2012

Performance, preference, promotion: political mobility of Chinese regional leaders

Liang Qiao
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

PERFORMANCE, PREFERENCE, PROMOTION: POLITICAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in

The Department of Political Science

by
Liang Qiao
B.A., Taiyuan University of Technology, 2003
M.A., Peking University, 2006
May 2012

To Shanxi Province, and Her People

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude is to my advisor, Dr. William A. Clark. I have been truly fortunate to have an advisor who gave me the guidance to help me complete my doctoral study at LSU. His patience and support helped me overcome many crucial situations and finish this dissertation. I hope that one day I would become as good an advisor to my students as Dr. Clark has been to me.

I am very grateful to all the professors who had taught me from LSU Department of Political Science; the intellectual training I received from whom is simply priceless.

I am thankful to my supportive family and friends back in China. Most importantly, to my parents: I owe you everything, and it is your love that keeps me going.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

As a study exclusively on the political elites, the dissertation studies the Chinese regional leaders and their political career mobility controlled by the central government from 1949 to 2010. The Chinese Communist Party controls its regional leaders by controlling their career movement (political mobility). This study explains why some regional leaders were promoted while some others were demoted or dismissed while most of them shared similar personal background and career experience. By providing empirical evidence with quantitative analysis, this study shows that in post-Deng Chinese politics (1997-2010) there are certain patterns and manipulated by the CCP center in demoting and dismissing its regional leaders in order to improve the party's overall ruling legitimacy. Many China watchers have ignored the fact that socioeconomic development among different Chinese regions is highly uneven yet has the government found any efficient solution. The conflicts of interests between a regional government and the central government of China may have caused different economic outcomes. Meanwhile, the political importance of a region in China can be evaluated through the center's fiscal indicators. Last but not least, sustainable economic growth and regional governments' financial conditions are among the decisive factors that determine regional leaders' political mobility in the future under the party-state political system.

INTRODUCTION

"His fellow villagers asked: 'It was planned by the meat-eaters, what it is for you to remonstrate with?'

Cao Gui replied: 'Meat-eaters are little learning; they are not far-sighted.'

Thus, he was shown in (to the Duke)."

---- "The Duke of Zhuang, Year 10,"

The Chronicles of Zuo (circa 4th Century BC)

It can be rather complicated to analyze the phenomena of Chinese politics in which most outcomes are exclusively determined by its leaders rather than by the people. No matter if they are Standing Committee members of the Politburo or the Communist Party officials in a mid-sized city of a quarter million people, they are names that are being mentioned, and faces that are being publicized everyday on the media. On the other hand, they are personalities that are very much unknown to the people. One might frequently be wondering: *who* are they? *What* are they like? And the most important of all, *how* have they become who they are?

From every aspect, voting or the holding of elections is not likely to become a regular part of most Chinese's political life in the near future. However, in a bureaucracy as large as the Chinese government that governs more than 1.3 billion people and a set of institutions, there are certain techniques, channels, principles, mechanisms, or even hints or signs that outside observers can use to make somewhat close predications about political mobility, personnel arrangements, successions and appointments. And the political career movements in the future among regional Chinese governmental officials are greatly affected by these leaders' leadership experiences and performances.

A. Why Regional Leaders in China Are Important?

Unlike in the United States, where a state and its administration are much more independent of the federal government, regional leaders in China serve as agents of the ultimately powerful central government, and enjoy their power as regional leaders in a much more different way. In most open political systems, successions or appointments of officials or politicians can be polled or surveyed through more public and transparent means; such issues, as they affect many people's everyday life, can be (and mostly will be) debated or discussed more openly with the press and the public. However, in Chinese politics, and to most Chinese, the mobility of political elites has not yet become an open topic, nor does it seem likely to become on in the near future. Rather, it is most discreet for open discussion. Discreet, it is; but it is also quite common and popular in private conversations. My father often recalls that his friends and he frequently enjoyed studying the appearance orders of senior Party officials (most were CCP politburo members) on the *People's Daily*'s front-page coverage of major political events back to his teenage years in the Cultural Revolution. That was how they "discovered" numerous political facts simply by thoroughly reading the contexts hidden under the front pages.

Compared to decades ago, everything today in China is no longer that secretive. Now if one turns on one's TV every evening, one may easily find that Chinese regional political leaders (both provincial and municipal) are being massively exposed to public scrutiny by allowing government-operated media coverage of their social and political activities days and nights. It has already become the norm that the headlines on one's daily evening news hour start with the headlines of what the political elites are engaged in during the working hours of the day. However, what fascinates me, as well as many others, is not what the elites are doing now, but how much of what they are doing now can affect their next move. In other words, hardly does

any higher ranking party or governmental official stay in one position for more than a few years; either they are moved up or they are carried down, or they restart with something similar but definitely not the same.

Overall, Chinese regional leaders are among a small groups of decision makers whose decisions have been changing peoples' lives and reshaping politics among local governments and the center. Individually, a regional leader, for instance, a party boss of a province or a deputy leader of a provincial people's congress, cannot be compared to any of the central leaders; a central leader is far more influential and powerful and controls a great deal of resources. But collectively, as there are hundreds of them, Chinese regional leaders are executors of the center's policies and regulations. Without sufficient and positive support from local governments, it is hardly true that any of the center's policy or important decision can be practiced or executed effectively.

B. Why Study the Political Mobility of Regional Leaders?

A monarch is usually born to be one, a U.S. President is usually elected to be one, but a regional leader in China is usually orchestrated to replace his or her predecessor. The professional trajectories of Chinese regional leaders can be very interesting yet mysterious in many ways. Their promotions and demotions can be "predictable" in terms of their age, gender, nationality, education, factions, and previous engagements in the political system. Yet, speaking of their capability, performance, opportunities and arrangements, their future can also be "unexpected". Such arrangements are always originated from the organization (*zuzhi*) which represents the Chinese Communist Party; but what factors the organization considers in order

making its final decisions on nominating and appointing a regional leader are the key elements that the study here tries to identify.

Among all the challenges and opportunities encountered in contemporary China, the core question is still about its politics. Has it changed through the years? How much it has changed toward more transparency and openness? And where is it going in the 21st century? Surely not all of these questions can be thoroughly studied and resolved in this dissertation. However, I intend to make my contributions to answering these questions by studying the patterns of political career mobility of China's regional leaders. This is the very subject that needs to be studied and analyzed to explain a series of socioeconomic phenomena ongoing in contemporary Chinese society. By unveiling the pattern of regional leaders' political mobility in post-Deng Xiaoping era, it is likely that most new socioeconomic changes taking places in China are helping the country to move forward. It is also obvious to all Chinese and China watchers, however, that it still has a very long way to go.

Today's regional leaders of China will very likely become the central leaders of China in the future. The author assumes that by making an empirical analysis of Chinese regional leaders' political mobility, we could establish a descriptive political mobility model that reveals leadership trajectories in Chinese politics.

C. Variables and Hypotheses

The relationship between the Center and the localities has undergone significant reforms ever since Deng Xiaoping became the leader of China. Since the abolition of the six administrative regions in the mid-1950s, the most important administrative levels have been the

provincial and the municipal. Unlike some other communist states (e.g. the former Soviet Union), the People's Republic of China has always been a unitary multinational state.

Below the provinces and the administrative equivalents, there is a three-level administrative network of (a) prefectures, (b) counties and cities, and (c) townships and districts. The prefecture does not constitute a level of political power, and therefore does not operate local People's Congresses and People's Governments. Instead, prefectures have agencies, administrative commissioners and their deputies, who are not elected but are appointed by the higher levels.

In the dissertation, I intend to answer the following core questions:

a. What are the patterns of regional elite political mobility in post-Deng Xiaoping's China?
b. What are the factors that affect elite mobility and its consequences?
c. How have political mobility issues affected leaders' decision-making? How can the outcomes be used to explain political phenomena in contemporary China?

Taking these questions into consideration, then, the dissertation will assess these following factors:

Independent variables:

i. Geographic characteristics: (a) regions, provinces and cities in which leaders work, (b) demographic characteristics: size of a region scaled by its population, (c) economic importance of this region.

ii. Biological factors of the sampled Chinese regional leaders: (a) distribution of sex, age, and nationality; and (b) correlation between the province and city in which they were born and the province and city in which they later serve as regional leaders.

iii. Educational background: (a) educational level, (b) major field and other professional training experiences, (c) alumni and other social connections.

iv. Career and recruitment patterns: (a) major career pattern; (b) work experiences in different organizations (e.g., party, government administration, military, the Youth League); (c) work experiences in different fields (e.g., industry, agriculture, military, propaganda); (d) work experiences at different levels (grass-roots, bureau/county/district, municipal); (e) initial year of party membership; (f) year of assuming office as mayor; and (g) the most recent previous position. In the following section, we will first present our findings in these three broad areas and compare characteristics of mayoral elites with those of elites at different levels. Then we will explore the correlation among variables by the application of regressions and coefficients. The final section is a discussion on the implications of these findings.

The hypotheses are:

a. Advantages in professional experiences and personal connections, in terms of helping leaders get promoted, can be greater than advantages of educational and professional trainings.

b. The center has its regional preferences when determining a regional leader's political mobility. Regional leaders who work in the more developed regions of China more frequently receive promotions than do leaders who work in less developed regions with weaker economic scale.

c. In the post-Deng Xiaoping era, leaders who are demoted or dismissed (downward political mobility) for actual causes (corruptions and violations) instead of purely political accusations. We expect to find some patterns in studying the downward political mobility among Chinese regional leaders in from 1990s to 2000s.

d. The empirical research of the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders will also have its theoretical contribution in studying post-communist authoritarian regimes and their elite. Regional leaders of China in the post-Deng era tend to be more technocratic. They behave more like regular bureaucrats and less like revolutionaries; thus, central government's selections are becoming more and more general, rational, and technical. Better understanding of the regime and the elite in China will constructively improve our understanding of Chinese government and political economy.

D. Regional Leaders' Political Mobility as the Outcome

The Chinese Communist Party is no longer the party it was when it came to power. A new generation of leaders whose socialization, educational background, and political experience differ significantly from those of the old elite has risen to high positions. China has opened up since Deng Xiaoping's "going out" reform of the late 1970s. Limited by the topic of my discussion, this study will not preview every aspect of contemporary social and political changes in China. To those who are interested, to begin with the analysis of Chinese leaders is a much more practical approach that a series of indicators can be used to unveil some of the most important political phenomena taking place in China. After more than 30 years of effort of installing private entrepreneurships and a market economy, the economic life of Chinese has been deeply and widely capitalized, globalized and internationalized. In 2010 alone, China was active in the G20 summit, surpassed Japan to be the largest economy in Asia, and was criticized

by the U.S. Congress and Obama administration for adjusting the renminbi exchange rates to overcome the global recession. Without the economic reform of the past few decades, most of these events listed above likely would not have taken place in China. Still, it is a fact that some fundamental changes in political life are more crucial for China to maintain a sustainable economic growth and to regain the balance between economic achievements and lagging environmental and social developments. To have most of these issued eased and problems solved, the authorities and political leaders in China must play more efficient roles to make the right choices for the people. Therefore, a great number of intrinsic changes, if not from the outside, need to be put on the government's agenda. As the great transformation was initiated by China's leaders, it is what the people say in China, *the one who tied the bell shall be the one who unties it*.

Here, the study attempts to combine the analysis of Chinese regional leaders both individually and collectively based on their characteristics as suitable candidates for certain leadership posts and the opportunities they have been given based on their training, experiences and previous working locations. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new issues. The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago. The dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are (1) how to decentralize economic initiative to microeconomic units while retaining some form of macroeconomic control, (2) how to increase functional efficiency while maintaining political control; and (3) how to continue their elitist orientation while legitimizing their governance. This study attempts to explore these issues by analyzing Chinese elites, especially those Chinese regional leaders who came to power in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. Studies of the social background and career patterns of elites must always be viewed with caution. It is hard to know what these characteristics explain about

concrete political behavior. Situational variables, be they international, bureaucratic, or resource constraints, may effectively strip elites of choice.

Despite of the decentralizing authority with resilient legitimacy of the CCP center since the late 1970s and especially the post-Deng Xiaoping era, there are enduring peculiarities in China's mobility regime related to its political and economic institutions[1]. There should be no doubt that the center controls the mobility of its regional leaders in order to consolidate its authority in contemporary Chinese political economy but not to have itself weakened by the socioeconomic changes through the years. As for the regional leaders, besides one's educational background, political credentials are important factors for leaders to build up to more powerful posts in the system. Social background and career patterns in the aggregate also do not tell us much about creative acts of the political leadership that aim to reshape patterns of political preferences within a polity, or about the individual psychological dimensions of key leaders that may significantly influence policy making. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the linkage between the characteristics of regional political elites in China today and the broader patterns of societal change. There is no doubt that the political elite has changed dramatically. Broader social trends are emerging that are closely related to the leadership transformation. We have focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic locality and political mobility as they signal emerging trends. Therefore, the possible correlations that will be discovered in this study can also help us find out not only the career patterns for Chinese regional leaders, but also the intrinsic political changes adapted by the Communist party and the possible directions China's political system is heading in the near future.

[1] Pierre F. Landry. *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.3-9. Also, Andrew J. Nathan. "Authoritarian Resilience," *Journal of Democracy*, 14(1)(January 2003), pp.15-16.

E. Data and Method

Because very little has been released by the Chinese government from its massive confidential archives, the study relies mostly on unclassified and published materials from Chinese state-owned media and news press. Another noticeable trend over the past 20 to 30 years in China, in terms of political transparency, is that information about Chinese politicians and political leaders has become more and more accessible to the public. Details about Deputy Chairman Lin Biao's failed coup against Chairman Mao Zedong were not released to the media after nearly a year after Lin Biao's plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971[2]. Now with telecommunication and the Internet, news about Chinese leaders travels at a much more vibrant speed; it has been awfully difficult for the governmental officials to cover up sensitive information once it has been known.

This study focuses on important personnel arrangements and changes which happened in 2000s, and to compares them both with those of Mao's era (1950s and 1960s) and Deng's era (1980s and 1990s). The state-run press, such as Xinhua news agency and the People's Daily, has relevant information on such subject, but scrambled by different dates and issues. Both Xinhua and the People's Daily's releases of the leaders' biographical information is considered the official version. The Communist Party of China has its own website that publishes official news of personnel changes in multiple languages (http://cpc.people.com.cn/). Other popular and reliable Chinese search engines and webhosts, such as sina.com, sohu.com, and china.com also publish relevant information periodically. Regional leaders' personal information and profiles have been collected and categorized through these resources. Economic data are accessible by

[2] Federick C. Teiwes. "Mao Zedong in Power (1949-1976)," in William A. Joseph ed. *Politics in China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.89-91. Also, in Ezra F. Vogel. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, M.A.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), p.60.

accessing the websites of China's National Bureau of Statistics (http://www.stats.gov.cn/) and the Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.gov.cn/), and other relevant official resources listed in the footnotes. In addition, each and every county, municipal and provincial government and CCP party organization has its own website that posts biographical information about particular leaders' profiles and its regional economic reports. Above all, this study relies on officially published news resources in both Chinese and English of China, the U.S. and other countries.

CHAPTER ONE
CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

People are always interested in their leaders. It does not matter if a leader was born to lead one's people whose loyalty to their leader comes genuinely, or if a self-made leader who has worked his way from the very bottom to the very top of the bureaucracy whose power comes from one's position and current ranking inside the bureaucracy, outsiders often attempt to make certain judgments about their leadership and are curious to find out more about their political life. And as time goes by, such curiosity somehow only grows stronger and stronger.[3]

Regional leaders usually are not yet the world leaders whose names and faces are known to many others in the world. Moreover, the majority of regional leaders will never become the top leaders of their nations and countries. This does not lower, however, the political importance of regional leaders compared to their national or central leaders; it only makes regional leaders more important to people who live under their regional leadership, as regional leaders are those who get involved in specific local affairs and make particular decisions that actually affect people's life in a much more direct way than any of the world leaders. Still, we the people expect no less from our regional leaders compared to the national leaders. We expect our leaders to be capable, wise, decisive, as well as moral.[4]

In terms of their responsibilities and engagements of regional people's livelihood, Chinese regional leaders have always been a crucial part in Chinese politics. They are the most responsible for carrying out central government's policies, applying its laws to the locals, and

[3] Numerous public opinion rankings and polls have been published from time to time on the U.S. Presidents. Surveyors like to ask interviewees to rank all the presidents from George Washington to Barrack Obama, even no one has had the chance to live under both of the presidencies but are still asked to make comparisons based on their impressions and opinions on American presidency.
[4] Joseph Nye Jr. *The Powers to Lead* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.144.

keeping all the institutions functioning. Meanwhile, they have also served as the primary and the main channel for the feedbacks on each of the center's decisions. Chinese regional leaders should to some extent, if they have not been doing so, also represent the interests of the regions they govern. In other words, regional leaders bear great expectations from both the center and the people. It seems to be a difficult task to handle, yet who handles it well gets mobilized upward in the bureaucracy and enjoys more power.

Before we start to explore the subject of the political mobility of Chinese political elites, we must keep in mind that regional leaders' power come from the center rather than the people. In Chinese history, China has been a highly centralized state. Historically, the State was divided into different administrative regions, later labeled as provinces and municipalities, done not so much to serve its people better but rather to serve its ruler more efficiently. It is acknowledged to scholars that the earliest formation of administrative regions in China, later were addressed as provinces and counties, was initiated by the emperor to appoint his men to govern these regions under his commands rather than having the land distributed to high ranking aristocracies who might build their own military forces and demand much more power from the emperor.[5] Thus, for centuries, absolute loyalty to the emperor was the primary requirement for a bureaucrat who was appointed as a regional leader in China. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, such loyalty to emperor had been replace by the loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP has had a considerable capacity to monitor individuals and control access to prestigious governmental posts around the country. Governors and provincial party chiefs since then have been appointed by the CCP's central leadership without campaigns and elections. Thus, the means adapted by the center to select its regional leaders is of great

[5] Liu Jianjun. *Gudai Zhongguo Zhengzhi Zhidu Shiliu Jiang (Sixteen Lectures on Ancient Chinese Political Institutions)* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2009), p.141.

importance for scholars to unveil the facts about regional leaders and their careers; also, which factor(s) would play the decisive role in determining a regional leader's career is what the author intend to discover in the study.

Hence, the first chapter of the study tries to answer these questions by examining the previous literature on the subject. What have we known about Chinese regional leaders and career mobility? What have been bypassed or forgotten in the studies on these regional leaders? What is it that we need find out by studying the regional leaders in China in the post-Deng Xiaoping era compared to that of Mao's era and Deng's era? Consequently, the chapter is divided into three different parts: first, a literature review of previous scholarly research; second, an introduction to regional governance in China as related to the issues raised and analyzed by the study; third, a general description of contemporary Chinese regional leaders, their leaderships, their roles in Chinese politics, and the meaningfulness of the case selection.

A. Studies on Chinese Regional Leaders and Their Careers

1. The Importance of Regional Leaderships in China

Generally speaking, one of the significant characteristics of Chinese politics, as in any authoritarian regime, is that the Communist party is closely tied to all governmental organizations. Therefore, the Party and all the organizations together make the entire Chinese bureaucracy. China's government is a one-party system with minimal popular participation; success therefore depends on the energy and ideas of its leaders. Historically, there was no middle-class in China. The ancient regime that the emperor ruled the country by appointing bureaucrats to run the massive bureaucracy was popularly supported by China's nationwide landed elites and contracted farmhands known as peasants. The vast proportion of land elites

came from retired bureaucrats who previously served in the government. Therefore, regional political elites had relied on the central government's support and authority in keeping their status quo in socioeconomic and political affairs.[6] While, on the other hand, the central leader(s) would be satisfied with the situation that regional elites can make some autonomous decisions over local issues, their power would be as limited by the center to prevent local leaders from overpowering the center with local affairs.[7] Thus, the possible dilemma which China's central leaders often have to face is not having their power decentralized, but also having it be too centralized, going beyond their capacity.[8]

Hence, administrative regions in China had served a very important political function in terms of maintaining a stable politic order nationwide; the regions are the main resources of taxations for the center's revenues. Thus, some scholars argue that regional and provincial governments, especially as regional development has made significant gains in the economic reform initiated in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, have been decentralizing the central government's control over economic sectors, constantly lobbying the top leaders of China to extract preferable policies for their regions and to gain more economic interests or policy benefits by lobbying the central leaders.[9] As important policy decision-making processes rarely involve regional leaders but as discussed and decided by the central leaders, provincial leaders have tried to influence the final policy outcomes by stressing the

[6] Land elites in Chinese history played crucial social and political roles to their locals though they were eliminated by CCP's Land Reform in 1950s and their influences to country life since then were replaced by CCP as well. Preconditions of Chinese communist revolution see Johan F. Swinnen and Scott Rozelle, *From Marx and Mao to the Market: The Economics and Politics of Agricultural Transition* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.100-102.

[7] It happens now and then, though not common, that local authorities ignore central commands or policies to maximize local leaders' economic interests. See Wang Kaicheng, "Central policy is only a piece of paper?" *Legal Weekly Review*, May 18, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.cntvwww.com/_d271335605.htm

[8] Liu. Ibid, pp.147-49.

[9] Fubing Su and Dali L. Yang. "Political Institutions, Provincial Interests, and Resource Allocation in Reformist China." *Journal of Contemporary China* (2000), 9(24):215-30.

importance of their provinces to the national economy. On the contrary, the central leadership has autonomy from parochial interests in many fields; central leaders should always consider the national interests ahead of the interests of a small region where a limited number of people would be beneficiaries of a certain policy. Whereas variations in policy implementation are needed to adapt to specific local conditions, policy choices are made ultimately toward maximizing China's national interests.[10]

Furthermore, scholars also find that such balance of power between the center and its regional leaders has existed since Mao Zedong's era. One of the significant outcomes of the leadership battles over provincial posts was the disastrous change took place in mid-1960s, when most provincial leaders had stabilized their posts and power and Mao himself felt unsecure about his personal leadership over the regional leaders. In 1967, nearly 81percent of incumbent provincial leaders were removed.[11] As provincial party chiefs and governors were purged and removed from their leadership positions during the Cultural Revolution, regional governance fell into chaotic situations where mass rebel groups took over regional governments by claiming they had mastered the truth of Maoist Thoughts and that regional leaders had become the bourgeoisie opposed to people's government and Mao himself. Such violent and drastic changes in regional leaderships destroyed the provincial governmental and party institutions and crushed regional leaders' political careers, sometimes even their personal livelihoods. Though the beginning years of the Cultural Revolution (which is commonly reckoned to have lasted from 1966-1976) were brutal to provincial leaders' career mobility, the provincial leadership of the main Cultural Revolution period was more stable as nearly all of them kept their positions in the government and the party. It is commonly understood that the Cultural Revolution caused political purges of

[10] Su and Yang. Ibid, 218.
[11] Zhiyue Bo. *Chinese Provincial Leaders* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 2002), p.72.

Chinese leaders from the center to municipalities, but scholars argue that in fact it was the most stable period for provincial leaders' career because the victims of the Cultural Revolution had already been removed in 1967 and those who survived the purges had entered into provincial leadership positions after 1967 and were able to keep their jobs until the Cultural Revolution was over. [12] Thus, after the disastrous change of regional leaderships, the rest of the leaders continued their political careers due to their loyalty to Mao and his Cultural Revolution.

Besides playing important roles in making economic strategies and maintaining the balance of power in the conflict between China's central leadership and regional leadership, scholars have also argued that regions in China are becoming more and more important in the country's great transformation from a developing country to modernization and industrialization. Historically, provinces have been under the center's direct leadership as it was they who have defined the importance of China's administrative regions. Urbanization is one of the most prominent indicators of a country's degree of modernization; while industrialization also caused massive immigration spurred by investments and working opportunities. Therefore, ever since the economic reform started three decades ago, coastal areas in China, especially cities and townships where factories and manufacturing plants are located, have become more and more important as the nation's economic engine and samples of urbanization. Hence, governing the newly urbanized cities and industrial areas have become crucial not only to provincial leaders but to the CCP center as well. The success of the market economy, private ownerships and entrepreneurs have all become challenging issues to the CCP leadership as political recruitment is no longer the shortcut to higher social classes. As pointed out by Li and Bachman, becoming a mayor of a municipality has often been a "stepping stone" to other higher political posts in China,

[12] Bo. Ibid, 73.

while under China's reform cities have taken on a much greater importance than under Mao's regime. [13] Yet rapid urbanization in China has raised many new challenges to Chinese authorities in the past few decades: environmental sustainability, exhaustion of natural resources and community development, welfare and livelihood of the laid-off state-owned enterprises' workers, wages and medical cares for tens of millions of migrant workers, education for lower income families, and the politically urgent task of dealing with the resistance and protests of citizens against governmental policies and regulations.

Most of these issues, as they are changing rapidly from time to time, have been studied by scholars and China watchers alike. In order to realize their interests and defend their rights, ordinary people may need to pay higher costs, and sometimes even face state repression. Some scholars point out that since the economic reform, individuals in China have found more social mobility channels other than joining the government-conducted units, such transition has been mainly positive by bringing changes to social systems and subordinate institutions charged with social welfare provision. But to midwife a mature civil society, the transition from traditional urban communities and their dwellers to more self-governance involves a "functional transition" from state to community institutions, since the party-state must loosen its control over private sectors and the private lives of the Chinese people. [14] Ascribed status is the social standing an individual is assigned at birth or assumes by tradition or by law. The lower strata of such a status hierarchy are often inseparable from the negative stereotypes that are associated with them. All societies display such practices of assigning statuses based on sex, gender, race, family origins, and ethnic differences. The Chinese household registration system (known as *hukou*) imposes a

[13] Cheng Li and David Bachman. "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism." *World Politics* (1989), 42(1):66.
[14] Xu Feng. "New Modes of Urban Governance: Building Community/*shequn* in post-*danwei* China," in Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne eds. *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2008), pp.22-38.

unique type of status based on one's parents' place of residence, a structural rarity across cultures. Over time, *hukou* has become a deeply ingrained socio-cultural identity used by people in constructing stereotypes. [15]

In consequence, most of the issues would eventually have themselves pointing to the regional government and its leaders. In other words, as in a highly politicized society where governmental control has been overpowering the society and its individuals, political solutions issued or directed by the government seems to be the most direct way of easing the tensions. As a result, although municipal leaders are not senior enough to make all the decisions, they are also the changing forces in Chinese politics.

By far the majority of studies on Chinese regional leaders focus on provincial party chiefs and governors alike, but the importance of newly industrialized cities and the political roles they are about to play somehow have been mostly unmentioned in scholarly works. Based on the consensus report published in 2011, there are 42 cities in China having a population larger than one million.[16] Presumably, the difficulties to municipal governance brought by larger populations can certainly be compared to that of governing a smaller province in less developed regions in China. Therefore, in future studies on related fields and subjects, more extensive studies on the regional differences in China, especially by comparing industrialized cities to agricultural townships in Chinese economy and politics, deserve their scholarly attention.

[15] Li Ma. *The Making of the Chinese Working Class* (Doctoral dissertation, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2010), p.7.
[16] Cited from "2011 Ranking of Chinese Cities," *http://www.chinacity.org.cn/csph/csph/68810.html* article retrieved on July 20, 2011.

2. Regional Leaders as Elites

Studies on elites show that certain social context and institutional causes can generate a new group of political elites who tend to have more unified interests due to such elite integration.[17] In Chinese politics, such a social context was the Communist Revolution in which CCP revolutionaries defeated the Nationalists and became the new group of political elites in China. The earlier mechanism used by the CCP to assign political positions to its revolutionaries was such that the party systematically allocated career opportunities according to the political loyalty of its members. Due to high degree of organizational penetration and influential control of educational and work institutions, the ruling communist party considers loyalty and party membership as two of the significant requirements of a leadership post.[18] Consequently, the party is in favor of recruiting officials with loyal party membership and higher capability in leading and governing, while the rewards for these members would be career advancement and a series of privileges, such as higher wages, better housing options and medical care packages. Meanwhile, educational credentials are found by scholars to be associated with increased organizational authority, even if such authority is secondary to a leader's loyalty to the party. In order to achieve more privilege and higher positions, leaders are encouraged by the party to achieve more educational credentials first. Thus, Chinese regional administrative officials whose loyalty is high and who have outstanding educational backgrounds tend to be the elites who enjoy more from their careers. In other words, "[i]t does not appear that intellectuals have been on the road to class power; instead, party bureaucrats have been on the road to college."[19]

[17] Robert D. Putnam. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp.122-23.
[18] Andrew G. Walder. "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order." *American Sociological Review*, 60 (June, 1995), p.310.
[19] Walder, Ibid, p.325.

Some China watchers have argued that the Chinese government today finds it harder than ever to attract, develop, and retain talent as some of the current cohort of regional leaders now will be the top leaders in China in the future. Graduates from the country's top universities, who once would have filled government posts, are instead now choosing to take jobs in the private sector. By slowing down the political transition to open democracy and by recruiting more talent, CCP leadership over the country is possibly declining. [20] Moreover, the structure of the country's bureaucracy stifles initiative and promotes mediocrity. Furthermore, many officials, from the village to the central government, are corrupt, thereby eroding the government's effectiveness and feeding popular discontent with the system. Another argument from China watchers contradicts the view that the entire leadership of China is facing great challenges brought by the CCP leadership itself. Instead, they argue that contemporary regional leaders in China collectively have become a strong political force, though individually they tend to be more obedient to the center. However, when dealing with issues affecting regional leaders' political careers or their regional interests, Chinese regional leaders as a group can make the center's policies rather difficult to be carried out. Issues such as international environmental agreements and an accurate renminbi exchange rate against the U.S. dollar have been pushed by the central government as urgent policies, but have been deliberately delayed or passively pursued by regional leaders. Thus, according to these scholars, the center's ability to unilaterally impose its will across China is "highly limited" due to regional political elites' overpowering influence. [21] In addition, analysts and political reporters have also noticed that even the Chinese military

[20] John Thorton. "China's Leadership Gap." *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2006), retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62097/john-l-thornton/chinas-leadership-gap on September 5, 2010.
[21] C. Fred Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell. China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), p.76. Also, Andrew Batson. "Beijing Tug of War Guides Yuan's Path," *The Wall Street Journal* (2010, November 2), retrieved from http://online.wsj.com (accessed November 3, 2010).

leaders, who had been absolutely loyal to CCP's center leadership since Mao's era, have become much more independent; for example, President Hu Jintao was bypassed (or delayed) in being told the results of an important air force test flight. [22]

Of all China's challenges, the most critical one could be that of nurturing a new generation of leaders who are capable, skilled, honest, committed to public service, and accountable to the Chinese people as a whole. Unless China manages to produce such leaders, the CCP and Chinese government would fail to meet the country's challenges and its public promises of a more prosperous and democratic future will remain unfulfilled. The difficulty that returnees face is only one aspect of the structural problems of China's bureaucracy. Another is that Chinese leaders must learn to deal with rapidly changing situations over many issues throughout the country. Such adaptability can cost a leaders' career if handled badly, but it also provides an excellent opportunity for further promotion. Another trend in the study of Chinese political elite mobility has been the tendency to concentrate on the mobility of much more highly ranked Chinese leaders, especially officials ranked at the politburo level (Dickson 2003, Manion 2004, Holbig 2009, and Shin, Shan and Liu 2010). They point out that economic reform and the installation of market economy have provided financial benefits for Chinese leaders. Bruce J. Dickson argues against the notion that economic development is leading to political change in China or that China's private entrepreneurs are helping to promote democratization. Instead, they have become partners with the ruling Chinese Communist Party to promote economic growth while maintaining the political status quo. Thus, the Communist Party's strategy for incorporating China's capitalists into the political system and the common interests, personal ties,

[22] David E. Sanger and Michael Wines. "China Leader's Limits Come into Focus as U.S. Visit Nears." *The New York Times* (2011, January 16), retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com (assessed January 16, 2011).

and common views of the party and the private sector are creating a new form of co-existence. Rather than being potential agents of change, China's entrepreneurs may prove to be a key source of support for the party's agenda and its leaders. [23]

One of the most enduring scholarly debates in the field of Chinese politics centers on the elite political equilibrium in the Chinese Communist Party. On the one hand, some scholars argue that Mao and other CCP leaders consistently sought to gain complete dominance over the party. On the other hand, it has been argued that factional politics at the top produces too much transaction cost such that no single faction can dominate. Clear historical examples can be brought to bear to support both sides. This type of study offers a novel perspective on the debate by taking advantage of a quantitative data set recording the biographies of all CCP Central Committee members from the first to the 16th CCP National Congress. The data set they used has an indicator of how influential the official heads of the CCP were within the CCP elite, as represented by the Central Committee. Compounding the difficulty, studies also find that many high-level officials are moved from post to post too quickly; state power is also interrelated with economic factors and business personnel profiles.

Chinese regional leaders in the above examples were native to the county, but served in townships other than the ones in which they were born, which is also part of a top-down administrative strategy of the center. Some scholars argue that the rotation of CCP cadres among different geographical areas often serves to reinforce their identification with higher levels of the apparatus rather than with the local community. [24] It is considered a strategy used by the center

[23] Bruce Dickson. *Wealth into Power: the Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.57-60.
[24] Maria Edin. "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective," *The China Quarterly*, 173(March, 2003):35-52.

to strengthen its ties to the local leadership groups. Many authors assert that the capacity of the central state is weakened by decentralization and that there is an erosion of the nomenklatura system; and some argue that the political structure in contemporary China has been transformed from a highly effective central direction of the local cadres to the situation that the center must try harder to coordinate its own local agents' behavior. [25] Therefore, regional leaders' mobility can also function as a means to enhance the center's influence and control over regional issues, as well as to host a talent show for the promising cadres. For instance, the CEO of a state-owned bank may suddenly find himself assigned to a provincial leadership position. For example, starting as an accountant of a rural coal mine in Yunnan province, Dai Xianglong (born in 1944) was promoted in 1985 to be vice president of the Agricultural Bank of China. Dai then in 1995 became the president of the People's Bank of China, the top financial job in China. In 2002, Dai was appointed as the mayor of Tianjin (the largest port of Northern China with one of the nation's largest Industrial and Economic Developmental Districts attached) and stayed in the post for another 5 years until in 2008 he was appointed as the president and the party chief of the National Council for Social Security Fund, PRC. All these ministerial posts consolidated Dai's experiences and reputation as one of China's most powerful financial figures who currently manages China's Social Security Fund with an asset value of about ¥ 780 billion. [26] To some degree, such promotion represents the government's hunger for talent and its willingness to put leaders wherever they are needed. Such job-hopping, however, limits the effectiveness of leaders, since they might have little time to learn about their positions or see their initiatives through, and they face resistance from subordinates who know that they will soon be gone.

[25] Edin. Ibid, p.50.
[26] *http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzsj/201005/t20100506_2682.html*

Other scholars have noticed that cadre training and professional development for regional leaders have become part of the party's priority agenda. In order to train party officials for their job qualifications, midcareer training is now common among regional leaders. To improve cadre competence, CCP party schools and leadership schools have been functioning as training institutes since Mao's era. But in recent decades, these party schools and leadership schools did not vanish. The training programs have been altered to fit into the new requirements from the center; some party leadership schools even started granting advanced degrees for cadres' midcareer training. [27] One of the major differences held by scholars asserts the Chinese and other former Communist parties' effective ability of adapting changes and learning from the past. For instance, "[o]ne thing that does seem certain—both from the China case but also from the former Soviet Union—is that stasis, nonadaptability, and inattention to change by the ruling party are a recipe for accelerated atrophy and likely regime collapse." [28] However, the efficiency of vocational training offered by party schools nationwide has been doubted by other scholars. Scholars find that in less developed regions, cadre and bureaucrat training usually is much less useful and meaningful when compared to that in developed regions of China. As a result, poorer vocational training has less help in cadres' career development; though the training itself was rather a mandatory task assigned by the party. [29]

As the dominant ruling party, the CCP and its top leaders may have realized that strong, effective and durable leadership can help the CCP overcome many of its crises. Speaking of party leadership transitions, the transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao as the CCP General Secretaries and Presidents of China had been made smoothly and highly predictable despite

[27] David Shambaugh. *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaption* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 2008), p.143.
[28] Shambaugh. Ibid, p.177.
[29] Frank N. Pieke. "Marketization, Centralization and Globalization of Cadre Training in Contemporary China," *The China Quarterly* (December, 2009), 200:953-71.

some significant personnel losses and gains (such as the replacement of Chen Liangyu, the former Shanghai party chief, conducted by Hu in 2006, which was viewed by others as Hu's successful attempt to reduce former President Jiang's influence in the party). Lower-level officials have the opposite problem, as pointed out by other scholars (Thorton 2006 & Edin 2003). Most must work patiently inside a single area of government until they reach a relatively senior level before they even have a chance to experience working in another ministry or bureau. Even at the national level, it is common for directors general to have spent their entire careers rising through the ranks of the bureaus they now lead. This further discourages risk taking and innovation and thus creates yet another obstacle to good governance. Furthermore, the political system, manipulated as it is by the party, encourages careerism at all levels: one Chinese study published in 2000 found that government officials were more worried about pleasing their superiors than serving the people. By most accounts, the central control over the provinces has caused more resources go to those provinces that boast greater representation in the center. As a result, the center treats central cities and other provinces differently; and central provincial interactions are contingent on the macro-political environment.[30] The Chinese party-state has the capacity to be selectively effective, but it depends on how it defines its priorities and degrees of importance when dealing with central and local governance issues. The center is severely constrained in its implementation of other policies, to the detriment of famers in less developed areas. To reduce rural poverty and farmers' burden, thus, "the center needs to modify its development strategy and move the issue of poverty and burden reduction to the top of its agenda." [31]

[30] Su and Yang. Ibid, p.228.
[31] Edin. 2003. Ibid, p.50.

Overall, the contributions that previous scholarly works have made must be acknowledged in terms of making the study of Chinese leaders and their political careers an advanced, comprehensive, meaningful, fascinating, and both methodologically and evidentially rich subject. Yet, the shortcomings of and deficiency existed in previous studies also must be pointed out in order to spur further progress and advancement to the subject. First, despite biological research and analysis on regional leaders' personal backgrounds, the socioeconomic and political differences existing among regional leaders in China has not been studied. Leaders differ in various ways. In terms of governing regional governments in China, the limit of one's capacity may not only exist for one's biological differences; due to regional differences and other unmeasured constraints, regional leaders' decision-makings and professional performances actually affect their career mobility as well. Second, as China has a large population and the population is not at all evenly distributed through the country, a large number of leaders of municipalities and coastal cities are governing a population equivalent to some provinces in the west of China. Thus, presumably, the difficulties of governing these municipalities can also be compared to that of governing provinces. Yet, hardly can any studies with strong analyses on municipal leaders in China be found at this stage. Most Chinese top leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin etc.) have been thoroughly studied, and numerous provincial leaders have likewise been studied, but regional leaders of newly developed cities and municipalities have not noticed considerably by scholars. Though it is not easily accessible for one to keep track of frequent personnel arrangements and reshufflings across China month by month and year by year, today's mayors and municipal leaders might well become governors and later national leaders; it is of vital importance, therefore, that we devote more attention to them in order to discover more of the political system in China. Third, due to a lack of relevant empirical

evidence and theoretical construction, the CCP center has not been studied properly as a crucial part of scholarly analyses of regional leadership. As regional leaders have been changing from time to time due to new tasks raised by China's progressive economic growth and social modernization, the center has in fact also been changing as fast, if not faster, as all the regional leaders. By taking all domestic issues into its consideration, the CCP center faces new challenges from regional leaders, and it also adjusts its mechanism by manipulating the standards of promoting, demoting or swapping regional leaders in order to achieve its desirable adaptabilities and to keep its dominant position at the center of Chinese politics. In consequence, when studying regional leaders and their political mobility, one must think of the center's reactions accordingly as so far it is still primarily up to the CCP center to decide a regional leader's career choices. As the dominant political party in China, the CCP center and its regional chiefs are not moving in opposite directions, rather they are actually well connected to keep the system working.

B. Typologies of Chinese Regional Leaders

Regional political elites are often considered the future leaders of China. Among 25 committee members and alternate members of the 17th CCP Politburo, 15 of them have had previous regional leadership experiences, including President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping (by all accounts the next president of China). In fact, "elite integration is also enhanced by sociometric ties, that is, networks of personal communication, friendship, and influence." [32] As in all communist regimes, the CCP has its system to manage the selection of leaders of governmental positions. The system, no matter how a cadre is promoted to be a regional leader, makes sure that the CCP holds a monopoly of power in town. Developed under the planned

[32] Putnam. Ibid, p.112.

economy and central-planning over all other kinds of social life, the system adopted by the CCP from the Soviet Union helps the party maintain its political dominance and authority in personnel arrangements across the nation.

1. Regional Governance in China

In general, a region's political importance is defined by its political or economic capacity and importance to the central government of China. And smaller regions are usually governed by a bigger regional government. It is most understandable to readers who are not familiar with administrative regions and rankings in China. However, unlike the system used in the United States, a big city in China usually also governs its surrounding counties; while a relatively small city can be equivalent to a county. Also, the biggest cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) are equivalents to a province are divided into districts such that each district is an equivalent of a regular city; but other cities with large population are not considered provincial units (Figure 1.1).

Thus, municipalities under the central government (namely) Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing and 28 provincial regions (with Taiwan excluded as its governor and regional leaders are not appointed by the CCP) govern cities under their regions. And most of these cities govern themselves and their surrounding counties. Each county governs a certain number of towns or townships, and then each town likewise governs villages or administrative units like villages. Therefore, according to the unit a leader is in charge of, all Chinese civil servants from the premier of the State Council to a town's chief, each of them can find their position in the system as they have all been classified by it.



Figure 1.1 Administrative Ranking in China

Table 1.1 Bureaucratic Rankings in Chinese Politics

Rankings (from high to low)	Title in Civil Service System	Equivalent in Regional Governmental System	Equivalent in CCP System
1	Premier of State Council	N/A	Standing Committee Member of Politburo
2	Vice Premier	N/A	Regular Member or Standing Committee Member of Politburo
3	Minister	Governor, Provincial Congressional Leader, Provincial CPPCC Leader	Provincial Party Chief, Member of CCP Central Committee
4	Vice Minister	Vice or Deputy Governor	Vice or Deputy Provincial Party Chief
5	Ministerial Departmental Head	Provincial Departmental Head, Mayor of a Capital City	Party Secretary of a Department
6	Vice Departmental Head	Mayor of a Mid-size City	Party Secretary of a Department or City
7	Divisional Head	Mayor of a Smaller City or a County	Party Secretary of a Smaller City or County
8	Sub-divisional Head	Deputy Mayor of a Small City or County	Party Secretary of a Small City or County

*Source: Author's Database

Based on the ranking inside the civil service system (as shown in Table 1.1), governors are regional leaders under the premier and the center of CCP, and their equivalents in the center are ministers. Thus, a minister can likewise be moved to a governor's post outside Beijing, as a governor can be called back to the center. Another confusing point to some readers would be: who has more power inside the same regional political system, the governmental chief or the party chief? They do enjoy the same ranking position on the chart, but in fact, the party chief has more power and his or her authority tops that of the governmental chief's. Needless to say,

within one political unit, the chief is always in principle higher than his or her deputies or all the vice chiefs. Exceptions are rare. [33]

Table 1.2 Economic and Administrative Regions of People's Republic of China

Region (Total Number = 4)	Provincial Units (Total = 31)
Northeast	Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin
East	Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan
Central	Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan
West	Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang

(Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are excluded)

Source: *http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/cgfb/t20060307_402309439.htm* accessed July 1, 2011

Based on China' geographic features and cultural characteristics nationwide, the country can also be divided into different grand regions: the East, the Northeast, the Central, and the West. Such divisions are not official but rather are valid for statistical or cultural reasons. However, regional economic performances are important indicators to the entire Chinese economy. Before the economic reform which was orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, regional economic differences within China were much less noticeable than they are at

[33] There are, of course, exceptions. Bo Xilai, whose father was a senior veteran of the Revolution and later long-term vice premier, was mayor and party chief of the city of Dalian under Liaoning Province in Northeastern China from 1992 to 2001. But it was well-known that his influence to the provincial affairs, and connections with the center were more superior than the then governor. Mr. Bo is now the party chief of Chongqing, one of the centrally directed municipalities. "China's Other Face: The Red and the Black," *The Economist* (2009, October 1), retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/14539628?story_id=14539628 on July 5, 2011.

present. The West has been much less developed compared to all other regions in China, while the Northeast used to be the industrial center of China from 1950s to 1980s as most heavy industries and high energy consuming plants were built there during the First Five-year Plan initiated in 1953. However, the success of Chinese economy in the past three decades made its way through labor intensive and export-leading manufacturing sectors, instead of exporting or selling heavy industrial products. Thus, the economy of the Northeast declined in 1990s and the coastal areas of China shone their light over the country. Therefore, becoming a regional leader in the coastal province, especially a mayor of a newly industrialized coastal city, can generate some rather aggressive and intensive competition among potential cadres. On the other hand, being moved to the West or the Northeast without a significant promotion on the ranking chart would be considered a sign of one's career stagnation. The data shown in Table 1.2 point out that the dominant region in Chinese economy is the East as the percentages of the West and the Northeast can hardly compete with the East at this stage.

Table 1.3 Regional Economies and Assets in China

Regions	GDP (100 million yuan)	Percentage (%)
Northeast	14,545	8.68
East	92,819	55.38
Central	31,617	18.86
West	28,620	17.08
Total	167,601	100

Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/cgfb/t20060307_402309439.htm; accessed June 20, 2011.)

Table 1.4 Economies and Assets of China's Provincial Units 2010

GDP Ranking	Provincial Unit	GDP (100 Million Yuan)	Per Capita (Yuan)	GDP Per Capita Ranking	Region
1	Guangdong	37775.49	39978	6	East
2	Shandong	33621.32	35893	7	East
3	Jiangsu	33478.76	43907	5	East
4	Zhejiang	22716.98	44895	4	East
5	Henan	19724.73	21073	14	Central
6	Hebei	17067.99	24583	12	Central
7	Liaoning	14696.23	34193	9	Northeast
8	Shanghai	14344.73	77205	1	East
9	Sichuan	14050.78	17289	24	West
10	Hunan	12939.85	19355	20	Central
11	Hubei	12866.05	22050	18	Central
12	Fujian	11855.08	33106	10	East
13	Beijing	11469.28	70234	2	East
14	Anhui	10191.48	16656	25	Central
15	Inner Mongolia	8967.52	37287	8	West
16	Heilongjiang	8257.24	21593	13	Northeast
17	Guangxi	7903.47	16576	26	West
18	Shaanxi	7752.2	20497	16	West
19	Jilin	7072.25	25906	11	Northeast
20	Tianjin	7068.56	63395	3	East
21	Shanxi	7050.38	20779	15	Central
22	Jiangxi	6954.12	15921	27	Central
23	Yunnan	6178.25	13687	29	West
24	Chongqing	5693.58	20219	17	West
25	Xinjiang	4005.41	19119	21	West
26	Guizhou	3662.43	9214	31	West
27	Gansu	3373.78	12882	30	West
28	Hainan	1585.19	18760	22	East
29	Ningxia	1198.15	19642	19	West
30	Qinghai	1012.69	18346	23	West
31	Tibet	434.34	15294	28	West

Source: http://www.armluntan.cn/paiming/html/caifubangwen/295.html accessed in July 20, 2011.

However, even among Eastern Chinese regions, differences among cities and provinces can be undeniable for not all of them are in the period of socioeconomic development (shown in Table 1.4). Centrally directed municipalities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, occupy tremendous resources and their GDP per capita indices can be compared to any of the OECD country's performance. Therefore, it is highly possible that regional leaders in Beijing, Shanghai or Tianjin attract more political attention from the center as they play with better cards with all eyes on them. Accordingly, it can also be true that becoming leaders in these cities tends to be more difficult for competitors. How difficult if compared to that of becoming an equivalent in the Central or the West of China? The answer awaits to be revealed in the later chapters of the study.

2. Trends of Regional Leaders in Mao Zedong's Era, Deng Xiaoping's Era, Compared to Post-Deng Xiaoping Era

The first generation of CCP local leaders and political elites were drawn from various types of backgrounds, "whose legitimacy was based on charisma, their roles in the revolution, and their positions as representatives of the former exploited class."[34] Without revolutionary practice, ideological influences (as well as ideological propaganda campaigns) from the center have become the crucial connection between the center and its regional elites. Despite the greater availability of information about the current leaders of the PRC's key political institutions, scholars remain divided in the conclusions to be drawn. While agreeing, for example, that the new elitist party cadres are generally younger and better educated than the first generation of revolutionaries, scholars and analysts disagree about "the nature of their training and career paths," [35] and the question of the possible existence of communist regime in the future. Thus,

[34] Li and Bachman. Ibid, p.89.
[35] Avery Goldstein. "Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC," *The China Quarterly* (September, 1994), 139, p.718.

"[t]he implications of a more influential subnational elite for the future evolution of the Chinese political system are not yet entire clearly." [36] By examining the historical process of building the communist state under Mao's central leadership, scholars also argue that in the 1950s and 1960s, local leaders and party cadres were tightly controlled by communist ideology, Leninist party discipline, and regional economic constraints controlled by the central planning system. Regional leaders, especially those lower ranking cadres, were scrutinized not only by their vertical leaders from the above, but also closely monitored by politically mobilized mass and relevant institutions at lower levels. [37] Though the short-lived, decentralized economic recovery initiated by Liu Shaoqi (then Deputy CCP Chairman and viewed as Mao's successor) before the Cultural Revolution called for more monitored economic freedom to the people and loosened control over regional authorities in order to stimulate the national economy, the ideological education and organizational discipline served as leverage on the local governments and their cadres to obey the center unconditionally. Therefore, "[b]oth the citizens and the cadres of the new [communist] regime were simultaneously subject to sanctions from a wide variety of sources, including central state authorities, members of work teams, representatives of mass organizations, and higher-ranking authorities of local political organizations, all of which employed a variety of means, from 'criticism' and 're-education' to the death penalty, in their attempts to ensure compliance and mete out 'revolutionary justice.'"[38] With such constrains and pressures put on regional leaders, the center may have reduced the degree and frequency of corruption and power abuses among officials and regional leaders. However, despite the violation of personal freedom and a large number of political injustices across the country, the center gained nothing more from

[36] Goldstein. Ibid, p.718.
[37] Patricia M.Thorton. *Disciplining the State* (Cambridge, M.A.: Havard University Asia Center, 2007), p.136.
[38] Thorton. Ibid, p.141.

its cadres than absolute loyalty; the improvement of governmental efficiency and most important of all, the urgent need of developing national economy, did not arise.

Starting from the Deng Xiaoping era, it has been more common to witness cadres promoted as regional party leaders and heads of governments with industrial, administrative, and distinctive professional background and career experiences. This type of elite mobility transformation contributes to political mobilization and liberalization by de-emphasizing ideological concerns and accentuating social tolerance in Chinese society. Deng's reform started with experiments that no one had done before. Thus, governors who fully cooperated with Deng in hosting the experiments in their provinces actually received great opportunities of promotion.[39] Relevant research on the topic also suggest that as veterans of the communist revolutions were still very much alive in Deng's era, their political mobility tend to be lower compared to that experienced in the Cultural Revolution as Deng promoted them to regional leadership posts when he was back to power and they did not retire until Jiang Zemin became the General Sectary of CCP in 1989 and the 14th CCP National Congress in 1992 (Li & Bachman 1989, Walder 1995a, Bo 2002). The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was a crucial event to some top leaders of China but it was not an earthquake to all regional leadership group in China. The transition from Deng to Jiang was more or less smoothly handled as Deng expected. Thus, many senior regional leaders remained in office until 1992.

After Deng Xiaoping's withdrawal from public in 1992 and his subsequent death in 1997, Jiang Zemin was known as the leader who "normalized" Chinese politics by repeatedly signaling that Hu Jintao would be his successor once Jiang had served his terms as General

[39] Zhao Ziyang, then party chief of Sichuan Province and Wan Li, then party chief of Anhui province were promoted to Politburo members afterwards in 1982 due to their braveness of supporting Deng's reformist ideas.

Sectary and the President. During these years (1997-2000s), a significant phenomenon was the rising importance of regional leaders' seats in the CCP Central Committee (shown in Table 1.5). Noticeably, regional leadership experiences had by this time become a crucial factor for one's career future to get into the center. One possible explanation the author thinks is this: as political movements have declined from Chinese politics, the center has replaced its judgment on cadres' loyalty to the party. Previously, by judging how much enthusiastic a cadre would like to participate in the movements could help one's upward career mobility. But now economic growth and regional governance have become more important factors if one wants to please the center and demonstrate one's leadership skills and capabilities.

Table 1.5: CCP Politburo Members with Regional Leadership Experiences

Year	Central Committee	Total Politburo Member	Members with Regional Experience	Percentage (%)
1956	8th	13	2	9
1969	9th	17	4	8
1973	10th	21	5	24
1977	11th	23	6	26
1982	12th	25	9	36
1987	13th	17	9	53
1992	14th	20	10	50
1997	15th	22	13	59
2002	16th	24	16	67
2007	17th	25	19	76

Source: Author's Database

Furthermore, the educational and professional training of regional leaders is also being emphasized by the center in an effort to improve leaders' performance. Some recent personnel arrangements have shown the open door for more talent into the system. For example, the current Minister of Science and Technology, Dr. Wan Gang, who is also the Chairman of the Zhigong

Party (one of the eight minority political parties in China), studied and worked in Germany for 16 years and occupied a senior technical and management position of the Audi Auto Group of Germany before he accepted a senior administrative post at Tongji University in Shanghai and moved back to China.[40] For decades, it was extremely rare for professional technicians from a minority political party to be chosen for a ministerial post; more typical was a rather honorary position in the National People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

C. Conclusion

In brief, a new generation of leaders whose socialization, educational background, and regional experiences differ significantly from those of the old elite, has risen to high positions in contemporary Chinese politics. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new issues. The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago. The dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are (1) how to decentralize economic initiative to microeconomic units while retaining some form of macroeconomic control, (2) how to increase functional efficiency while maintaining political control, and (3) how to continue their elitist orientation while legitimizing their governance. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the linkage between the characteristics of elites in China today and the broader patterns of societal change. There is no doubt that the political elites have changed dramatically. Broader social trends are emerging that are closely related to this leadership transformation. Studies have focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic localism, elitism, and political mobility and mobilization as they signal emerging trends. Many Chinese and

[40] A brief biography of Wan Gang, at *http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2007-04/27/content_6036501.htm* text in simplified Chinese, article accessed on October 15, 2010.

foreign observers are clearly aware and worried by some of them—particularly localism—and the central leadership may take action to mitigate or reverse any of these tendencies.

CHAPTER TWO
THE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS

The current map of Chinese politics shows a hierarchical system where the CCP occupies the dominant position and has great influence over every political issue flowing within the system. Unlike the former Soviet Union, where the Communist Party was the only game in town, the Chinese Communist Party does have followers[41] showing that this is not a "one-party state," but these are only followers, not competitors. Therefore, membership in the CCP usually is the first step for someone who is interested in a career in politics.[42] But the CCP contemporarily has more than 80 million members nationwide. While not all of them can enjoy a share of the CCP's power, who are those who have the potentials as well as motivation to become an official? By examining current regional leaders' career mobility trajectories, we may find that the party does not select its officials randomly. Instead, it is a series of combined factors of potential party members' background, experiences, capability and opportunities.

No denying that since its establishment 90 years ago, the CCP has been through a great deal of external challenges and internal turmoil. Yet, it survives and maintains a hold on central political power in China; its leadership has evolved and played the crucial part. Although not selected as leaders through elections, Chinese regional leaders are selected through a series of procedures and are given opportunities to accomplish tasks from their bosses; their performance will be taken into consideration for further promotion opportunities. Regional leadership is

[41] Besides the Chinese Communist Party (founded in 1921), there are other eight smaller political parties in China. They are China Zhigong Party (1925), China Democratic League (1941), Chinese Association for Promoting Democracy (1945), Jiusan Society (1945), China Democratic Construction National Association (1945), Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (1947), The Nationalist (KMT) Revolutionary Committee (1947), and China's Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party (1947).

[42] Surely there are benefits, both political and material, for being other political party members in China. Memberships and political mobility among the 8 minority party members will be studied accordingly in the study. But not in an independent chapter as the study focuses on CCP and its regional leaderships.

important to the CCP as it assures the CCP's political dominance locally; furthermore, outstanding regional leaders with talents and accomplishments are likely to be chosen for higher posts in the future. Thus, the selection procedure itself makes sure that the central leadership of China will be handed to the most capable bureaucrats in the country. "Promoting inner-party democracy" has been mentioned frequently in recent years through CCP propaganda. It means to grant more opportunities from the center to lower ranking officials and to party members holding different views of the center's policies or campaigns. It is said that the current general secretary, President Hu Jintao, has been supportive to a number of decentralized initiatives.[43] The center tries to be more democratic to its members within the system and tolerates a very small number of competitors, albeit with certain regulations over them. Though far from any open competition and with no opposition party allowed, it is obvious that the CCP is adopting changes gradually as it knows some changes are unavoidable in terms of modernization and globalization. In consequence, changes of the selection of regional leaders may show some new signs of the CCP's gradual and highly cautious transformation.

In the first chapter, we have already examined some of the newer phenomena found in regional leaders' curriculums over time: both ideological and organizational controls over CCP officials were tighter in Mao's era, compared to that of Deng's and post-Deng's China. In the second chapter of the study, we intend to find out: (1) what are the patterns of political mobility of Chinese regional leaders and why has the mobility had the decisive influence on their political careers? (2) When the political mobility is under discussion, what are the indicators in Chinese politics which construct the map of political hierarchy in China? (3) What are some rules of

[43] Shambaugh. *China's Communist Party*: *Atrophy and Adaption* (Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 2008), p.138.

thumb that influence political mobility of regional elites? And (4) what would a timely, cross-regional, comparative examination of Chinese regional leaders reveal?

A. Defining Political Mobility

In this study, the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders focuses on promotions or demotions of their career specifically means the movement of a leader from one position to another during his political career as a regional leader in China. As is broadly used in sociological studies, the term social mobility means "[t]he ability or potential of individuals within a society to move between different social levels or between different occupations;" [44] the political mobility in this study does not concern inter-occupational mobility as long as officials still work within the political system.

Political mobility is a crucial part of a Chinese regional leader's political career. The movement of a leader can be either vertical or horizontal within the hierarchical political system; moreover, such mobility exists in most communist and post-communist regimes as the dominant communist party controls the decisive power to determine a leader's political career. For example, "[t]he movement of Soviet political elites from one part of socioadministrative structure to another connotes a change in the individual's political status, defined in terms of political power. These changes over time reveal much about the dynamics of the political system itself." [45] Specifically in the case of Chinese provincial leaders, five different possibilities can be said to exist for a provincial leader's career: (1) stay where one is (no movement vertically or horizontally), (2) get promoted at the same locale (vertical movement), (3) receive no promotion

[44] Oxford English Dictionary, "mobility, n.1." Third edition, September 2002; online version June 2011. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/120494>; accessed 31 August 2011.

[45] William A. Clark. *Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev* (New York, N.Y.:Praeger, 1989), p.2.

but get transferred to a different region (politically no change but change of location), (4) get demoted at the same locale (vertical movement), and (5) retire (end of all movements).[46] It is true that continuing the same job or retiring due to one's age can be considered as part of a leader's career movement. But as no change or retreat from leadership (or death) has little significance on the mobility analysis, the study emphasizes regional leaders' promotion, demotion, and location changes.

1. Organizational Control of Leaders' Political Mobility

Within the state conducted political system, there are different sub-systems in Chinese politics. For instance, there are the CCP party system, the central and local governmental system, the military system, the state-owned corporation system, and the Communist Youth League system. Theoretically, officials who work in different sub-systems are actually interchangeable. However, as different sub-systems are in charge of dealing with different affairs in Chinese politics, some of the positions are practically more important to the whole system than that of other sub-systems. Thus, being transferred from other posts to a certain post actually means a promotional opportunity for the official. On the contrary, being transferred away from this certain post to other posts, as a matter of fact, means a demotion to the official. In general, it is the CCP politburo or important central committee members who decide posts for governorships, and the CCP chief of a province or a city makes decisions to transfer or reshuffle officials within his region. Practically, the CCP department of organization (an essential part of most CCP regional branches) handles the details once the decision is made, and they also catalog all the leaders and officials periodically and report to the organizational heads and party chiefs.

[46] Zhiyue Bo. *Chinese Provincial Leaders* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p.70.

Therefore, the party makes all the personnel decisions and arrangements that no matter which sub-system needs its leadership to be filled or changed, the decision-making authority remains in the party's hands. And the department of organization is in charge of carrying out the decisions. For instance, if a leadership reshuffle in a regional educational system is needed, the party chiefs will discuss about it, make their choice, and send the organizational head to have the job done. A department of organization exists in most CCP branches nationwide and it archives most personnel information including every party member's profile, curriculum vita, and career records. Generally speaking, organization departments specialize in surveying and classifying party members and officials personal information; the classifications routinize the political mobility processes among regional leaders, make sure candidates meet the basic requirements, and influence (and sometimes monitor) the decision-makers final decisions.

However, as they handle confidential materials unknown to most people, some organization departments abuse their power to make profit. A recent case shows that a Youth League chief of a sub-provincial city not only changed her name years ago (in order to be seen as being related to an influential person of her hometown), but also changed her year of birth multiple times within a short period of time, from 1969 to 1973, then from 1973 to 1978, in order to meet age qualifications for her career promotions. She was caught again using a fake name and documents to defraud of a multimillion dollar legacy.[47] Before this League official was finally sentenced in April 2011 for 14 years of jail, she had climbed all the way up from a young farmer without formal education to a sub-provincial political leader and once was considered a political star as she was a very "young" official among her peers. Even with nationwide organizational control over CCP cadres, there are unexpected factors in studying Chinese

[47] *Southern Daily* (March 15, 2011). "Wang Yali, Former Deputy of Youth League of the City of Shijiazhuang, Arrested." Retrieved from http://www.nfdaily.cn, July 20, 2011.

regional leaders' political mobility that can be difficult to detect or measure. Though the efficacy of the CCP's control over its local branches is not a subject of our study, the author would like to point out that some of the outcomes of the CCP's governance can be different from the center's expectancy. Such unexpected cases are not caused by systemic factors, as the party itself would not be willing to promote an official with fake credentials whatsoever, but the results have caused controversies among Chinese people question the party-state regime's efficacy and legitimacy.

2. Vertical Political Mobility: From Low to High

The vertical political movements of leaders are fairly obvious to explain. Apparently, one of the most important indicators to show a regional leader has received a promotion is that the leader has been moved from a lower level in the system to the next higher level. As shown in Table 1.1 of chapter one, a mayor of a small city becoming the mayor of a bigger city is a promotion, and a mayor from a mid-size city becoming a deputy mayor of a provincial direct city (usually the capital city of the province) is also a promotion to the leader. For higher ranking officials when a deputy governor or deputy party chief of a province moves up to the governor or the chief position, that official is getting a promotion. A governor or provincial party chief getting the job as mayor or party chief of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin or Chongqing also a promotion since the four central direct municipalities, though they are smaller than any province in China, means a great deal because most mayors or party chiefs of these four municipalities will sooner or later become members of the Politburo. If a provincial leader is removed to the center and accepts a chief ministerial post, usually it means a promotion. This is the case unless the leader is removed from an important region to a much less important central ministry. Being called up to the center entails having more opportunities and connections; perhaps becoming a

politburo member is soon enough to come true. Such movements in regional leaders' careers are vertical movements, as this type of promotions moves the leader upward and demotions move them downward in the category. Therefore, if a governor is being moved to a non-direct municipal city chief post, it is considered a demotion. And if a big city mayor is moved to a small city mayor post, or given a deputy major post at a similar type of city, in terms of population, economy and political importance, it is likewise considered as a demotion. In a word, going upward or downward depends on where the leader is going.

Meanwhile, measurements for deputies (e.g. deputy ministers, deputy party secretaries) have been a weakness in studying political elite mobility in China. It is hardly the scholars to blame since there are many more deputy posts than chief posts in both governmental and party sub-systems. Even inside the Center, deputies and vice-chiefs have been granted to senior central leaders as promotions, political compensations, balance of power, and temporary personnel arrangement negotiations.[48] Within a province, there is one governor and one party chief, but usually about 6 to 8 deputy governors and the same number of CCP deputy secretaries. The Chinese bureaucracy has always been expanding and never seems to be happy with its current size. Sometimes, for an important city inside a province, its party chief is also a deputy or vice governor and occupies one of the 8 seats. Despite the 15 sub-provincial municipalities (listed in Table 2.1 from Harbin to Shenzhen) whether a big city boss can be an equivalent to a deputy provincial chief or not, it has to be examined by looking at a specific case. It is only conventional that capital cities in provinces tend to be more important, but no official arrangement shows that a capital city boss must take a seat among the vice governors who sit next to the governor.

[48] Vice premierships on the State Council (the central government equivalent of China) are considered national leader posts in China. There are 4 vice premiers currently under Premier Wen Jiabao's executive leadership; however, there used to be up to 16 vice premiers in 1950s until 1970s as there was no constitutional limit of the number.

Therefore, when a city boss becomes a vice governor or party chief while having his or her city chief seat saved, it is considered a promotion. And for other vice governors, if they can hold titles more than the governorship, it is also an upward mobility. If they are striped to only one title from multiple titles and the one left is still a deputy one, meaning he is not in charge of a region, then we can call it a demotion.

In all, the vertical movements of Chinese regional leaders look quite mixed for outsiders. But they are not random at all. The leaders seem to be aware of the institutions set by the center, and what they need to do to keep them closer to the upstream, and what will flush them all the way down.

3. Horizontal Political Mobility: From Region to Region

Many have noticed the political difference among regions in China, but few have explained it well. Yet the social mobility trend shows that more educated, skilled labors flow from the less developed regions to more developed regions in China. The political mobility of regional leaders also shows that once in a while, underdeveloped regional leaders with better performance get moved to developed regions in China and become leaders there.[49]

[49] Bo. Ibid, p.82.

Table 2.1 Important Municipalities in China

Municipality	Population*	Political Importance	Leader Post Equivalent	GDP**	Province	Region
Beijing	19.6	Central Direct	Politburo Member	1377.8	N/a	East
Shanghai	23	Central Direct	Politburo Member	1687.2	N/a	East
Tianjin	12.9	Central Direct	Politburo Member	910.8	N/a	East
Chongqing	28.8	Central Direct	Politburo Member	789.4	N/a	West
Harbin	10.6	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	366.6	Heilongjiang	Northeast
Changchun	7.52	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	258.8	Jilin	Northeast
Shenyang	7.86	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	435.9	Liaoning	Northeast
Jinan	6.03	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	335.1	Shandong	East
Nanjing	8	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	501	Jiangsu	East
Hangzhou	7.97	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	509.9	Zhejiang	East
Guangzhou	12.7	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	1060	Guangdong	East
Wuhan	9.79	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	556.6	Hubei	Central
Chengdu	14	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	555.1	Sichuan	West
Xian	8.31	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	271.9	Shaanxi	West
Dalian	6.69	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	515.8	Liaoning	Northeast
Qingdao	7.64	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	566.6	Shandong	East
Ningbo	7.6	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	512.6	Zhejiang	East
Xiamen	3.53	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	205.4	Fujian	East
Shenzhen	10.36	Sub-Provincial	Vice Governor	951.1	Guangdong	East
Total	212.9			12367.6		

*Millions, as of 2010 **Billion Yuan, as of 2010

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (accessed June 3, 2011)

But why? Scholars of comparative politics state that developed regions are relatively easier to govern than underdeveloped regions. In developed regions, the rule of law is better established, citizens tend to be more educated, the infrastructure is markedly better than that of the underdeveloped regions, there exists greater social and political integrity, less social cleavages, more civic engagement, more social capital, and more advanced market economy. In general, the civil society is stronger and more autonomous in developed regions.[50] If so, a Chinese regional leader who has been doing well in governing a less developed region, as he or she has made progressive achievements, the center should have sent that leader to an even less developed region as the leader can do things that others cannot. In other words, have your best employees deal with the most troublesome customers. As a matter of fact, Chinese leaders who had worked well in underdeveloped regions more often find themselves transferred to more developed cities and provinces. Little has previous research noticed the logic of the CCP center behind its arrangement: that the primary concern when transferring leaders is not to put them where they are the most needed, but to put them in more important leadership posts and to use them in the future. It is known to all the people of China that more developed regions (especially the four central direct municipalities) occupy much more political importance in Chinese politics than do the less developed regions of China. Therefore, the reward for diligent leaders is to become more well-known and powerful to the nation. Arguably, the mayor of Shanghai may have less disturbing governance issues than the governor of Gansu Province. But certainly a politburo member as well as the mayor of Shanghai enjoys much more political and socioeconomic resources than the governor of Gansu who is usually not known to most Chinese and barely has the chance to participate in any of the center's decision-making processes.

[50] Robert D. Putnam. *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.171-76.

As shown in Table 2.1, the most important 19 central direct municipalities and sub-provincial cities make up almost 15.6 percent of the Chinese population and 14.4 percent of Chinese national economy. Furthermore, half of the cities listed here can even compare their economies to some of the provinces in Western China (i.e., Gansu, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc.) where the land is vast but people are poor. Thus, the political importance of these regions is weighed by their share in the national economy and their degree of social capital, such as skilled labor, prominent higher educational institutions, better infrastructure, hospitals and health care units, foreign investments and cultural affairs, the professional expertise of the labor force, the region's adaptability to business and foreign investments, locals' respect to the rule of law, etc. Therefore, if a provincial leader becomes the mayor of a central direct municipality, it is a promotion. Sub-provincial leaders (mayors and party chiefs) are next in line to become provincial leaders or ministerial posts in the center. Central-direct municipal party chiefs are already politburo members; their next upward movements are likely to be the leaders of China. However, when a central-direct municipal mayor is removed to be the party chief of some other provinces, it is still considered a promotion because party chiefs are more important than governors. Basically, governor posts are not attractive enough for mayors of central-direct municipalities; they want at least provincial party chiefs in the developed regions of China or seats in the politburo. Even if there are only about 25 politburo members are selected once in every 5 years.

4. Cross-Dimensional Transfers between the Executive and the Non-Executive Posts

Besides vertical mobility within one sub-system of Chinese government and horizontal mobility between regions in China, political mobility can also be found in movements of leaders across systems and regions.



Figure 2.1: Typical Setting of a Provincial or Municipal CCP Committee



Figure 2.2: Typical Settings and Functions of a Provincial Government in China

Previous studies of Chinese leaders' political mobility show that highly ranked regional leaders tend to have less potential upward political mobility opportunities as the promotional room left can be limited. However, before regional leaders reach a certain ranking, cross sub-system movements can be rather frequent.[51] Scholars argue that such frequent movements among leaders leave them little time and experience to prepare, but leaders' previous experiences hardly help them to adjust to a new working environment.[52] Scholars try to explain this phenomenon by claiming that the CCP is trying to train its cadres to adapt new challenges brought by internationalization and globalization of the 21st century. In fact, cross-dimensional political mobility existed even in the early years of the CCP's establishment. Deng Xiaoping was a classic case of the kind. Studied in France during his teenage years of 1920s, Deng joined the Communist Party of China before he was sent to more intense communist training in Moscow in 1924. After working briefly as a political advisor for a Nationalist (KMT) warlord (Gen. Feng Yuxiang) in 1927, he was sent to southwest rural China to organize local peasants' resistance against the KMTs. Then he was transferred back to Northern China where he officially became a military leader when the Anti-Japanese War broke out. He was put in charge of establishing the "Liberated Territories" as forts and settlements for the communists and their supporters during the War. Before his vice premiership in the early 1950s, he worked both as a regional party chief and a military commander of the People's Liberation Army. As a result, multiple job titles and frequent career moves did not overwhelm Deng but only made him more well-known as a

[51] Bo. Ibid, p.75.
[52] John Thorton. "China's Leadership Gap." *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2006), retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62097/john-l-thornton/chinas-leadership-gap on September 5, 2010.

strong-willed CCP leader. As Deng said himself by reviewing his personal stories, "I became a central leader at the age of 23, it was quite prominent!" [53]

Deng Xiaoping's case can be historically exceptional as he lived long enough to succeed as the top leader of China after Mao Zedong. But cross-dimensional personnel arrangements (making arrangements amongst the party, the state and government system) among leaders were common when the CCP became the dominant political force of China in 1949, and eventually the arrangements became systemic to provide regional leaders with different tasks before they get promoted or demoted. Meanwhile, cross-dimensional reshufflings among highly ranked regional leaders can always cause great attention nationwide. For example, in April 2010, Zhang Chunxian, the CCP Chief of Hunan Province, replaced Wang Lequan as the new CCP Chief of Xinjiang Autonomous Region of Uighurs, while Wang was moved to the center and became a deputy secretary of the Central Committee of Politics and Laws. Each man was a regional leader with the Politburo membership but no official explanation detailed the reason for the reshuffling. Wang Lequan had acquired his governorship of Xinjiang in 1991 and was known as a supporter of President Hu Jintao. However, the Uighurs Revolt in July 2008 shortly before the Beijing Olympics, with more than 200 deaths of innocent Han Chinese civilians killed by the revolted Uighur violence cause great controversies over Wang's governance in Xinjiang during the past two decades.[54] Unofficial sources claim that Wang might have abused his power to have chartered some governmental land to his family members instead of employing open bidding among potential buyers. Revolts or political instabilities seem to be unacceptable to the CCP center. On the other hand, ever known as a very capable Minister of Transportation, Zhang

[53] *Dangshi xinxi bao* (Journal of CCP Historical Information). Retrieved on September 3, 2011 from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/64915/4695973.html.
[54] A rather detailed list of references on the event, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_%C3%9Cr%C3%BCmqi_riots, assessed December 5, 2011.

Chunxian became a provincial leader in 2005. Not only is Mr. Zhang 9 years younger than Mr. Wang, but he is also known to the press as a "vivid" and "open" regional leader. This reshuffle showed the center's hesitation over Wang's regional leadership even if his performance had been approved for the past 19 years as the leader of Xinjiang. The center was seemingly eager to have a new face such as Zhang, who is not only press-friendly but also capable of easing multinational tension among the minorities.[55] The political career movements of Wang Lequan and Zhang Chunxian show that the CCP center has a strong interest in sustained unitary governance all over China; it will not tolerate its tenured regional leader decentralizing its authority. Noticeably, Wang was moved to the center with a senior post on the Central Committee but with less practical power compared to a senior provincial chief. According to the rankings, it was a slight promotion (since regional leaders all want to be in the center someday), but the deputy post itself means no further promotion would be likely and Mr. Wang is obviously too old to stay on the next CCP Politburo.

Generally speaking, governors and provincial party chiefs are interchangeable to each other. A governor or a deputy in the East can be transferred to the Central or West to be a party chief. It would be a promotion as the party chief controls more power in a province. And if a deputy party chief is transferred from the Central or the West to the East to be a governor, it is also a promotion, as this official is no longer one of the deputies, and the East is considered to be more important both politically and economically. For sub-provincial city mayors or party chiefs, governorships everywhere would be a promotion. Although western provinces can be poorer than a coastal city, becoming a governor means a provincial party chief is the next step upward;

[55] Brief biographies of Wang Lequn from Xinhua News, retrieved on September 3, 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/05/content_301890.htm. Biography of Zhang Chunxian from Xinhua News, retrieved on September 3, 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-03/17/content_782320.htm.

eventually, if one makes no big mistake, entering the center is also possible after tenured terms as a provincial leader. Within each governmental setting, the secretariat, the departments of finance, business, human resources, and public safety (police) are relatively more important than other departments as they control more political resources than the departments of agriculture, social security or cultural affairs. Thus, becoming officials of the more important departments means promotion opportunities, though they are actually more difficult to get in as well. For officials being transferred, for instance, from a post in a department of business to one in a department of environment can be viewed as a hold-back.[56]

By all means, the CCP is a political party with strong discipline and considerable organizational strength. In fact, all communist parties were established based on the Leninist ideology and organizational institutions. Thus, ideology and organization are crucial to a communist party's rule (and survival). Inside a regional CCP committee, the department of organization and the department of propaganda are usually occupied by officials with greater ambitions and stronger connections with the regional party chief. Therefore, cadres from these departments as well as from the committee of laws and politics are taking the VIP seats in the conference room. If cadres or governmental officials are removed from these departments to the department of the United Frontier or the bureau of senior party cadres (taking physical care of

[56] Wang Lijun (born in 1959), of the centrally directed municipality Chongqing, had been the commissioner of the municipal police bureau since March 2009; in May 2011, Mr. Wang accepted the post as one of Chongqing's vice mayors while he still kept his police chief post concurrently. On February 1, 2012, rumor had it through the Internet that Mr. Wang was removed from his commissioner's post. Within hours, the information was twitted by countless China's Weibo (similar to twitter) users saying that Wang would soon be downgraded since the commissioner's job was quite a "big deal." The next day the municipal government of Chongqing had to issue an official twit on Weibo saying that the government had only decided to make Wang Lijun the vice mayor who "gets in touch with the city's economic affairs (lianxi jingji gongzuo);" Mr. Wang is still a chief leader of the municipality but no longer the commissioner. Soon most of the twits and webpages that were spreading rumors of Wang getting downgraded were deleted by the authority. Reports on the issue: http://finance.ifeng.com/news/people/20120203/5529402.shtml, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/02-02/3639968.shtml, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-02/02/c_122647956.htm, and http://dzh.mop.com/whbm/20120202/0/7lz35OI28bbd1eFz.shtml (all links assessed February 2, 2012).

retired cadres and providing them with a series of welfare), it would be a demotion as they are considered "weaker" departments. On the contrary, it would be a promotion if one gets into the propaganda or organization department from other departments. A regional party school is much more independent compared to the departments. It has its faculty and facilities not attached to the party committee directly. Only its principal is usually a deputy party chief of the region. Thus, only party school principals' mobility will be taken into consideration in this study. However, party schools are where younger officials and cadres meet each other and get trained for further promotions. Therefore, party school training background can contribute to a regional leader's political mobility in his future career.

5. Where Do the Leaders Go? Movement after Leadership

When a leader is no longer a leader, such consequences would take place to the leader's personal life and political career: retirement, change of occupation, resignation, dismissal, and death. Though caused by different situations, if any of these possibilities happens to a leader it leads to only one consequence of the leader's political mobility: no movement thereafter.

In Mao Zedong's and Deng Xiaoping's eras, the political career of a high-ranked leader could be a life-time commitment as senior leaders rarely retired and worked until they were physically incapable of doing so (shortly before death). However, from the 1990s under Jiang Zemin's central leadership, it has become formalized that all regional leaders and central leaders must retire when reached a certain age line. The age limit for provincial leaders is sixty-five (with a few exceptions) and for lower-ranked leaders, it is sixty. When retirement became institutionalized, new opportunities for promotion and political mobility go to the younger cadres.

Unlike politicians in the developed world, Chinese political leaders generally do not change their occupation as politicians. It is more or less a Mandarin tradition that being a leader is a privilege rather than a job title. Once you are, you always are. When mayors or governors retire, they still enjoy the housing and medical care benefits as they used to; thus, changing career seems to be not only unwise but also unnecessary.[57] However, one loses one's leader's privileges if the leader is dismissed or forced to resign for mistakes made. Such mistakes include serious violations of laws or party disciplines, corruption and bribery, inappropriate behavior, governance mistakes, or being sued or reported for other violations by the masses. Whatever happens, once the cadre's party membership is dismissed and stripped down from the leadership post, a leader's political mobility is also terminated.

B. Measuring Chinese Regional Leaders' Political Mobility

1. The Changing Trends of Regional Leaders in China

A political leader's importance is usually evaluated by his or her decision-making power. Instead of fashioning a ranking figure of all Chinese central and regional leaders by weighing their political powers compared to each other, we must keep in mind that such ranking can be subjective and dynamic. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, Mao himself was the highest decision maker in China. But such ranking came from Mao's decades of revolutionary leadership, reputation across the communist world, other leaders' absolute loyalty to Mao as those who

[57] It is common that prominent senior governmental employees in China receive a series of materialized benefits operated by the bureau of governmental administrative management under a regional government where detailed services are considerate and thoughtful including food supplies all from organic gardens. A few governmental employees interviewed by the author in July 2010 admit that even junior employees have some sort of privileges such as lower mortgage interests and better (and more) housing choices though the benefits are limited compared to that of the leaders. Furthermore, a civil servant, who demands to be unnamed, works for a district government interviewed by the author in July 2010 told the author that the bureau provided daily breakfast-to-dinner buffets at a minimum charge, daily shuttle services, free uniforms and shoes, free seasonal farm produces during holidays even personal hygiene products for employees. "I have nowhere to spend my salary!" she said though her salary was only about $200 a month.

doubted Mao's leadership were gradually purged, and, indeed, his charisma. Therefore, the order of appearances of other leaders on the public media was of vital importance because whoever showed up next to Mao or stood closer to Mao in the Great Hall of People during state ceremonies was tabbed as a rising political leader and was deemed to have more importance in the center's decision-making process.

Deng Xiaoping was also a senior leader of the Chinese Revolution, but not as dominant as Mao. Since the late 1970s, the importance of central and regional leaders and their career paths were greatly influenced by Deng's personal decisions; but were not manipulated single-handedly by Deng himself, however. [58] Sometimes a certain personnel arrangement was issued as a balance of power among senior Politburo members, rather than a decision-making outcome toward a policy solution. For example, in order to recruit younger talents as CCP leaders and take over the party to continue the reform, Deng created the Central Advisory Committee to contain most senior leaders and save provincial leaders' seats for the new comers. The Committee was formed in 1982 during the CCP's 12th National Congress, and it was composed of 172 members and chaired by Deng himself. But the formalization of the semi-retirement of senior leaders began in 1975, and after numerous meetings and personal pushes between Deng and his senior colleagues, the Committee was finally established.[59] The Central Advisory Committee was abolished after two terms in 1992 as most senior leaders had passed away and the third generation of CCP central leadership had been formed. Therefore, even though Deng was the leader of China with decisive power over most issues, the authority of his leadership and

[58] Vogel. Ibid (2011), pp.381-82. Vogel points out that "[t]hey (General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang) had considerable freedom to run their offices as they saw fit. Deng learned their views through the written documents they forwarded to him."

[59] Li Zhanbin. "Zhongguwei Shi Nian Dashi Ji (Ten Years of the Central Advisory Committee)," in *Dangshi bolan (The Broadview of the History of Chinese Communist Party)* (2003), retrieved on September 5, 2011 from http://news.ifeng.com/history/1/200701/0116_335_64067.shtml.

his influence sometimes lacked the proper strength to push his regime to proceed the way he had planned. Indeed, the CCP leadership system is a highly Leninist yet hierarchical one, which means that centralized decision plus loyalty and discipline together characterize the nationwide system.

In contemporary China, especially after Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997, it has been shown that no single central leader is able to control all regional leaders' political mobility and their career movements. Both the third generation, headed by Jiang Zemin, and the fourth generation, headed by Hu Jintao, of the CCP center lacked charismatic personalities and wartime revolutionary backgrounds. Decision-makings inside the Politburo's compound may have been relying on leaders' actual powers rather than their honorary titles and impressive résumés, compared to their predecessors. In terms of regional leaders' mobility, simply by counting the leaders' order of appearances will not be enough for us to rank their importance in Chinese politics. Furthermore, with the same age range, similar educational background and trainings, and more likeness of their career experiences, these factors are now less significant for us in analyzing the differences of their positions ranked in the system. In other words, facing the growing talent pool but with similar types of talents, to make closer observation of how the center selects its regional leaders concerns a great deal of the accountability of this study. Nationwide, there were about 25,000 provincial-level cadres in China in mid-1980s; but the number grew rapidly to about 35,000 as of late 1990s.[60] And the CCP's Central Committee membership has indeed increased from time to time (Figure 2.3). An expanded bureaucracy can

[60] John P. Burns. "The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System as a Leadership Selection Mechanism," in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Yongnian Zheng eds., *The Chinese Communist Party in Reform* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2006), p.35.

be filled with more party cadres, but the task of disciplining all of the highly ranked officials can also be more difficult than before.



Figure 2.3: Increased Membership of the CCP Central Committee of National Congress by Year
Source: Author's Database

2. Toward Some Rules of Thumb with Measurements of Political Mobility

There are some rules of thumb that we should keep in mind when talk about political mobility of Chinese regional leaders.

(1) The Party system generally has more political resources than the regional governmental system, and it is more dynamic in terms of mobilizing its officials. Furthermore, having party membership can contribute significantly to one's career mobility compared to governmental employees without CCP party membership. Age, gender, nationality, educational level, professional background and so on contribute to the political mobility opportunities of a

regional leader's political career. However, being a Communist party member is still the most important credential a leader shall have.

(2) Leaders or cadres in executive positions can get more promotions than those who work at non-executive positions. It is difficult to define how executive a post must be to let its leader move upward within a certain period of time. However, we may assume that such mobility scores can be drawn from comparisons to those non-executive posts. Needless to say, in any bureaucratic organization, its fiscal and personnel decisions can easily become its top priority over other areas of authority. The governmental system deals with more administrative affairs, yet some Party departments still have more executive powers over personnel arrangements. Therefore, inside a regional government or party committee, leaders in charge of financial and personnel arrangements are considered more prominent than other leaders or deputies with the same ranking.

(3) Cadres with professional backgrounds (i.e., managers, engineers and businessmen from China's gigantic state-owned firms) can become Chinese regional leaders, and such career moves are considered promotions or upward political mobility. Executives of big state-owned corporations are sometimes promoted into the governmental system to become officials or regional leaders. But generally speaking, state-owned corporation's executives are rarely promoted into the Party system to become Party officials, neither regionally nor nationally. The initial career movement after one's executive post of a state-owned firm would very likely be a post in the government (or a central ministry) rather than a secretary or deputy secretary of the CCP committee. However, if a regional leader, either governmental or party secretaries, is moved to become an executive of a state-owned firm, it is hardly a promotion as it is a step away from the political system to the business world. That is, unless the leader is also appointed as a

chair or executive member of a state-owned firm. But his or her primary profession is that of a politician, not a businessman or businesswoman. Such cases will be coded differently and separately, but they are not common among regional leaders.

(4) For most regional leaders, one must become a member of the CCP's Central Committee (CC) in order to become a Politburo member as the next step. The Politburo is the head of the CC, and only very rarely has a regional leader become a Politburo member when first elected a CC member. Usually it takes another five years or longer; one has to wait until the next CCP National Congress to move from a CC member to be on the Politburo. As a result, becoming a CC member is a promotion but losing one's CC membership is a demotion. Also, once a CC member reaches his or her age of retiring, his or her CC membership will be terminated and a new member will be chosen by the CC. In other words, when one's political career stops, it also stops one's social responsibility, political entitlements and publicity.

(5) In contemporary China, military leaders have been promoted regularly and expectedly into the CCP's Central Committee, but they are rarely promoted to governmental positions or regional leader posts. The mobility model for Chinese military leaders is more of a straight up forward movement: they keep going straight up in the military hierarchy and among Party rankings until they retire someday or get removed for "disciplinary reasons."

(6) Leadership posts of the regional National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) have less upward political mobility compared to posts of regional party committee and government. Thus, being transferred or appointed as regional NPC or CPPCC leaders without senior membership on the regional CCP committee is not considered as a promotion. In recent years, it is also common that regional party

chiefs occupy the posts as presidents of regional NPC, but it does not indicate that any NPC president is simultaneously the party chief. Instead, it is of vital importance to become the party chief first; then having other job titles or not would not actually affect the party chief's political mobility in the future. Against the odds, to control more personnel and fiscal resources are two very important indicators of a leaders' promotional opportunities. NPC and CPPCC branches throughout China are run by the state and are considered inseparable political institutions of the party-state. Leaders of NPC and CPPCC are also considered regional leaders. However, as neither post controls executive powers in making policies and important decisions, without party leadership, NPC or CPPCC positions alone are not as important as the regional CCP committee or the government. Therefore, its leaders' political mobility scores would be relatively lower.

Above all, compared to that in the developed democracies where general elections serve to filter politicians and legislators once every few years, the posts held by Chinese regional leaders are usually stable such that most junior leaders get tenure and promotion once in a while. Again, Chinese politicians do not consider their political careers only as professions or job titles; they actually treat their careers as lifetime commitments to change their social status and personal life qualities. Thus, Chinese regional leaders' promotions do not only mean more power and more significant positions in the political system, the mobility can also determine the leaders' political future and other personal choices. As is shown in Table 2.2, since the CCP's 12th National Congress in 1982, the number of regional leaders with full Central Committee memberships seems to be formalized and fixed at about 60 (which means almost every provincial unit can have its party chief and governor sit on the CC as there are 31 provincial units, excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). The rationalization of regional leader selections also provides more accountability to the CCP's regional rule. Also, during the years with the most

frequent political movements, the percentage of regional leaders on the CC also changed dramatically (shown in Table 2.2 from 1956 to 1977).

Table 2.2: Regional Leaders' CC Membership of CCP National Congresses and Eastern Regional Leaders' Percentage

Year	CCP Congress	Central Committee Member	Alternate Members	Total	Regional Leaders w/ Full CC	Eastern Regional Leaders w/ Full CC	Percentage
1956	8th	97	73	170	33	12	36.4
1969	9th	170	109	279	91	37	40.7
1973	10th	195	124	319	104	29	27.9
1977	11th	201	132	333	98	29	29.6
1982	12th	210	138	348	69	27	39.1
1987	13th	175	110	285	66	20	30.3
1992	14th	188	129	317	62	20	32.3
1997	15th	193	151	344	61	19	31.1
2002	16th	198	158	356	63	21	33.3
2007	17th	204	167	371	64	23	35.9

Source: Author's Database.

C. Conclusion: Regional Leaders under the Mobility Whip

The power structure of the CCP is extremely hierarchical and centralized. Similar inputs can generate different outcomes through the political system. Examining only the outcomes would not be enough to determine the mechanism of the CCP politics. Interactions among actors in the system are difficult to gauge. Therefore, we must study the political outcomes through comparative analysis by comparing different actors and their political career trajectories from party cadres to regional leaders in China. Moreover, the nature of the single-dimensional political system determines the political mobility that is most important to a regional leader's career.

In this chapter, the study defines the political mobility of regional leaders to be their respective promotion, demotion, and movements throughout their careers. Based on the observations, a regional leader's political mobility can be upward or downward with transfers among different regions in China. In other words, vertical mobility determines the leader's promotion or demotion while the location of the leader's governance and practice of the leadership can also be decisive to the leader's future career moves. Among governmental posts and party positions, the study also points out that some posts are actually more important than others not because they are given more attention but because they control more resources and affect decision-makings more profoundly. As a result, cadres who occupy these more executive posts can get promoted more and sooner than those who work on non-executive posts. No Chinese leaders or laws ever point out which department of a government is more important than other or which is the least important. But it does make a difference when it comes to promoting leaders to evaluate their previous experiences as governmental employees or CCP cadres.

On the other hand, regional differences in China have served as the center's preference when deciding to move its leaders from one region to another. During the CCP's 60 years of rule, the developmental gap across the nation's different regions has become undeniably obvious. Regional gap in China can be explained by different levels of social resilience and different historical heritages that led these regions onto different paths toward modernization. However, it can also be a political issue with possible political solutions in terms of the center's governance and policy preferences. Some regions in China, especially coastal provinces and cities, not only draw better policies and more investments, but their political importance also sends their regional leaders up to the top tier of the Chinese hierarchy. Other less developed regions in China, comparatively speaking, have faced more developmental problems, and their regional leaders

may have drawn less attention from the center compared to the developed regions. Therefore, when measuring the political mobility of regional leaders in China, we must also take regional differences into our evaluation in order to make any relevant research more accountable and comprehensive.

Finally, the chapter has also pointed out some rules of thumb as potential standards to measure regional leader's political mobility. In order to find the pattern of leaders' mobility, an analysis of more than one dimension is surely needed. Recent trends in the careers of Chinese regional leaders' show that leadership selection has become more rationalized and formalized compare to decades ago under Mao Zedong's personal rule. The transformation of the CCP as a revolutionary organization to the dominant political party may contribute to the explanation. Also, the transformation from the central planning system to the market economy after 1978 may be useful for rethinking the gradual changes of Chinese government. Whatever approach or perspective is taken for studying the issue, we must remember that the hierarchical party-politics structure of the CCP determines the recruitment, selection and movement of its regional leaders. These phenomena still depend on the party's decisions instead of open discussions and democratic elections among all the people in China.

CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE MAKE OF CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS

The personal background of a person can provide vital information for others to know this person. With respect to political figures, it is even truer for the people to try to know their leaders by deconstructing their personal history before he or she had yet become one of the political elites. In contemporary Chinese politics, personal information of prominent politicians and governmental officials is indeed scarce and well-edited before it is released to the public. After reviewing the officially published profiles and brief biographies of hundreds of Chinese regional leaders', the author notices that Chinese officials' curriculum vitae use the same format (which is plain and bureaucratic in tone) with well-trimmed personal information, highly concise professional background and occupational experiences. Yet, tremendously interesting information has been found during the author's research by placing the plain texts back into their historical contexts and comparing different generations of Chinese regional leaders to each other. Ambiguities do exist in the profiles of Chinese regional leaders. While the study here has no intention to deny the ambiguities, the interpretations made by the study help readers clarify their potential suspicions about the make-up of Chinese regional leaders.

Classical elite studies often emphasize the importance of the personal background of political elites. Scholars point out that a person's early years of life, family influences, educational levels and social connections do matter a great deal in helping the elite choose politics as a career choice. Their characteristics accordingly affect the elite's political attitudes, partisanship, ideological beliefs, and future career moves.[61] Consistent with this approach to elite

[61] Geraint Parry. *Political Elites* (New York, N.Y. and Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1969), pp.97-99.

study, the study here also begins with its basic assumption that the background of a Chinese regional leader matters to the leader's political mobility in the future. Moreover, the study provides detailed research on both provincial and municipal leaders' background information and provides a cross-regional comparison among leaders to find out how age, gender, nationality, nativity, education, party affiliation and membership altogether have become important indicators for others to explain the regional leader's political mobility and related career movements.

Again, this study makes it clear that the hierarchical structure of Chinese politics determines that the center as well as China watchers pay special attention to Chinese regional leaders' background information in order to select potential talents to serve in the bureaucracy in the future. Therefore, in this chapter the study first examines crucial background information as indicators of Chinese regional leaders by giving out relevant analyses on regional leaders' profiles. Second, a comprehensive conclusion based on the findings of the chapter is presented in order to establish our further research on regional leaders' political mobility by taking the leaders' personal contexts into our consideration. In this chapter, based on Chinese regional leaders' profiles and background information collected by this study, we expect to find these characteristics and features among Chinese regional leaders:

(1) Provincial leaders are generally older in age than city and municipal leaders in China, due to their experiences and curriculums. Contemporary regional leaders are older than provincial leaders in the Mao Zedong era. But leaders were the oldest of all at the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era (late 1970s and early 1980s).
(2) Women and ethnic minority (non-Han nationals) regional leaders are much fewer than male and ethnic majority regional leaders. But we expect to see some increases of numbers

in post-Deng Xiaoping era such that there would be currently more women and minority regional leaders than before.

(3) The CCP has maintained a policy that regional leaders must serve during their careers outside their hometown provinces or regions in order to minimize growing personal ties with localities. City leaders are less important than provincial leaders, thus, we expect to see more even distribution between native officials and non-native officials, which means local-born leaders get even opportunities if they compete for deputy or vice posts at the municipal level. Also, more chief posts (governors, CCP chiefs, and mayors) go to leaders who are non-native to the regions.

(4) As younger generations of regional leaders were not interrupted during their school years by political movements and China's national college examination was restored in 1977 by Deng Xiaoping, leaders and cadres have had more opportunities to finish their education. Hence, we expect that in post-Deng era, more regional leaders will have received higher education compared to regional leaders in Mao's and Deng's era.

(5) In post-Deng era, more regional leaders will have attended to the CCP party schools. And more regional leaders will have been associated with the Communist Youth League of China. Both hypotheses are to be compared to the situations in Mao's and Deng's era.

And all of our expectations are based on the theories and empirical findings below:

A. Biological and Personal Background of Regional Leaders in China

1. Age

Chinese politics has its unique merit system such that the CCP rewards its cadres once in a while with political promotions and related social benefits according to each and every cadre's loyalty and commitment to the party. This merit system was not created by the CCP but has been commonly found among East Asian nations where the seniority of an official is sometimes considered the equivalent of the authority of the individual inside a political system where it is usually hierarchical and carefully arranged. In other words, the relationship between one's age and one's position can be understood as: the longer a cadre has served for the CCP, usually the higher the post this cadre may have occupied, with similarly distributed amounts of other social resources.

The first generation of CCP leadership acquired dominant political power through the Great Chinese Revolution, and the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. The previous regime was completely changed by adapting the Marxist-Leninist party-state regime

and most initial leaders were also revolutionaries and veterans. There was no official rule that a leader must retire at a certain age or pass one's power to the successor by making the leader's post vacant. And there was no official restriction that set an age beyond which an official would not receive any further promotion. Instead, whether a leader was going to retire or keep working as an official was determined by the center on an ad hoc basis, based on some rules of thumb plus common senses. As a result, both central leaders and regional leaders received their tenures as leaders of China in 1950s and 1960s.

In 1956, the 8th National Congress of the CCP was held in Beijing and a few newer members were added to the Politburo, the decision-making center of the CCP. As is shown in Figure 3.1, among 17 Politburo members, the average age was about 55 and the majority of them (N=11) were in their fifties and sixties meaning they were the early revolutionaries who joined the party in their twenties and thirties and had been through numerous events in the CCP history and became well-trained and well-experienced leaders. Although there was no retirement age requirement, since most leaders became CCP members at a fairly young age, many of them were still young despite their status as national leaders. Only a few (N=4) were getting into their seventies; compared to another 2 leaders were in their forties. The gap between the youngest and the oldest was about 30 years.



Figure 3.1: Member Age Distribution of the 8th CCP Politburo in 1956
Source: Author's Database (X=Age, Y=Number of Members).



Figure 3.2: Member Age Distribution of 17th CCP Politburo in 2007
Source: Author's Database (X=Age, Y=Number of Members)

However, about 50 years later, the demographics of the Chinese central leadership have changed significantly. At the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007, the newest generation of top Chinese leaders is generally older than the Politburo members of 1956. Among 25 members, the average age is 61.7, which is about 6 to 7 years older than the 8th Politburo. But the distribution of ages of Politburo members is actually much less diverged compared to that of the 8th Politburo. The majority of them (20 of 25) were in their sixties, and only 2 member were younger than 55 but still in their fifties by the end of 2007. The gap between the youngest and the oldest was only 15 years. These changes through the decades in the CCP central leadership show us that the CCP has become more mature in terms of its leaders' age ranges and the biological and chronological differences among central leader may have been reduced as they were born about the same period of time and experienced similar types of socioeconomic changes. Keeping in mind that 23 of the 25 Politburo members in 2007 served as regional leaders in China or worked in regional government, they have spent a number of years working in different parts of China before they got promoted to the center.

There are no constitutional regulations on age limits for Chinese national leader that mandate that when a leader reaches a certain age, he or she must retire by leaving the post open to the successor. However, according to a series of governmental documents and published articles,[62] most Chinese ministers, governors, CCP chiefs and their equivalent retire at the age of 65, for they should not receive any further promotion beyond that age. Deputies minister, vice governors, deputy provincial CCP chiefs and equivalents should not receive promotions once

[62] See *Guojia gongwuyuan shixing tiaoli* (Interim Regulations for State Civil Servants), Order of the State Council, No.125 (August 14, 1993). *Gongwuyuan shengzhi jiangzhi renmian tiaoli shixing* (Civil Servants Interim Regulations for Promotions, Demotions, Appointments and Discharges), The Department of Organization, The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, No.7 (2008). And also, *Gongwuyuan diao ren guiding (Regulations for Transferring and Appointments of Civil Servants)*, The Department of Organization and The Ministry of Human Resource, No.6 (2008).

they reached sixty years old. Departmental or divisional chiefs, mayors, city and municipal CCP chiefs should retire at the age of sixty year old and receive no promotion when that age is reached. Deputy departmental chiefs, vice mayors, deputy city municipal CCP chiefs and equivalents should also retire at the age of sixty and receive no further promotions once the age is reached. However, for any of the leaders mentioned above, when the retiring age is reached before one's current term is finished, one may finish one's current leadership term but receive no further promotion or continuous tenure thereafter. There have been, of course, exceptions. After the Cultural Revolution, most purged provincial and central leaders made their political encores by winning back the posts they held prior to the Cultural Revolution. They usually served until Deng Xiaoping's call for senior leaders' collective retirement at the 12th National Congress of the CCP in 1982. Even Deng himself was considered to remain in charge of the "overall situation" to decide on vital matter until 1989, and by then he was already eighty-five years old.

These regulations were eventually institutionalized by the end of Jiang Zemin's leadership as the General Secretary of the CCP in the early 2000s. Retirements of senior central and regional leaders in China had become formalized and widely accepted by leaders and the people. No member of the Central Committee (CC) or its Politburo elected at the 16th National Congress in 2002 of the CCP was older than 70 years old. Though Jiang himself remained the President of China, and kept his chairmanship of the Central Military Committee at the age of 76, he was no longer a CC member. As is shown in Figure 3.3, among 62 current regional leaders of China who are also CC members, their age range sits from 47 to 68 years old with the average of 59.4 years old (by the end of 2010). Upon their entry into the CC in 2007, the youngest among them was 44 years old (Hu Chunhua, then the First Secretary of the Youth League Central Committee who became the governor of Hebei Province in April, 2008, then the youngest

governor in China), while the eldest was 65 years old (Liu Qi, CCP chief of Beijing). Mr. Liu was actually serving his second term as a Politburo member meaning it would be unlikely for Mr. Liu to receive further promotions. Becoming a Politburo member in 2002, Secretary Liu started off early but made no subsequent career. Despite the fact that 44 can be too young for a governor and 65 might be overage for a city chief, the majority of Chinese regional leaders with CC membership are in their late fifties (35 of 62 leaders are between the age of 55-60).



Figure 3.3 Age Distribution of Current Regional Leaders on the CC
Source: Author's Database

Table 3.1 Chinese Regional Leaders' Age Analysis (Years)

Post	**Count**	**Max**	**Min**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**
Provincial	243	71	33	54.2	7.0
City	233	73	32	49.5	7.0
Total	476	73	32	51.9	

Source: Author's Database.

Table 3.2 Provincial Leaders' Age Analysis (Years)

1950s		***1960s***		***1970s***		***1980s***		***1990s***		***2000s***	
Mean	47.6	Mean	51.6	Mean	59.7	Mean	55.7	Mean	55.4	Mean	55.3
Std. Dev.	6.2	Std. Dev.	8.1	Std. Dev.	6.2	Std. Dev.	6.3	Std. Dev.	4.8	Std. Dev.	3.5
Min	37	Min	33	Min	40	Min	41	Min	38	Min	46
Max	67	Max	64	Max	71	Max	67	Max	64	Max	61
Count	53	Count	37	Count	47	Count	53	Count	50	Count	53

Source: Author's Database.

Table 3.3 City Leaders' Age Analysis (Years)

1950s		***1960s***		***1970s***		***1980s***		***1990s***		***2000s***	
Mean	42.4	Mean	49.4	Mean	52.8	Mean	55.5	Mean	50.6	Mean	50.1
Std. Dev.	5.3	Std. Dev.	2.8	Std. Dev.	7.9	Std. Dev.	7.3	Std. Dev.	4.5	Std. Dev.	5.1
Min	33	Min	44	Min	42	Min	42	Min	37	Min	32
Max	62	Max	56	Max	71	Max	73	Max	59	Max	58
Count	49	Count	24	Count	24	Count	31	Count	43	Count	62

Source: Author's Database.

While the relationship of leaders' ages and their further appointments tends to be formalized by recent CCP national congresses, Chinese regional leaders' ages are closed tied to their political mobility through the years. By examining 473 regional leaders in China since 1949, this study finds that as it is a hierarchical power structure of Chinese politics, it seems that older officials have also occupied more senior posts in regional the political system. As is shown in Table 3.1, in general, Chinese governors and provincial party chiefs have been older than mayors and city party chiefs. Considering a term for a provincial leader is 5 years and he can serve two terms continuously, but a term for county or sub-city districts leaders is only 3 years; it is reasonable that the age gap between provincial leaders are in general older than city leaders for about 5 years (average for provincial leaders: 54.2 and average for city leaders: 49.5) from 1950s to 2000s (Table 3.1).

Contemporary Chinese provincial leaders and city leaders (since 1990s) were relatively older than regional leaders in the 1950s, or the first half of Mao Zedong's era (results shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3). However, they have been relatively younger than regional leaders in the late 1970s and 1980s, which were the years shortly after the Cultural Revolution and at the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's economic reform. That is because during the Cultural Revolution, most of the tenured regional leaders were removed, dismissed, or purged from their leadership posts in a short time (1966-1968) and their posts were taken by the radical young workers from state-owned factories; these young radicals were known as *zaofanpai* (revolutionary rebels) and were extreme believers in Maoism among high school and college students known as the Red Guards. When the Cultural Revolution was finally over in 1977, many previous regional leaders recovered from the purges and regained their personal reputation and political authority (known as *pingfan*). Many of them were out of work for nearly ten years, which accounts for the

significant increase of average ages among regional leaders: provincial leaders gained about 8 years compared to that of the 1960s (Table 3.1, 59.7 of 1970s and 51.6 of 1960s). The maximum of age among the samplers in late 1970s was 71, while the maximum of the 1960s was only 64. The situation was very similar compared to that of the city leaders. The maximum age among city leaders in 1980s was 73 compared to 56 in the 1960s and the average age increased from 49.4 in the 1960s to 55.5 in the 1980s (see Table 3.3).

After the 12th CCP Congress in 1982, and especially after the 13th CCP Congress in 1987, the pattern of replacing older leaders with younger generations of cadres in regional governments was obvious. When the CCP Advisory Committees were established both in the center and among the provinces of China, senior leaders who had reached the retirement ages were retained in the Advisory Committee but no longer took up posts in the governments. This was known as CCP leaders' "semi-retirement." The Advisory Committee system was finally abolished in 1992 at the 14th CCP Congress and the full retirement of all the leaders who had reached their age limits was called by the CCP center. In other words, to refresh the party politics by removing senior regional leaders to retirement and introducing a considerable number of younger leaders to the system, the center finally had formalized its principles for age limits as lawful regulations. As is shown in Table 3.4, by examining specific provinces and cities, we can also find that the biological ages of regional leaders have become younger and younger, and that there were some significant drops of age among regional leaders shortly after the 12th Congress and the 13th Congress. Provincial leaders of Guangdong retired or retreated to the Advisory Committee after the 13th Congress and the entry of younger leaders lowered the mean age of leaders. Some provincial leaders of Guizhou stayed until 1982, which caused an increase of mean age among leaders, but once they retired after the 13th Congress, the mean also decreased

from 63.5 to 53 years old. On the municipal side, Xiamen of Fujian Province was not approved to become a sub-provincial unit until 1994, which means that before 1994 the leaders of Xiamen had lower political rankings than the capital city of the Province, Fuzhou. Thus, the mean ages of Xiamen leaders from 1977 to 1992 were relatively younger as low-ranked officials tended to be younger than governors or other provincial leaders. Still, the data show that older leaders were replaced with younger ones after the 13th Congress in 1987 when the retirement age of Chinese leaders was institutionalized.

Table 3.4 Provincial and City Leaders Age Changes (1977-1992)

Province	**1977-79 Count**	**Mean**	**1980-82 Count**	**Mean**	**1983-87 Count**	**Mean**	**1988-92 Count**	**Mean**
Shanxi	5	65	2	58.5	3	56.6	2	56
Guangdong	3	67	3	63	3	57.3	2	55
Guizhou	4	59.5	2	63.5	4	53	3	55.1
City	**1977-79 Count**	**Mean**	**1980-82 Count**	**Mean**	**1983-87 Count**	**Mean**	**1988-92 Count**	**Mean**
Guangzhou	1	71	2	58.5	2	55	4	57.5
Harbin	1	64	3	58	1	58	2	52.5
Xiamen	1	57	2	56	1	50	2	47.5

Source: Author's Database.

When regional leaders reached their retirement ages, not only do they need to save some opportunities for the young, but also they would acquire no upward political mobility in the future. Noticeably, especially since the 1990s, a number of regional leaders transferred from executive posts (party systemic or governmental) to non-executive posts (regional NPC or CPPCC[63]) when they approach to retirement age. Politically they are still considered important regional leaders as their political ranking in the civil service system have not been changed or dragged down. But being moved or transferred to the non-executive posts means that getting further promotions would be unlikely. This transfer can be seen as a certain type of preparation

[63] National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

for some regional leaders' retirement for old age. Meanwhile, in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, where regular retirements of leaders are lawfully clarified without personal exceptions, we need also notice that provincial leaders share a smaller age gap compare that of the city leaders in China. Shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the age standard deviation of provincial leaders in 1990s is 4.8 compare to that of 3.8 in 2000s. And current city leaders have the largest range of ages (from 32 to 58). Without major political and social interruptions such as the Cultural Revolution, and with diverged age distributions among Chinese city leaders in the 21st century, it could be an interesting phenomenon that city leaders may have more diverse personal backgrounds as lower ranked regional leaders while provincial leaders may be more homogenous, in terms of personal experiences and professional trainings. Is it because to become a provincial leader one usually has to wait longer that the years of waiting in line makes many others quit longing for upward mobility in the hierarchy? Because different Chinese cities in different regions are quite unevenly developed it makes the requirements for selecting city leaders much more specific and dynamic, and more locally oriented compared to that of provincial leaders. Whatever the cause, the issue will be studied in the later parts of the chapter by combining other characteristics of Chinese city leaders.

2. Gender and Nationality

Two of the long time oppressed social groups throughout Chinese political history have been women and ethnic minorities in China. Although the Communist Party was known to have liberated the poor and the disenfranchised social groups in China by establishing the "People's Democratic Dictatorship," known after 1949 as the People's Republic of China, overwhelmed by the thousands of years of male-dominance in social life and outnumbered by the Han majority in most parts of China, Chinese women and minorities are still considered weak voices in

contemporary Chinese politics. The CCP has been investing its political resources to ease the tension between the majority and the minorities in political life by recruiting more ethnic minorities with CCP membership into the political system and by saving legislature seats and governmental posts for the minorities, especially in the "autonomous regions," where traditionally and historically the habitats for the Chinese minorities. As early as in Mao Zedong's era, Mao had stressed the importance of handling the relationship between the majority and the minorities in general. Ethnic chauvinism, which comes from the overpowered ethnic majority, is seriously dangerous for any Communist party to maintain its political dominance and social stability. As Mao said: "We concentrate on fighting against Han nation's Chauvinism as well as regional nationalism, but that [regional nationalism] is generally not the key point…. In Soviet Union, the relationship between the Russian nation and the minorities is very abnormal, we should learn from their lesson." [64] However, the first generation of the CCP central leaders' great blueprint for harmony among all nationalities in China was never carried out in later years due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. Again, violent mass movements and radical communist ideologies did not considered ethnic minorities in China as social groups with special needs (socioeconomic underdevelopment and strong religious influences in people's life). Thus, local political elites and minority nationality regional leaders must sacrifice their beliefs and interests in exchange for survival.[65]

Deng Xiaoping was indeed a pragmatic political leader who constantly emphasized the importance of order and stability in Chinese society as the foundation of his reformist strategies. Since the 1980s, proportional representation of the ethnic minorities among Chinese regional

[64] Mao Zedong. *Ten Great Relationships(Lun Shi Da Guanxi)* (April 25, 1956). Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/30/content_2393996.htm.
[65] Robert Barnett. "Tibet," in William A. Joseph eds., *Politics in China* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.325.

governments was institutionalized as a crucial policy of the CCP's regional policy. In autonomous ethnic minority regions, the governmental head is regularly a member of the local ethnic group who is also a CCP member. A number of posts in the government, local NPC and CPPCC are also saved for the minorities where the numbers of the Han regional officials would not look overwhelming compared to that of the minorities. However, as the local CCP committee is the most executive political sub-system, the local CCP chief post is actually regularly controlled by a Han national regardless of the local population proportion. Among the CCP central leaders, including those in the Politburo, the CC, the NPC and CPPCC presidents and vice presidents, there are also proportional seats saved for leaders with minority nationality background.

Table 3.5 Nationalities among Chinese Regional Leaders

Post	Han	Percentage	Non-Han Minorities	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Provincial	354	95.7	16	4.3	370	100
City and Municipal	286	95.3	14	4.7	300	100

Source: Author's Database

As is shown in Table 3.5, among the 670 regional leaders surveyed in this chapter, it happens, though purely randomly, that only 30 of 670 leaders were actually ethnic minorities. Among provincial leaders, only 16 (4.3 percent) were not Han nationals; only 14 (4.7 percent) city and municipal leaders were not Han nationals. And among the 30 minority regional leaders, all of them were CCP members and most of them worked in their native provinces (Guangxi and Xinjiang) where their ethnic background could be beneficial for their political career mobility. Here, the author would like to point out that it might be statistically convincing that the study surveys all ethnic minority regions to track down all the leaders with non-Han nationality

background. However, the purpose of this study was not designated for an analysis of the Chinese ethnicity and political demographics. The 30 minority leaders look minor compared the entire 670 regional leadership cohort, but it has shown to the readers that the practice of allowing proportional representation of the minorities mainly work at special regions where the Han nationals are not the only majority ethnic group. Among the regions and provinces in Eastern, Southern and Central China, where the Han nationality dominates demographically, the absolute majority of the regional leaders are still made up from Han nationals. Furthermore, according to published reports, by 2008 there were 2.915 million governmental officials (at least holding a post as a deputy divisional head) across China who were ethnic minorities, which were about 7.4 percent of the entire governmental official population.[66] Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province located in Southwestern China, is a city with 890,000 minority nationals or 13.8 percent of its entire urban population. By 2011, 17.7 percent of governmental officials in Kunming were ethnic minorities; the percentage was higher than the minority population percentage of all urban dwellers of the municipality.[67] In the entire Tibet autonomous region, where there were 208,000 CCP members in 2011, 77,000 of them were both Tibetans and governmental officials. These 77,000 Tibetan governmental officials compose 70 percent of the entire governmental official population in Tibet.[68] It is still not clear that how many minority officials in Yunnan or Tibet have occupied high-ranked executive positions in the regional governments, or how many of them are chief leaders instead of being deputies or committee members. But as this study has mentioned earlier, the proportion is what really matters to the CCP center. Ethnic minorities must

[66] Xinhua News Agency (2008, May 8). "China has 2.915 million minority nationals that are governmental officials (Wo guo gong you shaoshu minzu ganbu 291.5 wan)." Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/08/content_8129325.htm

[67] Xinhua News Agency (2011, September 8). "17.7 Percent Governmental Officials in Kunming Are Minority Nationals (Kunming: Shaoshu minzu ganbu zhan quan shi ganbu zongshu de 17.7%)." Retrieved from http://yn.xinhuanet.com/gov/2011-09/08/c_131115748.htm.

[68] *People's Daily* (2011, June 12.). "77,000 Tibetan Governmental Officials are Minority Nationals (Xizang shaoshu minzu ganbu tupo 7.7 wan)." Retrieved from http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/14878562.html.

have their proportional representation in regional political system to show the center's policy preference and political investments to help create a peaceful political atmosphere between the Han and non-Hans.

Regardless their age, nationalities, passions, talents and experiences, historically before the establishment of the PRC, Chinese women could only participate in politics through informal channels. Empress Dowager Cixi of the Machu-Qing Royal Family was the undeniable central leader of China from 1861 during the Second Opium War to 1908 upon her death. Though powerful, she acquired no official title except the Mother of the Emperor (s). No female senior official was ever recruited under the Nationalist rule of China before 1949 not to mention the male dominated polygamy system and female prostitution were both legal until the Communists took over China. Economically, socially, and politically suppressed by men, Chinese women only acquired official recognitions as an important political force under CCP rule. Still, the political participation among Chinese women has been lower compared to that of Chinese men. Up to the 17th CCP Politburo, there have only been 5 women so far who have achieved the posts as Politburo members. These 5 are (were): Jiang Qing (1969, Mao Zedong's wife), Ye Qun (1969, then CCP Deputy Chairman Lin Biao's wife), Deng Yingchao (1978, then Premier Zhou Enlai's widow), Wu Yi (2002, then Deputy Premier), and Liu Yandong (2007, now Vice President of CPPCC and Councilor of the State Council). Except Wu Yi and Liu Yandong, who achieved Politburo posts based on their leadership experiences and promoted under Hu Jintao's leadership, the other three female Politburo members were more or less overshadowed by their famous husbands.

Table 3.6 Gender Distribution among Chinese Regional Leaders

Post	Male	Percentage	Female	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Provincial	334	98.2	6	1.8	340	100
Municipal	293	97.7	7	2.3	300	100

Source: Author's Database

For the unthinkable difficulties for a politically passionate Chinese woman to become a Politburo member or a central leader, it can be equally difficult for any woman to become a provincial leader in contemporary China. As is shown in Table 3.6, among the 340 provincial leader surveyed in this study, only 6 of them (less than 2 percent) were women. And noticeably, the first woman ever to become a governor in China did not happen until 1983.[69] Before that, female politicians were even rarer in the CCP politics. Among the 300 mayors and municipal leaders surveyed, there were only 7 women, which made less than 3 percent of the leadership body. However, all the increases in women's appearances in regional politics in China occurred in post-Deng Xiaoping era. Similar to the rule for ethnic minorities to become regional leaders, proportional representation for Chinese women in the political system has also been institutionalized. According to official reports, by 2010, 87.1 percent of provincial governments across China have women officials (did not specify the ranks or posts) in the leadership groups. The same level of the year 2000 was only 64.5 percent. Among all municipal governments in China, 89.4 percent of municipal governments have female officials in leadership positions (did not specify the ranks or posts) are women in the year 2010, compared that of the year 2000 was only 65.1 percent.[70] However, even with the satisfying increase in the numbers of Chinese women as political leaders, we still do not know how many women are actually appointed as

[69] Gu Xiiulian served the Governor of Jiangsu Province from 1983 to 1989 and accepted the post as the Minister of the Ministry of Chemical Engineering in 1989.

[70] *People's Daily* (2011, August 10.). "Increase of Female Leaderships in China's Provincial and Regional Governments (Zhongguo sheng shi nvxing lingdao ganbu peibeilv zengjia)."Retrieved from http://news.163.com/11/0810/05/7B2Q46NC00014AED.html

executive regional leaders instead of working in the non-executive posts and having much less influences on the policy decision-making processes.

Overall, in post-Deng Xiaoping era, Chinese women's political participation seems to be higher than before, with the increasing number of women as regional governmental officials. However, do the disadvantages of gender (female) and nationality (non-Han) now serve as their natural advantages for political promotions by maximizing the center's preferences on proportional representation, or do they remain as genuine weaknesses such that these leaders have little chance to acquire executive posts in the political system? The following chapters of the study will reveal more correlations of these leaders' political mobility throughout their entire political careers.

3. Locality

To govern one of the biggest countries in the world, the relationship between the central government of China and its local authorities has always been more or less problematic. The Chinese bureaucracy that recruited officials through national Confucian essay examinations was said to be invented in order to prevent regional aristocracies from resisting the central government's policies. Therefore, the divisions and distributions of the regional governance structure served to separate regional leaders' power and keep the balance among local governmental branches so that the central government could always maintain its strong influences over regional affairs.[71] The design of the Chinese regional governmental systems requires highly skillful techniques to avoid any possible failures that could cause conflicts among local authorities and make the system inefficient and incapable of implementing the central

[71] Liu Jianjun. *Gudai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu shiliu jiang* (Sixteen Lectures on Ancient Chinese Political System) (Shanghai, China: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2009), pp.161-63.

government's policies. In consequence, one of the primary requirements used by Chinese leaders before 1949 was to appoint non-locally born officials to be the regional leaders in a region.

It is quite common among Western politicians who campaign for governmental positions to emphasize their strong local background in order to gain popularity and votes from the locals. Under democracies, locality can be seen as a link between politicians and their local voters. Voters tend to think better of the candidates with specific local background as it may show their better understandings of local issues and more concerns about local voters' livelihood.[72] However, in Chinese politics, overwhelmingly strong local connections between an official and one's native hometown region was considered a problem by the central government. An official's strong ties with his localities indicated the risk that this official could build up his personal leadership and trust network too easily so that other regional leaders might be outnumbered and the central government's commands could be blocked. For example, in the Qing Dynasty's rule of China for 267 years, there were only three natives of Shanxi Province who ever were appointed as regional leaders in the province, and the regulation was that regional leaders must be transferred to a different region every three years to prevent them rooting locally.[73] Appointing non-native officials to a region was considered an effective means of centralizing regional politics and fiscal revenues, and more importantly, to prevent any sort of localism that can harm the entire political system. In fact, even after the establishment of the party-state regime in China in 1949, the CCP and its central leaders still had concerns about the degree of authoritativeness of Chinese regional government. There are different scholarly

[72] Republican candidate for 2012 U.S. Presidential election, Mitt Romney was seen to have better understandings of the Midwest political cultural and local politics as he is a native of the State of Michigan. In White, Joseph B. and Neil King, Jr. "GOP Looks for a Winner in Midwest Swing States," *The Wall Street Journal* (2011, September 26), A4.

[73] Xiao Gongqin. *Zhongguo de da zhuanxing* (China's Great Transition). [Beijing, China: Xinxing (New Star) Publications, 2008], p.190.

arguments over the locality issue under the CCP's early rule of China. Some scholars argue that the CCP had ignored the inherent problem of appointing natives to be local leaders, thinking that as native are generally more familiar with local issues and situations such that they might handle them better than non-native leaders. And this optimistic argument insists that this is the trend even in contemporary Chinese politics—that natives are seen more and more among regional governments in China.[74] Some other scholars, on the other hand, argue that the expanding power and influence of the provincial secretaries had made Mao Zedong uneasy as early as the 1960s. Mao felt that his authority and power were weakened by other central leaders and Chinese provincial chiefs. Thus, Mao's initiation of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was aimed at regaining his power as the absolute leader of China. This argument can be used to explain why most provincial leaders were removed and purged during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, however, Mao's fight against localism caused disastrous social and political effects.[75] A more theoretical approach, held by some scholars, points out that the early CCP party-state regime emphasized the inner-party balance of power, ideological education, strong party disciplines and frequent mass political movements, all of which actually reduced the opportunities for native regional leaders to build their personal ties within the regional political system. The characteristics of the early CCP rule concentrated on strengthening the personal leadership of Mao instead of any other form of decentralization of power.[76]

While all the research on the locality listed above has contributed to the study of regional politics and political leaders in China, none of the arguments mentioned above had analyzed all important aspects of the issue. The fundamental difference between Mao's China

[74] Zhiyue Bo. Ibid, pp.43-50.
[75] Cheng Li and David Bachman. "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China." *World Politics*, 42(1), (1989), p.84.
[76] Xiao, Ibid, p.190.

and Deng's China was neither corruption nor inner-party competition for the top leadership; instead, it was the installation of the central-planning economy (under Mao) and the transformation to market economy (under Deng). Along with the installation of the planned economy was totalitarian political centralization, and along with the transformation to market economy was a post-totalitarian technocratic regime. Neither of the economic-political system had a precedent in Chinese history, and actually brought more complexes into the existing problems. To the center, there are good reasons and bad reasons for appointing natives to be regional leaders at their hometowns. The advantages show a leader may get started fairly quickly as one needs no time to adjust in a familiar environment, and proficient knowledge of locale's geographies and demographics is indeed helpful for a regional leader. On the other hand, Chinese society is an atmosphere connected by family units, social capital but with low social mobility. As is discussed in chapter two, such an atmosphere, either social or political, prevents many regional leaders from pursuing higher vocational excellence and encourages leaders to chase their personal gains, abuse their power for rent-seeking corruptions and stay in power as long as possible. Corruption has emerged as a very common excuse used by the center uses to remove or demote a regional leader or any other CCP leader; it is due to the organizational and institutional features of corruption among Chinese officials.[77] As a result, when a native is appointed to be a regional leader in one's hometown region, it is likely that the leader will spend tremendous time and energy building up his personal networks in order to influence crucial regional governmental decisions to achieve the leader's utmost personal interests. This would be the last thing the CCP center expects to happen if the center's commands are being blocked or deliberately delayed by regional governments.

[77] Dali Yang. *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp.218-23.

Among the 610 regional leader in China surveyed by this study, the "native born" or "hometown" is define by looking at the leader's hometown province. There are 34 provincial regions in China with most of them have municipalities and cities, and in a relatively smaller provincial region, these municipalities can be very close to each other in distances. If a leader's locality is measured by which municipality one is from, it can be rather common that a leader's hometown municipality is only miles away from where the leader works. But the dummy variables might still be coded "0" for the leader is a "non-native." If so, the accuracy of the study will be significantly affected by the carelessness of the research design. Therefore, to faithfully reflect the realistic situation to the utmost, the dummy variable is only coded "0" if either a city leader or a provincial leader works at a regional government and he or she is from another province.

One might also argue with the study's approach that makes no distinction between a leader getting transferred or appointed from a very distant province to a new post and a leader getting transferred from a neighboring province which is only hundred kilometers away. However, a province is an ideal administrative unit that can be compared to the units based on its socioeconomic and political heterogeneity. Calculating a leader's moving distance between two posts of the leader's might be slightly helpful if the readers are interested in provincial customs of China. However, as this is not a cultural or anthropological study, the author believes the moving distance factor beyond provincial level is trivial.

Table 3.7a Non-Natives' Appointments as Regional Leaders in China

Post	Time	Native	%	Non-Native	%	Total	%
Provincial	1950s	21	32.3	44	67.7	65	100
City	1950s	21	40.4	31	58.6	52	100
Provincial	1960s	15	38.5	24	61.5	39	100
City	1960s	3	33.3	6	66.7	9	100
Provincial	1970s	11	23.4	36	76.6	47	100
City	1970s	7	46.7	8	53.3	15	100
Provincial	1980s	34	51.5	32	48.5	66	100
City	1980s	20	57.1	15	42.9	35	100
Provincial	1990s	21	38.2	34	61.8	55	100
City	1990s	24	48	26	52	50	100
Provincial	2000s	27	27	73	73	100	100
City	2000s	35	45.5	42	54.5	77	100
Total	N/A	**239**	**39.2**	**371**	**60.8**	**610**	100

Source: Author's Database

Table 3.7b Native and Non-Native Regional Leaders in China

Post	Native	%	Non-Native	%	Total	%
All Provincial	129	34.9	241	65.1	370	100
Post-Deng Provincial	41	31.1	91	68.9	132	100
All Municipal	157	52.3	143	47.7	300	100
Post-Deng Municipal	95	57.9	69	42.1	164	100

Source: Author's Database

As is shown in Table 3.7a, despite of the range of time and changes of the central leadership from Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the CCP center has always kept a certain percentage of regional leaders in as non-natives, while the center has also made sure that native leaders in local governments could be utilized for sustainable governance. Therefore, there has not been a remarkably significant drop of the native leaders in the regional governments. In the 1950s, about one third (32.3 percent) of regional leaders were locally raised who worked in their hometown provinces as party secretaries, governors and their deputies; and about 67.7 percent provincial leaders were outsiders or non-natives. Such a ratio remained until the occurrence of the Cultural Revolution, when senior leaders were removed and

purged. In 1990s and 2000s, the ratio of non-native leaders in Chinese provinces regained slowly back to 61.8 percent and 73 percent, which were about the same level of that of the 1950s. In other words, significant changes in the ratio of natives to non-natives appointed as Chinese provincial leaders only happened during the Cultural Revolution and a few years afterwards (before the opening of the 12th CCP National Congress in 1982). Other than that, the center's policy and determination of mixing up natives and non-natives across provinces remained constant. The similar situation can be applied to city leaders in China through the years. In the 1950s, about 40.4 percent of city leaders were "locals" where 58.6 percent of them were non-natives. In the 2000s, 45.5 percent of city leaders in China who were appointed to the posts were natives. While there are many more city municipalities in China than the number of provinces, and a number of provinces have influences to decide municipal level personnel arrangements, it is not surprising that there have been a higher percentage of natives appointed as city leaders than the stricter limit on natives becoming provincial leaders.

Table 3.8 Regional Chief Posts Held by Non-Native Officials

Time	**Non-Native City Chiefs**	**Total Chiefs**	**%**	**Non-Native Province Chiefs**	**Total Chiefs**	**%**
1950s	32	50	64	34	51	66.7
1960s	6	9	66.7	18	34	52.9
1970s	8	14	57.1	27	37	73.0
1980s	16	35	45.7	27	52	51.9
1990s	26	46	56.5	30	46	65.2
2000s	27	68	39.7	38	54	70.4
Total	115	222	51.8	174	274	63.5

Source: Author's Database

The difference between a chief leader and other deputy or vice leaders in a regional government of China has been discussed in chapter two of this study. In most cases, CCP chief secretary is more powerful than his deputies or other departmental heads who are standing committee members. The governor in a province is supposedly the executive officer who is more powerful than all the vice governors and departmental heads. The same situation can be applied to municipal governments as well: city secretaries and mayors are politically more important than their deputies. In consequence, do more natives occupy the chief posts than the non-natives in regional governments of China? This study shows that non-native regional leaders are more likely to be named to the chief posts, where natives are more commonly seen in deputy or vice-level posts. As is shown in Table 3.8, through the 60 years of the CCP rule of China, 63.5 percent of all provincial chiefs (first secretaries and governors) were actually working outside their native provinces. And 51.8 percent of chief city leaders (secretaries and mayors) in China were serving in non-native provinces' municipal governments. The findings show that although a certain percentage has been kept for natives to serve in regional governments as leaders, the center still keeps the chief posts mainly for non-native leaders from other provinces. The center is concerned with growing ties and connections among the sub-national native leaders and their localities, and such connections can cause localism, both economic and political, which would become an obstacle for the center's policies. The potential problems of having native regional leaders can lower the center's authority at the regional levels. By all means, the fact those provincial chiefs are important political leaders in China; therefore, the center must minimize the risks when it arranges the appointments. Both the provincial chief secretary and the governor of a province have decisive power over numerous decisions.

Currently, the majority of the provincial chiefs in China are also Central Committee members of the CCP, which means that these leaders can also affect the center's decisions by altering their legal votes in the CC. By appointing provincial chiefs, the center has a lot to weigh and consider, and natives controlling the chief posts more or less would increase localism. However, among all the chief city leaders studied here, the natives slightly outnumber non-natives among posts in municipal governments. It is possible that the personnel arrangements have been a combination of central preferences and the provincial decisions where at a lower level of an administrative region, natives are not only more acceptable by local residents, but also are more experienced with local customs. This study suggests that if any scholarly study tracks down to village level personnel arrangements in China, we expect to see many more natives take village chief posts than non-natives. Non-natives get little chance in village political campaigns. It is not because of localism is common among China's rural villages, but because it is almost unthinkable for a non-native farmer to be moved across provinces to become the head of a completely strange village. Village chiefs in China do not have wages; they only have allocations which are limitedly granted by township authorities. Without the economic and social privileges enjoyed by the municipal and provincial leaders, it makes no sense for a non-native farmer to compete with natives for a village official post—he would be better off to operate a small business or to work in the cities.

4. Education

The education of a leader is commonly regarded as an important indicator of the leader's partisanship, ideological preferences and future career movement. In classical elite theories, as well as in studies of political elites in democracies, empirical evidence shows that candidates with higher educational levels are more likely to be elected to legislatures, and the career patterns

of the elites are likewise correlated with their educational background.[78] Generally speaking, the higher one's educational level is, the more one tends to participate in political life, the more universal values one tends to recognize and accept, and the more professional one tends to be in their chosen occupation one engaged in. Historically, Chinese political leaders and elites were ideally supposed to be well-educated with thorough knowledge of Confucian philosophy and the humanities to work not only as bureaucrats for the monarchs, but also as moral models able to be appointed to regional governmental posts representing the empire's high standards of moralism and for good governance.[79] However, when the Leninist-based Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949, such an education of CCP officials was not considered a requirement for recruiting. By contrasting regional leaders' educational levels overall and especially the educational indicators in the 1950s and 1960s to those of the post-Deng Xiaoping era (see Table 3.9) the study argues the followings:

In the first place, when most leaders' educational levels were low, higher educational attainment was not a crucial requirement to become a regional leader in China. Most regional leaders appointed by the CCP in 1950s and 1960s were revolutionary veterans who joined in the Chinese Revolution as early as the 1920s. The requirements for recruiting revolutionaries were definitely different from the requirements for recruiting provincial and municipal leaders in China. Therefore, as most revolutionaries came from humble socioeconomic backgrounds (many of them even described themselves to be "dirt poor" before they became revolutionaries of the Red Army), opportunities for formal school education were indeed scarce. Even among the Politburo members, who were supposed to be the leaders of leaders, it was rare. Among all 17 of 8th CCP Politburo members elected in 1956, only 5 of the 17 had ever attended to college-level

[78] Moshe M. Czudnowski. "Higher Education and Liberalism among Political Elites," in Moshe M. Czudnowski (eds.) *Political Elites and Social Change* (DeKalb, I.L.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983), pp.34-37.
[79] Xuezhi Guo. *The Ideal Chinese Political Leader* (Westport, C.T.: Praeger Publishers, 2002), pp.10-11.

institutions or equivalents, and none of them was issued a degree. Among 116 provincial leaders of the 1950s and 1960s surveyed in the study, only 39 of them (33.6 percent) had ever achieved higher education, though the term used on their curriculum vitae was "the recognition of university culture," which roughly meant to have taken college courses or been enlightened intellectually by higher education related institutions. But the lack of outstanding university degrees and impressive GPAs did not affect any of these provincial leaders' careers as regional leaders. The situation was much the same for Chinese city leaders in the 1950s and 1960s. Among 105 city leaders surveyed in the same time range, only 21 of them (20 percent) claimed to have "the recognition of university culture." Accordingly, despite their educational levels, there was almost no distinction among leaders with higher education and those without. In other words, back to the early years of CCP's rule of China, education was not a crucial factor which was decisive for the center in appointing regional leaders. The reason was fairly simple: because only a small percentage of the CCP cadres received higher education. It was, in fact, an intellectual privilege so rare among most of the cadres. Mao Zedong, the top leader himself, was not enthusiastic at all for formal education.

Table 3.9 Educational Background of Chinese Regional Leaders

Time	**Post**	**College**	**%**	**No College**	**%**	**Total**
1950s-60s	Provincial	39	33.6	77	66.4	116
Post-1997	Provincial	102	100	0	0	102
All Time	Provincial	190	55.9	150	44.1	340
1950s-60s	City	21	20.0	84	80.0	105
Post-1997	City	116	97.5	3	2.5	119
All Time	City	176	69.3	78	30.7	254
Total	***N/A***	***644***	***62.2***	***392***	***37.8***	***1036***

Source: Author's Database

In the second place, when most leaders' educational levels got higher and reached a certain degree, higher educational level was no longer a crucial indicator for one's upward political mobility. Among 102 provincial leaders in China who received their posts from 1997 to 2010, all of them (100 percent) claimed to have achieved college level higher education. And among 119 city leaders in China of the same time period, 116 of them (97.5 percent) had received higher education when they were appointed to their municipal posts. For this time, most leaders listed on their curriculum vita that what they had were formal degrees with different major fields, but no longer "the recognition." As a matter of fact, in post-Deng era, Chinese regional leaders have become much more educated compared to the early CCP leaders of China. However, when something that used to be scarce has become something common, the meaningfulness of using it in filtering elites and non-elites will also drop tremendously. Most post-Deng era Chinese regional leaders were able to complete their higher education while pursuing their political careers. Thus, if everyone who studies can get a degree sooner or later, how much the center still weighs a leader's education is unknown. Starting in 2012, the Chinese central governmental system and all province-equivalent governmental systems will no longer recruit new civil servants with bachelor's degrees who have less than two years of full-time working experiences.[80] The policy announced by the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security of the PRC indicates that bachelor-degree level education is no longer considered an educational advantage among young civil servants who only have studied hard to pass the civil service recruiting exams. This event stirred some controversies among college graduates in China for they felt that their education had become cheap and common such that the job requirements for becoming a civil servant certainly had been raised. Only when higher education

[80] "Q&A for Preparing the Central Civil Service Exams, 2012 (2012 Guojia gongwuyuan kaoshi kaosheng wuqu)." Retrieved from http://www.gjgwy.org/2011/0905/19979.html

has become easy to achieve, would the center begin to evaluate applicants with other requirements. Instead, the newer requirement for recruiting future officials of the CCP concentrates more on the comprehensiveness of the fresh college graduates who have dealt with realistic social and political issues with administrative skills rather than those who merely know how to score high in exams. Being a leader, or to be a leader who occupies a government post, it may be more necessary to acquire some "contextual intelligence" that helps one "discern trends in the face of complexity and adaptability while trying to shape events." [81] For the contextual intelligence can be more helpful in accomplishing tasks better and getting promoted more promptly.

Finally, advanced degree came after senior leadership posts but not vice versa. In the post-Deng era, some regional leaders have attained doctorate degrees. Among 221 provincial and municipal leaders surveyed in the study, 11 of them now have doctorate degrees (5 percent) and 19 of them have master's degrees or attended master's programs without claiming the degrees (8.6 percent). Compared to Chinese regional leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, where none of the regional leaders had advanced degrees, it is considered as great education progress among Chinese regional leaders. However, among the advanced degree holders who were (are) also regional leaders, only 1 of the 30 was a professional researcher before he pursued a career in politics. Others were already regional leaders (though at lower ranks) when they started graduate school. And the leaders who went to graduate school have not given up their day jobs entirely, meaning most of them were part-time graduate students. And there were 20 of the 30 graduate school-trained leaders who were trained at regional party schools or the Central Party School of the CCP. Party schools do offer graduate programs like other regular universities in China, however, most party school based graduate programs have specialized programs for CCP

[81] Joseph S. Nye Jr. *The Powers to Lead* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.88.

officials but not available to regular students. In other words, being a medium-high ranked regional leader in China, there are even specialized graduate studies programs offered to you.

In sum, in contemporary Chinese politics, education may no longer be a crucial factor in studying career mobility of regional leaders in China, but the personal ties established during leaders' educational experiences may be used to explain factional politics in China, which is also related to the topic of the political mobility of the regional leaders. Related discussions will be presented in later chapters of the study, yet education is still used in the author's analysis of regional leaders' political mobility in order to filter certain variables.

B. Organizational and Professional Background of Regional Leaders in China

In fact, among studies on political elites done in the past, biological features of elites have been considered by scholars as very important independent variables that they determine an elite's political views and social activities in later times of his life. In this study, biological backgrounds of Chinese regional leaders are to be combined with a few other independent variables in order to explain the leaders' political mobility throughout their careers under the CCP's superiority. Most political elites under Communist or post-communist regimes are considered by political scientists to be technocrats, as the make of the authoritarian elite and their behaviors are different from that of the statesmen and politicians under democracies. Therefore, the author of this study believes that it is of vital importance to examine' Chinese regional leader's career movements by putting them back to the regime-related institutions, in order to avoid any premature, biased or single-dimensional analysis. By all means, the Communist Party of China is the most visible and vibrant political institution in contemporary Chinese society, hence, the following analyses of the study concentrate on organizational and professional backgrounds of Chinese regional leaders.

1. Party Membership and Party School Trainings

Needless to say, under CCP party-state regime, being a Communist party member is the presetting that is crucial among all other requirements to become a regional leader in China. Unlike two-party system or consensus government of democracies, where winning the majority in parliament by a political party cannot eliminate different voices from other political oppositions. Under the party-state regime, the CCP is the dominantly political force in Chinese politics. Being unchallengeable, any great decision will be made by the insiders of the CCP and the decision-making process involves no outsiders. In other words, the game of Chinese politics has set its primary rule which is that players must all be CCP members. Indeed, there are more than 80 million CCP members in China, [82] not all of them can or will step into real politics. In fact, most of them are affiliated with local CCP organizations, but are not involved in any of the center's policy-making processes. Our findings show that, among all regional leaders in China since 1949, the absolute majority of them were (are) CCP members. In Table 3.10, among 254 city leaders surveyed, 251 of them were (are) CCP members (98.8 percent), only 3 exceptions. Among 340 provincial leaders surveyed, accordingly 97.3 percent of them were (are) CCP members and only 5 exceptions. However, there has been significant change of numbers of non-CCP regional leaders in post-Deng Xiaoping era compared to that of Mao's and Deng's eras. The CCP members' majority of the regional leadership remains overwhelming, but there are always limited regional governmental seats saved for non-CCP members at all times.

[82] By 2010, China had 80,269,000 communist party members, confirmed by Deputy Chief Wang Taifeng of CCP Department of Organization. "Quanguo Dangyuan Renshu Tupo Ba Qianwan (Communist party members reached 80 million)," CPC News (June 24, 2011), retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/164113/14988776.html, on February 6, 2012.

Table 3.10 CCP Party Membership Counts of Chinese Regional Leaders

Time	Leader Post	CCP Member Count	%	Non-CCP Count	%	Total	%
All Time	City	251	98.8	3	1.2	254	100
1997-2010	City	146	97.3	4	2.7	150	100
All Time	Province	335	98.5	5	1.5	340	100
1997-2010	Province	117	98.3	2	1.7	119	100

Source: Author's Database.

Moreover, even if non-CCP members stand some chance to move upward in the political system in the future, it would be most unlikely that they can take the chief posts in regional governments. Among the regional leaders studied in this dissertation, all chief posts of Chinese provinces and cities have been occupied by CCP members. There were a few exceptions: at the very beginning of the People's Republic of China, to show the CCP's representativeness of all the people in China, Mao Zedong appointed a few non-CCP political activists to be governors, including the governor of Hunan Province, Mao's hometown.[83] However, after the Anti-Rightists Campaign in 1957 where most minority parties' leaders were politically isolated by the CCP, chief posts in Chinese regional governments were no longer appointed non-CCP leaders to be regional leaders. In all, it is the party's strong will that the political dominance of the CCP in China must remain unchallengeable, though strictly limited governmental seats can be given to non-CCP members in order to show the party's "generosity" to outsiders and its willingness for "multiparty collaboration." [84]

The nationwide party school system of the Communist Party of China was created during the years of the Great Chinese Revolution by the party. It was partially because of the

[83] Cheng Qian (1882-1968), who was local gentry elite since the late Qing Dynasty, a Hunan native and Nationalist (KMT) military leader who turned to the CCP rule after 1949, served as the governor of Hunan from 1949 to 1954.
[84] "Zhongguo Gongchandang lindao xia de duo dang hezuo he zhengzhi xieshang zhidu (The multiparty collaboration and political consultation system under the CCP's leadership)," by The Central People's Government of the PRC (May 25, 2005), retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-05/25/content_18182.htm (February 6, 2012).

poor educational level among early revolutionaries and also for strengthening the Leninist ideological influence among all CCP members. Inspired by the Communist party system of the Soviet Union, the first CCP party school was established in 1933 at a Communist settlement in Jiangxi Province [85] while the outside regions were still encircled by the KMT armed forces. Through the years, the CCP party school system has also undergone great transformations as Deng's economic reform transformed Chinese society fundamentally. Before the early 1990s, the party schools expanded all over China from counties to the center. During Jiang Zemin's leadership as the CCP General Secretary, establishments of county-level party schools had been demolished yet the city-level and provincial level party schools remained. Though shrinking in numbers, the importance of the party schools has not been declining at all. In contemporary China, being sent to training programs at party schools, especially being sent to the Central Party School in Beijing, is still considered a vital political opportunity for a younger cadre to gain career experiences; for anyone with a promising political future, it means a chance to meet some of the most important figures in Chinese politics. Furthermore, the headmaster post of the CCP Central Party School has always been taken by one of the top leaders in China. Since 1993, then Vice President Hu Jintao became the headmaster of the Central Party School, and Hu was succeeded by then Vice President Zeng Qinghong as the headmaster of CPS in 2002 after the 16th National Congress of CCP. It happened shortly before Hu became President of China in March 2003. After the 17th CCP National Congress in 2007, Xi Jinping, incumbent Vice President of China, headed the Central Party School by replacing Vice President Zeng. As a matter of fact, due to its importance in leader selections and successions of the CCP politics, the

[85] Ignatius Wibowo and Ly Liang Fook. "China's Central Party School: a unique institution adapting to changes." In Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), *Chinese Communist Party in Reform* (London: Routledge, 2006), p.140.

party school system in China is still a vitally important political institution attached to the communist party.

Table 3.11 Party School Training Experiences of Chinese Regional Leaders

Time	Leader Post	All Leader Count	%	Party School Attendance	%
All Time	City	289	100	197	68.2
1950s	City	52	100	3	5.8
1980s	City	38	100	10	26.3
1997-2010	City	154	100	62	40.3
All Time	Province	340	100	119	35.0
1950s	Province	65	100	10	7.1
1980s	Province	66	100	24	36.4
1997-2010	Province	102	100	65	63.7

Source: Author's Database

By contrasting party school trained regional leaders in China over the years, from Mao's era to post-Deng's era, our findings (shown in Table 3.11) prove the author's hypothetical expectations on the political importance of the CCP party schools to Chinese regional leaders to be correct. Firstly, the number of party-school trained CCP regional leaders in China has been steadily increasing in the past few decades, especially in post-Deng Xiaoping era. Overall, there have been 197 city leaders out of 289 (68.2 percent) have been trained at party schools. And 35 percent of provincial leaders of in the PRC's history (119 of 340) have been trained at party schools before they became provincial leaders in China. Also, the percentages of party school-trained city leaders increased from 5.8 percent in the 1950s to 26.3 percent in the 1980s and eventually reached 40.3 percent in post-Deng Xiao era from 1997 to 2010. The same percentages rises among provincial leaders with party school training increasing from 7.1 percent in the 1950s to 36.4 percent in the 1980s and 63.7 percent in the 1997-2010 eras. The significant rises of party school training background among Chinese regional leaders may be seen as proof of the

party's higher and higher standards for more professional and skilled leaders with better education and competence before they are appointed to head the regional governments around China.

Secondly, the nationwide party school system of the CCP has been offering various training courses above and beyond traditionally orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological education. Instead, a growing number of Chinese regional leaders completed their graduate school programs at the Central Party School and provincial-level party schools and received master's and doctor's degrees in fields other than Marxism, such as economic management. Among the graduate study programs booklets collected by the author from regional CCP party schools in China, some offer master's degree programs in "National Economy" with concentrations on "modern property theories" and "macroeconomic policy study;" [86] some offer 2- to 3-year master programs in economic management with listed courses such as accounting, banking and monetary policies, and "electronic business and marketing". [87] Though it is doubtful how effective these training programs offered by the party schools can be to turn technocrats into economists and business experts, it indicates some positive changes advocated by the center such that Chinese political elites are to be ready for greater economic changes and globalization in the near future.

Last but not least, a party school training background may not be a crucial factor that affects a regional leader's future career mobility. It does, however, have two important functions that might have made some leaders stand out from others with a similar curriculum vita. One is the comprehensive knowledge and global perspectives the leader can learn from party school education, as it is by all means designed as a leadership program to develop specialized expertise

[86] *Master's Degree Programs of 2010, CCP Shanghai Committee Party School* (Shanghai shiwei dangxiao shuoshisheng zhaosheng jianzhang).
[87] *Master's Degree Programs of 2008, CCP Zhengzhou Committee Party School* (Zhengzhou shiwei dangxiao shuoshisheng zhaosheng jianzhang).

in relevant subjects. The other function of party schools is to establish social networks for other regional leaders from different parts of the province/country. Though it is hard to monitor the interactions among the leaders during their party schools training, the network itself is undeniably valuable to a leader's political career.

2. Communist Youth League Experiences of Regional Leaders

Party memberships and party school trainings are tied to Chinese regional leaders' career choices before most of them received promotions to regional leadership posts. Under most circumstances, when an official or party cadre joined in the Communist party and was chosen to be trained at the party school(s), he is more likely to spend most time of his career inside the political system and long for the next upward movement toward a higher post. Unlike in democracies, where partisanship can be switched as a result of a voter's change of political beliefs and policy preferences, in Chinese politics a CCP member's partisanship was formed at a younger age. It usually takes more than two years for someone who expresses interest in becoming a CCP member to actually becoming a member. Furthermore, even before one has shown any particular interests in party membership, the totalitarian structure of the Communist party has already established pro-Communist organizations among Chinese youth, such as high school students, young farmers, and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army. The dominant part of all the sub-structures is the Chinese Communist Youth League, known as the League, which is in charge of selecting and assisting younger Chinese to become CCP members in their later years of life.

Arguably the largest political party in the world, CCP has highly strict and picky standards for recruiting new members into the party. For instance, after one shows interests in becoming a CCP member, one must wait until the party organization collects others' opinions of

one's application, and a "political inspection" of one's direct family members and relatives is also required. Finally, after all these procedural steps and if one is provisionally accepted as a CCP member-to-be, it takes another full calendar year for a "to-be" member to become an official member.[88] The Communist Youth League recruits its members applying a similar philosophy, but practically it is much simpler and costs less time. Therefore, before a young person decides to become a CCP member when reaches the age requirement of 18, he or she can choose to become a League member at the age of 14. According to the last consensus published in 2008, there are currently more than 75 million League members in China.[89] Meanwhile, as an important sub-structure of the CCP, the League is also the major patron of other social organizations among Chinese youth, such as the National College Students Association, the Association of the Young Volunteers, and the Communist Young Pioneers. In other words, the totalitarian characteristic of the Communist party entails controlling almost each and every aspect of a society where its citizens are organizationally connected and controlled by different units and sub-systems of the party. The League serves the function of maintaining the party's dominant control over Chinese youth and their politically related social activities.

The Communist Youth League was not commonly regarded as a prominent political organization in Chinese politics until in the early 1980s. When Deng Xiaoping became the top leader of China, he promoted to the center several younger leaders known as the Reformists who were in charge of carrying out Deng's reformist ideas to real policies. One of them was Hu Yaobang, who had been the chief of the League from 1953 to 1978. Long years of leadership experience as the League's chief secretary, Hu Yaobang had been familiar with many younger party cadres and was well-acquainted with their competences and capabilities. When Hu

[88] "Procedures to Become a Party Member (Ru Dang chengxu)", retrieved from http://www.gmw.cn/content/2006-06/28/content_443694.htm.
[89] Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-06/09/content_1010462.htm.

Yaobang was promoted by Deng Xiaoping to be the General Secretary of the CCP in 1981 (he resigned as the General Secretary in January 1987 but remained to be on the Politburo), he also promoted a number of his old time protégés to important political posts in China. Most of them were relatively young and in favor of reformist policies, opposed to some of the senior leaders who disagreed with Deng Xiaoping's "Open Door" reform. Those who were close to Hu Yaobang in the 1980s included current President of China and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (then Secretary of the Youth League) and Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao (then Director of the Office of the CCP Central Committee). Hu Yaobang's resignation and death in the late 1980s did not lead to the decline of former League officials getting crucial promotions. Instead, the League-affiliated leaders achieved more and reached higher in the political system of China. President Hu Jintao, who had years of working experiences as a student leader, headed the League in 1984 as the First Secretary and left the post when he was appointed the CCP secretary of Guizhou Province in 1985. In 1992, Hu Jintao became a Standing Member of the Politburo at the age of 49 and was expected by Deng Xiaoping as Jiang Zemin's successor. With the League background, provincial leadership experience (in Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet), the headmastership of the Central Party School from 1993 to 2002, and graduation from the elitist Tsinghua University, the self-made President Hu was considered to have promoted many CCP cadres with League background to important regional and ministerial positions as the network was crucial for Hu Jintao to consolidate his rule and to carry out his preferred policies.

In this study, regional leaders labeled with League background means they had at some time worked as League officials at an officially recognized League branch or regional committee. For those regional leaders who had ever been League members, but never took any fulltime job post at a League organization, they would not be coded as having League

background. With these clarifications, our findings support the author's hypothesis on the increase of regional leaders' League background in Chinese politics. As is shown in Table 3.12, there has been a significant growth of League background among Chinese regional leaders. Nearly one-sixth of regional leaders in China have had League working experiences; as the number for city leaders is 17.7 percent (51 of 289) and for provincial leaders is 16.2 percent (55 of 340). Such an increase was not a gradual change but rather a short-term phenomenon that took place especially in post-Deng Xiaoping era. In the 1950s, only 5.8 percent (3 of 52) of the city leaders surveyed had League experiences. And only 3.6 of percent provincial leaders (2 of 56) had League background. Even in the 1980s, 19.7 percent of provincial leaders had League background (13 of 66). However, between 1997 and 2010, 29.4 percent of provincial leaders had League working experiences (30 of 102); and 36.4 percent of city leaders (56 of 104) had League working experiences before they became city leaders. The growth of League connection to the regional leaders is being viewed by outsiders as a rapid rise of the League-affiliated officials in Chinese politics. Noticeably, not all the regional leaders with League experience were connected with the center of the Communist Youth League or had acquired their major promotions based on President Hu Jintao's personal instructions. In fact, many regional leaders with a League background had worked at local League offices and took governmental posts from these local departments of the League. It could mean that the rise of League-affiliated officials has become a nationwide trend—working for the League wherever the offices are helps one experience upward political mobility in the future; one does not need to be directly connected with President Hu Jintao. It is the systemic setting or arrangement that the League and its outstanding protégés have become more visible on the political hierarchy map of the CCP politics.

Table 3.12 Youth League Working Experiences of Chinese Regional Leaders

Column1	Leader Post	All Leader Count	%	League Background	%
All Time	City	289	100	51	17.7
1950s	City	52	100	3	5.8
1980s	City	34	100	2	5.9
1997-2010	City	154	100	56	36.4
All Time	Province	340	100	55	16.2
1950s	Province	56	100	2	3.6
1980s	Province	66	100	13	19.7
1997-2010	Province	102	100	30	29.4

Source: Author's Database

C. Conclusion

This chapter takes a closer look at some of the most important personal characteristics and biological features of all the regional leaders in China recorded by this study. There is no doubt that political elite must be studied as a political being as well as a physical being. This research based on leaders' personal backgrounds contains crucial information of the regional leaders in China. The information is what we need in order to make further analysis of the leaders and their career paths in following chapters of this study. At the beginning of the chapter, the author hypothetically expects that when compared to those in the earlier time periods of the PRC, contemporary Chinese regional leaders have not only improved their social status and political importance through economic reform, but also gradually changed their personal backgrounds by becoming more well-educated and politically trained for serving in regional governments of China.

In general, there are some aspects of Chinese regional leaders' backgrounds and personal characteristics that we need to keep in mind before we go any further. First, post-Deng Xiaoping era's Chinese regional leaders are relatively older compared to previous cohorts of regional leaders under Mao. It was due to the merit-based promotion mechanism of Chinese technocrats

that a leader usually would get promoted to the next higher post in the system. In consequence, as city leaders usually spend less time in the service, they are also relatively younger than provincial leaders in China; and provincial leaders are relatively younger than most of the central leaders who actually reached the high profile after serving at every step lower.

Second, the Chinese ethnic majority, the Han Chinese, occupy the majority of the regional leadership posts and all male leaders have visible advantages over female regional leaders. In a country such as China, the consistency of state building also reflects the ethnic majority's involvement as the dominant part of the process. Except in ethnic minorities' autonomously administrative regions, one expects to see more minority-background regional leaders sitting in responsible posts, still the party chief positions are mostly taken by Han Chinese candidates. And Chinese women's political participation was mostly forbidden until the creation of the People's Republic in 1949. As Chinese women had been suppressed by the opposite sex for centuries through every level of the society, it is still not common yet to see Chinese women in chief political posts.

Third, political localism has posed challenges to almost all the central governments in Chinese history. Central leaders must balance between native political elites and non-native elites when staffing regional governments and other bodies around China. Traditionally, natives were regularly excluded from regional governments so as to minimize any potential localism which can foster corruption, local networks, and the decline of the center's authority. As a matter of fact, it seems that the CCP has recently allowed a much greater percentage of natives to be regional leaders in their hometown provinces. And there are relatively more native city leaders in municipal governments than that of provincial governments, for the smaller unit it is, the less likely the center can exclude potential local influences over personnel arrangements, and

municipal personnel arrangements are mostly conducted by the provincial governments instead of the CCP center. Again, it is for the political privileges and socioeconomic benefits that one is willing to work at a distant location away from one's native area. Thus, we expect to see more non-natives taking chief posts instead of deputy or vice positions in regional governments across China.

Fourth, the results show that contemporary Chinese regional leaders, as political and social elite of China, have become much more educated compared to elite in Mao's and Deng's eras. In addition, it has been asserted in this chapter that when Chinese higher education has transformed through years, having a college degree has become an basic job requirement to recruit regional governmental officials, then the education level indicator might no longer be especially significant in deciding a regional leader's political mobility. A young leader needs to achieve more than a school diploma to expect a promotion in his leadership career.

In addition to personal background information, this chapter also examined some other important features concerning regional leaders in China. These factors can be related to the organizational and professional settings of the party-state directed by the Communist party.

First, being CCP member is definitely essential for potential candidate who is interested in becoming political elites in China. Most regional leaders are CCP members; members of other minority political parties are rarely appointed as chief regional governmental leaders. Also, the nationwide party school system plays its important political function in training governmental officials and younger cadres, enhancing the party's ideological control, upgrading regional leaders' knowledge reserves, and making personal connections among regional leaders themselves. The influence of party schools, especially provincial party schools and Central Party

School has not declined in post-Deng era; they actually gained organizational strengths by attracting higher ranked officials as well as greater social and political resources in the country.

Second, one of the newer phenomena seen in recent decades in Chinese politics has been the significant rise of the Communist Youth League affiliated regional leaders, also known as t*uanpai* (the Clique of the League). Due to two general secretaries of the CCP, Hu Yaobang and Hu Jintao, Youth League affiliations have become politically important to many CCP officials' career mobility. Our study shows that in recent years, there has been an important rise of League-based leaders on the map of Chinese political power.

By examining the background and characteristics of Chinese regional leaders, we can conclude that the making of Chinese regional leaders can be a rather complicated and non-linear process related to a series of personal, social, economic, and political factors. In fact, the feature of Chinese technocratic politics being dominated by the CCP has made some features of the regional leadership highly homogeneous (such as education, party membership, genders, and ethnic groups), while some other features remain complexly heterogeneous (locality and the League background) such that different indicators must be combined to improve the existing literature. Here, one should remember that the readers that most regional leadership posts are actually interchangeable; for instance, a governor can be promoted to a provincial party chief, and a vice secretary of the provincial party committee can be transferred to a mayor post at an important big city. Due to the dominance of the CCP in Chinese politics, where authority over making personnel decisions exclusively remains in the center's hands, political mobility issue can be practically more complicated than simply electing leaders as under democracy. The communist party must balance the interests of all the parties involved in the leaders' rearrangements such that each qualified candidate can be filtered by the center multiple times to

reach the final decisions. Again, the center always needs capable protégés to be in charge of the regional governance systems in China, but it is crucial that the center's superior authority must be maintained at all times.

This third chapter of this study analyzes matters of the most important personal backgrounds and characteristics of Chinese regional leaders, by establishing the correlation between the traits of the leaders and the political mobility patterns in their careers. Regional leaders' previous governmental posts in the Chinese political system and the locations of their previous governmental posts are also highly important independent variables to be thoroughly studied in this study. The next chapter of will be devoted to evaluate regional leaders' career paths and the geopolitical settings of their previous governmental posts. The results reveal what they had achieved before becoming Chinese regional elite.

CHAPTER FOUR
FISCAL REVENUES, GEOPOLITICAL SETTINGS AND POLITICAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS

Being a highly centralized country run by the state bureaucracy for its highest central leaders, the economic and business centers in China, where the revenues were generated for the government through taxation, historically had occupied great political importance as well. In fact, as the center's core interests had been tightly tied with the economic centers in specific Chinese regions, the coordination and conflict between regional elites and the center had existed long before the Communist party's rule of China.[90] The primary goal of the central government's taxations on business firms was to collect enough money for the Empire and for the emperors' massive spending. On one hand, the center needed to secure its dominance in local economies by monitoring local elites; on the other hand, locales also needed the authority of the center to maintain necessary social orders and protect local elites' interests in disputes with the peasants and workers. In other words, "[s]tatesmen and elites aimed to defuse discontent over tax issues based on household self-interests, the community's welfare, and the state's desire to sustain a stable relationship with local society." [91] When the CCP took over China, even though heavy taxation on the peasants was considered the "shackles and chains" put on them by the imperial regime, and while land reforms nationwide in the early 1950s guaranteed rural peasant' households with contracted farming land lent by the state to secure their basic livelihood, by centralizing Chinese economy under the CCP center's tight control, the relatively developed economic regions in China were under greater pressure from the center, and their incumbent regional political elites were replaced with veteran revolutionary cadres, who politically

[90] R. Bin Wong. *China Transformed* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.240.
[91] Wong. Ibid, p.243.

controlled the regional governments and also operated the regional economy through state-owned firms.

Although during Mao Zedong's era, the Chinese economy was framed and structured to concentrate on heavy industries and the machinery manufacturing sectors by adapting the highly similar model borrowed from Stalinist Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping's economic reform initially concentrated on the decentralization of the central planning economy which used to be strictly manipulated by the state. [92] The shared purpose of both Mao's central planning economy and Deng's socialist market had been to modernize China at a rapid pace to make it industrialized and developed. The legitimacy of the CCP's rule does not come from the claim that every Chinese would enter into the ideal society of Communism merrily, only under the guidance of the CCP; at least it was not the entirety of the party's plan. The legitimacy of Communist rule from the very beginning was based on the fact that the CCP promised the Chinese people a better quality of life.[93] However vaguely defined, life was supposed to become better under the new regime. The people's welfare and livelihoods should have improved, or been improving under the CCP's leadership. Hence, the better quality of life promise has driven the center to produce higher economic growth rates and achieve greater and greater GDP increases year by year. [94] In consequence, the common view held by both the center and its regional political leaders is: the greater the economic growth across China's different regions, and the higher growth rates and GDP numbers they achieved at the end of every year, the more stable the CCP's rule will be. Furthermore, when the tasks assigned by the center have been well-accomplished by the regional

[92] Johann P. Arnason. *The Future That Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 1993), pp.177-8.
[93] Kellee S. Tsai. *Capitalism without Democracy: the Private Sector in Contemporary China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp.28-29.
[94] Minxin Pei. "Jingji zengzhang yu zhengquan hefaxing (Economic Growth and the Legitimacy of the Regime)," BBC Chinese (September 19, 2011), retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/focus_on_china/2011/09/110919_cr_economicincrease_bypeiminxin.shtml.

leaders, the regional leaders' tenures are also secured; they can continue acting as both the leaders of their regions and the agents of the center to the people of the regions.

The scale of China's national economy has recently become one of the largest in the world. However, as the Western world's China watchers keep bashing the Chinese government's monetary policies and manipulation of the renminbi currency exchange rates, many have ignored the fact that socioeconomic development among China's different regions is highly uneven. Yet, the CCP center has not found any effective solutions.[95] Meanwhile, as in any post-totalitarian, party-state controlled and technocrats-operated state, many of the fundamental socioeconomic issues can be anatomized by looking at the structure of the Chinese political system. The conflicts of interests between a regional government and the central government of China may have caused different economic policy outcomes such that the center can influence regional governments through the allocations and other financial support. Moreover, the political importance of a region in China can also be evaluated through the center's fiscal indicator that is by taking a look at the tax revenue indexes in recent years. Last but not least, under the party-state regime, sustainable economic growth and regional governments' financial conditions and fiscal contributions to the center are among the decisive factors that determine regional leaders' political mobility in the future. Regional economic growth is one of the most desirable achievements of a regional government that the CCP center expects. Yet, the distribution of political-economic resources among different regions of China is astonishingly uneven and inconsistent. Therefore, by looking only at a region's economic achievement in determining a regional leader's political career can be rather biased when different indicators do not account for the highly secretive political realities happening in Chinese politics. As a result, we must also

[95] Bloomberg BusinessWeek (October 12, 2011). "Senate Triggers China Backlash as Bill Targets Yuan's Value." Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com

study each regional leader's leadership posts prior to his appointment to the new leadership post. The professional experiences of regional leaders certainly play important part in influencing the center's final decisions on regional political personnel arrangements, and the center is surely willing to promote a technocrat who combines loyalty, capability and integrity, and one's previous working experiences would supply some of the information that the center is searching for in making such decisions.

Therefore, in this chapter, the first part concentrates on analyzing the political importance of China's regions, using empirical data of different regional governments' social and economic achievements over the past three decades (i.e., since the initiation of Deng's reform). The second part of the chapter makes its evaluation of Chinese regional leaders' previous posts, profession experiences, and how both factors can affect these regional leaders' political mobility throughout their careers as regional leaders. The third part of the chapter combines our findings in part one and part two, and tries to sort out some of the most important patterns of Chinese regional leaders' career mobility. The following hypotheses are going to be examined in this chapter of the study.

Hypothesis 4.1: Chinese regions (provinces, municipalities, and cities) with greater economic contributions to the national economy and with faster economic growth, their regional leaders receive more promotions from the CCP center than those leaders from other parts of the country. In general, more socially and economically developed regions in China, their regional leaders are politically ranked higher than the rest of the regional leaders in China.

Hypothesis 4.2: Among regional leaders in China, leaders with previous local governmental leadership experience receive more promotions than those without local experience. In other

words, provincial leaders with mayor experiences get promoted more than those without such experience; and city leaders with local (county or city district) government leadership experience get promoted more than those without such experience.

Hypothesis 4.3: There are certain patterns that are evident in Chinese regional leaders' political mobility paths through the decades. For a regional leader, being transferred to developed regions means a promotion. Furthermore, regional leaders serve in Eastern Chinese provinces will receive more promotions than those leaders serving in other regions of China. Finally, leaders in chief positions (i.e., party chiefs, governors and mayors) get more promotions than their deputies (i.e., vice-secretaries, vice governors and vice mayors).

A. Regional Political Importance Evaluated through the Levels of Socioeconomic Development

In domestic politics, accurately comparing an administrative region's political importance to other regions of the country can be most difficult. It is especially true when the situation involves a relatively large country with a sophisticated domestic economic system and a large population. In democracies, where the majority of regional leaders are usually locally elected instead of being appointed by the central government, the political importance of a region can be vaguely gauged through the region's population, economic productivity, and its history of producing powerful statesmen capable of running a regional government as well as the whole nation. The degree of competitiveness of candidates' political campaigns might be used as an indicator to show how a certain region's political identity can affect the national elections; also important are the local political or electoral institutions of a region that impact candidates' campaign schedules. [96] However, in Chinese politics, where the CCP emphasizes cadres'

[96] Aaron Blake. "As Florida Moves to January, New Hampshire Threatens December Primary." *The Washington Post* (2011, September 30), retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com. The article describes the situation that

absolute loyalty and its authoritative rule of China, the center keeps the nature of the political hierarchy of all Chinese regions exclusively to itself. Yet, this study suggests that we may not be as accurate as the CCP center itself when evaluating Chinese regions' political importance; nevertheless, we may estimate such a hierarchy by using published indicators such as GDP values, taxation revenues, and social welfares; these data can be used as complex indicators of a Chinese region's socioeconomic development and political priority compared to other regions in China.

1. Weighing Economic Growth and GDP Achievements in Chinese Politics

Regional economic differences have existed in China throughout its history. As the natural condition determines a region's agricultural characteristics, traditionally, the most productive regions of China, both agriculturally and industrially, were located alongside the Yangzi River (the Long River) where generous rainfalls and warm climate have made the regions ideally suitable for crop farming, tea growing, and silk manufacturing.[97] Being far away from the wars with the Grassland nomadic tribes and having greater ethnic homogeneity and cultural integrity made the central and lower Yangzi River valley the historical economic centers of China. These more developed regions occupied a position of national economic dominance until the Communist Revolution. Studies show that shortly after the installation of the totalitarian regime with its economic concentration on heavy industrial development and energy intensive growth under Mao Zedong's leadership, the level of uneven development among Chinese regions was actually low, meaning that other inland regions were not significantly poorer than

---

the State of Florida was planning on change its primary date for 2012 U.S. Presidential election, while traditionally the State of New Hampshire is the first state held the primary and draws national political attention and publicity.

[97] Wong. Ibid, p.17.

the coastal China. [98] However, Deng's reform in the late 1970s involved a state-led fundamental change in Chinese economic structures, where energy-intensive heavy industries were surpassed by small-scale, labor-intensive, export-orientated, and privatized enterprises from the coastal provinces of China. These changes in economic life have allowed provincial units to play a much more important role in economic management than the ministries at the center which were traditionally in charge of planning and coordination and which reflected the strategic importance of provincial leaders.[99] In other words, the decentralization of the Chinese economy has given regional governments more autonomy in adopting economic policies to suit their local conditions; and the center, while loosening its control, still plays its authoritative role by influencing regional leaders in China.

Moreover, Deng's reformist policies have also empowered provincial leaders and regional officials with great authority in the allocation of economic resources in their provinces. Their political and economic decisions greatly influence the economic performance of these provinces. For this reason, they are also held accountable for the corresponding results arising

[98] Ravi Kanbur and Xiaobo Zhang. "Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: a Journey through Central Planning Reform, and Openness." *Review of Development Economics* (2005), 9(1):97.

[99] When founding special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong province, Deng Xiaoping and reformist leaders were supportive. Deng told the provincial leader: "So we will give you a policy that allows you to charge ahead and cut through your difficult road." Provincial leaders insisted that if they did not get money from the center, at least they must have the authority to raise their own funds. In Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap, 2011), pp.398-99.

from their decisions. As a result, "[t]o a degree, provincial leaders are just like the middle-level managers in a multidivisional corporation who are responsible for their divisional performance."[100] Not only are regional leaders in charge of making personnel arrangements and deciding on budgets and public spending, they are also taking control of attracting foreign investments and negotiating with business leaders and corporate representatives in signing contracts and making deals. In as much as foreign investors need the local authorities' influence on land-contracting with local farmers, to ease the local communities' environmental concerns and other sorts of protections they seek in business activities, regional political elites are key strategic actors.[101] The CCP center's preference on promoting private shares in the national economy does not mean that the Chinese Communists are ready to embrace capitalism, at least not ideologically. This is true especially of the center, which has always held somewhat "ambivalent" attitude toward private sectors and foreign investments in China.[102] As a matter of fact, giving regional governments more autonomous power to promote local economy and to create faster GDP growth have been seen as the center's important move to improve the Chinese people's quality of life. With improved quality of life and more economic freedom, it also enhances the legitimacy of the party-state regime's claim to be the only political party in China that has always "represented the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."[103]

[100] Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou. "Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China." *Journal of Public Economics* (2005), 89 (9-10):1746.
[101] In 2003, Li Zhen-e, then county CCP chief of Changsha County, died of accident on a golf course when having an important business luncheon with Japanese investors. *Xinhua News Agency* (2003, November 7). "Li Zhen-e Died While He Was 'On Duty' (Zhonggong Changsha shiwei rending Li Zhen-e yin gong xunzhi)". Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-11/07/content_1164928.htm.
[102] Bruce J. Dickson. *The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.64.
[103] "Three Represents of Jiang Zemin." Retrieved from http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html

Meanwhile, previous studies have shown that the center would like to promote its legitimacy by promoting the growth of China's GDP and related economic numbers. However, scholarly works have ignored the fact that regional economic achievement is among the few indicators that differentiate all the technocrats in Chinese political system. Chapter three of this study analyzed one thousand Chinese regional leaders' personal background information and found that most CCP cadres in the post-Deng Xiaoping era had similar educational background, age profile, gender (mostly male), nationality, and training experiences (party school system). In consequence, if one wishes to differentiate a regional leader from others with the same political ranking it is necessary to rely on one's deeper understandings of Chinese politics.

For instance, if a regional leader happens to be an important official from Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangdong Province, which are considered the most "open" regions in China, others would naturally connect the official with his region's economic achievement and modernization. For other regional leaders from less economically vibrant parts of China, one may need to point out the place on the map before the conversation continues to the next stage. The City of Shanghai is important in Chinese politics because it has the largest population, the largest scale of economy, and maybe the highest density of international visitors to China. Therefore, when CCP cadre-technocrats are becoming more and more homogeneous as a group, then whoever makes the economy grows faster will receive more promotions.

Table 4.1 Largest Provincial Economies, Their Population, and Their Leaders' Political Rankings (2010-2011)

Province	**GDP (100 Billion Yuan)**	**National Ranking**	**Population (Million)**	**National Ranking**	**Regi-on**	**Party Chief Politburo**	**Gover-nor CC**
Guangdong	37775.49	1	104.3	1	East	Yes	Yes
Shandong	33621.32	2	95.79	2	East	Yes	Yes
Jiangsu	33478.76	3	78.66	5	East	Yes	Yes
Zhejiang	22716.98	4	54.43	10	East	Yes	No
Henan	19724.73	5	94.02	3	Central	No	Yes
Hebei	17067.99	6	71.85	6	Central	No	Yes
Liaoning	14696.23	7	43.75	14	Northeast	No	No
Shanghai	14344.73	8	23.02	24	East	Yes	Yes
Sichuan	14050.78	9	80.42	4	West	No	Yes
Hunan	12939.85	10	65.68	7	Central	No	Yes
Hubei	12866.05	11	57.24	9	Central	No	No
Fujian	11855.08	12	36.89	17	East	No	No
Beijing	11469.28	13	19.61	26	East	Yes	Yes
Anhui	10191.48	14	59.5	8	Central	No	No
Inner Mongolia	8967.52	15	24.7	23	West	No	No

Source: Author's Database (Shanghai and Beijing are also listed in city rankings)

Table 4.2 Largest City Economies, Their Population, and Their Leaders' Political Rankings (2009-2011)

Municipality	**Provincial Location**	**Population(Hundred Thousand)**	**National Ranking**	**GDP(Billion Yuan)**	**National Ranking**	**Administrative Ranking**
Shanghai	N/A	230.2	2	1687.24	1	Provincial
Beijing	N/A	196.1	3	1377.79	2	Provincial
Guangzhou	Guangdong	100.46	7	1060.45	3	Sub-Provincial
Shenzhen	Guangdong	103.5	6	951.09	4	Sub-Provincial
Suzhou	Jiangsu	62.4	35	916.8	5	City
Tianjin	N/A	111.5	5	910.88	6	Provincial
Chongqing	N/A	281.6	1	789.42	7	Provincial
Hangzhou	Zhejiang	78.62	18	594.58	8	Sub-Provincial
Wuxi	Jiangsu	59.92	44	575.8	9	City
Qingdao	Shandong	75.8	21	566.62	10	Sub-Provincial
Foshan	Guangdong	71.9	25	563.85	11	City
Wuhan*	Hubei	82.88	13	551.56	12	Sub-Provincial
Chengdu	Sichuan	125.79	4	550	13	Sub-Provincial
Dalian*	Liaoning	60.8	41	515	14	Sub-Provincial
Ningbo	Zhejiang	56.46	51	512.58	15	City
Nanjing	Jiangsu	74.13	23	508.6	16	Sub-Provincial
Shenyang	Liaoning	81	15	501.5	17	Sub-Provincial
Changsha	Hunan	65.29	31	450	18	Sub-Provincial
Yantai	Shandong	65.15	32	435.85	19	City
Tangshan	Hebei	72.47	24	430	20	City

Source: Author's Database

(Population of the City of Guangzhou is cited according to the census of 2009; Shanghai and Beijing are also listed in Table 4.1 as provincial regions.)

Among 31 provincial regions in China (with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau excluded), Table 4.1 shows the top 15 largest provincial GDPs. The majority of them (7 of 15) are located in the East geographic region of China, while only a few (2 of 15) are located in the West. The top four of regions are located on the east coast and enjoying great locational conveniences and benefits in trading with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, some of the Mainland China's most important trade partners. In terms of population density, most

economically productive provinces also have large population, though Beijing and Shanghai are not physically large in area but are very "crowded" in density. Furthermore, the top six provincial units in terms of GDP (Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) plus Shanghai and Beijing, have their regional CCP chief secretaries are currently sitting as CCP Politburo members, the politically most prestigious positions a regional leader can reach in the hierarchical system. And among the 15 largest provincial economies in China, the majority of their governors (9 of 15), who are actually one level lower than the chief party secretaries in a provincial political system, are also seated on the CCP's Central Committee. Being a CC member is likewise seen as a central leadership post; because CC members can participate as voting members in a number of high-level decision-making processes.

As provinces located in different regions of China can differ from each other in terms of their levels of modernization and socioeconomic development, e.g., the economy of Guangdong province is almost about 300 times as big as that of Tibet in the Southwest China. Large cities with over a million residents tend to be less severely differentiated from one another. Table 4.2 lists the twenty biggest cities in China in terms of their population and municipal economic size. Shanghai and Beijing are in the advanced stage of development among all the regions in China; no matter that they are counted as big cities or central-directed municipalities, their economies make great contributions to the whole country. The party chiefs and mayors of the two cities are also politically important. Guangdong province has three of its cities (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Foshan) occupying the top positions on the table which means it is also an economic engine of industrialized China. Two of the three cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, are also sub-provincial political (and administrative) units. It is realistically true that when regional leaders get moved or relocated to Guangzhou or Shenzhen from other less

developed regions, it is considered a major promotion for the leaders. Next to Guangdong province, Jiangsu province also has three of its cities listed as top twenty municipalities. Though they altogether have less population (Suzhou 35th, Wuxi 44th, and Nanjing 23rd), they are economically stronger than most other cities in terms of GDP (Suzhou 5th, Wuxi 9th, and Nanjing 16th). Overall, other than the four centrally directed municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) that are provincial units, among the remaining 16 on Table 4.2, 10 of them (62.5 percent) are actually sub-provincial administrative units meaning that they are important both economically and politically to the center. Noticeably, even the smallest of the 20 cities (Tangshan of Hebei Province) has a registered population of 4,300,000. Considering the tasks of governing multimillion dwellers in a city, it can be as overwhelming as governing a province. If a leader can do well in governing any of these big cities, surely it is an achievement that deserves the center's attention.

In addition, despite the GDP index which is frequently used to measure regional economic and industrial development, urban population and labor forces are also being used to measure regional economic contributions to that of the national economy.[104] The next part of our analysis is going to take a more comprehensive look at on regional socioeconomic development and political importance in China.

2. Financial Revenues and Allocations of Chinese Regions

Historically, financial revenues collected from all regions of the country have been a major source of income for the Chinese central government as the central government spent massively on infrastructure and financed the bureaucracy to run the nation under the emperors'

[104] William A. Clark. *Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev* (New York, N.Y.:Praeger, 1989), p.63.

authority. [105] Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China the center's control over the national economy, as might be expected, tightened compared to the Republic of China's government under Chiang Kai-shek and KMT's leadership. With a centrally planned economy, everything and all types of economic activities must be strictly monitored by the state and well-planned in advance by the state's planning bureaus. Unlike in a market economy where politics does not influence the market's behavior directly but rather through indirect ways, in socialist systems, economic life is under the socialist party-state's scrutiny where the economy is controlled by the technocrats instead of investment bankers, and politics determines the market. [106] Thus, since the nationwide establishment of the party-state and totalitarian regime, Chinese regional governments have been tied politically and financially with the central government: on one hand, regional governments must be responsible for carrying out the center's economic plans and practicing them religiously; on the other hand, the center relies on regional governments' revenues to operate the entire China's socialist economic construction. The CCP center was entitled to squeeze the fatty parts out of its regional branches; and when it did, it made decisions by itself as to where and how the center was going to spend. In other words, the fiscal and financial systems adapted by the CCP since 1949 determined that every regional leader in China must always represent the center at each local governmental office, not only as a political administrator, but also as a tax collector. In return, it is the central government, instead the regional government itself, that determines how many financial returns (allocations) a regional government can keep for itself for local public projects for use of the people.

[105] Liu Jianjun. *Zhongguo Gudai Zhengzhi Zhidu Shiliu Jiang* (Sixteen Lectures on Ancient Chinese Political System) (Shanghai, China: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2006), pp.227-28.
[106] Kornai, János. *The Socialist System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). Zhang, An (trans.,). 2006.*ShehuizhuyiTizhi(The Socialist System)*. Simplified Chinese Edition (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2006), p.118.

Table 4.3 shows the changes through the years in how the Chinese government has divided its national revenues into two parts within the political system: the center and the regional governments. As is shown in the table, from the 1950s to mid-1970s, even the poor performances of the national economy could not stop the center from taking the majority of the national financial revenues; and the autonomy of Chinese regional governments to make their own economic policies to stimulate their local economic growth was extremely limited. For example, in 1953, only 26.1 percent of revenues were kept for regional governments, and in 1968, only 38.7 percent of revenues were kept for regional governments. Even in 1973, when the national economy made a limited recovery, regional governments still could only keep 44.4 percent of all the revenues allocated by the political system. Deng Xiaoping's reform gave more autonomy to regional governments and individuals in economic life. We can also notice the achievements of the reform by calculating the allocations of the revenues through the years.

As is shown in Table 4.3, from 1978 to 2003, which were the years of rapid growth in the Chinese economy, Chinese regional governments also controlled more financial revenues for themselves, instead of surrendering the last grain left in the jar to the center. This was especially true in the 1990s, where in 1993, when the center only kept 28.3 percent of the revenues and in 1998, the center only kept 28.9 percent to itself. However, limited financial power weakened the center's authority in political life and its control in conducting the gigantic economic system to function as it commanded. In the late 1990s, to overcome the negative effects caused by the 1997 financial crisis, the CCP center tightened its hands over state revenues in order to have more control over the national economy of China. As a result, in recent years, the center has taken the majority of the revenues (53.29 percent in 2008 and 51.12 percent in 2010). By doing so, the Chinese central government claims to have balanced regional economic growth and the center's

ultimate authority.[107] In other words, while the CCP center understands that regional governments' interests should be respected, and that their progressive economic plans should be encouraged, the center's decisive role must be recognized as unchallengeable at all times.

Because regional financial revenues are crucial to the CCP center, we may also hypothesize that among regional governments in China, those which generates the most revenues, it should have relatively more political importance to the central government. In other words, the region that is financially important to the center, it will deserve higher political importance in Chinese politics. And its regional leaders appointed by the center will be more high-ranked in the political system compared to those leaders who work in regions where they make fewer revenues to the center. We have already found that regional leaders in Chinese regions with higher GDP, also occupy higher posts in the hierarchical political system by being selected as Politburo members or Central Committee members with voting rights. Furthermore, according to the official economic data published by Chinese government, these regions with higher GDP are also making more financial contributions to the center; financially they weigh more than other regions in China. As is shown in Table 4.4, in the year of 2005, the top GDP producers in China were also the biggest revenue-makers in the country. The ranking of revenues by regions was: Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Beijing (ranked 1 to 6th on Table 4.4). Among them, Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Beijing were also top regions which spent more revenues than other regions in China (ranked 1, 2, 2, 5, and 9th on Table 4.4). And their regional chief CCP secretaries are currently all Politburo members.

[107] Song Xingyi. 2005. "Fenshui zhi gaige hou woguo zhongyang he defang zhengfu jian caizheng fenpei guanxi zouxiang fenxi (Analysis of Central-Local Financial Relationship after the Reform of Revenues)". *Inner Mongolia Social Sciences (Neimenggu shehui kexue, hanwen ban)*, 26(2), 2005:pp.107-108.

Table 4.3 China's Governmental Revenues with Comparisons between Central and Regional Governments by Year

Year	**Revenue Income (¥100 Million)**			**Percentage (%)**	
	National Total	Central Government	Regional Government	Central Government	Regional Government
1953	219.21	162.05	57.16	73.9	26.1
1958	400.36	177.22	223.14	44.3	55.7
1963	332.05	192.31	139.74	57.9	42.1
1968	357.84	219.49	138.35	61.3	38.7
1973	808.78	449.33	359.45	55.6	44.4
1978	1122.09	532.12	589.97	47.4	52.6
1983	1409.52	759.6	649.92	53.9	46.1
1988	2491.21	845.04	1646.17	33.9	66.1
1993	4642.3	1312.06	3330.24	28.3	71.7
1998	10798.18	3125.6	7672.58	28.9	71.1
2003	24649.95	7420.1	17229.85	30.1	69.9
2008*	61330.35	32680.56	28649.79	53.29	46.71
2010*	83080	42470	40610	51.12	48.88

Source: 1953-2003 data cited from *China Financial Yearbook (2006)*

*2008 and 2010 data cited from Xinhua News Agency: *National Budget Report (2010)*, retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011lh/2011-03/05/c_121152402.htm.

Table 4.4 Regional Financial Revenues and Expenses of National Percentages (2005)

Provincial Region	**Financial Revenue**			**Financial Expense**		
	Income (¥ 100 Million)	National Percentage (%)	National Ranking	Expenses (¥ 100 Million)	National Percentage (%)	National Ranking
Beijing	919.21	2.9	6	1058.31	3.1	9
Tianjin	331.85	1	16	442.12	1.3	25
Hebei	515.7	1.6	9	979.16	2.9	10
Shanxi	368.34	1.2	12	668.75	2	15
Inner Mongolia	277.46	0.9	19	681.88	2	15
Liaoning	675.28	2.1	7	1204.36	3.5	6
Jilin	207.15	0.7	24	631.12	1.9	17
Heilongjiang	318.21	1	16	787.79	2.3	12
Shanghai	1417.4	4.5	2	1646.26	4.9	2
Jiangsu	1322.68	4.2	3	1673.4	4.9	2
Zhejiang	1066.6	3.4	4	1265.53	3.7	5
Anhui	334.02	1.1	15	713.06	2.1	14
Fujian	432.6	1.4	11	593.07	1.7	20
Jiangxi	252.92	0.8	22	563.95	1.7	20
Shandong	1073.13	3.4	4	1466.23	4.3	4
Henan	537.65	1.7	8	1116.04	3.3	7
Hubei	375.52	1.2	12	778.72	2.3	12
Hunan	395.27	1.2	12	873.42	2.6	11
Guangdong	1807.2	5.7	1	2289.07	6.7	1
Guangxi	283.04	0.9	19	611.48	1.8	19
Hainan	68.68	0.2	29	151.24	0.4	30
Chongqing	256.81	0.8	22	487.35	1.4	24
Sichuan	479.66	1.5	10	1082.18	3.2	8
Guizhou	182.5	0.6	25	520.73	1.5	22
Yunnan	312.65	1	16	766.31	2.3	12
Tibet	12.03	0	31	185.45	0.5	27
Shaanxi	275.32	0.9	19	638.96	1.9	17
Gansu	123.5	0.4	28	429.35	1.3	25
Qinghai	33.82	0.1	30	169.75	0.5	27
Ningxia	47.72	0.2	29	160.25	0.5	27
Xinjiang	180.32	0.6	25	519.02	1.5	22

Source: *China Financial Yearbook (2006)*

Table 4.5 Regional Socioeconomic Development Compared to Their GDP Per Capita

Province/ Municipality	Loca-tion	GDP Per Capita Ranking[1]	Life Expectancy (Year)[2]	National Ranking	Public Educational Spending Per Capita (Yuan)[3]	National Ranking	Higher Educational Institutions[4]	National Ranking
Shanghai	East	1	74.89	8	1952.04	3	30	8
Beijing	East	2	75.92	1	2456.01	1	60	1
Tianjin	East	3	75.44	3	1464.22	4	17	18
Zhejiang	East	4	69.82	23	1050.02	10	27	10
Jiangsu	East	5	75.35	4	919.22	14	43	2
Guangdong	East	6	72.02	18	937.51	12	37	5
Shandong	East	7	72.32	16	649.51	25	40	3
Inner Mongolia	West	8	73.81	11	1096.09	8	10	25
Liaoning	North-east	9	75.26	5	926.9	13	40	4
Fujian	East	10	74.41	9	871.99	17	17	18
Jilin	North-east	11	74.11	10	859.12	18	24	14
Hebei	Central	12	69.92	22	649.56	24	30	8
Heilongjiang	North-east	13	72.12	17	698.72	22	25	13
Henan	Central	14	72.82	14	617.93	27	28	9
Shanxi	Central	15	71.02	21	843.27	19	16	19

Source: [1] By 2010, retrieved from http://www.armluntan.cn.

[2] By 2010, retrieved from http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=766839419.

[3] By 2009, retrieved from http://info.i0532.net/action-blogdetail-uid-12116-id-1392.html.

[4] By 2006, retrieved from http://bbs.city.tianya.cn/tianyacity/Content/333/1/23956.shtml.

Table 4.6 Chinese Municipalities and Cities' Revenues and National Rankings

City	Political Ranking	Regional Location	2009		2010		January 2011[3]	
			Revenues (¥ 100 Million)	National Ranking	Revenues (¥ 100 Million)	National Ranking	Revenues (¥ 100 Million)	National Ranking
Shanghai	Provincial	East	2540.3	1	2873.6	1	527	1
Beijing	Provincial	East	2026.8	2	2553.9	2	470	2
Shenzhen	Sub-Provincial	East	880.82	3	1106.8	3	149	3
Tianjin	Provincial	East	821.38	4	1069	4	131.4	6
Suzhou	City	East	745.18	5	900.55	6	139.5	4
Guangzhou	Sub-P.&Cap.	East	702.58	6	790[1]	7	121.1	7
Chongqing	Provincial	West	681.83	7	1018	5	135.5	5
Hangzhou	Sub-P.&Cap.	East	520.79	8	671.35	8	97.8	8
Nanjing	Sub-P.&Cap.	East	434.5	9	518.8	10	N/A	N/A
Ningbo	Sub-Provincial	East	432.8	10	530.9	9	N/A	N/A
Wuxi	City	East	415.91	11	511.9	11	74.7	10
Dalian	Sub-Provincial	Northeast	400.2	12	500.8	13	N/A	N/A
Chengdu	Capital City	West	387.5	13	506	12	81.9	9
Qingdao	Sub-Provincial	East	377	14	452.6	15	N/A	N/A
Shenyang	Capital City	Northeast	320.2	15	465.4	14	N/A	N/A
Wuhan	Sub-P.&Cap.	Central	316.1	16	390	16	59.4	11
Zhengzhou	Capital City	Central	301.9	17	386.8	17	54.4	12
Foshan	City	East	254	18	305.96	19	N/A	N/A
Changsha	Capital City	Central	246.3	19	312.42	18	46.3	13
Xiamen	Sub-Provincial	East	240.6	20	289.17[2]	21	N/A	N/A

Source: Author's Database.

[1]Number based on Guangzhou government's estimation, not actual final result. [2]Xiamen was out of top 20 in 2010, the 20th was Nantong, a city located in Jiangsu Province.

[3] Number collected through the published results in March 2011, only top 13 were ranked. "Sub-P.&Cap." means the city is a sub-provincial political unit and also the capital city of its province.

Moreover, previous scholarly works have studied the Chinese regional economies by heavily relying on each region's GDP growth and total size and comparing them to that of entire China. Such an approach surely is a means that provides a direct look at Chinese regional differences. However, by doing so, readers may likewise ignore the uneven development of socioeconomic levels among regions in China. This study suggests that we take more factors into consideration in comparing regional developmental gaps. As is shown in Table 4.5, the top fifteen GDP provinces in China in the year of 2010, their population's life expectancy and social welfare indexes are also ranked accordingly at the same time. Noticeably, the population of the centrally directed municipalities in China (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) has greatest life expectancies in the nation (No.1 Beijing, No.3 Tianjin, and No.8 Shanghai). Top GDP regions Guangdong and Zhejiang are ranked lower on the table with shorter population life expectancies, but they are large provinces with complicated geographic settings. There are certain regions in these two provinces where are very mountainous and much less developed. But these top GDP producers in general also spend more on public education for their people compare to that do other provinces in China. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin's educational spending is significantly higher than other regions, and Beijing's educational spending per capita in 2009 (¥2456) was four times that of Henan Province (¥618). Finally, as the national higher educational system is mostly sponsored by the government, and where most collegiate and higher educational institutions are public, we also find that biggest regional economies also have higher concentration of colleges, with Beijing (60), Jiangsu (43), Shandong (40), Liaoning (40), and Guangdong (37) occupying the table's top five spots.

Furthermore, after 30 years of continuously prolific GDP growth, many of the regional governments in China have already mastered the techniques of improving their economic

numbers and making their local GDP grow. That is to say, to evaluate a Chinese region's economic resources regional GDP growth rates in China must not be the sole criterion. There are two reasons evident.

First, GDP growth supported by strong investment and industrialization might have little to do with improvements in regional quality of life. For instance, GDP numbers can be boosted by exporting a region's natural resources, but the negative effects would be environmental pollution, shocking interruption of people's conventional way of life,[108] and the regional government's ignorance to social welfare such as public education and health care.

Second, as it is true in China's case, GDP numbers can be artificially inflated by governmental officials to look better than they actually are. Even a governor of a province sometimes has to use other indexes to correct GDP growth reports in order to reduce their artificial parts.[109] Instead, we should rely more on the regional revenues index to evaluate Chinese regional economies. Because the more revenues a province (or a city) would surrender to the center at the end of the year, the more gross revenues it has made during this fiscal year. Regional governments tend to keep more to themselves, as it is mutually true to the central government as well. Thus, the regional revenues index can be a more reliable resource of a region's political importance to the center, as the center highlights those regions more frequently that give more to the center.

[108] State-led investment in construction and demand for local herbal medicines caused environmental and habitual concerns of people living in Tibetan plateau. *Yangcheng Wanbao* (Yangcheng Evening News, 2006, July 26). "*Chongcao Lanfa Hui Jiaju* (Worsening Over-Harvest of Chongcao)," retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2006-07/26/content_4879755.htm on February 13, 2012.
[109] "China's Puzzling Numbers." *The Wall Street Journal* (2011, September 15). Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com on September 15, 2011.

Both Tables 4.4 and 4.6 show the national rankings of annual revenues among Chinese regions. In Table 4.4 for example, in 2005 the top revenue generators among provincial units of China were Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Beijing. All of them are located in the East of China. Beijing is politically crucial to the Communist government, while the remaining five of them are very industrialized regions with well-developed economic sectors. In Table 4.6, after comparing top twenty cities or municipalities in China that provide the most revenues for the center annually, we notice that Shanghai and Beijing, either as provincial-equivalent municipalities or as super-sized Chinese cities, make great financial contributions to the center. Meanwhile, bigger cities on the east coast of China in general make more financial contributions to the center than that of the cities in mid-west Chinese regions. And among the top 20 revenue providers, 4 of them are provincial municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), 9 of them are sub-provincial cities (45 percent), and 8 of them are provincial capitals (40 percent). Needless to say, a capital city is politically more important, as a political center can influence its economic policy-makings. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these top revenue providers for the CCP center, as generators of Chinese economic growth, also occupy important positions in the political system of China. Even among low-ranked smaller cities, being able to generate additional revenues is considered a political achievement for its regional officials, as more revenues draw more attention from the top leaders. [110]

Overall, financial revenues, allocations, and other comprehensive socioeconomic indexes used in this part of the study have shown that the economically more developed regions in China, enjoy higher quality of life than other regions in China. It proves the author's

[110] In Hubei Province, the City of Xiangyang made it publically acknowledged to all that its annual revenue contribution to the province in 2010 has topped a longtime rival, its neighboring city, Yichang. Retrieved from http://news.wuhan.soufun.com/2011-01-20/4408177.htm.

hypothesis to be reliable that these more developed regions merit greater investment from the center, and their regional leaders are considered to be more prominent than other regional leaders in China. The GDP index can be used to evaluate a region's political importance, as many previous scholarly works have shown. However, the results here have pointed out that relying solely on GDP factors to explain regional leaders' career movements can be biased. For instance, if the governor of Shanxi province in Central China receives a transfer to be the governor of Jiangsu province in East China, it is a promotion. But it is not only because Jiangsu has much greater GDP than Shanxi, but because other socioeconomic factors (people's life expectancy, educational spending, and college concentration) can demonstrate that Jiangsu is much more developed as a province than many other provinces in China. Thus, it is convincing to all that this particular governor is getting a promotion.

B. Previous Posts and Chief Leadership Experience of Chinese Regional Leaders

As discussed in chapter three of this study, the CCP center has its elaborate system of making comprehensive evaluations of Chinese regional leaders before it decides to give any promotion, demotion or transfer to any of the important regional political figures. However, as has also been discussed, some of the important indicators the center uses are based on biological features or personal characteristics of regional leaders and party cadres such that others would not stand a chance in the leadership competition. For instance, gender (being male), ethnicity (being a Han Chinese), or locality (serving at one's native province) and other natural advantages they possess are characteristics that others cannot compete with. Meanwhile, there are some other factors that seem to be relatively fairer when applied to all cadres with certain qualifications for regional leadership competitions; examples of such are educational level, CCP membership, and professional training (party schools' educational or training-program

experiences). By examining Chinese regional leaders' background information over the past six decades, the analysis here suggests that it seems that the CCP center cares not only about a regional leader's personal characteristics, but also values a great deal of the leader's previous occupational experiences and achievements. Basically, the merit system that rewards some regional leaders with upward political mobility acknowledges those regional leaders with creditable experiences who have done their jobs properly. The analysis presented here so far suggests a few assumptions to use before we explore any further Chinese regional leaders' previous occupational histories.

First, as the primary expectation the center has for a regional leader is a well-governed regional government, the center values those potential candidates with governance experiences (i.e., those who have previously worked on leadership posts). Second, compared to Mao's era where background combinations of regional leaders were more diverse (as they used to be revolutionaries who came from various strata of Chinese society), in the post-Deng era, Chinese regional leaders have a more uniform background. We now expect to see more regional leaders (higher in percentile) with previous experience as lower-level local leaders before they were appointed to the higher regional governmental posts. In other words, despite the importance of personal characteristics (gender, nationality and locality), more current regional leaders had been in local governments in their previous political careers than was the case under Mao.

Table 4.7 Chinese Regional Leaders' Local Working Experiences

Post	Experience	Counts	Percentage
Provincial	Mayor Experience	264	71.35
Provincial	No Mayor Experience	106	28.65
Provincial	Total	370	100
City	Local Experience	224	74.67
City	No Local Experience	76	25.33
City	Total	300	100
All Regional	Local Experience	488	72.84
	No Local Experience	182	27.16
	Total	670	100

Source: Author's Database (1950-2010)

Table 4.8 Mao Zedong Era Regional Leaders' Local Working Experiences

Post	Experience	Counts	Percentage
Provincial	Mayor Experience	37	66.07
Provincial	No Mayor Experience	19	33.93
Provincial	Total	56	100
City	Local Experience	41	65.08
City	No Local Experience	22	34.92
City	Total	63	100
All Regional	Local Experience	78	65.55
	No Local Experience	41	34.45
	Total	119	100

Source: Author's Database (1950-1976)

Our findings show that there are (were) a large number of Chinese regional leaders who had worked as lower-ranked local governmental officials before they received promotions to become regional leaders at the next-higher level of governments. As is shown in Table 4.7, among the 670 regional leaders surveyed in the current study, 488 of them (72.8 percent) whether provincial or city level worked previously as local officials. And 182 of them (27.2 percent) had no local-government based occupational experiences before they received the posts as Chinese regional leaders. Among all 370 provincial leaders, 264 out of 370 (71.4 percent) worked at some point in their careers as city leaders. Keeping in mind that city leaders are considered regional political elites, it means that the majority of provincial leaders in China in general had become political elites by virtue of their career moves to achieve higher rankings in the political system. City leader working experiences (e.g., being mayors or city CCP secretaries) may have helped them a great deal to become provincial leaders; as has been discussed in previous chapters of the study, most current central leaders of China had provincial leadership experience before they marched from provincial capitals to Beijing. Our findings also show that among all 300 city leaders from the1950s to 2000s, 224 of them (74.7 percent) had worked previously as local leaders in regional governments. These regional political units include counties, smaller cities, and administrative districts of big cities such as in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin where even a city district can have a population over one million.

In addition, the result shows that in Mao's era of Chinese politics, there were lower percentages of regional leaders in China with previous regional governmental working experiences. In other words, many communist cadres in Mao's era got promoted to be regional leaders without even having worked as regional leaders before. Among 119 regional leaders surveyed, with a concentration in the 25 years preceding Mao's, 78 of them (65.6 percent) had

occupational histories as regional leaders while 41 of them (34.5 percent) never worked in regional government, either at the provincial or lower-ranked local government levels. It can be viewed as proof that regional leaders in Mao's era came from more diverse background, as former revolutionaries instead of school-trained technocrats (Table 4.8).

Table 4.9 Post-Deng Xiaoping Era Regional Leaders' Local Working Experiences

Post	**Experience**	**Counts**	**%**
Provincial	Mayor Experiences	109	82.6
Provincial	No Mayor Experience	23	17.4
Provincial	*Total*	*132*	*100*
City	Local Experience	116	70.7
City	No Local Experience	48	29.3
City	*Total*	*164*	*100*
All	Local Experience	225	76.0
All	No Local Experience	71	24.0
Post-Deng All	*Total*	*296*	*100*

Source: Author's Database (1997-2010)

Our findings also show a significant increase in prior leadership experience among post-Deng Xiaoping era Chinese regional leaders. As is shown in Table 4.9, among 132 post-Deng provincial leaders categorized by the study, 109 of them (82. 6 percent) had previously worked as city leaders in different parts of China; while only 23 of them, 17.4 percent of the entire provincial leadership body, had had no regional governmental working experience. Among 164 post-Deng city leaders (mayors and party secretaries) studied, 116 of them (70.7 percent) had worked as leaders in local governments (counties, smaller cities, or administrative districts of big cities). But 71 of them (24 percent) had no local governmental working

experiences whatsoever before they were appointed by their regional leadership posts (Table 4.9). This result revealed by this study shows that in contemporary Chinese politics, regional leadership posts are more frequently occupied by CCP cadres with previous leadership experiences than by those who never worked as regional leaders at any level of the political system.

Table 4.10 Previous Occupational Experiences of Provincial Leaders

Previous Occupation	**Counts**	**%**
Business	6	1.6
Central	42	11.4
City Leader	100	27.3
Education	1	0.3
Governor	16	4.4
League Official	2	0.5
Military	24	6.5
Provincial Secretary	82	22.3
Vice Governor	36	9.8
Vice Secretary	53	14.4
Others	5	1.4
Total	367	99.9

Source: Author's Database (1950-2010)

Furthermore, supporting the assumptions presented earlier, some other noticeable details emerged in the process of recording provincial leaders' occupational histories. As is shown in Table 4.10, there have been some major patterns in the career paths taken by Chinese provincial leaders who became provincial elites in China. Among 367 provincial leaders examined by the study, a large number of them (100 of 367, or 27.3 percent) worked as city leaders in China before they were promoted to be provincial leaders (governors and provincial party secretaries). Eighty-two of the 367 (22.3 percent) provincial leaders were already provincial party chiefs before they were moved, meaning that what they had received were

opportunities to change their locations, either from the developed parts of China to the rest of the country or vice versa. Did their moves count as promotions, demotions or lateral change? We will need to specify in the following part of the study by tracking their career mobility. Similarly, there are (were) 16 governors, 36 vice governors and 53 vice secretaries of the 367 provincial leaders surveyed who received career movements while they were already provincial political elites. Combine these provincial elites (82 chief secretaries, 16 governors, 36 vice governors, and 53 vice secretaries), and then we have 187 of the 367 provincial elites (51 percent) who were tenured provincial leaders. There have been 24 military officers ever appointed as provincial leaders (6.5 percent), but all of them were named as provincial leaders under Mao's regime. No military officer has been found to receive a civil servant post ever since, evidence that the Chinese bureaucracy after Mao Zedong has become civilianized. Also, there were two Communist Youth League leaders who became provincial leaders directly after leaving League leadership posts. The two cases were Hu Qili (League Secretary prior to becoming Tianjin party chief in 1980) and Li Ruihuan (League Secretary prior to being Mayor of Tianjin in 1983). Mr. Hu and Mr. Li were colleagues and personal friends; when Hu left Tianjin top post, he recommended that Li be appointed his successor. Among 367 provincial leaders surveyed, there were six leaders who got promoted from business posts and one from education. However, none of them worked in private business or in an educational institution; instead, they were all employed by state-owned firms and university. By all means, regional leadership posts are open to qualified party cadres, but not to elites from the private sectors of China.

Overall, all regional leaders coded with previous regional leadership experiences were those who actually worked in local governments (county, city or district levels) as leaders, not

merely as committee members or division heads. Thus, our findings here have revealed two trends in post-Deng Chinese regional leaders. They are:

(1) Compared to Mao's and Deng's era, post-Deng Chinese regional leaders share more similar prior professional background as the majority of them used to be lower-ranked political elites before they were promoted to be higher-ranked regional leaders in China. Evidence shows that these newer leaders are (were) less diverse in terms of their occupational histories, as many of them spent their careers climbing the hierarchical political system, working from junior positions to get promoted step by step. Not only their personal features share many things in common (mostly male, Han Chinese, college-educated), but their career paths in general are also similar to one another.

(2) The root cause of the homogenization of Chinese regional leaders' before they received the center's promotion may not be the idiosyncratic personal reasons of the top leaders; instead, it could be the consequential result of the center's desire to fill regional governments with the CCP technocrats. First of all, a regional leader must be someone who is capable of accomplishing the center's complex tasks. Thus, candidates with local leadership credentials (and who actually achieved something while working as a local leader) seem to be suitable. Last but not least, the leader to-be must be loyal to the party and the center. Thus, years of experience serve as observational periods for the center to examine a potential regional leader's capabilities and trustworthiness. To be sure, regional leaders in China are supposed to be defenders of the party-state regime, not challengers to the center who dare to try anything to decentralize the center's authority.

C. Toward the Political and Geopolitical Patterns of Political Mobility among Chinese Regional Leaders

1. Classification of Regional Leaderships Posts, Regional Settings, and Background Analysis

This chapter of the study has argued that Chinese regional leaders' previous leadership experiences are important indicators of their future political mobility. The relevant research extant has not commonly taken into consideration both the prior posts of the leaders and the priori physical locations where the leaders (used to) work. Again, it is argued here that the CCP center values each regional leader's credentials as the center looks among them for a potential future leader of China on the world stage. Therefore, elaborate systems have been applied by the center to guide its personnel decisions for regional governments.

First, according to Chinese law, a provincial leader, which is equivalent to a minister of the central government on the political ranking chart, can work as a provincial head of government for a maximum of 2 terms. Each term is 5 years; thus, it would be a 10-year-period for a provincial leader working at the same post. A city leader can continuously work for 2 terms as well, and each term is again 5 years, resulting in a maximum 10 years term.[111] Nevertheless, before the finalization of the laws was issued in 2004, after multiple changes during the mid-1990s, regulations on how many terms a regional could serve at one's current post was only vaguely defined and often overlapped between the party system and the administration. Table 4.11 shows that the mean number of service years among Chinese regional leaders from the 1950s to 2000s is 5 years; it is 4.3 years for Chinese city leaders surveyed by the study.

[111] *Geji renmin daibiao dahui he difang renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa (Regional Congress and Government Formation Law),* modified and approved on October 27, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-06/21/content_8297.htm.

Second, there have been cases of provincial leaders serving 14 years in a provincial government, and one city leader served 17 years in the same post. Both cases were found in Mao's era and the early years of Deng's rule when the retirement of Chinese political elites had not been constitutionalized and formalized as laws. Here, the present analysis has hypothesized that the longer a regional leader serves, which means that his leadership post has become stabilized, the more likely it is for the leader to receive a promotion (upward political mobility). Because the merit system adopted by the party-state bureaucracy rewards cadres with great loyalty and faithful service, the longer years one serves the party, the greater a regional leader's chance to get promoted.

Third, as is shown in Table 4.12, all the regional leaders surveyed in this study are clearly classified by their current posts. Among all provincial leaders, the present study focuses solely on provincial CCP secretaries (156, or 42.2 percent), vice secretaries (49, or 13.2 percent), governors (130, or 35.1 percent) and vice governors (35, or 9.5 percent). These are the most responsible posts in the executive branch of provincial governments. Among all the city leaders recorded in this study, there are likewise four types of leaders: city CCP secretaries (152, or 50.7 percent) and vice secretaries (14, or 4.7 percent) from the party system, and mayors (109, or 36.3 percent) and vice mayors (25, or 8.3 percent) from the executive. In chapter two of this study, party chiefs and governmental heads are classified as decision-makers of the executive branches of Chinese regional governments. The regional People's Congress system and Political Consultative Conference system are clearly of political importance, but they do not occupy the decision-making parts of the Chinese political systems. By studying the executives of Chinese regional governments, one is more likely to find out revealing facts and trends of contemporary Chinese politics. As a matter of fact, even among the executives of Chinese regional

governments, the selection processes of governors and mayors (as heads of the administration), and party secretaries (as heads of CCP party-organizations) are actually different; so are the job requirements expected of these new leaders. Here, it is hypothesized that governors and mayors as administrative heads have different career paths and political mobility, compared to these of party leaders of regional governments. As has been discussed, party chiefs are ranked one level higher than administrative chiefs.

Table 4.11 Length of Service Years among Chinese Regional Leaders (Years)

Post	Counts	Mean	Standard Deviation	Max	Min
Provincial Leaders	359	5.0	2.6	14	1
City Leaders	300	4.3	2.5	17	1

Source: Author's Database

Table 4.12 Distribution of Posts among Regional Leaders

Post	Observations	Percentage
Provincial CCP Secretary	156	42.2
Governor	130	35.1
Vice Secretary	49	13.2
Vice Governor	35	9.5
Total	*370*	*100*
City CCP Secretary	152	50.7
Mayor	109	36.3
Vice Secretary	14	4.7
Vice Mayor	25	8.3
Total	*300*	*100*

Source: Author's Database

Fourth, the study also finds that examining the posts before and after an individual assumes the post of regional leader is necessary to draw accurate conclusion about regional leaders' political mobility. Therefore, every regional leader coded by the study has at least three types of movements recorded in the database: what post was held by this leader before becomes a regional leader? What is (was) one's current post held at the same time the data were sampled by the study? What is (was) the post held by the leader afterwards (after the leader had left one's current post)? In other words, we must be aware of where a regional leader came from, what the regional leader does (did) in the government currently, and where the leader was relocated (or removed) to.

Table 4.13 Previous Governmental Positions Held by Provincial Leaders

Previous Position Held	**Frequency**	**%**
Business	7	1.9
Central Govt.	42	11.4
Education	1	0.3
Governor	16	4.4
Youth League	2	0.5
City Mayor	100	27.2
Military	24	6.5
Provincial Secretary	82	22.3
Vice Governor	36	9.8
Vice Provincial Secretary	53	14.4
Other	5	1.4
Total	**368**	**100**

Source: Author's Database

Table 4.14 Position Held by Provincial Leaders afterwards

Position Held after Provincial Leadership	Frequency	%
Central Government	99	27.4
County Official	1	0.3
CPPCC (National)	10	2.8
Governor	44	12.2
Military	6	1.7
Mayor	1	0.3
National People's Congress	23	6.4
Provincial Secretary	139	38.4
Vice Governor	12	3.3
Vice Secretary	22	6.1
Other	5	1.4
Total	**362**	**100**

Source: Author's Database

Table 4.13 shows the array of prior posts held by these officials before they were appointed as provincial governmental heads of China. These occupational types are: provincial party secretary (22.3 percent), governor posts (4.4 percent), posts at Chinese central government (11.4 percent), vice provincial secretaries (14.4 percent), vice governors (9.8 percent), military officers (6.5 percent), Communist Youth League officials (0.5 percent), city mayors (27.2 percent), state-owned business (1.9 percent), education (0.3 percent), and others (1.4 percent). These data indicate that the majority of Chinese provincial leaders were appointed from positions as provincial governmental officials (chief and vice secretaries, governors and vice governors, which total 50.8 percent of all cadres). A large number of them were mayors or city chiefs prior to the promotion, and posts in the central government were the next largest sources of personnel getting promoted to provincial leaders. Thus, the data show the center's strong preferences in choosing provincial leaders with regional governmental leadership experience. Government-

related working experiences are more valued by the center than experience at firms and educational institutions. Moreover, if we look at the subsequent postings of provincial leaders (i.e., after worked as provincial leaders of China), 38.4 percent of them became chief provincial party secretaries, 12.2 percent of them became governors, 3.3 percent of them still worked as vice governors, and 6.1 percent of them as vice provincial secretaries. As shown in Table 4.14, another large portion of them (27.4 percent) went to the center and became ministerial or even higher political leaders in China. Thus, when provincial leaders leave provincial governments, the majority of them remained in executive branches of the Chinese governmental system. Only 2.8 percent worked at CPPCC and 6.4 percent of them worked at National People's Congress, both considered as parliamentary units of Chinese politics. In other words, provincial leaders remain in power (executive branches) when they leave provincial leadership posts.

Table 4.15 Position Held by City Leaders afterwards

Position Held after City Leadership	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Dismiss, Death or Unknown (0)	36	12
Non-Governmental (1)	12	4
City Vice Secretary (2)	1	0.3
Mayor or City Chief (3)	10	3.3
Transfer (4)	57	19
Vice Governor (5)	50	16.7
Provincial Vice Secretary (6)	39	13
Provincial CPPCC or Congress (7)	39	13
Governor (8)	20	6.7
Provincial Chief Secretary (9)	10	3.3
Central Govt. or Minister (10)	26	8.7
Total	300	100

Source: Author's Database

Meanwhile, similar results are also found in studying the career paths of Chinese city leaders' career paths after they left city leadership posts. Here, the subsequent post of city leaders

(after they have left their city leaderships) was coded from 0 to 10. The data show that a great number of Chinese city leaders (57 of 300, 19 percent) accepted locational transfers without a major upgrade of their political rankings. As seen in Table 4.15, these city leaders served at some other cities after their current posts, entailing a geographic change instead of a normative change of ranks. There were also many other city leaders who got promoted to be provincial leaders immediately after their terms were served in the cities: 3.3 percent of them became provincial party secretaries, 6.7 percent of them became governors, 16.7 percent of them became vice governors, and 13 percent of them became provincial vice secretaries. In all, 39.7 percent of all the city leaders observed received provincial promotions to posts as new provincial leaders of China. Also, 8.7 percent of city leaders became ministerial leaders at the central government level once they left city leaderships posts. Aside from dismissed, death, or retirement due to age, most city leaders stayed in the bureaucracy instead of stepping out of it for some other occupation. Only 4 percent accepted non-governmental positions, although not necessarily leaving politics for good. As has suggested in previous chapters of the study, a political elite in China enjoys more than mere political power and publicity. It can be very difficult, therefore, to leave one's regional elite lifestyle behind for one who has been entitled to it and has grown used to it.

Finally, geographic (locational) changes or relocations can have significant political meaning to Chinese regional leaders once they are transferred between regions in China. As highlighted earlier, different regions in China have different levels of political importance to the CCP center. Even if Chinese provinces are not different from each other in terms of population and administrative priority, they do have different degrees of socioeconomic development, and most of all, their revenue contributions to the central government make some of the regions stand

out from others. As the findings shown in Table 4.16 and 4.17, a great number of provincial leaders (106 of 370, or 28.7 percent) were moved to the central governmental system in Beijing after serving their terms as Chinese provincial leaders. Combined with those who were move to NPC and CPPCC posts (served as committee chairs or vice chairs of NPC and CPPCC), more than one third (36.2 percent) of Chinese provincial leaders eventually become central governmental officials, rightly considered political elites of China. In addition, a large of number of provincial leaders (21.4 percent) continued their leadership services in East China as provincial leaders of the more developed regions of the country. The rest of them, if not retired, demoted or dead, also continued working as provincial governmental heads in other regions of China, sent as they were to the West, Northeast, and the Central provinces of the country.

Table 4.16 Provincial Leader Changes of Regions afterwards

Provincial Leader Regions after	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Dismiss, Death or Retire(0)	13	3.5
West (1)	65	17.6
Northeast (2)	11	3.0
Middle (3)	68	18.4
East (4)	79	21.4
Central Government (5)	106	28.7
NPC or CPPCC	28	7.6
Total	370	100

Source: Author's Database

Table 4.17 City Leader Changes of Regions afterwards

Working Region after	Frequency	Percentage
Dismiss or Death (0)	6	2.0
West (1)	62	20.7
Northeast (2)	26	8.7
Middle (3)	65	21.7
East (4)	110	36.7
Central Government (5)	29	9.7
NPC or CPPCC (6)	2	0.7
Total	300	100

Source: Author's Database

While central governmental positions are actually foreseeable for Chinese provincial leaders, as their junior counterparts in Chinese cities, the majority of city leaders are not likely to get promoted to the central government immediately after their city leadership services. As Table 4.17 reveals, only 29 of 300, or 9.7 percent, arrived in the central leadership. And as city leaders are usually younger than provincial leaders, they rarely go immediately to work at NPC or CPPCC either, as these posts are reserved for more senior members of governments (only 0.7 percent of them were moved to NPC and CPPCC). Still, the majority of Chinese city leaders have to continue working at regional governments after their current terms. However, we do see a great number of them transferred to East China instead of staying where they were or moving to the Mid-West (36.7 percent of all city leaders accepted Eastern regional posts afterwards).

These descriptive statistical findings support our theoretical hypotheses that city leaders as relatively junior political elites in China, compared to provincial leaders and central leaders that they also need to serve a longer time and gain more local working experience before being

promoted higher in the hierarchical political system. Furthermore, as East China is economically important to the CCP center, we also see a higher concentration of political elites working in the Eastern provinces and cities, while other regions in China actually draw less political resource from the center.[112]

2. Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese Provincial Leaders

As we have clearly defined Chinese provincial leaders' current posts (the posts they held while being sampled by the study) in provincial governments, and the differences (both political and personal) of occupying different posts, our analysis now turns to concentrate on career movements beyond the positions of provincial leaders in certain regions, and the regional changes among different Chinese provinces. First, the author examines provincial leaders' political mobility by applying three different logistical regression models to identify independent variables that potentially might affect a provincial leader's career movements.

[112] In fact, except East Chinese regions with more developed economies and human capitals, they may have drawn less international attention as well. Recent *Financial Year Books of China* have shown the East Chinese provinces enjoy more foreign investments than all the Mid-West provinces combined. See Ge Shunqi and Zheng Xiaojie (2004). "Zhongguo 31 ge shengshi liyong waizi yeji yu qianli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative Studies on Achievements and Potentials of Using Foreign Investments among Chinese Provinces)." *Shijie Jingji (World Economy)*, 2004, 3(1): 11-15.

Table 4.18 Logistical Models Explaining Provincial Leaders' Political Mobility

	Model 1 **Promotion**	Model 2 **Demotion**	Model 3 **Transfer**
Age	-0.020	0.010	0.004
	(1.05)	(0.22)	(0.18)
College Edu.	0.527	0.975	-0.898
	(1.77)	(1.49)	(2.59)**
Native Province	-0.093	0.300	-0.193
	(0.33)	(0.49)	(0.60)
Length	-0.089	0.284	-0.080
	(1.54)	(2.47)*	(1.17)
Tenured	0.906	-1.873	-0.451
	(2.85)**	(2.70)**	(1.32)
League Experience	0.435	0.216	-0.180
	(1.16)	(0.30)	(0.45)
Party school	-0.469	-0.179	0.477
	(1.59)	(0.27)	(1.47)
Gov. now	0.624	-1.313	-0.021
	(1.57)	(1.52)	(0.05)
Sec. now	0.014	-0.462	0.313
	(0.04)	(0.66)	(0.79)
Developed Region	0.215	0.586	-0.670
	(0.52)	(0.52)	(1.58)
Mayor Experience	0.760	-0.561	0.113
	(2.68)**	(0.86)	(0.34)
Gov. before	0.027		0.363
	(0.04)		(0.49)
Sec. before	-0.685	0.310	0.705
	(2.03)*	(0.39)	(1.87)
Minister before	0.408	-0.313	-0.047
	(0.79)	(0.25)	(0.08)
Vice Gov. before	0.318	0.950	-0.219
	(0.61)	(0.98)	(0.36)
Vice Sec. before	0.283	0.978	-0.432
	(0.67)	(1.12)	(0.87)
Constant	1.051	-4.836	-0.425
	(0.92)	(1.89)	(0.34)
N	368	352	368
LR chi2	44.68	15.11	28.27
Prob>chi2	.0002	.4437	.0294
Pseudo R2	.106	.128	.082

(Standard Errors in parentheses)
*p≤ .05;**p≤ .01
Source: Author's Database

The three models of logistics regression are:

Model 1: Provincial leaders receive promotion (or not) due to factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP secretary of the province (or not), whether the province is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice governor before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).

Model 2: Provincial leaders receive demotion (or not) due to factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP secretary of the province (or not), whether the province is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice governor

before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).

Model 3: Provincial leaders receive parallel transfer (or not), meaning no change of ranks, due to factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP secretary of the province (or not), whether the province is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice governor before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).

Among all the independent variables, higher education, native province, tenure, party school training, current posts, city leader before, and top revenue provinces are all coded as dummy variables. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 4.18 and are discussed below.

First, whether a Chinese provincial leader receives a subsequent promotion or not, the outcome is positively affected if the leader has had city leadership experience; it is also positively affected if the leader is a tenured provincial leader (i.e., had served at least one full term), and served as a provincial CCP secretary before the current post. In other words, a

provincial leader is more likely to receive promotion if he: has been a city leader before, has tenure at his post as a provincial leader, or has been (or will become) a CCP secretary of a province. These dummy variables are significant in determining whether a provincial official receives promotion or not. Meanwhile, having had higher education, and if one's current position (at the time when observed in the study) is the governor of a province, both of these factors have positive influences on the leader's future promotion. However, the significance levels are lower than that of city leadership experiences, tenure, and chief secretary posts. None of the other dummy independent variables in the promotion model are statistically significant.

Second, whether a Chinese provincial leader is demoted or not, is correlated with education level and tenure in a governor post at a lower significance level. Provincial leaders observed in the study who received subsequent demotions were those without higher education but currently working as governors. However, the educational factor is not solely responsible for leaders' demotions. The demotion score is significantly related with all provincial leaders' length of services and previous provincial tenures. But it has no realistic meaning of such significance: demoted leader are those who are not tenured and have worked as leaders for shorter periods of time. It is a fact instead of being statistical proofs. No other independent variables have significance in affecting the demotion outcomes of provincial leaders.

Third, whether a Chinese provincial leader receives a parallel transfer or not is positively correlated with having higher education and having been a provincial secretary before his current post. Provincial leaders with college education who had worked as provincial chief-secretaries previously are more likely to receive transfers to different provinces. Meanwhile, having party school training and had a posting in a developed and revenue-contributing province both have positive affect on leaders being transferred laterally. But they are significant at lower confidence

intervals. No other independent variables are statistically significant in explaining the variation in the transfer data.

Furthermore, in order to track down the locational and regional shifts of Chinese provincial leaders after they served in provincial governments, the study also applies a multinomial regression model to examine the correlation between regional changes and the independent variables coded.

The *regional change model* is: the destination region a leader is relocated to after his provincial leadership posting is affected by that a leader's age, educational level, service in his native province, length of years served, tenured or not, Communist Youth League experience, party school training, previous service as governor (or not), as secretary (or not), service in developed provinces (or not), previous service as governor (or not), previous service as provincial secretary (or not), previous service as vice governor (or not), as vice secretary (or not), previous service as ministerial leader (or not), previous posting in any of East China' provinces (or not). Except age and length of service years are numbered, all other independent variables are dummy variables (0 or 1). Codes for different regions are shown in Table 4.16. And the results are shown in Table 4.19.

Table 4.19 Multinomial Logistics Model Explaining New Regions after Provincial Leadership

	Transferred to Regions After Provincial Leaderships					
	Dismiss or Retire	West	Northeast	Middle	East	NPC
	0	1	2	3	4	6
Age	1.025	1.064	1.093	1.026	1.039	1.136**
	(0.0440)	(0.0346)	(0.0633)	(0.0272)	(0.0251)	(0.0492)
College	0.910	0.368	0.411	0.673	0.540	0.474
	(0.627)	(0.188)	(0.320)	(0.275)	(0.203)	(0.282)
Native	0.762	0.430	0.115	0.965	0.820	1.219
	(0.517)	(0.203)	(0.130)	(0.344)	(0.286)	(0.626)
Length	1.248	1.172	1.028	0.991	1.065	1.074
	(0.166)	(0.107)	(0.176)	(0.0802)	(0.0825)	(0.122)
Tenure	0.519	1.629	1.408	2.099	1.388	1.290
	(0.349)	(0.837)	(1.268)	(0.889)	(0.540)	(0.785)
Y. League	2.214	3.224*	1.276	1.107	0.865	0.254
	(1.580)	(1.583)	(1.517)	(0.510)	(0.405)	(0.279)
Party school	1.283	1.305	0.201	0.828	0.923	0.798
	(0.856)	(0.587)	(0.225)	(0.313)	(0.343)	(0.451)
gov_now	0.417	0.397	2.540	0.944	0.497	2.118
	(0.370)	(0.236)	(3.081)	(0.465)	(0.244)	(1.901)
sec_now	0.445	0.734	1.423	0.572	1.046	2.573
	(0.355)	(0.402)	(1.748)	(0.294)	(0.470)	(2.318)
Developed Provinces	0.262	0.0324***	0.162	1.331	1124345.4	0.221

(table continued)	(0.327)	(0.0225)	(0.175)	(1.289)	(862815578.9)	(0.208)
gov_bef	0.00000190	1.886	0.000000535	2.175	0.433	0.408
	(0.00265)	(2.142)	(0.000893)	(1.736)	(0.532)	(0.539)
sec_bef	1.604	0.208*	0.532	0.321*	0.448	0.0748**
	(1.220)	(0.140)	(0.495)	(0.161)	(0.187)	(0.0671)
vgov_bef	1.563	3.843	1.392	1.089	1.788	2.143
	(1.974)	(2.756)	(1.834)	(0.718)	(1.093)	(1.722)
vsec_bef	0.685	1.119	0.841	1.075	0.556	0.172
	(0.840)	(0.690)	(0.806)	(0.561)	(0.313)	(0.157)
minister_bef	0.384	0.361	0.000000252	0.119**	0.278	0.222
	(0.489)	(0.262)	(0.000224)	(0.0865)	(0.189)	(0.172)
East_bef	0.865	0.460	0.218	0.308**	1.726	0.128**
	(0.596)	(0.215)	(0.189)	(0.121)	(0.603)	(0.0910)
N	368					

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Author's Database

Since most of the provincial leaders observed in this study were transferred to the central government to continue their services in the executive branch of Chinese political system, region code 5 for central government as a dependent variable is used as the base outcome for comparison. As shown in Table 4.19, when using the central governmental posts as base outcome, our findings are as follows:

(1) Provincial leaders who changed their serving locations to West China are positively affected by their college education, Communist Youth League background, have worked previously in a developed province, and were serving as current provincial secretaries. These independent variables have statistical significance on the likelihood of being relocated to the West.

(2) Provincial leaders who served in their native provinces were likely to be reappointed as provincial leaders in the Northeast, if they were not transferred to the central government. Provincial leaders from developed and top revenue-making provinces are also likely to be appointed as Northeastern provincial leaders, if they were not transferred to the central governmental. But the significance is at a lower confidence interval.

(3) Provincial leaders who previously served as provincial secretaries or as ministerial officials, and previously (not currently) worked in Eastern Chinese provinces, are likely to be relocated to Central Chinese provinces (in the middle of the country), unless they are getting promoted to the central government of China. All these variables seem to have strong significance on the outcomes.

(4) Provincial leaders with provincial secretary experience, ministerial experience, previous work experience in East China provinces, and higher education are likely to be relocated to the East.

(5) If provincial leaders are not promoted to the central governmental posts, those leaders with older age, provincial secretary or vice-secretary experience, ministerial leadership experience, and previously (not currently) worked in the East, are more likely to be relocated to NPC or CPPCC leadership posts. Also, leaders who currently worked in developed provinces of China, were more likely than others to receive NPC or CPPCC posts.

(6) Statistically, all the independent variables applied in the model have failed to explain why some provincial leaders were dismissed.

As has been suggested in a previous chapter of the study, if a provincial leader cannot get promoted to a central governmental leadership post, one might consider as acceptable choice in one of the developed provinces in East China. And Central provinces, financially and economically, are also better outcomes than the Northeast and the West. Here, this study applies the regional change model by changing the base outcome to the West (coded as 1). The results (Table 4.20) suggest that:

(1) If provincial leaders were not getting relocated to Western provinces of China after they had served in provincial governments, they were likely to be relocated to the Northeast of China if they had had party school training, and if they currently worked in developed provinces. Both factors are significant on the results at a lower confidence interval, yet they are more significant than all other independent variables on the outcomes.

(2) Provincial leaders currently worked in a developed province of China, assuming a Communist Youth League background, are more likely to be relocated to the middle of country (Central provinces), if they were relocated to neither the West nor the Northeast.

(3) If provincial leaders were not relocated to any of the three regions mentioned above, which are the West, the Northeast and the Central, those leaders with Youth League background and previous Eastern provincial leadership experiences were more likely to stay (or be relocated) in the East. Both factors have a strong influence on the outcomes.

(4) Several independent variables are shown to be significant in explaining why some provincial leaders were relocated (promoted) to central governmental leadership posts. Leaders with older age, higher educational achievements, work as Youth League officials (either the League central or regional organizations), currently working in a developed and industrialized province of China as the CCP provincial secretary, are significantly more likely to be promoted to the center of Chinese politics. Having any one of these factors would enhance a leader's upward political mobility. He does not need to have multiple factors. Previously serving as vice governors and currently serving in an Eastern province, also have a positive influence on leaders' promotion, but only at a lower confidence interval.

(5) Provincial leaders, if not relocated to the West, the Northeast, the Middle provinces, or to the central government in Beijing, who received posts in NPC and CPPCC systems were likely leaders with a Youth League background, who currently serve as governors from developed provinces, and who previously worked as CCP provincial vice-secretaries.

(6) Finally, leaders who previously served in Eastern provinces were likely to be promoted to NPC and CPPCC in Beijing, but the significance is robust at a lower confidence interval. On the contrary, regional leaders who previously served in other regions of China have not shown such career trajectories.

The details of the analytical models are shown in Table 4.20.

Table 4.20 Multinomial Regression Model Explaining Regional Changes (Base outcome 2)

	Transfer to Regions after Provincial Leaderships					
	Death or Dismiss	Northeast China	Middle Provinces	East China	Central Government	NPC or CPPCC
	0	2	3	4	5	6
age	0.963	1.028	0.964	0.977	0.940	1.068
	(0.0470)	(0.0630)	(0.0337)	(0.0329)	(0.0306)	(0.0512)
Higher Edu.	2.474	1.118	1.829	1.469	2.718	1.289
	(1.917)	(0.931)	(0.979)	(0.770)	(1.388)	(0.867)
Native Province	1.771	0.266	2.244	1.907	2.325	2.834
	(1.341)	(0.312)	(1.089)	(0.937)	(1.099)	(1.697)
length	1.066	0.877	0.846	0.909	0.854	0.916
	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.0803)	(0.0861)	(0.0778)	(0.110)
tenure	0.319	0.864	1.289	0.852	0.614	0.792
	(0.246)	(0.826)	(0.722)	(0.468)	(0.315)	(0.551)
League exp.	0.687	0.396	0.343*	0.268*	0.310*	0.0789*
	(0.524)	(0.475)	(0.181)	(0.147)	(0.152)	(0.0873)
Party school	0.983	0.154	0.634	0.707	0.766	0.611
	(0.716)	(0.175)	(0.302)	(0.340)	(0.345)	(0.375)
gov_now	1.052	6.405	2.381	1.253	2.522	5.341
	(1.008)	(7.981)	(1.452)	(0.793)	(1.500)	(5.006)
sec_now	0.606	1.937	0.778	1.424	1.362	3.504
	(0.518)	(2.418)	(0.465)	(0.801)	(0.745)	(3.221)
Top revenue provinces	8.064	4.985	41.03***	34664751.4	30.83***	6.823*
	(9.166)	(4.619)	(33.48)	(2.66015e+10)	(21.37)	(5.162)
gov_bef	0.00000101	0.000000284	1.153	0.229	0.530	0.216
	(0.00141)	(0.000473)	(1.213)	(0.328)	(0.602)	(0.314)
sec_bef	7.721*	2.559	1.544	2.155	4.815*	0.360
	(7.169)	(2.686)	(1.129)	(1.464)	(3.235)	(0.367)
Vice-gov_bef	0.407	0.362	0.283	0.465	0.260	0.558
	(0.523)	(0.476)	(0.207)	(0.326)	(0.187)	(0.466)
Vice-sec_bef	0.612	0.752	0.961	0.497	0.894	0.154*
	(0.764)	(0.736)	(0.588)	(0.326)	(0.552)	(0.147)
minister_bef	1.064	0.000000698	0.330	0.772	2.771	0.616

(table continued)	(1.445)	(0.000620)	(0.299)	(0.675)	(2.012)	(0.571)
East_bef	1.880	0.475	0.670	3.751**	2.173	0.279
	(1.414)	(0.432)	(0.336)	(1.781)	(1.014)	(0.213)
N	368					

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Author's Database

In comparing the two different outcomes after running the same regional change multinomial regression model, it makes more sense when we set the base outcome to be the West instead of the Central Government. In brief, regional revenues and economic development can explain many cases of provincial leaders' political mobility. Economic growth and developmental performance matter in regional leaders' political careers, as some scholars have found that "the Chinese central government tends to promote provincial leaders who perform well economically and terminate provincial leaders who perform poorly…economic performance matters for provincial leaders' career prospects [and] is robust to various sensitivity tests."[113]

Meanwhile, Youth League working experience and the holding of posts of governors or party secretaries can also explain many cases of provincial leaders' political mobility. However, none of these independent variables applied in all the regression models explain provincial leaders' demotion or dismissal cases very well.

3. Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese City Leaders

As in any clearly defined hierarchical political system, the higher a cadre moves the fewer choices of posts left for the cadre to compete for. Provincial leaders in China, by whatever standard, are already senior governmental leaders in Chinese politics, even if they get transferred to a different region without gaining a prominent promotion in the hierarchical system, they

[113] Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou. Ibid, p.1760.

should not be considered as the losers of the games of throne. By all means, when one has served as a provincial leader peacefully and competently until one's retirement age, the material compensations and social prestige that accrue are far from disappointing.

However, the case is different for a city leader in China. First of all, there are many more city leaders than provincial leaders, and only a limited number of them can receive great promotions (to become provincial leaders or even higher) even if the party-state's merit system is fairly based on a regional leader's performance and achievements. Simply put, there are not enough posts for everyone, and the higher you aim, the more difficult it is for you to reach. Second, city leaders on average are younger than provincial leaders, as provincial leaders are at the late stage of their careers. City leaders are in the middle yet crucial stage of their political careers, and they can be more anxious and ambitious to compete with one another for scarcely granted promotional opportunities, especially when the opportunity is to promote one from regional government to the CCP center. To many scholars and China watchers from the outside, Chinese technocrats (as it can be the same for all bureaucracies under authoritarian regimes) are collectively defined and assumed to have great similarities with each other. Nevertheless, they do end up very differently and unexpectedly based on their background and experiences as leaders in different regions across China. Therefore, in order to more accurately reflect the political reality of the party-state system, here, it is important to apply a few more models of analysis to find out where the city leaders have gone after they served in their current posts. Besides getting promoted, transferred or demoted, many city leaders entered into a provincial leadership group, and some of them even acquired central governmental positions afterwards. Thus, our logistical regression models of Chinese city leaders' political mobility are:

Table 4.21 Logistics Regression Analysis of City Leader's Political Mobility

	Model 1 Promotion	Model 2 Demotion	Model 3 Transfer	Model 4 Provincial after	Model 5 Finally Central
Age	-0.0153	-0.0493	0.00317	-0.0191	-0.0354
	(-0.73)	(-1.16)	(0.12)	(-0.93)	(-1.51)
Gender	0.0905		-0.987	0.0452	0.0499
	(0.11)		(-1.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
College	0.239	-1.090	-0.325	-0.245	0.891*
	(0.72)	(-1.69)	(-0.77)	(-0.74)	(2.32)
Native province	-0.168	0.619	0.450	-0.0112	-0.367
	(-0.62)	(1.03)	(1.25)	(-0.04)	(-1.22)
CCP member	0.170			-0.890	
	(0.13)			(-0.66)	
Length year	0.0243	-0.00221	0.0734	0.0975	0.00980
	(0.38)	(-0.02)	(0.92)	(1.52)	(0.14)
Tenure	0.666	0.474	-1.105*	-0.164	0.0682
	(1.83)	(0.53)	(-2.38)	(-0.44)	(0.16)
League	0.0635	0.824	-0.961	0.543	-1.167*
	(0.18)	(1.19)	(-1.58)	(1.52)	(-2.50)
Party school	0.361	-0.948	0.193	0.386	-0.321
	(1.15)	(-1.15)	(0.46)	(1.27)	(-0.93)
Local before	0.665*	0.260	-0.631	0.765*	-0.295
	(2.14)	(0.35)	(-1.64)	(2.43)	(-0.83)
Mayor now	0.407	0.910	-0.626	1.297**	2.341*
	(0.94)	(0.81)	(-1.16)	(2.69)	(2.21)
City sec. now	0.859	0.0699	-0.525	2.024***	3.108**
	(1.96)	(0.06)	(-0.98)	(4.19)	(2.93)
Big revenue cities	0.437	0.0909	-0.0963	0.0547	0.547
	(1.53)	(0.16)	(-0.26)	(0.19)	(1.65)
Eastern before	-0.281	-0.385	0.438	0.299	-0.389

(table continued)	(-0.97)	(-0.64)	(1.16)	(1.06)	(-1.22)
Constant	-0.764	-1.067	0.408	-0.386	-2.366
	(-0.41)	(-0.42)	(0.25)	(-0.20)	(-1.20)
N	299	289	296	299	296

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model 1: Chinese city leaders receive promotion (or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).

Model 2: Chinese city leaders receive demotion (or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).

Model 3: Chinese city leaders receive parallel transfer (or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).

Model 4: Chinese city leaders receive provincial leadership position (or not) promotion (or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).

Model 5: Chinese city leaders receive central governmental posts promotion (or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders' age, educational level, serving in one's native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school

training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).

Here, Model 4 is applied to examine why some city leaders have made a greater career jump than others—how they managed to be promoted into provincial governments instead of staying at the city leadership level of the political system. Model 5 is applied to examine what might possibly affect city leaders' political mobility such that after a longer time period (if not immediately) they finally got promoted to central leadership positions in China (CC members, Politburo, or ministerial posts). It is surely a smashing achievement for one to make one's way from a leader of a Chinese city (as there are thousands cities) to be a central governmental leader. The results of all five of the logistics regression models are shown in Table 4.21. Our findings are:

(1) City leaders who received promotions or upward political mobility were more likely to be those leaders who were tenured on their leadership posts, who had previously worked in local government (lower than city-level governments) as governmental heads, and who currently served as party secretaries of the cities, instead of serving at other posts. Also, city leaders who worked in developed regions with great revenue contributions to the central government tended to be promoted more frequently than those who worked in less developed parts of China. But this relationship is only statistically significant at a lower significance interval.

(2) City leaders who were demoted or dismissed afterwards were not associated statistically with any independent variables. No convincing statistical proof was found among the independent variables as to what had caused leaders to be dismissed.

(3) City leaders who received parallel transfers without outstanding changes of hierarchical rankings were likely to be those leaders who were tenured (finished at least one term of service), and who were local governmental leaders previously (local experience). Also, leaders with a Youth League background were more likely to be transferred.

(4) Several independent variables seem to affect the likelihood of being provincial leaders afterwards. City leaders, who are promoted to be provincial leaders immediately after their city chief posts, were those with local governmental leadership experience, currently served as mayors or city secretaries (party chiefs). Also, longer years of service, Youth League experience and party school training, and previously work as governmental heads in an Eastern province of China, all influence the odds of being transferred.

(5) Among all the city leaders observed in the study, those who finally achieved central governmental leadership positions of China, were those with better educational background (with college degrees), with Youth League experience, who had worked as mayors or chief party secretaries of cities. Also, by controlling the independent variables mentioned above, leaders with older age, who had worked in developed provinces of China, and who had previously worked in Eastern provinces were more likely than other leaders to be promoted to central government at later stages of their political careers.

Furthermore, it is of equal importance to show the cross-regional mobility of city leaders as the models mentioned above also test the leader's horizontal political mobility. Therefore, we may adopt the *regional change model* (multinomial logistic regression) of regional leaders again in examining city leaders' regional changes after they served in certain regions of China.

> The *regional change model for Chinese city leaders* is: the region a leader was relocated to after one's city leadership is explicable in terms of a leader's age, educational level, served in native province, length of years served, tenured (or not), Communist Youth League experience, party school training (or not), service as mayor (or not), as party secretary (or not), service in developed provinces (and great revenues contributing cities) (or not), previous service as local leaders (or not), previous service in secretary (or not), previously worked in Eastern Chinese provinces (or not). Except age and length of service years are numbered, other independent variables are dummy variables (0 or 1). Codes for different regions are shown in Table 4.17. Meanwhile, in order to analyze city leader's political mobility across regions, the model also runs with controlling different outcomes as base outcomes.
>
> *Situation 1*: In running the regional change model, set dismiss, retire, or death (coded 0) as the base outcome, in order to have other outcomes' possibilities compared with city leaders being dismissed, dead or retired.
>
> *Situation 2*: In running the regional change model, set West (coded 1) as the base outcome, in order to have other outcomes' possibilities compared with city leaders being relocated to the West of China.

Table 4.22a Multinomial Regression Analysis of City Leader's Regional Changes afterwards

	(1) Region after City Leaders West 1	Northeast 2	Middle 3	East 4	Central Government 5	NPC or CPPCC 6	(2) Region after City Leaders Dismiss, Retire, Death 0	Northeast 2	Middle 3	East 4	Central Government 5	NPC or CPPCC 6
age	0.904	0.966	0.892	0.900	0.937	0.677	1.106	1.069	0.987	0.996	1.037	0.749
	(0.0659)	(0.0739)	(0.0640)	(0.0621)	(0.0708)	(0.273)	(0.0807)	(0.0455)	(0.0314)	(0.0360)	(0.0450)	(0.298)
college	2.676	2.207	3.442	1.855	11.01	1.27764e+15	0.374	0.825	1.286	0.693	4.116	4.77472e+14
	(3.601)	(3.058)	(4.545)	(2.346)	(15.52)	(3.15104e+18)	(0.503)	(0.572)	(0.698)	(0.423)	(3.241)	(1.17759e+18)
Native	4.766	5.070	6.802	5.758	4.027	2.41e-14	0.210	1.064	1.427	1.208	0.845	5.06e-15
	(5.745)	(6.267)	(8.134)	(6.673)	(4.937)	(3.67e-11)	(0.253)	(0.538)	(0.555)	(0.561)	(0.437)	(7.69e-12)
Length year	1.383	1.487	1.300	1.551	1.581	0.328	0.723	1.075	0.940	1.122	1.143	0.237
	(0.548)	(0.596)	(0.514)	(0.605)	(0.636)	(0.684)	(0.287)	(0.126)	(0.0882)	(0.117)	(0.146)	(0.486)
tenure	0.378	0.538	0.654	0.369	0.125	0.0800	2.643	1.421	1.729	0.975	0.329	0.211
	(0.582)	(0.861)	(1.002)	(0.543)	(0.194)	(0.281)	(4.065)	(1.036)	(0.952)	(0.648)	(0.229)	(0.684)
league	0.521	0.509	0.344	0.447	0.254	280.0	1.918	0.976	0.660	0.857	0.487	537.1
	(0.699)	(0.705)	(0.461)	(0.582)	(0.357)	(1744.2)	(2.573)	(0.566)	(0.305)	(0.492)	(0.329)	(3277.6)
Party school	0.744	0.626	0.392	0.654	0.469	6.22e-17	1.344	0.841	0.527	0.878	0.630	8.36e-17
	(0.991)	(0.857)	(0.520)	(0.847)	(0.635)	(1.20e-13)	(1.790)	(0.458)	(0.220)	(0.459)	(0.348)	(1.62e-13)
Mayor now	0.000000334	0.000000465	0.000000610	0.000000659	24.25	6.34247e+12	2990886.7	1.390	1.825	1.971	72515483.3	1.89696e+19
	(0.00142)	(0.00197)	(0.00259)	(0.00280)	(120632.7)	(3.11514e+16)	(1.26940e+10)	(0.983)	(1.060)	(1.531)	(1.88287e+11)	(4.68891e+22)
City sec. now	0.000000198	0.000000102	0.000000270	0.000000292	5.796	4.84951e+11	5051415.4	0.515	1.362	1.475	29276114.7	2.44969e+18
	(0.000840)	(0.000432)	(0.00114)	(0.00124)	(28836.0)	(2.38186e+15)	(2.14394e+10)	(0.374)	(0.768)	(1.102)	(7.60155e+10)	(6.05514e+21)
Big revenue cities	0.439	0.640	1.315	2.573	2.434	4.36e-08	2.276	1.456	2.993**	5.856***	5.540**	9.92e-08
	(0.460)	(0.688)	(1.357)	(2.545)	(2.649)	(0.0000342)	(2.381)	(0.762)	(1.213)	(2.883)	(3.109)	(0.0000779)
Eastern before	0.0253**	0.0595*	0.0461*	2.173	0.113	49073438.2	39.54**	2.354	1.823	85.90***	4.453*	1.94023e+09
	(0.0324)	(0.0776)	(0.0575)	(2.710)	(0.143)	(3.85512e+10)	(50.69)	(1.682)	(1.106)	(51.31)	(3.011)	(1.52421e+12)
N	299						299					

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.22b Multinomial Regression Analysis of City Leaders' Regional Changes afterwards

	(3) **Region after City Leaders** Dismiss, Retire, Death 0	West 1	Middle 3	East 4	Central Government 5	NPC or CPPCC 6
Age	1.035	0.935	0.923	0.931	0.970	0.701
	(0.0791)	(0.0398)	(0.0383)	(0.0403)	(0.0480)	(0.279)
College	0.453	1.213	1.560	0.841	4.990	5.78959e+14
	(0.628)	(0.841)	(1.039)	(0.580)	(4.307)	(1.42789e+18)
Hometown	0.197	0.940	1.342	1.136	0.794	4.76e-15
	(0.244)	(0.475)	(0.672)	(0.612)	(0.472)	(7.23e-12)
Length year	0.673	0.930	0.875	1.043	1.063	0.220
	(0.270)	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.152)	(0.452)
Tenure	1.860	0.704	1.217	0.686	0.232	0.149
	(2.978)	(0.513)	(0.906)	(0.548)	(0.195)	(0.486)
League experiences	1.964	1.024	0.676	0.878	0.498	550.1
	(2.721)	(0.594)	(0.399)	(0.582)	(0.378)	(3362.7)
Party school	1.598	1.189	0.627	1.044	0.750	9.94e-17
	(2.189)	(0.647)	(0.342)	(0.635)	(0.481)	(1.92e-13)
Mayor now	2151038.3	0.719	1.313	1.418	52152960.9	1.36429e+19
	(9.12951e+09)	(0.508)	(0.921)	(1.170)	(1.35415e+11)	(3.37226e+22)
City sec. now	9814112.1	1.943	2.645	2.865	56878927.8	4.75937e+18
	(4.16534e+10)	(1.412)	(1.944)	(2.396)	(1.47686e+11)	(1.17642e+22)
Big revenue cities	1.564	0.687	2.056	4.023*	3.805*	6.82e-08
	(1.682)	(0.360)	(1.028)	(2.215)	(2.384)	(0.0000535)
Eastern before	16.80*	0.425	0.774	36.50***	1.892	824358039.3
	(21.89)	(0.304)	(0.498)	(23.15)	(1.328)	(6.47601e+11)
N	299					

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Source: Author's Database

Situation 3: In running the regional change model, set the Northeast (coded 2) as the base outcome, in order to have other outcomes' possibilities compared with city leaders being relocated to the Northeastern provinces of China.

The results (shown in Table 4.22a and Table 4.22b) suggest the following:

(1) For Chinese city leaders, if they are not retiring or being demoted after their leadership services, those leaders who got transferred to the West, the Northeast, and the Middle provinces of China were likely to be those who had previously served at Eastern Chinese provinces, meaning that they still could continue their leadership but with changes of locations. The results show that city leader with prior Eastern regional leadership experience stayed in the government longer (more durable) than those who did not.

(2) City leaders who got promoted to central governmental posts were those who had higher education and who had previously worked in the East. But the significance interval is lower.

(3) City leaders who got transferred or relocated to the Middle and the Eastern provinces of China were those leaders served at developed cities of China (with great revenue contributions) and had Eastern regional leadership experience. It seems clear that previous regional or local governmental experience may have helped those leaders stay in the relatively more developed regions of China, instead of moving to the poorer side of the country.

(4) City leaders not relocated to the West and the Northeast of China, who got promoted to central government were those who had higher education, were with tenures, had previously worked in Eastern regions, and were currently serving as city leaders in develop cities that made

great revenue contributions. These independent variables' influences on the likelihood are statistically significant (All results shown in Table 4.22a and Table 4.22b).

In addition, the results of "regional change regressions" of provincial and city leaders show that:

(1) Due to the center's deliberate arrangements, talented bureaucrats are always sent to the developed provinces in China but less competent regional leaders always serve in underdeveloped parts of the country.

(2) This uneven (or unfair) arrangement actually may have increased the gap between the developed coastal regions of China and less developed Mid-West China. People, as they want, deserve better leadership if they cannot elect their regional leaders.

D. Conclusion：Chinese Political Elites "on the Go"

1. Political Mobility and the Preferred Characteristics of Chinese Regional Elites

In this part of the study we have intensively studied the patterns of Chinese regional leaders' career mobility by providing applicable research models to analyze the specific cases under observation. The analysis suggests examining Chinese regional political leaders' career mobility with a broader and more comprehensive perspective by analyzing their personal background, previous professional experiences of working at different levels of governments in Chinese politics, and more importantly, how different Chinese regions' geopolitical settings have influenced these regional leaders' political careers in the future. As the previous chapter of the study has pointed out, in contemporary Chinese politics CCP officials need to be of a younger age (as there are retirement requirements on age), have had higher education and have

demonstrated expertise in administrative management. In this chapter, the study also points out that regional leader's local leadership experiences matter; those who worked in executive branches of the regional governments in China (provincial or municipal party committees and governments) had advantages over those who worked in non-executive branches of the governments (NPC or CPPCC systems and attached offices) or those with other professional background (educational institutions or state-owned business firms).

As a matter of fact, by applying the analytical research models designed to examine the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders from the 1950s to 2000s, the findings show that Chinese regional political elites with certain personal characteristics tied to their professional career choices tend to receive more upward career assignments than those who do not possess any of these personal characteristics. These factors are: relatively younger age (more years to stay in the executive posts before retiring), higher educational credentials (though the study does not specify or compare college education with advanced post-graduate degrees), professional leadership training in the party school system, and relatively longer years of serving the government (tenured leaders) that can prove one's loyalty to the party-state.

Furthermore, because all the cases are randomly selected from different time periods of Chinese political history and from different regional settings of Chinese political economy, there are not considerable numbers of female regional leaders or leaders with ethnic minority background. Thus, gender and nationality factors do not have significant influences on career movements in the research models. However, it is firmly believed that if it is a study on ethnic groups or gender preferences in Chinese politics is undertaken, we may see more robust outcomes by controlling other independent variables and focusing on gender and ethnicity only. Against all odds, gender and ethnicity factors by far are not crucial factors that can solely affect

the decision-makings of the CCP center or alter the entire regime; instead, it is believed that only fundamental change of regime shall bring much more dynamics to both of the two groups in Chinese political life.

Moreover, the nativity of regional leaders serving at their hometown provinces (either provincial leaders or city leaders) does not seem to have convincingly strong negative effects on regional leaders' political mobility. In other words, the study has found no evidence that a regional leader cannot get promoted because one is a native who heads a region government in one's native province. Despite exceptional cases, we conclude that it is some other set of factors that may have prevented a particular regional leader from being promoted or making parallel transfers as regional leaders. The CCP center does not appear to judge a regional leader only on the basis of nativity or locality. Previous studies suspected that the CCP center viewed localism as a threat to the center's authority, and that the center might, therefore, treat native and non-native regional leaders differently. Our findings show that native-born leaders sooner or later change the regions where they serve as regional leaders, and the majority of them do not tend to stay at their native provinces throughout their careers. From a natural perspective, then, there is a real circulation of elites. It is suggested here that it is the localism that concerns the center, not any individual regional leader from a particular province of China that alarms the center. At least we have no proof in concluding that native-born leaders receive no promotions.

2. Political Mobility and Regional Leaders' Performance

Needless to say, one of the most overpowering features of Chinese political-economic phenomena is the sustaining economic growth under the authoritarian party-state regime. Some of the previous studies on the issues have suggested that economic achievements may affect

Chinese regional leaders' political mobility as the center prefers those leaders who have made the economy look good. [114]

Our findings show that this issue should be discussed from both of its sides: first, more developed regions (provinces and their major metropolitan municipalities) do enjoy more socioeconomic development in addition to higher GDP growth. It is likely that officials who are appointed to be regional leaders in developed provinces of China have much larger shoes to fill in as they must keep the economic growth fast enough to keep their posts. Second, it happens recently that GDP growth numbers tend to reflect less realistic situations of Chinese regional economic development; the numbers fabricated by regional officials can be deceptive, designed to cheer the Chinese people up and please the CCP center. Therefore, we adopt regional revenues incomes and their contributions to the center as an adjustment. The results have shown our hypothesis to be convincing that regional leaders from higher revenue contributing regions get promoted higher, faster, and greater.

As most economically developed provinces are in the East, our analysis has also applied another independent variable to observe how many incumbent regional leaders in China previously had served in the East as governmental heads. The results show that regional leaders, who previously worked in the East and currently worked in a developed region, had greater possibilities of getting promoted. And they actually have greater chances to be relocated to the central government in Beijing, which means that their political careers will have entered into a much more advanced stage than the rest of the regional leaders in China. China's reform of its personnel control system coincided with the beginning of its economic reforms. A crucial turnaround in personnel management was the wholesale change in the evaluation criteria for

[114] Li and Zhou (2005), and Bo (2002).

government officials. Political conformity, which was the only important pre-reform criterion for promotion, gave way to economic performance and other competence-related indicators. Although political loyalty remains important, generating more financial resources for the center (and for the local government as well) has proved to be an efficient means for leaders to show off their achievements in governance. In other words, they are the "employees of the year (fiscal year)" who are expecting to be rewarded by the center.

Our findings show that when it comes to political mobility opportunities, there exist actual differences between more executive posts and less executive posts in Chinese regional governments. Findings of the study show that among provincial leaders, CCP chiefs and governors are more likely to be promoted than vice party secretaries and vice governors. There is only one governor of a province at a time, and the same is true of the party chief of the province. But there can be several vice secretaries and vice governors in charge of different departments inside the regional political system. Therefore, the "CEOs" of regional governments, governors and party chiefs so to speak, are the ones who think of the big pictures and run the entire systems. Among city leaders observed in the study, city party chiefs and mayors received more promotions than vice secretaries and vice mayors. As city governments are ranked lower than the provincial governments, vice city secretaries and vice mayors are more junior regional leaders (and they are younger in general); it takes longer for them to climb up the administrative hierarchy, and promotion opportunities come later as well.

The findings support the hypothesis made in the previous chapters of the study: the CCP is a political party with strong discipline that runs the party-state, and the CCP center has its strict rules in promoting regional leaders that one's achievements must be proved by one's

loyalty and performance altogether. Though there are exceptions, in post-Deng's Chinese politics, the center is extremely cautious to make the regional leaders do "great leaps upward." [115]

The East of China is the better-looking side of the country, but we must keep in mind that the rest of China combined has more developmental issues and more complicated governance-related problems (poverty, infrastructure, education, welfare, multinational groups, and natural resource related environmental issues). As a matter of fact, in addition to the evidence the study has found that regional leaders from the developed regions of China get more opportunities. Our findings also show that regional leaders serving in other regions of China with particular credentials or personal experiences can get the spotlight attention from the CCP center as well, even though the chances seem to be greater for those who work at the East. Two other important indicators applied by the study are local leadership experience and Communist Youth League official experience. Our study finds that in the post-Deng era regional leaders with administrative experience in the Communist Youth League have been attracting more and more political opportunities from the center. As we have discussed in the prior chapter of the study, the smaller group containing officials with Youth League working experiences inside the CCP was developed at a relative later stage of the CCP's rule. Our analysis shows that regional leaders (as well as the central leaders who came from regional governments) classified as *Tuanpai* (the clique of the League) came with very different personal background, and the concentration of League-related regional leaders is most pronounced in the Mid-west provinces of China.

Furthermore, our findings show that this locational disadvantage does not stop Youth League-related regional leaders from getting outstanding opportunities of promotion; having

[115] One the important feature of contemporary Chinese politics is that the center tries to make leadership transitions more smooth and semi-predictable. Relevant studies on the topic see Bruce J. Dickson. "Threats to Party Supremacy." *Journal of Democracy*, 14(1), (2003):27-35, and Andrew G. Walder. "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order." *American Sociological Review*, 60(3), (June 1995):309-28.

Youth League experience has a significantly positive influence on regional leaders who received promotions. In terms of regional changes after the fact, leadership posts in the less developed parts of China have not stopped League-related regional leaders from getting relocated to the central government in Beijing. Can this background advantage (having worked for the Youth League) overcome a regional leader's locational disadvantage (serving at the Mid-west regions of China)? And why are League-affiliated regional leaders are not concentrated in the developed provinces of China? The next chapter of the study will discuss more about on this topic.

In addition, another significant factor that has affected regional leaders' political mobility in a general sense is having local governmental experience. Our findings show that among all provincial leaders in China observed by the study, those who have had city leadership experience were more to win promotions than those who have not. Provincial leaders who have serve as city leaders had greater promotions. Likewise, city leaders who have had leadership experience at lower level local governments were more likely to get promotions than those who have not.

Overall, Chinese regional leaders who had served in local governments before they were appointed to governmental heads at other local governments tend to get more subsequent promotions than those regional leaders who came from the central government, state-owned business or education institutions. The significance of local work experience on regional leaders' political mobility suggest that the CCP center values regional leaders' credentials and achievements before they receive regional governmental posts or serve as regional political chiefs in China. After all, leaders who have spent their previous careers at local governments very likely would know local politics more than those have not had any similar working experiences in the regional governmental system. Bureaucracy in general is a merit system where

professional training and specialized expertise are more encouraged, but where passion and enthusiasm for being politicians are less necessary and helpful. Apparently, the center values those regional leaders who are more familiar with agenda-settings and solution-orientated governing skills. Presumably, most authoritarian regimes do likewise.

3. The Unveiled Opacity: Downward Mobility of Regional Leaders

The patterns of promotions and transfers are adequately explained by the series of factors observed in the study. However, we still have not found a functioning model to explain Chinese regional political elites' downward career movements, such as demotions and dismissals. Even if the independent variables have robust significance in explaining the outcomes of promotions and transfers. We may have clarified why Chinese regional leaders receive promotions, but we have little idea why some Chinese regional leaders have received demotions and gotten dismissals.

In fact, though the cases of all regional leaders observed in the study were randomly chosen, leaders' demotions seem to be even more random, such that a demoted leader's age, education, nativity, professional experiences (party school trainings and local experiences before), incumbent position (governor, secretary or mayor), locations (Eastern or Mid-west China), economic tribute and fiscal contribution to the center (top revenue making provinces or cities) and length of years serving as regional leaders do not seem to have a significant influence in explaining demotions. As a result, it is suggested that the demoted or dismissed regional leaders need to be examined and explained through other unconventional means in order to reveal the correlation between a leaders' performance and the center's drastic disapproval that makes the latter decide to discontinue the leader's service for the regime.

At this stage, though, the downward mobility of Chinese regional leaders does not seem to be affected by the conventional factors used in the study. At least we know that for whatever reason a CCP cadre gets dismissed by the center, it is the termination of his political career and the end of a regional leader's political mobility. Therefore, as the models applied in this chapter analyze the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders, it is suggested that we need to study the demoted or dismissed cases differently and independently by applying analytical theories and models other than the ones we have used here. Otherwise, this study by far is effective in explaining the outcomes of political mobility of regional leaders.

Again, pointed out earlier, the teleology of any study on Chinese political elites and elite political mobility must ultimately be concerned with the party-state regime and any dynamic changes of its. Therefore, the following part of the study will continue in its efforts to unveil the existing opacities in studying Chinese regional leaders' political mobility.

CHAPTER FIVE
FOR THE HARMONIOUS SOCIETY:
BEYOND ECONOMIC REASONING AND HOW NOT TO GET PROMOTED

One of the most noticeable trends in Chinese politics in the post-Deng Xiaoping era is that the CCP has become less unified in ideological concentration, party organization, and the central leadership. Such a decentralizing trend of the party-state regime, even though the CCP center's authority as the central government of the unitary state has not been severely weakened at all, has also caused many newer phenomena in the personnel arrangements and the selection of regional official in Chinese politics. As this study has suggested, the reformist policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s were actually and practically a series of decentralizing actions aimed at limiting the center's influences over the market and people's economic life. Local authorities were encouraged to issue economic growth-centric policies featuring the advantages of their particular regions.

Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping insisted that such decentralized reformist economic plans should and would not lead to visibly greater income inequality among the Chinese people, or unevenly developed Chinese regions. The essential guideline of his reformist ideas was to transform China toward "common prosperity." The prosperous Chinese people would accelerate the pace to the common prosperity.[116] In fact, more than 30 years of economic reform pushed by the CCP has brought countless social changes to Chinese society but not the common prosperity Deng Xiao predicted.

Furthermore, as revealed by the study, the undeniably huge developmental gaps among different Chinese regions might have also brought political inequality into contemporary Chinese

[116] Deng Xiaoping (1986). "Rang yi bufen ren xian fu qilai (Allow Some of Us to Be Rich First)," in *Deng Xiaoping's Speeches on August 16 to 19, 1986.* Retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/34136/2569304.html

politics. According to the analysis of Chinese regional leaders' political mobility in the previous chapter of this study, regional leaders from different Chinese regions received different promotion opportunities. They were also being relocated differently after they have served their terms in a region. Though the geopolitical settings have their rigidities and are not easily subject to social or political changes, their uneven development resulted political differences when a regional leader of China makes their plans to climb up to ascend the party-state hierarchy.

Other than the developmental advantages that the Eastern Chinese provinces enjoy, the political influences of their regional leaders are also associated with the fiscal contribution they make to the CCP center. Unlike increasing the regional GDP growth rate, where governmental investments and costly public projects (e.g., cross-provincial freeway systems, high-speed bullet train rail tracks, metropolitan subways and urban landscapes) can boost the GDP number greatly in a very short period of time and put the regional governments in debt, fiscal revenues take a much longer time to grow. The growth is also more vulnerable (compared to GDP growth manipulated by the government) to external factors, such as market demands and global economic trends.

However, as the study has examined, when the CCP center grants promotion opportunities to regional leaders who fiscally contribute more to the center, it actually encourages Chinese regional leaders to squeeze more from their local people and give more to the center (and save more to themselves). When the economy is prosperous and flourishing, the negative side effects seem to be trivial as the people's general income has been increasing. Yet during recession, such a means of revenue-collecting can severely deepen the cleavages between

local businesses and their regional governments. Some recent cases have shown popular discontent caused by local governments' brutal ways of collecting taxes.[117]

To nurture a sustainable local economy is more difficult than to destroy its fruits. Hurting the local businesses, in order for the governmental heads themselves to get promoted, is a regretfully foolish practice as it kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. Meanwhile, due to the great achievements of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the Eastern Chinese provinces are now known for being the economic engines of the country, and their regional governments draw much more political and social resources than the regional governments of the rest of China. Regional leaders capable of keeping the economy and revenue incomes growing have become the CCP center's preferences in selecting potential elites to fill regional governmental posts. From this perspective, being a governmental official from Eastern China can be more preferential than those from other regions of China. For regional officials who do not have such advantages may have to try something different to show their outstanding leadership skills so as to be considered for promotion. Such preferential advantages, as the study examines in the priori chapter, also exist among Chinese regional political elites with Communist Youth League background. Youth League working experience seems to have helped officials get promoted to prominent governmental posts.

Besides the patterns shown in regional leaders' promotions and transfers, few factors can explain the termination of the political career of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng period. Aside from age, which is the most obvious factor to determine a regional leader's retirement (as

[117] A township in Zhejiang Province (Zhili) where local businesses concentrate on manufacturing children's garments for exporting, the government doubled the "sewing machine taxes" to all firms regardless of the declining market demands due to the global recession. It caused local people's protests and violent behavior to show their strong dissatisfaction toward the tax raises. Patti Waldmeir. (2011, October 28) "Soldiers Curb Unrest in Chinese Factory Town." *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com, accessed October 28, 2011.

when one reaches a certain age limit, one is most likely to retire), and institutionalized retirement (leaving one's office and transition of power to the successor) has not yet been found strong connections with other factors that can explain why many regional leaders received demotions or were dismissed.

In Mao Zedong era of Chinese regional politics, political reasons and elite power struggles were the main causes that resulted in regional political elites losing their prominent posts in regional governments. The political turbulence was extremely unstable during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), while even the central leadership was in crisis from time to time due to Mao's purges of the veteran revolutionary leaders. More than 80 percent of governmental officials were purged and removed during the chaotic Cultural Revolution period.[118] This assertion that removals of regional leaders were due to their political standings against Mao's personal leadership has been empirically studied by a number of scholars.[119]

Since the 12th CCP National Congress in 1982, where institutionalized retirements of senior leaders became a part of the personnel arranging system, regional leaders' political mobility had been more connected with their governance achievements, especially regional economic growth and revenue incomes. Fewer regional political elites were terminated from their careers for exclusively political reasons. In other words, disobeying the center can cost a regional leader his job, but merely obeying the center (without achieving anything economically great) cannot guarantee the leader's tenure. The removal of General Secretary Hu Yaobang in 1987 and the resignation of Mr. Hu's successor, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang in 1989 were both remarkable political events in Chinese politics, but neither one of them resulted in a

[118] John P. Burns. "The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System as a Leadership Selection Mechanism," in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Yongnian Zheng (eds.): *Chinese Communist Party in Reform* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2006) p.42.
[119] Zhiyue Bo. *Chinese Provincial Leaders* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p.87.

political earthquake among Chinese regional governments. Most Chinese regional leaders remained in their posts after 1989 even if the political atmosphere had shifted drastically. When former Shanghai party boss, Jiang Zemin was appointed the new general secretary of the CCP, the power transition was smooth.

This study contends that there are two reasons why most regional leaders were not reshuffled after 1989. First, the ultimate decision-maker, Deng Xiaoping, was still in power. Although Deng himself was not the constitutional head of government in China, his influence and directions over governmental policies and finalized decisions were undeniably decisive. This included the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang and the promotion of Jiang Zemin from Shanghai party boss to the general secretary of the CCP in 1989. Second, the importance of Chinese regional politics had been switched to sustaining the high-speed economic growth and the transition to the market economy from the central-planning system. Ideological politics was no longer the only consideration that the center used to determine a regional leader's fate. Even after 1989, Deng Xiaoping insisted that the decision of continuing the reform was unstoppable. Deng insisted that "no single character of the Political Report of 13th CCP National Congress shall be changed" [120] to make it clear to all that he always supported the reform. The top priority of the party-state shifted from political struggles to socioeconomic development of China. Chinese regional governmental leaders have also shifted from proletarian revolutionaries to the authoritarian regime's technocrats and local economic managers. They started focusing more on the normalized local governance issues, as most regional governments in the world do, such as the

[120] Cited from Wang Xiao:"Zhengzhi tizhi gaige: shisanda baogao yu shiqida baogao bijiao (The Political Reform: Comparison of the 13th CCP Congress Report and the 17th CCP Congress Report)." Retrieved from http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=118807, accessed August 12, 2011.

emphasis of the importance of economic development, increasing of revenues, and lowering the unemployment rates.

Therefore, one can hypothesize that contemporary cases of removals or dismissals of Chinese regional leaders are much more normalized or institutionalized compared to those of the Mao Zedong era. Chinese regional leaders are dismissed or demoted due to their incompetence, due to their violations of laws and state regulations, due to their power-abusing or corrupt behaviors, but not merely because they had misunderstood the central leader(s), or they took the wrong side during any political debates. Meanwhile, as the great achievements of Chinese economic reform over the past 30 years were strongly associated with governmental policies and support of Chinese government(s) (both the central government and regional governmental branches), we can further hypothesize that the demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng era are also associated with economic issues, especially cases involving the abuse of power and rent-seeking economic crimes of political elites. Nationwide and systemic corruptions among governmental officials have posed great challenges to the CCP's ruling legitimacy.

Furthermore, in post-Deng Xiaoping era Chinese politics, especially since the 16th CCP National Congress in 2002 when Hu Jintao was elected as the General Secretary of CCP, the party has mandated social orders and political stability to sustain their leaderships of the country. Contentious politics due to socioeconomic changes, environmental concerns due to rapid and nationwide industrializations, and major accidents involving great number of civilians, are the newest challenges to the CCP in contemporary Chinese society. None of them were foreseen by either Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping during their years as China's ultimate leaders.

All these governance-related issues are compelling the CCP center to take affirmative actions to discipline those regional leaders who fail to handle the problems well and who deserve to be swept from the elite. The removal of regional leaders due to any of these crisis-management failures has not yet become institutionalized, which means not every official who fails to manage these issues will be fired. But having failed to manage the crises is an excuse that is used by the center to dismiss or demote some regional leaders. However, compared to avoiding economic crimes, do the social management skills of Chinese regional leaders occupy the same political priority on the center's cadre policy agenda? Does the center dismiss or demote a regional leader because of alleged corruption activities, mistreatment of social movements, or major accidents involving the local people? At last, this chapter of the study gives a comprehensive analysis of political mobility trends among post-Deng Xiaoping regional leaders. With dismissal cases taken into consideration, we will now have an overall perspective of the subject, and a more clearly defined map of regional leader's political mobility.

The essential hypotheses of the chapter are:

Hypothesis 5.1: Compared to party politics under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping where political struggles accounted for many of the removals of Chinese regional leaders, post-Deng Xiaoping's China dismisses such officials due to: (1) the age limits for formal retirements, (2) economic crimes, such as accepting bribes and engaging in corruption, (3) serious violations of the state's laws and regulations, and (4) incompetence on the job and having made serious mistakes over governance-related issues (such as mistreatment of accidents, environmental issues, and other social stability-related issues).

Hypothesis 5.2: As is shown in the previous chapter of this study, Eastern Chinese regional leaders get promoted more. There are similar patterns that characterize the demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders as well. Dismissals and demotions of regional leaders from different parts of China are handled differently. Some groups of regional leaders are more resilient than other regional leaders.

Hypothesis 5.3: Highly ranked Chinese regional leaders are more resilient than lower-ranked Chinese regional leaders. It is more likely that lower-ranked officials will get demoted than higher-ranked regional leaders. In other words, the higher one's rank, the safer one may be from the center's disciplining actions.

A. Downward Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese Regional Leaders in Post-Deng Xiaoping Era

Collectively, Chinese regional leaders who head regional governmental branches across the country are technocrats hired and trained by the CCP party-state and work for the party as its agents nationwide. Yet, individually, every Chinese regional leader is a party cadre who has emerged from numerous rounds of selections and attained at a certain height within the strictly hierarchical political system. Every step one is about to take must be carefully planned as any incorrect move can cost everything one has achieved so far in this elaborate political game. This study has already highlighted the reason why a political career means a great deal to a Chinese regional leader. It is not only because of the political importance that comes with being a governmental leader; but the social privileges and personal prestige that come along with a regional leader's political power occupy great significance when one chooses to start a career in the government.

This unique feature of Chinese politics, where power is strongly associated with all sorts of social and economic resources, makes the political career of a regional leader in China a lifetime commitment and a prominent lifestyle choice. Considering the many difficulties a regional leader has been through (to get promoted from the very bottom of the system), and how much effort (and possible sacrifice) he has made for the exchange of power and privileges, it is obvious that it can be unthinkably disastrous for a regional leader's political career to be terminated suddenly and abnormally. In other words, no Chinese regional leader, we assume, would ever try to avoid promotion, let alone seek dismissal. Furthermore, to be put in prison for violations and crimes is definitely an extremely shameful moment for any fallen regional leader, especially since they were once in line for more upward political mobility in the system.

In studying Chinese politics of in the post-Deng era, and taking the dismissals of regional leaderships as results which are against most Chinese regional leaders' motives, the current analysis assumes that any regional leader in China who encounters unexpected demotion or dismissal ordered by the center, must be given a reasonable explanation by the CCP center. This logic applies both to the leader himself and the public who once regarded him as their legitimate authority. When the CCP center announces a new regional leader, it makes sure the whole process looks to be a seemingly sensible arrangement for the leader has achievements that qualify for the reward. In like manner, when the center decides to terminate a regional leader's career, it must be presented a seemingly sensible decision as well. Having no direct access to the CCP center's decision-making processes, though, we predict that the top leaders of China make their decisions (mostly) based on objective reasons, performance-related not mere political bias. As a matter of fact, there are two main types of downward political mobility found among Chinese regional leaders who are under the center's scrutiny. First, they could be demoted, but

still stay in the political system. These regional leaders would leave their current posts but accept lower posts in regional governments (or sometimes in the central governments but in lower-ranked or non-executive offices). Second, they could be kicked out from the bureaucracy completely and be dismissed from their current posts. Such a scenario would mean the end of their political mobility, and many of them would also face judicial charges for the crimes they have committed.

As discussed in the previous chapter, institutionalized regular retirement due to age also causes the termination of a regional leader's political career. In this study, 63 of 370 (17 percent) were retired due to the age limit. Also among the 370 provincial leaders, 132 of them served as provincial leaders in post-Deng Xiaoping era, and after their leadership service, 5.4 percent of them retired due to the government's age limit regulations. We have also discussed in prior parts of the study the fact that regional leaders who were in offices shortly after the Cultural Revolution had the highest mean age among all Chinese regional leaders at all times because many of them were revolutionary veterans who were purged during Mao's Cultural Revolution, only regaining their careers afterwards. Thus, the retirement rate since the 1990s among regional leaders has been more stabilized by the CCP center. Rarely are older leaders allowed to go beyond the age limit. Regularly retired regional leaders (as well as central leaders) leave younger leaders more room and freedom in regional governance. Some regional leaders actually changed their occupation afterwards, though it is a rare thing for a regional leader to do.

Among all the observations of post-Deng Chinese provincial leaders, there was one leader who later became university president and two leaders later ran large state-owned companies. Although they were no longer in the government, they still worked for the state (public higher education and state-owned economy). Some regional leaders chose to "resign" so

as to terminate their political careers. For the resigning leaders, if they resigned for purely personal reasons (health or other private issues), this study views the situation to be similar to an age-based retirement. However, if they resigned due to crimes and violations, and if they were charged by the legal branches of the government (The People's Courthouses or The People's Procuratorates), the study views such cases the similar situations to leaders who were dismissed for wrongdoing. We look at the outcomes of the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders regardless of causes of the termination of their political careers are what we analyze.

1. Corruptions, Serious Violations, Accidents and the Removals of Chinese Regional Leaders

As a persistent ailment of Chinese politics, corruption of governmental officials in China has had a rather long history. The Communist Revolution and the establishment of the People's Republic seemed to have reduced corruption for a short period of time under Mao's totalitarian rule. Yet, the economic "opening up" and privatized market since the late 1970s seemed to cause increasing corruption in Chinese government, and elite corruption was one of the main customs voiced held by the protesters on Tiananmen Square in 1989. Some scholars consider corruption as the failure of the planned economy—is a generic problem existed in most Communist regimes.[121] Others view the increasing number of corrupt officials as a developmental issue which is particularly associated with countries that are undergoing sociopolitical transitions in the middle of the painful modernization process.[122]

[121] Janos Kornai. *The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). Cited from simplified Chinese edition, Zhang An (trans.) (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2007), pp.260-61.
[122] Xiao Gongqin. *Zhongguo de da zhuanxing (China's Great Transformation)* (Beijing: New Star Press, 2008), pp.183-86.

Regardless of different pathological explanations of corruption, the undeniably high degree of corruption existing in contemporary Chinese politics has definitely alarmed the CCP center in recent years, as corrupt governmental officials have caused great losses to the country's economic resources, national capacities, social capital, and public disrespect. Worst of all, though, corruption has weakened the CCP and its regional governments. As pointed out by China watchers, the large number of corrupt governmental officials stirs up greater social inequality and political instability; "those who are most likely to prosper are the ones who are most closely tied to the state. Those who have taken the lead in getting rich have little incentive to change the system that has allowed them, their families, and their friends to prosper."[123] An example of this corruption is rent-seeking scandals where the semi-open access to the market for the investors entailed pressure from powerful political figures to make doing business easier. For some expected amounts of bribery to lubricate the political system, business people would gain a much greater share of the market as a reward.[124]

In addition to the corruption that exists on the business side of China, where private enterprises seek easier accesses to the market of 1.4 billion consumers, China's infrastructural boom in the recent decades provides another channel of generating numerous corruption cases. Due to the demands of sustainable economic growth and trillions of U.S. dollars of governmental investments in China's public infrastructure, governmental officials, who do not have to be high-ranking political figures at all, who deal with the details of expenditures are exposed to the daily opportunities of billions of dollars of cash flow from the governments' vaults to the contractors'

[123] Bruce Dickson. *Wealth into Power: the Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.236.

[124] Not only in China, but Indian business people consider briberies to the bureaucracy nowadays as simply another cost of establishing business. See Amol Sharma. "Bribes, Bureaucracy Hobble India's New Entrepreneurs," *The Wall Street Journal* (2011, November 1), A1 and A14. In the same article, the access of "Dealing with Construction Permits" that controlled by world governments ranks China the 179th and India the 181st.

banking accounts. The absence of a well-functioning auditing structure in China gives these officials the perfect chances to put tremendous amounts of the governmental investments into their own pockets. Recently, China's railway minister was dismissed for his involvement in the stealing of the national high-speed railway investments, [125] and many provincial leaders and departmental heads were caught for having stolen money from other public projects, such as freeway constructions. [126] Accepting bribes can cause disturbances of the market as it violates the fairness of competitions. Stealing the public investments on infrastructures also generates serious problems that the center disproves the most. Either circumstance would alarm the center to take actions against corrupt governmental heads, and likely to remove them from their posts.

Another issue, which is related to corruption and which stirs social controversies in Chinese society, is the seeming increase in safety accidents and public health crises. Due to the unfairness of market competition and the absence of "value-free" quality control, many unqualified Chinese food and drugs manufactures have entered the market not because of the sound quality their products, but for the bribes they have offered to the governmental officials. In consequence, fatal accidents due to the poor quality of these products (sometimes they were toxic without passing the governmental tests) have occurred, and have caused people's anger toward the manufacturers and the governments' monitoring failures. The frequency of such events has been rising in recent years; so has the number of the regional governmental leaders

[125] Wong, Edward. "China's Railway Minister Loses Post in Corruption Inquiry." *The New York Times* (2011, February 12). Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com

[126] "Fubai Jiaotong tingzhang de duochong zuilian (The Corrupt Head of the Department of Transportation of Anhui Province)." Retrieved from http://www.people.com.cn (2006, October 8).

(including ministers of the central government) who have gotten fired by the center due to their deadly mistakes.[127]

While it does not mean that each and every similar accident would cost a regional leader his career, the discontent of the people can damage the center's reputation and threaten its rule of China. It is possible that both the center and the regional political system try to protect their protégés from these incidents and minimize their negative effects. Because of this, it is an acceptable strategy for the center to sacrifice one or two of its less favored employees. Above all, we must admit that certain large scale of incidents could cost some regional leaders their posts, as has happened before.

Furthermore, a relatively newer phenomenon that affects Chinese regional leaders' political mobility is the land dispute issue involving the people, the government, and a third party (mostly real estate developers). Accidents relating to mishandled drug and food products directly affect Chinese people's lives and merit the center's great attention (and immediate counter-measures). While land disputes are highly sensitive sociopolitical issues that until recently have not been widely discussed by the Chinese government.

All the land of China is ultimately claimed by the Chinese government as the only rightful owner and landlord. Dwellers and farmers living on the land only have the right of using their land based on their contract with the state. Soaring real estate prices across most Chinese cities in recent years have provided the government with the opportunity to sell its land to real estate developers for cash. However, the government must first get rid of the dwellers (with

[127] Former Chief of National Food and Drugs Inspection Bureau, Zheng Xiaoyu, a ministerial official, was sentenced to death in 2007 for his corrupt activities by letting unqualified drugs enter into the market and caused fatal accidents of Chinese people. Retrieved from http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-07-10/122813415293.shtml, accessed October 2, 2011.

compensation offerings) on the land first to open it for the developers. Frequently, when the dwellers refuse to move, the governmental branches clear them out through improper means. The land dispute issues have caused fatal incidents involving civilian deaths and ignited social protests involving hundreds to thousands of villagers and suburban dwellers. Some of the incidents were exposed to the media before the provincial or central government could react, causing roaring anger and ghastly criticisms among the Chinese people especially amongst Internet users. As a result, again, to ease the societal dissatisfaction and to direct people's hatreds to certain targets, some regional governmental leaders would lose their jobs or get demoted for incompetence. By far, among the demoted and dismissed regional leaders observed in this study, most provincial-level governmental leader had never been punished for land dispute problems; however, lower-ranked officials who were involved were demoted or removed.

Above all, in post-Deng Chinese politics, regional leaders who received downward political mobility or terminations of their political careers were always associated with certain reasons or explanations given by the CCP center. Their removals were primarily due to official misbehavior, such as corruption and other unlawful violations, administrative failures that led to accidents and loss of lives and property, abuse of power for personal gains, and other scandals are unacceptable for any governmental officials as civil servants (usually include accusations of having extra-marital affairs, sexual harassment, and all other morally unacceptable behavior). Table 5.1 shows that the most common types of accusations applied by the CCP center to remove or demote its regional leaders. Corruption (133 counts) or having violated other laws (140 counts) was found among removed regional leaders. Also, having made unforced administrative mistakes (114 counts) or having mishandled accidents (90 counts) were common reasons used by the center to fire its regional leaders. Overall, regional leaders were removed for

violating one or more of the listed accusations given by the center. Only a few regional leaders (7 counts) were accused directly for political disagreements with the center that cost their careers. Again, compared to that of Mao's era, being politically wrong is no longer the main reason a regional leader got fired, at least not the publicly acknowledged reason.

Table 5.1 Types of Accusations Causing Regional Leaders' Demotions or Dismissals

Type of Accusation	**Frequency**
Corruption	133
Other Violation	140
Accident	90
Duty Mistakes	114
Movements	24
Land Disputes	83
Stability	73
Scandal	65
Political Reason	7

Source: Author's Database

2. The Possibility and the Degrees of Punishments: What's Hard to Gauge?

Among studies of political elites under authoritarian regimes, the factors influencing elites' political mobility are difficult to measure due to limited information released by state-monitored sources. Information beyond the brief statements must be gauged through contextual meaning and relevant sociopolitical events. The situation is the same for scholars and China watchers who study Chinese political elites if no reliable insiders provide reliable news of what is going on in the decision-making black box. However, certain information about demoted or dismissed Chinese regional leaders can be generally categorized based on the descriptions and accusations given by the state-owned media. As is shown in Table 5.1, most demoted or dismissed Chinese regional political elites in recent decades were removed because of their

illegal violations, especially corruption-related crimes. But we have little knowledge about how these officials got caught by the center. Furthermore, how (and when) would the center determine to take actions toward a corrupt cadre due to serious violations? As we have discussed in chapter three, many of the post-Deng regional leader share very similar professional background and political career paths. They have also been working in the same regions prior to receiving different further political mobility. Why then, were some of them under investigation for corruption, while some others were not? Since most of the outsiders will not know at all until the information is released by the center, previous studies have not provided convincing analysis on the issue.

Some other questions remain to be answered at this stage before we discuss any further aspects of the removal of Chinese regional leaders. First, to what degree would the CCP center tolerate corruption and bribery among its regional political elites? And when does the center being silent? This study has revealed that different governmental branches occupy different political status in the political system of China. Meanwhile, we have also found evidence that some regions in China are politically more important than others, not only because they are located in the coastal regions of the country, but because they also generate greater revenue contributions to the center. Do these factors give more political protection to the regional leaders who work in these regions? Are more executive posts exposed to the CCP center's scrutiny because the executives deal with more complicated situations in carrying out the policies, while the non-executives are less vulnerable due to fewer opportunities for wrongdoing? For instance, the head of a cultural department or a local People's Political Consultative Committee would be much less involved in a mining accident or a local people's social protest against the government's tax hikes.

Second, has the center always been reasonable in removing its regional leaders with corruption as the prime cause? Or are of corruption so prevalent because such charges gain the center increased authority and cater to the wants of the people in China? In other words, if it is known to the center that the bureaucracy is corrupt frequently and collectively, it is only a matter of timing to weed out a regional official who seems to be disloyal and disputative to the center over certain issues?

Table 5.2 Distribution of Posts of Demoted and Dismissed Regional Leaders

Post	**Count**	**%**
Provincial Secretary	8	2.6
Prov. Vice Sec.	33	10.8
Governor	7	2.3
Vice Governor	45	12.7
Ministerial	18	5.9
City Secretary	21	6.8
City Vice Sec.	18	5.9
Mayor	30	9.8
Vice Mayor	74	24.1
Sub-City or County Level	65	19.3
Total	319	100

Source: Author's Database

As the study itself is not fully devoted to the political phenomena of corruption in China, the analysis does not pretend to answer all the questions raised above. Yet, for a political system with extremely limited access to outsiders, these questions are surely of great benefits to anyone who intends to make intellectual contributions to the subject. As in our study, we have at a minimum observed the dismissed Chinese regional leaders with different characteristics to support the proposed hypotheses. As shown in Table 5.2, the 319 total dismissals involved, 8 provincial CCP secretaries, 33 vice or deputy provincial secretaries, 7 governors, 45 vice

governors, and 18 ministerial officials (including regional leaders ranked as the equivalent of a minister). Together they constituted more than one-third of the observed cases. Provincial and sub-provincial leaders are considered senior governmental leaders in China; many of them are also CCP Central Committee members and the next move upward will be on their way to the Politburo.

Meanwhile, there were 74 vice mayors, 18 city vice or deputy secretaries, and 65 sub-city ranked regional leaders observed by the study. Together they made 49.2 percent of the sample. These are the regional leaders who are considered relatively lower-ranked officials. They are younger and less-experienced in governmental posts, and they all have their supervisors to give them orders. Yet, these lower-ranked regional leaders are those who try hardest to receive promotions in order to have a greater future career in politics. Otherwise, they may end up where they are doing administrative jobs on a daily basis with official earnings much less than other careers.

Above all, compared to the study of upward political mobility among Chinese regional leaders, there are fewer unambiguous lessons we can learn from studying the dismissed Chinese regional leaders. It can be hypothesized here that removals of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng era are more regular, rational and legitimate with visible and explainable causes other than political purges and power struggles among central leaders. Compared to the removals of regional leaders in Mao's and Deng's eras, we expect to see more removals for actual unlawful accusations but less ideological disagreements or disputes.

Table 5.3 Correlations of Variables Observed in Demoted and Dismissed Regional Leaders

	age	gender	college	ccpmember	psec	gov	pvsec	vgov	csec
age	1.0000								
gender	0.1977	1.0000							
college	0.3127	0.2100	1.0000						
ccpmember	0.0147	-0.0202	0.0571	1.0000					
psec	0.2946	0.0408	0.0347	0.0132	1.0000				
gov	0.1379	0.0381	0.0258	0.0124	-0.0250	1.0000			
pvsec	0.3361	-0.0029	0.0769	0.0281	-0.0568	0.1583	1.0000		
vgov	0.2805	0.0642	0.1697	0.0336	-0.0678	-0.0633	-0.0249	1.0000	
csec	0.0907	0.0676	0.1404	0.0219	-0.0443	-0.0414	-0.0524	-0.0758	1.0000
mayor	0.0413	0.0354	-0.0980	0.0266	-0.0538	-0.0503	-0.0788	-0.0744	-0.0023
cvsec	0.0035	-0.0557	0.0275	-0.1521	-0.0408	-0.0381	-0.0866	-0.0642	-0.0676
vmayor	-0.2326	-0.0214	-0.0435	0.0456	-0.0922	-0.0861	-0.1710	-0.2336	-0.1527
county	-0.4294	-0.1422	-0.2584	0.0420	-0.0848	-0.0792	-0.1799	-0.2148	-0.1404
minister	0.0636	0.0623	0.1293	0.0202	-0.0408	-0.0381	-0.0866	-0.1034	-0.0676
league	0.0607	-0.0662	0.1215	0.0190	0.0536	0.0624	0.0606	0.0686	0.0526
partyschool	0.0608	-0.0964	0.0724	0.0276	0.0111	0.0907	0.0537	-0.0510	0.0343
east	0.1194	-0.0098	0.1260	0.0481	0.0426	-0.0410	0.0815	0.0267	0.0743
west	-0.0058	0.0820	0.0461	0.0473	0.0454	-0.0390	-0.0093	0.0543	-0.0692
middle	-0.0521	-0.0539	-0.0970	-0.1123	-0.0317	0.1199	-0.1394	-0.0270	0.0494
northeast	-0.1253	-0.0579	-0.1785	0.0266	-0.0538	-0.0503	0.1691	0.0187	-0.0457
poor_reg	-0.2262	-0.0801	-0.2394	-0.0631	-0.0412	-0.0160	0.0102	-0.0569	-0.1348
first_media	-0.2534	-0.0106	-0.0238	-0.0125	-0.0160	0.0016	-0.2123	-0.1501	0.0812
low_rank	-0.5515	-0.1283	-0.2353	0.0756	-0.1527	-0.1426	-0.3030	-0.3685	-0.2272
incompete	-0.1640	0.0236	0.0960	0.0241	0.0261	0.0343	-0.1033	-0.0560	-0.0335
corruption	0.4639	0.0783	0.2761	0.0708	0.1046	-0.0014	0.2059	0.3068	0.0235
accident	-0.4218	-0.0829	-0.4369	-0.0368	-0.1053	-0.0025	-0.2004	-0.2062	-0.0328

(table continued)

stability	-0.2437	0.0417	-0.1787	-0.0499	0.0047	-0.0341	-0.1691	-0.1882	0.0305
movements	-0.0826	0.0727	-0.0273	0.0236	0.1047	-0.0445	-0.1011	-0.1207	0.0653
violation	0.2484	0.0336	0.2184	-0.0071	0.0555	0.0792	0.0834	0.1568	0.0369
powerfight	0.1053	0.0381	0.0792	0.0124	0.2490	-0.0233	0.0879	0.0601	0.1315
Mistake	-0.3382	-0.0665	-0.2123	-0.0216	-0.1257	-0.1174	-0.1797	-0.1660	-0.0213
scandal	0.3046	0.0615	0.1710	0.0420	0.1154	-0.0258	0.1548	0.1008	0.0807
Land issue	-0.1426	-0.0042	-0.0615	-0.0419	-0.0075	-0.0439	-0.1402	-0.1279	0.0094
demotion	-0.2645	-0.0583	-0.1117	-0.0571	-0.1885	-0.0312	-0.0455	-0.0596	-0.0554
dismiss	0.3566	0.1350	0.2439	0.1219	0.0199	0.0541	0.1621	0.1954	0.0400
jail	0.3068	0.0863	0.2354	0.0649	0.0366	0.0118	0.1099	0.2342	0.0209
LostCCP	0.4011	0.1032	0.2053	0.0699	0.1483	0.0006	0.1896	0.2569	0.0271
fin_recov	-0.3313	-0.0933	-0.0561	0.0444	-0.0412	0.0197	-0.1155	-0.1181	-0.0262

	mayor	cvsec	vmayor	county	minister	league	partys~l	east	west
mayor	1.0000								
cvsec	0.0113	1.0000							
vmayor	-0.1855	-0.1082	1.0000						
county	-0.1706	-0.1293	-0.2921	1.0000					
minister	-0.0821	-0.0623	-0.1406	-0.1293	1.0000				
league	-0.0772	0.0039	-0.0294	-0.1215	0.0039	1.0000			
partyschool	-0.0046	0.0964	-0.0178	-0.0985	0.0056	0.0639	1.0000		
east	-0.0454	-0.0850	0.0818	-0.0534	-0.0534	-0.0390	-0.0082	1.0000	
west	0.0095	0.0136	-0.2239	0.3019	-0.1457	-0.0359	-0.0277	-0.3294	1.0000
middle	0.1096	0.1123	0.1556	-0.2056	-0.1799	-0.0146	0.0911	-0.4280	-0.4208
northeast	-0.0344	-0.0354	0.0454	0.0443	-0.0821	0.1203	-0.0764	-0.1954	-0.1921
poor_reg	-0.0377	0.0515	-0.0320	0.2723	-0.3202	0.0316	0.0240	-0.6393	0.3931
first_media	0.0732	-0.1297	0.0565	0.1529	-0.0175	0.0067	-0.0982	-0.0132	0.0450
low_rank	-0.2853	-0.1775	0.6035	0.5550	-0.2330	-0.1308	-0.1048	0.0407	0.0400
incompete	-0.0579	-0.0743	0.1107	0.0498	0.0271	-0.0162	-0.0236	-0.0411	-0.0643

(table continued)

corruption	0.0443	0.0616	-0.0931	-0.4048	0.0896	0.0612	0.0675	0.1998	-0.0724
accident	-0.0192	-0.0998	0.0553	0.3143	0.0220	-0.0544	-0.0792	-0.1867	-0.0142
stability	0.0996	0.0560	-0.0107	0.1226	0.0560	-0.0621	-0.0904	-0.1224	-0.0096
movements	0.1493	-0.0210	-0.0223	0.1164	-0.0727	-0.0137	-0.0596	-0.0900	0.1366
violation	-0.0370	-0.0058	-0.1031	-0.1383	0.0499	-0.0087	0.0301	0.1120	-0.0386
powerfight	0.0232	-0.0381	-0.0861	-0.0792	-0.0381	0.0624	-0.0521	0.2076	-0.0390
duty_mstk	-0.0486	-0.0483	0.1816	0.1958	0.0091	-0.0589	-0.1739	-0.1337	-0.0149
scandal	0.0443	0.0743	-0.2175	-0.2491	0.2440	-0.0139	-0.0202	0.0738	-0.0827
landissue	0.0220	-0.0270	0.1028	0.0615	0.0354	0.0552	-0.0156	0.0730	-0.0689
demotion	-0.1172	-0.0889	0.1065	0.2471	-0.1183	0.0098	-0.0989	0.0091	-0.0490
dismiss	0.0282	0.0755	-0.1378	-0.2093	0.0755	0.0286	-0.0509	0.0402	0.0143
jail	0.0286	0.0558	0.0168	-0.3498	0.1126	-0.0076	0.0763	0.1632	-0.0842
ccplost	0.0266	0.0089	-0.1013	-0.3504	0.0930	-0.0245	0.0290	0.2380	-0.0799
fin_recov	-0.1025	-0.0054	0.1424	0.0939	-0.0054	0.0799	0.0404	-0.1496	-0.1072

	middle	northe~t	poor_reg	first_~a	low_rank	incomp~e	corrup~n	accident	stabil~y
middle	1.0000								
northeast	-0.2373	1.0000							
poor_reg	0.2361	0.1886	1.0000						
first_media	0.0908	-0.1710	0.0424	1.0000					
low_rank	-0.0400	0.0885	0.1890	0.1645	1.0000				
incompete	0.0113	0.1026	0.0110	0.1064	0.1279	1.0000			
corruption	-0.1453	0.0001	-0.3626	-0.4034	-0.3815	-0.1401	1.0000		
accident	0.1089	0.1013	0.2805	0.3170	0.2880	0.1745	-0.4908	1.0000	
stability	0.1457	-0.0807	0.1828	0.3885	0.0766	0.2254	-0.3957	0.4807	1.0000
movements	-0.0309	0.0268	0.0518	0.2661	0.0686	0.1795	-0.2301	-0.0276	0.4359
violation	0.0154	-0.1912	-0.2307	-0.0699	-0.1732	-0.2248	0.1894	-0.4891	-0.3424
powerfight	-0.1101	-0.0503	-0.1960	0.0457	-0.1426	0.0343	0.1747	-0.0984	-0.0853
duty_mstk	0.0854	0.0649	0.2096	0.2009	0.3095	0.2149	-0.4542	0.5121	0.4575

(table continued)

scandal	-0.0375	-0.0900	-0.2539	-0.1214	-0.3721	-0.0960	0.4158	-0.2812	-0.1958
landissue	0.0249	-0.0768	0.0055	0.3244	0.1373	0.0065	-0.2954	0.0269	0.4352
demotion	0.0566	0.0458	0.1777	0.1986	0.3121	0.0077	-0.3323	0.2416	0.1016
dismiss	-0.1021	0.0282	-0.2262	-0.1887	-0.2722	-0.0864	0.4524	-0.3329	-0.2100
jail	-0.0287	-0.1287	-0.2707	-0.2272	-0.2529	-0.1409	0.6064	-0.3839	-0.2906
ccplost	-0.1222	-0.0843	-0.3192	-0.2595	-0.3435	-0.1606	0.6678	-0.3965	-0.2962
fin_recov	0.1419	0.1577	0.1725	0.1866	0.1847	0.2604	-0.4484	0.2917	0.1654

	moveme~s	violat~n	powerf~t	duty_m~k	scandal	landis~e	demotion	dismiss	jail
movements	1.0000								
violation	-0.1935	1.0000							
powerfight	-0.0445	0.0792	1.0000						
duty_mstk	0.1278	-0.3518	-0.1174	1.0000					
scandal	-0.1212	0.2779	0.1879	-0.3158	1.0000				
landissue	0.2872	-0.0125	-0.0930	0.1545	-0.2257	1.0000			
demotion	0.0251	-0.0762	-0.0776	0.3131	-0.2608	0.0713	1.0000		
dismiss	-0.0698	0.2819	0.1015	-0.3085	0.2924	-0.1525	-0.4386	1.0000	
jail	-0.2333	0.2718	0.1460	-0.3532	0.4182	-0.1419	-0.3987	0.4887	1.0000
ccplost	-0.2267	0.2943	0.1771	-0.3632	0.4718	-0.1693	-0.3702	0.5017	0.7666
fin_recov	0.0705	-0.1920	-0.0838	0.3139	-0.2464	0.1010	0.3213	-0.4737	-0.4236

	ccplost	fin_re~v
ccplost	1.0000	
fin_recov	-0.4576	1.0000

Source: Author's Database

3. Analysis of Chinese Regional Leaders' Removals

Base on the accusations the CCP center utilizes to drag down regional leaders, there are five different main outcomes that could happen to a dismissed regional leader. These outcomes are listed in Table 5.4 below.

Table 5.4 Consequences Due to The Center's Accusation

Consequence	Count	%
Demotion	206	66.9
Dismissal	213	69.2
CCP Membership Lost	131	43.5
Jailed	120	39.0
Finally Recovered	72	23.4

Source: Author's Database

As is shown in Table 5.4, downward political moves in the careers of regional leaders could be: (1) being demoted to a lower post in the government, (2) being dismissed and removed from current post and no longer employed in the government, (3) being dismissed from his post and losing CCP membership, (4) being dismissed from a governmental post, and being jailed for illegal wrongdoing, and (5) being removed but managing eventually to come back to governmental leadership post.

These five outcomes of regional leaders' downward political mobility and future career paths are not statistically distinct outcomes. This means, for example, that losing CCP membership does not mean one will recover one's post in the future. And getting dismissed by the center does not mean the leader must be jailed. They represent different degrees of political mobility. However, a certain correlation is stronger when it comes to lost CCP membership and jailed former regional leaders (see Table 5.3 for the correlations among variables). Regularly,

before a leader would be sent to jail, he would first be deprived of his CCP membership. Losing CCP membership is a disciplinary punishment made by the Communist party; receiving a jail sentence is a punishment decision made by the courthouse. And once a leader was jailed for wrongdoing, there would no possibility that this leader would be hired again by the government. Thus, for any cases of lost CCP membership and a jail sentence, the chance for a full recovery is zero. The Communist party does not employ anyone with criminal histories as a governmental official. Being dismissed, being deprived of CCP membership, and being jailed—all the three outcomes can happen together to the same regional leader, meaning that one's serious unlawful violations had led to the center's severe punishments.

Now that we have clarified all the potential ambiguities in the present research design of Chinese regional leaders' downward political mobility, it is now possible to examine theoretical hypotheses of the "Chinese Regional Leaders' Downward Political Mobility Analysis" models:

> *Model 1*: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will receive a demotion from his current regional leadership post is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not)

had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age.

Model 2: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will receive a dismissal from his current regional leadership post is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age.

Model 3: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will lose his CCP membership is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age.

Model 4: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will be sentenced to jail for wrongdoing is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been

involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age.

Model 5: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will eventually recover from previous punishment is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age.

Furthermore, the current analysis utilizes a multinomial logistics regression analysis to examine the regional leaders' demotions and dismissals issued by the center. "The Multinomial Downward Mobility Models" are as follows:

Model 6: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will experience downward political mobility of one administrative level is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age. Set the base outcome as "2".

Model 7: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will experience downward political mobility of at least two administrative levels is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people's protests occurred (or not), whether the leader's behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader's post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader's age. Set the base outcome as "1".

Here, no change of post is coded as "0", demotion is coded as "1", and dismissal is coded as "2". The purpose of utilizing the multinomial model is to examine downward mobility short of being jailed, being deprived of CCP membership, or recovering a political post after punishment.

Table 5.5a: Logistics Regression Models of Regional Leader's Downward Political Mobility

	(1) Demotion	(2) Dismiss	(3) Lost CCP
age	0.989	1.068*	0.968
	(0.0269)	(0.0318)	(0.0316)
college	1.167	1.627	0.573
	(0.524)	(0.698)	(0.314)
psec	0.166	0.261	15550853.1
	(0.208)	(0.340)	(2.06534e+10)
gov	0.818	3.591	0.954
	(0.782)	(5.006)	(1.149)
pvsec	1.667	1.862	1.545
	(1.006)	(1.738)	(1.127)
vgov	1.506	2.064	1.418
	(0.869)	(1.872)	(0.933)
csec	0.656	1.356	0.834
	(0.436)	(1.283)	(0.707)
cvsec	0.801	4.692	0.500
	(0.553)	(4.879)	(0.418)
mayor	0.646	2.318	1.040
	(0.405)	(2.056)	(0.834)
vmayor	0.000000272	0.0000506	2.289
	(0.000262)	(0.0318)	(3.378)
county	0.000000695	0.0000749	0.834
	(0.000670)	(0.0471)	(1.269)
league	1.622	1.392	0.364
	(1.073)	(1.174)	(0.306)
east	2.130	0.600	3.169
	(1.692)	(0.680)	(3.145)
west	0.479	3.409	1.727
	(0.450)	(4.485)	(1.944)
middle	1.070	1.981	1.017
	(0.916)	(2.464)	(1.076)
northeast	0.734	10.97	0.973
	(0.784)	(15.38)	(1.247)

(table continued)

poor_reg	2.243	0.256*	1.461
	(1.093)	(0.178)	(0.850)
corruption	0.570	10.50***	15.34***
	(0.228)	(6.161)	(7.653)
accident	1.281	1.573	0.919
	(0.726)	(0.881)	(0.670)
stability	0.490	2.357	1.951
	(0.302)	(1.291)	(1.400)
movements	1.663	1.116	5.58e-08
	(1.334)	(0.772)	(0.0000742)
violation	1.308	4.578**	2.398
	(0.456)	(2.267)	(1.077)
duty_mstk	3.580**	0.796	0.541
	(1.518)	(0.318)	(0.247)
first_media	2.006	1.066	1.485
	(0.746)	(0.435)	(0.668)
scandal	0.570	3.205	7.944***
	(0.221)	(2.371)	(4.507)
low_rank	4482077.9	39765.7	0.515
	(4.31678e+09)	(24991239.0)	(0.720)
landissue	0.716	0.845	0.945
	(0.303)	(0.362)	(0.454)
N	308	308	308

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Author's Database

Table 5.5b: Logistic Regression Models of Regional Leaders' Downward Political Mobility

	(4) Jailed	(5) Final Recovery
age	0.981	0.908**
	(0.0321)	(0.0315)
college	1.161	3.020*
	(0.657)	(1.559)
psec	2.026	6.853
	(2.500)	(12.14)
gov	2.264	1.771
	(2.657)	(2.478)
pvsec	1.993	1.442
	(1.436)	(1.429)
vgov	3.387	2.327
	(2.298)	(2.208)
csec	1.868	1.034
	(1.607)	(1.071)
cvsec	2.008	1.323
	(1.746)	(1.454)
mayor	2.646	0.317
	(2.147)	(0.307)
vmayor	4.609	258851.7
	(6.901)	(607466937.5)
county	0.687	189322.1
	(1.091)	(444296606.6)
league	0.643	2.524
	(0.504)	(2.372)
east	0.491	0.130
	(0.466)	(0.180)
west	0.367	0.0999
	(0.401)	(0.155)
middle	0.392	0.312
	(0.399)	(0.452)
northeast	0.0884	0.744

(table continued)	(0.112)	(1.183)
poor_reg	1.596 (0.912)	0.848 (0.617)
corruption	11.04*** (5.020)	0.0215*** (0.0199)
accident	0.626 (0.480)	1.007 (0.654)
stability	1.330 (1.039)	0.510 (0.297)
movements		0.947 (0.731)
violation	1.639 (0.661)	0.657 (0.404)
duty_mstk	0.526 (0.238)	1.752 (0.797)
first_media	0.978 (0.426)	1.363 (0.620)
scandal	4.287** (2.019)	0.117 (0.136)
low_rank	1.046 (1.451)	0.00000258 (0.00607)
landissue	1.817 (0.871)	0.864 (0.401)
N	284	308

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Author's Database

Table 5.6 Multinomial Regression Models of Regional Leader's Downward Political Mobility

	(6) Downward Mobility No Change 0	Demotion 1	(7) Downward Mobility No Change 0	Dismissal 2
age	0.000000247	0.934*	0.000000265	1.071*
	(0.000252)	(0.0286)	(0.000269)	(0.0328)
college	3.23e-40	1.149	2.81e-40	0.870
	(1.50e-35)	(0.524)	(1.31e-35)	(0.397)
psec	1.4044e+155	1.137	1.2350e+155	0.879
	(3.2819e+160)	(1.798)	(2.8859e+160)	(1.391)
gov	2.13e-33	0.302	7.05e-33	3.309
	(3.50e-28)	(0.446)	(1.16e-27)	(4.886)
pvsec	5.5896e+128	0.327	1.7104e+129	3.060
	(1.3043e+134)	(0.334)	(3.9912e+134)	(3.127)
vgov	0.000256	0.653	0.000393	1.532
	(61.20)	(0.603)	(93.78)	(1.415)
csec	2.33e-31	0.623	3.73e-31	1.604
	(4.57e-26)	(0.618)	(7.33e-26)	(1.591)
cvsec	7.39453e+62	0.186	3.97958e+63	5.382
	(1.06736e+68)	(0.191)	(5.74433e+68)	(5.542)
mayor	7.56e-17	0.840	9.00e-17	1.191
	(1.81e-11)	(0.760)	(2.15e-11)	(1.077)
vmayor	3.02589e+17	1.121	2.69975e+17	0.892
	(1.71644e+22)	(0.538)	(1.53143e+22)	(0.428)
league	3.70e-47	0.643	5.75e-47	1.556
	(4.92e-42)	(0.551)	(7.66e-42)	(1.334)
east	1.03e-39	1.014	1.01e-39	0.986
	(2.69e-34)	(1.185)	(2.65e-34)	(1.153)
west	1.22e-51	0.178	6.85e-51	5.619
	(1.92e-46)	(0.245)	(1.08e-45)	(7.739)
middle	6.50e-83	0.381	1.70e-82	2.621
	(1.04e-77)	(0.494)	(2.73e-77)	(3.396)
northeast	7.06e-91	0.118	5.99e-90	8.486

(table continued)	(1.11e-85)	(0.171)	(9.43e-85)	(12.31)
poor_reg	0.000408	6.180*	0.0000659	0.162*
	(79.14)	(4.479)	(12.81)	(0.117)
corruption	8.94472e+55	0.0756***	1.18262e+57	13.22***
	(1.31452e+61)	(0.0443)	(1.73799e+62)	(7.751)
accident	0.000196	0.327	0.000600	3.058
	(17.10)	(0.193)	(52.30)	(1.807)
stability	1.44e-15	1.158	1.24e-15	0.864
	(4.86e-11)	(0.664)	(4.20e-11)	(0.496)
movements	5.8147e+100	0.478	1.2160e+101	2.091
	(5.1152e+105)	(0.348)	(1.0697e+106)	(1.523)
violation	2.37e-54	0.219**	1.08e-53	4.559**
	(2.11e-50)	(0.112)	(9.62e-50)	(2.338)
duty_mstk	35.29	1.166	30.28	0.858
	(3522909.3)	(0.474)	(3022635.4)	(0.349)
first_media	8.35014e+93	1.501	5.56297e+93	0.666
	(1.14204e+98)	(0.612)	(7.60839e+97)	(0.272)
scandal	2.28e-67	0.307	7.42e-67	3.253
	(2.19e-63)	(0.234)	(7.13e-63)	(2.475)
low_rank	8.49e-71	0.637	1.33e-70	1.571
	(2.27e-65)	(0.532)	(3.57e-65)	(1.313)
landissue	2.70e-90	0.555	4.86e-90	1.800
	(8.34e-86)	(0.257)	(1.50e-85)	(0.831)
N	308		308	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Author's Database

4. Findings

The analyses above point to the following major findings:

(1) Post-Deng era's Chinese regional leaders who had received demotions were more likely to have received those demotions because of poor performance in their leadership duties. Leaders who failed to treat their jobs as seriously as the center expected, or who caused serious mistakes would be demoted. Also, if the leader's mistake(s) was released to the media before the authorities could act and consequently caused public attention, the leader was more likely to be demoted. The independent variable has significant influence on the likelihood. It indicates the center's effort to minimize the negative publicity caused by the leader's wrongdoing. In addition, leaders from poorer regions are more likely to be demoted than leaders from richer regions. However, this prediction is successful only at a lower significance level (results are shown in Table 5.5a).

(2) Regression analysis shows that regional leaders who were dismissed and removed completely from the political system by the center were those who had corrupt activities and were accused of accepting bribes. This finding provides support for the hypothesis offered earlier. Also, leaders with other serious illegal violations (damaging the national security, leaking confidential intelligence, abusing power, violating human rights and privacy, brutal or violent behavior, crime-related activities including murder) were very likely to be removed and dismissed, ending their political careers. Again, results show that leaders from poorer regions were more likely to be dismissed than leaders of the developed regions. Meanwhile, leaders of older age were more likely to be dismissed once they were associated with wrongdoing. Issues concerning political stability (protests, people's criticisms, or damage to the party-state's rule

and legitimacy) can also cause leaders to be dismissed. But the prediction is successful at a lower confidence interval.

(3) Regression analysis shows that Chinese regional leaders who lost their CCP membership were more likely to have been charged with corruption or bribe-taking. Among observed cases, leaders who lost their CCP memberships were frequently accused of corruption. Also, leaders who lost CCP memberships were those who were accused of other unlawful violations and illegal wrongdoings. In addition, regional leaders who were involved in personal scandals (especially if the sandals were known to the public) as well as their other misbehaving were likewise highly likely to be deprived of their CCP memberships. Chinese regional leaders are considered party-state's technocrats yet ones who enjoy traditionally acknowledged, mandarin-like, higher social status. They do not represent only the political authority of the party, but also carry the CCP's legitimate and moral image. The results show that the CCP center has little tolerance for any damage to its reputation caused by its regional leaders' adulteries or other licentious behaviors. The likelihood is statistically significant (see Table 5.5a).

(4) Regression analysis shows that post-Deng regional leaders who were jailed for criminal charges by the government were much more likely to be those who were corrupt and tainted by personal scandals at the same time. The results suggest that corruption is very often used by the central authority as a primary accusation in jailing its fallen regional leaders. Meanwhile, results show that vice governors had a much higher probability of being jailed than any other regional leadership posts observed in the study. It shows that executives are more exposed to the danger of being caught by the center for their misbehaving. Also, results show that leaders who worked at in Northeastern China were more likely to be jailed than regional leaders from other parts of the country (see Table 5.5b).

(5) Regression analysis shows that regional leaders who eventually recovered from demotions and dismissals were those who were younger and with higher education credentials. Also, leaders accused of being corrupt at the time of their removals (but without other types of accusations) were more likely to recover their governmental posts than those who were removed for other wrongdoings (see Table 5.5b). It seems that the center still values such leaders' usefulness despite their greed. Yet, there were only a relatively small number of cases of political recovery, and making reappearance can be a highly complicated issue involving both personal capabilities and political opportunities simultaneously. Deng Xiaoping himself was a well-known example of that during his political life. He was purged three times and returned to power three times. Indeed his final political reappearance in 1977 was eminently successful.[128] Yet Deng was surely never accused of crime-related charges by the party leaders, including Chairman Mao.

Furthermore, to clearly present the trajectories of downward political mobility of Chinese regional leaders, the multinomial regression models have suggested the following: regional leaders who received demotions and dismissals were those of younger ages, were accused of incorrectly handling accidents (i.e., mining accidents, collective food poisonings, public terror threats or incidents, environmental pollutions, and so on). Also, those leaders facing corruption charges and other unlawful violations were likely to be demoted. In addition, regional leaders of the poorer regions of China were more likely to be demoted, once being charged for their wrongdoings. All other thins held constant, regional leaders of less developed regions of China are more vulnerable to the center's disciplinary actions (see Table 5.6).

[128] *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Deng Xiaoping," accessed November 28, 2011, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/157645/Deng-Xiaoping.

To summarize, the analytical models presented here have been successful in explaining the downward political mobility in general of Chinese regional leaders in post-Deng Chinese politics. It is clearer that the center downgrades or removes its regional leaders with fairly reasonable charges and accusations. Most regional leaders were removed in the name of justice and the rule of law. It is now unusual for the center to remove or purge any of its regional leaders without proper excuses and strong evidence of the leader's wrongdoing. Although there could be political reasons and private motivations for the top leaders to reshuffle a local government and its leaders, they would take pains to make the whole process look normal.

Moreover, involvement in serious corruption and illegal activities are the most frequently used accusations by the center to remove or rectify its regional leaders. And these charges never fail to work as the entire bureaucracy has been corrupt due to the rent-seeking authoritarian regime-controlled market economy.

B. Geopolitical Preferences and Chinese Regional Leaders' Political Resilience

By all means, the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping when he became the actual leader of China in the late 1970s has by far brought tremendous changes to Chinese society and the state. In fact, Deng's original reformist plans not only included economic transformation to market economy, but also included a rich bundle of political reforms to the CCP. He pushed these reforms even though he was reportedly to have despised "Western-styled" parliamentary democracy as an unacceptable institutional choice for the Chinese state. However, there have been newer but trickier problems confronting the CCP after Deng's retreat from public politics and his eventual death in 1997.

The decentralized market and export-led economic growth over the last three decades have caused a visible decline of the CCP's centralized authority, and an enormous developmental gap between the more industrialized coastal regions of China and the less developed Midwest. The inklings of the problem were actually foreseen by Deng himself, but he seemed to be too optimistic about the situation to leave the party any specific instructions for the future. Gradually, the disparity between China's economic reform and its political transition has started showing its significant negative side. Not only is the future of Chinese people's livelihood now hijacked by the rumors of a potential collapse of the state-orchestrated economic growth, but also those economically advanced regions of China are corrupting the regime by taking advantages of it.

Up to now the study has revealed many important patterns of Chinese regional leaders' career movements, and it is now quite clear that different regions, due to their geographic and socioeconomic differences, occupy different levels of political importance to the center. Naturally, these regions are able to influence the center's political moves as well by rearranging the settings of regional political systems and their elites. The elites' performances and the center's preferences for the regions they lead combine to determine the opportunities the elites receive for further political advancement.

Furthermore, it has been hypothesized that compared to the rest of the regional leaders in post-Deng's China, regional leaders who head the economically advanced regions of China have more resilience facing the center's discipline over the leaders' corruption and other unlawful violations. As demonstrated in the first part of the chapter, regional leaders from the less developed regions of China are more likely to be demoted and dismissed when their wrongdoings are discovered by the center. On one hand, it could be true that in the less developed regions of China, their socioeconomic development is more dependent on the

governments' strength and determination to modernize. In a way, the bigger role the local government plays in the economy, the more wrongdoing opportunities the regional leaders might encounter as they are given more power with less control. On the other hand, it can be more realistic to reason that in less developed regions of China, the relatively less political importance the regional leaders have exposes them to greater danger of being punished by the center for their corrupt or unlawful activities.

Based on the findings in previous parts of this study, longer years in regional leadership services contribute to a regional leader's upward political mobility (getting promoted); and constitutionally, a provincial leader in China can serve only two 5-year terms up to 10 years total. A city leader can also serve two terms of 5 years each, up to 10 years of services in the same post. The analysis of the data on Chinese regional leaders show that on average, provincial leaders in China serve 5 years before they receive other occupational options granted by the center; and city leaders serve 4.3 years in average before they move forward to other positions (both results are shown in Table 4.11).

Table 5.7 Regional Leaders of the City of Shenzhen and Their Post Changes

Year	Name	Post	Length(Year)	Previous	Location	After	Location2	Change of Region
1995	Li Zibin	Mayor	5	Vice Minister	Central	Minister	Central	Y
1998	Zhang Gaoli	Secretary	3	Vice Gov.	Guangdong	Gov.	Shandong	Y
2000	Yu Youjun	Mayor	3	Provincial	Guangdong	Vice Gov.	Hunan	Y
2001	Huang Liman	Secretary	4	City Dep. Sec.	Shenzhen	Provincial NPC	Guangdong	N
2005	Xu Zongheng	Mayor	4	City Dep. Sec.	Shenzhen	Dismiss	N/A	N/A
2005	Li Hongzhong	Secretary	2	Vice Gov.	Guangdong	Gov.	Hubei	Y
2007	Liu Yupu	Secretary	3	Provincial	Guangdong	City NPC	Shenzhen	N
2010	Wang Rong	Secretary	1	City Sec.	Suzhou	N/A	-	-
Mean	N/A	N/A	**3.1**	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Author's Database

Table 5.8 Regional Leaders of the City of Suzhou and Their Post Changes

Year	Name	Post	Length(Year)	Previous	Location	After	Location2	Change of Region
1998	Liang Baohua	Secretary	2	Vice Gov.	Jiangsu	Gov.	Jiangsu	N
2000	Chen Deming	Secretary	2	City Dep. Sec.	Suzhou	Gov.	Shaanxi	Y
2001	Yang Weize	Mayor	3	Bureau Chief	Jiangsu	City Sec.	Wuxi	N
2002	Wang Min	Secretary	2	Vice Gov.	Jiangsu	Gov.	Jilin	Y
2004	Wang Rong	Secretary	5	Mayor	Wuxi	Mayor	Shenzhen	Y
2008	Yan Li	Mayor	3	City Dep. Sec.	Suzhou	N/A	-	-
2009	Jiang Kunhong	Secretary	2	Mayor	Nanjing	N/A	-	-
Mean	N/A	N/A	**2.7**	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Author's Database

Table 5.9 Regional Leaders of the City of Wenzhou and Their Post Changes

Year	Name	Post	Length(Year)	Previous	Location	After	Location2	Change of Region
1984	Yuan Fanglie	Secretary	1	Mayor	Zhejiang	Prov. Court	Hangzhou	N
1984	Lu Shengliang	Mayor	4	Vice Mayor	Zhejiang	City NPC	Wenzhou	N
1985	Dong Chaocai	Secretary	5	City Sec.	Zhejiang	Vice Gov.	Hangzhou	N
1988	Liu Xirong	Mayor	2	Provincial	Zhejiang	Vice Gov.	Hangzhou	N
1990	Chen Wenxian	Mayor	6	Vice Mayor	Zhejiang	State Business	Hangzhou	N
1990	Kong Xiangyou	Secretary	2	Vice Mayor	Zhejiang	Prov. NPC	Hangzhou	N
1992	Zhang Youyu	Secretary	6	Vice Mayor	Wenzhou	Vice Gov.	Hangzhou	N
1996	Qian Xingzhong	Mayor	7	Vice Mayor	Zhejiang	Business	-	-
1998	Jiang Jufeng	Secretary	4	Provincial	Zhejiang	Vice Gov.	Chengdu	Y
2002	Li Qiang	Secretary	2	Mayor	Zhejiang	Prov. Dep. Sec.	Zhejiang	N
2003	Liu Qi	Mayor	3	City Dep. Sec.	Zhejiang	City Sec.	Ningbo	N
2004	Wang Jianman	Secretary	4	City Dep. Sec.	Hangzhou	Vice Gov.	Hangzhou	N
2006	Shao Zhanwei	Mayor	2	Vice Mayor	Ningbo	Mayor	Hangzhou	N
2008	Zhao Yide	Mayor	3	City Dep. Sec.	Wenzhou	City Sec.	Quzhou	N
2010	Chen Derong	Secretary	1	Mayor	Jiaxing	N/A	-	-
2010	Wu Weirong	Mayor	1	Mayor	Jinhua	N/A	-	-
Mean	N/A	N/A	**3.3**	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Source: Author's Database

It is a reasonable outcome to observe that most Chinese regional leaders can tenure their posts to finish their first term. Meanwhile, analysis in previous chapter shows that regional leaders who receive demotions and dismissals were strongly associated with short years of services. In other words, many demoted or dismissed regional leaders received the punishment before they were able to finish their first term. The 352 observations made by the study have shown the same pattern of downward political mobility (results are shown in Table 4.18). In general, the common pattern we have found is: the longer a regional leader has served, the greater the chance that the leader can be promoted. The shorter years a leader has served, the greater the chance that the leader may be demoted. It is understandable that it would take some time for the leaders to prove themselves to be qualified as the CCP center's loyal servants.

However, it seems that Chinese regional leaders from the economically advanced regions might have been able to change the rule of the game. The City of Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, the City of Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, and the City of Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, are all located in more developed coastal provinces of China. All of them are more industrialized cities in their own province, and all of them are considered outstanding revenue generators to their provinces and the CCP center. As shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9, there are two smashing features that each of their leaders shared in common that deserve to be noticed.

First, in average, city leaders in all the 3 cities had served much shorter tenures than the national average of the regional leaders. Leaders of Shenzhen changed only every 3.1 years in average (Table 5.7), leaders of Suzhou changed every 2.7 years in average (Table 5.8), and leaders of Wenzhou changed every 3.3 years (Table 5.9). In other words, leaders in these 3 cities move rapidly. Changing posts within short periods of time not only avoided demotions to the

leaders of these cities, but also provided the majority of them with promotion opportunities that many other Chinese regional leaders (especially the city leaders who are younger yet ranked relatively lower) have been seeking for years.

Second, a great number of the leaders from the 3 cities experienced upward political mobility from the tier of city leaders to the tier of provincial leaders. As has been pointed out in previous parts of the study, among thousands of city leaders in China, only a small number are fortunate enough to become provincial or ministerial leaders in the future of their political career. Failure to be promoted to the provincial tier usually would not give a city leader any chance to step up on the CCP's Central Committee, the club of the senior Chinese officials, and very likely the city leader will end up working in the municipal government until he retires. The ranking barriers that haunt the lower-ranked Chinese regional leaders are considered the "bottle-neck" of a political elite's career. In other words, among the city leaders with similar educational background, training and expertise, and career experience, some of them received promotions earlier and more frequently, making them ranked higher in the political system of China. The rest of them seem to be less mobilized and stuck with the posts and locations they have had. They can, however, keep the privileges associated with regional political elites and some lower-ranked posts can be considerably lucrative inside a regional government. Yet with less hope of getting promoted to the upper tier of the political system, their career future is indeed gloomier than those regional leaders who have broken through the bottle-neck of their career prospects.

It is important to remember that none of the three cities—Shenzhen, Suzhou, or Wenzhou—is the capital city of their provinces, and that none of them is the most populous city of the province in which they are located. The vital political importance they occupy on the CCP's map is due to their crucial function as some of the most important economic engines of

industrial China. As rewards, after serving the center as its managers of regional economic development and revenue creation, these city leaders can receive promotion opportunities that are higher than the national average, elevating them into the provincial leaders' club. Therefore, serving as regional leaders at specific locations in China where the state's economic and financial lifelines are located can be the turning points for the regional leaders to successfully break through the "bottle-necks" of upward political mobility.

To sum up, the elite sample examined in this study was randomly chosen. More typical cases are the supersized Chinese cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, where their municipal leaders are current Politburo members. With no biased preferences regarding any region of China, this study argues that the impact of the locational, socioeconomic and geopolitical settings of Chinese regional governments on the political mobility opportunities of regional leaders must not be underestimated.



Figure 5.1 Political Mobility Patterns of Chinese Regional Leaders in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era

Legend: Straight arrows in orange show transfers of regional leaders among different regions and from the Communist Youth League to regional governments. Straight arrows in blue and red show leader's promotions and mobility from/to the CCP center. Curvy arrows show regional or central leaders' movements to the legislative branches of Chinese political system: the National People's Congress systems and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference system.



Figure 5.2 Patterns of Demotions and Dismissals of Chinese Regional Leaders in Post-Deng Xiaoping Era

C. Conclusion: The Regime's Configuration of the Regional Leaders' Political Mobility

Among the classical studies of social and political elites whose ultimate fates were concurrently associated with the regime, some scholars assert that there are a few important signs that show the declining quality of the regime's elites. They would initially appear to be softer than before, showing others a more humane side. Yet they appear to be very greedy trying everything to increase their "unlawful appropriations and to indulge in major usurpations of the national patrimony."[129] It would be an ambiguous assertion to state that the Communist Party of China as the ruling force of the country is a declining elitist party. The Chinese economy is predictably moving forward and more and more Chinese people have improving lifestyles.

Meanwhile, to confront Pareto's argument, the CCP party-state has not yet shown its more humanly soft side. It is a government that is highly sensitive to external political stimulation and to the Chinese people. It has also put up the world's greatest Internet censorship system to filter potential risks brought on by recent movements in the Middle East.[130] Also, prominent social activists who show resentment are considered as dissidents and are treated harshly by the regime. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and popular artist Ai Weiwei are prime examples.[131]

The unyielding side the regime seems to be very determined to continue its single-party rule of the country such that potential competitors are not likely to set their foothold in the political arena. From the other side, Pareto's assertion concludes that the systemic corruption of

[129] Vilfredo Pareto. *The Rise and Fall of the Elites* (New York, N.Y.: Arno Press, 1968 and 1979), p.59.
[130] Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield. "Catching Scent of Revolution, China Moves to Snip Jasmine," *The New York Times* (2011, May 10). Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com.
[131] Michael Wines. "China Assails Nobel Peace Prize as 'Card' of West," *The New York Times* (2010, November 5). Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. And Tania Branigan. "Ai Weiwei Attacks Injustices in China in Magazine Article," *The Guardian*(2011, August 29). Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk.

the entire bureaucracy has become the primary force that exposes the regime to the Chinese people's criticisms and discontentment.

As the study has revealed in this chapter, a great number of demoted or dismissed Chinese regional leaders in recent decades were corrupt, accepting huge amounts of bribes. The market economy as an institutional design chosen by Deng Xiaoping was supposed to enhance competition and lawfulness in Chinese society. In fact, "the market economy with Chinese characteristics" has increased the opportunities for governmental officials to abuse their power by seeking lucrative personal gain from business and public investments.

On one hand, the center's removal of officials with corruptions, unlawful violations, scandals, and incompetence has shown the CCP center might be vigilant in disciplining its fallen cadres, even sending some senior governmental leaders to prisons and executing others. This shows that the center can respond to the people's dissatisfaction toward the regime. On the other hand, the massive scales of power-abusing, rent-seeking corruption and violations have shown the great failure of the CCP's management of its regional political elites. Given tremendous amounts of social and economic privileges with respect and prestige, a regular city leader in China should not be in desperate need of extra money as most of his proper private needs are being supplied by the government at the taxpayers' expenses. On the contrary, however, regional leaders are turning their authority into various lucrative ways to maximize the personal gain by usurping state investments and blackmailing businessmen. If the CCP center should be directly responsible for its regional leaders' wrongdoings, at the very least the center has failed to build an efficient nationwide administrative system.

By comparing the patterns that have evolved over time, in this chapter has highlighted the transitions and changes of career patterns giving regional leaders downward political mobility. Unlike in Mao Zedong's era, where regional leaders were dismissed mainly for political reasons even though they violated no laws, in post-Deng's Chinese politics, the CCP center actually promotes and demotes its regional political elites for lawful administrative reasons. Primarily, a regional leader will be removed or punished for his actual illegal wrongdoing, not because of political accusations of being disloyal to the center. In fact, among the cases observed in the study, almost all of the dismissed regional leaders who were later put on trail pleaded guilty of their corruption and other violations. The majority of them accepted the sentences without further appeals. Though these cases cannot prove that the center was always correct with its accusations, at least it shows that the center's accusations are somewhat reasonable and evidence-based.

Finally, the findings point out that even among the demoted or dismissed regional leaders, not all officials have been treated equally. The study shows that regional leaders from the more developed parts of China seem to have more political resilience that they are more likely to survive the center's rectifications, are more likely to recover their careers after punishment. Regional leaders who led in the important economic centers of China received faster and higher upward political mobility opportunities than regional leaders from other regions of China. The developmental gap among Chinese regions not only creates inequality of economic growth, but also leads to political inequality among Chinese regional political elites.

Moreover, lower-ranked officials have been shown to be more likely to be exposed to the danger of getting rectified by the center for their unlawful violations and management failures. Executive posts such as vice mayors and vice governors who are in charge of operating

governmental policies in certain fields are especially more likely to be removed for the mistakes or accidents that directly involve these leaders. Therefore, another disparity of Chinese regional politics is that party officials (regional secretaries, deputy secretaries, *et hoc genus omne*) are ranked higher than governmental officials (governors, mayors, and their deputies) yet the party officials are usually less responsible for the governments' mistakes and management failures. All being the employees of the CCP, it would a unilateral statement to assert that the center protects the party officials more; but the relatively lower-ranked executive regional leaders are more vulnerable for making the incorrect moves.

For example, the former provincial party secretary of Shanxi province, Mr. Zhang Baoshun, was appointed the Secretary in 2005 from his vice governor post of the same province. Later, from 2005 to early 2009, there came three different governors of Shanxi Province: Gov. Yu Youjun (2005-07) was dismissed for the province's rural brickkiln's labor-abusing scandal; Gov. Meng Xuenong (September 2007-September 2008) was forced to resign after the province's mining accidents and increasing death tolls among the miners; and Minister Wang Jun (then Head of National Safety Inspection Division) was appointed as the Interim Governor (September 2008-January 2009) to deal with the aftermath. Three different governors with little working experiences in the province all took responsibility for the government's mistakes, while party Secretary Zhang Baoshun who had been vice governor of the province since 2001, was not politically damaged at all by any of these unexpected events. When he finished his term as the CCP Secretary of Shanxi, Mr. Zhang was transferred to Anhui Province, President Hu Jintao's hometown province and continued serving as the provincial party secretary.[132]

[132] Su, Yongtong (2010, June 4). "Jin guan Zhang Baoshun de fengyu jiu nian (Nine years as the Head of Shanxi, Mr. Zhang Baoshun)." *Nanfang Zhoumo (The Southern Weekend)*. Retrieved from http://www.chinaelections.org

The opacity of the regional political personnel arrangements of contemporary China not only makes the outsiders feel puzzled by watching it, but also makes the incumbent political actors face risky choices and sensitive subjects in policy-making decisions. A new term that describes the tricky situations and interweaved personal feelings of being a governmental official in China is *luoguan* (the Bare Officials). It refers to an official who has more or less secretive behaviors, especially of the unlawful kind, has sent his wife or children abroad with large amounts of cash. The possessions are the official gained through illegal means. Thus, once the official is caught by the center for his wrongdoing, the official can either flee quickly by leaving no worries behind, or go to prison by himself while his family members and properties remain safe and sound in a foreign country.[133]

It is undoubtedly logical that a regime's elites are configured by the regime and become the agents of the regime that is greatly benefited by their effort to make the regime work. Elites should maintain their loyalty to the regime that provides them with privileges. By studying the demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng Xiaoping era we reach the conclusion that the current party-state regime of China is struggling to manage all of its regional elites, while the regional elites are also struggling to maintain their commitment to the regime.

[133] Xu Busheng (2009, December 10). "Rang 'Luoguan' baolu yu yangguang xia (Expose the Bare Officials under the Sun)." *The Shanxi Daily*. Retrieved from http://fanfu.people.com.cn/GB/10553248.html

CONCLUSIONS

"Mencius said to the king Xuan of Qi, 'When the prince regards his ministers as his hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as another man; when he regards them as the ground or as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy.'"

——"Lilou, Book II," *Mencius* (circa 4th Century BC)

Chinese regional leaders have occupied a role of undeniably remarkable importance in the political history of China. Historically, Chinese regional political elites had traditionally played crucial roles in industrializing and modernizing the nation. The famous yet failed Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) of the late Qing Dynasty was initiated by some of the most open-minded governors of the stumbling Manchu Empire, while the center government was hesitant to make such moves for a very long time. [134] The direct effect of the failed effort of modernization through decentralized commerce and regionalized industrialization was the defeated Chinese naval forces in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; the secondary effect which has not been forgiven by many people of China until in the 21st century was the disabled regime of the late Qing dynasty and its great negligence that failed the entire nation. By reviewing history, many modern Chinese people seem to have more sympathy for the regional political leaders in the late Qing dynasty's social upheavals than to the regime itself. Yet, by all means, when the last Chinese dynasty fell and was replaced by the Republic of China, the majority of its political elites lost their privileges and retreated from the forefront of Chinese politics to their mostly eremitic private lives.

[134] Barrington Moore Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, M.A.: Beacon Press, 1967), pp.176-77.

With the findings of the study, we are certain to conclude at this stage that it is the particular type of regime that creates particular types of political elites (and socioeconomic elites as well) who in return work for the regime to make sure that the regime keeps functioning. In contemporary Chinese politics, Chinese regional leaders are protégés and agents of the party-state regime who continuously get rewarded by the party in financial terms and in sociopolitical privileges. Overall, as in many other meritocracies found in world politics, the three most important parts of Chinese politics are the central government, the elites, the people; the interactions among them have reframed and reshaped the regimes in different time periods.

A. The People: Judging the Regime by Its Elites

Scholars and China watchers have noticed the evolving adaptions the CCP has made through the years since the end of the Cultural Revolution and especially the great economic changes brought by the post 1978 reform. In fact, the adaptions the CCP has made were not due solely to its internal party demand of self-improvement, but were due to the even greater changes taking places in Chinese society. The transition of the CCP from a highly centralized totalitarian Leninist party to a pro-business, post-totalitarian authoritarian political party has been pushed by the changing Chinese society which "has become far more plural, fluid, and dynamic, and the way in which it is governed needs to reflect that reality." [135] The traditional point of view, which used to be held by the majority of Chinese people until the Maoist years of Chinese political history, that the state and the government that runs it represent the ultimate secular authority is gradually declining because of the rise of economic individualism and the popular demand for the rule of law to replace absolute obedience to the state and the government. The CCP and its

[135] Gary Sigley. 2006. "Chinese Governmentalities: Government, Governance and the Socialist Market Economy," *Economy and Society* 35 (4), p.504.

regional political leaders are adopting changes to their agenda in order to achieve more efficient governance of the people and the country.

The study has revealed that the CCP center has been using highly complicated but carefully designed models in selecting capable cadres to operate the party-state's nationwide regional governments ever since the establishment of the People's Republic. We have found that in the past 60 years as the regime matures from an isolated revolutionary party to the dominant political force of a country of 1.4 billion, its regional leaders have also become much more educated, more professionalized, more open-minded (in adapting to globalization and dynamic changes in world economy and politics), more managerially skilled (in attracting foreign investments and promoting local economic growth), and more technocratic in terms of relying on solving problems and less on charisma in gaining popularity from the voters. In other words, compared to early revolutionary veterans appointed as regional leaders, contemporary Chinese regional leaders are more technically trained for the administrative professions as regional leaders. The people of China are the direct forces that push the CCP to adjust its way of organizing its regional political leadership. Only when the Chinese people's livelihood is being improved can the people accept the regime as the legitimate authority or so-called government.

Without fundamental progress in transforming the regional governments above and beyond reshuffling their leaders, the people of China would not view their regional leaders as their lawful and rightful representatives but rather as the agents of the center. As highlighted in the study, governing a Chinese province with tens of millions of residents brings no less governance-related issues and administrative challenges than governing a medium-sized country

of the world.[136] The center relies on its provincial leaders to represent its authority while the provincial government relies on its municipal and county-level governmental branches and their principals to govern the locales. As a result, most Chinese do not encounter their mayors or governors in their daily lives (and many are not aware of regional governmental leadership reshuffles), not to mention powerful central leaders such as CC members, Politburo members or someone even more superior. It is the lower-ranked officials who interact with the people the most; and it is most often the case that a citizen would be mistreated by a local authority with relatively low ranking in the bureaucracy who often lacks the accomplishment or sophistication one may find from a higher-ranked CCP cadre. However, when people feel mistreated and abused by authority, they sometimes do not associate their dissatisfactions with their local officials who are lower-ranked or non-ranked governmental employees, but with the entire party-state regime and its gigantic nation-wide bureaucracy. [137] Administratively, the CCP center controls its regional agents through party discipline, organizational means (mobility whips), and ideological propaganda (mind control). It is hardly true (or practically possible) that each and every local governmental policy comes directly from the Chinese central government. Nevertheless, when any of the local officials' wrongdoings causes popular discontent, they forward their dissatisfaction to the upper level of the government as most people consider the authority of the central organs to be responsible for the aftermath. In other words, lacking of

[136] France, the United Kingdom and Italy each has population of more than 60 million (retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population), while there are currently 9 provinces in China each has population of at least 60 million (retrieved from http://www.chinaquhua.cn/list/renkou_list.html).

[137] In a recent land dispute protest involving a suspicious death of a villager, the villagers of Wukan, Guangdong Province showed their strong distrusts over their municipal and provincial authorities, even if administratively the village is the lowest and smallest unit with political superstructure. Pictures of reports show the villagers using banners with slogans such as "The CCP Center Save Us" written on. See Andrew Jacobs (2011, December 15). "Provincial Chinese Officials Seek to End Village Revolt," *The New York Times*, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/world/asia/local-chinese-officials-seek-to-end-village-revolt.html?_r=1&ref=asia. And also in Martin Patience (2011, December 15). "China's Wukan Village Stands up for Land Rights," BBC News, retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16205654. Both articles were accessed on December 16, 2011.

transparency and openness, the CCP center's control over its regional political leaders through its cadre policy does not concern most Chinese people. If the complaints do not bring better governance or people's life-improvements it would be equally disappointing to the people as there were no change at all. The use of political mobility as the center's powerful organizational weapon must be associated with realistic issues of people's lives in order to generate more ruling legitimacy for the party-state regime. Otherwise, the people consider themselves as outsiders and in the situation of "taxation without representation" which not only increase their distrusts to their regional leaders but also of the CCP central authority.

Fundamentally a regime must root itself into its people to survive any possible turbulence and crisis, and it seems to be common sense that a regime and its elites should have perceived. When all is said and done, the improvement of governance and the degree of the Chinese people's satisfactions toward the regime must be considered seriously by the CCP center and its regional leaders. A complicated system of arranging regional governments may work to provide temporary solutions, but it is far from being a satisfactory solution to the people's legitimate political demands. "The urban middle class wants national dignity, a sense of progress, a national purpose, and the opportunity for fulfillment through participation in the overall reconstruction of society." [138] Political modernization, following the economic development brought on by the regime, has its own definition of a "good life." It is the sort of change that has never existed before that these people want to occur; and they surely would not stop asking when only a few of their regional governmental heads had been demoted by the center. The task of maintaining the current system of rule requires the CCP to make changes: they might not be fundamental changes at this stage, but they must be effective changes that really work and are

[138] Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1968), p.371.

compatible with China's socioeconomic development and status as a rising great power in the world.

B. The Elites: between the Regime and the People

This study focused exclusively on Chinese regional leaders' political mobility by tracking their career movements over the decades since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Two of the most important findings presented in this study are: first, the CCP center has eventually adapted a much more normalized and institutionalized means of determining its regional elites' career future; and second, while being a part of the larger political elite in contemporary China, regional leaders of China have been treated significantly differently due to the geopolitical and socioeconomic characteristics of the regions.

The party-state government in China has created politically and socially privileged groups of Chinese regional leaders since the establishment of the People's Republic. It is the regime which grants certain privileges to its political elites, and in return the elites are expected to maintain and defend the regime in order to keep themselves privileged. We have found that from Mao era to the post-Deng era, the majority of top Chinese leaders (the Central Committee members and its Politburo members as the ultimate decision-makers of the country) have more or less regional leading experience, especially those who were promoted since the economic reforms of the late 1970s. It indicates that some regional leaders of China are potentially going to be the leaders of the country someday; and being an important regional governmental head may be a stepping stone to the central leadership. This practice of the CCP center, as it has become a more institutionalized process, compels leaders in China's regional governments to compete

(with each other) for the limited seats on the CC, and requires that one must be much more aggressive with greater strategic plans to fight for Politburo membership.

In consequence, under a regime where even a CC member (as they are already higher than being a regular provincial leader) still does not have full access to the top decision-making tier, and where an alternate CC member does not even have voting rights of the center's decisions, the informal connections and resource-seeking communications among leaders play a crucial role in determining a leader's career future and one's use of power. In other words, when most leaders want to progress upward in the hierarchical system despite there being no formalized procedure to follow, the informal ways of getting promoted shall dominate the "high-end" part of Chinese politics. Presumably, it will also create a tremendous amount of space and opportunities for factional politics and informal networks among Chinese political elites. Before it is released to the public, personnel decisions in Chinese politics are notably marked by rumors, mysteries, opacities, suspicions, and sometimes schemes, plots and distrust. There is no doubt that regional leaders and other political elites will be hurt by the highly unofficial ways of competition as they are dealing with uncertainties that even a professional politician cannot predict; yet eventually the efficiency and quality of the regime will be greatly weakened by its own imperfect mechanism of selecting leaders as its elites are afraid of the uncertain outcomes. By all means, being haunted by the rumors about leadership successions is no positive help for any government to continue its effort of making its policies work.

The delicate position of Chinese regional leaders, as being specially arranged by the party, makes them a medium between the CCP center and the Chinese people. In principle, the regional leaders are supposed to govern the people with the center's institutions while expressing the people's needs and sentiments to the center. Historically, the initiation of Deng Xiaoping's

reformist ideas involved a series of decentralizing agricultural economy recovery plans carried out in a few selected provinces of China on an experimental basis.[139] And those regional leaders who were bold in carrying out the reformist policies received central leadership posts as rewards.[140] Yet, when the center over-emphasizes regional economic development as a measurement of its regional leaders it might generate unexpected problems. Because the fiscal and locational preferences of the CCP center factors into the promoting or demoting Chinese regional leaders, it actually makes those Chinese regional leaders who possess no geopolitical advantages or are without informal or fractional connections with top political figures of China almost excluded from further significant promotions. Having been treated differently, these regional elites' behaviors viewed as acting against the center's commands seem to be of some kind of explainable self-centeredness. If getting promoted from one's leadership post is unlikely or with limited possibilities, one might think more about turning one's post into profit by utilizing the governmental resources to make money in business through businessmen who are seeking such opportunities. As a result,

> "corruption discourse during the reform era is more diffuse and less politicized than was the case during these three time periods and relies more heavily on the language of the market than on political categories defined by the state. The images of political corruption that predominate in reform-era tabloids are frequently intermingled with lurid descriptions of criminal and deviant sexual behavior, and offer very little by way of political analysis as to possible causes or potential cures. As the state has receded to make room for market forces, corruption discourse itself has become commodified, eschewing the categories of class and status, and caters to a new set of manufactured popular desires. " [141]

[139] Johan F. M. Swinnen and Scott Rozelle. *From Marx and Mao to the Market: the Economics and Politics of Agricultural Transition* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.56.
[140] Former CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Former NPC President Wan Li were two of the most famous provincial leaders who backed Deng's reform vigorously in early 1980s and got promoted to be central leaders.
[141] Patricia M. Thornton. *Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State-making in Modern China* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.214.

Furthermore, when getting promotions becomes a mixed outcome of a regional leader's performance, the center's preference and the impact of informal connections with central leaders, it means that simply being a capable regional leader is not enough to ensure further promotion in this regional leader's political career. Such a practical concern will make the regional leaders put much less weight on promoting their local people's livelihood and socioeconomic development, and much more weight on getting connected with central leaders and having more publicity and fame. This study has found that regional leaders who work in the more developed regions of China get more opportunities for promotion; some of them get promoted much more quickly than leaders of other regions. After serving in these developed regions, these leaders either got promoted to the center or remained in the same region with higher posts: they rarely get transferred to the underdeveloped parts of the country where good governance can be more difficult to achieve due to the dearth of resources available. Thus, some Chinese regional leaders have all the advantages with outstanding career successes while some others have no such advantages.

Moreover, this study's finding that the higher-ranked regional leaders receive more protections of the center than the lower-ranked officials is a further reflection of the systemic bias that exposes the lower-ranked regional elites to the punishments that they may not have deserved. This study finds that accusations of corruption are frequently used by the CCP center to drag the fallen regional leaders down from their posts. Nevertheless, there are preferable patterns where the downgraded elites have not all been treated equally. If the elites are to be rewarded equally by the regime, they should be punished equally as well. Otherwise not only the accomplishments of the center would be reduced (or become excessively costly to achieve), its elites would also be turned away due to the inequality which even exists at the very nature of the

political mobility mechanism. Gradually, the effort to "promote administrative redesigns that enhance the sinews of governance and provide the foundations for a regulatory state,"[142] which is supposed to be made by both the regime and its leaders of regional governments, would be achieved at much higher costs with many setbacks.

The achievements of the regional governments that get little attention from the center may not have themselves availed properly by the party, and as the size of the bureaucracy is so gigantic that such cases can be unavoidable and more common than people have estimated. It surely is the misfortune of those regional leaders with great ambitions and a great loss to the regime that good governance can be achieved in more efficient ways. As has been emphasized multiple times in this study, the elites are viewed collectively by the outsiders yet they are actually very different from each other; it should be the regime that remains sensitive to the fact. Each and every elite of the regime should be treated equally with trust and respect that they deserve.

C. The Regime: Ruling the People with the Elites

By all means, the party-state system dominated by the Communist Party of China is a powerful regime run by professionals. The CCP has been paying close attention to the political arenas it is in, both domestic and international. The party and its center have been facing all sorts of challenges and tensions, and have understood the importance of adapting to these challenges. The collapse of the Soviet Union played a crucial role in making the CCP understand world politics better; despite the ideological constraints it carried at that time. With Deng Xiaoping's insistence, the reform carried on without the disturbance from the more conservative CCP

[142] Dali Yang. *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2004), p.296.

leaders.[143] Deng and other reformist Chinese leaders had realized that the way for the CCP to survive a political earthquake such as the collapse of the Soviet Union was not to halt the marketization but to expand it and deepen it. The conclusion they reached was that the ruling legitimacy of the CCP only exists in making the Chinese people happy. "To abandon the path of reform and opening now in favour of ideological orthodoxy would only lead the CCP, and China, to catastrophe of the sort befalling the CPSU and the USSR." [144] Thus, the direction of further political change in China should start by reforming its regional governments and their leaders.

It seems that the nature of Chinese politics has hardly changed for the past two centuries and that the center of political power has always strictly controlled its regional governmental heads, rewarding the best performers among them with opportunities of higher promotions and greater prestige. Regional elites have had to be both capable and intelligent in tackling the central government's tasks efficiently while their ways of handling the regional governments must be acceptable and appropriate from the center's point of view. However, much the intrinsic mechanism may have remained the same, the external world has changed almost fundamentally. Today's world politics and the dynamic changes in Chinese society have left little time for the regime and its elites to think thoroughly before they react. As a matter of fact, the conventional model where the center commands and rearranges its regional political elites in order to achieve its notion of good governance under the center's authority is facing potent challenges from both domestic and international sources. "This may help to improve the party's popular legitimacy in the near term, but over the longer term more competitive dynamics

[143] John W. Garver.1993. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *The China Quarterly*, 133 (1), pp.25-26.
[144] Garver. Ibid, p.26.

need to be introduced into the system."[145] The authority of the CCP center is being threatened, though in a gradual way, by other governments of the world, by the citizens of China with modernized political demands, and most important of all, by the CCP's regional leaders as even the elites of the regime have started making plans for themselves.

By controlling the political mobility of its regional leaders, the CCP center has unmistakable advantages in governing the party and the state with remarkable efficiency. Especially when the socialist market economy requires more decentralized and regionalized policies to adapt to the regional characteristics of China, by controlling the outputs (personnel system, GDP growth and revenues), instead of the inputs (investments and labor policies) of the regional political economy, it surely is a progressive way of making the regime work at lower costs. However, since the "economic decentralization has led to the feudalization of administrative power, and the power monopoly of the party has become the personal power monopoly of each chief administrator," [146] one of the consequential outcomes is that the party uses the political mobility whip to balance the regional economic dominance and the center's organizational authority. In consequence, sustained economic growth relies on the developed regions of China, but by controlling the regional leaders' career movements the center can be assured that these regions will not challenge the center's dominance by deepening the economic decentralization.

Furthermore, by granting capable elites with upward mobility or transferring them to the more developed regions of China (as these regions are also more politically important), and by demoting or removing elites who failed to meet the center's expectations, the center tries to

[145] David Shambaugh. *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaption* (Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 2008), p.180.
[146] Pan Wei. "Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China," in Susheng Zhao ed., *Debating Political Reform in China*: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p.3.

maintain its ruling authority by showing its regional leaders its "just" and "mighty" sides. However, with uprising people's movements, mishandling of accidents and land disputes protests all pointing to China's regional governments, it is doubtful that such a system will in fact increase the central government's accountability (which actually matters the most to the regional leaders), and the continuity of its policies. As the lower-ranked regional leaders and leaders from less developed parts of the country get punished more frequently and harshly than those more powerful and higher-ranked leaders in the developed provinces, the accountability of the center's personnel system might eventually decline in the eyes of its regional leaders. Moreover, when corrupt elites start to flee with all of their unlawful gains, gradually the people will lower their respect for the entire regime and do the same things that those corrupt officials have already been doing.

Regional leaders are essential to the regime; the center's effective control of the Chinese people comes from its effective control of regional leaders. To increase the accountability of the regime, the center must use more effective methods of managing its elites in order to achieve better governance with more credibility. Although punishments after crimes sounds like a solution, it might be more efficient to prevent crimes from happening in the first place. Since corrupt activities among Chinese regional leaders are more and more common and reach deeper and deeper degrees, perhaps it is the time for the center to rethink and modify its current system of mobility control over its regional leaders. All the arrangements of Chinese regional governance enacted by the center function to maintain the CCP's ruling legitimacy; however, the satisfaction of the Chinese people must be treated by the center with at least as much importance as the center handles its regional political leaders. Otherwise the control of the regional leaders' political mobility will bring only temporary peace to regional politics but no

help to the regime in the long run. Aside from the improvement of local governance as a long-term goal for Chinese regional leaders to achieve, the accountability and accessibility of the regional governments in China can be achieved in a much shorter time with much lower costs by involving the regional elites. Numerable institutions have been set up to improve government work and to prevent possible official corruption. Furthermore, technology can also play a more crucial role than building up the "Great Fire Wall" by filtering politically sensitive information on the Internet. Some scholars argue that Chinese local governments have not been governing with transparency and dedication; the accessibility issue (of the governments' websites) should be treated as a very important part of the continued development of e-government in China. [147] The cost of keeping the communicating channel open is presumably much lower than making any systemic regime changes.

Punishing its fallen corrupt regional leaders through lawful means is indeed a positive step taken by the CCP and when the center realizes the importance to maintain a good image, the rule of law will have a higher level of authority than any other institution of the regime. [148] When the regional leaders of China today are being demoted or dismissed for their wrongdoings, the center is making use of the law. It is remarkably different from the Mao and Deng eras of Chinese politics when the rule of law sometimes could not be applied to the central leaders of the CCP; yet the center must not forget that it must obey the laws itself even if it is the ultimate decision-maker of the regime. Political development, as important as economic development, must be achieved by the government in order to meet the Chinese people's

[147] Yuquan Shi. "The Accessibility of Chinese Local Government Web sites: an exploratory study," *Government Information Quarterly*, 24(2007), pp.399-400.

[148] Francis Fukuyama. "Transition to the Rule of Law," *Journal of Democracy* (2009), 21(1), p.35.

expectation for good governance. Among the essential elements of good governance: "a good legal system, clean and honest officials, high administrative efficiency, and good administrative services," [149] it is the government that is responsible for bringing the people good livelihoods under the rule of law. When it comes to the rule of law, as it is most closely associated with good governance under many post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes, no single element of the party of the three (the people, the elites, and the regime) shall make itself exceptionally more powerful than the others.

[149] Yu Keping. "Good Governance and Legitimacy," in Deng Zhenglai and Guo Sujian (eds.), *China's Search for Good Governance* (London, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.18.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnason, Johann P. 1993. *The Future That Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model.* London, U.K.: Routledge.

Batson, Andrew. 2010, November 2. "Beijing Tug of War Guides Yuan's Path," *The Wall Street Journal*, retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304173704575578062112825920.html

BBC Zhongwen. 2011, February 14. "'Land Corruption' Caused a Number of Officials Dismissed (Tudi fubai an daozhi dapi guanyuan luoma)." Retrieved from BBC Zhongwen http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2011/02/110214_hainan_land_corruption.shtml

Bian, Yanjie. 2002. "Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28:91-116.

Bird et al (Eds.). 1995. "Decentralization of the Socialist State." World Bank, Washingtong, D.C.

Becquelin, Nicolas. 2002. "Enforcing the Rural-Urban Divide: Use of Custody and Repatriation Detention Triples in 10 Years," *China Rights Forum*, 2(2002):22-27.

Bo, Zhiyue. 2002. *Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility.* Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.

—. 2007. "China's New Provincial Leaders: Major Reshuffling before the 17th National Party Congress." *China: An International Journal*, 17(1):1-25.

Brown, Kerry. 2009. *Friends and Enemies: The Past, Present and Future of the Communist Party of China*. New York, N.Y.: Anthem Press.

Burns, John P. 2006. "The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System as a Leadership Selection Mechanism," in Kjelc Erik Brodsgaard and Yongnian Zheng eds., *Chinese Communist Party in Reform*. London, U.K.: Routledge.

Burns, John P. and Wang Xiaoqi. 2010. "Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Servants' Behaviour." *The China Quarterly*, 201:58-78.

Chen, An. 2003. "The New Inequality." *Journal of Democracy,* 14(1):51-59.

Chen, Jie and Bruce J. Dickson. 2008. "Allies of the State: Democratic Support and Regime Support among China's Private Entrepreneurs," *The China Quarterly* 196 (December 2008), pp.780-804.

Chen, Ye, Hongbin Li, and Li-An Zhou. 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China." *Economics Letters*, 88(3):421-25.

Cho, Yong Nam. 2009. *Local People's Congresses in China: Development and Transition*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Chun, Lin. 2006. *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Clark, William A. 1989. *Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev*. New York, N.Y.: Praeger.

Cohen, Myron. 1993. "Cultural and Political Inventions in Modern China: the Case of the Chinese 'Peasant'," *Daedalus* 122, no.2, p151-30.

Czudnowski, Moshe D. (Eds.) 1983. *Political Elites and Social Change: Studies of Elite Roles and Attitudes*. DeKalb, I.L.: Northern Illinois University Press.

Dickson, Bruce. 2003. *Wealth into Power: the Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Dyer, Geoff. 2011, March 4. "Who Will Be China's Next Leaders?" *FT Magazine by Financial Times*, retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b7106090-4471-11e0-931d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1W4dZY21i on March 4, 2011.

Edin, Maria. 2003. "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective," *The China Quarterly,* 173(March):35-52.

Fairbank, J. K. 1986. *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*. New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row.

—, and Merle Goldman. 1998. *China: A New History.* Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.

Fan, C. Cindy. 1997. "Uneven Development and Beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao China." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 21, 4 (December): 620-639.

Garver, John W. 1993. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *The China Quarterly*, No.133 (March): 1-26.

Gerth, Karl. 2003. *China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation.* Cambridge, M.A.: Havard University Press.

Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

Goldstein, Avery. 1994. "Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC," *The China Quarterly*, 139 (Sept.): 714-30.

Goodman, David S.G. 2000. "The Localism of Local Leadership Cadres in Reform Shanxi," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 9(24): 159-83.

Guo, Xuezhi. 2002. *The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: a historical and cultural perspective*. Westport, C.T.: Praeger.

Han, Yanming. 2010. "The Missed Details of Village Democracy in China (Zhongguo cunzhuang minzhu de xijie queshi)." Special Feature for *The Financial Times*, November 8, 2011, accessed through http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035397.

Hanster, Amy. 2008. *Service Encounters: Class, Gender, and the Market for Social Distinction in Urban China*. Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press.

Hannum, E. 1999. "Political Change and the Urban-Rural Gap in Basic Education in China, 1949-1990." *Comparative Education Review* 43: 193-211.

He, Jun. 2011, August 19. "Comparison of Chinese and American Civil Servants' Wage Systems (Zhong Mei gongwuyuan gongzi zhidu bijiao)," *Financial Times Chinese*, retrieved from http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001040212

Holbig, Heike. 2009. "Remaking the CCP's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 38, 3(2009): 35-61.

Huang, Jing. 2000. *Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Jacobs, Andrew. 2010, March 1. "Chinese Editorials Assail a Government System." *The New York Times*, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com

Kanbur, Ravi and Xiaobo Zhang, 2005. "Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: A Journey through Central Planning, Reform, and Openess." *Review of Development Economics*, 9(1):87-106.

Kelliher, Daneil. 1994. "Chinese Communist Political Theory and the Rediscovery of the Peasantry," *Modern China 20*, 4: 390-93.

Kornai, János. 1992. Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2006. Zhang, An (trans.,). First Simplified Chinese Edition: Shehuizhuyi tizhi. Beijing, China: Central Compilation & Translation Press.

—. 2008. "The Inner Contradictions of Reform Socialism," in János Kornai, *From Socialism to Capitalism: Eight Essays*. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, pp.25-45.

Kostinskiy, G. 2001. "Post-Socialist Cities in Flux," in Paddison, R. (ed.) *The Handbook of Urban Studies*, London, U.K.: Sage Publications.

Kuhn, Philip. 1980. A. *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China:Militarization and Social Structure*, 1796-1864. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Laliberte, Andre and Marc Lanteigne. 2008. *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century*. London, U.K.: Routledge.

Lampton, David. 2008. *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*. Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press.

Landry, Pierre F. 2008. *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Lau, Lawrence, Yingyi Qian and Gerard Roland. 2000. "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition." *Journal of Political Economy*, 108(1):120-43.

Lee, Ching K. 2007. *Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt.* Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press.

Lerman, Arthur J. 1977. "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan." *The American Political Science Review*, 71(4):1406-22.

Lewis, John W. and Litai Xue. 2003. "Social Change and Political Reform in China: Meeting the Challenge of Success," *The China Quarterly*, 176 (Dec.):926-42.

Li, Cheng and David Bachman. 1989. "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China." *World Politics*, 42(1):64-94.

Li, Cheng and Lynn White. 1993. "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping," *Asian Survey*, 33(8):757-86.

Li, Cheng. 2001. *China's Leaders: The New Generation*. Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield.

__ , ed. 2008. *China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.

Li, Hongbin and Li-an Zhou. 2005. "Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China." *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(2005):1743-62.

Li, Peter Ping. 2006. "The Puzzle of China's TVEs: The paradox of local corporatism in a dual-track economic transition." *Management and Organization Review*, 1(2):197-224.

Li, Xueju. 1994. *A Study of Chinese Urban Basic Level of Government Construction*, Beijing, China: Sociology Publishing House of China.

Lieberthal, Kenneth G. and David M. Lampton, eds. 1992. *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Liu, Bo. 2011, June 27. "Yang Kuisong: CCP Needs to Keep Its Flexibility (Yang Kuisong: Zhonggong xuyao baochi linghuoxing)." Financial Times, retrieved from *http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001039293* on June 27, 2011.

Liu, Jianjun. 2009. *Sixteen Lectures on Ancient Chinese Political System*. Shanghai, China: Shanghai People's Publishing House.

Lovell, Julia. 2006. *The Great Wall: China against the World*. New York, N.Y.: Grove Press.

Lǔ, Xiaobo. "Booty Socialism, Bureau-Preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China." *Comparative Politics*, 32(3):273-94.

—. 2002. *Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party*. Palo Alto, C.A.: Stanford University Press.

Lu, Rey-ching. 2011. *Chinese Democracy and Elite Thinking*. London, U.K.: Palgrave MacMillan.

Ma, Changbo. 2011, January 20. "Yun Chunqing Governs Shanxi (Yun Chunqing Zhi Jin)." *Financial Times*, retrieved from *http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001036588* accessed on January 21, 2011.

Ma, Li. 2010. *The Making of the Chinese Working Class: Rural Migrants in Shanghai*. Doctoral degree dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

Mann, Susan. 1984. "Urbanization and Historical Change in China," *Modern China,* 10(1):79-113.

Mary Douglas. 1966. *Purity and Danger: An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo*. London: Routledge.

Manion, Melanie. 1985. "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders." *China Quarterly*, 102:203-33.

—. 2004. *Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.

Mattich, Alen. 2010, October 8. "Unbalanced China." *The Wall Street Journal*, retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com.

McAuley, Mary. 1974. "The Hunting of the Hierarchy: RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries and the Central Committee," Soviet Studies, 26(4): 473-501.

McGregor, Richard. 2010. *The Party: the Secret World of China's Communist Rulers*. New York, N.Y.: Harper.

Mote, Frederick W. 1970. "The City in Traditional Chinese Civilization," in *Traditional China*, James T.C. Liu and Wei-Ming Tu (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Murphy, Raymond. 2002. *How Migrant Labor is Changing Rural China*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1988. *Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Nathan, Andrew J. 1973. “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics.” *The China Quarterly*, 53(Jan.):34-66.

Nathan, Andrew J. and Bruce Gilley. 2002. *China’s New Rulers: the Secret Files*. New York, N.Y.: New York Review of Books.

Naughton, Barry. 2007. *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth*. Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.

North, Douglas. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2008. *The Powers to Lead*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

O’Brien, Kevin J. and Li Lianjiang. 1999. “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China.” *Comparative Politics* 31(2):167-86.

__, 2006. Rightful Resistance in Rural China. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Oi, Jean. 1989. *State and Peasant in Contemporary China*. Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press.

—. 1992. “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China.” *World Politics*, 45 (Oct.): 99-126.

Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Pareto, Vilfredo. 1979. *The Rise and Fall of the Elites*. New York, N.Y.: Arno Press.

Parkin, Frank. 1979. *Maxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

—. 1979. “Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation”, in Frank Parkin (ed) *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*. London, U.K.: Tavistock Publications.

Parry, Geraint. 1969. *Political Elites*. New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger

Pan, Wei. 2006. “Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China” in Suisheng Zhao, ed. *Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Laws vs. Democratization*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.

Pan, Zequan, 2007. *Society, Subjectivity and Order: Spatial Turn of Rural Migrant Research*. Social Sciences Press, Beijing, China.

Peaker, G. 1971. “The Plowden Children Four Years Later.” London, U.K.: National Foundation for Education Resources in England and Wales.

Pei, Minxin. 1998. *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.

__. 2008. *China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental Autocracy*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.

Peyrefitte, Alain. 1992. *The Immobile Empire*, New York, N.Y.: A.A. Knopf.

Perkins, D. H. 1994. “Completing China’s Move to the Market.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 8(2):23-46.

Pieke, Frank N. 2009. “Marketization, Centralization and Globalization of Cadre Training in Contemporary China.” *The China Quarterly*, 200(Dec.):953-71.

—. 2009. *The Good Communist: Elite training and state building in today’s China*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

—. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Qin, Hui. 2005. *On Ten Chinese Traditions*. Shanghai, China: Fudan University Press.

—. 2008. "The Making of China Miracle and the Culture", on *Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo)*, Jan. 20, 2008.

Saich, Tony. 2001. *Governance and Politics of China*, London, U.K.: Palgrave.

Sanger, David E. and Michael Wines.2011, January 16. "China Leader's Limits Come into Focus as U.S. Visit Nears." *The New York Times*, retrieved from *http://www.nytimes.com* January 16, 2011.

Schram, Stuart R. 1969. "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology". *The China Quarterly*, 38:1-26.

Schwartz, Benjamin Isadore. 1961. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1961.

Shahld Yusuf and Anthony Saich (eds.). 2009. *China Urbanizes*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Shambaugh, David. 2008. *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaption*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press.

Shih, Victor, Wei Shan, and Mingxing Liu. 2010. "Gauging the Elite Political Equilibrium in the CCP: A Quantitative Approach Using Biographical Data", *The China Quarterly*, 201:79-103.

Shirk, Susan L. 2007. *China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Sigley, Gary. 2006. "Chinese Governmentalities: Government, Governance and the Socialist Market Economy." Economy and Society, 35(4):487-508.

Skinner, G. William. 1977. *The City in Late Imperial China*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Solinger D.J. 1995. "The Floating Population in the Cities: Chances for Assimilation?" In *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China.* D. Davis, R. Krus, B. Naughton and E.J.Perry (eds.), New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press.

—. 1995. "China's Urban Transients in the Transition from Socialism and the Collapse of the Communist 'Public Goods Regime'." *Comparative Politics* 27(2):127-46.

—. 1999. *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of Market*. Berkely, C.A.: University of California Press.

Su, Fubing and Dali Yang. 2000. "Political Institutions, Provincial Interests, and Resource Allocation in Reformist China," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 9(24): 215-30.

Sun, Liping. 2004. *Transtition and Fragmentation: Social Structural Changes in China since the Reform*. Beijing, China: Qinghua University Press.

Sun, Yan. 2004. *Corruption and Market in Contemporary China*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Su, Yongtong. 2010, June 2. "Nine Years of Governor Zhang Baoshun (Jin guan Zhang Baoshun de fengyu jiu nian)." *The Southern Weekend Journal*, retrieved from http://www.infzm.com

Swaine, Michael D. 1995. *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs*. Santa Monica, C.A.: Rand Publishing.

Szelenyi, Ivan. 1978. “Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies.” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 19:63-87.

Tang, Wenfang and Willian L. Parish. 2000. *China Urban Life Under Reform: The Changing Social Contract*, New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Thornton, Patricia M. 2007. *Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State-making in Modern China*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1998. *Durable Inequality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tsai, Lily L. 2007. “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China”, *American Political Science Review*, 101(2):355-72.

Tsou, Tang and Andrew J. Nathan. 1976. “Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics.” *The China Quarterly*, 65(Mar.): 98-117.

Unger, Jonathan. 2002. *The Transformation of Rural China*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Walder, Andrew. 1995. “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” *American Sociological Review*, 60 (Jun.): 309-28.

—. 1995. “Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis of China’s Transnational Economy,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 101(2):263-301.

Wang, Shaoguang. 2001. “The Changing Role of Government in China” in Xudong Zhang ed. 2 *Whither China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Wedeman, Andrew H. 2003. *From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Wei, Y. D. 2000. *Regional Development in China: States, Globalization, and Inequality.* London, U.K.: Routledge.

Wu, Guoguang. 1995. *On the Relationship between the Central State and Local Governments*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University.

Xian Evening News. 2010, August 24. "New Changes in Provincial Personnel Arrangements: More Social Science and Humanity Graduates for High Ranking Officials (duoge shengfen shengbuji ganbu tiaozheng, lvxin gaoguan wenke beijing zengduo)." Retrieved from *http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/12524696.html* accessed on June 10, 2011.

Xiao, Gongqin. 2008. *China's Great Transition (Zhongguo de da zhuanxing)*. Beijing, China: Xinxing (New Star) Publications.

Xin Jing Bao. 2011. "Recent Personnel Reshufflings among Provincial Leaders (Jinqi sheng bu ji guanyuan tiaozheng)." *Xin Jing Bao* (Beijing News Daily), August 29, 2011, A4.

Yang, Dali. 2003. "State Capacity on the Rebound." *Journal of Democracy*, 14(1):43-50.

—. 2004. *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China*. Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press.

Yeung, Henry Wai-chung. 2000. "Local Politics and Foreign Ventures in China's Transitional Economy: the Political Economy of Singaporean Investments in China." *Political Geography*, 19:809-40.

Young, Alwyn. 2000. "Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in PRC", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2000(4): 1091-1135.

Yu, Jianrong. 2010. "Political Analysis of Keeping Social Stability under Pressure: the Mechanism of the Stiff-Stability of Chinese Society (Yali weiwen de zhengzhixue fenxi: zhongguo shehui gangxing wending de yunxing jizhi)." *Strategy and Management* (zhanlue yu guanli), 2010(4):55-59.

Yu, Keping. 2003. "The Emerging of China's Civil Society and Its Significance for Governance." http://www.asienhaus.org/public/archiv/China-CS_YK.pdf accessed on January 23, 2011.

—. 2009. *Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society and Culture in Contemporary China*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.

Yuan, Weishi. 2004, October 25. "Characteristics and Origins of Corruptions of Late Qing Governmental Officials (Wan Qing guanyuan tanwu de tedian yu genyuan)," China Week, retrieved from http://www.china-week.com/html/2295.htm on August 25, 2011.

Zai Liang. 2001. "The Age of Migration in China." *Population and Development Review* 27:499-524.

Zhang, Li. 2001. *Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power and Social Networks within China's Floating Population*, Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press.

Zhang, Xiaobo, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang. 2004. "Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(12):2857-71.

Zhang, Yang. 2003. *Local Government and Politics in China*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe

Zheng, Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook. 2003. "Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 8(1&2):65-86.

Zheng, Yongnian. 2004. *Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition.* Singapore: Time Academic Press.

__, 2004. *Globalization and State Transformation in China*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Zhou, Xueguang. 1995. "Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the Post-Mao Era", *Comparative Political Studies*, 28(1995): 440-68.

APPENDIX I: ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party (or The Communist Party of China)
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
GOV	Governor
NPC	National People's Congress
SEC	Secretary of CCP Regional Committee (Provincial or Municipal)
SEZ	Special Economic Zone

APPENDIX II: OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED CCP PERSONNEL ARRAANGEMENT


中国共产党新闻
News of the Communist Party of China
中文简体 BIG5 ENGLISH 日本语 РУССКИЙ ЯЗЫК

中国共产党新闻>>人事任免

2007 年 05 月 23 日 09:04

★省市区人事任免 **·杜奇林当选中共四川省委书记**

2007 年 5 月中央及地方党委人事任免一览

【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】

中共四川省第九届委员会第一次全体会议 5 月 1 6 日选举杜奇林为省委书记，蒋巨峰、李崇禧为省委副书记，当选为省 委常委的还有欧泽高（藏族）、王少雄、魏宏、李春城、李呈刚（女）、叶方勇、柯尊平、王怀臣、钟勉、黄新初，省纪委 第一次全体会议选举欧泽高（藏族）为省纪委书记，徐谈、任俊年、黄河、陈俊旭（女）为省纪委副书记。 **·王珉当选中共吉林省委书记**

中共吉林省第九届委员会第一次全体会议 1 8 日选举王珉为省委书记，韩长赋、王儒林为省委副书记，当选为省委常委 的还有李维（女）、邓凯、李秀领、王松苗、马俊清、李德泉、高广滨、徐建一、荀风栖。中共吉林省纪委第一次全会选举 李德泉为省纪委书记，高金祥、吴晓荣、尹歌为省纪委副书记。 **·白志杰同志任新疆维吾尔自治区党委常委**

中共中央 5 月 17 日下发《关于白志杰同志任职的通知》，通知说，中央批准白志杰同志任新疆维吾尔自治区党委常委。 **·刘淇当选中共北京市委书记**

中共北京市第十届委员会第一次全体会议 5 月 22 日选举刘淇为市委书记，王岐山、王安顺为市委副书记，当选为市委常委 的还有马志钢、先春瑞、陈敏尔、尤当田（女）、吉林、马振川、吴爱文（女）、李士祥、李少军、武调，中共北京市纪委 第一次全会选举马志钢为市纪委书记，张惠昆、王海平、隋秀梅（女）、于春生为市纪委副书记。 **·赵乐际当选中共陕西省委书记** 中共陕西省第十一届委员会今天下午举行第一次全体会议，选举赵乐际为省委书记，袁纯清、王侠为省委副书记，当选 省委的还有赵正永、郭永平、马中平、李锦斌、李希、朱洪武、孙清云、洪峰、夏龙祥、魏民洲。 **·张德江当选中共广东省委书记** 中共广东省第十届委员会第一次全体会议 5 月 2 5 日选举张德江为省委书记，黄华华、刘玉浦为省委副书记，当选为省 委常委的还有朱明国（彝族）、黄龙云、李鸿忠、胡泽君（女）、朱小丹、肖志恒、李容根、林雄、武维克、周镇宏。 **·汪洋当选中共重庆市委书记** 中共重庆市第三届委员会第一次全体会议，选举汪洋为市委书记，王鸿举、张轩为市委副书记。 **·强卫当选中共青海省委书记** 中共青海省第十一届委员会第一次全体会议 5 月 2 7 日选举强卫为省委书记，宋秀岩（女）、骆惠宁为省委副书记。当 选为省委常委的还有李志成、仁青加（藏族）、程京升（回族）、白玛旺山、王黎年、沈伟、王建军、李晓鹏、李炳仁、徐福 顺、多杰热旦（藏族）。 **·习近平当选中共上海市委书记** 中共上海市第九届委员会第一次全体会议今天选举习近平为市委书记，韩正、殷一璀（女）为市委副书记。 **·沈德咏当选上海市委常委、市纪委书记** 中共上海市纪委第一次全会选举沈德咏为市纪委书记，唐闻铭、顾国林、程志强、李茶华（女）为市纪委副书记。 **·张高丽当选为天津市委书记** 中共天津市第九届委员会第一次全体会议今天选举张高丽为市委书记，欧相龙、邢元敏为市委副书记，当选为市委常委 的还有黄兴国、王小京、肖怀远、戴新宇、杨栋梁、欧新军、史维嘉（女）、陈旭辰、何利军、殷鲁华。 **★地方市县人事任免** **·崔曰臣同志当选威海市委书记**

5 月 10 日，中共威海市第十三届委员会第一次全体会议选举崔曰臣同志为市委书记，王培陆、刘玉文同志为市委副书记。 **·赵立维任云南曲靖市委书记**

近日，云南省委常委、省委组织部部长李江代表省委宣布了省委关于曲靖市委主要领导职务调整的决定，任命米京生同 志为省政府党组成员、省长助理，不再担任曲靖市委书记职务；任命赵立维同志为曲靖市委委员、常委、书记。 **·高广滨任中共长春市委书记**

经中共中央批准，吉林省委日前决定，高广滨同志任中共长春市委委员、常委、书记，王儒林同志不再担任长春市委书 记、常委、委员职务。

48小时新闻排行榜

48小时评论排行榜

【先锋周刊】国民党中央大换为 何趁上胡总书记照片！ “党员事件”应成为共同的教训 【党报早读】为市委书记同上课 献叫好｜党员事件已查获涉案人 员 116 名 青海省面向全国公开选拔 12 名副 厅级领导干部 黑龙江省纪委通报五起严重违纪 违法案件 孙力军等受制裁 中央统战部负责人就近日舆论热 私人代表接触答记者问 毕美家同志任宿北市委书记 贝塔斯曼停止给中国企业的思考 陈树隆同志任芜湖市委书记 10 名同与毛泽东的婚恋情缘

(Screenshot taken from http://cpc.people.com.cn)

APPENDIX III: A SAMPLE OF A REGIONAL LEADER'S OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY



简历

，男，蒙古族，196X 年 2 月生，内蒙古 XXXXX 人，学历：大学普通班，毕业院校系及专业，XX 农业大学草原系草原专业。1976 年 6 月参加工作，1978 年 3 月入党，现任。

1973.09——1976.06 XX 农业大学草原系草原专业学习；

1976.06——1979.05 XX 省旗畜牧局草原站干部、副站长；

1979.05——1981.10 内蒙古自治区畜牧局草原站副站长；

1981.10——1983.11 内蒙古自治区畜牧局副局长兼草原站站长；

1983.11——1986.02 内蒙古自治区副旗长，旗委副书记；

1986.02——1989.03 内蒙古自治区旗委副书记、旗长；

1989.03——1990.02 内蒙古自治区市副市长；

1990.02——1995.01 内蒙古自治区市委常委、副市长；

1995.01——1998.04 内蒙古自治区盟委副书记、盟长；

1998.04——2001.09 内蒙古自治区政府秘书长（1996.05——1998.05 在中国社科院研究生院企业管理专业研究生课程班学习）；

2001.09——2003.01 内蒙古自治区市委副书记、市长（2001.03——2002.01 在中央党校一年制中青班学习）；

2003.01——2003.06 内蒙古自治区盟委书记；

2003.06——2004.04 内蒙古自治区盟委书记、盟人大工委主任；

2004.04——2004.09 内蒙古自治区市委书记、市人大常委会主任；

2004.09——2004.12 内蒙古自治区呼和浩特市委书记；

2004.12——2010.12 内蒙古自治区党委常委，市委书记。

(Screenshot taken from http://www.people.com.cn)

APPENDIX IV: SCREENSHOT OF A PROVINCIAL BUREAU OF LETTERS AND VISIT ONLINE REPORTING WEBHOST

(For Reporting and Accusing Governmental Employees for Unlawful Violations)

APPENDIX V: OFFICIAL REPORT OF OFFICIAL WITH UNLAWFUL VIOLATION

[Screenshot taken from Xinhua News Agency (2012, February 12) http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2012-02/08/c_122671868.htm]

VITA

Liang Qiao is the son of Qiao Dahong and Liang Weiping. A native of Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, in 1999 he graduated from Taiyuan No.15 Middle School. He attended Taiyuan University of Technology from 1999-2003 with Bachelor of Economics degree. He attended Peking University in Beijing from 2003-2006 and earned a Master of Laws degree. He then entered the Graduate School of Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge in the fall of 2006. At the May 2012 Commencement he will receive the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.