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Gay-marriage in 2004 U.S. presidential election

James Dunphy

Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, jdunph1@gmail.com

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GAY-MARRIAGE IN 2004
U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION

A Thesis

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Louisiana State University and
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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the factors that affected individual turnout and vote choice in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Regarding the outcome of the election, a point of dispute among scholars pertains to whether evangelical Christians played a meaningful role in helping re-elect then-President Bush to a second term in 2004. The gay-marriage issue played a prominent role in the presidential campaign, due in part to a ruling the Massachusetts Supreme Court rendered in November 2003 that legalized the marrying of same-sex couples within the state's borders. The Court's decision had a reverberating effect, particularly among evangelicals, and subsequently, it affected the presidential campaign as well.

Christian conservatives were successful in organizing efforts to get initiatives and referenda designed to constitutionally ban recognition of same-sex marriages on the ballot in 11 states, all of which passed easily in November. Using a large and previously untapped dataset, I develop a research design that builds on work by Campbell and Monson (2008), which shows that evangelicals who lived in a state with a marriage amendment on the ballot in November had a higher level of mobilization for Bush than other evangelicals.

Contrary to those findings, I find that the marriage amendments in 2004 had no substantive impact on turnout or vote choice. Moreover, evangelicals living in marriage states were not more likely to turn out or vote for Bush in 2004, controlling for other relevant characteristics of the voters. Factors that influenced turnout in the 2004 election include: party identification strength, education, income, age, gender, region, and residence in a battleground state. Party identification, ideology, and race were predictors of vote choice in the 2004 election.

INTRODUCTION

On November 2, 2004 then-U.S. President George W. Bush was re-elected to a second term in the White House by a narrow 2.4 percentage points and 35-electoral vote margin (286-251)¹, after defeating Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry. The former number was the smallest margin of victory for any incumbent president in American history (Altschuler and Spitzer 2007), and the latter was the fourth closest electoral vote margin for a presidential contest since 1868 (Campbell 2004). In the immediate aftermath of the election, many media pundits and commentators, perhaps looking for an explanation to satisfy the close result, arrived at the conclusion that the former president's victory was largely driven by the support of (moral) values voters.

This conclusion was probably at least partly derived from the national exit poll presented on election night, which showed that “moral values” was the top determinant of vote choice among the electorate in terms of deciding how it cast its vote for president². This thesis examines more closely the role the hot-button issue of the 2004 campaign—gay-marriage—played in deciding the outcome of the election, including how ballot propositions related to the issue affected voter turnout and presidential vote choice among evangelical Christians.

A November 2003 decision the Massachusetts Supreme Court rendered that legalized gay-marriage within the state's borders proved to be a lightning rod in the 2004 presidential campaign. Following the decision, Christian conservatives got behind efforts to place initiatives on state ballots that were designed to constitutionally ban gay-marriage. Each of the marriage amendments passed in November 2004, and some have suggested that the president benefitted—in terms of both increased turnout and vote share—from the presence of these amendments on

¹ The actions of one “faithless” elector in Minnesota ultimately prevented Kerry from winning the 252 electoral votes it initially looked like he would win on election night.

² Roper Public Opinion Research Data (2004)

state ballots. This is notable, as scholars have usually found that initiatives in the context of a presidential election have no aggregate effect on turnout (Donovan et al. 2009, Grummel 2008, Smith 2001, Everson 1981).

The contradictory findings scholars have produced regarding how the amendments affected the outcome of the 2004 election present an opportunity to re-examine whether a certain facet of the presidential campaign (direct democracy) was able to stimulate turnout among a targeted subgroup of the larger electorate—and if it may have also affected vote choice.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Republican Strategy

Rather than focusing on winning over undecided swing voters, in 2004, Republican operatives devised a “base-mobilization” strategy to get Bush re-elected. According to one of the president’s chief strategists—Ken Mehlman—this two-pronged strategy consisted of 1) emphasizing the need for strong leadership to counter the threat of terrorism, and 2) mobilizing millions of evangelical Christians and other culturally conservative voters upset about gay-marriage, abortion, and other threats to traditional values as well (Abramowitz 2004). More specifically, Karl Rove set a goal for the second part of the strategy that aimed to turn out an additional four million evangelicals nationwide (Green 2006).

At first glance, Rove’s stated goal appears to have been met with success—exit polls suggest that 22 million evangelicals turned out in 2004, up from 15 million in 2000 (McMahon 2005). Nationally, turnout in 2004 was 60 percent—the highest it had been since 1968 (Altschuler and Spitzer 2007)—and up in every state from 2000 (McDonald 2004); however, scholars are not in complete agreement that a systematic increase in turnout occurred among evangelicals, social conservatives more broadly, or even that Republicans had a better turnout model than the one Democrats devised. Renowned political scientist Alan Abramowitz, for instance, has stated that there is no indication that the election outcome reflected a brilliantly executed campaign by the Republicans or a flawed campaign by the Democrats (Abramowitz 2004). Similarly, Harvard Professor of Government Barry Burden has claimed that not much evidence exists that social conservatives turned out disproportionately in 2004 (Burden 2004). In this thesis, one dispute I attempt to resolve relates to how turnout among evangelical/born-again Christians was affected as a function of ballot initiatives and referenda that were presented to

voters in 11 states in November—all of which were designed to constitutionally ban gay-marriage within the respective states' borders.

Additionally, another disputed claim about the 2004 election revolves around how said ballot measures affected presidential vote choice. There is a stronger consensus in the scholarly literature that the measures increased support for Bush than there is that they increased turnout. Nevertheless, more than a few scholars have claimed that the ballot measures neither increased turnout (Abramowitz 2004, Burden 2004, Karol and Miguel 2007, Smith et al. 2006), nor had any tangible effect on presidential vote choice (Abramowitz 2004, Hillygus and Shields 2005). In addition to testing for the effect of (gay-)marriage states on intention to vote, I also test for a possible effect presence of the initiatives may have had on presidential vote choice. A large and untapped dataset consisting of answers from telephone interviews more than 80,000 respondents provided the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) both pre- and post-election 2004 is the main source of data used in this thesis³.

But first, how did the gay-marriage issue impact the 2004 campaign, and who exactly are the values voters who some have claimed put Bush over the top in his re-election bid?

Values Voters

A casual observer of the 2004 election could probably be excused for conflating values voters and evangelical Christians. In 2004, approximately 23 percent of the electorate identified themselves as born-again or evangelical Christians; and, Bush won approximately 78 percent of these voters (McMahon 2005)—a near mirror image of the national exit poll shown below, which had the president winning 80 percent of the electorate (22 percent overall) who identified

³ The largest number of observations associated with a statistical model in this thesis contains slightly less than 20,000 observations, as not every individual who was interviewed answered each of the questions in the survey. In terms of the relevant questions associated with the variables used in this thesis, the highest number of observations for one of the dependent variables is approximately 32,000 observations.

moral values as the top issue that determined presidential vote choice⁴. Gay-marriage is said to be one of the issues that was “lurking” behind exit polls such as this one (Olson et al. 2006).

FIGURE 1. NATIONAL EXIT POLL (2004)

Issues	Total	Kerry	Bush
Taxes	5	43	57
Education	4	73	26
Iraq	15	73	26
Terrorism	19	14	86
Economy/Jobs	20	80	18
<i>Moral values</i>	22	18	80
Health care	8	77	23

Thus, values voters essentially became synonymous with the Christian Right in dialogue on the 2004 presidential election. Prominent Christian Right activists have offered definitions describing the characteristics of values voters and the objectives they hope to achieve in electoral politics. Former head of *Focus on the Family* James Dobson, for instance, has said that a values voter is “someone with a Christian worldview who begins with the assumption that God is—that he not only exists, but he is definer of right and wrong, and there are some things that are moral and some things that are immoral, some things that are evil, and some things that are good” (Denton Jr. 2005).

Former Executive Director of the *Christian Coalition* Ralph Reed has said that “values voters in the South and the Heartland are concerned about preserving marriage, protecting children from violent or sexually explicit entertainment, teaching the same values in school that are taught at home, and reducing the number of teen pregnancies and abortion. More than any single issue, they seek to redress a coarsening of the culture and a loss of civility” (2005).

⁴ Roper Public Opinion Research Data (2004)

Getting more at the demographic and political characteristics of these voters, Christian Right activists have generally been found to be traditional evangelical Protestants, fundamentalists, Pentecostals, charismatics, and “plain-vanilla” evangelicals (Green 2006). Additionally, they have usually been found to be conservative and Republican in affiliation, with a very strong emphasis on moral issues, especially abortion and school prayer (2006). In the 2004 election, moral values voters likely concentrated on abortion, school prayer, and gay-marriage when in the voting booth (McMahon 2005).

Former President of the *Family Research Council* Ken Connor has said that the two issues that are non-negotiable for the base are: “the sanctity of life and the sanctity of marriage” (2005). In 2004, three-fifths of Christian Right activists named abortion and same-sex marriage as the most important problem facing the country, with foreign policy concerns coming in a distant second (Green 2006).

It’s important to note that not all “values voters” are affiliated with the Christian Right. In 2004, for some voters, values also consisted of concerns related to the morality of preemptive war, social justice, poverty, and civil rights, just to name a few (Denton Jr. 2005). But in 2004, the concerns of these voters appear to have been outweighed in importance by an issue of morality that eventually came to the fore of the presidential campaign—gay-marriage. And, for Democrats, as the 2004 campaign progressed, discussions of moral values, religion, and faith became a distraction and a liability for Democratic standard-bearer Sen. John Kerry (2005).

Gay-Marriage in 2004 Presidential Campaign

In retrospect, one key moment of the 2004 presidential campaign came in November of 2003, when by a one-vote majority, the Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized the marrying of same-sex couples within the state’s borders. This ruling is said to have ignited a renewed culture

war in courts across the country (McMahon 2005); and, indeed the decision had noticeable effects on the Christian Right, and subsequently, the presidential campaign as well.

One thing the same-sex marriage issue did in 2004 was rearrange the issue agenda of the Christian Right such that this particular issue received higher priority than did any other existing one (Wilcox 2006). The specter of gay-marriage is also said to have helped generate new state organizations devoted to the Christian Right, not to mention invigorate existing ones (2006). Perhaps more pertinent to the 2004 election, though, the same-sex marriage issue also helped create interracial coalitions that had not previously existed (2006). In Michigan, for example, the issue was so powerful that it helped cement an unusual alliance between white evangelicals, African-American Protestants, and Roman Catholics throughout the state (Penning 2006).

The issue resonated in American church congregations as well, especially in white, southern evangelical churches. These places became an organizing machine for Republicans in the same way that labor unions had functioned for Democrats in previous elections (Denton Jr. 2005). The same-sex marriage issue also stimulated electoral activity in pastors and congregations that had previously been inactive (Wilcox 2006). Many pastors who had previously avoided talking about elections from the pulpit did so in 2004 (2006). In fact, politicking in the 2004 election became so intense that the IRS sent letters to both political parties reminding them that churches engaging in partisan activities were in danger of losing their tax-exempt status (Denton Jr. 2005).

The gay-marriage issue not only transformed the Christian Right in 2004, however. It also had a large indirect effect on the presidential campaign as well. In addition to the Massachusetts Court's decision, the open defiance of marriage laws across the country—by elected officials, like former San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, for example—led President

Bush to announce his support for a U.S. constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union between one man and one woman (McMahon 2005). This is noteworthy, as the president's previous stance was one that had him opposed to gay-marriage, but also to a Constitutional amendment forbidding it, which was—poll after poll in 2004 showed—the median position of the general electorate as well. But Republican strategists were leery of the change in public support of gay rights over the previous two decades, and thus were reluctant to embrace the national amendment that Christian groups and the president now opposed (Wilcox 2006).

Instead of an amendment to the Constitution, then, the battle over gay-marriage was taken to the states. The Massachusetts decision helped lead to the establishment of a “judicial activism” frame, which led to a push to amend state constitutions to preclude “activist, liberal judges” from “discovering” a right to same-sex marriage in state constitutions (2006). The gay-marriage issue became the catchall for concerns about activist courts, banning school prayer, attempts to remove “under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance, and limiting religious displays in public (Denton Jr. 2005).

By November of 2004, initiatives or referenda designed to constitutionally ban gay-marriage appeared on the ballot in 11 states—Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah (Karol and Miguel 2007). Marriage referenda also appeared on the ballot in two primary states prior to November—Louisiana and Missouri. In all, each ballot measure passed easily, garnering 70 percent support on average (Donovan et al. 2008)⁵.

⁵ Percentages marriage referenda and initiatives passed with in 2004: **Referendum states:** Mississippi (86 percent), Louisiana (78 percent), Georgia (76 percent), Oklahoma (76 percent), Kentucky (75 percent), Missouri (71 percent), and Utah (66 percent). **Initiative states:** Arkansas (75 percent), North Dakota (73 percent), Montana (67 percent), Ohio (62 percent), Oregon (57 percent), and Michigan (56 percent).

The large margins the amendments passed with may have caused observers of the 2004 election to conclude that a “spillover” effect resulted from these marriage contests, and that Bush may have been the beneficiary of the presence of these propositions on the ballot. A more skeptical observer, however, may argue that the true intent of these measures was not to actually ban gay-marriage in the first place, but ultimately to drive up support for Bush.

Proponents of the marriage initiatives have disputed this assertion, however. Phil Burress, president of the *Citizens for Community Values* in Ohio, has said that the timing of the initiatives was dictated by the Massachusetts’ Court’s decision on marriage (Vlahos 2004): “This is all about marriage for us. If it helps Bush, so be it” (2004). Burress did not deny that Christian conservative groups were behind the amendment efforts, however. “It’s (the church,) people of faith that have been behind this for years,” he said (2004).

State chairwoman of the *Georgia Christian Coalition* Sadie Fields remarked that the presidential contest was not taken into consideration when devising the initiative in Georgia. “If that’s a byproduct, then so be it. What we are fighting is the radical homosexual agenda,” she said (Brownfield 2004).

Prior to the election, initiative and referendum scholar John Matsusaka said that the initiatives would most likely help Bush and other Republican candidates the most, given that Christian conservatives were the ones behind the initiative efforts in 2004 (Vlahos 2004).

How these ballot measures influenced the likelihood of voting among evangelical Christians and how they affected presidential vote choice is disputed among scholars, and represent the two main questions this thesis seeks to answer.

Voter Turnout in 2004

Nationally, turnout was 60 percent in November 2004 (McDonald 2004), up six points from the 2000 election, and the highest it had been since 1968 (Altschuler and Spitzer 2007). But how did the half of the Republicans' base-mobilization strategy that emphasized increasing turnout among evangelical Christians fare? Academic studies have shown that the mobilization of evangelicals is maximized when issues such as abortion, gay rights, and school prayer are either on the ballot, or are major components of a political campaign (Smith et al. 2006). Findings from the scholarly literature suggest, though, that the higher number of evangelicals that turned out in 2004 may have simply been the result of a natural increase among a single demographic group from one four-year election cycle to the next. Comparisons of exit polls, for example, show that evangelicals constituted 23 percent of the electorate in both the 2000 and 2004 elections (Keeter 2005).

But even without an increase in the proportion of the electorate that this demographic comprised, there still would have been an increase in voter turnout in terms of raw numbers, given natural growth within the group. The concern of this thesis is how the ballot measures influenced voting intention among this bloc. Were evangelicals/born-again Christians residing in states where these measures were on the ballot more likely than other potential voters to have expressed an intention prior to the election?

As implied above, research on this question has yielded more findings on the side of the null hypothesis that the ballot measures ultimately did not systematically increase turnout among evangelicals in noncompetitive states—or in presidential battlegrounds (Burden 2004, Abramowitz 2004, Smith et. al 2006, Smith et. al 2005, Karol and Miguel 2007). Rather, research has indicated that increases in (overall) turnout in 2004 were associated with states

whose electoral votes were being contested by both parties in the presidential election, and/or states where there was a competitive Senate contest on the ballot (McDonald 2004).

One scholar who has analyzed the aggregate effect the ballot propositions had on turnout found that the marriage amendments had their greatest impact in states that were not competitive in the presidential election. Among non-battleground states, the turnout rate was up 7.0 percent from 2000 in the eight states that voted on a marriage ballot proposition, while the turnout rate was up only 4.0 percent in the non-battleground states that did not vote on a marriage amendment (McDonald 2004). Ultimately, though, overall turnout in these states was lower (56.7 percent) than it was in the non-battlegrounds that did not vote on a marriage amendment (58.8 percent).

Conversely, in 2004, presidential battlegrounds had both higher turnout and a higher turnout rate compared with non-battleground states. Turnout in the competitive states was 65.9 percent (+8.3 from 2000), while turnout in the noncompetitive states was 58.4 percent (+4.7 percent from 2000), a significant difference of 7.5 percentage points moving from contested to uncontested states.

McDonald analyzed aggregate data, however, and did not examine how the initiatives and referenda may have influenced turnout among evangelicals in particular states. And on that question, some empirical evidence shows that evangelicals were mobilized to turn out to vote in states that voted on marriage amendments, and particularly in Ohio, which is a useful case study for scholars due to a number of factors. Some of these include: its presidential battleground status; its having a marriage initiative on the ballot—Issue 1—and; its status as one of the states where the marriage amendment is said not only to have increased turnout among evangelicals, but also where it is said to have directly affected the outcome of the presidential contest. Ohio

carried with it added importance in 2004—given that had Kerry won the state’s 20 electoral votes he would have garnered the necessary 270 electoral votes to win the presidency, everything else equal.

Turnout in Ohio in 2004 was 72 percent of registered voters (Green 2006), up 10 percent from 2000 (McMahon 2005)—after South Dakota, the second highest rate of increase in the nation (Donovan et al. 2005). Current *Family Research Council* President Tony Perkins has asserted that Issue 1 made the difference for Bush in Ohio. According to Perkins’ analysis, had values voters comprised the 18 percent of the electorate they did in Pennsylvania, rather than the 23 percent they made up in Ohio, Bush would have lost a raw number of 139,807 votes (McMahon 2005), which would have been enough for Kerry to win the state, and thus the presidency. Bush ended up winning Ohio by approximately 118,000 votes in November (Smith et al. 2005). But given Perkins role as a political activist and a possible vested interest he may have had in promulgating a values voters meme for the 2004 election outcome, his analysis does not carry as much weight in this thesis as that which other scholars have disseminated.

Smith et al. (2005, 2006) have used county-level data to determine that areas with larger concentrations of evangelical populations in Michigan and Ohio did not show higher levels of turnout relative to the rest of the state (Smith et al. 2006). The conclusion of these scholars is that turnout was up across the board in both Michigan and Ohio (2006).

Findings regarding how the marriage initiatives and referenda affected presidential vote choice are more in unison and are collectively stronger than the findings regarding how they may have influenced turnout. And, these findings are consistent with a claim that the ballot measures pertaining to gay-marriage had the net effect of increasing the president’s vote share in these states.

Bush Vote Share as Function of Marriage Amendments

In 2004, voters who identified themselves as born-again, evangelical, or fundamentalist Christians were significantly more likely than others to mention that gay-marriage was a very important issue consideration for them in deciding how to cast their ballot for president (Donovan et al. 2008). As outlined above, the evidence is not clear-cut that these groups were mobilized to vote at a higher rate relative to the rest of the electorate. But might they have netted the president more votes relative to other demographics?

One study that merged county-level religious, socioeconomic, and political data with 2004 election results found that, at least in Ohio, the density of evangelicals in a county was positively related to support for Bush (Smith et al. 2006). In Michigan, the same study yielded results which showed that the county-level proportion of Catholics had a positive effect on Bush's vote share, but that the percentage of evangelicals per county was not a statistically significant predictor of vote choice (2006).

The effects the ballot measures may have had on the presidential vote, however, may not just be limited to a purported increase in mobilization for Bush among evangelicals and other values voters. Opposition to gay-marriage in 2004 was consistently strong across demographics, and may have had the effect of increasing Bush's vote share from other voting blocs as well. For instance, Smith et al. found that in Ohio, Issue 1 increased the president's vote share across demographics, not just among evangelicals (2005).

In Ohio, two factors—issue priming and issue mobilization—may have interacted with one another to create a simultaneous effect for Bush (Donovan et al. 2005). But looking at the specific case studies of Ohio and Michigan, Donovan et al. found no direct effect of issue

mobilization on intentions to support Bush (2005). This same finding can be applied to the other marriage amendment states as well (Karol and Miguel 2007).

Campbell and Monson, however, have found that evangelicals who resided in states that voted on a marriage amendment were mobilized to vote for Bush at a higher rate than those in states that did not vote on an amendment (Campbell and Monson 2008). These scholars also found, however, that Republican secularists in these same states were demobilized (2008). But, since evangelicals are in greater abundance than are secularists in the Republican Party, the net effect was, in all likelihood, still a gain for Bush. Indeed, in 2004, evangelicals comprised the largest demographic group for Bush, constituting 35 percent of his supporters (Keeter 2005).

Scholars' attempts to disentangle the marriage issue itself from the much more broadly-defined "moral values" has led to some different conclusions regarding the role the gay-marriage issue is said to have played in influencing the outcome of the presidential election. Hillygus and Shields found that the marriage issue (and abortion) had no effect on voter decision making among Independents, voters living in battleground states, or on voters living in states with marriage amendments on the ballot (2005). These scholars, as well as others, have determined that the Iraq War, the economy, and terrorism were all considerably more important to voters in deciding how to cast their ballot for president (Mulligan 2008, Lewis 2005).

In terms of the specific factors one can attribute Bush's re-election victory to, other possibilities include: the president's incumbent status (Denton Jr. 2005), as well as his advantage over Kerry on the terrorism issue (Abramowitz 2004). Abramowitz noted that in three states directly affected by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks—New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut—Bush gained an average of 5.4 percentage points relative to 2000, compared to the 2.5 percent average he gained in the rest of the country (2004).

THEORETICAL RELEVANCE

Would it have been reasonable for Republican strategists to expect that the marriage amendments on the ballot in 2004 would systematically increase turnout overall, and not just among their evangelical base? Theorists of participatory democracy would contend that that would have been a reasonable expectation. Theories of participatory democracy hold that if democratic institutions offer people greater opportunities to participate in decisions, those institutions may have an “educative” effect on them (Tolbert et al. 2009). Educative effects of democracy include such things as: enhancing citizen engagement, building confidence in government, mobilizing interest groups and political parties, and increasing voter turnout, among other things (Tolbert et al. 2009).

An abundance of evidence exists, too, which lends support to theories of participatory democracy as they relate to turnout. The general consensus among scholars appears to be that forms of direct democracy, like initiatives and referenda, for example, generally have the net effect of increasing turnout in most elections (Tolbert et al. 2001, Tolbert and Smith 2005, Childers and Binder 2010). In nearly all cases, scholars agree that the effect of increasing turnout is more pronounced in midterm elections than in presidential elections (Childers and Binder 2010).

Disagreement is found on the question of whether ballot measures have the effect of increasing turnout in presidential elections. Recent works have shown that ballot measures have had this effect in presidential elections, and in the 2004 election in particular, initiatives were found to be the cause of an increase in overall turnout (Lewis 2005, McDonald 2004). For the most part, though, past findings have generally shown that ballot measures do not have the effect

of increasing turnout in presidential elections. The high stimulus of the presidential election has generally drowned out any effect other electoral contests have on turnout (Everson 1981).

The mobilization of interest groups seems to be a possible causal mechanism that can account for the possibility that evangelicals (or values voters) may have turned out in higher numbers in the 2004 election. In terms of the marriage initiatives functioning to increase turnout, it is plausible that churches in the relevant states may have attempted to mobilize members in the body to turn out and vote in favor of the marriage amendments.

Churches may have also demonstrated influence by spending advertising dollars in the relevant states as well. If it was in fact interest groups that were responsible for stimulating a possible increase in turnout among evangelicals in 2004, it is likely that mobilization among the relevant subgroup would be consistent across parties. In other words, it should not matter that an evangelical or born-again Christian is a Republican, Democrat, or Independent. It should only matter that he or she belongs to the interest group attempting to mobilize the targeted population. If an interest group explanation is plausible, turnout among evangelicals should be consistent across parties.

On the other hand, if it was the Republicans' base-mobilization strategy that caused a possible increase in turnout, it seems that mobilization among the relevant subgroup (evangelicals) would only be specific to Republican voters. As mentioned earlier, half of the Republicans' strategy consisted of attempting to increase turnout among culturally conservative voters concerned or upset about threats to traditional values. These strategists would have most likely focused their efforts in Republican areas, rather than in Democratic ones, knowing that party identification is usually the best predictor of vote choice in partisan contests.

Another mechanism by which turnout among evangelicals may have increased in the 2004 election is the marriage campaigns themselves. Advertising dollars spent in the relevant states may have translated to greater recognition of the ballot propositions, and subsequently greater interest and awareness among the electorate, which could have led to higher turnout. In other words, the campaigns could have had the effect of stimulating the interest of peripheral voters.

The substance of the propositions could have also functioned to increase turnout. Social issues such as: abortion, same-sex marriage (and homosexual rights), stem-cell research, euthanasia, civil rights, and drug policies tap core values that reflect deeply held beliefs and are thus often seen as more meaningful to citizens than other more complex issues (Biggers 2009). Grummel writes that a sizable portion of the electorate holds a strong and uncompromising position on the values embodied in policies that pertain to morality, and that these uncompromising positions are often based on religious beliefs (2008). Moral issues, especially, have been found to be highly salient with the electorate (Biggers 2009), and voters tend to display greater awareness of these issues than others that appear on ballots as well (Nicholson 2003). Moral issues have been found to be the cause of an increase turnout in past elections—when they have been on the ballot (Grummel 2008).

The issue priming phenomenon associated with ballot initiatives is a possible mechanism that may have been at work in terms of increasing turnout among evangelicals, and subsequently affecting the presidential contest as well. There is some evidence that certain issues, when they appear on the ballot, have the effect of causing voters to mention that particular issue as important to them, and subsequently a factor that was considered in their vote choice. And, there is some empirical evidence that the marriage initiatives and referenda had a priming effect on

support for Bush in 2004 (Donovan et al. 2008, Donovan et al. 2005). Voters living in states where gay-marriage was on the ballot were more likely to mention that issue as being “very important” in their consideration of presidential candidates (2008, 2005). And ultimately, voters who reported in surveys as having been “very concerned” about gay-marriage were more likely to vote for Bush in 2004 (Donovan et al. 2008), irrespective of religious affiliation. In this thesis, though, I do not test for a priming influence (or the effects of marriage campaigns) that may have functioned to stimulate turnout or influence vote choice.

Instead, I develop a research design that expounds on the one Campbell and Monson constructed in a 2008 article published in a scholarly journal⁶. I break down turnout models (actually, intention to vote models) by parties, and include an encompassing model that combines all potential voters together in a single model. This should function to enhance understanding on whether increased mobilization of evangelicals, if it occurred at all, was consistent across parties, as an interest group explanation would hold, or if it was confined to Republicans, as an explanation that pertains to electoral strategy would contend.

Further, I estimate an additional model that tests for the independent variables of interest (born-again Protestants, gay-marriage state, etc.) on presidential vote choice. Campbell and Monson’s key finding in their article is ambiguous in that it does not give a clear understanding on the difference between mobilization and vote choice among evangelicals in the 2004 election. Their conclusion is that: “... (white) evangelical Protestants had a higher level of mobilization for Bush in states with a gay-marriage initiative (on the ballot)” (Campbell and Monson 2008).

It appears as though the authors are attempting to convey that evangelicals both turned out in higher numbers than other groups in 2004, and that they also voted for Bush at higher rates

⁶ The article Campbell and Monson wrote is entitled: “The Religion Card: Gay-Marriage and the 2004 Election” and was published in *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 2008 (Vol. 72, No. 3).

than other groups. But, it is interpreted such that they are attempting to account for two different phenomena without their legitimately having evidence to do so. Moreover, only one probit regression is included in their article, with the dependent variable a dichotomous one that measured factors that influenced vote choice. Thus, it seems that the authors did in fact test for vote choice as a function of the interaction of identification as an evangelical and residence in a gay-marriage state—but not necessarily turnout. In this thesis, I test for most of the factors Campbell and Monson used in their design, on both intention to turn out in November and presidential vote choice.

The theoretical points related to interest group mobilization and electoral strategy outlined above serve as the foundation for the hypotheses in this thesis, and for the empirical analysis to follow.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Self-reported intention to vote in the 2004 presidential election is positively related to 1) identification as a born-again Protestant Christian; and 2) an interaction term measuring identification as a born-again Protestant and residence in a gay-marriage ban state.

Hypothesis 2: Self-reported vote for President Bush in 2004 is positively related to 1) identification as a born-again Protestant Christian; and 2) an interaction measuring the effects of identification as a born-again Protestant and residence in a gay-marriage ban state.

RESEARCH DESIGN

For this design, the two sources of data used are the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) and the 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES). To empirically test for the hypotheses, logistic regression is the statistical method that is used to determine the effects the main independent variables of interest (born-again Protestant, gay-marriage state, born-again \times gay-marriage state interaction) have on the dichotomous dependent variables (intention to vote and presidential vote choice). In place of a measure gauging intention to vote, a dummy variable for reported turnout is substituted in the ANES turnout model.

Data

The 2004 NAES is the main source of data for this research design. For the 2004 election, the NAES conducted a broad and expansive survey that spanned more than 13 months (Oct. 7, 2003 – Nov. 16, 2004) and included 81,422 randomly selected U.S. adults for telephone interviews. One obvious advantage this dataset offers is that the large sample of observations ultimately permits one to draw strong, definitive conclusions from the empirical findings—assuming a sound research design is in place. The large number of observations in the sample also means that, unlike with other sources that consist of survey data, the NAES sample potentially allows researchers the ability to isolate a single state (or multiple states) for testing purposes.

The 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) consists of only 1,212 responses in total. The number of observations from any single state is relatively small, and simply does not provide the needed number for a strong design, particularly with the questions attempting to be answered in this design. The NAES, on the other hand, averages more than 1,000 observations per state. Thus, creating a dummy variable for the 11 states that had a marriage

amendment on the ballot in November, and using NAES data, yields over 15,000 observations of potential voters living in marriage amendment states. Conversely, creating a similar dummy variable using ANES data yields only 200 observations of residents in marriage states.

In addition to low numbers of observations associated with typical post-election surveys, another common problem with them is that there are fewer variables for researchers to parse through, and often less than ideal measures of the variables that were attempted to be measured. For instance, the ANES does not provide a specific measure of evangelicalism. It only categorizes respondents by denomination based on whether they attend service on a weekly basis. In comparison, the NAES not only categorizes respondents based on their religious denomination and propensity to attend service, but the more detailed questionnaire also provides a measure of evangelicalism by asking interviewees whether they considered themselves to be an evangelical/born-again Christian.

In some instances, though, models using ANES data may produce more accurate results than those which models using NAES data produce. In these cases, the ANES will function to serve as a point of analysis. But, with the low number of observations in the dataset, the ANES models in this design mostly function to substantiate or refute findings the NAES models produce.

One flaw of the NAES dataset is that it does not provide a completely valid measure of evangelicalism. The 2004 NAES does contain a question inquiring of respondents whether they considered themselves to be an “evangelical/born-again Christian.” But this question obviously combines evangelicals with respondents who did not identify as evangelical, but did identify as “born-again,” which ultimately provides for a measure of evangelicalism that is much higher than this group’s proportion of the 2004 electorate. Indeed, the tabulation shows that the yes/no

divide on this question is approximately 40 percent/60 percent, significantly higher than the 23 percent of voters who identified as evangelical Christian on the national exit poll previously cited.

There are problems associated with the 2004 NAES dataset, but those found in the ANES dataset (and other typical post-election surveys) are more obvious, and make it a much less ideal choice for use in this design.

Dependent Variables

In place of the reported turnout variable in the NAES model, I use a measure of voting intention. This variable should function similar to that of a reported turnout measure in that a number of respondents, who actually did not intend to vote, will indicate that they did because of the social desirability pressure factor that accompanies voting. Indeed, of the approximately 33,000 respondents who were asked this question in the NAES sample, more than 90 percent of the sample indicated that they intended to vote in November.

It is likely that this measure of voting intention may be even less valid than those that accompany measures of reported turnout, which have generally been found to be greatly inflated. Studies that measure validated voting have shown that reported turnout can be as much as 7.0 – 11.5 percent higher than election day turnout (Anderson and Silver 1986), or even as much as 20.0 – 30.0 percent higher than election day turnout (Silver et al. 1986). But while the question the NAES asked may not be a valid measure of who actually intended to turn out to vote in 2004, it should still be a reliable one. Pressure to indicate an intention to vote should be relatively consistent across demographic groups, and across the states.

In those instances where the pressure may have been greater for certain groups of people to indicate that they intended to vote, findings on the characteristics that have tended to factor

into overreporting help formulate the research design, and can help corroborate or refute empirical findings from the logit models. A safe assumption is that the same characteristics that predict overreporting post-election would be the most significant characteristics factoring into respondents' expressing an intention to vote pre-election. Scholars have an idea about which demographic characteristics best predict validated turnout, as well as overreporting, and I use past findings in this area to guide expectations regarding which individuals were most likely to indicate prior to the election that they intended to vote in November 2004.

The dependent variable for voting intention is simply coded 0 for those who indicated prior to the election that they did not plan to vote and 1 for those who—prior to the election—expressed an intention to vote in November.

The dependent variable in the presidential vote choice model simply measures who NAES respondents voted for in 2004. The variable is coded such that 1 = vote for Bush, and 0 = vote for Kerry, Ralph Nader, or someone else. This question was asked of respondents over two different time periods (both pre- and post-election)—and contains approximately 1,500 responses⁷. In the dataset, responses from both questions are combined to create a single variable.

That the dependent variable only has 1,500 responses associated with it is one downside to this measure of vote choice, and ultimately means that the number of observations in the vote choice model will be substantially reduced in comparison to the intention to vote models—which consist of nearly 20,000 observations in all, and more than 5,000 apiece broken down by party. But, the presidential vote choice model still yields over 1,000 observations—enough from which one can draw meaningful conclusions.

⁷ For exact question wordings of the relevant variables, see the description of the NAES variables in the appendix (p. 53-55).

Since both of the dependent variables in this design are dichotomous, I conduct logistic regression analysis to estimate the effects of the relevant independent variables on stated intentions to vote (among all potential voters combined, and among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents separately) and presidential vote choice (among all potential voters).

Independent Variables

One of the main independent variables of interest in this design is a constructed variable—referred to as *Born-again Protestant*—that combines the effects of respondents identifying themselves as born-again/evangelical Christians and attending services at a church of a Protestant denomination. Scholars have found that the mobilization of evangelicals is often maximized when social issues are either on the ballot or are major factors of the political campaign (Biggers 2009). As mentioned above, the NAES does not provide a single measure of evangelicalism. Rather, it combines respondents who identify as either a born-again *or* an evangelical Christian into one dichotomous variable. In order to get closer to the effect of identification as an evangelical Christian, I combine the “yes” observations of this variable with the observations of another variable, in which respondents claimed attendance at church services of various denominations.

Specifically, the relevant questions in the NAES survey are: “*Do you consider yourself an evangelical or born-again Christian?*”⁸ and for those who attend weekly services, “*Do you attend services at a Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or Mormon church?*”⁹ Since evangelicals are affiliated with the Protestant religion, I have combined the observations for this response with those also identifying as evangelical/born-again Christian to obtain a better measure of evangelicalism. Thus, this is a simple dichotomous variable where 1 = born-again Protestants,

⁸ 2004 NAES codebook, page 361

⁹ 2004 NAES codebook, page 360

and 0 = else. Instead of using the single measure of evangelicalism the NAES provides, the constructed variable at least reduces the proportion of evangelicals to 38 percent (down from 42 percent). This is far from a perfect measure of evangelicalism, of course, but it seems to be the best one that can be utilized with the questions and responses from this dataset. Instead of including Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and others who may have identified as “born-again,” the constructed variable limits the responses to those who indicated that they attend service at a Protestant church, and who also identified as a born-again/evangelical Christian.

Another variable of interest, *Gay-marriage state*, is also a dichotomous one, where 1 refers to the 11 states that had a marriage amendment on the November ballot¹⁰, and 0 refers to the other 39 states and Washington D.C. As outlined above, the marriage issue tended to be more salient with voters in states where it was on the ballot. With some findings indicating that initiatives have had the effect of increasing turnout in presidential elections, respondents who lived in marriage amendment states may have been more likely than those living outside them to express an intention to vote.

Tolbert et al. (2009) conducted an individual-level analysis on voter turnout as a function of initiatives appearing on state ballots, and found that voters living in a state with more initiatives on the ballot were more likely to vote in the 2004 election. Daniel Biggers looked specifically at social issue ballot measures in the 2004 election and found that the presence of each additional social measure led to an increase in the likelihood of an individual’s voting by 2.3 percent (Biggers 2009).

Since intention to vote (and support for Bush) among evangelicals may be conditioned by living in a marriage amendment state, as Campbell and Monson have claimed is the case, an

¹⁰ Marriage amendment states include: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.

interaction term is used. *Born-again Protestant* × *gay-marriage state* is an interaction term that measures the effect of respondents residing in one of the 11 marriage amendment states, and identifying as a born-again Protestant. It is expected that this variable will be positively related to expressed intention of voting (and support for Bush), as Biggers has demonstrated that turnout among evangelicals can be heavily influenced when social issues are on the ballot (2009).

Since there is evidence that turnout was up in the states that were contested by both presidential candidates (McDonald 2004), I include a variable for battleground states, where 1 equals the 11 states that were decided by five percentage points of fewer in the popular vote¹¹, and where 0 represents the remaining 39 states and Washington D.C. Respondents in one of these presidential battleground states may have been more likely to vote than those living outside them, perhaps thinking that their vote was potentially more valuable than it would have been in another state that was not contested by both presidential candidates.

In the presidential vote logit model, a variable—*Marriage amendment*—that tests for the effect of opposition to gay-marriage on support for Bush is included. This question, in particular, asked: “*Do you favor an amendment to the U.S Constitution that would prohibit states from marrying same-sex couples?*” An ordinal variable where 0 refers to respondents who strongly oppose a Constitutional amendment; 1 = somewhat oppose; 2 = neither approve nor oppose; 3 = somewhat approve; and 4 = strongly approve, is used to measure this factor. The expectation is that this variable will be highly significant for Bush, since the findings up to this point agree (and are clear) that people opposed to gay-marriage were more likely to vote for Bush in 2004, controlling for other factors.

¹¹ In this design, battleground states include the 11 states whose electoral votes were decided by fewer than five percentage points in the popular vote in November: Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

Ideally, other variables that measured opinions and attitudes on salient issues in the 2004 election (the economy, the Iraq War, terrorism, etc.) would be included in this type of model, for the purpose of determining how well the marriage issue predicted vote choice relative to other issues. But, multicollinearity with the independent variables of interest is the result of including other issue variables in the NAES vote choice model. Absent these variables, then, the marriage amendment variable should only function to inform on whether the issue, by itself, is positively related to vote choice, as has been found to be the case in the 2004 election.

Control Variables

A number of control variables that have been found to influence turnout and vote choice are included in each of these models, and help get closer to the actual effects of born-again Protestantism and residence in a gay-marriage state on both voting intention and presidential vote choice.

Affiliation with a political party and strength of one's party identification has been found to be positively related to turnout (Timpone 1998), and here, a dummy variable indicates whether respondents mentioned their partisan affiliation as either strong or not strong (0 = not strong; 1 = strong). The expectation is that this control will be positively related to voting intention. The variable for party identification is most relevant to the presidential vote choice model. For this control variable, 0 = Democrats; 1 = Independents; and, 2 = Republicans. Party identification has tended to serve as the factor that best predicts vote choice in partisan elections. Thus, this variable should be the one most strongly related to support for Bush in the vote choice models.

Ideology is a standard control variable that is included in a lot of turnout models. Here, *Conservatism* is an ordinal variable that places respondents' ideology on a five-point scale. Zero

= very liberal; 1 = liberal; 2 = moderate; 3 = conservative; 4 = very conservative. If ideology is a predictor of vote choice, the coefficient should be positively signed in the vote choice model.

Ideology strength groups respondents who indicated that they were either very liberal or very conservative into one category, with those indicating less strong ideologies (conservative or liberal) into another category, with moderates in a category by themselves. Specifically, 0 = moderates; 1 = conservative or liberal; 2 = very conservative or very liberal.

A person's level of education has been found to be the strongest predictor of turnout in the United States (Abramson and Clagett 1984). But, education has also been found to be one of the characteristics most positively related to overreporting as well (Anderson and Silver 1986, Silver et al. 1986, Granberg and Holmberg 1991, Bernstein et al. 2001). The NAES broke down respondents' education levels into nine categories, ranging from those with an eighth grade education or lower, to those owning a graduate or professional degree. For education, the variable is coded such that the low value (0) refers to those with an eighth grade education or lower, and the high value (8) refers to those possessing a graduate or professional degree¹². It is expected that for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, education will be positively related to stated intention of voting.

Bernstein et al. (2001) show that higher-status voters are among the groups of people most likely to overreport voting. This would almost certainly include those living in higher income households. Individuals in these households, then, may be more likely than potential voters living in lower income households to indicate an intention to vote. As with education, the NAES broke down respondents' household incomes into nine categories, ranging from those earning less than \$10,000 annually to those earning more than \$150,000 per year. And as with

¹² See variable appendix (p. 53-55) for a detailed breakdown of NAES variable codings.

education, the variable (*Household income*) is coded such that 0 refers to the lowest annual household income, and 8 refers to the highest annual household income.

Age is yet another factor that has been found to influence both voter turnout and overreporting. Past studies have found that turnout increases as a function of age, but that there is a curvilinear effect associated with this relationship (Timpone 1998). Once voters reach a certain plateau, turnout begins to decrease with age. The age of respondents in the NAES sample ranges from 18 – 97 years. This variable has not been recoded and will function as a continuous variable in each of the logit models. Because of the curvilinear effect that's been found to be associated with turnout, I incorporate a variable (*Age-squared*) into the models to determine if there is such an effect associated with voting intention and age.

Evidence exists which shows that men are more likely to overreport voting than women (Granberg and Holmberg 1991). Thus, a control for respondents' sex is included in this design. A dichotomous variable, with men coded as 0s and women as 1s, is incorporated into each of the logit models.

Along with education, the other demographic characteristic that has most commonly been found to be positively related to overreporting is race. Typically, studies have shown that blacks are more likely to overreport voting than are whites, although the difference is not substantial (Anderson and Silver 1986, Silver et al. 1986, Abramson and Clagett 1984, Silver et al. 1986, Bernstein et al. 2001).

In identifying respondents' race, the NAES prefaced interviewees with a question inquiring whether they were of Hispanic or Latino descent. If no, interviewees were then asked which racial category they best fit under. Two dichotomous variables for race are included in the models. The first, *Hispanic*, simply indicates whether respondents were of Hispanic or Latino

descent (1) or not (0). The second, *Black*, combines other racial minorities (Asian, American-Indian, and other) with whites into one category (0), and places blacks into a separate category by themselves (1).

Marital status is included in this design to control for the effect of being married, on both intention to vote and presidential vote choice. There is some evidence that married voters tend to turn out at higher rates than non-married voters (Timpone 1998), but not as much that they tend to overreport relative to unmarried potential voters. This variable may be more significant in the vote choice model, then, since Bush is said to have done better with married women voters in 2004 than in 2000 (Burden 2004).

A dummy variable for the South is also included in this design. If the intention to vote models are a good predictor of actual turnout in November, this coefficient should be negatively signed, since voters living in the South tend to turn out at lower rates than voters living in other regions. This variable is coded 1 for the 11 states of the old Confederacy¹³, and 0 for the remaining 39 states and Washington D.C.

Finally, a dummy variable for Catholic voters is incorporated into the models, mostly for the purpose of comparing intention to vote among Catholics with intention to vote among born-again Protestants. This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for potential voters who identified as Catholic and 0 for those who did not identify as such.

¹³ Eleven states of the Old Confederacy include: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia

FINDINGS

NAES Voter Intention Models

There is some empirical support for the hypothesis that identification as a born-again Protestant is positively related to expressed intention to vote. But, while the statistical relationship between the variables is relatively strong, the substantive one seems to be relatively weak.¹⁴ Table 1 (p. 32) shows that the relationship between expressed intention to vote and identification as a born-again Protestant is significant at the .01 level for all potential voters, but among parties, the relationship is only significant at the .10 level (for both Republicans and Independents). It could be the case that the large number of observations in the model that includes all potential voters detected a relationship between the variables that does not substantively exist.

Because the independent variables in the intention to vote models explain a relatively low percentage of the variance (approximate ranges are from 14 percent to 17.5 percent), predicted probabilities are not shown for these variables. Notwithstanding the low pseudo r-squared values of the models, though, the number of observations ranges from a low of approximately 5,400 for the model of Independents to as high as nearly 20,000 for the model that includes all potential voters—a sufficient number from which one can draw strong conclusions.

There is also little substantive evidence that voters who lived in gay-marriage states may have been more likely to vote in November than those living outside them. Table 1 shows that the relationship between intention to vote and residence in a gay-marriage state is significant at the .05 level. It's noteworthy, though, that this variable is not statistically related to any of

¹⁴ See Table 1 on page 32 for full results the logit models using NAES data produced. Asterisks indicate the variables that are statistically related to intention to vote—among all potential voters, and then broken down by party. Table 4 (p. 40) shows the results from a similar logit model using ANES data, with reported turnout substituted in place of intention to vote as the dependent variable.

TABLE 1. FACTORS AFFECTING INTENTION TO VOTE AMONG SUBSETS OF VOTERS (NAES RESULTS)¹⁵

	All potential voters	Republicans only	Democrats only	Independents only
Born-again Protestant	0.2523***	0.3320*	0.1005	0.2434*
Catholic	0.1814**	0.0323	0.2925**	0.1612
Gay-marriage state	0.2550**	0.4219	0.2190	0.2224
Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state	-0.0819	-0.2481	-0.0083	-0.0278
Battleground states	-0.0716	0.0881	-0.0668	-0.1271
South	-0.1485*	-0.3446**	-0.0801	-0.0391
Party identification strength	0.5716***	0.9339***	0.8016***	0.1970*
Ideology strength	0.1111**	0.2396**	0.1071	-0.0860
Education	0.2360***	0.2697***	0.2264***	0.2198***
Household income	0.2320***	0.2397***	0.1921***	0.2366***
Black	0.4834***	-0.5474	0.6089***	0.5510***
Hispanic	-1.1029***	-1.2623***	-0.9654***	-1.1855***
Marital status	-0.0582	0.0534	-0.1254	-0.1027
Sex	0.2677***	0.0699	0.1900*	0.3306***
Age	-0.0009	-0.0210	0.0068	0.0103
Age-squared	0.0003**	0.0004*	0.0002	0.0002
Party identification	0.0684	--	--	--
Conservatism	0.1312***	--	--	--
Constant	-0.4989*	0.5287	-0.0936	-0.5611
Number of observations	= 19,753	= 7,669	= 6,726	= 5,358
Pseudo r-squared	= 0.1606	= 0.1670	= 0.1439	= 0.1745

* indicates $p < .10$

** indicates $p < .05$

*** indicates $p < .01$

¹⁵ Dependent variable in model is Intend to Vote in 2004 General Election (0 = no; 1 = yes)

Republicans, Democrats, or Independents' expressing an intention to vote—but was only related to expressed intention to vote when all of the groups were combined. Again, the large number of observations in the model may have made it such that a relationship between the variables is detected, despite a substantive relationship between the variables not actually existing.

The interaction measuring born-again Protestant identification and living in a marriage state is not statistically significant for any group (or for all potential voters), and the coefficient is negative in each of the models. If Campbell and Monson's conclusion is that evangelicals living in marriage amendment states were more likely to turn out than evangelicals living in other states, there is no support for it based on findings from the NAES.

Identification as a Catholic is also strongly related to expressed intention to vote among all potential voters, but only among Democrats across parties. For both groups, the relationship is significant at the .05 level, with the larger coefficient value present for Democrats. In terms of predicting the change in born-again Protestants and Catholics' intending to vote, the likelihood of expressing an intention to vote is higher among Protestants than among Catholics.

To the extent that these findings on expressed intention to vote can be extrapolated to those in the turnout literature, similar factors that have been found to predict turnout are significant in the NAES models. Some of these include: strength of party identification, education, and household income. Strongly identifying with a party is a good predictor of indicating an intention to vote in 2004, especially for Republicans and Democrats, but much less so for Independents.

Among all potential voters, and across parties, education and household income are strongly related to one's expressing an intention to vote. For Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, both of these coefficients are significant at the .01 level. The coefficient values for

these two variables are highly consistent across the models, with nearly identical values present for the variables for all potential voters (0.2360 for education and 0.2320 for household income)¹⁶.

Among all potential voters, strength of one's ideology is also found to be positively related to expressed intention to vote (.05 level), but only among potential Republican voters (.05 level) by party. The similarly strong coefficient for conservatism corroborates that it was conservative voters, rather than liberal ones, who were most motivated to turn out in 2004.

Another characteristic that is positively and strongly related (.01) to intention to turn out among all voters is the dummy variable for blacks. For Democrats and Independents, too, the relationships are significant at the .01 level. Since there is seemingly nothing unique about the 2004 election that may have stimulated blacks to turn out at a higher rate than usual in November, one may posit that this racial group may account for some of the large discrepancy between actual voting and the expressed intention to vote evident in the NAES question. Scholars have found that blacks are one of the groups of potential voters most likely to overreport, and this seems like the most likely explanation for this specific finding in the intention to vote models. It is noteworthy, though, that when other factors have been controlled for, scholars have found that blacks vote at higher rates than whites.

Women were also more likely than men to indicate an intention to vote prior to the election. Since men have been more likely than women to overreport in past studies, it could be that sex predicted actual turnout in 2004, with women more likely than men to vote. The relationship between sex and the dependent variable is significant at the .01 level for all potential voters, likewise for Independents, but only at the .10 level for Democrats. Republican women were not more likely than Republican men to indicate an intention to vote, however.

¹⁶ Multicollinearity was tested for among the independent variables, but was not found to exist in the NAES models.

The control variable most negatively related to expressed intention to vote is the dummy variable for potential Hispanic voters. Among all potential voters, and across parties, the negative relationship is significant at the .01 level in each of the four models. If the estimated models are a good predictor of who would actually turn out to vote in November, Hispanics were probably the ethnic group least likely to vote. This is not overly surprising given that Hispanics tend to vote at a lower rate relative to their share of the population.

The dummy variable for the South also shows a negative relationship with expressed intention to vote. The relationship is only significant at the .10 level for all potential voters, but is significant at the .05 level for Republicans. If valid, one could theorize that this may be due to the lack of competitive states throughout the region. President Bush ended up carrying every southern state in 2004, and perhaps potential Republican voters in these states perceived their vote as being less important than it would have been in a more hotly contested battleground state in the upper Midwest or Mountain West region, for example. In any event, turnout in the South is usually lower than it is in other regions for most elections.

Coefficients for the battleground state variables in the intention to vote models are not statistically significant. There is no evidence in the NAES models that potential voters residing in presidential battlegrounds were more likely than potential voters living in other states to indicate prior to the election that they would vote in November. This finding may be due simply to the social desirability factor that functioned to pressure all voters, regardless of the state they lived in, to indicate an intention to vote prior to the election.

Controls for marital status and age are both found to be unrelated to the dependent variable; although, removing the control for age that tests for the curvilinear effects makes the relationship between actual age and expressed intention to vote highly significant (.01 level),

which is consistent with findings in the turnout literature and in the literature on overreporting. Older voters are more likely than younger voters to vote, and are also more likely than younger voters to overreport (Anderson and Silver 1986).

NAES Vote Choice Model Findings

The logit model that tests for the factors that may have influenced the presidential vote yields far fewer observations (1,010) than do the intention to vote models, but it explains a much higher percentage of the variance (61.27 percent). This model does show some support for the hypothesis regarding the predicted relationship between presidential vote and identification as a born-again Protestant, but none regarding the hypothesis as it pertains to marriage states. Table 2 below shows that voters who identified as born-again Protestants were about 25 percentage points more likely to vote for Bush than were those who did not identify as such¹⁷. The positive relationship between these variables is significant at the .01 level, too. The interaction measuring born-again Protestantism and residence in a marriage amendment state is not significant again, nor is the dummy variable for gay-marriage ballot states.

TABLE 2. CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED VOTE CHOICE (NAES RESULTS)

Variables	Change 0-> 1	Min-> Max
Born-again Protestant	0.2516	0.2516
Marriage amendment	0.0728	0.2710
Party identification	0.4573	0.8456
Conservatism	0.1504	0.6654
Black	-0.4589	-0.4589

¹⁷ The first column (0-> 1) indicates the predicted change in terms of increasing in one value on the variable scale (i.e., 1-> 2) on the marriage amendment scale. The second column (Min-> Max) indicates the predicted change in terms of moving from the lowest value on the variable scale to the highest one (i.e., 0-> 4 on the marriage scale).

The variable added to the model to test for how the marriage issue itself may have functioned in the presidential election does show significance for Bush. Voters strongly supportive of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex couples from marrying were more than 27 percentage points more likely to have voted for Bush than were those who strongly opposed one.

TABLE 3. FACTORS AFFECTING PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE (NAES RESULTS)¹⁸

Variables	Coefficients
Born-again Protestant	1.1042***
Catholic	0.3641
Gay-marriage state	-0.2135
Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state	0.0650
Marriage amendment	0.2918***
Party identification	2.4964***
Conservatism	0.8044***
Education	-0.0804
Household income	0.0280
Black	-2.0709***
Hispanic	-0.6660
Marital status	0.2411
Sex	-0.2642
Age	-0.0315
Age-squared	0.0002
Constant	-3.6611***
N = 1,010	* indicates p < .10 ** indicates p < .05 *** indicates p < .01
Pseudo r-squared = 0.6127	

¹⁸ Dependent variable in Table 3 is presidential vote choice (0 = Kerry, Nader, or someone else; 1 = Bush).

The only other factors in the model that predict support for Bush are, unsurprisingly, identification as a Republican, and identification as a conservative. For the former, the likelihood of voting for Bush increased by nearly 85 percentage points, moving from a Democratic voter to a Republican one. Very conservative voters were approximately 67 percentage points more likely than very liberal voters to have cast a ballot for Bush. Both of these relationships are significant at the highest level.

The dummy variable for race is the only independent variable negatively related to presidential vote choice. Black voters were 46 percentage points less likely to vote for Bush than were white voters and other minority voters, holding everything else constant. Control variables for marital status and sex are in the expected positive and negative directions, respectively. But, neither coefficient shows a statistically significant relationship with support for Bush or Kerry.

ANES Turnout Model Findings

Similar models estimated using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) that test for reported turnout and vote choice have been included in this thesis for the purpose of corroborating or refuting results from the NAES. After including the relevant independent variables in the ANES logit model, the number of observations is reduced down to 712 in all¹⁹. The model shows little support, though, that the main independent variables of interest are meaningful in terms of their having influenced turnout in 2004.

Like the NAES, the ANES, unfortunately, does not provide a good measure of evangelicalism. In its place, a simple dummy variable for Protestantism is included.²⁰ Neither

¹⁹ See Table 5 on page 41 for the predicted changes associated with the statistically significant independent variables.

²⁰ Since evangelicals belong to the Protestant religion, this seems to be the best possible measure of evangelicalism in the available data. However, since the effects of marriage initiatives on turnout have been found to be less strong for Protestants than for evangelicals (Camp 2008), findings associated with this variable cannot be extrapolated to those in the measure for evangelicalism in the NAES models. For coding procedures of ANES variables, see variable appendix (p. 56-57).

this variable nor the dummy variable for Catholics is related to turnout in 2004²¹. Likewise, the dummy variable for gay-marriage states, as well as the interaction term measuring Protestantism and residence in a gay-marriage state is not found to be related to turnout either²². It is important to note that the dummy variable for gay-marriage states was constructed absent data from five of the eleven states with a marriage amendment on the ballot in November; the sample the ANES collected simply does not contain responses from voters in those states, and is missing responses from voters in other states as well.

One significant difference between the NAES and ANES models is the statistical relationship each one estimated between intention to vote (turnout) and battleground states. Table 5 indicates that respondents living in one of the aforementioned eleven battleground states were approximately nine percentage points more likely to have voted than respondents not living in battleground states. The predicted change in this variable is similar to the actual difference (7.5 percent) McDonald found in the article he wrote on turnout. The relationship between turnout and battleground states is significant at the .01 level in the ANES model.

Controls that demonstrate a positive relationship with turnout include: conservatism, education, household income, and sex—similar to the findings in the NAES models. It seems, then, that women, conservatives, and highly-educated respondents were more likely to have voted in 2004 than men, liberals, and less-educated respondents, controlling for other factors. Each of these individual relationships is significant at the .05 level or greater. The relationship between turnout and household income is significant at the .10 level, with those living in

²¹ See Table 4 (p. 40) for full results of the ANES Turnout logit model.

²² An alternate specification that uses a measure for moral traditionalism in place of the variable for Protestantism likewise does not show statistical significance as it relates to turnout. Similarly, the interaction term (moral traditionalism \times gay-marriage state) substituted in place of the interaction term (Protestant \times gay-marriage state) in the ANES turnout model is also not statistically related to turnout in another specification of the ANES turnout model.

households earning more than \$120,000 per year nearly nine percentage points more likely to have voted than those living in households earning less than \$9,000 per year.

Neither of the variables for age show a statistically significant relationship with turnout; however, once again, if the variable that tests for the curvilinear effect of age is removed, the continuous variable for age is found to be highly related (.05 level) to turnout in 2004. Moving

TABLE 4. FACTORS AFFECTING TURNOUT IN 2004 ELECTION (ANES RESULTS)²³

Variables	Coefficients
Protestant	-0.4915
Catholic	-0.4816
Gay-marriage state	0.1068
Protestant * gay-marriage state	-0.6268
Battleground states	0.9968***
South	-0.2803
Party identification	0.1741
Conservatism	0.1994**
Education	0.3777***
Household income	0.1032*
Black	0.2837
Hispanic	-0.0435
Marital status	0.1236
Sex	0.4721**
Age	0.0061
Age-squared	0.0001
Constant	-1.5752*
N = 712	* indicates p < .10
	** indicates p < .05
Pseudo r-squared = 0.1332	*** indicates p < .01

²³ Dependent variable is dichotomous one measuring whether a respondent indicated that he or she voted in the 2004 general election (0 = no; 1 = yes).

from the youngest voter to the oldest voter increased the probability that he or she voted by nearly 12 percentage points.

Coefficients controlling for the South and Hispanic voters are in the expected negative direction. But neither variable is significantly related to turnout in 2004. The control for marital status is also in the expected (positive) direction; however, this variable is also not related to turnout in 2004.

TABLE 5. CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED TURNOUT (ANES RESULTS)²⁴

Variables	0-> 1	Min-> Max
Battleground states	0.0925	0.0925
Conservatism	0.0318	0.1390
Education	0.0908	0.3060
Household income	0.0137	0.0853
Sex	0.0519	0.0519

ANES Vote Choice Model Findings

As with the turnout model, some of the results in the ANES vote choice model corroborate those found in the NAES models. Table 6 shows that Protestantism is positively related to support for Bush (.05 level)²⁵. Specifically, Protestants were nearly 19 percentage points more likely than non-Protestants to vote for Bush in 2004, everything else equal²⁶. The ANES model shows that Republicans were more likely to have voted for Bush than Democrats

²⁴ First column indicates change associated with increasing in one value on the scale of the relevant variable (i.e., 4-5 for household income). The second column indicates change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value (i.e., 0-8 for household income).

²⁵ See Table 7 on page 42 for the change in probabilities associated with the statistically significant variables, as well as for the full results of the ANES vote choice model (Table 6).

²⁶ A variable measuring moral traditionalism substituted in place of the variable for Protestants also shows significance for Bush in an alternate specification. However, neither the dummy variable for gay-marriage states nor an interaction measuring moral traditionalism and residence in a gay-marriage state is significant for Bush.

TABLE 6. FACTORS AFFECTING PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE (ANES)²⁷

Variables	Coefficients
Protestant	0.7639**
Catholic	0.0874
Gay-marriage state	0.5691
Protestant * gay-marriage state	-0.8256
Party identification	2.4739***
Education	-0.1627**
Household income	0.0053
Black	-1.5001***
Hispanic	-0.4639
Marital status	0.1764
Sex	-0.0676
Age	0.0960**
Age-squared	0.0009**
Constant	-4.4212***
N = 713	* indicates p < .10 ** indicates p < .05 *** indicates p < .01
Pseudo r-squared = 0.4736	

TABLE 7. CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED VOTE CHOICE (ANES RESULTS)²⁸

Variables	0-> 1	Min-> Max
Protestant	0.1882	0.1882
Party identification	0.4027	0.8439
Education	-0.0371	-0.2392
Black	-0.3311	-0.3311
Age	0.001	0.9305
Age-squared	-0.0001	-0.8696

²⁷ Dependent variable in Table 6 is presidential vote choice (0 = Kerry, Nader, or someone else; 1 = Bush).

²⁸ The first column of coefficient values in Table 7 indicates the change in probability associated with increasing in one value on the variable scale (i.e., moving from 2 to 3 on the scale for the education variable). The second column of coefficient values indicates the change in probability associated with moving from the lowest value of the variable to the highest value (i.e., 0 to 8 on the scale for the education variable).

by over 84 percentage points. This is nearly identical to the 84.56 figure produced in the NAES model. As is the case with the NAES model, the relationship between the two variables is significant at the .01 level, and in both vote choice models, the coefficient for party identification is larger than that of any other independent variable.

Unlike the NAES model, though, the ANES vote choice model shows that more educated voters were less likely to have cast a ballot for Bush than less educated voters. Moving from a voter who did not have a high school diploma to one who had attained an advanced degree decreased the likelihood of his or her voting for Bush by nearly 24 percentage points. The coefficient for the education variable in the NAES model, while negative, is not related to vote choice in 2004.

Black voters were only 33 percentage points less likely to have cast a ballot for Bush in 2004 than white voters and other racial minorities, according to the ANES finding. The curvilinear effect that's been found to exist between age and turnout, oddly, exists between age and vote choice in 2004. The likelihood of voting for Bush in 2004 increased with age, but only up to a certain point.

DISCUSSION

It is difficult to conclude with any amount of certainty that the independent variables of interest in this design were influential in terms of predicting turnout in 2004. The stronger NAES intention to vote models show that identification as a born-again/evangelical Protestant is substantively, weakly related to intention to vote in 2004. A possible explanation for the statistical discrepancy between the NAES and ANES models is that the variable substituted in place of born-again Protestant in the ANES dataset does not reduce the measure down to those who identified as a born-again or evangelical Christian, and is thus much cruder. It could be that the NAES model accurately predicted turnout among born-again Protestants in November. Or, it could be that these voters overreported their likelihood of voting, as they have been found to do retrospectively. Unfortunately, the findings from the models do not lend one to draw a strong conclusion in this regard.

Similarly, the ANES turnout model failed to substantiate the finding that potential voters residing in states with a marriage amendment on the ballot were more likely to have voted in November. Results from the NAES also show a substantively weak relationship between residence in a marriage state and intention to vote, in that this independent variable is not related to intention to vote among any of the parties, but is only related to the dependent variable when all voters are included together. In the ANES model, the relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant. Once again, though, the available data made it such that the variable used for gay-marriage states in the ANES models is a crude measure of the actual voter universe. The data does not contain responses from essentially half (5 of 11) of the states that voted on a marriage amendment, meaning again, that it is difficult to conclude with any amount of certainty how turnout in 2004 was affected as a function of residence in a marriage state.

Born-again/evangelicals may or may not have been more likely than other groups to turn out in 2004, but the findings show that the president did benefit from their presence at the polls. Both vote choice models show that the relationship between this variable and support for Bush is highly related. There is no evidence, however, that evangelicals who lived in marriage states were more likely than evangelicals who lived in the other 39 states to have voted for the president in 2004—or that any voters living in marriage states were more likely than those living outside them to vote to re-elect Bush in 2004. To the extent that the marriage issue itself influenced the presidential contest, results from the NAES show only that voters who held a very conservative position on gay-marriage were very likely to vote for Bush in 2004, everything else equal.

Taken together, the independent variables of interest in this design show that the effects of direct democracy, and perhaps the marriage campaigns themselves, impacted the 2004 presidential election in a minimal way. Ultimately, it appears that it is still the characteristics of the individual voter (race, education, sex, etc.) that can best predict turnout, rather than the activities of the campaigns, which would seem to lend support to a minimal campaign effects thesis.

This design corroborates other findings on the 2004 U.S. presidential election in two ways: 1) that certain voters living in marriage amendment states were not more likely than residents living outside them to have voted in 2004. And, 2) that voters in these states were not more likely to have voted for Bush in 2004, everything else equal. Rather, the influence of evangelicals on vote choice is consistent across the states. It is necessary to note that the measures of the dependent variables in the NAES (and the ANES) models are not perfect, or even ideal. But, there is reason to believe that they are reliable measures of turnout and vote

choice, such that it's possible to extrapolate findings from the models to enhance a greater understanding of the factors that influenced the 2004 presidential election—and turnout and vote choice more broadly.

A benefit of including the turnout model using the ANES data is that it seems to confirm the factors that did in fact predict turnout in 2004. Women, strong conservatives, highly-educated voters, and voters living in higher-income households all were not only likely to express an intention to vote prior to the election when asked, but were also likely to follow through and vote in November. In this sense, then, the NAES intention to vote models appear to resemble valid turnout models for a partisan election. Controls for such factors as party identification strength, age, and the South—factors that have been found to be related to turnout in past studies—are statistically significant (in the expected directions) in the NAES intention to vote models and the ANES turnout model.

One area, though, where the NAES models more closely resemble a typical model for overreporting is in the finding for the control for potential black voters. The NAES models show a strong positive relationship between race (black) and intention to vote; the ANES model, however, shows that blacks were not more likely than whites or other racial minorities to have turned out in 2004. If anything, blacks have usually been found to turn out at lower rates than whites. If blacks are the group most likely to have overreported voting in 2004, that the ANES model indicates they were not more likely than other groups to turn out in 2004 seems to confirm my interpretation that this earlier positive effect is a function of overreporting.

One area where the ANES findings may be superior to the NAES findings is in the estimated relationships between turnout and battleground states. The ANES shows that respondents living in battleground states were more likely than those living outside them to have

voted in 2004; this finding is consistent with the general one in the literature, and seems to be the most plausible one for this variable. It seems likely that there may have been more pressure for residents in battleground states to vote in November, but not necessarily more pressure for them to indicate an intention to vote prior to the election. It could be that the overinflated dependent variable in the NAES models made it such that the results are skewed in terms of showing inflated turnout as a function of residence in a non-battleground state.

Despite the relative small number of observations in the vote choice models, the findings generally agree with each other. The most significant difference is with the education variables. Although the variable is negatively signed in the NAES model, the relationship is not significant, unlike in the ANES model—where the most highly-educated voters were 24 percentage points less likely to have voted for Bush than voters with the least amount of formal education, everything else equal. The income brackets the interviewers placed the respondents in for this question differed somewhat, but not enough to mean the difference between a negative relationship and a statistically insignificant one, one would think.

It could be that excluding the control for ideology in the ANES model made it such that a relationship between education and vote choice is detected—when none truly exists. Additionally, the lower number of observations in the ANES model and the lower pseudo r-squared value may mean that the null finding for education in the NAES model is more accurate than the negative relationship the ANES model detected.

A control for ideology as well as a measure of respondents' positions on the gay-marriage issue was excluded in the ANES vote choice model for the purpose of keeping the number of observations in the model higher than a minimum number of 700 respondents.

CONCLUSIONS

The closeness of the 2004 presidential election, the unique role values voters and gay-marriage played in the campaign, and the contradictory findings on how the marriage issue substantively affected turnout and vote choice among evangelical Christians combined to present an opportunity to re-examine how these factors influenced the 2004 presidential election.

I developed a research design that built on a similar one Campbell and Monson (2008) constructed, to gain a better understanding of the role evangelicals and the gay-marriage issue played in the 2004 presidential election. The scholars' conclusion is clear in that they determined that (white) evangelicals living in gay-marriage amendment states were more likely than other evangelicals to vote for President Bush in 2004, but ambiguous in that it combines the effect of this interaction on both turnout and vote choice. Using a large and previously untapped dataset, I find that identification as an evangelical is not related to turnout, but that it is significantly related to vote choice. Everything else equal, born-again Protestants were more than 25 percentage points more likely than non-born-again Protestants to have voted for Bush in 2004.

The effects of the marriage amendments in the 2004 election, though, appear to be minimal, if not nonexistent. Turnout in gay-marriage states was not higher among evangelicals, or among the electorate at-large than it was in the states whose voters did not cast a ballot on a marriage amendment. It could be that the initiatives primed voters to consider the issue when they cast their ballot for president, and that this effect may have been significant for Bush. But, the findings in this design show that initiatives in the context of the 2004 election did not have a substantive impact on the outcome. Evangelicals did increase the president's vote share, but this effect is consistent across the states, and not confined to marriage amendment states.

Turnout in 2004 can be better explained by traditional factors that have been found to have a positive effect—strength of party identification, education, income, age, region, residence in a battleground state, etc. Similarly, characteristics such as party identification, ideology, and race accurately predicted vote choice in 2004. Campaign strategists, then, should take notice that the effects of short-term and temporal factors like hot-button issues and forms of direct democracy are limited in the amount of influence they can have in the context of a U.S. presidential election. These political actors are probably better served by focusing on the relevant characteristics of their respective electoral bases, and then devising a strategy with those factors given top priority.

Comparing the influence of evangelical Christians across elections is a potential avenue for future research. How did evangelicals factor into the 2000 U.S. presidential contest, in terms of both turnout and vote choice, when former President Bush was on the presidential ballot for the first time, and when gay-marriage is said to have played no meaningful role in the campaign?

Another possible avenue for research entails comparing findings across years, as a function of the type of election (on-year-off-year, presidential-midterm, etc.). Is turnout among evangelicals more pronounced in midterm elections—when ballot initiatives perhaps have more potential to stimulate turnout among the larger electorate? How did participation among evangelicals in the 2006 midterm election fare as a function of the presence of social issue ballot measures, in comparison to their participation in the 2004 election?

Additionally, how did turnout in marriage states in 2004 compare to turnout in those same states in the 2000 presidential election—when marriage amendments were not on the November ballot? It could be that a better way to gauge the effects of the marriage amendments on turnout is to compare results across elections, rather than across states.

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DATA SOURCES

American National Election Studies (2004)
 National Annenberg Election Survey (2004)
 Roper Public Opinion Research Data (2004)

APPENDICES

NAES VARIABLE CODINGS

Dependent Variables:

Intend to vote in general election:

0 = no; 1 = yes; (question asked 7/16/2004 – 9/22/2004 without filter; question asked 9/23/2004 – 11/1/2004 with filter “if did not vote early in general election”)

Presidential vote choice:

0 = Kerry, Nader, or someone else; 1 = Bush; (question asked 9/23/2004 – 11/1/2004 and 11/3/2004 – 11/16/2004)

Independent Variables:

Born-again Protestant:

0 = respondents who attend religious services and who identify as: non-Protestant and not an evangelical/born-again Christian, non-Protestant and evangelical/born-again Christian, or Protestant and not evangelical/born-again Christian; 1 = respondents who attend Protestant services (to include: Baptist, Christian, Episcopal, Jehovah’s Witness, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and non-denominational Christian) and identify themselves as evangelical/born-again Christians.

Gay-marriage state:

0 = each of the 39 states without marriage amendment on ballot in November, and Washington DC; 1 = Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah

Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state:

Effect of born-again Protestantism and living in one of 11 states with marriage amendment on the November ballot

Battleground states:

0 = each of the 39 states whose electoral votes were decided by more than five percentage points in the general election; 1 = Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin (states whose electoral votes were decided by fewer than five percentage points in the general election)

Marriage amendment:

0 = respondents who would strongly oppose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbidding states to marry same-sex couples; 1 = "...somewhat oppose..."; 2 = "...neither approve nor oppose..."; 3 = "...somewhat approve..."; 4 = "...strongly approve..." (question asked from 2/5/2004 – 11/16/2004)

Party identification strength:

0 = not strong; 1 = strong (question asked to interviewees: Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Republican/Democrat/Independent?)

Party identification:

0 = Democrats; 1 = Independents; 2 = Republicans

Conservatism:

0 = very liberal; 1 = liberal; 2 = moderate; 3 = conservative; 4 = very conservative

Ideology strength:

0 = moderate; 1 = conservative and liberal; 2 = very conservative and very liberal

Education:

0 = eighth grade or lower; 1 = some high school, but no diploma; 2 = high school diploma or equivalent; 3 = technical or vocational school after high school; 4 = some college, but no degree; 5 = Associate's degree or two-year college degree; 6 = four-year college degree; 7 = graduate or professional school, but no degree; 8 = graduate or professional degree

Household income:

0 = less than \$10,000; 1 = \$10,000 - \$15,000; 2 = \$15,000 - \$25,000; 3 = \$25,000 - \$35,000; 4 = \$35,000 - \$50,000; 5 = \$50,000 - \$75,000; 6 = \$75,000 - \$100,000; 7 = \$100,000 - \$150,000; 8 = More than \$150,000

Age:

Variable not recoded; functions as continuous variable (respondents in NAES dataset range from 18 to 97 years of age)

Sex:

0 = male; 1 = female

Black:

0 = white, Asian, American Indian, other; 1 = black (question asked of respondents who indicated in previous survey question that they were not of Hispanic or Latino descent)

Hispanic:

0 = not Hispanic; 1 = Hispanic (question asked to interviewees: Are you of Hispanic or Latino descent?)

Marital status:

0 = never married, separated, divorced, widowed, or living as married; 1 = married

South:

0 = each of the 39 states not of the Old Confederacy, and Washington D.C.; 1 = Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia

Catholic:

0 = Protestants (to include: Baptist, Christian, Episcopal, Jehovah's Witness, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and non-denominational Christian), Jews, Mormons, Orthodox (to include: Greek, Russian, and Eastern), Muslims, other; 1 = Catholics (question asked to interviewees: Do you mostly attend a place of worship that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, an Orthodox Church, Muslim, or some other religion?)

ANES VARIABLE CODINGS

Dependent Variables:

Voted in 2004 general election:
0 = no; 1 = yes

Presidential vote choice:
0 = Kerry, Nader, someone else; 1 = Bush

Independent Variables:

Protestant:
0 = Catholic, Eastern Orthodox (Christian), Jewish, other, none; 1 = Protestant

Gay-marriage state:
0 = each of the 39 states without marriage amendment on ballot in November, and Washington DC; 1 = Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah (data contains missing responses from Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma)

Protestant × gay-marriage state interaction:
Measures effect of identification as Protestant and residence in one of 11 states with marriage amendment on the November ballot

Battleground states:
0 = each of the 39 states whose electoral votes were decided by more than five percentage points in the general election; 1 = states whose electoral votes were decided by fewer than five percentage points: Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin (data contains missing responses from Nevada and New Mexico)

Party identification:
0 = Democrats; 1 = Independents; 2 = Republicans

Conservatism:
0 = extremely liberal; 1 = liberal; 2 = slightly liberal; 3 = moderate; 4 = slightly conservative; 5 = conservative; 6 = extremely conservative

Education:
0 = no high school diploma; 1 = eight grades or less completed, no diploma; 2 = nine to eleven grades completed, no diploma; 3 = high school diploma or equivalent; 4 = more than 12 years of schooling completed, no college degree; 5 = junior college or community college degree; 6 = Bachelor of Arts degree, no advanced degree; 7 = advanced degree attained

Household income:

0 = less than \$9,000 annually; 1 = \$9,000 - \$14,999 annually; 2 = \$15,000 - \$24,999 annually; 3 = \$25,000 - \$34,999 annually; 4 = \$35,000 - \$49,999 annually; 5 = \$50,000 - \$69,999 annually; 6 = \$70,000 - \$89,999 annually; 7 = \$90,000 - \$119,999 annually; 8 = \$120,000 annually or more

Age:

Variable not recoded; functions as continuous variable (respondents in ANES dataset range from 18 to 90 years of age)

Sex:

0 = male; 1 = female

Black:

0 = else (Asian, Native American, Hispanic, etc.); 1 = black

Hispanic:

0 = else (black, Asian, Asian and Native American, etc.); 1 = Hispanic (black and Hispanic, Hispanic, Hispanic and white)

Marital status:

0 = widowed, divorced, not married, separated, never married, or partnered; 1 = married

South:

0 = each of the 39 states not of the Old Confederacy, and Washington D.C.; 1 = Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia (data contains missing responses from Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina)

Catholic:

0 = Protestant, Eastern Orthodox (Christian), Jewish, other, none; 1 = Catholic

VITA

James Dunphy was born in Oxford, Ohio, in 1982. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State University in December 2004 and is currently an American politics graduate student in the department of Political Science at Louisiana State University. Mr. Dunphy currently works for the Disaster Recovery Unit in the Office of Community Development for the state of Louisiana, and is a non-commissioned officer in the Louisiana Army National Guard. His first experience with electoral politics came in 1999 at a library in eastern Iowa, when as a 17-year-old high school senior, he participated in a pre-caucus meeting for then-U.S. Vice-President Al Gore.