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Selling National Security: Journalism, Political Actors, and the Marketing of Counterterrorism Policy

Nicole M. Napolitano

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SELLING NATIONAL SECURITY: JOURNALISM, POLITICAL ACTORS, AND THE
MARKETING OF COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

by

NICOLE M. NAPOLITANO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City

University of New York

2016

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Selling National Security:
Journalism, Political Actors, and the Marketing of Counterterrorism Policy:
A Case Study

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Nicole M. Napolitano

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

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Advisor: David A. Green, Ph.D.

Abstract

The social construction of terrorism in the public sphere naturally limits and directs logical policy options. In the United States, media are a primary vehicle for the construction of social problems and accompanying policy solutions, as much of public discourse takes place in media narratives. News media play a major part in political communication, both between government and governed as well as among different segments of government.

Social construction in media is shaped by journalistic values and preferences, occurs within an active and influential policy process, and is shaped by powerful policy actors. Government-based policy actors, or *governmental policy entrepreneurs*, are of particular interest, as their strategies of political communication are also shaped by the “mediatization” of politics—the process by which political actors internalize and make political decisions that prioritize media logic. Moreover, the strategies they select are dependent on the individual’s or agency’s power to effect policy change.

In terrorism coverage, governmental policy entrepreneurs have a substantial amount of leverage over narratives. This dissertation is an exploratory examination of the influence that governmental policy entrepreneurs have on terrorism news narratives in two ways: via a directed qualitative content analysis of news coverage on the Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013, and interviews with current and former journalists. Its goals are to document the way that governmental policy entrepreneurs apply claims-making strategies involved in the construction of terrorism as a social problem within the public sphere of the American news media, and to

systematically examine the political and organizational forces influencing the “behind-the-scenes” production of these news narratives. This approach allows the claims-making strategies of governmental policy entrepreneurs that appear in media coverage to be contextualized within the values and operations of journalism that result in the claims’ inclusion in news narratives.

The findings of the content analysis establish a descriptive framework of the forms that governmental policy entrepreneurial strategies may take during a specific type of open policy window: a terror attack. Governmental policy entrepreneurs hinted at needed funding or legislative change toward new policies or used frames that reified existing preferred policies. Democrats constructed the problem of terrorism as an issue that the Democratic Party was effectively handling and the Boston Marathon Bombing as an anomaly within an otherwise effective system—agenda-affirming responses contradicting the Republican claims-making strategy. Conversely, Republicans framed the problem—terrorism—as an ever-present risk and a significant and likely-to-occur cost relative to the status quo.

Interviews with 26 journalists from a variety of media indicated that governmental policy entrepreneurs who have access to news narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism likely gain this access as a result of a confluence of three factors: an open policy window, sound use of media logic, and source power. Most respondents noted that their most important sources were current or former members of government, including federal and local law enforcement.

Many reported that they and their journalistic colleagues actively challenged narratives concerning policy options or counterterrorism actions that could have an adverse impact on civil rights and liberties, public or military safety, how America is viewed overseas, or the U.S. economy. When asked which precise journalistic strategies they used to challenge government messages, however, journalists who were interviewed described “challenging” information from government sources by consulting other members of their source networks—most of whom were also currently or formerly in government. In other words, when these journalists actively challenged information from the government, they did so by consulting other government sources.

In addition, many respondents reported that providing context to audiences was important when covering terrorism. One of the primary ways they do this, however, is to connect aspects of new terror events to pre-existing knowledge about terrorism, especially via interviews with

current or former government “experts”. By asking these experts about how a new terror event fits into the structure of terrorism they already understand (for instance, by inquiring about “lone wolves” and connecting terror cells), journalists may inadvertently and uncritically be incorporating a new face to the existing frame of an old enemy. In short, “piggybacking”, or the policy entrepreneurial strategy of connecting new events to existing cognitive and emotional symbols, may be directly facilitated by “contextualizing” efforts by journalists in stories about terrorism.

This is the first study to systematically describe the types of claims-making symbols and frames governmental policy entrepreneurs use during a focusing event of a terror attack, and then situate those symbols and frames within the larger context of the production processes of journalism and the negotiation of newsworthiness to explore how these symbols and frames reach news narratives intact. It also advances knowledge of the media-government relational system by informing methodological choices of future quantitative and qualitative studies of journalistic and policy-setting processes with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism. Finally, this study joins multiple theoretical literatures from media criminology, political communication, and policy analysis. This multidisciplinary can greatly aid future theoretical orientations by expanding both criminological and political communication paradigms.

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review

In recent years, a number of studies have examined the content of the American journalistic narrative surrounding terrorist events, acts of political violence, and counterterrorism policies espoused by the United States (e.g. Nacos, 2002; Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003). This extensive examination of the content of terrorism news has led to a deeper understanding of the characteristics of American news stories on terrorism. What is found far less frequently in the literature is an in-depth discussion of both the production of these narratives, and the connection between terrorism news production and the political process.

Media production processes are, in fact, left out of many discussions of content within the general field of media criminology. Whereas many studies in the field focus on an analysis of the content itself or, less frequently, the interaction between audience and media, the potential impact of news on viewers, politicians, and policies begins with the decisions made by editors, producers, and media owners. Arguably, fully understanding the cultural context of media and its role in the public's understanding of worldwide terrorism involves contextualizing the production of news, as well. This is particularly true when examining terrorism within the paradigm of social constructionism, which holds that all human knowledge is “developed, transmitted, and maintained in social situations”, or, in other words, our understanding of any given social concept is socially constructed via the natural process of human interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 13). Spector and Kitsuse (1977) extend this perspective to the definition and description of particular social problems, characterizing them as a “*process* of interaction between claimants that is organized by what they claim to be ‘a problem’” (p. x, emphasis in original). Inasmuch as terrorism is a social problem largely constructed for the public in and by the news media, analysis of terrorism is incomplete without an examination of the production of

these narratives. Further, the resulting construct of terrorism in the public sphere naturally limits and directs logical policy options, restricting discussion of counterterrorism efforts to topics which fit within the socially contrived paradigm of the problem of terrorism.

While some hold to the democratic ideal of a “free and impartial” press, in reality, the mainstream news media are best classified as a bureaucratic, profit-seeking, political institution. News organizations typically operate under a set of practical and professional rules that are universal to the practice of journalism, and collectively define the news media as a unified social institution (Gans, 1979/2004). The production of news is primarily governed by a business model that, like all businesses, is chiefly concerned with earnings, perhaps even more so in recent years as the media have been increasingly corporately owned and consolidated. Further, given that the news media also play a major part in political communication, both between government and governed as well as among different segments of government, they can also be seen as an essential political institution, and part of the policy process (Cook, 2005).

Though typically self-defined as independent and neutral, news media do not merely report objective truth. The same influences which professionally and bureaucratically define the press ultimately color the production of news narratives. Journalism has a set of professional values, including the importance of the “scoop,” strict adherence to impartiality, and a commitment to clear and interesting storytelling. Further, journalists are influenced by overarching cultural values of their society; these “enduring values,” as termed by sociologist Herbert Gans, have an effect on the way stories are selected and framed. Additionally, as news stories represent saleable goods, the production of news is also affected by the ever-present media profit motive. Stories must be produced on a regular basis to fill news space, and corporate news organizations are required to provide profit to shareholders. As such, events that

are easier to report on within production constraints and that have the potential to draw more readers, viewers, and listeners are selected for, while those that are less likely to draw public interest or are more resource-consuming to cover may receive little or no press attention. Finally, and a pivotal point for the current study, the professional culture of journalism gives credence to the stories and perspectives of some sources over others, and these sources tend toward those in positions of power or authority—particularly that of the political variety.

News stories on terrorism and counterterrorism are particularly good examples of the impact of media production values and goals on narratives. Terrorists and the media have been said to have a symbiotic relationship (Nacos, 2007). The ultimate political motivation for a terror attack may be wide-ranging, but overall, the key primary goals are fairly similar: “publicizing issues, communicating demands, and airing grievances to pressure authorities, influence the public policy agenda, and gain concessions; undermining the authority of opponents; reinforcing and mobilizing support among potential sympathizers and coalition partners; ... [and sometimes] to shock, demoralize, or otherwise damage a political enemy” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 8). To achieve these goals, terrorists often require media access. Many who commit acts of political violence generally understand the importance of attention to their cause, seek to impact a wider audience via media coverage, and make an attempt to provide journalists with imagery likely to receive coverage (Nacos, 2007). Such coverage also benefits media organizations by providing exactly the kind of news most likely to attract high readerships and ratings: a violent spectacle, often with accompanying bloody imagery and clear victims and villains with which to construct a simple two-sided narrative of 'good vs. evil.' In addition, given that many newsrooms have seen significant budget cuts in recent years (Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2008), modern terrorism news may also be particularly budget-friendly, in two ways.

Whereas older stories on foreign political violence would require embedded reporting and advance planning, today's stories may be conducted with immediate communications from foreign reporters due to advances in technology, including digital video and email. Further, given that much information on terrorism comes directly from government press releases and statements (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003), journalists may be able to conserve production resources by scheduling collection of source material from press conferences and delivering government statements verbatim.

In fact, narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism policy are constructed with government officials and offices as primary, and often the *only* sources of information. This happens not only because of the aforementioned potential for cost-saving, but also because reporting on terrorist activity requires access mediated by the government (Nacos, 2007), because government agencies actively utilize the media to disperse information to the public (Cook, 2005), and because long-standing journalistic practice considers law enforcement and government the most important insider sources on stories of crime and terrorism (Nacos, 2007). While the media agenda in the construction of these narratives is to provide the public with information and to tell a coherent story, government sources often have their own agendas when speaking with the media. These agendas may be as straightforward as disseminating essential facts to the citizenry—for instance, when police needed to inform people in Boston of street and transportation closures just after the bombing of the Boston Marathon in 2013—but they may also include a number of policy objectives. Government officials and offices may attempt to use media to set a social problem agenda and push certain policy choices over others within those agendas (Kingdon, 2003). Media exposure is needed to both gain public support for particular policies and to put public pressure on other government officials and offices (Cook, 2005). While

news content is certainly passively impacted by journalism's professional values, the cultural values of American society, and the profit motive of news organizations, these collective influences along with the embedment of the press in the American political process also lead narratives in journalism to be easily subject to outright manipulation by individuals in government who are actively seeking to shift policy by redefining problems.

The social problems and political communications literatures have several different names and overlapping definitions for these individuals: Loseke (2003) refers to them as a politically-motivated subset of “claimsmakers”—individuals attempting to publicly define problems and solutions—and this process of delineation as “claims-making”. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) use the term “availability entrepreneurs” to describe individuals who attempt to fix public attention on specific problems, interpret phenomena in particular ways, and raise the salience of certain information (p. 687). John W. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams framework of agenda setting and policy formation uses the term “policy entrepreneurs,” who he describes as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (2003, p. 179). These individuals may be in elected or appointed government positions, interest groups, or research organizations, but their goals are similar: to get their preferred policy solutions onto the government agenda. They do this by attempting to bring together what Kingdon describes as the three “streams” of the policy process: problems, policies, and politics. The *problem stream* consists of conditions that citizens and policy makers want addressed, the *policy stream* is essentially a “soup” of ideas that compete for acceptance in policy networks, and the *politics stream* is comprised of three elements: national mood, pressure-group campaigns, and

administrative or legislative turnover. When all three streams are brought together on a particular issue, an opportunity, or “open window,” is created to bring forth new policy.

While Kingdon estimated the importance of media to the policy process to be a minor contribution, there are a number of reasons to believe that Kindgon underestimated their significance. Indicators of some problems are only brought to light through investigative journalism, national mood is dependent upon the presentation of information via media outlets, pressure-group campaigns require publicity to be effective, and administrative and legislative turnover is deeply connected to news coverage during election seasons. The press also plays a vital role in the communications occurring among government actors, particularly now, at a time when deep political polarization prevents or severely limits collaborative face-to-face encounters between legislators of opposing parties (Lee, Hamilton, Martino, Gunning, & Selden, 2015).

Timothy E. Cook (2005) argues that the news media are, in fact, a collective political institution that remains vital to the policy process. Cook “sees the news media as a coherent intermediary institution without which the three branches established by the Constitution could not act and could not work” (2005, p. 2). Media possess the ability to direct public attention to particular policy issues and “influence the salience of topics on the public agenda,” shaping political reality in a process known as “agenda-setting” (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002, p. 1). The word “agenda” is used differently in various contexts, referring alternately to an “announced subject for a meeting,” “the kind of plan an organizer wants participants to adopt,” or “a coherent set of proposals,” depending on the setting (Kingdon, 2003, p. 3). This dissertation uses the term in the way that John Kingdon (2003) does, as “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (p. 3). Agenda-setting in this context is the

process which “narrows this set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 3). This definition is more expansive than those that focus on media’s role in agenda-setting (e.g. McCombs & Shaw, 1972), and includes *any* factor influencing which topics end up on the public policy agenda.

This relationship is symbiotic. Journalists' professional and cultural values lead them to gravitate toward “events, ideas, preoccupations, strategies, and politics of powerful officials” (2005, p. 111). The ease of media access for officials and the wide reach of modern news media provoke members of government to see journalists as vital to accomplishing their goals. As such, political actors now attempt to fit their activities into the production goals and values of the press to attempt more favorable coverage of both their agendas and public personas. Moreover, while democratic publics often depend on journalism to “mediate” information between the government and the citizenry, an overreliance on the press can lead to the “mediatization” of politics. Jesper Strömbäck (2008) defines the former circumstance, “mediation,” as “a situation in which the media have become the most important source of information and vehicle of communication between the governors and the governed” (p.230). Mediatization, on the other hand, occurs when “a political system to a high degree is influenced by and adjusted to the demands of the mass media in their coverage of politics” (Asp, 1986, p. 359). The process of mediatization can result in the de-prioritizing of political logic and the supplementation of media logic, the “form of communication and the process through which media transmit and communicate information” (Altheide, 2006, p. 10). Strömbäck (2008) argues that by the penultimate stage of mediatization of politics,

media have become so important that their formats, content, grammar, and rhythm—the media logic—have become so pervasive that basically, no social actors requiring

interaction with the public or influence on public opinion can ignore the media or afford not to adapt to the media logic. (p.238)

Cook (2005) asserts that while production values of news may seem content-neutral, the press' preference for simple and straightforward narratives that have two sides and a clear-cut resolution forces political actors to shift their behavior; they must appear to be direct, consistent, and act decisively, even when no action is necessary. Problems must appear to have clear causes and solutions, and if possible, be accompanied by visually ascertainable indicators. In addition, reporters' tendencies to frame narratives as stories about the disorder, chaos, and turmoil of modern society and subsequent restoration of stability and order, or what Donileen Loseke (2003) discusses as the process of *diagnostic* and *prognostic* framing, pressures political actors to appear to be solving problems all of the time, even in the absence of objectively identified problems or reasonable solutions. Diagnostic frames offer putative explanations for social problems while the goal of prognostic framing is to suggest logical solutions to them; many news stories, particularly those regarding social upheaval or violence, demonstrate these frames in their identification of the causes of disorder and actions taken or recommended to restore order. Government actors feature prominently in these narratives, and may be the individuals promoting particular solutions to problems outlined in the media (Cook, 2005).

While not all policy entrepreneurs are government actors, all advocate for particular policy shifts. Those who are frequently featured in the news tend to be more adept at using the press to achieve policy goals. Generally, policy entrepreneurs seek media access for two basic policy goals: shifting public opinion (for those policy solutions that would benefit from public support), and communicating with members of government to get a problem or policy solution onto the agenda. These goals are only achieved by working within the cultural, production, and

profit values of the news media. Successful policy entrepreneurs leverage news frames and culturally relevant sociopolitical symbols, which trigger emotional or cognitive responses in viewers (Kingdon, 1995/2003). These symbols serve as focusers of attention to issues because they prime audiences to organize facts and proposed policies into pre-existing schema. As Kingdon notes: “Symbols catch on and have important focusing effects because they capture in a nutshell some sort of reality that people already sense in a vaguer, more diffuse way” (1995/2003, pp. 97-8).

Although all policy entrepreneurs are claims-makers who attempt to define social problems and solutions in ways that best fit their agendas, not all who engage in prognostic and diagnostic framing in the news media are policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are actively engaged in advocacy of solutions, and all of their interactions with media are aimed at furthering their policy goals. In American stories on terrorism, policy entrepreneurs may include the President and members of his or her administration or staff, members of Congress and their staff, individuals from government agencies like the Department of Homeland Security or U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, lobbyists and people affiliated with political parties and interest groups, law enforcement officers or officials, the U.S. military, traditional pressure groups like the American Civil Liberties Union or Southern Poverty Law Center, and research institutes and scholar activists acting upon the policy implications of the literature in their fields. However, others who appear in or construct coverage, such as journalists, pundits unaffiliated with the policy process, civilian witnesses, social media participants, and vox pop, “person on the street” interviewees, may also engage in an assessment of problems and propose solutions. These non-policy-entrepreneur claims-makers (hereafter referred to as “lay framers”) may be seeking notoriety, self-promotion, or more viewers, listeners, or readers, but their motives for

media interaction exist outside of the traditional policy agenda-setting processes. Both lay framers and policy entrepreneurs shape news narratives on terrorism. As it is these narratives which inform the public of the existence and nature of terrorist activity and counterterrorism proposals and policies, both policy entrepreneurs and lay framers are important parts of the social construction of the American concept of terrorism. Consequently, a full understanding of the social construction of terrorism and the resulting impact on counterterrorism policies requires a far more nuanced examination of not only the content of frames and claims within media, but the news production *process* in regard to stories on terrorism and counterterrorism, in particular the selection of sources, their access to media, and the meaning and structure that journalists give to disparate facts.

As noted earlier, far too few studies in media criminology focus on news production processes, and fewer still examine journalists' perceptions of issues related to the social construction of terrorism. This dissertation addresses these gaps by analyzing claims-making and newsroom decision-making in the course of narrative construction in stories primarily focusing upon terrorism events and counterterrorism policies. Through a combination of qualitative content analysis and interviews of those with knowledge of the inner workings of the news process, I examine the role of policy entrepreneurs and government as sources and the production context of narratives which employ political symbols and frame devices likely to hold prominence in counterterrorism policy debate and agenda-setting. The study achieves these goals along two avenues: First, it documents and analyzes the governmental claims and claims-makers featured in news coverage of a single terror event. Second, it identifies the strategies used by government actors to advance certain policy solutions, including how governmental policy entrepreneurs obtain access to contribute to news narratives. Third, it reveals the factors that

journalists believe influence the construction of narratives on terrorism. In short, the study seeks to systematically characterize the role of the press in the social construction of terrorism, with a view toward the implications for how this process informs policy responses.

This study is multidisciplinary in scope, drawing from a range of complementary theoretical frameworks and analytical techniques. It is embedded in the social construction frameworks of Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Spector and Kitsuse (1977). It is further theoretically oriented in the literature of policy analysis, derived from the work of Kingdon (2003) and Elder and Cobb (1983)—specifically their analysis of the media’s transmission of the political, cognitive, and emotional symbols used by policy entrepreneurs to shape the problem stream. In addition, the study builds on the work of Cook (2005) in the field of political communication, utilizing his perspectives on the bureaucracy of news organizations and the role of media in government. It as well draws heavily from the media criminology and terrorism studies literatures of Altheide's (2006) discourse of fear, Nacos's (2006) exploration of the content of terrorism coverage, and Norris, Kern, and Just's (2003) “war on terrorism” frame. The intersection of such a diverse range of disciplines and analytical perspectives provides for a fuller understanding of the various components of the system of media production and its effects, specifically how they shape public and government perceptions of terrorism events, and the policy decisions that follow.

Terrorism and the United States

Scholars of terrorism often note that one of the most difficult and contentious issues in the literature involves defining which behaviors fall under the label of “terrorism” (see Schmid, 2004). There is no overriding legal or academic definition of the term, and components of definitions may be widely diverge both among nations and among agencies within a single

country (Schmid, 2011). This is perhaps due to the pejorative nature of the term itself; to label an organization as “terrorist” is to strip it of political legitimacy (Crenshaw, 2011). The term may be invoked and applied in a highly subjective fashion, depending on the favored perspective, as noted by Bruce Hoffman (2013):

If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, an ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism. (p. 23)

It is this subjectivity which has prevented international political agreement on which activities constitute terrorism. For example, the United Nations, while issuing several resolutions which may be construed as defining terrorism, has completely avoided in its definitions the concept of “state terrorism” —the incidence of systemic political violence intended to instill fear in an unarmed populace—“committed either by agents of the state or state proxies who carry out their campaigns by using materials provided by the state” (McAllister & Schmid, 2011, p. 204). UN Security Resolution 1566 of 2004 outlines terrorism as comprising

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. (§ 3)

Within the departments and agencies of the United States, there are also a number of definitions identifying divergent components. The State Department defines terrorism succinctly

as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (in 22 U.S. Code § 2656f), whereas the Department of Defense (2010) defines it as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies, [and is] often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.” The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 includes in its own, distinct definition

activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, that (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

The academic literature on terrorism, too, contains dozens of competing definitions, as well as multiple attempts to consolidate these into some sort of universal definition for purposes of both policy advisement and research (e.g. Weinburg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). Jeremy Varon goes so far as to state that the development of “a universally valid normative definition of terrorism [is] the holy grail of the entire discourse” (2011, p. 122). The lack of a scholarly consensus on what exactly constitutes terrorism is not a purely intellectual concern. Not only does it result in potentially widely differing estimates of the number of terror attacks and attempts worldwide, Schmid (2004) notes that that the lack of a consensus definition of terrorism also inhibits effective counterterrorism measures, prevents international cooperation and mobilization, and results in a comingling of terrorism with other kinds of political violence

which may be seen as less morally reprehensible, such as use of guerilla tactics against a tyrannical government.

One of the more inclusive academic consensus definitions of terrorism (and the definition that will be used in this dissertation due to its emphasis on a model of political violence as a form of communication) comes from Schmid and Jongman (1988, as cited in Schmid, 2004, p. 382). They derived the following definition using scholarly input through questionnaires, including all elements upon which most experts agreed:

Terrorism is an [1] anxiety-inspiring method of repeated [2] violent action, employed by (semi-) [3] clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for [4] idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The [5] immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen [6] randomly (targets of opportunity) or [7] selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. [8] Threat- and violence-based [9] communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to [10] manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a [11] target of terror, a [12] target of demands, or a [13] target of attention, depending on whether [14] intimidation, [15] coercion, or [16] propaganda is primarily sought. (p. 382)

Of note in this definition, and in fact *all* descriptions of terrorism, is the requirement of information on the actor's *reasons* for the behavior. Generally, to be considered a terrorist act, an event must involve motives that are political or ideological, as well as intent to inspire fear in a populace. More specifically,

Actors employ terrorism for five basic and interrelated reasons, regardless of specific political objective or ideology: to set the political agenda in a conflict, to undermine the authority of a government or governments they oppose, to provoke overreaction from the government or from the targeted population, to mobilize popular support at home or abroad, and to coerce compliance. (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 9)

Each of these reasons for violent action involves a number of interrelated goals, usually involving tactical propaganda, for which communication with government regimes and the public is a necessary component. For instance, terrorist organizations use attacks to demonstrate power and define the group's identity and image, and all terrorist acts imply threats of future action; "[t]he act must convey the message 'you may be next' to a particular group" (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 23).

In any examination of the motives and goals of a terrorist group, there are both apparent and conjectural reasons for behavior. Some terrorist organizations may release statements or videos explicating the exact motivation of a particular act; for example, the North African segment of Al Qaeda publicly demanded the withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan in November 2010 in exchange for freeing French citizens whom the organization had kidnapped from Niger two months earlier (Al Jazeera, 2010). Crenshaw describes the common tactic of compelling withdrawal of occupying powers as "a subset of a larger purpose of coercing compliance on the part of the adversary" (2011, p. 11). More frequently, however, terrorist communication may be more implicit, as was the case when Osama bin Laden released a video in November 2001 of several of his young sons playing on the wreckage of a US helicopter, likely implying the vulnerability of an enemy government (a frequent approach, as Crenshaw notes, in the 'undermining of authority of an opposed government'). The motives of terrorism are

therefore often “imputed or assumed” (Hulsse & Spencer, 2008, p. 574)—and such assumptions are not made in a sociopolitical vacuum. What publics, scholars, and governments understand about terrorism is largely shaped by an understanding of that individual or group “that has been produced in political, scientific, and media discourse” (Hulsse & Spencer, 2008, p. 576). These social constructions, it can be argued, are largely responsible for not only an academic understanding of the concept of terrorism, but also for the cultural climate that drives counterterrorism policy options. In order to fully understand terrorism, therefore, it can be argued that public discourse on the topic is an essential component of analysis. In the modern world, much of public discourse takes place via media narratives—and both terrorists and counterterrorism actors vie for narrative control in this public sphere (Nacos, 2007).

Terrorism & Media: A Symbiotic Relationship

Scholars have long written about the “symbiotic” nature of the relationship between terrorism and journalism. As Schmid and De Graaf (1982, p. 14) have noted, “an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication”. As implied by Schmid’s definition of terrorism noted earlier, which states that terror attacks are intended to be “anxiety-inspiring” events in which the “direct targets of violence are not the main targets,” but are merely “message generators” used to “manipulate the main target (audience(s))” for purposes of “intimidation”, “coercion”, or “propaganda” (Schmid, 2004, p.382), terrorism *requires* publicity. Terrorism scholar Paul Wilkinson (1997) claimed that media coverage is “intrinsic to the very activity of terrorisation” (p.53), and Shurkin (2007) pithily notes that “[i]f terrorism can be defined as violence that is designed to deliver a message, the media are the messenger” (p. 82).

From the perspective of those who engage in terror attacks, news coverage is necessary to attain multiple objectives. Nacos (2007) outlines four media-centered goals of terrorist activity:

attention and awareness, recognition of motives, respect and sympathy, and quasi-legitimate status (p. 20). Obtaining control over a news agenda allows terrorists to intimidate target populations and increase public anxiety and fear. Terror attacks are also often designed in politically or culturally symbolic ways. For example, Timothy McVeigh chose to carry out the Oklahoma City Bombing on the second anniversary of the firefight ending the Waco siege at the Branch Davidian compound so that subsequent media reports would be forced to discuss the political perspective and aims of the terror attack. In addition to attempting to communicate with enemies via media, terrorists also seek to communicate with those on whose behalf they claim to act, seeking solidarity and new recruits via successful strikes against a perceived common enemy. Media are also complicit in bestowing quasi-legitimate status upon terrorist groups simply by relaying their messages and interviewing members as they would any legitimate political actor.

Other scholars have offered similar perspectives on the goals of terrorist activity related to news coverage. Paletz and Schmid (1992), for instance, note that terror events are about developing a persuasive, propagandizing narrative that attempts to convey the terrorists' own strength and to make their opponents appear vulnerable, focusing attention on repressive government activities, demoralizing opponents and invigorating the morale of sympathizers, radicalizing the public, creating a chaotic environment in which government authorities appear to have no control, and painting themselves as heroes; none of these goals can be achieved without widespread press coverage. Walsh (2010) divides media goals of terrorism into three general categories (p. 1). Firstly, some terrorist groups attempt to use news coverage to pressure enemies to give in to demands. Secondly, media may be used to convey messages aimed at provoking a strong counterterrorism response, which, in turn, can radicalize and mobilize a more moderate

public in the terrorists' home country or community. Thirdly, terrorists seek to display to their supporters (both current and potential) their ability to successfully strike at enemies. Paul

Wilkinson (1997) notes that terrorists require media access to achieve four main goals:

1) To convey the propaganda of the deed and to create extreme fear among their target group/s; 2) To mobilise wider support for their cause among the general population and international opinion by emphasising such themes as the righteousness of their cause and the inevitability of their victory; 3) To frustrate and disrupt the response of the government and security forces, for example by suggesting that all their practical anti-terrorist measures are inherently tyrannical and counterproductive; and 4) To mobilise, incite and boost their constituency of actual and potential supporters and in so doing to increase recruitment, raise more funds and inspire further attacks. (pp. 56-7)

There is also some indication that terrorists often savvily and actively attempt to appeal and conform to media production values. Camphuijsen and Vissers (2008) observe that the tendency toward symbolic targets or dates for an attack and the targeting of famous or vulnerable victims are nearly always for propaganda purposes, while the decision to attempt to achieve large numbers of casualties and to utilize spectacular tactics and weaponry, such as bombs, may at least partially be made in order to ensure significant media coverage. Additionally, terrorist groups have become proficient in media access techniques, releasing video and audio recordings, press releases, and images directly to worldwide press outlets, interacting on Internet message boards, and maintaining organizational websites and publications like *Inspire* magazine, an online periodical of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, published in English (Nacos, 2006; Paletz & Schmid, 1992). Perhaps no terrorist organization has become better known for media proficiency than Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS (also known as Islamic State of

Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL), which publishes an English-language magazine called Dabiq as part of a strong digital media presence which includes heavy use of online social network platforms (Koerner, 2016).

On the other side of the symbiosis lies the tendency of media outlets to cover visually compelling violent events that occur suddenly and harm American interests. Walsh (2010) notes that the “structure and competitiveness of the news industry” impart “incentives to provide overly extensive coverage of terrorist attacks” (p. 2). He goes on to note that terrorist events fit many of the criteria of journalistic interest, as studied by researchers of *news values* (e.g. Galtung & Ruge, 1965, Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, & Harcup & O’Neill, 2016): “terrorism occurs suddenly and unexpectedly, involves conflict, often selects prominent or symbolically important targets, can often be attributed to specific terrorist groups, and provokes strong feelings of fear and dread in media audiences” (p. 5). Terror events are a boon to ratings for media outlets due to the inherent spectacle of such events; there are clearly identifiable victims, villains, and heroes for media to dramatically portray, and the potential for graphic descriptions of violence (Nacos, 2002).

Journalists often “argue that terrorism is an important public policy issue and deserves substantial coverage from the media” (Walsh, 2010, p. 5). Shurkin (2007) notes that journalists are put in a difficult spot when it comes to coverage of terror events in that they “must report attacks as they happen” but are also “part of the reason these attacks occur in the first place” (p. 81). According to Shurkin (2007), journalists are well aware that terrorists are using them to spread their messages, and are conscious of the choice of language used to describe events so as not to instill unnecessary fear into their audiences. Some scholars have observed that the very nature of a democratic and free press *forces* journalists to cover terror attacks, whether media are

being used as a conduit to spread fear and propaganda or not (e.g. Wilkinson, 1997, Nacos, 2007). Freedom of the press is often accompanied by a set of professional values that direct journalists to cover any event that may be of interest to the public, and the competitive nature of the free market pushes them toward coverage of events that are likely to increase ratings and readership.

Walsh (2010) notes that countries that have a press that is not explicitly controlled by the state *also* have a press that selectively covers events and individuals which compete with each other for news space. “[T]errorist organizations must compete for media attention with a wide range of other actors such as politicians, sports teams, entertainers, private firms, and other terrorist groups” (p. 5). Further, in countries with autocratic government control over the press, states typically suppress terrorism coverage to “minimize public fear and the political influence of [violent] opposition groups” (Walsh, 2010, p. 5). Supporting this notion, Drakos and Gofas (2006) find that underreporting¹ of terror attacks is most highly concentrated in non-democratic countries that do not have a free press.

Despite the somewhat fatalistic sentiment of attributing the terrorism-media symbiosis to democracy and freedom of the press, media have often been criticized for their *unnecessarily* dramatic and sensationalistic coverage of terrorism. Cohen-Almagor (2005), for instance, points out that journalists frequently go beyond mere reporting—they “become part of [the horror of terror], adding to the drama” (p.385). Journalists have been accused of failing to challenge government narratives on terrorism, overdramatizing the violence of terror attacks, and stoking public fear of terrorism and showcasing violent imagery in order to obtain ratings (Altheide, 2006; Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2011).

¹ “The essence of underreporting is the suspicion that observed terrorist events might well not correspond to the actual number of attacks” (Drakos & Gofas, 2006, p. 715).

Coverage of Terrorism

Scott (2001) points out that because media are focused on audience attention, patterns of coverage should be driven by predictions about audience interest. As such, news organizations are likely to limit coverage of terror attacks to avoid diminishing interest resulting from oversaturation of the news narrative with stories on terrorism. The result is a sharp focus on coverage of terror attacks with features that are most likely to be of greatest interest for Americans (Nacos, 2003).

Featured far more frequently in American coverage are those terrorist attacks that harm or threaten Americans or American interest, involve substantial casualties or damage, that occur in areas that are more accessible to journalists and are longer in duration, or that are comprised of kidnappings, hijackings, or the taking of hostages (Nacos, 2002; Quester, 1986; Weimann & Winn, 1994). Attacks in which perpetrators have been identified are “4 times as likely to be reported in newspaper and 10 times as likely to be reported on television” (Walsh, 2010, p. 4, on the findings of Weimann & Winn, 1994). In their analysis of domestic terror attacks between 1980 and September 10, 2001, Chermak and Gruenwald (2006) found that the media have a tendency to ignore many incidents while sensationalizing only a few—those more likely to be covered in detail tended toward higher numbers of casualties, those linked to domestic terror groups, and those that targeted airlines.

Global terrorist acts that better fit the dominant American social construction of terrorism are also more likely to be covered in depth. For example, acts of political violence committed by individuals or groups that are unaffiliated with government entities are more frequently covered than acts of political violence committed by state entities (Nacos, 2002). Global terror events that take place in the Middle East or Europe are twice as likely to receive coverage than those in

Latin America (Weiman & Winn, 1994), and Powell (2011) found that news narratives of terror attacks on U.S. soil between October 2001 and January 2010 indicated a

thematic pattern of terrorism coverage in which fear of international terrorism is dominant, particularly as Muslims/Arabs/Islam working together in organized terrorist cells against a “Christian America,” while domestic terrorism is cast as a minor threat that occurs in isolated incidents by troubled individuals. (p. 90)

Powell (2011) hypothesizes that Orientalism plays a heavy role in how American media constructs narratives of terrorism.

Islam entered the contemporary U.S. news cycle initially because of connections to oil, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and terrorism; thus, all of the major stories, and what the audiences in the West know about Islam and Muslims, is connected to control of the resource of oil, war, and terrorism. This sets up minimal knowledge of Islam, except for in terms of need, control, and fear, leading to Western reactions to Islam, as Edward Said argues, being largely Orientalist. “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and most of the time ‘the Occident’” (Said, 1978, p. 2). The “Occident,” or the West, is placed in opposition to and as superior to the Orient. As a result, Orientalism can be viewed as “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 3) ... This scenario sets Islam against the West, or specifically the United States. (p. 92)

To sum up, as Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) state, “the research concludes that media emphasize the dramatic, most violent, and conflictual terrorist accounts, and ignores [sic] historical, cultural, and social explanations for terrorism” (p. 436).

Some scholars have suggested that terrorists alter their tactics to comply with media preferences, indicating that, like political actors, terrorists are also governed by media logic and mediatized political processes. Weimann and Winn (1994) explain:

Modern terrorism can be understood in terms of the production requirements of theatrical engagements. Terrorists pay attention to script preparation, cast selection, sets, props, role playing, and minute-by-minute stage management. Just like compelling stage plays or ballet performances, the media orientation in terrorism requires a fastidious attention to detail in order to be effective. (p. 52)

Walsh (2010) notes that terrorist organizations that receive more news coverage may simply be more effective at media relations and adjusting their actions and press outreach to fit media production values. Insight into this process is added by Gerrits (1992, cited in Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 58), who, following a thorough examination of autobiographies, diaries, letters, and interviews of terrorists, identified seven strategies they utilized to achieve publicity:

- designing interventions with news value in mind
- embarking on ancillary propaganda and recruitment efforts
- timing and locating actions in light of their publicity value
- disseminating official statements
- maintaining contacts with journalists and providing interviews
- proclaiming responsibility for terrorist deeds
- communicating to terrorist audiences through the meaning or symbolism of the target or modus operandi

Martin (2006) defines this type of publicity-focused terrorism as “media oriented terrorism,” a type of political violence which is designed to attract attention from the press.

Media oriented terrorism is not always a feature of political violence, however. Surette, Hansen, and Noble (2009) assert that “the desire for media attention is not a constant feature of terrorism and the degree of media orientation a terrorist group displays during specific acts or during a prescribed time period will vary” (p. 360). Media oriented terrorists have a “communication intent that includes such elements as credit-taking, media usable communiqués, and symbolic targets and actions” and prioritize symbolic victim types—country of origin, occupation, or economic status matters most—and “targets and locations are chosen to maximize media and public attention” (Surette, Hansen, & Noble, 2009, p. 361).

Increased media attention to terrorists who are adept at obtaining press attention may have more widespread consequences, as well. Rohner and Frey (2007) found that terrorist attacks were the subject of increased press attention, and that increases in coverage are associated with increases in the number of future terror attacks. Scott (2001) notes that, “to compete successfully for media attention, terrorists must be original enough to stage incidents that are a departure from past events. Hence, large media returns to terrorism come mostly from the perpetrators’ imaginative abilities” (p. 126). Nacos goes so far as to say that “[g]etting the attention of the mass media, the public, and decision makers is the *raison d’être* behind modern terrorism’s increasingly shocking violence” (Nacos, 1994, p. 8). Terrorists indeed seem to be largely aware of the kinds of violence that will attract media attention. Among the reasons for Timothy McVeigh’s choice of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building during the 2005 Oklahoma City Bombing was that it had “plenty of open space around it, to allow for the best possible news photos and television footage” (Nacos, 2002, p. 12). Weimann and Winn (1994), citing an interview Weimann conducted with a former terrorist from the German Red Army Faction and

Italian Red Brigades, found the convicted terrorist to perceive the media as inherently susceptible to “blackmail”, of a sort:

[I]f you don't publish, we kill or bomb... We can plan actions that will bring the media to us...the work is done in the Middle East or a European airport but it is planned by people who know the media, who know how to use them. So they have to report it. And they have to explain it: why all the killings? Why are there bombs? So the public in Europe and the U.S. can hear us, understand our motives and see us as fighters in a social war and not as criminals or lunatics. (p. 62)

In addition to the analysis of content of news stories on terrorism and counterterrorism, scholars also note that coverage of terrorism may have serious effects on public opinion and emotion. Witnessing coverage of terrorism, especially repeated imagery that is dramatic or violent, can lead to “distress, shock, fear, phobic avoidance of public places, fury, and pain” (Shoshani & Slone, 2008). These feelings may lead the public to become more punitive and prejudiced toward outgroups (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009). Terror management theory asserts that priming audiences with thoughts of inevitable death leads to extreme anxiety, which reinforces commitment to in-groups and results in demonization of perceived enemies and demand for punishment (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 2003). Barkun (2011) contends that the basic human fear of the unseen danger leads people to interpret the “invisible” terrorist, who remains undetected until he strikes, as an excessively grave threat. This, in turn, leads publics to accept counterterrorism policy that is extreme or invasive, because the threat as it is imagined is more serious than the threat as it truly exists. Altheide and Michalowski (1999) find that the “discourse of fear,” or the “pervasive communication, symbolic awareness and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective

environment” is virtually inescapable in modern media. David L. Altheide (2006) further argues that attempts at manipulation of news narratives by government actors for political gain have been especially efficacious in the development of fear-related policy decisions, particularly those relating to terrorism. As Altheide (2006) contends, fear “is socially constructed and managed by political actors to promote their own goals... [G]etting one's view of the world accepted opens the door to many other programs and activities to implement this view” (p. 18). It is precisely this possibility—that counterterrorism policy can be implemented by policy actors via the instigation of fear in the public—that requires that terrorism scholars examine the role of media in the creation of public perceptions and social definitions of terrorism. As Barkun (2011) notes, “terrorism exists in two domains—in the world and in our minds” (p. *ix*). How American society perceives the threat of terrorism influences the social construction of acceptable counterterrorism efforts, as well.

If a group or individual is labeled a terrorist, the social construction of what that designation means will determine which government actions are seen as justified or required in their apprehension, trial, and punishment. Given the potential political and legal ramifications of the application of the term “terrorism,” it is important to question who has the power to publicly assign such a label to behavior (and thus direct the parameters of discourse as well as the social construction of both the concept of terrorism and those whom the public considers terrorist actors).

Typically, government actors determine when to call an act “terrorism” (Schmid, 2004), and news outlets often follow suit. A recent example of this dynamic occurred during the early news reporting of the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon. On CNN’s live breaking coverage (CNN, 2013a) Wolf Blitzer initially identified the event as an “explosion,” during a

broadcast with on-the-scene reporter and CNN law enforcement analyst Mike Brooks, speculating that it may have been an accident (going so far as to caution viewers that “it is certainly possible it could have been a generator exploding or some gas lines exploding”). Shortly thereafter, he employs the label “bombing” after Vice President Biden used the term:

BLITZER: We are getting in a statement, though, from the vice president, Joe Biden. He just spoke out a few minutes ago.

He said, “I’m speaking here. They just turned on the television in my office and apparently there has been a bombing. I don’t know any of the details of what caused it, who did it. I don’t think it exists yet, but our prayers are with those people in Boston who have suffered injuries. I don’t know how many of them there are. I’m looking at it on television right now.”

It’s interesting, though, Mike, he uses the word “bombing,” which could be different obviously than an explosion.

That’s -- I don’t know if he’s just hearing -- assuming the explosion is a bomb or whatever, but if it was a bomb, obviously, that escalates what we’re seeing.

BROOKS: Well, you know, it’s the vice president who’s putting this out there, Wolf, and so you would think that the vice president would have some kind of briefing. (CNN, 2013b)

Finally, Blitzer notes that the Boston Police Department had essentially shut down all transportation in the city, the Massachusetts Governor had requested that everyone in the city stay away from crowds and return to their homes, and the President intended to address the nation within minutes. Only then does Blitzer declare to viewers, “And now, by all indications, this does appear to be a terrorist attack...Clearly an attack. No one yet has claimed

responsibility. We don't know who is responsible for this, but clearly we have now concluded this is a terrorist attack, for whatever motivation -- whatever the motivation is” at approximately 5:45 PM EST (CNN, 2013c). Blitzer’s reluctance to label the attack at the Boston Marathon first a bombing, and then terrorism, reflects a general reluctance of journalists to use the word terrorism without a cue from government officials. This reliance on government for event labels is one example of journalism’s reinforcement of dominant narratives in the social construction and framing of terrorism.

Brigitte Nacos (2007) maintains that media operatives, aware of the negative connotations of the word, seem “uncertain and confused” in their use of the label (p. 25). As such, they seek “safe” situations in which the label is permissible to use, and are therefore more likely to use the word “terrorism” to describe politically motivated violence when Americans are victims of the attack (similarly, foreign media outlets use the word when their own citizens are victims), when the perpetrators are from the Middle East, and when political leaders have used the term to publicly describe the incident (Nacos, 2007). This latter condition—reliance on government definitions of terrorist behavior—may be related to the reliance on government for information on political violence in general. Government agencies are typically gatekeepers for specifics on terror events, access to victims and locations, and details on suspects.

Government Sources in Media Coverage of Terrorism

The role of government officials and offices in media coverage of terrorism is a complicated one. Primary sources for stories about terror events and counterterrorism responses are frequently, and sometimes exclusively, political leaders and law enforcement. This is partly due to the insider knowledge that government actors possess with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism, and partly due to the journalistic gravitation toward government sources. As Cook (2005) points out, “the first central bias of the American news media is the focus on

official action” (p. 92). Journalists show a strong preference for “persons in a position to know...[and have a] preoccupation with who is authoritative enough to be quoted in the news” (Cook, 2005, p. 92). Moreover,

beyond governmental processes being the subject matter, and official sources being quotably useful, government enables reporters to know when news happens, where they are in the development of the overall storyline, where it will go next, and who the principal characters are in that story—the sources who are either “in a position to know,” preferably in a designates position of power within official hierarchies, or in a position to affect the final outcome, such as by providing a swing vote or acting as spokesperson for a recognized bloc. (Cook, 2005, p. 93)

This may be especially true for stories on terrorism. As Nacos (2007) puts it:

Whether circumstances involve domestic or international counterterrorist politics and policies, governments are in excellent positions to communicate their messages through news coverage. From this position of strength, government officials tend to dominate reporting on foreign and security policy—especially when it concerns military conflict or the likelihood of military deployment. (p.143)

On the one hand, some journalists appear painfully conscious of the fact that the information they get from state sources is biased toward government perspectives—often even intended to achieve government objectives. Journalist Joel Shurkin, in his comparison of coverage of a terror attack to coverage of a public health catastrophe, notes that one of the most difficult aspects of crisis coverage is obtaining clear, reliable, and creditable information from government sources, particularly due to the disjunction between the goals of journalism and the goals of government (Shurkin, 2007, p. 83). At a 2002 conference, Elaine Shannon of *Time*

Magazine discussed the responsibility of government sources to provide journalists with credible information, and acknowledged that journalists “all know that people in government have their own agenda—their agencies do—just as [journalists] do [themselves]” (Ethiel, 2002, p. 43). Journalist and documentary filmmaker John Pilger (2004) has spoken extensively on news media’s complicity in promoting government narratives:

By discarding its role as history’s ‘first draft’, journalism promotes, directly and by default, an imperialism whose true intentions are rarely expressed. Instead, noble words and concepts like ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ and ‘liberation’ are emptied of their true meaning and pressed into the service of conquest. When journalists allow this corruption of language and ideas, they disorientate, not inform; or, as Edward S. Herman put it, they ‘normalise the unthinkable for the general public’ (p. 22).

On the other hand, journalists continue to rely nearly exclusively on government sources for stories on terrorism and counterterrorism, and appear to either willingly or unwittingly reproduce government narratives in their coverage. Immediately after 9/11, for example, several individuals with ties to government offices or agencies, including former CIA Director James Woolsey and former Senator David Boren, used their television appearances to direct public attention to the possibility of Iraq’s involvement in the attack. A study by national media watch group FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) found that 73% of all nightly news sources discussing Iraq in October 2003 were current or former U.S. government or military officials (Whiten, 2004). Earlier in 2003, FAIR found that in the first weeks of the invasion of Iraq, of a total of 840 U.S. network news sources who were current or former government or military officials, “only four were identified as holding anti-war opinions” (Rendall & Broughel, 2003).

The failure of journalists to challenge government narratives has been widely blamed for public willingness to engage in war with Iraq (e.g. Altheide, 2006):

Major network television journalists, wearing American flag pins on their lapels, occasionally crying on camera, and offering constant moral support to an expanding network audience, offered very little perspective and understanding of the 9/11 events, seldom asking the most basic questions of administration officials who were pushing draconian legislation to limit civil rights through Congress while military appropriations were increasing drastically in pursuit of an emerging ambiguous war plan to attack Iraq. (p. 178)

A number of journalists (and the *New York Times* collectively) later expressed regret for how the lead-up to the Iraq War was handled by the press, acknowledging failures of independent reporting. The *New York Times* (May 26, 2004) said, "Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged -- or failed to emerge." When journalist John Pilger (2004) asked former CBS *60 Minutes* anchor Charles Lewis in 2003, "What if the freest media in the world had seriously challenged Bush and Rumsfeld and investigated their claims, instead of channeling what turned out to be crude propaganda?" Lewis replied, "If the media had been more aggressive and more tenacious towards getting the truth, there is a very, very good chance we would not have gone to war in Iraq" (p. 20). Lewis elaborated:

You know, under Bush, the compliance and silence among journalists is worse than in the 1950s. Rupert Murdoch is the most influential media mogul in America; he sets the standard, and there is no public discussion about it. Why do the majority of the American

public still believe Saddam Hussein was behind the attacks of 9/11? Because the media's constant echoing of the government guarantees it. (Pilger, 2004, p. 20)

Journalistic failures to challenge government narratives on Iraq may, as Lewis asserts, have contributed to the eventuality of the war—but they certainly contributed to the miseducation of the American people. Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis's (2003) examination of a large set of polling data found that over 60% of respondents incorrectly believed that evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda had been found, weapons of mass destruction had been discovered in Iraq, or that world public opinion favored the US going to war with Iraq. These misperceptions were deeply tied to the respondents' preferred media source, with 80% of Fox News viewers believing at least one, compared with only 23% of audiences preferring NPR or PBS. Further, these misperceptions were deeply tied to support for the war. Only 23% of respondents with none of these misperceptions supported going to war with Iraq, compared with 53% of those with one misperception, 78% with two, and 86% with all three.

Even the act of referring to an event as terrorism appears to be driven, in part, by a reproduction of government narratives. As previously noted, government actors usually determine when to label an act as terrorism (Schmid, 2004), with journalists using the label only once government sources have done so. Brigitte Nacos (2007) maintains that media operatives, aware of the negative connotations of the word, seem "uncertain and confused" in their use of the label (p. 25). As such, they seek "safe" situations in which the label is permissible to use, and are therefore more likely to use the word "terrorism" to describe politically motivated violence when Americans are victims of the attack (similarly, foreign media outlets use the word when their own citizens are victims), when the perpetrators are from the Middle East, and when political leaders have used the term to publicly describe the incident (Nacos, 2007).

In the case of stories on terrorism and counterterrorism, it is not unusual that most sources are related to government. Federal, state, and local agencies and officials are most likely to possess “inside” information on terror events and the policies employed to disrupt or respond to those events. In their attempt to obtain information from their sources in government, journalists are made part of a metaphoric tug-of-war, vying for control of the news narrative with a government which seeks to utilize the media to transmit particular messages. As noted by Hess and Kalb (2003), there is a

clash between those in government who have the responsibility to provide for the common defense, as established in the Constitution, and those who have the responsibility and the right, guaranteed by the same Constitution, to tell the public what the government is doing and where and how well the government is doing it. (pp. 10-11).

As with the symbiosis between terrorism and media, there is, too, a symbiosis between the goals of the press and the goals of those in government seeking to manage national security issues. The press may (and does) publish information that the government wishes to suppress, as when reporters released details of the identity and manhunt for Faisal Shahzad, who was later convicted for the 2010 attempted car bombing in Times Square. The release of this information caused Shahzad to try to flee New York City, and he was apprehended on a commercial airplane at John F. Kennedy airport just prior to takeoff.

Though there is an ever-present push-and-pull relationship between government and media, Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston (2007), as cited in Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro, (2011) conclude that journalists nonetheless frequently remain “within the sphere of official consensus and conflict displayed in the public statements of key government officials who manage the policy areas and decision-making processes that make the news” (p. 12). The Sphere

of Consensus is one of three spheres of media coverage proposed by Daniel Hallin (1986). It refers to the type of coverage that occurs about a topic upon which there is a perceived widespread consensus, and thus for which "journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or to remain disinterested observers." Instead they collectively "serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values" (p. 117). Different journalistic standards apply, on the other hand, to the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy, that is

the region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues recognized as such by the major established actors of the American political process. The limits of this sphere are defined primarily by the two-party system—by the parameters of debate between and within the Democratic and Republican parties—as well as by the decision-making process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch. Within this region, objectivity and balance reign as the supreme journalistic virtues. (p. 116)

On the outskirts of these spheres lies the Sphere of Deviance, "the realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard," where journalism "plays the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political conflict" (Hallin, 1986, p. 117).

Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston (2007) and Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro (2011) argue that, ultimately, the reliance of the press on the narratives of government relegates terrorism coverage to operate within the values, needs, and social constructionism of the state. The War on Terror becomes consensus, and disputes about how to protect the American people from the specter of terrorism are confined to two-party debate about a limited set of "legitimate" and established political perspectives. For example, the absence of press challenges of the

political consensus on counterterrorism can be seen in the underreporting of drone attacks in Pakistan (McKelvey, 2012), in American press coverage of Syrian refugees that is more frequently framed within a debate about illegal immigration than war and political asylum (Ethical Journalism Network, 2015), and in the abundance of news stories focusing more on whether National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden was a hero or a traitor rather than on the NSA's mass surveillance of millions of Americans (Plumer, 2013).

That the press relies heavily on government sources and often reflects state perspectives on terrorism should not be surprising. As Cook (2005) puts it,

The dominance of official voices is not however simply because it is more efficient for newsmen to focus on them. Not only are officials well organized to help subsidize the news, but their presumed authority allows reporters to create a defensible account. And at its most basic, journalists end up judging the utility of information at least as much by who says it than what it says...Someone in an official role within the governmental hierarchy tends to endow information with the credibility of his or her position in the hierarchy and/or with his or her involvement in the decision-making process; that same person outside that position saying the same thing would be more likely to be seen as providing speculation or hearsay. (p. 97)

Cook (2005) disagrees with the notion that reliance on official sources means that journalists merely parrot the status quo, however. He argues instead that it is much more important to “must consider how reporters’ production values influence the political tone and impact of their reports” (p. 97). Further, Cook asserts that the role of media in government must be understood through the lens of media’s role as a political institution.

Media as a Political Institution

Cook (2005) argues that news media do not merely represent a social institution, but are actually a united political institution within the United States—much like political parties—and the media's importance in the process of policymaking continues to rise. All branches of American government devote more time and money to media relations, including the now-common practice of employing public-relations professionals, some of whom are drawn directly from the field of journalism (McChesney & Nichols, 2010), to determine the best ways to “go public” with information. This is not merely to inform a democratic public, and goes well beyond attempting to influence elections and re-election. “The news media have direct contact with and influence upon elites. And not only does information change as it passes through the filters of the media, but political actors respond to the agenda of the news and often anticipate the media's response even before they decide what to do and how to do it” (Cook, 2005, p.10).

There are, according to Cook, three situations in which political actors benefit from the publicity that news media provide: “where making news is, in and of itself, action; where it focuses the attention of other policymakers and thereby sets the agenda; and where it helps to persuade others into action” (2005, p. 117). Cook (2005) asserts that “the extent and kind of media strategy” (p. 118) chosen by political actors depends on the gap between an individual’s or agency's power to effect policy change, and the desired change itself. In other words, when political actors lack the power to get a policy onto an agenda, or wish to defend or increase their budget, use of media is one way to help them achieve their goals. For example, The Pentagon’s [media] strategy is less inclined toward the minutiae of policy than toward educating the public on the need for a big defense, sophisticated (and expensive) weapons systems, and a large bureaucracy...[This] media strategy is influenced by whatever will allow it

to fulfill its perceived mission and protect its programs and its budget (Cook, 2005, p. 147).

Of course, political actors do not have control over the media. “[N]ewsmaking and its place in the political system is best conceived not as a linear, unidirectional process but as interactive and interdependent, the result of ... the *negotiation of newsworthiness*. Political actors and journalists (and only occasionally citizens) interact in a constant but implicit series of negotiations over who controls the agenda, what can be asked, where and how, and what a suitable answer will be” (Cook, 2005, p. 12, emphasis in original).

Due to these negotiations of newsworthiness, political actors now frequently operate by “media logic”—the “form of communication and the process through which media transmit and communicate information” that “tends to be evocative, encapsulated, highly thematic, familiar to audiences, and easy to use” (Altheide, 2006, p. 10). Altheide and Snow (1979) elaborate:

media logic consists of a form of communication; the process through which media present and transmit information. Elements of this form include the various media and the formats used by these media. Format consists, in part, of how material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteristics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication. Format becomes a framework or a perspective that is used to present as well as interpret phenomena. (p. 10)

Recent work in media and politics suggests that political communication and policy logic are often subservient to media logic, media organizational requirements, and news values, ultimately resulting in the previously noted mediatization of politics—the shaping of political actions to obtain favorable media attention (Stromback, 2008).

According to Strömbäck (2008), mediatization, which occurs in several stages, may best be understood as

dominance in societal processes of the news values and the storytelling techniques the media make use of to take advantage of their own medium and its format, and to be competitive in the ongoing struggle to capture people's attention. These storytelling techniques include simplification, polarization, intensification, personalization (Asp 1986; Hernes 1978), visualization and stereotypization, and the framing of politics as a strategic game or "horse race" (Mazzoleni 1987; Patterson 1993). (p. 233)

In Strömbäck's fourth and final stage of mediatization of politics, political actors "not only adapt to the media logic and the predominant news values, but also internalize these and, more or less consciously, allow the media logic and the standards of newsworthiness to become a built-in part of the governing processes" (2008, p. 239-240). Given the near-ubiquitous coverage of media-savvy 2016 Republican Presidential Candidate Donald Trump, who had by March 2016 received approximately \$2 billion in free media coverage from a press which frequently covered Trump's "inflammatory remarks," polling results, and battles with the Republican establishment (Silver, 2016), some would argue that American politics may currently inhabit Strömbäck's fourth stage.

The embedment of the press within the American political process, together with the potential to provide content and to construct events that conform to media production goals and values, render journalistic narratives susceptible to manipulation by policy actors. For example, those who advocate for particular policy solutions, or *policy entrepreneurs*, as John W. Kingdon (2003) refers to them, can leverage a carefully influenced narrative to obtain public support for policy solutions when such support is necessary, or advance policy solutions to the agenda by applying pressure to government actors in other sectors. For instance, in May 2016 Congressional Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi framed the reluctance of House Republicans to

pass a Department of Energy funding measure that included an amendment prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating against LGBT employees as such:

House Republicans' thirst to discriminate against the LGBT community is so strong that they are willing to vote down their own appropriations bill in order to prevent progress over bigotry...In turning against a far-reaching funding bill simply because it affirms protections for LGBT Americans, Republicans have once again lain bare the depths of their bigotry. (Arkin, 2006)

Kingdon's Multiple Streams framework of agenda setting and policy formation is particularly useful to understand the ways this kind of policy entrepreneurship can powerfully influence and shape the production of news narratives to facilitate the creation and selection of preferred policies.

Multiple Streams and the Role of Policy Entrepreneurs

The Multiple Streams framework (MSF) is an empirically oriented and validated theory of policy formation at the national level that seeks to explain how policy items get onto public policy agendas (agenda setting), and the process of policy decision making (Zahariadis, 2007). Outlined by John Kingdon (1995/2003), this framework follows the tradition of Cohen, March, & Olsen's (1972) "garbage can model" of organizational choice, which conceptualizes policy decisions as deriving from a metaphorical garbage can in which generally disconnected problems and solutions are dumped by individuals who drift in and out of the realm of policy decision making. MSF draws heavily from Cohen, March, & Olsen's perspective that no one person controls the process of choice, as fluctuating legislative attendance, opportunities, and attention make the policy process dynamic and interactive. Kingdon's framework is derived from his

extensive analysis of interviews with individuals working in the national policy arena on issues of health and transportation—including congressional staff, upper-level civil servants, political appointees in departments and bureaus, presidential staff, lobbyists, journalists, consultants, academics, and researchers—with an aim toward tapping into “entire policy communities” (1995/2003, p. 5).

Like the garbage can model of policy, MSF assumes that policy decisions involve much ambiguity and a combination of rationality and irrationality in the decision-making process. Kingdon argues that government essentially consists of “organized anarchies,” as Cohen, March, and Olsen put it (as cited in Kingdon, 1995/2003, p. 84), that are characterized by fluid participation in the policy process due to legislative turnover, the influence of nongovernmental actors, and differing amounts of time and attention devoted to decisions.

As noted earlier, Kingdon characterizes the entirety of the policy system as being comprised of three “streams”: problems, policies, and politics. First, MSF theorizes that situations become visible as problems when coupled with statistical indicators, the occurrence of “focusing events,” or feedback from the effects of previous solutions (Kingdon, 1995/2003, p. 94). Terrorism, for instance, is viewed by the American public as a far more concerning problem after the focusing event of September 11th than it was before (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003).

Second, policy ideas are generated by specialists in the policy world; academics, legislators, legislative staff, government executives, or any other individuals with access to the policy process and knowledge of the policy area may generate policy ideas. These ideas are discussed in a variety of policy arenas, and are often altered during the process of policy formation. Those that are selected in this process are chosen for their “technical feasibility”—whether the government can actually hope to employ or enforce the policy given the resources it

currently possesses—and “value acceptability”—whether the values reflected in the policy seem amenable to the cultural values of the American public, and thus have the potential to result in re-election of political actors (Kingdon, 1995/2003, p. 131-132).

Third, the elements that comprise politics streams—national mood, pressure-group campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover—are gauged by legislators via public opinion polling and communications from interest groups, which in turn can help ascertain potential support or opposition to a given political agenda. According to Kingdon's research, national mood and interest-group pressures combined with shifts in ideological composition of groups of policymakers (for example, after an election) exert the most powerful effect on agenda setting at a national level.

While other perspectives on policy formation employ rationality—which assumes that policy makers are utility-maximizers—or constructionism—which assumes that competing groups craft reasonable arguments aiming to persuade the other side (Zahariadis, 2007)—MSF focuses on the process of manipulation of policy makers by policy entrepreneurs, those individuals either inside or outside the policy world who make an attempt to shift policy. Policy entrepreneurs operate by finding problems for their solutions, manipulating information, and locating receptive politicians to manipulate (Kingdon, 1995/2003). Their solutions are not always rational, and their arguments are often designed as attitude and emotional triggers, rather than material for reasoned debate.

This perspective derives from Kingdon's assertion that under conditions of ambiguity, rationality in decision-making is limited; the definition of problems may shift mid-discussion, the relevance of information may be misunderstood or difficult to distinguish, and policy choices, therefore, become less about problem-solving and more about the meaning and

relevance assigned to information. The goal of policy entrepreneurs is to strategically manipulate information to provide context and meaning that serves their interests. To do so, they often use labels and symbols with specific cognitive and emotional triggers to highlight the aspects of a problem or solution that are most likely to lead to a desired policy solution. For instance, discussions on North Dakota's efforts to ban abortions if physicians can detect a fetal heartbeat, regardless of the presence of genetic abnormalities, included comments by State Representative Bette Grande aligning terminations of genetically problematic pregnancies with both discrimination toward those with Down syndrome and the selective breeding and genetic engineering protocols of Hitler (Bump, 2013).

Policy decisions are made, according to MSF, when all three policy streams are joined together at critical moments, referred to as policy windows. Policy windows are opened by the perception in the political stream of compelling problems or the occurrence of an event, as when, for example, a new presidential administration or a specific focusing event draws attention to a particular issue. Focusing events for criminal justice policy shifts are often atypical and particularly horrific criminal acts that swiftly capture public attention, such as, for example, the shooting of twenty children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, in December 2012. In the months after the mass murder by 20-year-old Adam Lanza, media stories were rife with debates on gun control, particularly proposals to ban semi-automatic weapons and high-capacity magazines, and efforts by the Obama administration to enact federal gun-control legislation were accompanied by Vice President Joe Biden's statement that, "For all those who say we can't ban assault weapons, I say one thing: Think about Newtown" (CBS New York, 2013). During an open policy window, which may last for an extended period of time or be very short in duration, policy entrepreneurs and the media may

draw public and political attention to problems. Policy entrepreneurs focus attention on problems and solutions by using strategies such as framing, which involves the presentation of information to draw a specific allegorical reaction, and affect priming, involving the excitation of emotional attitudes by employing symbols with emotive and cognitive power over communities to attract attention. Entman (1993) describes the process of framing similarly to Loseke's (2003) aforementioned "prognostic and diagnostic framing," with framing involving "selection" and "salience," and frames being used to "diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe" (p. 52). He explains:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described...Frames, then, define problems - determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes - identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments - evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies - offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. (p. 52)

Where framing is largely about defining problems and solutions, "affect priming" is largely about provoking emotional responses, and is a subset of Iyengar and Kinder's (1987) more general notion of "priming," a concept describing the process by which news media are able to determine audience's evaluative standards for policies and political actors by steering attention to certain issues. Affect priming is the presentation of an audience with contextual cues designed to provoke a particular emotive schema, which, in turn, triggers specific attitudes and behavior. Erisen, Lodge, and Taber (2014) give a number of examples of how these cues operate in the domain of politics:

In the political arena, these include subtle political symbols such as judicial robes, physical characteristics of people, like skin color or height, and myriad contextual factors... Were we to ignore the effects of implicit influences on citizen judgments, we would fail to appreciate Mendelberg's (2001) findings showing the subtle effect of racial cues in the 1988 Willie Horton ad; Brader's (2006) demonstration of the effects on preferences of upbeat music, smiling faces, and family togetherness, contrasted with dark, moody backgrounds, and threatening images in political ads; or the subtle effects of gender, race, height, and attractiveness on presidential candidate evaluations (Eagly et al., 1991). (p. 188)

While Loseke (2003) does not use the term "priming," this concept is similar to her notions of "cultural themes, which are widely shared values and beliefs about the way the world should work...[They] include such beliefs as the importance of freedom, families, patriotism, and individual responsibility," and "cultural feeling rules,...which are widely shared beliefs about how we should feel about particular types of people [and include] what types of people deserve sympathy and...condemnation" (p. 30). Cultural feeling rules help audiences determine which individuals are stereotypical "villains" that should be punished, and which are stereotypical "victims" that should receive help. These rules are powerful and culturally distinct; Loseke argues that victims in the United States may only be construed as such, and offered help, when they are believed to be "morally good people [who] are greatly harmed through no fault of their own" (p. 79). Similarly, villains are ripe for punishment when they are construed as having intentionally inflicted "extremely horrifying consequences" for "no good reason," and more so when they are also seen as "dangerous outsiders" (p. 84-85). According to Loseke, these cues are

key to understanding when and how audiences accept claims made about definitions and solutions relating to the array of social problems.

The tactics of framing and affect priming are especially conducive to punitive or confrontational policy if the resulting national mood is negative; if the problem can be framed as a threat to the status quo, the resulting national mood also allows for more risk in the solution (Zahariadis, 2007). This kind of problem framing is common for counterterrorism and anti-crime efforts: the implication that Americans should fear victimization creates a national mood that is not only negative and is framed as a loss to the status quo of perceived safety, but that seeks comfort from the perceived security provided by government action. These actions can become increasingly intrusive (as with airport body scanners) or aggressive (as with drone attacks of suspected terrorist regions), so long as the perceived threat to the status quo remains. If the solution does naught but maintain the status quo, policy entrepreneurs frame the “problem” to be solved as a gain relative to the status quo. In other words, the solution proposed is seen as maintaining a gain, rather than merely reinforcing the status quo.

Under Kingdon's model, the media play a minor and subordinate role in setting the policy agenda and in determining which policy options will be selected. Kingdon (2003) asserts that while “mass media clearly do affect the public opinion agenda” (p. 57), mass media do not have a major impact on the policy agenda. Kingdon's sample of policy makers reported feeling disdain for the “public fuss” around some issues, and claimed they ignored media attention of issues that were not already being discussed in the policy world. Kingdon noted that mass media's episodic tendencies—covering one issue, then jumping to another, or what Shanto Iyengar (1991) refers to as “episodic framing”—may dilute the overall effect of news stories on policy. Further, Kingdon notes that media report on, rather than influence, governmental activities, and that the

dramatic storylines sought by journalists are more likely to come at the end of the policy-making process.

For instance, the media may cover a carefully staged and dramatic congressional hearing that took weeks to prepare or that was prompted by some event beyond the control of either media or Congress. In either case, the agenda was set much earlier and by processes not much affected by the media. (Kingdon, 2003, p. 59).

Media do, on the other hand, “act as a communicator within a policy community” (2003, p. 59), Kingdon asserts, and thus, media may influence policy by bringing those policy issues being discussed in one segment of the policy arena to the attention of other policy specialists, even magnifying a problem so that widespread political attention is drawn to the issue.

However, as mentioned above, there are reasons to believe that media may play a much larger role in policy development than Kingdon anticipated. Kingdon argues that media may play a role in shaping public opinion, and to the extent that policy makers utilize public opinion to make policy decisions, media may play an “indirect” role in policy development. Timothy Cook (2005) expands upon this point, observing that Kingdon argues that “[i]n policy realms that are already salient, empirical indicators are deemed most influential; less visible matters require what Kingdon terms 'focusing events, crises, and symbols'... [y]et how do policy areas maintain, attain, or lose salience?” (p. 11). Cook asserts that Kingdon neglects the media's role as key actors in policy formation. While media are indeed reactive to authoritative sources like policy makers in a way that few other policy actors are (Cook mentions the Supreme Court as another reactive policy actor), they are not merely conduits of information provided by policy makers. Journalists are subject to a set of news values and to a range of organizational and institutional

constraints embedded within a particular cultural milieu, all of which impact both how journalists construct narratives, as well as how sources interact with journalists.

While focusing events may make certain policy options more likely, it is often the news media that give attention to particular events in the first place, implicitly or explicitly placing pressure on political actors to act. “Citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by journalists’ reports about these events and situations” (McCombs, 2004, p.1). Problems are defined in the public sphere, and national mood is shaped and interest groups mobilized by the information and events selected for public presentation by the press. As McCombs and Shaw (1972) argue,

In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position. In reflecting what candidates are saying during a campaign, the mass media may well determine the important issues—that is, the media may set the “agenda” of the campaign. (p.176)

Birkland (1998) goes further, asserting that media coverage of focusing events can be vital for groups lacking power in the policy process, as these events are both highly likely to be covered in the press and already possess pre-packaged symbols that can be leveraged for policy advocacy:

A focusing event is an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously (p. 54)...[M]ajor

events often reach the agenda without group promotion through media propagation of news and symbols of the event. (p. 56)

This media propagation of symbols gives less powerful groups another advantage in policy debates. Pro-changed groups are relieved of the obligation to create and interpret powerful images and symbols of the problem. Rather, groups only need repeat the already existing symbols that the media have seized upon as the most important in the current crisis. These obvious symbols are likely to carry more emotional weight than industry or governmental assurances that policy usually works well. (p. 56)

The suddenness of focusing events also gives less powerful groups significant advantages in their debates. The public and policy makers learn of focusing events virtually simultaneously, which diminishes advantages that policy elites have in framing the nature and substance of public problems before broader public participation is possible. (p. 56)

The process by which open policy windows are created by focusing events and the simultaneous joining of the policy, problem, and politics streams is an important and useful analytical tool. It helps in understanding how exceptionally extreme counterterrorism policies—for instance, widespread warrantless mass surveillance of American communications (Macaskill & Dance, 2013), drone attacks in Pakistan that kill unintended civilian targets (Ackerman, 2014), or “enhanced interrogation techniques” of terror suspects that many would characterize as torture (BBC News, 2014)—can come to be normalized in the American political process. First, the framing of these options as being optimal solutions is contingent upon how the problem of terrorism is socially constructed by both the press and political actors. Second, how these individuals construct the problem is largely related to the strategies of policy entrepreneurship.

Symbols, Framing, and Claims-making in the News

Following the logic of both Kingdon (2003) and Cook (2005) on policy formation, there are several strategies of policy entrepreneurship that can be identified as especially important for policy manipulation. These strategies typically work to either take advantage of or create favorable conditions in either the politics or problem streams. According to Kingdon (2003), the policy stream is likely to have solutions aplenty, merely awaiting the right problem and political climate. In the tradition of the “garbage can model,” many policies, including counterterrorism policies, can be found in varying forms in policy discourse long before they become policy. For instance, while mass surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) has been a hot topic of policy discussion since Edward Snowden revealed the extent of data and metadata collection from wide swaths of Internet users, the NSA has publicly and privately lobbied for expanded legal capability to warrantlessly collect such information for decades. In 1994, the NSA sought to require the use of an Internet encryption protocol it developed, and forbade the use of other encryption programs on American networks – specifically to allow it to monitor Internet traffic for “national security” purposes (Doyle, 1994). In 2000, the NSA and FBI jointly attempted to obtain legal power to monitor all US web traffic in search of potential cyber security attacks with the proposed ““Federal Intrusion Detection Network, or FIDNet, a monitoring system in which thousands of computer software programs keep a constant watch on computer networks looking for odd behaviors,” a plan which was publicly supported by then-President Bill Clinton (Blumner, 2000, p. 1D).

It was only after the focusing event of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 that these policies found a far greater political foothold, as Americans were fearful of another attack and angry at the failures of intelligence that led to the completion of the attacks in 2001 (Bamford, 2009). Since those attacks, the NSA has created a number of programs allowing warrantless,

clandestine, domestic data-mining, and examinations of databases of electronic records of emails, online conversations, and internet browser searches, sparking a national debate on the legitimacy of such widespread access to private information that is unconnected to ongoing investigation. While these programs are technically authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, since 9/11, FISA has been amended by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, the Protect America Act of 2007, and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, expanding the authority of the American government to collect intelligence data, especially electronic surveillance data, as a mechanism to prevent and combat terrorism.

Thus, given the existing set of solutions in the policy stream, most attempts to shift public discourse related to policy designed to impact either the problem stream or the politics stream. Government-based policy entrepreneurs seek to shift policy-related narratives for two general audience groups: other government actors, agencies, or departments; and the general public. In the case of the former, media may be used to apply political pressure or to justify current budgets or requests for expanded budgets. In the case of the latter, media may be used to shift voting behavior or mobilize public support for a particular policy solution. In either case, the strategies employed are the same; all tactics for narrative manipulation may be understood as either the aforementioned affect priming or framing. Both serve to define policy problems for the public, and as a result, narrow the range of possible policy solutions.

In practice, affect priming involves the use of cognitive or emotional symbols or labels to trigger particular attitudes or affective states. This strategy taps into the way people organize new information, fitting it into their preexisting ideas, feelings, and beliefs, and making sense of it within a familiar storyline (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). Powerful emotional and cognitive symbols can focus debate on particular aspects of an issue, raise the level of emotional

attachment to certain solutions, and give the status quo either a positive or negative connotation. According to Elder and Cobb (1983) symbols are used by political actors to obtain, communicate, and maintain political power, serving to “undergird authority by legitimizing the distribution of power” (2003, p. 18). In the realm of modern US counterterrorism policy, the legitimization process of the American response in the worldwide “War on Terror” often utilizes symbols supporting the authority of the United States to engage in war with an enemy presence that is concealed from public view, which may attack at any time. The “War on Terror” perspective, either overtly or more subtly, reinforces the notion that Americans are always at risk of a terror attack, that a certain amount of freedom must always be traded for security from these potential attacks, that aggressive counterterrorism policies are the primary means of maintaining security from terrorist threats, and that in such precarious times, the people must have confidence in the counterterrorism policies of the government to keep them safe (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003).

Within this conceptual framework, a multitude of images and visceral responses may be triggered by the particular symbolic metaphors adopted by policy entrepreneurs. For instance, the construction of terrorism as a social problem demanding “war” in response is not done accidentally. In short, the war metaphor, as Loseke (2003) notes, simplifies complexity, rendering nuanced problems in black and white, while also discouraging disagreement or dissent:

“War” is a compelling metaphor. It encourages policymakers to believe there is an identifiable enemy, it conjures up images that the cause is righteous and that there should be unity of purpose. War also evokes the cultural theme of patriotism and makes it difficult for opposing claims-makers to criticize. (p. 107)

In addition to the symbolic metaphor of “war,” Alexander Spencer (2012) identifies three other symbols commonly used to organize the social construction of terrorism: as a crime, an uncivilized evil, or a disease (though “war,” he notes, was by far the most commonly used symbol associated with stories on terrorism in his study period of 2001 to 2005). Spencer states that the “central idea of metaphorisation is that metaphors map a source domain, for example WAR, onto a target domain, for example TERRORISM, and thereby make the target domain appear in a new light” (2012, p. 396). These symbols may be overt (as in the plainly stated “War on Terror”), or they may reference specific war-related language or events. Spencer (2012) notes, for instance, that some news stories specifically compared 9/11 to the attack on Pearl Harbor which preceded America’s entrance into World War II. Language comparing Al Qaeda to World War II enemy forces includes “islamnazis” and “islamofascists” who use “blitz” or “kamikaze” tactics (p. 401). Other warlike phrasing includes terms like “battles,” “sieges,” “warzones,” “frontlines,” “troops,” “battlefields,” “command centers,” “units,” “armies,” “brigades,” “footsoldiers,” “lieutenants,” “commanders,” “military arsenal,” “operations,” “missions,” “bases,” “fortresses,” and “warchest” (Spencer, 2012, p. 401).

Terms like these trigger specific emotional and cognitive schema, thus implying that only certain policy options are relevant. If terrorism is war, then responses that are normally only reserved for war—military attacks on foreign soil, holding enemy combatants without trial, trying suspects by military tribunal rather than in open court—become justifiable and commonplace. If, on the other hand, terrorism is metaphorized as a “crime,” using language like “gang,” “mob,” “criminals,” “crime scene,” “victims of crime,” and “murder” (Spencer, 2012, p. 403), the cognitive and emotional response triggered would likely result in policy discussions implying a judicial response rather than a military response. Symbolizing terrorism as an

“uncivilized evil” (“possessed,” “vile,” “evil,” “monstrous,” “barbaric,” “subhuman”) allows for a dichotomization of good and evil, “us” and “them” (Spencer, 2012, p. 405). Such dehumanization of an enemy is what allows policy options like torture—that would normally never be morally or legally acceptable, even in war—to become normalized. Connecting terrorism with the notion of “disease,” (“sick,” “madmen,” “lunatics,” “psychopath,” “deranged,” “crazed fanatics,” “poisonous clerics,” “infest”) conversely, implies that terrorists must be isolated and quarantined, as is the case with the US collection of suspected terrorists at military camps like Guantanamo Bay. Counterterrorism options are thus constrained by the framing of terrorism, and heavily dependent on symbols and metaphors used to construct the problem.

Frames, the “conceptual tools which media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret, and evaluate information” (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992, p. 60), are employed to evoke an allegorical reaction in an audience.” The frame does not predetermine the information individuals will seek but it may shape aspects of the world that the individual experiences either directly or through the news media and is thus central to the process of constructing meaning” (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992, p. 61). A number of frame types are used in stories on terrorism and counterterrorism, each exemplifying different tactics. One of the most common tactics in application of counterterrorism policy is the leveraging of a focusing event. According to Martha Crenshaw (2001), “[t]errorist attacks, especially spectacular incidents causing large numbers of casualties or targeting important national symbols, will contribute to putting the issue on the national policy agenda” (p. 335). Terror attacks are particularly useful for advocating punitive or confrontational policy options, because they are inherently seen as a loss relative to the status quo. When a terrorist

successfully attacks American interests or citizens, the status quo of peace and safety is broken, and the losses are tallied: of lives, of property, of the illusion of blissful security.

In the absence of a terror attack, policy entrepreneurs may either manufacture or emphasize the danger of a *potential* threat (as was the case when mass Internet surveillance was advocated to protect against cyberterrorism). They may also present their preferred solution as necessary to maintain the status quo by, for instance, pointing out that the US has not had another large-scale terror attack and implying that mass surveillance is what keeps the country from such a fate. Boydston and Glazier (2013) further explore with the impact of perceived deficits to the status quo in their application of the “loss versus gain” themes of prospect theory and the “self-referential versus other-referential” themes of social identity theory to terrorism frames. They argue that major shifts in frame selection regarding terrorism will occur along these two dimensions, because from a sociopsychological perspective, potential losses, especially those perceived to be perpetrated by an out-group, loom larger than potential gains.

Generally, these frames are presented in stories about identified or potential problems and solutions—or what Loseke (2003) refers to as prognostic and diagnostic frames. Facts are given significance by media outlets, which construct the meaning and cause of a condition (a diagnostic frame) and suggest solutions to the problem (a prognostic frame) via the contextualization of the issue within their coverage. In terrorism stories, the way news stories contextualize the problems underlying a terror event implies a specific counterterrorism response. In other words, the prognosis or policy response is logically linked to its causal or diagnostic construction. For example, when a suicide bombing is contextualized as resulting from the inability of a foreign government to control insurgency, the prognostic frame (i.e. the

counterterrorism responses) specified within the news story is likely to be congruent with this perspective (e.g. drone attacks in the region). This contextualization occurs within a “social problems formula story”—a narrative device which contains a narrow plot, a clear cause/effect relationship between the social problem and the proposed solution, dramatic and one-sided characters, and moral tales with clearly evil villains and innocent victims (Loseke, 2003). The story involves “dramatizing the persecution of the good; it is characterized by inflated and extravagant expression, strong emotionalism, heroic confrontation between good and evil, and the need to choose sides” (Loseke, 2003, p. 91). Such is exactly the kind of dramatic storytelling preferred by the news media.

While several studies have examined terrorism’s frames and symbols in the *content* of narratives (e.g. Valenzano, 2009; Nagar, 2010), to date, few studies have examined the role of the *process* of news development in selecting the frames and symbols that appear in terrorism coverage. Of the literature that does examine media production, much focuses on journalists as constructors of coverage. For example, one such study included interviews with journalists about their perceptions of the “war on terror” frame. They found that reporters with *USA Today* reified the government definition of the “war on terror” by conceptualizing the phrase as a series of government policies, actions, and perspectives, and adopting language from the Bush administration to discuss terror-related topics, thereby transmitting the government framing of terrorism and counterterrorism directly through their coverage (Lewis and Reese, 2009).

What has been left largely unexplored by studies on the production of narratives about terrorism, however, is a fuller examination of how the relationship between journalists and their government sources (many of whom have their own policy agendas) impacts the coverage of terrorism. Research in this area would require scholars to go beyond a simple analysis of the

content of coverage, to document instead not only the strategies used by policy entrepreneurs in their framing of terrorism as those strategies appear in content, but also the processes by which these narratives are produced. Understanding the relationship between government policy actors and journalists involves understanding the influence that government has on news narratives, how this influence is negotiated within the press, and the contextualizing of frames and symbols by journalists. Such an examination has yet to be undertaken. The proposed study aims to address this gap, by analyzing the choice of information sources in terrorist coverage, the content of and selection process for stories and event descriptions, and the production context of narratives which employ political symbols and frame devices likely to hold prominence in counterterrorism policy debate and agenda-setting.

Chapter 2: Dissertation Analytical Framework and Methods

Analytical Framework

The dissertation attempts to link several concepts from prior scholarly literature in multiple disciplines into a single, unified analytical framework of terrorism claims-making in mass media and its relationship to agenda-setting in counterterrorism policy. Firstly, this study assumes that terrorism as a social problem is socially constructed via an interactive process of communication amongst the public, mass media, and policy actors. Further, the way that terrorism is socially constructed naturally limits and shapes the range of counterterrorism options considered possible and effective, and thus the social construction of terrorism also directly and powerfully impacts American counterterrorism policy.

Secondly, it is also assumed that the process of socially constructing terrorism is instigated by claims-makers who have high “source power,” to use Gans's (1979/2004) term. These include those media sources for whom press access requires little, if any, work to achieve.

Here, I separate claims-makers with high source power into two distinct groups. The first is composed of policy entrepreneurs, whom I define, following Kingdon (1995, p. 180), as those who both seek the goal of pushing particular policy agendas and maintain “some claim to a hearing” due to their professional expertise on the topic at hand, who possess “an ability to speak for others, as in the case of the leader of a powerful interest group,” or who hold “an authoritative decision-making position, such as the presidency or Congressional committee chairmanship”. The second is comprised of those I will term “*lay framers*”—those who make prognostic and diagnostic claims in mass media, but who are neither part of the policy process nor actively attempting to set policy agendas. Lay framers, under this model, are primarily ideological commentators, pundits unaffiliated with the policy process, journalists, and editors, whose goals are mainly self-promotion, ratings, or profits for news organizations.

Essentially, this analytical framework notes that media content is not created in a vacuum; journalists live in a subjective world in which their assessment of “facts” and “appropriate” sources are subject to the passive influence of professional, organizational, and cultural values and the active influence of policy entrepreneurship. As per Cook's (2005) assessment of political uses of media, I assert that policy entrepreneurs involved in the policy process make diagnostic and prognostic claims about terrorism in the media under two conditions. The first is what I refer to as the *internal communication model* of political communication. The aim of policy entrepreneurs is to put pressure on others involved in the policy process, primarily members of government, to move a policy item to the top of the policy agenda or to make a decision on a pending policy issue. The second, what I call the *external communication model*, occurs when policy entrepreneurs attempt to shift public opinion during an open policy window via the creation of a pressure group campaign. This external

communication is most likely to be a tactic when 1) the policy entrepreneur is attempting to gain control of a policy issue for the purposes of justifying his/her own power (especially as it serves re-election), 2) a government agency is attempting to increase or justify budgetary expenses, 3) a proposed counterterrorism policy is likely to be seen by the public as riskier, more expensive, or less ethically or legally justified than the status quo. Further, these particular kinds of claims-makers—policy entrepreneurs—are likely to “own” the social problem of terrorism, meaning the government's diagnostic frame has become the “taken-for-granted” frame for the social problem of terrorism (Loseke, 2003, p.69). Government claims-makers have become the “accepted authority” on the issue of terrorism, in part because they possess a great deal of information to which journalists require access, and in part due to the press's extreme bias in favor of government actors as sources. Journalists’ reliance on these official sources makes them what Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts (1978) call “primary definers” of concepts, and what Ericson, Baranek, and Chan (1989) refer to as “authorized knowers”—“key power holders” whose selection as sources by media “is bound up with the nature of power and authority in contemporary society” (p. 35).

Finally, this analytical framework asserts that the strategies of political communication and effective claims-making shape the social construction of terrorism. Claims-makers use prognostic and diagnostic frames either in overt language or in the latent content of claims (Loseke, 2003) to assert the “true” nature of the problem of terrorism and the “correct” solutions. When these frames are employed by policy entrepreneurs within the policy process (*governmental policy entrepreneurs*), they may be used to defend existing counterterrorism strategies or to propose new ones. They will likely engage the political symbols of *Security*, *Threat*, and *Risk* to stand in for “larger, more diffuse worries” (Loseke, 2003, p. 68). Other

terrorism claims-making strategies will include simple diagnostic frames and use “fairy-tale” narratives involving victims who are innocent and suffered horribly, and villains who intentionally caused harm for “no good reason” (Loseke, 2003, p. 83). As per Altheide's (2006) and Barkun's (2008) work, these stories are likely designed to stoke fears as a way to obtain more favorable policy results. As such, victims are construed as being potentially “anyone,” and their stories are likely to be highly personalized, whereas villains are likely to be constructed as dangerous outsiders (Loseke, 2003). Further, due to the combative and umbrella-like nature of the “war on terror” frame, new instances of terrorism are apt to be “constructed as a different instance of an already existing problem” (Best, 1990, as quoted in Loseke, 2003, p. 61), a process Loseke calls “piggybacking.” In other words, each new terror incident, rather than being constructed as a separate problem, is likely to be framed as merely a new face to an old enemy, and will be amalgamated into the diffuse and archetypal adversary that Americans fight in the War on Terror. This consolidation of all terror threats into one diaphanous, widespread “bogeyman” can be dangerous. It ignores all nuance of threat, and assumes that all terrorists and terror groups operate the same ways, have the same missions and motives, and can be stopped with the same counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, it limits enforcement attention to only those fitting the profile, risking ignorance of potential terrorists who may not.

In short, this dissertation proposes that news content “sells” counterterrorism policy, and that this content is actively and passively manipulated by governmental policy entrepreneurs, professional journalistic and cultural values, and financial concerns of the news media. This study seeks to identify and to explore the precise mechanisms by which the media-driven political and social construction of terrorism and counterterrorism occurs, the role that

governmental policy entrepreneurs have played in this process, and how the news media interpret governmental policy entrepreneurs' attempts to frame terrorism and counterterrorism.

Aims and Research Questions

The goals of this dissertation are twofold: first, to document the government actors and claims-making strategies involved in the construction of terrorism as a social problem within the public sphere of the American news media, and second, to systematically examine the political and organizational forces influencing the “behind-the-scenes” production of these news narratives. This approach allows the claims-making strategies of governmental policy entrepreneurs that appear in media coverage to be contextualized within the values and operations of journalism that result in the claims’ inclusion in news narratives.

These two research objectives generate quite divergent research questions. As such they will be pursued via a two-phased mixed-methods approach, involving first a qualitative content analysis of news stories during and immediately after a focusing event, followed by an analysis of the production of news narratives from the perspective of those engaged in the production process, as ascertained via interviews with current and former journalists from a variety of news outlets.

The research questions relating to the content analysis phase are as follows:

1. What prognostic and diagnostic claims are made to frame the social problem of terrorism?
2. Who makes these claims?
3. Which claims-making strategies are used to construct these claims?
4. How are terror events (open policy windows) used to advocate for particular counterterrorism policies?

The research questions relating to the interview phase are as follows:

1. How do governmental policy entrepreneurs obtain access to the news narrative?
2. What factors influence the construction of news narratives on terrorism?
3. To what degree are journalists aware of policy entrepreneurship, and what do they think about government attempts to shape news narratives?
4. Under what conditions do journalists challenge government narratives on terrorism?

Research Methods

A content analysis is a method of analyzing textual data that can be adapted to the “substantive and theoretical interests of the researcher” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1277). Content analyses can be quantitative when they are used to determine the frequency or relationship between particular words or phrases, or qualitative when they are used to examine content for themes and underlying meanings (Morgan, 1993). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) define qualitative content analysis “as a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (p. 1278). Qualitative content analysis typically begins with the application of categorical codes, words or short phrases that “symbolically [assign] a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute” to data (Saldana, 2012, p. 3).

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) outline three types of qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed, and summative.

The major differences among the approaches are coding schemes, origins of codes, and threats to trustworthiness. In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the text data. With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. A summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context (p. 1277).

When the goal of research is to describe a phenomenon and there is little or no existing research on the phenomenon, a conventional content analysis is most appropriate because it allows the researcher's categorical codes to flow inductively from the text (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002). Researchers who wish to quantify the use or contextual position of particular words or phrases in text may use a summative content analysis, an approach which does not attempt to infer meaning so much as it attempts to explore usage patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

If the goal of the researcher is to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory,” a directed content analysis is more appropriate (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). This type of analysis is deductive, with theoretical schemas serving to “provide predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships among variables, thus helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between codes” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). Any text that does not fit into an initial theory-driven set of codes is given a new code and analyzed inductively, becoming either a new category or subcategory of an existing code.

One of the goals of this dissertation is to examine the way that governmental policy entrepreneurs apply claims-making strategies during media coverage of a focusing event or open

policy window. As previously noted, these claims-making strategies are documented in a diverse set of scholarly works: Kingdon's 1995 analysis of policy entrepreneurship and setting policy agendas; Loseke's 2003 outline of claims-making strategies within the framework of a social constructionist perspective; Boydston and Glazier's 2013 configuration of frame analysis drawn from prospect theory's "loss versus gain" approach and social identity theory's "self-referential versus other-referential" scheme; Barkun's 2011 "invisible enemy" framework; and Spencer's 2012 delineation of the social construction of terrorism through metaphoric discourse. This dissertation expands upon these works by joining them into a single schema for the purpose of documenting a collective set of claims-making strategies made by governmental policy entrepreneurs in press coverage surrounding terrorism. As such, a directed content analysis is most appropriate.

A content analysis alone is not, however, sufficient to achieve the goals of the dissertation. While it is important to document the nature and frequency of these claims-making strategies in the press, mere documentation cannot explain how governmental policy entrepreneurs gain access to news narratives, nor can it explain the process by which journalists interpret and publish the claims made by government actors. Interviews are a particularly useful method to explore these questions from a journalistic perspective because they allow participants to discuss first-hand experiences along with their internal perceptions and interpretations of those experiences (Kvale, 2008). Further, interviews allow respondents to communicate confidentially with the researcher, and permit the probing of responses for additionally rich detail (Kvale, 2008).

These methods have key benefits for the purposes of this dissertation, but they bring with them challenges. Much like scholarly researchers, journalists have a rigorous code of ethics

surrounding confidentiality of sources (American Society of News Editors, n.d.), and asking members of the press to discuss how they interact with government sources can be a delicate discussion. However, providing participants with a one-on-one confidential environment and focusing on relationship-building between the researcher and the respondent can build trust and result in a more complete dataset (Weiss, 1994).²

Chapter 3: Phase I, Content Analysis

Data Collection and Analysis: Phase I, Content Analysis

The initial phase of investigation is a content analysis of coverage of a single terror event, the Boston Marathon Bombing of 2013, separated into two distinct phases: what I term the *terror event period* and *terror event latency period*. The former is characterized by coverage devoted to the terror attack itself: the tactics, perpetrators, victims, and immediate government response. The latter is a subsequent adjacent time frame during which coverage shifts to updates on the conditions of injured victims and damaged locations, evaluations of law enforcement and government responses, and a more in-depth critical examination of prevention strategies. A purposive selection of one focusing event likely to open a policy window and the subsequent utilization of that window allows for temporal comparisons of the types of prognostic and diagnostic frames, the positions and identities of government claims-makers, and the strategies of claims-making used to structure and shape news narratives about terror events and the proposed solutions to the problem of terrorism.

² Two means of collecting self-report data were deemed less useful for the aims of this dissertation. Focus groups, for instance, involve a small number of participants responding collectively to interview questions (Liamputtong, 2011). This method is susceptible to the skewing of responses by more talkative participants, and a group atmosphere may inhibit journalists' honesty, given the sensitivity of the topic. The use of written surveys is also inappropriate for the aims of this dissertation because they do not allow for the researcher's interaction with participants, and thus would prevent a full and detailed examination of journalists' interpretations of their interactions with governmental policy entrepreneurs.

For purposes of this analysis, all government claims-makers in news stories on the Boston Marathon Bombing are assumed to be operating within the policy process, and are thus considered governmental policy entrepreneurs (the terms “government claims-makers” and “governmental policy entrepreneurs” are thus used interchangeably). I employ two “media noise reduction” techniques in order to ensure that claims made by government actors are clearly those of the government actor, and not being distorted by the journalist. Firstly, the content analysis examines the manifest and latent content of claims *directly attributable* to governmental policy entrepreneurs in the selected news coverage. Manifest content analysis involves “analyzing for the appearance of a particular word or content in textual material” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). “Latent content analysis refers to the process of interpretation of content...[focusing] on discovering underlying meanings of the words or the content” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283-1284).

Secondly, the sample of news articles were selected from *The Associated Press* (AP), an ideologically neutral newswire. The AP, founded in 1896, is a multinational not-for-profit cooperative of news organizations. It is owned by the over 1,400 U.S. newspapers that are AP members and operated by an elected board of directors (Associated Press, 2013). Rather than running its own newspaper, television channel, or radio station, the AP provides content directly to other news outlets. Editors at those outlets then determine which AP stories they will publish. AP is also known for its vast global reach. It

serves news organizations in more than 120 countries in five languages, and delivers news in multiple media formats for newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and online and wireless services. In 2007, more than 4,000 employees staffed more than 240

AP bureaus in 97 countries, making AP's reach and news dominance nearly unparalleled. (Ekstrand, 2009, p. 117)

Determining the slant of political ideology of a news source is not without risk or contention, but this study presumes the political moderacy of the Associated Press for two reasons. Firstly, members of the AP are of a wide-ranging set of political ideologies and interests:

AP's dominance, traditions of objectivity, and speed in news gathering are well documented...Because so much of the AP news report contains member-contributed news and because AP serves so many diverse news organizations, AP editors strive to produce an unbiased news report that reflects the multiple viewpoints each story might require and that would appeal to the most members. (Ekstrand, 2009, p. 117)

Secondly, the AP has a very strict code of political ethics that forbids its employees from engaging in political activity at all:

Editorial employees are expected to be scrupulous in avoiding any political activity, whether they cover politics regularly or not. They may not run for political office or accept political appointment; nor may they perform public relations work for politicians or their groups. Under no circumstances should they donate money to political organizations or political campaigns. They should use great discretion in joining or making contributions to other organizations that may take political stands.

Non-editorial employees must refrain from political activity unless they obtain approval from a manager (AP News Values & Principles, 2013).

AP is arguably as close to an apolitical news source as is possible in modern American media, and thus, news stories on the Boston Marathon Bombing collected from its archives

should hypothetically contain more straightforward statements from governmental policy entrepreneurs and fewer instances of politicized editorializing by journalists.

The Boston Marathon Bombing

The explosions at the 2013 Boston Marathon, allegedly orchestrated by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, killed 3 people and injured over 200 others. Older brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed in a police shootout in Watertown, Massachusetts, after an extensive manhunt. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev has since been convicted in federal court of using and conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction resulting in death and malicious destruction of property resulting in death. He was sentenced to death in May of 2015.

Dzhokhar has stated that the bombing was motivated by America's "attack on Islam" (Reitman, 2013). This case meets Schmid's (2004) definitional criteria of terrorism noted above: the bombing was a violent act resulting in death, injury, and widespread social anxiety and fear, committed by clandestine individuals for political reasons. The direct targets of the bombing were targets of opportunity and largely symbolic of the Tsarnaevs' true target: the United States government and American society (Reitman, 2013). Beyond merely meeting the criteria for a terrorist event, however, one of the primary justifications for selection of the case of the Boston Marathon bombing is the fact that its perpetrators were unaffiliated with any larger terrorist organization. Independent, "lone-wolf" terrorists are particularly frightening to publics because they are assumed to be less detectable than terrorists operating within larger groups. Barkun (2011) notes that it is the perception of dangers concealed in plain sight which creates the most anxiety:

An even greater measure of invisibility appears when terrorist acts are committed not by large, well-administered organizations, but by small, ad hoc groups, or by

individual freelancers, wannabes with idiosyncratic visions answerable to no one. In such circumstances, we seem surrounded by unseen enemies. (p. 35)

It is this particular kind of public fear that may most often be used to justify increasingly intrusive or harsh counterterrorism practices. In fact, lone-wolf attacks have been used by law enforcement in the past to justify the enhanced internet surveillance of the public among other measures. For example, shortly after two men murdered a British soldier in Woolwich, London, in an apparent act of retaliation for perceived attacks on Islam, London's former Metropolitan Chief of Police John Yates told CNN, "It's always the one we feared, the lone wolf that can come from nowhere and not be on our radar... [T]here is some internet surveillance going on...[I]t's been made very clear by police chiefs in recent weeks that if you download something like 'Inspire' you will be arrested, it is an offence and you will be charged" (Thompson, 2013).

The selection of the Boston Marathon bombing coverage for content analysis thus allows for an examination of a recent terror attack, widely covered by American media, that is highly likely to inspire continued fear among the public due to its transpiration on American soil by a previously "unseen" threat. It is hypothesized that these features make this bombing an ideal focusing event that governmental policy entrepreneurs might seize upon and reference in their attempts to promote counterterrorism policies.

Sampling

To collect news stories on the Boston Marathon Bombing during the *terror event period*, I searched the media database of LexisNexis for the keywords "Boston Marathon" and "bombing" or "explosion" appearing in the headlines and lead paragraphs of Associated Press coverage for the period of April 15, 2013 (the date of the attack) and April 21, 2013. This time frame was selected by examining the "Google Trends" count of web searches for the phrase

“Boston Marathon” in April and May of 2013. Google Trends is a tool utilized by search engine Google to describe the popularity of specific search terms entered into its search engine over time, with the number '100' designated to represent the maximum number of total searches for a term relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. A declining rank indicates that the popularity of the search term has decreased compared to other search terms, and can be used as a rough indication of a decline in public interest in a particular topic relative to other topics.³ On April 15, 2013, the phrase “Boston Marathon” had a Google Trend score of 100. By April 21, 2013, the score had declined to a 7, indicating that public searches for the term had drastically declined relative to its peak a week earlier. April 21, 2013 was the first date that the relative search popularity of the phrase “Boston Marathon” declined below 10, relative to its peak on April 15, 2013. The total number of articles derived via this method of search was 126.

The sample for the *terror event latency period* was derived in a similar fashion. Associated Press articles were selected from LexisNexis, but the search parameters included a different time frame and search terms. In this case, the *terror event latency period* is presumed to begin on April 22, 2013, and is extended to six months after the initial terror attack, for an end date of October 15, 2013. This wide time frame allows for exploration of temporal shifts in strategies of policy entrepreneurship. To limit the topics of discussion to only those relating to policy options, the search term “counterterrorism” was added to the search term “Boston Marathon.” Articles with either of these terms appearing in either the headline or lead paragraph of the same article were then selected for the sample. The resulting number of articles for this search was 49. Combined, the corpus consists of a total of 175 AP articles for analysis.

³ More information on this tool can be found at <https://www.google.com/trends/>

Coding and Content Analysis

Both the manifest (what is actually written or said) and latent (the underlying meaning of what is written or said) content of these stories were examined. HyperRESEARCH, a Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) program, was used to conduct a simultaneous quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to provide a detailed in-situ description of the nature of the policy-related media-framing process. This description includes the frequency in which individual governmental policy entrepreneurs' (as defined by Kingdon's criteria outlined above) appear in the coverage; the organizational and political affiliations of policy entrepreneurs; the nature, content, and frequency of specific prognostic and diagnostic frames regarding terrorism and counterterrorism; and the strategies of policy entrepreneurs used to frame terrorism and counterterrorism.

As previously noted in Chapter 2, several claims-making conceptualizations were joined to form a single schema for analysis: Kingdon's 1995 analysis of policy entrepreneurship and setting policy agendas; Loseke's 2003 outline of claims-making strategies within the framework of a social constructionist perspective; Boydston and Glazier's 2013 configuration of frame analysis drawn from prospect theory's "loss versus gain" approach and social identity theory's "self-referential versus other-referential" scheme; Barkun's 2011 "invisible enemy" framework; and Spencer's 2012 delineation of the social construction of terrorism through metaphoric discourse. This schema, outlined in Table 1, was developed after multiple rounds of qualitative coding aimed at documenting the thematic content of prognostic and diagnostic frames and noting the accompanying cognitive and emotional symbols. Once finalized, the schema became a coding guide for a directed content analysis.

This process was guided by the principles of grounded theory and analyzed utilizing inductive logic, seeking thematic patterns in both manifest and latent language. In an inductive

analysis, the “researcher discovers recurrent phenomena in the stream of local experience and finds recurrent relations among them” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 155). Inductive analysis is a core component of grounded theory. Grounded theory, a method initially outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), is developed by first categorizing observations into conceptual topics. These topics are informed by the issues of interest (e.g. the cognitive and emotional symbols documented by the noted scholars) derived from the study's conceptual framework. The next steps in grounded theory-building involve testing the logic of the initial categorization via further observation and connecting this these data into to logical overarching themes or patterns. The result is a theory of causal or correlative inference which is grounded in, and built from, the initial data collection process.

Grounded theory was chosen as the most appropriate approach to the topic because existing scholarship is fragmented and subdivided by disciplines, so it lacks theoretical cohesion. The study’s aims are not to test a given theory, but to develop a theoretical framework to unify these competing perspectives. Adopting a grounded theory approach for this descriptive and exploratory study allows emergent patterns among governmental claims-making strategies to be observed and recorded, informing future research and theory building.

The process of coding is iterative under the grounded theory approach. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967),

Joint collection, coding, and analysis of data is the underlying operation. The generation of theory, coupled with the notion of theory as process, requires that all three operations be done together as much as possible. They should blur and intertwine continually, from the beginning of an investigation to its end. (p. 43)

The coding process, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967), involves *systematic coding*, or noting categories or properties of data in search of emergent categories which are reformatted and pruned over the course of the analysis. Glaser and Strauss (1967) further describe how these categories are grouped: “Lower level categories emerge rather quickly during the early phases of data collection. Higher level, overriding and integrating, conceptualizations-and the properties that elaborate them-tend to come later during the joint collection, coding and analysis of the data” (p. 36).

The coding process for this dissertation’s content analysis took place in three phases, and was guided by the principles and framework laid out by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Saldana’s *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (2009). In the first coding phase, all statements directly attributable to current or former government actors were identified (N = 115). Of the 175 articles selected for review, only 46 contained statements that could be directly attributable to government actors. Another 39 articles contained statements that were indirectly attributable to government actors, but these statements were not coded for analysis because they were either paraphrases by journalists or from unidentified government sources.

In the event that the same statement appeared in multiple articles, only the first statement was coded, as it was the content rather than the frequency of entrepreneurial messages that was the focus of analysis. Multiple identifying codes for each government actor, including specific associated agencies or organizations, were also recorded in this phase. For example, Harry Reid, who at the time was the Democratic U.S. Senate Majority Leader, was assigned concurrent identifying codes *Harry Reid*, *Democrat*, *Senate*, and *Senate Majority Leader*. These identifying codes allowed statements to be grouped by individual, by agency/organization, or by political group. All statements were also given one or more descriptive codes, which “summarize the

primary topic of the excerpt” (Saldana, 2009, p. 5). Some of these codes were “In Vivo” codes, which are codes taken directly from the language of the text (Saldana, 2009, p. 6). For example:

Statement	Identifying Codes	Round 1 Codes
[President Obama:] “So if you want to know who we are, what America is, how we respond to evil, that’s it. Selflessly. Compassionately. Unafraid.”	President Democrat White House Barack Obama	“What America is” “Who we are” American identity Fearless “How we respond to evil” Hero vs. Villain

The second phase of coding took place immediately following the first, and consisted of grouping all statements made by governmental policy entrepreneurs into one or more “claims-making” categories, the final list of which is outlined in Table 1. Claims-making categories, as I define them, are conceptual categories that reflect symbolic strategies of claims-making and framing, and thus are referred to for the remainder of this dissertation as “claims-making symbols” or “symbols”. This process of category development took several weeks of coding and re-coding, along with concurrent examination of various literatures related to claims-making and policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 2003; Loseke, 2003; Barkun, 2011; Spencer, 2012; and Boydston & Glazier, 2013). This is consistent with the prescribed process of qualitative coding as laid out by Saldana (2009), in which multiple rounds of coding and recoding “further manages, filters, highlights, and focuses the salient features of the qualitative data record for generating categories, themes, and concepts, grasping meaning, and/or building theory” (Saldana, 2009, p. 8). Once finalized, the list of claims-making symbols was sorted into a codebook, and each code was given a conceptual definition to improve reliability of code application to statements. Finally, each statement was assigned one or more claims-making symbol codes in a preliminary analysis.

Table 1: Content Analysis; Analytical Schema

Claims-making Symbol	Conceptual Definition	Associated Scholarly Work
Disorder vs. Order	Terrorism represents a sense of disorder; counterterrorism efforts are a way to provide restoration of the social order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boydston and Glazier • Kingdon
Loss	Terrorism results in a loss of American life, property, or interests; counterterrorism is a gain to the status quo or recoup of prior loss	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boydston and Glazier • Kingdon
Risk	Terrorism indicates future risk of danger; counterterrorism is the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boydston and Glazier • Kingdon

	elimination or mitigation of risk	
Invisible enemy	Terrorism is dangerous because it represents an invisible enemy; counterterrorism is the solution via discovery of these hidden enemies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barkun
Anti-American	Terrorism is anti-American or against the American way of life; counterterrorism is patriotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loseke
Clear Villain	Terrorist is an unequivocally evil villain; counterterrorism and those who enforce it are clear heroes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loseke
War	Terrorism is part of a war; counterterrorism is an effort to win the war (“War on Terror”)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spencer • Loseke
Outsiders	Terrorism originates from outsiders (“them”); counterterrorism represents the in-group mentality (“us”)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spencer

The third and final phase of coding in the content analysis took place six months after the second. This gap in time was needed to improve the reliability of application of codes via the test-retest method. Reliability “is a matter of whether a particular measurement technique, applied repeatedly to the same thing, will yield the same result each time” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2010, p. 136). Test-retest reliability refers to consistency of results of the same measurement tool being applied at two different times, and the test-retest method is a way to test the reliability of a measurement tool by applying it at two different times and calculating the degree of difference between results (Maxfield & Babbie, 2010). Krippendorf (2013) recommends the test-retest method in content analyses, in which “one observer rereads, recodes, or reanalyzes the same text” to detect inconsistencies in findings at multiple points in time (p. 270). While this method is not necessarily considered as valid an assurance of reliability as interrater coding would be (Krippendorf, 2013), the nature of a dissertation prevents the use of multiple coders, making the test-retest method the best available option.

During the third phase of coding, all government statements were re-coded via the fresh application of claims-making symbol codes. Approximately 87% of statements were assigned the exact same claims-making symbol codes during this round of coding as they were during the last round. For the remaining statements (N = 14), codes were ultimately assigned by comparing those that were assigned in both coding cycles, and reflecting upon the conceptual definitions to determine which codes ultimately applied (or did not apply). During this phase, identifying codes were also revisited. These codes were aggregated up to manageably sized conceptual-identifying categories to best describe differences among groups of individuals. For instance, the previously noted example of Senator Harry Reid was coded up to the highest level of identifying characteristic possible: Democrat. Ultimately, statements made by governmental policy entrepreneurs were categorized as being made by Democrats, Republicans, Local Law Enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security, or Federal Law Enforcement.

Results: Phase I, Content Analysis

Terror Event Period

The overwhelming majority of statements found in the coverage during the *terror event period* (N=126) were made by Democrats (N=44), specifically by President Barack Obama (N=35). This is unsurprising given the natural amplification of a president's political role during times of national tribulation and the affordance of the presidency of a bully pulpit on nearly any issue (Cook, 2005). The remaining statements were spread fairly evenly among Vice President Joe Biden (N=1), Majority Leader Harry Reid (N=1), Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel (N=1), Boston Mayor Tom Menino (N=1), Sen. Diane Feinstein (N=1), and Reps. Adam Schiff (N=1) and Dutch Ruppersberger (N=2). In addition, there was one official White House statement that

was coded but unattributable to President Obama himself, but was coded separately as a Democratic statement representing his administration.

Republican statements (N=12) were also spread evenly among multiple elected officials. One statement per official was coded for House Speaker John Boehner, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Sen. Saxby Chambliss, Sen. John McCain, Sen. Kelly Ayotte, Sen. Greg Ball, Reps. Michael McCaul and Ed Royce, and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Two coded statements were attributable to Sen. Lindsey Graham.

Local law enforcement coverage centered around Boston, the locus of the attack, with seven statements attributable to Boston Police, nearly all of which came from Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis (N=6). Police Chief Edward Deveau of Watertown, MA, the town in which Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was apprehended, made just one statement. Comparatively, there were three statements attributable to federal law enforcement personnel, namely Special Agent Richard DesLauriers (N=2) and FBI Director Robert Mueller (N=1). Finally, three statements were coded that were attributable Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, the sole spokesperson from the Department of Homeland Security. The analysis reveals that each of these groups engaged in different policy-entrepreneurial patterns (see *Figure 1*).

	Disorder		Anti-American		Risk		Clear Villain		Loss		Invisible Enemy		Outsiders		War		Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Democrat	23	34	13	19	9	13	6	9	6	9	4	6	5	7	1	1	67
Republican	6	33	1	6	8	44	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	11	18
Local Law Enforcement	3	16	0	0	7	37	1	5	0	0	2	11	2	11	4	21	19
Federal Law Enforcement	1	20	0	0	1	20	1	20	0	0	2	40	0	0	0	0	5
Department of Homeland Security	3	38	1	13	3	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	8

Figure 1: Frequency of Claims-making Symbol Codes, Terror Event Period

Democrats' Use of Symbols

For Democrats, the most frequently utilized claims-making symbols centered around restoration or reinforcement of social order (Disorder, N=23, 34%), This perspective frames counterterrorism measures as patriotic and contrasts the first responders to terror attacks with Anti-American terrorists (Anti-American, N=13, 19%), and the presentation of continued risks as reifying and expanding the current homeland security regime system (Risk, N=9, 13%). When either Risk or Disorder converged with Anti-American political symbolism for Democrats, the resulting interactive claims-making approach emphasized the strength and resilience of the existing social order and existing administrative efforts to combat terrorism. It invoked notions of solidarity and patriotism to support America's responses to terrorism.

For example, President Obama's speech the day after the bombing, published in full by the AP on April 16, 2013 ("President Obama's remarks on Boston explosion," 2013), clearly exemplifies this category:

I've directed my administration to take appropriate security measures to protect the American people. And this is a good time for all of us to remember that we all have a part to play in alerting authorities if you see something suspicious, speak up". The heroism of those who rushed forth to aid the victims of the bombing was apportioned to all Americans by Vice President Joe Biden at the Michigan state Democratic Party's annual Jefferson-Jackson dinner when he noted that many "were running to help their fellow runners and citizens watching. It was an instinct, sort of stamped in our DNA. ("President Obama's remarks on Boston explosion," 2013)

When symbols of Disorder and Risk were combined by Democrats, there was a hint of a potential for future danger, tempered by faith in the current system of protection. This was exemplified by President Obama on April 15, 2013: "I've directed the full resources of the

federal government to help state and local authorities protect our people, increase security around the United States as necessary, and investigate what happened” (“Text of Obama's remarks on Boston explosions,” 2013). More explicitly, President Obama noted that “with public safety at risk and the stakes so high, it's important that we do this right” (Pace, 2013a). President Obama’s remarks reveal his confidence that the “full resources of the federal government” can be relied upon to protect the American public, and imply that the audience can share this certainty.

When the symbol of Risk was used alone, Democrats couched it in a professed need for security. For instance, Maryland Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger said, “We want to make sure this is not a pattern,” warning that “people could expect to see greater security at public areas such as train stations, ports and baseball games” (Pace, 2013b). Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel used the marathon bombing as a window for touting Chicago's surveillance camera system, stating that “[t]hey serve an important function for the city in providing the type of safety on a day-to-day basis not just for big events like a marathon” (Crary, 2013).

Democrats whose sole political symbol was that of Disorder focused almost entirely on amassing the resources of the federal government and current administration in an effort to restore order and a sense of security for the public. This was particularly true of President Obama, for whom nearly every statement included this political symbol. Just after the bombing, President Obama focused on reassuring the American public by insisting that “We will find out who did this. We'll find out why they did this...Any responsible individuals, any responsible groups, will feel the full weight of justice” (Pace, 2013b). He also expressed “extraordinary confidence in the men and women of the FBI, the Boston Police Department, and the other agencies that responded so heroically and effectively in the aftermath of yesterday's events” (“President Obama's remarks on Boston explosion,” 2013). Majority Leader Harry Reid reported

on the Senate floor that Obama had “pledged every federal resource available ... to bring justice to the perpetrators” (Espo, 2013).

Moreover, the symbol reemerges once the perpetrators of the attack were located and neutralized. President Obama noted that the arrest of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev “closed an important chapter in this tragedy,” (Pace, 2013a) while Boston Mayor Menino's tweet on social media platform Twitter was reported to be simply, “We got him” (Lindsay & Peoples, 2013). These reifications of the overarching social and political order, despite the disorder a terror attack can bring, may be explained by the fact that with a Democrat in the White House, the party had an interest in expressing confidence in the present administration. This is especially true of the President himself, who leveraged the Disorder symbol frequently. As a leader of both his political party and country, President Obama’s reassurance that order would be restored is expected.

Other patterns emerged when Democrats used different combinations of claims-making symbols. When used alone, for instance, the Clear Villain symbol was employed by President Obama to condemn the perpetrators, by, for example, declaring that the bombing “was a heinous and cowardly act” (“President Obama's remarks on Boston explosion,” 2013). More frequently, this symbol was used in conjunction with the Anti-American symbol, as when President Obama said, “So if you want to know who we are, what America is, how we respond to evil that's it. Selflessly. Compassionately. Unafraid” (“President Obama's remarks on Boston explosion,” 2013). The Clear Villain symbol was also a frequent covariant of the Outsiders symbol, as it was in another quote of President Obama:

“We finish the race, and we do that because of who we are...[a]nd that's what the perpetrators of such senseless violence these small, stunted individuals who

would destroy instead of build and think somehow that makes them important that's what they don't understand” (LaVoie & Geller, 2013).

The Invisible Enemy symbol was frequently focused primarily on the assurance that the terrorists would be found, as when President Obama noted,

What we don't yet know, however, is who carried out this attack, or why; whether it was planned and executed by a terrorist organization, foreign or domestic, or was the act of a malevolent individual. That's what we don't yet know. And clearly, we're at the beginning of our investigation...[I]t will take time to follow every lead and determine what happened. But we will find out. We will find whoever harmed our citizens and we will bring them to justice. (“President Obama's remarks on Boston explosion,” 2013)

Loss was another frequent theme in President Obama’s statements. The symbol was used either as an expression of Presidential condolences, as it was when he said, “Michelle and I send our deepest thoughts and prayers to the families of the victims in the wake of this senseless loss,” (“Text of Obama's remarks on Boston explosions,” 2013) or in conjunction with an assurance of order restoration, as it was when he said, “The families of those killed so senselessly deserve answers” (Pace, 2013a).

Similarly, all expressions of the Outsiders symbol were employed by President Obama, sometimes combined with the Disorder symbol. When these two frames were combined, the result was a reassurance that America would persevere despite the acts of people who were not part of American society: “If they sought to intimidate us, to terrorize us ... [i]t should be pretty clear right now that they picked the wrong city to do it...We may be momentarily knocked off our feet, [b]ut we'll pick ourselves up. We'll keep going. We will finish the race” (“A look at the deadly Boston Marathon bombing,” 2013).

The sole expression of a War symbol among Democrats came from Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, who noted that the Tsarnaevs had “clearly amassed a small arsenal of explosives” (Braun, 2013).

Republicans' Use of Symbols

The patterns of political symbols were different within the policy entrepreneurial strategies of Republicans, for whom the two most frequent symbols were Risk (N=8, 44%) and Disorder (N=6, 33%). I had initially hypothesized that Republicans might have been equally likely to utilize the Anti-American symbol in reinforcing the heroism of first responders, but this turned out to be a false assumption; while there were many assertions made by President Obama that “Americans refuse to be terrorized” (Kuhnenn, 2013) and that “on days like this, there are no Republicans or Democrats” (“Text of Obama's remarks on Boston explosions,” 2013), only one Republican, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, employed this symbol. He focused his comments on America's military, combining the symbols Anti-American and War when he said that he “marveled at the coordination, skill, and bravery of military, intelligence, and law enforcement officials at every level” (Pace, 2013a).

Republicans' use of the Disorder symbol was decidedly different than that of Democrats. Whereas Democrats used the frame to reassure that order would be restored, Republicans used it critically, insinuating that the current Presidential administration had not yet, or could not, restore order after a terror attack. Sometimes these statements were blatant declarations that the country did not have sufficient intelligence about the attackers. Rep. Michael McCaul said, “We just don't know whether it's [the bombing] foreign or domestic” (Espo, 2013). Others were more circumspect in their suggestion that President Obama may find it difficult to achieve order restoration through counterterrorism efforts. For instance, former Secretary of State Condoleezza

Rice said that President Obama “has to be very careful not to give out information prematurely here and they have to be sure they aren't tipping off the people who are responsible” (Pace, 2013c).

In both instances in which a Republican praised order restoration efforts, the comments were directed at law enforcement. Referring to the New York City Police Department's counterterrorism protocols, Mayor Michael Bloomberg's said, “Some of the security steps we are taking may be noticeable. And others will not be” (Abdollah & Long, 2013). House Speaker John Boehner's described Boston law enforcement's response to the attack as “a job well done under trying circumstances” (Pace, 2013a). These statements are emblematic of this focus on law enforcement as order restorers, and they are contrasted with Republicans' implications that the Obama administration lacks the capability to restore order.

The Republican critique of the Obama administration was perhaps most prominent in their employment of the Risk symbol. Rep. Ed Royce, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the bombing “yet another stark reminder that we must remain vigilant in the face of continuing terrorist threats” (“Witnesses describe scene of marathon bombing,” 2013). Additionally, there were several Republican condemnations of aspects of the criminal processing of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Senator Saxby Chambliss, for instance, said “I am disappointed that it appears this administration is once again relying on Miranda's public safety exception to gather intelligence which only allows at best a 48-hour waiting period that may expire since the suspect has been critically wounded” (Sherman, 2013). Similarly, Sens. John McCain, Kelly Ayotte, Lindsey Graham, and Rep. Peter King released a joint statement stating that they had “concerns that limiting this investigation to 48 hours and exclusively relying on the public safety exception

to Miranda, could very well be a national security mistake. It could severely limit our ability to gather critical information about future attacks from this suspect” (Sherman, 2013).

Law Enforcements’ Use of Symbols

The symbols utilized by the FBI, local police, and Department of Homeland Security were remarkably similar. The most frequently utilized symbols among these law enforcement agencies were Risk (N=11, 34%), Disorder (N=7, 22%), War (N=5, 16%), and Invisible Enemy (N=4, 13%). The symbol of Risk was a frequently co-occurring frame; in nearly every instance in which either War or Invisible Enemy claims-making symbol codes were applied, Risk was a thematic constant. The confluence of War and Risk was apparent in statements by Watertown’s police chief, Edward Deveau, regarding the apprehension of the Tsarnaevs:

We're in a gunfight, a serious gunfight. Rounds are going and then all of the sudden they see something being thrown at them and there's a huge explosion...There were over 250 rounds of extended ammunition that was found at the scene. This was a five- to 10-minute gun battle that occurred there, punctuated by loud explosions...This was as dangerous as it gets in urban policing. (Murphy & Zezima, 2013)

A statement by Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis is also emblematic of a combined hint of future danger combined with distinct warlike imagery:

We have reason to believe, based upon the evidence that was found at that scene the explosions, the explosive ordnance that was unexploded and the firepower that they had that they were going to attack other individuals...[t]hat's my belief at this point. (Breed & Peoples, 2013).

When combined with Disorder, the Risk theme appeared to be used to amplify the sense of urgency devoted to restoring order. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, for

instance, noted that law enforcement at all levels were “work[ing] tirelessly to get to the bottom of the senseless attacks in Boston, and defend and protect the American public” (Pace, 2013a).

In only one instance, Risk was specifically tied to the Outsider theme: when Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis declared, “We believe this man to be a terrorist. We believe this to be a man who's come here to kill people” (Hirsch, 2013).

Terror Event Latency Period

Statements made by governmental policy entrepreneurs in the *terror event latency period* were assigned one of the following identity codes: Democrats, Republicans, Local Law Enforcement, Federal Law Enforcement, or Federal Intelligence/Legal Agencies. Statements were more evenly distributed during this time frame, with 14 statements made by Democrats and 10 by Republicans. President Obama still dominated the political mediascape, however, with 8 of the 14 Democrats' statements attributed to him. The remaining statements were made by then-Secretary of State John Kerry (N=2), Representative Adam Schiff (N=2), Representative Stephen Lynch (N=1), and Representative Dutch Ruppersberger (N=1).

Republican statements were spread fairly evenly across a number of leading members of the party, with Representative Michael McCaul making two coded statements, and one statement each from Representatives Bob Goodlatte, Dana Rohrabacher, Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, and Mac Thornberry, along with Senators John McCain and Marco Rubio. In addition, two Republican candidates for Senate in 2013, Gabriel Gomez and Mike Sullivan, were each quoted once on how they used the Boston Marathon Bombing during primary campaigning.

Like the local law enforcement featured in coverage from the *terror event period*, most of the statements during this subsequent time frame were from Boston or Massachusetts, with one statement attributable to Massachusetts Homeland Security chief Kurt Schwartz, and three attributable to Boston Police Commissioner Edward F. Davis III. The remaining local law

enforcement statements were equally divided among two other large cities, with one statement from Los Angeles police Deputy Chief Michael Downing, and the other from then-NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism David Cohen.

There were five statements attributable to federal intelligence or legal agencies: one each by Shawn Turner, Spokesman for Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Homeland Security Deputy Inspector General Charles K. Edwards, Justice Department spokesman Lou Ruffino, vice chair of the Homeland Security secretary's advisory community on faith-based organizations and communications Paul Goldenberg, and Attorney General Eric Holder. The FBI made two statements, one from FBI spokesman Paul Bresson and the other Boston FBI Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers.

While much of the policy entrepreneurship documented in the *terror event period* focused on retrospective categorization of the terror attack and U.S. preparedness for it, the *terror event latency period* was more prospective. Governmental claims-making in this time frame focused mainly on the remaining holes in security protocols and the associated risk. Democrats and federal intelligence and law enforcement representatives assured the public that gaps were minor and could be addressed, while Republicans called into question America's ability to be responsive to an ever-changing terrorist threat. Statements made by local law enforcement representatives concerned on-the-ground tactics, strategy, and funding they saw as necessary to prevent terror attacks. In the case of Boston Police Commissioner Davis, these statements also took the form of a critique of federal intelligence-sharing efforts with local police. Like the *terror event period*, different groups presented different policy entrepreneurial patterns (see *Figure 2*).

Democrats' Use of Symbols

Among Democrats, the most frequently utilized frames were Disorder (N=10, 38%) and Risk (N=7, 27%), distantly followed by Clear Villain (N=3, 12%) and Invisible Enemy (N=3, 12%). In this time period, Democratic political interests more clearly shifted to a reinforcement of the existing social order, with both Disorder and Risk strategies contextualizing terrorism solutions as firmly within the current administration's counterterrorism capabilities. Nearly all of the Disorder statements were explicitly defensive of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and agencies, partly as a response to governmental reviews of whether intelligence information regarding the Tsarnaev brothers was appropriately investigated and shared. A number of Democrats made statements at the beginning of this inquiry that deflected early criticisms. These included Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, who noted that “right now, it's way too soon to criticize or to start making political arguments or who failed or whatever,” and Rep. Adam Schiff, who commented, “The review is just beginning, but I haven't seen any red flags thus far” (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013). Rep Schiff further elaborated, “Just because the FBI didn't find derogatory information about the suspects doesn't mean it wasn't there to be found. But nor should we leap to a conclusion of malfeasance. Instead, this review may produce one important component of the ‘lessons learned’ from the attacks” (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013).

President Barack Obama both defended his administration's counterterrorism efforts, noting that “the FBI performed its duties, the Department of Homeland Security did what it was supposed to be doing” prior to the bombing (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013), while simultaneously admitting that possible enhancements to protocols may further protect American interests. Statements of this type made up the entirety of co-occurring Disorder and Risk codes, with President Obama's strategic rhetoric riding a line between reinforcing the current system's adequacies and admitting the inherent difficulties in stopping a terror attack. He implies that

even the best-functioning homeland security procedures and protections would never preclude another attack, especially given protections of American civil liberties. Obama called it “hard stuff” to stop terror attacks, especially ones by what he described as “self-radicalized individuals” who choose to kill and maim “because of whatever warped, twisted ideas they may have” (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013). Additional statements by President Obama follow this same theme:

We want to go back and we want to review every step that was taken...We want to leave no stone unturned. We want to see, is there in fact additional protocols and procedures that could be put in place that would further improve and enhance our ability to detect a potential attack. (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013)

Now is the time to ask ourselves hard questions about the nature of today's threats and how we should confront them. In the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. (Jakes & Pace, 2013)

	Disorder		Anti-American		Risk		Clear Villain		Loss		Invisible Enemy		Outsiders		War		Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Democrat	10	38	1	4	7	27	3	12	0	0	3	12	2	8	0	0	26
Republican	7	47	0	0	3	20	2	13	0	0	1	7	0	0	2	13	15
Local Law Enforcement	3	20	1	7	5	33	1	7	1	7	3	20	1	7	0	0	15
Federal Intelligence/Law Enforcement	6	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6

Figure 2: Frequency of Claims-making Symbol Codes, Terror Event Latency Period

The concept expressed in the latter quote also reflects an increased co-occurrence of Risk, Clear Villain, and/or Invisible Enemy or Outsiders codes among Democrats during the latency period. A number of Democrats seemingly deflected attention from the potential systemic issues in America's terror plot detection approach by focusing instead on the singular and unpredictable anathema of this particular terror attack. A number of quotes referred to the “self-radicalization” of the Tsarnaev brothers, with President Obama remarking on the “daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders” (Jakes & Pace, 2013). He further elaborates:

The best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community which has consistently rejected terrorism to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting toward violence (Sullivan, 2013).

The reference to working with Muslim American communities was one offshoot of the Democrats' framing of the failure to prevent the Boston Marathon Bombing more as a function of the difficulty of detecting an “invisible enemy” in a society which values and protects privacy and religious liberties than as indicative of a failure of counterterrorism processes. This is echoed in President Obama's declaration that any inquiries into the federal processes related to prevention of terrorism should determine whether “there [are] more things that we can do, whether it's engaging with communities where there's a potential for self-radicalization of this sort” (Sullivan, 2013). In fact, Democrats' classification of the “invisible enemy” as a core terrorist threat accounted for the entirety of the application of the Risk code within this party. In stark contrast was the Republican strategy, which framed these processes—and the Obama administration—as potentially incapable of dealing with a vast and powerful terrorist threat with many smaller offshoots.

Republicans' Use of Symbols

Republicans' use of the Disorder strategy during this time frame reflected their earlier use: in all instances in which the code was applied, the statement was a direct or indirect criticism of the current counterterrorism mechanisms of the United States. In regards to the congressional delegation sent to Russia (which had warned U.S. intelligence officials about Tamerlan Tsarnaev in 2011) to investigate whether prevention efforts were flawed, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher said, "We think there is some information that is vital for us to know that hasn't been made public yet" (Jakes & Pace, 2013). This sentiment was echoed in Rep. Michael McCaul's comment that the panel sought to "find out how we did not see it coming ... what went wrong, and how to fix it" ("Lawmakers look at 'lessons' from Boston bombing," 2013). Rep. Mac Thornberry grounded the investigation's potential findings to future risk, saying, "We should review what happened, be unafraid to follow the evidence, even if politically inconvenient, and make changes accordingly...[t]he terrorists adapt, so must we" (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013).

Perhaps the most explicit statement against the Obama administration's counterterrorism approach came from Rep. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, who noted that President Obama's statements on security versus freedom at the National Defense University on May 24, 2013 "were only necessary due to a deeply inconsistent counterterrorism policy, one that maintains it is more humane to kill a terrorist with a drone than detain and interrogate him at Guantanamo Bay" (Jakes & Pace, 2013).

For Republicans, the Risk, Invisible Enemy, and Clear Villain statements often implied connections to the danger posed by global Islamic terrorist groups like Al Qaida. Sen. John McCain most clearly outlined this approach: "I believe we are still in a long, drawn-out conflict

with al-Qaida. To somehow argue that al-Qaida is on the run comes from a degree of unreality that to me is really incredible. Al-Qaida is expanding all over the Middle East, from Mali to Yemen and all places in between” (Jakes & Pace, 2013). Others more subtly couched the actions of the Tsarnaev brothers in the larger War on Terror. A week after the attack, Senator Marco Rubio noted that while it was too early to say that the Tsarnaev Brothers had no ties to foreign terrorists, they were certainly “a couple of individuals who become radicalized using Internet sources” (Jakes & Sullivan, 2013). Republican Senate nominee Gabriel Gomez argued that Dzhohkar Tsarnaev should have been tried as “an enemy combatant” (Peoples, 2013), and his opponent, Mike Sullivan, agreed, saying that America's “first concern must always be preventing future terrorist acts against our people” (Peoples, 2013).

Law Enforcements' Use of Symbols

Local law enforcement statements' most frequent codes were Risk (N=5, 33%), Disorder (N=3, 20%), and Invisible Enemy (N=3, 20%). The majority of these statements focused on the importance of obtaining on-the-ground intelligence and access to federal intelligence information in the prevention of terror attacks. These statements were heavily focused on municipal police agencies' abilities to thwart terror plots. For instance, David Cohen, the NYPD's top intelligence official, noted that the Boston attack showed “the need for a vibrant intelligence program that uniquely addresses the counterterrorism security equities of New York City (Apuzzo & Goldman, 2013).” One of the most explicit praises of specific policy options came from Massachusetts homeland security chief Kurt Schwartz, who said that “people are alive today” due to federal grant money for equipment and law enforcement resources (Caldwell, 2013).

A number of statements were made by then Police Commissioner of Boston, Ed Davis, in his testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in the

Congressional inquiry following the bombing. Commissioner Davis testified that local police needed more information about those who may pose a national security threat, saying that there existed a “gap with information sharing at a higher level while there are still opportunities to intervene in the planning of these terrorist events,” noting that the Boston Police Department “was unaware of information the Justice Department had prior to the bombings about Tamerlan Tsarnaev's six-month trip to Chechnya” the year before the bombings (Jelinek & Kellman, 2013). Davis went on to suggest that “cities should look at deploying more undercover officers and special police units and installing more surveillance cameras,” but noted that he does “not endorse actions that move Boston and our nation into a police state mentality, with surveillance cameras attached to every light pole in the city...[w]e do not and cannot live in a protective enclosure because of the actions of extremists who seek to disrupt our way of life” (Caldwell, 2013).

The only code applied to the six statements made by members of federal intelligence and law enforcement organizations was Disorder. The strategy for these governmental policy entrepreneurs was similar to that of Democrats, with all statements actively defending the counterterrorism system in place at the time. Some focused on their agencies' cooperation with governmental review of the intelligence community's handling of information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's spokesman Shawn Turner, for instance, said that “Clapper believes the review will show his agencies shared information about the suspect appropriately” (Sullivan & Dozier, 2013). Boston FBI Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers defended the federal law enforcement's policy of giving local law enforcement passive access to certain intelligence databases provides “accessibility and awareness that otherwise would be unfeasible” (Caldwell, 2013).

Others redirected the conversation to the successful apprehension of Dzhohkar Tsarnaev, like FBI spokesman Paul Bresson who assured that the FBI was cooperating with the inquiry, but also noted that the FBI had a responsibility to “protect the integrity of the judicial process...ensuring both the government's ability to conduct a successful prosecution as well as protecting the rights of all parties involved, including the victims, their families and the defendant, who as it turns out, has a court appearance on the same day as this hearing” (Jelinek & Kellman, 2013).

Some echoed President Obama's discussion of the need for law enforcement to engage with Muslim communities in order to prevent radicalization—and presumably, future terror attacks. Paul Goldenberg, the vice chair of the Homeland Security secretary's advisory community on faith-based organizations and communications, notes, “At the end of the day it's about building capacity and trust between the community and the police that are responsible for their safety. We still have challenges, and we've really got to address those challenges” (Sullivan, 2013).

Chapter 4: Phase II, Interviews

Data Collection and Analysis: Phase II, Interviews

Whereas the goal of this dissertation's content analysis is to document the strategies of policy entrepreneurship apparent in terrorism news coverage during an open policy window, the second phase of investigation—semi-structured interviews with current and former journalists, editors, and producers in news media—is intended 1) to document the process of entrepreneurs' access to the news cycle and 2) to capture news professionals' perspectives on the relationship between journalism and government within the context of terrorism coverage.

Participants were recruited via the snowball sampling method. Snowball sampling, or what Biernacki and Waldorf (1981) refer to as “chain-referral sampling”, is a non-probability sampling technique in which a study sample is derived “through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest” (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, p. 141). This sampling method was originally developed as a way to study social network structure (Coleman, 1958, Goodman, 1961), and was later adapted to obtain access to hard-to-reach populations (Sudman & Kalton, 1986). Biernacki and Waldorf (1981) assert that snowball sampling “is particularly applicable when the focus of study is on a sensitive issue, possibly concerning a relatively private matter, and thus requires the knowledge of insiders to locate people for study” (p. 141).

In snowball sampling, an initial “first wave” sampling frame—referred to as “seeds” within sampling literature—must be developed, generally via a convenience sample leveraging the networks of the researcher or via cold contacts of individuals in the target population (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). The beginning sampling frame in this dissertation began with initial contacts from personal and professional networks of the researcher (N=30). In addition, a “cold” contact sampling frame (N=347) was developed by scouring the staff lists of public websites of national news outlets (including *Fox News*, *Fox News Radio*, *National Public Radio*, *Reuters*, *The Associated Press*, *The New York Times*, *The Boston Globe*, *CNN*, *The Washington Post*, *MSNBC*, *ProPublica*, and *Buzzfeed*) and emailing journalists whose online biographies or recent stories included national security issues.

All 377 members of the sampling frame were sent initial emails that explained the dissertation and interview process, and invited participation in the research. Two follow-up emails were sent: one two weeks after the initial email, and another two weeks after that. The

only journalists who were not sent follow-up emails were those who worked at CNN at the time of contact; I was informed in initial contacts with these journalists that CNN has a policy requiring employees to consult with CNN's Public Relations personnel before submitting to interviews. I subsequently contacted public relations staff members at CNN to whom I was referred by journalists who wished to participate in this research. I was denied access to CNN journalists and told that "CNN does not allow for such interviews, as our producers and talent simply do not have the time available for such requests, due to breaking news and our 24/7 coverage of stories" (personal communication, May 9, 2013).

The first wave of solicitations resulted in 16 participants. Five journalists who were contacted in the first wave chose not to participate but provided additional names to contact, resulting in an additional two participants. The 18 seed participants collectively referred me to an additional 24 journalists, of whom four participated in this research. These four referred an additional 16 journalists, of whom three participated and two declined but referred me to five other journalists. One of those referred journalists participated. Active recruitment of interviewees lasted for 13 months, ultimately resulting in a sample size of 26 interview participants.

One of the ethical constraints surrounding the use of snowball sampling is the possibility of exerting undue pressure to participate when, as the Belmont Report (1979) put it, "persons in positions of authority or commanding influence—especially where possible sanctions are involved—urge a course of action for a subject" (Part C.1., n.p.). To avoid this issue, I did not mention the name of the source who had given me a potential participant's name when contacting them. In situations in which participants preferred to forward my contact information

to colleagues they thought may wish to participate, I asked if any of the individuals they wished to contact were current subordinates or mentees. None were.

Another potential ethical concern with snowball sampling occurs when the researcher receives private information about potential participants from current participants. To avoid this issue, I asked for names rather than contact information, and declined to accept contact information when it was offered. Contact information was obtained via online search instead, and contact was made via the journalists' publicly available email addresses.

Individuals who agreed to participate were sent an informed consent document as required by the Institutional Review Board of the City University of New York (see appendix), and a mutually convenient time frame for the interview was scheduled via email. As per the comfort level of the participant, interviews were conducted either in person, via telephone, email, or Google chat. Interviews conducted either via telephone or in person were recorded with the permission of the respondent as a supplement to field journal notes. Four respondents declined to be recorded. All in-person interviews occurred in mutually convenient public places, at the interviewees' request. To facilitate sample expansion, at the conclusion of each interview, participants were asked if there were colleagues they suggest I contact.

Prior to asking substantive questions, participants were asked about their general journalistic history, information which was supplemented via internet searches of participants' biographies. Specifically, participants were asked in which medium they primarily worked and in which media they had worked in the past, and for how long they had been in the field of journalism. These questions provided data that were used to determine the existence and nature of differences in how journalists engage with government sources based on the medium of their work and the duration of their time in the field of journalism. While each interview began with a

standard list of questions, follow-up questions and prompts were targeted to the narratives each respondent told, resulting in interviews that were very typically conversational in style—even via email. To protect the privacy of participants, no identifying information was recorded in notes or audio files, and identifying information from email and internet chat responses were not copied into electronic files. Further, participants were asked at the outset of interviews to avoid using any names in their responses.

Interviews were semi-structured, though the sequence and inclusion of all questions were largely governed by the flow of the conversation with each journalist. This approach reflects current scholarly practice with regard to qualitative interviews, as described by Kvale (2008):

The interview is focused on particular themes; it is neither strictly structured with standard questions, nor entirely ‘non-directive’. Through open questions the interview focuses on the topic of research. It is then up to the subjects to bring forth the dimensions they find important by the theme of inquiry. The interviewer leads the subject towards certain themes, but not to specific opinions about these themes. (p. 12)

Qualitative interviews are an especially helpful methodological choice for the goals of this dissertation. Weiss (1994) outlines seven research aims that could make qualitative interviewing the most appropriate method of data collection: 1) developing detailed descriptions about events or developments, 2) integrating multiple perspectives, 3) describing process, 4) developing holistic description, 5) learning how events are interpreted by participants, 6) bridging intersubjectivities to allow a situation to be understood from an insider’s perspective, and 7) identifying variables and framing hypotheses for quantitative research (pp. 9 – 11). As previously discussed, this dissertation is an exploratory study examining the role of governmental policy entrepreneurs as sources and the news production processes that result in

narratives with political and emotional symbols that may well shape counterterrorism policy debate and agenda-setting. These research goals are best served by documenting the observations and opinions of a group of individuals with intimate knowledge of these processes: the journalists for whom these news stories are work product. To fully understand the intersecting social and professional processes that culminate in terrorism news coverage requires an integration of the “fullest, [most detailed] reports possible” (Weiss, 1994, p. 9) from multiple journalists from a variety of news organizations, as no one journalist has observed the full process in its entirety. While this dissertation does not collect the perspectives of other members in the production process of news stories on terrorism and counterterrorism—including editors, producers, other journalistic support staff, and the governmental policy entrepreneurs themselves (a limitation that is discussed in more detail later in this dissertation)—the documentation of this process ultimately requires the holistic approach Weiss describes. “By putting together process reports from people whose behaviors interrelate...we can learn about systems...[I]n general, the dense information obtained in qualitative interviewing permits description of the many sectors of a complex entity and how they go together” (Weiss, 1994, p. 9).

Of course, a full and complete depiction of the production process of the news narratives of interest would require detailed information from all participants in this process, but by beginning with qualitative interviews with journalists, this dissertation opens the door to explore one set of perspectives. Examining the patterns of opinions and observations from the current sample of interviewees can also advance knowledge of the entire media-government relational system by informing methodological choices of future quantitative and qualitative studies of journalistic and policy-setting processes with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism.

The starting list of questions, which form a backbone of topics covered during every interview, and their relationship to this study’s research questions appear below in Table 2:

Interview Questions	Associated Research Questions
1. What are the most common kinds of sources used for stories on global political violence or U.S. counterterrorism responses and policies, and how are these sources accessed? Do sources more frequently approach you with information, or do you have regular sources for stories like these? How do you decide whom to use as a source on these stories?	How do governmental policy entrepreneurs obtain access to the news narrative?
2. What do you feel are the most common constraints on reporters that may prevent them from telling a complete story, or telling the story the way they want to? Are there pressures from higher-ups or outside forces that impact how a story is written?	What external factors influence the construction of news narratives on terrorism?
3. Have members of government, interest groups, or organizations ever attempted to impact the way you write about global political violence or U.S. counterterrorism responses and policies? How? Do these groups provide you with information on these issues? Do you ever incorporate this information? Under what conditions would you do so?	To what degree are journalists aware of policy entrepreneurship, and what do they think about government attempts to shape news narratives?
4. Under what circumstances would you actively challenge information that comes from government officials? How would you do this?	Under what conditions do journalists challenge government narratives on terrorism?
5. Is there anything else you think I should know to help me better understand all aspects of the process of writing, editing, producing, and airing stories on political violence? Is there anyone else you think I should talk to?	

Table 2: Interview Questions and Associated Research Questions

Email and internet chat responses were compiled into electronic text files, as were all transcribed field notes and audio recordings. These files were uploaded into HyperRESEARCH for coding and analysis.

In a similar fashion to that of Phase I, the process of coding and analyzing interview responses was guided by the principles and framework laid out by Glaser and Strauss's (1967) work on grounded theory development and Saldana's *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (2009). Unlike Phase I, however, Phase II's coding was cyclical and iterative, with each interview being examined for singular patterns immediately after its conclusion, and then being examined against the patterns found in prior interviews. Phase II's analytic process closely followed the protocols of coding outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) more closely than that of Phase I because the two phases had different goals. Whereas Phase I was intended to document cognitive and emotive framing employed by governmental policy entrepreneurs in terrorism coverage (and thus was primarily *descriptive*), Phase II was aimed at exploratory theory-building. Phase II examined the relationship between government sources and journalists in the construction of stories on terrorism and counterterrorism from the perspective of a key set of players in the news narrative production process. With Phase II, I sought to construct a theoretical framework integrating governmental policy entrepreneurial framing with testable hypotheses of how these frames ultimately appear, seemingly intact in news narratives on terrorism and—as prior scholars like Altheide (2006) and Nacos (2007) have noted—often without challenge by the journalists who transmit them to the public. In other words, what sort of filtering role do journalists believe they have between the information provided to them by government sources and the information then conveyed by the media to the public?

Coding of interview data was consistent with Glaser and Strauss's (1967) "constant comparative method" of analysis, which "is concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally testing) many categories, properties, and hypotheses about general problems" (p. 104). This method was appropriate for Phase II analysis because there is no existing body of theoretical literature on the topic of journalists' perspectives on their role as transmitters of information provided by governmental policy entrepreneurs. Thus, there is no existing theory to test—the information gleaned in Phase II is entirely exploratory, and aimed at generating testable theoretical frameworks for future research.

This method consists of four stages: "1) comparing incidents applicable to each category, 2) integrating categories and their properties, 3) delimiting the theory, and 4) writing the theory" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 105). In the first stage, the researcher

starts by coding each incident [or individual instance bearing on a category] in the data into as many categories of analysis as possible, as categories emerge or as data emerge that fits an existing category...[W]hile coding an incident for a category, [the researcher should] compare it with the previous incidents in the same and different groups coded in the same category. (p. 105-106)

Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that as coding progresses, two kinds of categories will emerge: those that the researcher has constructed, and those that have been extracted from the language used by respondents. The latter category is likely to conceptualize labels for processes and behaviors that the researcher is attempting to explain, while the former is likely to evolve into the explanations themselves (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 107). When the researcher reaches a point in which there is a seeming conflict between prior categories and new data, Glaser and Strauss assert that the researcher should stop coding to produce an analytical memo to record and

re-examine the logical conclusions of the researcher's conceptual thinking. These memos can help the researcher to resolve coding conflicts and generate additional theoretical ideas.

Ultimately, codes, field notes, and analytical memos are all considered in the theory formation stage.

In Glaser and Strauss's (1967) second stage of qualitative analysis, *integrating categories and their properties*, "the constant comparative units change from comparison of incident with incident to comparison of incident with properties of the category that resulted from initial comparisons of incidents" (p. 108). This process allows a researcher to compare new incidents related to a category to the accumulated knowledge of the typical characteristics of that category, thus integrating incidents into properties. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) put it, this "constant comparison causes the accumulated knowledge pertaining to a property of the category to readily start to become integrated; that is, related in many different ways, resulting in a unified whole" (p. 109).

The first round of coding in Phase II was thus both descriptive and In Vivo (Saldana, 2009), aimed at exhaustively summarizing conceptual topics in responses, then creating higher-level categories that reflect journalists' perception of symbolic strategies of claims-making and framing and the role of government sources in news narrative construction. This analysis involved comparative re-coding as new codes developed throughout the process, and keeping analytical memos to document new themes and theoretical orientations throughout the coding procedure. Logic-testing of the initial categorizations was then tested via further observation, and with each new interview, codes related to overarching themes or patterns were refined (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

For example, one respondent said, “We go on with the info we have, and we might talk for only a minute, but we try hard to give things proper context” (T1, January 19, 2014)⁴. This incident was initially assigned the codes “proper context” and “go on with info we have”. Later, as other interviewees talked about what “context” meant to them, the properties of the category “proper context” shifted to include the generalized characteristic of “timely coverage and scoop” (which included the code “go on with info we have”) to reflect the fact that when respondents discussed context, they nearly always did so in a way that gave deference to timely coverage of terrorism over fully detailed stories on terrorism. In this way, individual datum, or “incidents” as Glaser and Strauss (1967) call them, were compared to one another, and common characteristics were amalgamated into categories and properties of categories. This is consistent with the process of grounded theory-building as Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe it: “Thus the theory develops, as different categories and their properties tend to become integrated through constant comparisons that force the analyst to make some related theoretical sense of each comparison” (p. 109).

As the rounds of coding in Phase II progressed, incidents were compared against accumulated knowledge of properties of categories, and theoretical patterns began to emerge. For instance, it soon became apparent that the category “proper context” and its sub-characteristic of “timely coverage and scoop” differed for those whose primary journalistic medium was the Internet. As explained in more detail in the Phase II Findings section of this dissertation, for those who primarily publish news on a website, “timely” coverage requires far less production cost, and as such may include small bits of coverage added to a growing news story online. The

⁴ Citations for interview respondents use the following format: Letter indicating primary medium of respondent’s work (i.e. “T” for television, “R” for radio, “N” for newspaper, and “I” for Internet), number corresponding to the order of interview (i.e. “1” for the first interview conducted, “2” for the second, and so on), and the date of the interview.

“scoop” is in hitting the “publish” button sooner than competitors, with whatever content is available, not writing a full story for the next day’s newspaper or locating soundbites for a broadcast. Providing “proper context” to news on terrorism took a different form for these journalists, and so their responses were separated out into a different category and analyzed as a unique pattern set. This type of refinement is part of what Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to as “delimiting the theory”:

First, the theory solidifies, in the sense that major modifications become fewer and fewer as the analyst compares the next incidents of a category to its properties. Later modifications are mainly on the order of clarifying the logic, taking out nonrelevant properties, integrating elaborating details of properties into the major outline of interrelated categories and-most important-reduction.

By reduction we mean that the analyst may discover underlying uniformities in the original set of categories or their properties, and can then formulate the theory with a smaller set of higher level concepts. This delimits its terminology and text. (p. 110)

Throughout the coding process, codes, categories, and their relationships were defined and redefined until a set of theoretical criteria emerged—what Glaser and Strauss (1967) call “theoretical saturation” (p. 112). These criteria were recorded in the midst of coding and theory refinement in multiple series of analytical memos. During the *writing theory* stage, these memos, along with codes and categories, are essential to recording an analytical framework and converting it to a systematic substantive theory that is driven by the data itself and the issues and sub-issues of interest (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 113). The interview data collected in this dissertation was thus examined in an issue-focused manner, aggregating data from multiple

respondents, and seeking common themes or patterns among “time on the job” and “primary journalistic medium” subgroups of respondents.

Results: Phase II, Interviews

Of the 26 interviewees, most primarily worked in either Internet journalism (n=10, 38%) or television news (n=8, 31%), with four respondents each listing radio (15%) or newspaper (15%) as their primary medium (see Figure 3). All of the interviewees who primarily work in television journalism had crossed between cable and local news stations, and all had spent their entire careers in broadcast journalism. In fact, most interviewees had spent the majority of their




Figure 3

careers working in one primary medium, though some crossovers, often earlier in career paths, were noted. For example, two of the radio journalists had previously worked in newspapers, and those working in television had all started with local news stations, even if they progressed to national cable news stations later. Given

the general consistence of medium across careers, only the interviewee's self-selected “primary medium” of journalism was coded as a variable of interest.

Most of the sample had spent many years in the field of journalism. Interviewee experience was coded into three categories: those with under five years in journalism, those with five to ten years in journalism, and those with over ten years in journalism. These categories were provided to interviewees for self-selection to avoid, as much as possible, recording exact information which might later be connected to interviewee identity.

Nearly a third of interviewees who listed the Internet as their primary medium had spent fewer than five years in journalism (see Figure 4). Half of these participants had between five and ten years in the field, and the remaining 20% had over ten years of journalistic experience. This category of primary medium had the largest amount of variance. No other medium had participants with fewer than five years in journalism. A quarter of those who listed either radio or television as their primary medium reported having been in journalism between five and ten years, while the remaining 75% had over ten years of experience in the field. Those working for newspapers were evenly split between the categories of five-to-ten years and over ten years in journalism.

Primary Medium	Years of Journalism Experience		
	Under 5 Years in Journalism	Between 5 and 10 Years in Journalism	Over 10 Years in Journalism
Internet	30%	50%	20%
Television		25%	75%
Radio		25%	75%
Newspaper		50%	50%

Figure 4

Broadly, these interviews sought to explore 1) the precise mechanisms by which the media-driven political and social construction of terrorism and counterterrorism occurs (including issues of potential influence of professional journalistic and cultural values and financial concerns of the news media), 2) what role governmental policy entrepreneurs have in

this process, and 3) how the news media interpret governmental policy entrepreneurs' attempts to frame terrorism and counterterrorism. Primary medium and years of journalism experience influenced interviewees' answers to many questions about these topics, though there were also several commonalities in response patterns. These themes and patterns are discussed in detail below.

Key Components and Constraints of Stories on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Across respondents, there was a remarkable degree of consistency in the features they believed comprised “good” news stories on terrorism. News stories on terror attacks, respondents said, should convey as much specific information about the attack as is known. This includes the identity of the perpetrator(s), whether an individual acted alone (a phenomenon that the majority of respondents referred to as “lone wolf” attacks) or appear to be part of a group or terror cell, whether the attack is connected to larger terrorist organizations or other cells, the method or mechanism of attack, the location of the attack and whether this location is financially or politically significant, and any details known about the possibility of future attacks related to the current one. The extent to which speculation on unknown facts may be included in “good” terrorism reporting, however, was split between journalists in broadcasting media and those in either print or Internet media.

“Good” News Coverage on Terrorism: Providing “Context”

Two-thirds of those working in radio or television news mentioned that they make attempts to “properly contextualize” information, as one television-based respondent put it (T1, January 19, 2014). “Sometimes we go on air with just a wire report,” (presumably from AP or Reuters), they said, or “sometimes it's just a live shot story. We go on with the info we have, and we might talk for only a minute, but we try hard to give things proper context. We can scare

the beejesus out of people so we're conscious of not doing that to people...we look to see if it's a contained situation or not connected with terrorism.” This concern about instilling public fear due to proceeding with bare facts thus appears to be connected with the pressure to broadcast quickly in a 24-hour news cycle. When pressed about the specifics of what is meant by “context,” though, the constraints of professional, financial, and organizational values in modern broadcast journalism become apparent, as was the case with one television-based respondent:

Question: What do you mean by 'context'?

Answer: Well, we get experts to talk—for example, people in cyber security spoke when a source alerted us to some gaps in [power grid] security—they talked about how a cyber-attack could do physical damage, and how such an attack would have huge implications. A person alerted us to a video that existed [pointing out gaps in power grid cybersecurity], so we talked to the power industry and the government.

Question: And how would providing this context prevent the public fear that you referred to?

Answer: At [my former television news outlet], not causing fear was always at the front of our minds. We tried to choose the right language—to make it clear what we didn't know and what we did, though sometimes we can't be reassuring, like with the Underwear Bomber, for example, we didn't know if there were others. We try to be honest, frank, and truthful, and say, 'we don't know and are investigating.' We pass info on to the audience as sources call and tell us what's going on— we don't leave them [the audience]. (T6, April 4, 2014)

What this respondent describes regarding the necessity of using “experts” and government sources to provide context to terror attacks is a reflection of the professional value of selecting “objective” knowledgeable sources is a common sort of description of appropriate sources among those in television, radio, and newspaper. *Objective*, in this context, reads as *official*—nearly all of these respondents first listed government sources as being among their most important for stories on terrorism.

Those who work primarily in Internet-based journalism, however, were far more likely to rely upon “on-the-ground” sources who could tell them “what [was] really going on” (I13, July 21, 2014). As one Internet-based respondent said, “For me it’s people with direct involvement on the ground. I think they’re more honest than U.S. officials. So rebels, activists, jihadis, smugglers, refugees” (I20, November 25, 2014).

Perhaps this difference in source selection is related to another phenomenon outlined by the television reporter above: the broadcaster-specific perspective that news stories on terrorism must be aired absent detailed information. Couched within this journalist's description of airing early and incomplete information on a terror attack and informing the audience that the station “[doesn't] know and [is still] investigating” as “[preventing] fear” (though putting aside, for now, that one doubts that this approach reduces fear rather than instigates it) is the familiar pressure of “the scoop”. Multiple broadcast respondents mentioned that timeliness and adding something of substance to the narrative are both key professional concerns, and that these concerns are reinforced by producers. One radio-based respondent noted, for instance, “Sometimes we scrap stories...[I]f it's just background info and not breaking news, it's harder to get on the air” (R10, June 4, 2014). A television anchor noted this pressure even more explicitly:

The pressure is very high. Other news organizations are all scrambling to find video, new info, surveillance...we need to provide constant updates. We're always reading the wires for what the competition is saying because we don't want to be scooped. Sometimes it feels like being on a knife edge. (T24, February 22, 2015)

Comparatively, Internet-based reporters don't seem to have as much concern about “the scoop”—at least, not in the same way. This may relate to the relative ease with which stories can be posted online—i.e., the lower production costs associated with Internet journalism. For example, when asked why he didn't mention the pressure to have terrorism stories posted faster than other websites, one Internet-based journalist replied,

Well, there *is* a certain pressure to have stories posted quickly, but most of the journalists here [at my news outlet] who cover political violence do a lot of embedded work, so we're often working on [more complex] stories. In the meantime, [the website] posts wire reports and covers what other news outlets are reporting. We can also do on-the-ground live [web] updates, either by updating the original story when we have more information or tweeting breaking news [via social networking site] Twitter. (I3, February 1, 2014)

The comparatively reduced response time allowed by Internet journalism reflects the comparatively lower production costs associated with this type of media. Newspapers must collect as much information as possible in between print deadlines (though a number of respondents who work within newspaper organizations mentioned the flexibility of providing “in-between” updates via the web); radio journalists must create copy worthy of valuable broadcast time, often including audible soundbites from sources; television journalists must prepare new narratives with either video or live shots with multiple anchors who are prepared to

go on air; and generally, all of this preparation is completed with the input of not only editors, but producers and technical staff to run equipment.

In Internet-based journalism, according to several respondents, there are two types of individuals writing about political violence: established, often embedded, long-form investigative journalists, and staff writers who mine the Internet for story updates from other news outlets and websites and amass these various snippets into either a full news narrative or a bullet-point “fact sheet” or “update list”. There are few, if any, technological or equipment-related hurdles. Internet-based journalists all reported that they worked with one primary staff editor, sometimes the site's managing editor, generally via email, and that these stories were subject to direct upload onto the news site once reviewed.

While nearly all respondents mentioned that they—or another writer—included “web versions” of broadcast or print news stories, the relatively lower production bar seems to allow Internet journalists a great deal of flexibility. As one respondent—a “staff writer” rather than an embedded investigative reporter—put it, “Most readers don't notice that some of the [hard news] stories [we post] have very little original reporting; it's just what other news outlets are saying...Pretty much all news [organizations do] this, but it happens faster online” (I3, February 5, 2014).

Similarly, more of the “traditional medium” journalists mentioned financial or production constraints on news narratives than did Internet journalists. When asked about the key production components needed in telling a “good story” with regard to terrorism, television-based journalists all mentioned the absolute requirement of having at least one of two things. First, “a good reel”—meaning ready video clips of, mainly, the aftermath of the attack; interviews with witnesses, victims, acquaintances of the attacker, or “experts”; and “context-providing” clips

related to the motivation of the attacker. Second, an on-the-ground reporter communicating with an anchor from a key location like the location of the attack, the attacker's home, the hospital victims were taken to, or sites related to law enforcement or politics. Similarly, radio journalists mentioned the need for audio reels containing quotes from key public or law enforcement officials, victims, witnesses, acquaintances of the attacker, or “experts”. The technical and production costs associated with collecting these audio and video reels are higher than the relatively low costs associated with, say, a story upload to an existing website, though none of the respondents reported believing that these constraints had a negative impact on news narratives. Newspaper reporters, however, while lacking the same sorts of production requirements, were most apt to recognize the financial constraints on news organizations, and thus, on the construction of news narratives, as was the case with the following journalist:

Question: Are there any other types of internal or organizational constraints on your ability to include everything you want to include in a story about terrorism?

Answer: Not really organizational, but there are fewer of us [reporters] so probably fewer stories [on global terrorism] than before. And less about foreign news. But if something happens on American soil, we'll cover it. (N17, October 5, 2014)

Comparatively, Internet-based journalists recognize fewer organizational or financial constraints, though those who are embedded or stationed in other countries were most likely to focus on the logistical and safety issues associated with this type of reporting:

[With regard to] Syria it's the danger of going there and the fact that doing so requires going with an armed group or not going at all, both of which limit what you can see. No one pressures me on anything though. (I2, February 15, 2014)

This type of response was common among all embedded reporters and foreign-desk correspondents, though, and not unique to the experience of Internet-based journalists. Multiple respondents from broadcast and newspaper journalism mentioned the dangers of reporting from militarized or war zones. As one television reporter put it, “Being in the Middle East, reporting from there, that changes the kind of stories you can do...[T]he relationships you have to build are different [because it’s dangerous] territory” (T23, February 13, 2015).

Governmental Policy Entrepreneurs as Sources

As previously noted, most respondents noted that some of their most important sources on stories about terrorism were members of government, including federal or local law enforcement. All respondents noted that they both received tips from sources who had contacted them, and also had a routine cadre of sources they routinely called on for specific types of stories. As one television correspondent put it, “[Most of my key sources are at] the CIA, FBI, DHS...I have contacts at the White House, congressional sources, local authorities...[and] people I call who are not necessarily in the federal government but are just really well connected [within U.S.] communities of intelligence” (T6, April 4, 2014).

Many respondents further noted the importance of “experts,” or sources used to provide context and elaborate upon the meaning of facts provided by government sources. Of the 18 respondents who discussed the use of “experts” as sources, however, 16 reported that the largest category of “expert” sources in their news narratives are former members of government. These responses were not associated with any particular primary medium. As one radio journalist put it:

Question: You mentioned that many of the experts you routinely call for contextual quotes are former law enforcement or government employees. What

percentage of these “expert” sources formerly worked for local or federal government?

Answer: Oh, I'd say most of them. We look for people with inside knowledge of law enforcement or FBI responses to terrorism, or people who understand the mechanics of foreign policy or military responses, things like that. (R5, March 21, 2014)

All respondents expressed the need to cross-reference source information with other sources, though again, embedded reporters responded differently to questions on this topic. Journalists based in the United States exclusively discussed checking information with their usual contacts, or as one television correspondent put it, they “call as many people as possible to confirm information because [they're] never completely sure who will have the info [they] need” (T26, April 22, 2015). Journalists who were stationed overseas were far more likely to report cross-checking information with “on-the-ground” sources, primarily those with direct knowledge of an ongoing political struggle between governments and anti-government actors.

More than any other factor, journalists considered *access* and *reliability* to be of paramount importance when developing a regular source network. “Sources who don't know anything are useless,” one radio-based respondent said (R21, December 18, 2014), and similar sentiments were echoed by all interviewees. Sources with high-level government or law enforcement access were most prized, because they were often the best—and usually the *only*—sources of information about details about perpetrators, possible related individuals or groups, mechanisms of attacks, and the risk of future attacks. With few exceptions, when asked what kind of source they would call first if a terror attack occurred, journalists identified people they knew in local law enforcement or the federal government, depending on the location of the

attack. One television-based respondent reported that they “confirm [all unsolicited source information] with government [sources]” (T14, July 27, 2014). Journalists often reported collaborating with others in their newsrooms to expand source networks, as well. One television reporter explained, “[Once we find out about the attack,] producers, all the people in [the news organization] call their sources to confirm” (T1, January 19, 2014).

If a source proves unreliable—for instance, if they were to provide information that proved factually inaccurate or if they outright lied to a journalist—they may be dropped from a source network. One television journalist related the following example of such a case:

With the AQAP printer cargo bombs [that went off during an attack on a cargo plane in 1998], we had one source that contacted us and said there were explosives involved. We had another [federal government] official [who was a regular source] call after we reported that [there may have been explosives on the plane] and rant and rave and say we were wrong. I could never trust that official again. He was out of the loop...I never used him again. (T1, January 19, 2014)

When asked more directly about why certain government sources are selected over others, patterns of responses often reflected the prioritization of media logic (Altheide, 2006). Overwhelmingly, respondents report that government sources who are quickly responsive, reliable, and quotable are most likely to be utilized repeatedly. As one television reporter put it, “[Good government sources are] those who know how to synthesize information and are easier to understand...[W]e get a soundbite to highlight the important info...[We’re looking for] big, bold arguments [that can be delivered in] two minutes” (T8, May 19, 2014). While this reporter believed broadcasting requirements were very different than print (in that newspapers have

“more leeway” with long form source material), newspaper-based respondents had similar requirements for sources.

All of the respondents working in print journalism described concision and clarity as being among their primary considerations when determining which government sources would remain in regular consideration. For example, one respondent working at a national newspaper noted that he preferred to call sources who understood that they were “not writing a treatise” when he asked for comments: “concise, simple, [and] understandable,” (N15, August 8, 2014) as he put it, were also source qualities valued across respondents' primary media.

From the patterns of responses, it appears that government actors who wish to gain regular access to news narratives must prove themselves useful to journalists by providing important and trustworthy information in a format that is easily incorporated into news content.

The Impact of Governmental Policy Entrepreneurs on News Narratives

All respondents reported taking very seriously any information provided by government sources, and prioritizing calls to these sources above most others in their source networks. The increased access to information about terrorism affords government actors unique access to news narratives surrounding the topic. The need for sources from within the federal government in particular is further amplified when news stories turn from the initial event to the post-attack review of national security (a stage of the news process discussed as the *terror event latency period* in Phase I of this dissertation). It is during this period of reporting that respondents reported relying most heavily upon their government source networks. It is also during this period that many reported noting an increased number of attempts by members of government or interest groups to shape news narratives.

Once the news cycle surrounding an act of political violence begins to discuss policy implications, a number of respondents said that government actors provide them with media-friendly press releases and easy-to-read memos—sometimes solicited, and sometimes unsolicited. This type of government/media interaction is common with all policy-related discussions, though the government-provided source material on policy and procedural responses to terrorism naturally focuses mainly on national security agendas. A number of respondents report that government actors seem to “kick into high gear” in the months following major terror attacks, particularly those on American soil or involving American interests. This time is marked by, as one radio journalist said, “a lot of public discussion about how vulnerable we are to terror attacks or whether we're doing a good job at preventing terrorism here and fighting it abroad...[politicians] argue about whether we're safe [with the current counterterrorism approaches]” (R10, June 4, 2014).

While journalists immediately reach out to government sources following acts of political violence, all interviewees reported also receiving unsolicited calls from their U.S. government sources following major global terror attacks, including those in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2008, and the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. Nearly 70% of respondents reported that American government sources reached out to them following an act of political violence in an attempt to “make sure [they] got the story straight,” as one television anchor said (T23, February 13, 2015). Sometimes these calls were attempts to correct perceived misinformation being reported, but more often, regular members of journalists' source networks reached out to provide information on 1) the American government's policy, resource deployment, or media response to the attack; or 2) facts about the attack and status of the investigation. The former category of unsolicited information always came from sources in

federal government or law enforcement, and occurred more frequently when attacks were on foreign soil. For example:

Question: So if a government source calls you following a terror attack, say, a foreign attack, why are they doing that? What information would they be calling with?

Answer: Well usually they give us a heads up about whether our government is going to make a statement and when that might happen, or they'll let us know if [the American government is] helping the country [where the attack occurred], or they'll give us background on the attackers and whether they have a known history [of prior investigation on suspicion of radicalism or terrorist intentions].

(T14, July 27, 2014)

The latter category of calls was exclusively reported to have occurred with the Boston Marathon bombing, and these sources were from a combination of local and federal law enforcement agencies. These calls consisted of sources providing information on the descriptions of the Tsarnaev brothers just after the attack, the status of closures of public spaces and transportation in Boston, the status of the manhunt for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, and what was known at that point about the brothers' history. For instance, one radio journalist noted, “We were getting constant calls by [contacts in] Boston PD keeping us up to date on what the public needed to know about police activity and the roads and trains...basically anything they needed us to air to keep the public safe and informed” (R5, March 21, 2014).

Unsolicited communications from members of government were generally seen as benign attempts to maintain reciprocal relationships with media or to provide public safety-related information rather than outright endeavors to shift narrative structures—but not always. When

asked whether members of government had ever tried to change the way they reported on terrorism or counterterrorism policies, all respondents replied in the affirmative. As one embedded Internet journalist said, “There are always people trying to push their own propaganda, but I try to cut through it and/or tune it out. You can cross-check government information with people you trust. And that’s definitely a place where on-the-ground sources can help” (I24, February 22, 2016).

The type of government “propaganda” reported by journalists varied widely. For instance, some saw well-structured press releases on counterterrorism efforts as attempts to control the narrative. “[Federal government offices and agencies] send us these press releases from their media people, and you have to start with that, obviously, but you always want to check it out with your sources,” one Internet reporter said. “They word things carefully, and you have to make sure you read between the lines” (I4, March 6, 2014). Other respondents were universally suspicious of anything coming from government sources, even if the source was part of their regular network:

Question: How do you correct for [sources providing misinformation]?

Answer: Everyone has an agenda or a perspective they're trying to get you to believe or a story they want to convince you to run with...you have to call everyone, the government sources you have, or the on-the-ground people who can give you perspective on what the government says is happening. You have to go and see what's happening for yourself.

Question: Have you seen situations where the government says one thing to the media, or to you specifically, but on the ground you're seeing something different?

Answer: Yeah. Like with Syrian refugees, the American government is painting them as being a major risk when it comes to terrorism, like they all hold radical beliefs, and they want us to report the risk...they tell us about all these investigations going on behind the scenes, the specter of [terrorist investigations] we don't know [about]...[but] I talk to these [refugees]. They're not terrorists. They're *fleeing* terrorism. (I9, May 23, 2014)

Sometimes, however, government actors outright requested changes to the narrative on national security. Respondents reported numerous attempts to directly shift how they report on terrorism. These attempts may include requests to not run certain stories in whole or in part, requesting that specific details be emphasized, or outright arguing a perspective—sometimes by criticizing those with opposing viewpoints.

When members of government ask that reporters not run stories, the most frequent reason given is national security. Journalists say they take these concerns very seriously, and weigh carefully what to run. For instance, one television anchor noted a government request to “spike” a story on U.S. chemical plants' potential vulnerability to terrorism:

Question: Can you give me an example of a time when you pulled part of a story because someone in government asked you to?

Answer: There was one story where we were discussing the lack of security in place at chemical plants. Sometimes talking about vulnerabilities is a road map to terrorists. We got push back from some folks [in government] because highlighting these [vulnerabilities] makes people uncomfortable.

Question: Was this one of your congressional sources, or...?

Answer: No, no—Homeland Security.

Question: Did you run the story?

Answer: No. (T1, January 19, 2014)

When requesting that certain details be emphasized in a story, members of government were reported to have concerns that other sources of information may provide inaccurate information. Multiple respondents noted conversations occurring in which their government sources attempted to ascertain what the journalist knew and where the information had come from, in an effort to “correct” anything that differed from the source's own perspective. For instance, one newspaper reporter noted a time when a government source corrected his terminology in a clear attempt at framing:

We were reporting on militia extremism in the United States once, and I was talking to a [federal government] source who kept calling it a 'patriot militia group'. (N18, October 13, 2014)

Respondents reported that government actors' attempts to argue a particular perspective were often structured as statements against some specific opponent's viewpoint, though this is likely related to the *cult of impartiality*, or the habit of journalists to report widely contrasting opinions on the same issue, noted by Tuchman (1978). Several interviewees mentioned instances of this happening in response to their questions about the factual basis for some assertion appearing in the news cycle—in other words, journalists would call members of government to get their take on a terrorism or counterterrorism-related claim, and the source would use the opportunity to assert their own opinion and denigrate an opponent's. For example, one television reporter said:

Respondent: We want to [get soundbites that] give viewers an unbiased perspective. If we hear something from one source, we want to check whether it's

accurate, so we call everyone we can to confirm...if we hear two really different things, we give viewers both sides.

Question: Can you give me an example of this happening, hearing two things and having to report both?

Answer: We were working on an early story about [National Security Agency whistleblower Edward] Snowden, and government [mass] surveillance, and I was talking to a source in the intelligence community about the NSA's capabilities to track all [of the American public's] emails and phone calls, and [the source] kept insisting the NSA couldn't do that and that Snowden was a traitor. So when we ran the story, we reported on what everyone was saying about the NSA['s] ability to conduct mass surveillance], but we also talked about the possibility of [Snowden committing] treason. (T8, May 19, 2014)

All respondents reported some attempt by government actors to either actively or passively impact news narratives and all reported that they actively challenge government narratives, but respondents differed in the mechanisms and timing of their challenges of government information. Many noted that it was difficult to obtain reliable information in the aftermath of terror attacks, and given the pressure to report on these events quickly, there were fewer challenges to what government sources reported. For instance, several interviewees in television and radio reported running stories with information provided by one or two government sources or by other news networks, even if the information was not necessarily fully confirmed by other sources. As time wears on, these journalists run more in-depth stories, and both these stories and narratives focusing on counterterrorism are most likely to feature active challenges to government information.

Respondents with embedded journalistic experience were most likely to challenge government attempts to shift news narratives by consulting a network of nontraditional sources—in particular, sources living in areas hit hard by terrorism. As one Internet reporter put it, “Governments push their own agendas. It's important to talk with people who are *living* these policies—people who can really tell you what's happening on the ground”. (I20, November 25, 2014)

This theme—determining the true impact or potential impact of policy options—seems to shape the way most journalists report interacting with their government sources. Journalists admitted that they were usually content to follow the lead of their government sources in the immediate aftermath of attacks, because these individuals possessed the majority of the most accurate and rapidly available information. Occasionally, respondents noted that they would call in “experts” to add context or supplementary content following an attack. For example, if a particular type of explosive was used, they might call a source with knowledge of the extent of possible damage that type of explosive might have, or how difficult it would be to obtain. When it came to possible counterterrorism options, however—that is, the “policy implications” phase of both news and politics that seems to follow acts of political violence—journalists are much more skeptical of government sources and narratives. For example:

Question: In what kinds of situations would you challenge government narratives about counterterrorism?

Answer: In every situation. By checking it with reality. (I24, February 22, 2016)

Nearly all respondents, when asked what would cause them to challenge information coming from a government source, reported that they and their colleagues actively challenged narratives concerning policy options or counterterrorism actions that could have an adverse

impact on civil rights and liberties, public or military safety, how America is viewed overseas, or the U.S. economy—in other words, the potentially *high costs* associated with counterterrorism policy options. Seven respondents, for instance, used the American government's now-infamously inaccurate information leading up to the War in Iraq as an example of a government narrative that journalists should have questioned, and seemed to have been affected by that lesson. For instance, as one television reporter noted, “[We challenge counterterrorism policies] with every question. How? Why? What's the rationale? How will it work? What will it cost? The War in Iraq was something that should have been challenged [like this]. I'm chilled by the fact that media [are] not challenging enough [of government policies]” (T6, April 4, 2014). Five mentioned the potential incompatibility of mass surveillance with democratic ideals, using it as an example of a counterterrorism policy on which they actively challenged government narratives. As one Internet journalist said:

A good example [of a challenge to government narratives] would be [stories about] the Snowden leak. The government said they weren't using mass surveillance domestically, but then we saw all this evidence that they were doing just that. That's [the kind of information that] comes from [journalists] challenging what the government *says* is happening. (I13, July 21, 2014)

Four respondents also discussed the impact of the use of drones in the Middle East on foreign relations, suggesting that the diplomatic and moral costs were too high. For example, one radio journalist noted:

The increase of drone attacks [in the Middle East] under Obama were a major focus for us. The administration's perspective was that drones were more precise attacks on terrorist targets, and involved minimal loss of American military lives

and resources. We ran a whole series of stories on the loss of innocent lives due to imprecision and misinformation surrounding targets, the costs to our international reputation, and the potential for drones to radicalize people [in the Middle East].

(R21, December 18, 2014)

When asked *how* they challenged government counterterrorism policy narratives, however—which *precise* journalistic strategies they used to counter government messages—it became clear that hardline challenges like these were not the norm. Nearly all respondents reported tempering their direct confrontation of government narratives on counterterrorism because of concerns for national security, for instance. As one television reporter put it, “You never know what counterterrorism information [journalists] release might increase the risk of terrorism. We have to use our best judgment”. (T7, April 27, 2014)

Moreover, most respondents noted that their challenges to some government sources often involved consultation with their source networks—most of whom were *also* currently or formerly in government. In other words, when respondents actively challenge information from the government, they do so by consulting other government sources. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of respondents reported that their primary check on government counterterrorism propaganda was one or more calls to sources who were in federal government, local law enforcement, or the government-funded “intelligence community”—i.e. “the experts” that many interviewees reported consulting to provide context in news narratives about terrorism. For example:

Question: When you actively challenge government information—government narratives—on counterterrorism policies, how do you do that?

Answer: We do a lot of things. We gather information on the feasibility, the impact, of what they're proposing. We call experts to verify the information we get [from the government].

Question: Which experts would you call?

Answer: Well, it depends on the topic. We might call people in the intelligence community, former Homeland Security or NSA or FBI if [the topic is] something related to national security issues.

Question: Would you call academics? Like, researchers who do stuff on counterterrorism?

Answer: Sometimes we would, yeah. We usually prefer people who have practical knowledge, though. (T14, July 27, 2014)

Another respondent in Internet journalism discussed “fact-checking” with “on-the-ground” sources following public discussions of government counterterrorism policy proposals:

We absolutely fact-check with our on-the-ground sources when we're discussing [counterterrorism] policy. We want to know how it works in real life. So, for example, if the government is talking about how we need mass surveillance, we talk to local law enforcement - is this going to help them? Would they have access to these [files on possible suspects generated from mass surveillance efforts]?

Would this kind of thing have prevented [the bombing of the] Boston [Marathon]?
(I20, November 25, 2014)

Similarly, a newspaper reporter mentioned that a vital consideration for any counterterrorism policy would be its economic impact. When asked which sources would be consulted in such a discussion, they replied, “I have a few sources who are economists who I call

for stories like these...one guy in particular is focused on foreign affairs issues...he used to work for the feds, so he has a useful perspective on this stuff” (N15, August 8, 2014).

Collectively, these findings paint an interesting picture of the relationships between journalists covering terrorism and counterterrorism policy options, and the government sources they consult. This relationship is neither antagonistic nor convivial but rather co-dependent, particularly when seen through the lens of Kingdon's process of policy entrepreneurship. These respondents admit that they rely, sometimes heavily, on government sources to help them construct what they see as full narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism. Moreover, government actors who wish to gain access to news narratives to “sell” particular policy options must learn to work within the framework of professional journalistic values and media logic that allows them to develop relationships with journalists. These concepts will be discussed more fully below, in the Discussion section.

Chapter 5: Limitations, Conclusions, and Discussion

Limitations

Phase I: Content Analysis

There are several limitations to the approach that was used to document governmental policy entrepreneurial framing. Firstly, the decision to code only statements directly attributable to governmental policy entrepreneurs comes with a number of caveats. Statements made via unnamed governmental sources went uncoded because they could not be characterized as belonging to any particular party or agency, thus rendering them impossible to analyze. These statements may represent governmental officials who speak on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss an ongoing investigation, statements from press offices of governmental agencies or actors, or authorized or unauthorized information leaks. Any

or all of these statements may have a policy entrepreneurial purpose, but this study was unable to examine them. Further, journalists may paraphrase rather than directly quote even those statements which *are* directly attributable to governmental policy entrepreneurs, thus potentially changing the connotation of the original entrepreneurial message. Statements such as these were also left uncoded due to the potential for journalists to reinterpret messages as they saw fit. These messages may have had a policy entrepreneurial purpose, but this study could not fully examine them, either.

Secondly, in some cases, the same statement appeared in multiple articles. In these instances, only the first statement was coded, as it was the content rather than the frequency of entrepreneurial messages that was the focus of analysis. It should be noted, however, that, while not the focus of this analysis, more frequent messages may have more of an impact on how messages are received and interpreted by the public or other governmental actors or agencies (Loseke, 2003, p. 38). Future research on governmental policy entrepreneurial strategies should examine this confluence of factors in policy entrepreneurship.

Thirdly, in several instances, former government actors appeared as sources, generally to contextualize events (for instance, former FBI agents were quoted as a way to add general information about the process of terrorism investigations). These statements were considered “color commentary” and went uncoded, though it is possible that some of these sources were acting with implicit or direct authority from current governmental policy entrepreneurs.

Fourthly, the number of coded statements is fairly small, despite representing the full population of codeable statements within the selected sample of articles. While the focus of this aspect of the dissertation is the type of governmental policy entrepreneurship documented in

news stories occurring just after a terror attack, future researchers may wish to examine the time frame of analysis to determine further shifts in strategies.

Finally, the decision to limit analysis to only one news medium and one news outlet, along with the moderate sample size of news articles, limit the generalizability of the findings of the analysis. By examining only one news source, the ability to determine the potential impact of the political orientation of news outlets on the types of statements represented in coverage is lost. Future research may also approach this angle of research to more comprehensively document the relationship between political journalism and governmental policy entrepreneurship. These findings should be compared with future research analyzing potential differences in the impact of medium on the types of governmental policy entrepreneurship, especially given the medium-related differences found among respondents' content and source priorities in the second phase of this dissertation.

Phase II: Interviews

In the second phase of data collection and analysis, the small sample of respondents also limits generalizability. In addition, the use of one interviewer as opposed to several raises the potential for interviewer effects to skew findings. Future research in this area could expand the sample and include multiple interviewers to improve *external validity*, or the generalizability of these finding to other samples (Maxfield & Babbie, 2010).

Further, the multiple modes of data collection (via telephone, in person, internet chat, and email), while convenient for respondents, may render interviews less than comparable due to the differential impact of varying forms of communication. This potential impact, however, is mitigated by the fact that respondents chose the method of communication they felt most comfortable with, so it could be argued that their responses were more complete due to the self-selection of a preferred mode of communication.

Finally, the use of self-report data always carries the risk of inaccuracy. Respondents lie, misremember, and structure their responses to paint themselves in the best light (Weiss, 1994). These issues may be especially prevalent here given the sensitivity of journalists regarding topics of sources and inner workings of narrative construction, as well as the fear of their responses leaking. Given that respondents are public figures, the pressure to put on a positive professional face makes it likely that their responses are not fully truthful. Future research may wish to anonymize data collection to compare responses with these findings.

Conclusions and Discussion

Scholars like Cook (2005), Kingdon (1995), and Loseke (2002) have found that government actors attempt to influence news narratives to “sell” policy options. This dissertation sought to expand upon this literature by determining the degree to which journalists are aware of policy entrepreneurship and government attempts to shape news narratives, and whether this knowledge influences the way they interact with government sources. It further sought to determine the precise mechanisms by which the media-driven political and social construction of terrorism and counterterrorism occurs, what role governmental policy entrepreneurs have in this process, and how the news media interpret governmental policy entrepreneurs' attempts to frame terrorism and counterterrorism.

The findings of the content analysis establish a descriptive framework of the form that governmental policy entrepreneurial strategies may take during a specific type of open policy window: a terror attack. Each group of governmental policy entrepreneurs employed different strategies, contextualizing and framing the problem of terrorism in several ways. Firstly, they used frames that reified existing preferred policies, for instance, when members of local law enforcement praised federal grants for resources and tactical gear for local police. Secondly, they

hinted at needed funding or legislative change toward new policies, for instance, when members of local law enforcement suggested that further intelligence-sharing between the federal government and municipal police agencies was necessary to prevent terror attacks. Finally, they provided support or criticism of existing political organizations or agencies and their policy agendas, as was the case with the vast majority of Democrats' and Republicans' statements, which either defended or critiqued the efficacy of the existing counterterrorism system.

These findings are consistent with the literature of policy entrepreneurship strategies. By socially constructing the prevention of or response to terrorism within a prognostic and diagnostic framework (Loseke, 2003) while leveraging the open policy window (Kingdon, 2003) created by the Boston Marathon Bombing, governmental policy entrepreneurs pressure other government actors and agencies to respond within narrowed policy contexts (Cook, 2005). Democrats' construction of the problem of terrorism as an issue that the Democratic Party is effectively handling and the Boston Marathon Bombing as an anomaly within an otherwise effective system are agenda-reifying responses contradicting the Republican claims-making strategy. This latter strategy, as outlined in the findings of the content analysis, prognostically frames the problem—terrorism—as an ever-present risk and a significant and likely-to-occur cost relative to the status quo. It is of note that the strategy of presenting a situation as a certain loss compared with the status quo of inaction is an approach commonly utilized by groups lacking control over policy agendas (Loseke, 2003, p.36).

Other common claims-making strategies used to “hijack” the agenda from a more powerful group, according to Loseke's research, include the “construction of extreme consequences” (2003, p. 57). Policies surrounding terrorism are perhaps most apt to warrant strategies such as these. Groups that lack the power to shift policy in other ways may use the

open policy window provided by the focusing event of a terror attack to assert that the consequences of failing to adopt more hardline policies would be catastrophic. In addition, Republicans' and law enforcements' construction of the perpetrators of the bombing as stereotypically villainous, dangerous outsiders is a related strategy, used by claimsmakers to justify potentially extreme or unpopular policy options. Further, new constructs may “piggyback” on existing cognitive and emotive constructs, with new terror attacks “constructed as a different instance of an already existing problem” (Loseke, 2003, p. 67, citing Best, 1990) and symbolic of “larger, more diffuse worries” (Loseke, 2003, p. 68). These strategies are apparent in Republicans' connection of the Boston Marathon Bombing to al Qaida and the more diffuse threat of global terrorism apparent in California Republican Representative Ed Royce's characterization of the bombing as “yet another stark reminder that we must remain vigilant in the face of continuing terrorist threats” (Pace, 2013b).

By framing the Boston bombing as “just another arm” of global Islamic terrorism perpetrated by brutal, unredeemable villains whose values are not in line with those of typical Americans and whose head will merely spawn another, equally brutal arm as soon as one is destroyed, Republicans imply that the “true” problem lies within the lack of ability of the Democrats—especially President Obama's administration—to annihilate the monster they have depicted. This tactic both pressures other government actors, particularly those in Congress, toward spending on defense and military options (a Republican favorite) *and* suggests that the opposing party is inept and untrustworthy. The implied prognosis, of course, is a change of guard. This strategy is emblematic of zero-sum theories of majoritarian democracies in political economics. In zero-sum politics, when one political party “wins,” the other “loses,” and vice versa—there is a finite amount of political power, and a political “win” for one side is

automatically a loss for the other (Brams, 1975). “Wins” in a majoritarian democracy may be tallied as public support, particularly those expressed via votes.

To a lesser degree, law enforcement and intelligence professionals offer the same entrepreneurial strategies as Republicans, though less as a challenge to an opposing party and more so as a self-reifying effort to maintain finances, access to information they believe to be important to national and local security, and agency relevance. Contrastingly, Democrats are on the defensive against these tactics, and use their own entrepreneurial strategies to portray the Boston bombing as an isolated incident, and offer a different prognosis—better cooperation with local law enforcement and American Muslims in order to protect Americans while also preventing radicalization.

While these strategies may be made visible in news media, the process of marketing one's entrepreneurial efforts via journalism is not without risks and is largely unclear. For example, messages may be distorted by journalists or cut and restructured by editors. In order to determine how government entrepreneurial messages become part of the final news product, one must delve further into the relationship between government sources and those who relay these messages: journalists themselves. Phase II of this dissertation explored this relationship further via interviews with journalists, and revealed several important aspects of the process of narrative construction in the news coverage of terrorism and counterterrorism. Consistent with several theories of policy agenda-setting, the governmental policy entrepreneurs who have access to news narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism likely gain this access as a result of a confluence of three factors: an open policy window, sound use of media logic, and source power. As Kingdon (1995/2003) notes, an open policy window may be opened by the perception of

compelling problems or the occurrence of a specific focusing event that draws attention to a particular issue.

The potential for a terrorist attack like the Boston Marathon Bombing to serve as a focusing event is fairly self-evident. The findings of this dissertation, however, indicate that this type of focusing event—a terrorist attack—is more an open window for policy entrepreneurs who are government actors than non-governmental policy entrepreneurs. In other words, a terrorist attack leads journalists to consult—mainly, and sometimes exclusively—with government source networks, affording governmental policy entrepreneurs a greater opportunity to use these open windows for policy agenda-setting. This means that governmental policy entrepreneurs have more influence in the social construction of terrorism than non-government actors who attempt to shape public narratives on the topic. This influence is a powerful thing; it allows government actors to shape policy agendas in ways that those outside of government would never be able to achieve.

While no respondent specifically mentioned the influence of the government-employed “PR professionals” that Cook (2005) referenced, nearly all of them discussed their preferred sources in terms that fit the “media logic” perspective. This logic, as Altheide says, “tends to be evocative, encapsulated, highly thematic, familiar to audiences, and easy to use” (2006, p10). Overwhelmingly, journalists reported a preference for sources who were able to present information in easy-to-understand soundbites. As seen in the findings from Phase I, in stories on terrorism and counterterrorism, these soundbites often engage political symbols like *Security*, *Threat*, and *Risk*, which stand in for “larger, more diffuse worries” (Loseke, 2003, p. 68).

Further, the preference that respondents reported for employing “contextualizing experts,” most of whom were current or former members of government offices or agencies,

indicates the potential for stories on terrorism to be particularly ripe for the use of the strategy of piggybacking, or when new events are “constructed as a different instance of an already existing problem” (Best, 1990, as quoted in Loseke, 2003, p. 61). By asking these experts about how a new terror event fits into the structure of terrorism they already understand (for instance, by inquiring about “lone wolves” and connecting terror cells), journalists may inadvertently and uncritically incorporating a new face to the existing frame of an old enemy, and thus contributing to the diffuse and archetypal adversary that Americans fight in the War on Terror: that of the “Islamic radical terrorist”.

The findings of both phases of the study, however, suggest that the most important factor influencing access to news narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism is what Gans (1979/2004) called *source power*—observed in the way that certain individuals have no trouble accessing news narratives. Loseke (2003) argues that this power to access public narratives includes the right to assert the “true” nature of the problem of terrorism and the “correct” solutions—to “own” social problems, as it were. Journalists who were interviewed all reported that they sought out government sources first when writing about terrorism and counterterrorism. These sources thus provide the dominant frame for the social construct of terrorism, and are able to leverage their media access to advocate policy solutions that fit their uncritically reported prognostic and diagnostic frames.

Moreover, nearly *all* of the experts journalists called upon to contextualize government information were also speaking from a governmental perspective. These findings may explain why the government's diagnostic frame has become the “taken-for-granted” frame for the social problem of terrorism (Loseke, 2003, p. 69). Government claims-makers have become the “accepted authority” on the issue of terrorism, in part because they possess a great deal of

otherwise unavailable information to which journalists require access, and in part due to the press's extreme bias in favor of government actors as sources, as reflected in the responses of interviewees. The high source power of government sources on topics of terrorism and counterterrorism may explain why journalists—though they say they recognize attempts by government actors to shift narratives and work to fight propaganda by consulting other sources—tend to consult other government sources first, even when challenging government narratives.

The findings of Phase II also shed some light on the circumstances surrounding these challenges to government information. The reasons for challenges to government policy narratives were often couched in terms of the potential for loss compared to the status quo—in other words, when a policy option, on its face, may have high economic, ideological, or security costs. Given that punitive or confrontational policies—like drone attacks and mass surveillance—are more likely when problems can be framed as threats to the status quo (Zahariadis, 2007), the tendency of journalists to recognize risky policy options and actively confront them in news narratives has great potential benefit to democratic societies that wish to have more balanced policy discussions.

However, when coupled with the inclination toward sources with a government background, these challenges may be less than effective. While it's likely that not all government sources actively attempt to shift policy (i.e. are currently engaged in policy entrepreneurship), the possibility that any member of government has a policy agenda always remains. Such a government source may be seeking to justify an agency's budget or its very existence, for example.

Further, easy access to a news narrative allows policy entrepreneurs to answer journalists' objections by over-emphasizing potential threats to overlay the risk involved in failing to use

their preferred solution to maintain the status quo. Boydston and Glazier's (2013) premise—that potential losses, especially those originating with an out-group, loom larger than potential gains—adds an additional psychosocial element to journalists' self-stated “propaganda” challenges. Terrorism by outsiders will always be seen in America as a grave risk with the potential for tremendous damage. If journalists aim to challenge official justifications for those policies with potentially high costs (whether those costs are related to possible loss of military or civilian lives, the heavy financial burden of a war, or the irreparable harm to civil liberties), they may wish to step outside of government source networks to do so.

This dissertation is merely an exploratory study, using a small sample of both news stories and respondents, and cannot hope to speak to all of the complexities of the government/journalist relationship within the context of news production of terrorism and counterterrorism. Its findings, however, suggest that further research in this area is needed. The importance of the role of journalists in democratic societies cannot be overstated. Journalists provide a pluralistic platform, correcting the unequal balance of power between the public and the state. They act as a branch of democratic governments—commonly referred to as the Fourth Estate—that serves to set agendas and raise issues that more often represent the interests of the public than corporate or political elites (Cook, 2005). When the topic of the news is terrorism, however, the possibility that policy agendas will develop that restrict civil rights and liberties is even greater. As such, future research will need to expand upon the current data collection in order to more fully understand the role of governmental policy entrepreneurs in the construction of news narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism, and their impact on counterterrorism policy in the United States.

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