

IMPOSING DEMOCRACY BY FORCE:

CAN IT BE DONE?

Alyson A. Ochs

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Master's Thesis Committee

John McCormick, PhD, Chair

Michael Snodgrass, PhD

Scott Pegg, PhD

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The imposition and promotion of democracy through military force is an idea that has been discussed throughout U.S. history since the end of World War II. Military interventions—coupled with nation building—serve as a pivotal point of discussion as the United States continues its efforts to establish democratic states in regions all across the world. This thesis examines three unique case studies post-WWII, arguing that democracy cannot, in fact, be forced. This argument arises from historical research as well as democratic evaluation tools such as Freedom House. Democracy must be tied to the culture and people of a given society in order to achieve substantive and enduring change; conducting an election is not sufficient to establish a truly democratic nation.

John McCormick, PhD, Chair

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Introduction

Throughout history, the use of force has been coupled with the promotion of a body of ideas. The external imposition of democracy into regions, countries, and sectors of the world outside the United States is nothing new, and remains prevalent today in U.S. foreign policy (Pearson, Walker, & Stern, 2006). According to Von Hippel (1999), “The U.S. administration and military have been involved in nation-building and promoting democracy since the middle of the nineteenth century and ‘Manifest Destiny.’” Pei and Kasper (2003) report that the United States has used its armed forces abroad on more than 200 occasions, while Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2004) note that between World War II and the present, the United States intervened more than 35 times in developing countries with only one successful democratic establishment.

The United States began to appear on the world stage during Woodrow Wilson’s administration, leading the charge for worldwide democracy; his famous 1917 appeal to Congress explicitly stated, “The world must be made safe for democracy” (Meernik, 1996). Wilson also asserted that the United States had to “vindicate the principles of peace and justice” in regards to Germany (Jones, 1940). The Kennedy-Johnson administration also pursued this ideal with their policy of nation-building in Vietnam, with Johnson viewing Vietnam as a “struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.” President Ronald Reagan followed suit with his attempt to produce a unified democratic Lebanon and a restored democratic Grenada through military intervention (Meernik, 1996). George H. W. Bush went on to campaign for the defense of democracy in Panama, Bill Clinton for democracy in Haiti, and George W. Bush for his vision of a democratic Iraq or Afghanistan (Bush, 1989; Grandin, 2016; Bush, 2003).

Philosophers might applaud and support the promotion of democracy by the United States; Immanuel Kant argued in the late 18th Century that democracies or republics are more peaceful than other forms of government (Flang, 2006). However, Kant also warned against using force to implement democracy. In *Perpetual Peace*, he states, “No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of another State” (Kant, 1795). Reflecting these very sentiments, John Stuart Mill predicted limitations on military intervention in regards to democracy by stating, “To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive and not defensive, is as criminal as to go to war for territory or revenue; for it is as little justifiable to force our ideas on other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other respect” (Mill, 1949). Winston Churchill echoed this argument, stating, “When democracy was admitted to, or rather forced itself upon the battlefield, war ceased to be a gentleman’s game” (Winston Churchill Centre, 2014).

Despite warnings in regards to the notion of a forced democracy, the United States emerged as front-runner in pairing the idea of democracy with nation building and a sense of responsibility to liberate those in need. Luce (2002) suggests that democratic implementation is not only necessary; it is the responsibility of the United States to “accept whole-heartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.” George W. Bush, seemingly agreeing with this notion, stated “ it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (NPR, 2005).

When examining past interventions by the United States using military force, the results are troubling—whether or not one agrees that it is the responsibility of the United States to do so. Scholars such as Phillips (2006) describe interventions as “military agendas painted with secrecy, misplaced power, and Western cocksureness,” while former U.S. Security Advisor Anthony Lane noted a “dangerous hubris” in military intervention with democracy (Poole, 2005). Pei and Kasper (2003) further identify U.S. shortcomings by stating the experience in democratic nation building is one with “low rates of success, difficulty, and unilateralism.” Phillips (2006) suggests that the U.S. has pushed democracy as an almost American transplant and has ignored essential factors that could produce a successful transition into a democratic state. Phillips states, “We must move beyond the Founders perceptions of democracy and realize that democracy is not a Western import but an indigenous adaptation of general principles by each and every country worldwide. Democracy cannot simply be looked at as an American transplant.” Phillips urges scholars to look at cases such as Mongolia, Mexico, or Mali; as he suggests, “these countries are figuring out how to do it themselves, adapting democracy to their local culture, traditions, history, and more...therefore it becomes their own particular form of democracy or their own way of doing it...democracy is homegrown” (Phillips, 2006).

This thesis offers the following hypothesis: The U.S. cannot successfully impose democracy by military intervention. This paper will examine military endeavors from Post-Cold War era to the present day, with specific case studies of Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq. Although the work will focus on interventions occurring Post-Cold War, essential data prior to the Cold War provide insight into the formation of the people, culture, and

potential for political processes and success. The case study approach will allow for the evaluation, analysis, and qualitative discussion of multiple sources of evidence, drawing on years of previous work. The chosen cases represent a diverse group of organizational actors with varying colonial roots, ethnic populations, clan-based loyalty, and use of multinational forces to attempt a democratic transition. Somalia will represent: a seemingly homogenous ethnic population, Soviet ties, clan factions, and a humanitarian mission that switched to forceful measures (Office of the Historian, 2013). Haiti will represent: one of the world's poorest countries, the use of a U.N. peacekeeping presence, a free and fair election processes, and a population with over 80% Christians (Washington Post, 2015). Iraq will represent: a country with long-term vested U.S. interests and foreign policy, the beginnings for the War on Terror, and a prolonged military occupation that continues today and is further complicated by the groups such as the Islamic State (Bennett-Jones, 2015). The selected countries all include military intervention utilizing force, and each contains key elements that many propose could work for democracy. Somalia favors a monoethnic group (Karatnycky, 2002). Haiti has a predominantly Christian population (Hassan, 2015). Iraq represents years of military occupation, funding, and the concept of American soldiers instructing Iraqi soldiers on how to defend their own country.

For purposes of this thesis, democracy will be measured and defined in accordance with Freedom House's three-tiered rating system, which rates a country or territory based on its political rights and civil liberties. Scores range from 0 to 4 points for each of the 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators (Freedom House, 2016). Political rights in this scale include: Electoral Processes, Political

Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government. Civil liberties include: Freedom of Expression, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (Freedom House, 2016). Each country is then assigned two ratings between one and seven (one rating for political rights and one rating for civil liberties); the average of the two calculates the degree of freedom or Freedom Rating. A score of 1.0-2.5 represents a Free democracy; 3.0-5.0 is Partly Free, and 5.5-7.0 is Not Free (Freedom House, 2016).

In the Freedom House Scale, countries (not territories) must meet a certain minimum standard for political rights: seven or higher in Electoral Process and overall political rights of 20 or above (Freedom House, 2016). Political rights reflect: (a) free and fair elections; (b) candidates who are elected actually rule; (c) competitive political parties; and (d) the representation of minorities in government (Freedom House, 2016). Civil liberties in this measure include freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. In addition, civil liberties comprise: (a) free and just economic activity; (b) an independent judiciary; and (c) opportunity for all, including both women and minority groups (Freedom House, 2016).

The Freedom House measure is just one tool to measure the quality of a democracy; the case studies will add more nuance and complexity. The work of Kekic (2007) and Coppedge et al. (2011) will provide additional units of measure with which to examine, conceptualize, and measure, the effectiveness of democracies established with the use of military force. Coppedge et al. (2011) notes that it is essential to examine democracy because, “perhaps no other concept is as central to policymakers and scholars” (Coppedge, 2011). By comparing various elements of a particular country or

region of the world, it is hoped that a basic understanding can be formulated as to the ingredients for successful transition into democracy. Failed interventions represent opportunities to learn from past mistakes and potentially adapt or alter future interventions to avoid the use of force.

The thesis was inspired by a number of factors. As a person who was new to the discipline, I was drawn to the concept of democracy. I was intrigued by its many definitions and its ever-lasting applications in the United States. I wondered if it could truly be exported or adopted by other countries or regions much different from my own. A second point of inspiration came from my service in the United States Army. Traveling to countries such as Afghanistan, soldiers are asked to not only serve in traditional combat roles but also attempt to “win the hearts and minds” of the country we are currently occupying. As a medical provider, I witnessed increased violence and resistance during periods of attempted democratic transition, such as during election periods. I wondered: could democracy be implemented here? Can democracy be forced?

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Liberty is the mother not the daughter of order. Is liberty only possible if order is first established by force or does order arise best from an atmosphere of liberty, from free people developing their own interpersonal agreements, arrangements, and accommodations to starve off disorder? (Tucker, 1885)

There has been extensive literature regarding: (a) United States military interventions throughout history (Sultan, 2001); (b) specific studies surrounding United States efforts for nation-building (Pei and Kasper, 2003); (c) studies regarding the abuse of power by the United States to establish democratic rule (Phillips, 2006); and (d) studies that attempt to examine the very concept of the term “forced democratization” (Walker, 2011). However, very little work has been done to analyze specific case studies of countries affected by U.S. military force, utilizing literature analysis and the key elements of the Freedom House rating to propose an alternative to forced rule.

This literature review will attempt to explore the following concepts: (a) U.S.-led involvement and force against non-democratic states in the post-Cold War era; (b) the abuse of U.S.-inspired foreign policy to force democracy; and (c) measuring democracy beyond the election process-what is success?

A Long History of U.S. Military Interventions: It is the “Right” Thing to Do

Christopher Kayo from the CATO Institute (quoted in Lowenthal, 1991) argues: “The United States has attempted to export liberal democracy institutions through military occupation and reconstruction throughout its history and with mixed results. For every west Germany or Japan, there is a Cuba, Haiti, Somalia, or Vietnam.” To Kayo and others, the fundamental problem is not just knowing what a democracy looks like or

recognizing the importance of the protection of civil rights, political rights, the rule of law, and so on. The issue stems from a lack of understanding on how to incorporate these essential elements in a foundation where it does not already exist (Lowenthal, 1991). Soldiers are not simply faced with the traditional components of war, such as firepower or ammunition; they too are faced with special interest-groups, civil wars, disconnected leaders, rigged elections, poor economies, and religious ideologies, all of which represent the very fibers upon which the country functions. Aksenyonok (2004), who served as a special envoy of the Russian Foreign Ministry for Russia and eastern Slavonia, noted the difficulty of producing a “recipe” for Western values elsewhere (particularly within the Middle East). Aksenyonok identifies one of the main barriers to the success of democracy overseas as the simplified approach taken by the U.S. military and government. To him, because the United States experienced success in post-Communist countries in central and Eastern Europe, the government feels that there is some sort of stencil or patterned rubric that may be followed to ensure success elsewhere.

Support of various interventions with force has been backed by the viewpoint that democracy is, in fact, the best way to govern. This belief supports the ability of the United States to peacefully work with other countries (Kant, 1795). Lynn-Jones (1998) argues that democracy abroad should be one of the central foreign-policy goals for the United States. With the implementation of democracy, people will live better lives; enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, and freedom from government violence; enjoy an enhanced quality of life; and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. Lynn-Jones states there are six reasons to spread democracy; including, but not limited to:

1. Democracies will not go to war with the United States;
2. Democracies do not support terrorism against the United States;
3. Democracies produce fewer refugees;
4. Democracies will ally with the United States;
5. American ideals flourish when others adopt them;
6. Democracies make better economic partners (Lynn-Jones, 1998).

The Economist echoes this sentiment as well, quoting Alexis de Tocqueville's statement:

"Democracy might look weaker and confused at the surface but has lots of hidden strengths" (The Economist, 2014). The article continues,

The strengths of democracy comes from its ability to offer alternative leaders with alternative solutions to existing problems and challenges...In order for democracy to be sustainable, it must be built on a strong foundation, to harness human creativity but also to check human perversity, and then kept in good working order, democracy must be constantly oiled, adjusted, and worked upon (The Economist, 2014).

McFaul (2009), too, agrees that democracy must spread to as many places outside the Western hemisphere as possible. Although he does not necessarily advocate for the use of force to achieve peace, McFaul declares that, "If other countries were to adopt the principles found in democracy, it would better serve American interests." McFaul proposes the democratization not only of the Middle East and Asia, but also the expansion of democratic principles to Russia, China, and even the Hermit Kingdom of North Korea. McFaul denies that the concept is outlandish and states that it is "no crazier than dreaming the same for Europe in 1948." To McFaul, "America should encourage incremental political liberalization, support civil society nongovernmental organizations, aid in domestic reform, and promote trade liberalization" (McFaul, 2009).

The Problem: Democracy as a Forced State

Blaugh (2009) agrees that although the concepts of “force” and “power” via military intervention can promote change, we must be mindful that this power is “only legitimate when it is based on the free and fair agreement of the people as a whole.” In order for democracy to work and function well within a society, Blaugh suggests that democracy must go beyond simply an ideal or an aspiration to actual practice. He states,

We really do have to get away from thinking about democracy as a social engineering project because it's precisely that engineering project which separates us from what is actually going on...It's not a question of: What should we do to the people to make them more democratic...It is instead more important to focus on how we can understand democracy in a slightly different way, a way that works for this particular group of people.

He goes on to suggest that, “first of all, nobody can tell a people or a culture how to be democratic” (Blaugh, 1999). President Barack Obama too foresaw the problems associated with forced democracy when he said, “The danger I think is when the United States, or any other country, thinks that we can simply impose these values on another country with a different history and culture ” (The Last Refuge, 2009).

Dahal (2013) asserts that in order for us to truly understand the ability of other countries or regions to move towards even higher level of democratic values, we must look at them in their own light, through their own ‘governmental organs’ and move beyond simple force. Regions must be stable enough to create an environment that is conducive to producing democratic reform. Instead of viewing countries as almost “experimental democracies,” the U.S. should work more towards providing stability with the direct involvement of the people.

Aksenyonok (2004) agrees with this statement, especially in reference to regions such as the Middle East, recognizing that it is in fact, “quite different from a Germany or Japan.” Instead, the Middle East has a civilization of “special peculiarities, ages-long history, a deep rooted mentality, and governance and public life traditions that are different than that of the West” (Aksenyonok, 2004), a notion that both foreign policy advocates, leaders, and soldiers enforcing democracy must bear in mind. President Aquino II of Myanmar notes the difficulty of spreading democracy and reform, recognizing the importance of remaining committed and steadfast to the cause. President Aquino II noted,

We want to encourage them, we want to promote their stability because it will improve the whole regions stability that lays the basis for the improvement of living standards for the entire region. Your power emanates from the people. If you are committed to the direction then the government basically has to follow the people. Myanmar and their neighbors should share our experiences, share our resources, and share our knowledge in that transition and make democracy work (Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2014).

Echoing these sentiments, Husain (2013) states, “Barricades, bullets, blood, and bombastic statements will not restore democracy.” He urges the United States to change their way of thinking: “We should help defang their more extreme elements, provide economic assistance for development (not only military aid), facilitate free trade, support civil society organizations, work with Muslim democracies like Turkey, and contain regional autocracies like Saudi Arabia” (Husain, 2013).

A forum entitled, “Should the U.S. use force to establish democratic governments,” analyzed the role of military force in the establishment of democracy (Middle East Forum, 2006). Aligning with Blaugh (2009), Congressman David Price stated,

It is not appropriate for the U.S. government or any government to use military force or the threat of military force for the sole purpose of changing the government of a sovereign nation. Doing so violates central tenets of our own American experiment, namely independence and self-determination. Moreover, military force is a blunt instrument, excellent for overwhelming an enemy with force, but ill-suited for building political processes and institutions in a positive way (Middle East Forum, 2006).

Across the United States, people agree that force is, in fact, not the answer to achieving democracy. A Third Way poll from Chicago, IL, 88% of respondents agreed with the statement: “The U.S. cannot impose democracy by force on another country.” Americans not only disagree with the use of force; they also disagree with the mere *threat* of the use of force, with 66% stating that “warning a government that the U.S. military might intervene if it does not carry out democratic reforms” does much more harm than good (World Public Opinion, 2007).

In *Democracy doesn't flow from the barrel of a gun*, Patten (2003) confirms Aksenyonok's (2004) work and concepts from others by exploring the many challenges of the Middle East and surrounding regions; as the title of the book might suggest, Patten recognizes the faulty approach used by the U.S. thus far. Recognizing the need in some cases for intervention, Patten states,

Democracy seldom arrives without external pressure, but Western countries should heed the identity of an ‘armed missionary’—bringing democracy to Islamic countries on the tips of precision-guided missiles. If we in the West think that democracy as a political form holds global appeal, we should not force feed it to the subservient states as a Western geostrategic option (Patten, 2003).

Coffey (2010), also recognizing the difficulty of forced democracy (due to the complexity of its nature), states the U.S. fails to recognize “how vastly different the political cultures of peoples are—their collective beliefs, values, habits.” Coffey perhaps summarizes the challenges of promoting democracy best in his reference to James

Madison who wrote, “the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (quoted in Coffey, 2010). Donnley (2002) notes that democracy alone, forced or not, does not simply solve all of the countries present problems. He states, “Democratization does not guarantee social justice any more than it guarantees economic growth, harmony, free markets, or the end of ideology.” The funneling of money to fight corruption and the use of force, “has proven unsuccessful,” and furthermore, “you have to fault the international community itself by forcing democracy in a hot-house atmosphere...you can’t manipulate a country into democracy. You can manipulate a country into an election” (Donnley, 2002).

In *Somalia in Perspective: When the Saints Go Marching In*, Weil (1993) notes that the intervention in Somalia was not the first time the U.S. attempted to change a country with the use of force. Weil states,

...this was, after all, the third time within the four short years of the Bush administration, following Panama and Iraq, that the United States invaded a third world country to disarm the very same ‘thugs,’ that it had been massively arming and employing as ‘assets’ only a year or two earlier (Weil, 1993).

Such a raw display of power by the “only remaining superpower” has its own rationale. Indeed, the more its use of military muscle is fiddled with apparent contraindications, the more it enforces that the United States alone is the arbiter of the globe, deciding on its own who will be favored and who will be punished” (Weil, 1993).

Castaneda et al. (1993) wrote that the combination of force and U.S.-centered policy led to “failing democratic states.” In reference to regions such as Latin America, they state,

The motivations of economic benefits, geopolitical imperatives, and ideological crusades, as well as the record of U.S. interventionism ranging from Mexico in 1847 to Grenada in 1983, all counsel opposition and skepticism. Even the best intentions usually absent set the worst of precedents (Castaneda, 1993).

In *The U.S. Policy of Democracy Promotion in Latin America*, Gilbert furthers this notion stating, “The U.S. policy of democracy promotion in Latin America has consisted of promoting governments that are favorable to U.S. political and economic interests rather than democracy itself” (Gilbert, 2008). Kerr and Salvador (2011) from the Center for Strategic Research agree that the United States continues to fall short in pairing military intervention with U.S.-centered policy. They state, “The United States should not focus on creating a totally new way to govern in these regions, but instead work with the current infrastructure in place to strengthen social, economic, and security elements to further promote self-determination and change.” Kerr and Salvador (2011) further this argument, noting that the United States must approach these states as, “peers and emphasize that Washington wants to support their democratic initiatives, not dictate what they believe are the next appropriate steps, as this will foster resentment because other countries may see it as affront to their dignity and sovereignty.”

Elections Do Not Equal Success

Scholars argue that,

when it comes to democracy we are still driven by regular elections and majoritarian rule. We have ignored all other ingredients for a sustainable government, like a competent civil service, guaranteed constitutional rights, checks and balances, rule and law, and an independent judiciary (International Crisis Center, 2009).

Kadir (2013) notes,

For decades Islamists were criticized for not endorsing democratic rules and being bent on ending democratic governance in Egypt and beyond yet, virtually each time the Islamists won free elections, they were forcibly removed from gaining power in the first place.

Algeria (1991), Turkey (1997), Palestine (2006), and Egypt (2013) all witnessed the same outcome (Kadir, 2013). The problem is not simply that these groups of people are

“unable” to take office or begin to touch the very bases of what we deem democratic.

Rather, the West and the United States fail to condemn or intervene when the laws of the democracy are violated, thus, “undermining the credibility of frequent calls for democracy from the West” (Kadir, 2013). In order for democracy to be successful, Kadir states, countries need a two-pronged approach: one that is domestic, and one that is more international. He declares, “While the military’s involvement in politics is crucial to any democratization effort, we must bear in mind that it is the outcome of democratization efforts, not the cause.” Military efforts should protect economic interests at hand while not undermining the very policies of a stronger society (Kadir, 2013).

Elections are not the only component; in examining the democratic processes in countries such as Bosnia and Egypt, Dimitrova (2005) and Martini and Taylor (2011) point to the abuse of power by elected officials and more of the same lack-luster interventions put forth through U.S. policy. In Bosnia, it comes in the form of The Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was given total power to: (a) directly impose legislation; (b) enact interim measures when Bosnian parties are unable to reach an agreement; (c) veto candidates for ministerial positions; (d) impose economic sanctions; and (e) take punitive actions against public officials or politicians (Dimitrova, 2005). In Egypt, troubled democracy took the form of the U.S. greatly exerting influence with aid

in the amount of over 1.3 billion dollars per year, covering 80% of its procurement costs and ignoring the corruption of elected military officials in power. The tenets of U.S. military interventions such as these can also be applied to those that brought about democracy with force; both have similar applications in policy, such as in rendering large amounts of aid and helping with the induction of election processes. Hays (2004) states in reference to failed states, “Had we known what we had known now we would have funded and trained personnel inside domestic structures...working with them and thus building government capacity instead of International community capacity.”

In an examination of Haiti, *The Washington Post* recognized the difficulties of U.S. attempts to force democracy despite the holding of an official election in 2011 or the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force post-military intervention. The article describes Haiti’s parliament as “disbanded” and its “judiciary weak and subject to manipulation” (Washington Post, 2015). Fifteen years earlier, Murphey (2000) reviewed and addressed the Haitian intervention with the exact same results, stating, “Haiti remains a violence-prone, corrupt nation.” Parliamentary elections in 2000 were declared to be “fraudulent;” international aid is continuously shifting between frozen vs. unfrozen assets; unemployment tops 70 percent, with 65 percent of adults who are unable to read nor write; and Haiti is described as, “the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere.” (Murphey, 2000). Furthermore, today: “Mr. Martelly’s government and some of his closest associates are suspected of all manner of intimidation, violence, and corruption” (Washington Post, 2015).

Dreyfuss (2010) presents a timetable of events, beginning with the 1915 entrance of U.S. Marines in Haiti that quashed local resistance to establish a 19-year temporary

military government; in 1934, U.S. forces withdrew. The current goal of the United States is to guide “credible, inclusive, and legitimate elections that genuinely reflect the will of the Haitian people” (quoted in Grandin, 2016). However, the problems in Haiti span far beyond simply holding elections. Sprague examines the troubling nature of U.S. involvement in the nation, citing the U.S. marine training of Baby Doc’s Leopards, a militant group assigned to force rule and described as, “particularly brutal in dealing with civilians,” far removed from the vision of a truly democratic state (Grandin, 2016).

Weil (1993) too explored this kind of absence of involvement with the local people in nations with a newly established electoral process. Weil describes interventions in Somalia as an “instance in which the United Nations is intervening without the acceptance of the government involved, on the grounds that Somalia has become so anarchic that there is no one left with the authority to approve the action” (Weil, 1993). The U.S.-led intervention, known as “Operation Restore Hope,” was designed as a relief project; although the then-U.N. Ambassador, Madeline Albright, stated it was for, “the restoration of the entire country.” Pairing initial force with displacement only yielded troubling results: in the case of Somalia, U.N. forces ambushed and mutilated and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and made a public display of the human remains. To Weil (1993), the United States reduced already-susceptible countries to states of even further anarchy through the imposition of “democracy,” in order to install U.S. national interests. Weil describes this U.S. intervention as an “unrestrained freedom to intervene after conditions have been made desperate enough,” thus allowing the American military to go back to the Vietnam saying or motto of, “we had to destroy it to save it” (Weil, 1993).

Walker (2011) identifies that the concept of forced democracy—although seemingly straightforward—is actually quite complex, particularly when attempting to evaluate the relative success of this process. Walker (2011) does not see an election as the sign of a successful democratic installation; he develops another way to look at the concept of force and evaluation of its success. He states that forced democratization must be separated into three distinct categories: (a) Intervention with Proliberalization Policies; (b) Interventions with Democratizing Intent; and (c) Intervention with Regime Change. He seeks a more nuanced measure of Democratic Outcome through analyzing two existing measures: The Polity IV Measure and The Freedom House Measure. The Polity IV Measure explores the degree of openness of political institutions along with six other components including constraints on executive authority and political competition. The Freedom House Measure attempts to capture the “real world rights and social freedoms enjoyed by individuals,” in a given country, in a given year (Walker, 2011). Results of his study reveal that what he classifies as Variant I Interventions (Proliberalization Policies) classify both Iraq and Afghanistan as “works in progress.” Variant II Interventions (Interventions with Democratic Intent, such as in Somalia), have been “even less successful in ensuring long-term democratization.” Variant II Interventions (Intervention with Regime Changes, in countries such as Haiti), also fail to bring about absolute change. Walker concludes that, “interventions which attempt to force democracy are not likely to lead to long-term, full democratization with all of the accompanying features one would expect, such as strong rule of the law and high respect for basic human rights” (Walker, 2016).

Other scholars and organizations have also found fault in the current approach to democratic intervention around the world, in both the application of force and the outcome of its success. According to the Constitutional Rights Foundation, success entails large numbers of U.S. ground troops, the participation of local citizens, and a continuous involvement of all parties. The report declares four key components to U.S. internationalism including: established security, a keen understanding of the country's internal characteristics, multilateralism, and a level of commitment from all (Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2014). Aksenyonok (2004) and others urge Americans, leaders, and political scholars to examine the other side of the medal when it comes to instilling democracy, urging us not to look at simply separating factions, drawing military lines, or labeling others as 'radical,' but instead to push for open theological and secular discussions about the models of government that could work here. (Aksenyonok, 2004). The Carnegie Report from the Constitutional Rights Foundation echoes President Aquino and Aksenyonok's sentiments by resting on a trite and well-known proverb of patience and perseverance: "After all, Rome wasn't built in a day." (Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2014)

The qualitative analysis of force is insufficient to truly measure the success of such intervention; the analysis of democracy requires more than a summary of philosophical notions of nation building, or a discussion of passionate American sense of duty to spread democracy to others. The analysis of democracy requires some sort of measurement that we can really see in order to evaluate true effectiveness. In *The Democracy Barometer: A New Instrument to measure the quality of democracy and its potential for comparative research*, Bühlmann, Merkel, Muller and Weßels (2011) state:

“measuring democracy is not an easy task, but anyone who does empirical research on democracy needs good measures.” Existing indices utilized in the past include scales such as the Freedom House (previously mentioned and used in this thesis), Polity, and the Vanhanen Index of Democratization; however, many in the discipline still argue that issues remain in three key areas: conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation. Several other projects also aim to evaluate democracy, such as the democratic audit (1994), the New Index of Democracy (2006), and The Democracy Ranking (2008). Shortcomings identified by these authors suggest that, “previous indices of democracy do not live up to the demands of current democracy research” (2011). Current measures “are not sensitive enough to measure the subtle differences among established democracies”; and furthermore, “democracy is a complex phenomenon, and a minimalist measurement cannot do it justice” (Bühlmann, Merkel, Muller, and Weßels, 2011).

Chapter 2: The Case Studies

Somalia

The country of Somalia has an estimated population of 8.4 million people with the inclusion of Ethiopian refugees (Metz, 1992). Somalian history traces its roots back to 100 A. D., with the Beriberi people living in the Horn of Africa (Metz, 1992). Rulers from the Omanis to the Zanzibaris to the sharifs of Mukha battled for land and strategic holds; Metz identified that, in 1885, Somalia experienced five distinct, simultaneous colonial rules, including the French in the northwest, the British in the central region, and Kenya in the southwest.

The history of Somalia can serve as a point of interest when examining its ability to accept democracy through force, as it has long battled for power and independence. In 1943, Somalia created its first political party known as the: “Somalia Youth Club.” The political party sought to unify all Somalian territories by challenging loyalty to various clans. The country, although seemingly homogeneous in language and occupation, was sharply divided into distinct clan-like families including the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawive, along with two agricultural groups consisting of the Digil and the Rahanwayn (Metz, 1992).

Clan loyalty and a constant struggle for resources, power, and land created a rather aggressive undertone to a nation struggling to establish a political system, even with the best intentions of outside military or humanitarian interventions. Metz notes: “Historically, Somali’s have shown fierce independence, an unwillingness to submit to authority, a strong clan consciousness, and conflict among clans and subclans despite their sharing of a common language, religion, and pastoral customs” (Metz 1992). Daud

(2012) further recognizes the importance of clan loyalty, stating: “Thus, the clan is indeed the core of personal identity, social security, insurance, defense, and the fusion and fission of Somali society.” Stevenson (1995) affirms: “The clan is the only palpable political entity the Somali knows. It is the essential unit of Somali culture” (Stevenson 1995).

With the independence of Somalia in 1960, many Somalis remained hopeful for the representation they so desperately fought for. In 1969, sixty-four political parties arose, backed by Soviet influence; this was followed by the assassination of President Shermaarke by one of his bodyguards who represented the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Siad Barre became the new President of Somalia and would go on to introduce Marxist socialism (Ghalib, 1995), launch the Ogaden War against Ethiopia in 1977 (Metz, 1992), and as Ghalib states,

...purposefully ignore the important principles of popular support as soon as he consolidated his power base...Instead he chose to rely on acts of terror against the civilian population among whom not just the activity but the very presence of opposing group members were reported to him directly (Ghalib, 1995).

With a drained postwar economy, loss in transportation and communication channels, and increased national debt, Siad Barre recognized the need to reach out for international (particularly Western) support. Soon, Americans would see firsthand the suffering of a group of people, far removed from them and their everyday lives. Marred by a backdrop of violence and human rights violations, the July 1989 Mogadishu demonstrations, and the killing of some 450 persons, Somalia became a top contender for international aid and support.

Despite the creation of a Somali constitution in 1979 citing elements of free speech, religion, and assembly, elements of corruption prevailed. The constitution was described as simply: “tools to mimic institutions of democracy” and “lure superpowers” into coming to the aid of a country struggling to attain its freedom (Stevenson, 1995). Ghalib recognized the importance in the role of the media in the involvement of the United States in responding to the Somalian demise, stating, “Somalia affairs made little impact on world consciousness until the unprecedented suffering that accompanied the famine of the early 1990’s was featured on TV screens throughout the world” (Ghalib, 1995). Playing on the heartstrings of the American people, Stephenson notes the easy persuasion of the “world’s hero’s” (Stephenson, 1995), despite Barre’s systematic genocide, oppression, economic sanctions, and the approval of candidates into leadership only approved by Barre himself (Daud, 2012). Ghalib further notes, “Many innocent people were brutally killed en masse, solely because of their clan membership or upon mere suspicion of anti-regime activities” (Ghalib, 1995). Africa Watch reported that, in Siad Barre’s three final years in office, over 50,000 unarmed civilians were killed; thousands more died of starvation from the poisoning of water wells and the slaughtering of livestock (Metz, 1992).

Following the end of Siad Barre’s presidency, a new leader emerged with a provisional government: President Ali Mahdi Muhammad. Yet, this regime change appears to have created an even more broken Somalian system, as many groups grew angry at the creation of a government without their consultation or input. Refugees from Ethiopia (50,000), Kenya (300,000), Yemen (65,000), Djibouti (15,000), and Europe (100,000) poured into Somalia, creating a constant struggle for food supplies and

allowing for the rise of warlords in the cities and clan-recruited, militia-backed power over the centralized government (Metz, 1992).

In April of 1992, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 751, establishing the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) with a mission to provide humanitarian aid and facilitate the end of hostilities in Somalia (Metz, 1992). Fifty unarmed observers were to monitor and resolve the issues plaguing a very broken country, rife with civil unrest, dictatorship, clan-based loyalties, hundreds of thousands of famine-stricken civilians. Americans and the international community watched as television and media outlets “graphically captured the starvation and strife resulting from years of famine and clan warfare” (Casper, 2001). Abdulkadir Mohammed Aden, acting Vice-president of the interim government stated: “We wish the United States would sponsor us since the U.S. now has responsibility for the whole world” (Casper 2001). Casper states: “Our own citizens began to question the nation’s passiveness. The congressional Black Caucus—pointing to our recent exploits in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait—led the call for U.S. involvement by asking, ‘Why not Africa?’” (Casper 2001).

Despite the immensely complicated atmosphere of Somalia, and the warnings of seasoned regional diplomat Smith Hemp Stone, the U.S. continued to be swayed and propelled to intervene in Somalia via military operations (Stevenson, 1995). Somalia at this time was the world’s leading candidate for humanitarian intervention with the International Committee of the Red Cross estimating that 75 percent of the population was in danger of starving (Stevenson, 1995). Although other interventions had proceeded since Mid-August of 1992 during Operation Provide Relief, Operation Restore Hope

would incorporate the use of a unified task force of twenty nations to secure lines of communication and the security of aid stations throughout the country. Ghalib states:

Operation Restore Hope 1992-1993 was seen as a noble and necessary gesture, it was a new and unaccustomed humanitarian intervention role for the U.S. military that had much to do with U.S. presidency and the frustrations of captains of the aid industry and charities (Ghalib 1995).

As complications mounted, Resolution 814 was passed in March of 1993. Casper declares,

For the first time in U.N. history, a force would be armed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to restore peace, law, and order, including the disarming of Somalia militias and holding those responsible for violence individually accountable...The resolution further established as an objective the rehabilitation of the country's political institutions and economy, nation building (Casper 2001).

In May of 1993, UNISOM II (consisting of 14,000 peacekeepers) assumed the mission from UNITAF; the U.S. task force that once provided daily watch was disbanded (Stevenson, 1995). Stevenson states: "American policy makers had only a glancing understanding of the Somalis unique culture. The mission was far more difficult to execute than either President Bush or General Colin Powell had imagined" (Stevenson 1995). Stevenson continues:

Overall the American approach smacked unmistakably of wishful thinking-in particular, the idea that the simple, scalar weight of benign power can transform anarchy of mysterious causes into a cooperative, self-perpetuating rebuilding package...It isn't so...As Ambassador Hemp Stone noted before Operation Restore Hope even began: 'It will take five years to get Somalia not on its feet but just on its knees' (Stevenson, 1995).

A variety of lessons can be learned from the intervention in Somalia with the use of military force. Daud states: "There have been fourteen reconciliation attempts aimed at restoring peace and stability in Southern Somalia but all have failed to yield intended

objectives” (Daud 2012). To authors such as Stevenson, military intervention is the last resort. To him, the United Nations should remain the primary authority in regards to nation rebuilding; even if a military commitment exists, negotiation should be preferred (Stevenson 1995). Casper states:

We tricked ourselves into thinking that humanitarian assistance meant a peaceful, orderly, and cooperative relationship with the indigenous population...Operations were ill-planned and left forces with insufficient supplies, no unity of command, and no clear set of objectives when working with U.N. forces that were often fractured and ill-prepared” (Casper 2001).

Admiral Howe, who served in Somalia as Special Representative of U.N. Secretary General from March 1993-March 1994, further described the U.S. commitment as a narrow mission stating: “We are going to put a Band-Aid on this thing, basically, we are going to stabilize it.”

America did not truly understand the people they were attempting to support. The mission, although well intended, “was simplistic and too late to save many Somalis;” the African crisis is “invariably complex and not for the dilettante” (Ghalib 1995).

Stevenson states: “The American command believed the Somalis to be intellectually primitive, culturally shallow, and militarily craven” (Stevenson 1995). In 1992, Times writer Steven Talbott compared the mistakes made in Somalia to those made in Vietnam; Somalia militia groups were labeled as simply: “Toyota Land Cruisers manned by boys as the Viet Cong were peasants who used pongi stakes” (Stevenson 1995).

Furthermore, to view Somali nation building as anything similar to that of Western democracy is a mistake. Stevenson writes: “Somali culture is what makes Somalis so singularly unmalleable, so reluctant to take guidance” (Stevenson 1995).

In a culture where over 90 percent of women have their clitorises clipped in preadolescence to a heritage founded on clan contentiousness and the Somali as accountable only to God; it is difficult to link Western traditions and ideas to that of the Somalian people (Stevenson 1995).

Other works too describe the Somali people as very different from the West, pointing to the *Xeer* or Somalia's customary legal system (Ali, 2012). Here, Somali elders derive authority as guardians of their communities and are relied upon to make decisions that affect their people; they are neither elected nor voted for (Ali, 2012). Somali people survive without traditional institutions that Westernized cultures might state as essential: local networks, conferences, gatherings, and clan loyalties represent their form of government, power, and decision-making (Hayes and Hassan, 2009).

Ultimately, the mission did not plan for what would happen to the Somalis after the removal of U.S. forces and aid. With the withdrawal of soldiers from multiple countries, soldiers were training less and could do nothing but carry out essential tasks, let alone empower Somalis or promote democracy. Stevenson states: "Though humanitarian intervention is an extraordinary remedy, once applied, its termination should be structured so as to allow the beneficiary population to be weaned of its dependence on foreign troops" (Stevenson 1995). The International Crisis Group agrees, suggesting that the U.S. should have put forth a 5-10 year plan that was "supported by experts in international customs" to directly aid the economy, provide measurable goals, and genuinely represent local clans and social groups (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Daud recognizes the importance of empowering the people; he examined the colonization methods of Italy and Britain (Daud, 2012). Daud affirms that in contrast to southern Somalia, Somaliland had successfully constructed the first democratic state of its kind in the Horn of Africa with an emerging *laissez-faire* economy, legal frameworks

intended for democratic institutions, and various political parties (Daud, 2012). Success to Daud relates directly to the approach taken by the British early on in its development. In Somaliland, unlike southern Somalia, the British left behind skilled and competent civil servants. Civil servants here were required to obtain certificates or degrees to be considered for employment. This approach not only empowered the local people but it made them less reliant on colonial forces when they left or could no longer monetarily support them (Daud, 2012).

Aside from providing and encouraging needed education, the British also allowed Somaliland to keep to their own traditions, which is an important lesson that can be learned when attempting to build a new nation. As demonstrated in the Somali National Movement, to prevent civil war, elders asserted their power and demanded that each clan contain its militia. Gatherings were conducted in the traditional manner (that is, under a tree), including The Grand Conference of the Northern People in 1991, The Borama Conference in 1993, and the Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation Conference in 1993; to Daud, these summits “defined the fate of Somalilanders” and “elevated their pride” (Daud 2012).

The United States, like the Italians in early colonization period, mistakenly forgot to empower the people themselves; forgot to incorporate their traditions, their leaders, and their way of life into a government that would work for *Somalia*. Instead of viewing Somalia as “putting Humpty Dumpty back together again,” the U.S. should have instead put forth a more comprehensive plan outside short-term applications of force. Clearly defined goals with an exit strategy, the incorporation of the Somalian representatives, and the avoidance of costly urban conflict with civilian casualties all remain relevant points

when addressing attempts to improve the United States' mission in applying democracy in this war-torn nation (International Crisis Group, 2012).

The Freedom House ratings for Somalia—from shortly after the U.S. interventions in the 1990s and in the present day—provide further support for an unsuccessful transition to democracy. According to the Freedom House *Country Rating and Status 1973-2016* report, Somalia earned a seven for both political rights and civil liberties in 2016; a rating of “not free” throughout the entire data set. According to this measure, Somalia represents a country with few or no political rights because of severe government oppression; stemming not only from the acts of Siad Barre and violent clan loyalty, but also the lack of a functioning political system all together. When examining key points of analysis in the Freedom House questions, it becomes apparent that Somalia never had an established or reputable election monitoring system, either during the intervention of the U.S. military, or after. Voter registration was essentially non-existent or clan-favored, and any party outside of Barre's was continuously attacked, intimidated, and killed *en masse*. Furthermore, Somalia provides “virtually no freedom of expression or association” in the civil liberties measure (Freedom House, 2016). Somali leadership used media outlets in order to propagandize Somali suffrage for the benefit of the leadership only, not to help those who were actually suffering. Both before and after U.S. intervention, Somalis were not allowed peaceful protest without fear of intimidation or death; persons outside of favored clan memberships were not provided an opportunity of council; and members of any minority group, including women, did not and do not enjoy the same practices and privileges as men.

Haiti

To some scholars, Haiti has been ready for true democracy for decades. The Haitian people have continued to fight for their voice to be heard within the political arena, despite hardships such as the 1987 massacre of voters at polling stations (Weisbrot, 2012). In December of 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won 67% of the vote in a presidential election that international communities deemed fair and appropriate (Global Security, 2015).

Despite the accomplishment of holding a supposedly free and fair election, there remained dissatisfied parties within the armed forces who sought change. Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras pushed President Aristide out of power in a military coup on September 30, 1991 (Kretchik et al., 1998). With international outrage over refugees escaping the Haitian borders for Florida, and changes in the international environment, Haiti represented an unwelcomed political catastrophe for the American political leaders of the time (Kretchik et al., 1998).

Despite previous interventions of U.N.-imposed oil and arms embargos, meetings with key Haitian military officials for the restoration of constitutional government, and changes in leadership, the U.N. authorized member states to use all means necessary to aid in the dismantling of Haiti's military leadership with the passage of Resolution 940 (Global Security, 2015). The United States and Haiti had a tense relationship; despite pledges to restore elected leadership, the military command became increasingly repressive, the economy drastically declined, and thousands of Haitians continued to flee (Global Security, 2015).

In September 1994, U.S. military forces executed Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The intent of the mission was not only to restore President Aristide to power but to also create a more stable and prosperous democratic society (Kretchik et al., 1998). Operations such as these were considered low-intensity conflicts when compared to war, even if armed conflict was a possibility. Operations were classified according to the potential use of military force—whether it was a distinct possibility or very unlikely (Kretchik et al., 1998). Operations of this kind, or those that were more humanitarian in nature were guided by the United Nations, which created a dialogue to address how to guide or control such unique situations. As noted by some research: “Peace operations, as opposed to more orthodox military operations, often lack a traditional enemy, tend to be highly ambiguous, and are subject to frequently changing political guidance” (Kretchik et al., 1998, p. 28). The Department of Defense simultaneously planned for both invasive forceful measures and a peaceful entry; involving the use of not only 3900 paratroopers but the utilization of U.S. special operations (Global Security, 2015). From a military standpoint, the operation was deemed successful in inhibiting emigration, restoring leadership, and handing over responsibility to U.N. entities. Unlike Somalia, the U.N. did activate a headquarter size element to Haiti prior to the change of command while also deploying successive units for peacekeeping operations (Global Security, 2015).

When examining the success or failure in the establishment of democracy by military intervention, it is useful to compare the histories of the United States and Haiti. Despite coming from similar beginnings, Haiti and the United States have experienced very different results when it comes to the creation of a democratic nation. For instance,

both Haiti and the United States fought revolutions against dominant empires: The U.S. fought the British between 1775-1783, and the Haitians fought the French from 1792-1804 (Albert, 2013). Both of their revolutions led to independence, both countries elected military officials as their first executives (the U.S. elected General George Washington and Haiti elected Toussaint L' Overture), and both countries were among some of the first in the world to draft and adopt a written constitution (Albert, 2013).

Despite some of these very significant similarities between the U.S. and Haiti, Haiti has come to be one of the poorest nations in the world, with little hope for a true democratic state. To some, the elements of destruction came from the repressive leadership of Duvalier (“Baby Doc”) and the legacy he left behind. The National Democratic Institute notes: “Since the fall of the Duvalier family dictatorship, transition to democracy in Haiti has been challenged by the highest poverty rates in the Western hemisphere, limited access to education, and corruption” (National Institute for Democracy, 2014). Furthermore, citizen unrest and the government’s inability to improve the daily lives of its citizens remains a constant challenge to an already fragile political system.

Other research points to the historical significance of Haitian colonization that led to the inability of the U.S. to establish democracy by force (Albert, 2013). Haiti’s road to independence, much like that of Somalia, was a violent one. As a former slave colony, Haiti was forced to compensate France the equivalent of 25 billion dollars in exchange for freedom (Albert, 2013). Kretchik et al. (1998) suggest that the Haitians were never truly prepared for self-rule because they had no experience in it. Due to the inexperience of the Haitian people and leaders, civic rule and the development of governance was

extremely difficult and the Haitian revolution was masked with illiteracy, the racial caste system, and the struggle to survive (Kretchik et al., 1998).

This environment made the establishment of democracy rather difficult; but to some, this very history gave the people of Haiti a sense of purpose and a will to never stop seeking justice (Raventos & Wark, 2014). Haiti has been tested repeatedly in its resiliency and ability to adapt, as it seeks to overcome the effects of the violent extermination of the indigenous Taino people, stifling economic embargoes, and crushing poverty—76% of the population lives on less than two dollars a day (Raventos & Wark, 2014). Upon his capture, Toussaint L'Ouverture (a former slave and leader of the 1791 revolt) warned others of the Haitian people's deep-seated will to survive: "In overthrowing me, they have only felled the trunk of the tree of black liberty in Saint Domingue...It will regrow from the roots because they are deep and many" (Raventos & Wark, 2014).

Another important component to Haiti's struggles to sustain democracy stem from the constitution itself. Unlike the American constitution, which establishes a federal government constructed of a division of power and the bill of rights; the first Haitian constitution had no check or balance of power and instead named L'Ouverture as governor for life (Albert, 2013). In the second attempt to draft a constitution, L'Ouverture's successor, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, resumed supreme authority over the region (Albert, 2013). Although the third construct, adopted in 1987, seemingly established a division of power and a bill or rights, Haiti continued to struggle. Albert states: "The point is that a constitutional text is meaningless without a political culture that respects the rule of law and abides by it" (Albert, 2013).

Even after U.S. intervention and a call for democracy from many Haitian people, elections were widely dismissed, voter turnout was poor, and armed commandos stormed the presidential palace in 2001 (Global Security, 2015). Despite seeking aid from the Organization of American States, Aristide lacked the institutions, political culture, and safety needed to afford him such opportunities (Global Security, 2015). Armed opponents—such as the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti, the Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front, and various armed gangs with loyalties for various factions—created an extreme climate of violence, abuse, and assassinations of key officials (Global Security, 2015). Funding to aid Haiti in its rebuilding process ended largely in March of 2001 (Global Security, 2015). Unable to completely ignore the situation at hand, leaders sought to create a more sustained occupation, unlike that of the 1994 Operation Secure Tomorrow (Global Security, 2015). With the aid of the U.N., a multinational presence sought to provide security and address civil unrest. Operations geared toward humanitarian relief would follow; in 2005 with “New Horizons,” in 2008 with “Continuing Promise,” and in 2010 with “Unified Response” (Global Security, 2015). Despite such interventions and the distribution of labor and aid, Haiti continues to struggle to achieve democracy.

One can also look to the very population itself to further examine U.S.-instilled principles of democracy in Haiti. Haiti’s inability to produce a successful democratic state despite military intervention is a result of the economy, growth, and the result of natural disasters. Haiti has had to continually rebuild its cities, bury its dead, and plead for additional support, rather than truly build upon its own democratic institutions. In January 2010, over 200,000 people were killed, 300,000 were injured, and two million

people were left homeless (Raventos & Wark 2014). The concept of democracy, although seemingly a good one, is not that simplistic in this culture. Barnett states: “A people brutalized and impoverished for centuries need food, shelter, clothing, health care, and education to a far greater extent than they need to drop a ballot in a paper box” (Barnett, 2004). The foundations of socio-economic development and the needs of the people perhaps supersede the notion of forming a true democratic state, which takes years and years of planning, development, and work (Barnett, 2004). Before establishing the legal frameworks other markers of a democratic society, Haitian society needs to provide for basic human needs in order to lift its citizens above the poverty line, and provide the kind of security that permits people to exercise freedom (Raventos & Wark, 2014). Although the United States was able to set conditions that allowed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to reassume the presidency, this coup was empty, as it provided no building blocks with which to create a lasting democracy.

When applying the Freedom House scale, Haiti ranks at a five for political rights and civil liberties with an overall rating of “partly free” (Freedom House, 2016). As a result of the military interventions in the 1990s and numerous humanitarian efforts throughout the 2000s, Haiti’s development of democracy remains a work in progress at best. Despite a presidential election that was considered both fair and representative of the Haitian people, military coups, violence, and terror directly impaired the ability of the leadership to implement both policy and change. Elected representatives were replaced with aggressors in the form of Cedras, thus violating general principles necessary for the creation of political liberties and potential democratic rule. In addition, Albert (2013)

reminds us that Haiti had virtually no true division of powers, appointments of judges in government affairs, or a body to regulate or counter the interests of only the powerful.

Iraq

It is imperative to examine the history of Iraq prior to the “war on terror” that continues to influence U.S. involvement and policy. Although the U.S. involvement prior to World War II was limited, the perception of Western influence in the Arab world dates back as early as the Crusades, when the Pope of Rome sought to seize Jerusalem from the Arabs (Shuster, 2013). Research suggests it is this very history and sphere of influence that comprises over 70 plus years of Western promises to Arab independence; creating not a long lasting, equitable relationship but rather one built on distrust and suspicion (Richman, 1991).

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been heavily involved in the Arab world. Reasons for such involvement include, but are not limited to oil holds, the need to push out Soviet influence, and political gains of international foreign policies (Richman, 1991). With the 1953 elections, President Dwight Eisenhower sought to incorporate Secretary of State John Dulles’s policy of countries either being with the United States or against them (Richman, 1991). As a result, direct U.S. involvement in Iran only deteriorated relations with the Arab world, when both the U.S. and Great Britain organized an international boycott of Iranian oil (Richman, 1991). Author James Bill wrote: “The American intervention of August 1953 was a momentous event in the history of Iranian-American relations...It left a running wound that bled for twenty-five years and contaminated relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran following the revolution of 1978-79” (Richman, 1991). This “wound” directly impaired U.S.

relationships with the Arab world, creating distrust and suspicion despite sustained efforts to stand by stated obligations.

With Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s, President Bush went to the United Nations declaring that a new world order must be established and a tyrant leader could not be tolerated (Richman, 1991). The administration recommended aggression and military force, because instability in the region endangered American interests. American interventions in Iraq and elsewhere have been more about using the region as a sphere of influence rather than protecting a troubled culture in need of aid (Richman, 1991). Chomsky (2006) noted that long before the invasion of Iraq, the U.K. and the U.S. were well aware that the invasion would actually increase terrorism. The National Intelligence Council reported in December of 2004 that the invasion led to higher levels of recruiting in terrorist organizations, and funds were directly linked to improving training grounds and the technical skills of soldiers to create a more professional class of terrorists (Chomsky, 2006). Instead of promoting democratic views, the invasion directly impaired them, and sullied the worldwide view of American intervention, "greatly strengthening the popular appeal of anti-democratic radicals such as those of al-Qaeda and other jihadi salafis" throughout the Muslim world (Chomsky, 2006). Terrorism experts such as Peter Bergen suggest that the U.S. helped to create the very front of terror it now fights in Iraq and the Middle East (Chomsky, 2006). The media described foreign fighters found in Iraq not as former terrorists with violent pasts, but instead people who became radicalized by the war, seeking to represent and defend their fellow Muslims (Chomsky, 2006).

As in the other case studies, one can argue that Iraq lacks the conditions necessary to establish democratic institutions. The system of democracy in Iraq must overcome years of foreign occupation and civil war in order to succeed. Issues such as low standards of living and low literacy rates inhibit political change (Basham & Preble, 2003). Across the Arab world, societies have long been overdue for change, with years and years of suppression, autocratic rule, and deep religious divisions between the Sunni, the Shia, and the Secular Islamist ideals (Monroe, 2013). The fall of Hussein in Iraq serves as a poignant example of these lingering tensions: although the dictator had fallen, the divide amongst the people remained, with Shia supporters who sought revenge from years of suppression by Hussein on one hand, and Sunnis who wanted to regain their place of power and comfort on the other (Monroe, 2013).

President George W. Bush's aim—to democratize places such as Iraq as a strategic priority post-9/11—was undermined by the association of democracy with force in Iraq, the focus on counterterrorism instead of freedom, and the U.S. inability to support elected leaders they did not agree with (Lagoon, 2011). To Monroe, although many of the efforts to democratize are well intended, they have increased political stress and created further complications in these regions (Monroe, 2013). He states:

“Astonishingly, sometimes when we think we are supporting democracy, our moderate secular Sunni friends in places such as Bahrain and Egypt have charged that we are in fact supporting terrorists” (Monroe, 2013).

The effects of such an invasion with the use of military force continue to render unintended and disturbing consequences, directly impairing the elements many deem necessary to build governance. According to the U.N. World Food Program, post-U.S.

invasion, the median income for Iraqis fell from 225 in 2003 to 144 in 2004, acute malnutrition doubled, and about 400,000 Iraq children suffered from wasting or chronic diarrhea due to protein deficiency (Chomsky, 2012).

Others view Iraq as a tentative success, noting that despite deep divisions of power, ethnic conflict, and varying views of centralists versus federalists, the democratic project in Iraq led to the end of more than four decades of dictatorship (Manfreda, 2016). The Republic of Iraq gradually introduced post 2003 U.S.-led invasion, destroyed the regime of Hussein, and effectively initiated the insertion of a prime minister role (Manfreda, 2016). Although plagued by violence, Iraqi elections have demonstrated intense political participation, a great contrast to the former repressive regime. Diamond (2004) too remains optimistic in Iraqi development, pointing to a number of formidable changes, including but not limited to: an Iraqi governing council, a civil society organization working with USAID, an Iraqi Higher Women's Council, and ongoing training on the implementation of democratic councils.

Although the change is in fact essential post-Hussein, scholars such as Richman (1991) continue to problematize the U.S. approach, forcing democracy on others in the assumption that the American form of governance is the best for all. The U.S. has made significant errors in each of these three regions, most glaringly in the use of foreign policies that do not reflect the needs or wants of the local community but instead the political or socioeconomic interests of the people of the United States.

Foreign policy—coupled with an existing economic market and infrastructure to other countries lacking such building blocks—is simply unfeasible. The United States did not have a foreign policy that could effectively deal with the many subgroups in Iraq

(Cohen, 2009). Religious bonds, citizen loyalty to clans or tribes, and ethnic groups much different than the people of the United States, have proven to overwhelm the implementation of Western ideals in Somalia, Haiti, or the Middle Eastern nations (Cohen, 2009). Although the ideals of American pride are valuable at home, they do not translate abroad (Smith, 2012).

Instead of being excited for change, local populations in Iraq have witnessed the results of this kind of U.S. involvement in the 65 years following WWII (Smith, 2012). Civilians see Americans supporting dictators over citizens, stationing soldiers on holy Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia, or dismissing elections because they deemed the candidate was a terrorist (Smith, 2012). The U.S.-led invasion to Iraq in 2003, although heavily accelerated by the attacks of 9/11, were seen by many as a path to continue the almost four decades of regional control of oil supply, instead of a call to end terror and improve the lives of the people (Jones, 2012).

Samuel Huntington remarked in 1981 that certain terms, such as “Soviet threat,” served as convenient rhetorical devices with which to sell intervention or make the use of military action more palatable (Chomsky, 2012). The use of such force and militarization over time has created high costs for the people living in the Middle East and elsewhere. U.S. policy throughout this region serves the interests of only a few regional leaders, and continues to foment war, thousands of deaths, and unlivable living conditions (Jones, 2012). It is clear, that the people, the foundation for potential change or democracy, want U.S. forces to leave. According to one of the most in-depth polls shortly after the U.S. invasion in 2003, Oxford Research International found that 79% of people had no

confidence in U.S./U.K. troops, and more than 70% of all Iraqis wanted U.S. forces out by fall of 2003 (Chomsky, 2012).

According to Freedom House, Iraq remains consistently a country deemed not free. Current ratings give Iraq a score of five in political rights and a score of six in civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016). Improvements post-Hussein can be noted throughout the transitional period; however, it clearly takes time, effort, and lasting commitment to induce true change. Government accountability and openness remain a problem in a country prone to violence. Although elections are now taking place, citizens still face challenges in their ability to vote, gather information about voting processes, and utilize media to obtain information. Civil Liberties such as in Freedom of Expression and Belief are improving in Iraq, but much work remains: citizens continue to be censored, media-outlets are dependent on government funding, and cultural expression is open to violent intervention and reprisals.

Chapter 3: Conclusions

The use of force to instill change continues to be an important component of U.S. intervention in foreign affairs. Over the past seven decades, democratic powers led by the United States have attempted to bring about democracy through external military imposition (Walker, 2011). Military actions—such as the 1994 interventions in Rwanda to stop genocide—can be an essential tool when attempting to provoke change. However, intervention via force should remain a last resort (Lagon, 2011). As early as 1949, the World Court warned that the use of force could have devastating effects, and suggest that this “intervention would be reserved for the most powerful states, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of justice itself” (Chomsky, 2012). The Court’s warnings remain just as prescient, if not more, in the present day.

To some, the concept of promoting democracy through military intervention or force is simply the American government’s hidden agenda; from the war on drugs in Latin America to the war on terror in the Middle East (Chomsky, 2012). The use of such force in cases such as these has been justified by policies that strengthen military imposition at the expense of civilian authorities (Chomsky, 2012). U.S. interventions have consistently sent a message that “democracy is acceptable if it aligns with U.S. interests” (Chomsky, 2012). The more appropriate path to producing democracy involves creating a system that works best for a particular group of people. Whether in the form of battling Soviet aggression, responding to a humanitarian crisis portrayed on the media, promoting a belief that military force represents “smart power” incorporating a range of tools beyond just that of force (including military, legal, and cultural assets to enrich foreign policy), the U.S. continues to involve itself in the affairs of others (Walker,

2011). Walker (2012) notes that, despite the purity of their motives, and even though the U.S. military interventions throughout history have not been perfect, they have “nudged some countries” toward democratic status in the motto that “partly free is better than not being free at all” (Walker, 2012). Although Walker recognizes that it takes time to transform from atrocities to democratic processes, he mentions that outcomes of these interventions depend a great deal on one’s definitions and measurements of success; be it rights, participation, or even competitiveness (Walker, 2012).

Gunitsky (2015) agrees with Walker (2012), labeling measurements of democracy as “challenging” and “abstract.” Results are difficult to examine or label as successes or failures, and measures of freedom are far less concrete than other units of measurement. Kekic states: “There is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested, and there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject” (Kekic, 2007). Kekic identifies that the various measures of democracy include both thin and thick concepts. The thin closely corresponds to Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy and the Freedom House electoral democracy measure, while the thick corresponds to the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, based on the view that measures of democracy reflect the state of political freedom, civil liberties, free and fair elections, functioning government, and participation in political culture (Kekic, 2007).

Gunitsky (2015) further adds to the difficulties in assessing democratic freedom in the examination of Russia. The Polity and the Freedom House measures display two vastly different portrayals of Russian democracy, stating: “The problem is that democracy means different things to different people” and that although measures of democracy are needed, they can either clarify or mislead. He urges researchers to

embrace a more “careful approach,” recognizing the drawbacks and assumptions involved in each system of measurement (Gunitsky, 2015).

Recognizing the complexity in the measurement of democracy, I will continue to utilize both the pairing of the Freedom House scale (which involves more than 80 analysts and 30 advisors) with the qualitative data found in the research of so many to develop the case studies.

Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq continue to lack a sustained democratic form of governance despite extensive military intervention. Although Iraq seemingly showed improvement over years of hardship, particularly in the area of political rights, it lacked the ingredients necessary to protect not only the rights of minorities such as women, but also to protect civil liberties, just as it was in Somalia and Haiti. As Freedom House (2016) notes, “The gap between a countries or territories political rights and civil liberties is rarely more than two points. Politically oppressive states typically do not allow a well developed civil-society.”

An effective alternative to military force would seek to engage and support local chapters, communities, and organizations that directly build upon the concepts of establishing democracy and civil societies (Lagon, 2011). Private organizations linked with community leaders, deeply-rooted and vested in the society itself, will have a better chance of enabling the movement necessary to form a representative government (Lagon, 2011). Spending, instead of growing a military fund, should channel into a social fund that focuses on both diplomatic and economic measures rather than militaristic ones (Chomsky, 2012). An example of such a fund—the U.N. Democracy Fund (UNDEF) launched in 2006 by Secretary General Kofi A. Annan—provides some insight

interventions that provide an alternative to force. Annan, who sought to support a variety of civil institutions, yielded over 85% of its funds to non-governmental organizations rather than U.N. agencies or governments as implementers. Grants such as this give governments the ability to focus on what research shows us are essential elements of democracy: education, women's rights, human rights, and economic development (Lagon, 2011). Bühlmann et al. (2011) also identify the need for essential components of democracy including freedom, equality, and control. Bühlmann et al. (2011) noted: "Guaranteeing as well as optimizing and balance freedom and equality are the core challenges of a democratic system." With the creation of grants that directly support civil society organizations and the direct involvement of the governed, the "building blocks" of democracy can serve as stronger tools than the utilization of force.

The installation of democracy represents an ongoing process in U.S. foreign policy. The case studies discussed here can simply serve as a stepping-stone in the quest to obtain knowledge about the promotion of democratic values through the use of military force. Despite the shortcomings in Haiti, Somalia, and the region of the Middle East, each case represents opportunities to learn and improve in order to produce true change and represent the people of a newly democratic nation. Passionate people, the will to participate in elections, and the attempt to establish a central government, all can serve as the beginnings of a democracy, even if it is far different from that of the U.S. (Kekic, 2007).

Democracy and policy requires time, commitment, and day-by-day engagement. (Chomsky, 2012). A conceptual framework for intervention must reflect the diversity and identity of the people rather than trying to create a universal (i.e., European) model of

a nation-state (Cohen, 2009). The United States must respect local leadership, be mindful and realistic about political infrastructures in the area, and act as a mentor rather than a master (Cohen, 2009). Wealth, opportunity, and advancement should prevail (Cohen, 2009; Flang, 2006), drawing on Boutros-Ghali's idea of democratization at both the state and the international level. Voices for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) linked with various conventional groups, such as those seen in Cairo (on women) or Vienna (on human rights) could have the potential to promote higher levels of functioning government (Flang, 2006). Much work remains on the road to change, but the use of military force cannot create long-lasting democracies until the basic necessities of the people are met, authoritarian and repressive rule is put to an end, and the people seek to invoke change without fear of repercussion.

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Curriculum Vitae

Alyson A Ochs

Education

Master of Arts Political Science: Indiana University

Bachelors of Nursing: Marian University

Bachelors of Biology: Marian College

Honors, Awards, Fellowships

Army Accommodation Medal: Operation Atlantic Resolve, Germany 2016, Romania
2015

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, 2015

Army Accommodation Medal: Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 2013-2014

Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal 2014

Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Star 2014

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 2009

National Defense Service Medal 2009

Research and Training Experience

Interim MA Student Professor, Indiana University, "Introduction to American Politics,"
2010.

Assistant to the Director of Trauma, Oregon Health and Science University, Surgery:

Lead Research Registered Nurse, October 2014-June 2015

Professional Experience

United States Army: 2009-present

Officer in charge of Advanced Trauma Life Support

Officer in charge of Training, Health and Safety, and Infection Control

Publications

“Far Forward Anesthesia and Massive Blood Transfusion: Two Case Studies Revealing the Challenge of Damage Control Resuscitation in an Austere Environment.” AANA

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