GUBERNATORIAL COATTAIL EFFECTS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS: A REEXAMINATION

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Introduction

Literature researching the effect of presidential coattails on lower level federal elections is substantial (Calvert and Ferejohn 1984; Campbell and Summers 1990); however, this has relatively failed to gain traction at the state-level. Because voters rely heavily on information short-cuts, such as partisanship, in state-level elections, the impact of coattails should be more profound in the states compared to the nation as a whole. Drawing from the presidential coattail literature, Hogan's (2005) study is the lone piece of research fully modeling the impact of coattails from a gubernatorial perspective. Hogan's work should be lauded for being the first to define the impact of gubernatorial coattails, and the causal mechanisms surrounding them; however there are some important questions which remain unanswered after his influential work: Are gubernatorial coattails as impactful as Hogan's research suggests? Does a state's ideological composition and/or gubernatorial power mitigate or strengthen the impact of coattails? Though Hogan finds gubernatorial coattails to be impactful in state legislative elections, it is necessary to retest his findings with updated data, and additional variables, to ensure that these findings are not a remnant of the chosen time frame and/or selected cases, as his research examines nine states over one election cycle.

To answer these questions, I analyze the impact of gubernatorial coattails at the district-level in nine states over two election cycles (2002 and 2006): Alabama, Arkansas, California, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. By examining these states over two elections, rather than one, this research retests Hogan's hypotheses with a revised conceptual framework, which better accounts for the causal mechanisms surrounding gubernatorial coattail effects in state legislative elections within a given year, and over time.

Presidential Coattails

A coattail is often defined as "…spillover effect whereby an election for an upper-level office influences an election for a lower-level office" (Hogan 2005). Using presidential coattail literature as his theoretical foundation, Hogan notes how coattails defined in this manner have largely been tested in national elections. Because of this, Hogan contends that he is not creating a new literature, but explaining the coattail phenomena from the perspective of a different election venue. Moving from Hogan's work, the following will highlight key findings from the presidential coattail literature, and explain why those findings are applicable in gubernatorial elections, controlling for election venue. In addition, I will highlight the important aspects of voter behavior, and delineate the important variables in gubernatorial elections.

Prior studies focusing of presidential coattails have found diminishing effects. For example, research from Campbell and Sumners (1990) examined state election returns for presidential election years from 1972 to 1988, and determined that a decrease in partisanship and an increase in senate campaign spending accounted for a diminished effect of presidential coattails (Campbell and Sumners 1990).

Moreover, Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) analyzed election returns from 1956 to 1980, and concluded presidential coattails are present in all election years, but their significance erodes over time. Comparable to Campbell and Sumners' findings, Calvert and Ferejohn found a decrease in partisanship at the state level, but accounted for attitudes towards presidential candidates, and local forces unique to congressional races (i.e. incumbency) as overriding factors. Most recently, Herrenson et al. (2011) found evidence of presidential coattails for all Democrats during the 106th Congress (Clinton)

and returning Republicans during the 108th Congress (W. Bush), suggesting that presidential coattails are now an inconsistent, rather than constant factor. These studies indicate that presidential coattails are an acting force in elections; however, their impact has dramatically been reduced over time. Though coattails are associated with a diminishing effect, there are factors present at the national level such as polarization and candidate centered campaigning, which are attenuated at the state-level. For this reason, it is fair to extrapolate from the presidential coattail literature when analyzing gubernatorial effects. However, as noted by Hogan, it is important to delineate the similarities and differences between election venues.

Gubernatorial Coattails and the Variables that Matter

Though Hogan's research provides the most comprehensive analysis of gubernatorial coattails, previous scholars (Weber 1980; Bibby 1983; Campbell 1986; Chubb 1988; Berry et al. 2000) have also examined their impact. These scholars find support for gubernatorial coattail effects in state legislative elections; however its impact is constrained by year, as each fails to cover multiple election cycles. These scholars, in addition to Hogan, elucidate multiple characteristics unique to state-level elections, all of which are important to this study.

First, in terms of gubernatorial elections, partisanship is extremely influential when determining voter preferences (Partin 1995). Also, multiples analyses found partisanship to be the overriding factor in gubernatorial elections held in 1982, 1986, and 1990 (Svoboda 1995; Atkeson and Partin 1995). More recently, Gerber and Huber's (2010) analysis of partisan responses to state election outcomes found that survey respondents reacted with a "…similar pattern of partisan response" in gubernatorial elections compared to national elections. Therefore, due to the competitiveness of parties in American states, traditional party preference can account for a majority of voter decisions at the state-level.

Second, an important candidate-level characteristic applied in past research is incumbency. Noted by multiple scholars, incumbent legislators have two distinct advantages over their challengers: name recognition and resources (Berry et al. 2000; Hogan 2004). Therefore, at the state-level, the plausibility of incumbent legislators accruing more votes than their challengers is high.

Third, the professionalism of a legislature is believed to have an overarching effect on gubernatorial coattails as more professional legislatures award distinct advantages to incumbents (Berry et al. 2000; Carey et al. 2000). The state legislative professionalism measure is derived from three factors: Salary and benefits, time demands of service, and staff and resources (Squire 2007).

Finally, the schema in which governors operate can greatly influence public policy and media perceptions (Dilger et al. 1995; Beyle 2001). Essentially, if a governor's office in a given state is viewed as powerful, governors in those states will be involved in more contentious and salient issues within the public, compared to weaker governors.

Voting Behavior

Though this research utilizes aggregate level voting data, it is important to explore how individual vote choices are made. The seminal work on voting behavior, Campbell et al.'s (1960) *American Voter*, posits that vote choices are strongly shaped by partisan attachments developed in the early stages of life. The other major contribution from the Michigan team is that political information, engagement, and ideological reasoning was minimal among the public (Bartels 2008). These claims were revisited by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) in the *American Voter Revisited*, with the main implication being that the voting behavior among the public is extremely consistent, as it changed very little over the fifty year gap between studies. Combined, these findings suggest that voters are strongly influenced by partisan attachments, whose specific votes are shaped by short-term factors (e.g. presidential popularity, national economic performance, etc.).

Though partisanship is argued to be a driving force in voting behavior at any level, there are criticisms of this position. Most of these criticisms can be found in the affective intelligence framework which suggests that emotion plays a vital role in political decisions at the individual level. Essentially, the scholars have found that an individual anxiety and/or enthusiasm is the driving force behind vote choice, rather than partisanship or issue position(s) of a given candidate (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et.al. 2000).

In addition to the affective intelligence critique, some scholars argue that the impact of partisanship has not been consistent across time. In the early 1970's, numerous scholars (Broder 1971; DeVries and Tarrance 1972; Niemi and Weisberg 1976) were suggesting that party loyalties were steadily decreasing, as independent responses in

public opinion surveys were on the rise, mitigating the impact of the "Michigan model." Testing these claims in the modern era, Bartels (2000) examined congressional and presidential voting patterns from 1952-1996, and found that even though party loyalties decreased in the 1970's, voting behavior linked to partisanship increased exponentially in the early 1980's, climaxing in 1996.

Highlighting the behavior literature, Evans (2007) analyzes a multitude of voting theories, but focuses on the following: Rational, prospect, and directional. Even though all of the prior have different intricacies, Evans believes they are all linked by one commonality: "They suggest that voters' policy preferences will be close to the party for which they have voted." Likewise, research by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2001) examines if macro-partisanship, coined by Stimson et al. (1995), erodes or ascends during economic downturns or political scandals. As illustrated above, the "Michigan model" concludes that partisanship is the cardinal diagrammatic factor in electoral studies (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Namely, partisanship is an important factor in all elections; however, it even more important when predicting outcomes of state legislative elections.

In all, the literature is segmented into two interrelated topics: Presidential and gubernatorial coattails and voting behavior. It is clear that state-wide direct elections (state-level) differ from national, indirect elections (national-level); however, the underlying theory driving presidential coattails is analogous for state-level executives, controlling for a host of factors exclusive to the states. Given that partisanship is the driving force behind individual vote choice, regardless of election type, coattails should present themselves in state-level elections. Taken together, these findings in the literature

suggest that the phenomena of coattails should transcend to the state-level, though its magnitude is still unclear.

Expectations

Similar to Hogan's research, the dependent variable will be the percentage of the two-party vote garnered by the Republican legislative candidate in each district-level election[1]. Data are from races which were contested by both major parties (Democrats and Republicans) in each chamber of the state legislature.

The first independent variable of interest, gubernatorial coattails, is calculated as the percentage of the two-party vote garnered by Republican gubernatorial candidates at the district level.[2] The coattail variable should carry a positive coefficient in relation to the dependent variable. This anticipated direction mirrors the coattail finding from Hogan's research.

H_1: An increase in gubernatorial coattails will lead to an increase in the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican legislative candidate.

Hogan's research provided scholars an excellent foundation regarding gubernatorial coattails; however, he omitted a few key variables. First, state ideology is expected to play a role in vote choice for state legislative candidates as partisan cues shape voter choice immensely (Green et al. 2001; Evans 2007). The following model will effectively measure state ideology using Ceaser and Saldin's "Major Party Index" (2005). The "Major Party Index" (MPI) is measured on a biennial basis, using

[1] Hogan's dependent variable was the percentage of the two-party vote obtained by the Democratic legislative candidate in each election at the district-level.
[2] This measure was obtained via precinct level returns in each state except the following: California, Minnesota, and New York. Each Secretary of State in these states tabulated gubernatorial returns by district.

presidential and gubernatorial election returns to calculate a statistic for each state.[3] Ceaser and Saldin's MPI is comprised of six components, and weighted by percentage (%): President (25%), Congress (25%; Senate 12.5%; House 12.5%), Governor (25%), and State Legislature (25%; Senate 12.5%; House 12.5%). After calculation and weighting, a percentile statistic is applied to each state, ranging from 0 to 100. States with values over fifty (50) percent are deemed Republican, and states with values under fifty (50) percent are Democratic.[4] Given the coding scheme of the MPI, a positive coefficient should be beneficial to Republican legislative candidates. If the research were examining Democratic candidates, a negative coefficient would be expected.

H_2: An increase in MPI will lead to an increase in the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican legislative candidate.

The second additional factor is a result of state politics scholars illustrating that the schema in which governors operate can greatly influence public policy and media perceptions (Dilger et al 1995; Beyle 2001). As a result, subsequent models will effectively measure gubernatorial powers by consulting Thad Beyle's "Governor's Institutional Powers Index" (GIP). To create a measure of gubernatorial power, Beyle evaluated the succeeding six power categories: Tenure, budget authority, appointment, veto powers, party control in the state legislature, and separately elected executive branch

[3] To access MPI data consult the following link: http://scholar.harvard.edu/saldin/data
[4] See the Appendix for the corresponding MPI values for each state.

officials. Beyle then applies a rating, scaled from one (weak) to five (powerful).[5,6] As mentioned above, states with a greater capacity to govern are able to respond to public opinion and unexpected political issues directly (unilateral orders), rather than relying on the legislative process (Miller and Blanding 2012). Because of this, I expect the GIP coefficient to be negative, as "powerful" governors are involved in more contentious and salient issues within the public, compared to weaker governors.

H_3: An increase in GIP will lead to a decrease in the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican legislative candidate.

[5] To obtain more information on the categorization of Beyle's index, please contact myself or reference Beyle's website directly, http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/gubnewpwr.html. After referencing his site, select "2007" under the section entitled "Institutional Powers of the Governors of the 50 States."
[6] See the Appendix for the corresponding GIP values for each state.

Additional Factors[7]

Candidate-Level

The most important candidate-level characteristic applied in the model is incumbency. Noted by multiple scholars, incumbent legislators have two main advantages over their challengers: name recognition and resources (Berry et al. 2000; Hogan 2004). Therefore, with all other elements being equal, the plausibility of incumbent state legislators accruing more votes than their challengers is high. The incumbency variable is dichotomous, taking a value of "1" if the Republican state legislative candidate is an incumbent and "0" otherwise. In addition to incumbency, an open seat variable is included in the subsequent models. Open seat measures if the Republican candidate is running in an open seat district (1 = yes; 0 = no). If both variables are not included, a spurious result is possible as the model omits the Democratic Party, and isolates the Republican Party.

District-Level [8]

As suggested by the review of literature, a wide array of district-level characteristics are expected to affect the percentage vote ascertained by state legislative candidates. To begin, determining the partisanship of state legislative districts is extremely important; therefore, specific demographic characteristics of each district must

[7] All variables included in this section were chosen to mirror those used by Hogan (2005).

[8] In contrast to Hogan's model which utilized an index developed from an indicator used to illustrate the influence partisan diversity has on congressional elections (Koetzle 1998), I measured each demographic variable individually. I choose this route as Koetzle's indicator was developed for specific use in congressional elections, not state legislative elections, and as noted above, multiple scholars have illustrated how gubernatorial elections differ from federal elections (Jewell, Morehouse 2001; Stanley and Niemi 2001).

be calculated. Subsequent models will include the following demographic variables: percentage white, percentage black, percentage of the population (18+) with at least a two year degree, and median household income. In contrast to Hogan's model, each demographic variable will measured individually for two reasons. First, Hogan's index is developed from an indicator used to illustrate the influence partisan diversity has on congressional elections (Koetzle 1998).[9] Chiefly, Koetzle's indicator was developed for specific use in congressional elections, not state legislative elections, and as noted above, multiple scholars have illustrated how gubernatorial elections differ from federal elections (Jewell and Morehouse 2001; Stanley and Niemi 2001). Second, as explained in Hogan's analysis, his calculation of Koetzle's index yields an incorrect result, increasing the plausibility of inaccurate statistical inference.

State-Level [10]

In addition to MPI and GIP, the professionalism of a legislature is believed to have an overarching effect on gubernatorial coattails as more professional legislatures award distinct advantages to incumbents (Berry et al. 2000; Carey et al. 2000). Accordingly, the variable used to measure a state's legislative professionalism is derived from the Squire Index (2007). In a 2007 reexamination of his initial 1992 index, Squire creates a state legislative professionalism measure, scaled from 0 to 1.0, conceptualized from three factors: Salary and benefits, time demands of service, and staff and resources. In additional to legislative professionalism, the statewide margin of the two-party vote in the gubernatorial election is included as the wider the margin of victory, the greater the impact of coattails.

[9] Hogan's index is explained in footnote "5" on page 590.
[10] State dummies are also included to capture the effect of each nested in the model.

Interactive Effects

The first interactive effect, (Governor Coattail x Open Seat) is included as the absence of an incumbent state legislative candidate will greatly increase the competition of the race. Because incumbency is expected to boost the magnitude of the coattail effect, the interaction of open seat with a governor's coattail should dampen the effect. The second interactive effect, (Governor Coattail x Statewide Governor Margin), will account for the competitiveness of gubernatorial elections. In most cases, more competitive races lead to increased voter mobilization, therefore, resulting in a higher percentage of uninformed voters. As a result, uninformed voters are expected to heavily rely on partisan cues, therefore increasing the plausibility of gubernatorial coattails. The coefficient should be negative as coattails increase and gubernatorial election margins decrease.

Data and Methods

The data used for this paper were taken from the individual websites of the Secretary of State or Elections Bureau for each state during the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial election cycles. The states included are as follows: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. The dependent variable in the subsequent models will be the percentage of the two-party vote garnered by the Republican legislative candidate in each competitive election. Competitive electoral returns for both the upper and lower chambers of the state legislature were utilized in all states except New York.[11]

Table 1 provides the percentage of the total vote ascertained by Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates in 2002 and 2006. There is considerable variance in these races among the states. For example, in 2002 Alabama had the most competitive gubernatorial election, with the Republican candidate winning by a margin of .24 percent; however, New York had the least competitive race in 2002 with the Republican candidate winning the election by over 19 percent. In 2006, the races were much less competitive, with the smallest margin of victory occurring in Minnesota with the Republican candidate winning by 1.04 percent. The largest margin of victory occurred in New York with the Democratic candidate winning by a margin of over 41 percent.

The chief dependent and independent variables of interest are the percentage vote totals of Republican gubernatorial and state legislative candidates. Table 2 outlines the average Republican percentage for both governor and state legislative candidates, and

[11] Only lower-chamber district-level for the governor were available.

similar to the prior tables, they also display a vast amount of variance among percentile ranges and vote totals.

Demographic statistics came from the United States Census Bureau's *American Community Survey*. To mirror Hogan's analysis, non-presidential elections were chosen as gubernatorial coattails are more likely to be observed during this time frame.

To further imitate Hogan's research, and given the cross-sectional nature of the data, I utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.

$$\hat{Y}_i = a + b\,X_i + e$$

Though a fixed effects model would be ideal, the data is not truly panel based, as some districts having two-party competition in 2002, do not in 2006, and vice versa. As a result, to capture the within state variation, dummy variables for each state were created.

Results

Beginning with Table 3 (2006 and 2002 data integrated), I can confirm Hogan's findings and my first hypothesis, as the coattails' coefficient was highly significant ($p < .001$) in all instances. Each column in Tables 3, 4, and 5 is defined by each state-level variable, as there is a modest amount of correlation between the three measures. Similar to Hogan's research, the effect of gubernatorial coattails is modest, ranging from .362 to .421, with an average of .40 percent. Clearly this is a modest impact, but given the competitiveness of gubernatorial and state legislative races, the presence of a coattail effect could push a candidate to victory. Moving to Tables 4 (2006 data only) and 5 (2002 data only), the coattail coefficient maintains its statistical impact ($p < .001$), though it's magnitude is higher in 2002 (.460 average) compared to 2006 (.323 average). This difference highlights the key advantage of this data as it allows for a greater understanding of coattails at different points in time, instead of the aggregative approach present in Hogan's research. In terms of substantive effects, the coattails coefficient is associated with the largest maximum effect among the main independent variable, with an impact of 36.4. Clearly, coattails can have a substantial impact when the governor garners a large percentage of votes at the district-level.

Regarding the second hypothesis, the MPI coefficient was highly significant ($p < .001$), and in the desired direction in all models (See Model 2 in Tables 3, 4, and 5). Similar to the coattails coefficient, the MPI coefficient carried a modest average impact of .33 percent. Though this finding is of little importance in highly Democratic and Republican districts, it is meaningful in competitive districts, as votes cast strictly from an ideological perspective could secure a victory. The maximum effect of the MPI

variable is 7.359. In other words, the largest predicted change in the amount of votes ascertained by Republican state legislative candidates is 7.359, when going from the minimum value of MPI (42.5 in California) to the maximum value of MPI (64.8 in Wyoming). This substantive finding indicates the variation in ideology among the states, and points to the increased importance of partisanship in state-level elections. Given the significance, and maximum effect of the MPI coefficient, it is clear that state ideology plays a role in vote choice for state legislative candidates, as partisan cues can shape voter choice immensely.

The final hypothesis, regarding Beyle's GIP Index, was proven to be statistically significant in all instances ($p < .05$), and highly impactful, with a negative, average effect of 4.5 percent, suggesting that "powerful" governors weaken their standing with the public over time as they are involved in more contentious and salient issues, compared to weaker governors (See Model 3 in Tables 3, 4, and 5). The maximum effect associated with Beyle's GIP index is 6.3, the lowest among the main independent variables. Though GIP is associated with a modest maximum effect, this is not surprising, as the index ranges from one to five. These findings advance the literature on gubernatorial coattails, indicating that the institutional design of the executive branch in each state can contribute to the success or failure of the party affiliated candidates in legislative elections.

Looking at the interactive models, three findings are worth mentioning.[12] First, mirroring Hogan's research, coattails remain significant when interacted with an open seat, though the magnitude is nearly cut in half in the combined model. A second

[12] In Table 6, each column is defined by the data used. Column 1 is the integrated data, Column 2 uses 2006 data only, and Column 3 utilizes 2002 data only.

finding, which departs from Hogan's research, regards the inconclusive effect of competitive gubernatorial elections. In the combined and 2006 models, the statewide margin coefficient is positive and significant ($p < .05$). However, in 2002, the coefficient changes direction, and increases in significance, signaling to the uniqueness of each election cycle. Finally, the interaction between coattails and statewide margin produces a minimal effect, though it is significant in 2006 and 2002. This finding contrasts Hogan's research which found a highly significant, negative effect, signaling that coattails are stronger in competitive elections. Moreover, this difference suggests that competitiveness of gubernatorial elections is of minimal importance when explaining coattail effects.

Removing all state-level characteristics present in the prior models, I created dummy variables for each state to determine the impact of each state within the model.[13] The finding of note in Table 7 is the increased impact of coattails when looking at the individual years[14]. In 2006 the coattail variable was .749, and in 2002 .612. These coefficients double the size of prior coattail coefficients. This finding suggests the need for true panel data, so that a fixed effect model can be utilized to tease out the difference between and within states and years.

Additionally, the significance of each state variable is constrained by year. For example, in 2002, Texas is significant ($p < .05$), but insignificant in 2006, and in the combined year model. Moreover, Arkansas is highly significant in the combined year

[13] Alabama, coded as 1, serves as the base for which the dummy variables should be interpreted.
[14] In Table 7, each column is defined by the data used. Column 1 is the integrated data, Column 2 uses 2006 data only, and Column 3 utilizes 2002 data only.

model and 2002, but insignificant in 2006. These findings echo the need for more concise data to fully explain the coattail phenomena in state legislative elections.

Lastly, Table 8 models gubernatorial coattails in states where the Republican gubernatorial candidate secured victory. Modeling coattails from this perspective is necessary as prior research has failed to tease differences in coattail magnitude between winning and losing gubernatorial candidates. As seen in Table 8, the average magnitude of coattails for winning Republican candidates is .57 percent, a modest increase over the .40 average effect of coattails seen in Table 3. Also of note is that the constant maximum effect of the coattails coefficient (36.4) stays the same even when isolating states where the Republican gubernatorial candidate was victorious.

Discussion

The purpose of this research was to reaffirm and expand on Hogan's (2005) research on gubernatorial coattails. As illustrated in the above models, coattails have remained a modest factor in state legislative elections. More importantly, the addition of variables capturing a state's ideology and a governor's institutional powers has added substantially to the field's knowledge of state legislative elections. Since governors can be viewed as the party leader in a given state, it is an important to recognize that the institutional design of the executive branch in each state can contribute to the success or failure of party affiliated candidates in state legislative elections. The significant coefficients of MPI and GIP indicate that partisan cues and institutional factors are prominent influences in gubernatorial elections (Beyle 2001; Green et al. 2001; Ceaser and Saldin 2005; Evans 2007).

Though this research reaffirmed the importance of gubernatorial coattails, future research is still needed for a variety of reasons. First, there is an eight year gap between the data frame in this research and Hogan's. This may explain the insignificance of demographic variables as Hogan consulted data from the 1990 U.S. Census and a 1994 publishing of *The Almanac of State Legislatures*, while this research utilized data derived from updated *American Community Surveys* accessible via the U.S. Census. Second, though tedious to compile, nearly every state has precinct level returns available. If more data were compiled and utilized, researchers could model a more complete view of coattails, rather than a brief insight. Adding to this point, more sophisticated modeling is needed to better understand the effects of coattails. Though this data and Hogan's provides researchers with a good foundation for understanding coattails, panel data and

the use of fixed-effects modeling would allow researchers to more effectively tease out the differences within state and within year.

Conclusion

Only Hogan (2005) has attempted to fully conceptualize how gubernatorial coattail effects operate at the state-level. Though successful in determining the important casual mechanisms underpinning gubernatorial coattails, his research left some important questions unanswered. The purpose of this research was to answer these questions by examining the temporal and state-based trends of gubernatorial coattails. By using this framework, this research has answered these questions, by confirming the modest impact of coattails, and illustrating the importance of each state's ideology and gubernatorial power in the causal framework. These findings emphasize the increased importance of party identification at the state-level, consistent with the "Michigan model," while distinguishing that more powerful governors become highly involved in more salient and contentious issues among the public, minimizing their coattail effect. Most importantly, these findings emphasize the temporal and state-based trends of gubernatorial coattails, providing a more nuanced theoretical and empirical foundation to the field's understanding this phenomena.

Appendix

Table 1. 2006 and 2002 Gubernatorial Election Returns

State	Rep Votes Received	Rep % Received (2-Party)	Dem Votes Received	Dem % Received (2-Party)	Margin of Victory
AL '06	718327	58.02	519827	41.98	16.04
AR '06	315040	42.24	430765	57.76	15.52
CA '06	4850157	58.95	3376732	41.05	17.9
MN '06	1028568	50.52	1007460	49.48	1.04
NY '06	1274335	29.22	3086709	70.78	41.56
OK '06	310327	33.5	616135	66.5	33
TN '06	540853	30.24	1247491	69.76	39.52
TX '06	1716792	56.71	1310337	43.29	13.42
WY '06	58100	30.01	135516	69.99	39.98
AL'02	672225	50.12	669105	49.88	0.24
AR '02	427082	53.03	378250	46.97	6.06
CA '02	3169801	47.29	3533490	52.71	5.42
MN '02	999473	54.89	821268	45.11	9.78
NY '02	2262255	59.59	1534064	40.41	19.18
OK '02	441277	49.61	448143	50.39	0.78
TN '02	786803	48.45	837284	51.55	3.1
TX '02	2632591	59.13	1819798	40.87	18.26
WY '02	88873	48.96	92662	51.04	2.08

Table 2. 2006 and 2002 District-Level Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Received by Republican State Legislative and Gubernatorial Candidates

	State Legislator and Senator			*Governor*			
State	*Average*	*S.D.*	*Range*	*Average*	*S.D.*	*Range*	*N*
AL '06	47.13	15.84	19-78	57.33	12.01	23-80	63
AR '06	41.99	10.91	22-64	42.5	8.58	27-59	33
CA '06	42.82	17.44	Jan-72	54.81	13.59	17-76	89
MN '06	42.92	13.95	Sep-70	45.63	12.18	Dec-65	194
NY '06	35.17	21.29	Mar-68	26.69	13.31	Mar-50	106
OK '06	51.8	13.68	18-75	32.85	6.77	14-48	62
TN '06	47.9	14.34	16-72	30.69	7.23	Sep-42	51
TX '06	53.58	11.99	26-75	61.67	9.87	39-87	77
WY '06	51.59	12.63	34-82	27.22	6.04	18-41	23
AL '02	50.2	16.02	19-82	49.13	14.56	Apr-94	72
AR '02	48.21	11.75	23-68	56.51	7.28	38-71	44
CA '02	44.34	17.95	Sep-76	41.98	13.98	Oct-65	86
MN '02	47.92	13.91	Dec-72	44.19	10.88	13-63	189
NY '02	39.18	22.78	Mar-76	56.84	21.08	Jul-89	108
OK '02	47.5	16.35	13-82	48.15	10.58	Dec-70	65
TN '02	47.12	14.2	19-79	47.36	8.36	18-64	64
TX '02	54.21	14.76	25-80	59.09	12.33	26-81	79
WY '02	54.54	13.61	34-86	45.26	9.8	29-65	36

Table 3. Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican State Legislative Candidates (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Coattails	0.420*** {.023}	0.421*** {.023}	0.362*** {.025}
Incumbent	18.163*** {.700}	17.788*** {.702}	18.344*** {.688}
Open Seat	9.49*** {.698}	9.594*** {.692}	9.404*** {.691}
White	0.143*** {.035}	0.136*** {.033}	0.206*** {.033}
Black	-0.042 {.045}	-0.032 {.044}	-0.006 {.043}
Hispanic	-0.013 {.024}	-0.041+ {.024}	-0.029 {.024}
Median Household Income	0** {0}	0** {0}	0*** {0}
Education	-0.107*** {.030}	-0.123*** {.030}	-0.095*** {.029}
Leg. Pro	-6.532*** {2.041}	-	-
MPI	-	0.336*** {.048}	-
Beyle	-	-	-4.479*** {.711}
Constant	9.224** {3.514}	-8.528** {3.807}	19.975*** {4.134}
R-squared	.663	.671	.673
N	1395	1395	1395

Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4. Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican State Legislative Candidates, 2006 Only (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Coattails	0.336*** {.027}	0.35*** {.027}	0.282*** {.034}
Incumbent	18.534*** {.923}	17.947*** {.926}	18.707*** {.906}
Open Seat	9.687*** {.979}	9.655*** {.947}	9.336*** {.985}
White	0.149*** {.046}	0.123** {.043}	0.18*** {.044}
Black	-0.043 {.054}	-0.059 {.051}	-0.037 {.054}
Hispanic	-0.09** {.033}	-0.106*** {.031}	-0.095** (.032}
Median Household Income	0*** {0}	0*** {0}	0*** {0}
Education	-0.264*** {.045}	-0.274*** {.044}	-0.256*** {.044}
Leg. Pro	-2.773 {2.899}	-	-
MPI	-	0.36*** {.074}	-
Beyle	-	-	-3.173** {1.017}
Constant	13.661** {4.747}	-2.763 {5.397}	22.957*** {5.946}
R-Squared	.703	.714	.708
N	652	652	652

Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 5. Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican State Legislative Candidates, 2002 Only (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Coattails	0.493*** {.039}	0.473*** {.040}	0.416*** {.039}
Incumbent	17.801*** {1.019}	17.805*** {1.031}	18.194*** {1.011}
Open Seat	9.113*** {.987}	9.397*** {1.00}	9.381*** {.947}
White	0.122* {.052}	0.17*** {.048}	0.245*** {.047}
Black	-0.035 {.069}	0.016 {.068}	0.057 {.065}
Hispanic	0.056+ {.032}	0.025 {.032}	0.041 {.033}
Median Household Income	0** {0}	0** {0}	0*** {0}
Education	-0.036 {.039}	-0.054 {.039}	-0.029 {.037}
Leg. Pro	-11.649*** {2.853}	-	-
MPI	-	0.303*** {.058}	-
Beyle	-	-	-6.43*** {1.009}
Constant	5.096 {4.957}	-15.196** {4.976}	16.493** {5.420}
R-squared	.644	.645	.665
N	743	743	743

Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 6. Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican State Legislative Candidates with Interaction (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

	Model 1 (Combined)	*Model 2 (2006)*	*Model 3 (2002)*
Coattails	0.385*** {.045}	0.378*** {.043}	0.423*** {.063}
Coattails x Open Seat	0.223*** {.042}	0.147** {.054}	0.308*** {.065}
Statewide Governor Margin	0.142* {.069}	0.139* {.055}	-0.025*** {.006}
Coattail x Statewide Governor Margin	0.001 {.002}	0.007*** {.001}	0** {0}
Incumbent	19.001*** {.734}	17.611*** {.932}	18.835*** {1.046}
Open Seat	-0.624 {2.013}	1.916 {2.295}	-6.171+ {3.255}
White	0.08* {.035}	0.054 {.038}	0.203*** {.047}
Black	-0.106* {.045}	-0.128** {.044}	0.059 {.066}
Hispanic	-0.037 {.024}	-0.059* {.031}	0.169*** {.031}
Median Household Income	0 {0}	0** {0}	0*** {0}
Education	-0.088** {.029}	-0.118*** {.037}	0.02 {.035}
Leg. Pro	-11.447*** {2.091}	-18.637*** {2.845}	-8.925*** {2.475}
Constant	15.945*** {3.630}	13.504*** {4.010}	1.147 {5.074}

R-Squared	.685	.786	.688
N	1395	652	743

Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 7. Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican State Legislative Candidates, State Dummies (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

	Model 1 (Combined)	*Model 2 (2006)*	*Model 3 (2002)*
Coattails	0.391*** {.028}	0.749*** {.072}	0.612*** {.066}
Incumbent	17.632*** {.702}	14.449*** {1.117}	16.435*** {1.072}
Open Seat	9.258*** {.703}	6.847*** {.875}	9.038*** {.954}
White	0.216*** {.035}	0.105** {.040}	0.243*** {.044}
Black	0.02 {.048}	0.019 {.051}	0.183** {.071}
Hispanic	-0.027 {.028}	-0.008 {.031}	0.075* {.034}
Median Household Income	0*** {0}	0 {0}	0+ {0}
Education	-0.086** {.028}	-0.079** {.039}	0.006 {.034}
Arkansas	-6.755*** {1.567}	4.585 {2.839}	-10.861*** {2.186}
California	-2.407 {1.691}	-2.608 {2.140}	-0.392 {2.494}
Minnesota	-6.331*** {1.421}	1.955 {2.507}	-4.418+ {2.435}
New York	-5.65*** {1.545}	12.479*** {3.260}	-15.381*** {2.354}
Oklahoma	1.506 {1.689}	19.597*** {3.300}	-3.163 {2.363}
Tennessee	-0.502 {1.654}	18.344*** {3.366}	-5.691** {2.369}

Texas	-0.396 {1.427}	0.283 {1.898}	-5.238* {2.262}
Wyoming	4.195** {1.886}	23.352*** {4.243}	2.295 {2.628}
Constant	3.98 {3.955}	-8.946+ {5.359}	-9.727 {5.304}
R-Squared	.652	.743	.641
N	1395	652	743

Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 8. Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican State Legislative Candidates in States Where the Republican Gubernatorial Candidate Won

	Model 1 (Combined)	*Model 2 (2006)*	*Model 3 (2002)*
Coattails	0.548*** {.025}	0.665*** {.033}	0.497*** {.036}
Incumbent	16.249*** {.844}	13.989*** {.950}	16.892*** {1.270}
Open Seat	9.276*** {.766}	5.287*** {.937}	10.303*** {1.091}
White	0.167*** {.050}	0.085 {.056}	0.312*** {.083}
Black	0.068 {.057}	0.019 {.071}	0.242** {.092}
Hispanic	0.041 {.031}	0.018 {.032}	0.113** {.051}
Median Household Income	0+ {0}	0 {0}	0** {0}
Education	-0.076* {.036}	-0.069 {.043}	-0.017 {.054}
Leg. Pro	-16.076*** {2.511}	-8.637** {3.260}	-28.784*** {3.804}
Constant	-0.468 {5.051}	-0.665 {5.801}	-12.606 {8.260}
R-Squared	0.703	0.816	0.677
N	803	391	492

Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Figure 1. Graphic Representation of Gubernatorial Coattails and its Effect on the Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Garnered by the Republican Legislative Candidate



Figure 2. Graphic Representation of MPI and its Effect on the Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Garnered by the Republican Legislative Candidate



Figure 3. Graphic Representation of GIP and its Effect on the Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Garnered by the Republican Legislative Candidate



Supplemental Table 1. MPI, GIP, and Legislative Professionalism Statistics:

State	*MPI*	*GIP*	*Leg. Pro.*
Alabama	50	2.7	0.071
Arkansas	44.1	3	0.106
California	42.5	3.4	0.626
Minnesota	51.6	4	0.169
New York	46.1	4.1	0.481
Oklahoma	54.3	3.1	0.187
Tennessee	50.7	3.9	0.116
Texas	59.6	3.1	0.199
Wyoming	64.8	3.3	0.054

Supplemental Table 2. Maximum Effects for the Main Independent Variables:

Variable	*Max Effect*
Coattails	36.4
MPI	7.359
GIP	6.3

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