998): the exclusion of outsiders from the group, excessive demands made on group members, the urge for conformity resulting in restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms that keep members in downtrodden groups in place. Considering how homophilous interaction is accepted as normative interaction, understanding why heterophilous interaction demands more effort and costs more, and why a tension exists between group solidarity and social mobility when the balance between maintaining resources (creating group solidarity by using homophilous interaction) and gaining more resources (social mobility by using heterophilous interaction) is broken, the inclusion of negative social capital into the current argument will help us to develop a more comprehensive theory of social capital, especially when considering the effects of negative social capital on individuals and social structures. For instance, examining the two extreme levels of opposite-direction-interactions, namely, too much homophilous-too little heterophilous and too much heterophilous-too little homophilous, in a group helps us to better understand how negative social capital provides a comprehensive perspective to the tension between

group solidarity and social mobility.¹⁰ When there is too much homophilous interaction (and too little heterophilous interaction) between individuals in a group, the intense accumulation of sentiments among individuals lead to the creation of group solidarity in the cluster. However, excessive amounts of group solidarity might cause the exclusion of outsiders from the cluster, put excessive demands on group members, and thus prevent social mobility. This can restrain the efficiency and effectiveness of the group and impede individual autonomy and innovation. When there is too little homophilous interaction (and too much heterophilous interaction), this might lead to high levels of social mobility on the one hand but fragmentation of the ties between the group members on the other. This can also restrain the efficiency and effectiveness of the group. In brief, negative social capital is an important tool to understand the differences between homophilous and heterophilous interactions in terms of how they function differently for individual benefits within and between social groups.

Due to the lack of a clear definition of negative social capital, here I will provide a more detailed examination of the negative consequences of social capital. Thus, my examination will provide a more comprehensive aspect to the concept of social capital. I argue that social capital has its consequences in two dimensions: the local dimension and the global dimension (dimensions for both positive and negative consequences, but for the sake of the argument presented in this chapter, here, negative consequences will be discussed). The local dimension is negative consequences when there is social capital available, and the global dimension is negative consequences when there is little or no social capital available. In the local dimension, social capital has its negative consequences at the individual/group level (local network) and has local effects. However, in the global dimension, social capital has its negative consequences at the community level (global network) and has both local and global effects. The negative consequences of social capital in the local dimension can be referred as negative social capital as suggested by Portes (1998), which include excessive demands on group members, restricting individual freedom, excluding outsiders, and downward leveling norms. They result from the imbalance between different forms of social capital (not due to scarcity or lack of social capital but due to the

¹⁰ Extreme levels of same-direction-interactions, namely too little homophilous—too little heterophilous and too much homophilous—too much heterophilous, do not help us in our discussion of negative social capital since in the former there will be no group formation due to the inadequacy of interactions, and in the latter there will be no disorder in the group due to the positive relationship between group solidarity and social mobility. Other than these four extreme levels of interactions, it is assumed that the balance of the structure will not be under threat.

imbalance between the levels of bonding and bridging/linking social capital, resulting from the imbalance between the amount of homophilous and heterophilous interactions in a group), and have their consequences in terms of group solidarity and social mobility at the individual/group level as mentioned above. The negative consequences of social capital in the global dimension, on the other hand, result from the scarcity or lack of social connections between and within groups (not due to the imbalance between the amount of homophilous and heterophilous interactions but due to the lack of these interactions at all) and have more catastrophic effects on the social structure at the community level, such as anomie. The difference between the local dimension and the global dimension in terms of the negative consequences of social capital brings to mind the difference between Lin's and Putnam's analyses of social capital: first, a focus on network structure composed of relations among individuals relatively at the local level represented by Lin, and second, a focus on the specific content, intensity, and frequency of the relations among individuals at the community level represented by Putnam. These two scientists' analyses, therefore, are useful to exemplify the negative consequences of social capital in both local and global networks. In this chapter, I focus on the negative consequences of social capital at the individual/group level (the local dimension).

In addition to negative social capital, Putnam's (2000) bonding and bridging social capital and afterwards linking social capital help us to address the positive-negative argument of social capital outcomes. Also, all the three concepts are closely related to the argument of homophilous and heterophilous interactions and expressive and instrumental actions.

In his conceptualization of social capital, Putnam (2000) makes a distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. According to Putnam (2000:22),

some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. Examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women's reading groups, and fashionable country clubs. Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights movement, many youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations.

Bonding social capital occurs within such groups of people wherein a bond of trust and solidarity connects them to each other and provides crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the group (Leonard 2004). Unlike bonding social capital, bridging social capital facilitates the way individuals acquire other forms of capitals such as economic or human capital and diffuse information

and innovation since it provides opportunities for individuals to connect with others who are socioeconomically or structurally dissimilar to them (Leonard 2004). In other words, bonding social capital provides “strong ties” and people employ these “strong ties” as “bonds” rather than “bridges” (Granovetter 1973) with which they can acquire other forms of capitals. But bridging social capital allows people to get acquainted with people from outside their own groups, and these acquaintances, which are “weaker but more cross-cutting ties” or “bridges,” can be used as pathways to other forms of capital. As economic sociologist Mark Granovetter has pointed out when seeking jobs or political allies, “the ‘weak’ ties that link me to distant acquaintances who move in different circles from mine are actually more valuable than the ‘strong’ ties that link me to relatives and intimate friends whose sociological niche is very like my own” (cited in Putnam 2000:22-23). This difference between bonding and bridging social capital leads to the conclusion that bonding social capital is good for “getting by,” but bridging social capital is crucial for “getting ahead” (Putnam 2000).

In addition, linking social capital, as addressed by Poortinga (2012), refers to vertical linkages across hierarchies of power and status. Different from both bonding and bridging social capital, linking social capital is concerned with relations between individuals who are not on an equal footing. In other words, while bonding social capital “refers to connections to people like you” (family, relatives, kinship), and bridging social capital “refers to connections to people who are not like you in some demographic sense,” linking social capital is unique in that it only “pertains to connections with people in power, whether they are in politically or financially influential positions” (Woolcock and Sweetser 2002:26). In addition to negative social capital, the inclusion of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital with an application of the strength of weak ties theory (Granovetter 1973) provides a conceptual framework to more fully explain Lin’s (2001) conceptualization of interactions (homophilous and heterophilous) and actions (expressive and instrumental).

Lin (2001:48) argues that “actors access social capital through interactions to promote purposive actions.” Even though Lin (2001) accepts the existence of an association between homophilous interaction and instrumental action, and between heterophilous interaction and expressive action, he does not put enough emphasis on these two forms of associations between interaction and action. Lin (2001) asserts that homophilous interaction primarily promotes expressive action, and heterophilous interaction

primarily promotes instrumental action. In order to conceptualize his claim of this association between interaction and action aspects of the access to social capital, Lin (2001:48) provides a typology of interaction and action, as shown in Table 2.1, in which he presents his hypothesis of the association between either homophilous or heterophilous interactions and either expressive or instrumental actions in terms of the effort needed by individuals to perform the interaction and the return acquired once motivated by the action. Lin's (2001) typology of interaction and action differs along two dimensions from the typology of interaction and action provided in Table 2.2. Lin (2001) considers only the interaction and action aspects of the access to social capital. However, the typology presented here includes the strength of weak ties and the type of social capital aspects in addition to interaction and action aspects.

Table 2.1 Lin's Predictions of Effort and Return for Action and Interaction

Motivation for Action	Type of Interaction	
	Similarity (Homophilous) (S)	Dissimilarity (Heterophilous) (D)
Maintaining Resources (Expressive) (E)	LE,HR	HE,LR
Gaining Resources (Instrumental) (I)	LE,LR	HE,HR

Note: LE: Low Effort, HE: High Effort, LR: Low Return, HR: High Return

In Table 2.2, there are two groups of typologies defined by the tie that connects the Ego and the alter in terms of the particular interaction and the particular action that characterize it: either a weak tie or a strong tie. In the typologies, the two motives for the action are represented by two rows: maintaining resources (Expressive [E]) and gaining resources (Instrumental [I]). Two types of interaction relative to resources in the two columns are homophilous interactions (Similarity [S]) and heterophilous interactions (Dissimilarity [D]). Each cell represents the coupling of a particular type of interaction and a particular action. The three variables that can be used to describe each cell are: how much effort is required for the interaction (LE: Low Effort, HE: High Effort), how much return may result relative to the purposive action (LR: Low Return, HR: High Return), and which type of social capital these particular interactions and particular actions form (Bonding: BN, Bridging: BR and Linking: LK).

As can be seen in Table 2.2, a homophilous interaction can be successfully motivated not only by expressive action, but also instrumental action; and at this point, unlike Lin's (2001) typology, Putnam's distinction between bonding and bridging social capital might be helpful. Since the initial effort for homophilous interaction with expressive action is to preserve the valued resources at an individual's disposal, this interaction is expected to occur in such groups of people that a bond of trust and solidarity connects them to each other. Thus, this interaction is more likely to accumulate bonding social capital for the individuals.

Table 2.2 Predictions of Effort and Return for Action and Interaction with the Type of Social Capital While Considering the Tie that Connects the Actors

Tie	Motivation for Action	Type of Interaction	
		Similarity (Homophilous) (S)	Dissimilarity (Heterophilous) (D)
Strong Tie	Maintaining Resources (Expressive) (E)	LE,HR,BN	HE,LR,LK
	Gaining Resources (Instrumental) (I)	LE,LR,BR	HE,HR,LK
Weak Tie	Maintaining Resources (Expressive) (E)	LE,HR+,BN	HE,LR+,LK
	Gaining Resources (Instrumental) (I)	LE,LR+,BR	HE,HR+,LK

Note: LE: Low Effort, HE: High Effort, LR: Low Return, LR+: The Amount of Return between High and Low Return, HR: High Return, HR+: Higher Return

BN: Bonding Social Capital, BR: Bridging Social Capital, LK: Linking Social Capital

Additionally, contrary to what Lin (2001) asserts, homophilous interaction can also be motivated by instrumental action. Since the initial effort for instrumental action is to gain valued resources, individuals with similar resources or who are at adjacent hierarchical levels might try to gain resources by interacting with others to accumulate bridging social capital. In this case, these individuals use homophilous interaction with instrumental action.¹¹

¹¹ For example, Tortoriello and Krackhardt (2010:168) argues that Simmelian ties—a bridging tie when the parties involved are reciprocally and strongly tied to each other and they are both reciprocally and strongly tied to at least one common third party (Krackhardt 1998:24)—generate innovations (both

On the other hand, a heterophilous interaction can also be successfully motivated not only by instrumental action, but also expressive action. An individual might try to reach out to other individuals who have more resources or who are at a higher level to defend his/her resources, and also in the same way an individual might try to reach out to other individuals to gain more resources. In this case, an appeal to bridging social capital can be further supported by the introduction of linking social capital. Consequently, these three forms of social capital, bonding, bridging and linking, provide us a unique perspective to understand the importance of the association between the two types of interactions, homophilous and heterophilous and the two types of actions, expressive and instrumental, as potential generators of social capital.

When the tie is a weak tie (a bridge) rather than a strong tie, all the variables in the cells as the outcome of the coupling of a particular action and a particular interaction stay the same except for the return acquired. As can be seen in Table 2.2, all the return signs in the weak tie typology have a “+” next to the main sign. This “+” means a surplus value in return acquired due to the tie’s characteristic, whether a bonding or bridging tie. Since the tie that connects the actors is a weak tie (see actors A and B in Figure 2.2), the actors at both ends of this tie are perceived as important and valuable by the other actors that they have connections with both in their own clusters and other clusters. For instance, the actors that actor A in Figure 2.2 has connections within his/her own cluster perceive him/her as important and valuable because they are dependent on him/her to pass the boundary of their cluster, since actor A has at least one other cluster to reach out to by providing them an exit point. Also, the actors that actor A has connections with in other clusters¹² perceive actor A as important and valuable because they are dependent on him/her to enter his/her own cluster, since actor A has the ability to connect them to his/her own cluster by providing them an entry point. In brief, the “+” gives the return an additional value and make it more preferable for the Ego. Thus, the inclusion of the concept of the weak tie into the typology of action and interaction forms the continuum of return aspect as presented: LR, LR+, HR and HR+.

through bridging and linking two actors for both expressive and instrumental purposes) by facilitating “the formation of common knowledge and shared meanings, [reducing] frictions due to differences in understanding, and [promoting] the cooperation and coordinated actions that are necessary to integrate and take advantage of diverse sources of knowledge.”

¹² In this situation actor B. However this is not limited to actor B because actor B’s relation to actor A is a direct relation and actor B’s alters in his/her own cluster (actor 8, for example) also see actor A as an important actor since they might have interests in actor A’s cluster that they want to reach with the help of actor B.

To sum up, the inclusion of the concepts of negative social capital, bonding social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital into Lin's (2001) conceptualization of interactions and actions that was explained in Table 2.2 is also shown in Figure 2.2 with an hypothetical example. Actor A should pass the border of his/her own cluster (bridging social capital with homophilous interaction between actors A and B) to enter actor B's cluster to reach actor B's resources. However, actor B's border might not allow actor A to enter actor B's cluster, which is negative social capital (exclusion of outsiders from the group) affecting actor A due to the closure of actor B's cluster. In this situation actor A is perceived as an outsider and excluded from actor B's cluster (in this case interactions 4-7, 12-B, 10-11, and 9-14 are also rejected due to the closure of actor B's cluster). Also, actor B might confront excessive demands from the others in his/her own cluster (bonding social capital with extreme levels of homophilous interaction depicted with interactions B-7 and B-8) such as social, political or financial help and miss the chances to reach to others from other clusters (linking social capital with heterophilous interaction depicted with interaction B-12). In these instances, negative social capital, bonding social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital help us to understand how actor A could not succeed in mobilizing himself/herself and how actor B was forced to maintain group solidarity.




Figure 2.2 An Application of Negative Social Capital, Bonding Social Capital, Bridging Social Capital, and Linking Social Capital with Homophilous and Heterophilous Interactions

As an empirical example supporting the hypothetical example given above, Portes (1998) states that strong social ties that connect members of a group to each other (actor B's cluster in Figure 2.2) enable them to be successful in their economic initiatives, but they might also implicitly exclude outsiders from these opportunities (see the rejected interaction between actor A and actor B in Figure 2.2). Portes (1998) provides the example of minority groups that dominate certain industries while excluding outsiders such as Koreans in East Coast cities, traditional monopoly of Jewish merchants over the New York diamond trade, and Cubans over numerous sectors of the Miami economy. In another example, strong group solidarity and consequently group closure may, under certain circumstances, prevent the individuals from attaining freedom and success in business initiatives. Geertz (1963) observes in his study in Bali that successful entrepreneurs might be hindered by the excessive demands of the job and loan-seeking kinsmen. These claims, according to Geertz (1963), resulted from the strong norms imposing mutual assistance within the family and community members (in the hypothetical example, actor B might be hindered to access to actor A due to the excessive demands of the members of actor B's cluster).

2.4. Diffusion of Resources and Information in Different Settings: The Inclusion of the S-Shaped Diffusion Curve to the Current Discussion

As explained in the previous section, individuals use homophilous and heterophilous interactions both to maintain their resources with expressive action and to gain additional resources with instrumental action. Interactions promoted by purposive actions show divergent tendencies in their characteristics when structural anomalies such as wars, economic or political depressions, disasters, etc. that might create chaotic outcomes happen in society. These divergent tendencies of homophilous and heterophilous interactions in these chaotic settings best demonstrate themselves in the form of differentiating types of reciprocity in relationships.

Martin (2009:21) states, "a relationship indicates the possibility of repeated actions of a particular type between two persons." Put differently, a relationship between two actors consists of repeated actions, either expressive or instrumental between each other, promoted by a particular type of interaction, either homophilous or heterophilous. According to Martin (2009), each actor has an action profile corresponding to the relationship that s/he forms with other actors. When the relationship is symmetric, the action profiles of the actors are mutual and the relationship is intrinsically equal; when the

relationship is asymmetric, the action profile of at least one actor is potentially empty, that is, reciprocity might not happen; and when the relationship is antisymmetric, the action profiles of the actors are different (Martin 2009), that is to say, an antisymmetric relationship is a kind of a combination of two asymmetric relationships. In other words, symmetric relationships by their very nature assert the interchangeability of persons. In this sense, symmetric relationships are equal and reciprocal relationships such as those of friendship or alliance. Asymmetric relationships distinguish the two persons interacting with each other and represent equal relationships (that is, relationships between two individuals with similar resources or at similar hierarchical levels) and possibly not reciprocal relationships. Donation, occurring between two individuals with similar hierarchical levels, in the sense of transferring something from one to the other without reciprocity highlights this asymmetry. Finally, antisymmetric relationships also distinguish the two persons interacting with each other and represent unequal relationships (that is, relationships between two individuals with dissimilar resources or at dissimilar hierarchical levels) and possibly reciprocal relationships. Domination highlights this antisymmetry since egalitarianism is neither present by definition, nor allowed by choice of the participants of the relationship (Martin 2009:21).

Homophilous interactions are unlikely to show any changes in their tendencies in settings that might be identified as chaotic. The reciprocal characteristic of the homophilous interaction is assumed not to change. Promoted by either expressive or instrumental action, homophilous interactions maintain the symmetric or mutual character while either maintaining or gaining resources. The possible changes in homophilous interactions in these situations are expected to strengthen the motives behind the interactions and to get different results such as accumulating more bonding social capital. In these situations, homophilous interaction with instrumental action is expected to change the motive behind the interactions, maintaining resources rather than gaining more resources, due to the expectation that people want to protect their resources first, and later think about increasing them. In other words, in chaotic settings people with similar resources or at adjacent hierarchical levels are more likely to protect their resources with homophilous interaction while generating more bonding social capital mutually.

While homophilous interactions are expected to maintain the mutual or symmetric structure of the relationship between the two actors, heterophilous interactions are assumed to show changes in their

structure depending on the setting, either normal or chaotic. In normal settings, heterophilous interactions, whether promoted by instrumental action or expressive action, maintain the antisymmetric structure in relationships. While one of the actors shows an act of dominance over the other one, the other actor shows an act of submission. It is obvious that the submissive actor is looking for the resources of the dominant actor, who has a greater command of social capital (resources resulting from both his/her own assets and his/her alters' assets due to his/her social connections to them) due to his/her higher position in the structural hierarchy; therefore his/her intention in his/her action profile, which is to access the other's resources, is justifiable. However, the action profile of the dominant actor in the antisymmetric relationship is questionable. In antisymmetric relationships, while the submissive actor has much to gain, the payoff for the dominant actor in the heterophilous interaction poses a question: why should the dominant actor respond by offering his/her resources as social capital to the submissive actor?

According to Lin (2001), individuals consider each other's interests in interactions and this line of rationality may be maintained in all relationships. In antisymmetric relationships where heterophilous interactions create an imbalanced structure between a dominant and a submissive actor, while the submissive actor has a justifiable profit-seeking motive, the dominant actor might not have one. This imbalanced structure does not break the rationality principle since the dominant actor also has a motive. The motive for the dominant actor might be approval, esteem, liking, attraction, or distinction through reputation rather than profit (Lin 2001). In other words, while the submissive actor uses heterophilous interaction to access material rewards, the dominant actor might use it to access symbolic rewards. Dominant actors in heterophilous interactions need symbolic rewards in the form of reputation because they require symbolic standing in the form of reputation in addition to economic standing in the form of wealth. Without social standing, economic standing collapses; without economic standing, social standing is meaningless (Lin 2001). According to Lin (2001), these symbolic rewards that the dominant actor obtains through heterophilous interactions lead to greater visibility of him/her in the larger society. Put differently, antisymmetric relationships between two actors through heterophilous interactions "are means to maintain and promote social relations [for both actors], create social credits and social debts [for the submissive actor], and accumulate social recognition [for the dominant actor]" (Lin 2001:152).

In normal settings, even though a heterophilous interaction between two actors has an antisymmetric structure separating the two as dominant and submissive, in chaotic settings, an asymmetric structure might emerge in addition to the antisymmetric structure. In chaotic settings such as disasters, the antisymmetric structure of heterophilous interactions might become asymmetric in specific situations. In other words, dominant actors in heterophilous interactions might maintain the interaction without any expectation from the submissive actors due to the possible increase in the solidarity of individuals in chaotic settings. In such situations, heterophilous interactions take the form of donation or transfer of resources from the dominant actor to the submissive one. Martin (2009:73) states that “the essential asymmetric relationship is probably donation or transfer, the action whereby A who possesses O relinquishes this possession so that B may take charge of O.” In this case, one important issue should not be overlooked. The giver of the donation in question (the dominant actor) should not be known by the taker of it (the submissive actor) since the violation of this impairs the asymmetric structure and converts it into its original state, an antisymmetric structure. This transformation from asymmetric back to antisymmetric happens since the taker of the donation is assumed to give symbolic rewards to the giver for his/her benevolence. For instance, if a businessman/businesswoman donates money to the needy and this is well publicized, it generates social debts for the needy and social recognition for the businessman/businesswoman. Therefore, in order to protect the spontaneous transformation from antisymmetric to asymmetric and prevent the loopback, it is assumed that these donations have been done by means of charities, which provide confidentiality, thus neither the action profile of the giver (giving donations) nor the action profile of the taker (giving approval, esteem, liking or attraction) are reciprocated.

When we come to the reason behind this transformation of the structure of heterophilous interaction between two actors from antisymmetric to asymmetric, the reciprocal and positive relationship between sentiment and interaction might help. According to Lin (2001), the relationship between sentiments and interactions is so strong that the more individuals share sentiments, the more likely they are to interact and engage in activities. That is to say, interactions are based on shared emotions. Also, Collins (2004) thinks that shared emotions are the ultimate force behind interactions. In normal settings, it is assumed that the positive relationship between sentiments and interactions with the principle of

homophily lead individuals to come closer to each other and share emotions to interact since interactions tend to take place among individuals with similar lifestyles and socioeconomic characteristics (Lin 2001). In chaotic settings, however, the principle of homophily not only increases its importance and lead individuals to share emotions and interact with each other (homophilous interaction with the purpose of expressive action), but also obtains a different aspect regarding the relationship between sentiments and interactions. While in normal settings, interactions are based on shared emotions (which is, according to the principle of homophily, to be acquired among individuals due to their similarity of lifestyles and socioeconomic characteristics), in chaotic settings, the properties of the unique setting (for instance, the image of the towers burning and collapsing, the courage and determination of the firefighters, and the increasing national unity of the once passive crowd of witnesses, which became symbols of group solidarity on 9/11) replace shared emotions or sentiments that are required to develop interactions between individuals. In other words, in chaotic settings, individuals do not need to know each other, share emotions beforehand, or have similar lifestyles or socioeconomic characteristics to interact with each other since the unique characteristics of the chaotic setting provides the necessary components of the potential interactions by generating empathy, and creating collective identity and synergy among individuals. For instance, in her study of post-disaster communication in Denmark, Andersen (2013:271) argues that “during the course of the [chaotic] event, the people affected experienced an all-encompassing focus on their situation, an outpouring of sympathy and an acknowledgement of their situation from outside the area –from family members, authorities, politicians, the media, and the public in general.” The chaotic setting paved the way for identical interactions not only with family members, friends, colleagues, and local authorities (basically homophilous interactions), but also with people from non-local private charity initiatives and formal institutions with whom they were less acquainted (basically heterophilous interactions) (Andersen 2013). In addition to Andersen (2013), Aldrich (2012a) examined several disaster contexts, including 1923 Tokyo earthquake, Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, and Hurricane Katrina in his research on post-disaster recovery. Aldrich (2012a) found that social networks provided essential resources for community resilience in the face of the destructive force of natural disaster. The chaotic setting, resulted from the disaster context, facilitated social interactions between individuals, regardless of the differences between them, and provided essential information, financial and

administrative support, and guidance through strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1973). Moreover, in his research on 1923 Kanto earthquake in Tokyo, Aldrich (2012b) found that social capital is the most important predictor of post-disaster population recovery, more than earthquake damage, population density, human capital, or economic capital. This also demonstrates how chaotic settings remove the barriers between individuals and facilitate social interactions among them through social capital in the form of interpersonal ties. In this sense, Dynes (2002) argues that during chaotic settings, such as disasters, physical capital (e.g., buildings, roads, etc.) and human capital (e.g., people) are destroyed, while social capital is less damaged and less affected. Actually, social capital is the only form of capital that is renewed and enhanced during the chaotic settings (Dynes 2002). This leads to the assertion that chaotic settings can be seen as the motive of new social capital in the form of new social interactions. Thus, it can be argued that heterophilous interactions (interactions between socioeconomically dissimilar individuals) in chaotic settings take the form of homophilous interactions (interactions between socioeconomically similar individuals) in normal settings. Collins (2004:42) provides a description for the chaotic settings that create the stage for the transformation from antisymmetric relationships to asymmetric ones.

Occasions that combine a high degree of mutual focus of attention, that is, a high degree of intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional entrainment – through bodily synchronization, mutual stimulation / arousal of participants' nervous systems – result in feelings of membership that are attached to cognitive symbols; and result also in the emotional energy of individual participants, giving them feelings of confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for action in what they consider a morally proper path. These moments of high degree of ritual intensity are high points of experience. They are high points of collective experience, the key moments of history, the times when significant things happen. These are moments that tear up old social structures or leave them behind, and shape new social structures...

These are the turning points such as wars, periods of economic or political depression, and external threats to national security and disasters, which increase the levels of solidarity, civic conscience and patriotic sentiments of citizens. In these turning points, people set aside their differences and place importance on what they consider to be more superior values such as unity and integrity.

The mechanisms that operate to create and sustain solidarity among individuals in chaotic settings, as mentioned above by Collins (2004), may provide the stage that transforms the structure of heterophilous interactions from antisymmetric to asymmetric. This transformation supports the idea of integration among individuals similar to the way these stages lead societies to integration rather than

fractionation. Martin (2009) states that when the relationship is antisymmetric, the action profiles of the actors are different; however, since this relationship is reciprocated, it is an equal relationship. When the relationship is asymmetric, one of the actor's action profiles is empty which means reciprocity might not happen (Martin 2009). In this case, since the relationship is not reciprocated, it isn't an equal relationship. Related to the current discussion, what these mechanisms mentioned above by Collins (2004) provide with this transformation from antisymmetric to asymmetric is that we obtain "an egalitarian structure composed of unequal relationships instead of inegalitarian structure composed of equal relationships" (Martin 2009:330). For instance, while an antisymmetrical relationship such as a reciprocated heterophilous interaction between a higher class and a lower class individual (for instance, donation in which the giver and the receiver know each other) might seem egalitarian in terms of reciprocity, this relationship is actually inegalitarian since it promotes the domination of the higher class individual over the lower class one. On the other hand, while an asymmetrical relationship such as an unreciprocated heterophilous interaction between a higher class and a lower class individual (for instance, donation in which the giver and the receiver of the donation don't know each other) might seem inegalitarian in terms of reciprocity, this relationship is actually egalitarian since it promotes the restructuring of the society by strengthening the needy individuals. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 might be a good, concrete example for the transformation of the structure of heterophilous interactions from antisymmetric to asymmetric and the distinction between integration by means of egalitarian structure and fractionation by means of inegalitarian structure in the context of chaos and its effect on societies. As Alexander (2004:100) states,

Before 9/11, America had been fractured by social cleavages, by the normal incivilities attendant on social complexity, and even, on occasion, by unspeakable hostilities. After 9/11, the national community experienced and interpreted itself as united by feeling, marked by the living kindness displayed among persons who once only had been friends, and by the civility and solicitude among those who once merely had been strangers.

While the transformation of the structure of heterophilous interactions from antisymmetric to asymmetric in chaotic settings is an important point to look at within the current discussion, for the sake of the central argument of this chapter, this transformation should be examined together with the consideration of the close relationship between social capital and interpersonal influence.

Society is composed of individuals and the relationships between them, and consequently is a network that contains individuals and ties linking those individuals. According to Kadushin (2012), the very basis of a network is that something passes or flows from one individual to the other by means of ties: for instance, friendship, love, money, ideas, opinions, diseases, and any kind of resources, namely interpersonal influence as Martin (2009) calls it. There are four types of interpersonal influences by which any kind of novelty, information, or resource is passed from one individual to the other: contagion, pressure, diffusion, and authority (Martin 2009). These four types differ in terms of the recipient of influence.

According to Martin (2009:155), interpersonal influence can be divided according to “whether the recipient of influence is assumed to be implicitly resistant to adapting his or her behavior or beliefs (reluctant) as opposed to being predisposed to adapt (eager); and according to whether the recipient is more likely to be influenced by some persons than others (selective) or equally liable to be influenced by all classes of others (open).” Each resulting combination has been given an identifying name: when the recipient of influence is ‘reluctant’ to adapt and ‘selective’ to whom to be influenced, the influence is identified as “authority;” when the recipient is ‘reluctant’ and ‘open,’ the influence is identified as “pressure;” when the recipient is ‘eager’ and ‘selective,’ the influence is identified as “diffusion;” and finally, when the recipient is ‘eager’ and ‘open,’ the influence is identified as “contagion” (Martin 2009).

Considering the concept of social capital in terms of homophilous and heterophilous interactions which are used to access or mobilize social resources to generate social capital (Lin 2001), I argue that diffusion, out of the above mentioned four, is the most suitable type of interpersonal influence to understand the functioning of the concept of social capital. According to Kadushin (2012:137), “diffusion is a process through which elements are transferred, borrowed, or adopted into a social system.” Diffusion results with the combination of the recipient of influence (here, alter) who is assumed to be implicitly eager to accept the outcomes of the influence (because the alter also want to exchange material or symbolic goods as Ego does), and be selective of whom to be influenced (here, Ego) (Martin 2009). In that case, diffusion is the best fit for homophilous and heterophilous interactions to generate social capital since both of the interactions require an alter who is eager to interact with an Ego whom s/he will be able to select before interacting.

In line with the relationship between social capital and diffusion, the assertion that the transformation of the structure of heterophilous interactions from antisymmetric to asymmetric in chaotic settings, which evoke threatening and highly dynamic situations marked by high levels of information need and low levels of information availability, leads me to speculate that these unique settings facilitate the diffusion of information and resources between individuals and enables the easier accumulation of bonding and bridging social capital in terms of homophilous interactions and linking social capital in terms of heterophilous interactions. Graphically, the effect of chaotic settings on diffusion of information and resources and accumulation of social capital can be better depicted with the inclusion of the S-shaped curve to the current discussion. The classic S-shaped curve is shown in Figure 2.3 (Kadushin 2012:154).




Figure 2.3 Classic S or Sigmoid Growth Curve

In general, diffusion of information and resources follows an S-shaped curve with the y-axis representing the cumulative proportion adopted and the x-axis representing the time of adoption (Kadushin 2012). The diffusion in the form of the S-shaped curve happens as follows: at first, a few individuals are affected once the novelty (information or resources) is introduced, then through various interactions, either homophilous or heterophilous throughout the social structure, those individuals affect others. Thus, the number of adopters increases rapidly. Finally, the increase in the number of adopters slows down since the available pool of potential adopters grows smaller (Kadushin 2012).

My conceptualization of diffusion with the S-shaped curve as depicted in Figure 2.4 elaborates the classic curve by including five major periods into the discussion in order to completely address the diffusion of information and resources. These periods are introduction period (A), first tipping point (T1), the period of escalation (B), second tipping point (T2) and the period of diminution (C).




Figure 2.4 Classic S Growth Curve with Five Major Periods

In the first period, the novelty, either information, resource, opinion, etc. (Y), which the individual (X) has, is introduced. At the beginning, X introduces Y in his own cluster, and the diffusion of Y starts slowly either by homophilous or heterophilous interactions within the cluster.¹³ Since a social structure is likely to have more homophilous interactions than heterophilous interactions (Lin 2001), in this period, it can be asserted that diffusion is mostly conducted by homophilous interactions. In the meantime, while the diffusion continues, the interactions between actors (mostly homophilous interactions) generate bonding and bridging social capital depending on the action that promotes the interaction (either expressive or instrumental). Linking social capital is relatively less likely to be generated since homophilous interactions prevail within the clusters. The diffusion in the first, or introduction, period is indicated in the S-shaped curve with the circle A. As can be seen, this is just the beginning of the diffusion and this period ends with the first tipping point (T1).

¹³ Depending on X's positionality within his/her cluster and his/her cluster's positionality in the structural hierarchy, the speed of the diffusion and the S-shaped curve changes. The best position for both X and his/her cluster to diffuse the novelty more quickly to more individuals is the central position since being located in the center, X will be closer to others within his/her cluster and X's cluster will be closer to other clusters.

A tipping point represents the moment when “the diffusion appears to take off on its own without any further input from the outside” (Kadushin 2012:209-210). In the conceptualization presented here, the first tipping point represents that the diffusion passes the boundaries of the clusters that X is a member and starts to spread to other clusters by homophilous and heterophilous interactions. This new period, the period of escalation, is indicated in the curve with the circle B. In this period, the weak ties or bridges that connect the clusters to each other enable the escalation of the diffusion. Thus the novelty was not imprisoned in X’s cluster and could reach other clusters and other individuals. This escalation shows again the strength of weak ties. In this period, due to the positionality of the actors at the both ends of the weak ties, it can be said that the diffusion is conducted first by heterophilous interactions through the actors at the both ends of the bridges, and second by homophilous and heterophilous interactions through the actors in the new clusters that the novelty is reached. In the meantime, while the diffusion continues through the bridges and the actors inside the new clusters, the interactions between the actors generate bonding social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital. The period of escalation ends with the second tipping point (T2).

The second tipping point represents the beginning of the period of diminution since the diffusion is about to finish due to the unavailability of potential adopters of the novelty. This period, the period of diminution, is indicated in the curve with the circle C. In this period the diffusion continues for a short time and then stops when the actors at the very ends of the clusters are reached. In this period, as happens in the introduction period, the diffusion is mostly conducted by homophilous interactions within the clusters, and it generates bonding and bridging social capital depending on the purposive action, either expressive or instrumental.

In normal settings being the case as explained above, in chaotic settings, there are important changes in the diffusion of resources and in the development of the S-shaped curve. In chaotic settings, the tipping points slide towards the ends of the curve due to the decreasing individual thresholds. The threshold, which is used interchangeably with the tipping point, determines when a particular individual overcomes his/her resistance to adopt the novelty (Kadushin 2012). Decreasing individual thresholds in chaotic settings, in another sense, depicts the transformation of the structure of heterophilous interactions from antisymmetric to asymmetric since the unique characteristics of the chaotic settings not only lead

individuals to overcome their resistance to adopt new information and resources, but also lead them to overcome their resistance to interact with dissimilar (socioeconomically or hierarchically) others. Thus, the sliding tipping points towards the ends of the curve and the decreasing levels of individuals' thresholds (or decreasing levels of closeness to dissimilar others) demonstrate that by shortening the duration of the period of introduction and the period of diminution and by extending the duration of the period of escalation, the unique chaotic settings enable the diffusion of information and resources to reach more people more quickly with a shorter amount of time. This means that chaotic settings might facilitate the accumulation of social capital in a shorter amount of time. As Ibrahim, Ye, and Hoffner (2008) mention, there is a positive relationship between a negative effect, which has chaotic outcomes, and interpersonal diffusion that might reflect efforts to cope with emotion through social contact. Individuals may exacerbate their negative feelings created by the chaotic settings through conversation with others (especially using homophilous interactions with the intention to promote expressive action). Aldrich (2012a, 2012b) and Dynes (2002) support this argument that more collective action and strong bonds during chaotic settings, created by the informal assurance from family, friends, and neighbors, lead to the building of social capital and consequently easier and quicker post-disaster recovery. This also supports the assumption that homophilous interactions prevail in a social structure and take precedent over heterophilous interactions (since expressive action takes precedent over instrumental action, and expressive action is more likely to be associated with homophilous interactions than heterophilous interactions) due to individuals' priority of protecting their available resources over gaining additional resources, especially in chaotic settings.

Lastly, I argue that, in line with the explanations of the diffusion and the S-shaped curve, the predictions of effort and return of action and interaction with the type of social capital that are shown in Table 2.2 changes in the context of chaos. Table 2.3¹⁴ shows that in chaotic settings all the variables stay the same except for the effort needed by individuals to perform the interactions. As can be seen in Table 2.3, all the effort signs in both typologies have a “-“ next to the main sign. This “-“ represents the

¹⁴ The typology in Table 2.3 represents the optimal typology that can be achieved through the combination of interactions and actions in a social structure. A better typology could only be achieved by decreasing the levels of effort dimension in Table 2.2. Thus, chaotic settings provide the motivations behind this change in the effort dimension through decreasing the levels of individual thresholds (or through transforming the structure of heterophilous interactions from antisymmetric to asymmetric). In another sense, Lin's (2001) typology in Table 2.1 represents the 1st generation predictions of effort and return for action and interaction, typology in Table 2.2 represents the 2nd generation, and typology in Table 2.3 represents the 3rd generation.

decreasing levels of individual thresholds. Therefore in chaotic settings the effort needed to interact with others decreases when compared to the effort that is needed in normal settings. In these cases, the continuum of effort aspect changes as presented: LE-, LE, HE- and HE.¹⁵ Decreasing levels of effort in chaotic settings also supports the idea that the characteristics of these settings facilitate the accumulation of social capital more than in normal settings. Thus, chaotic settings enable the same amount of return in terms of social capital with a smaller amount of effort. The next section provides two case studies to illustrate the applicability of the holistic approach.

Table 2.3 Predictions of Effort and Return for Action and Interaction with the Type of Social Capital While Considering the Tie that Connects the Actors in Chaotic Settings

Tie	Motivation for Action	Type of Interaction	
		Similarity (Homophilous) (S)	Dissimilarity (Heterophilous) (D)
Strong Tie	Maintaining Resources (Expressive) (E)	LE-,HR,BN	HE-,LR,LK
	Gaining Resources (Instrumental) (I)	LE-,LR,BR	HE-,HR,LK
Weak Tie	Maintaining Resources (Expressive) (E)	LE-,HR+,BN	HE-,LR+,LK
	Gaining Resources (Instrumental) (I)	LE-,LR+,BR	HE-,HR+,LK

Note: LE-: Lower Effort, LE: Low Effort, HE-: The Amount of Effort between Low and High Effort, HE: High Effort, LR: Low Return, LR+: The Amount of Return between High and Low Return HR: High Return, HR+: Higher Return

BN: Bonding Social Capital, BR: Bridging Social Capital, LK: Linking Social Capital

¹⁵ While it is highly likely that the chaotic setting decreases the effort dimension for expressive action, it is unclear whether it decreases the effort dimension for instrumental action. The reason for this is that individuals put more emphasis on protecting what they have rather than gaining more during chaotic settings. For instance, an alter might decrease his/her threshold for expressive action during a chaotic setting and interact with an Ego who expends less effort than s/he normally does. In other words, the Ego expends less effort because the alter decreases his/her threshold for expressive action. This is not risky for both the alter and the Ego since they don't have anything to lose. This threshold change is rewarding for both. However, whether the chaotic setting leads the alter to decrease his/her threshold for instrumental action is unclear since this is riskier for the alter. The alter has more to lose this time since the Ego expends less effort and has less to lose. Therefore, the effort dimension for instrumental action during chaotic settings should be interpreted carefully.

2.5. Applicability of the Holistic Approach

The purpose of this section is not to provide critical tests of the conceptualized holistic approach in this chapter, but to use two case studies to illustrate that the holistic approach can provide a conceptual framework to see the common ground of the different conceptualizations of the concept of social capital.

Case Study 1—Coleman (1988) argues that the trustworthiness among the merchants of the wholesale diamond markets in New York City exhibits an important form of social capital through which the markets function properly. According to Coleman (1988), the process at the markets is as follows: in the process of negotiating a sale, a merchant gives another merchant a bag of diamonds (worth thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars) and asks him/her to examine them. There is no formal insurance for the first merchant that the second merchant will not substitute or steal any of the stones. However, due to the close and frequent interactions resulting from ethnic and family ties between the two merchants, the first merchant trusts the second merchant that s/he will not substitute or steal any of the stones. Also, the second merchant does not think about substituting or stealing any stones since this will cause him/her to lose family, religious, and community ties (Coleman 1988). According to Coleman (1988:S99), “the strength of these ties makes possible transactions in which trustworthiness is taken for granted and trade can occur with ease.”

Coleman (1988) argues that the trust, resulting from the strong clustering ties between the two merchants, becomes social capital and facilitates the trade between them. In this respect, following the holistic approach, we should first ignore the weak tie row in Table 2.2 since the diamond exchange will only occur between strong ties. This not only shows the closure of the social circles of these merchants, which guarantees the observance of norms within these social circles, but also indicates the negative social capital perceived by the outsiders who might also want to trade with them. Second, for Coleman (1988), the trust between the two merchants provides bonding social capital for them. This leads them to strengthen their family, community, or religious relations through expressive action, as shown in Table 2.2. However, according to the holistic approach illustrated in Table 2.2, the trust between the two actors might also provide them bridging and linking social capital. The merchants do not have to be similar in terms of possessions and hierarchical class positions in order to interact with each other and negotiate a sale. Both a homophilous and heterophilous interaction might occur between two merchants. Also, the

exchange of stones between the merchants represents an instrumental action since the motivation behind the exchange is to gain additional possessions afterwards. Therefore, the holistic approach shows that different from Coleman's (1988) perspective, the exchange of stones not only provides (1) bonding social capital through homophilous interaction between the two merchants who have intentions of promoting expressive action (e.g., preserving family, community, or religious bonds between the two merchants), but also (2) bridging social capital through homophilous interaction between the two merchants who have intentions of promoting instrumental action (e.g., gaining additional possessions afterwards by either selling the stones or buying the stones) and (3) linking social capital through heterophilous interaction between the two merchants who have intentions of promoting both expressive action (e.g., strengthening family, community, or religious bonds between the two merchants) and instrumental action (e.g., gaining additional possessions afterwards by either selling the stones or buying the stones). Thus, the holistic approach provides a common ground for different conceptualizations of social capital (the strength of ties, different forms of social capital, negative social capital, and action-interaction perspective) and consequently presents a comprehensive understanding of how social capital functions for a more productive social life for the merchants (both socially and economically).

Case Study 2—According to Coleman (1990), an interesting case that illustrates how social capital functions and facilitates individuals' lives is the rotating credit associations found in Southeast Asia and elsewhere (e.g., Turkey). These associations are groups of friends and neighbors who typically meet monthly (generally, each month in one member's house). Each member of a group contributes the same amount of valuable assets (a predetermined amount of money or a quarter gold coin as implemented in Turkey) to a central fund, which is then given to one of the members (through balloting to decide the sequence before beginning the rotation). Thus, after n months each of the n persons has made n contributions and received one payout. The most important issue about the rotating credit association is that each member follows the rules of the game, and the degree of trustworthiness among the members of the group does not let any of the members to abscond after receiving a payout early in the sequence and leave the others with a loss due to the ready threat of ostracism against violators, similar to the case in the New York diamond trade markets (Coleman 1990:306).

From Coleman's (1990) point of view, these credit associations consist of friends and neighbors who are strongly tied to each other. Therefore, we should think of these associations as closed social circles that do not accept outsiders. Members of these associations have both homophilous and heterophilous interactions among themselves (members might be strongly tied; however, their possessions or social positions might be different). Also, they not only promote instrumental action through amassing savings for small capital expenditures, but also expressive action through strengthening their bonds to each other and consequently promoting trust. As a result, as shown in Table 2.2, these rotating credit associations not only generate (1) bonding social capital through homophilous interaction between two members who have intentions of promoting expressive action (e.g., preserving their ties through sharing information and gossiping), but also (2) bridging social capital through homophilous interaction between two members who have intentions of promoting instrumental action (e.g., amassing savings for later expenditures), and (3) linking social capital through heterophilous interaction between two members who have intentions of promoting both expressive action (e.g., strengthening bonds through sharing information and gossiping) and instrumental action (e.g., amassing savings for later expenditures).

While from Coleman's (1990) perspective it is understood that these credit associations are closed social circles that do not accept outsiders, I argue that outsiders can also join these associations. I refer to these outsiders as individuals who are strongly tied to one or two members of the association but are weakly tied to the other members. Unlike the other members of the association who have deep trust with one another, which is the reason why the association operates successfully (that is, due to social capital), outsiders don't have such social capital in the form of trust. However, what they have is social capital in the form of social credentials provided by their strongly tied contacts in the association (Lin 2001). These contacts provide the other members insurance about these outsiders and lead other members to trust the outsiders as they trust to one another. Therefore, it can be argued that rotating credit associations are not closed social circles, and they might accept outsiders (weakly tied contacts) when these outsiders provide insurance that they are trustworthy.

In this case, following the holistic approach illustrated in Table 2.2, it can be argued that outsiders (as weak ties perceived by the members of the association, except for their strongly tied contacts who

function as gatekeepers for them) interact with the members of the association (both homophilous and heterophilous interactions) to promote both expressive action (e.g., making new friends and enlarging their social network) and instrumental action (e.g., amassing savings for later expenditure). Thus, they generate bonding, bridging, and linking social capital. Interestingly, different from the other members, they acquire more return when they promote expressive action. This is because they are perceived as weak ties by others, and therefore they make new friends and enlarge their social networks through interacting with them, while others only preserve what they have. Therefore, relative to others they gain more.

This case study shows the holistic approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of how rotating credit associations function and generate social capital. From Coleman's perspective it is perceived that these associations operate successfully only when the members are strongly tied. They are used for instrumental purposes, namely amassing savings, and they generate bonding social capital. However, the holistic approach discusses that these associations operate successfully with both strongly and weakly tied members as long as they trust each other. Also, these associations are used for both expressive (e.g., sharing one's sentiments, gossiping) and instrumental purposes (e.g., amassing savings), and they generate bonding, bridging, and linking social capital. Thus, similar to the case study 1, the holistic approach presents a comprehensive understanding of how social capital in the form of trust among the members of the credit association functions for a more productive social life and generates more social capital.

2.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I developed a comprehensive concept of social capital utilizing many of the theoretical components developed by social capital experts in the field. I have composed a more holistic structure of social capital by identifying the similarities of previous definitions of the concept of social capital while leaving the differences behind. This has allowed me to see the common components of the different concepts of social capital and synthesize them to be able to examine society with a broader perspective. This new approach to social capital yields three main results: first, social networks have value, but this value changes according to the strength of ties that constitute the network. Second, each social tie with the combination of interaction and action leads to a different form of accumulation of social capital (bonding, bridging, or linking) while allowing the exchanges of material and symbolic resources.

And third, the value that different ties (either strong or weak) bring to the network, and the accumulation of social capital acquired through social ties (bonding, bridging, or linking) change according to the setting (either normal or chaotic) of the social structure. With these results at hand, it is hoped that a more holistic concept of social capital will increase its usefulness and applicability for researchers and ensure comprehensiveness for the people who need feasible solutions to the social, political, and economic problems.

Chapter 3 – Evaluating the Importance of Social Capital for the Conversion of the Forms of Capital: A Critical Approach to the Bourdieusian Model

3.1. Introduction

In his inspiring piece, *The Forms of Capital*, Bourdieu (1986) contributed two important and distinct understandings of the concept of capital to the sociological literature, different from Marx. These contributions are his conceptualization of different forms of capital and his conceptualization of the conversions of these forms of capital. Bourdieu's contribution to the concept of capital is manifested through his varied understanding of capital, namely capital as both material in the interested form and immaterial in the disinterested form. Additionally, Bourdieu developed the interconvertibility principle, which asserts the fungibility among economic, cultural, and social capital alike. For Bourdieu, this interconvertibility principle ensures a better understanding of the ongoing competition among individuals for valued resources and positions in societies via capital.

Even though Bourdieu has provided a unique perspective on the forms of capital and on the conversion processes among these forms of capital, his theory still lacks two important aspects: first, his conception of the conversion processes restricts itself to the individual level, thus focusing on the conversions within individuals; and second, his conception of the conversion processes does not include the functioning of symbolic capital. I argue that while the Bourdieusian model of conversion among the forms of capital addresses the relatively simple individual-level transformations, it does not adequately cover the more important group-level transformations that occur between individuals through their usages of social capital. Thus, in my conceptualization of the conversion among the forms of capital, social capital (one's social connections that s/he has first to interact with and second to exchange resources) becomes a master capital that allows individuals to enhance their social positions in the stratified society. This understanding of social capital facilitates the examination of the more complex group-level transformations and the conceptualization of a broader and more comprehensive model of conversions among the forms of capital.

To develop the Bourdieusian model of conversion and present my own conceptual approach of the conversion of capital, here I will first focus on how Bourdieu distances himself from Marxism and how this estrangement affects his conceptualization of the concept of capital different from Marx. Second, I will examine each form of Bourdieu's capital separately in detail. Third, I will investigate Bourdieu's

understanding of the conversion among different forms of capital and reveal the shortcomings of his model. Finally, I will attempt to develop his model and present my own conceptual approach of the conversion of the forms of capital while removing the shortcomings of the Bourdieusian model.

3.2. Bourdieu and the Forms of Capital

The concept of capital can be traced back to Karl Marx who defined the concept as “a definite social relation of production pertaining to a particular historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this thing a specific social character” (Marx 1981 [1894]: 953). Marx argues that money and commodities are capital only insofar as they emphasize two distinct properties: an investment with expectations of return and a surplus value generated by the investment (Marx 1995; Lin 2001). Capital, for Marx, as the potential investment by the capitalist, generates capital as a surplus value at the end of the production process only for the capitalist, not for the laborer. In this sense, this process only sustains the laborers’ subsistence so that they can continue providing labor for the production process. However, the same process provides a surplus value for the capitalist so that they can use a significant portion of it as capital for later investments. In this sense, Marx’s conception of capital is based on the exploitative social relations between two classes: capitalists and laborers (Marx 1995; Lin 2001).

Bourdieu’s conception of capital differs from Marx’s in relation to his critical dialogue with Marxism. As Swartz (1997) has identified, Bourdieu develops Marx’s analysis of capital through distancing himself from Marxism in three ways. First, Bourdieu extends Marx’s notion of economic interest to noneconomic goods and practices, thus transcending its narrow economicism and expanding the universe of exchanges from an economically self-interested perspective to a noneconomic, and therefore disinterested perspective (Swartz 1997; Desan 2013). Following Weber’s sociology of religion, Bourdieu (1986) posits that all action is interested, either material or symbolic, and an interested action cannot be produced without producing its negative counterpart, disinterestedness. Bourdieu explains that:

The class of practices whose explicit purpose is to maximize monetary profit cannot be defined as such without producing the purposeless finality of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man, with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art’s sake and pure theory (Bourdieu 1986:242).

In other words, the material forms of exchange in Marx’s sense should not only represent the economic forms of capital but should also include the immaterial forms of exchange in the form of other types of

capital. This is required to ensure the more effective and easier social and cultural reproduction of the social order in society. This assertion leads us to the second way that Bourdieu distances himself from Marxism.

Bourdieu conceptualizes capital in all forms of power, whether they are material, cultural, social, or symbolic (Swartz 1997). According to Bourdieu, when resources become objects of struggle for individuals, they become capital (Bourdieu 1986). Therefore Bourdieu does not restrict his perspective to economic capital in the form of money and property as Marx does. Instead, he extends capital to include cultural capital in the form of cultural goods and services including educational credentials, social capital in the form of acquaintances and networks, and symbolic capital in the form of legitimation (Bourdieu 1986). In addition to the extension of capital into several forms, another way Bourdieu expands Marx's theory is claiming the possible conversion¹⁶ of one form of capital into another under certain conditions. The conversion of capital constitutes a central focus in Bourdieu's sociology since this process provides individuals and groups an opportunity to supplement a certain form of capital by accumulating another, thus to maintaining and/or enhancing their social positions in the stratified society (Bourdieu 1986).

The third way that Bourdieu distances himself from Marxism is his focus on the symbolic systems such as art, science, education, literature, and religion, and the impact they have on the reproduction of social inequality (Swartz 1997). Bourdieu argues that Marxism underestimates the importance of such symbolic systems and their effects on the symbolic dimension of power relations; therefore he develops a sociology of symbolic forms and a theory of symbolic violence and capital to provide theoretical analyses of such systems (Bourdieu 1984; Swartz 1997).

The clear distance between the Marxist and the Bourdieusian conceptions of capital, as briefly illustrated here (see Swartz 1997:66-94 for detail), leads us to Lin's (2001) identification of the dichotomy between the classic theory of capital and neo-capital theories. Lin (2001) calls the concept of capital described by Marx, the "classic theory of capital." Lin (2001) argues that similar to the classic theory of capital, all subsequent theories of capital are based on the assumption that capital is the investment of resources for the production of profit. However, these subsequent theories of capital eliminate the class

¹⁶ In this chapter, both the conversion of and the transformation of one form of capital into another form represent the same process. I use the terms, conversion and transformation, throughout the chapter without attributing different meanings.

explanation as a necessary theoretical orientation and place both the capitalists and the laborers as the sole utilizers of the investment made and the surplus value generated. The classic theory of capital only involves the capitalists and neglects the laborers. This basic change in the theoretical orientation of the classic theory of capital reveals what Lin (2001) calls the “neo-capitalist theories.” These alternative theories focus on the forms of capital other than economic capital and include human capital,¹⁷ cultural capital, and social capital.

In line with the three theoretical arguments that Bourdieu developed to distance himself from Marxism and considering the dichotomy between “classic theory of capital” and “neo-capital theories” (Lin 2001), Bourdieu (1986:241) defines the concept of capital as “accumulated labor.” Accumulated labor refers to resources—economic, cultural, social, or symbolic—that individuals and groups draw upon to “enable themselves to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor” and to maintain and enhance their social positions in the structural hierarchy (Bourdieu 1986:241). The concept of capital, for Bourdieu, is broader than the monetary notion of capital in economics, and contains not only monetary and nonmonetary forms of resources, but also tangible and intangible forms of resources (Anheier et al. 1995). According to Swartz (1997), Bourdieu’s conception of capital can be depicted in relation to a labor theory of value: “Capital represents power over the accumulated product of past labor and thereby over the mechanisms which tend to ensure the production of a particular category of goods and thus over a set of revenues and profits” (Swartz 1997:74). In other words, capital can be seen as a power relation founded on quantitative differences in the amount of labor they embody; that is, accumulated labor is conceptualized as capital when it becomes the object of struggle as a valued resource (Swartz 1997).

Bourdieu conceptualizes capital with a much broader perspective than Marx that includes many types of labor—social, cultural, political, religious, to name but a few—which constitute power resources. According to Bourdieu (1986:241), capital is “what makes the games of society—not least, the economic game—something other than simple games of chance offering at every moment the possibility of a miracle.” In *The Forms of Capital*, Bourdieu (1986) provides a significant interpretation of the concept of

¹⁷ Despite their similarities in how they are measured (such as level of education or individual skills), Gary Becker’s (1964) concept of human capital, which is beyond the scope of this paper, needs to be distinguished from Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital. The concept of human capital, which is especially important in economics, focuses on the returns in the marketplace, especially economic returns. However, cultural capital focuses on the reproduction of the dominant class (Lin 2001).

capital and the relationship among the three fundamental forms of capital. Bourdieu states that “depending on the field¹⁸ in which it [capital] functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises” (1986:243). These three fundamental forms of capital, which I will address throughout the paper, are economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital.

Economic capital refers to the economic goods that individuals have such as property, wealth, and other financial objects. Bourdieu rarely attempted to define economic capital, saying that he didn’t want to “dwell on the notion of economic capital, because it is not his area” (Desan 2013:332). Bourdieu slightly touched on economic capital in *The Forms of Capital* and argued that “economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital” and these other types of capital are “transformed, disguised forms of economic capital” (Bourdieu 1986:252). All other types of capital are reducible to economic capital in the final analysis. According to Bourdieu (1986), while all forms of capital are fundamentally (or their basic/fundamental origins) economic in nature, capital manifests itself in noneconomic ways as social, cultural or symbolic capital, and thus they are treated differently and have varying effects on the application, use, and accumulation of capital. Economic capital is the ultimate form of capital since, according to Bourdieu, economic capital has the most durable and reliable consistency in time and space. For example, a prominent study performed by Lamont (1992), supports the notion that economic capital is more consistent in space than other forms of capital. Lamont (1992) argues that intelligence, which is an important component used by individuals to draw cultural boundaries is represented in France different than in the United States. While in the United States intelligence signifies factualism, pragmatism, efficiency, and experience, in France it refers to eloquence, general competency, *un sens critique*, and a strong capacity of abstraction (Lamont 1992). However, economic capital represents the same components in both countries. Therefore, it can be seen that cultural capital does not function as a

¹⁸ A discussion around the concept of field is beyond the purpose of this chapter, but, briefly, fields “denotes arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital” (Swartz 1997:117). Fields are structures of the social setting that are organized around specific types of capital. There are many fields as there are forms of capital. For instance, while cultural capital is the key property in the intellectual field, economic capital is the key property in the administrative field. Scientists compete for scientific capital in the field of science, whereas religious authorities compete for religious capital in the field of religion (Bourdieu 1984:113-114).

common currency in very large and highly differentiated societies such as the United States and France, while economic capital does (Lamont 1992; see also Lamont and Lareau 1988).¹⁹

Bourdieu's conceptualization of different forms of capital other than economic capital is an attempt to extend the common-sense assumption of capital as economic to a more comprehensive perspective in which the power dynamics is depicted as capital operates in noneconomic spheres of social life (Desan 2013). Cultural capital, in this sense, represents this extension from the logic of economic analysis to ostensibly noneconomic goods and services.

Bourdieu argues that a society's dominant class²⁰ imposes its culture on the dominated class by engaging in pedagogic action (e.g., education). The pedagogic action provides the internalization of the values and the symbols of the dominant class in the next generation, thus reproducing the salience of the dominant culture (Bourdieu 1977a; Lin 2001). According to Bourdieu, the social reproduction of the dominant culture can be achieved through the imposition of "symbolic violence" by the dominant class on the dominated class. Symbolic violence occurs in the pedagogic action through which values and symbols of the dominant class are legitimated or misrecognized by the dominated class as the objective values and symbols of the society, not as the values and symbols of the dominant class (Bourdieu 1977a; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Lin 2001). Thus, symbolic violence through pedagogic action provides the unconscious acceptance of the dominant culture by the dominated class (Bourdieu 1977a; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Lin 2001). In line with these explanations, Lin (2001:15) defines cultural capital as the

¹⁹ Bourdieu's "field" concept might be used to explain the different settings between the United States and France. It is argued that while the U.S. is more fiscal oriented than France, France is more human oriented (Lamont 1992). In this respect, while in the U.S. the administrative field, which puts more importance on economic capital than cultural capital, outweighs the artistic field, which puts more importance on cultural capital than economic capital, in France, the artistic field outweighs the administrative field.

²⁰ For Bourdieu, social class is "a universal principle of explanations" (Bourdieu 1984:114). Bourdieu designs class with two dimensions; capital volume and composition of capital. Capital volume constitutes the vertical dimension. The social standings of individuals are determined by both their economic and cultural capital levels, otherwise known as their capital volumes. The higher the capital volume of an individual, the higher he or she is positioned in the stratification system (Bourdieu 1984:128-129). In the case of France, for instance, differences in the total volume of capital define the structure that includes an upper class, a middle class, and a lower class (Swartz 1997). In addition to individuals' total capital volumes, their specific compositions of capital are important to distinguish them from each other and position them in the social hierarchy. This positionality constitutes the horizontal dimension of Bourdieu's class operationalization, utilizing the strength of cultural versus economic capital (Erickson 1996). The distinction between intellectuals and industrialists who have similar total volumes of capital but different compositions of capital might be a good example for the horizontal dimension of Bourdieu's class design.

“acquisition and misrecognition of the dominant culture and its values (or legitimized²¹ values).” In relation to Lin’s perspective on cultural capital, Lamont and Lareau (1988) argue that cultural capital is used for cultural and social exclusion. The internalization of the dominant culture in the form of verbal facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, information about the school system, and educational credentials provide individuals the opportunity to exclude themselves from others who are deprived of these cultural signals (Lamont and Lareau 1988; Swartz 1997). In this sense, Lamont and Lareau (1988:156) propose a more comprehensive definition of cultural capital as “institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion.” These signals are considered cultural capital only when they are defined as high status cultural signals by a large group of people (Lamont and Lareau 1988). Thus, differentiating levels of cultural capital, which demonstrates itself as the “disposal of taste” or consumption of specific cultural forms, marks individuals as members of specific groups or not (Bourdieu 1984). Aside from the above-mentioned features of cultural capital, there are additional functions of the concept with which I am not concerned in this paper.²²

Just as the concept of cultural capital moves away from the logic of economic analysis, so does social capital illustrate the noneconomic potential of capital in the social world. For Bourdieu (1986:248), social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.” In other words, social capital is the accumulation of social opportunities via social interaction, such as participating in organizations and meeting with people. According to Bourdieu (1986), one’s social capital depends on the size of his/her social connections and on the total volume of capital (the combination of all forms of capital such as cultural, economic, or symbolic) in these social connections’ possessions. This

²¹ The cultural preferences and attitudes of the dominant class constitute the legitimate culture, and the cultural preferences and attitudes of the dominated class constitute the dominated culture (Lamont and Lareau 1988). The legitimate values, in this sense, refer to the values of the dominant class.

²² Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes three types of cultural capital: (1) embodied cultural capital in the form of legitimate cultural attitudes, preferences, and behaviors that are internalized during the socialization process; (2) objectified cultural capital in the form of transmittable goods—books, computers, paintings—that require embodied cultural capital to be appropriated; and (3) institutionalized cultural capital in the form of degrees and diplomas which certify the value of embodied cultural capital (Lamont and Lareau 1988:156). According to Lamont (1992) and Lamont and Lareau (1988:156), out of these three types of cultural capital, institutionalized cultural capital should receive more attention since it is certified and widely diffused across classes, and it can be used as an indicator of class position.

means that one's social capital increases with the number of social agents that s/he is connected with in two ways. Resources in the form of social capital can be accessed through one's direct and indirect ties. Resources may be in one's social connections' possessions or in their social positions (Lin 2001). In other words, social capital refers either to the resources currently available in the material or symbolic possession of one's social connections, or to the resources, which can be accessed indirectly through those social connections. In summary, as Lin (2001:23) states, Bourdieu sees social capital as "a collective asset endowing members with credits, and it is maintained and reinforced for its utility when members continue to invest in the relationships."

Even though Bourdieu proposes three fundamental forms of capital—economic, cultural, and social—in his analysis of the forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986), his theoretical perspective actually includes one more fundamental but disguised form of capital,²³ which is called symbolic capital. Symbolic capital comes to the forefront of Bourdieu's argument of capital especially in his conceptualization of the conversion of the forms of capital.

Bourdieu develops his concept of symbolic capital through Weber's notions of charisma and legitimacy and through the extension of Weber's notion of interest (Bourdieu 1986, 1991; Swartz 1997). According to Bourdieu, all practices are interested whether directed towards material or symbolic items. Actors pursue not only the economic forms of action and objects depicted as material and interested (e.g., money, gifts, or powerful positions), but also noneconomic forms of action and objects depicted as symbolic and disinterested (e.g., demands for recognition, deference, or obedience) to be able to exchange one from the other under specified conditions (Bourdieu 1986, 1991; Swartz 1997). In line with his conceptualization of resources as capital "when they function as a social relation of power by becoming objects of struggle as valued resources" (cited in Swartz 1997:43), Bourdieu, like Weber, argues that the exercise of power requires legitimation. In this sense, Bourdieu's concept of "misrecognition," similar to the idea of "false consciousness" in the Marxist tradition, ensures the transformation of economic and political interests present in a set of practices into disinterest and allows the accumulation of symbolic power or legitimacy for specified activities (Bourdieu 1986; 1977b; Swartz 1997). Put differently, according to Bourdieu,

²³ In this chapter, I am not concerned with the other field-specific forms of capital such as religious capital or scientific capital.

Symbolic practices deflect attention from the interested character of practices and thereby contribute to their enactment as disinterested pursuits. Activities and resources gain in symbolic power, or legitimacy, to the extent that they become separated from underlying material interests and hence go unrecognized as representing disinterested forms of activities and resources (cited in Swartz 1997:43).

Symbolic capital, in this sense, refers to “denied capital,” which disguises the interested (material) characteristics of activities and resources and demonstrates them as disinterested (symbolic), thus providing legitimation (Bourdieu 1986, 1991; Swartz 1997). In this way, “individuals and groups who are able to benefit from the transformation of self-interest into disinterest” obtain symbolic capital in the form of “recognition, deference, obedience, or service for others” (which have noneconomic, symbolic, and disinterested characteristics) and “accentuate selected personal qualities of elites as supposedly superior and natural” rather than presenting themselves as inferior by obtaining other forms of capital (which have economic, material, and interested characteristics) (Bourdieu 1986; 1991; Swartz 1997:43).

With his unique perspective on capital, differing from that of Marx, Bourdieu provides a more comprehensive understanding of the functions of the various forms of capital in society. In addition, the importance of Bourdieu’s theoretical conceptualization of the forms of capital shows itself in the fungibility among these forms of capital since these conversion processes allows individuals to use their initiatives and strategize for the competition of valued resources in society. Bourdieu (1986) argues that economic capital is the most essential form of capital since it is at the root of all other types of capital and all other forms of capital can be reduced to economic capital in the final analysis. Economic capital can be converted to and from social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital through the utilization of intangible entities such as social class, class cultures, and social networks. Although Bourdieu (1986) provides a conceptual framework to understand the convertibility of different forms of capital, I argue that he confines his theoretical argument of the conversion of the forms of capital to the individual level. Therefore, further theoretical analyses must closely investigate the conversion processes not only at the individual level but also at the group level. Especially his conceptualization of the conversion process should be developed more thoroughly to provide comprehensiveness and facilitate apprehension. My elaboration and critical approach to the Bourdieusian conception of conversion of the forms of capital, in which I will investigate both the individual and group level conversion of the forms of capital, is presented in what follows.

3.3. Conversions of the Forms of Capital

Bourdieu's (1986) contribution to the concept of capital is not only his conceptual approach to various forms of capital, but also his theoretical analysis in the fungibility among economic, cultural, and social capital. Bourdieu (1986:253) states that "the convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social space) by means of the conversions least costly in terms of the conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself." In other words, through converting and transforming their available forms of capital into other forms, individuals might contribute to their overall accumulation of deployable resources and maintain their dominant positions in the stratified society (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). According to Bourdieu (1986), while individuals can directly acquire resources (either economic, cultural, or social), they can also indirectly increase their resources through the utilization of other forms of resources, which leads us to the possible types of conversion works: (1) economic to social, (2) social to economic, (3) economic to cultural, (4) cultural to economic, (5) social to cultural, and (6) cultural to social.²⁴ Although Bourdieu (1986) sees economic capital as the ultimate form of capital that all the other forms are reducible to (the brutal fact of universal reducibility to economics), he implies that economic capital remains the ultimate goal (thus focusing on the types of conversion works enumerated as 1, 2, 3, and 4, while implying the presence of other two possible types of conversion works), and thus provides his conceptualization of the conversion among the forms of capital within an individual. He does not provide a detailed analysis of how the conversion of the forms of capital occurs between individuals. In this chapter, I will focus on the potential processes of conversions between the forms of capital and attempt to conceptualize my own perspective on the conversion of the forms of capital to dissipate the deficiencies of the Bourdieusian model of conversion.

In its most basic form, Bourdieu's conceptualization of the conversions of the forms of capital can be understood as shown in Figure 3.1. In particular, the illustration highlights the most significant characteristic: the fungibility among the different forms of capital. While individuals accumulate economic capital to ensure the reproduction of their class positions, they can also convert their economic capital

²⁴ Symbolic capital can also manifest itself throughout the conversion processes. However, since I conceptualize the conversion of symbolic capital into other forms differently than Bourdieu, I will discuss how it can be converted into other forms of capital later in detail.

into either social or cultural capital to provide an additional environment to maintain their social reproduction. As mentioned above, for Bourdieu (1986:252) “economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition.” Also, Bourdieu (1986:252) states that “the different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, but only at the cost of transformation, which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in question.” From these two statements, it is understood that the transformation from economic capital (into either cultural or social capital) occurs with a specific amount of cost. Moreover, the transformation into economic capital (from either cultural or social capital) occurs with a potential loss through attrition, which is not comparable to the cost that is needed to convert economic capital into cultural or social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Anheier et al. 1995).




Figure 3.1 The Basic Model of Conversions Among the Forms of Capital

The potential loss during the conversion process occurs depending on the reproducibility, transmissibility, and liquidity of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986). As Anheier et al. (1995) argue, economic capital is the most liquid and most readily available form of capital for the transformation into social and cultural capital. However, due to their stickier structures, the convertibility of social and cultural capital into economic capital is costlier and more subject to attrition. In terms of costs during the conversion processes, the transformation of economic capital into social capital (such as exchanges of gifts, services, visits, etc.) presupposes “apparently gratuitous expenditure of time, attention, care, and concern,” and the transformation of economic capital into cultural capital (such as the amount of time devoted to acquiring cultural capital) presupposes “an expenditure of time that is made possible by

possession of economic capital” (Bourdieu 1986:254). In terms of the potential losses of the conversion processes, the transformation of social capital into economic capital might “entail the risk of ingratitude, the refusal of that recognition of nonguaranteed debts which such exchanges aim to produce,” and the transformation of cultural capital into economic capital might lead to the “disadvantage that the academic qualification [which is the institutionalized form of cultural capital (see Footnote 22 for detail)] is neither transmissible (like a title of nobility) nor negotiable (like stocks and shares)” (Bourdieu 1986:254). From a simple economic standpoint, the cost to transform economic capital into either social or cultural capital might be seen as waste of time, money, or emotion, whereas, it is, for Bourdieu, “a solid investment, the profits of which will appear, in the long run, in monetary or other forms” (Bourdieu 1986:253). This is a risky investment and the returns of this investment (as either potential loss or potential profit) in the form of economic capital (through the transformations of cultural or social capital into economic capital) determine if it is a success or a failure. In line with these explanations, Figure 3.2 presents the Bourdieusian conception of conversion processes more comprehensively.




Figure 3.2 The Basic Model of Conversions with Effort and Return Dimensions

As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the Bourdieusian model posits that the transformation from economic capital into social and cultural capital presupposes a cost (an effort [E]), and the transformations from social and cultural capital into economic capital might lead to a potential loss (as a return of the effort [R]). The other alternative process of conversion work, which is the transformations of social capital into cultural capital and cultural capital into social capital, is not adequately theorized in the Bourdieusian model.

According to Lizardo (2006a), the widespread consensus asserts that while networks are the infrastructure of society and thus are hard and causally effective, cultural tastes are fleeting simple objects that flow through the networks. However, it has been shown by research that networks are hardly stable (Wellman et al. 1997; Burt 2000, 2002), and cultural tastes are more stable (Smith 1995; Dumais 2002) than the current network theory leads us to believe. Therefore, similar to Anheier et al. (1995), Lizardo (2006a) asserts that while it is difficult to convert social capital into cultural capital, the transformation of cultural capital into social capital is easier. Even though the Bourdieusian model implies the presence of potential transformations of social capital into cultural capital and cultural capital into social capital, these forms of transformations are not clear in his scholarly work. Since Bourdieu focuses on the economic capital, all the essential transformations occur from or into economic capital in his model. According to Lizardo (2006a:780), "Bourdieu did not fully theorize the directional link going from cultural to social capital, focusing instead on the conversion of cultural into economic capital ... and the analogous conversion of social into economic capital." In this chapter, I am specifically interested in all potential processes of conversion work among the four forms of capital including symbolic capital, which I will address later.

Empirically, the conversion of the forms of capital has occupied the attention of researchers who focus on the outcomes and effects of the conversion processes on the enhancement of individuals' lives in the social hierarchy. All of the conversion processes among the three forms of capital (economic, cultural, and social) are well studied in the sociological literature, examples of which I will discuss below.

Within the research investigating the causal relationship from cultural capital to social capital and from social capital to cultural capital, Erickson (1996) criticizes Bourdieu's argument of the causal relationship between economic capital (in the form of social class positions of individuals) and cultural capital (in the form of high-status culture), and argues that social network variety (as social capital) is a better source of cultural variety (as cultural capital) than is class itself (as economic capital). Erickson (1996:221-222) states that: "those who interact with a wider variety of people must respond to a wider variety of culture shown by others and, hence, develop a wider repertoire of culture themselves" (see also DiMaggio 1987). Supporting Erickson (1996), Rieggle-Crumb, Farkas, and Muller (2006) argue that social capital in the form of social connections between students lead to potential transformations of social

capital into cultural capital through accessing information and advice to knowledgeable and academically skilled friends as trustworthy sources. In contrast to Erickson's (1996) argument, Lizardo (2006a) questions the popular notion that assumes network relations determine cultural preferences. Instead, Lizardo (2006a) conducts several empirical analyses indicating that cultural knowledge that is associated with different kinds of tastes (which Lizardo refers to as cultural capital) have significant effects on the size and intensity of individual networks (which Lizardo refers to as social capital). Lizardo (2006a:781) states, "the consumption of cultural goods and performances can serve as a bridge not only to sustain current network connections but also to gain and cement new ones." Thus, differing from Erickson's model (1996), he provides an alternative form of conversion of information and cultural knowledge into social connections. In this sense, Erickson's (1996) and Lizardo's (2006a) research provides settings where we can look at the same phenomenon—exchange of social and cultural resources—from two opposite directions.

While Erickson (1996) and Lizardo (2006a) demonstrate how social capital and cultural capital convert into each other, Lin (1982, 1999, 2000, 2001) and Granovetter (1995) provide detailed explanations about how economic capital and social capital convert into each other. Their research shows that people with more advantaged origins (e.g., those born into families with high SES) and more prestigious jobs (as economic capital) have better networks (as social capital). Moreover they show that having richer networks (as social capital) can lead to better jobs (as economic capital).

Finally, for the conversions of economic capital into cultural capital and cultural capital into economic capital, Bourdieu's (1977a, 1984) research in the French context posits that children originating from higher-class parents (economic capital) are socialized to like and know the higher-class culture that educational institutions teach and reward. Thus, the compliance of what they have learned from their socialization into high-class society in conjunction with a high-quality education produces increased levels of cultural capital. As these children move from school to work life, those who are equipped with more cultivation (embodied cultural capital), more tangible cultural objects (objectified cultural capital), and better degrees (institutionalized cultural capital) are more likely to obtain higher paying jobs (economic capital).

According to Bourdieu (1986:252), “there are some goods and services to which economic capital gives immediate access; others can be obtained only by virtue of a social capital of relationships (or social obligations) which cannot act instantaneously.” In other words, individuals might acquire some forms of resources immediately through their levels of economic capital at the individual level (e.g., obtaining a degree converting economic capital into cultural capital); however, they have to have social capital to acquire other resources (e.g., others’ volumes of capital, which are not easily accessible through economic capital) through creating social connections with others at the group level. Social capital’s productivity reveals itself only through its usage both in the economic capitalization of network resources and in many forms of capital being accumulated and capitalized at the same time (Svendsen 2010). Therefore, the conceptualization of social capital in Figure 3.2 needs to be developed. Figure 3.2 shows the conversions of an individual’s forms of capital. These conversions occur at the individual level. This figure does not include the functioning of social capital as Bourdieu (1986) discusses it, nor does it include the conversions of the forms of capital at the group level. Therefore Figure 3.2 needs to be further developed by considering the conversion processes both at the individual and at the group level and through the conceptualization of the functioning of social capital in the conversion processes at the group level.

Here, the most important point to see is that there is dependency among the different forms of capital not only within an Ego, but also within the Ego’s social network. In other words, the model illustrated in Figure 3.2 is that of only Ego, but in reality, for example, Ego’s economic capital is not only dependent on his/her social and cultural capital, but also on all of his/her alters’ forms of capital within his/her local network (Guan, unpublished manuscript). The importance of social capital comes to the forefront of this study in understanding the dependency among different individuals’ differing forms of capital in a social network. A simple illustration of this new perspective is shown in Figure 3.3.

So far, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the conversion of the forms of capital (shown in Figure 3.1) has been developed by including the effort and return dimensions of the conversion processes (shown in Figure 3.2) and by including the individual and group level conceptualizations of the conversions through the functioning of social capital (shown in Figure 3.3). However, the Bourdieusian model still lacks two more important aspects of the conversions of the forms of capital: (1) the lack of a

clear theorization of the conversion processes between cultural capital and social capital, and (2) the lack of a clear theorization of symbolic capital throughout the conversion processes.




Figure 3.3 The Basic Model of Conversions among the Forms of Capital at the Group Level

While the transformations from economic capital into social capital, economic capital into cultural capital, social capital into economic capital, and cultural capital into economic capital are well theorized, and while the transformations from cultural capital into social capital and social capital into cultural capital are hardly implied in the Bourdieusian model, the transformations from the three forms of capital (economic, social, and cultural) into symbolic capital and the transformations from symbolic capital into the three forms of capital are not addressed in that model. It is necessary to understand the functioning of symbolic capital throughout the conversion processes to fully comprehend how the conversions of the forms of capital occur and how these conversions lead to the structuring of the social order in society.

In line with the changes and development in the conceptualizations of the conversions of the forms of capital from Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.3, my own conceptualization of the conversions of the forms of capital starts with the assumption that all individuals have certain amounts of economic capital, social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital (I will use EC, SC, CC, and SyC respectively from now on to symbolize these forms of capital). The inclusion of SyC into the current discussion different from

Bourdieu's conceptualization, which hardly implies it, is important for my conceptualization since SyC is an essential component in the conversion processes occurring especially between individuals at different hierarchical levels (e.g., between a working-class Ego and a middle-class alter). The consideration of SyC in the current discussion facilitates the understanding of the conversion processes between individuals from different hierarchical positions in the stratified society. Thus, consideration of SyC in this will provide a clear perspective to the potential exchanges of symbolic and economic resources between these individuals.

I argue that the transformations of the forms of capital into other forms occur at two levels: at the individual level and at the group level. Which form of capital is able to transform into another form and at which level depends on the mobility of the forms of capital. In other words, the transformation of any form of capital into another form and at which level this will occur depends on the usage of SC during the transformation because SC provides the mobility to other forms of capital. If the transformation does not require the usage of SC, this transformation will occur at the individual level. If it requires the usage of SC, it will occur at the group level.

At the individual level, an Ego can convert his/her EC and CC amid themselves. For example, a well-endowed individual can buy books or art objects to show his/her cultural capital (objectified form of cultural capital for Bourdieu), and thus convert his/her EC into CC. S/he can also afford any kind of expenditures to obtain a diploma or certificate from a higher education institution to use his/her CC in the job market (institutionalized form of cultural capital for Bourdieu). By doing this, s/he will convert his/her EC into CC with an expectation that this CC will return to him/her as EC in the future.²⁵ This individual can also use his/her EC and CC to obtain SyC in certain environments. However, SyC can only be acquired through social connections with other individuals; therefore the acquisition of SyC requires the usage of SC through the transformations of certain forms of capital into other forms at the group level.²⁶

²⁵ This individual can also use his/her EC to acquire CC in the embodied form. However, this process is more difficult than transforming EC into CC either in the objectified form or institutionalized form. The reason behind this is that embodied cultural capital in the form of legitimate cultural attitudes, preferences, and behaviors are mainly internalized during the socialization process, and it is hard to change what was acquired during socialization afterwards by using EC. The change in the embodied cultural capital can only be achieved by acquiring the means through EC that are compatible with the existing values (Bourdieu 1986; Lamont and Lareau 1988).

²⁶ This procedure will be explained in more detail later with examples.

According to Bourdieu (1986:249), “the volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural, or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.” Especially focusing on the latter part of this sentence, it can be understood that individuals, who intend to interact with others, see others’ volumes of capital (EC, CC, or SyC) as part of their own SCs. Therefore it can be argued that one’s SC is directly related and proportional to others’ volumes of capital that s/he wants to interact with. Figure 3.4 provides an illustration of the conceptualization of SC as outlined here. In Figure 3.4, all individuals have others’ volumes of capital added into their SCs. The small circles inside the actors’ SCs represent the other two actors (with all their forms of capital) with whom they intend to interact. Since individuals interact with others expecting that they will be able to access others’ volumes of capital, individuals’ volumes of capital play a big part in the decisions of interactions. For this reason, conceptually, I argue that both interacting individuals see each other’s volumes of capital as part of their SCs, and therefore, to interact with each other, they convert their volumes of capital into their SCs.




Figure 3.4 A Simple Illustration of Social Capital Between Individuals

The conversion of the volume of capital into SC does not occur tangibly. This conversion only refers to the creation of conceptual links between actors who intend to interact with each other. Individuals have to perform this conversion conceptually before interacting with others to set the stage for

interaction, since only by doing this, can the interacting individuals see the others' volumes of capital as accessible (without seeing others' volumes of capital as accessible, they will not interact with them since the objective behind this interaction is to access to others' volumes of capital).²⁷ That is to say, individuals convert their volumes of capital into their SCs, which actually refers to the potentially interacting individuals that they have, to show them that their volumes of capital are reachable by them, thereby signifying that they are open to interaction with them. An individual's SC, therefore, represents his/her open door to outside social connections that works to send and receive certain resources.

The transformation of the volumes of capital into SC occurs in two different ways. First, if the two potentially interacting individuals meet for the first time and intend to interact, each of them hypothetically converts all of his/her forms of capital (EC, CC, and SyC) into SC to show the other individual his/her available capital capacities. Each individual performs these transformations to ensure that the other individual sees all of his/her capital capacities (EC, CC, and SyC) before determining which form of capital s/he wants to exchange with which form. Second, if the two potentially interacting individuals have already met before and know each other's capital capacities, they only convert their intended forms of capital to exchange with each other, that is, they convert the forms of capital that they want to exchange with each other. For this reason, on the one hand, when the two individuals meet for the first time and intend to interact with each other, the volume of capital transformed into SC has two meanings. First, it refers to all of these two individuals' forms of capital since this transformation is needed to ensure their decision about what to exchange. Second, after they decide what to exchange, it refers to the intended forms of capital that the interacting individuals attempt to exchange with each other. On the other hand, when two individuals have already met before and intend to interact with each other, it is important and necessary to understand that the volumes of capital transformed into SC, in this case, refer to only the intended forms of capital that the interacting individuals attempt to exchange with each other.

In order to understand the transformation of an individual's volume of capital into his/her SC before the interaction, it is also necessary to understand the differences and similarities between SC and other forms of capital. As Svendsen (2010:633) argues,

²⁷ Differently from the interactions with more pragmatic nature, the more intimate and emotional interactions among individuals (such as love), which do not seek an objective to access to others' volumes of capital, is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Like [the other forms of capital], [social capital] can be accumulated, stored, and converted. It accrues its owner benefits without being destroyed; in fact it increases by usage. And it facilitates action just as they do. However, unlike the other forms of capital, social capital exists neither in objects nor in people, but between human beings; is increased by usage and cultivation; is wholly informal; and gives access to all the other forms of capital.

In Figure 3.4, the usage of small circles in each actor's sphere of SC indicates other actors with their volumes of capital and refers to each actor's SC's existence neither in objects nor in him/her, but between them.

As an illustration, it is assumed that two individuals want to interact with each other with the intention of exchanging either material or symbolic rewards. In order to interact with each other, each individual converts his/her volumes of capital (if the two first meet, volume of capital refers to all their forms of capital; if the two have met before, volume of capital refers to the intended forms of capital they want to exchange) into his/her SCs and shows the other individual (who actually is part of his/her SC) that s/he is open and ready for interaction. If the two have not already met before, this conversion provides each individual with the opportunity to see the other individual's capital capacities (EC, CC, or SyC) and decide on what to exchange. If the two have already met before, this conversion provides each individual with the understanding that the other individual is ready for interaction. Thus, assuming that the interaction occurs between an upper- and working-class individual, the upper-class individual might give EC to the working-class individual and receive SyC from him/her. Thus, the working-class individual sends SyC and receives EC from the upper-class individual. Therefore the upper-class individual converts his/her EC into his/her SC, and the working-class individual converts his/her SyC into his/her SC before interaction. As a result, I argue that all individuals convert their volumes of capital (EC, CC, or SyC) into their SCs before interacting with their social connections. This conversion depends on whether the potentially interacting individuals have already met before or not and depending on their intended forms of capital they want to exchange with each other. Thus, owing to its unique role throughout these conversions, SC functions as a connector between individuals.

Due to the indispensability of the usage of SC during the exchange of resources among individuals, SC becomes the essential form of capital for the transformations of the forms of capital into each other at the group level. At the group level, an Ego needs to use his/her SC to acquire SyC or accumulate more EC or CC by accessing his/her alters' EC, CC, or SyC. In order to understand the levels

of mobility of the forms of capital, metaphorically, the Ego can be referred to as an atom including immobile protons and neutrons within its nucleus, and mobile electrons surrounding the nucleus. While protons and neutrons contribute to the stable structure of the atom, the electrons provide mobility to the atom and prevent stability. An Ego can convert his/her CC and EC into each other only within himself/herself at the individual level, and these two forms of capital do not provide mobility to the Ego (similar to protons and neutrons within the atom) by allowing him/her to interact with his/her alters. Only by converting his/her EC, CC, or SyC into his/her SC, can the Ego succeed in this objective. The Ego's SC, on the other hand, leads the Ego to interact with his/her alters causing mobility (similar to electrons within the atom), and thus, acquiring SyC, and accumulating more EC, CC, or SyC.²⁸ In this way, SC functions as "a helping hand, a string-pulling, the old boy network" (Bourdieu 1986:258) which enhances the accumulation of the forms of capital for the Ego through the acquisition of his/her alters' forms of capital. Bourdieu provides an example to the usage of SC for the transformation of an Ego's CC into his/her EC as a return to his/her earlier effort of converting his/her EC into his/her CC. Bourdieu (1986:258) states:

It goes without saying that the dominant fractions [those individuals who have high positions in the structural hierarchy], who tend to place ever greater emphasis on educational investment [through converting their EC into CC especially in the institutionalized form], within an overall strategy of asset diversification and of investment aimed at combining security with high yield [through converting their CC into EC as a return to their earlier effort], have all sorts of ways of evading scholastic verdicts. The direct transmission of economic capital remains one of the principal means of reproduction, and the effect of social capital tends to correct the effect of academic sanctions [the usage of SC facilitates the conversion from CC into EC]. Educational qualifications never function perfectly as currency [the effort to transform EC into CC with an expectation that CC will contribute to EC afterwards in a risky investment and may function differently than expected]. They are never entirely separable from their holders: their value rises in proportion to the value of their bearer, especially in the least rigid areas of the social structure.

Erickson supports Bourdieu's understanding of SC as a helping hand over the transformation of EC into CC and states: "advantaged people, including higher-class people [EC], will certainly have better cultural resources [CC], ... and [this is] because of the diverse networks [SC] that advantaged people have" (1996:224).

²⁸ The Ego's decision to acquire SyC or accumulate CC or EC by using his/her SC differs depending on (1) the hierarchical position of the Ego, (2) the hierarchical position of the Ego's alter, (3) the type of interaction, and (4) the type of action that the Ego uses to access to his/her alter (For more detail of the usage of SC in consideration with the different types of actions and interactions that the Ego uses to access to his/her alters, see Chapter 2).

At the group level, SC functions as a transmitter as well as a connector. During the interaction between an Ego and his/her alter, on the one hand, the Ego needs to transform his/her capacity of EC, CC, or SyC to his/her SC to connect to his/her alter. On the other hand, the alter also transforms his/her EC, CC, or SyC to his/her SC to connect with Ego.²⁹ After connecting to each other, both the Ego and his/her alter transmit any form of capital that they want to exchange with their partners through the usage of their SCs.³⁰ Afterwards, both the Ego and his/her alter receive the transmitted form of capital from their partners through their SCs and insert whatever form of capital they acquire into their capacities of capital, namely what they have already had as capital. This time the conceptual transformation occurs from their SCs into their received forms of capital. For example, if an Ego acquires CC (EC or SyC) in the form of SC from his/her alter, s/he firstly transforms this SC into CC (EC or SyC) and secondly inserts this CC (EC or SyC) into his/her capacity of CC (EC or SyC). Afterwards, s/he can also convert this CC (EC) into EC (CC) within himself/herself at the individual level. Thus, SC functions first as a connector that links these two actors to each other to interact through the actors' transformations of their resources (EC, CC, or SyC) into their SCs, and second as a transmitter that provides the actors the opportunity to exchange whatever form of capital they need.

The example shown in Figure 3.5 illustrates how these conversions occur and how SC functions throughout the conversion process. During an interaction between an upper-class actor (A), who, for the purposes of this example, is assumed to have made a financial donation with the intention of acquiring SyC, and a working-class actor (B), who is assumed to have received the donation thus acquiring EC, actor A first converts his/her EC into his/her SC (a1), and meanwhile actor B converts his/her SyC³¹ into

²⁹ The transformation of EC, CC, or SyC to SC is required to ensure the environment for the interactions that might occur between individuals. Each individual, who intends to interact with others, comes to this environment with his/her capital capacities (EC, CC, and SyC). An individual's differentiating levels of the forms of capital and his/her differentiating intentions of transforming which form of capital into which form, determines his/her interactions with others (with whom s/he is going to interact with what purpose).

³⁰ Normally, after two actors connect to each other to exchange resources, this exchange and consequently the transformations of certain forms of capital into other forms for the two actors do not occur simultaneously. According to Bourdieu (1986), for example, the transformation of one's EC into SC or one's EC into CC is a risky investment since the return of these transformations as EC might not happen and if happens it might take time. Therefore a simultaneous effort and return should not be expected during the conversion processes. However, for simplicity, in both my explanations and examples I assume that after the actors connect to each other and thus transform their volumes of capital into their SCs, all the transformations among them occur simultaneously.

³¹ Due to its abstract structure compared to EC and CC, it is important to understand what SyC really is and how it can be converted into SC during the conversion process. SyC does not represent something

his/her SC (a3). Finally the two actors connect to each other (a2 and a4), set the stage for interaction, and exchange resources.³²³³ Thus, SC first functions as a connector that links these two actors. Then, the two actors exchange the forms of capital that they intend to exchange with each other. Through the transformations of EC into SC (by actor A-b1), SC into SC (the interaction between the two actors-b2 as the follow-up link of b1), and SC into EC (by actor B-b3) and SyC into SC (by actor B-c1), SC into SC (the




Figure 3.5 The Newly Theorized Model of Conversions Among the Forms of Capital Between Two Actors, Example 1

that individuals have but something that they will lose in certain situations through their interactions with others. While EC and CC refer to mostly tangible resources that individuals have (CC might be intangible especially in its embodied form), SyC refers to intangible resources that individuals will lose. That is the reason why SyC cannot be converted into other forms of capital at the individual level. SyC is not a resource that can be converted into EC or CC within an individual. It can only be acquired or lost through the interactions with social connections and through the usage of SC. For instance, when actor A donates money in the form of EC to actor B, SyC might be the response of actor B to actor A in the form of a diminution in actor B's capacities seen as actor B's feeling of indebtedness or his/her feeling of gratitude to actor A as a response to actor A's donation. While actor B does not lose any kind of tangible resources by sending actor A his/her SyC, this antisymmetric relationship (see Chapter 2 for detail) between actor A and actor B strengthens their positions in the structural hierarchy as a dominant actor A and a submissive actor B. If actor A's donation to actor B is heard by others, actor A not only receives SyC from actor B, but also from others who appreciate what actor A does. Thus, the donation that actor A gives to actor B generates social debts for actor B in the form of SyC that s/he sends to actor A and social recognition for actor A in the form of SyC that s/he receives from both actor B and the other individuals.

³² The links entitled a2 and a4 subsequently are not separate from the links entitled a1 and a3 subsequently. The little circles inside each other's SCs represent the other actor they interact with. Therefore, a2 and a4 are follow-up links of a1 and a3 that were drawn to facilitate the understanding of the interaction between actors.

³³ During the interaction, actor A first makes a move towards actor B to interact with him/her. Therefore his/her intention to exchange resources shows itself with the transformation of his/her EC into his/her SC (a1) and his/her part of the interaction (a2). Then, as a response to actor A's intention and part of interaction, actor B responds with the transformation of his/her SyC into SC (a3) to show actor A that s/he intends to interact and his/her part of the interaction (a4) to create the link between him/her and actor A. Who makes the first move depends on what individuals need to exchange with each other, and what sequence this exchange of the forms of capital entails. In this example, actor A has to make the first move since actor B can send his/her SyC only as a return to actor A's effort. SyC follows EC. During an exchange between an actor's EC and another actor's CC, it cannot be definitely said which actor will make the first move since there is no certain rules about the sequence between CC and EC.

interaction between the two actors-c2 as the follow-up link of c1), and SC into SyC (actor A-c3), SC functions as a transmitter that provides these two actors with the opportunity to exchange the necessary forms of capital. That is to say, as a result of the interaction and exchange between actor A and actor B, actor B receives EC in the form of SC (b1 and b2) and first transforms this SC into EC and second inserts this EC that s/he receives from actor A into his/her capacity of EC (b3). Meanwhile, actor A receives SyC in the form of SC (c1 and c2) and first transforms this SC into SyC and second inserts this SyC that s/he receives from actor B into his/her capacity of SyC (c3). If desired, actor B can also convert this EC into CC within himself/herself at the individual level. Again, I would like to point out that all the transformations from or into SC throughout the interactions are conceptual transformations. They occur intangibly to set the stage for actors to interact with each other and exchange whatever forms of capital they need. And these conceptual transformations from or into SC should be examined with the idea that social capital exists neither in objects nor in people, but between human beings (Svendsen 2010). In addition, Figure 3.6 shows the interaction and exchange of resources between an actor C and an actor D. This time actor C exchanges his/her EC with CC and accumulates CC and actor D exchanges his/her CC with EC and accumulates EC. The interaction and exchanges between actor C and actor D follow the same principles explained in Figure 3.5.




Figure 3.6 The Newly Theorized Model of Conversions, Example 2

In sum, it is suggested that the transformations of EC into CC and CC into EC only occurs at the individual level. These transformations do not occur at the group level. The group level transformations occur only through the usage of individuals' SCs. Individuals can acquire other forms of capital from their social connections at the group level only by using their SCs through converting their forms of capital (EC, CC, or SyC) into their SCs and vice versa. Afterwards, they insert any forms of capital that they acquire

from their social connections to the same form of capital that they have already had through using their SCs.

The efficiency of an Ego's SC depends on his/her levels of EC, CC and SyC. The more an Ego has EC (CC or SyC), the more likely s/he is able to use his/her SC to connect to his/her alters and the more likely s/he has access to their EC, CC, and SyC. This is due to the power and efficiency provided to SC via the transformations of Ego's EC, CC, or SyC into SC.³⁴ Additionally, it is assumed that due to the conversion processes among the forms of capital, an Ego's forms of capital are directly proportional to all other forms of capital for which the Ego has capacity. The more an Ego's EC, the more likely s/he is to have CC, and vice versa, the more an Ego's CC, the more likely s/he is to have EC. The more an Ego's EC, CC, or SyC, the more s/he is able to use his/her SC. And finally, the more an Ego's EC or CC or both, the more likely s/he is to have SyC. Whether the Ego's EC, CC, or SyC provides the highest level of efficiency to SC depends on the field (see footnote 18 for detail) in which individuals compete for valued resources. In cultural fields, for example, it is assumed that an Ego's CC rather than his/her EC gives more efficiency (e.g., usefulness and strength) to his/her SC, and in administrative fields, it is assumed that an Ego's EC rather than his/her CC gives more efficiency to his/her SC in his/her interactions with his/her alters.

Up to this point, I have introduced and developed the basic principles of my theoretical conceptualization of the conversions of the forms of capital with examples. I have addressed: (1) how CC and EC convert into each other at the individual level, and thus how individuals accumulate CC or EC at the individual level, (2) how SC functions as a connector that links individuals to each other and provides a stage for them to interact, (3) how SC functions as a transmitter that facilitates the exchange of resources among individuals, and (4) how EC, CC, and SyC can be accumulated using SC at the group level. However, I have not focused on how SC can be accumulated at both the individual and group levels. At the end of this chapter, I will share my ideas of how SC is accumulated at the individual and group level using Granovetter's (1973) "Strength of Weak Ties" theory.

³⁴ Which form of capital transforms into SC depends on the Ego's decision of which form of capital s/he is intended to acquire from his/her alter and which form of capital his/her alter is intended to receive from the Ego. For example, actor A transforms his/her EC into his/her SC to acquire SyC from his/her alter, and actor B transforms his/her SyC into his/her SC to acquire EC from the Ego.

At the individual level, how an individual accumulates SC is straightforward. The more an individual has EC, CC, or SyC, the more s/he is to have SC. It is expected that wealthy and economically well endowed (EC), sophisticated and culturally flexible (CC), and legitimate and recognized (SyC) individuals will have more social connections (SC) that they can access. Looking at the relationship between CC and SC, for example, Lizardo (2006a) found that one's cultural preferences are directly related to his/her social network (also see Erickson 1996). Also, focusing on the relationship between EC and SC, Lin (1999, 2000, 2001) and Granovetter (1995) posit that one's social class origin (either advantaged or not) and his/her job (either prestigious or not) are directly related to his/her social network. And finally, addressing the relationship between SyC and SC, Lin argues that SyC in the form of recognition "reinforces the legitimacy of certain actors who claim their resources and positions and, at the same time, offers incentives for further social exchanges and unequal transactions among actors, enhancing their social capital" (2001:158).

At the group level, however, the accumulation of SC is more complex. Since an individual's SC is directly and proportionally related to other's volumes of capital (Bourdieu 1986), I argue that individuals accumulate more SC at the group level in accordance with Granovetter's (1973) explanations of the creation of connections among individuals in his inspiring piece, *The Strength of Weak Ties*.

Granovetter (1973:1361) argues, "the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie." In line with Granovetter's definition of the strength of a tie, I argue that compared to individuals who have not met to interact with each other before, those who have met before and thus converted their volumes of capital (EC, CC, and SyC) into their SCs to interact with each other are more likely to create strong ties than weak ties between each other. In Figure 3.7, which provides an illustration of the interactions and exchange of resources among the three actors, actor A is assumed to have met with actor B and actor C before, and actor B and actor C are assumed to have not met before. According to Granovetter (1973:1362), "if strong ties connect A to B and A to C, both B and C, being similar to A (due to the homophily principle, which posits that interactions take place among individuals who are similar to each other [Homans 1950]), are probably similar to one another, increasing the likelihood of a friendship once they have met (due to the idea that "the more frequently persons interact with one




Figure 3.7 The Newly Theorized Model of Conversions Among Three Actors

another, the stronger their sentiments of friendship for one another are apt to be' [Homans 1950:133])." In other words, if an individual has a strong connection with two others by way of strong ties, then it is highly likely that the two others will also be connected to each other, thus producing triadic closure. For that reason, the strong ties between actor A and actor B and between actor A and actor C create a weak tie between actor B and actor C.

The small circles in each actor's SCs also show the strength of the ties among them. Since actor B and actor C are unlikely to interact without their ties to actor A, they have dashed circles, which represent their potential social connections that they have not met before, in their SCs. Only by using their strong ties to actor A, they are likely to create a weak tie between each other and interact via that weak tie.

Similar to the interactions and exchange of resources shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7 shows how actor A uses his/her strong ties with the other two actors to interact and exchange resources with them. In order to do that, actor A first exchanges his/her EC with actor B's SyC and then exchanges his/her CC with actor C's EC. His/her actions are shown in Figure 3.7 as follows: actor A first converts his/her EC into his/her SC (a1), and meanwhile actor B converts his/her SyC into his/her SC (a3). Then the two actors connect to each other (a2 and a4), setting the stage for interaction and the exchange of resources. Since these individuals have met before, they only convert the forms of capital that they intend to exchange, thus signifying a strong-tie relationship. Finally, the two actors exchange the forms of capital that they intend to exchange with each other (following the actions of b1, b2, and b3 for actor A's EC, and c1, c2, and c3 for actor B's SyC).

Actor A also converts his/her CC into EC by using the strong-tie relationship with actor C. The interaction and exchange of resources between actor A and actor C follow the same sequence of actions that actor A and actor B use. To set the stage for interaction, actor A uses the actions entitled d1 and d2, and actor C uses the actions entitled d3 and d4. They then exchange their CC and EC and convert them into EC and CC by using the actions entitled e1, e2, and e3 for actor A's CC, and f1, f2, and f3 for actor C's EC.

The most important factor to consider in Figure 3.7 (more important than the strong tie connections between actor A and actor B and between actor A and actor C) is the creation of a weak-tie

connection between actor B and actor C. These two actors use their strong ties to actor A to create a weak tie between themselves, and thus to accumulate more SC at the group level. Since actor B and actor C have not met before, to set the stage for interaction and show the other actor their capital capacities before interaction, they first convert their volumes of capital (EC, CC, and SyC) into their SCs (entitled g1 for actor B and g3 for actor C). Then, as follow-up actions to their intentions (entitled g2 for actor B and g4 for actor C), they connect to each other first to interact and second to exchange resources.

In conclusion, the conversion of the forms of capital is complex and must be examined at both the micro (individual) and macro (group) levels. I argue that even though the conversion processes can best be observed at the micro level within an individual, they can best provide what individuals need at the macro level using SC between individuals. Therefore, deeper and more comprehensive explanations focusing on both the conversion processes and the forms of capital are required. In this sense, Bourdieu's argument of economic capital as the root of all other forms of capital needs to be developed in line with my theoretical conceptualization. While, for Bourdieu and in relation to the conversion processes at the individual level, economic capital is at the root of all other forms of capital, I extend this to argue that social capital is at the root of all other forms of capital at the group level. This conclusion follows since all other forms of capital are reducible and transformable to social capital in order to be converted into other forms at the group level. As Svendsen (2010) argues, an individual's volume of capital (EC, CC, and SyC) in the form of the possession of a harmonious mix of tangible and intangible forms of capital, on the one hand, functions as a credit and credibility in the broadest sense of the word. An individual's social capital, on the other hand, should be seen as a "master capital" that allows the individual access to his/her alters and consequently their volumes of capital and acquire credits and credibility in his/her social network. Therefore, the mastery of the usage of this "master capital" has big potential in determining who is to be a success or a failure in society.

3.4. Conclusion

While Bourdieu's (1986) *The Forms of Capital* offers significant insight into the nature of the relationship among economic, cultural, and social capital, his unique perspective in the fungibility among the three forms of capital includes neither the more comprehensive and broader conceptualization of the

conversion processes occurring at the macro level, nor the applicability of symbolic capital throughout conversions. In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a conceptual framework to address the problems that Bourdieu's conceptualization lacks through focusing on the functioning of the concept of social capital and its applicability among individuals. While Bourdieu's conceptualization of the conversion of the forms of capital has often been understood as the relationship among economic, social, and cultural capital within an individual, with the arguments in this chapter, I enlarged the interdependency assumption among these three forms of capital and provide a comprehensive explanation of the effects of an alters' forms of capital on the Ego's forms of capital.

Beyond Bourdieu's conceptualization, I have addressed: (1) how an individual's cultural capital and economic capital convert into each other at the individual level, thus how an individual accumulates cultural capital or economic capital at the individual level, (2) how an individual's social capital functions as a connector that links him/her to his/her alters, and thus provide a stage for interaction, (3) how an individual's social capital functions as a transmitter that allows the exchange of resources between him/her and his/her alters, (4) how an individual's economic capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital can be accumulated by using his/her social capital at the group level, and finally (5) how an individual's social capital can be accumulated at both the individual and group levels.

In sum, the main tenet of Bourdieu's argument is that economic capital is the most liquid and the most valuable. However, this unique perspective restrains its arguments to the individual level only. The link between the individual level and group level conversions through the conceptualization of social capital as a master capital functioning both as a connector and a transmitter between individuals enlarges Bourdieu's original conception of the forms of capital and the conversion processes among them. Thus, a more encompassing understanding of the strategies that individuals apply to compete for resources and positions in the social order can be achieved.

Chapter 4 – Information Diffusion through Functional Bridges: A Critical Approach to the “Strength of Weak Ties” Theory on the Diffusion of Cultural Information

4.1. Introduction

Since the publication of Granovetter’s (1973) well-known study, *The Strength of Weak Ties* (SWT), in which Granovetter asserted a new perspective of the social value of interpersonal ties, there have been many studies that have confirmed the usage of strong and weak ties for the diffusion of resources, information, and influence (Friedkin 1980, 1982; Weimann 1980; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Brown and Reingen 1987; Burt 1992, 2004; Granovetter 1995; Crowell 2004; Yakubovich 2005; Kadushin 2012; Marsden and Campbell 1984, 2012). Drawing upon Granovetter’s SWT theory, these studies have suggested that strong ties are socially valuable since they promote group solidarity and trust, while weak ties, especially those that connect otherwise unconnected social circles, are more valuable since they promote access to non-redundant information from diverse segments of a social network.

Although many studies (including some of the above-mentioned such as Granovetter 1973, 1995; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Brown and Reingen 1987; Burt 1992; Yakubovich 2005) have investigated the network benefits of social capital through focusing on how one’s social contacts as a part of his/her social capital function as a conductive mechanism to provide him/her useful non-redundant information (the conductivity dimension of social capital), there are few studies that have tested the applicability of SWT theory; moreover there are little to no studies that have attempted to develop it. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to address this research gap and examine the conductivity dimension of social capital by presenting a more developed version of SWT theory.

The link, provided by SWT, between micro and macro levels of sociological theory in terms of the effects of the strength of interpersonal ties at the micro level interactions on the diffusion of information and influence at the macro level patterns of social world, points to the importance of hole-spanning ties (what Granovetter (1973) calls bridges) that integrate distant segments of a social network and to the need of conceptual models that explain how diffusion occurs throughout the social networks through bridges. While research shows that bridges have been efficient in providing access to novel job information (Granovetter 1973, 1995; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Fernandez-Kelly 1995; Yakubovich 2005), cultural information (Erickson 1996; Lizardo 2006a), and scientific information (Crane 1972;

Coleman 1988), there is still a lack of systematical analysis on the question of how bridges function, which mechanisms lead them to diffuse non-redundant information, and consequently how the total network diffusion pattern differs depending on the functioning of bridges—that is, whether the diffusion follows an S-shaped curve or not.

In addition, even though Granovetter (1973) presents a groundbreaking understanding of tie strength and bridge formation in SWT, his explanation of weak ties needs further clarity and comprehensiveness since what should be understood from weak ties is unclear. That is, in contrast to Granovetter's limited understanding of weak ties, it is argued in this chapter that weak ties mean different types of interpersonal ties in different contexts. Also, his explanations of how bridges form and what breaks bridges—that is, the transitivity principle—tend to treat bridges as omnipotent non-redundant ties that can always be used to acquire novel information. However, this treatment of bridges as omnipotent ties—that is, hole-spanning ties that always function efficiently—ignores the dysfunctional aspects of bridges.

In that case, a detailed look at the mechanisms that differentiate functional and dysfunctional aspects of bridges with an emphasis on what determines this difference can be helpful for a better understanding of the usage of bridges (by liaison persons³⁵) as conductors of information diffusion. Also important to consider is that this detailed look should focus on the compatibility between the type of information that diffuse through bridges and the characteristics of the persons who actually hold the edges of these bridges.

Finally, due to their potential importance as the connectors of otherwise unconnected social circles and therefore as the integrators of the total social network, bridges serve important functions for the diffusion of resources, information, and influence between two social circles as well as for the total network diffusion. In this sense, bridges, whether they function efficiently or not, strongly affect the diffusion patterns of social networks. Therefore, what changes the diffusion patterns of the total social network and how bridges take part in this process should also be considered in a developed version of SWT.

³⁵ A liaison person is an individual who is positioned at one end of a bridge. The characteristics of liaison persons will be elaborated in the following sections.

Attempting to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the diffusion of information through interpersonal ties and fill the theoretical gaps in SWT left by previous research, I will first present my conceptual framework through which I develop the SWT theory and adapt it to the five-stage diffusion process conceptualized in Chapter 2. Then, I will focus on the diffusion of cultural information and job information to test my hypotheses about interpersonal ties, bridges, and information diffusion. To do this, I will use the 2002 General Social Survey (GSS), which is administered by National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to a nationally representative sample of 2,765 non-institutionalized English-speaking persons 18 years of age or over residing in the U.S.

4.2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

4.2.1. Tie Strength and the Forms of Bridges

Bourdieu (1986:248) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.” This broad definition of the concept indicates that resources embedded within a social network become social capital as they are accessed by individuals. Social capital, in this sense, refers also to the social networks through which assets can be mobilized for instrumental or expressive purposes. Therefore, social capital comprises both the network as one’s strong- and weak-tie connections and the resources that can be utilized through accessing these strong- and weak-tie connections (Bourdieu 1986; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Kadushin 2012).

In this case, Bourdieu’s definition of social capital, which indicates an individual’s strong- and weak-tie contacts to be a part of his/her social capital—as being the possessors of the resources that the individual wants to access and use—brings the argument of how these social contacts as social capital benefit the individual. According to Lin (2001), an individual can benefit from his/her social capital in four ways: information flow, influence, social credentials, and reinforcement. Briefly, first, the individual can provide useful information about opportunities and choices through his/her ties to his/her contacts. Second, the individual’s social contacts may exert influence on others throughout their decision-making process (e.g. hiring or promotion) in favor of the individual. Third, the individual’s ties to his/her social contacts might be perceived by others as certifications of his/her social credentials that can reassure others about the resource capacity of him/her. Finally, the individual’s ties to his/her social contacts

demonstrate his/her worthiness as an individual and a member of a social group, and thus reinforce his/her identity and recognition in society (Lin 2001). For the purposes of this chapter, my focus will be on the information benefits of an individual's social capital, that is, the functioning of social capital for the diffusion of valuable information among individuals.

Before scrutinizing the information benefits of social capital, we first need to define the social network that provides these benefits to an individual. Essentially, a social network is an informal version of a social structure. Lin (2001:33) defines social structure as consisting of social positions that possess differential amounts of valued resources, that are hierarchically related to authority, that are organized around certain rules and procedures, and that are occupied by agents who act on these rules and procedures. Social networks, on the other hand, which represent a less formal social structure, have little or no formality in delineating rules, in assigning agents to positions and in organizing the social relationships in the context of authority (Lin 2001). In its broadest sense, a social network consists of people (nodes) and relations among them (ties) through which information, ideas, love, money, and even diseases pass from one node to another (Kadushin 2012). More specifically, social networks consist of social clusters (a group of densely connected individuals) which are also connected to each other through individuals within these clusters. In terms of the links among individuals within and between clusters, the tie concept with a consideration of the strength of ties should be examined to understand the functioning of social networks.

Asserting his definition of a tie, Granovetter (1973:1361) explains that it is “a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.” Following Granovetter's (1973) logic, we can better understand the development and social value of both strong and weak ties. Strong ties (one's strong-tie contacts) will be indicated by a higher amount of time that two actors spend with each other, a higher level of intensity/intimacy between actors, and high levels of mutual reciprocity, as compared to weak ties. Strong ties are socially valuable, because they (via high rates of time, intensity, intimacy, and reciprocity between actors) promote group solidarity and trust. On the other hand, weak ties (one's weak-tie contacts) maintain relatively low levels of these characteristics but remain socially valuable in that they promote access to novel and non-redundant information (Granovetter 1973). In this sense, it can be

suggested that the integrity of social clusters is acquired through strong ties, and the integrity of the total social network is acquired through weak ties. It is these weak ties that integrate the total social network by linking clusters from distant parts of a network that have received much attention from researchers (Granovetter 1973, 1983, 1995; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Burt 1992, 2004; Crowell 2004; Yakubovich 2005; Kadushin 2012).

Granovetter (1973) calls these weak ties that connect otherwise unconnected social circles of a network “bridges.” A bridge can be defined as the sole linkage that connects two clusters, which has two or more individuals, without which the two clusters would break up (Granovetter 1973). This means that when considering A and B as members of two separate portions of a network, as shown in Figure 4.1, the bridge, as the only path connecting them, provides the only pipeline that can be used for the flow of resources, information, and influence. This pipeline is not only used for the flow of resources, information, and influence from A to B and from B to A, but also from A to anyone directly (e.g., D) and indirectly (e.g., F) connected to B and from B to anyone directly (e.g., C) and indirectly (e.g., E) connected to A.




Figure 4.1 The “Bridge” and the “Structural Hole” Concepts

A different perspective from Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) “bridge” concept is Burt’s (1992, 2004) “structural hole” concept. Structural holes refer to the separation that leads to the lack of access between two clusters, while bridges refer to the linkages that span these holes and connect the two clusters. Granovetter’s (1973) and Burt’s (1992, 2004) theories may look different, but the difference is largely in language and focus. While Granovetter’s theory focuses on the ties that connect two unconnected portions of a network, Burt’s theory focuses on the holes that separate these two portions of the network. Also, while in Granovetter’s theory, a person who has more bridges has a more advantageous position in terms of obtaining novel resources and information; in Burt’s theory, a person who has more structural

holes (that is, more non-redundant ties) has a more advantageous position in terms of obtaining novel resources and information (see Figure 4.1). I argue that bridges have more importance than structural holes throughout the diffusion processes when we take agency into consideration. The reason is that bridges diffuse information through the decisions of agents; however, structural holes are structural components of social networks and therefore have nothing to do with the agents.

The bridge concept has vital importance for any kind of diffusion in social networks; therefore, how bridges are formed and what eliminates bridges should be examined before focusing on the diffusion process in social networks. Granovetter (1973, 1983) posits that not all weak ties are bridges, but all bridges are weak ties (what I call the bridge hypothesis). A strong tie is unlikely to be a bridge due to the transitivity principle. Figure 4.2 illustrates the bridge hypothesis and explains the transitivity principle as follows: for two individuals (B and C), the amount of time spent with a common actor (A) and the similarity in terms of possessions and hierarchical positions with each other (B with C) resulting from the time that they spent with their common actor (A) affect the strength of tie that they will generate between each other: strong B-A and C-A ties increase the likelihood of a strong B-C tie; in that vein, weak B-A and C-A ties decrease the likelihood of a B-C interaction. Following the above argument, Granovetter (1973, 1983) argues that if A is connected to B and A is also connected to C, there has to be a B-C tie, whether weak or strong, depending on the strength of A-B and A-C ties (this is also the same for B-E tie). Therefore, the A-B tie has to be a weak tie in order to maintain its status as a bridge since having a strong A-B tie will more likely create a B-C (also B-E tie) tie whose strength depends on the A-C (A-E) tie. In this regard, “a strong tie can be a bridge, therefore, only if neither party to it has any other strong ties, unlikely in a social network of any size...Weak ties suffer no such restriction, though they are certainly not automatically bridges. What is important, rather, is that all bridges are weak ties” (Granovetter 1973:1364). Therefore, bridges tend to be weak ties since strong ties lead to triadic closure, which eliminates bridges. Research has found evidence to support Granovetter’s (1973) theoretical conclusions. Weimann’s (1980:16) study, for example, which posits that “networks of strong ties are significantly tending to transitivity, while networks of weak ties lack this tendency, and in some cases even tend to intransitivity,” supports this argument. Also, according to Marsden and Campbell (2012:17), weak ties are more likely to have “connectivity-generating” characteristics, and they are “less subject to closure-producing transitivity

pressures that operate on stronger ones.” Lastly, Friedkin (1980) and Brown and Reingen (1987) tested Granovetter’s theory and verified its accuracy and applicability supporting that bridges and intergroup ties in social networks are disproportionately weak ties.




Figure 4.2 The “Transitivity” Principle and the Formation of Bridges

Granovetter (1973, 1983) mentions two types of bridges in SWT: a network bridge and a local bridge. A network bridge, as shown in Figure 4.1, is the only path that connects two distant clusters through spanning structural holes that separate these two clusters. A local bridge, on the other hand, is a shortcut between two unconnected parts of a network. Unlike a network bridge, a local bridge is not the only path with which two parts of a network are connected. The importance of local bridges is that they provide alternative and short paths between two unconnected groups of individuals. Figure 4.3 illustrates the difference between a network bridge and a local bridge. Bridges in Figure 4.3—the A-B and C-D weak ties—are local bridges because if either of them is removed, the two parts of the network will still be connected. However, if we assume that there is only the A-B bridge connecting the two parts, then it is clear that the A-B bridge is a network bridge since it is the only link that connects the two parts of the network and the two parts of the network would be separated in its absence.




Figure 4.3 The “Network Bridge” (the A-B tie only) and the “Local Bridges” (A-B and C-D ties)

In addition to the two types of bridges that Granovetter (1973, 1983) mentions—network bridges and local bridges—I argue that there are two additional forms of bridges that need to be considered in research related to network benefits of social capital: structural bridges and functional bridges. Granovetter (1973) argues that those individuals, who have many weak ties, are more likely to be bridges (either a network bridge or a local bridge). Granovetter’s concept of bridge shows us a structural tie between two unconnected groups of individuals. These structural ties have the characteristics of a bridge, that is, they are weak ties and they represent the only path (as network bridges or alternative shortcuts as local bridges) connecting separate groups. However, in certain situations, they might not function in a way that is expected from a bridge; that is, they might not diffuse any kind of resources in a significant manner. While a specific type of resource (e.g., cultural information) might flow from these bridges, another type (e.g., job information) might not flow. Marsden and Campbell (2012:20) state that “a tie has the capacity to convey resources or information of value [which indicates what Granovetter calls bridges and what I call structural bridges] does not assure that it will transmit them.” In this sense, I argue that a bridge, in Granovetter’s sense, always refers to a structural bridge and only becomes a functional bridge when it diffuses any kind of resources in a significant manner, when required. Functional bridges differ from structural bridges similar to how weak ties differ from bridges. Similar to how Granovetter (1973, 1983) argues that not all weak ties are bridges, but all bridges are weak ties, I argue that not all structural bridges are functional bridges, but all functional bridges are structural bridges. For example, in Figure 4.3, the two local bridges (the A-B and C-D weak ties) are structural bridges since they are weak ties and they connect the two parts of a network otherwise unconnected. However, we cannot simply know whether they are also functional bridges. As an illustration shown in Figure 4.3, I assume that Actor A has novel information and shares it with Actor B and Actor C. However, Actor C does not share it with Actor D.³⁶ In this situation, while both bridges are structural bridges, the A-B bridge becomes a functional bridge since it significantly diffuses the information from Actor A to Actor B. However, the C-D bridge is a non-functional bridge since it is not used for diffusion.

It is important here to return to the tie concept and its relationship to types of bridges. Diverging from Granovetter (1973), I argue that the term “weak tie” refers to different meanings in different contexts

³⁶ I will address the reasons why an actor shares what s/he possesses and why another actor does not in Section 4.2.4 in more detail.

affecting the diffusion process and therefore requires further elaboration. I suggest that there are four different types of weak ties, as presented in Figure 4.4 (the solid lines represent the strong ties and dashed lines represent the weak ties). Depending on the context where it functions, a weak tie might mean (1) a weakly-tied contact in one's own social cluster—what I call “a within-group weak tie” (weak ties depicted as 1-5, 4-5, and 2-3 in Figure 4.4); (2) a weakly-tied contact from a different social cluster, which is already connected with one's social cluster—what I call “a between-group weak tie” (the weak tie depicted as 1-6 in Figure 4.4); (3) a weakly-tied contact from a different social cluster that is otherwise unconnected from one's own social cluster—what I call “a structural bridge” (weak ties depicted as 2-7 and 4-8 in Figure 4.4); and (4) a weakly-tied contact from a different social cluster that is otherwise unconnected from one's own social cluster, and this weak tie diffuses resources, information, or influence in a significant manner—what I call “a functional bridge” (depicted as 4-8 in Figure 4.4 after assuming that the 4-8 weak tie significantly diffuses resources, information, and influence). This elaboration of weak ties, different from Granovetter (1973), is vital to understand the importance of different types of weak ties on the diffusion of resources, information, and influence. The reason for this is that compared to Granovetter's limited understanding of weak ties, this elaboration provides us an opportunity to see the different functions of weak ties in different contexts and to examine how the distinction between structural and functional bridges affects the pattern of the total network diffusion, whether an S-shaped curve or not.




Figure 4.4 The Types of Weak Ties

So far, I have mentioned how social capital and social networks are associated, what constitutes social networks, how strong and weak ties differ from each other, what creates and eliminates bridges, what types of bridges there are that can be used for the diffusion of resources in social networks, and what types of weak ties there are depending on the context where they function. The next section, in line

with the arguments and concepts presented above, will further my conceptualization of the diffusion process, presented in Chapter 2, by focusing on the diffusion of information within and between social clusters. Thus, I will adapt my conceptual arguments on SWT to the five-stage diffusion process, conceptualized in Chapter 2, before focusing on the diffusion of cultural information and testing my hypotheses.

4.2.2. Information Diffusion through Strong Ties, Weak Ties, and Functional Bridges

As mentioned in Chapter 2, diffusion, during which the recipient is eager to accept whatever is diffused and selective from whom s/he is going to receive it, is the most suitable type of interpersonal influence to understand the functioning of the concept of social capital. It was also argued in Chapter 2 that diffusion is the best fit for homophilous and heterophilous interactions to generate social capital since both of the interactions require an alter (Ego's direct contacts) who is eager to interact with an Ego (an arbitrarily selected individual) whom s/he will be able to select before interacting.

The homophilous interactions (relations between two individuals who have similar resources or who are at similar hierarchical levels) and heterophilous interactions (relations between two individuals who have dissimilar resources or who are at dissimilar hierarchical levels) within (more homophilous and fewer heterophilous) and between (fewer homophilous and more heterophilous) social clusters indicate the progress of diffusion throughout the social networks. Regarding the fact that homophilous interactions tend to occur among persons with relatively stronger ties, and heterophilous interactions tend to occur among persons with relatively weaker ties, it is expected that information diffuses throughout the social network more quickly within the clusters. Also, this quick diffusion leads to the fact that further interactions within the clusters do not provide different and novel information for the individuals. As Granovetter (1973:1371) argues, novel and different information can be acquired from the other clusters through hole-spanning ties, namely bridges: "those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own and will thus have access to information different from that which we receive."

According to Granovetter (1983:209), in general, "weak ties provide people with access to information and resources beyond those available in their own social circle; but strong ties have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily available [than weak ties]." Weak ties are more important for the diffusion of information in a network since the removal of an average weak tie

“would do more damage to transmission probabilities than would that of the average strong one” (Granovetter 1973:1366). In other words, weak ties integrate the separate and unconnected parts of a network; therefore, diffusion traverses greater social distance and reaches a larger number of people more quickly and easily when applied through weak ties rather than strong ties. Also, Burt (1999:48) asserts that ties spanning structural holes provide non-redundant information, which is “more additive than overlapping.”

Empirical applications of weak ties as the main provider of novel information include research on job information (Granovetter 1973, 1995; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Fernandez-Kelly 1995; Yakubovich 2005), cultural information (Erickson 1996; Lizardo 2006a), and scientific information (Crane 1972; Coleman 1988). For example, Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn (1981) argue that weak ties connect individuals to their dissimilar acquaintances. They found that usage of weak ties in finding jobs were significantly efficient only when individuals connected to their acquaintances that were well placed in the occupational structure. Fernandez-Kelly (1995) suggests that networks can provide only the resources they possess. She argues that black inner-city youth have difficulty obtaining quality information about what employers expect on job interviews since their social networks—people within their clusters—are generally unemployed or too inexperienced to be able to provide such information. In this regard, the social circle in which an actor resides only provides common and homogeneous information to him/her, not novel information. Therefore, accessing only the diverse and previously unconnected portions of a network can provide novel and different information to the actor. Also, Granovetter (1995) found that job information acquired from proximate contacts were less likely than distant ones to be efficient in job assignments since distant contacts are more useful to the individual in providing non-redundant information that one’s immediate social circle does not have. Lastly, Erickson (1996) points to the importance of network diversity (possessed especially through weak ties) for the creation of cultural variety (e.g., omnivorousness [Peterson 1992; Peterson and Simkus 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996]) in the form of cultural knowledge. She argues that individuals who have wider networks, provided by weak ties, are more likely to have wider repertoires of cultural information.

The conceptualized diffusion process presented in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 4.5, asserts that diffusion occurs in five periods: the introduction period (A), the first tipping point (T1), the period of

escalation (B), the second tipping point (T2), and the period of diminution (C). In the introduction period (A), the novelty is introduced and diffused mainly with strong ties to individuals within the cluster. The first tipping point (T1) represents the moment that diffusion passes the boundary of the cluster and starts to spread to other clusters through weak ties (functional bridges). In the period of escalation (B), the novelty continues to diffuse to other clusters through weak ties (functional bridges) and to actors within all the clusters through mainly strong ties. The second tipping point (T2) represents the deceleration of the diffusion process. Finally, in the period of diminution, diffusion reaches the actors at the very ends of the clusters and stops. This five-stage diffusion process provides a new perspective to the diffusion of resources in the total social network; however, it does not include the cluster-based diffusion processes within the network. Therefore, next, in consideration with my conceptual arguments on SWT, a new model, which includes both the cluster-based and total network diffusion mechanisms, will be presented.




Figure 4.5 The S-shaped Diffusion Curve with Five Stages

The social network that I present in this model consists of actors who have a collection of close friends, most of whom know one another—a tightly-knit group. Also, these actors have a collection of acquaintances, actually more than their close friends, few of whom know one another—a loosely-knit group. However, these acquaintances are also likely to have close friends of their own and will therefore be a member of a tightly-knit group of individuals. While actors' strong ties connect them to their close friends and provide them access to only their friends' resources, their weak ties connect them not only to

their acquaintances directly, but also to their acquaintances' close friends indirectly, allowing them to access both their acquaintances' and acquaintances' friends' resources (Granovetter 1983). Weak ties, as examined before, receive more importance in this model, because these different tightly-knit groups of individuals, who are located in distant parts of the social network, "would not be connected to one another at all were it not for the existence of weak ties" (Granovetter 1973:1363). Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b demonstrate a simplified version of this diffusion model.




Figure 4.6a The Total Network Diffusion as an Outcome of Cluster-Based Diffusions (see Figure 4.6b for correspondence)




Figure 4.6b The Total Network Diffusion through Functional Bridges

The difference between the diffusion model presented in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 4.5 and the new diffusion model presented here and shown in Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b results from the latter model's more comprehensive perspective of the diffusion mechanisms occurring within the social clusters. The S-shaped diffusion curve in Figure 4.5 presents the growth of the diffusion for the total social network; however, social networks have many social clusters, and I argue that the diffusion process for the total network is an outcome of the diffusion processes of each cluster within that network. Also, I argue that diffusion occurs in each cluster following the same five-stage diffusion pattern. In other words, the S-shaped diffusion curve for the total network occurs in five periods as an outcome of the smaller S-shaped diffusion curves—also occurring in five periods—for each cluster within that network. This argument that there are two forms of diffusion occurring at the same time—one in each social cluster and one in the total social system as an outcome of the diffusion in social clusters—follows the distinction made by Valente (1996) between adoption made within social clusters and adoption made with respect to the total social system. Valente (1996) argues:

There are individuals who are innovative with respect to their personal network or those who are innovative with respect to the social system. Those with high network thresholds who adopt early relative to the social system are only innovative relative to the social system, not relative to their personal communication network. Low network adopters are individuals who adopt early relative to their personal network yet may, though not necessarily, adopt late relative to the social system (cited in Kadushin 2012:157).

Valente's (1996) distinction between being an early adopter of innovations with respect to the social system and being an early adopter of innovations with respect to personal communication networks provides valuable contribution to the understanding of the S-shaped diffusion curve and the difference between the total network diffusion and cluster-based diffusion mechanisms. However, a better understanding can be achieved through the elaboration of the sets of roles that individuals perform throughout each stage of the diffusion process.

Crane (1999:15) asserts that diffusion of fashion, which, I argue, resembles the diffusion process conceptualized in the new model, requires different sets of roles throughout each stage of the diffusion process: "innovators originate a fashion or a fad, opinion leaders perform important roles in initiating the process of dissemination, early adopters are attracted by its exclusiveness and uniqueness, and late adopters unintentionally contribute to its demise by making it too popular to be distinctive." In line with Crane's (1999) ideas on the sets of roles required for each stage of the diffusion process, the required

roles for the diffusion of information in this model, as illustrated in Figure 4.6b, will now be discussed. First, those individuals who transmit the information from other clusters through functional bridges are called innovators from the perspectives of the newly reached clusters. The innovator, in Figure 4.6b, is the actor depicted as “I” in Group A. However, Groups B, C, and D do not see this actor as the innovator. According to these groups, the innovators are those individuals who first transmit the information to their groups through functional bridges. Second, those individuals who receive the new information through the functional bridges in the newly reached clusters are called opinion leaders (opinion leaders are actors depicted as “O” in each group). Third, opinion leaders’ direct connections in their own clusters are called early adopters (actors depicted as “E” in each group). Fourth, early adopters’ strong- and weak-tie connections in their own clusters are called late adopters (actors depicted as “L” in each group).

Drawing upon Valente’s (1996) ideas and following the stage-specific roles of the diffusion in the current model presented above and shown in Figure 4.6b, the hypothetical example of the diffusion of information for both the total network and the social clusters shown in Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b, can be presented as follows: the novel information is introduced by the actor depicted as “I” in Group A. Then, this actor shares this information with an opinion leader in his/her cluster, the actor depicted as “O.” The opinion leader in Group A shares this novel information with an early adopter in his/her cluster, depicted as “E.” Finally, the early adopter in Group A shares this information with a late adopter, depicted as “L.” While the diffusion process in Group A seems to be over at this time, this only represents the period of introduction for the total network diffusion. Then, the novel information passes the boundary of Group A and diffuses to Group B from the early adopter in Group A to the opinion leader in Group B. This boundary-breaking and hole-spanning diffusion mechanism—implemented by the functional bridge linking Group A to Group B—represents the first tipping point and the beginning of the period of escalation for the diffusion of the total network. As the diffusion reaches all the actors in Group B, the novel information passes the boundary of Group B and diffuses to Group C through the functional bridge between the early adopter in Group B and the opinion leader in Group C. The diffusion continues to spread in Group C and finally passes the boundary of Group C through the functional bridge between the late adopter in Group C and the opinion leader in Group D. This final hole-spanning diffusion mechanism represents the second tipping point and the beginning of the period of diminution for the diffusion of the total network. Finally,

when the last adopter in Group D receives the novel information, the diffusion process for both the Group D and the total network ends. If the diffusion is examined carefully, it can be seen that information did not diffuse from Group A to Group D through the early adopter in Group A to the opinion leader in Group D. This means that the structural bridge (the dashed line between Group A and Group D in Figure 4.6b) between these two actors did not become a functional bridge (functional bridges are represented through bold solid lines) and did not diffuse the information in a significant manner. In other words, out of the four structural bridges linking the four clusters to each other, only three of them diffused the information and became functional bridges.

Using the current model, we can see how the total network diffusion occurs as the outcome of the cluster-based diffusion processes and how functional bridges differ from structural bridges. However, this model presents an abstract version of information diffusion using functional bridges. In the next section, I will focus on the diffusion of cultural information and present a more concrete model of information diffusion with which I test my hypotheses on the usage of strong ties, weak ties, and functional bridges for the diffusion of cultural information.

4.2.3. Diffusion of Cultural Information

Prior research focusing on information diffusion has mainly investigated the usage of interpersonal ties for the diffusion of job information (e.g., employment opportunities) among individuals (Granovetter 1973, 1995; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Fernandez-Kelly 1995; Bian 1997; Yakubovich 2005). In general, these studies found weak ties to be more useful than strong ties to obtain job-related information (Granovetter 1973, 1995). Others found that weak ties were more likely than strong ties to be effective in leading to employment opportunities only when these weak ties were positioned in the upper strata of the occupational structure (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Yakubovich 2005). Conversely, in certain situations, strong ties also provided useful job information (Weimann 1980; Bian 1997; Brown and Reingen 1987). For instance, according to Bian (1997), if influence rather than information is the object of flow through personal networks during job searches, then jobs can be channeled through strong ties more easily than through weak ties.

In addition to job information, research has also focused on how social networks function as carriers and pipelines for the diffusion of cultural information. It is argued that cultural heterogeneity is an

outcome of social network heterogeneity (DiMaggio 1987; Erickson 1996). People with diverse networks interact with others who have diverse cultural repertoires and thus learn diverse cultural knowledge. Especially, drawing upon the works of DiMaggio (1987) and Erickson (1996), Lizardo (2006a) found that not only is cultural heterogeneity the outcome of social network heterogeneity, but the reverse is also true. One's cultural tastes affect his/her social network, and using interpersonal ties, one can enlarge his/her social network by transmitting cultural information.

The importance of Lizardo's (2006a) study results from its unique argument that different types of interpersonal ties diffuse different types of cultural information. Lizardo's (2006a) argument is simple: popular culture and the arts have become two important foci, which connect individuals to make conversations and share information. Since popular culture "provides the stuff of everyday sociability" (DiMaggio 1987:444) and a weakly constraining foci around which different kinds of people can organize joint activities and make conversations (Feld 1981), it is a cultural form that is shared by almost everybody from the different social circles of a network. Therefore, popular culture is more likely to be used to connect and interact with dissimilar others (weaker connections). However, high culture, which provides a highly constraining foci around which only people who have certain characteristics can organize joint activities and make conversations (Feld 1981), is more demanding and arcane than popular culture. Moreover, high culture is less visible and shared than popular culture, and therefore less likely to be used to connect and interact with dissimilar others. High culture is used to sustain local connections. Therefore, popular culture is used to nourish existing weak-tie connections with heterogeneous others, while high culture is used to sustain strong-tie connections with homogeneous others (Lizardo 2006a). Following the above argument, Lizardo (2006a:802) suggests that when two individuals come to interact, "the probability that a popular cultural form (one that is already shared by almost everyone in the social structure) will be selected as the topic of the exchange should be inversely proportional to the strength of the tie between the two individuals. In a similar way, the probability that an unpopular cultural form is selected should be directly proportional to the strength of the tie."

Lizardo's (2006a) findings, implying that popular cultural information (since it is a popular cultural form) tends to be diffused through weak-tie connections and high cultural information (since it is an unpopular cultural form) tends to be diffused through strong-tie connections, seem interesting. However,

these findings are said to be the outcome of a conditional situation. These findings are correct only if individuals want to start a conversation with others or enlarge their social networks through social interaction. For example, as Erickson (1996) points out, sports, as a popular cultural form, is more likely than books or the arts to be used to make conversations with dissimilar others since it is a widely shared and visible genre that help to create cooperative ties between individuals from diverse portions of a network. People are expected to be more familiar with sports (popular culture) than books or the arts (high culture). The problem here lies in the applicability of this assertion to the real world. Both the intention of the actors and the subject matter broached during interaction must therefore be considered in one's everyday conversations. For example, Lizardo (2006a) suggests that conversations between strongly tied individuals will be centered on high culture; however, the real world experience is that both close friends (strong-tie contacts) and acquaintances (weak-tie contacts) often discuss similar topics. Specifically, these topics often revolve around events in popular culture and are discussed especially when the interaction expectation is one of casual conversation. Therefore, I argue that if an individual has no deliberate intentions for starting a conversation/making friends with a dissimilar other(s), his/her priority of choice as a topic for conversation with others, whether they are friends or acquaintances, would be a popular cultural form. Only specific situations in which individuals aim to (1) create a distinct identity, (2) draw boundaries to differentiate themselves from dissimilar others, (3) generate solidarity through strengthening bonds with similar others, and (4) maintain their advantageous status in social, economic, and cultural arenas (Bourdieu 1984; Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000), might require the individual to choose an unpopular cultural form (such as high culture or idioculture³⁷ [Fine 1979]) as the topic of conversation and the type of information for diffusion.

I argue that, in terms of cultural information diffusion, strong ties take precedence over weak ties in diffusing both popular and high cultural information, since through the amplification of trust and emergence of a shared identity, dense networks—strong clustering ties—foster cooperation among actors that can be used for greater volume and depth of information sharing (Coleman 1988; Baum et al. 2012). Also, due to the homophily principle, which points to the fact that homophilous interactions prevail

³⁷ Idioculture refers to the culture of an interacting group of individuals. More specifically, it is defined as “a system of knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs shared by members of an interacting group to which members can refer and employ as the basis of further interaction” (Fine 1979:734).

over heterophilous interactions within social circles, it is argued that information—cultural, behavioral, or material—is more likely to be diffused within the local environment through strong ties than between localities through weak ties (McPherson et al. 2001). Lastly, Brown and Reingen (1987) assert that when both strong and weak ties are available as potential sources of information, actors are more likely to activate their strong ties than weak ties for the flow of information.

As DiMaggio (2009) argues, shared cultural knowledge facilitates and enhances emotional rewards for the knowledge-exchanging individuals and generates a bonding relationship among them. In this sense, it can be suggested that popular culture has a more solidarity-generating characteristic than high culture, and this leads popular culture to be chosen as a topic of conversation more than high culture within social groups. According to Kane (2004), popular cultural activities produce higher levels of solidarity than high cultural activities do since they (1) assemble individuals together to interact with each other, (2) focus their attention to the cultural activity, and (3) lead individuals to have a common emotional mood (Collins 1988). Kane (2004:112) argues that popular cultural activities “provide a physical assembly of people with a common focus of attention and an awareness of that common focus, which in turn leads to a shared emotional tone” and high cultural activities lack this. For example, while activities such as art museum visits, art exhibits, or classical music concerts bring individuals into contact with one another, there is no certainty that individuals stay in the same physical environment for any duration. Visitors of art museums or art galleries might move from room to room as they look at different works of art. Also, they do not share a common emotional mood in high cultural activities. For instance, in classical music concerts, audience members might become emotionally involved with the activity; however, the emotional performance might not produce the same kind of solidarity as the popular cultural activity does since “emotional engagement [at high cultural activities] is expected to be experienced as (and contained within) an individual, while [popular cultural activities such as popular music concerts] allow this engagement to be experienced as a group” (Kane 2004:119). In line with this argument, I expect that individuals are more likely to talk about popular cultural forms than high cultural forms with their strong-tie contacts. This leads to the expectation that as the number of one’s strong-tie contacts increase, his/her opportunity to obtain popular cultural information increases. Therefore, I hypothesize that the higher the

number of strong-tie contacts an individual has, the more frequently s/he obtains popular cultural information (Hypothesis 1a).

Popular culture is less likely to be acquired from distant contacts using weak ties than close contacts using strong ties. The reason for the tendency of popular cultural information diffusion through strong ties rather than weak ties is that popular cultural information is widely shared, highly visible, and easily accessible. Strong ties facilitate the flow of popular cultural information since “cohesion [an indirect result of dense social groups with high numbers of strong-tie connections] around a relationship can ease knowledge transfer by decreasing the competitive and motivational impediments that arise, specifically the fact that knowledge transfer is typically beneficial for the recipient but can be costly for the source [of the information]. Dense third-party ties around the relationship may serve to overcome those impediments” (Reagans and McEvily 2003:242). In this respect, it would be more costly and difficult to obtain this type of information from weak-tie contacts instead of obtaining it from the media or easily accessible strong-tie contacts. I expect that weak-tie contacts do not have any significant effects on the amount of popular cultural information that one obtains. Therefore, I hypothesize that the number of weak-tie contacts (the within-group and between-group weak ties) that one has does not significantly increase the frequency of popular cultural information s/he obtains (Hypothesis 1b). Additionally, due to the highly visible character and easily accessible nature of popular culture, I argue that weak ties that are expected to be functional bridges and diffuse information in a significant manner do not significantly diffuse popular cultural information and therefore remain structural bridges (Proposition 1).³⁸

As Erickson (1996) suggests, social network heterogeneity leads to cultural heterogeneity. Network heterogeneity refers to social relations with different types of people—having both strong-tie and weak-tie contacts. Cultural heterogeneity, in terms of cultural information, refers to having both popular and high cultural informational capital (Bourdieu 1986), or omnivorousness (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Simkus 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996). I argue that weak-tie contacts play a bigger part than strong-tie contacts in providing social network heterogeneity to an individual since all individuals are expected to have at least one strong-tie contact, and these strong-tie contacts only provide homogeneity to the

³⁸ The type of weak ties depicted as structural bridges cannot be tested with data using the obtained amount of information through diffusion as the dependent variable since these weak ties are structural ties and cannot diffuse information, as explained in Section 4.2.1. Therefore, Proposition 1 will not be tested with data, but will be elaborated in the Results and Discussion sections.

individual. In the same way, I argue that high culture plays a bigger part than popular culture in providing cultural heterogeneity to an individual since all individuals are expected to have basic popular cultural information due to its highly visible nature. Therefore, when thinking about the positive relationship between social network heterogeneity and cultural heterogeneity, it is not actually the positive relationship between strong ties and popular culture that leads to both network and cultural variety, but the positive relationship between weak ties and high culture that does. As expressed in Hypothesis 1a, popular cultural information can easily be acquired through the media and strong-tie contacts; however, due to its lack of popularity compared to popular culture, high cultural information is relatively invisible and hardly accessible through the media and personal contacts. Therefore, it can be suggested that the odds of having immediately accessible high cultural information from strong-tie contacts is less likely than weak-tie contacts that are positioned in diverse parts of the social network (Kane 2004).

Additionally, I argue that within-group weak ties and between-group weak ties are not expected to diffuse high cultural information. The reason is that both types of weak ties do not have bridging functions; therefore they do not provide non-redundant information to one's social circle. Redundant high cultural information, in this regard, would diffuse through strong ties before weak ties (within-group and between-group weak ties). Functional bridges, on the other hand, are expected to diffuse high cultural information in a significant manner since the unavailability of this type of information in one's social group can only be satisfied through using functional bridges that are expected to provide non-redundant information from diverse portions of a network. In line with these arguments, it can be asserted that high cultural information does not significantly diffuse through strong ties and weak ties (within-group weak ties, between-group weak ties, and structural bridges). Therefore, I hypothesize that the number of strong-tie contacts (Hypothesis 2a) and weak-tie contacts (Hypothesis 2b) an individual has does not significantly affect the frequency of high cultural information s/he obtains. On the other hand, following the arguments on functional bridges, it is expected that only those weak-tie contacts that are functional bridges diffuse high cultural information in a significant manner (Proposition 2).³⁹

Following the argument on how popular cultural information and high cultural information diffuse through strong ties, weak ties (within-group and between-group), and functional bridges, I investigate how

³⁹ Proposition 2 will be elaborated and converted into a hypothesis in the next section.

an individual's interest in both types of cultures affects the diffusion through interpersonal ties. The interest in the consumption of a wide variety of culture, both high and popular culture, indicates "cultural omnivorousness" (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Simkus 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996).

Omnivorousness resembles what Erickson (1996:224) refers to as cultural variety: "a little working knowledge of a lot of cultural genres combined with a good understanding of which culture to use in which context." Therefore, it can be asserted that omnivorousness as an indicator of cultural variety might lead to social network variety. Previous research shows that individuals who combine both popular and artistic styles of cultural consumption—cultural omnivores—are more likely to have larger network sizes and they are more likely to have connections that span larger distances in social space (DiMaggio 1987; Erickson 1996; Lizardo 2006a, 2011). Omnivorousness, thus, provides individuals a hybrid position with both clustered closure ties, which are expected to enable trust and cooperation within one's social circle, and distant bridging ties, which are expected to provide diverse and non-redundant information between social circles (Baum et al. 2012; Reagans and McEvily 2003).

In line with this argument, it is expected that omnivorous cultural information, which includes both popular and high cultural information, has a diffusion character similar to the diffusion characters of both popular and high cultural information. I argue that following the diffusion character of popular cultural information, which diffuses through strong ties and not through weak ties and functional bridges, omnivorous cultural information diffuses among cultural omnivores through strong ties within a social circle. On the other hand, following the diffusion character of high cultural information, which diffuses only through functional bridges and not through strong ties or weak ties, omnivorous cultural information diffuses among cultural omnivores through functional bridges between social circles. This time, omnivorous cultural information must be novel and non-redundant; otherwise it would diffuse through strong ties within the social circle. Therefore, I expect the omnivorous cultural information to diffuse among cultural omnivores through strong ties within social circles and through functional bridges between social circles. In line with this reasoning, I hypothesize that the more strong-tie contacts a cultural omnivore has, the more frequently s/he obtains omnivorous cultural information (Hypothesis 3a). The number of weak-tie contacts (within-group weak ties, between-group weak ties, and structural bridges) a cultural omnivore has are not hypothesized to significantly affect the frequency of omnivorous cultural

information s/he obtains (Hypothesis 3b). Additionally, similar to Proposition 2, only those weak ties that are functional bridges are expected to diffuse omnivorous cultural information in a significant manner (Proposition 3).⁴⁰

Finally, I would like to close this section with an assertion that popular cultural information is less likely than high cultural information to have a diffusion pattern, similar to the model conceptualized in the previous section. The reason for this is that popular culture is more publicized and visible than high culture. Therefore, popular cultural information is less likely than less publicized and less visible high cultural information to be diffused through functional bridges linking different social clusters. This leads to the argument that popular cultural information is less likely than high cultural information to follow the five-stage diffusion process; because the conceptualized model of diffusion process requires unique, invisible, and not easily reachable information that starts to diffuse from one node within a social circle and ends with one node within another social circle. However, popular cultural information is easy to obtain, especially through the media, and therefore the heightened availability of popular cultural information in many clusters at the same time prevents the usage of functional bridges for the diffusion process of the total social system. This easy availability of popular cultural information in many clusters at the same time is expected to break the conceptualized diffusion pattern for the total social system, which is less likely to occur with high cultural information.

In the next section, I will focus on the “functional bridge” concept and elaborate the propositions that I suggested to test its accuracy and applicability within the social networks (Propositions 2 and 3).

4.2.4. Liaison Persons

In Section 4.2.1, I defined structural bridges as weak ties that span structural holes and bridge otherwise unconnected social clusters. Then I differentiated functional bridges from structural bridges and defined them as structural bridges that diffuse resources, information, or influence (whatever is being diffused) when required. The formation of a structural bridge or a functional bridge is dependent upon the weak tie’s ability to diffuse resources, information, or influence between otherwise unconnected social clusters. In order to fully understand the formation of bridges, whether structural or functional, we must consider: what causes a structural bridge to diffuse resources and thus being converted to a functional

⁴⁰ Proposition 3 will be elaborated and converted into a hypothesis in the next section.

bridge, what kinds of people serve as the brokers and bridgers that serve to hold the clusters together through functional bridges, and what are the social properties of these individuals who connect social clusters separated by structural holes. These considerations must be assessed in order to expand upon the functions of weak ties and comprehend the diffusion process throughout the total social network.

A structural bridge consists of a tie between two individuals from different and unconnected social groups. The diffusion that converts a structural bridge to a functional bridge occurs between these two individuals—what Granovetter (1973) refers to as “liaison persons.” According to Burt (1999:49-50), a liaison person, who is in the position to create bridges between otherwise unconnected contacts, is “an entrepreneur in the literal sense of the word—a person who adds value by brokering the connection between others.” These individuals “with contact networks rich in structural holes are individuals who know about, have a hand in, and exercise control over rewarding opportunities,” and are identified as opinion leaders in diffusion research (Burt 1999:49-50). The importance of liaison persons comes from their favorable structural positions, which provide them social and economic advantages based on their access to specific types of information through the weak ties they have, that connect them to others.

Liaison persons, who span structural holes through creating bridging ties, have three advantages over others: information breadth, timing, and arbitrage (Burt et al. 2013). Connecting with a variety of others in different social circles through functional bridges, liaison persons (1) access information and resources more than others in their own social circle as early as possible, (2) gain an advantage over others by mediating them, (3) exercise control over this advantage through choosing with whom to interact and share this advantage, and thus (4) offer an alternative to others in their own social circle (Kadushin 2012).

Following the above argument on liaison persons, I assert that diffusion in a significant manner through functional bridges has two important components: the personal characteristics of the liaison persons and the type of information that is diffused. This means that the conversion of a structural bridge to a functional bridge and significant diffusion afterwards depends on the harmony between the two liaison persons at the very ends of a functional bridge and the compatibility between the liaison persons and the type of information intended to be diffused from one to the other.

It has been suggested that an actor's moral-cultural worldviews have an association with his/her core personal network (Vaisey and Lizardo 2010). This means that an actor's social contacts whose behaviors, tastes, and expressive styles are not compatible with him/her will be less likely to be selected (thus tend to decay) for interaction, communication, or diffusion (thus stay as structural bridges and not become functional bridges) by the actor than social contacts who exhibit compatible cues with the actor (Vaisey and Lizardo 2010). In light of this, I argue that before diffusing any type of information to one another, "actors must possess, in addition to generic knowledge of relationships and their information obligations, a sense of others' idiosyncratic information needs and expectations" (Ryan 2006:242). This means that actors in the position of information sources (e.g., liaison person 1) are expected to know what their potential receivers (e.g., liaison person 2) already know and what these receivers expect to be told (Ryan 2006). On the one hand, what the receivers already know is an important part to consider for the source since redundant information that flows from him/her to a potential receiver might be perceived as social gaffes. Also, they don't want to appear intrusive by offering information without assurance that it is sought (Marsden and Campbell 2012). On the other hand, what is expected from the receiver becomes more of an issue since information that will not be appreciated by the receiver might also be perceived as redundant. For example, high cultural information from a "snob"⁴¹ source to a "slob"⁴² receiver will not be appreciated and will be perceived as redundant (Peterson and Simkus 1992). Also, as Erickson (1996) states in her research on culture in the workplace, choosing books or the arts as conversation topics rather than sports, may not be appreciated by one's co-workers because they may not have the necessary means to appreciate these topics. Therefore, in the case of high and omnivorous cultural information, it can be expected that the source (the liaison person at the first end of the structural bridge) will use his/her structural bridge to diffuse information and convert it to a functional bridge if s/he knows that the receiver (the other liaison person at the second end of the structural bridge) will appreciate and understand the information and accept it without resistance. The source's choice to send the information to the receiver or not is important because the information flow between a source and a receiver depends on the ease of transfer from the perspective of the source. A less time-consuming and effortless transfer,

⁴¹ A Snob is an individual who only consumes high culture and despises lowbrow cultural activities, namely most popular cultural activities.

⁴² A Slob is an individual who consumes lowbrow activities indiscriminately and stays away from high cultural activities.

resulting from the receiver's openness to learn, will be preferred by the source, and if the transfer demands more time and effort, the source might give up the transfer (Reagans and McEvily 2003). These arguments support the idea that information is easier to be transferred from a source to a recipient if both have similar background characteristics (Reagans and McEvily 2003) or information capacities. In line with this reasoning, I expect that liaison persons with different personal and background characteristics (such as gender, race, age, educational attainment, and occupational prestige) tend to send or receive different types of information through functional bridges. So, for example, two female (or white, educated, poor, etc.) liaison persons, for instance, are expected to send or receive a different type of information from two male (or black, uneducated, wealthy, etc.) liaison persons. I call this concept Functional Bridge-Liaison Person-Information Proposition—FLI Proposition. A source tends to diffuse information to a receiver whose personal and background characteristics are compatible with the type of information; and vice versa, a receiver tends to receive information that is compatible with his/her personal and background characteristics. The reason for this is that people with different characteristics tend to be good at appreciating, understanding, and accepting different types of information. For instance, two female (or white, educated, poor, etc.) liaison persons might be good at appreciating, understanding, and accepting a different type of information from two male (or black, uneducated, wealthy, etc.) liaison persons. In accordance with the FLI Proposition, I claim that Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, which suggest that functional bridges significantly diffuse high and omnivorous cultural information, respectively, should be developed.⁴³ In this case, I argue that gender in comparison to other personal characteristics becomes an important predictor of liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse high and omnivorous cultural information. Moreover, women in comparison to men become the highly likely candidates to be liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse high and omnivorous cultural information.

It can be suggested that gender is an important characteristic that determine the amount of cultural information an individual obtains. For instance, previous research shows that women are more interested than men in cultural activities (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Bryson 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; Kane 2004). Therefore, I argue that women are more likely than men to obtain cultural information,

⁴³ Proposition 1 does not suggest functional bridges to significantly diffuse popular cultural information; therefore it will not be developed here.

especially high and omnivorous cultural information. However, it can also be suggested that other personal characteristics are important for the amount of cultural information an individual obtains. Following the previous research (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; DiMaggio and Ostrower 1990; Bryson 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004), it is expected that more educated, wealthier, older, and white individuals are more interested in cultural activities than less educated, poorer, younger, and black individuals. In this regard, I also expect that educated, wealthier, older, and white individuals are more likely than their less educated, poorer, younger, and black counterparts to obtain cultural information, especially high and omnivorous cultural information. While there does not seem to be a difference between gender and other personal characteristics in terms of cultural information obtainment, the reason for gender rather than other personal characteristics such as education, wealth, age, marital status, or race to become the (potential) predictor of liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse high and omnivorous cultural information lies in its importance for the diffusion of information through social networks.

In the context of education (or wealth, age, race, etc.), for instance, I argue that while there is a difference between an educated and an uneducated individual in the amount of cultural information they obtain, there is no difference between them in the amount of cultural information they obtain through their social networks. In other words, I state that through the resources, such as TV, newspaper, and the Internet, an educated individual might obtain significantly more cultural information than an uneducated individual since s/he is expected to be more interested in cultural activities than his/her uneducated counterpart. However, I argue that the usage of their personal networks does not provide such a difference between an educated and an uneducated individual in the amount of cultural information they obtain. Gender, on the other hand, is argued to have a unique position in this issue. I expect that there is not only a difference between a female and a male individual in the amount of cultural information they obtain through TV, newspaper, and the Internet, but also through their social networks. This unique position of gender, compared to other personal characteristics, results from the significant difference between males and females in their usages of social networks for information obtainment, which will next be discussed.

Research shows that women are historically more disadvantaged than men in accessing diverse networks since their social networks are mainly based on strong-tie connections (Marsden and Hurlbert

1988; Lin 2001; Moren-Cross and Lin 2008). There are few studies associating women with weak ties and examining how women function as bridgers between social circles (Dindia and Allen 1992; Crowell 2004; Zhang et al. 2014). For instance, as Mickelson (1989) argues, the different patterns of judgment and behavior between men and women might occur due to differences in their socialization periods in which women are socialized to place greater importance on relationships, while men are socialized to place greater importance on themselves. Therefore, women tend to focus on others during social interactions, and thus have higher concern for others. In contrast, men tend to focus on themselves, and have higher concerns for self (Zhang et al. 2014:1099). Thus, this indicates that women tend to become better connectors than men between otherwise unconnected social circles. As an example, Dindia and Allen (1992) suggest that females are more likely than males to disclose information to both strong and weak ties and thus creating bridging connections between social circles. This section, in this sense, attempts to provide further support for this situation: gender (women versus men) as the potential predictor of the liaison persons for the diffusion of cultural information, especially high and omnivorous cultural information.

Women's higher rates of participation and consumption of traditionally high status cultural activities has been one of the most consistent findings in the literature (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Bryson 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; Kane 2004). Research shows that women participate in and consume high culture more than men and appear to assign more legitimacy to high culture (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Bryson 1996; Kane 2004). Several reasons have been presented for the gender gap in high cultural consumption: gender differences in early socialization (Mickelson 1989; Dindia and Allen 1992; Dumais 2002), society-wide cultural norms (Collins 1992; Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000), and labor force participation and gendered occupational cultures (Lizardo 2006b). For example, Collins (1992) argues that women are more likely than men to be involved in high cultural activities since they are overrepresented in occupations that are more compatible with the culture-producing sectors such as education and the arts. This means that both men and women who work in occupations compatible with the culture-producing sectors should have similar levels of high cultural consumption. However, Bihagen and Katz-Gerro (2000:343) contradict Collins' (1992) argument that gender differences in high cultural consumption should be smaller within the cultural sectors and instead assert that "the gender

differences... persist in significance and size across educational categories, age categories, income levels, and across most occupational classes” since they argue that gender is an independent source of differentiation in cultural consumption. Bihagen and Katz-Gerro (2000) also argue that women tend to be more engaged in high culture since they represent a role model for their children and desire to cultivate their children’s cultural capital.

Lizardo (2006b) suggests that labor force participation is an important predictor for the gender difference in high cultural consumption. Lizardo (2006b) argues that in market sector occupations, where economic capital outweighs cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984), men stay away from occupation-irrelevant forms of cultural activities (basically high cultural activities) more than women in order not to be seen as deviant by other same-sex co-workers. However, in the cultural sector, where cultural capital outweighs economic capital (Bourdieu 1984), men and women consume highbrow culture at similar rates and the gender gap in high cultural consumption disappears (Lizardo 2006b). This research shows the conditional influence of labor market on the gender gap in high cultural consumption. Finally, Upright’s research provides a comparison of women to men in their levels of cultural consumption, and consequently supports women’s higher participation in cultural activities than men. Upright (2004) shows that while women significantly affect their husbands’ cultural participation, men do not have such an effect on their wives’ cultural participation. Also, women tend to attend particular cultural activities without their husbands, and men are much more likely to attend cultural activities if their wives do so as well. The influence of women on their husbands’ cultural consumption exceeds the influence of men on their wives’ behavior (Upright 2004). These findings strongly support women’s higher interests in culture in general and high culture in particular.

The above arguments demonstrating the consumption and consequently the interest gap in high culture between men and women support the fact that after controlling for factors such as education, occupational class position, age, family status, and income, women tend to be more active in high culture, while men tend to be more active in popular culture (DiMaggio 1982; Bryson 1996; Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000). Assuming that gender is the most compatible personal characteristic of a liaison person who intends to diffuse cultural information through functional bridges, the explicit fact that women are more interested in high culture than men can then be associated with the FLI Proposition. Thus, Proposition 2,

which asserts functional bridges to diffuse high cultural information in a significant manner, can be developed and stated as follows: female liaison persons diffuse significantly more high cultural information than male liaison persons through functional bridges (Hypothesis 2c).

In addition to female's higher consumption of and interest in high culture, the content of cultural activities such as reading (e.g., books, magazines), listening (e.g., music, radio), and viewing (e.g., TV), which are generally perceived as popular cultural activities, are also more highbrow oriented for women than for men (Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000). Moreover, women still have a high level of cultural variety in popular cultural forms with the exception of some genres such as sports (Erickson 1996) and heavy metal music (Bryson 1996). Therefore, it can be suggested that women tend to be more omnivorous than men. In this case, Proposition 3, which asserts functional bridges diffuse omnivorous cultural information in a significant manner, has been developed in accordance with the FLI Proposition as follows: female liaison persons diffuse significantly more omnivorous cultural information than male liaison persons through functional bridges (Hypothesis 3c).

So far, I have prepared hypotheses to test how interpersonal ties and functional bridges diffuse cultural information. For these hypotheses, I assume that the FLI Proposition is correct. However, lastly, I would like to test the validity of the FLI Proposition. To do that, I will examine job information with the FLI Proposition and address whether gender as the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse cultural information also predicts job information diffusion or not. Thus, I will be able to see whether the assertion in the FLI Proposition—that is, different types of information diffuse through functional bridges which are held by individuals with different personal and background characteristics—is correct or not.

I argued above that gender (being female rather than male) is the most compatible background characteristic for an individual to be a liaison person for a functional bridge that diffuses cultural information. However, I argue that job information requires an individual to have a different characteristic rather than being female to be diffused through functional bridges. In other words, job information tends not to be diffused through female liaison persons; because this time gender as a background characteristic for an individual does not have priority and superiority as it does over other characteristics

in diffusing cultural information. Job information requires liaison persons to have a different personal characteristic than gender (being female), which complies with cultural information diffusion.

As Burt (1999) indicates, liaison persons tend to be opinion leaders. According to Coleman (1988:S117), “an individual who serves as a source of information for another because he is well informed [e.g., liaison persons for their own social cluster] ordinarily acquires that information for his own benefit, not for others who make use of him.” Opinion leaders might be an exception in this situation since they share their information to maintain their structural position as opinion leaders (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Coleman 1990). Opinion leaders share information with the expectation that those who acquire information from them will pay deference or gratitude for the information they get. This is reminiscent of the conversion of cultural capital into symbolic capital that was mentioned in Chapter 2.

In this sense, research (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Yakubovich 2005) shows that efficient job information is significantly acquired from individuals who are positioned in the upper strata of the occupational structure rather than female individuals. This indicates the importance of occupational prestige (and most likely social prestige) rather than gender for the diffusion of job information. In other words, it can be argued that liaison persons who have prestigious jobs are highly likely to acquire novel job information and share it with others in their own social clusters to maintain their structural position as opinion leaders. This suggests that while women as liaison persons and opinion leaders might serve as sources of cultural information for others in their own social circles, they are unlikely to serve as sources of job information. People with prestigious jobs (thus occupational and social prestige as the personal characteristic) are more likely than women (thus gender as the personal characteristic) to serve as sources of job information for others. Based on these arguments, research findings, and the FLI Proposition, I expect occupational prestige to be the predicting personal characteristic for the liaison persons that diffuse job information through functional bridges. In this sense, I hypothesize that liaison persons with prestigious jobs significantly diffuse more job information than liaison persons with less prestigious jobs through functional bridges (Hypothesis 4).

4.3. Data and Measures

4.3.1. Data

To test my hypotheses, I use the 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2002), which is administered by National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to a nationally representative sample of 2,765 non-institutionalized English-speaking persons 18 years of age or over residing in the US. The 2002 GSS contains questions on cultural information obtainment frequencies, and a network module that includes questions on social network characteristics and tie strength. With these, the 2002 GSS provides a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between network structure and cultural characteristics with its high-quality and representative dataset of American population.

4.3.2. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables, in this study, are “popular cultural information obtained” (PCIO), “high cultural information obtained” (HCIO), “omnivorous cultural information obtained” (OCIO), and “job information obtained” (JIO). All four dependent variables are ordinal variables measuring the number of times an individual obtained information during a twelve-month period.

For the PCIO dependent variable, respondents were asked to indicate how many times they “obtained information about a concert, play, or other performing-arts event in the past year.” For the HCIO dependent variable, respondents were asked how many times they “obtained information about an exhibit or other event at an art museum or art gallery in the past year.” For the JIO dependent variable, respondents were asked how many times they “searched for information about a new job or explored career opportunities in the past year.” The response categories for these three dependent variables range from “not at all” (0), “one or two times” (1), “3-5 times” (2), and “6 or more times” (3). As can be seen here, none of the three questions specifically ask about obtained/searched information through social networks. An individual might not only use his/her personal network to obtain/search information, but also use other media such as TV, newspapers, the Internet, and etc. Therefore, the usage of these questions to analyze the effect of an individual’s personal network on his/her obtainment/search of information might provide conservative and underestimated results. However, this usage can also be justified as such. Culture in the form of cultural information is an important way of starting conversations/making friends with others; therefore, people might obtain cultural information through their social contacts in addition to other media.

Also, high and omnivorous cultural information might be shared among individuals (e.g., snobs, individuals with wealth, and individuals with high prestige) who aim to create a distinct identity by drawing boundaries to differentiate themselves from dissimilar others (Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000). Lastly, some people might be interested in sharing cultural information with others to maintain their advantageous status in social, economic, and cultural arenas (Bourdieu 1984; Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000) by showing others what they have (in this case, the diffusion of cultural information occurs, for instance, between a dominant and a submissive actor; thus, the dominant actor maintains his/her social status by acquiring social prestige, and the submissive actor acquires cultural information).

The OCIO dependent variable indicates how many times a respondent obtained both popular and high cultural information in the past year. The OCIO dependent variable was operationalized as follows: first, I coded the OCIO dependent variable as 0 if either of the PCIO and HCIO dependent variables is 0. In other words, in order for the OCIO dependent variable to be other than 0, both of the PCIO and HCIO dependent variables must be other than 0. Then, I coded the OCIO dependent variable as the sum of the PCIO and HCIO dependent variables for these cases. Thus, the measure consists of six categories, 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (there is no 1 category since 1 represents either popular or high cultural information and does not represent omnivorous cultural information). Finally, I recoded the measure from 2-6 to 1-5. In this way, the final measure represents whether the information obtained is omnivorous or not (0 or not) with the degree of omnivorousness, ranging from 1 to 5.

4.3.3. Independent Variables

The independent variables that I use in this study are: the number of strong ties a respondent has, the number of weak ties a respondent has, educational level, family income, age, age-squared, gender, marital status, level of cultural participation, level of political participation, race, size of community, number of children, and occupational prestige score.

In order to define the numbers of strong and weak ties a respondent has, I followed Lizardo's (2006a) operationalization of Ego-network density. Here, the total network size of a respondent is determined as a response to this question: "Not counting people at work or family at home, about how many other friends or relatives do you keep in contact with at least once a year." This count variable represents the number of social contacts a respondent has kept in touch with at least once in the last year

(his/her total network size). Then, I identified the number of strong and weak ties a respondent has. First, I determined the number of strong ties a respondent keeps in touch with as a response to this question: "Of these friends and relatives [connected at least once in the last year by the respondent], about how many would you say you are really close to, that is, close enough to discuss personal or important problems with?" The usage of this question as an indicator of a respondent's strong ties is consistent with Granovetter's (1973:1361) definition of a tie and Marsden and Campbell's (1984) argument of tie strength (also see Lizardo [2006a]). Second, I determined the number of weak ties a respondent keeps in touch with by subtracting his/her number of strong ties from his/her total network size.

In addition, following the arguments on functional bridges and the FLI Proposition, presented in the previous section, that assert gender to be the predicting personal characteristic for the liaison persons that ensures significant diffusion of cultural information and occupational prestige to be the predicting personal characteristic for the liaison persons that ensures significant diffusion of job information, I expect that weak ties that do not significantly transmit information become functional bridges when interacted with gender for cultural information and with occupational prestige for job information. Therefore, in order to test the FLI Proposition and the functional bridges, I created two interaction variables between gender and weak ties and between occupational prestige and weak ties.

Higher education appears to be significantly related to greater participation in cultural activities, especially in high cultural activities; therefore I expect that a respondent's educational level will significantly affect his/her intention to obtain cultural information. The educational level independent variable ranges from 0 to 20 years of education. On the other hand, financial status, measured by family income in this study, seems ambivalent in its association with a respondent's intention to obtain cultural information, especially on high cultural information. The family income independent variable, which ranges from "under \$1,000" to "\$110,000 or over," was recoded to the midpoint value for each category (the last category was recoded as \$150,000) and then converted to \$1,000 units for simplicity of interpretation.

Age, age-squared, and the number of children are count variables. Gender was coded male (0) and female (1). Two dummy variables were created for race: white (reference category), black, and other race. Marital status was operationalized using two dummy variables: single (reference category) that

indicates respondents who have never married, married, and widowed/divorced/separated, which combines respondents who were widowed, divorced, and separated. The occupational prestige score variable ranges from 17 to 86. The size of community variable contains a broad range of categories. Therefore it was operationalized using three dummy variables that combined some categories together: "large city" (reference category) that combines "within an SMSA and a large central city (over 250,000)" and "a medium size central city (50,000 to 250,000);" "suburb" that combines "a suburb of a large central city," "a suburb of a medium size central city," "an unincorporated area of a large central city (division, township, etc.)," and "an incorporated area of a medium central city;" "small city" that represents "not within an SMSA, (within a county) and a small city (10,000 to 49,999);" and "village" that combines "a town or village (2,500 to 9,999)," "an incorporated area less than 2,500 or an unincorporated area of 1,000 to 2,499," and "open county within larger civil divisions, e.g., township, division."

A respondent's levels of cultural and political participation are potential indicators of his/her social network and thus his/her immediately accessible resources for cultural information. Therefore, these variables were included in the analysis. The level of cultural participation is an index that includes seven activities indicating a respondent's interest in cultural activities. The formulation of the questions on these seven activities is as follows: "Did you do (visit, attend, or read) _____ within the past twelve months?" The activities are: "visit an art museum or gallery," "go to a live ballet or dance performance, not including school performances," "go to a classical music or opera performance, not including school performance," "go out to see a movie in a theater," "read novels, poems, or plays," "went to a live performance of popular music," and "went to a live drama." The level of political participation is also an index that includes seven activities indicating a respondent's interest in political activities. The formulation of the questions on these seven activities is as follows: "Over the past 5 years have you done any of the following to express your opinion?" The activities are: "boycotting a product," "sign a petition or an e-mail letter," "join a protest rally or march," "contact an elected official by phone, letter, or e-mail," "give money to a group advocating social change," "contribute your time to help the needy," and "participate in a walkathon or marathon to raise money for a cause."

For both the "level of cultural participation" and the "level of political participation" independent variables, I added the number of "yes" responses to the seven activities for each respondent. The total

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable Name	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variables				
Popular Cultural Info.	1.071	1.135	0	3
High Cultural Info	.552	.892	0	3
Omnivorous Cul. Info.	.825	1.477	0	5
Job Information	.742	1.069	0	3
Independent Variables				
Education	13.364	2.974	0	20
Family Income ^a	50.096	40.840	.5	150
Age	46.283	17.370	18	89
Female	.555	.496	0	1
Marital Status				
<i>Single (Ref)</i>	.256	.436	0	1
<i>Married</i>	.458	.498	0	1
<i>Divorced</i>	.284	.451	0	1
Cultural Participation	1.878	1.848	0	7
Political Participation	1.945	1.740	0	7
Race				
<i>White (Ref)</i>	.791	.406	0	1
<i>Black</i>	.148	.355	0	1
<i>Other Race</i>	.060	.238	0	1
Size of Residence				
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>	.315	.464	0	1
<i>Suburb</i>	.443	.496	0	1
<i>Small City</i>	.082	.275	0	1
<i>Village</i>	.158	.365	0	1
Number of Children	1.810	1.687	0	8
Occ. Prestige Score	43.864	13.913	17	86
Tie Strength				
<i>Strong Ties^b</i>	7.976	10.200	0	75
<i>Weak Ties^c</i>	21.899	34.195	0	200

^a Values are divided by 1,000

^b Values above 75 truncated at 75

^c Values above 200 truncated at 200

scores for each independent variable range from 0 (no activities at all) to 7 (every one of the seven activities). Cultural participation items are correlated with each other and show sufficient reliability (Cronbach's alpha= .71). Political participation items are also correlated with each other and show sufficient reliability (Cronbach's alpha= .68). Descriptive statistics with regard to the dependent and independent variables are displayed in Table 4.1.

4.4. Results

To understand how cultural information (popular, high, and omnivorous) diffuse through one's strong and weak ties, in Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 respectively, I present a series of multiple regression models,⁴⁴ in which I regress popular, high, and omnivorous cultural information obtained against strong- and weak-tie network density measures and some control variables. In Model 1 of Table 4.2 (Table 4.3, Table 4.4), I present a baseline model showing the effects of the control variables on how often an individual obtained popular (high, omnivorous) cultural information in the past year, that is, the diffusion of popular (high, omnivorous) cultural information from one individual to the other. In the next two models (Model 2 and Model 3), I include the separate effects of strong and weak ties respectively on the obtainment frequency of popular (high, omnivorous) cultural information. In Model 4, I show the effects of both strong and weak ties on the obtainment frequency of popular (high, omnivorous) cultural information and examine the relative effects of these two types of interpersonal ties on the diffusion of information from one individual to the other. Finally, in Model 5, I test an interaction effect between gender and weak ties to examine whether functional bridges held by female liaison persons, compared to male liaison persons, significantly transmit more high and omnivorous cultural information from one individual to the other.

4.4.1. Diffusion of Popular Cultural Information

As shown in Model 1 of Table 4.2, individuals who are highly educated, wealthy, and eager to participate in cultural and political activities, obtain popular cultural information more frequently than

⁴⁴ Since all of the four dependent variables (PCIO, HCIO, OCIO, and JIO) are ordinal variables, which are ordered and coded as consecutive integers, I first used Ordered Logit as the method to analyze the dependent variables. Then I treated the ordinal dependent variables as continuous and estimated them using OLS Regression. Both methods gave similar results in terms of signs and significance of coefficients. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity of interpretation, I presented the results of OLS Regression in this chapter. The Ordered Logit estimates of the dependent variables can be seen in Appendix.

Table 4.2 Multiple Regression Estimates of Popular Cultural Information Obtained

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1230)			Model 2 (N=1212)			Model 3 (N=1212)			Model 4 (N=1212)		
	b		SE	b		SE	b		SE	b		SE
Education	.0451	***	.0115	.0448	***	.0115	.0456	***	.0116	.0444	***	.0115
Family Income	.0028	***	.0008	.0025	**	.0008	.0026	***	.0008	.0025	**	.0008
Age	-.0298	**	.0101	-.0260	**	.0102	-.0284	**	.0102	-.0257	*	.0102
Age-Squared	.0001		.0001	.0001		.0001	.0001		.0001	.0001		.0001
Female	-.0446		.0561	-.0450		.0564	-.0445		.0568	-.0454		.0565
Marital Status												
<i>Single (Ref)</i>												
<i>Married</i>	-.0359		.0831	-.0321		.0835	-.0399		.0840	-.0316		.0835
<i>Divorced</i>	.0958		.0899	.0894		.0905	.0945		.0910	.0911		.0905
Cultural Participation	.3657	***	.0322	.3413	***	.0325	.3538	***	.0325	.3402	***	.0325
Political Participation	.1057	***	.0181	.0952	***	.0183	.0995	***	.0184	.0935	***	.0184
Race												
<i>White (Ref)</i>												
<i>Black</i>	-.0742		.0815	-.0397		.0826	-.0672		.0828	-.0366		.0827
<i>Other Race</i>	-.1463		.1127	-.1146		.1132	-.1349		.1138	-.1105		.1133
Size of Residence												
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>												
<i>Suburb</i>	-.0954		.0654	-.0868		.0656	-.0978		.0659	-.0864		.0656
<i>Small City</i>	-.0750		.1061	-.0715		.1065	-.0688		.1072	-.0712		.1066
<i>Village</i>	-.2465	**	.0853	-.2587	**	.0852	-.2582	**	.0858	-.2619	**	.0853
Number of Children	-.0271		.0203	-.0346		.0204	-.0299		.0206	-.0355		.0205
Tie Strength												
<i>Strong Ties</i>				.0120	***	.0028				.0114	***	.0029
<i>Weak Ties</i>							.0016	*	.0009	.0007		.0009
Female*Weak Ties												
Constant	.9312	***	.2557	.8016	**	.2580	.8968	***	.2584	.7984	**	.2581
Adj. R ²	.2963			.3007			.2923			.3005		

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

others. For instance, holding all other variables constant at their means, the level of education (family income, cultural participation, political participation), when changed from one standard deviation (SD) below the mean to one SD above the mean changes the predicted frequency of popular cultural information an individual obtains from .97 (.98, .80, .91) to 1.22 (1.21, 1.46, 1.28) times of obtainment. On the other hand, individuals who are older and who live in small-sized communities such as towns and villages, obtain popular cultural information less frequently than others. Interestingly, gender, race, and marital status do not have significant relationships with the obtainment frequency of popular cultural information.

In Model 2 and Model 3, it can be seen that one's strong and weak ties separately have significant positive associations with the obtainment frequency of popular cultural information. However, the effect of one's weak ties loses its significance when both strong and weak ties are included in the model, as shown in Model 4. This illustrates that individuals use their strong-tie contacts more than their weak-tie contacts to obtain popular cultural information. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b; that is, the number of an individual's strong ties has a significant positive relationship with the amount of popular cultural information s/he obtains, and the number of an individual's weak ties does not have such an association. For instance, holding all other variables constant at their means, from one SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, the effect of one's strong ties changes the predicted frequency of obtained popular cultural information from 1.01 to 1.22 times of obtainment. On the other hand, his/her weak ties changes the predicted frequency of obtained popular cultural information from 1.09 to 1.13 times of obtainment, which is, compared to the effect of his/her strong ties, negligible.

Lastly, in separate models, I tested whether the interaction terms between the control variables (including gender in line with the FLI Proposition) used in this study and weak ties have any significant relationships with the obtainment frequency of popular cultural information. The reason for these tests was to examine whether any personal characteristics (the control variables used in this study) come to the forefront as the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse popular cultural information through functional bridges, in line with the FLI Proposition. However, none of the interaction terms had significant associations with the obtainment frequency of popular cultural information; therefore, these models were not presented in Table 4.2. I argue that these findings provide support for

Proposition 1, which suggests that popular cultural information does not significantly diffuse through functional bridges. In other words, the unavailability of a predicting personal characteristic that represents the liaison persons for popular cultural information—the insignificant results of the interaction terms—indicates the dysfunctionality of weak ties, which link otherwise unconnected social circles, for popular cultural information across social circles.

4.4.2. Diffusion of High Cultural Information

Model 1 of Table 4.3 shows that individuals who are highly educated and are frequent participants in cultural and political activities obtain high cultural information more frequently than others. Net of other variables, from one SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, educational level (cultural participation, political participation) changes the predicted frequency of high cultural information obtainment from .50 (.19, .43) to .60 (.99, .67) times of obtainment. Compared to its association with popular cultural information obtainment, family income does not have any significant relationship with high cultural information obtainment. This is consistent with the previous research that attaches more importance to education than income in high cultural consumption and participation (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Halle 1992). Other control variables do not have significant relationships with the obtainment frequency of high cultural information except for being divorced and living in a small community, which have negative associations with this dependent variable.

In Models 2 and 3 of Table 4.3, I examine the separate effects of one's strong and weak ties on his/her obtainment frequency of high cultural information. However, as seen in these models, neither an individual's strong ties nor his/her weak ties show significance. In Model 4, I examine the relative effects of one's strong and weak ties on how often s/he obtains high cultural information. This model also shows that one's strong- and weak-tie contacts do not provide him/her a potential resource for high cultural information. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b that the number of an individual's strong and weak-tie contacts does not significantly affect the amount of high cultural information s/he obtains.

In Model 5, I test whether high cultural information diffuses through functional bridges and whether gender (women compared to men) becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison

Table 4.3 Multiple Regression Estimates of High Cultural Information Obtained

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1230)		Model 2 (N=1212)		Model 3 (N=1212)		Model 4 (N=1212)		Model 5 (N=1212)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Education	.0171 *	.0086	.0187 *	.0087	.0185 *	.0087	.0184 *	.0087	.0175 *	.0087
Family Income	-.0003	.0006	-.0003	.0006	-.0003	.0006	-.0003	.0006	-.0003	.0006
Age	-.0002	.0076	.0002	.0077	.0001	.0077	.0005	.0077	-.0004	.0070
Age-Squared	-.0001	.0007	-.0001	.0001	.0000	.0001	.0000	.0001	-.0001	.0001
Female	.0157	.0421	.0218	.0426	.0216	.0426	.0214	.0426	-.0460	.0498
Marital Status										
<i>Single (Ref)</i>										
<i>Married</i>	-.0492	.0625	-.0515	.0630	-.0522	.0630	-.0510	.0630	-.0580	.0629
<i>Divorced</i>	-.1370 *	.0676	-.1394 *	.0683	-.1373 *	.0683	-.1378 *	.0683	-.1417 *	.0682
Cultural Participation	.4462 ***	.0242	.4424 ***	.0245	.4433 ***	.0244	.4413 ***	.0245	.4406 ***	.0245
Political Participation	.0674 ***	.0136	.0631 ***	.0138	.0624 ***	.0138	.0616 ***	.0139	.0617 ***	.0138
Race										
<i>White (Ref)</i>										
<i>Black</i>	-.0676	.0613	-.0577	.0624	-.0591	.0621	-.0547	.0624	-.0541	.0623
<i>Other Race</i>	-.0431	.0847	-.0358	.0855	-.0354	.0854	-.0320	.0856	-.0343	.0854
Size of Residence										
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>										
<i>Suburb</i>	-.0492	.0491	-.0463	.0495	-.0475	.0494	-.0459	.0495	-.0470	.0494
<i>Small City</i>	-.0335	.0797	-.0317	.0804	-.0310	.0804	-.0314	.0804	-.0362	.0803
<i>Village</i>	-.1384 **	.0641	-.1528 **	.0643	-.1552 **	.0644	-.1557 **	.0644	-.1528 **	.0643
Number of Children	.0037	.0152	.0014	.0154	.0014	.0154	.0006	.0155	.0003	.0154
Tie Strength										
<i>Strong Ties</i>			.0021	.0021			.0016	.0022	.0016	.0022
<i>Weak Ties</i>					.0008	.0006	.0007	.0007	-.0013	.0010
Female*Weak Ties									.0034 **	.0013
Constant	-.0141	.1923	-.0556	.1948	-.0447	.1939	-.0587	.1949	.0194	.1967
Adj. R ²	.3484		.3487		.3489		.3487		.3518	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

persons for this kind of information diffusion. In order to do this, I include the interaction term between gender and weak ties into the model. I can now observe whether women are more likely to become liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse high cultural information than men.⁴⁵ In this model, strong ties still show no significance; however, the effect of weak ties on the obtainment frequency of high cultural information significantly differs between females and males. For instance, from one SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, the number of weak ties changes the predicted frequency of high cultural information obtainment from .52 to .63 times for females, in comparison to .56 to .50 times for males. The significant interaction term between gender and weak ties strongly coincides with the argument made in Section 4.2.4, which asserts that gender becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse high cultural information through functional bridges, and women compared to men tend to be the protagonists of high cultural information diffusion between different portions of a network. Therefore, this finding provides support for Hypothesis 2c that female liaison persons significantly diffuse more high cultural information than male liaison persons through functional bridges.

4.4.3 Diffusion of Omnivorous Cultural Information

As seen in Model 1 of Table 4.4, similar to high cultural information diffusion, individuals who are highly educated and frequent participants in cultural and political activities are frequent obtainers of omnivorous cultural information. Net of other variables, educational level (cultural participation, political participation), from one SD below its mean to one SD above its mean, changes the predicted obtainment frequency of omnivorous cultural information from .72 (.28, .63) to .95 (1.52, 1.05) times. While size of community has a significant relationship with how often an individual obtains omnivorous cultural information, family income, age, gender, marital status, race, or the number of children an individual has

⁴⁵ In addition to the interaction term between gender and weak ties, for all the models in which I tested whether functional bridges diffuse high and omnivorous cultural information (Model 5 of Tables 4.3 and 4.4), I also estimated the significance of the interaction terms between all the control variables included in this study and weak ties. However, as I expected and stated in the conceptual framework of this chapter, none of them showed significance with any of the cultural information dependent variables (high and omnivorous). This shows the importance of gender for the diffusion of cultural information through functional bridges. The reason for this is that while there is a significant difference between female and male liaison persons, there is no significant difference between educated and uneducated, old and young, wealthy and poor, white and black, married and single, etc. liaison persons in terms of the diffusion of cultural information.

Table 4.4 Multiple Regression of Omnivorous Cultural Information Obtained

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1230)		Model 2 (N=1212)		Model 3 (N=1212)		Model 4 (N=1212)		Model 5 (N=1212)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Education	.0409 **	.0145	.0401 **	.0146	.0399 **	.0146	.0395 **	.0146	.0379 **	.0146
Family Income	.0004	.0010	.0003	.0010	.0002	.0010	.0002	.0010	.0002	.0010
Age	-.0142	.0127	-.0120	.0129	-.0125	.0129	-.0114	.0129	-.0130	.0129
Age-Squared	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001
Female	-.0122	.0704	-.0072	.0715	-.0076	.0715	-.0080	.0715	-.1223	.0834
Marital Status										
<i>Single (Ref)</i>										
<i>Married</i>	-.1129	.1044	-.1126	.1058	-.1149	.1058	-.1116	.1058	-.1233	.1056
<i>Divorced</i>	-.1268	.1129	-.1401	.1147	-.1353	.1147	-.1366	.1146	-.1433	.1144
Cultural Participation	.6943 ***	.0404	.6810 ***	.0412	.6840 ***	.0410	.6786 ***	.0412	.6774 ***	.0411
Political Participation	.1188 ***	.0228	.1146 ***	.0232	.1135 ***	.0232	.1111 ***	.0233	.1113 ***	.0232
Race										
<i>White (Ref)</i>										
<i>Black</i>	-.1256	.1023	-.1076	.1047	-.1132	.1043	-.1011	.1048	-.1001	.1045
<i>Other Race</i>	-.1924	.1414	-.1771	.1435	-.1783	.1434	-.1687	.1436	-.1726	.1432
Size of Residence										
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>										
<i>Suburb</i>	-.0670	.0821	-.0641	.0831	-.0677	.0830	-.0633	.0831	-.0652	.0829
<i>Small City</i>	-.0799	.1332	-.0806	.1350	-.0790	.1350	-.0799	.1350	-.0881	.1347
<i>Village</i>	-.3652 ***	.1071	-.3713 ***	.1080	-.3764 ***	.1081	-.3778 ***	.1081	-.3728 ***	.1078
Number of Children	-.0051	.0255	-.0082	.0259	-.0078	.0259	-.0100	.0260	-.0106	.0259
Tie Strength										
<i>Strong Ties</i>			.0057	.0036			.0045	.0037	.0044	.0037
<i>Weak Ties</i>					.0019	.0011	.0015	.0011	-.0018	.0017
Female*Weak Ties									.0058 **	.0022
Constant	.1182	.3210	.0534	.3270	.0855	.3254	.0467	.3269	.1791	.3300
Adj. R ²	.3492		.3451		.3452		.3455		.3487	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

does not show any significance. Individuals who live in small communities obtain omnivorous cultural information less frequently than others.

Separate effects of an individual's strong- and weak-tie contacts on his/her obtainment frequency of omnivorous cultural information are examined in Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. As can be seen in these models, neither types of social connections are potential sources of omnivorous cultural information for an individual. Also, their relative effects, examined in Model 4, show that neither the number of an individual's strong-tie contacts nor the number of his/her weak-tie contacts has a significant relationship with how frequently s/he obtains omnivorous cultural information. These findings support Hypothesis 3b, but they contradict Hypothesis 3a. That is, neither the number of an individual's strong ties nor the number of his/her weak ties significantly affects the frequency of omnivorous cultural information s/he obtains.

In Model 5, as for the HCIO dependent variable, I present the effect of the interaction term between gender and weak ties on the obtained omnivorous cultural information. Consistent with Hypothesis 3c, gender becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse omnivorous cultural information through functional bridges. The interaction term shows that the effect of weak ties on the obtainment frequency of omnivorous cultural information is significantly different between women and men. For instance, from one SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, the number of weak ties changes the predicted frequency of the obtained omnivorous cultural information from .76 to .96 times of obtainment for females, in comparison to from .88 to .79 for males.

4.4.4. The FLI Proposition

Lastly, in Table 4.5, I test whether the FLI Proposition, which indicates that individuals with different personal and background characteristics tend to diffuse different types of information through functional bridges and become liaison persons, is accurate. In order to do this, I first present in Model 1 how gender functions as the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse job information. Thus, I can see whether a different type of information (job information instead of cultural information) diffuses through functional bridges that are held by the same type of liaison persons, namely women versus men. However, Model 1 shows that the interaction term between gender and weak ties does not show significance for job information. This means that while the

Table 4.5 Multiple Regression Estimates of the FLI Proposition

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1212)		Model 2 (N=1170)		Model 3 (N=1170)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Education	.0274 *	.0121	.0251 *	.0132	.0245 *	.0131
Family Income	-.0012	.0008	-.0012	.0008	-.0012	.0008
Age	-.0358 ***	.0107	-.0355 ***	.0111	-.0358 ***	.0111
Age-Squared	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001
Female	.0110	.0690	-.0057	.0603	-.0093	.0602
Marital Status						
<i>Single (Ref)</i>						
<i>Married</i>	-.0426	.0873	-.0233	.0892	-.0337	.0891
<i>Divorced</i>	.0593	.0946	.0779	.0965	-.0762	.0963
Cultural Participation	.0699 *	.0340	.0622 *	.0348	.0619 *	.0347
Political Participation	.0682 ***	.0192	.0702 ***	.0197	.0724 ***	.0197
Race						
<i>White (Ref)</i>						
<i>Black</i>	.0590	.0864	.0493	.0884	.0416	.0882
<i>Other Race</i>	.2082 *	.1184	.2200 *	.1201	.2198 *	.1198
Size of Residence						
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>						
<i>Suburb</i>	.0045	.0685	.0197	.0700	.0181	.0699
<i>Small City</i>	-.0943	.1114	-.0677	.1132	-.0642	.1129
<i>Village</i>	-.1484 *	.0892	-.1461	.0920	-.1504	.0918
Number of Children	-.0056	.0214	-.0049	.0222	-.0041	.0222
Occupational Prestige			.0011	.0025	-.0021	.0028
Tie Strength						
<i>Strong Ties</i>	.0022	.0030	.0021	.0031	.0020	.0030
<i>Weak Ties</i>	-.0011	.0014	-.0018 *	.0009	-.0092 **	.0030
Female*Weak Ties	-.0010	.0018				
Prestige*Weak Ties					.0001 *	.00006
Constant	1.6691 ***	.2729	1.6459 ***	.2831	1.8147 ***	.2903
Adj. R ²	.1773		.1709		.1747	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

effects of weak ties on the diffusion of high and omnivorous cultural information significantly differ

between women and men (thus gender being the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons

for the diffusion of high and omnivorous cultural information), the effect of weak ties on the diffusion of job information is not different between women and men. This finding provides support for the FLI Proposition that different types of people diffuse different types of information. Then, in Model 2, I include the occupational prestige score as an additional independent variable into the analysis; however, the occupational prestige score also does not show any significance with job information diffusion among individuals. Finally, in Model 3, following the research (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Yakubovich 2005) that identifies people in the upper strata of occupational structure as potential sources of job information for others, I include a new interaction term between occupational prestige score and weak ties to estimate whether the occupational prestige becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse job information through functional bridges. Thus, through this interaction term, I examine whether those individuals with prestigious jobs compared to their counterparts with less prestigious jobs diffuse more job information. I find that the effect of weak ties on the diffusion of job information significantly differ for people with prestigious jobs, who are perceived as potential sources of job information by others in their own social circles and are therefore eager to obtain novel job information from others in different social circles, compared to their less prestigious counterparts. This finding provides further support for the FLI Proposition that different types of information (cultural vs. job) tend to be diffused through functional bridges, which are held by individuals with different personal and background characteristics (gender vs. occupational prestige). Also, this finding supports Hypothesis 4, which asserts that occupational prestige is the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse job information through functional bridges, and liaison persons with prestigious jobs significantly diffuse more job information than liaison persons with less prestigious jobs.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Similar to Model 5 in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, in Model 5 of Table 4.5, in addition to the interaction term between occupational prestige score and weak ties, I estimated the significance of the interaction terms between all the control variables included in this study and weak ties. However, as I expected and stated in the conceptual framework of this chapter, none of them showed significance with the job information obtained dependent variable. This shows the importance of occupational prestige for the diffusion of job information through functional bridges. The reason for this is that while there is a significant difference between liaison persons with prestigious jobs and liaison persons with less prestigious jobs, there is not a significant difference between educated and uneducated, female and male, old and young, wealthy and poor, white and black, married and single, and etc. liaison persons in terms of the diffusion of job information.

4.4.5. Summary

Four conclusions emerge from these analyses: (1) net of control variables, popular cultural information is more likely to be diffused through strong ties, and this type of information does not significantly diffuse through weak ties (within-group and between-group) or through functional bridges; (2) net of control variables, high cultural information does not significantly diffuse through either strong or weak ties. However, the effect of weak ties significantly differs between females and males in diffusing high cultural information, as would be expected considering the research (see Section 4.2.4) that shows a stronger positive relationship between being female and interest in cultural activities (especially high cultural activities) than being male. Therefore, gender is the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse this type of information through functional bridges; (3) holding all other variables constant, omnivorous cultural information does not significantly diffuse through either strong or weak ties. Similar to high cultural information diffusion, however, the effect of weak ties becomes significantly different for females than males in diffusing omnivorous cultural information. Therefore, gender is the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse omnivorous cultural information through functional bridges; and (4) the FLI Proposition, which asserts that different types of information tend to be diffused through different types of people is supported. While gender becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse cultural information through functional bridges, occupational prestige becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse job information through functional bridges. Accordingly, cultural information (high and omnivorous) tends to be diffused through female liaison persons than male liaison persons, and job information tends to be diffused through liaison persons with prestigious jobs than liaison persons with less prestigious jobs.

4.5. Discussion and Conclusions

Ever since Granovetter (1973) wrote *The Strength of Weak Ties*, questions related to tie strength and bridge formation have become a foundation for much research in the sociological literature. This study is a product of this widely acknowledged research tradition. The aim of this chapter was to examine the network benefits of social capital through focusing on the conductivity dimension of the concept of social capital, that is, the usage of social connections as a conductive mechanism to diffuse valuable information. With this chapter, I addressed two main research questions: (1) do diffusion patterns of social

networks differ for various types of information depending on whether they are unique or widely shared; and (2) does the SWT theory need an update considering its unique but relatively limited perspective to the usefulness of weak ties for information diffusion?

In order to answer the first question, I first elaborated the “weak tie” concept and introduced four different types of weak ties: within-group weak ties, between-group weak ties, structural bridges, and functional bridges. Due to its importance in the diffusion process of the total social networks, I then focused on the “functional bridge” concept and distinguished it from Granovetter’s (1973) “bridge” concept. Finally, I examined the five-stage diffusion process that I had mentioned in Chapter 2 and developed it by showing how functional bridges connect different social clusters and integrate them to perform total network diffusion as a result of the cluster-based diffusion processes. These were conceptual preparations to answer whether diffusion patterns of social networks differed for various types of information depending on whether they were unique or widely shared. The answer to this question was hidden in the result of the second question that I addressed in this chapter.

To answer the second question, I used the 2002 GSS to test (1) whether an individual’s personal social network, consisting of his/her strong- and weak-tie contacts, provides him/her informational capital in the form of cultural information, and (2) whether the type of information obtained (novel and unique information, not redundant information) through an individual’s weak-tie contacts tends to differ depending on his/her personal and background characteristics, in accordance with the FLI Proposition. Consistent with theories addressing the necessity of popular and high culture for interactional purposes (DiMaggio 1987), the solidarity-generating characteristic of popular culture due to its high visibility (Collins 1998; Kane 2004; DiMaggio 2009), the distinguishing characteristic of high culture due to its invisibility and costly obtainment (Bourdieu 1984; Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000), the nature of strong ties providing an easy flow of information (Coleman 1988; McPherson et al. 2001; Brown and Reingen 1987), and the nature of weak ties providing access to otherwise unconnected portions of a network (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Burt 1992, 2004), it was expected that popular cultural information would diffuse through strong ties, high cultural information would diffuse through weak ties only when they were functional bridges, and omnivorous cultural information would diffuse through strong ties as well as weak ties only when they

were functional bridges connecting different social circles. All of my current findings, except for omnivorous cultural information diffusion through strong ties, were in line with these expectations.

In this regard, it was shown that popular cultural information diffused significantly through strong ties. That is, the more an individual has strong-tie contacts, the more frequently s/he tends to obtain popular cultural information. In contrast, weak ties did not show any significance on the diffusion of popular cultural information. Moreover, as I expected, functional bridges did not provide access to popular cultural information from other individuals residing in different social circles. The unavailability of a specific type of predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that would diffuse popular cultural information through functional bridges led to this conclusion. Despite consistency with the previous research on information diffusion (Reagans and McEvily 2003), the diffusion of popular culture through strong ties rather than through functional bridges contradicts what Lizardo (2006a) found in his research. Lizardo (2006a:800) suggests that popular culture, as “the default form of portable cultural knowledge” is more likely to diffuse through weak ties (what I call functional bridges) rather than strong ties. This inconsistency between the two studies might have resulted from two possible situations. First, Lizardo’s (2006a) findings are predicated on the condition that individuals use popular culture to start conversations with dissimilar others or to enlarge their social networks by meeting with dissimilar others. This ignores the daily talk and conversation between friends, which, I argue, tends to be based on popular cultural topics. Second, Lizardo (2006a) uses network-density measures (one’s strong- and weak-tie contacts) as dependent variable and culture as independent variable. However, I use the opposite. This different perspective on the relationship between social networks and culture, whether culture shapes networks or networks shape culture, similar to the difference between Erickson (1996) and Lizardo (2006a), might be another reason for the inconsistency between the two studies.

High cultural information, different from popular cultural information, did not diffuse through strong ties. I argued that the reason might be the unpopular and unfavorable nature of high culture for selection as a topic for daily talk and conversation between strongly-tied individuals. On the other hand, high cultural information did diffuse through weak ties that were also functional bridges. Again, these findings contradict what Lizardo (2006a) found in his study. Lizardo (2006a) suggests that high culture would diffuse only through strong ties among a group of more restricted audiences due to its special and

invisible form. While I agree with Lizardo (2006a) in his argument that associates a certain group of people who have the necessary means to appreciate high culture with high culture consumption, I also argue that high culture is not widely shared and easily accessible like popular culture. Therefore, it is less likely to be selected and used for daily talk between strongly-tied individuals. As Lizardo (2006a) asserts, high culture is shared only by a group of more restricted audiences, and this provides support for my finding that high culture can only be diffused between social circles through functional bridges that are held by certain individuals who tend to be members of this group of more restricted audiences. Consistent with the research that differentiates women from men in their usages of social networks for informational purposes and associates women with high culture (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Bryson 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; Kane 2004), I found that gender became the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffused high cultural information through functional bridges, and female liaison persons diffused more high cultural information than male liaison persons.

Besides the benefits of interpersonal ties for popular and high cultural informational capital, I also analyzed how omnivorous cultural information as a combination of popular and high cultural information diffused through strong and weak ties. Consistent with high cultural information diffusion, it was found that omnivorous cultural information diffused through functional bridges among cultural omnivores across social circles and not through strong ties within social circles. It can be suggested that omnivorous cultural information, which was perceived as relatively unpopular compared to popular cultural information and therefore not easily reachable within one's cluster, tended to be diffused through functional bridges between otherwise unconnected social clusters. Similar to high cultural information diffusion, gender became the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffused omnivorous cultural information through functional bridges, and female liaison persons diffused more omnivorous cultural information than male liaison persons.

In addition to the diffusion processes of popular, high, and omnivorous cultural information through strong and weak ties, the most innovative part of this chapter, however, dealt with the FLI Proposition through which I introduced the association between liaison persons and the type of information diffused through functional bridges. It may well be concluded that popular cultural information does not diffuse through functional bridges. There are two potential reasons for this. First, popular culture

is everywhere, and one can easily obtain popular cultural information from friends, relatives, and the media. Second, the potential diffusion of popular cultural information through functional bridges from other social clusters is highly likely to be redundant due to the first reason, and therefore unnecessary and unfavorable.

High and omnivorous cultural information diffuse through functional bridges since they are perceived as more unique and less accessible than popular culture, and therefore are less likely to be redundant when obtained from other social circles through functional bridges. More importantly, gender comes out as the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse high and omnivorous cultural information through functional bridges, in accordance with the FLI Proposition, and female liaison persons diffuse more high and omnivorous cultural information than male liaison persons, in accordance with the previous research (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Bryson 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; Kane 2004). The reason for gender, in comparison to other personal characteristics, to be the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons for the diffusion of cultural information is the significant difference between men and women in their usages of social networks for informational purposes. Also, in terms of cultural information diffusion, women maintain a close relationship with culture appreciation and consumption (especially high culture) and they are therefore perceived by the source of the information as the best potential receiver in terms of the demand for novel information (experienced by the receiver), the ease of the flow (experienced by both the source and the receiver), and the cost of the flow (experienced by the source).

While gender seems to be related to the diffusion of cultural information through functional bridges, we must still consider if it is the personal characteristic of the liaison persons for the diffusion of other types of information in a significant manner, as questioned in the FLI Proposition. In order to elaborate on the FLI Proposition, I examined gender for the diffusion of cultural and job information. Thus, I compared how two different types of information would diffuse through the same type of individuals. The results indicate that while gender becomes the predicting personal characteristic of liaison persons for the functional bridges that diffuse cultural information, it does not function efficiently for job information diffusion through functional bridges. In compliance with the FLI Proposition, occupational prestige becomes the predicting personal characteristic of the liaison persons that diffuse job information through

functional bridges. Thus, liaison persons with prestigious jobs diffused significantly more job information than liaison persons with less prestigious jobs. Consistent with the previous research (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Yakubovich 2005), the reason for this interesting finding (the significant difference between individuals with prestigious job and individuals with less prestigious jobs in terms of how efficiently they diffuse job information, in comparison to insignificant differences between educated and uneducated, wealthy and poor, old and young, married and single, etc. individuals) might be that those people with prestigious jobs are more likely to have social contacts from other social clusters that also have prestigious jobs and consequently useful job information. This leads individuals who reside in the same social circles as individuals with prestigious jobs to perceive them as potential sources of novel job information. Therefore, the popularity of individuals with prestigious jobs provided by the perceptions of others might lead them to function as opinion leaders and liaison persons since they would not want to lose their popularity in the eyes of others.

Lastly, the usage of functional bridges for high cultural information and not for popular cultural information deduced through the empirical analysis in this chapter provided an answer to the question of whether diffusion patterns of social networks differ for various types of information, depending on whether they are unique or widely shared. Through the conceptual framework and the empirical analysis presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that diffusion patterns of total social network differ between high cultural information and popular cultural information since high cultural information diffuses through functional bridges between social clusters and this diffusion complies with the five-stage diffusion process of the total network diffusion. However, popular cultural information does not need to be diffused through functional bridges due to its wide availability within each cluster; therefore, this dysfunctionality of functional bridges for the diffusion of popular cultural information breaks the five-stage diffusion pattern of the total network diffusion. This leads to the assertion that while unique information (such as high cultural information or specific job information), which is more likely to be diffused through functional bridges between otherwise unconnected social circles, tends to follow the conceptualized diffusion pattern—that is an S-shaped diffusion curve with five stages. However, widely shared and easily accessible information (such as popular cultural information), which is less likely to be diffused through functional bridges

between otherwise unconnected social circles due to their easy availability, tends not to follow the conceptualized diffusion pattern.

This study makes five important contributions to the literature. First, I developed the “weak tie” concept and introduced four different types of weak ties. By doing so, I presented an update to Granovetter’s (1973) limited perspective to the usefulness of weak ties for information diffusion. Second, I expanded upon Granovetter’s “bridge” concept and introduced two types of bridges, a structural bridge and a functional bridge. Thus, I showed that not all bridges were functional and that some were dysfunctional. This challenged the earlier understanding of bridges as always-useful non-redundant ties since bridges might not be useful in specific situations. Third, the introduction of the “functional bridge” concept became a useful tool for the understanding of the five-stage diffusion process as an outcome of the cluster-based diffusion processes. Thus, I could identify which types of information comply with the five-stage diffusion process of the total network diffusion, depending on whether they are unique or widely available. Fourth, I could examine how interpersonal ties diffused popular, high, and omnivorous cultural information, and how strong and weak ties differed in the diffusion of different types of cultural information. Thus, I showed how widely available and restricted forms of culture connected and integrated individuals in different ways. Last and I think the most important contribution of this study is the introduction of the FLI Proposition, which provided a comprehensive perspective to the understanding of information diffusion through functional bridges. Through the FLI Proposition, I was able to compare the diffusion of cultural information with the diffusion of job information while emphasizing which mechanisms made these diffusions possible, that is, the compatibility between the type of information and the type of individuals who diffuse it.

Although this research holds several merits, some limitations should be mentioned and the results should be assessed within these limitations. First, it must be acknowledged that the measure of the obtained popular cultural information is far from optimal. While activities such as art exhibits or events at an art museum or art gallery—activities that I used to measure the obtained high cultural information—can be easily accepted as high culture, cultural activities such as concerts, plays, or other performing arts event—activities that I used to measure the obtained popular cultural information—might also be perceived as high culture. The use of cultural activities that possibly represent both popular and high

culture as an indicator of the obtained popular cultural information surely holds serious measurement error. In my defense, it must be said that the analysis supports the use of concerts, plays, or other performing arts events as indicators of popular culture. If Models 1 of Tables 4.2 and 4.3, which present the baseline models for the obtained popular and high cultural information respectively, are examined, it can be seen that while family income significantly affects the information obtainment about the activities used to measure popular culture, it loses its significance on the information obtainment about the activities used to measure high culture. In line with previous research that associates education with high culture more strongly than popular culture and income with popular culture more strongly than high culture (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Halle 1992), this is solid evidence that differentiates the activities used to measure popular culture from the others used to measure high culture. Yet, future studies may improve upon the current research by employing a more accurate measurement of popular cultural information obtainment.

Second, it must also be acknowledged that the research questions that I used to operationalize the dependent variables do not specifically measure the frequency of information obtainment/search through social networks, but also imply the obtainment/search of information through other media such as TV, newspapers, and the Internet. Therefore, the usage of these questions to analyze the effect of an individual's personal network on his/her obtainment/search of information might provide conservative and underestimated results. However, when the findings of the current study are examined in light of this limitation, it should be discussed whether this limitation holds for each type of research questions used to operationalize the dependent variables, especially "popular and high cultural information obtained" dependent variables. Following the previous research that associates level of education, level of wealth, race, age, and gender with cultural consumption, a significant difference between educated and uneducated, wealthy and poor, white and black, old and young, and female and male individuals should have been expected in their obtainment of both popular and high cultural information. The reason for this is that educated, wealthy, white, old, and female individuals are more interested in cultural activities than their counterparts and are expected to use their resources (such as TV, newspapers, and the Internet) more efficiently to obtain cultural information. In terms of popular cultural information obtainment, the findings showed significant difference between educated and uneducated, wealthy and poor, and old and

young individuals, in line with this expectation. However, in terms of high cultural information obtainment, the findings showed a significant difference only between educated and uneducated individuals.

Therefore, it might be suggested that the research question used to operationalize the PCIO dependent variable is in line with this limitation mentioned above, and this dependent variable not only measures information obtainment through social networks, but also through other types of media. However, it might be argued that HCIO dependent variable contradicts this limitation since the findings are not consistent with the previous research; that is, there is no significant difference between wealthy and poor, old and young, white and black, and female and male individuals in terms of how frequently they obtain high cultural information. There is a significant difference only between educated and uneducated individuals. Therefore, it might be suggested that the research question used to operationalize the HCIO dependent variable specifically measures information obtainment through social networks and not through other media such as TV, newspapers, and the Internet. It can also be suggested that the significant associations of cultural and political participation with both popular and high cultural information obtainment shows the importance of personal networks to obtain information since cultural and political activities are argued to provide individuals an opportunity to communicate, converse, and diffuse information.

Third, the GSS data only measures reception of information and does not measure sending of information. Therefore, this one-sided and limited perspective of the usage of social networks for information diffusion prevents a better understanding of the network benefits of social capital. Lastly, in this study, I only used cultural and job information diffusion to test the validity of the FLI Proposition. Future studies may test the FLI Proposition with different types of information and examine whether different types of information require liaison persons with certain characteristics to diffuse information through functional bridges.

In closing, the findings reported here suggest an important amendment to Granovetter's (1973) *Strength of Weak Ties*. As a follow-up and revision to his inspiring piece, Granovetter (1983:229) states, "I have not argued that all weak ties serve the functions described in SWT—only those acting as bridges between network segments." The findings of this study, combined with this statement, suggest that not all bridges serve the functions described in SWT, only those acting as functional bridges. It is implied that

with the consideration of the FLI Proposition and the diffusion model presented here, the SWT theory can be better understood and applied to the diffusion processes occurring both within and between social clusters. Thus, this study hopefully makes an effort to offer a vision for future research.

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation was to systematically analyze some of the most important and widely accepted social capital theories through specifically focusing on the three dimensions of the concept of social capital: the dimensions of holism, convertibility, and conductivity. To accomplish this, in three separate studies (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4), I have addressed each dimension of the concept of social capital with a critical approach, discussed what their main components are, presented who their most prominent thinkers are and what they have claimed, revealed their shortcomings, and finally offered plausible solutions to remove the shortcomings.

In Chapter 2, in order to develop a holistic approach to social capital (the holism dimension of social capital), I have examined some of the most important social capital theories in the sociological literature, such as Mark Granovetter's (1973, 1983) "Strength of Weak Ties" theory, Robert D. Putnam's (2000) "Bonding, Bridging, and Linking Social Capital," and Alejandro Portes' (1998) "Negative Social Capital" and synthesized them using Nan Lin's (2001) typology of "Expressive-Instrumental Actions" and "Homophilous-Heterophilous Interactions." Thus, through this synthesis, I have provided a contribution through which all these different conceptualizations of social capital can be seen at the same time. In other words, it is now possible to see how one conceptualization of the concept of social capital coincides with another through the holistic approach. Furthermore, I have developed the synthesis through examining the relationship between interpersonal diffusion and social capital. To do that, I have included Charles Kadushin's (2012) "S-shaped Diffusion Curve" and John Levi Martin's "Symmetric-Antisymmetric-Asymmetric relationships" into my conceptual framework to address the effects of differentiating social structures such as normal and chaotic settings on the diffusion of information and resources among individuals. Finally, I have provided two case studies to show the applicability of the holistic approach to the real world.

In Chapter 3, I have introduced a new conceptual framework for the functioning of social capital throughout the conversions of the forms of capital (the convertibility dimension of social capital). To do that, first, I have addressed the shortcomings of the Bourdieusian model of conversions among the forms of capital: (1) the ignorance of the conversions between individuals, while focusing only on the conversions within individuals; (2) the lack of a clear conceptualization of the functioning of symbolic

capital throughout the conversion processes; and (3) the lack of a clear theorization of the functioning of social capital throughout the conversion processes. Then, I have removed the shortcomings through elaborating on the Bourdieusian conception of the interconvertibility principle and through presenting my conceptual understanding of the conversions at both the individual and group levels. The usage of example figures in which I have demonstrated the conversion processes both within and between individuals is expected to provide a better understanding to the interconvertibility of the forms of capital. Through this chapter, I have attempted to show that while for Bourdieu, economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital in terms of the conversion process at the individual level, social capital is at the root of all other types of capital in terms of the conversion process at the group level, since without social capital, conversion of the forms of capital would not happen at the group level.

In Chapter 4, I have focused on the usage of interpersonal ties for the diffusion of information among individuals (the conductivity dimension of social capital). More specifically, I have addressed the usage of social ties that connect otherwise unconnected social circles for the diffusion of information. In this sense, I have attempted to develop Mark Granovetter's "Strength of Weak Ties" theory through presenting more comprehensive conceptions of the "weak tie" and "bridge" concepts. Then, I have adapted the elaborated conceptions of weak ties and bridges, mainly the distinction between structural and functional bridges, to the S-shaped information diffusion process, conceptualized in Chapter 2. Thus, I have showed how the developed version of the SWT theory, provided by the distinction between structural and functional bridges, better explains the total network diffusion process. Finally, in line with my conceptual arguments on the SWT theory, I have used the 2002 GSS to test my hypotheses about interpersonal ties, bridges, and information diffusion across social circles.

In closing, it has been argued that the concept of social capital has received much attention since 1970s. It has been empirically applied to social problems many times; however, there have been few theoretical analyses and almost no critical approaches to the concept of social capital since then. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to provide critical approaches to some of the widely known social capital theories, such as the Bourdieusian model of conversions of the forms of capital and Granovetter's "*Strength of Weak Ties*." It is hoped that this dissertation has succeeded in this and offered a research vision for future attempts to that end.

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Appendix – The Ordered Logit Estimates of Popular Cultural Information Obtained, High Cultural Information Obtained, Omnivorous Cultural Information Obtained, and Job Information Obtained

Table A.1 Ordered Logit Estimates of Popular Cultural Information Obtained

Variable Name	Model 1 (N=1230)			Model 2 (N=1212)			Model 3 (N=1212)			Model 4 (N=1212)		
	b		SE	b		SE	b		SE	b		SE
Education	.0982	***	.0246	.0994	***	.0248	.0994	***	.0247	.0986	***	.0248
Family Income	.0050	**	.0016	.0045	**	.0016	.0048	**	.0016	.0044	**	.0016
Age	-.0539	*	.0213	-.0460	*	.0215	-.0505	*	.0215	-.0450	*	.0216
Age-Squared	.0002		.0002	.0002		.0002	.0002		.0002	.0002		.0002
Female	-.0688		.1145	-.0780		.1155	-.0647		.1153	-.0760		.1155
Marital Status												
<i>Single (Ref)</i>												
<i>Married</i>	-.0465		.1674	-.0338		.1689	-.0585		.1685	-.0331		.1690
<i>Divorced</i>	.2147		.1848	.2053		.1863	.2089		.1862	.2079		.1863
Cultural Participation	.7056	***	.0674	.6668	***	.0678	.6834	***	.0676	.6655	***	.0679
Political Participation	.2052	***	.0366	.1859	***	.0370	.1926	***	.0370	.1823	***	.0372
Race												
<i>White (Ref)</i>												
<i>Black</i>	-.1401		.1663	-.0635		.1690	-.1180		.1680	-.0570		.1691
<i>Other Race</i>	-.3050		.2339	-.2258		.2356	-.2748		.2344	-.2181		.2356
Size of Residence												
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>												
<i>Suburb</i>	-.1886		.1328	-.1720		.1336	-.1940		.1333	-.1707		.1337
<i>Small City</i>	-.0509		.2107	-.0311		.2126	-.0360		.2116	-.0308		.2125
<i>Village</i>	-.4848	**	.1800	-.5123	**	.1810	-.5128	**	.1807	-.5238	**	.1814
Number of Children	-.0456		.0429	-.0602		.0435	-.0506		.0432	-.0623		.0435
Tie Strength												
<i>Strong Ties</i>				.0232	***	.0059				.0218	***	.0061
<i>Weak Ties</i>							.0036	*	.0018	.0017		.0019
Female*Weak Ties												
Log Likelihood	-1390.77			-1371.09			-1377.14			-1370.65		
Pseudo R ²	.1346			.1369			.1331			.1372		

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

Table A.2 Ordered Logit Estimates of High Cultural Information Obtained

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1230)		Model 2 (N=1212)		Model 3 (N=1212)		Model 4 (N=1212)		Model 5 (N=1212)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Education	.0632 *	.0290	.0668 *	.0291	.0663 *	.0291	.0660 *	.0291	.0622 *	.0291
Family Income	-.0013	.0018	-.0014	.0019	-.0015	.0019	-.0016	.0019	-.0015	.0019
Age	-.0122	.0256	-.0107	.0257	-.0106	.0258	-.0095	.0258	-.0107	.0259
Age-Squared	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0002
Female	.1050	.1372	.1102	.1382	.1100	.1383	.1076	.1383	-.0860	.1637
Marital Status										
<i>Single (Ref)</i>										
<i>Married</i>	-.0332	.2000	-.0365	.2008	-.0383	.2010	-.0347	.2009	-.0502	.2007
<i>Divorced</i>	-.4247 *	.2201	-.4360 *	.2222	-.4268 *	.2224	-.4310 *	.2224	-.4387 *	.2224
Cultural Participation	1.1655 ***	.0776	1.1534 ***	.0782	1.1561 ***	.0780	1.1522 ***	.0782	1.1571 ***	.0785
Political Participation	.1996 ***	.0416	.1895 ***	.0421	.1893 ***	.0421	.1863 ***	.0423	.1890 ***	.0423
Race										
<i>White (Ref)</i>										
<i>Black</i>	-.2415	.2124	-.2031	.2144	-.2123	.2136	-.1971	.2147	-.1921	.2147
<i>Other Race</i>	-.0025	.2682	.0208	.2695	.0212	.2690	.0321	.2695	.0187	.2695
Size of Residence										
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>										
<i>Suburb</i>	-.1324	.1552	-.1226	.1559	-.1279	.1557	-.1213	.1559	-.1193	.1559
<i>Small City</i>	-.0156	.2670	-.0060	.2680	-.0047	.2677	-.0035	.2681	-.0168	.2692
<i>Village</i>	-.5170 **	.2284	-.5654 **	.2301	-.5687 **	.2297	-.5279 **	.2301	-.5659 **	.2300
Number of Children	.0106	.0519	.0042	.0525	.0064	.0523	.0028	.0526	-.0009	.0526
Tie Strength										
<i>Strong Ties</i>			.0059	.0062			.0046	.0064	.0041	.0065
<i>Weak Ties</i>					.0021	.0020	.0017	.0021	-.0041	.0035
Female*Weak Ties									.0092 *	.0042
Log Likelihood	-954.62		-945.28		-945.18		-944.93		-942.52	
Pseudo R ²	.2062		.2053		.2054		.2056		.2077	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

Table A.3 Ordered Logit Estimates of Omnivorous Cultural Information Obtained

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1230)		Model 2 (N=1212)		Model 3 (N=1212)		Model 4 (N=1212)		Model 5 (N=1212)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Education	.0980 ***	.0306	.0969 **	.0306	.0962 **	.0307	.0957 **	.0306	.0925 **	.0307
Family Income	-.0004	.0019	-.0006	.0019	-.0007	.0019	-.0008	.0019	-.0008	.0019
Age	-.0351	.0268	-.0310	.0269	-.0308	.0271	-.0291	.0271	-.0307	.0272
Age-Squared	.0002	.0002	.0001	.0002	.0001	.0002	.0001	.0002	.0001	.0002
Female	.0645	.1425	.0597	.1432	.0621	.1432	.0571	.1432	-.1287	.1699
Marital Status										
<i>Single (Ref)</i>										
<i>Married</i>	-.0898	.2055	-.0885	.2057	-.0932	.2061	-.0871	.2061	-.1009	.2058
<i>Divorced</i>	-.2582	.2280	-.2945	.2299	-.2770	.2301	-.2864	.2302	-.2908	.2302
Cultural Participation	1.0836 ***	.0787	1.0613 ***	.0790	1.0662 ***	.0788	1.0602 ***	.0790	1.0643 ***	.0793
Political Participation	.2188 ***	.0430	.2096 ***	.0433	.2098 ***	.0434	.2051 ***	.0435	.2077 ***	.0436
Race										
<i>White (Ref)</i>										
<i>Black</i>	-.2553	.2210	-.2083	.2228	-.2226	.2220	-.1988	.2231	-.1927	.2229
<i>Other Race</i>	-.2137	.2906	-.1754	.2915	-.1768	.2905	-.1577	.2912	-.1670	.2912
Size of Residence										
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>										
<i>Suburb</i>	-.1136	.1588	-.1019	.1594	-.1125	.1591	-.0998	.1595	-.0965	.1594
<i>Small City</i>	-.0174	.2716	-.0114	.2726	-.0077	.2721	-.0061	.2727	-.0168	.2738
<i>Village</i>	-.8860 ***	.2531	-.9108 ***	.2541	-.9124 ***	.2531	-.9245 ***	.2542	-.9202 ***	.2545
Number of Children	-.0030	.0552	-.0089	.0557	-.0061	.0555	-.0117	.0558	-.0160	.0559
Tie Strength										
<i>Strong Ties</i>			.0095	.0062			.0074	.0065	.0071	.0065
<i>Weak Ties</i>					.0033	.0020	.0027	.0021	-.0027	.0035
Female*Weak Ties									.0084 *	.0042
Log Likelihood	-1087.38		-1081.41		-1081.24		-1080.6		-1078.57	
Pseudo R ²	.1819		.1794		.1796		.1800		.1816	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

Table A.4 Ordered Logit Estimates of the FLI Proposition

Independent Variables	Model 1 (N=1212)		Model 2 (N=1170)		Model 3 (N=1170)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Education	.0711 **	.0269	.0671 *	.0291	.0675 *	.0292
Family Income	-.0016	.0018	-.0019	.0018	-.0017	.0018
Age	.0286	.0303	.0269	.0311	.0231	.0311
Age-Squared	-.0010 **	.0003	-.0010 **	.0003	-.0010 **	.0003
Female	.0534	.1470	-.0166	.1278	-.0203	.1279
Marital Status						
<i>Single (Ref)</i>						
<i>Married</i>	-.1693	.1737	-.1387	.1764	-.1526	.1764
<i>Divorced</i>	.1067	.1946	.1275	.1968	.1408	.1968
Cultural Participation	.1313 *	.0715	.1170	.0727	.1135	.0730
Political Participation	.1485 ***	.0395	.1543 ***	.0402	.1596 ***	.0403
Race						
<i>White (Ref)</i>						
<i>Black</i>	.1472	.1771	.1236	.1796	.1059	.1801
<i>Other Race</i>	.3356	.2362	.3588	.2375	.3486	.2384
Size of Residence						
<i>Large City (Ref)</i>						
<i>Suburb</i>	-.0211	.1441	.0089	.1460	.0032	.1462
<i>Small City</i>	-.2384	.2345	-.1824	.2360	-.1730	.2364
<i>Village</i>	-.2546	.1942	-.2636	.2001	-.2822	.2007
Number of Children	-.0310	.0520	-.0291	.0525	-.0299	.0525
Occupational Prestige			.0011	.0052	-.0054	.0059
Tie Strength						
<i>Strong Ties</i>	.0041	.0064	.0041	.0064	.0031	.0064
<i>Weak Ties</i>	-.0017	.0031	-.0040 *	.0022	-.0186 **	.0069
Female*Weak Ties	-.0039	.0041				
Prestige*Weak Ties					.0003 *	.0001
Log Likelihood	-1196.1		-1161.34		-1158.67	
Pseudo R ²	.1235		.1189		.1210	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-sided test)

Vita

Durmus Ali Yuksek received his Bachelor of Science degree in System Engineering from Turkish Military Academy in 2007. He received his Master of Arts degree in Sociology from Louisiana State University in 2013. He will receive his Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology from Louisiana State University during the Summer 2015 commencement ceremony.