

AN ANALYSIS OF
LEADERSHIP AMONG
ONE-TERM PRESIDENTS

Sean J. Byrne

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Master's Thesis Committee

William D. Blake, Ph. D., Chair

Margaret R. Ferguson, Ph. D.

Amanda J. Friesen, Ph. D.

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The study of the presidency is a most interesting area of research. While the sample size of 43 is very small, they are all unique and their stories, opportunities and challenges vary significantly. This project and the paper developed from it has been a tremendous learning opportunity. I would like to take the opportunity to acknowledge and thank my advisor, Professor William Blake for his recommendations and sound advice. They were invaluable in helping me take an idea that grew out of a simple “one-liner” in a speech to a project that hopefully is thought provoking and provides readers with an insightful view of some of our country’s most significant and at times challenged leaders. I would also like to recognize Professors Margaret Ferguson and Amanda Friesen for their comments, feedback and solid advice as this project developed and came to fruition. Additionally, I would be remiss if I did not thank Secretary James A. Baker, III for unknowingly giving me the idea for this project, and to President George H.W. Bush for being not only a mentor, but also the “greatest one-term president in the history of the United States.”

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The study of the presidency would appear to be relatively simple. The sample population is relatively small, their performance is, for the most part, recorded and like the weather, it seems everyone has opinions about them. In reviewing current literature discussing presidential greatness, most historians and political scientists have generally looked to answer two questions: 1) Who were our greatest, and; 2) How should all be rank ordered? For the last 65+ years, presidential polls have been the main vehicle used to answer these questions. In doing so, researchers have generally reached out to the public and asked them to rank order the presidents from greatest to worst. The results at the top and bottom of these surveys have been relatively consistent. While the specific order may vary, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are generally viewed as the best; with the likes of James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson and Warren Harding at or near the bottom of the rankings.

As for the rest, they usually fit into one of four categories -- the near great, the average, the below average, or failures, with the one-term presidents who failed to be reelected normally being rated in the lower categories. This would seem to make sense, because they are often viewed as failed presidents. However, as surprising as it may seem, of the 43 men who have served as President of the United States, only fourteen were reelected and went on to serve past their initial term. Ten were defeated in their bid for a second

term. Five failed in their attempt to win their party's nomination to run for reelection and seven opted not to run for reelection. Additionally, five of the seven who died while in office, died during their first term and were not afforded the opportunity to run for a second term. It does not appear that any scholarly work has been done to collectively look at this group who make up a full third of the presidential population. This represents a sizable gap in political thinking to be rectified.

William D. Blake, Ph.D., Chair

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Introduction

On 21 January, 2014 James A. Baker, Secretary of State during the George H. W. Bush presidency, made the bold statement in a speech at the celebration in honor of the 25th anniversary of Bush's inauguration that "George Bush was the best one-term President in the history of the United States" (Baker, 2014). His comment led to considerable dialog and head nodding in agreement from a most partisan audience. In fairness to Secretary Baker, his comment was a good personal appraisal of his friend's time in office, but was it correct? And, if so, how would one know?

The initial question for consideration would appear to be a simple one, namely, "Who was the best one-term President in the history of the United States?" However, in attempting to answer that seemingly simple question, a significant number of issues arise. For instance, what is greatness in the context of a one-term President, and what are the dimensions of "greatness" that should be considered in answering this question? Other difficult and somewhat subjective issues arise, such as, is it possible to be great, but simply not appreciated? Also, were those that were not reelected really that terrible, or were they simply unlucky in the timing of their administrations? These questions all beg for answers. However, in looking at how to answer these questions, it appears one of the main characteristics mentioned in almost every study of the presidency is presidential leadership and the use of power. This paper will specifically address the leadership dimensions by which presidents have been evaluated and analyze how presidents, in general have performed against them, and specifically how one-term presidents fared.

In reviewing current literature discussing presidential greatness, most historians and political scientists have generally looked to answer two questions: 1) Who were our greatest, and; 2) How should all be rank ordered? For the last 65+ years, presidential polls have been the main vehicle used to answer these questions. In developing their theories, researchers have generally reached out to the public and asked them to rank order the presidents from greatest to worst. The results at the top and bottom of these surveys have been relatively consistent. While the specific order may vary, Lincoln, Washington and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are generally viewed as the best; with the likes of Buchanan, Andrew Johnson and Harding near or at the bottom of the rankings.

As for the rest, they usually fit neatly into one of four categories -- the near great, the average, the below average, or failures, with the one-term presidents normally being rated in the lower categories. This would seem to make sense, because they are often viewed as failed presidents. It does not appear that any scholarly work has been done to collectively look at this specific group, which is significant because they make up over a third of the total presidential population. This represents a sizable gap in political thinking to be rectified and this thesis will do so.

One might ask, “Why is presidential leadership even important, when we have three branches of government sharing the government’s responsibilities? The answer is easy, they don’t share responsibility, rather they provide balance, and keep each other in check, and someone has to be “in charge.” And, as Nancy Kassebaum indicated, leadership on the national scene must and can only emanate from the Oval Office. Those who serve in

Congress cannot provide national leadership, because they must “meet the constituent interest against the national interests” (Kassebaum, 1979: 241). This research is important because, not only will it specifically address the leadership and use of power by a specific group of presidents, it will add to a body of knowledge which is significant for a society of which Michael Genevieve has noted, "Students today are a-historical: they know virtually nothing about any president who came before George Bush" (Genovese, 2000: ix).

As surprising as it may seem, of the 43 men who have served as President of the United States, only fourteen were reelected and went on to serve past their initial term. Ten were defeated in their bid for a second term. Five failed in their attempt to win their party's nomination to run for reelection and seven opted not to run for reelection. Additionally, five of the seven who died while in office, died during their first term and were not afforded the opportunity to run for a second term.

A one-term president for purposes of this study is defined as one who either failed in his attempt for reelection, or failed to receive his party's nomination to run for reelection. To date, fifteen have fallen into this category. They will serve as the initial sample population for this research. Listed in the order they served, they are:

<u>President</u>	<u>Term(s) of Office</u>	<u>Reason for Leaving Office</u>
John Adams	1797-1801	Failed in Reelection Bid
John Q. Adams	1825-1829	Failed in Reelection Bid
Martin Van Buren	1837-1841	Failed in Reelection Bid
John Tyler	1841-1845	Failed to be Renominated
Millard Fillmore	1850-1853	Failed to be Renominated
Franklin Pierce	1853-1857	Failed to be Renominated
Andrew Johnson	1865-1869	Failed to be Renominated
Chester A. Arthur	1881-1885	Failed to be Renominated
Grover Cleveland	1885-1889, 1893-1897*	Subsequently Reelected
Benjamin Harrison	1889-1893	Failed in Reelection Bid
William Howard Taft	1909-1913	Failed in Reelection Bid
Herbert Hoover	1929-1933	Failed in Reelection Bid
Gerald Ford	1974-1976	Failed in Reelection Bid
Jimmy Carter	1977-1981	Failed in Reelection Bid
George H.W. Bush	1989-1993	Failed in Reelection Bid

*Grover Cleveland technically qualifies as a one-term president because he was defeated by Benjamin Harrison when he ran President after his first term; however, four years later he defeated Harrison, becoming both the 22nd and 24th President of the United States. As such, he will not be considered part of this population for this analysis.

The study of the presidency is unique in many ways. First, the sample size is very small and the conditions they served under vary greatly from peace to war, economic stability to depression and during periods of isolationism to being the unquestioned leader of the free world. In each administration the challenges were unique and different.

Additionally, for the most part, the study of presidents has been mostly anecdotal in nature and failed to use the types of quantitative measures that are now so prevalent in the social studies. This research will analyze the issues from both a quantitative and qualitative view using the results of polls and surveys, presidential leadership studies and historical reviews as the primary resources to gauge presidential success and greatness.

Acknowledging that while all three are excellent resources and of great interest, each has shortcomings. But when taken together, they offer unique insights into the qualities and traits that have made some presidents stand out from the rest.

For the most part, polls and surveys solicit feedback on that vague quality of “greatness” whereas leadership studies focus specifically on how the presidents led and used their presidential powers. Historical reviews help put the results of polls and leadership analysis in context with the times. It is unclear when considering presidents if greatness and leadership are synonymous and whether the greatest presidents were also the best leaders. This paper will argue that leadership and the attributes it encompasses are the most important presidential characteristics in determining greatness and in doing so, places special emphasis on analyzing the sample population through the more focused lens of how they led. This paper will: 1) review the sample population and how they have been rated and ranked by experts in the political science, legal, and historical arenas; 2) review the most significant challenges they faced as president, and; 3) analyze how they fare when analyzed in light of the most current thoughts on presidential leadership.

The last point is most significant if only because presidential leadership, as is all of leadership, is difficult to define. While many resources have been reviewed as part of this research, three presidential studies stand out among them and appear to be the most relevant. The final portion of this thesis will review and analyze the presidents being discussed based on how they used their presidential powers and leadership skills in the context of the theories presented in the following presidential studies: “Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents,” by Richard E. Neustadt; “The Strategic President, Persuasion & Opportunity in Presidential Leadership,” by George Edwards, and: “The

Politics President Make, Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton,” by Stephen Skowronek.

While a major portion of this research analyzes the sample population using the theories previously identified, they are not the only presidential theories that abound. Bruce Kuklick, argues that presidential success is not truly about leadership, but rather how the president is perceived, and that the presidents we judge as being the most successful are those who skillfully manipulated the emotions of the populace (Kuklick: 1988).

Likewise, C. Don Livingston, took a different tact from the norm, indicating that most recent presidential leadership dialog focusses on the human and institutional aspects of the presidency, but don't pay sufficient attention to the presidential environment, namely the effects of mass communications and how they have diminished our view of the president's leadership propensity and productivity by denying him flexibility to maneuver and operate (Livingston, 1984: 53). Whereas Kuklick may in fact be correct in his observations concerning perception versus concrete achievements being the way we measure presidents, and Livingston articulating that modern presidents now have less room to maneuver behind the scenes in order to do the country's biddings, we must have a method to measure the leadership and accomplishments of our presidents. Therefore, this research will primarily utilize the theories and methods of Nuestadt, Edwards and Skowronek as its base line.

These three noted political scientists have taken different and unique approaches in their analysis of presidential power and leadership. Interestingly enough, if one is to follow their dialog on presidential leadership, it appears to be a successful president, one needs to be a good “clerk”, but also have the power to persuade (Neustadt); or needs to be an able “facilitator” (Edwards) or, simply be lucky based on the timing of his presidency (Skowronek and to an extent, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.). While the theories cited are considerably more detailed than the summaries just provided, they encompass many different aspects concerning the use of presidential power and those factors will be an integral element of this report.

The first issue to be resolved would seem to be the easiest, namely, “what is leadership?” Per Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, leadership has a number of definitions to include: “the quality of a leader ...capacity to lead ... is that degree ingredient of personality which causes men to followis the successful resolution of problems,” (Gove ed. 1993:1283). However, even with a “standard” definition, such as above, the concept of leadership is at best nebulous and hard to definitively describe. Neustadt indicates, “we like to “rate’ a President. We like to measure him as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ and call what we are measuring his “leadership’” (Neustadt, 1980:3). Theodore Lowi observed, “Because we expect more from our presidents than they are capable of delivering, the potential for presidential failure is exacerbated” (Lowi, 1985). Given those dynamics, how can presidents be successful leaders? For the purposes of this analysis, we will follow the lead of Justice Potter Stewart and the analogy he used when discussing a case in front of the Supreme Court. He said the specific subject under

consideration “was hard to define, but that I know it when I see it” (*Jabobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)). As this research is further developed, specific criteria for leadership and the attributes that define it will be developed, and we will know it when we see it. To do this, the use of expert polls and survey results will provide the initial means to reduce the initial sample population to a more realistic and manageable element that can be further reviewed through detailed analysis of their time in office and how they used their presidential powers.

While a number of resources will be utilized and analyzed in this research, the ultimate goal is relatively simple, namely to determine who was the greatest one-term president. And in the eyes of the American people the criteria for success is relatively simple, they want a president in the White House who can get the job done (Cronin, 1980: 43). In determining who that person is, and how well they did in “getting the job done,” this research looks to identify the president who exuded confidence, showed himself to be both competent and capable, able to work with the power elites both inside and outside of Washington, and did so in a way that he clearly set the agenda, was in charge and got the job done. While it is clear that both opportunity and competence affect a president's historical standing, this research will identify the president who got the job done best. Using the criteria that great leadership defines presidential greatness, this report will address a number of significant issues concerning Presidential performance and leadership and will answer the questions, “What are the factors that should be utilized to provide a consistent way to evaluate presidential success and who was the greatest one-term President in U.S. history?”

Chapter One
Greatness Among
One-Term Presidents
How Other Have Seen Them

The leadership exhibited by the 14 one-term presidents will initially be analyzed using their overall rankings and trends in their ratings from expert and scholarly polls and the leadership dimension ratings identified in the 2000 and 2009 C-SPAN Historian's Survey of Presidential Leadership.

Polls and Surveys: It seems that with the nearly monthly release of polling results informing the general public of how our presidents rate from best to worst, it would be relatively simple to answer the questions previously outlined. However, if anything, many of these simply muddy the water. Although consistently showing the same individuals at either the top or bottom of the rankings, the results are far from analytical and often appear extremely subjective. This portion of the report will outline the history, "accuracy" and utility of Presidential Ranking Polls through a review of a significant number of polls with special emphasis on the following:

The Schlesinger Polls: In 1948 Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., a noted American historian, began what has become an American ritual when he asked 55 experts, the majority of whom were historians, to evaluate each president on his "performance in office" and place them into one of five categories: Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average and

Failure. The “standard” was not to be their lifetime achievements, but rather their performance during their time in the White House. Believing the scholars could recognize greatness or failure, they were left to decide for themselves how presidential performance was to be judged. He conducted a second survey a number of years later (1962) , and his son, a no less eminent historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. conducted a third survey (1996). Although precedent setting, and excellent sources of data, these polls were not without issues. In reviewing the results of his and his father’s polls in a Political Science Quarterly article, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. went to great lengths to discount the problems caused by the subjectivity of the polls but then similarly discounted more scientific approaches as having not enough or too many variables and being difficult or intimidating for those being surveyed. He further identified that regardless of the method, the results came out remarkably similar (Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., 1997: 179) and that there were problems with the respondents establishing their own criteria and often not following the minimal guidance they received. Additionally, difficulties arose evaluating Presidents such as Ford and Kennedy because of the brevity of their time in office and with Presidents such as Nixon, Lyndon Johnson and George H.W. Bush because their foreign and domestic records were so dissimilar (Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., 1997:183). Also, many respondents were reluctant to confine their judgments to White House performance. However, at least at the top and bottom of the polls, with few exceptions, there was a high level of consistency in their rankings. The results of how the fourteen one-term presidents placed overall in the Schlesinger surveys are as follows:

President	Schlesinger Sr. 1948	Schlesinger Sr. 1962	Schlesinger Jr. 1996	Change in Rankings* From 1948-1996
John Adams	9	10	11	+2
John Q. Adams	11	13	18	+7
Martin Van Buren	15	17	21	+6
William H. Taft	16	16	22	+6
Chester A. Arthur	17	21	26	+9
Andrew Johnson	19	23	37	+18**
Herbert Hoover	20	19	35	+15
Benjamin Harrison	21	20	19	-2
John Tyler	22	25	32	+10
Millard Fillmore	24	26	31	+7
Franklin Pierce	27	28	33	+6
Gerald R. Ford	--	--	28	
Jimmy Carter	--	--	27	
George H. W. Bush	--	--	24	
Total # of Presidents in survey	29	31	39	

*Changes in rankings are based on the differences between the first (1948) and third (1966) polls and must also be considered in light of the changes in the size of the evaluated population which increased from 29 to 31 to 39. Note also that a + indicates a higher numerical ranking which actually indicates a negative trend in that they went down in the polls. The only one in our sample population whose ranking indicated a -, or favorable move, was Benjamin Harrison who went from 21 to 20 to 19 in the three polls.

** Largest negative change between the 1st and 3rd Schlesinger poll.

It is significant to note that all but one of the one-term presidents (Harrison), placed lower in subsequent polls than they did in the initial 1948 poll. Others, such as Andrew Johnson, Herbert Hoover and John Tyler did not stand the test of time well and fell considerably in the rankings. It should also be noted, that due to their dates in office, three of the presidents in the sample population (Ford, Carter and George H.W. Bush) were only considered in the third Schlesinger survey which precluded the opportunity to see trends that may have occurred as their administrations were viewed over time and from different perspectives. This is significant in light of the positive resurgence of presidents such as Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, and that the “presidencies of James Madison, John Adams, and John Q. Adams are no longer as highly regarded as

they used to be” (Lindgren, 2000: 2). Concerns over these issues will be somewhat rectified later in this review.

Public Opinion Polls: In the years since the Schlesingers initiated this ritual, public opinion polls and surveys have become somewhat of a cottage industry. Regrettably, these types of polls often lack rigor, direct questions to the general public rather than an informed group, are not scientific in nature and generally deal with generic questions such as: “Who do you think was the greatest American President?” or “Who do you regard as the greatest United States President?” The results in these types of polls are questionable, at best, for at least two reasons: 1) No standard criteria for “greatness” is provided and, 2) In asking the question of the general public, there is no guarantee the respondents are versed enough to make informed responses. Polls of this nature are of interest, but to be discounted because they too often appear to be little more than popularity contests, versus expert evaluations and therefore will not be considered in this analysis.

Expert/Scholarly Polls: Probably the best group of individuals to rank order the presidents would be a group of former presidents; however, to date only one has publically done so, that being Harry Truman who in 1953 named his eight best presidents -- in chronological order, Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, Grover Cleveland, Wilson and FDR – and his eight worst – Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin Harrison, Warren G. Harding and Eisenhower (Schlesinger, 1997: 181). Once again, like the study of presidents, a very

small sample size of “respondents” and some have noted that Truman may have used this in part to sling arrows at his successor, Eisenhower, who had been in office less than two years when Truman provided his ratings. However, the Schlesingers, in their evaluations and in a small number of later polls, limited respondents to a number of “experts,” in areas such as history and political scientist, and at least in one case legal experts, which ensured respondents were, if not experts, at least relatively well versed on the population being considered. However, even when gathering experts, issues have been noted.

Nichols, identified a number of problems with polls of this nature, the biggest being that expert presidential ranking polls are simply “not very rigorous” and are fraught with subjectivity, context and bias issues (Nichols, 2012: 277). He also raised concerns over the lack of a specific criterion for success in the evaluation of presidential leadership, asking the question, what must a president do, or how must he act to be considered great? Among his concerns were that: there seems to be no rules, set criteria or consistency used regarding when and how the surveys are done and most of the surveys appear subjective in nature allowing the scholar or institution to use their own criteria to evaluate and; secondly, it is unclear how the polls put differing administrations into appropriate historical perspective. In essence, “how can you fairly treat presidents who faced different historical opportunities and problems? Are the polls biased?” In addressing this concern, the usual cited threat has been the contention of a “predominance of Democratic partisan preference within most sample surveys.” Nichols additionally noted the possibility “that expert presidential ranking polls are not independent of one another” and that too often it appears the same experts are taking part in multiple surveys (Nichols, 2012: 277-278). Therefore, the respondents’ potential biases may be reflected and the

polls and surveys become more about those doing the surveys than the population being evaluated.

In conducting the research for this project, two additional issues surfaced which must also be taken into account. As indicated by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., evaluations often look to be made outside of the established parameters with presidents often appearing to be evaluated based on the “whole man” versus simply their time in office, and secondly, changes to evaluations based on later criteria and the passage of time from when Presidents left office, allow their result to be influenced by later historian’s evaluations. Situational dependent, this could be a positive, such in the cases of Eisenhower and Truman, or a negative as it has shown to be with Andrew Jackson, Herbert Hoover and more recently Woodrow Wilson..

Without question, polls and surveys have considerable shortfalls; however, they also have great utility. They represent the opinions of a specific population at a certain time, and that is relevant. Additionally, while indicating that the polls appear to be biased and subjective, when they have an informed group taking them, it may be that rather than being subjective, the respondents are simply more knowledgeable. Using this philosophy, some relatively recent surveys appear to have minimized many of the shortcomings identified.

The “October 2000 Wall Street Journal Survey of Scholars in History, Politics and Law,” along with James Lindgren’s analysis as outlined in his article, “Rating the Presidents of

the United States, 1789-2000: A Survey of Scholars in History, Political Science, and Law,” and the 2000 and 2009 C-Span Historians’ Survey of Presidential Leadership overcame, or at least minimized, many of the shortfalls of earlier surveys. They were done with exceptionally qualified respondents and significantly more specificity than previous similar projects. Following is a detailed discussion of the surveys.

The October 2000 The Wall Street Journal Survey of Scholars in History, Politics and

Law: In his articles about his and his father’s polls, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. went to great lengths to defend their polls against allegations that they were biased, left wing oriented and rewarded those with more progressive agendas (Schlesinger, 1997: 180). While these allegations continue to plague many more recent surveys, in preparing the book “Presidential Leadership Rating the Best and the Worst in the White House,” the editors went to great lengths to rectify that situation. They used the most politically unbiased criteria and selective group of respondents to that time. Their study reported the results from a survey of 78 “scholars on the presidency,” which surveyed experts on presidential history and politics from the fields of law and political science as well as historians. They balanced the group to be surveyed with approximately equal numbers of experts on the left and on the right in order to have the most politically unbiased perspectives on presidential reputations possible (Taranto, and Leo, eds. 2004).

With a major goal of presenting the opinion of experts controlling for political orientation, they attempted to resolve the conflict between prior rankings of presidents that were either done by liberal scholars or conservative scholars, but not by both. Expert

panels of scholars in each field (law, political science and history) developed a list of experts in their fields to take the surveys. The 78 respondents (a 59% response rate) consisted of 30 historians, 25 political scientists and 23 law professors. In the final report, they additionally included numerous comments provided by the respondents to clarify responses.

The scholars were asked to “Please rate each President using the table below. In deciding how to rate a president, please take into consideration the value of the accomplishments of his presidency and the leadership he provided the nation, along with any other criteria you deem appropriate.”

PRESIDENT	HIGHLY	ABOVE	AVERAGE	BELOW	WELL BELOW
	SUPERIOR	AVERAGE		AVERAGE	AVERAGE

They were further asked to “Please identify the five most over-rated or under-rated Presidents of the United States, indicating whether they are overrated or underrated.” While none of the one-term presidents made the over-rated listing, both Hoover and Carter made the under-rated list.

In attempting to identify predictors of high presidential ratings, Lindgren did not find a statistical relationship between the ages or political party of a president and his mean ratings by scholars. In other words, neither age nor affiliation at the time of election had any measurable effect on measured presidential success (Lindgren, 2000:16-17).

However, while not specifically addressing one-term presidents who failed in their bid for reelection, Lindgren did note an apparent bias against one-term presidents and that

“presidents who served less than one full term rated about a half a point lower (-.45) than those who served just one full term. On the other hand, presidents who served parts of two terms (or more) rated nearly a full point higher (.95) than presidents who served just one term (Lindgren 2000:16-19). The results for our sample population are below:

Ranking of Presidents by Mean Score

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.
Great -- None in our sample			
Near Great – None in our sample			
Above Average			
13 John Adams	3.36	3	.80
Average			
19 William Howard Taft	3.00	3	.66
20 John Quincy Adams	2.93	3	.76
21 George H.W. Bush	2.92	3	.68
23 Martin Van Buren	2.77	3	.61
26 Chester Arthur	2.71	3	.56
Below Average			
27 Benjamin Harrison	2.62	3	.54
28 Gerald Ford	2.59	3	.61
29 Herbert Hoover	2.53	3	.87
30 Jimmy Carter	2.47	3	.75
34 John Tyler	2.03	3	.72
35 Millard Fillmore	1.91	3	.74
Failure			
36 Andrew Johnson	1.65	3	.81
37T Franklin Pierce	1.58	3	.68
39 James Buchanan	1.33	3	.62

These appear to be among the first surveys of their type, using quantifiable measurements and a consistent response and scoring system, as well as a balanced, knowledgeable group of respondents. However, as good as they are, a set of complimentary surveys, the

2000 and 2009 C-SPAN Historians Survey of Presidential Leadership, have proven to be even more comprehensive. In conducting those surveys, C-SPAN asked presidential historians to rank order the 42 former occupants of the White House based on the ten specific attributes of leadership listed below:

- Public persuasion
- Crisis leadership
- Economic management
- Moral authority
- International relations
- Administrative skills
- Relations with Congress
- Vision/setting the agenda
- Pursuit of equal justice for all
- Performance within (the) context of their time

In evaluating their results, “C-SPAN’s academic advisors developed a survey in which participants used one (“not effective”) to ten (“very effective”) to rate each president on ten qualities of presidential leadership ... (as listed above) ... Surveys were distributed to 147 historians (65 responded) and other professional observers of the presidency, drawn from a database of C-SPAN’s programming, augmented by suggestions from academic advisors. Participants were guaranteed that individual survey results remain confidential. Survey results were tabulated by averaging all responses in a given category for each president. Each of the categories was given equal weighting in the total scores” (C-SPAN, 2000 and 2009). In compiling their results, they were thus able to show not only who was ranked the highest, but also how each was rated in each of the categories.

Our sample population, listed in the order of how they were ranked overall in the polls, versus all presidents, is as follows:

<u>President</u>	2000 Ranking	2009 Ranking	(+/-)
John Adams	16 (598)	17 (545)	-53
George H.W. Bush	20 (548)	18 (542)	-6
John Q. Adams	19 (564)	19 (542)	-24
Gerald Ford	23 (495)	22 (509)	+14
William Howard Taft	24 (491)	24 (485)	-6
Jimmy Carter	22 (518)*	25 (474) *	-44
Benjamin Harrison	31 (426)	30 (442)	+16
Martin Van Buren	30 (429)	31 (435)	+6
Chester A. Arthur	32 (423)	32 (420)	-3
Herbert Hoover	34 (400)	34 (389)	-11
John Tyler	36 (369)	35 (372)	+3
Millard Fillmore	35 (395)	37 (351)	-44
Franklin Pierce	39 (286)	40 (287)	+1
Andrew Johnson	41 (280)	42 (258)	-22

() Indicates cumulative numerical score based on the 10 leadership attributes.

+/- Reflects their overall numerical score change from 2000 to 2009.

*Based on their scores, there appears to be a natural break line between President Carter and President Harrison in both ranking and numerical scores.

These are the most thorough and specific surveys to date and the population surveyed is comparable to that of the 2000 Wall Street Journal survey for balance. Additionally, because they used a consistent criterion, it enables the reader, or analyst to follow trends and better observe how presidents have been viewed over time. While still somewhat subjective in nature, they have a large enough sample size that there is some level of strength in aggregation. The traits used in these surveys, will be the attributes this report utilizes to further define those we will look for in measuring presidential leadership. Acknowledging these appear to be the best, or at least most reliable results, they are not without issues. By providing ten specific attributes for consideration, they provide a level of specificity in defining that vague term “leadership.” However, they are all weighted the same in the final computation. It would seem that some traits would be

more indicative of presidential leadership than others. For example, while acknowledging that “Administration” was identified by Woodrow Wilson, when he was a young professor at Princeton, as a key element in the discipline of political science, it is doubtful it should be given the same weight as Crisis Management and Economic Management. It would have been relatively simple to have prioritized and/or weighted the variables. However, at this stage, the numbers have been computed and you “have what you have,” and therefore these are the figures we will work with. Based on their results, a review of the “top” one-term presidents is as follows:

President	2009 Rank*	2000 Rank	2009 Score	2000 Score	Net Score Change
J. Adams	17 (1)	16 (1)	545	598	-53
G.H.W. Bush	18 (2)	20 (3)	542	548	-6
J.Q. Adams	19 (3)	19 (2)	542	564	-22
Ford	22 (4)	23 (5)	509	495	+14
Taft	24 (5)	24 (6)	485	491	-6
Carter	25 (6)	22 (4)	474	518	-44**

*The first number indicates their ranking against all presidents. The number inside the () indicates ranking among one-term presidents.

** In reviewing all 14 of the sample population, a natural break in their scores appears immediately after President Carter. (See page 19.)

Adams again received the highest rating among one-term presidents; however, the trend identified earlier by Lindgren concerning Adam’s presidency being held not as highly as previously continues (Lindgren, 2000: 1). Meanwhile, Bush continues his upward trend as it appears his time in office is receiving somewhat of a relook similar to those that Eisenhower and Truman have received in recent years. In the two C-SPAN surveys, John Adams was ranked highest among one-term president with George H.W. Bush ranked third in the 2000 survey and 50 aggregate points lower than Adams and then moving up

to second and only 3 points (less than .3 of one percent) behind Adams in the later survey.

While concern over the weighting of the different variables has already been addressed, two additional “issues” concerning President Bush need to also be raised. Bush received a very low rating, a full 15 points lower than Adams’s rating in the category “Vision/Setting the Agenda.” His score in this area, especially so soon after his presidency, may have been based not so much on a lack of vision, but more on an off the record comment he made.

In a Time Magazine article, “Where is the Real George Bush?” Robert Ajemian made reference to a conversation Bush had with a friend concerning laying out an agenda for his administration and Bush commented, “Oh, the vision thing” (Ajemian, 1987: 20). Bush’s comment was quickly picked up by the press and political commentators and used against him by his political opponents. In looking at the situation a bit more holistically, one does well to remember that Bush was following a charismatic president into office, one who Bush had served as Vice President under and that he had been actively involved with in establishing the nation’s priorities and policies for the previous eight years. Additionally, his predecessor (Reagan), is one who is often included in the group of presidents identified as “near great” and in following him, Bush pursued many of the same policies and programs. Probably better representations of Bush’s true thoughts and vision that did not get the same level of attention are the two identified below:

- “We don’t need radical new direction, we need strong leadership. We need to remember who we are (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992: 22) , and
- “... we’re coming in to build on a proud record that has already been established: (Bush, 1989).

Secondly, it is generally acknowledged that among the key reasons Bush lost in his reelection bid was due to the state of the economy and in correcting it, he broke an earlier campaign promise to not raise taxes. The United States had entered a mild recession, as compared to other post-war recessions in July 1990, and it lasted until roughly March 1991 (Gardner, 1994). It was characterized by a sluggish employment recovery with unemployment continuing to rise through June 1992, even though overall economic growth had started the previous year (Smith, 2011). Bush made the difficult decision to raise taxes in order to jump start the economy; however, in doing so he committed political suicide. While the economy had begun to grow as the presidential campaign was conducted, the belated recovery from the 1991 recession contributed to Bill Clinton’s victory in the 1992 presidential election. In his campaign, Clinton used the economy as a primary focus and between that, and the involvement of a third party candidate, Bush was not reelected, after having a near 90% approval rating the year before. Clinton had the good fortune of having the economy rising and the recession end during the early days of his administration. In the end, Clinton won praise for his economic leadership, and while Bush ranked 23d overall for Economic management, Clinton was ranked 3rd.

Overall, the six highest rated one-term presidents in the major expert polls are as follows:

	Schlesinger Sr.	Schlesinger Sr.	Schlesinger Jr.	WSJ/Lindgren	C-SPAN	C-SPAN
1948	1962	1996*		2000	2000	2009
J. Adams (9)	J. Adams (10)	J. Adams (11)	J. Adams (13)	J. Adams (16)	J. Adams (17)	
J.Q. Adams (11)	J.Q. Adams (13)	J.Q. Adams (18)	Taft (19)	J.Q. Adams (19)	G.H.W. Bush (18)	
Van Buren (15)	Taft (16)	B. Harrison (19)	J.Q. Adams (20)	G.H.W. Bush (20)	J.Q. Adams (19)	
Taft (16)	Van Buren (17)	Van Buren (21)	G.H.W. Bush (21)	Carter (22)	Ford (22)	
Arthur (17)	Harrison (20)	Taft (22)	Van Buren (23)	Ford (23)	Taft (24)	
A. Johnson (19)	Arthur (21)	Bush (24)	Arthur (26)	Van Buren (30)	Carter (25)	

() Indicates their overall placement in the survey results.

*First time Ford (28), Carter (27), and G.H.W. Bush (24) are considered in a Schlesinger Poll. Their placing in the overall poll is identified within the (). Among the one-term presidents, Bush was the only one who made the top six on that poll with Carter ranked 7th and Ford 8th.

As shown in the results of the six expert surveys above, John Adams is routinely viewed the top one-term president. This is further reinforced by his ranking on the two scholarly surveys referenced which ranked the presidents based on leadership attributes. However, is he truly the greatest? While he has been consistently at the top of the most credible polls and surveys, his overall placement in the expert and scholarly surveys has trended downwards. Is this simply due to the passing of time? Or possibly the more modern 24 hour news and information cycle that makes anything not happening today, not relevant? Both explanations are plausible, but it is doubtful that either of these tells the full story.

Rather, it possibly may be because those taking the surveys are knowledgeable historians and political scientists who are more closely scrutinizing his actual time in office. Some, most notably Stephen Skowronek, have included Adams among a group, including Adam's son, John Q. Adams and Jimmy Carter, as failed presidents (Skowronek, 1993,

7). It is possible that Adams is no longer being advantaged by his accomplishments prior to his presidency?

Meanwhile, Bush continues to move upward in the polls the longer he is out of office and his administration is looked at through a different lens. On a statistical basis, most recently he trailed John Adams by far less than 1%, and with the gains he has made over the last few years, it is not difficult to envision him passing Adams in the near future.

Earlier in this report I indicated, “The traits used in these surveys, will be the attributes utilized to further define those we will look for in measuring presidential leadership.” Therefore, based on the polls one would have to recognize John Adams as number one, with Bush a close number two. As we continue to evaluate our presidents and their place in history, it is easy to predict that he may very well be recognized as “the greatest one-term president in U.S. history,” at least from what the polls tell us in the not too distant future. But is that all there is? Is measuring leadership based solely on polls enough? In his narrative report outlining the results of his 1948 poll, Arthur Schlesinger Sr. indicated the six greatest presidents (Lincoln, Washington, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Wilson, Jefferson and Jackson) were “lucky in their times.” This paper will now review the six presidents who over the years have moved into the top positions among one-term presidents and see how “lucky they were in their times.”

Chapter Two

Greatness Among One-Term Presidents

A Review of Their Times

By the conclusion of the first chapter of this report, the candidates for the best one-term president had been reduced from the original 14 to six using the results of the expert surveys as the criteria to measure their leadership traits and attributes. While that avenue could probably be pursued a bit further, it is clear that a number of trends have been identified and the top six are generally becoming a relatively consistent group. Now may be a good time to relook the results of the 2000 and 2009 C-Span Historians Survey of Presidential Leadership.

<u>President</u>	2009 Ranking	2000 Ranking	(+/-)
John Adams	17 (545)	16 (598)	-53
George H.W. Bush	18 (542)	20 (548)	-6
John Q. Adams	19 (542)	19 (564)	-24
Gerald Ford	22 (509)	23 (495)	+14
William Howard Taft	24 (485)	24 (491)	-6
Jimmy Carter	25 (474)*	22 (518)*	-44
Benjamin Harrison	30 (442)	31 (426)	+16
Martin Van Buren	31 (435)	30 (429)	+6
Chester A. Arthur	32 (420)	32 (423)	-3
Herbert Hoover	34 (389)	34 (400)	-11
John Tyler	35 (372)	36 (369)	+3
Millard Fillmore	37 (351)	35 (395)	-44
Franklin Pierce	40 (287)	39 (286)	+1
Andrew Johnson	42 (258)	41 (280)	-22

() Indicates cumulative numerical score based on the 10 leadership attributes.

+/-Reflects the numerical score change from 2000 to 2009. This, in part, shows how they are “trending.”

For the remainder of this research, we will use the top six: John Adams, George H.W.

Bush, John Q. Adams, Gerald Ford, William Howard Taft, and Jimmy Carter, as our

revised sample population. In doing so, and expanding on the research done in the first portion of this report we will be better able to answer the questions, “What are the factors that should be utilized to provide a consistent way to evaluate presidential success and who was the greatest one-term President in U.S. history?”

Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. in his famous 1948 article, found a similar thread running through the administrations of all his survey deemed to be great. He found that “It is in the administrations of these men that we can find a common pattern. The greats were indeed lucky in “their times”: they are all identified with some crucial turning point in our nation’s history. As our first president, Washington got the infant republic on its feet. Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase was our first territorial expansion, pushing back the western boundary from the Mississippi to the Rockies. Jackson put down an attempt at secession on the part of South Carolina and acted to right the imbalance between the eastern moneyed interests and the Western and Southern farmers. Lincoln preserved the Union through four years of bloody civil war. Wilson’s “New Freedom” and Roosevelt’s “New Deal” introduced far reaching changes in the social and economic structure of the country and both men led the U.S. to intervene in world wars and the making of international peace. All six by timely action achieved timeless results” (Schlesinger, Sr., 1948: 68). If this trend follows the six who have been “designated” as the greatest, does it follow that the trend would continue and that to be great, one must not only have the skills, but also the opportunity? The question now to be answered, is not only were our six lucky in their times, but also “by timely actions achieve timeless results?” This portion of the report will review the times and key events that occurred during the

administrations of the six one-term presidents and reflect on how they handled their leadership challenges and the situations that faced the United States.

John Adams

John Adams, one of our Nation's Founding Fathers, was our second President. Harvard educated, he held a number of significant positions before, during and after the Revolutionary War and is generally viewed as a scholar, and intellectual. However, to say that these attributes led to a successful presidency would be incorrect. Not only faced with the daunting issues of running the country, he was faced with:

- Affiliation and ties to a remarkable predecessor at a time when the political landscape both at home and abroad was dramatically changing and, neither he nor his party, were in synch with the changes.
- A dynamic vice-president who not only was also the leader of the opposition, but also the leading agent for change in the government and in the way of government.
- Internal strife and disloyalty within both his party and administration.

As Washington's Vice President, Adams was the logical Federalist candidate for president in 1796 and he defeated Thomas Jefferson of the Democrat-Republican party. Under the rules in effect at the time, whoever received the most votes became the president with the runner up becoming the vice president. Therefore, these two rivals were elected as a "team" – our nation's first team of rivals. Regretfully, their team was not a success.

Adams' party, the Federalist, had in large part been formed by Alexander Hamilton. Washington had been a supporter of their programs and was Hamilton's mentor dating back to the Revolutionary War days. Hamilton was a dynamic leader and strategic thinker whose drive, initiatives and policy recommendations and subsequent implementations were critical in the founding days of our country. He was the country's first Secretary of Treasury and played a central role in the decision by the newly independent United States to assume the debts of its former colonies, a key step in constructing a sound monetary system and credit-worthy nation. He virtually created the nation's financial architecture from scratch (Rattner: 2015). In carrying out this agenda, the Federalist Party advocated policies calling for a centralized government with a national bank, tariffs and relied on strong relations with Britain to improve trade opportunities.

However, Adams' foremost opponent, Jefferson, the vice president and leader of the opposition party, stood firmly against the Federalist policies. Jefferson further believed the previously approved "Jay Treaty" which negotiated relations with England, and of which Adams had been a co-author, had been uneven and advantaged England. Jefferson believed that the policies of the Federalists were outdated and pressed for change. However, Adams was encumbered by the policies of his predecessor and his party and continued to support them. While faced with these challenges to his administration, Adams was also forced to spend much of his time as president engaged in actions to keep the United States out of war with France and working towards normalizing the strained

relations between the two countries. As Adams exerted great effort to stay out of war, he was faced with increasing opposition to his actions concerning France by both parties.

Regretfully, Adams' personality did not help him during these trying times, and at times he was his own worst enemy. Not noted for his tact, "Adams's bluntness was not an asset to the new American nation at this time when the utmost diplomacy was needed everywhere" (Ambruster, 1966: 63). It seemed that for a good part of his professional career he went out of his way to offend many of those from whom he needed, or would need, support. During the Revolutionary War period, while in France working with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, Adams was openly disdainful of Franklin's work ethic and insubordinate. It was noted that he had the "capacity for envy and jealousy, even vanity... he did not feel secure. A touchy man, rather than a sensitive one, he could not avoid showing his jealousy of Washington whom he looked upon as merely a military hero and thus inferior to the scholar" (Ambruster, 1966: 63-64). These traits, and his overly aggressive behavior did not win him the support needed during his presidency. If that were not enough, when it appeared the U.S would possibly be going to war with France, he supported Congress' passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts which consisted of four measures designed to limit immigration and free speech. However, he then used these measures to respond to criticism against the government and more specifically against opposition within his own party, which completely eroded what little internal support he had.

These actions, exasperated the already tense relationship Adams had within the Federalist Party where his position was already tenuous at best. Adams was only notionally the head of the Federalist Party with the true power being Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton's efforts and influence to the fledgling country were well known and although the Federalists made Adams their presidential candidate, it was based in large part on his on his national reputation and solely to ensure the defeat of Thomas Jefferson. However, most in the party would have preferred Hamilton. While Hamilton and his followers provided some level of support to Adams during the elections of 1796, they did so only because they considered him, as opposed to Jefferson, to be the lesser of two evils. They believed Adams lacked the seriousness, and popularity that had caused Washington to be successful and feared Adams was too vain, opinionated, unpredictable and stubborn to follow their directions (Elkins and McKittrick, 1993: 513-537). In that, they were right because Adams "was not shrewd enough to conceal . . . his ego" (Armbruster, 1966: 64). However, they believed that he was the strongest national candidate in their fight to defeat Jefferson. In the end, the friction between Adams and Hamilton and his followers could not be overcome and ultimately led to Adams' downfall.

When elected in 1796, Adams retained Washington's cabinet and continued the major programs of the Washington Administration. In doing so, he acted to strengthen the central government, and continued the economic programs Hamilton had implemented, both of which were strategic mistakes, and subsequently cost him. Neither of these were what the states or general population wanted, and by pursuing them, his presidential time was combative and led to his defeat four years later. While Hamilton held no official

position during Adams' administration, he regularly consulted with and advised key cabinet members, especially his successor, the Secretary of the Treasury. While the retention of Washington's cabinet by Adams ensured a level of continuity, the members remained too close to Hamilton and their mixed loyalties caused great friction with Adams. Because of this, Adams often was forced to act independent of their advice, making decisions in spite of, or over their strong objections.

Adams had been put in a near untenable situation and then exacerbated it through his own actions. Stephen Skowronek best summed it up when he said, "The second president, was an affiliate of the first (president), and although he was skeptical of the course chartered during the Washington administration, Adams came to power dutifully affirming its policies and personnel. Adams was not free to deal with his "inheritance" as he saw fit and take charge on his own terms. In fact, the Hamiltonians he held over from Washington's cabinet worked against his efforts to do just that, usurping in the process some of the most basic powers and turning his initial affirmation of continuity and stability into an impediment to his capacity to be a president at all. By the time Adams was ready to purge Hamilton's henchmen and stake out his own ground, he was all too deeply implicated in their controversial programs, and neither they nor their strongest opponents, the Jeffersonians, were prepared to credit the legitimacy of the new order he belatedly ventured to establish in his own right" (Skowronek, 193: 23).

Against this backdrop, Hamilton actively sought to prevent Adams' election and the bitterness between the two men became public knowledge in 1800 when Hamilton

denounced Adams in a letter that was published through the efforts of Jefferson's Democratic-Republicans.

In 1800 Adams was unsuccessful in his bid for reelection, being opposed not only by the Democratic-Republicans under Jefferson but also by an aggressive Hamilton, who "opted for the part of the spoiler in the election of 1800 and renounced ...Adams. Adams had betrayed Hamilton's cause; he had scuttled the he party program and purged Hamilton's friends from power. Hamilton reckoned that if Federalism was to ever to regain its proper bearing, Adams would have to be defeated and he party rebuilt in opposition to a Jefferson presidency. If we must have an enemy at the head of the government," he advised, "let it be one who we can oppose, and for whom we are not responsible, who will not involve our party in the disgrace of his foolish and bad measures" (Skowronek, 1993: 62).

With the exception of keeping the United States out of a possible war with France, which Adams considered his crowning achievement and subsequently had memorialized on his tombstone, Adams' administration for the most part was a disaster. He had been a statesman, diplomat, and leading advocate of American independence from Great Britain; however, he did not fare well in his role as president. Following an incredibly successful and revered president and continuing his policies even though they had lost the support of the majority of the population led to dissention from all sides. His inability to keep his party and cabinet in check and their disloyalty wreaked havoc on his intended agenda.

Well educated, and an Enlightenment political theorist who promoted republicanism as well as a strong central government, he was one of only two Presidents that signed the Declaration of Independence. It appears much of his fame and legacy came from his activities before and during the revolution, but not due to his time as president. In fact, he was among a group of presidents “generally judged as politically incompetent” (Skowronek, 1993: 8).

George H.W. Bush

George Herbert Walker Bush served as the 41st President of the United States from 1989 to 1993 and was the first vice president to be elected directly to the office of president since Martin Van Buren in 1837. However, much like Van Buren and John Adams, his good fortune in being elected directly from the vice presidency was tempered by comparisons to the incredibly successful presidents they followed into office (Washington, Jackson and Reagan). In all three cases, their predecessors are now routinely ranked among the greats or near greats in most polls while Bush, Adams, and Van Buren failed to be reelected.

A successful businessman, Bush had previously served in a number of key positions culminating with his duties as vice president under Ronald Reagan. His resume is most impressive having served a congressman, ambassador, as well as the U.S Representative to China, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the Republican National Committee during the difficult Watergate period. In 1989 Bush was nominated by the

Republican Party and ran against Democrat Michael Dukakis, winning 54% of the popular vote and 426 out of 537 electoral votes.

For the most part, foreign policy drove the Bush presidency, with the Berlin Wall falling in 1989, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later. His greatest test and success came when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and then threatened to move into Saudi Arabia. Vowing to free Kuwait, Bush rallied the United Nations, the U. S. people, and Congress and sent 425,000 American troops to the Middle East where they were joined by 118,000 troops from allied nations. After weeks of air and missile bombardment, the 100-hour land battle called Desert Storm routed Iraq's million-man army. He also sent American troops into Panama to overthrow the corrupt regime of General Manuel Noriega, who was threatening the security of the canal and the Americans living there. Noriega was subsequently brought to the United States for trial as a drug trafficker (WH Biography).

However, Bush experienced difficulties domestically. In his acceptance speech when nominated to run in 1988, he included a commitment to not raise taxes. Later the economic situation changed dramatically. Bush had inherited the deficits of the Reagan years and although by today's standards, the numbers appear low, by 1990 the deficit had tripled from 1980 levels. A fiscal conservative, Bush saw the need for action to reduce the deficit and ensure fiscal stability. As a Republican president, working with a Democrat controlled Congress, he argued the best way to reduce the deficit would be through cuts to government spending, as opposed to the Democrats who sought to raise

taxes. As the battle waged on, Bush was forced by the Democratic majority to compromise and support their efforts to increase tax revenues. Although the economic situation had dramatically changed since his pledge, many Republican leaders felt betrayed because Bush had specifically promised "no new taxes."

Republicans in Congress did not support the President, their party leader, and defeated a Bush proposal which would have enacted spending cuts and tax increases to reduce the deficit by \$500 billion over five years. Subsequently, Bush was forced to accept the Democrats' demands for higher taxes (and more spending), which further alienated Republicans. Shortly before this situation arose, Bush had been cited as having a record-high approval rating of 89% (Gallup, 1992). However, the budget and tax situation caused a splintering within the Republican Party and his approval rating, especially among Republicans, was damaged to a level from which it never recovered.

However, he did have a number of major domestic successes. During his administration much progress was seen with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as well as one of the most pro-civil rights bills in decades. He also oversaw greatly increased federal spending for education, childcare, and advanced technology research, and the approval and implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990, which led to a 40 percent increase in legal immigration to the United States. However, domestically he will probably always be more remembered for the economic difficulties which were exacerbated by his own party. The economy was on the upswing as the presidential

campaign was conducted and the belated recovery contributed to Bill Clinton's victory in the 1992 presidential election.

Bush was also faced with a situation similar to today's Tea Party "revolution" within the Republican Party. The radicalization of some segments of the far right portions of the party led by Pat Buchanan forced Bush, in an effort to maintain some level of party unity, to move further to the right on some issues and incorporate a number of socially conservative planks into the party platform. Once Bush had secured the nomination, in an effort to bring the party together and appease his detractors, he allowed Buchanan to give the keynote address at the Republican National Convention, and his "culture war" speech alienated many moderates within the party. This served as a major distraction for Bush and forced him to spend considerable time and resources mending fences within the party over the next few months when he should have been campaigning based on his agenda.

The public's concern over the federal budget deficit and fears of professional politicians also led to the independent candidacy of billionaire Texan Ross Perot, who was able to collect enough signatures to get his name on the ballot in all 50 states. While not winning any states in the final election, he garnered over 19 million votes, the most ever by a third party candidate. The consensus is that Perot's running hurt Bush far worse than Clinton and in all likelihood if Perot had not run, the majority of his votes would have probably gone to Bush. In an election where the two frontrunners were separated by 5 million votes, the 19 million cast for Perot were crucial losses for Bush.

In his campaign, Clinton used the state of the economy as his primary focus and between that, and the involvement of Perot, Bush was not reelected, after having had a near 90% approval rating the previous year. Clinton had the good fortune of having the economy continue to rise and the recession end during the very early days of his administration. Post presidency Clinton is praised for his economic leadership, while Bush suffers by comparison.

Was Bush a failed president? Definitely not in the sense of Adams and some others in this report. In fact, on the world stage, and especially in the areas of foreign policy, and as a wartime president, he did exceptionally well. It has been noted that “The success of Operation Desert Storm was only possible because of the coalition assembled by George Bush – one unparalleled in world history and one that would not have supported the direct overthrow of Saddam Hussein.... (and) near the end of his term, the United States deployed, for the first time in history its armed forces for a large-scale humanitarian purposes in a foreign nation (Somalia) - but only after he had exhausted the alternatives and laid out the groundwork for a consensual policy (Edwards, 2009; 159-160).

However, the economy did him in and while it is little remembered 20+ years later, beside for Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, his overall successes are long remembered.

John Q. Adams

If, in its early days, the United States had a “royal” family, it was definitely the Adams family. “They ...conducted themselves regally, governed disinterestedly and

demonstrated unalloyed patriotism” (Armbruster, 1966: 98). If America has had a “crown prince” it was John Quincy Adams. “He served under Washington and with Lincoln; he lived with Benjamin Franklin, lunched with Lafayette, Jefferson and Wellington; he walked with Russia’s czars and talked with Britain’s king; he dined with Dickens, taught at Harvard, and was America minister to six European countries. He negotiated the peace that ended the War of 1812, freed the African prisoners on the slave ship Amistad, served 16 years in the House of Representatives, restored free speech in Congress, led the antislavery movement.....and.... he was the sixth president of the United States.” (Unger, 2012: 1). However, like his father, he had a most unsuccessful presidency.

With a background such as his and having accomplished so much before he ran for President, it would seem that he would have been incredibly successful as president. However, that was not to be. In 1824 when he ran for President, he faced three major opponents: Andrew Jackson, William Crawford, and Henry Clay with each representing a different geographic region of the country. Jackson, the war hero of the War of 1812, was the "man of the people" and had far greater support than the other candidates, winning 42% of the popular vote and 37% of the electoral vote, while Adams won only 32% of both. However, since no one received a majority, the election was sent to the House where each state would cast one vote for president. Clay's personal dislike for Jackson and the similarities of his views and Adams' on major issues such as tariffs and the need for internal improvements such as with roads and infrastructure, caused him to drop out and throw his support to Adams. This led to Adams' election by the House on

February 9, 1825, on the first ballot. Adams' victory shocked Jackson, who had received the most electoral and popular votes and fully expected to be president. When Adams became president, he appointed Clay to be his Secretary of State. This forever tainted Adams' term as President as opponents claimed that a "corrupt bargain" had been made between the two of them. Jackson subsequently dropped out of active politics for the next four years to work behind the scenes and do all possible to sabotage Adams' efforts and secure his own victory in the next election.

Domestically, Adams focused on "internal improvements," which consisted of actions such as high tariffs to support programs such as road--building, and the establishment of a national bank to encourage productive enterprise, as well as developing a national currency. Adams fought hard for modernization programs that included roads, canals, a national university, an astronomical observatory, and other initiatives; however, he had mixed results in large part due to opposition from Jackson's followers.

Similarly on the international side, although generally regarded as one of the greatest diplomats in U.S history, Adams achieved little of long-term consequence in foreign affairs while president due to the opposition he faced in Congress, where his rivals generally prevented him from succeeding (Bennis, 1956, vol 1: 18-19).

Nagel argues that his political skills were not any less than others of the day, and notes that having Henry Clay, one of the era's most astute politicians, as a principal advisor and supporter throughout his presidency was advantageous; however, Adams' political

problems were the result of an unusually hostile Jacksonian faction, and Adams' own dislike of the office (Nagel, 1999). Additionally, although a product of the political culture of his day, like his father before him, he refused to play politics according to the usual rules and was not aggressive in seeking out and garnering political support.

Like his father, in so many ways, John Quincy Adams appears to be more noted for his time before and after serving as president. One of our greatest diplomats, he drafted the Monroe Doctrine and a number of treaties while serving as representative to six different countries and as Secretary of State. After his presidency, he was outspoken and adversarial especially on the issue of slavery. Brilliant and astute, he articulated a theory whereby the president could abolish slavery by using his war powers correctly predicting Abraham Lincoln's use of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. He also predicted the likelihood of the Union's dissolution over the slavery issue. However, he was not able to overcome many of the obstacles he, and his political opponents, placed in front of him and showed little ability to either compromise or even coordinate. His time as president was not a good time, and like his father, he has been “generally judged as politically incompetent” (Skowronek, 1993: 8).

Gerald R. Ford

It is difficult to imagine a president entering office under more challenging circumstances than Gerald Ford. He became president after having been the vice president for barely eight months, replacing Spiro Agnew who resigned in disgrace. He then assumed the presidency when Nixon resigned in the wake of the Watergate scandal making Gerald

Ford the only man to have ever held the offices of vice president and president, but not have been elected to either of them. Ford was chosen as vice president, in large part, because of reputation for integrity and openness as well as his popularity in the Congress, and his moderate views.

Untainted by Nixon's activities, upon assuming the presidency, Ford had a short "honeymoon" and had the support of the American people and Congress. However, a month after taking over the presidency, in an effort to calm the earlier controversies caused by the Nixon administration, Ford pardoned the former president. Ford claimed he did it to save the nation from the prospect of a long, messy, and divisive trial. This action was universally unpopular and it severely damaged Ford's ability to lead and garner support for his agenda. In an editorial, The New York Times stated that the Nixon pardon was "a profoundly unwise, divisive and unjust act" and with a stroke of the pen destroyed his "credibility as a man of judgment, candor and competence" (The New York Times. December 28, 2006). On October 17, 1974, Ford testified before Congress on the pardon, making him the first sitting President to testify before Congress since Abraham Lincoln (Ford Testimony on Nixon Pardon - C-SPAN Video Library. C-spanvideo.org. October 17, 1974).

Selecting his own cabinet, Ford worked to establish his own agenda during his first year in office, despite opposition from the heavily Democratic Congress. In describing himself, Ford viewed himself as "a moderate in domestic affairs, a conservative in fiscal affairs, and a dyed-in-the-wool internationalist in foreign affairs" (WH Biographies).

Initially his top priority was to curb inflation; however, when the recession became the more serious issue, he shifted to measures aimed at stimulating the economy, while still working to combat inflation. He vetoed a number of non-military appropriation bills that would have further increased the deficit, and subsequently vetoed 39 measures during his first 14 months in office (WH Biographies).

While not as controversial as the Nixon pardon, President Ford offered clemency to those who evaded the draft during the Vietnam War if they would swear allegiance and perform two years of public service. Similarly, those who deserted during the war could return for two years in the branch they left to achieve clemency. Ford was criticized both by those who felt he was being too easy on the draft dodgers and those who had avoided the service because they felt they were in the right in their dissent.

“In the foreign policy arena, he signed the Helsinki Accords, which symbolized a major step towards détente in the Cold War. Additionally, he oversaw the final pullout of troops from Vietnam. This happened as fighting continued and he was not able to get the previously approved funding from Congress to continue operations due to the unpopular nature of the war. Subsequently, after United States involvement in the war for over 10 years, the United States allowed Saigon to fall. By 1976, North and South Vietnam were united into a communist led country. Preventing war in the Middle East was high among his objectives and by providing aid to both Israel and Egypt, the Ford Administration helped persuade the two countries to accept an interim truce agreement. Detente with the

Soviet Union continued and Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev set new limitations upon nuclear weapons” (WH Biography).

Domestically, with little success, he presided over the worst economy in the four decades since the Great Depression, with growing inflation and a recession during his tenure (Frum, 2000: xxiii, 301).

Ford’s was a short, troubled presidency. His times were not good times to be in office. He was faced with the challenges of rising inflation, a depressed economy, chronic energy shortages, the final days of a very divisive war and through it all, the continuing cloud over his head of the Nixon administration malfeasances. In the end he could not overcome those challenges, but it seemed that the people of America knew he was doing all possible. Even with all his problems in office and a major challenge by Ronald Reagan in the Republican primaries, he lost the election by less than 1% of the vote and actually carried more states than the winner, Jimmy Carter.

After Ford left the White House in 1977, he justified his pardon of Nixon by carrying in his wallet a portion of the text of *Burdick v. United States*, a U.S. Supreme Court decision which stated that a pardon indicated a presumption of guilt, and that acceptance of a pardon was tantamount to a confession of that guilt. In 2001, the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation awarded the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award to Ford for his pardon of Nixon and in presenting the award to Ford, Senator Ted Kennedy said that

he had initially been opposed to the pardon of Nixon, but later stated that history had proved Ford to have made the correct decision.

Was he a great president? No, and while he may have had a failed “presidency,” he was not a “failed president” as he has been called (Skowronek, 1993, 411). Under the circumstances, he probably had little chance for success and at best was a caretaker president. No one summed up his time in office better than his successor, Jimmy Carter, who on Inauguration Day began his speech: "For myself and for our Nation, I want to thank my predecessor for all he has done to heal our land" (White House Biographies).

William H. Taft

The case of William Howard Taft is, like Ford’s, most unique. Whereas Ford entered office under the worst of circumstances, it would seem that Taft entered office under the most favorable circumstance possible. In fact, “Only two or three times in American history has an incumbent President been able to pick his successor and get the nation to accept him. Probably it can be said that Jefferson was responsible for Madison's being in the White House, Certainly Jackson named Van Buren as his heir and urged his acceptance. But Theodore Roosevelt practically gave the country an ultimatum to take Taft or take himself for a third time, and the country without a whimper took Taft because "Teddy" told them to. And, as always happens when a glamorous man is followed by an unglamorous one, Taft could not fill his predecessor's shoes; and this was construed by Theodore Roosevelt's followers, despite the accomplishments of the Taft Administration, as disloyalty to the Roosevelt program. The newspapers, for whom

Roosevelt had supplied headlines almost every day of his Presidency, continued to feature the adventures of the dramatic man, so that the people, through their reading, also came to be somewhat disappointed in the Taft regime" (Armbruster, 1966: 255).

In 1908, after having served as President for nearly two full terms, Theodore Roosevelt choose not to run again. Roosevelt and Taft had had a long term personal and professional relationship with Taft having served in a number of key governmental positions, to include Secretary of War during Roosevelt's administration. With Roosevelt not running, he orchestrated Taft's nomination. His election against Bryan was virtually a foregone conclusion (Armbruster, 1966: 257) and Taft won with 52% of the popular vote.

Although Taft had been strongly supported by Roosevelt and the progressive elements of the party, he tried to be his own man. A lawyer by profession before he became so closely aligned with Roosevelt, his rise in politics initially came through Republican judiciary appointments, and then through service in a number of key governmental postings. President McKinley sent him to the Philippines in 1900 as chief civil administrator and there he improved the economy, built roads and schools, and helped bring democracy, at least at some level, to the country. However, it was clear early in his career that Taft much preferred law to politics. Appointed a federal judge at 34, he aspired to be a member of the Supreme Court. However, Roosevelt had other plans for him.

Taft knew when he assumed office that his governing style, mannerisms and personality all differed from those of his predecessor. Unlike Roosevelt, Taft did not believe in the stretching of presidential powers. He once commented that Roosevelt "ought more often to have admitted the legal way of reaching the same ends" (WH Biographies). Taft continued many of Roosevelt's policies, but in some cases not as enthusiastically as his predecessor. His agenda emphasized trust-busting, civil service reform, strengthening the Interstate Commerce Commission, improving the performance of the postal service and passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. However, he alienated many liberal Republicans by defending the Payne-Aldrich Act which continued high tariff rates. A trade agreement with Canada, which Taft pushed through Congress, would have pleased eastern advocates of a low tariff, but the Canadians rejected it. He further antagonized Progressives by supporting his Secretary of the Interior, who they accused of failing to carry out Roosevelt's conservation policies (WH Biographies).

In the angry Progressive onslaught against him, he was given little credit for having initiated 80 antitrust suits and that during his administration Congress submitted amendments for a Federal income tax and the direct election of Senators. A postal savings system was established, and the Interstate Commerce Commission was directed to set railroad rates (WH Biographies).

Taft's foreign policy agenda, known as "Dollar Diplomacy" often involved the use of military actions in support of diplomacy as a means of promoting U.S. business interests

overseas. For instance, Taft sent Marines to Nicaragua in 1912 to help stop a rebellion against the government primarily because it was friendly to American business interests.

Taft was faced with many issues that were not under his control. His situation was very similar to the one John Adams had with Hamilton. Theodore Roosevelt was not able to cut the ties to the office and allow Taft be his own man. Roosevelt's continued involvement and presence on the political scene caused considerable problems and divided loyalties among their joint followers. Roosevelt further compounded the situation by publically stating he would not run but then having second thoughts. Not able, or wanting to separate himself from his followers, through them he continually challenged the president's every action. Even with this, Taft may well have overcome these issues and been reelected; however, Roosevelt took steps to run for president at the end of Taft's first term, and when he was unable to secure the Republican nomination, he formed the Bull Moose Party. This action completely splintered the Republican Party and led to Woodrow Wilson's election.

Taft's post presidential years were good and satisfying. Returning to his first love, the law, he became a law professor at Yale and in 1921 he got his long desired wish to become a member of the Supreme Court when Warren Harding nominated him to be the Chief Justice, a position he served in until a month prior to his death in 1930.

Were Taft's times bad? Probably not as bad as those of John Adams and John Q. Adams; however, he suffered many of the same issues. While his administration is not noted for significant achievements, he suffered no major setbacks and he may well have been

reelected without the internal infighting and splintering of his party. He, like John Adams, was most adversely affected by the forces that should have been his most strident supporters.

Jimmy Carter

In 1976 James Earl (Jimmy) Carter ran for president on a platform focused on restoring trust in government after the debacle of Watergate. Basing much of his campaign around Ford's pardon of Nixon, he faced off against a serving president who was having difficulties with issues such as high inflation, high energy costs and recession. While this would seem to be the perfect scenario, the vote was close with Carter winning barely 50% of the popular vote and 297 out of 538 electoral votes.

According to his White House biography, he aspired to make government "competent and compassionate," and responsive to the American people and their expectations. His achievements were notable, but in an era of rising energy costs, mounting inflation, and continuing tensions, it was impossible for his administration to meet these high expectations (WH Biographies).

However, "although inheriting a number of significant issues from his predecessor's administration, Carter entered with significant support and the opportunity to make significant positive change; however, he was not successful and he is generally considered a failed president" (Skowronek, 1993: 411).

Carter started his administration with a somewhat controversial action that caused angst both on the left and right. Whereas his predecessor had offered clemency in return for service to draft dodgers, Carter, on his first day in office, issued a pardon for all those who dodged the draft in the Vietnam War era. However, he did not pardon deserters.

During his administration, he worked hard to combat the continuing economic woes of inflation and unemployment and by the end of his term he could claim an increase of nearly eight million jobs and a decrease in the budget deficit, as measured in percentage of the gross national product. Unfortunately, inflation and interest rates were still at near record highs, and efforts to reduce them caused a recession (WH Biography).

He did have a number of limited successes in domestic affairs. He dealt with the energy shortage by establishing a national energy policy and by decontrolling domestic petroleum prices to stimulate production. He promoted government efficiency through civil service reform and proceeded with deregulation of the trucking and airline industries. He sought to improve the environment. His expansion of the national park system included protection of 103 million acres of Alaskan lands. In the area of human and social services, he created the Department of Education, bolstered the Social Security system, and appointed record numbers of women, blacks, and Hispanics to government jobs (WH Biography).

However, in foreign affairs, Carter for the most part was not successful. His championing of human rights was coldly received by the Soviet Union and some other nations. He had some success in the Middle East through the Camp David agreement of 1978, which helped bring good will between Egypt and Israel and he obtained ratification

of the Panama Canal treaties. Building on the work of predecessors, he established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and completed negotiation of the SALT II nuclear limitation treaty with the Soviet Union (WH Biography).

However, he will long be remembered for his setbacks in foreign policy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused the suspension of plans for ratification of the SALT II pact and led to a boycott by the U.S. of the 1980 Olympics. While he was able to formally establish diplomatic relations between China and the U.S, the dynamics of foreign policy for the United States dramatically changed on November 4, 1979, when the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran was seized and 60 Americans were taken hostage. In retaliation for the 52 U.S. hostages who were subsequently held for more than a year, Carter suspended oil imports from Iran. With the UN Security Council calling for the release of the hostages, Carter initially imposed economic sanctions with little success and then authorized U.S. troops to conduct a covert rescue mission to rescue the hostages. The attempt ended with the loss of U.S. lives and was not successful. While the Ayatollah Khomeini eventually agreed to release the hostages in exchange for release of Iranian assets in the U.S., they were not released until after Carter left office and Reagan had been sworn in as President. This gave the strong message that the Iranians felt they could outwait Carter, but were concerned with the potential response and actions Reagan might take. The hostage crisis furthered the perception of weak leadership on Carter's part and along with his domestic issues led to a most unsuccessful four years in office.

Carter left the presidency in 1981 and like William Howard Taft, was extremely successful after his time as President. Many believe he has been our most successful ex-president. He became an important figure in Habitat for Humanity and been involved in diplomatic endeavors and missions throughout the world. Many feel his time in office was a stepping-stone for great things and political commentators have at times referred to Carter's post-White House period as his "second term." Widely applauded for his globe-trotting efforts, in 2002 he became the first former President to win the Nobel Peace Prize. However, his time in office and his administration suffered from his inexperience in politics, his micro-management and his frequent backing down during confrontations. At times he appeared indecisive and ineffective and to not be able to clearly articulate his priorities. His disdain for the Washington DC political environment was clear and he seemed to be distrustful and uninterested in working with other groups, or even with Congress when it was controlled by his own party.

In the 1980 campaign his opponent, Ronald Reagan, projected an easy-going self-confidence, in contrast to Carter's serious and introspective temperament. Reagan used the economic problems, Iran hostage crisis, and lack of Washington cooperation to portray Carter as a weak and ineffectual leader which led to him becoming the first elected president since Hoover in 1932 to lose a reelection bid.

Acknowledging Carter inherited a number of significant issues from his predecessor's administration, he was not able to overcome them and as more situations arose, especially with international ramifications, he did not exhibit the leadership or abilities to resolve

them. His time in office was difficult time for the entire country, leading to a dramatic shift in the political alignment of the country. It led to the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the ushering in of a completely new philosophy of the use of presidential power. Like some of the other presidents this paper has discussed, Carter found himself among group of presidents “generally judged as politically incompetent” (Skowronek, 1993: 8).

So, where did they stand in their time as President? While it is safe to say that all presidents have challenges during their time in office, these six presidents had truly difficult presidencies. Adams, Taft, Bush and Carter faced virtual uprisings from within their own parties. John Q. Adams was a president, who although before his presidency had great prestige and a superb reputation, lost much of his credibility because of the taint of how he secured the presidency. Ford appeared to have significant personal credibility and prestige however, he lost much of both when he pardoned Nixon. Carter was a virtual unknown who brought little personal baggage with him when he became president. Because he was so unknown, he had to establish his personal reputation and credibility, but seemed overwhelmed by the issues and was not able to establish either. It appears that to a degree all became victims to their times, and both John and John Q. Adams, as well as Carter have all been called “politically incompetent” and Ford and Carter both called failed presidents (Skowronek, 1993; 411, 8).

Even with their issues, Bush and Taft seem to have accomplished the most during their time in office and have been the most successful. While Taft saw in-fighting within his party, his administration, for the most part was successful. Bush’s difficulties with the

economy were noted earlier, however, he will be best remembered for his position on the world stage as leader of the coalition he led during the liberation of Kuwait from the forces of Saddam Hussein.

Chapter Three
Greatness Among One-Term Presidents
“Presidential Time”

Have we exhausted ways to look at these presidents? No, because a number of significant studies exist that provide us with additional ways to look at our presidents.

If one is to review the current dialog in presidential leadership literature, it appears to be a successful president, one needs to be a good “clerk”, but also have the power to persuade; or needs to be an able “facilitator”; or, simply be lucky based on the timing of his presidency. This portion of the thesis will review how these presidents used their presidential powers and leadership skills and analyze them in accordance with the principles outlined in a number of significant presidential leadership studies. While many common threads run throughout these resources, three stand out due to the precedents they established in changing the way we look at presidential leadership and the use of presidential power. They are: “Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents,” by Richard E. Neustadt; “The Strategic President, Persuasion & Opportunity in Presidential Leadership,” by George Edwards, and; “The Politics President Make, Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton,” by Stephen Skowronek. As such, theirs will be the primary resources used to further analyze our sample population.

Richard Neustadt’s book, “Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents,” changed the landscape on how scholars viewed presidential power and leadership, arguing that

“Presidential power is the power to persuade” (Nuestadt, 1960: 11). In differentiating presidents before Franklin Roosevelt and those subsequent, he noted that presidents now are expected to do far more than their authorities prescribe and for the last 65+ year’s scholars, students, and presidents have viewed presidential leadership through this prism. With the initial publication of his book in 1960, Nuestadt reoriented the study of the presidency from those of Edward Corwin (Corwin, 1957), who focused on the formal constitution based powers of the presidency and Clinton Rossiter who stressed the president’s formal roles (Rossiter, 1960). Nuestadt made the case that the president’s power is based on personal power rather than formal authority of the position.

Nuestadt viewed leadership and “presidential power” from a strategic view and looked beyond a president simply trying to get a bill through Congress or settling strikes, and in doing so scrutinized the ability to influence and answer questions such as: What is its nature of the individual’s influence and what are its sources of power? What can this man accomplish to improve the prospect that he will have influence when he wants it? Strategically, the question being not how one masters Congress in a particular instance, but what he does to boost his chance for mastery in any instance, looking toward the future (Nuestadt, 1990: 4)? Nuestadt hypothesized that modern Presidents face demands from five distinguishable sources: from the executive officialdom, from Congress, from his supporters, from citizens at large and from abroad. He further argued that while the President derives his powers from his constitutional authority, he is actually relatively weak and little more than a “clerk” who is not able to affect significant change without the approval of congress, and that there are no guarantees that other members of the

government, to include members of his administration, will help him achieve his goals (Nuestadt, 1990: 8). In arguing such, he focused on three key traits the President must possess to succeed in the White House.

Nuestadt saw the “power to persuade” as the most significant aspect of presidential power and that in executing it presidents convince others that what he wants is in their best interest acknowledging that just because he wants something done, does not mean that others will carry out his desires (Nuestadt, 1990: 29-49). This is because “the president's advantages are checked by the advantages of others. Continuing relationships will pull in both directions. These are relationships of mutual dependence. The president depends upon persons whom he would persuade; he has to reckon with his need or fear of them” (Neustadt, 1990: 31). In his continuing dialog and negotiations, the President must emphasize to his colleagues how his policies will benefit them as well.

The second aspect of Presidential Power is the President’s “professional reputation.” The President’s reputation in large part comes from how successful others feel he will be in carrying out his agenda and legislation (Nuestadt, 1990: 50-72). Basically, does he have the resources and executive branch support to do what he promises? The group with whom the president’s professional reputation is most important is the “Washingtonians.” While not necessarily located in Washington they are the “elites,” individuals such as governors, politicians, foreign ambassadors, and the congress. Reputation comes into play by how capable the government's infrastructure is, and how the president is

perceived in his ability to carry out his agenda and legislative actions. The better the reputation of the president the easier it is to facilitate negotiations to implement policies.

The third aspect of presidential power is related to his “public prestige” and how the public views the president (Nuestadt, 1990: 73-89). While the public has little direct association with policy making, their view of the president affects how legislation is enacted. Public prestige is also seen in the private sector. If private organizations look highly upon the president, it's easier to execute his policies. A good opinion on the constituency's part will help the president's policies move through Congress.

Public prestige and professional reputation as outlined by Nuestadt, have much in common. The public's view affects the reputation, and the reputation affects the public opinion of the president and without these and the capabilities to capitalize on them, the president will fail. He further indicated that a president must think and act proactively so the decisions he makes today will aid in his abilities to persuade tomorrow. Nuestadt said, “The presidency is not a place for amateurs. The sort of expertise can hardly be acquired without deep experience in political office. The presidency is a place for men of politics but by no means is it a place for every politician” (Nuestadt, 1960:152).

In reading Nuestadt, one obvious shortfall, or possibly a bias becomes obvious. “The centerpiece of Nuestadt's analysis was his description of a new political/institutional system that had taken shape in the late 1940s and early 1950s, basically his is a portrait of “the presidency at mid-century” one that identified incumbents after Franklin Roosevelt

as a distinct and coherent group facing similar challenges in political action (Nuestadt, 1960: 5), but differing from their predecessors. He argues that in this period central direction and control of national affairs had become for the first time a routine imperative, and therefore modern presidents have to be leaders as opposed to being mere clerks fulfilling the constitutional responsibilities of the office.

This characterization by Nuestadt is somewhat condescending and his “periodization of presidential history – his distinction between modern and premodern contexts for the exercise of power -- introduced a sense of coherence into the relentless succession of incumbents and raised the study of leadership efforts above the idiosyncrasies of the case at hand. But simple periodization schemes impose severe limits on the analysis of leadership, and Nuestadt’s was no exception The notion of a prior age when presidents did not *have* to be leaders -- an age when vital national interests were only sporadically at the fore and most presidents could rest content with mere clerkship – is nothing more than a conceit of modern times. The question of just how different the politics of leadership in modern times is or whether the mid-twentieth-century individuals share more with one another than they do with president in earlier periods is never greatly explored” (Skowronek, 1993: 4-5).

Due to this omission, or bias, three of our sample population (John Adams, John Q. Adams and William Howard Taft) are not mentioned in Nuestadt’s text, because he focuses entirely on the “modern president,” as if earlier presidents did not deal with similar issues.

His discussion of George H.W. Bush is done to simply support his premise that the office and responsibilities of the President have dramatically changed over the last 200+ years and will continue to do so. “Since FDR in wartime, every president including Bush has found the role of superpower sovereign beguiling: personal responsibility at once direct and high ... But the distinctions lessen -- compare Bush's time with Nixon's to say nothing of Eisenhower's -- and we should expect they will lessen further” (Nuestadt, 1990: 317-318). Nuestadt passed away in 2003; depriving political scientists the opportunity to hear more of his thoughts on Bush's and subsequent administrations. His thoughts would have been most interesting in that Bush appeared to have the attributes Nuestadt called for and entered office with the one of the finest sets of credentials and experiences of any of our presidents, along with an outstanding reputation and considerable proven abilities in working behind the scenes.

His discussion of Gerald Ford is much more detailed and acknowledges, due to the circumstances under which Ford entered office and the shortness of his term, his time in office was most unique in American history. Although coming into office under the most adverse of conditions, Ford had a superb reputation and was held in high esteem upon entering office by the general population. Additionally, although he had been Nixon's vice president, he was not tainted by the corruption within the White House. His professional reputation was intact and he had served honorably in Congress for over 25 years, had risen to the position of House Minority Leader, and may well have eventually been the Speaker of the House had he remained in Congress. Additionally, he did well coming into office and bringing in a team that knew government and with whom he felt comfortable. In fact, Ford's White House is notable for having in it more political

associates with government experience who knew him when their status matched his own, or nearly so, than any president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Nuestadt, 1990: 228).

However, the favorable atmosphere he enjoyed soon changed. “Succeeding a disgraced man, but not himself legitimized by a popular election, Ford needed to assure the continuity of office by his demonstrated *differences* from his predecessor. That he managed to convey for just a month then blurred it when he pardoned Nixon, who had not yet even been indicted (Nuestadt, 1990: 295). “Ford’s reputation slumped, his prestige was already falling, and the media bore down on him as scornfully as four years afterward on Carter” (Nuestadt, 1990: 295).

From Nuestadt’s perspective, Ford basically did himself in. While generally seen as a well-intentioned man, he was faced with a number of severe challenges such as inflation, high unemployment and reestablishing the government’s credibility after Watergate. However, Ford’s presidential prestige and ability to use his powers to credibly lead and persuade which would have strengthened his case for presidential greatness, were mooted by the terms of his accession, his initial actions in office and inability to use his powers in carrying out his agenda.

Jimmy Carter's transition to the presidency started him off on the wrong foot and then the situation worsened. As discussed earlier, Carter had a number of significant shortcomings in his leadership and management style. He promised that his

administration would maintain higher standards than his predecessors. However, during his administration he lived up to none of those images “and was lambasted in the press for his shortcomings. Comments describing the state of affairs during his first year for the most part were damning and indicated, “I have never heard so many suggestions of ineptness about a new Administration,” from a Democratic senators staff member, and “The president decides even the petty questions himself. He attends to minute details to an obsessive degree.” At the end of his second year, the comments were no more positive, “[He falls short] in commanding the attention of the American people” (Nuestadt, 1990: 233-234).

Possibly too much was expected of President Carter, “a relatively unknown with a plurality of 0.04 percent of the popular vote is not the combination of which mandates are made” (Nuestadt, 1990: 234). He suffered from the consequences of being an outsider and wanting to continue to be one. A lackluster campaign, a low vote, was followed by a tepid national reaction to his person and his programs (Nuestadt, 1990; 239).

And the situation simply got worse. Carter did not seem to exhibit any of the three traits that Nuestadt found so important. He did not have a national public following and therefore the public prestige needed to be able to push his agenda. Nor did he have the professional reputation that would have led to a level of credibility with the Washingtonians and shown them he could carry out his agenda. Seen as a weak leader in almost every area and virtually overwhelmed by the issues confronting his administration, he clearly did not have the power to persuade.

Based on Nuestadt’s comments and an analysis of the administrations of the presidents he did not address, outlined below is how successful the sample population was in exhibiting Nuestadt’s three key traits while in office:

	Traits		
	Power to Persuade	Professional Reputation	Public Prestige
J. Adams	No	Yes	Yes*
Bush	Yes**	Yes	Yes
J.Q. Adams	No	Yes***	Yes
Ford	No	No****	No****
Taft	Yes*****	Yes	Yes
Carter	No	No	No

* Considerable prestige with the public; however, it was greatly diminished during his term.

** Significant successes in garnering support for action such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm and most of his agenda; however, difficulties in getting full support for economic legislation.

*** However, severely tarnished by the circumstance that brought him into office

**** The pardon did irreparable damaged both his professional reputation and public prestige

***** Had the ability, but was somewhat stifled by the actions of his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, and his followers.

In his book, “The Strategic President,” George Edwards took a somewhat different approach than Neustadt, with the premise that presidents best achieve change when they exploit existing opportunities rather than attempt to persuade others to change or alter their preferences or behavior. He argues presidents don’t lead, rather they pursue and advance agendas that already have some level of support. He disputes Neustadt’s premise that presidential power is “the power to persuade” and argues that the president must engender change by other means. For Edwards, it’s not whether a president matters, it’s “how” they matter. Namely, how do they bring about change? He argues even the most skilled and effective president does not create new opportunities by persuading others to follow their lead (Edwards, 2009: 6). In his analysis of Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, Edwards goes against the

consensus view and argues that none of the three, was truly able to employ persuasive rhetoric and go over the head of Congress to change the political terrain. Rather, he argues presidents cannot really move public opinion because the population's policy preferences are stable over time and competing arguments drown out the President's message. Rather, they must work around the edges.

Edwards maintains presidential leadership is most effective when presidents are "facilitators" who recognize opportunities, prioritize them, and, convince a small number of undecided actors to support particular goals. Arguing that change is not inevitable, and facilitators make things happen that otherwise would not, he argues they are skilled leaders who must recognize the opportunities that exist in their environments, choose which opportunities to pursue, when and in what order, and exploit them with skill, energy, perseverance, and will (Edwards, 2009:12).

Edwards, like Nuestadt, did not address all presidents in his book. Neither of the Adams' were mentioned, and in the case of Taft, the only reference made was in relation to Bush when he said, "Bush became only the fifth sitting president this century to be defeated (other defeated incumbents were William Howard Taft, Herbert Hoover, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter)" (Edwards, 2009; 163). (Of note in the previous century there were also five as well as an additional five who failed to be renominated – authors note.).

While Edwards acknowledges Bush had significant roadblocks placed in front of him as he attempted to move his agenda, he also noted that Bush possessed the traits he indicated

were needed to be an effective president. Given Edwards' focus on leadership so intensely tied to the powers of coordination and facilitation, and the need to articulate agendas and issues, it is regrettable that when asked about his biggest disappointment as President George H.W. Bush replied, "I just wasn't a good enough communicator" (Edwards, 2009; 21). However, he did have talents, and Edwards commented, "Observers often commented that George W. Bush lacked Reagan's charisma, but was a Washington insider with highly developed interpersonal skills" (Edwards, 2009; 45). "George Bush lacked rhetorical skill and he knew it. He was uncomfortable in the "bully pulpit" but also believed that public saber rattling was counterproductive..... He went public as much as his predecessors but he was more comfortable building consensus one-on-one behind closed doors" (Edwards, 2009: 157).

"When Bush took the oath of office on January 20th 1989 he was already fighting an uphill battle. He began his tenure with one of the worst for strategic positions of any newly elected president in American history. New presidents traditionally claim a mandate from the people, because the most effective means of setting the terms of debate and overcoming is the perception of an electoral mandate, an impression that the voters want to see the winner's programs implemented. George H.W. Bush was not so fortunate. The conditions of his electoral victory undermined any claim that the White House could make as to having received a mandate. The new president's popular vote percentage was a respectable but unimpressive 53%, and his party lost seats in both houses of Congress. He actually ran behind the winners in 379 of the 435 congressional

districts. Thus there was little basis for members of Congress inferring presidential coattails” (Edwards, 2009: 154).

An important leadership resource for a president is “the strength of his party in Congress. President Bush took office facing the largest opposition majority in Congress of any newly elected president in American history – Democratic advantages of 10 seats in the Senate and eighty-five seats in the house. The budget deficit also tightly restricted his ability to take policy initiatives, because there was very little in the way of slack resources with which to take them” (Edwards, 2009: 155).

“Following conservative icon Ronald Reagan would have been difficult for any president, especially a Republican one. Moreover, the conditions in which Reagan’s successor George H.W. Bush found himself were not felicitous. Yet the President had success and dealt with a number of major and contentious issues. Thus the George H.W. Bush presidency it is instructive in increasing our understanding of how presidents may make the most out of circumstances in which they serve and that are beyond their power to change” (Edwards, 2009 153).

Bush did have the power to persuade and facilitate. His successes in foreign policy and his status as a wartime president and coalition leader of Operation Desert Storm are a large part of George H.W. Bush’s legacy. They were “only possible because of the coalition assembled by George Bush – one unparalleled in world history and one that would not have supported the direct overthrow of Saddam Hussein” (Edwards, 2009 159

– 160). While usually recognized for the first gulf war, Edwards noted other numerous other successes in using his facilitation skills.

Edwards indicates that Bush was somewhat limited making dramatic changes because he had inherited so many problems from Reagan. In fact, “In general the presidency of George H.W. Bush was devoted to consolidating the changes of the Reagan administration and dealing with the problems it left behind rather than mobilizing a coalition behind new enterprises. It was a term of prudent stewardship, but not one that was oriented towards laying the groundwork for significant changes in domestic policy. While opinions change over time, it is interesting to note, the only time Bush and his predecessor, Reagan were “compared” in one of the Schlesinger presidential surveys was in 1996, when Bush actually placed higher (24th versus Reagan’s 25th ranking out of 39 presidents) (Schlesinger; 1997).

The president is dependent on his environment in creating favorable strategic positions from which he can exercise leadership at the margins. Given his strategic position, George Bush had fewer opportunities to exploit than did most presidents. Understanding the weaknesses of his situation, and not able to persuade the Democrats in Congress to vote for conservative legislation, he made progress on a number of fronts by pursuing moderate policies and negotiating compromises with the Democratic majority. Ultimately however he could not overcome the weakness of his strategic position and responded to the context in which he served by turning to foreign policy where his inclinations and

expertise gave him greater flexibility and more opportunity to leave his mark on history” (Edwards, 2009 166).

Edwards has little to say concerning Ford, besides that he either lacked a vision for the future or failed to effectively articulate one and this led to stewardship of competence without a compass and detracted from his ability to build a strong image to lead the American people and Congress (Edwards, 2009; 157). However, while giving Ford the benefit of the doubt, this situation, in part was exacerbated by the circumstances behind how he came to office and his missteps during his first few weeks in office.

Carter had little success in articulating his agenda and working with people, especially those he needed most in Congress to move his agenda forward. While every president faces unique challenges, Carter seemed to have suffered from an overabundance of them, many of which were self-inflicted or came from within his own party. Like Ford, “Carter had the misfortune to preside during a period of substantial inflation and unemployment whereas stable prices sustained economic growth and general prosperity characterized Kennedy and Johnson’s tenure” (Edwards, 2009: 134-135). Additionally, “the constant opposition he faced from the vocal and powerful liberal wing of his own party undermined Carter's ability to promote his policies. His press secretary, Jody Powell reported that a survey of the press found that 75% of the critical commentary on the administration in 1977 came from Democrats, mostly liberals. In 1980 the President had to deal with the challenge of Senator Edward Kennedy for the Democratic nomination” (Edwards, 2009: 134-135).

Carter had considerable problems in pursuing his agenda and garnering support on the Hill. Edwards states “the White House is often its own greatest competitor” and was not able to focus the nation on his agenda. It is well documented how his staff did not help him through good coordination with an adversarial congress. Because they did little coordination with the Hill they had great difficulties in simply getting his actions on Congress’ agenda” (Edwards, 2009: 100).

While his democratic predecessor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, had been very successful in dealing with Congress based on personal prestige and reputation, Carter failed miserably. However, to help put this situation in perspective, perhaps the most obvious difference between democratic administrations of the 1960's and Jimmy Carter's in the late 1970's was that Carter was disadvantaged by serving during a period of congressional assertiveness that followed Vietnam and Watergate.

Similar to Ford he did not have a vision. Or if he did, he failed in his ability to articulate it (Edwards, 2009; 157). Nuestadt probably put it best when he said, “The presidency is not a place for amateurs. The sort of expertise can hardly be acquired without deep experience in political office. The presidency is a place for men of politics but by no means is it a place for every politician” (Nuestadt, 1960:152).

Based on Edwards’ comments and an analysis of the administrations of the presidents he did not address in his book, the chart below outlines how successful the sample population were in exhibiting Edwards’ key traits while in office:

Trait	Facilitation Skills	Ability to Exploit Opportunities
J. Adams	No*	No*
Bush	Yes	Yes**
J.Q. Adams	No	No***
Ford	No	No
Taft	Yes	Yes****
Carter	No	No

*Inability to exhibit either due to dissention within his own party

** Overall successful; however, some difficulties with pursuing his solution to budget issues

*** Dissention with powerful opposition

**** Was overall successful in exploiting many of the opportunities with his agenda; however, his lack of complete support for his predecessor's agenda led to internal party dissention.

The leadership traits and usages of power outlined by Neustadt and Edwards come from their perspective of looking back at and reviewing how presidents performed in order to recommend how future Presidents should possible act. In his book "The Politics Presidents Make, Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton," which won the Richard E. Nuestadt Prize for Presidential Research, Stephen Skowronek's thoughts runs counter to both Nuestadt and Edwards. Although looking at presidents and their administrations retrospectively, he provides a very sophisticated view and a predictive model. Whereas Nuestadt, and to a lesser degree Edwards, argue the president is weak and either must use his power to "persuade" or "facilitate" to make his agenda successful, Skowronek believes the President has enormous power and the challenge is in his authority. His book, "offers an analysis of leadership patterns that are repeatedly produced through the American constitution system by the peculiar structure and operation of its presidential office. In this sense, it is about the politics that the American presidency makes" (Skowronek, 1993: xvi). Further, his central argument is that, "assuming the presidential office and exercising its power has an inherent disruptive political effect, and that the presidential leadership is a struggle to that effect in the reproduction of a legitimate political order"(Skowronek, 1993: xii). This "legitimate political order" is key, in that

the true measure of power for a president is what is the basis, namely the warrant (license), that legitimize his actions? That “legitimacy” is key, because without that legitimacy, his supporters become discouraged and his enemies emboldened. While this initially appears to be somewhat in synch with Nuestadt’s discussion of Presidential reputation and prestige, he disputes Nuestadt (Skowronek, 1993, 5), and argues the most important factors in the president’s efforts and his chances for success are predicated on where he stands in “political time,” which in large part is based on the successes or failures of his predecessor(s). He sees presidents as classified in two dimensions:

- Their affiliation with, or opposition to, a given “regime”
- The extent to which that order is either vulnerable or resistant.

The president’s success is predicated in large part, by where the president and the predecessor he is most closely aligned to stand in the following political cycle:

- Reconstruction: Presidents who were fortunate enough to follow a weak or vulnerable regime (i.e., Roosevelt after Hoover, or Reagan after Carter) and were able to establish a new order. This group is made up of the great regime builders who overthrew the vulnerable previous regimes – Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. (Skowronek, 1993: 36-37). None of our candidates fall into this category.

- Disjunction: The period where a long standing political order is collapsing and no longer capable addressing the challenges facing the country. They are caught between the actions they need to take and those their supporters oppose. Examples of presidents in this category include John Adams, John Q. Adams, Herbert Hoover,

Franklin Pierce and Jimmie Carter. Skowronek argues their issues were less their capabilities and limitations but rather that they governed in impossible times and could not satisfy the demands of their supporters (Skowronek, 1993: 39-40).

- Articulation: These are affiliated with the new order from Reconstruction; however, are faced with different challenges. They are expected to follow the vision of their predecessor, while at the same time there appears to be differing opinions as to what that vision actually entails. Their decisions ultimately split their support base which still holds loyalties to the initial reconstructive President. They are seen as in two groups. Those that immediately follow in the coalition founder and are seen as unable to stand in their predecessor's footsteps (i.e., Martin Van Buren, William Howard Taft, Harry S. Truman, and George H.W. Bush) and those that later attempt to renew the founder's vision (James Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Baines Johnson and George W. Bush). They quite often become one-term presidents (Skowronek, 1993: 41-42). (Underlining is this author's.)

- Pre-Emption: While one party is dominant, occasionally the other party comes into office (i.e., Andrew Johnson, Cleveland, Wilson, Eisenhower, Nixon, Clinton, and Obama) and you end up with an opposition leader in a resilient regime. Presidents in this category generally distance themselves from the previous failed order; however, they generally have extremely adversarial relationships with the powers of the previous regimes (Skowronek, 1993: 43-44). The book mentions this situation, but does not discuss it in detail. None of our candidates fall into this category.

Five of our six presidents fall into the two categories Skowronek indicates are most likely to lead to unsuccessful presidencies:

	Reconstruction	Disjunction*	Articulation**	Pre-Emption	Caretaker***
John Adams		X			
George H.W. Bush			X		
John Q. Adams		X			
Gerald Ford					X
William H. Taft			X		
Jimmy Carter		X			

*Their issues were less their capabilities and limitations, but rather that they governed in impossible times and could not satisfy the demands of their supporters.

**They immediately follow the coalition founder and are seen as unable to stand in their predecessor's footsteps and generally become one-term Presidents.

***Not a category identified by Skowronek; however Ford's circumstances of coming into office and his limited time in office do not offer the opportunity to clearly place him in one of the other categories.

Skoronek's model is unique and stresses not necessarily leadership traits, but where the President stands in time and his political affiliation, and that are the best indicators of their potential for success. From a historical perspective this model is very interesting and in retrospect, predictive. In outlining the philosophical difficulties presidents face with when in either the Disjunction or Articulation categories, it is clear that all six of our candidates entered office with powerful negative dynamics they had to overcome and did so with varying levels of success.

All six had problematic presidencies. Their problems were not necessarily in their leadership style. In some cases it was internal party dissention or inherited issues such as troubled economic times. In other cases appears to have just simply been their personal

leadership style, and yet in still other cases it appears they virtually had no chance to be successful due to circumstances beyond their control.

The chart below indicates how successful our six presidents were in exhibiting the traits identified for presidential success by Nuestadt and Edwards and if their “Presidential Time” fit Skowronek’s model.

	Nuestadt	Edwards	Skowronek
J. Adams	No	No	Yes
Bush	Yes	Yes	Yes
J.Q. Adams	No	No	Yes
Ford	No	No	Yes*
Taft	Yes	Yes	Yes
Carter	No	No	Yes

*Although mentioned by Skowronek, comments were minimal and only to clarify another’s situation.

Greatness Among One Term Presidents

Conclusion(s)

Measuring presidential success and their ability to lead is not a simple process and leaves much to the researcher's discretion. The situation is compounded by the multitude of opinions and the expectations we have put on the 43 who have occupied what is arguably the most critical position in the world. Analyzing our sample population in light of the varied situations they faced while in office, and how they met, or failed to measure up to the criteria established in current theories on what attributes the presidents need to be successful and how the public and scholars have viewed their performance has presented a number of interesting challenges – none of which could not be overcome.

All faced significant challenges. Some from strong opposition parties, some from internal factions, some from both. Some faced issues with the circumstances that led them into office, and others had unique situations as they left office. All met their challenges in different ways and with varying levels of success. In the research for this project a number have been called fail presidents, or worse. However, it is clear they were all well-intentioned, dedicated and did the best possible under often adverse conditions.

Attempts have been made to ensure the criteria used in this research has been as holistic and unbiased as possible. The criteria used to measure them has been threefold: 1) How the public and experts in the political science and history fields have viewed their time in

office; 2) An analysis from a strictly historical perspective on how they handled the major situations that arose during their administrations, and; 3) An analysis of their leadership styles and how they used their presidential powers.

In reviewing our six candidates for the greatest one-term president if one simply goes by the numbers, it would be John Adams followed very closely by George H.W. Walker Bush and then followed at some distance by John Quincy Adams, Gerald Ford, William Howard Taft and Jimmy Carter.

If the researcher follows the Arthur Schlesinger model and looks for events that gave the candidates the opportunity to be "lucky in their times" and be identified with some crucial point in our history, the nod could possibly go to either Adams for keeping the United States out of war with France or George H.W. Bush for his success in leading the coalition against Saddam Hussein during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, or to Gerald Ford for his actions, although controversial, in resolving the Nixon situation after the Watergate crisis. Here the nod goes to Bush. His crisis was real and he led a major coalition on the world stage. In the case of Adams, his actions are like trying to prove a negative. However, it is a given, that the United States did not go to war but, it is none the less difficult to subjectively or objectively measure his success. In the case of Ford, he inherited a number of tremendously difficult issues and a times had significant problems while in office, but he was none the less aggressive in his actions to reconcile the country and right the economy. He acted courageously in pardoning Nixon, and will

forever be remembered for that action; however, that action was tremendously unpopular and exacerbated a number of other significant issues he had during his unsuccessful term. In reviewing the candidates based on current presidential leadership philosophies, especially through Skowronek's lens, it is clear all came into office under relatively adverse conditions. While not necessarily pre-determining their ultimate successes, they were all at a disadvantage upon entering office.

Against Edward's and Nuestadt's models, the majority of the sample population had difficulties, caused by either their own personality quirks or internal party infighting or severe attacks from strong opposition leaders. Bush and Taft come out somewhat better than the others, with Bush getting the nod based on his persuasive powers in forming the coalition for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and on his abilities lead and facilitate. Edwards noted that while not as strong a communicator as his predecessor, he was able to function quite often behind the scenes and take advantage of his Washington insider credentials. Faced with a major disadvantage in the opposition majority in the House and the Senate for the most part he did well in pushing his agenda through. Edwards specifically comments that Bush's presidency was instructive in increasing the understanding of how presidents can make the most out of circumstances which are beyond their control to change. In the other cases, the others were not as successful.

While the research question to be specifically answered was not whether George H.W. Bush was the greatest one-term president, this analysis suggests, he was. However, it also adds to the body of work in two other areas. It shows how presidents either reacted,

or didn't react to adverse conditions and provides a number of lessons future presidents should avoid, at the risk of becoming a one-term president. Among them are:

- All the men involved in this study were politicians, yet they did not all understand the political landscape, nor be flexible enough to prepare for change. John Adams was the last Federalist president. All the historical pieces indicate the country was anxious for change, and yet he did not move from the position of his predecessor until it was too late politically. His situation was not helped by having an opponent as his vice president, but he also exacerbated the situation by retaining his predecessor's cabinet remain in place.
- Better prepare for your presidency. Carter had three months to prepare. However, he came across as unprepared and so anti-Washington, that he was not able to gain the credibility he needed as an unknown coming to Washington. Bill Clinton also stumbled when he first took office over issues such as health care; however, his transformation should be used as an example of how a president can overcome early obstacles. Ford, regretfully, had no time to prepare for his time in office.
- In following a most successful president, such as Washington, Theodore Roosevelt or Reagan into office you must early on differentiate yourself from your predecessor, or embrace the principles he stood for. Adams could have championed change, and Taft paid dearly for not aligning himself with Roosevelt aggressively enough.
- Any behavior that appears to be underhanded or unethical will affect your entire time in office. John Quincy Adams paid dearly for Henry Clay's support. This advice is even more relevant in today's political environment with 24 hour news coverage, etc.

Conspiracy theories continue into Ford's alleged complicity in the Nixon pardon continue today.

- Leave room for compromise. The inability, or lack of desire to seek compromise can poison an administration. John Adams showed little flexibility in his adherence to Federalist policies until late in his term, even though the country was already moving in that direction. His son, had little opportunity to compromise due to the circumstances in which he came in to office. Carter came in as an outsider and did not want to work within the systems and paid the price. Although possibly beyond his control, Ford lost the opportunity to compromise early on during his administration, and ended up not being able to pursue his agenda and subsequently vetoed far more legislation (66) than any of the other president in our sample population (John Adams (0), John Quincy Adams (0) Taft (39), Carter (31), and George H.W. Bush (44)), although his time in office was by far the shortest.
- Although possibly counter intuitive, presidents do have to take positions above the fray, and simply “do the right thing.” While he was surprised at the extent of the public outcry, I believe Gerald Ford in his heart did the right thing in pardoning Richard Nixon. Bush faced a similar fate as Ford, when he reneged on his pledge of “No new taxes.” When making these stands, be strategic in thought, method and be prepared for the consequences, be they positive or negative

Before completing this research, it should be noted, that while the author feels strongly his research is solid and his findings defensible, he acknowledges that continued research should be done, and based on the changing dynamics of leadership thought and politics

in general, a different author could come up with different findings in the future. New areas of thought are being developed. For instance, while both Nuestadt and Edwards have espoused philosophies that presidents should use their political powers to persuade and work issues within the boundaries of the past, many in the political science arena are viewing this situation from far more radical views based on the current political environment, as well as a relook of the past.

For instance, while Skowronek touches on it slightly, recent political actions seem to more strongly focus on the executive and legislative branches attempting to circumvent rather than cooperate with the other branch. In many cases it appears that rather than utilize the policies and practices that have been formally in place for decades, they now oft time go for a preemptive strike approach which sees less coordination and bargaining and more public posturing than before. This view goes against the grain and the time honored traditions of bargain and “horse-trading.” Samuel Kernell further notes that presidents go public not simply to impress the general populace but to enhance the administration's position with Washington elites. Mobilizing public opinion is a way of influencing other Washingtonians who are also dependent upon public support for their positions (Kernell: 1986). While Kernell initially outlined this approach nearly 30 years ago, it clearly contradicts Edwards and to some extent Nuestadt, but it offers insights into the current national political environment. Continuation of this type of “politics” in the future may cause dramatic changes in the skills presidents need in the future.

Taking this approach a radical step further, William Howell, in his thought provoking book, "Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action," discounts the generally positive leadership theories and actions reinforced and articulated by Nuestadt and Edwards and outlines an aggressive style of presidential leadership that is based on the "propensity of presidents, especially during times of crisis, to unilaterally impose their will on the American public" (Howell, 2005). In doing so, he somewhat revises the commonly held view of history and argues that rather than persuading or coordinating, presidents routinely set public policies over the objections of Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. Citing instances throughout U.S. history, from the Louisiana Purchase to the Emancipation Proclamation and beyond, he outlines cases where presidents have by-passed Congress and in some cases the American people to set policies of their own. In just the last 65+ years, the period Nuestadt focusses on in his book and refers to as the modern presidency, Roosevelt interned Japanese Americans, Kennedy established the Peace Corps, Johnson got affirmative action underway, Reagan greatly expanded the president's powers of regulatory review, and Clinton extended protections to millions of acres of public lands all though executive, not legislative actions (Howell, 2005). Howell further goes into great detail describing the executive actions taken by George W. Bush, post-September 11, in creating a new cabinet post and in the construction of a parallel judicial systems to apprehend, hold and try suspected terrorists, all done behind closed doors in the Executive Branch. And, further supporting Howell's thesis, these practices are clearly on-going today as President Obama implements executive orders to push his agenda rather than go through the difficult process of dealing with a legislative branch with the opposition in majority.

Howell's research goes well beyond the theoretical scope of previous studies and rather than focus on a president's skill, reputation, and ability to persuade and negotiate he contends that presidents can "effect policy change outside of a bargaining framework" (Howell, 2005: 13). He contends that Presidents have unilateral powers that go beyond persuasion and negotiation with Congress and that they can, and have exerted direct power on policymaking processes, and are able to limit the legislative and judicial bodies' ability to check and intervene. He examines the conditions under which presidents can expedite their agenda and change policy without congressional or judicial consent and then outlines a model of presidential power that forces substantive consensus through legislative branch through the threat of the veto, the use of executive orders vice legislative actions, and through the use of National Security Directives.

Additionally, in an approach that has yet to have gained much traction to date, but yet merits consideration, Ethan Fishman has taken a very philosophical approach to the study of the presidents and taken the political science community to task on how they look at our presidents. He specifically takes on Nuestadt and Edwards in describing how they go to great lengths to explain the causes and effects of presidential behavior, but do little provide normative judgment of that behavior. They rate the president's as good if they are energetic or persuasive and successful in passing legislation but really question whether the decisions president make or the policies they pursue are moral or laudable or "virtuous" as opposed to the normal leadership criteria used in the behavioral science world. He delves more frequently into the philosophical and looks at leadership categories such as prudence, pragmatism, idealism, and cynicism (Fishman, 2001).

This paper has gone to great lengths in evaluating the one-term presidents based solely on their time in office and not their other accomplishments either before or after taking the presidency, and hopefully has been somewhat successful in doing so. However, this appears to be an area worthy of study, and one that is beginning to get increased visibility. Winger and Jain, in an article currently under review for publication, have shown that the presidents most likely to engage in ambitious post-presidencies were those who either resigned or failed to win re-election and of the ten presidents they initially identify as having the most international affairs involvement post-presidency, eight left office either through their inability to secure their party's nomination, a failed campaign, or resignation (in the case of Richard Nixon) (Winger and Jain, unpublished). Interesting that this population virtually mirrors the one we have been discussing.

In a recent New York Times article, Justin Vaughn discusses common threads he found among those he considers to be great ex-presidents. He identifies that in many cases our greatest ex-presidents have engaged in important post-presidency work, sometimes at a level that rivaled their accomplishments in the White House. On the down side he also identifies that our worst ex-presidents have been noteworthy for taking strong positions against the national interest and consistently undermining their successors for personal and political reasons. Based on his opinions and research he determined the four greatest ex-presidents were John Quincy Adams, Jimmy Carter, William Howard Taft, and Herbert Hoover and that John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and Teddy Roosevelt were our country's worst ex-presidents (Vaughn, 2015). Interesting that seven of those eight were one-term presidents.

Without question, there is considerably room for further research in this area and with this population. Hopefully, this research has laid a good groundwork for future efforts. While others could potentially come to different conclusions, or use different criteria to measure success, based on the criteria that Americans, “want a president in the White House who can get the job done,” it appears James Baker was correct, when he declared, “George Bush was the best one-term President in the history of the United States.”

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Sean J. Byrne

Education:

Indiana University, MA, Political Science
United States Army War College
United States Marine Corps Staff College
University of Utah, MBA
University of Detroit, BS, Business (summa cum laude)

Professional Experience:

Major General (Retired), United States Army
Senior Executive Service, Department of Homeland Security

Honors/Awards

Distinguished Graduate, United States Marine Corps Staff College
Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Distinguished Writing Award

Publications:

Looking for Sam Damon, Military Review, Volume LXXVIII, No. 3, May-June 1998.
Domestic Sovereignty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents, Military Review,
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