Summer 2010

A rationalist explanation of terrorist targeting

Stephen Charles Nemeth
University of Iowa

A RATIONALIST EXPLANATION OF TERRORIST TARGETING

by

Stephen Charles Nemeth

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2010

Thesis Supervisors: Associate Professor Brian Lai
Associate Professor Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

ABSTRACT

Why do terrorists select the targets that they do? Why do terrorist organizations often eschew simple targets for symbolic ones? And, why in other circumstances, do terrorists avoid symbolism for easy targets? Current explanations only provide a partial account. This project argues that targeting choices are driven by two competing needs for terrorist organizations: public support and operational success. The relative importance of each of these factors then determines what type of target a terrorist organization is more likely to select, either civilian or non-civilian.

Following previous literatures, I theorize that terrorist organizations are locked in bargaining interactions with targeted governments for public support. Governments need the assent of the public to govern while terrorist organizations need public support for their continued existence. I then condition this model by considering the role of three factors that can influence this interaction: government attributes, public support, and the presence of competing terrorist organizations. I posit that each has an independent effect on targeting, determining which target types a terrorist organization selects. In particular, attributes such as democracy, high levels of public support for terrorism, and a monopolistic group environment are likely to yield greater levels of civilian targeting. In addition, these factors should also have a joint effect; states with favorable values for all factors should be more likely to experience domestic terrorism than states with two or less of these attributes.

This theory is tested using a dataset of domestic terrorism for all states from 1970 to 2007. Empirical results are mixed. State attributes, such as democracy and openness, have no effect in increasing the likelihood that civilian targets are struck. On the other hand, public support as proxied by economic performance and repression, has a statistically significant effect in increasing the likelihood of terrorist violence against civilian targets. Lastly, organizational competition has a mixed effect; competition has no effect when

measured independent and increases civilian targeting when measured in conjunction with public support.

I conclude the analysis by detailing the strengths and weaknesses of the approach, future areas of research, and specific policy recommendations to counter the terrorist targeting threat.

Abstract Approved: _____
Thesis Supervisor

_____
Title and Department

_____
Date

_____
Thesis Supervisor

_____
Title and Department

_____
Date

A RATIONALIST EXPLANATION OF TERRORIST TARGETING

by

Stephen Charles Nemeth

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2010

Thesis Supervisors: Associate Professor Brian Lai
Associate Professor Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

_____

PH.D. THESIS

_____

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Stephen Charles Nemeth

has been approved by the Examining Committee
for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Political Science at the July 2010 graduation.

Thesis Committee: _____
Brian Lai, Thesis Supervisor

_____
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thesis Supervisor

_____
John Conybeare

_____
Paul Hensel

_____
Stephen Vlastos

To my family

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Any project of this size is often the sum result of the efforts of many. I'd also like to express my love and admiration for my parents. Their histories and backgrounds always provoked my curiosities and inspired me to take an interest in international relations. I am always inspired by their stories and humbled by their dedication to their children. I'd also like to thank and warn my sister – this is something you'll have to do one day. I hope that I can be there for you like you have for me. I'd also like to thank Holley Hansen, for being a sounding board and a debate partner, and also for just being herself.

I'd also like to thank my advisors, Brian Lai and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. Both of them have dedicated an inordinate amount of time to my graduate student career. Their dedication and efforts in this project to encourage, prod, and cajole will not be forgotten. Lastly, I'd like to express my appreciation to the other members of my dissertation committee: John Conybeare, Paul Hensel, and Stephen Vlastos..

ABSTRACT

Why do terrorists select the targets that they do? Why do terrorist organizations often eschew simple targets for symbolic ones? And, why in other circumstances, do terrorists avoid symbolism for easy targets? Current explanations only provide a partial account. This project argues that targeting choices are driven by two competing needs for terrorist organizations: public support and operational success. The relative importance of each of these factors then determines what type of target a terrorist organization is more likely to select, either civilian or non-civilian.

Following previous literatures, I theorize that terrorist organizations are locked in bargaining interactions with targeted governments for public support. Governments need the assent of the public to govern while terrorist organizations need public support for their continued existence. I then condition this model by considering the role of three factors that can influence this interaction: government attributes, public support, and the presence of competing terrorist organizations. I posit that each has an independent effect on targeting, determining which target types a terrorist organization selects. In particular, attributes such as democracy, high levels of public support for terrorism, and a monopolistic group environment are likely to yield greater levels of civilian targeting. In addition, these factors should also have a joint effect; states with favorable values for all factors should be more likely to experience domestic terrorism than states with two or less of these attributes.

This theory is tested using a dataset of domestic terrorism for all states from 1970 to 2007. Empirical results are mixed. State attributes, such as democracy and openness, have no effect in increasing the likelihood that civilian targets are struck. On the other hand, public support as proxied by economic performance and repression, has a statistically significant effect in increasing the likelihood of terrorist violence against civilian targets. Lastly, competition has an indirect effect that operates through democratic openness and repression, although in a way contrary to the overall theory presented here.

I end by discussing the implications that targeting strategy has for academic and policy circles. One of the most effective ways to address targeting is to address the underlying public support for terrorist organizations. This can lead to a variety of policy responses ranging from the creation of counternarratives to foreign assistance. While the element of substitutability is always present when addressing terrorism targeting, a greater understanding of the process provides a first step towards better understanding and combating this form of violence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ix

LIST OF FIGURES x

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Introduction and Research Question 1
1.2 Introducing the Model 3
1.3 Researching and Understanding Terrorist Violence 5
1.3.1 Explanations for Terrorist Violence 8
1.3.2 Explanations for Terrorist Targeting 11
1.4 Towards a New Model of Targeting 15
1.5 Importance of the Research Question 18
1.6 Outline and Plan 20

CHAPTER 2: A RATIONALIST EXPLANATION OF TERRORIST TARGETING 24

2.1: Introduction 24
2.2 Building the Model 26
2.2.1 Assumptions 26
2.2.2 Target Selection and its Consequences 30
2.3 Bargaining and Terrorism 37
2.3.1 Bargaining and Terrorist Target Selection 40
2.3.2 Sequence of Moves 44
2.3.3 Group Outcomes 46
2.4 Variation in Government 47
2.4.1 Causal Mechanism I: Selection Institutions 48
2.5 The Distribution of the Public 52
2.5.1 Causal Mechanism I: Economic Contractions 55
2.5.2 Causal Mechanism II: Repression 59
2.6 Group Environment 64
2.6.1 Causal Mechanism I: Group Competition 64
2.7 Conclusion 69

CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT ATTRIBUTES ON TARGETING 77

3.1 Introduction 77
3.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations 80
3.2.1 Selection Institutions 81
3.3 Research Design 85
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 90
3.3.2 Statistical Methodology 90
3.3.3 Measure for Selection Institutions 91
3.3.4 Control Variables 92
3.4 Results 95
3.5 Discussion 97
3.6 Conclusion 98

CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT ON TARGETING 126

4.1 Introduction.....126
4.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations.....127
4.2.1 Economics 127
4.2.2 Repression 131
4.3 Cases, Units of Analysis, and Methods 134
4.3.1 Measures for Economic Performance 134
4.3.2 Measures for Repression 136
4.4 Analyses.....137
4.4.1 Potential Pitfalls.....140
4.5 Discussion.....142
4.6 Conclusion 145

CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF GROUP COMPETITION ON TARGETING.....160

5.1 Introduction.....160
5.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations.....161
5.2.1 Competition 162
5.3 Measures for Competition 167
5.3.1 Measures for Group Competition.....167
5.3.2 Measures for Group Competition and Public Support 170
5.4 Analysis 170
5.5 Discussion.....173
5.6 Conclusion 174

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 186

6.1 Introduction.....186
6.2 Findings 187
6.3 Weaknesses of the Approach.....193
6.4 Policy Implications 194
6.5 Avenues of Research 201
6.6 Conclusion 203

APPENDIX: GROUP BIBLIOGRAPHY 204

REFERENCES 227

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Target Types 72

Table 2.2: Costs and Benefits Associated with Target Types 73

Table 2.3: Revisiting Gurr's Analysis of Terrorist Action (1961-1970) 74

Table 3.1: Target Types 100

Table 3.2: Terrorist Organizations, Civilian Targeting Proportion, and Total Attacks 101

Table 3.3: Terrorist Organization Ideologies & Definitions 119

Table 3.4: The Effect of Winning Coalition Size on Terrorist Targeting 120

Table 3.5: Robustness Check on Winning Coalition Size on Targeting 121

Table 4.1: The Effect of Unemployment on Civilian Targeting 146

Table 4.2: The Effect of Repression on Civilian Targeting 147

Table 4.3: Effect of Unemployment and Repression on Civilian Targeting 148

Table 4.4: Terrorist Targeting in Civil War 149

Table 5.1 The Effect of Competition on Civilian Targeting 175

Table 5.2: The Effect of Competition, Unemployment, and Repression on Civilian Targeting 176

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Fearon's (1995) Bargaining Range 75

Figure 2.2: Sequence of Moves in Framework 76

Figure 3.1: Coding Rule & Screening Mechanism 122

Figure 3.2: Average Civilian Attack Proportion Frequency (by Terrorist Organization) 123

Figure 3.3: Average Civilian Attack Proportion Frequency (by Terrorist Organization /Year) 124

Figure 3.4: Distribution of Known Organization Types 125

Figure 4.1: Group Targeting Proportions and Unemployment (4 Regions) 150

Figure 4.2: Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects 152

Figure 4.3: Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies) 153

Figure 4.4: Repression on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects 154

Figure 4.5: Repression on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies) 155

Figure 4.6: Repression and Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects 156

Figure 4.7: Repression and Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies) 157

Figure 4.8: Effect of Unemployment on Targeting Conditioned on Civil War 158

Figure 4.9: Effect of Repression on Targeting Conditioned on Civil War 159

Figure 5.1: Average Level of Competition per State (1970-2007) 178

Figure 5.2: Average Level of Terrorist Organization Competition (1970-2007) 179

Figure 5.3: Competition and Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects 180

Figure 5.4: Competition and Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies) 181

Figure 5.5: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Unemployment 182

Figure 5.6: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Repression 183

Figure 5.7: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Unemployment (Democracies) 184

Figure 5.8: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Repression (Democracies) 185

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

> While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.
>
> Fyodor Dostoevsky

1.1 Introduction and Research Question

Why do terrorists select the targets that they do? Why does the same organization choose different targets over time and within different states? Existing explanations only provide a partial account. Answers that appeal to the psychology of the perpetrator do not appear to fit; instead the "outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality" (Crenshaw, 1981: 390).[1] Nor can the selection of targets be ascribed as a manifestation of the grievances of the poor. Many terrorists come from the middle class, and are often college educated. Political grievances are also not a compelling explanation, as Laqueur (1977: 1) states: "Grievances always exist, but at certain times and in certain places major grievances have been borne without protest, whereas elsewhere and at other times relatively minor grievances have resulted in violent reaction."

Explaining the puzzle presented by modern terrorism has become a significant endeavor for those involved both in policy and academia. Political science has taken a gradual approach to the study of terrorism, first focusing on the conditions under which violence, including terrorism, occurs. More recently, researchers have begun to fill out this knowledge, not only by refining our understanding of when terrorism occurs but by understanding that violence varies in its intensity, its victims, and its purposes. For

---

[1] See Victoroff (2005) for a contending explanation.

terrorism researchers, this has led to attention being devoted to the matter of target selection. As a result, today there exist a wide variety of explanations that describe this process and an array of researchers working on this issue.

Unfortunately, the theories that have been offered are also limited to some degree. First, some perspectives only look at targeting by organizations engaged in high levels of intrastate violence, such as civil wars (Kalyvas, 2004, 2006; Findley, 2008). This only evaluates terrorism as a tactical choice within war, not as a tactic used by aggrieved organizations in place of war. Second, the definition of terrorism used by some approaches is too restrictive. In essence, terrorism occurs when civilians are targeted, but takes on a different label if the government is targeted, even if the tactics and intent are similar. Third, some of the explanations appear ad-hoc when faced with explaining variations in target choice. Lastly, many of these perspectives are ill-suited to respond to variation. Specifically, some explanations, like regime type, are essentially constants and do not vary enough to explain shifts in target choice. As a result, much work remains in crafting a rigorous theory of target selection.

In this study, I examine terrorist target variation as a result of a bargaining interaction between a terrorist organization and a targeted government (Kydd and Walter, 2006).[2] This approach has been a common one in political science, allowing us to understand actions ranging from parliamentary politics to behavior in interstate wars (Reiter, 2003). Bargaining models have been used to explain both the onset of terrorism and the use of violence (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Centinyan, 2002; Lake, 2003).

I build upon these previous works and construct a model that allows us to consider the way bargaining affects targeting choices. I add to the previous literatures by

---

[2] The government is treated as a unitary actor. The government policy that is used against terrorists is treated as the agreed upon policy of the entire government, regardless of disagreements between and within institutions.

considering the bargaining model as set within a broader environment. This environment consists of three broad factors: the attributes of the government, the distribution of support in society, and the state of the organizational environment. The presence and characteristics of these factors individually shape the costs and benefits associated with target choice. In addition, these factors are also assumed to work in conjunction with one another. The interaction of the various factors too, should also have a significant and measureable effect on target choice.

1.2 Introducing the Model

At the core of my model is the recognition that terrorist organizations are aware of the distribution of support in a society (Bloom, 2005: 77-78).[3] Changes in this distribution affect the costs of particular targets.[4] A large number of terrorist supporters, coupled with a organization's selectivity, means that the normally high costs associated with civilian targeting are reduced. In essence, a organization can afford to lose supporters in these situations because, in the end, they will get the few supporters they seek. As the number of supporters decreases, civilian targeting becomes more costly and non-civilian targets are more likely to be selected.

Changes with the other two factors, government and organizational attributes, further shape the targeting choices that result. In situations where governments are unresponsive to the public, such as in autocracies, the lack of citizen input into government policy reduces the political benefit of civilian targeting for the terrorist

---

[3] I define terrorist organizations as organized collectives which conduct terrorism. The definition of terrorism is taken from the GTD Dataset (Dugan and LaFree, 2009) as is explained below. This approach excludes individuals that conduct terrorist acts as well as unorganized groups of people, such as "protestors", which happen to conduct terrorism during the course of an event, such as a riot. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

[4] This model assumes that terrorist organizations already exist and does not problematize their formation.

organization. Organization level factors, such as competition, affect the bargaining interaction by decreasing the amount of support that each organization expects to gain from their targeting choices. In both instances, these modify the bargaining interaction and alter the expected targeting choice that results.

This study is distinguishable from other studies of terrorism on the basis of several factors. First, terrorism is broadly defined as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: ii). This definition of terrorism allows more types of targets and a broader range of violence to be included. In particular, this accords best with the use of terror in the real world: the terrorist goal of fear and political change can occur with attacks on any target, not just civilians. This allows us to avoid the normative trap, made in other research, of conflating terrorism as a function of its targets.

Second, this analysis considers domestic terror.[5] This is important not only because it is more prevalent than international terrorism (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005), but because a view of international terrorism is likely to be biased towards large states and certain highly capable organizations (Abadie, 2005). Third, this analysis considers a wide range of organizations, spanning from short-lived terror organizations to more established organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This allows the analysis to be as broad as possible, encompassing the range of targets of terrorism and the range of actors that perpetrate it.

---

[5] This is defined as "incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target" (MIPT, 2006).

1.3 Researching and Understanding Terrorist Violence

While terrorism is a phenomenon nearly as old as civilization itself, its study is a function of the modern era. In particular, the study of terrorism began in earnest with the wave of anarchist violence that swept Europe and the United States in the late 19th century. Explanations for terrorism at that time focused on the psychology and physiology of the perpetrators; they were viewed as either mentally ill or suffered from maladies ranging from vitamin deficiencies to tuberculosis and epilepsy (Laqueur, 1977). Others even attributed the violence to causes such as "decadent literature", barometric pressure, and even moon phases (Laqueur, 1977).[6]

Modern studies of terrorism have attempted to move beyond these early approaches. Spurred by events such as the hostage crisis at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the September 11th attacks, terrorism research has attempted to use the tools of modern social scientific inquiry to explain and bring order to these random and chaotic acts of violence. However, in stark contrast to the study of war, terrorism research has been continually plagued by a debate on definitions, theory, and methods. These difficulties have hampered the development of a clear scientific study of terrorism.

One of the initial problems with the development of a scientific study of terrorism was considerable debate as to whether the field would provide any useful insights. Ariel Merari (1991: 88), a noted scholar on terrorism, argued that:

> Repeated occurrences of the same phenomenon are the basis of scientific research. In the case of terrorism, however, there is hardly a pattern which allows generalizations. Clearly, the heterogeneity of the terroristic phenomena makes descriptive, explanatory, and predictive generalizations, which are the ultimate products of scientific research, inherently questionable.

---

[6] In Joseph Conrad's (1923) *The Secret Agent*, these tropes may be in evidence. Adolph Verloc, the man tasked with the objective of destroying the Greenwich observatory, runs a seedy business in which he sells pornography, contraceptives, and other items. While Verloc has misgivings about the operation, he manages to influence his mentally ill brother-in-law Stevie to conduct the attack. This reprehensible act enrages Verloc's wife, who subsequently kills him.

The inability to note whether terrorism was even an issue worth studying paralleled the difficulties states had in countering the threat. Terrorists struck randomly and without warning and seemed to be immune from the investments states made in countering it. Given that a consensus could develop on the suitably of terrorism as a field of study, numerous other obstacles came into being.

One of these obstacles was the definition of terrorism. Presently, over 200 definitions of terrorism are known to exist (Stohl, 2007). One of the major works in the field, Bruce Hoffman's *Inside Terrorism* (1998), dedicates the first chapter to discussing the difficulties, and politics, inherent in defining the word terrorism. One of the difficulties is semantic: very few people wish to be labeled as "terrorists." Instead, they wish that the terrorist label be reserved for "true" villains and, as such, exists as a normative condemnation of an opponent's tactics, not as an objective description to be used in scientific analysis.

Politically, countries and agencies use different definitions of terrorism. Many times these definitions are self-interested, highlighting an agency's capabilities while downplaying its weaknesses. The State Department's definition of terrorism is, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants targeted by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Hoffman, 1998: 38). The Department of Defense defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives" (Hoffman, 1998: 38). The FBI uses the following definition, "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (Hoffman, 1998: 38).

These definitions all focus on different characteristics. The State Department's definition focuses on terrorism as being solely committed against civilian targets while

excluding threats. This definition, because it does not involve direct existential threats to the government, best facilitates the involvement of the State Department. The FBI's definition is broader, using the term persons and property to encompass a broader range of actors. Here, like in the State Department definition, no mention is made of threats. This excludes a wide range of potential terrorist activities, such as hijacking, which is primarily threat, rather than force, based. The Defense Department has the broadest definition of terror, allowing for threats and terrorism to be directed against a range of targets other than civilians. This, along with the FBI's definition, helps advance the mission of each agency, justifying its intervention into a greater range of events.

Lastly, because of these debates, the majority of terrorism research is not quantitative (Stohl, 2007) and, unfortunately, comprised of work with "relatively weak research methods" (Silke, 2004: 11). As a result, terrorism research must overcome some difficulties associated with the work of past scholars, "who have studied events, perpetrators, responses, and contexts, but not in general within the confines of a scientific paradigm of agreed upon data, definitions, concepts, relationships, and methods" (Stohl, 2007: 258). Schmid and Jongman's (1988) analysis of terrorism research indicates the fruit that has resulted from such debates: of 6,000 works on terrorism that have been published between 1968 and 1988, "virtually none tried to uncover in an empirical manner the patterns and relationships which exists in how terrorists carry out operations" (Silke, 2004: 10). The data that was used was of uneven quality, lacking detail, and consisted of journalistic accounts.

Because of this, the quantitative study of terrorism has lagged behind the study of other forms of conflict, such as interstate or intrastate war. Conceptual debate still lingers and, in the absence of an effective consensus to provide guidance, the research that results often varies in quality and its policy and theoretical contributions are of mixed utility.

1.3.1 Explanations for Terrorist Violence

Since the early explanations of terrorist violence, our explanations for how terrorism occurs have evolved substantially. Current explanations center on explaining terrorism as an outcome of a complex process; one whose preconditions come from a variety of structural, psychological, and rational choice factors (Ross, 1993). Structural causes of terrorism see violence as the result of state level factors such as politics, culture, economics, and social relations. Psychological perspectives attempt to explain terrorism as an outcome of internal motivations. Lastly, rational choice theories see participation in terrorist organizations and the decision to conduct terrorism as the result of a conscious choice weighing costs and benefits. It is the first and last perspectives that have formed the bulk of the current work on terrorist violence.

Structural theories "posit that the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies" (Ross, 1993: 317). One of the foundational and most debated points in terrorism research – that relating terrorism to regime type – has been a structural argument. Work in this area has found competing effects; one perspective argues that democracies provide substantial freedom that allow organizations to operate and thrive (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1989; Schmid, 1992; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 2001). Eyerman (1998) contends that democracies provide institutions, such as elections and broader political participation, which help reduce terrorism. He finds this to be true amongst established democracies. Li (2005) argues that both effects are present; democratic institutions reduce terrorism, while executive constraints act to increase terrorism.

Similarly, the state's use of repression also provides a structural explanation of terrorism. This, in some ways, provides a parallel to the previous discussion as states that are most capable of exerting control over their publics are autocracies. This control should then be manifested in relatively little terrorism since the limited space in autocracies by which people or organizations have to coalesce, debate, and dissent should

provide few opportunities for this type of behavior. At the same time, repression may also, in certain instances, provide grievances through which violence and terrorism can occur (Gurr, 1970). Repression in these cases may then spur terrorism in a number of different ways (Lichbach, 1987; Mason and Krane, 1989; Francisco, 1995).

Structural approaches have also resulted in work relating economics to terrorism. Here, the studies attempt to assess the general causal logic that poverty encourages terrorism. Work by Abadie (2005) and Piazza (2006) find no connection between economics and terrorism. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) use two different sources of data - biographical information on 129 Hezbollah members killed in paramilitary actions and a survey of Palestinians – and also find no support for the role of economics. In fact, they find that participation in terrorism is the province of the educated and employed, not the downtrodden.

Psychological perspectives argue that "political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces" and that these forces compel them to commit acts of violence (Post, 1998: 25). Studies of this type have, with few exceptions, seen no striking psychopathology (such as illness or mental deficiencies) which distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence. Rather, terrorism appears to be carried out by people who are "aggressive and action-oriented, and who place greater-than-normal reliance on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting" (Post, 1998: 31). West German government studies also indicated that terrorists were the products of especially traumatic family situations and were often failure prone in their attempts to ingratiate themselves into "normal" society.

Social alienation also figured into a study of Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euzkai Ta Askatasuna or ETA) members. Clark (1983) found that members were more likely to be the product of a mixed Spanish-Basque household than the surrounding Basque population. In essence, their activism was interpreted as an attempt to "out-Basque the Basques." While this line of research has been extensive (Cooper, 1977;

Taylor, 1988; Sageman, 2004), the overwhelming consensus is that terrorists, like the people they target, are psychologically heterogenous (Victoroff, 2005).

Lastly, the rational choice perspective sees terrorism as resulting from actors who operate under three assumptions (Abrahms, 2008). First, terrorists are motivated by stable and consistent political goals. That is, political grievances form the base and motivation for terrorist violence. Second, terrorism is a course of action decided on when other forms of political participation have been blocked. This perspective is consistent with Sandler et al.'s (1983) view that terrorism is an allocation decision made when total resources to the organization are highest, where the costs of illegal acts are low, and where the relative gains for illegality are high. Lastly, terrorism is used insofar as its effectiveness outweighs the effectiveness of other means. A variant of this argument can also suggest that particular forms of terrorism are used over others based on their effectiveness. Given this, terrorists should be discriminating about their attacks and select violence consistent with the risks and consequences involved. In practical terms, this understanding should result in terrorism occurring in certain states (i.e. democracies) (Gurr, 1988; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994; 1998; Eyerman, 1998) and in more lax security environments (Enders and Sandler, 1993; 2005).

Until recently these perspectives, although important in forming much of the basis of past and present research on terrorism, were not applied to the study of terrorist targeting. Instead, terrorism research focused on the conditions that led to the onset of terrorism as well as the factors that led organizations to choose terrorism over non-violence. Such an approach overlooks a critical aspect of terrorism - that of selecting targets to breed a condition of fear amongst the populace. Political science has begun to move in this direction, with researchers such as Sandler and Lapan (1988), Juergensmeyer (2003), Kalyvas (2004, 2006), Goodwin (2006), and Findley (2008) all providing further insight into the targeting process. The resultant body of work provides

a good starting point for the development of new theories on terrorist violence and targeting.

1.3.2 Explanations for Terrorist Targeting

From the perspective of the terrorists themselves, terrorist targeting follows a definable logic. Carlos Pisacane, a mid 19th century Italian revolutionary, conceptualized terrorism as "propaganda of the deed" and selected targets which would "draw attention to…inform, educate, and ultimately rally the people behind the revolution" (Hoffman, 1998: 17). George Habash, the founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) stated that target selection is driven not only by the notoriety of the act but that "the main point is to select targets where success is 100% assured" (Hoffman, 1998: 178). The Hamas training manual takes a similar approach, prioritizing the availability of vulnerable targets over more dramatic secure targets; stating in essence, "it is foolish to hunt the tiger when there are plenty of sheep around" (Bloom, 2005: 34).

In attempting to place theoretical explanations to the anecdotal evidence, political scientists have advanced a variety of theories. These theories can be divided into one of two main categories. The first set discusses target selection as result of factors internal to the organization. Deeply held personal beliefs such as religion and grievance act as the metric, not only for the selection of terrorism, but for the selection of targets. Simply put, targets which are determined to be contributing to a particular grievance or to a violation of religious principles are those which are attacked. Affective approaches, on the other hand, see the conduct of terrorism and target selection as strategies that best ensure organizational cohesion.

Grievance based explanations for targeting follow a simple logic: political targets have often followed political grievances, while economic targets have followed economic grievances. The actions of Irish Nationalists, and later the IRA, are perhaps one of the best known demonstrations of the logic of political terror; from the late 19th to early 20th

century, the IRA conducted attacks on British political leaders and institutions as a response to harsh policies in Northern Ireland (Bowden, 1976). Similarly, economic grievances have manifested themselves as attacks on economic targets (Ross, 2004). In 1976, the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) criticized the Indonesian government for stealing the island's resource wealth and attacked a natural gas facility in Aceh. More recently, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has adopted a similar tactic and attacked oil targets throughout Nigeria in order to extract payments it believes are owed to the local oil-producing communities (BBC News, 2006, PBS NewsHour, 2007).

Contrasting the simple logic of grievance based target selection is religiously-inspired terror. In particular, this type of terrorism has proven to be particularly savage and hard to place in an empirical pattern. Targets are not chosen on the basis of their ability to symbolize a political or economic grievance nor on the ability of the perpetrator to survive the act. Rather, targets are chosen because they represent evil, while the terrorist symbolizes the forces of good (Juergensmeyer, 2003). This division of the world into absolutes makes political compromise impossible and turns all of society into a potential target. Since there is little discrimination for enemies, targets selected through "sacred" concerns may be more likely to be civilian and high-casualty. However, beyond this, empirical patterns for this type of terrorism may not be easily discernable since the basis for tactical decisions may be made on the religious, rather than political, plane.

Lastly, rather than being a simple outgrowth of religious or political grievances, terrorist target selection may be the result of a need to develop "strong affective ties with fellow terrorists" (Abrahms, 2008: 80). In particular, terrorist targets are selected which help to advance the existence of the organization, even at the expense of the political goals of the organization. Understanding terrorism in this way, as Abrahms (2008) argues, explains much of the anomalous behavior in terrorism: the use of anonymous attacks, attacks on similar organizations, ill-defined goals, and the use of terror despite

the availability of other means. However, this perspective does make an understanding of targeting difficult because it ascribes terrorism to an opaque set of goals.

A second categorization of targeting theories sees selection as influenced by the environment in which a organization is located. In particular, target selection may be influenced by the normative and institutional incentives provided by regime type. For democratic states, factors such as participation in the selection of leaders means that civilian targets may be the most effective means for terrorists to effect political change (Hewitt, 1993). This rationale is said to be present in al-Qaeda's bombing of the Madrid train system in 2004 (US Congress, 2004). Voters connected the attack with a spectacular failure in policy on behalf of the conservative government and, despite earlier polls predicting a conservative victory, instead voted for a liberal government.

Unfortunately, theories on the weakness of democracy are directly contrasted with a competing view; democratic openness and electoral institutions make terrorism less likely by increasing the benefits of non-violence relative to those of violent action (Eyerman, 1998). As a result, target selection may be driven by other factors. Furthermore, democracy may not simply mean an increase in the likelihood that civilians are attacked. Instead, concerns for legal provisions and lack of a repressive security apparatus may decrease the cost of attack on all segments of the state rather than just the people. Once again, this shifts the causal burden of target selection to other factors.

The environment can also have an effect on target selection through the rational choice perspective; namely by affecting the costs of attacking the target versus the benefits gained from it (Sandler et al. 1983). Organizations select targets "on the basis of what will create maximum impact with a maximum chance of success" (Stohl, 1988: 5). A number of theories (Kalyvas, 2004, 2006; Bloom, 2005; Goodwin, 2006; Findley, 2008) use rationality as an underlying basis for terrorist targeting. In particular, these theories either see variations in terrorist targeting as an outgrowth of disparities between a terrorist organization and an opponent (Kalyvas 2004; Goodwin 2006; Findley 2008) or

the end result of an evolutionary process involving both the failure of other forms of influence and competition with other organizations (Bloom 2005).

Kalyvas (2004: 103) argues that the targeting of civilians occurs as "the product of an unwillingness or failure to discriminate, usually caused by lack of information". Goodwin (2006) provides a similar argument, stating that terrorism (or "categorical" violence waged indiscriminately against civilians) is dependent upon the past relationship of rebels and civilians. When rebels view citizens as complicit, or as perpetrators of past wrongs against their organization, categorical terrorism is viewed as an optimal strategy. This occurs because there exist no costs to attacking non-compliant civilians. On the other hand, if citizens are seen as potentially helpful, using categorical violence against them becomes costly because it damages a organization's legitimacy and potential resource base. In those cases, organizations employ violence which is more selective amongst targets. Goodwin (2006) uses this rationale to explain why organizations such as al-Qaeda have used categorical violence while the African National Congress (ANC) did not.

For Findley (2008), terrorism is a tactical choice that occurs as the result of power disparities between a rebel group and the government; shifts in this balance introduce incentives for the use or disuse of terrorism. Terrorism, specifically violence against civilians, is a preferred strategy in cases of asymmetry because it is the best way to combat a disproportionately powerful enemy. Interventions on the side of the terrorist organization help to turn the organization away from terrorism, due to the infusion of new resources, to more direct means of conflict.[7] Organizations also may become less likely to use terrorism in these cases because it may jeopardize the support of the third party. While incomplete in some regards, Findley's (2008) model provides an

[7] See Buhaug (2006) for a similar explanation concerning civil wars.

explanation for tactical variation that has occurred in civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka.

Bloom (2005) also uses a rational choice perspective to explain terrorist targeting. Here, terrorism is not a function of power shifts but rather a tactical and targeting choice made in the presence of failure and competition. That is, these tactics are used as response to failures with other forms of influence (Bloom, 2005: 78). These actions are continued when they result in the winning of adherents, resources, and attention. As a result, organizations begin to compete with one another over the ability to claim a bomber as their own. This competitive process then results in a cycle of ever escalating violence as organizations try to outdo one another with more daring and spectacular attacks. Organizations that win these competitions can then demonstrate their proficiency, thus attracting new members and recruiting future members. This perspective does not allow for explanations of target variance, but rather, gives an explanation for the ever-increasing lethality and daring of terrorist attacks.

1.4 Towards a New Model of Targeting

The range of potential explanations for terrorist targeting represents a burgeoning field of interest for political scientists. However, the assumptions of many of these perspectives do not accord either with our theoretical or empirical understandings of terrorism. First, arguments that use the internal aspects of organizations, such as grievance, religion, and affect, are opaque and not adequate for quantitative analysis. While it is not necessary that the factors themselves be measurable, it is not clear how changes in these factors would impact the selection of targets. An explanation attributing target change to a change in these internal attributes would also be considered ad-hoc; such changes could be explained by merely stating that the underlying grievances changed, the ways to ensure organization solidarity changed, or that one type of target did not hold religious significance. In fact, the relationship of ideology (whether of a

political or religious nature) to terrorism has been a controversial one. Crenshaw (1985: 471) states, "it is difficult to use ideology as the critical variable that explains the resort to or the continuation of terrorism." In fact, she argues that it is "the group, as selector and interpreter of ideology, [that] is central" (Crenshaw, 1985: 471). Similarly, reliance on perspectives of this sort will also not provide us with the information about why organizations would make the decision to switch target types.

An additional problem with a grievance-based explanation is that it can border on tautology. Abrahms (2008) argues that most terrorist organizations have ill-defined goals. Rather, attacks and violence are based on a vague compilation of grievances. As a result, followers are often unaware of their organization's grievances and, in some instances, provide justification for their attacks that is at odds with that of the organization. In other cases, grievances are manufactured after an attack and made to fit the circumstances. The organization is then perceived as demonstrating tactical acumen and political awareness when, in fact, it possesses neither.

Second, external perspectives on target selection, while testable, do not vary enough to provide a compelling account of the variation of terrorist targeting. For most established democracies and autocracies, regime type remains relatively static (Gurr, 1974). Findley (2008) provides one way around this problem. He argues that the choice between the tactics of terrorism and warfare is not whether there exists a condition of war or of the distribution of capabilities among the combatants. Instead, it is the *changes* in the capabilities between the two sides that matter. In terms of regime type, this leaves anocracies – those states in between democracies and autocracies – as the only systems with substantial enough variation to provide a valid explanation for why terrorist targets vary. This reduces the number of cases and effectively eliminates the types of states – democracies – thought most likely to suffer from terror.

Lastly, the perspectives (Kalyvas, 2004, 2006; Goodwin, 2006; Findley, 2008) emphasizing the relationship of the organization to its opponents, while both testable and

variable, use an overly restrictive definition of terrorism. In essence, the central concept of terrorism is defined as a tactic used against civilians. For Goodwin (2006: 2048) terrorism is "the strategic use of violence and threats of violence by an oppositional political organization against civilians or noncombatants, and is usually intended to influence several audiences." Findley (2008: 4) agrees, describing terrorism as "deliberate, violent acts against civilians designed to create anxiety or fear in the population so that political, social, or economic demands can be made to the government or the public."

While the definitions used by these authors have found support with some researchers, they also pose some problems. At one level it equates the acts of terrorist with those of states, acting to cloak the former with an air of legitimacy (Hoffman, 1998). While both states and terrorist organizations have been guilty of atrocities, states have sought to put boundaries and rules to reduce these transgressions. Terrorists have regularly and purposefully overstepped these bounds. More importantly, the definitions used also fail to accurately reflect the nature of terrorism. Organizations have indeed targeted "guilty" civilians, but they have also attacked the military, killed innocent civilians in non-target countries, attacked the figures and symbols of government, and damaged states' infrastructure (Hoffman, 1998). Lastly, both approaches only consider the use of terrorism within the context of a civil war. The aims of organizations engaged in civil war may be different from the vast number of weaker groups that contest state policy during times of peace. By limiting the analyses to organizations in instances of civil war that only conduct civilian attacks biases the data and limits the usefulness of the inferences drawn from that research. Instead, the greatest theoretical headway can only be made when the definition reflects the breadth of terrorist acts.

1.5 Importance of the Research Question

Focusing on target selection is an important and appropriate area for study. Analyzing terrorism as a decision amongst several forms of violence rather than a blanket act is an important way to advance the field of conflict studies (Kalyvas, 2006). In civil war, for example, violence can be used to punish civilians or enforce order (Kalyvas, 2004; 2006). In terrorism, violence is also instrumental, changing with the needs of the organization (Thornton, 1964; Bowyer Bell, 1975). For one, terrorists can choose attacks against civilian targets when they resonate and gain public approval. In other instances where indiscriminate civilian violence is frowned upon, organizations direct violence against military targets (Bloom, 2005). Treating terrorism as a single phenomenon ignores the utility of its variation; scholarly discourse has frequently critiqued theories for treating actors as undifferentiated wholes and for ignoring the nuance in the study of politics. Terrorism and targeting are no different.

Understanding the variation in terrorism is important. Kalyvas (2004: 100) discusses that in certain instances, "violence is a resource rather than the final product." Viewing violence in this way allows it to be used as an independent variable and allows us to make sense of seemingly indiscriminate and irrational acts. This perspective would also help unite disparate types of violence – both terrorists and insurgents face costs from targeting civilian and, as a result, have rules in place that limit the use of civilian violence. Providing an explanation applicable to both provides the first step towards creating a "unified theory" of violence.

Failing to gain a better understanding of terrorist target selection has substantial monetary and political implications for all countries affected by terrorism. Currently the United States spends at least $50 billion in efforts designed to counter terrorism at home

(Office of Management and Budget, 2010).[8] Our investment in combating terrorism abroad dwarfs this amount, as the United States has allocated nearly $159 billion towards operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq for the 2011 Fiscal Year (Office of Management and Budget, 2010). The investment that we, as a country, make in resources and personnel represent the value that we believe these targets possess to terrorist organizations. Yet, the targets that we perceive as having the most value may not necessarily be perceived as such by terrorist organizations. The investments made in these targets are often political and done without careful analysis. As a result, much of the investment that has been made in counterterrorism may represent a strategy that ignores the trees for the forest and advocates blanket, rather than pinpoint solutions (Sandler and Lapan, 1988). This misallocates resources and potentially leaves us no safer than we were before these decisions were made.

A number of potential policy recommendations stem from this analysis. One important recommendation is for governments to focus on the underlying public support for a terrorist organization. This means that governments must be aware of the messages that terrorist organizations use to their constituents. In particular, governments must be aware of the social, in addition to the violent, message of terrorist organizations. Many terrorist organizations gain popular support because they are the only element of authority and support in particular areas. The international community can help in this regard, funding and creating institutions to better provide for social welfare, thus maintaining and growing support for the central government. Governments can also engage in the rhetorical battle, co-opting the terrorist message and advancing a counter-narrative; examples include detailing any contradictions in terrorist philosophy or

[8] The Fiscal Year 2011 budget allocates at least $44 billion for the Department of Homeland Security and $4.5 billion for FBI counterterrorism operations.

pointing out, in the case of religious or ethnic-based terrorism, the deaths of coethnics or coreligionists from terrorist violence.[9]

A second recommendation for governments is to limit and narrow the scope of repressive violence, if deemed necessary for counterterrorism. This reduces the negative externalities of government repression, thus reducing the likelihood that the government's actions form the basis of new terrorist recruitment and more civilian targeting. In addition, this also reduces the efficacy of the terrorist message; governments do not demonstrate excessive violence nor irresponsibility in its use. Once again, the failure of the message limits the ability of the terrorist organization to recruit new members.

For both recommendations, terrorist preference is shifted from civilian to non-civilian targets. Given the element of terrorist operational substitution, this seems to do little to curtail the threat of terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 2004). However, given the characteristics of non-civilian targets, the number of terrorist organizations able to attack these targets should be decreased. In this way, an understanding of targeting may provide a way to reduce the likelihood of terrorist violence.

1.6 Outline and Plan

Having presented an introductory foundation for my research, I now provide an overview of the rest of the project. The next chapter introduces the theory. In particular, I focus on arguments that equate terrorist organizations with political organizations. This allows me to connect targeting choices to organizational maintenance. Because target types differ regarding the effect they have on the survival of the organization and the

---

[9] Examples include Shining Path (SL) founder Abimael Guzman's opulent lifestyle despite his class war rhetoric, SL's massacre of peasants and forcible recruitment of children, and the deaths of Muslims in al-Qaeda's attack on the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (McClintock, 1998; Starn, 1998; Wright, 2006; Libicki et al., 2007; Masterson, 2009).

likelihood that it achieves its goals, these choices are employed at different times. This is incorporated into the contextualized bargaining model and results in definable targeting choices being made in responses to changes in the environment. I develop four main and three ancillary hypotheses about these environmental influences and their effects on targeting choices.

The third chapter provides the first empirical assessment of the environment's impact on the bargaining model. Here, I test arguments that government attributes such as selection institutions impact targeting choice. Results find no support. This suggests that broad factors relating to institutional design have no effects on whether terrorist organizations use terrorist attacks to achieve political goals or to guarantee organizational continuity. While this approach uses a near constant as a variable, this does not provide the sole explanation, as many other research works have. Instead, winning coalition size provides a background condition that provides a point to build on in the following chapters.

The fourth chapter evaluates the role that public opinion has on target selection. There, because cross-sectional public support measures present theoretical and methodological obstacles, I use unemployment and repression as proxies of government support. The results suggest that both unemployment and repression have effects on civilian targeting. These results become more significant when analyzed in the states evaluated as most prone to civilian targeting – those with high audience costs and open political systems. In one instance, winning coalition size in conjunction with public opinion (as proxied by repression) does have a strong effect on target choice.

I also test whether these variables hold in conditions of civil war. Results indicate that organizations in countries with civil wars hold the same concerns: civilian targeting is a function of public support. This provides the first step towards synthesizing an explanation for target use in different forms of conflict.

Chapter 5 tests the impact that organizational competition has on targeting behavior. Here, I adopt the assumptions made in the theory chapter about public support to argue that this has a moderating influence on civilian targeting. This builds off of Bloom's (2005) theory about competition and the escalation of violence. I also utilize the organizational ecology literature to argue that public support provides energy that reduces the negative effects of competition on civilian targeting. The results indicate that competition does not have an independent effect. The second hypothesis suggests that public support should increase the likelihood that terrorist organizations will adopt outbidding behavior in situations of competition. However, when analyzed in the context of democratic states with high levels of public support (those with more energy), competition leads to less civilian targeting.

The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the results of the research and discusses the implications for both research and policy. Terrorist targeting remains an opaque process, mainly because we have no access to the internal workings of terrorist organizations. The best that we can do is to theorize how these overt acts reflect the interplay between internal organization processes and the environment at large. However, given these limitations, we can still provide some useful insights into the likelihood of targets being attacked. This allows us some purchase towards developing more effective and precise policy. I conclude the chapter and the overall dissertation by discussing the potential applications and new avenues of research that this theory provides.

Ultimately, the theory and analyses presented in the following chapters have the potential to greatly increase our understanding of how terrorist organizations utilize targeting as an instrument of achieving their goals and ensuring organizational longevity. More broadly, this approach allows us to better understand terrorism, a phenomena that only recently was decried as enigmatic and unsuitable for scientific analysis. It is my

hope that this analysis can begin to provide a greater understanding of this unfortunate, and pervasive, form of violence.

CHAPTER 2: A RATIONALIST EXPLANATION OF TERRORIST TARGETING

He's a terrorist. You can't expect him to act like you or me.

Inspector Dominic, V for Vendetta

2.1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theory that explains why terrorist organizations choose their particular targets and how they shift between them. I begin by discussing the assumptions of the model; that organizations are concerned about their survival, they are goal oriented, and that they act in a rational manner. I then connect these assumptions to the logic of target selection. Not all target types are the same; their political meanings, their costs, and benefits differ. As a result, organizations choose targets as an extension of their desire to remain in existence, to achieve their goals, and to rationally pursue both of these objectives.

These targeting choices and their implicit costs and benefits are then integrated into a bargaining model. Essentially, I argue that governments and terrorist organizations are locked into a bargaining interaction over some distribution of public support (Kydd and Walter, 2006). This distribution has important implications for both actors. For the terrorist organization, these constrain or broaden organizations' targeting repertoire by changing the costs and benefits associated with different target types. For the government, the distribution acts to expand or contract the counterterrorism policy space.

I then evaluate this bargaining model within the context of the broader environment in which both states and terrorist organizations are a part. The environment is an important part of the overall bargaining scenario; the interactions that characterize a bargaining relationship are not conducted in a vacuum. Instead, agreements are arrived at

and shaped by the competing interests that the actors have to represent; Putnam's (1988) discussion of the "two-level game" provides an illustration of concept in action in international negotiations. The sum total of these effects as well as their values at any given time then produces outcomes that vary significantly from those that would have occurred had only one factor been present.

The environment discussed in this analysis shapes and creates a "two-level game" of sorts for terrorist organizations; the condition of the environment determines the suitability of choosing targets to either influence one level and extract political concessions from the state, or to work on another level and ensure organizational continuity. In order to test the effects of shifts in the environment on target choice, I focus on three categories of inputs: state characteristics, public support, and organizational competition. Each of these shapes the bargaining environment and allows us to generate testable hypotheses.

In particular, these three categories are represented by six hypotheses. The first category of inputs, state characteristics, is represented by two hypotheses which focus on selection institutions and state resolve. The selection institution hypothesis asserts that states with large winning coalitions are more likely to suffer attacks on civilian targets than states with small winning coalitions. This should occur because large coalition systems incorporate citizen input into policy decisions. The participation of the citizenry in leader selection and policy implementation mean that attacks directed at civilian targets will be the most likely to result in discernable policy change. The hypothesis on resolve argues that states with high resolve will suffer attacks on non-civilian targets. This occurs because the political benefit of civilian targeting should decrease as the state's unwillingness to acquiesce increases.

The second category of inputs, public support, argues that the distribution of public opinion toward the organization has measurable effects on targeting choice. In particular, organizations are cognizant of public opinion, since new recruits have to be

drawn from a sympathetic population. Government actions that increase public support make the selection of civilian targets less costly, while positive government actions increase the cost. The hypothesis here uses economic performance and repression as proxies of public support and argues that states with poor economic performance, or records of repression, are more likely to experience civilian targeting. In sum, public support, given that organizations remain a certain size, provides a surplus of recruits that can be drawn against when the organization selects civilian targets.

Lastly, organization competition, as represented by an increasing number of ideologically similar terrorist organizations, represents the last category of factors. Here, I hypothesize that increasing organization competition leads to increasing levels of non-civilian targeting. This occurs because excessive actions, particularly the targeting of civilians, by any one organization are liable to reduce the likelihood that an interested recruit joins any organization. A second hypothesis in this category also contends that civilian targeting is more likely to occur in situations where high competition is offset by favorable public opinion. This is akin to increasing, for each organization, the likelihood that terrorist actions result in the acquisition of an additional recruit.

2.2 Building the Model

2.2.1 Assumptions

One might think that political organizations, such as interest groups, share little affinity with terrorist organizations. Since these organizations share little in common, the analysis of one would be expected to yield little information about the other. I argue instead that the tools of the organizational approach allow us to do just that; groups, regardless of their ultimate political goals or the means with which they pursue them, share commonalities that provide us with insight that advances the study of both (Crenshaw, 1985; Oots, 1989). My model is based on this equivalence; I assume that, like their political counterparts, terrorist organizations are concerned about their survival,

are goal directed, and are rational in the pursuit of their objectives. Furthermore, unlike their non-violent cousins, terrorist organizations evaluate their violence based on its instrumentality. Understanding these assumptions is important because they provide us the bases of constructing a theory that is applicable to all groups in a wide variety of different operational environments.

Obviously, the most important desire of any group is for its survival (Wilson, 1973). For terror organizations, organizational survival is particularly important because the alternatives for members outside the organization are limited. Organizations that neglect the importance of maintaining their organization are quickly splintered, absorbed by others, or destroyed by the state. Foremost to the necessity of survival for any organization is the ability to recruit new members to the organization. For many political organizations, including terrorist organizations, recruitment and membership can accommodate a large variation in member commitment: some join for the benefits that they receive, others because of the promise of comradeship and solidarity, and still others join because they are willing to work and sacrifice for the achievement of a particular goal.

Within a terrorist organization, the selection of the appropriate member is important. The life of a terrorist is one "characterized by the lack of comfort, the absence of expendable income, and the denial of leisure activity and personal privacy" (Wolf, 1978: 176). The Al-Qaeda manual points out the same, writing that the life of a terrorist is difficult and only suited for particular individuals, "The nature of hard and continuous work in dangerous conditions requires a great deal of psychological, mental, and intellectual fitness" (2006: 15). Failing to select the appropriate recruit can be detrimental to the cause, costing the organization the "lives of comrades and…the success of future operations" and can ultimately cost the organization its existence (Wolf,

1978: 176).[10] As a result, a terrorist organization needs a way to screen its recruits as a means of ensuring its survival.

The ability to weed out unqualified members is an important part of the organization's operational maintenance. Bueno de Mesquita (2005a) describes Al-Qaeda's organizational imperative to its recruiters; "select…the trainees carefully," the group's manual urges. It goes on to point out that the ideal recruit possesses 14 characteristics: **"**intelligence and insight, ability to observe and analyze, truthfulness and counsel, ability to act, change positions, and conceal oneself, caution and prudence, maturity, concealing information, and patience" (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a: 523).

Given that organizations are able to provide for their survival, organizations then act in accord with the second assumption: the attainment of an ideological or political goal. For terrorist organizations, this can be categorized into one of five central goals: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 52).[11] These goals form the basis of terrorist

---

[10] Crenshaw (1981) provides some context in this matter. She notes William Mackey Lomasney, an American Fenian fighting for Irish independence in the late 19th century, and his particularly virulent distaste for low quality recruits:

> [Would-be terrorists are] such stupid blundering fools that they make our cause appear imbecile and farcical. When the fact becomes known that those half-idiotic attempts have been made by men professing to be patriotic Irishmen what will the world think but that Irish revolutionists are a lot of fools and ignoramuses, men who do not understand the first principles of the art of war, the elements of chemistry or even the amount of explosive material necessary to remove or destroy an ordinary brick or stone wall. Think of the utter madness of men who have no idea of accumulative or destructive forces undertaking with common blasting powder to scare and shatter the Empire.

[11] For terrorism, regime change refers to the overthrow of an existing government and its replacement with one that is more amenable to the terrorists or one led by the terrorists themselves. Territorial change is taking territory away from one state for the creation of a new state or to give it to another. Policy change refers to a goal that seeks some shift in a targeted government's policy. Social control is seeking change in individual rather than government action. Attacks against abortion providers would fall in this category. Lastly, status quo

violence, even for those organizations whose political goals are ambiguous. Al-Qaeda's own political agenda provides an example; their goals range anywhere from the creation of an Islamic caliphate to the expulsion of non-Muslims from Arab lands.

These goals may also be endogenous to the situation the organization finds itself. In civil war studies, this means that organizations contesting weak states are more likely to engage in center-seeking conflicts while those contesting more capable states are more likely to fight for secession (Buhaug, 2006). This parallels the situation of terrorist organizations; organizations may change goals to respond to changes in their activity level, the state of the organization, and the response of the government (Crenshaw, 1985). While this is problematic for those who wish to ascribe ideological rigidity to terrorist organizations, the shift in goals also has important implications for the methods they use to pursue them. These methods, in the form of targeting, have definable characteristics which I discuss below.

Third, organizations, in their pursuit of their goals and organizational maintenance, act in a rational manner. The concept of rationality refers to the ability of a person or organization to possess stable and consistent preferences, to compare the costs and benefits of all available actions, and to select the course of action with the optimal expected utility (Abrahms, 2008: 80). In practice, this means that organizations are cognizant of the risk and resources required for particular operations (Sandler et al., 1983; Enders and Sandler, 1993). Given this, organizations have demonstrated definite patterns in their actions; organizations rank their tactics on the basis of risk and resources, simple tactics are more prevalent than complicated ones, and hostage-taking events are overwhelmingly successful (Sandler et al., 1983). This suggests that terrorist violence is

---

maintenance simply refers to a terrorist goal that seeks to support a regime or territorial distribution against those who wish to change it (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 52-53).

not the product of madness, but rather a response of an attentive and reactive organization.

2.2.2 Target Selection and its Consequences

Given these assumptions, we need to model both the costs and benefits associated with particular targets and the way we conceive of the differences between them. Clarifying these elements then allows us to create a framework through which we can understand the target selection process.

The underlying logic of target selection is complex; organizations often eschew simplicity for symbolism. The attack on the *USS Cole* provides one example. The success of this attack was far from certain; in fact, the odds of failure for the operation was high; the ship was heavily defended and armed to withstand nearly every type of possible conventional weapon attack (Wright, 2006). Rather, the *Cole* was valuable because it was symbolic. The seventeen casualties inflicted are, relative to other attacks, small and certainly not enough to change US policy. Instead, the attack demonstrated a organization's capability and, with it, brought the support of hundreds and thousands of newly-convinced followers (Wright, 2006). On the other hand, there are potential targets like transportation hubs, hotels, and restaurants. These are not symbolic and are relatively easy to penetrate. The value for the organization in these targets rests not in the demonstration of capability or their symbolism, but in their ability to drive up casualties. It is these attacks, readily crossing the moral boundary that generates fear and, for many governments, changes in policy.[12]

In this analysis, I argue that organizations choose from among two types of targets: civilian and non-civilian. A basic categorization of targets into these two types is

---

[12] Despite the prevalence and symbolism of a "no-concessions" policy towards terrorism, states have frequently negotiated and made concessions to terrorist organizations (Bacevich, 2001; Sandler and Enders, 2004).

provided in Table 2.1. Targets such as politicians, city halls, military installations, government offices, embassies, and police stations form the non-civilian category. The civilian target category includes private citizens, schools, religious figures, transportation networks, utilities, and businesses.

This two-part distinction, while admittedly basic, forms the basis of both government preparations and terrorist logic. For the US government, the State Department *Patterns of Global Terrorism* and the FBI's *Terrorism in the United States Report* divide terrorist targets into civilian, military, commercial, and government. These distinctions are for expository purposes; more simply one can characterize these targets on the basis of their ability to be defended, as is done in counter-terrorism efforts (Libicki et al., 2007).

The defense of targets is an important distinction to discuss. Counterterrorism experts frequently talk about the potential target environment for terrorists as a dichotomy between "hard" and "soft" targets. This distinction simply reflects the degree of investment made in security measures. The non-civilian targets discussed here can be put in that former category as the investment made in their security is quite large; defensive measures can range from identification cards to armed patrols. These security measures entail a commitment to adequately serve their constituent populations and to protect those providing the service.

For civilian targets, this is not the case. For both autocracies and democracies, civilians are largely left to provide for their own security. In democratic states, respect for civil rights and civil liberties precludes an onerous security apparatus.[13] For autocracies, the same investment is not made because civilians are largely immaterial to the government. However, these states deploy their security in roughly the same way;

---

[13] This point has been used in research linking democratic attributes to increased levels of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983; Schmid, 1992).

civilians are protected using a policing strategy that emphasizes areas and zones. This means that, regardless of the political characteristics of the state, the per-unit allocation of security is lower for civilian than it is for non-civilian targets.

Additionally, non-civilian and civilian targets can be differentiated on the basis of their accessibility and value. Non-civilian targets represent the critical functions of government: administration and security. In an objective sense, attacks on any of the two can yield critical harm to the state. Attacks on the security apparatus weaken the state, shifting the balance of capabilities towards the organization and potentially hastening a government's overthrow or capitulation. Attacking the administrative functions of government can also be significant. Attacks against the leadership modify the expectations of the public and, more importantly, can lead to a replacement leader whose own objectives may not accord with the previous administration (Marvick and Marvick, 1971). To this end, states are careful to limit access to these types of targets. In the case of the military, this means citizens are largely prohibited from access. In terms of a state's administration, democratic governments are careful to provide access to leaders in carefully controlled situations. In autocracies these concerns are usually not present and access is tightly controlled.

This is contrasted with civilian targets, which are objectively less valuable and more accessible. Civilian targets represent the populace, culture, economy and the infrastructure of a given society. As such, these types of targets are ubiquitous in all types of states. If we were to evaluate attacks on these targets in an objective sense, we would find that they are relatively meaningless; civilian deaths, outside of the political context, represent murder on a large scale. They do not change the balance of capabilities between the terrorists and the government nor do they automatically lead to changes in policy. Civilian targets become valuable for terrorists when evaluated in systems which value civilian input. In autocracies, civilian targets have little meaning for the leadership and the above logic holds. In democracies, civilian targets have value

because of the policy-making power of the citizenry. Civilians, witnessing attacks on their fellow citizens, can evaluate that policy has failed thus engendering significant political change (Hewitt, 1993). This, argues Pape (2003), explains why democracies are prime targets for suicide terror.

Terrorist organizations employ a simpler logic and frequently divide the enemy into its civilian and non-civilian components. Bin Laden's fatwa against the West used this distinction – it ordered Muslims everywhere to "kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military" (Pape, 2003: 346). A Hamas training manual does the same and admonishes its readers to prioritize vulnerable civilian targets over more dramatic secure government targets, stating, "it is foolish to hunt the tiger when there are plenty of sheep around" (Bloom, 2005: 34).

In sum, I adopt this targeting convention for simplicity, to more accurately accord with the ways the targets are defended, their value, and their accessibility, and to be consistent with the logic with which they are selected.

Civilian Targets

The choice of civilian targets has been a substantial and effective part of the terrorist repertoire. One reason for this primacy is the logistical ease of striking civilian targets. States are peppered with civilian targets. As a result, organizations are faced with a large number of accessible and vulnerable locales that can be serve as potential targets. This also simplifies operations; effective actions often comprise little more than placing a weapon in a public thoroughfare and detonating it at the appointed time. In addition, the psychological effect, relative to cost, is large for civilian targets. Unaffected civilians, seeing the effects of terrorism and the same vulnerabilities in their own life, cause the terrorist message to resonate far beyond the actual target (Schmid, 1992).

Second, terrorism directed against civilians, particularly in a democracy, often provides the most direct way to inflict costs upon a target government (Pape, 2003).

Organizations choose civilian targets as it puts the targeted government at the greatest disadvantage by making the populace bear the costs of conflict. As a result, targeted civilians, in addition to the broader populace, press for changes more readily than if the conflict were directed at the military.

Lastly, civilian targets generate an appearance of resolve for a terrorist organization. The execution of attacks on civilian targets, and the willingness to do so in the future, provides leverage in an organization's interactions with an opposing government (Pape, 2003). The government then faces increased costs for maintaining its position on a contested issue as well as a psychologically vulnerable public clamoring for changes that reduce the likelihood of terrorism in the future. These dual concerns, coupled with an enemy that has already demonstrated a willingness to break ethical norms, have resulted in a number of governments acquiescing to terrorist demands.[14]

At the same time, civilian targets also pose risks to the terrorist organization. Large numbers of civilian casualties can often cost a organization its support and jeopardize its existence (Ross and Gurr, 1989; Byman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1998). The operations of ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) illustrate this possibility. Its initial operations, designed to draw attention to both the Armenian genocide and calls for independence, received wide ranging support from Armenian communities through the United States and Europe. However, its bombing of Paris's Orly Airport on July 15th, 1983, which resulted in the deaths of 7 and injuries to 56 others, fractured the organization and reduced the amount of support it had once enjoyed

---

[14] Pape (2003: 348) demonstrates that during the time period from 1980 to 2001, 5 out of 11 terrorist campaigns resulted in the acquiescence or partial concessions of targeted governments. In fact, the record may indeed be better than that. Of the five campaigns he lists as ongoing, both the US and Israel have made concessions. The United States has withdrawn its forces from Saudi Arabia, fulfilling one of Al-Qaeda's demands. Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, partially fulfilling the demands of a variety of groups for Israel to withdraw from Palestine.

(Crenshaw, 1991; Hoffman, 1998). As Tololyan (1986: 19) writes, the selection of civilian targets greatly reduced the viability of the movement:

> The Armenian terrorist movement deeply miscalculated the kinds and amounts of violence and dissension which the Diaspora consensus could tolerate; it miscalculated equally badly the degree to which its own success depended on at least the silent acquiescence, if not the support, that such consensus enables.

Terror organizations appear to be mindful of the risks of civilian targets and, as a result, select civilian targets deliberately and only in certain circumstances. Pape (2003) argues that the pursuit of nationalist goals provides one such scenario. Organizations can only undertake suicide terror directed at civilians when the level of commitment amongst the organization is high. Organizations may also embark upon civilian targeting as an initial strategy (Thornton, 1964), timing them to indicate resolve while also providing enough time to reduce the potential for backlash. In essence, civilian terror presents a tradeoff to the organization; short term influence is sought at the expense of constituent support (Pape, 2003). Table 2.2 shows some of the costs and benefits associated with this target choice.

Non-Civilian Targets

The second target group discussed here are those classified as non-civilian. This category – comprised mainly of government buildings, police, and military – form the most predominant target type for terrorist organizations (Gurr, 1980). These are attractive targets for most terrorist organizations because they provide them with a means to advance a political message without endangering the organization's support. Organizations may also use terrorism of this type to provide a message of capability, indicating that they have the ability and the resources to be an effective antagonist to an opposing government (Wright, 2006). As a result, terrorism of this sort can be seen as a means of organization building, by providing examples of power, while at the same time striving towards a political objective.

At the same time, this targeting category also has disadvantages. Some targets require a high investment out of organizations, and not all organizations are able to make this investment. Government and military targets in particular impose high costs on their attackers. Organizations have to invest in training their cadres in infiltration, gaining intelligence about the target, and providing the appropriate weapons for the action. Such an investment was evident in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban in their raid on the Pakistani Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi in late 2009. In that incident, militants dressed in army uniforms drove a van through a series of checkpoints and after a firefight, entered the heavily guarded headquarters and took several hostages (Perlez, 2009). After an eighteen-hour standoff, forces entered the building, killed the militants, and released 42 hostages.

Secondly, the selection of this type of target may also demonstrate, however unwarranted, an inability or unwillingness to conduct extra-normal violence. This may indicate a organization is not committed enough to absorb the costs of civilian targeting. One consequence of this is a loss of membership. The selection of non-civilian targets may lead to burnout (Ross and Gurr, 1989). Members, disaffected by the unwillingness of the organization to take risks, may decide to leave. For Chai (1993), the act of violence is itself the appeal for members; organizations that are unwilling to attack civilian targets may cost themselves certain types of members.

Third, the choice of non-civilian targets may reduce the organization's overall efficacy. Because this type of target may be easier for the public to understand, the emotional backlash and demands for political or social change may be less strident than situations in which civilians are the target (Libicki et al., 2007). These constraints, along with the payoffs associated with non-civilian targets are also presented in Table 2.2.

2.3 Bargaining and Terrorism

Given that there are tradeoffs involved with different target types, how are organizations able to make that decision? Here, I argue that, like many political interactions, the relationship between the state and the terrorist organization is one of bargaining. In essence, this relationship is one of "deciding how to divide the gains from joint action" (Powell, 2002: 2). As such, the relationship discussed here comes from a rich history of bargaining models in political science. Before we discuss this interaction in detail, it is appropriate to place this relationship within the broader context of bargaining models in political science and to discuss the reasoning behind bargaining.

In both theory and practice, politics is essentially a bargaining process. Two or more actors interact to determine the allocation of some resource. Within political science, an understanding of bargaining is critical to understanding the basic interactions that shape both domestic and international policy. Scholars in American politics can use this to better understand, among others, the relationships between Congress and the President, the negotiation between parties, and the "logrolling" that occurs within parties. Within the subfield of international relations, these types of models have been successfully used to model not only the onset of cooperation and conflict, but to also model the actions within war as well. These models further demonstrate their utility by not only being useful for the interactions of states, but also for actors below the state level (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Centinyan, 2002; Lake, 2003).[15]

We can demonstrate bargaining scenarios in political interactions through the use of the bargaining range adapted from Fearon (1995) shown in Figure 2.1. First, two players are placed at either ends of a standard continuum. These players can represent any type of political actor that seeks a resolution over some particular issue. The

---

[15] See Lake (2003) for a more thorough discussion of bargaining theory and its applications to research on the democratic peace, ethnic conflict, and treaty design.

continuum itself represents the range of all possible outcomes regarding the issue under contention. The two players have preferences over the outcome; the first player seeks to control the entire interval and wishes for an issue resolution close to its preferred outcome of 1 and the second player seeks outcomes close to its preferred point of zero. Actors are free to negotiate to create a resolution that fits somewhere along this line

At the same time, the players here can also resort to war to achieve a better distribution. In this case, the players have probabilities of p and $1-p$ of winning the prize. Combined with player one's cost of fighting, c_1, his payoff to fighting is $p-c_1$. Player two's payoff is $p+c_2$. Player one then prefers accepting any point that is greater (to the right) than $p-c_1$ to fighting. The second player prefers any point less (to the left) than $p+c_2$ to fighting. In this scenario, then, a space exists for a bargain to be created. In crisis bargaining situations, states that demonstrate a greater interest in the stakes at hand usually achieve a bargain within this range.[16]

The puzzle in international relations is that even though war breaks out, there continues to exist a bargaining outcome more desirable than the costly war option (Fearon, 1995). War occurs here due to three conditions: parties have private information with incentives to misrepresent, they are unable to credibly commit to a bargain reached, or the issues at stake are indivisible.[17]

---

[16] Morrow (1989) discusses three components any model of crisis bargaining must fit. First, actions in the process are sequential. Second, each side is uncertain of the other side's resolve. Lastly, the nature of each sides' resolve is determined by their expectations of the outcome of a protracted conflict between the two sides.

[17] Fearon's (1995) discussion of private information has led to a whole host of work which may also be applicable to terrorism studies. In particular, scholars have argued that there exist a variety of ways that actions by other states can be deemed credible; this includes the overall role of democratic institutions and audience costs (Lipson, 1998), opposition parties (Ramsay, 2004), and selection institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Weeks (2008) makes a similar argument, focusing on the ability of leadership to be replaced for autocracies.

When fighting does occur, it too can be a bargaining process. This can occur in two ways: combat can destroy the enemy's resources or can reduce uncertainty over the outcome (Reiter, 2003). In the first perspective, an enemy can lose some amount of an objective indicator, like forts (Smith and Stam, 2004), or lose resources in the course of battlefield defeats (Filson and Werner, 2002). In the end, opponents no longer have the will to resist and some new bargain (minus the costs of war) is established. The second perspective describes war as a way that private information is revealed and that war continues until both sides' appraisals of the outcome converge (Blainey, 1988; Slantchev, 2003), thereby coming to a new distribution of actor preferences.

We can evaluate acts of terror in the same way (Corsi, 1981; Overgaard, 1994). One particular way this is done is by having the terrorist act reveal private information (Lake, 2002). This demonstration, according to Lake (2002), is used to shift the balance of capabilities between the state and the terrorist organization towards the organization. This eventually helps future terrorists obtain a better bargain; in effect, "bargaining over particular issues now is subordinated to a broader strategy of using violence to change the relative capabilities of the two sides" (Lake, 2002: 17). Kydd and Walter (2006) evaluate terrorism in the same way as Lake (2002), but in a more immediate sense. Organizations undertake terrorism because under normal circumstances, states would not take their demands seriously. Terrorism acts to reveal private information about the organization, specifically their resolve, and therefore shifts the government closer to the terrorist's own position.

At the same time, these models also differ on the role of the public in the bargaining relationship. Kydd and Walter (2006) do not explicitly examine this role. Rather, the ways that terrorist organizations bargain with the government, mainly through their choice of strategy, is determined by institutional constraints. Pape (2003) has a more direct role for the public; he argues that the presence of politically active public makes suicide terrorism a cost-effective option. Civilians are uniform in this view;

suicide terrorism is chosen because citizens have the ability to act and change policy. Lastly, Lake's (2002) model provides the greatest role for the public. Rather than acting as a homogenous entity, terrorist actions sometime seek to provoke the government into response which moves moderates from support for negotiation to support for the terrorist organization.

2.3.1 Bargaining and Terrorist Target Selection

The basic framework presented in Figure 2.2 provides a way to understand the targeting process as an outcome of a bargaining process which is, in turn, shaped by a variety of external factors. Unlike standard treatments of bargaining models, this framework is not a formal model. Instead, the framework I provide presents a useful heuristic that allows us to explain how organizations make targeting decisions. In particular, this framework augments bargaining models by incorporating a role for the environment in the interaction of the two actors; in this, the environment shapes the signals each actor sends – terrorist organizations in their target choice and governments in their actions.

This approach is similar to the ones discussed by Siquiera and Sandler (2006), Bueno de Mesquita (2007), and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007). Both of these models place terrorist organizations and governments within a larger framework of interactions, both with each other and with the general population. Furthermore, these models involve the actors acting strategically, each hoping to change - through attacks or the allocation of resources - the nature of their interaction and, thus, the response from the other actor. My approach mainly adds the function of target selection to these models. Thus, organizations and governments continue to act strategically and responsively to changes in their environment. However, in this framework, this results in a set of definable targeting choices.

Within my framework, there are three main actors: the terrorist organization, the government, and the public. The terrorist organization consists simply of the number of people actively involved with the organization. At this basic stage, the terrorist organization is assumed to be in an equilibrium position. That is, it has the correct number and type of members it wants. The government, here treated as a unitary actor, represents all the institutions that make up the governing structure of a particular country. The public represents all those not involved in either the government or the terrorist organization. Furthermore, consistent with previous models of insurgent violence and terrorism, the public is comprised of three subgroups – those who support the government, those undecided, and those who support the group (Mason and Krane, 1989).

The public is included as an actor because its participation in the interaction between a terrorist organization and the government more closely approximates what occurs in terrorist situations. Governments and terrorist organizations are not the sole participants in these situations; rather, states and terrorist organizations are engaged in struggles akin to electoral contests: both seek some measure of the public's support (Kydd and Walter, 2006).[18] This distribution can act to constrain as well as broaden the choices of the terrorist organization and the government.[19] Terrorist organizations, while

---

[18] This is the same in the counter-insurgency literature. Insurgent groups seek "the active support of a plurality of the politically active people and the passive acquiescence of the majority" (US Army, 1990: X). This implicit distribution of the populace is also discussed below.

[19] The selection institutions theory comes to mind (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2005). In it, the sizes of the selectorate (the segment of the public that can make leadership decisions) and the winning coalition (the subset of the selectorate that provides the leaders with power) determines policy. In particular, the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate is important. Democracies, because they have large winning coalitions, have to offer public goods in their policies. Because these goods are non-excludable, all of society benefits. Autocracies, with small winning coalitions and selectorates, offer private goods. These goods do not benefit society and instead only lead to the enrichment of the ruling class.

not necessarily seeking complete public support, need the assent of some part of the populace to maintain organization numbers, minimize opposition, and to preserve material support. Governments also have the same requirements; public support minimizes domestic opposition, increases public support for government operations, and increases the resources the government has at its disposal.

The statements and actions of terrorist organizations seem to indicate this logic. The creation of a code of conduct by the Taliban in 2009 indicated, not only a desire by the leadership to consolidate its control over the organization, but a conscious decision by the leadership to directly manipulate public opinion to support the organization:

> The utmost effort should be made to avoid civilian casualties…The mujahideen have to behave well and show proper treatment to the nation, in order to bring the hearts of civilian Muslims closer to them (Al Jazeera, July 7, 2009).

Similarly, the IRA *Green Book*, a manual written for incoming IRA recruits in the early 1970s, also asked its members to avoid triggering civilian animosity:

> In brief, our personal conduct as well as our conduct of our Republican activities must be aimed at, if not enhancing support, at least not creating enemies unnecessarily (Coogan, 2000: 554).

Governments consider the same factors. Public support is important for the government since it provides the government a freer hand in creating counter-terrorism policy and an opportunity to divert funds towards other goals (Li, 2005; Warner, 2007). The *US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual* (2007: 179) discusses the need for the government, or the "host nation (HN)" to be mindful of its actions and the security of the populace with respect to counterterrorism or counter-insurgency efforts:

> Progress in building support for the HN government requires protecting the local populace. People who do not believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN (Counter-Insurgency) efforts. The populace decides when it feels secure enough to support COIN efforts.

The populace and government can then pursue other goals after their security is assured. Governments that fail to engender this support are disadvantaged; not only must

they continue to allocate resources towards counter-terrorism, they must also invest additional resources towards simply sustaining whatever public support remains. This expense, that of maintaining both public support and counterterror operations, is often a goal of terrorist organizations when they try to provoke government violence.

For terrorist organizations, a large distribution of supporters benefits the organization in two mutually reinforcing ways. First and most simply, an increased amount of civilian support means increased material and personnel support to the organization. This allows organizations to undertake operations of greater risk and cost and, at the same time, to be less vulnerable to the failure of an operation or capture of an operative. Second, and more importantly, this also allows the organization to become more selective in their recruitment (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a). This provides the organization with more capable recruits and, in turn, has a definable effect on the organization's targeting strategy; recruits with greater skills and experience are assigned to civilian targets while those with less skills and less experience are assigned to military targets (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007).[20]

These processes reverse in times when support erodes. Resources and membership dry up, raising the individual costs of operations. As such, organizational operations have to become less risky and less sophisticated. Recruitment becomes more difficult and standards raised during times of higher support have to be lowered. Finally,

---

[20] This leads to a paradox: groups assign their least skilled members to operations of greatest peril. This may be a reflection of the greater value of civilian targets; the more lethal the operation, the greater political impact the operation provides. Attacks against military targets may be a potential training tool for new recruits as they have relatively less political impact and, if they are not struck, less cost for the terrorist organization. In other words, attacks like this, both because of the capability of the target and the inexperience of the recruits, can be easily explained away or disavowed by the group if a failure occurs. On the other hand, operations that are successful, given these constraints, can be seen as a "bonus". One extension of this argument may be that unclaimed operations are more likely to be taken against military targets.

the personnel available are less skilled, further driving down the organization's capabilities and reducing the scope of the organization's target repertoire.

2.3.2 Sequence of Moves

The framework presented in Figure 2.2 describes the sequence of moves. It should be noted that it does not suggest the exact order of moves. Instead, this should be viewed as a snapshot of a repetitive process amongst all actors. For example, the public may start first, breaking towards the terrorist organization and changing the value of different targeting choices.

Here, the government acts first by choosing either a negative or positive action. It is important here to consider that these actions are not necessarily responses to terrorist organizations; instead, they can range from macroeconomic performance to deliberate policy actions such as repression.[21] These acts are also defined on the basis of their means regardless of their ends. This is similar to the approach used in Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007); discriminating counter-terror is considered positive. Here, governments use their intelligence capabilities to infiltrate terrorist organizations, conduct targeted assassinations, and approach terrorism in a measured way without inflicting undue harm on the population. Negative counterterror is indiscriminate; governments here use indiscriminate bombings, curfews, and repressive tactics which place negative externalities on the population.

The public then responds to these actions in one of two ways: they choose to either support the government or to support the terrorists. This specifically means that the distribution of the public amongst the three subgroups - supporters, undecideds, and antagonists - shifts.

---

[21] While exogenous shocks are not necessarily "moves" of the government, they are treated as such in the model.

Under one option, the public can choose to support the terrorist organization. This usually occurs in response to negative government actions, such as repression. In such acts, the distribution of the public changes; members of the antagonistic public become neutral and members of the neutral group move to the supportive group (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). In other words, this type of government action expands the number of people willing to join or more overtly support the organization beyond its already committed followers. Such an outcome is one of the explicit goals of the terrorist provocation strategy (Kydd and Walter, 2006).

In rare cases, the public can also choose to support the terrorist organization despite positive acts of the government. The public may then choose to support the terrorists not because it is responding to government policy, but because terrorist support was its existing preference. In other words, this change in policy demonstrates public support was an artifact, allowing the true preference of the public to be shown.

The public can also choose to support the government. This typically follows positive government actions. In this case, the public distribution shifts; supporters become neutral and neutral members become antagonistic. In other words, the government simply increases the amount of support it maintains. The actions of the Italian government in response to the domestic terrorism of the late 1970s and early 1980s may provide an example. There, the government engaged in a multifaceted approach which sought to undermine the perception that terrorism was an acceptable act and, at the same time, encouraged former terrorists to reenter the population through less restrictive legal measures (Ferracuti, 1998; Serafino, 2002). In all, these actions were successful; the legitimacy of the organizations was eroded and a large number of former terrorists reentered normal private life.

The public, under less frequent situations, may also choose to respond to negative government acts with increased support of the government. One particular example may be the public's support for the government's actions in the wake of the September 11th

bombings. Measures such as the passage of the USA PATRIOT act, the creation of terrorist tribunals, and increased domestic surveillance were initially greeted with a wave of support since they represented a concerted attempt to avoid the horrors of a second 9/11-style event. However, it is important to keep in mind that government support here was based on a fear of an exogenous threat rather than a reflection of support for the government's actions.

After the public has shifted, the terrorist organization moves next by choosing a target type from among civilian and non-civilian targets. The distribution of public support from the previous stage, as well as the influences at the organization level, such as sponsorship or competition, helps determine the costs and benefits of each of the different targeting choices. The organization chooses a target type and the framework repeats.

2.3.3 Group Outcomes

These interactions yield eight potential outcomes, as shown along the bottom of Figure 2.2. Here, I apply our earlier assumptions about target choice – civilian targets are costly yet politically efficacious, non-civilian targets are safe, yet ineffective – to clarify why the interactions discussed earlier yield the selection of specific target types. I first analyze the two outer branches of the framework and discuss the target outcomes before discussing the two inner branches.

The first situation discussed is that along the left side of the framework. This occurs when public support has shifted in the direction of the terrorist organization due to negative government action. In this case, the organization is advantaged. The surplus of supporters means the organization can choose civilian targets, achieve its goals and generate fear amongst the populace, and afford the defection of supporters engendered by the civilian targeting decision without being worse off.

In the opposite situation (the right side of the framework), where the amount of support directed towards terrorist organizations is reduced, the organization is more constrained. In this case, the organization has to focus on group maintenance and choose non-civilian targets. This allows the organization to keep the followers it already has and to hopefully shift public support towards the organization to advantage it in future iterations.

The same is likely to hold for one of the internal branches, those where the public supports a government which has undertaken a negative action (the right side of the left branch). A organization engaged in civilian targeting in this situation would simply validate the negative perceptions of the organization. In addition, this type of strategy would also act to increase support for any government counterterror strategy (Li, 2005). From the organization's perspective, civilian targets would harm future recruitment efforts by decreasing the number of potential supporters available in the future.

Lastly, civilian targets may also be less wise in those instances where public support exists despite positive government action (the left side of the right branch). In such a situation, organizations may achieve their political goals but lose supporters due to backlash over their targeting choice. This can occur because the organization may have, in the past, built a reputation for choosing non-civilian targets. As a result and despite their advantage, organizations may have to consider targeting non-civilian targets.

2.4 Variation in Government

The first factor that I assess in determining a organization's target selection is the role of the government. This is akin to changing the costs and benefits associated with each of the different targeting choices in the framework. In particular, government attributes should reduce the effect of public support on target selection. This can occur because the locus of political decision varies among regime types; in autocracies, this decision making power is located either among the military, a political party, or a small

circle centered on an autocrat. Terrorist organizations, realizing that civilian targets have no political efficacy, should then turn to non-civilian targets. In democracies, civilian targets should become more widespread, particularly because the citizenry has significant input in the policy making process.

The willingness of the state to acquiesce to terrorist demands may also have an effect on targeting choice. In this case, organizations that reside in states that readily concede to organization demands may be less likely to choose non-civilian targets and may instead choose to strike civilian targets. In such cases, engendering support may become less important than achieving political goals. The efficacy of civilian attacks changes again in context of resolved states; in these situations, organizations should abandon civilian targets and adopt a strategy centered on non-civilian targets.

2.4.1 Causal Mechanism I: Selection Institutions

One way that we can address institutional differences between states is to evaluate the size of the group that is able to provide leaders with their power. This group, as explained by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), comprises the selectorate. In a democracy, citizenship or naturalization, with some minimum age, constitutes the only effective barriers to participation in the selectorate. In autocratic systems, entrance into the selectorate is typically more difficult, as entry can be determined by highly specific rules, such as military service, party membership, ethnic background, familial ties, or even amity with the leader.

Within the selectorate lies an even smaller subset: the winning coalition. This group consists of those who have provided the leader with his/her power and whose continued loyalty is necessary to maintain the leader's position. The size of the winning coalition necessary to provide a leader with their requisite power can vary quite considerably - a majority of the selectorate, in democracies, to any number of different types of supporters in autocratic systems.

The size of this group then, in turn, affects the amount and type of rewards a leader can distribute to maintain power. In all states, leaders use the resources of the government to reward and create new followers. In states with small winning coalitions, leaders can use the resources of the government to rewards followers directly. This typically takes the form of private goods, those goods that are excludable and rival. In essence, small winning coalition governments typically become a kleptocracy – where taxes, resource profits, and other government income are typically funneled, away from their most beneficial outlets, to the leadership. In states with large winning coalitions, the amount of people credited with helping provide a leader with power precludes the direct transfer of resources. Instead, leaders allocate public, non-rival and non-excludable, goods. In this way, the entire society, supporters as well as opponents, are benefitted.

It is this difference in goods provision and winning coalition size that leads to fundamental differences in the ability to replace leaders. In less democratic systems, the smaller winning coalition means that the probability of a selector being excluded from any other future coalition is high. As a result, incumbent leaders are advantaged in small winning coalition systems because they can guarantee a place in the winning coalition to a member and a supply of private goods while a challenger can only probabilistically promise a future spot in their winning coalition and some future allocation of private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). This increases the risks of defecting and makes the position of the leader relatively safe. Policy here remains relatively constant; as long as the winning coalition remains enriched, government policy remains static.

As the size of the winning coalition increases, or selectorate decreases, the probability that a particular selector will be in a challenger's coalition increases. This decreases the risk that a member of the incumbent's winning coalition is excluded from a challenger's coalition. As a result, members of a winning coalition in a democratic society are more able to defect from one winning coalition and to join another that offers a more favorable distribution of goods. The counterterrorism policy results that arise

from these two systems differ dramatically. In large winning coalition systems, constituents are likely to evaluate security as a public good and as a component of their leadership choice. Leaders, knowing this, will stress security and be less likely to acquiesce to terrorist demands.[22] Further, acquiescence can also be used by challengers as a political issue, furthering harming the incumbent's chances of staying in power. In small coalition systems, acquiescence is less of a problem as long as it does not impact the winning coalition's supply of private goods.[23]

While the theory of selection institutions allows us to determine the locus of decision-making in a state, it also allows terrorists to determine the targets that have the greatest potential impact. This has remained relatively understudied in the literature. Gurr (1988) provides one of the few empirical studies to evaluate this relationship. He finds, in 87 states from 1961 to 1970, a substantial variation in the likelihood of the general public being attacked between regions based on their overall level of democracy. In particular, he found that in less democratic regions, like Latin America and "Afro-Asian" states, the citizenry sustained 17%-18% of the attacks. In the more democratic European region, the public's share of attacks nearly doubled, to 35%. In Table 2.3, I replicate Gurr's results by drawing from Bueno de Mesquita et. al's (2003) data and the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The results indicate a relationship between civilian targeting, democracy, and winning coalition size.

This variation is consistent with the organizational assumptions discussed earlier. This means writ large, terrorists should attack the targets that yield the most benefit. This

---

[22] Pape (2003) suggests that suicide terrorism is used against democracies precisely because they do acquiesce to terrorist demands. It is worth noting, however, that the concessions gained by terrorists in nearly all instances were modest and not "central to the target countries' security or wealth…and most were potentially revocable."

[23] This is likely to differ amongst different types of small winning coalition systems. For an argument along these lines, see Weeks (2008).

means that in small winning coalition states, an effective terrorist attack should focus on the institutions that provide the winning coalition with their private goods. Terrorists target these institutions in the hope that their attack will severely limit the flow of private goods to the leader and the members of his coalition. If effective, these economic shocks should encourage members of the winning coalition to oust leaders if their level of goods falls below a certain level (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 284-295), helping to achieve a terrorists' goal. If terrorists pursue this strategy, they should target nationalized industries that funnel profits to the members of the leader's coalition (Kramer, 1977). At the same time, given that the military or security apparatus is often deployed in a small winning coalition kleptocratic state to ensure the continued flow of income to the ruler's winning coalition and to prevent challenges to the incumbent (Grossman, 1999), terrorists should also target this apparatus in small winning coalition states.

In large winning coalition states, the most effective target should change. In particular, the ability of the selectorate to easily defect to a challenger should mean that a terrorist threat, or an attack, directed towards the public will be the most effective action. Evidence for this is quite real; voters in democracies have frequently held incumbent governments responsible incumbent governments are usually held responsible for terrorist attacks and failed security policy (Hewitt, 1993).

These considerations are likely to changes the outcomes previously indicated in the framework. One effect of large winning coalitions is that they increase the benefits of civilian targeting. Specifically, this occurs because the large vulnerability of these systems makes them sensitive to any changes in the security of its citizens. As a result, organizations only have to devote a minimum of resources to achieve their preferred political outcome. As a result, organizations should focus on civilian targeting in these situations.

The speed by which the government concedes also reduces the costs of civilian targeting. The greater the effect of civilian pressure on government policy, the less

important continued civilian support becomes for the organization. In the basic framework, civilian support exists to maintain the organization in the interaction with the government. In those situations where the government concedes quickly, the organization can be less concerned about its public perception and less concerned about the need for a steady supply of recruits. Once again, civilian targeting becomes a likely strategy.

For small winning coalition systems, the opposite holds. Given that governments will not be coerced by civilian targeting, the benefits of civilian targets are reduced. Instead, organizations will be more likely switch over to strike non-civilian targets since they might have more effect on changing government policy, especially if they change the level of resources to the selectorate. Success in striking non-civilian targets may also be beneficial to the organization, helping to draw in new supporters and providing the organization with a wider resource base.

Because the benefits of civilian targeting have decreased in small winning coalition systems, a non-civilian targeting strategy becomes more likely. Organizations which use a civilian targeting strategy will only erode their popular support, dissuade potential recruits, and shift public support towards the government. In addition, this may also legitimize government counterterror strategy, further harming the organization (Li, 2005). As a result:

> **Hypothesis 1**: Groups in states with large winning coalitions are more likely to choose civilian targets, while groups in states with small winning coalitions are more likely to choose non-civilian targets.

2.5 The Distribution of the Public

The second factor that I assess in determining a organization's target selection is the underlying distribution of the public. In the framework, this corresponds to the first two stages and results in four potential scenarios in which the terrorist organization has to select targeting strategies. The first two are straightforward; the public acts in ways

consistent with the government's action. It moves towards the government under positive actions and away during negative actions. The second set of scenarios is divergent; the public acts counter to government actions. These scenarios then lead to a variety of different outcomes as the terrorist organization seeks to balance their message to the government with the costs and benefits associated with signaling.

It is important at this stage to consider whether backlash and an unfavorable public distribution, especially coming from outside the organization's own constituency, is an important deterrent to terrorist actions and targeting choices. In many ways, organizations have to be cognizant of this fact; a nationalist organization killing a member of the majority can be damaging to the extent that it affects their goals. For example, support for terrorism declined in the West Bank as hope built for the Oslo Accords.[24] Support increased only as the likelihood of an agreement became less and less likely (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).

In addition, organizations may also have to be aware of the distribution of the public because they may not be entirely sure where their next supporters will come from; the Red Brigades committed such an error and drove away potential supporters when they killed Guido Rossi, a popular communist union official (Drake, 1998). In sum, this means that certain terrorist organizations, outside of the segment of the population they purport to represent, have to be doubly aware of the impact of their actions and the reputation that they create.

The first scenario I consider is when the government acts negatively and the public moves towards the terrorist organization, as seen in the left side of the framework.

---

[24] This was especially evident in conversations with members of secular, not Islamist groups (Post et al., 2003).

Here, organizations are able to select civilian targets.[25] This occurs because the organization does not require all of the additional support it has gained. Rather, they only need those who are best able to contribute (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a). Because of this, the organization is able to absorb the opprobrium and backlash that such choices engender, while at the same time, making progress towards their goals. In other words, organizations begin to act like autocratic states, where - the amount of people needed to maintain the organization is far less than the amount of people wishing to join. As such, organizations can be careful about who they add to their already committed "core". Hassan (2001: 38) relates the experience of one senior member of Hamas:

> Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent. It is difficult to select only a few. Those whom we turn away return again and again, pestering us, pleading to be accepted.

When the public shifts towards the government, either consistent with positive government action or in response to negative government action, the targeting choices change. In other words, the organization begins to approximate a democracy; that is, the amount of outside support begins to equal the demand. This in turn, constrains targeting behavior and limits organizations to selecting non-civilian targets. These targets, unlike civilian targets, enhance organization viability by demonstrating an organization's ability to speak for disaffected people. At the same time, these choices are unlikely to yield much in the way of political goals. This choice then, made at the expense of their goals, helps organizations strengthen their position for future interactions with the government by creating the impression amongst the populace that the organization's goals are worthy of consideration or that the government's opinion of the organization may be unjustified.

---

[25] This example parallels the findings of Bueno de Mesquita (2005a): economic downturns increase the potential pool of terrorist recruits. Because better qualified recruits are available, the group can conduct a more extensive campaign of violence.

Lastly, the public can also respond to positive government action by moving closer to the terrorists. This is likely a rare event but it necessitates, for the terrorist organization, changes in targeting strategy. Here, organizations must respond with non-civilian targets. This runs counter to other situations in which public support shifts towards the terrorists. Here, organizations must scale back their targeting decisions because selecting civilian targets is likely to be costly. In essence, organizations much choose non-civilian targets because a decision to the contrary may validate negative opinions about the organization and, in addition, make the government appear to be the more reasonable actor.

These scenarios suggest that non-civilian targeting is a pervasive outcome. Civilian targeting, on the other hand, is only a good option when the public turns in the direction of the terrorists as a response to negative actions undertaken by the government. This suggests the following proposition from which I derive the first two hypotheses:

> **Proposition 1**: Groups will be more likely to select civilian targets when negative government actions have led to a public distribution in their favor.

2.5.1 Causal Mechanism I: Economic Contractions

While it is difficult to assess the exact distribution of societal interests, one potential way we can do this is to evaluate a state's economic performance as a proxy for public support. Economics has long been used as a measure of public support, allowing us to build linkages between models of peaceful political change, as in models of economic voting (Lewis-Beck, 1986, 1988), and political violence (Alesina et al., 1996; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). Explanations that attempt to tie terrorism to economics have been less successful. At best, scholars have stated that terrorism is most likely to be a result of both economic and political factors (Piazza, 2006). However, given that organizations already exist, changes in economic conditions and changes in the costs associated with different target types are likely to have an effect.

Economic explanations of terrorism might be compared to the greed versus grievance arguments in the civil war literature. The first economic explanation, equivalent to greed explanations, holds that terrorism is a "special application of the economics of occupational choice" (Krueger, 2007: 11). This perspective comes from the work of economist Gary Becker (1968), who argued that criminals were rational individuals acting on self-interest. Individuals choose illegal activity if the rewards of action exceed the probability of punishment and the loss of income from legal work. According to this model, criminals then are those that fit the common description that one would associate with the criminal element – those "down on their luck" and those with the least to lose from the decision to engage in illegal activities. This initial idea then led to a similar model for terrorism: individuals are likely to engage in terror when the relative gains for illegality are high, the costs of illegal acts are low, and where the resources available for terrorism are high (Sandler et al., 1983).

Explaining terrorism through this perspective has, like economic studies of crime, provided a variety of discouraging results; terrorism is more likely to be perpetrated by the educated and employed, not the impoverished (Russell and Miller, 1983; Hudson and Majeska, 1999; Atran, 2003; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Berrebi, 2007). [26] Evidence from the terrorists themselves bear this out. Russell and Miller (1983:55), in a sociological profile of urban terrorists in a variety of countries from 1966-1976, found that "approximately two-thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or post-graduate students." Hudson and Majeska (1999: 48-49) had a similar finding:

---

[26] One notable exception to the economics of crime research is that of Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001). They argue, using alcohol consumption and defense contracts awarded to states as instruments, that greater levels of unemployment are associated with a greater likelihood of property crime. Levitt (2001) contests these results both on methodological and theoretical grounds.

> Terrorists in general have more than average education, and very few Western terrorists are uneducated or illiterate…Older members and leaders frequently were professionals such as doctors, bankers, lawyers, engineers, journalists, university professors, and mid-level government executives.

In sum, the perspective of the impoverished terrorist makes little sense in the context of terrorism – a typical theme in the Arab press is that meaningless sacrifice is senseless: "He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation" (qtd in Atran, 2003). The organization also gains nothing from terrorism committed by the poor and uneducated; the costs of failure for a terrorist organization are large.

The second economic argument, comparable to grievances, finds no relationship. Piazza (2006), analyzing a variety of economic factors, found no correlation between aggregate factors such as GINI scores, the Human Development Indicator, or GDP growth and the incidence of terrorism. Instead, he argues that the occurrence of terrorism is one largely attributable to weak party systems and social cleavages. Similarly, Abadie (2005), using insurance ratings to delineate risk of terrorist attack, found that a country's per-capita income is unrelated to risk. Instead, the occurrence of terrorism is predicted by the state's lack of political rights.

A more direct example of economically grievance-based terrorism may be Krueger and Maleckova (2003)'s example of "robin-hood" terrorism. In events like this, people are motivated to conduct terrorism, not because of their own economic circumstances, but because of the lack of economic opportunities of their countrymen. As a result, the theoretical expectation is that terrorists are more likely to come from poor countries than wealthy ones. Initial results, before the inclusion of political variables, bear this out. Once indicators for political freedom are added, results indicate that poor countries are no more likely to provide terrorists than wealthy ones. To Krueger and Maleckova (2003), these results echo the other findings in this area; terrorism is an overwhelmingly political, rather than economic phenomena.

While economic downturns may not lead to greater levels of terrorism, the economy can lead to changes in target choice. Bueno de Mesquita (2005a) argues that economic contractions reduce individual opportunity costs to terrorism. Aggregated together, this leads to public opinion shifted in the direction of the terrorist organization. Moreover, this places us on the left side of the framework. The combination of a discontented and motivated populace, combined with recruitment effort that only selects the most qualified, leads to organizations whose operatives have characteristics distinct from the population at large.[27] This also reduces the cost of civilian targeting since the organization has a large number of potential members that can only fill a limited number of positions in the organization.

While a depressed economic climate can create a large pool of recruits that help reduce the cost of civilian targets, the higher quality of operatives in itself can also lead to increased civilian targeting. Organizations, wishing to maximize success, assign the most qualified operatives to attack civilian targets (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007). In this case, the costs of civilian targeting are once again reduced; the presence of committed operatives reduce the likelihood that backlash from the organization's targeting decisions will shake their commitment. For these reasons together, I expect:

> **Hypothesis 2**: Groups are more likely to target civilians in states with economic downturns.

---

[27] A past description of volunteers for suicide terrorism provides a stunning example:

> None of the suicide bombers—they ranged in age from eighteen to thirty-eight—conformed to the typical profile of the suicidal personality. None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires (Hassan, 2001: 38).

However, civilian targeting is more likely to matter to those states that value citizen input, in other words, states with large winning coalitions. As a result:

> **Hypothesis 2A**: Groups are more likely to target civilians in states that are experiencing economic downturns and also rely on large winning coalitions**.**

2.5.2 Causal Mechanism II: Repression

A second factor that is likely to change the distribution of the public is the propensity of the government to use repression against its own people. This behavior, and its relationship to terrorism, has been a relatively under-studied area in political science research (although see Allen and Colley, 2008).[28] Its complexity also lends itself the relative lack of work on the topic. Firstly, terrorism and repression are most likely endogenous – the occurrence of one provokes the occurrence of the other. Second, appropriate data needed to measure either have, until recently, been unavailable (see Lichbach, 1987; Silke, 2004). Given that this relationship has remained relatively obscure, the role of repression on organization targeting also remains unknown. Here, I discuss the political effects of repression and the potential outcomes that it may have for terrorist organizations considering targets.

The background to a discussion of repression and dissent, of which terrorism can be considered an extreme form, lies in the wide variability that exists in the ways organizations choose to dissent. Tilly (1978) was among the first to identify this, arguing that the variability lies in the "political opportunity structure" found in a particular state at a particular time. For Tilly (1978), the aggregation of these choices within the political context, as proxied by political openness, presented a curvilinear relationship. That is, organizations existing in open systems are likely to engage in fewer protests because

---

[28] The relationship between repression and civil war is, on the other hand, well studied. See work by Gurr (1970), Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Regan and Norton (2005).

there exists numerous, less costly, and more direct ways to redress grievances.[29] At the other end, systems are so repressive that organizations cannot develop the capacity (from either an organizational or cognitive perspective) to protest (Meyer, 2004). In sum, protest then occurs in those situations where a "space of toleration" exists for the actors and where the state lacks the outlets for redress as well as the repressive capacity to quash dissent (Meyer, 2004).

The act of repression, and the state which uses it, provides a suitable example of a "political opportunity" structure. It is in this type of venue where I evaluate the role of target choice. It is also here where dissent meets repression, where the findings, unfortunately, begin to diverge. In some work, the relationship between repression and dissent is linear – that is, repression either leads to the deterrence of further claims against the government or succeeds in creating further dissent (Hibbs, 1973; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Francisco, 1996). In other instances, the relationship between the two is curvilinear and dissent becomes either more or less likely to occur at the extremes (Gurr, 1970; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Muller, 1985). In still yet other cases, the effect is variable or non-existent (Rasler, 1996; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Moore, 1998). This forms what Davenport calls the "punishment puzzle" (2007: 8).

Fortunately, there do exist a number of analyses restricted to broad definitions of dissent that attempt to resolve the "punishment puzzle." Lichbach (1987) suggests a rational actor model to link the divergent findings. He argues that organizations have a choice between tactics and respond in three broad ways: organizations shift tactics in response to a government's coercion, organizations adjust their mix of tactics to maintain its overall balance of activities, and inconsistent government actions increase dissent. Organizations, rather than instinctively or automatically reacting to repression, choose an

---

[29] This parallels the "political access school" interpretation regarding terrorism and democracy. See Eyerman (1998) for more discussion on this point.

appropriate mix which keeps pressure on the government and keeps the total costs to the organization at a manageable level. As a result, the model proposed by Lichbach (1987) provides a consistent explanation linking the range of findings in the literature.

Subsequent studies have supported these assertions. Moore (1998), in a limited study, confirms Lichbach's (1987) findings. Using data from Peru and Sri Lanka, he finds that the rational actor model proposed by Lichbach (1987) outperforms a contextual argument (Gupta et al., 1993) and one centered on repression and the timing of dissent (Rasler, 1996).[30] In sum, organizations respond to coercion by changing strategies in all regime types regardless of the amount of time elapsed from the initial act of coercion.

Francisco (1995), studying protest in three coercive scenarios; East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Palestinian Intifada, also finds support for an adaptation argument roughly similar to the substitution effect that Lichbach (1987) discusses. Although the fit with each of the cases differed, this "backlash" finding provided the strongest support. In particular, he found that while severe coercion may depress the level of protest temporarily, it increases dissident behavior in the long-run, especially if the repression is applied indiscriminately.

While the wide range of disparate findings regarding the repression-dissent nexus have been replaced by broad explanations, the relationship between repression and terrorism is characterized by a dearth of work and a range of various findings. Crenshaw (1981), in her wide-ranging discussion on the causes of terrorism, adopts Tilly's (1978) argument and describes the relationship between repression and terrorism as an inverted U. In particular, she argues that revolutionary terrorism, one that is informed by an ideology and seeks revisionist goals, is most likely to occur in places where "paths to

---

[30] Moore selects Sri Lanka and Peru because of the presence of the LTTE and Shining Path (SL), respectively. Their status as "violent groups" provides a more difficult test of Lichbach's theory because those groups are believed to be least likely to substitute non-violence for violence.

legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime's repression is inefficient" (1981: 384).

Testas (2004), in an analysis of terrorism in the Middle East, concludes that the relationship between the two is the opposite. Drawing from earlier work by Frey and Luechinger (2002) and Muller and Opp (1986), Testas (2004) argues that counterterrorism strategies which rely on repression are likely to backfire as a deterrent to terrorism. Repression, in these instances, increases the expected value of the goal, thus making it more likely that the citizenry will choose to become involved in violence against the government. Thus, the absence of policy space may be irrelevant, provided that the regime's repression inadvertently enlarges the benefits to violence and terrorism.

Perhaps the one way to reconcile the diverse range of outcomes regarding repression and its relationship to any form of violent dissent is to evaluate how the citizenry, as a resource for either the organization or government, responds to the interaction between the organization and the state. Mason and Krane (1989) argue that repression can act to either increase or decrease support for dissent and opposition depending on how the repression is applied. Given that the level of support changes for the opposition, its ability to conduct operations and vary its intensity also changes.

In particular, Mason and Krane (1989) argue that governments can use three types of repression: targeted repression against leaders, repression against rank and file, and indiscriminate repression. Governments that use indiscriminate violence, targeting civilians as well as complicit members of the organization, serve to drive support towards the opposition. This occurs because the opposition organization needs only to provide the means to avoid repression to gain an individual's support. In situations where government repression is targeted against rank and file members, explicit support for the organization should remain static since those who occasionally assist the organization will opt to become uninvolved, while those who participate will have little to lose by continuing. Lastly, repression against leaders will increase active support for the

government, since the citizenry will doubt the organization's future ability to provide public goods.[31] As a result, repression can yield a variety of outcomes consistent with those of previous studies (Lichbach, 1987, Francisco, 1995; Moore, 1998); repression can lead to the replacement of violent strategies with non-violent (or less violent strategies) in some cases and backlash in others.

Mason and Krane's (1989) work allows us to understand how repression by the government impacts targeting choice. Government repression, and its extent, helps to shift public support either to or away from terrorist organizations. Repression that moves the citizenry towards the terrorist organization should reduce the costs of civilian targeting because it generates a large amount of latent and overt support for the organization. Once again, this can act as a buffer for the organization, using it to replace losses brought about by its targeting choices. Less extensive repression, including targeted repression, generates the opposite and shifts public support to support of the government or to a neutral state. This suggests:

> **Hypothesis 3**: Groups are more likely to choose civilian targets in states that use indiscriminate repression on their populations.

Once again, this effect is likely to be conditional on the openness of government. States that incorporate citizen input into their decisions will be most likely to be effected by civilian targeting. As a result,

> **Hypothesis 3A**: Groups are more likely to choose civilian targets in states that use indiscriminate repression on their populations and who also rely on large winning coalitions.

---

[31] However, latent support for the group should increase in this case latter two cases because, first, the government will be unlikely to offset the loss of benefits from the opposition with benefits of their own. In the second case, it is doubtful that coerced populations will shift support to the government in any demonstrable way.

2.6 Group Environment

While the previous hypotheses focused on the actions of the public and the government, the last set of hypotheses focus on the nature of the organizational environment and their effect on target choices. Here, I focus on situations where terrorist organizations compete with one another. Given that we expect organizations to have some optimum level of support, as discussed in the model, variations in the organization environment – in the form of adding further organizations – threatens to change the costs and benefits associated with different targeting choices. In particular, we should expect that the accumulation of additional organizations will dilute each organization's potential allocation of new supporters from individual terrorist action. For civilian targets, increased competition increases the impact of backlash since there are less available people to compensate for those who leave. Choosing non-civilian targets is also impacted; disaffected members, who may grow disenchanted with the organization's perceived weakness, have more potential options should they choose to exist. As a result, organizations must adapt to these changing conditions and find ways to either maintain their preferred level of support or to attract new followers (Crenshaw, 1985; Oots, 1989; Bloom, 2005). It is here where we discuss those particular adaptation mechanisms.

2.6.1 Causal Mechanism I: Group Competition

One important component to terrorist organization behavior is the role of the organizational environment the organization is located in. This system, that of competition or monopoly as well as simply the presence of other organization, is important because it determines the potential resources the organization has, the nature of its support, and the type of behavior a organization can engage in independent of the state's security, its regime type, or economic characteristics. This field of study, typically centered on the competition between terrorist organizations, has emerged recently to become one of the most fruitful and dynamic areas in terrorism research.

The most extensive, and classic, study of the interaction of organizations and the resultant terrorist behavior is the work of Mia Bloom (2005). In her study, she compares the violence of Palestinian and Sri Lankan terrorist organizations and notes suicide terror flourishing in Israel and the occupied terrorists while diminishing in Sri Lanka. The cause of these variations, she notes, is the presence of competition in the case of the former and the consolidation of power by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil-Eelam (LTTE) in the other. In particular, she notes that competition drives suicide terrorism through an outbidding mechanism (Crenshaw, 1985; Bloom, 2005). This occurs when organizations compete for civilian support by demonstrating their capability through more spectacular displays of violence. A cycle of violence is then created – a state responds with violence, creating the preconditions for further civilian support for terror and further incentives for outbidding.

However, the logic of outbidding cannot work in every setting. Competition can lead to more violence in one of four scenarios: the public only focuses on organization resolve, organizations are unconcerned with the effect that the violence has on its goals (Abrahms, 2008), norms have developed to such an extent that extreme violence is not treated with moral approbation (Gurr, 1988; Khashan, 2003), or if the organization is oriented around religious, rather than secular, goals (Juergensmayer, 2005). Given that the absence of any one of these explanations, excepting perhaps the last, renders competitive violence destructive to the organization, it is unlikely that these conditions hold over a wide temporal or spatial domain.

Organizations are, in fact, concerned about the effect of violence on their goals. In particular, they realize that outbidding and extreme violence may draw a disproportionately harsh response from the authorities, thus damaging or eliminating the very resources they seek to protect (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006). Organizations then may moderate their violence - not out of a sense of unity with their competitors, but because of a sense of self-preservation. This perspective is similar to that of "cooperative

plunder" in civil wars; organizations, rather than fight and destroy a useful natural resource, periodically engage in the exploitation of the resource to continue conflict (Ross, 2004). Bloom (2005) points to a mutual cease-fire of sorts between the PKK and Turkish Hezbollah, "[the] situation changed in 1993, when the two conflicting sides understood the danger of the internecine strife and arrived to an agreement of modus-vivendi and common struggle against the Kemalist regime" (qtd in Bloom, 2005: 113). Pape (2005: 15) notes a moderating effect: monopolistic areas are characterized by a greater quantity and more severe attacks than competitive areas like the West Bank (Pape, 2005: 15).

The public reaction to violence, even in the context of competition, may also force organizations to moderate (Sandler and Siqueira, 2006).[32] One of the motivations for the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) decision to move away from suicide terror and extreme violence was the public's increasing intolerance of terrorist violence. This stemmed in large part from the PKK's target choice – the organization had decided to turn its attention to "traitors" within the Kurdish community.[33] This campaign of violence against its own community, often quite extreme and gruesome, had the effect of driving supporters away and creating splits within the organization. An attack on an open air bazaar on October 7th, 1998, which killed 7 civilians and injured 118 others, provided the defining moment for public support for the organization. An account from the time detailed, "a sharp reaction from Turkish public opinion: huge street demonstrations in favor of the secular regime, a strong press campaign, and swift action by security authorities against the perpetrators and their sponsor" (qtd in Bloom, 2005: 113). These

---

[32] This is akin to median voter models (Downs, 1957). If the "median" civilian supports moderation, groups should respond by choosing a level of violence, or targets, that reflect the desire for moderation.

[33] Interestingly, Bloom (2005: 110) states that much of this approbation came from the PKK's ceasing to "differentiate between military and civilian targets."

actions, along with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, deeply affected the organization's viability as well as its choice of tactics. Suicide terror in Turkey is now the province of international, rather than domestic, organizations (Bloom, 2005).

We can evaluate the effects of competition on target choice by referencing the framework discussed previously. In most cases, position of the bargaining interaction has no effect; organizations select non-civilian targets because the presence of other organizations reduces the benefits of civilian targeting. In addition, the use of civilian targets harms the entire organizational system, driving away supporters to any organization. In one case, described below, civilian targeting may result from competition. This occurs because benefits of civilian targeting may outweigh the negative effect of the presence of other organizations. I describe each of these cases in more detail below.

In situations where the public supports the government (the right side of the framework), the presence of competition further reduces the benefits of a civilian targeting strategy. Organizations not only have to compete with other organizations over a distribution of supporters, but the likelihood of adding a supporter is divided amongst all participating organizations. Attacking civilians will not only reduce support for the attacking terrorist, but reduce the probability that any other organization will gain any potential supporters.

Attacking other organizations for their supporters is also dangerous; the portion of the population supportive of terrorist organizations may shift away from accommodation towards indifference or support of the government. Members of the attacked organization may, instead of being "poached" by the competing organization, join any of the other competing organizations. As a result, organizations in this case should be especially likely to continue striking non-civilian targets.

In those cases where the public supports terrorist organizations (the left side of the framework), a strategy of non-civilian targeting is likely to continue. Organizations will

be reluctant to engage in civilian targeting because there exists less of a cushion between the number of current members and the number of additional members that can be gained. As the number of competing organizations increases, regardless of the level of support directed towards the terrorist organization, the probability of a organization gaining any one new member is reduced. This, combined with the possible loss of members due to operational backlash, also makes the selection of civilian targets unwise.[34]

This preference for non-civilian targets should be quite strong, changing over to civilian targets only when the distribution of the public is firmly in the direction of the terrorist organization. Such a situation may occur on the left side of the framework, but only when the government has committed an action such as indiscriminate repression that has caused a large shift in public opinion towards the terrorist organization. Under these situations, the uncertainty of gaining additional supporters despite the presence of other organizations is reduced. Here too, the benefits of internecine warfare may become realizable. Organizations can target one another, destroy the organization and steal supporters, and increase the probability that they will gain additional supporters.

Most of these results are likely to hold even if we change the benefits of civilian targeting, as would occur when a state's winning coalition becomes smaller. Similar to the cases in which the government is responsive to the citizenry, competition will lead to targeting strategies which favor non-civilian over civilian targets. In fact, in all cases targeting strategies will favor non-civilian targets. In these cases, organizations avoid

---

[34] One particularly vivid example is provided by the actions of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyaa (GAI) in the November 1997 attack in the Egyptian town of Luxor. The GAI, seeking to distinguish itself amongst a host of other groups, decided to attack Egypt's tourism industry and provoke the government into a harsh over-reaction. Rather than gain further support from the populace, the deaths of 62 people, mostly tourists, outraged the Egyptian public (Wright, 2006; Cronin, 2007). GAI suffered a tremendous drop in its credibility and the operations of all Islamist groups in Egypt abruptly ceased (Wright, 2006).

civilian targets not because the benefits are diffuse, as they are in the regular framework, but because civilian targets cannot achieve their goals in systems where the public has no role in policy or leader selection.

In monopolistic environments, the benefits to civilian targeting once again change. Given that supporters and undecideds have (or may have) preferences to violently confronting the government in such situations, they have little recourse over disagreements in targets and must continue to support the existing terrorist organization. In addition, any additional supporters which are available after government action accrues solely to the only existing organization. Organization leaders, knowing this, can then embark upon violence towards civilian targets. For most distributions of society, organizations in monopolistic situations are more likely to select civilian targets. Non-civilian targets become the preferred strategy only in those situations where public opinion is extremely unfavorable to the organization or where governments are unaffected by civilian targets, such as in small winning coalition systems. These points lead to two hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 4**: Groups in monopoly situations will be more likely to select attacks against civilian targets than those in competitive situations.
>
> **Hypothesis 4A**: Groups in competitive situations and favorable distributions will be more likely to select attacks against civilian targets than those in competitive situations and non-favorable distributions.

2.7 Conclusion

Overall, this chapter suggests that targeting choices are determined by the overall bargaining environment that exists between terrorist organizations and the governments they oppose. This environment has an effect on the determination of target choice; organizations can decide to choose targets which help achieve political goals, like civilian targets, or those that help maintain the organization, such as non-civilian targets. This

"two-level" game, essentially one between goals and organizational maintenance has an important role in the success and continuation of a terrorist organization.

This analysis builds on past targeting literature and posits that changes at three different levels – government, public, and organization – alters the bargaining environment and impacts the costs of benefits of different target types. Government attributes have the strongest effect; states with large winning coalitions increase the effectiveness of civilian targets by increasing the government's vulnerability to public pressure. Resolve also affects target choice by increasing the willingness of a state to acquiesce to terrorist demands. This too increases the probability that organizations will select civilian targets. In certain instances, the measures can outstrip the lower two levels; negating both the effects of public support and organization competition.

Public support also has an effect, once again changing the costs of benefits of the two target types, in those situations where government is responsive to public input. Here, public opinion, proxied by economic performance and repression, in favor of the terrorist organization can make civilian targeting more likely by providing the perpetrating organization with a popularity buffer that allows it to weather any backlash created by its targeting choices.

Lastly, the presence of competing organizations impacts targeting choice by reducing each organization's per-unit allocation of support. As a result, civilian targeting becomes less likely because the benefits are less likely to accrue to any one organization. In addition, civilian targeting and escalatory attacks are dangerous not only for the organization, but for the entire organization system within a state. This leads, contrary to the outbidding literature, to attacks on non-civilian, rather than civilian, targets.

From these explanations, I develop four hypotheses linking the three attributes to target choice. The next three chapters begin to empirically assess these hypotheses. Each chapter builds on the one before to develop a multi-stage model of terrorist targeting

behavior. Moreover, the empirical chapters further develop the idea that targeting is an important tool and is employed by terrorists in a purposive and rational behavior.

The next chapter discusses the role of two government characteristics: selection institutions and resolve. These attributes provide a shape to the entire dissertation and allow us to begin to understand the process and effects of terrorist targeting.

Table 2.1: Target Types[35]

Non-Civilian	**Civilian**
Government (Diplomatic)	Abortion Related
Government (General)	Airports & Airlines
Military	Business
Police	Educational Institution
	Food and Water Supply
	Journalists & Media
	Maritime
	NGOs
	Private Citizens & Property
	Religious Figures & Institutions
	Scientist
	Sports Related
	Tourists
	Transportation
	Utilities

[35] These target types come from the GTD data (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). In addition, I exclude the following target types: criminal, other, terrorists, and unknown.

Table 2.2: Costs and Benefits Associated with Target Types

Non-Civilian	**Civilian**
Benefits: • Demonstrates capability • Backlash less likely • Good for building organization	*Benefits:* • Demonstrates resolve • Makes progress towards goals • Inexpensive
Costs: • Resource-intensive • May make organization appear uncommitted • Demands for change less likely to result	*Costs:* • Backlash possible • Increase Gov't support • Only effective in certain scenarios

Table 2.3: Revisiting Gurr's Analysis of Terrorist Action (1961-1970) [36]

Region	Avg. Polity Score	Average W	Number of Incidents	Property Targets	Government Targets	Public Targets
European	6.71	.831	117	86%	36%	35%
Latin America	3.20	.548	125	65%	57%	17%
Afro-Asian	2.57	.486	77	43%	71%	18%

[36] Gurr analyzes 87 states, self-governing territories, and noteworthy areas in his study. This test includes 84 states. I exclude Hong-Kong (part of the UK during the period), N. Ireland (part of the UK), and Puerto Rico (part of the US).

Figure 2.1: Fearon's (1995) Bargaining Range



Figure 2.2: Sequence of Moves in Framework



H1: Groups in states with large winning coalitions are more likely to choose civilian targets, while groups in states with small winning coalitions are more likely to choose non-civilian targets

H2: Groups will be more likely to target civilians in states with economic downturns.

H2A: Groups are more likely to target civilians in states that are experiencing economic downturns and also rely on large winning coalitions**.**

H3: Groups are more likely to choose civilian targets in states that use indiscriminate repression on their populations.

H3A: Groups are more likely to choose civilian targets in states that use indiscriminate repression on their populations and who also rely on large winning coalitions.

H4: Groups in monopoly situations will be more likely to select attacks against civilian targets than those in competitive situations.

H4A: Groups in competitive situations and favorable distributions will be more likely to select attacks against civilian targets than those in competitive situations and non-favorable distributions.

CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT ATTRIBUTES ON TARGETING

> The revolutionist enters the world of the state, of the privileged classes of the so-called civilization, and he lives in this world only for the purpose of bringing about its speedy and total destruction. He is not a revolutionist if he has any sympathy for this world.
>
> Sergei Nechayev, Catechism of a Revolutionary

3.1 Introduction

On February 16th 2005, FBI Director Robert Mueller sat before the 15 members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter SSCI) and spoke about the criminal threats that faced the United States during the previous year. Mueller devoted a significant part of his testimony to the danger of terrorism, a security threat the director called, "the gravest we face" (SSCI, 2005). His statement, while somewhat alarmist, aptly summarized the way terrorism was viewed at that time. Terrorism, despite the passage of three years since the attacks of 9/11, remained in the forefront of the national conscience. During the previous year, American intelligence had indicated that terrorist operatives had conducted surveillance on financial targets in a number of major American cities, the report of the 9/11 Commission became public, the conspirators in the attack on the USS Cole were sentenced, and a bill redesigning the American intelligence community to cope with terrorist threats was signed into law. In addition, terrorism, and the ability to be secure from such threats, had also been a pivotal issue in the election that November.[37]

---

[37] Public anxiety about terrorism was also part of a conscious political strategy during the election. In September 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney warned voters of the consequences of electing the Democratic opponent, Sen. John Kerry:

Mueller's concern was shared amongst other members of the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Porter Goss, Mueller's counterpart at the CIA, also warned in testimony two days later, that terrorists were seeking to use unconventional weapons against the United States (Jehl, 2005). Implicit in the testimony of both men was the concern that the United States provided a range of targets attractive to potential terrorists. Mueller stated that:

> America is awash in desirable targets - those that are symbolic like the U.S. Capitol and the White House - as well as the many infrastructure targets, like nuclear power plants, mass transit systems, bridges and tunnels, shipping and port facilities, financial centers, and airports -- that if successfully hit, would cause both mass casualties and a crippling effect on our economy (SSCI, 2005).[38]

This statement echoed the warnings of various counterterrorism officials, who repeatedly cautioned that terrorists sought to attack targets with high concentrations of the general public such as shopping malls, stadiums, and office buildings. The FBI's *Terrorism 2000/2001* report (2001) noted a preference for civilian targets; from 1980 to 2001, 57% of all terrorist attacks in the United States were directed against civilian and commercial targets.[39]

> It's absolutely essential that eight weeks from today, on November 2nd, we make the right choice, because if we make the wrong choice then the danger is that we'll get hit again and we'll be hit in a way that will be devastating from the standpoint of the United States.

[38] Available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm

[39] Available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.pdf. 254 (57%) terrorist attacks were perpetrated against civilian/commercial targets, 106 (24%) against government, 61 (14%) against foreign and diplomatic targets, 14 (3%) against military targets, and 7 (2%) were unclassifiable. Using my data, 58 civilian targets were struck out of a total of 84 (69%). These numbers differ because the FBI data takes planned actions into account. In addition, the FBI's definition of terrorism may be likely to encompass acts defined as criminal in the GTD data. For more on the differences between definitions, see Chapter 1.

This preference has been seen in terrorist actions. A RAND study on terrorism targeting cited the relative importance of civilian targets in the United States towards the pursuit of terrorist, and particularly Al-Qaeda's, goals:

> Attacks on the U.S. homeland will be particularly attractive, both because civilian targets are "softer" than are the heavily fortified U.S. outposts in the Muslim world, and because pain inflicted upon the U.S. population itself is likely to have a larger political effect (Libicki et al., 2007: 9-10).

During that same time period, 1980 to 2001, civilian targets comprised only 37% of all terrorist attacks in Egypt.[40] There, operations were directed primarily at the government, perhaps the most notable act being the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Many other actions were driven by the authoritarian and complex nature of Egyptian politics and regulations. The actions of the government in repressing political opposition, closing off alternate sources of information, and creating a repressive security structure led to a wide variety of groups whose primary target was the government (Cook, 2007). Even the perceived "decadence" of the society – the adoption of some Western cultural norms - was placed at the feet of the political leadership in Cairo, forming yet another rationale for making the government the principal target for the country's terrorist organizations (Ibrahim 1980, 1988, 1996).

In the following sections, I operationalize and empirically test these differences in terrorist targeting. I find a positive, yet significantly weak relationship between winning coalition size and civilian targeting choice. This suggests that elements of regime type, or the elements that give rise to our common definitions of regime type, provide us with a way to understand targeting that more classical definitions of regime type cannot. This

---

[40] Once again, utilizing my data, I determined that 226 terrorist events occurred in Egypt during the time period from 1980 to 2001. Of that total, 84 attacks (37%) were committed against civilian targets.

may allow terrorists to identify the locus of power in these different states, and thus select the target type that yields the most political benefit. Given that target types have different costs and benefits depending on the situation in which they are deployed, regime type may provide one element of terrorist target choice.

The chapter proceeds as such; I first begin by briefly discussing the effects of this institutional attribute. I follow by providing an overview of the data, discussing case selection, the data generating process, and the units of analysis. In this section, I will also introduce the variables to be used and discuss the methodology to be employed. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical analyses as well as a variety of robustness checks on the results. I conclude by summarizing the results and discussing their implications.

3.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations

While terrorism can always be reduced to simple phrases such as "propaganda of the deed", a true appraisal of the utility of the act of terrorism must take in a variety of factors. One factor that is important is the context in which the terrorist organization operates; different states have different vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the terrorist organization for their political gain. For democracies, the vulnerability of the government to public grievance should provide terrorist organizations with a useful heuristic towards determining the appropriate target (Pape, 2003; Libicki et al., 2007). For less democratic states, the reduced role of the public and the reduced vulnerability of the government to the public, should also change what target type is the most effective.

The target variation that exists between the United States and Egypt proves illustrative in this respect. Groups in the United States see the targeting of civilians as the most effective route towards changing American policy while groups in Egypt see the solution to failed policy, or even unfavorable social trends, in targeting the government.

The analysis I conduct here tests how selection institutions, a way to measure government openness to the public, affects the type of targets terrorist organizations choose.

3.2.1 Selection Institutions

The baseline for my discussion on the effect of selection institutions on target choice is the debate over the effect of regime type on terrorism. This has been one of the foundational and most contested areas of research in terrorism studies. One set of scholars (Gurr, 1980; Crenshaw, 1981; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 1998; Sandler, 1995) point to the liberal characteristics of democracies - such as respect for civil liberties, freedom of the press, and rights of due process – and argue that democracy increases the risk of terrorism. This occurs because these attributes reduce the costs of operation and the likelihood of punishment for terrorist organizations.

Another perspective argues that democracies have attributes that should reduce the occurrence of terrorism. The presence of free and fair elections provides one mechanism by which this occurs, allowing citizens to make policy and leadership change without the use of violence (Schmid, 1992). Beyond this, citizens also have the right to undertake political change by becoming involved in the political process directly, whether through running for office, protest, or the creation of political parties (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994). Lastly, non-violent conflict resolution is an established norm in these states, allowing disagreements that have been unaddressed through the political process be resolved without the use of violence (Ross, 1993). These attributes all lower the costs of achieving political goals, thus making terrorism and violence less attractive (Eyerman, 1998).

Li (2005), in an attempt to reconcile these competing claims, uses two different definitions of democracy and finds two competing effects. First, he finds that democratic participation reduces the likelihood of terrorism by reducing the cost of achieving political goals while increasing citizen efficacy. At the same time, he finds that

democratic constraints, such as limits on executive power and elections, make terrorism more likely by reducing a government's freedom of action in countering terrorism.

The role that these attributes have on targeting is unclear. Given that a group already exists, one may speculate that neither attribute of democracy has an effect. They may merely shape the likelihood of terror, not the way it is used once a group comes into being. These attributes can also shape targeting choice. One may expect that both features may reduce the costs associated with all target types by increasing access to targets and increasing the political impact a target has once struck. However, if we believe that groups are conscious of the costs of different target types, groups may defer to the less resource-intensive category and select civilian targets.

Gurr (1988), in his study of political terrorism in 87 states from 1961 to 1970, found a relationship between democracy and targeting choice. In all states, he found that government targets formed the most prevalent target type. [41] Beyond that, he found a large variation in the likelihood of private citizens being attacked based on level of democracy.[42] In regions that are less democratic, such as Latin America (a region encompassing Central and South America, as well as Spain) and "Afro-Asian" states, the citizenry sustained 17%-18% of the attacks. In the more democratic European region, the public's share of attacks nearly doubled to 35%. These results, while preliminary, provides some support for the contention that terrorists attack different targets in democracies than they do in autocracies.

One reason this difference may occur is due to the political power of citizens in democratic states. In democracies, political power is granted and maintained through the

---

[41] The percentages are 36 % for European states, 57% for Latin American states, and 71% for "Afro-Asian" states.

[42] Gurr defines the mass public as "private persons and groups." I use the more general term "public" throughout the chapter.

consent of the people. Policy has to be geared towards the people in order for leaders to remain in power. Policy that harms the public can lead to creation of new policy as well as the replacement of leadership. Al-Qaeda's attacks on the Madrid train system in 2004 may have been conducted with this goal in mind (Burke, 2004).[43]

In autocratic states, power comes from a far smaller group. In Egypt, power resides mainly within the military officer corps (Cook, 2007). Changes to the rent streams relied on by the military or in the modification of policies that directly impact this group may be the way to create policy change in this system.

Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (1999, 2003) selection institutions theory is one way we can explain the difference in target types between the two states. The main actors in the political systems of the United States and Egypt, the citizenry and the military respectively, provide two examples of the selectorate.[44] In democracies, this group is quite large, citizenship or age requirements provide the only substantive barriers to participation. In autocratic systems, the selectorate is typically smaller and more difficult to gain access to. Entry can be determined by specific rules, such as military command, personal connections, party membership, or a similar ethnic background to the leader.

Within the selectorate resides the winning coalition – those whose "support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over disenfranchised members of the society" (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 51). In a democratic state, leaders generally depend upon a large winning coalition, usually a majority or plurality of the selectorate. The winning coalition in autocratic states is far

---

[43] An internet site visited by the perpetrators prior to the attacks, the Global Islamic Media Front Web site, believed that attacks on Spanish targets would generate, "huge pressure on the British presence, which Tony Blair could not overcome" (Atran, 2006: 136).

[44] Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003: 42) define the selectorate as a "the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership."

smaller, usually depending upon some artificial scarcity like status or rank within the selectorate to gain entry. This often results in systems in which the winning coalition can be much smaller than the selectorate, yet still determine national leadership and policy.

The size of the winning coalition also determines the type of goods a leader can provide to keep constituents' loyalty. In systems where the winning coalition is large, such as a democracy, leaders cannot afford to directly reward individual supporters. As a result, leaders have to instead allocate broad public goods to their supporters. Since these goods are non-exclusive, their benefits extend beyond the members of the winning coalition to all of society. States with smaller winning coalitions can afford to allocate private goods directly to their supporters, thus bypassing any indirect support of the larger society.

Lastly, the size of the winning coalition relative to the selectorate also determines the likelihood of political change. In less democratic systems, the smaller winning coalition means that the probability of a selector being excluded from any other future coalition is high. As a result, members of an incumbent's coalition are highly loyal. Incumbent leaders are advantaged in small winning coalition systems because they can guarantee a place in the winning coalition to a member and a supply of private goods while a challenger can only probabilistically promise a future spot in their winning coalition and some future allocation of private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Larger winning coalitions decreases the risk that the member of the incumbent's winning coalition is excluded from a challenger's coalition. As a result, members of a winning coalition in a democratic society are more able to defect and join another coalition that offers a more favorable distribution of goods.

This directly relates to which targets are effective. Because the selectorate in a large winning coalition state is more likely to defect to challengers who can promise a more beneficial distribution of public goods, such as public safety, a terrorist attack need only be directed at the public. In small winning coalition states, an effective attack would

not target the citizenry, since it has little role in the creation of policy. Instead, effective targets in these states should focus on the smaller winning coalition or the institutions that provide the winning coalition with private goods. Thus,

> **Hypothesis 1**: Groups in states with large winning coalitions are more likely to choose civilian targets, while groups in states with small winning coalitions are more likely to choose non-civilian targets.

3.3 Research Design

While most studies of terrorism have focused on instances of either international or transnational terrorism, I restrict my analysis to cases of domestic terror. I choose this approach for a number of reasons. First, the causal mechanisms that drive domestic terror are likely to be quite different from those of international terror. The role of democracy, for example, may be quite different depending on the type of terrorism we choose to study. In international terrorism, democracy may cause a transnational terror group to cross the border into a democratic country to conduct an attack to force civilians to pressure the government into changing a policy that affects the host country. The effect at the domestic level is simpler; democracy may affect terrorism simply by providing an environment where groups can form without the unjustified intrusion of the state (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983). Schmid (1992: 17) highlights this difference:

> The point I wish to make is that democratic processes must be working properly in order to prevent domestic terrorism. Strong emphasis has to be placed not only on majority rule but also on minority rights…In sum, then, the strengths of well-working democracies can minimize the probability that domestic terrorist groups emerge. However, they are no guarantee against threats from abroad.

Correctly accounting for the effects of domestic institutions on international terror would require a more complex research design. Here factors like target state democracy would be combined with other factors such as the government of the host state and the general status of the host state-target state relationship. Some research demonstrates this type of design; Bapat's (2007) work on the internationalization of terrorist campaigns

stands out as an example. Here, I avoid these complex designs and instead rely on domestic terrorism data.[45]

Second, according to Sandler (2003), domestic terrorism is the far more prevalent phenomena, outpacing international terror by a factor of eight to one. As a result, much of what we do know may only be readily applicable to a small subset of the larger phenomena of terrorism (Young and Findley, 2009). Domestic events then, if properly operationalized, allow a potentially larger set of groups and events for researchers to draw conclusions from.

In order to analyze the relationships discussed here, I use the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD). This dataset, currently housed at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, is a terrorist event dataset initially collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS) and transferred to the University of Maryland in 2001. This initial dataset included 61,637 incidents of terrorism spanning the years 1970-1997.[46]

In the years since the transfer of the data, researchers at the START Center have improved the GTD. The first such example of their work has been the March 2009 release of the GTD. This version of the dataset marks the mergers of two previous datasets, the original GTD and a 1998-2007 update of the GTD called GTD2. This new version adds ten additional years and over 20,000 additional cases of terrorism to the existing database. In all, the GTD now includes approximately 81,800 acts of terrorism, both domestic and international, in 178 states from 1970 to 2007. For this analysis, I rely

---

[45] In order to use transnational terror data with the general theory discussed here one would have to know how each groups' constituency felt towards each of the terrorist organization's target states. For an attack on a French target we would have to know the public's orientation towards France. This may be relatively difficult.

[46] During the course of the move, files for 1991 were lost. Analyses using this data are all missing in this time period.

on information indicating target type, the perpetrating group, the date, and location of terrorist attacks.

One of the main advantages of the GTD dataset is the flexibility it offers researchers. The first of these is its broad definition of the act of terrorism. Traditionally, the definition of terrorism has proven to be a point of contention for terrorism researchers (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Hoffman, 1998; Silke 2004). This often leads to agenda-driven, political, or biased research. The definition of terrorism used by the GTD is quite broad: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: ii). The definition, absent references to targets and referring to a variety of goals and mechanisms, allows researchers to create their own, narrower definitions and to pare down the data according to their requirements.

Second, the GTD contains a wide variety of perpetrators of terrorist violence. Well-defined organizations such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Tupamaros are included alongside groupings such as political parties, student protesters, and rebels. This too provides researchers with flexibility, allowing them to focus on areas of individual interest ranging from terrorism, protest, or crime.

In this analysis, I incorporate data on the founding, ideology, and operational areas of terrorist organizations into the GTD. Data for these variables come from the START Center's Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS) database (2008) and additional data sources such as the U.S. State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (various years), the *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* (Anderson and Sloan, 2002), Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman's *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (1988), and many other sources.[47] This additional

[47] TOPS is located at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/.

information allows me to create a coding rule that allows a way to distinguish between international and domestic terrorism.[48]

In order to create this coding rule, I gather information on the location of each attack, the nationality of the target, and the group associated with the attack. I first omit targets of a different nationality than the state in which the attack took place. Attacks on foreign targets on domestic soil include attacks on foreign embassies or occupying troops. I then note the location of the attack and the group responsible. This is then compared to the available group record in the TOPS database or other pertinent data source. If the location of the attack in GTD matches a known operating area for the terrorist organization in any of the data sources, this event is then marked as one of domestic terror.[49] This results in a coding rule consistent with the domestic terrorism definition used by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) as "incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target" (MIPT, 2007).[50] Since I am concerned with target choice, rather than operational execution, I include failed attacks Maoz (2007). An example of the coding rule and included cases is presented in Figure 3.1.

The final dataset contains 31,364 acts of domestic terror perpetrated by 459 terrorist organizations.[51] This comprises 429 main groups, such as the original al-Qaeda

---

[48] For a listing of groups plus their relevant data sources, please refer to the group bibliography in the Appendix.

[49] This also holds for terrorist organizations operating in more than one country given that the additional countries are recognized by the data.

[50] The MIPT's Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) was the predecessor to the TOPS database. This project ceased operations in March 2008 and was transferred to the START Center.

[51] Out of the total number of cases - 81,800 – 32,112 were excluded because they were listed as "unknown" or "other". From the remainder, 11,882 cases were dropped because they included unorganized collectives such as "a deranged patient", "student protestors", or "pirates" as well as groups that are not accounted for in the consulted data sets. A further 2,155 were dropped – 836 because they were doubtful instances of terrorism and 1,319 were dropped because they

founded in Pakistan, plus 30 "franchises" or offshoots, such as al-Qaeda in Somalia. I then aggregate all attacks perpetrated by the same group in the same state by year, resulting in a final dataset of 2,131 group-state/years. This unit of analysis was selected because it offers the most variation with the smallest time period possible. Alternative approaches, such as using the attack as the unit of analysis, would add little since the results would collapse into the general structure proposed here. Interestingly, the number of domestic terror activities closely approximates Sandler's (2003) ratio of eight to one. Here, the number of domestic cases (31,364) far surpasses that of international terror (4,287) for a 7.3 to one ratio.

Lastly, I restrict the analyses to groups that have conducted more than one terrorist attack during their operational lifetime.[52] This type of organizational behavior is widespread, perhaps accounting for our lack of knowledge about a wide number of groups. This may occur as a spontaneous action: like-minded individuals gather briefly to protest a government policy. At the same time, established organizations may do the same to conduct an attack on a particular target for which they might suffer heavy costs. As such, these groups are not concerned with establishing an organization with any long-term goals or any maintenance imperatives. This also means that the distribution of the public and the factors I discuss here are largely immaterial to the group. Such impermanence is a characteristic of many Greek terrorist organizations; groups are established to protest a government policy, conduct an attack, and quickly melt back into society.

---

represented excluded target types. In all, this results in 35,651 total cases; 31,364 domestic and 4,287 international.

[52] The inclusion of these groups has no appreciable effect on the findings.

3.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a count of each state's civilian targets by year. This is constructed by referring to Table 3.1 and aggregating all target types that fit within the civilian category. This count and the use of the number of total targets as an exposure term, as explained below, allows us to conceptualize civilian targeting as a proportion. This proportion then provides an indication of the group's willingness to choose civilian targets. Refer to Table 3.2 for a list of groups and their average civilian targeting propensity. The proportion yields a range of interesting findings as shown in Figure 3.2.[53]

3.3.2 Statistical Methodology

Because the dependent variable indicates the number of attacks on civilian targets in a given year, event count models are appropriate. Poisson models are not appropriate in this case, as they assume that the data are independent and homogenous; it is likely that targeting is not independent as groups that have gained experience with it are more likely to use it in the future (Jackson et al., 2005). Instead, given that the number of civilian attacks is likely dependent and is over-dispersed, I employ a negative binomial model (Long, 1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).

In addition, I use the total number of targets (the sum of civilian and non-civilian) per group state/year as the exposure term. This takes different levels of activity into account by controlling for the number of time a group has an opportunity to attack a civilian target. In particular, this allows us to distinguish between groups with the same levels of civilian targeting, but different overall activity; groups that attack 10 civilian targets out of 11 total targets provide a very different test of the variables than those that strike 10 civilian targets out of 100.

---

[53] Groups with only one event are excluded from the histogram.

In order to account for endogeneity, I lagged the independent variables. Lastly, I also include robust standard errors clustered by state to address any potential problems with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Greene, 2002).

3.3.3 Measure for Selection Institutions

The first independent variable of interest, W, is a measure from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). This measure indicates the size of the winning coalition in each respective state.[54] This variable is an additive index constructed by using four variables: regime type (REGTYPE), taken from the Arthur Banks dataset (1996) data, and three POLITY IV variables – Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP), Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN), and Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP) (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003: 134).

The presence of favorable attributes in each of these components provides one point. For the regime type measure, the presence of democracy, which is theorized to have the largest winning coalition, gains 1 point. XRCOMP values of two or greater, indicating a system in which elections occur gains a second point.[55] Increasing values in this case indicate a greater responsiveness to supporters and thus, a larger winning coalition. XROPEN values greater than two, indicating selection systems more open that hereditary ones, gains an additional point. Lastly, PARCOMP values of five gain the final point. Values of five indicate competitive systems, with "relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level" (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). These values are summed and divided by

---

[54] Due to data availability, values for this measure end in 2001.

[55] A 2 on the XRCOMP variable indicates a "dual/transitional" system. States with these systems seat one leader according to hereditary succession while using competitive elections to seat the second one. This is also used to indicate "transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election" (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009**:** 20). XRCOMP values of three indicate competitive elections.

the number of categories to result in a range of values from 0 to 1. I expect that states with small values, indicating states with small winning coalitions, should have a greater proportion of non-civilian targets attacked than ones with large values.

3.3.4 Control Variables

Typically, the control variables used in terrorism research have echoed many of the ones used in research on civil conflict. Variables such as geography, Cold War, economics, and commodity exports have been used to explain the occurrence of terrorism. Because this analysis does not attempt to explain when conflict occurs, but rather what type of violence is used, many of these variables are not included as controls. Geography, for example, may provide us an explanation for why groups may use terror or engage in higher-level actions like insurgency but does not provide a logical explanation for why one group will choose civilian targets and why another will not. Still others out of this list of classic controls serve as the explanatory variables of target selection, prompting us to search for new and plausible controls.

The first control variable I include is a measure of a state's urbanization. Urban areas pose especially attractive targets for terrorist organizations (Frey et al., 2007). Not only do cities contain meaningful symbolic targets, but they also hold vast numbers of civilian and non-civilian targets in high density. As a result, groups face decreased operational costs for attacks as well as the potential for greater overall impact (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002).

At the same time, however, this target-rich environment increases the likelihood that a target will be struck in error. Groups may, intending to strike a non-civilian target, inadvertently strike a civilian target and vice versa. The August 15th, 1988 Omagh bombing provides one possible example of urbanization contributing to a mistake in targeting (Dingley, 2001). In the original plan, the IRA sought to detonate a car laden with explosive near the town courthouse, the local symbol of British power.

Unfortunately, the IRA operatives panicked when they caught sight of a local patrol and parked the car on an adjacent street. Other operatives, unaware of the change in location, phoned in a warning and caused an exodus of people down the same street where the car was parked. The reaction to the attack was a swift condemnation of the organization from every political party in Northern Ireland, Ireland, Great Britain, and amongst supporters in the United States (Dingley, 2001: 461).

To account for this, I use a variable from the *World Development Indicators* indicating the percent of state's population that lives in urban areas. This accounts for the possibility that the target attacked differs from the true intended target due to factors such as population density. While other measures, such as percent urban land, exist, the variable used here may provide a better control since urban areas are "target rich" and contain high concentrations of not only civilians but also non-civilian targets such as government and police.

A second control I include accounts for the group's past targeting preferences. This variable attempts to capture the group's increasing proficiency and learning with a particular target type; groups that have experience at attacking non-civilian targets in the past may be more likely to select non-civilian targets in the future because they have gained a knowledge of countermeasures, patterns, and opportunities that prove useful in future interactions (Jackson et al., 2005). The Provisional Irish Republic Army's (PIRA) development of the mortar reflected an accumulation of knowledge from past interactions with government forces; the perfection of this weapon allowed the PIRA to attack heavily defended military and police installations in Northern Ireland by striking from a distance and going over defenses rather than straight at them. This weapon became so successful for the PIRA that it was further refined and eventually used in an attack on the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street in 1991 (Jackson et al., 2005).

The variable I use to capture this is a running proportion of civilian attacks aggregated from the beginning of the group's operations to each individual year.[56] I construct the variable in this way to account for organizational knowledge; technical skill and know-how should be passed through different "generations" of terrorist operatives (Pluchinsky, 1992; Olcott and Babajanov, 2003). This variable can also be considered to be a control for path dependence and is superior to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable because it reflects the longer-term past and does not use up variation that should be explained by other variables (Achen, 2000).

Third, I include a control for a state's security and administrative capacity. Groups actively eschew states that are able to control their territory and actively seek out weaker and less capable countries (Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Sandler, 1997; Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002: 98). For this, I use a measure of relative political capacity (RPC). This simply measures the capacity of the government to extract resources from its population. States that are able to efficiently extract resources from their populace are better positioned to counter many of the preconditions that may affect terror as these states are advantaged in economic growth (Leblang, 1997), increased private investment (Feng and Chen, 1997), and policy enactment (Snider, 1997). Further, states that are advantaged in resource extraction may also have less internal violence (Benson and Kugler, 1998). Data for this variable comes from Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2008).

Lastly, I include a control for group ideology. Previous work by Drake (1998) has indicated that target selection is heavily influenced by an organization's dominant ideology. Groups with a religious orientation are more likely to target civilians; targets are chosen because they represent evil, while the terrorist symbolizes the forces of good (Juergensmeyer, 2003). On the other end of the spectrum, groups with a nationalist or

---

[56] If the group existed prior to the beginning of the data, this variable is calculated from 1970.

separatist ideology may be more likely to target the government and military, whom they see as the primary barriers to the fulfillment of their goal. The coding for this variable comes from the TOPS database. A listing of ideologies and their distribution in the data are provided in Figure 3.3.

In order to clarify the results, I pared down the number of ideological control variables by using the terrorist ideologies available from the previous MIPT TKB database. [57] I classified Anarchist, Leftist, Communist, and Anti-globalization organizations as *Left*. Racist, Conservative, and Reactionary organizations are labeled as *Right*. The remaining ideologies - Nationalist, Religious, Environmental, and Other - are distinctive and thus remain uncategorized. Religious groups, given the expectation that they are most likely to attack civilians, are the excluded category.

3.4 Results

Model 1 in Table 3.4 presents the results testing the first hypothesis (H1). I find no support for the contention that broad institutional features, as operationalized by selection institutions, have an effect on the selection of civilian targets. All control variables, with the exception of past targeting preferences, also fail to achieve significance. The effect for past targeting preferences is quite strong ($p < .001$) and positive, indicating an increased number of civilian targets struck for the most experienced organizations.

The lack of an effect in Model 1 may be a result of the construction of the dependent variable relative to the selection institutions theory. One characteristic of the private goods distribution system of small winning coalition states is the use of industry and business to funnel profits to the members of the leader's coalition (Kramer, 1977). In the case of Egypt, the military is highly involved in both the manufacturing and service

[57] See Table 3.3 for a list of group ideologies and their definitions.

industry. In one instance, a high-ranking member of the military even sought to establish a domestic automobile company (Cook, 2007: 81). These avenues are pursued in order to ensure the continued flow of income to the ruler's winning coalition and to prevent challenges to the incumbent (Grossman, 1999). As a result, terrorists should also target industry in small winning coalition states.

I reconstruct the dependent variable to include business as a non-civilian target. Results should indicate, if the theory is correct, a positive and significant relationship between winning coalition size and civilian targeting. The results, presented in Model 2, also indicate no relationship ($p = .78$) between the two. Broad institutional characteristics seem to play no role in the selection of terrorist targets.

Table 3.5 presents the results of a robustness test replacing the winning coalition size variable with more traditional regime type measures on the two models tested previously. Model 1 uses the Democracy score measure from the POLITY IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers (2009). The dependent variable used is the definition of civilian target as used in Model 1 in Table 3.4. Model 2 uses the same Democracy score measure, but assesses on the alternative dependent variable used in Model 2 for Table 3.4.

In both models, the democracy score measure fails to find significance, indicating that winning coalition size is capturing a different effect. One attribute that may be account for this, that is also absent in the winning coalition variable, is the effect of executive constraints. Gleditsch and Ward (1997: 380) note that executive constraint, while constituting a small part of the overall measure of autocracy and democracy, "virtually determines [both] values." The presence of these constraints do not allow an indication of where political power is drawn from, as do winning coalitions, and may have an ambiguous effect on targeting.

A number of explanations exist for the lack of a theoretically consistent finding in the models. One is that data availability inherently overstates both the quantity and type

of targets struck in democratic states (Drakos and Gofas, 2006). Similarly, this effect may not also be about the absolute amount of information regarding terror attacks, but about what type of information is released. Autocratic societies may have compelling political reasons to publicize terror attacks on civilian, rather than non-civilian targets. Publication of attacks on non-civilian targets may signal that the regime is weak, leading to more attacks on these targets. This effect is evident in the data, as the mean level of civilian attacks in states with small winning coalitions exceeds that of large winning coalitions (.622 > .562, $t=2.86$ ($p < .01$)).

3.5 Discussion

Using the differences in target choice between the United States and Egypt as a motivating example, this chapter sought to demonstrate the effects of institutional design and government resolve on the selection of domestic terrorist targets. This corresponds with the top of the framework, as presented in the theory chapter, and provides the first component towards a more thorough understanding of target selection. The measure discussed is useful because they allow us to step beyond the usual autocracy/democracy distinction to unmask the specific attributes that may contribute to terrorism – the ability of government policy to be changed.

The findings indicate that winning coalitions have no statistically significant effect on targeting choice. Winning coalition size, by roughly indentifying the locus of power in a society, provides a terrorist organization with a useful heuristic that allows them to quickly determine which targets yield the greatest benefit. This leads to groups selecting, in certain occasions, targets which are operationally difficult and resource-intensive. This also provides a point to build on in the subsequent chapter: public opinion may have a greater effect on terrorist targeting in those situations where governments are open to the people.

The need for a multi-stage model echoes that of Drake (1998b). He argues that target selection is a complex process that takes a variety of factors into account. We can see the desirability of a larger model is evident when we define targeting as an outcome of a bargaining interaction between governments and terrorist organizations. Competition, a factor discussed in the third empirical chapter, may only have an effect when public support is needed to provide pressure on the government. This then moderates competitive behavior. Lastly, given that public support is necessary, it should then only have an impact in those states where citizens can have a direct role in shaping policy.

3.6 Conclusion

While institutional attributes provide a good starting point for addressing the differences in target choice that exist between different states, the true explanation lies in considering political institutions as part of a larger model. In addition, the explanations for target selection and terrorism occurrence are not substitutable. Political factors can determine when terrorism occurs, as is done by Li (2005), but the selection of appropriate targets is a much more difficult and deliberative process. All groups can gain some support from the decision to attack, maintaining this support through the selection of targets through a protracted campaign presents another, and more difficult, challenge.

This chapter sought to identify the institutional causes of terrorist target selection. Winning coalition size was hypothesized to affect target choice by changing the costs and benefits associated with different target types by changing which aspect of society is most vulnerable. Larger winning coalitions increase the benefit of civilian targeting because they increase the likelihood that attacks on those types of targets will yield political outcomes favorable to the group. Smaller winning coalition size shifts increase the benefits of non-civilian targeting for the same reason. State leadership, not willing to lose the support it needs to maintain power, will capitulate to strikes against non-civilian

targets. The insularity of the leadership from the public will also reduce the potential negative impact of its capitulation to a terrorist organization.

Winning coalitions also affect costs; an increase in size in the winning coalition should also increase the cost of targeting by raising the potential of backlash. However, given that any terrorist organization only has a limited number of positions it needs to fill, the effect of backlash is outweighed by the ease by which groups can gain recruits in situations where public support is fluid.

These arguments carry over into the next chapter. There, I discuss the impact of public support on target choice. This component arguably forms the most important part of terrorist targeting because it determines the viability of the organization and the likelihood that it achieves its goals. As a result, the results from the next chapter should provide a stronger test of the determinants of terrorist targeting. In addition, the conditional nature of public support – it exists to shape terrorist targeting in those states where public support is important to the state –mean that we can use the results here in combination with the next chapter's results. These two attributes, working together, may provide us with a better model of terrorist targeting and a better understanding of terrorist violence.

Table 3.1: Target Types[58]

Non-Civilian	**Civilian**
Government (General)	Abortion Related
Government (Diplomatic)	Airports & Airlines
Military	Business
Police	Educational Institution
	Food and Water Supply
	Journalists & Media
	Maritime
	NGOs
	Private Citizens & Property
	Religious Figures & Institutions
	Scientist
	Sports Related[59]
	Tourists
	Transportation
	Utilities

[58] These target types come from the GTD data (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). In addition, I exclude the following target types: violent political party, other, terrorists, and unknown.

[59] All attacks on sports-related targets (n=6) are either coded as international terrorism or conducted by unidentified or unorganized collectives and are excluded from the analysis.

Table 3.2: Terrorist Organizations, Civilian Targeting Proportion, and Total Attacks

Organization Name	Civilian Targeting Proportion	Total Number of Targets Attacked
20 December Movement (M-20)	.422	9
23rd of September Communist League	.493	35
28 May Armenian Organization	1	2
2nd of June Movement	.5	8
31 January People's Front (FP-31)	.962	15
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (UK)	1	4
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (Spain)	1	6
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) (Iraq)	1	1
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) (Syria)	.5	2
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	.731	83
Actiefront Nationalistisch Nederland	.5	2
Action Directe	.559	38
Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries	1	1
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	0	1
African National Congress (South Africa)	.328	559
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)	.5	4
Al Faran	1	1
Al Jihad	.4	6
Al Zulfikar	.5	6
Al-Adl Wal Ihsane	.5	4
Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front	.75	3
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	.774	97
Al-Fatah	.829	28
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)	.510	245
Al-Haramayn Brigades	0	3
Al-Intiqami al-Pakistani	1	2
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) (Ethiopia)	1	1

Table 3.2 Continued

Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) (Somalia)	.5	2
Al-Madina	0	1
Al-Mansoorian	.028	14
Al-Nawaz	1	1
Al-Qa`ida (US)	1	4
Al-Qa`ida (UK)	1	1
Al-Qa`ida (Saudi Arabia)	.5	3
Al-Qa`ida (Somalia)	0	1
Al-Qa`ida (Afghanistan)	.479	14
Al-Qa`ida (Pakistan)	.25	6
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (Iraq)	.376	48
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (Jordan)	1	2
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	1	1
Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)	.25	8
Albanian National Army (ANA)	0	1
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)	.367	8
Alfaro Vive	.662	20
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)	0	1
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)	.833	5
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	.5	8
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	.928	27
Amal	.3	6
Andres Castro United Front	0	1
Angry Brigade (Italy)	.5	2
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) (US)	1	21
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) (UK)	1	21
Animal Rights Militia	.5	2
Ansar al-Islam	.208	14

Table 3.2 Continued

Ansar al-Jihad	1	1
Ansar al-Sunna	.333	9
Anti-American Arab Liberation Front	1	1
Anti-Communist Command (KAK)	1	1
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)	0	2
Anti-Racist Guerrilla Nuclei	1	1
Anti-State Action	1	3
Anti-State Justice	0	3
Anti-Zionist Movement	1	2
Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) (France)	.5	3
Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) (Spain)	.5	4
April 6th Liberation Movement	.679	28
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	.667	3
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan	1	1
Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA)	1	3
Armata Corsa	.25	3
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN)	.143	7
Armed Commandos of Liberation	1	4
Armed Forces for Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL)	0	2
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)	.395	34
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	.863	126
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)	.388	22
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA)	1	17
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR)	.431	19
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)	.5	2
Aryan Nation	.5	4

Table 3.2 Continued

Asbat al-Ansar	1	1
Association Totalement Anti-Guerre (ATAG)	0	1
Aum Shinri Kyo	.667	7
Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA)	.625	7
Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the Zionist Presence in France	1	1
Azania People's Organization (AZAPO)	.333	4
Baader-Meinhof Group	.364	21
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	.75	10
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	.767	19
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	.5	4
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	.532	1704
Bersatu	1	1
Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTHK)	.4	8
Black Brigade	1	2
Black Hand	1	1
Black Liberation Army	.543	28
Black Order	.75	6
Black Panther Group (Palestinian)	.531	14
Black Panthers	.556	8
Black September	1	1
Black Star	.25	4
Black Widows	1	1
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)	.583	6
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT)	.667	3
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)	.370	27
Brazilian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAB)	1	4
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	.431	28

Table 3.2 Continued

Brunswijk Jungle Commando	.390	31
Canary Islands Independence Movement	.784	30
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)	.412	23
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC)	.389	23
Catholic Reaction Force	1	3
Charles Martel Group	1	1
Che Guevara Brigade	1	3
Chicano Liberation Front	.833	9
Chilean Anti-Communist Alliance (ACHA)	.833	6
Chin National Army	1	1
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)	.461	57
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement	.297	16
Clandestini Corsi	0	2
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA)	.714	7
Communist Combattant Cells (CCC) (Belgium)	.65	12
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)	.396	22
Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist	1	1
Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M)	.2	10
Conscientious Arsonists (CA)	.667	3
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	.474	23
Contras	.460	92
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	.628	490
Corsican National Liberation Front-Historic Channel	.453	127
Croatian Freedom Fighters	1	1

Table 3.2 Continued

DHKP/C	.042	12
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	0	1
Death to Kidnappers (MAS)	.523	16
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	.668	29
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)	.667	3
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) (Myanmar)	0	1
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) (Thailand)	.556	5
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)	.093	135
Dev Sol	.579	196
Dev Yol	.833	4
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)	.75	9
Dishmish Regiment	.951	41
Dukhta-ran-e-Millat	1	1
Eagles of the Palestinan Revolution	1	1
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) (US)	.910	37
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) (Canada)	1	1
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)	0	5
Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP)	.417	43
Eritrean Liberation Front	.75	4
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front	.75	3
Etnocacerista Movement	0	1
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	.464	3288
Fatah Hawks	.75	4
February 28 Popular League	.929	12
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)	.425	183

Table 3.2 Continued

Force 17	.767	10
Francia	1	1
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	.407	95
Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army	.674	38
Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	.714	9
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)	0	1
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners	1	5
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)	.25	5
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)	.545	78
Gazteriak	1	1
George Jackson Brigade	.833	12
Global Intifada	0	1
Gracchus Babeuf	.5	2
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	.869	20
Grey Wolves	0	1
Grupo de Combatientes Populares	1	1
Guadeloupe Liberation Army	.667	7
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)	.833	16
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)	.449	123
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)	.304	136
Guerrilla Forces for Liberation	.5	6
Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF)	.368	56
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	.682	219
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)	0	2
Harkat ul Ansar	.417	7
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	1	1

Table 3.2 Continued

Hector Rio De Brigade	0	1
Hizb-I-Islami	.917	6
Hizballah	.597	44
Hizballah Palestine	0	1
Holy Spirit Movement	.5	5
Independent Armed Revolutionary Commandos (CRIA)	.263	19
Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA)	1	1
Informal Anarchist Federation	.333	4
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	.926	16
International Communist Group	0	1
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)	.833	6
International Solidarity	1	1
Iparretarrak (IK)	.427	57
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) (UK)	.548	93
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) (Ireland)	.667	3
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)	.853	13
Irish Republican Army (IRA) (UK)	.380	2398
Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Ireland)	.679	23
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain	1	1
Islamic Jihad (Ideological Grouping) (Lebanon)	.667	5
Islamic Jihad (Ideological Grouping) (Israel)	.547	117
slamic Jihad Group (IJG)	0	1
Islamic Movement for Change	1	1
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)	.214	142
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	.385	13

Table 3.2 Continued

Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC)	.7	6
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (India)	.222	14
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (Pakistan)	1	2
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)	.554	17
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)	.667	9
Jamaat-E-Islami (Pakistan)	.111	5
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)	0	8
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	.456	58
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)	.333	7
Japanese Red Army (JRA)	1	1
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) (Philippines)	.8	5
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) (Indonesia)	.75	4
Jenin Martyrs Brigade	0	1
Jewish Defense League (JDL)	1	15
Justice Army for Defenseless Peoples	1	1
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide	1	1
Kach	.714	8
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (Myanmar)	.9	12
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (Thailand)	1	1
Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front	.5	5
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	.667	3
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	1	1
Karen National Union (Myanmar)	.797	55
Karen National Union (Thailand)	.5	2
Karenni National Progressive Party	1	2
Khalistan Commando Force	.3	16
Khalistan Liberation Force	.6	10
Khmer Rouge	.679	119

Table 3.2 Continued

Khristos Kasimis	0	1
Komando Jihad (Indonesian)	1	1
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	0	2
Ku Klux Klan	1	4
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)	.5	2
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	.333	3
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party	1	1
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	.717	11
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	.440	907
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (India)	1	2
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Pakistan)	.719	13
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	.564	68
Laskar Jihad	1	1
Lebanese Liberation Front	1	1
Lebanese National Resistance Front	.75	7
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	.383	950
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Uganda)	.868	90
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Sudan)	1	1
Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF)	.377	23
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)	1	19
M-19 (Movement of April 19)	.514	488
Macheteros	.374	17
Mahdi Army	.5	2
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	.557	775
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	.497	25
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit	1	2
Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary Brigade	.5	13

Table 3.2 Continued

Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade	1	5
May 15	1	1
May 19 Communist Order	0	4
May 98	1	2
Meibion Glyndwr	.833	30
Meinhof-Puig-Antich Group	1	1
Montoneros	.500	65
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH)	.667	5
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	.540	138
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	.608	152
Mountaineer Militia	0	1
Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	1	1
Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)	.125	6
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	.561	43
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)	.823	295
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)	.5	2
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) (Mozambique)	.872	148
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) (Zimbabwe)	1	4
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) (South Africa)	1	1
Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	3
Muslim Brotherhood	.305	75
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	.708	142
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)	1	1

Table 3.2 Continued

National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)	.6	7
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	.708	31
National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)	.233	30
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	.688	1077
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	.411	20
National Liberation Union	1	2
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B)	.5	4
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	.5	2
National Socialist Council of Nagaland	.048	16
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)	.5	2
National Socialist Liberation Front	0	1
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	.826	316
Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)	0	1
New People's Army (NPA)	.315	966
New Revolutionary Alternative (NRA)	0	1
New Revolutionary Popular Struggle (NELA)	1	1
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)	.881	75
Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Force	.5	2
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)	.291	884
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)	.501	66
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC)	0	2
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) (UK)	.626	30

Table 3.2 Continued

Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) (Ireland)	1	2
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	.5	2
Omega-7	1	22
Orange Volunteers (OV)	1	8
Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN)	1	1
Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution	.333	7
Orly Organization	1	2
Oromo Liberation Front	1	3
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	.542	68
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	.685	22
Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty)	1	1
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM)	.752	20
Patriotic Resistance Army (ERP)	1	1
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	1	1
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	.7	24
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)	.976	19
Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA)	.667	7
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)	.542	7
People's Liberation Army	.1	6
People's Liberation Forces (FPL)	.528	154
People's Liberation Front (JVP)	.432	387
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	.716	57
People's Revolutionary Militias (MRP)	0	2
People's Revolutionary Organization	.375	11
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	0	1

Table 3.2 Continued

People's War Group (PWG)	.372	85
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)	.667	4
Phalange	0	2
Polisario Front	1	1
Popular Forces of April 25	.671	25
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	.662	55
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)	.557	234
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	1	5
Popular Resistance Committees	.786	14
Popular Resistance Front (FPR)	0	1
Popular Revolutionary Action	1	1
Popular Revolutionary Army	.156	17
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)	1	1
Prima Linea	.506	54
Proletarian Nuclei for Communism	0	1
Puerto Rican Resistance Movement	1	3
Puka Inti Maoist Communist Party	1	2
Purbo Banglar Communist Party	.625	5
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)	1	2
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	.369	27
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)	.528	26
Recontras	.430	47
Red Army Faction (RAF)	.712	31
Red Brigades	.306	204
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC)	.333	5
Red Flag	.575	22
Red Hand Commandos (UK)	.875	7
Red Hand Commandos (Ireland)	1	2

Table 3.2 Continued

Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	.909	16
Republic of New Africa	1	1
Republic of Texas	0	1
Resistenza Corsa	1	4
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	.491	1380
Revolutionary Bolivariano Movement 200	1	1
Revolutionary Cells	.654	36
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade	1	1
Revolutionary Force Seven	1	1
Revolutionary Front for Communism	1	1
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) (Indonesia)	.32	11
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) (East Timor)	0	1
Revolutionary Nuclei	.417	6
Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA)	.372	107
Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP)	.167	37
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)	.504	52
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)	1	1
Revolutionary Struggle	.2	7
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	.68	27
Revolutionary United Front Movement	0	1
Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the People Party (PROCUP)	.5	2
Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)	.648	18
Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident FARC)	.367	59
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade	0	1

Table 3.2 Continued

Rote Zora	1	1
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)	.6	8
Salafia Jihadia	1	1
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) (Algeria)	.324	37
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) (Mauritania)	0	1
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	.525	198
Saor Eire (Irish Republican Group)	1	2
Sardinian Autonomy Movement	1	1
Save Kashmir Movement	.5	2
Scottish National Liberation Army	.125	7
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)	.75	12
Secret Army Organization	1	3
Secret Organization of al-Qa'ida in Europe	1	4
Sekihotai	1	1
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force	.547	96
Shining Path (SL)	.593	4272
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB)	.408	194
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	.861	10
Social Resistance	0	5
Sons of the South	1	1
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)	1	2
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	.583	45
Sovereign Panama Patriotic Front	0	1
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist) (France)	1	1
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist) (Spain)	.5	2
Spanish National Action (France)	1	1

Table 3.2 Continued

Spanish National Action (Spain)	.5	2
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)	1	4
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	.591	17
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)	0	5
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)	.917	7
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	.5	3
Taliban	.563	361
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)	.611	6
Tanzim	1	3
Tawhid and Jihad	.6	5
Terra Lliure	.463	51
The Extraditables	.316	99
Tigers	0	1
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)	1	4
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)	.805	26
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	.676	457
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)	.892	19
Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement	1	1
Tupamaros	.677	22
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	.208	23
Turkish Hizballah	0	3
Turkish People's Liberation Army	.45	22
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C)	.708	34
Uganda Democratic Christian Army (UDCA)	1	1
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)	.762	193
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	.883	227

Table 3.2 Continued

Ummah Liberation Army	1	1
Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB)	.5	12
United Arab Revolution	1	1
United Freedom Front (UFF)	.9	10
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	.608	153
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	0	1
United Nicaraguan Opposition	0	5
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)	1	3
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)	.528	11
United Popular Action Movement	.531	78
United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)	.867	20
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors	1	1
Weather Underground, Weathermen	.369	36
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	1	1
White Legion	0	1
Workers' Revolutionary Party	0	1
Yatama	1	2
Young Liberators of Pattani	1	1
Youth Action Group	1	3
Zapatista National Liberation Army	.815	22
Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation	0	2
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)	.5	15
Zimbabwe African People's Union	.813	9
Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)	.5	2

Table 3.3: Terrorist Organization Ideologies & Definitions

Anarchist	Anarchist terrorists are opposed to all forms of government. Anarchists are often allied with Leftist groups.
Anti-Globalization	Anti-globalization terrorists oppose the increasing integration of the world into a single free market. They believe that the impact of global capitalism on both the average individual and national culture is negative. Anti-globalization terrorists most often attack corporate and U.S. targets.
Communist/Socialist	Communist/socialist terrorists commit acts of terrorism to pressure their government to follow policies that conform with communist or socialist ideology. They often attack in opposition to such government policies as the privatization of state industry, the reduction of state entitlement programs such as pensions or welfare, or increased integration into the global economy.
Environmental	Environmental terrorists commit acts of terrorism to influence their government's environmental policy.
Leftist	Leftist terrorists include all groups that are on the liberal end of the political spectrum without being explicitly anarchist, communist or socialist. Leftists often see themselves as defending the equality, freedom, and well-being of the common citizens of a state.
Nationalist/Separatist	Nationalist terrorists see themselves as the representatives of their nation or national group. They commit acts of terrorism to defend what they believe to be the interests of their national group. Nationalist terrorist organizations are often seeking statehood on behalf of a minority ethnic or religious group that is currently within a larger state, in which case the terrorists are separatists as well as nationalists.
Racist	Racist terrorists include all groups that select targets based on their ethnicity. Many racist groups also attack people whose religious views or sexual orientations they disapprove of.
Religious	Religious terrorists commit acts of terrorism in order to comply with a religious mandate or to force other to follow that mandate.
Right-Wing Conservative	Right-wing conservative terrorists seek to preserve the established order, or to return to the traditions of the past. Right-wing conservative terrorists support the current government.
Right-Wing Reactionary	Reactionary terrorists are right-wing groups that seek to overthrow the current political order in order to return to a past way of life. The Ku Klux Klan, for example, wants the American south to return to its pre-Civil War social order. These groups often have a warped and inaccurate perception of what life in the past was like.
Other	Terrorist organizations that do not fit any of the TKB's ideological classifications are defined as "other."

Table 3.4: The Effect of Winning Coalition Size on Terrorist Targeting

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Winning Coalition	.033	-.018
	(.028)	(.065)
Left	.029	.077
	(.034)	(.071)
Right	-.058	-.080
	(.037)	(.099)
Nationalist	-.010	-.008
	(.022)	(.072)
Environmental	-.069	.064
	(.050)	(.126)
Other	-.074	.033
	(.045)	(.081)
RPC	.000	-.055
	(.023)	(.054)
Urban Population	.001	.000
	(.001)	(.001)
Past Targeting Preferences	1.77***	
	(.091)	
Past Targeting Preferences 2		2.42***
		(.072)
Constant	-1.73	-2.04
	(.063)	(.092)
Wald χ^2	935.56***	2336.62***
Log Likelihood	-2580.61	-2353.38
Observations	1,563	1,561

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered on state in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1.

Table 3.5: Robustness Check on Winning Coalition Size on Targeting

	Model 1	**Model 2**
DEMOC	-.000	-.000
	(.000)	(.001)
Left	.027	.102*
	(.039)	(.061)
Right	-.056	-.066
	(.036)	(.083)
Nationalist	.008	.026
	(.027)	(.057)
Environmental	-.029	.125
	(.051)	(.115)
Other	-.101	.039
	(.047)	(.066)
RPC	-.003	-.052
	(.021)	(.050)
Percent Urban	.000	.000
	(.001)	(.001)
Past Targeting Preference	1.75***	2.37***
	(.080)	(.072)
Constant	-1.71	-2.04
	(0.057)	(.083)
Observations	1793	1790
Wald χ^2	1076.86***	2265.81***
Log Likelihood	-2924.53	-2696.44

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered on state in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1.

Figure 3.1: Coding Rule & Screening Mechanism



Case	Group	Date	Target Nationality	State
1	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	1/14/1980	Salvadoran	El Salvador
2	FMLN	1/24/1980	Salvadoran	El Salvador
3	FMLN	2/14/1980	Salvadoran	Guatemala
4	FMLN	9/15/1980	German	El Salvador
5	FMLN	2/4/1981	Guatemalan	El Salvador
6	FMLN	11/12/1981	Salvadoran	El Salvador
7	FMLN	4/26/1982	Salvadoran	El Salvador
8	FMLN	10/18/1982	Salvadoran	El Salvador
9	FMLN	2/3/1983	Salvadoran	El Salvador
10	FMLN	8/18/1983	American	United States

Figure 3.2: Average Civilian Attack Proportion Frequency (by Terrorist Organization)



Figure 3.3: Average Civilian Attack Proportion Frequency (by Terrorist Organization /Year)



Figure 3.4: Distribution of Known Organization Types



CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT ON TARGETING

> I have the means to make myself deadly, but that by itself, you understand, is absolutely nothing in the way of protection. What is effective is the belief those people have in my will to use the means. That's their impression. It is absolute. Therefore, I am deadly.
>
> The Professor, The Secret Agent

4.1 Introduction

Public support has always been an important component of militant action. Mao (1961: 93) felt that the relationship between effective guerrillas and the peasantry must "be likened to water… and the fish who inhabit it," and as such must adhere to strict rules to maintain the support of the peasant class. A guerrilla that fails to follow these rules becomes "a fish out of its native element" jeopardizing their own personal safety and the viability of the larger movement (Mao, 1961: 93).

Today's terrorist organizations face the same strictures; groups need to maintain public support in order to operate and succeed. Beyond that, the nature and availability of an organization's support also affects the likelihood that different targeting strategies are used. Here, I empirically test how changes in public support affect terrorist targeting strategy.

Because measures of public support toward terrorist organizations are difficult to find, I assess this using two proxy measures: 1.) the effectiveness of a government's economic policy as measured by unemployment statistics and 2.) the government's openness to its people as measured by government repression. These indicators have been used in the past to assess both the likelihood of conflict as well as terrorism. Here, I apply these measures to a database of domestic terrorist events to shed some insight into the target selection process.

In the following sections, I discuss the theoretical expectations, operationalize, and test arguments relating public support to terrorist targeting strategy. In the next section, I review the theoretical explanation discussed in the theory chapter. The third section introduces the variables and the methodology to be employed. The fourth section presents the results from the empirical analyses. The fifth section summarizes the results and discusses their implications. The sixth, and final, section concludes.

4.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations

I test the hypotheses in this chapter by relying on two concepts traditionally used in the study of conflict. For terrorism scholars, economics may play a role in the occurrence of terror because it provides grievances while also lowering the opportunity cost for violence (Blomberg et al., 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). Repression may act in the same way; increasing grievances and potentially lowering opportunity costs to violence. For both of these factors, I analyze whether changes in either affect public support, influencing the costs and benefits of different targets, and changing terrorist targeting strategy.

4.2.1 Economics

The way that economics contributes to conflict can be thought of in two ways: greed and grievance. In the greed explanation, economics provides the "prize" which results from violence. Individuals, groups, and states engage in conflict not only for the control and power that is given to the victors, but for the goods and benefits that result from violence.[60] In such conflicts, rebels are spurred by the potential for profit,

[60] Because motives are often hard to deduce, economic explanations of violence using greed and grievance often appear observationally similar. Despite the difficulty in delineating the two, these arguments provide a marked contrast with purely political explanations of violence, which stress grievances that are well-founded in objective political circumstances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

insomuch as they are "indistinguishable from bandits or pirates" (Grossman, 1999: 269). This often leads to conflicts in which resource plunder is the primary motive; conflicts of this type have been fought in Sierra Leone for diamonds, Cambodia for lumber and gems, and Angola for oil (Ross, 2004).

The grievance perspective argues that conflict is the result of a motive: individuals or groups are denied equitable access to the economy.[61] Groups and states fight based on this belief; the poor may fight to induce the redistribution of wealth while the wealthy may fight to secede from such policies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Terrorist organizations such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) have used redistributive arguments to justify their violence (Ross, 2004). GAM's "Declaration of Independence of Acheh-Sumatra" cites the exploitation of the region; "Acheh, Sumatra, has been producing a revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese neo-colonialists, which they used totally for the benefit of Java and the Javanese" (Ross, 2005: 40).[62] MEND issued a similar statement before a series of bomb blasts in March 2010 and used the familiar rhetoric of redistribution and economic inequality, "the Niger Delta has been partitioned into oil blocks which have been distributed amongst mostly Northerners while indegenes of the Niger Delta can barely survive" (Onwuchekwa and Ehireman, 2010).

Civil wars have been explained through reference to these two approaches. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) test both and find that greed is a sufficient motivator for civil war. Economic variables can indicate the possibility of finance, making rebellion

---

[61] Grievance is far broader than just economic factors. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) operationalize grievance into a number of measures: ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, and political exclusion.

[62] $15 billion has never been the amount of income wealth generated from Aceh. Rather, during the 1980s, Aceh has contributed from $1 to $3 billion to Indonesian national income while receiving only $82 million from the Jakarta government for economic development (Arnold, 2001; Sulistiyanto, 2001).

feasible through the presence of natural resources or the use of extortion when it otherwise would not be.[63] At the same time, it may also indicate "foregone earnings", individuals are likely to take up violence when they have little to lose from the decision to forego legal employment for rebellion (2004: 588). Economic explanations based on grievances, such as income inequality, fare less well. This largely indicates that civil conflict may, in most instances, be considered one that is explained by opportunity rather than motive.

Economic discontent has also been linked to less violent outcomes ranging from coups (Alesina et al., 1996), civil violence (Gurr, 1970), and voting (Lewis-Beck, 1986, 1988; Powell and Whitten, 1993). In each, economic grievances, rather than greed, form a central component in citizens' appraisals of the government. In non-democracies, this frustration often bubbles over into outbursts of violence since legal and non-violent means of registering discontent are unavailable. In democracies, where this access is a fundamental right, this discontent is often reflected in the electoral performance of incumbents. Changes in economic performance cause voters to place stewardship of the economy with leaders who promise better performance.

Quantitative work on terrorism has found little support for either explanation. Terrorists are not motivated by economic grievances or greed; studies by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) as well as Piazza (2006) suggest that politics rather than economics provide the impetus for terrorist violence.[64] Terrorism is not conducted by the poor and downtrodden, but is conducted by the educated, the employed, and the politically active (Russell and Miller, 1983; Hudson and Majeska, 1999; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003).

---

[63] For more discussion on resource conflicts see Homer-Dixon (1994); Klare (2001), Ross (2004), and Humphreys (2005).

[64] Although see Blomberg et al. (2004), Drakos and Gofas (2004), and Honacker (2004).

In fact, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find that participation and support of terrorist acts are more likely to be found amongst the educated and employed than illiterates.

The poor track record of economics as an explanation for terror would also suggest that it fails to play a part in terrorist targeting. One potential way to incorporate the economics and terrorism is to integrate arguments about organizational recruitment and screening (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a). In this approach, economic conditions reduce opportunity costs for violence, leading to a greater level of interest in terrorist organizations. This influx presents the organization more qualified recruits than available spaces. Groups then select from this number, choosing the most qualified and capable thus leading to terrorist demographics distinctly different from the background population.

Targeting is affected in two ways by this process. The presence of a surplus of supporters reduces the costs that may occur due to the selection of civilian targets. Given that there exists some probability that targeting choices will engender a harsh public response, the organization afford the defection of some supporters because a ready supply of interested potential members exist to take the place of each departed supporter.

The availability of better qualified recruits also increases the benefit of civilian targeting by raising the likelihood that the intended target is struck. In Israel and the occupied territories, groups have become more lethal with economic downturns, assigning their best operatives to suicide operations against civilian targets (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007). This allows an organization to better achieve its goals and better position it to gain future supporters. Based on these two processes, I expect:

> **Hypothesis 2**: Groups will be more likely to target civilians in states with economic downturns.

At the same time, the benefits of economic downturns on public support and its contribution to a civilian targeting strategy are likely conditional on regime type. Public support is likely a concern only for those states in which the consent of the public is

valued. The greater a regime's sensitivity to its public, the greater benefit associated with civilian targeting – that governments will capitulate on the contested issue. As a result, I expect:

> **Hypothesis 2A**: Groups are more likely to target civilians in states that are experiencing economic downturns and also rely on large winning coalitions**.**

4.2.2 Repression

Like economics, the existing empirical record tying repression to violence is mixed. Scholars have argued for a number of avenues by which repression affects dissent. Tilly (1978) argued that the wide variation of potential responses existed due to the "political opportunity structure" found in a particular state at a particular time. For Tilly (1978), the expected relationship between the two was an inverted-U; groups existing in open systems were likely to engage in fewer protests because of the presence of numerous legal ways to redress grievances. At the other end of the spectrum, repressive systems also faced less violence since the onerous security apparatus denied people the opportunity and to protest (Meyer, 2004). In such a perspective, public support that leads to terrorism only becomes available in a narrow "window" between harsh repression and political openness (Crenshaw, 1981).

Other scholars (Muller and Opp, 1986; Frey and Luechinger, 2002) have argued that the relationship is essentially positive and linear; repression leads to more protest and violence. For Muller and Opp (1986), this is inherently a function of the protestor; those who find protest to be costly are more likely to participate than those who believe otherwise. This may indicate that protestors attach high public goods with rebellion against a repressive regime. Frey and Luechinger (2002: 7) have a similar finding; increased repression may indicate to potential terrorists "that that their cause is particularly worthy and will be rewarded accordingly in afterlife". This may contribute

to the inefficacy of repression when confronting certain types of terrorist organizations, especially religiously-inspired ones (Juergensmeyer, 2005).

Others (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Hibbs, 1973) argue that repression has a deterrent effect, decreasing violence with each application of repression. Increases in the use of violence by the state decreases challenges and leads to less challenges in the future. Lichbach (1987) and Francisco (1995) argued that this does indeed occur: the communist governments of East Germany and Czechoslovakia were largely able to deter widespread protest and challenges. However, these successes were often illusory; protestors often substituted ineffective tactics for more successful ones and looked for moments of weakness to stage protests.

These perspectives offer no consensus on repression's effect on public support and the ability of terrorist organizations to use this resource. One way that we can bridge these divergent findings is to adopt the framework provided by Mason and Krane (1989). They argue that repression's effect on dissent is conditional on the level of repression a government uses. States that use targeted repression – and focus strictly on rebellious leaders – leads to a decrease in active support.[65] Mason and Krane (1989) suggest that this decrease is not due to fear, but to a belief amongst active supporters that the rebels are unable to deliver on their promised goods allocation. The civilian populace will remain uncommitted, preferring to remain outside a state's reach. Repression directed against the rank and file of the group will cause known supporters to remain with the organization, since they are likely to be targeted regardless of their support. The general public will remain uncommitted, since even occasional participation with rebels may lead to victimization. Highly repressive states increase support for dissent by reducing the

---

[65] Latent support should rise though, since the elimination of benefits provided by the rebel organization is unlikely to be offset by benefits provided by the government (Mason and Krane, 1989: 180).

benefits groups have to offer to get people to join. Groups merely have to promise safety, rather than any tangible benefits, to get support from the general public.

Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) make a similar argument. Governments can use discriminating or undiscriminating counterterror. Discriminating counterterror acts like selective repression: states are attentive to direct force towards members of the terrorist organization and limit any spillover onto the general population. Undiscriminating counterterror is less precise and ignores the welfare of the public in its quest to reduce terrorist violence. These two counterterror strategies work in the same way discussed above; undiscriminating counterterror radicalizes the population and leads to greater support for extremist elements within terrorist organizations. Selective counterterror decreases support for terrorist organizations and emboldens moderates, leading to less overall terrorism.

This suggests that, like economics, repression shifts public support. Regimes that use indiscriminate repression lowers individual opportunity costs to terrorism by presenting the public with a stark choice – to either remain neutral and be killed by government violence or to effect change and possibly gain a modicum of safety. This should also lead to a greater availability of high quality recruits. Once again, this allows terrorist organizations with a buffer that allows it to weather backlash created by its targeting choices and a greater level of capability that allows it to select civilian targets. This is captured in the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 3**: Groups in states that repress their populations are more likely to choose civilian targets.

Once again, the effectiveness of repression in shifting public support is expected to be conditional on regime. I anticipate that repression is likely to lead to civilian targeting in those states where civilian targeting is effective and, moreover, where citizen input is valued. This modifies the previous hypothesis in the following way:

Hypothesis 3A: Groups are more likely to choose civilian targets in states that use indiscriminate repression on their populations and who also rely on large winning coalitions.

4.3 Cases, Units of Analysis, and Methods

Since this chapter focuses on the effects of a different set of variables while using the model discussed in the theory chapter, many of the attributes remain the same. Due to the use of a dependent variable that accounts for the number of civilian targets attacked, a negative binomial model is used to estimate the results. I account for differences in group activity by including the total number of attacks (civilian + non-civilian) as the exposure term. I lagged the independent variables to account for endogeneity. Lastly, I also include robust standard errors clustered by state to address any potential problems with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Greene, 2002).

4.3.1 Measures for Economic Performance

The inability of most studies on the economic effects of terrorism to find a statistically significant effect has been frustrating. From an academic perspective, the inability to discuss terrorism on the same economic terms as civil war prevents a synthesis of the two literatures. For policy makers, the lack of a strong relationship is disheartening because it renders a whole series of economic and social remedies to terrorism ineffective.

The lack of findings may occur due to the measurements used in previous analyses (van den Bergh, 2007). GDP per capita, a common measure in the literature, operates on the assumption that well-being can be estimated by income (Easterlin, 2001). The costs of living and the requirements for welfare often differ substantially from state to state, rendering aggregate measures less useful. GDP per capita has also been found to "de-link" from individual measures of welfare. This essentially means that at some point,

GDP growth and individual welfare diverge (Max-Neef, 1995; Helliwell, 2003).[66] Both attributes further reduce the utility of broad economic measures as an indicator of social conditions because it clouds the ways by which economics affects individual decisions to engage in particular behaviors (Easterlin, 1974; Branchflower and Oswald, 2004). Instead, indicators such as employment, personal freedom, health, and family provide better measures of individual welfare.

The measure I use, unemployment, provides a good substitute for GDP per capita. Its low correlation with GDP per capita (.016) suggests that it accounts for a different attribute of economics. The linkage of unemployment with negative social and individual effects are also well documented - social exclusion, skill loss, psychological harm, racial and ethnic inequality, and a loss of social values have all been tied into changes in employment status (Sen, 1997).[67] Politically, greater levels of unemployment may feed into terrorism by increasing resentment towards immigrants or by causing individuals to embrace extremist ideologies (Sen, 1997; Laqueur, 2004). These factors can facilitate terrorist violence, as seen in the violence of the First Intifada (1987-1993) (Atran, 2003).

To create the unemployment measure, I used data from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the *World Development Indicators*.[68] From the ILO, I used unemployment measures taken from national labor force sample surveys. Whenever possible, I used unemployment measures which included unemployment statistics for

---

[66] The exact point where GDP and social welfare begin to diverge is difficult to pinpoint. One study finds this point to occur at income levels approaching $15,000 (Helliwell, 2003). However, it is likely that from a cross-national perspective, this "threshold point" will differ widely from country to country.

[67] Studies in the psychiatric literature have a similar finding: individual unemployment is consistently rated as a major source of distress (Clark and Oswald, 1994).

[68] The International Labor Organization's Database on Labor Statistics, or LABORSTA, is available at: http://laborsta.ilo.org/.

both men and women. The data from the WDI, due to its high correlation with the ILO measures (.965), were used to fill in gaps in the ILO data. In all, I have unemployment statistics for 69 countries in the dataset – 3,406 cases total.

4.3.2 Measures for Repression

Similar to the economics discussion above, there exists considerable debate on the effect of repression on dissent (Davenport, 2007). While finding the exact "curve of revolution" will continue to be a matter of much debate and research, Mason and Krane's (1989) framework relating levels of repression to public support allows one way to assess the effect of repression on terrorist targeting.

I measure repression by using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al., 2009). The PTS provides a five-point scale of state terror for more than 180 states from 1976 to the present using information from two sources: Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. This scale is underpinned by three conceptual dimensions; violence is evaluated on the basis of its scope, intensity, and range - allowing a direct synthesis with the Mason and Krane's (1989) conceptualization of levels of repression.

Repression at levels 1 and 2, the lowest in the PTS, roughly correspond to a regime using a targeted policy, "a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity…a few persons are affected…political murder is rare" (Wood and Gibney, 2010: 7). Repression at levels 3 and 4 can be thought of as repression directed against rank and file members, "there is extensive political imprisonment…terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas" (Wood and Gibney, 2010: 7). Lastly, repression at level 5 corresponds to a random targeting strategy in which, "the leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals" (Wood and Gibney, 2010: 7).

Because I wish to assess the effect of effect that repression has on public support, I dichotomize the PTS measure to account for those instances where Mason and Krane

(1989) suggest public support firmly shifts in the direction of the terrorist organization. PTS levels 1 through 4 (repression which is directed against terrorist leaders and rank and file) denote situations of low public support for terrorist organizations while PTS level 5 (widespread repression) denotes high levels of public support.

4.4 Analyses

The first hypothesis predicted that groups operating in states with struggling economies were more likely to select civilian targets. A visible inspection of civilian targeting preferences plotted on unemployment for significant groups in four of the five COW regions (Americas, Middle East, Europe, and Asia), found in Figure 4.1, provides some initial support.[69] In particular, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), despite their dissimilarities, show the greatest response to changes in unemployment. However, as is evident in the plots, the actual substantive effect is quite small. This is echoed in the empirical findings.

I begin with the first hypothesis (H2), which predicts that higher levels of unemployment are associated with increases in civilian targeting. This is tested in Model 1 in Table 4.1 by including the ILO/WDI unemployment variable. As expected, the coefficient for unemployment is positive and strongly significant, indicating a relationship between economic conditions and targeting strategy ($p = .021$).

Figure 4.2 provides a visual assessment of the marginal effects. These were first calculated by generating estimates with the *Clarify* program (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 2003). Boehmke's (2008) *plotfds* utility was then used to graphically interpret the estimates. The boxplots represent the average effect that a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean has on the number of

---

[69] The lack of consistent ILO unemployment data for African states prevented a prediction for an African terrorist organization.

civilian targets struck, while holding all other variables constant.[70] The arms of the boxplot represent the 95 percent confidence interval. The precise numbers and the confidence intervals also run along the right side.

The marginal effects provide further support to the first hypothesis. A change in unemployment, from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above (a change from 3 percent to 12.8), results in an additional .43 civilian targets being attacked. The only other significant independent variable, past targeting preferences, has the strongest effect, yielding ten additional civilian attacks across a two standard deviation change (.29 to .87).

Model 2 in Table 4.1 presents the results of the second hypothesis (H2A), which predicts that unemployment should lead to greater levels of civilian targeting in states with large winning coalitions. This is tested by including the unemployment variable in an analysis of states with winning coalitions greater than .5.[71] The results do not indicate support for the hypothesis as the coefficient for unemployment is not statistically significant ($p = .69$). Figure 4.3 presents the marginal effects. Here, only past targeting preferences have a significant and strong effect.

One explanation for the lack of results in this model may be that unemployment fails as a sufficient enough motivator for political violence in democracies. People may express discontent when unemployment increases, but the intensity of this feeling may not be strong enough to have individuals consider terrorism. Instead, a variety of institutions and outlets exist for the dissent to be expressed peacefully (Eyerman, 1998). This suggests that the effect of unemployment on terrorist targeting may be stronger in

---

[70] For discrete variables, the effect is calculated when the variable changes from 0 to 1.

[71] This closely approximates the standard POLITY IV distinction for democracy, correlating at .73.

those states where these institutions are only partially present or where they are still developing.

Table 4.2 presents the results of the tests of the third (H3) and fourth (H3A) hypotheses. The first states that increased levels of government repression were likely to result in increased civilian targeting while the second argues that this effect is conditional upon a state having a large winning coalition. The first hypothesis fails to find support, while weak support is found for the second hypothesis. Indiscriminate repression, as indicated by PTS scores above five, has a weakly significant effect on target choice ($p = .057$).

The marginal effects for these two models are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. For Figure 4.4 repression has a weak effect, increasing the number of civilian targets by .55 targets. Past targeting preferences have the strongest effect, creating nearly 10 more civilian attacks across the two standard deviation range. Figure 4.5 shows a similar small effect for repression; democratic states that use indiscriminate repression suffer .5 more attacks on civilian targets than a democratic state that does not. Past targeting preferences once again have the strongest effect, increasing the amount of civilian targets struck by 12.

In Table 4.3, I present results running a full model incorporating both repression and economic variables. This allows us to reduce the possibility that the independent variables when measured individually are accounting other, unmeasured, factors. The first model runs the analysis on a sample of all states while the second runs it on a sample of democratic states. The results of the first, full, model indicate strong effects for unemployment and weak significant effects for repression. The second model, using democracies, shows a strong effect for repression with no statistically significant effect for unemployment. .

Figures 4.6 and 4.7 provide the marginal effects. For Figure 4.6, a two deviation change in unemployment yields an increase in civilian targeting of about .44 targets.

Repression is slightly weaker, increasing the incidence of civilian targeting by about .39 targets when changed from conditions of discriminate to indiscrimate terror. For Figure 4.7, unemployment has no effect indicating no independent effect once accounting for repression. For repression, the marginal effects become stronger - a change from a condition of low repression to one of indiscriminate repression yields an increase in .63 civilian targets. In both figures, past targeting proportion demonstrates a strong effect, both accounting for an increase in approximately 11 civilian targets.

4.4.1 Potential Pitfalls

One potential problem with this analysis may be that many of the cases necessary to the analysis are being omitted by some systematic process related to the dependent variable. In this case, civil war might affect the results because the use of unemployment measures may only capture strong states. To test this, I reran the analyses while including civil war data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2001).

This dataset defines armed conflict as, "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 2009: 1). Four types of conflict are coded in the data: extrasystemic, interstate, internal conflict, and internationalized internal conflict.[72] For the purposes of this study, I restricted the analysis to the last two forms of conflict. In order to account for state years in which more than one conflict was occurring, I code

[72] These conflict types refer to: 1.) a conflict "between a state and a non-state group outside of the state's own territory" (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 2009: 7). This particularly refers to wars fought to gain or maintain colonial or imperial possessions. 2.) An interstate conflict refers to conflicts fought between two states. 3.) Internal conflicts are conflicts waged between a government of a state and an internal opposition group. 4.) Internationalized internal conflicts are those waged between the government of one state and an internal opposition group with the intervention of outside states on one or both sides.

for the highest level of conflict intensity.[73] In all, 1,242 terrorist group-state/years are associated with some level of violence: 875 take place during times of minor conflict while 367 occur during war. I add group-state/years of peace to create a three-part ordinal variable; this was then used to create an interaction term with both the unemployment and repression variables. The results are presented in Table 4.4.

The results indicate that war intensity has no effect on the effect of either unemployment or repression on terrorist targeting choice. Because assessment of interaction terms can be somewhat difficult (Brambor et al., 2006), I turn to a visual evaluation of their effects. To assess this, I used Boehmke's (2006) *grinter* data utility.[74] *Grinter* works by plotting the marginal effect of competition on targeting over the one of the constituent variables in the interaction term. The y axis represents a rate, similar in interpretation to the dependent variable with the included exposure term. The x axis in the figure represents the conditioning variable – in this case, the level of internal conflict. The bold line represents the main effect, while the two dashed lines on either side represent the 95% confidence interval. Results that include zero within the confidence interval would indicate a failure to achieve significance. The plots resulting from both models in Table 4.4 are presented in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.

Figure 4.8 indicates that unemployment has a significant and positive effect on civilian targeting as conflict intensity increases. This is particularly after states cross the internal minor armed conflict threshold at level one. The effect loses significance once conflict reaches the highest level of conflict: war. The significance of the middle range may allow a potential synthesis of explanations of violence in both terrorism and civil

---

[73] This is dichotomized between minor (25 to 999 battle deaths per year) and war (1,000 plus battle deaths per year).

[74] Control variables are held at their mean (continuous) or mode (dichotomous)

war. Figure 4.9, on the other hand, indicates no statistically significant effect in the interaction between repression, civilian targeting, and conflict intensity.

A second concern is that the availability of unemployment measures is related to a state's regime type. This is indeed present within the data; using standard practice for POLITY scores, I calculate that 34% of non-democracies have unemployment statistics versus 74% of democracies.[75] However, I do not anticipate this to be a concern since the average unemployment level between the two regime types is not statistically different ($t = -1.29$ ($p = .198$)) and the average civilian targeting proportion for excluded autocracies (.629) exceeds that of democracies ((.540), $t = 2.84$, ($p < .01$)). As a result, inclusion of additional cases, and particularly autocracies, would have biased the results in further support of the analyses.

4.5 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter was to empirically demonstrate that a relationship exists between government actions such as economic policy and repression and terrorist targeting strategies. Drawing on the framework presented in the previous chapter, I argue that poor government performance, as indicated by these variables, allows groups to pursue target types that it would otherwise be unable to. This works by increasing the amount of support a group normally receives. Under such situations, groups can afford to engage in the politically effective, yet costly strategy of civilian targeting because it only needs the support, either financially or through overt participation, of a small fraction of the newly acquired allocation of the populace. This situation is reversed when the government performs well; groups only have a small subset of the populace to work with and civilian targeting will only further diminish this group.

---

[75] Autocracies are defined as regimes with POLITY Democracy scores under 6 while democracies are those at 6 and above.

The arguments presented here were tested using GTD data under a unique coding rule that allowed the analysis of domestic terrorism. I operationalized targeting strategy by measuring civilian targets in a negative binomial model which included total as an exposure term. Repression and economic performance were tested using the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al., 2009) and unemployment, respectively. Results from the analyses indicate mixed support for the variables when conducted in individual analyses. The results become strongly significant when combined in the same model.

The significance of unemployment stands out amid a variety of studies that have failed to find a relationship between economics and terrorism. Krueger and Maleckova (2003: 123), in an analysis of economics and terrorism, appraise the evidence linking economics to a related subject, hate crimes, and calls evidence of a direct link between the two, "highly elusive". This elusiveness has also characterized subsequent forays seeking to link economics and terrorism. Here, I rely on unemployment, a measure better suited to capture the societal and political effects of economic underperformance (Sen, 1997; van den Bergh, 2007). In this case, I find an effect for unemployment, in that it changes the targeting options available to a terrorist organization.

This lends support to the work of Bueno de Mesquita (2005a). Here, rather than finding support for the occurrence of terror, I find that the impact of economic downturns lies in the effect it has on targeting choice. Groups, emboldened by increased public support, can afford to engage in civilian targeting. At the same time, this also modifies Bueno de Mesquita's (2005a) work. Here, rather than causing groups to devote more resources to the occurrence of terror, economic performance changes targeting. Given that most groups are characterized by limited resources, this may be a more realistic and cost effective option.

The results for repression suggest a similar process. Citizens respond to indiscriminate repression by increasing their support for terrorist organizations (Mason and Krane, 1989). Then, once again emboldened by this support, groups increase the

level of civilian targeting. This provides a contrast to those who see protest as dependent on government moderation (Tilly, 1978; Crenshaw, 1981). In this analysis, groups seem to respond to repression with even greater protest and, despite government violence, citizens also respond in the same way.

Lastly, it becomes apparent that the substantive effects of the variables under consideration have a limited role on civilian targeting. This is largely anticipated; the average number of terror attacks perpetrated by any one group in the data is low (averaging 8 attacks per year). In addition, the average change in a state's level of unemployment is also low, increasing by an average of .02 percent per year. Such increases are most likely of little value for the terrorist organization since the quality of potential recruit in those situations is likely to be low. This effect should become more pronounced and result in better recruits as unemployment increases.

Additionally, these results also suggest that the threat of terrorism in most instances is low. Most groups have very limited lifespans and do not get the opportunity to become concerned with long-term organizational maintenance (Oots, 1989). In those cases where organizations are well-developed, these concerns are more real. For Peru's Shining Path, a group which committed nearly 500 acts of terror per year in the 1980s, an increase of one percent unemployment could yield an increase of thirteen additional civilian targets.

The lack of additional substantive results for the controls is of mixed importance. On the one hand, the lack of effects for most of the ideological control variables, excepting anarchism and conservative ideology, casts some doubt on the centrality of ideology as stated by Drake (1998). On the other, the lack of results here also strengthens the causal importance of our independent variables and the past targeting preferences variables – groups are heavily dependent upon learning to strike at different target types and, when opportune, use instances of unemployment and repression to strike at target types, independent of their ideologies.

4.6 Conclusion

The results discussed here only present one side of the puzzle and demonstrate the effects of shifting the support of the populace from the government to the terrorist organization. In the following chapters, I modify this by adding the institutional characteristics of the state and the extent of the competition the terrorist organization faces. The sum total of these factors provides us with a nuanced view of target choice. With that in mind, we turn to the following chapter and discuss the role of institutional effects on terrorism.

Table 4.1: The Effect of Unemployment on Civilian Targeting

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Unemployment	.005**	.002
	(.002)	(.004)
Controls		
Left	.051	.083
	(.057)	(.069)
Right	-.048	-.030
	(.045)	(.058)
Nationalist	-.003	.001
	(.027)	(.032)
Environmental	.009	-.007
	(.061)	(.061)
Other	.056	.089
	(.046)	(.072)
RPC	.037	.034
	(.036)	(.059)
Urban Population	-.000	.001
	(.001)	(.002)
Past Targeting Preferences	1.77***	1.77***
	(.103)	(.137)
Constant	-1.75	-1.83
	(.091)	(.126)
Wald χ^2	1912.08***	1032.99***
Log Likelihood	-2013.89	-1457.61
Observations	1,179	847

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1. Analyses restricted to groups with more than one lifetime attack. Religious is the excluded ideological category

Table 4.2: The Effect of Repression on Civilian Targeting

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Repression=5	.019	.053*
	(.017)	(.028)
Controls		
Left	.027	.058
	(.039)	(.049)
Right	-.058	-.046
	(.036)	(.050)
Nationalist	.012	.018
	(.028)	(.030)
Environmental	-.025	-.021
	(.051)	(.049)
Other	-.092**	-.066
	(.047)	(.069)
RPC	-.000	.028
	(.021)	(.048)
Percent Urban	.000	.001
	(.001)	(.001)
Past Targeting Prefs	1.75***	1.74***
	(.080)	(.115)
Constant	-1.68	-1.77
	(.067)	(.100)
Wald χ^2	881. 78***	705.73***
Log Likelihood	-2948.99	-1935.80
Observations	1811	1142

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1. Analyses restricted to groups with more than one lifetime attack. Religious is the excluded ideological category.

Table 4.3: Effect of Unemployment and Repression on Civilian Targeting

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Unemployment	.005**	.002
	(.002)	(.004)
Repression	.042*	.065**
	(.023)	(.026)
Controls		
Left	.049	.083
	(.058)	(.070)
Right	-.049	-.028
	(.045)	(.060)
Nationalist	.005	.014
	(.028)	(.033)
Environmental	.017	.006
	(.060)	(.062)
Other	.052	.077
	(.045)	(.072)
RPC	.040	.045
	(.035)	(.059)
Percent Urban	-.000	.001
	(.001)	(.001)
Past Targeting Prefs	1.77***	1.78***
	(.102)	(.138)
Constant	-1.76	-1.86
	(.089)	(.125)
Wald χ^2	2375.76***	845.24***
Log Likelihood	-2013.19	-1456.47
N	1179	847

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1. Religious is the excluded ideological category.

Table 4.4: Terrorist Targeting in Civil War

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Unemployment	.003	
	(.003)	
Unemployment * War Intensity	.002	
	(.003)	
Repression		.045
		(.060)
Repression * War Intensity		-.032
		(.046)
War Intensity	.027	.043*
	(.025)	(.023)
Controls		
Left	.051	.025
	(.059)	(.042)
Right	-.035	-.046
	(.047)	(.039)
Nationalist	.014	.019
	(.025)	(.028)
Environmental	.002	-.034
	(.058)	(.049)
Other	.066	-.096*
	(.048)	(.050)
RPC	.022	-.012
	(.037)	(.022)
Urban Population	.001	.001*
	(.001)	(.001)
Past Targeting Proportion	1.79***	1.77***
	(.113)	(.089)
Constant	-1.83	-1.77
	(.123)	(.096)
Wald χ^2	2200.95***	902.34***
Log Likelihood	-2010.91	-2945.86
Observations	1,179	1,811

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1. Analyses restricted to groups with more than one lifetime attack. Religious is the excluded ideological category

Figure 4.1: Group Targeting Proportions and Unemployment (4 Regions)





Figure 4.1 Continued



Figure 4.2: Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects



Figure 4.3: Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies)



Figure 4.4: Repression on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects



Figure 4.5: Repression on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies)



Figure 4.6: Repression and Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects



Figure 4.7: Repression and Unemployment on Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies)



Figure 4.8: Effect of Unemployment on Targeting Conditioned on Civil War



Figure 4.9: Effect of Repression on Targeting Conditioned on Civil War



CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF GROUP COMPETITION ON TARGETING

> The Zealots grew more insolent, not as being deserted by allies, but as being rid of men who might put them out of countenance, and repress their wickedness.
>
> Flavius Josephus, The Jewish War

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present empirical tests of the effects of competition, the last set of variables related to the framework, on the targeting choice of terrorist groups. In previous studies, terrorism is believed to be more prevalent and more deadly in competitive environments (Crenshaw, 1981; Bloom, 2005). This is thought to occur because these environments encourage outbidding - a process of escalating violence between terrorist organizations to gain public support (Bloom, 2005). This process yields a cycle of violence that further legitimizes and privileges civilian violence and creates a constituency of people "dying to kill."

The most prevalent targeting choices that result from competition and outbidding are civilians. Groups choose these for the same reasons discussed in the theory chapter - they are effective – they "terrorize the civilian population and provoke some political change" – and they are low cost (Bloom, 2005: 17). This choice then provides a mark of respect to these groups persuading potential recruits, promoting continued violence, and encouraging imitation by other organizations.

It is also obvious that the conditions that bring about civilian targeting in competitive situations do not exist in all areas. In those areas where public support and the popularity that ensues from civilian targeting are missing, the benefits of this targeting choice are reduced. Citizens will be still affected by the targeting choice, but the backlash that is created is likely to overwhelm the benefits created. The Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as Bloom (2005: 96) notes, found civilian targeting to be counterproductive in certain instances and shifted their strategies accordingly. I argue that competition can also create these effects, thus coercing groups to choose non-civilian targets, "moderating" their violence.

In the following sections, I discuss these points and highlight that competition can lead to the selection of non-civilian, rather than civilian, targets. In the next section, I begin the discussion of competition and targeting choice by drawing on Bloom's (2005) theory of outbidding. I contrast this logic with my theory to argue that competition may have a moderating influence on target selection. This leads to the hypotheses. In the third section, I operationalize the concepts and provide a brief overview of the data. The fourth section presents empirical tests of the hypotheses and robustness checks of the results. In the fifth section, I discuss the results and the implications of this research on policy. The sixth, and final, section concludes.

5.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations

While studies on terrorism have long studied the effects of external factors such as economics or regime type on the use of terrorism, less work has been dedicated to role of internal factors. Much of this can be attributed to the clandestine nature of terrorist organizations, little exists that can provide us with an appreciation of a group's internal workings. At the same time, the efforts of the research community have yielded some results - secondary sources and some quantitative data have allowed us to generate theory on the microbehavior of terrorist organizations (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a, 2008; Siquiera, 2005; Shapiro and Siegal, 2007; Berman and Laitin, 2008).

This chapter views competition as an internal factor – its effects allow us to make assumptions about the behavior of individuals who are part of the organization and those who wish to join. In addition, its effect can be moderated by external factors – the effect

of competition on targeting strategy varies based on the strength of factors such as unemployment or repression.

The effects of competition on targeting are considered using two hypotheses. One states that competition acts to moderate violence. This occurs because the preconditions that encourage outbidding and civilian targeting are rare. Organizations will have to react to demonstrations of public backlash with lower levels of violence. Civilian violence will be counterproductive in these scenarios, leading to the net loss of members. The second hypothesis contends that the effect of competition on targeting is conditional; that is, competition will be more likely to result in civilian targeting when public support is high. This should occur because the cost of losing members is reduced when there exists a large pool of potential replacements. Because this incorporates a role for the environment in which a group is placed, this provides a more direct test of Bloom's (2005) theory and allows an assessment of the effects that have been discussed in the previous chapters.

5.2.1 Competition

The dominant perspective relating competition to terrorist targeting has been that it increases terrorist violence because it leads to a game of outbidding between terrorist organizations (Bloom, 2005). The logic of this is simple - "if multiple insurgent groups are competing for public support, bombings will intensify in scope and number as they become both the litmus test of militancy and the way to mobilize greater numbers of people within their community" (Bloom, 2005: 78). This, evident in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, then helps to provide an explanation of why some states have become more characterized by suicide terrorism than others.

The theory also suggests that civilians become the target category of choice in competitive situations. This allows groups to reap a variety of benefits. First, the destruction of civilian life along with that of the bomber, allows groups to demonstrate

their legitimacy and resolve. For the group, the choice of the bomber to die for the group and the cause provides it with the legitimacy that allows it to recruit others. For the organization's political goals, the use of extranormal violence elevates it above others and demonstrates its commitment to the issue under contention (Pape, 2003). This also allows the costs, such as the death of innocent civilians, to be mitigated. Groups can justify their actions by holding the state responsible for creating the conditions that allowed the act to occur (Bloom, 2005).

However, the logic of outbidding assumes that the public is solely concerned with the visibility and militancy of terrorist organizations. It is just as likely that the public is instead concerned with the level of extremism an organization uses (Khashan, 2003; Bloom, 2005). This can affect the costs and benefits associated with this targeting type, leading to a decrease in public support for the organization or, more seriously, an active backlash against the organization (Ross and Gurr, 1989).

Public revulsion and backlash have been common responses to instances of civilian targeting. In Morocco, a series of suicide attacks on civilian targets in 2003 met with massive public condemnation and street protests (Kalpakian, 2005; Alonso and Rey, 2007). In Northern Ireland, the Omagh bombing in 1998 and the deaths of 29 civilians brought swift criticism from a variety of national and international actors. This response swiftly reduced support for the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and increased support for the recently signed Good Friday agreement (Dingley, 2001). Other groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Basque terrorist organization Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna or ETA) have also encountered public condemnation over their targeting choices (Cronin, 2006: 29).

Extreme violence can also negatively impact the behaviors of other terrorist organizations, even those unconnected to the perpetrators. The events of September 11th 2001 increased the willingness of the LTTE to enter into negotiations with the

government (Fair, 2005). One aspect of this decision was the loss of moral and financial support that the attacks engendered amongst the Tamil diaspora community. The group also became concerned that the normative implication of its label as an "insurgent" group would become tied in with that of "terrorist", costing it further support.[76]

While being aware of the drawbacks to excessive violence, a terrorist organization must also be concerned with its visibility. Visibility is an important component towards ensuring a constant supply of new members. Jerrold Post and his research team (2003: 173) found, in interviews with incarcerated terrorists, that nearly 60 percent of secular group members and 43 percent of religious group members joined the most active group in their community. Carlos Marighela (1971: 33), author of the noted *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and leader of the Brazilian terrorist organization National Liberation Action, noted the benefits of visibility, adding that "what made us grow was action: solely and exclusively revolutionary action."

Organizations must also remain visible in order to justify the expense made on the training of its members. The process of training and indoctrinating new operatives often entails high sunk costs for the organization, binding it to a course of action that seeks to maximize a return on its investment (Chai, 1993). For the operative, the personal costs of dropping out of society, eschewing legal employment, and joining the organization makes activity their only sustenance. As a result, constant action is an asset and passivity is an object of scorn in most terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1985). As Kellen (1979: 37) asserts, "the desire for effective – or at least noticeable – actions appear to be one of the prime motivations of terrorists".

---

[76] Fair (2005: 146) also notes that prior to the September 11th attacks, the diaspora community was "jittery" about their support for the LTTE due to its recruitment of children and its use of suicide terrorism.

The presence of other organizations can be detrimental to groups that fail to satisfy the demand for action. For those operatives who have few options outside of a life of violence, joining, or creating, an organization that is more adept in the use of violence becomes an attractive option. The fracturing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was caused by disagreements over the use of violence. The PFLP gradually constrained the types of violence its members could take part in, first by outlawing the use of hijacking and then declaring guerrilla warfare as inappropriate (Crenshaw, 1985: 85). As a result, by 1984, many of the PFLP's cadre had decided to join, or form, organizations which were more likely to employ these acts.

The potential costs of violence and the contrasting need for visibility mean that terrorist organizations face real obstacles when in competitive situations. They must use enough violence to achieve prominence but must be judicious enough in its use to avoid becoming a fringe group. Groups must balance these competing attributes, settling on a final targeting strategy that maximizes visibility through violence while appealing to those who value visibility over violence and others who solely value violence. As a result, group targeting choices are likely to be a function of the distribution of support across competing groups.

In situations of competition, assuming fixed level of public support, each increase of an additional organization reduces each group's potential allocation of support. Given assumption that civilian targeting results in a net gain of organizational support for the organization, the use of this strategy in competitive situations ultimately results in each group gaining a pool of supporters that does not compensate for the loss of members through normal attrition. As a result, the political benefit gained by civilian targeting as discussed in Chapter 2 is outweighed by the loss of supporters engendered by this targeting choice.

In order to lessen this effect and gain support beyond their original constituency, terrorist organizations would have to either coordinate their actions and the gains that

result or adapt their targeting strategies to include less noteworthy targets. While organizations have joined together in coalitions, this is a rare occurrence (Hutchinson, 1975; Oots, 1986, 1989, Crenshaw, 1991). Instead, groups should be more likely to moderate their violence (Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). Bloom (2005) notes that after years of internecine conflict and decreasing public support, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and Turkish Hezbollah dropped their individual campaigns of extreme violence to unite against the Turkish government. As a result, I expect that:

> **Hypothesis 4**: Groups in competitive situations will be more likely to select attacks against non-civilian targets.

The net result of a per-unit loss of support created by targeting civilians in competitive situations can be mitigated by increasing the total amount of public support. In studies of group ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1998; Lowery and Gray, 1995), the limiting effects of competition in a particular area can be ameliorated by adding energy. For Lowery and Gray's study of interest group populations (1995), energy was conceptualized as constituent interest. This allows "more individuals and more species to be supported within a space" (Lowery and Gray, 1995: 7-8). For the purposes of this study, this means that a greater number of terrorist organizations can be supported within the same habitat.

I borrow from Chapter 2 and conceptualize energy as the existing distribution of public support. Support that has shifted in the direction of the terrorist organization increases the per-unit allocation of support by increasing the number of supporters an organization retains per attack on civilian target. This allows groups to conduct civilian targeting in situations of higher competition than it would be able to in conditions of low public support. For Bloom (2005: 82), repressive counterterror has such an effect – increasing civilian support and "inculcat[ing] a greater sense of outrage and anger, making a formerly inhospitable environment accepting and approving of mounting violence against civilians." In Israel, a competitive area, this provides a never-ending

flow of recruits to Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and many other groups. This leads to the second hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 4A**: Groups in competitive situations and favorable distributions will be more likely to select attacks against civilian targets than those in competitive situations and non-favorable distributions.

5.3 Measures for Competition

I measure the effect of competition on targeting by using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for the years 1970 to 2007. The unit of analysis is the terrorist group/state-year, allowing me to assess the role of competition on individual organizations. Because the dependent variable is a count of civilian targets, I use a negative binomial regression. I account for the different rates of activity of terrorist organizations by including an exposure term of the number of total targets (the sum of civilian and non-civilian) attacked per group state/year. I continue to use percent urban population, relative political capacity, past targeting preferences, and ideology measures as controls.[77]

5.3.1 Measures for Group Competition

One of the most useful insights from the organizational ecology literature is that competition occurs between groups that draw from the same resource (Lowery and Gray, 1995). Farm advocacy groups are distinct from business groups and, as such, are only likely to face competition from other farm groups. The same should be true for terrorist organizations; communist terrorist organization should face competition from groups with similar ideological goals, not dissimilar ones. People that wish to secede from a particular state have their needs best served from a nationalist, rather than a religious,

---

[77] For brevity, I do not go into detail regarding the structure of the data or the estimation of the model since many of these concepts were already covered. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion about case selection, the dependent variable, and the methodology used.

organization. Post et al. (2003: 173) notes recruitment occurring within these lines: "individuals from strictly religious Islamic backgrounds were more likely to join Islamist groups, while those who did not have a religious background might join either a secular or religious group."

To create this variable, I first sum for each group state-year the number of other groups that exist within each group's ideological category.[78] As stated in the third chapter, individual ideological data for each organization are available from the Terrorist Organizational Profiles (TOPs) website. In situations where organizations represent more than one ideological category, I assume that the group gains recruits and support from the least competitive category.[79] As a result, I use the lower number. Values of 1 indicate monopoly – a terrorist organization is, for that state-year, the only member of that ideological category.[80] Values greater than 1 indicate increasing levels of competition. I expect that high values will lead to non-civilian targeting while low values will be associated with civilian targets.

Figure 5.1 plots the average level of competition for states in the analysis. The distribution of competition scores provides interesting findings. I find that democratic states have more terrorist groups than autocratic states ((8.16 > 3.23), $t = -31.62$, ($p < .01$)), echoing the findings of Eubank and Weinberg (1994). This also suggests that democratic states have a higher level of competition than their autocratic counterparts ((3.68 > 1.81), $t = -18.75$, ($p < .01$)). As a result, one expectation may be that

---

[78] There are eight current ideological control variables: right, communist/anti-globalization, nationalist, religious, leftist, anarchist, environmentalist, and right-wing conservative.

[79] There exist in the data a number of groups that have more than one ideology. For example, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), a former terrorist group based in Armenia and Lebanon, is associated with both a communist and a nationalist ideology.

[80] One potential issue is that of separatist and ethnic terrorist organizations. This would treat all separatist groups as the same, which is obviously not the case. Different separatist groups appeal to different constituencies. This is an issue for future work.

competition amongst terrorist organizations may, independent of the effects discussed in the previous chapters, make democracies more likely to suffer from attacks against non-civilian targets.

Figure 5.2 plots the average level of competition by regime type over the duration of the GTD dataset. It indicates that competition amongst terrorist groups has increased over time in both autocratic and democratic states. This provides further support to the previous finding that democracies are more likely to harbor terrorist groups than autocracies. This finding should be independent of underreporting bias (Drakos and Gofas, 2006) and indicate a true effect – terrorist organizations are less likely to reside in autocracies since these types of states are best able to exert control over their territory (Lai, 2007).

The increase in this value over time, particularly for democracies after 1990 provides an interesting result.[81] One explanation for the increase may be the rise in democracies that occurred after the end of the Cold War. The establishment of political freedoms and civil rights in these new democracies may have provided the conditions for these groups to take root (Crenshaw, 1981; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983; Schmid, 1992).[82] Globalization and the increased access to information may also provide an explanation. Individuals on the fringes of society now have a greater ability to organize and greater access to potentially dangerous information (Zanini and Edwards, 2001; Weimann, 2006). Lastly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of funding for many of its satellite states increased the likelihood that weapons and manpower, previously under government control, have found their way into terrorists' hands.

---

[81] See Enders and Sandler (1999) and Radu (2002) for a discussion of the effects of the end of the Cold War on terrorism.

[82] This may not only be responsible for the rise of new groups, but for an increasing number of splinter organizations.

5.3.2 Measures for Group Competition and Public Support

The second hypothesis states that the effect of competition on civilian targeting is conditioned by the presence of public support. To capture this, I generate a variable interacting group competition with the public support measures (unemployment and repression) from Chapter 3. I expect that the effect of competition to decrease as public support increases. In order to assess the effects of the interaction terms, I once again follow the advice of Brambor et al. (2006) and assess these visually by utilizing Boehmke's (2006) *Grinter* data utility.

5.4 Analysis

Table 5.1 presents the results from the test of first hypothesis (H4). Model 1 tests the full sample. The results indicate that competition, even when designed to account for intra-categorical competition, has no effect on terrorist targeting choices. Terrorist organizations are no more likely to strike civilian than non-civilian targets. This non-finding casts some initial doubt on the applicability of outbidding to a broader set of cases.

Model 2 uses a subsample of groups from democratic states. The results also indicate no relationship between competition and targeting. Here, like the previous model, groups with an "other" ideology are strongly significant. The applicability of this finding is low, since this classification represents a wide variety of terrorist organizations that did not fit any of the other MIPT group classifications. Also, past targeting preferences exert the strongest effect in both models.

Figure 5.3 shows the marginal effects. The results here indicate the lack of an effect for the competition variable and, like the previous analyses, the limited effect of many of the control variables. Two effects are noteworthy; organizations labeled as "other" are strongly related to a decrease in nearly three civilian targets. Past targeting preferences also demonstrates a strong effect; increasing this variable from one standard

deviation below the mean (approximately .30) to one standard deviation above the mean (approximately .88) leads to groups striking nine additional targets. Figure 5.4 shows stronger results; "other" groups are associated with a decrease in 10 civilian targets while a two standard deviation increase in past targeting preferences are associated with an increase in 12 civilian targets.

These results indicate that competition by itself is not an important determinant of targeting strategy. This result is largely anticipated and in line with the framework presented in the theory chapter. In that discussion, the effect of each targeting choice built upon the previous: groups attack civilians in democracies because the public has a role in determining policy, public support affects targeting only in those cases where public support is important to the government. Here, competition is also dependent upon the previous levels – competition has a negative support on public opinion only in those cases where public is an important actor in the government. In those situations where public support is not necessary, competition should not exert an effect on civilian targeting.

Table 5.2 presents the results from the first test on the second hypothesis (H4A). This hypothesis argued that competition's impact on civilian target is conditional on public support. In the logic of organizational ecology, this incorporates the role of energy. I expect that increases in energy should yield a benefit to terrorist organizations by providing a larger net gain from operations using civilian targets, allowing it the ability to strike civilians while at higher levels of competition.

Model 1 presents the results using an interaction term between unemployment and competition for the full sample. Results indicate a strong positive effect for unemployment ($p < .01$), as demonstrated in Chapter 4. The interaction term, on the other hand, is negative and not significant. Once again, past targeting preferences are strongly associated with greater levels of civilian targeting. Model 2 uses an interaction between competition and indiscriminate repression (PTS = 5) for the full sample. Here,

repression does not have an effect. Similarly, the interaction term also fails to achieve significance. Of the control variables, only the indicator for "other" ideologies and the control for past targeting strategies achieve significance.

Models 3 and 4 test the same two interaction terms for a subsample of democratic states. Unemployment remains significant. This differs from the results in the previous chapter, where unemployment was not significant when analyzed within a democratic subsample. This may be because competitive situations are more likely to take place within democratic states. Repression is significant in the fourth model, but at the cost of competition. Only past targeting preferences, which are again associated with greater civilian targeting, and "other" groups, which have a statistically strong and negative effect on civilian targeting in three out of the four models, are statistically significant control variables.

I once again analyze the interaction terms presented in Table 5.2 by using Boehmke's (2006) *grinter* data utility.[83] These results are presented in Figures 5.5 though 5.8. Findings consistent with the second hypothesis (H5) would include a positively sloped line without encompassing zero with the confidence interval. Instead, in both figures the marginal effect is negatively sloped, indicating that civilian targeting becomes less prevalent as both energy variables increase. For Figure 5.5, unemployment is shown to have no effect on competition. This is echoed for Figure 5.6 and the effect of repression. This occurs because both figures encompass zero within their standard errors. This runs counter to our expectations about the role of energy on competition and may suggest that it has no role on competition in general.

Figures 5.7 and 5.8 assess the interaction term using the democratic subsample. Figure 5.7 indicates a steeper, and significant, negative slope. Repression in democracy,

[83] Control variables are held at their mean (continuous) or mode (dichotomous)

indicated in Figure 5.8, has no effect. These figures suggest that unemployment is a stronger conditioning factor on competition and targeting than repression. Furthermore, this also suggests that the effect of unemployment can only be seen once we disaggregate the different state types.

5.5 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter was to empirically demonstrate the effect of group competition on targeting choice. Drawing from population ecology as well as the framework presented in Chapter 2, I argue that group competition demonstrates certain attributes and has a measureable effect on civilian targeting. I first argue that competition is not simply a function of numbers; organizational ecology models contend that competition is within-issue; groups contend with other similar groups. For terrorist organizations, this means that groups with similar ideologies are more likely to contend with one another for public support. This competition decreases the probability for any one group that civilian targeting will yield additional, high quality, recruits. As a result, organizational competition within ideologies should yield a moderating, rather than an intensifying effect, on civilian targeting.

Second, energy plays an important role in competition. Habitats with more resources are able to handle a larger population. In the group environment, this effect is proxied by the underlying distribution of the public. Publics that support terrorist organizations provide the resources that allow groups to better pursue civilian targets. This should then offset, to some degree, the effects of increasing competition. As a result, groups in resource-rich areas should be more likely to attack civilian targets than groups in resource-poor areas with the same level of competition.

The results indicate some support for these contentions. The first hypothesis, testing the independent effect of competition, finds no relationship. Competition, by itself, does not have an effect on target choice. The role of energy, as discussed in the

second hypothesis, has a limited effect. Here, the interaction between competition and public support, when looking at unemployment in democratic states, has a small and negative effect on the number of civilian targets terrorist organizations attack

The findings indicate that competition is a factor whose effects on targeting are conditional on public support. More broadly, it also indicates that terrorist organizations, given that public support is mobilized, are mindful of the effects of their targeting choices and sensitive to the possibility of backlash (Ross and Gurr, 1989). This concern, rather than outbidding, seems to figure into targeting strategy.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter assesses the role of competition on civilian targeting. Using concepts from the organizational ecology literature, I model competition as an interaction between ideologically similar groups. Competition, as an independent factor, has no effect on targeting behavior. However, when taken in context with the factors discussed in previous chapters, competition has the theorized effect. In effect, public support and democracy together provide the group system with energy, further driving targeting behavior.

In the following chapter, I summarize the findings and discuss the implications that this has on policy. The findings suggest that targeting is a multi-stage process that depends upon the conditions at various levels. In many ways, this brings to mind the research into the study of war. Stuart Bremer once remarked of other works on war as "approach[ing] the causes of war question as if it were a planetary motion problem. They assume that one factor is so much more powerful than the rest that good predictions can be expected ignoring other factors…" (1996: 20). I follow this approach. In the summary chapter, I will also refer to the framework to assess its success as a model of group targeting behavior. Lastly, I will discuss the limitations of this study as well as the other avenues of research that this study has uncovered.

Table 5.1 The Effect of Competition on Civilian Targeting

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Competition Index	.001	.003
	(.003)	(.004)
Left	.031	.072
	(.045)	(.063)
Right	-.046	-.030
	(.044)	(.060)
Nationalist	.005	-.000
	(.027)	(.031)
Environmental	-.017	-.011
	(.056)	(.062)
Other	-.404***	-15.42***
	(.074)	(1.02)
RPC	.006	.031
	(.027)	(.052)
Urban Population	.000	.001
	(.001)	(.001)
Past Targeting Preferences	1.71***	1.71***
	(.081)	(.106)
Constant	-1.66	-1.75
	(.070)	(.111)
Wald χ^2	682.59***	1052.15***
Log Likelihood	-2760.47	-1836.23
Observations	1,711	1,089

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered on state in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1.

Table 5.2: The Effect of Competition, Unemployment, and Repression on Civilian Targeting

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Unemployment	.008***		.007**	
	(.003)		(.004)	
Indiscriminate Repression		.032		.085**
		(.022)		(.041)
Competition Index	.008	.001	.017*	.004
	(.008)	(.003)	(.009)	(.005)
Competition Index * Unemployment	-.001		-.003***	
	(.001)		(.001)	
Competition Index * Indiscriminate Repression		-.005		-.009
		(.004)		(.006)
Left	.037	.031	.058	.071
	(.065)	(.046)	(.084)	(.065)
Right	-.066	-.047	-.050	-.015
	(.056)	(.045)	(.075)	(.064)
Nationalist	-.009	.009	-.017	.014
	(.028)	(.028)	(.035)	(.035)
Environmental	-.009	-.011	-.046	.006
	(.075)	(.057)	(.097)	(.064)
Other	-.252	-.400***	-15.36***	-16.56***
	(.232)	(.075)	(1.02)	(1.02)
RPC	.037	.008	.042	.041
	(.041)	(.026)	(.068)	(.053)
Urban Population	.000	.000	.002	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)
Past Targeting Preferences	1.76***	1.71***	1.74***	1.71***
	(.109)	(.081)	(.146)	(.110)
Constant	-1.77	-1.67	-1.88	-1.79
	(.102)	(.073)	(.165)	(.126)
Wald χ^2	2289.69***	1004.46***	1912.19***	1357.51***

Table 5.2 Continued

Log Likelihood	-1964.19	-2760.17	-1392.64	-1799.13
Observations	1,149	1,711	799	1,054

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered on state in parentheses. * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 (two tailed). All independent variables (other than ideology) lagged at t-1.

Figure 5.1: Average Level of Competition per State (1970-2007)



Figure 5.2: Average Level of Terrorist Organiz**a**tion Competition (1970-2007)



Figure 5.3: Competition and Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects



Figure 5.4: Competition and Civilian Targeting: Marginal Effects (Democracies)



Figure 5.5: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Unemployment



Figure 5.6: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Repression



Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5.7: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Unemployment (Democracies)



Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5.8: Effect of Competition on Targeting Conditioned on Repression (Democracies)



Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon.

United States Department of Homeland Security

6.1 Introduction

My dissertation began by asking a simple question – why do terrorist organizations select the targets that they do? More broadly, what explains the wide variety of behavior in terrorist organizations - why given what we know about the costs of targeting and the potential pitfalls of terrorist violence, do groups sometimes avoid simple targets and attack more complex ones?

I first answer this question by developing a bargaining model in which the interaction between the government and a terrorist organization determines target choice. This bargaining interaction is then influenced by the larger environment. I divide this environment into three sets of factors that affect the bargaining model: government attributes, public support, and group-environment factors. These factors, both independently and in concert, affect target choice by changing the costs and benefits associated with the two major target types. The empirical chapters demonstrate that each of these factors have a statistically significant on terrorist targeting.

Yet these answers only provide part of the explanation. The final chapter reflects on this analysis and discusses the perils and promise of this approach. In the next section, I review the broad theoretical discussion as well as the findings from the empirical chapters. The third section highlights several of the weaknesses with the current analyses and offers some suggestions for future refinement. The fourth section uses the findings to address several policy areas in which the findings are relevant:

counterterror operations and assessment. The next section addresses potential avenues of research identified by this analysis. In particular, two branches of research can be gleaned from the framework presented here; one focusing on other factors that may influence the bargaining interaction between states and government and another where the bargaining interaction leads to behaviors other than targeting, such as splintering and the creation of front groups. The final section concludes.

6.2 Findings

Terrorist organizations exist in both the popular conception and academic literatures as a sort of "black box." This analysis has attempted to illuminate some of this ambiguity by focusing on the terrorist organization as the unit of analysis, generating a unique dataset of *domestic* terrorist events, and incorporating outside factors into a traditional bargaining model between the terrorist organization and the host government. These broad research design attributes, coupled with the findings from the empirical chapters provide us with a first step towards understanding a highly elusive, yet important, component of terrorist organizational behavior.

This approach takes us beyond traditional studies of terrorism in a number of ways. First, the focus on the organization as the unit of analysis allows us to better model the conditions that exist in each state that may affect organizations' strategies in different ways. Many of the existing approaches to terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 1998, 2001; Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005; Koch and Cranmer, 2007) are similar to realist theory in International Relations, treating the terrorist organization much as they would a state – as an undifferentiated whole. This assumption permits analyses to proceed at the state level, aggregating and obscuring the actions of individual organizations.

This is problematic because it eliminates the role that ideology has on target choice and terrorist action (Drake, 1998). The beneficial effects of democratic participation as identified by Li (2005) may work in the aggregate because it lumps

individual organizational actions. At the organizational level, increased access to the vote may also decrease violence amongst nationalist, leftist, or environmental organizations because it increases the likelihood that their political demands are considered. At the same time, this may also encourage more violence amongst right-wing groups because access threatens their perception of an appropriate "social order". The actions of the Ku Klux Klan in response to increased African-American participation in the electoral process can be considered as one indication of the differential effects that democratic participation has on different ideologically-aligned organizations.

Secondly, this analysis contributes to the terrorism literature by considering domestic terrorism. Much of the efforts and attention in policy and academic communities have been directed towards understanding a more specialized and unique form of terrorism – "transnational" terrorism.[84] In specific, transnational terrorism probably reveals very little about most terrorism that occurs – groups that can afford to act across borders are likely to be a very specialized and capable subset of all terrorist organizations. Organizations that can mount attacks in one country while being based in another confront and solve tremendous resource and logistical concerns that not every organization can overcome.[85] At the same time, the effect of political, social, and economic trends are diminished – increased access to the franchise, as discussed above, has no effect on groups comprised of non-nationals. Groups also face fewer institutional

---

[84] Transnational terrorism refers to "the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries" (Mickolus et al., 2003)

[85] The costs of the 9/11 attacks, for example, have been estimated to be between $400,000 and $500,000. Operatives incurred an additional $270,000 in expenses. Al-Qaeda's pre 9/11 budget was estimated to be $30 million (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

checks on their violence – public support in an attacked state is of little concern when operatives and resources are drawn from a second state.[86] What is instead measured are groups that are abnormally lethal and weakly affected by domestic-level attributes.

In reality, most terrorism is domestic and is perpetrated by those who lack access to resources and publicity (Sandler, 2003). As a result, many terrorist organizations face a continual struggle for resources and public support. As a result, organizations have to be cognizant of their operational choices – organizations have frequently issued commands to their operatives to be aware of the consequences their actions have on the wider public. This is in addition to the costs that targeting choices have on public support; ASALA, the Real IRA, and ETA have all faced public condemnation for their targeting choices (Cronin, 2006). Even currently, Al-Shabab, one of the most fearsome of a patchwork of organizations that rule Somalia, faces both passive and active civilian backlash over its extremism and violence (Gettleman, 2010).

Lastly, this study broadly contributes to the literature by envisioning terrorist targeting as an outcome of an augmented bargaining process between the government and the terrorist organization. While using a bargaining framework between a government and a terrorist organization to explain the occurrence of terrorism is not new (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007), the impact of the environment on the bargaining interaction and the resultant effect on targeting is unique. The environment discussed in this analysis takes three forms: government attributes, public support, and group characteristics. This environment, in combination with the bargaining model, shapes the costs and benefits of different targeting choices. This helps us explain targeting behavior that is not expected – such as the Pakistani Taliban's attack on the heavily fortified and guarded military headquarters in Rawalpindi in October 2009 (Perlez, 2009).

---

[86] Of course, overly lethal violence has the potential to affect public opinion amongst group supporters in foreign states. For more discussion of this point, see Chapter 2.

Aside from these broad contributions, this research also provides more specific results. In the first empirical chapter, I argue that government attributes, as explained by Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (2005) selection institution argument, affect target selection by changing the benefit associated with each target type. Governments that allow the citizenry to participate in the selection of policy and leadership increase the likelihood of civilian targeting. This occurs because the provision of public goods, and the ease by which citizens can enter and exit the winning coalition, make political change highly likely to occur. Given this, leaders are highly sensitive to public sentiment. Groups sensing this will then strike against civilians and provoke the political change that they seek.

The empirical findings in Chapter 3 indicate no effect for winning coalition size on civilian targeting. This suggests two points. One is that terrorist organizations are largely unconcerned with the ways that societies select their leaders - target selection is driven by factors other than a government's vulnerabilities. The lack of effect for standard regime type measures in the robustness check also suggests that the lack of an effect for selection institutions is not an isolated finding. The other is that this line of research requires more work, especially in the realm of data collection. In particular, greater efforts towards uncovering terrorist organizations in autocratic and small winning coalition states would provide more variation in the independent variable, allowing us to better test this contention.

Chapter 4 assesses the effect of public support on terrorist targeting. Given that cross national public support data do not exist, I assess the role of public support through the use of two proxy measures: economic policy and government repression. Both of these measures affect the selection of targets by shifting public opinion. These shifts within the public, from one of government support to organizational support and vice versa, increase or decrease the pool of supporters available to the terrorist organizations. Shifts that contract the pool of supporters, caused by positive government actions such as

good economic policy or government openness, increase the costs of civilian targets by increasing the relative impact that excessive violence has on the existing supporter base. This forces organizations to substitute achieving their political objectives for maintenance activities. As a result, organizations should be more likely to strike government targets to expand the supporter pool and to better allow for civilian targeting in future interactions with the government.

These concerns are reversed when negative government actions occur. Organizations have a larger pool of potential recruits to draw from. This reduces the relative costs of excessive violence and allows the organization to substitute maintenance activities for goal attainment. In such situations, organizations will be more likely to adopt targeting strategies that focus on civilian targets.

The results indicate that public support has an effect on organizational targeting strategies. Unlike previous economic appraisals of terrorism, which find no consistent relationship between economic conditions and the onset of terrorism, my results show that economics have an effect on organizations' targeting strategies. In addition, the analyses suggest differential effects for government policies. States suffer greater levels of terrorism in response to government repression rather than economic policy. This occurs particularly within democracies, as repression may represent a basic violation of the covenant between a democratic government and its citizens. This also suggests that indiscriminate repression is a costly strategy for counterterror and that targeted repression may provide a better alternative for reducing terrorist violence.

Lastly, Chapter 5 draws upon the organizational ecology literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Lowery and Gray, 1995) to discuss the impact of organizational competition on target selection. In particular, this chapter provides an argument for competition that differs from the outbidding literature – namely that competition will lead organizations to select lower levels of violence and select non-civilian targets in situations where it would normally select civilian targets. This is likely to occur because

civilian targeting is unlikely to have the same utility and the same measure of public support in each state (Khashan, 2003; Bloom, 2005). Because groups have to be concerned with their public profile as well as their effectiveness, this encourages groups to choose a level of violence that provides the maximum publicity while minimizing the negative effects from extremist violence.

Operationalizing organizational competition as occurring within the same state and within similar ideologies, I test two hypotheses. The first, using the argument above, asserts that competition leads to a decrease in the amount of civilian targeting. In the second hypothesis, I borrow from an innovative organizational ecology work in the interest group literature (Lowery and Gray, 1995) to argue that competition's negative effect on civilian targeting may be mitigated by the presence of favorable public opinion. This argument is akin to the ecological literature – more species can exist within a certain area provided that more resources can be found. This reduces competition because species are in less direct conflict for those resources. I envision this working for terrorist organizations as well; the direct conflict between organizations for recruits is mitigated by the presence of more potential recruits.

The results indicate mixed support. The pure competition measure has no effect; civilian targeting is neither more nor less likely under situations of competition. While this does not validate my first hypothesis, it suggests that our understanding of group competition needs to be more nuanced than that suggested by the outbidding literature (Bloom, 2005). The second hypothesis receives limited support. Organizations are less likely to use civilian targeting in competitive situations in democracies when unemployment is high. This effect is contrary to that in the fourth chapter. This warrants study into whether competition or public support has the strongest effect in determining targeting choice. While these answers are forthcoming, this at least suggests that competition, and the organizational ecology approach towards understanding competition, may be a useful area of future inquiry.

6.3 Weaknesses of the Approach

One potential weakness of this approach is that it does not account for endogeneity in a comprehensive way. Terrorist targeting is a difficult concept to envision as part of an endogenous process with either repression or economics. Previous work (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, 2005) has established that terrorism has a negative impact on economics, triggering the potential for further terrorism. The same process holds for repression (Allen and Colley, 2008). With targeting that process is indistinct: do civilian or non-civilian targets trigger the endogenous process that begets more terrorism? Future analyses needs to identify which targets encourage an endogenous process and, once identified, take this process into account.

Second, the target types used to construct the dependent variable form a dichotomy that corresponds best to a democratic state; all targets other than government, military, and police are classified as non-civilian. A more accurate definition of target types should take state institutional variation into account – classifying business, utilities, and segments of the transportation industry as government - depending on the circumstance of individual states. Industry in Egypt, for example, may be better classified as government since it provides goods that allow the military to continue to support the government (Cook, 2007). This may well be a minor modification as significant relationships have been found for most of the key independent variables using this analysis's operationalization. I anticipate that as the measure is refined, stronger results should follow.

Another approach to better assess the role of public support may exist through the consideration of *unanticipated* government policy. Because we expect the public and the government to behave strategically, ordinary measures of unemployment may not provide a useful indication of changes in real public support. For Palmer and Whitten (1999), measuring unanticipated changes provided a better way to assess the effects of the economic voting model. Given that this may be a useful indication of public support

for government policy, this may also be useful for understanding terrorist organizations. Accounting for unanticipated events may better model public support because it allows us to incorporate instances where the public can anticipate and prepare as well as those instances where it is caught off guard. This should increase the likelihood of civilian targeting since unanticipated unemployment, and the inability of individuals to prepare by finding other employment or managing by other means, should increase the size and quality of the potential recruit pool.

Lastly, as in most analyses of terrorism, more effort must be made to increasing the quality of the dataset. This analysis gathered information from a variety of sources to construct a dataset of over 29,000 events of domestic terrorism perpetrated by over 400 terrorist organizations. This represents but a small portion of the total number of researched terrorist organizations and an even smaller portion of the total number of terrorist organizations.[87] For this analysis, more information on additional terrorist organizations will broaden this analysis and increase the generalizability of the findings. From a broader perspective, more data on terrorist organizations can provide a revealing look into the effects of the traditional variables we use to discuss terrorism. In addition, as our knowledge of terrorism grows, we can begin to incorporate variables on organizational dynamics, such as size, membership distribution, sponsorship, that will provide for a new range of scholarship in terrorism studies and political science.

6.4 Policy Implications

While understanding the use of targeting by terrorist organizations is a nascent field of study, a failure to fully understand this process can prove detrimental. This ignorance is symptomatic of terrorism in general. The public's understanding of

[87] The Terrorist Organizational Profiles (TOPs) dataset has information on 856 terrorist organizations.

terrorism is largely determined by what they see in the news - images of grim terrorist leaders, bombastic and frightening statements made by operatives, and images of indiscriminate and seemingly endless violence. As a result, the public perceives the threat of terrorism to be far greater than it is in actuality (Lustick, 2006; Mueller, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). For those in policy and academia, treating terrorist organizations as undifferentiated wholes and conceptualizing all terrorist organizations as transnational organizations - highly capable, broad-based, and with an insatiable need for violence - contributes to this dangerous misperception. This lends itself to the creation of more paranoia and more bad policy.[88]

An understanding of terrorist targeting proves important for a number of reasons. First, similar to the discussion in the theory chapter, an understanding of targeting may provide us with one way to understand terrorist recruitment and publicity. This forms the essence of Pisacani's phrase "propaganda of the deed" (Hoffman, 1998). For organizations that conduct suicide terrorism, attacks on civilian targets and the martyrdom of the operative provides a "proven capacity to radicalize and mobilize additional supporters and recruits by emphasizing a misguided altruism that glorifies death and the afterlife in pursuit of a just cause" (Libicki et al. 2007: 64). This perverse form of publicity makes the execution of the terrorist act even more beneficial for the organization – not only has action been taken against the target government, but the act itself alerts and radicalizes a new constituency. In democracies, where media are more pervasive, the receptive audience is likely to be larger (Schmid, 1992).

At the same time, the selection of targets may also provide a demonstration of the underlying capability of the terrorist organization (Overgaard, 1994). As discussed in the

---

[88] Mueller (2006: 2) provides an interesting example of paranoia in the founding document of the US Department of Homeland Security: "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon."

theory chapter, the potential investment in resources and logistics is likely to differ greatly between the two target classifications used here, civilian and non-civilian. For al-Qaeda, attacks against hardened non-civilian targets provided a way for the organization to quickly establish its credibility as a meaningful force and to attract new recruits (Wright, 2006; Libicki et al., 2007).

For other organizations, targeting provides a good analogue to operational strength. Shining Path's target set has been dramatically constrained due to a number of setbacks it has encountered, most notably the arming of the rural peasantry by the government and the capture of the organization's top leaders in 1992 and 1998 (Cameron and Mauceri, 1997; Starn, 1998; Rapoport, 2001; Masterson, 2009). The current manifestation of Shining Path looks remarkably different from its past glory: operations are now devoted to narcotrafficking and attacks against small civilian targets (Masterson, 2009). To a lesser degree, al-Qaeda has suffered the same fate. The setbacks endured by the organization since the advent of the American-led "War on Terror" has greatly limited the type of targets the organization has been able to pursue (Libicki et al., 2007).

These understandings can then be used to create more effective strategies to counter the threat of terrorism. One approach is to use the elements learned here to create policies and programs that allow potential targets to be identified before they are struck. One approach is to create metrics denoting the terrorist target selection process (Stungis and Schori, 2003; Stungis et al., 2006). These approaches, using terrorist priorities (such as publicity, casualty count, and economic impact) as parameters, can be combined with the factors that have been discussed here. The resulting metric can then be used to objectively allocate personnel and funding to targets deemed most at risk.

A second strategy suggested by this analysis is to target a terrorist organization's public support. One potential problem facing many terrorist organizations is the way to rationalize the deaths of civilians, some with many of the same religious, ethnic, and political preferences as the perpetrators. Al-Qaeda faced this problem with the deaths of

Muslims in the dual embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Libicki et al., 2007). Targeted governments should be quick to use this information and reframe an organization's target choice, harnessing both local media and social networks to point out the incongruity between a terrorist organization's actions and rhetoric. Narratives emphasizing, for example, Muslim casualties created by a Muslim group can prove quite beneficial for reducing the public support of terrorist organization. This information can also give way to rumors which, if carefully managed by the government or its representatives, can further damage the legitimacy of the terrorist organization (Bhavnani et al., 2009).

Governments can also address public support through countering the terrorist organization's provision of government services. One explanation for the enduring appeal of organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban has been its provision of services in remote and dangerous areas (Gvineria, 2009). In the lawless areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the West Bank, and Gaza, terrorist organizations have acted in place of the government, providing the services that local and national officials cannot. As a response, governments must take back these functions and create policies that address the economic and social welfare of its citizens. These types of policies have been shown to be quite effective as a means of addressing terrorist behavior; undercutting the incentives the public has to provide support for terrorist organizations (Burgoon, 2006).

This also suggests a role for the international community. One of the most important actions the international community can take is to encourage partners suffering from terrorism to dedicate resources to the development of these areas. As stated in the fourth chapter, GAM's grievances against the Indonesian government centered on an extractive policy that only saw the region of Aceh gain four cents of government assistance for every dollar of income generated from its resource wealth (Sulistiyanto, 2001). During the most of the GAM insurgency, direct assistance for the region remained illusory. Instead, aid was directed towards donor states' commercial objectives,

the modernization of Indonesia's security forces, or to other regions (Arase, 1994; Gounder and Sen, 1999).

As a policy recommendation, this means that donor states must be conscious of the way their aid allocations are spent. In many cases, foreign aid often substitutes for spending that recipient governments would have undertaken anyway, thus freeing up government funds for other purposes (Pack and Pack, 1990, 1993; Khilji and Zampelli, 1994; Devarajan and Swaroop, 2000).[89] This often undermines the intention of donor states and foreign aid programs. As a result, donors must be willing to exercise conditionalities on their foreign aid and cut off foreign aid flows if recipient states misuse their funds or violate agreed-upon rules (Crawford, 1997). One approach, called the Public Expenditure Reform Loan (PERL) may overcome these problems (Devarajan and Swaroop, 2000). This program replaces individual aid programs with direct budgetary support for a government's public expenditure program. This type of program is then dependent upon the government's continued progress in goals mutually agreed upon with the lender. Because aid is tied to a broad program of economic and social development, this reduces fungibility and allows donor states to exercise leverage in order to ensure development funds are spent in the correct areas.

Third, governments can seek to reduce the threat of terrorist targeting to civilian targets by encouraging the adoption of "repentance laws."[90] These laws grant leniency to captured or admitted terrorist members who disassociate themselves from terrorist organizations or collaborate with law enforcement (Ferracuti, 1998). Contrasted with active repression, these laws have a minimal impact on public support. Law enforcement can use intelligence gleaned from admitted terrorists to capture other terrorists with

---

[89] This is commonly referred to as fungibility.

[90] Repentance laws have been used in countries other than Italy. Most notably Peru and Turkey (Aktan and Koknar, 2002; Baer, 2003)

minimal impact on the general citizenry. Defections and desertions encouraged by these laws also reduced public support for terrorism by increasing organizational extremism (Ross and Gurr, 1989; Crenshaw, 1991). In Italy, groups engaged in acts of brutality; one group assassinated in prison a very young former member whom it had accused of being a traitor (della Porta, 1993: 166). Another killed two private security guards in the hope of "denouncing" the suspected treason of another militant (della Porta, 1993: 166). Groups, too, began to abandon their ideology, encouraging further defection and use of the repentance laws. One member confided, "when the old ideological categories are abandoned, the indispensible need to start again, to believe, to hope, to work for something new and different arises" (**qtd in** della Porta, 1993: 166).

In Italy, the results led one scholar to declare that "terrorism in Italy appears to have been defeated" (Ferracuti, 1998: 59). In the space of seven years, terrorist attacks in Italy dropped from a high of 2,513 in 1979 to 30 in 1986 (Ferracuti, 1998: 59). Compared to the military approach the Italian government had used previously, the public support approach proved more effective and long lasting in confronting the country's terrorist problems (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986; Crenshaw, 1991; della Porta, 1995).

The counterterrorism strategies suggested by this analysis also suggest several actions that states should avoid. One is that states should avoid using repression as a means of counterterrorism; these efforts are frequently paradoxical – repressive governments or even governments perceived as repressive often exacerbate the threat of terrorism. Carlos Marighela, himself a terrorist, argued that terrorist organizations were best able to win public support when they were able to provoke the government into repressive and violent action (Crenshaw, 1981). Organizations have long operated under that understanding; provocation strategies have been used by organizations such as ETA, the IRA, the Red Army Faction (RAF), and Al-Qaeda to further their organizational support (Heymann, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005b; Kydd and Walter, 2006).

In addition, repressive counterterrorism, when necessary, should be applied as narrowly as possible (Kydd and Walter, 2006). In particular, states must use a strategy which distinguishes terrorists from the general population. This strategy, because it relies on the discrimination between citizen and terrorist, is resource intensive yet limits the creation of legitimate grievances against the government (Mason and Krane, 1989). This helps to eliminate terrorist leaders and operatives, while at the same time reaffirming public support for the government. Citizens view the government's judicious use of violence as an indication that the leadership can be trusted, shifting support towards the government. This also reduces potential issues such as warrantless wiretapping, racial profiling, and illegal seizure, which may provide the attributes that give rise to public dissatisfaction. At the same time, this delegitimizes terrorist portrayals of the targeted government as feckless and irresponsible with its use of violence once again lowering public support for the terrorist organization.

These approaches appear to shift the focus of attacks from civilian to non-civilian targets. In many ways this is true. Non-civilian targets typically enjoy a greater investment in security and are, by and large, less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In addition, the amount of fear generated by these attacks is generally lower than that caused by attacks on civilian targets (Libicki et al., 2007). Shifting the burden to non-civilian targets increases the difficulty a terrorist organization has in striking a target and reduces the benefit gained from attacks. This also reduces the likelihood of success, reducing the perception of success and further harming organizational efforts to recruit new members. Given these factors, the number of organizations capable of striking such a target is lowered, further reducing the overall likelihood that a particular target is struck (Sandler et al., 1983; Cauley and Im, 1988).

6.5 Avenues of Research

Several avenues of research are suggested by this research. Broadly, these areas encompass the consideration of independent and dependent variables not considered in this research. These variables help us to further illuminate the "black box" of terrorism – by giving us an insight into group dynamics. First, these allow us to evaluate how the presence of outside funding and resources affect group behavior. This considers the effect that state sponsorship has on activity, a timely and pertinent area of research. These variables may also allow us to consider how organizational form adapts to the amount and types of resources a group has available. Secondly, the research suggested by this analysis also allows us to assess different group behaviors – such as credit-taking, the creation of front organizations, and splintering. All of these allow us to understand terrorism beyond the mere use of violence and to conceptualize it as something that also incorporates a range of behaviors, inputs, and activities.

One of the most interesting, yet least understood, aspects of terrorism is the role of outside providers of resources such as state sponsors, diaspora communities, and outside financiers (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006).[91] The presence and availability of these actors may help to encourage civilian targeting by reducing a group's reliance on domestic sources of support. This would result in organizations being relatively immune to changes in the factors presented here so long as the outside source remains in place. An approach that connects changes in sponsorship, such as the end of the Cold War or changes in governments in particular states, to changes in targeting would be a particularly interesting area of research.

---

[91] Outside financing refers to the creation of franchises by a larger group. One example is the creation of al-Qaeda branches in states other than Afghanistan and Pakistan (Byman and Pollack, 2001).

Resource availability may provide another potential independent variable that can be used. Reports have suggested that the Taliban has financed its operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan and in neighboring Afghanistan through the extraction of emeralds in Pakistan's Swat Valley (Yusufzai and Wilkinson, 2009). This may help to finance a greater number of attacks or attacks with a high level of sophistication. At the same time, resources may also artificially inflate public support for the organization, thus allowing greater numbers of civilian attacks to occur. This similarity – that terrorism and other forms of violence can be exacerbated by the presence of resources – suggests one way to link terrorism with the literature on resource-driven civil wars (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Ross, 2004; Humphreys, 2005). Analyses focusing on resource attributes - such as scarcity, abundance, lootability, and concentration – and their effects on targeting, activity, and organizational form are some of the potential extensions of this research (Le Billon, 2001). A spatial analysis linking terrorist incidents with resource proximity might be another fruitful extension of this research area.

At the same time, the general framework can be kept while considering different dependent variables. In this case, we can assess how these attributes affect the formation of front groups and splinter organizations. One can conceptualize the creation of front groups as a response to potentially unpopular attacks. As a result, we can anticipate that front groups are more likely to form when organizations face a low level of public support.

Splinters may form under the same circumstances. Given that organizations are more likely to attack non-civilian targets in situations of low support, the potential that differences of opinion over the use of violence between extreme rank-and-file and moderate leadership increases (Wolf, 1978, Oots, 1986, 1989; Chai, 1993). Given that this divisiveness is connected to the types of target that a group selects, attacks against non-civilian targets in situations of low public support may also lead to the creation of splinter organizations.

6.6 Conclusion

This analysis has sought to identify factors which are responsible for determining whether terrorist organizations pursue civilian or non-civilian targets. Government attributes such as selection institutions and public support, as proxied by economic policy and repression, provide the strongest results. These indicate that terrorist organizations are products of their environment – responding the opportunities and constraints provided not only within their state but by the distribution of public support.

This analysis is also of benefit because it offers real and meaningful solutions to terrorist violence and targeting. One recommendation focuses on reducing terrorism through the diminution of public support to the organization. Previous approaches, such as Italy's "repentance law" have been successful manifestations of this approach. This quickly reduced a seemingly intractable problem to one that was easily contained by the Italian government. The second recommendation focused using repression in a targeted way; violence directed at perpetrators helps to reduce the appeal of terror and increase public support for governments. The last recommendation concerns assessing the effectiveness of counterterror policy by looking at the appeals groups make to potential members. Appeals made that focus on monetary reward and adventure may provide an indication that groups face situations of low public support and may be more likely to select non-civilian targets to build that support.

Despite the difficulties assessing this particular form of violence, providing a coherent framework by which it can be studied provides a first step towards providing an effective response. The areas of research suggested by this approach also provide a promising way to broaden our understanding of terrorism. Hopefully, this approach can provide new areas of inquiry that will allow us to better understand and confront terrorism.

APPENDIX: GROUP BIBLIOGRAPHY

Group Name	Country	Time Range[92]	Sources
20 December Movement (M-20)	Panama	1990-1992[93]	TOPs
23rd of September Communist League	Mexico	1973-1982	START (2008)
28 May Armenian Organization	Turkey	1977	START (2008)
2nd of June Movement	West Germany	1971[94]-1980[93]	START (2008); Anderson and Sloan (2002)
31 January People's Front (FP-31)	Guatemala	1981-1982	START (2008)
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades	UK, Spain	2003-2006	START (2008)
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Iraq, Syria	1974-1998[93]	START (2008)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Philippines	1991-2007	START (2008)
Actiefront Nationalistisch Nederland	Netherlands	1992[95]	START (2008)
Action Directe	France	1979-1989[93]	START (2008)
Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries	France	1977	START (2008)
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	Yemen	1994-2003[93]	START (2008)
African National Congress (South Africa)	South Africa	1961-1996[93]	START (2008)
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)	South Africa	1973-1994[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Al Faran	India	1995	START (2008)
Al Jihad[96]	Egypt	1974-2001	Wright (2006); U.S. Department of State (2008); START (2008)
Al Zulfikar	Pakistan	1977-1992[93]	START (2008)

[92] Temporal range for the data in this analysis is 1970 to 2007.

[93] Used date of last attack as group end date.

[94] Date of first attack used as group beginning date.

[95] Used date of only attack as beginning/end date.

[96] Merged with Al-Qaeda in 2001.

Appendix Continued

Al-Adl Wal Ihsane	Morocco	1979-2007	Shahin (1998); Ghanmi (2007)
Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front	Iran	2005-2007	START (2008)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	2000-2007	START (2008)
Al-Fatah	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1959-2007	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)	Egypt	1977-1998	START (2008); U.S. Department of State (2008)
Al-Haramayn Brigades	Saudi Arabia	2003-2004[93]	START (2008)
Al-Intiqami al-Pakistani	Pakistan	2002	START (2008)
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)	Ethiopia, Somalia	1992[94]-2005[93]	START (2008)
Al-Madina	India	2002-2007	START (2008)
Al-Mansoorian	India	2002[94]-2007	START (2008)
Al-Nawaz	Pakistan	1999[94]-2000	START (2008)
Al-Qa`ida	US, UK, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan	1989-2007	START (2008)
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq[97]	Iraq, Jordan	2004-2007	START (2008)
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Saudi Arabia	2004-2007	START (2008)
Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)[98]	Algeria	2007	START (2008); NTCT (2010)
Albanian National Army (ANA)	Macedonia	2002-2007	START (2008)
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)[99]	Philippines	1984-1999[93]	START (2008)

[97] Also called Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers.

[98] Originally called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC). Name changed in 2007.

[99] A splinter group of the New People's Army (NPA).

Appendix Continued

Alfaro Vive	Ecuador	1977-1991[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)	Myanmar	1988-2007	START (2008)
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)	India	1978-1986[93]	Major (1987)
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	India	1990-2007	START (2008)
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	Uganda	1995-2001[93]	U.S. Department of State (2003)
Amal	Lebanon	1975-2007	START (2008)
Andres Castro United Front	Nicaragua	1995-1999	START (2008)
Angry Brigade	Italy	1999	START (2008)
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)	US, UK	1976-2007 if UK 1982-2007 if US	START (2008)
Animal Rights Militia	UK	1982[94]-1985[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Ansar al-Islam	Iraq	2001-2007	START (2008)
Ansar al-Jihad	Iraq	2004-2005	START (2008)
Ansar al-Sunna	Iraq	2003-2007	START (2008)
Anti-American Arab Liberation Front	West Germany	1986	START (2008)
Anti-Communist Command (KAK)	Indonesia	2000-2007	START (2008)
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)	Italy	1995-2004	U.S. Department of State (2004); U.S. Department of State (2007)
Anti-Racist Guerrilla Nuclei	Italy	1999	START (2008)
Anti-State Action	Greece	1999-2000	START (2008)
Anti-State Justice	Greece	2006	START (2008)
Anti-Zionist Movement	Italy	1999	START (2008)
Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL)	France, Spain	1983-1989[93]	START (2008)
April 6th Liberation Movement	Philippines	1980[95]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1969-2007	START (2008)
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan	Iran	2005	START (2008)

Appendix Continued

Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA)	Argentina	1974-1978[93]	START (2008)
Armata Corsa	France	1999-2001	Atkins (2004); START (2008)
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN)	France	1999[94]-2002	START (2008)
Armed Commandos of Liberation	US	1968-1972	START (2008)
Armed Forces for Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL)	Indonesia	1974-2001	Kingsbury (2001); Rees (2002)
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)[100]	El Salvador	1975-1980	START (2008)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)[101]	Algeria	1992-2007	START (2008); Kushner (2003)
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)	Italy	1969-1978[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988);
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA)	US	1967-1971[93]	START (2008)
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR)	Italy	1977-1988[93]	Crenshaw (1991)
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)	Lebanon	1975-1996	Kurz and Merari (1985); START (2008), Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Aryan Nation	US	1979-2007	START (2008); Kushner (2003)
Asbat al-Ansar	Lebanon	1995[94]-2007	START (2008); U.S. Department of State (2008)
Association Totalement Anti-Guerre (ATAG)	France	2001	START (2008)
Aum Shinri Kyo	Japan	1984-2007	START (2008)
Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA)	Spain	1976-1985[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)

[100] Became part of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in 1980.

[101] The Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) was a splinter of this organization.

Appendix Continued

Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the Zionist Presence in France	France	1979	START (2008)
Azania People's Organization (AZAPO)	South Africa	1978-1992[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988);
Baader-Meinhof Group	West Germany/Germany	1968-1998	START (2008)
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	India	1978-2007	START (2008)
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	Pakistan	2003-2007	START (2008)
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)[102]	Thailand	1963-2007	START (2008)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Spain	1959-2007	START (2008), Department of Defense (1988)
Bersatu[103]	Thailand	1989-2007	START (2008)
Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTHK)	India	1984-1994	Wallace (1995); Mahmood (1996)
Black Brigade	Lebanon	1985[95]	START (2008)
Black Hand	Lebanon	1983[95]	START (2008)
Black Liberation Army	US	1970-1984[93]	START (2008)
Black Order	Italy	1974-1983[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Black Panther Group (Palestinian)	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1988-1995[93]	START (2008)
Black Panthers	US	1966-1972	START (2008)
Black September	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1971-1974	START (2008)
Black Star	Greece	1999-2002	START (2008)
Black Widows	Russia	2000-2007	START (2008)
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)	India	1996-2003	START (2008)
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT)	South Africa	1996-1997	START (2008)

[102] A faction of the Bersatu organization.

[103] Umbrella organization of separatist groups in Thailand

Appendix Continued

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)	Papua/New Guinea	1989-1997	Jane's (2009)
Brazilian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAB)	Brazil	1976[95]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	France	1966-2000[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Brunswijk Jungle Commando	Suriname	1986-1992[93]	French (1991)
Canary Islands Independence Movement	Spain	1959-1982	START (2008)
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)	France	1983[94]-1985[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC)	Spain	1971[94]-1979[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Catholic Reaction Force[104]	UK	1983-2001[93]	START (2008)
Charles Martel Group	France	1975-1983	START (2008)
Che Guevara Brigade	Argentina	1976-1990[93]	Griesman (1977); START (2008)
Chicano Liberation Front	US	1971[94]-1975[93]	Hewitt (2000)
Chilean Anti-Communist Alliance (ACHA)	Chile	1984[94]-1988[93]	Gunson et al. (1988)
Chin National Army	Myanmar	1988-2007	UNHCR (2004)
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)	Japan	1957-2007	START (2008)
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement	Honduras	1980-1994[93]	START (2008)
Clandestini Corsi	France	1999[94]-2004	START (2008)
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA)	France	1986	START (2008)
Communist Combattant Cells (CCC) (Belgium)	Belgium	1984[94]-1985[93]	START (2008)
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)	India	2004-2007	START (2008); Yardley (2009)

[104] Most likely a front group for the IRA.

Appendix Continued

Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist	India	1969-2007	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M)	Nepal	1996-2007	START (2008)
Conscientious Arsonists (CA)	Greece	1997-1998	START (2008)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	UK	1986-2007	START (2008), CAIN project (2010); State Department (2008)
Contras[105]	Nicaragua	1979-1990	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)[106]	France	1974[94]-2007	Ramsay (1983); Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Corsican National Liberation Front-Historic Channel	France	1991[94]-1999[93]	START (2008)
Croatian Freedom Fighters	US	1976-1980	START (2008)
DHKP/C[107]	Turkey	1994-2007	START (2008), NCTC
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	Russia	2002-2007	START (2008)
Death to Kidnappers (MAS)	Colombia	1981-1990	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1969-2007	START (2008)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2000-2007[93]	International Crisis Group (2003)

[105] Umbrella name for a variety of groups aligned against the Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan Civil War.

[106] Announced its dissolution in 1997. In 1999, the FLNC-Historic Channel and other groups merged and became the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC).

[107] A splinter group of Dev Sol.

Appendix Continued

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[108]	Myanmar, Thailand	1995[94]-2007	START (2008)
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)	Nicaragua	1982-1991	Walker (1991)
Dev Sol[109]	Turkey	1978-1996[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Borzaslan (2004)
Dev Yol[110]	Turkey	1975-1982[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Borzaslan (2004)
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)	India	1996-2007[93]	START (2008)
Dishmish Regiment	India	1982-1986	Department of Defense (1988)
Dukhta-ran-e-Millat	India	1987-2007	START (2008)
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1989[95]	Pluchinsky (1986)
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)	US, Canada	1992-2007	START (2008)
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)	Sri Lanka	1986[94]-1989[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP)	Argentina	1969-1977	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Eritrean Liberation Front	Ethiopia	1960-1979[93]	START (2008)
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front[111]	Ethiopia	1970-1990	START (2008)
Etnocacerista Movement	Peru	2005[94]-2007	START (2008)
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	El Salvador	1978[94]-1994[93]	START (2008)
Fatah Hawks	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1994-1995[93]	Usher (1996)

[108] A splinter group of Karen National Union.

[109] A splinter group of Dev Yol.

[110] A splinter of the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA)

[111] A splinter group of the Eritrean Liberation Front.

Appendix Continued

February 28 Popular League	El Salvador	1978-1992	START (2008)
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)	Spain	1975-2000[93]	START (2008)
Force 17	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1979-1994	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Kushner (2003); Luft (2003)
Francia	France	1978-1979[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Indonesia	1976-2005	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army	Spain	1987-1994	Olmeda (2007)
Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	Indonesia	1963-2007	START (2008)
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)	Canada	1963-1973	Fournier (1984); Leman-Langlois and Brodeur (2005)
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners	Lebanon	1977-1983	START (2008)
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)	Angola	1963-2007	START (2008)
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)	US	1974-1985	START (2008)
Gazteriak	France	1994-2000	START (2008)
George Jackson Brigade	US	1975[94]-1977[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Global Intifada	Sweden	2002-2007	START (2008)
Gracchus Babeuf	France	1989[94]-1991[93]	START (2008)
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	Turkey	1979-2007	Kushner (2003), START (2008)
Grey Wolves	Turkey	1974-1996	Rosie (1986); Schmid and Jongman (1988); Atkins (2004)
Grupo de Combatientes Populares	Ecuador	1994-2007	START (2008)

Appendix Continued

Guadeloupe Liberation Army	France	1980-1983[93]	START (2008)
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)[112]	Guatemala	1952-1990[93]	START (2008)
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)	Guatemala	1982-1996	START (2008)
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)[112]	Guatemala	1972-1994[93]	START (2008)
Guerrilla Forces for Liberation	US	1987	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF)	India	1980-1989[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1987-2007	NCTC; START (2008)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)[113]	India	1985-2007	START (2008)
Harkat ul Ansar[114]	India	1993-1997	START (2008)
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	Bangladesh	1992-2007	START (2008)
Hector Rio De Brigade	Haiti	1982-1986	START (2008)
Hizb-I-Islami	Afghanistan	1974-2007	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Hizballah	Lebanon	1982-2007	NCTC; START (2008)
Hizballah Palestine	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1992[95]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Holy Spirit Movement	Uganda	1986-1990[93]	Allen (1991)
Independent Armed Revolutionary Commandos (CRIA)	US	1977[95]	Sater (1981)
Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA)	Philippines	2001-2007	START (2008)

[112] Merged with three other leftist groups to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) organization in 1982. It may have carried out operations in its own name after the merger.

[113] This group along with two others, is thought to form the Pakistani wing of Al-Qaeda

[114] In 1993, under the guidance of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's external intelligence agency, the HuM reunited with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) to form a new organization, Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA). The group returned to its original name in 1997.

Appendix Continued

Informal Anarchist Federation	Italy	2003-2007	START (2008)
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	South Africa	1991[94]-1994[93]	Hudson (1996)
International Communist Group	Italy	1984	START (2008)
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)	France	1974-1975	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
International Solidarity[115]	Italy	2000-2007	START (2008)
Iparretarrak (IK)	France	1973-2005[93]	Gregory (2003)
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	UK, Ireland	1974-2007	START (2008)
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)[116]	UK	1986-1992	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Monaghan (2001)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	UK, Ireland	1922-2007	START (2008)
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain	Bahrain	1996[95]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Islamic Jihad (Ideological Grouping)	Lebanon, Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1980-2007	Amr (1994); START (2008)
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)	Uzbekistan	2004-2007	START (2008)
Islamic Movement for Change[117]	Syria	1995-2003	START (2008)
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)	Algeria	1989-1997	START (2008)
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	Iraq	2006-2007	Shapiro (2008)
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC)[118]	Colombia	1989-2007	START (2008)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)[113]	India, Pakistan	2000-2007	START (2008)
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)	Bangladesh	1998-2007	Karlekar (2008); START (2008)
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)	Bangladesh	1941-2000[93]	Glynn (2002);

[115] May now be a part of the Informal Anarchist Federation.

[116] A splinter of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).

[117] May be a front group for Al-Qaeda

[118] A splinter group of M-19 (Movement of April 19th)

Appendix Continued

Jamaat-E-Islami (Pakistan)	Pakistan	1941-2007	Stern (2000); Ahmad (2007)
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)	India	1990-2007	START (2008)
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front[119]	India	1989-1996[93]	START (2008)
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)	Nepal	2004-2007	START (2008)
Japanese Red Army (JRA)	Japan	1970-2000	START (2008)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	Philippines, Indonesia	1993-2007	START (2008)
Jenin Martyrs Brigade	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	2003-2007	START (2008)
Jewish Defense League (JDL)	US	1968-2007	START (2008)
Justice Army for Defenseless Peoples	Mexico	1997-1998	START (2008)
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide	US	1975-1983	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Kach	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1971-2007	START (2008)
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)	Myanmar; Thailand	1961-2007	Badgely (1965): Schmid and Jongman (1988); Lintner (2003); BBC News (2010)
Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front	France	1984-1989	Chanter (1991)
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	India	1994- 2007	START (2008)
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	India	1980- 2007	START (2008)
Karen National Union	Myanmar, Thailand	1959-2007	START (2008)
Karenni National Progressive Party	Myanmar	1955-2007	START (2008)
Khalistan Commando Force	India	1986-1995[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Atkins (2004);
Khalistan Liberation Force	India	1986-1999[93]	Mahmood (1996)

[119] GTD data includes actions committed by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a closely related precursor to the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front.

Appendix Continued

Khmer Rouge	Cambodia	1951-1998	START (2008)
Khristos Kasimis[120]	Greece	1977[95]	START (2008)
Komando Jihad	Indonesia	1968-1981[93]	Conboy (2003)
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Macedonia	1992-1998[93]	START (2008)
Ku Klux Klan	US	1866-2007	START (2008)
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)	India	1999-2007	START (2008)
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	Iraq	1946-2007	START (2008)
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party	Turkey	1995	START (2008)
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	Turkey	2004-2007	START (2008)
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Turkey	1974-2007	START (2008)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi[113]	India, Pakistan	1996-2007	START (2008)
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	India	1989-2007	START (2008)
Laskar Jihad	Indonesia	2000-2002[93]	Szajkowski (2004)
Lebanese Liberation Front	Lebanon	1986-1989	START (2008)
Lebanese National Resistance Front	Lebanon	1982-1991[93]	START (2008)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Sri Lanka	1976-2007	START (2008)
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Uganda, Sudan	1992-2007	START (2008)
Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF)	Honduras	1978-1988[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)	UK	1997-2007	START (2008)
M-19 (Movement of April 19)	Colombia	1974-1990	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Macheteros	US	1978-1998[93]	START (2008)
Mahdi Army	Iraq	2003-2007	Mowle (2006)
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	Chile	1983-1997[93]	START (2008)

[120] Offshoot of Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)

Appendix Continued

Maoist Communist Center (MCC)[121]	India	1969-2007	START (2008)
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit	Turkey	1977[94]-1989	Schmid and Jongman (1988); State Department (1990)
Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary Brigade	Dominican Republic	1987-1988[93]	START (2008)
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade	El Salvador	1980[94]-1992[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
May 15	Greece	1998	START (2008)
May 19 Communist Order[122]	US	1983-1985	START (2008)
May 98	Greece	1998	START (2008)
Meibion Glyndwr	UK	1979-1990[93]	Gallent et al. (2003)
Meinhof-Puig-Antich Group	France	1975	START (2008)
Montoneros	Argentina	1970-1981	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH)	Honduras	1980-1992	START (2008)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)[123]	Philippines	1978-2007	START (2008)
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	Philippines	1972-2007	START (2008)
Mountaineer Militia	US	1994-1996[93]	START (2008)
Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	Nigeria	1999-2007	Ikelegbe (2005)
Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)	Nigeria	2006[94]-2007	START (2008)
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	Senegal	1982-2007	Minorities at Risk Project (2006)

[121] Merged with the Communist Party of India-Maoist in 2004. It may have carried out operations in its own name after the merger.

[122] A coalition of Weather Underground and Black Liberation Army (BLA) members who robbed banks to finance their terrorist activities.

[123] A splinter of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Appendix Continued

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile)	Chile	1965-1994[93]	START (2008)
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)	Mozambique	1962-1992[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)	Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa	1976-1999[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Iraq	1963-2007	START (2008)
Muslim Brotherhood	Syria	1979[94]-1983[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan	1990-2007	START (2008)
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)	Uganda	1988-2007	START (2008)
National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)	Burundi	1994-2005	Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2005); Peterson (2006)
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	India	1988-2007	START (2008)
National Liberation Army (NLA)	Macedonia	2001[95]	Kim (2002)
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	Colombia	1964-2007	START (2008)
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	India	1989-2007	START (2008)
National Liberation Union	Suriname	1989-1991	START (2008)
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B)	Cyprus	1971-1978	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Anderson and Sloan (2002)
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	Liberia	1984-1997	START (2008)
National Socialist Council of Nagaland	India	1978-1997[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)	India	1988-2007	START (2008)
National Socialist Liberation Front	US	1969-1975[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Angola	1966-2002	START (2008)

Appendix Continued

Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)	Bolivia	1990-1991	START (2008)
New People's Army (NPA)	Philippines	1969-2007	START (2008)
New Revolutionary Alternative (NRA)	Russia	1996-1999	START (2008)
New Revolutionary Popular Struggle (NELA)	Greece	2002	START (2008)
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)	US	1970[94]-1979	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Force[124]	Nicaragua	1983[94]-1984[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)[124]	Nicaragua	1983[94]-1987[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)	Greece	1975-2001	START (2008), Kassimeris (2001)
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC)	Nigeria	1995-2007	START (2008)
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)	UK, Ireland	1969-1979[93]	START (2008)
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Ethiopia	1984-2007	START (2008)
Omega-7	US	1974-1983[93]	START (2008)
Orange Volunteers (OV)	UK	1998[94]-2007	Coogan (2000); START (2008)
Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN)	El Salvador	1968-1980[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution	US	1979-1986[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Orly Organization[125]	France	1981-1983	START (2008)
Oromo Liberation Front	Ethiopia	1973-2004[93]	START (2008)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1964-2007	START (2008)

[124] Joined with a number of other groups to form the United Nicaraguan Opposition in 1985. It may have carried out operations in its own name after the merger.

[125] Branch of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) organizations.

Appendix Continued

Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	Burundi	1980-2007	International Crisis Group (2007)
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM)	Honduras	1988[94]-1995[93]	START (2008)
Patriotic Resistance Army (ERP)	Honduras	1990	START (2008)
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	Iraq	1975-1998	START (2008)
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	Thailand	1968-2007	START (2008)
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)[126]	Colombia	1994-2007	START (2008)
Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA)	Colombia	1977[94]-1986	START (2008)
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)	South Africa	1995-2007	START (2008)
People's Liberation Army (India)	India	1978-2007	START (2008)
People's Liberation Forces (FPL)[127]	El Salvador	1970-1980	START (2008)
People's Liberation Front (JVP)	Sri Lanka	1971-1990[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	El Salvador	1969-1979[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
People's Revolutionary Militias (MRP)	Ecuador	2003-2007	START (2008)
People's Revolutionary Organization	Argentina	1992[94]-1996[93]	START (2008)
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	India	1977-2007	START (2008)
People's War Group (PWG)[128]	India	1980-2004	START (2008)
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)	Argentina	1967-1974[93]	START (2008)
Phalange	Lebanon	1930-1982[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Polisario Front	Mauritania	1973-2005	START (2008)

[126] Now part of the United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC).

[127] Joined the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in 1980. It may have carried out operations in its own name after the merger.

[128] In September 2004, the People's War Group (PWG) merged with the Maoist Communist Center to form the Communist Party of India-Maoist.

Appendix Continued

Popular Forces of April 25	Portugal	1980[94]-1986	START (2008)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1967-2007	START (2008)
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)	Colombia	1967-2007	START (2008)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	Angola	1956-1996[93]	START (2008)
Popular Resistance Committees	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	2000[94]-2007	START (2008)
Popular Resistance Front (FPR)	Argentina	1989[95]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Popular Revolutionary Action	Greece	2003[95]	START (2008)
Popular Revolutionary Army	Mexico	1996-2007	START (2008)
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)	Brazil	1968-1976[93]	START (2008)
Prima Linea	Italy	1976-1981	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Proletarian Nuclei for Communism	Italy	2003-2007	START (2008)
Puerto Rican Resistance Movement	US	1971-1981	START (2008)
Purbo Banglar Communist Party	Bangladesh	1995[94]-2007	START (2008)
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)	Somalia	1997[95]	Klein (2002)
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	UK	1998-2007	START (2008)
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)[112]	Guatemala	1962-1989[93]	START (2008)
Recontras	Nicaragua	1991[94]-1997[93]	START (2008)
Red Army Faction (RAF)	West Germany	1978-1998	START (2008)
Red Brigades	Italy	1969-1990[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC)	Italy	1983[94]-2007	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START
Red Flag	Venezuela	1970-1996[93]	START (2008)
Red Hand Commandos	UK, Ireland	1972-1995	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	UK	1999-2007	START (2008)
Republic of New Africa	US	1968-1971[93]	START (2008)

Appendix Continued

Republic of Texas	US	1995-1997[93]	START (2008)
Resistenza Corsa[129]	France	2002-2003	START (2008)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Colombia	1964-2007	START (2008)
Revolutionary Bolivariano Movement 200	Venezuela	1992-1995	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Revolutionary Cells	West Germany	1974-1991[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade	US	2003[95]	START (2008)
Revolutionary Force Seven	US	1970	START (2008)
Revolutionary Front for Communism	Italy	2001[94]-2007	START (2008)
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)	Indonesia, East Timor	1974-2007[93]	Narayan (2000)
Revolutionary Nuclei	Greece	1997[94]-2000[93]	START (2008)
Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA)[112]	Guatemala	1979-1990[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP)	Spain	1973-1980	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)	Greece	1975-1995	START (2008)
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)	Italy	2000[94]-2007	START (2008)
Revolutionary Struggle	Greece	1998[94]-2007	START (2008)
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	Sierra Leone	1991-2002	START (2008)
Revolutionary United Front Movement	Honduras	1989	START (2008)
Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the People Party (PROCUP)[130]	Mexico	1980-1994	START (2008)
Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)	Japan	1969-2007	START (2008)

[129] Joined the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) in 2003.

[130] In May 1994, PROCUP merged with the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR).

Appendix Continued

Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident FARC)	Colombia	1984-1988[93]	Department of Defense (1988); Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade	Russia	2002-2007	START (2008)
Rote Zora	West Germany	1983-1995[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)	Rwanda	1987-1995[93]	Reed (1996)
Salafia Jihadia	Morocco	2003[94]-2007	START (2008)
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)[131]	Algeria, Mauritania	1996-2007	START (2008), NCTC (2010)
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	Nicaragua	1960-1996[93]	START (2008)
Saor Eire	Ireland	1967-1971[93]	Coogan (2000)
Sardinian Autonomy Movement	Italy	2002	START (2008)
Save Kashmir Movement	India	2002-2004[93]	START (2008)
Scottish National Liberation Army	UK	1983[94]-2002[93]	BBC News (2002)
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)	Guatemala	1976-1985[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Secret Army Organization	US	1969-1972	START (2008)
Sekihotai	Japan	1988[94]-1990	START (2008)
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force	Bangladesh	1974-1997[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Shining Path (SL)	Peru	1970-2007	Taylor (1983); McClintock (1998); START (2008); Masterson (2009)
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB)	Colombia	1986[94]-1994	START (2008)
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)[132]	Pakistan	1985-2006[93]	START (2008)

[131] Now part of the Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) organization

[132] Changed name to Millat-e-Islamia/Pakistan in 2002.

Appendix Continued

Social Resistance[133]	Greece	1988[94]-1990[93]	START (2008)
Sons of the South	Lebanon	1984	START (2008)
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)	UK	2001-2007	START (2008)
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	Namibia	1960-1989[93]	START (2008)
Sovereign Panama Patriotic Front	Panama	1992[94]-1999[93]	START (2008)
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)	France, Spain	1975-1982[93]	START (2008)
Spanish National Action	France, Spain	1979	START (2008)
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)	India	1977-2007	START (2008)
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	Sudan	1983-2007	START (2008)
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)	Iraq	1982-2007	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Nasr (2006); Katzman (2007)
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)	US	1973[94]-1975[93]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	Lebanon	1930-1986[93]	START (2008)
Taliban	Afghanistan	1994-2007	START (2008)
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)	Sri Lanka	1973-1986[93]	Matthews (1986); Schmid and Jongman (1988); Long (1990)
Tanzim	Israel, West Bank/Gaza	1993-2007	START (2008)
Tawhid and Jihad[134]	Iraq	2004[95]	START (2008); State Department (2008)
Terra Lliure	Spain	1980-1992[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
The Extraditables	Colombia	1987-1990[93]	START (2008)
Tigers	Swaziland	1998	START (2008)

[133] Most likely an alias for the November 17th Revolutionary Organization.

[134] Announced their allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004. Now known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers).

Appendix Continued

Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)	Ethiopia	1975-1990[93]	START (2008)
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)	India	1978-1988[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	Peru	1983-1997	Baer, (2003); START (2008)
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)	Bolivia	1991-1993	START (2008)
Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement	Venezuela	1998-2001	START (2008)
Tupamaros	Uruguay	1963-1971[93]	START (2008)
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)[135]	Turkey	1972-2003	START (2008)
Turkish Hizballah	Turkey	1980-2001[93]	START (2008)
Turkish People's Liberation Army	Turkey	1970-1980[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C)	Turkey	1971-2007	START (2008)
Uganda Democratic Christian Army (UDCA)	Uganda	1990-1994[93]	START (2008)
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)	UK	1971-2007	START (2008)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	UK	1966-2007	START (2008)
Ummah Liberation Army	Sudan	1990-1999	RAND (2008)
Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB)	El Salvador	1976-1980[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
United Arab Revolution	Kuwait	1986	START (2008)
United Freedom Front (UFF)	US	1974-1984[93]	START (2008)
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	India	1979-2007	START (2008)
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	India	1964-2007	START (2008)
United Nicaraguan Opposition	Nicaragua	1985-1986[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); Anderson and Sloan (2002)

[135] Named changed to the Maoist Communist Party.

Appendix Continued

United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)	India	1999-2004	START (2008)
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)	El Salvador	1974-1980[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
United Popular Action Movement	Chile	1983[94]-1994[93]	START (2008)
United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)	Colombia	1997-2006	START (2008)
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors	Myanmar	1999-2007	START (2008)
Weather Underground, Weathermen	US	1969-1978[93]	START (2008)
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	Uganda	1995-1997	START (2008); IDMC (2010)
White Legion	Ecuador	2001-2003	START (2008)
Workers' Revolutionary Party[136]	Bolivia	1988	START (2008)
Yatama[137]	Nicaragua	1992[95]	Anderson and Sloan (2002)
Young Liberators of Pattani	Thailand	2002	START (2008)
Youth Action Group	France	1974-1976[93]	START (2008)
Zapatista National Liberation Army	Mexico	1983-2005	START (2008)
Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation	Bolivia	1989-1990[93]	START (2008)
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)	Zimbabwe	1963-2002[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988); START (2008)
Zimbabwe African People's Union	Zimbabwe	1961-1983[93]	Schmid and Jongman (1988)
Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)	Zimbabwe	1975-1979[93]	Chung (2006)

[136] Front group for Shining Path in Bolivia

[137] Most likely YAMATA – a pro-Contra group involved in the Nicaraguan Civil War. The name is a Miskito Indian acronym for "United Nations of Yapti Tasba (Sacred Motherland)" (Anderson and Sloan, 2002: 120).

REFERENCES

Abadie, Alberto. 2005. Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism. *American Economic Review* 95(4): 50-56.

Abadie, Alberto and Javier Gardeazabal. 2003. The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country. *American Economic Review* 93(1): 113-132.

Abrahms, Max. 2008. What Terrorists Really Want. *International Security* 32(4): 78-105.

Achen, Christopher. 2000. Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, UCLA, July 20-22.

Ahmad, Irfan. 2008. Cracks in the 'Mightiest Fortress': Jamaat-e-Islami's Changing Discourse on Women. *Modern Asian Studies* 42(2-3): 549-575.

Aktan, Gunduz and Ali Koknar. 2002. "Turkey." In *Combating Terrorism*: *Strategies of Ten Countries,* ed. Yonah Alexander, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Al Jazeera. 2009. "Taliban Issues Code of Conduct." July 28. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/20097278348124813.html (August 18, 2009).

Al Qaeda. 2000. "Al-Qaeda Manual." http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf (July 22, 2008).

Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. 1996. Political Instability and Economic Growth. *Journal of Economic Growth 1*(2): 189–211.

Allen, Michael and Cynthia Colley. 2008. Will Fear Keep Them in Line?: Untangling the Relationship Between Repression and Terrorism. Presented at the Annual Meeting of International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26-29.

Allen, Tim. 1991. Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement in Context. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 61(3): 370-399.

Alonso, Rogelio and Marcos Garcia Rey. 2007. The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19(4): 571-592.

Amr, Ziad Abu. 1994. *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Anderson, Sean and Stephen Sloan. 2002. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Arase, David. 1994. Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan's ODA. *Pacific Affairs* 67(2): 171-199

Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Marina and Johnson, Kristin. 2008. Relative Political Capacity: Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings. Presented at the Annual Meeting of International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26-29.

Arnold, Wayne. 2001. Exxon is Preparing Return to Rebel Area in Indonesia. *New York Times*, 19 June.

Asal, Victor and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2006. Researching Terrorist Networks. *Journal of Security Education* 1(4): 65-74.

Asal, Victor and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008. The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. *Journal of Politics* 70(2): 437-449.

Atkins, Stephen. 2004. *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Atran, Scott. 2003. Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. *Science* 299:1534-1539.

Atran, Scott. 2006. The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly* 29(2): 127-147.

Bacevich, Andrew. 2001. Between the Lines: Terrorizing the Truth. *Foreign Policy* 125: 74-75.

Badgely, John. 1965. Burma's Zealot Wungyis: Maoists or St. Simonists. *Asian Survey* 5(1): 55-62

Baer, Suzie. 2003. *Peru's MRTA*: *Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement*. New York: Rosen Publishing Group.

Bank of Israel. 2003. "The Economy: Development and Policies." http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mehkar/doch03/eng/summ03e.htm (August 12, 2009).

Banks, Arthur. 1996. *Political Handbook of the World*. New York: CSA Publications.

Banks, William, Renee de Nevers, and Mitchel Wallerstein. *Combating Terrorism*: *Strategies and Approaches*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Bapat, Navin. 2007. The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4): 265-280.

BBC News. 2002. "Who Are the Tartan Terrorists?" March 2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1850234.stm (April 2, 2010).

BBC News. 2006. "Nigeria's Shadowy Oil Rebels." April 20. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4732210.stm (July 15, 2008)

BBC News 2010. "Burma's Kachin Army Prepares for Civil War." February 22. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8528985.stm (February 25, 2010).

Becker, Gary. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 76(2): 169-217.

Benmelech, Efraim and Claude Berrebi. 2007. Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(3): 223-238.

Benson, Michelle and Jacek Kugler. 1998. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 196-209.

Berman, Eli and David Laitin. 2008. Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model. *Journal of Public Economics* 92(10-11): 1942-1967.

Berrebi, Claude. 2007. Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Among Palestinians. *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy* 13(1): 1-36.

Berrebi, Claude and Esteban Klor. 2006. On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6): 899-925.

Bhavnani, Ravi, Michael Findley, and James Kuklinski. 2009. Rumor Dynamics in Ethnic Violence. *Journal of Politics* 71(3): 876-892.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd ed. New York: Free Press.

Blomberg, S. Brock, Gregory Hess, and Akila Weerapana. 2004. Economic Conditions and Terrorism. *European Journal of Political Economy* 20(2): 463-478.

Bloom, Mia. 2005. *Dying to Kill*: *The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Boehmke, Frederick. 2006. "Grinter: a Stata Utility for Graphing the Marginal Effect of an Interacted Variable in Regression Models." http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html (January 23, 2010)

Boehmke, Frederick. 2008. "Plotfds: A Stata Utility to plot the marginal effect of independent variables." http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html (January 23, 2010)

Bowden, Tom. 1976. The IRA and the Changing Tactics of Terrorism. *The Political Quarterly* 47(4): 425-437.

Bowyer Bell, J. 1975. *Transnational Terror*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Bozarslan, Hamit. 2004. *Violence in the Middle East: From Political Struggle to Self-Sacrifice*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Brambor, Thomas, William Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. *Political Analysis* 14(1): 63-82.

Branchflower, David and Andrew Oswald. 2004. Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA. *Journal of Public Economics* 88(7-8): 1359-1386.

Bremer, Stuart. 1996. "Advancing the Scientific Study of War." In *The Process of War*: *Advancing the Scientific Study of War*, eds. Stuart Bremer and Thomas Cusack. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alistair Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 791-807.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alistair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005a. The Quality of Terror. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 515-530.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005b. Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. *International Organization* 59(1): 145-176.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2007. Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror. *International Organization* 61(1): 9-36.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2008. Terrorist Factions. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(4): 399–418.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Eric Dickson. 2007. The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 364-381.

Buhaug, Halvard. 2006. Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research* 43(6): 691-708.

Buhaug, Halvard and Scott Gates. 2002. The Geography of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 417-433.

Burgoon, Brian. 2006. On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2): 176-203.

Burke, Jason. 2004. Al Qaeda. *Foreign Policy* 142: 18-26.

Byman, Daniel. 1998. The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21(2): 149-169.

Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly Connections*: *States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Byman, Daniel and Keith Pollack. 2001. Bin Laden's Group will Survive Him. *Newsday*, 18 February.

CAIN Project. 2010. "Abstracts on Organisations – C – Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)." http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/corgan.htm (April 2, 2010).

Cameron, Colin and Pravin Trivedi. 1998. *Regression Analysis of Count Data*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cameron, Maxwell and Philip Mauceri. 1997. *The Peruvian Labyrinth*: *Polity, Society, Economy*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Cannistraro, Vincent. August 30, 2001. Assassination is Wrong—and Dumb. *Washington Post.*

Cauley, John and Eric Im. 1988. Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidents. *American Economic Review* 78(2): 27-31.

Centinyan, Rupen. 2002. Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention. *International Organization* 56(3): 645-677.

Chai, Sun-Ki. 1993. An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence. *Comparative Politics* 26(1): 99-110.

Chanter, Alaine. 1991. The Media and Politics in New Caledonia in the 1980s. *The Journal of Pacific History* 26(2): 313-329.

Chung, Fay. 2006. *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*: *Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Clark, R.P. 1983. Patterns in the lives of ETA members. *Terrorism: An International Journal* 6(3): 423-54.

Clark, Andrew and Andrew Oswald. 1994. Unhappiness and Unemployment. *The Economic Journal* 104(424): 648-659.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. On Economic Causes of Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 50(4): 563-573.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.

Conboy, Ken. 2003. *INTEL: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing.

Conrad, Joseph. 1923. *The Secret Agent*. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company.

Coogan, Tim Pat. 2000. *The IRA*. London: Harper Collins Publishers.

Cook, Steven. 2007. *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Cooper, H. H. A. 1977. What is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective. *Legal Medical Quarterly* 1:16-32.

Corsi, Jerome. 1981. Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25(1): 47-85.

Crawford, Gordon. 1997. Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency. *Democratization* 4(3): 69-108.

Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379-399.

Crenshaw, Martha. 1985. An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism. *Orbis* 29(3): 465-489.

Crenshaw, Martha. 1991. How Terrorism Declines. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3(1): 69-87.

Crenshaw, Martha. 1998. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." In *Origins of Terrorism*, ed. Walter Reich. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2006. How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups. *International Security* 31(1): 7-48.

Davenport, Christian. 1995. Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3): 683-713.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. State Repression and Political Order. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 1-23.

della Porta, Donatella. 1993. "Institutional Responses to Terrorism: The Italian Case." In *Western Responses to Terrorism*, ed. Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten. New York: Frank Cass.

della Porta, Donatella. 1995. "Italian Leftwing Terrorism." In *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow. 1986. Unwanted Children, Political Violence, and the Cycle of Protest in Italy. 1966-1973. *European Journal of Political Research* 14(6): 607-632.

Devarajan, Shantayanan and Vinya Swaroop. 2000. "The Implications of Foreign Aid Fungibility for Development Assistance." In *The World Bank*: *Structures and Policies*, ed. Christopher Gilbert and David Vines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

di Tella, Raffael, Robert MacCulloch, and Andrew Oswald. 2001. Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys. *American Economic Review* 91(1): 335-341.

Dingley, James. 2001. The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy, and Purpose Behind the Incident. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24: 451-465.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Drake, C.J.M. 1998a. The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(2): 53-85.

Drake, C.J.M. 1998b. *Terrorists' Target Selection*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Drakos, Konstantinos and Andreas Gofas. 2004. The Determinants of Terrorist Activity: A Simple Model for Attack Occurrence Across Space and Time. Presented at the Conference on the Political Economy of Terrorism, University of Southern California, Pasadena, CA, April.

Drakos, Konstantinos and Andreas Gofas. 2006. The Devil You Know but Are Afraid to Face: Underreporting Bias and its Distorting Effects on the Study of Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(5): 714-735.

Dugan, Laura and Gary LaFree. 2009. "Global Terrorism Database." http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (May 15, 2009).

Easterlin, Richard. 1974. "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence." In *Nations and Households in Economic Growth*: *Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz*, eds. Paul David and Melvin Reder. New York: Academic Press.

Easterlin, Richard. 2001. Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory. *The Economic Journal* 111(473): 465-484.

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 1993. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 87(4): 829-844.

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 1999. Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1): 145-167.

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 2004. "What Do We Know About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?" In *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, and Failures*, ed. Andrew Silke. London: Frank Cass.

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 2005. After 9/11: Is It All Different Now? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 259-277.

Eubank, William and Leonard Weinberg. 1994. Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism? *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6(4): 417-443.

Eubank, William and Leonard Weinberg. 1998. Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(1): 108-118.

Eubank, William and Leonard Weinberg. 2001. Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(1): 155-164.

Eyerman, Joe. 1998. Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems. *International Interactions* 24(2): 151-170.

Fair, C. Christine. 2005. Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11(1): 125-156.

Fearon, James. 1994. Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2): 236-269.

Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715-35.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Fein, Helen. 1995. More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World. *Human Rights Quarterly* 17(1): 170-191.

Ferracuti, Franco. 1998. "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy." In *Origins of Terrorism*, ed. Walter Reich. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner. 2002. A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 819-837.

Findley, Michael. 2008. Strategies of Terrorism During Civil War. Presented at the Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 3-6.

Fournier, Louis. 1984. *FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Francisco, Ronald. 1995. The Relationship Between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39(2): 263-282.

Francisco, Ronald. 1996. Coercion and Protests: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States. *American Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 1179-1204.

French, Howard. April 14, 1991. To Suriname Refugees, Truce Means Betrayal. *New York Times*.

Frey, Bruno and Alois Stutzer. 2002. What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research ? *Journal of Economic Literature* 40(2): 402-435.

Frey, Bruno and Simon Luechinger, 2002. Terrorism: Deterrence May Backfire. University of Zurich: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics.

Frey, Bruno, Simon Luechinger, and Alois Stutzer. 2007. Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism. *Journal of Economic Surveys* 21(1): 1-24.

Gallent, Nick, Alan Mace, and Mark Tewdwr-Jones. 2003. Dispelling a Myth? Second Homes in Rural Wales. *Area* 35(3): 271-284.

Gettleman, Jeffrey. 2010. Somali Backlash May Be Militants' Worst Foe. *New York Times*, 23 March.

Ghanmi, Lamine. 2007. Bombers Had Targeted Casablanca Landmarks: Papers. March 13. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1369488420070313 (April 2, 2010).

Gibney, Mark., Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood. 2009. *Political Terror Scale 1976-2006.* http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ (August 5, 2009).

Glaeser, Edward and Jesse Shapiro. 2002. Cities and Warfare: The Impact of Terrorism on Urban Form. *Journal of Urban Economics* 51(2): 205-224.

Gleditsch, Kristian and Michael Ward. 1997. Double Take: A Re-Examination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3): 361-383.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallenstein, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2001. Armed Conflict, 1946-2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2006. A Theory of Categorical Terrorism. *Social Forces* 84(4): 2027-2046.

Gounder, Rukmani and Kunal Sen. 1999. What Motivates Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Australia's Aid to Indonesia. *Journal of Developing Areas* 33(3): 379-394

Greene, William. 2002. *Econometric Analysis*. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

Gregory, Shaun. 2003. France and the War on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15(1): 124-147.

Greisman, H.C. 1977. Social Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, Violence, and Social Control. *Crime, Law and Social Change* 1(3): 303-318.

Grossman, Herschel. 1999. Kleptocracy and Revolution. *Oxford Economic Papers* 51(2): 267-283.

Gunson, Phil, Andrew Thompson, and Greg Chamberlain. 1988. *Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of South America*. New York: Routledge.

Gupta, Dipak, Harinder Singh, and Tom Sprague. 1993. Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(2): 301-339.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1974. Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971. *American Political Science Review* 68(4): 1482-1504.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1988. "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s." In *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed. Michael Stohl. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1998. "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases." In *Origins of Terrorism*, ed. Walter Reich. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert and Will Moore. 1997. Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4): 1079-1103.

Gvineria, Gaga. 2009. "How does Terrorism End?" In *Social Science for Counterterrorism,* eds. Paul Davis and Kim Cragin. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Hamilton, Lawrence and James Hamilton. 1983. Dynamics of Terrorism. *International Studies Quarterly* 27(1): 39-54.

Hannan, Michael and John Freeman. 1977. The Population Ecology of Organizations. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(5): 929-964.

Hannan, Michael and John Freeman. 1989. *Organizational Ecology*. Cambridge: Harvard University.

Hassan, Nasra. 2001. "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers," *The New Yorker*, 19 November.

Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. Towards a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Changes, and Civil War, 1816-1992. *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 33-48.

Helliwell, John. 2003. How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variations to Explain Subjective Well-Being. *Economic Modeling* 20(2): 331-360.

Hewitt, Christopher. 1993. *Consequences of Political Violence*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co.

Hewitt, Christopher. 2000. Patterns of American Terrorism, 1955-1998: An Historical Perspective on Terrorism-Related Fatalities. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12(1): 1-14.

Heymann, Philipp. 2003. "Dealing with Terrorism After September 11, 2001: An Overview." In *Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness*, eds. Arnold Howitt and Robyn Pangi. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hibbs, Douglas. 1973. *Mass Political Violence*: *A Cross-National Causal Analysis*. New York: Wiley.

Hirschman, Albert. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hoffman, Bruce. 1993. Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5(2): 12-29.

Hoffman, Bruce. 1997. The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9(2): 1-15.

Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. *International Security* 19(1): 5-40.

Honacker, James. 2004. Unemployment and Violence in Northern Ireland: A Missing Data Model for Ecological Inference. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 15-18.

Hopwood, Derek. 1991. *Egypt*: *Politics and Society 1945-1990*. London: Harper Collins Academic.

Hudson, Judith. 1996. Riding the Tiger: Urban Warfare on the East Rand. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8(4): 108-123.

Hudson, Rex and Marilyn Majeska. 1999. *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508-537.

Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. 1975. Transnational Terrorism and World Politics. *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1(2): 109-129.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1980. Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12(4): 423-453.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1988. Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s. *Third World Quarterly* 10(2): 632-657.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1996. *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

Ikelegbe, Austine. 2005. State, Ethnic Militias, and Conflict in Nigeria. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39(3): 490-516.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2010. Background of the Conflict in the West Nile and the WNBF, 1971-2002. http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/EF322F0884DC12D0802570B8005AAE38?OpenDocument#disclaimer (March 16, 2010).

International Crisis Group. 2003. "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration. May 23. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/063-rwandan-hutu-rebels-in-the-congo-a-new-approach-to-disarmament-and-reintegration.aspx (March 16, 2010).

International Crisis Group. 2007. "Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL." August 28. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Burundi%20Finalising%20Peace%20with%20the%20FNL.ashx (March 16, 2010)

International Labor Organization. 2009. "Main Statistics (Annual) – Unemployment." http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c3e.html (November 8, 2009).

Jackson, Brian, John Baker, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio Trujillo, and Peter Chalk. 2005. *Aptitude for Destruction*: *Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and its Implications for Combating Terrorism*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Jacobson, Philip. 2001. "Home-Grown Martyrs of the West Bank Reap Deadly Harvest." *Sunday Telegraph*, 19 August.

Jane's Information Group. 2009. "Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) (Papua New Guinea), Groups – Asia – Dormant." http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Bougainville-Revolutionary-Army-BRA-Papua-New-Guinea.html (March 16, 2010)

Jehl, Douglas. 2005. Al Qaeda is still a Threat, U.S. Intelligence Chiefs Say. *New York Times*, 18 February.

Jenkins, Brian. 1975. *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Terror in the Mind of God*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kalpakian, Jack. 2005. Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28(2): 113-127.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2004. The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War. *Journal of Ethics* 8(1): 97-138.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Karlekar, Hiranmay. 2008. The Terrorism that Stalks Bangladesh. *Global Asia* 3(1): 42-48.

Kassimeris, George. 2001. *Europe's Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November*. London: Hurst & Company.

Katzman, Kenneth. 2007. "Iran's Influence on Iraq." In *Surging Out of Iraq,* ed. by Steven Costel. Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers.

Kellen, Konrad. 1979. *Terrorists-What are they Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Kennedy, Paul. 2003. *A Guide to Econometrics.* 5th ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Khashan, Hilal. 2003. Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings. *Third World Quarterly* 24(6): 1049-1067.

Khilji, Nasir and Ernest Zampelli. 1994. The Fungibility of U.S. Military and Non-Military Assistance and the Impacts on Expenditures of Major Aid Recipients. *Journal of Development Economics* 43(2): 345-362.

Kim, Julie. 2002. *Macedonia*: *Country Background and Recent Conflict*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 347-361.

King, John. 1998. Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions in Argentina and Chile. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 26(2): 1-27.

Kingsbury, Damien. 2001. "East Timor." In *The Southeast Asia Handbook*, eds. Patrick Heenan and Monique Lamontagne. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers.

Klare, Michael. 2001. *Resource Wars*: *The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Klein, Alex. 2002. "The Horn of Turbulence: Political Regimes in Transition." In *Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence, and Development in Crisis Regions*, eds. Tobias Debiel and Alex Klein. London: Zed Books.

Knack, Stephen. 2004. Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? *International Studies Quarterly* 48(1): 251-266.

Koch, Michael and Skyler Cranmer. 2007. Testing the "Dick Cheney" Hypothesis: Do Governments of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right? *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4): 311-326.

Kramer, John. 1977. Political Corruption in the USSR. *Western Political Quarterly* 30(2): 213-224.

Krueger, Alan. 2007. *What Makes a Terrorist?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Krueger, Alan and David Laitin. 2007. Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism. Unpublished Manuscript.

Krueger, Alan and Jitka Maleckova. 2003. Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(4): 119-144.

Kurz, Anat and Ariel Merari. 1985. *ASALA*: *Irrational Terror or Political Tool*. Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

Kushner, Harvey, ed. 2003. *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Walter. 2006. The Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.

LaFree, Gary and Laura Dugan. 2007. *GTD1 (1970-1997) Global Terrorism Database Codebook*. College Park: START.

Lai, Brian. 2007. 'Draining the Swamp': An Empirical Examination of the Production of International Terrorism, 1968-1998. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4): 297-310.

Lake, David. 2002. Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty First Century. *Dialogue IO* 1(1): 15-29.

Lake, David. 2003. International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices. *International Studies Review* 5(4): 81-89.

Lapan, Harvey, and Todd Sandler. 1988. To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question. *American Economic Review* 78(2): 16–21.

Laqueur, Walter. 1977. Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction, and Political Science. *Journal of Contemporary History* 12(1): 1-42.

Laqueur, Walter. 2002. *A History of Terrorism*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Laqueur, Walter. 2004. The Terrorism to Come. *Policy Review* 126: 49-64.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict. *Political Geography* 20(5): 564-581.

Leader, Stefan and Peter Probst. 2003. The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15(4): 37-58.

Leblang, David. 1997. "Political Capacity and Economic Growth." In *Political Capacity and Economic Behavior*, eds. Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler. Boulder: Westview Press.

Leman-Langlois, Stéphane and Jean-Paul Brodeur. 2005. Terrorism Old and New: Counterterrorism in Canada. *Police Practice and Research* 6(2): 121-140.

Levitt, Steven. 2001. Alternative Strategies for Identifying the Link Between Unemployment and Crime. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 17(4): 377-390.

Lewis-Beck, Michael. 1986. Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy. *American Journal of Political Science* 30(2): 516-546.

Lewis-Beck, Michael. 1988. *Economics and Elections*: *The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Li, Quan. 2005. Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorism Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 278-297.

Libicki, Martin, Peter Chalk, and Melanie Sisson. 2007. *Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Lichbach, Mark. 1987. Deterrence of Escalation?: The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(2):266-97.

Lipson, Charles. 1998. *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lintner, Bertil. 2003. "Myanmar/Burma." In *Ethnicity in Asia*, ed. Colin Mackerras. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Lotrionte, Catherine. 2003. When to Target Leaders. *The Washington Quarterly* 26(3): 73-86.

Long, David. 1990. *The Anatomy of Terrorism*. New York: Free Press.

Long, J. Scott. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Lowery, David and Virginia Gray. 1995. The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 1-29.

Luft, Gail. 2003. The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing. *Middle East Quarterly* 10(1): 3-13.

Lustick, Ian. 2006. *Trapped in the War on Terror*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mahmood, Cynthia. 1996. *Fighting for Faith and Nation*: *Dialogues with Sikh Militants*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Major, Andrew. 1987. From Moderates to Secessionists: A Who's Who of the Punjab Crisis. *Pacific Affairs* 60(1): 42-58.

Mao, Tse-Tung. 1961. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Maoz, Zeev. 2007. Evaluating Israel's Strategy of Low-Intensity Warfare, 1949-2006. *Security Studies* 16(3): 319-349.

Marighela, Carlos. 1971. *For the Liberation of Brazil*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2009. "Polity IV dataset." http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (March 15, 2009).

Marvick, Dwaine and Elizabeth Marvick. 1971. "The Political Consequences of Assassination." In *Assassinations and the Political Order,* ed. William Crotty. New York: Harper & Row.

Mason, T. David and Dale Krane. 1989. The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror. *International Studies Quarterly* 33(2): 175-198.

Matthews, Bruce. 1986. Radical Conflict and the Radicalization of Violence in Sri Lanka. *Pacific Affairs* 59(1): 28-44.

Max-Neef, Manfred. 1995. Economic Growth and Quality of Life: A Threshold Hypothesis. *Ecological Economics* 15(2): 115-118.

McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6): 1212- 1241.

McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. 2008. Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Towards Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20(3): 415-433.

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. 2006. "Analytical Tools." http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp (10 October 2006).

Merari, Ariel. 1991. Academic Research and Government Policy on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3(1): 88-102.

Meyer, David. 2004. Protest and Political Opportunities. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 125-145.

Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler, Jean M. Murdock, and Peter Flemming. 2003. *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2001*. Dunn Loring: Vinyard Software.

Midlarsky, Manus, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida. 1980. Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism. *International Studies Quarterly* 24(2): 262-298.

Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 112(4): 725-753.

Minorities at Risk. 2006. "Assessment for Diolas in Casamance in Senegal." http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43301 (April 2, 2010).

Moghadam, Assaf. 2003. Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26(2): 65-92.

Monaghan, Rachel. 2001. The Return of 'Captain Moonlight': Informal Justice in Northern Ireland. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25(1): 41-56.

Moore, Will. 1998. Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 851-873.

Morrison, Andrew and Rachel May. 1994. Escape from Terror: Violence and Migration in Post-Revolutionary Guatemala. *Latin American Research Review* 29(2): 111-132.

Morrow, James. 1989. Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining. *American Journal of Political Science* 33(4): 941-972

Mowle, Thomas. 2006. Iraq's Militia Problem. *Survival* 48(3): 41-58.

Mueller, John. 2006a. Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy. *Foreign Affairs* 85(5): 2-8.

Mueller, John. 2006b. *Overblown*: *How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them*. New York: Free Press.

Mueller, John. 2008. Terrorphobia: Our False Sense of Insecurity. *American Interest* May/June

Muller, Edward. 1985. Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence. *American Sociological Review* 50(1): 47-61.

Muller, Edward and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1986. Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action. *American Political Science Review* 80(2): 471-488.

Narayan, Raviprasad. 2000. The East Timor Crisis. *China Report* 36(1): 93-99.

Nasr, Vali. 2006. When the Shiites Rise. *Foreign Affairs* 85(4): 58-74.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11Commission: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2008. "Terrorist Organizational Profiles (TOPs) Data". http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/ (March 15, 2009).

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 2010. "Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html (April 2, 2010).

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 2010. "Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)." http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/dhkpc.html (April 2, 2010).

Ngaruko, Floribert and Janvier Nkurunziza. 2005. "Civil War and Its Duration in Burundi." In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis Volume 1- Africa*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Office of Management and Budget. 2010. *Budget of the U.S. Government*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Olcott, Martha and Bakhtiyar Babajanov. 2003. The Terrorist Notebooks. *Foreign Policy* 135: 30-40.

Olmeda, Jose. 2007. "War on Terrorism: The Spanish Experience, 1939-2006." In *A Military History of Modern Spain*: *From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror*, eds. Wayne Bowen and Jose Alvarez. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Onwuchekwa, Okey and Napoleon Ehireman. 2010. "Nigeria: Four Governors Escape Death." http://allafrica.com/stories/201003160530.html (April 2, 2010).

Oots, Kent. 1986. *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Oots, Kent. 1989. Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 12(3): 139-152.

Ostrom, Charles and Brian Job. 1986. The President and the Political Use of Force. *American Political Science Review* 80(2): 541-566.

Overgaard, Per Baltzer. 1994. The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(3): 452-478.

Pack, Howard and Janet Pack. 1990. Is Foreign Aid Fungible? The Case of Indonesia. *The Economic Journal* 100(399): 188-194.

Pack, Howard and Janet Pack. 1993. Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 75(2): 258-265.

Palmer, Harvey and Guy Whitten. 1999. The Electoral Impact of Unexpected Inflation and Economic Growth. *British Journal of Political Science* 29(4): 623-639.

Pape, Robert. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 343-361.

Pape, Robert. 2006. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.

Paxson, Christina. 2002. Comment on Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova "Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" Unpublished Manuscript.

PBS NewsHour. 2007. "Guerrilla Groups Attack Nigerian Oil Resources, Affecting World Market." January 26. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june07/nigeria_01-26.html (April 2, 2010).

Perlez, Jane. 2009. Pakistan Retakes Army Headquarters; Hostages Freed. *New York Times*, 10 October.

Peterson, Dave. A Beacon for Central Africa. *Journal of Democracy* 17(1): 125-131.

Piazza, James. 2006. Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(1): 159-177.

Pluchinsky, Dennis. 1986. Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe: A Diagnosis and Prognosis. *Conflict Quarterly* 6(3): 5-25.

Pluchinsky, Dennis. 1992. Academic Research on European Terrorist Developments: Pleas from a Government Terrorism Analyst. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 15(1): 13-23.

Poe, Steven, Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2): 291-313.

Post, Jerrold. 1998. "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces." In *Origins of Terrorism*, ed. Walter Reich. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny. 2003. The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15(1): 171-184.

Powell, G. Bingham and Guy Whitten. 1993. A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

Powell, Robert. 2002. Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 1-30.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.

Radu, Michael. 2002. Terrorism after the Cold War: Trends and Challenges. *Orbis* 46(2): 275-287.

Ramsay, Robert. 1983. *The Corsican Time-Bomb*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Ramsay, Kristopher. 2004. Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4): 459-486.

Raphael, Steven and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer. 2001. Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime. *Journal of Law and Economics* 44(1): 259-283.

Rapoport, David. 2001. *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Rasler, Karen. 1996. Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution. *American Sociological Review* 61(1): 132-152.

Reed, William Cyrus. 1996. Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34(3): 479-501.

Rees, Edward. 2002. Security-Sector Reforms and Transitional Administrations. *Conflict, Security and Development* 2(1): 151-156.

Regan, Patrick and Daniel Norton. Protest, Rebellion, and the Onset of Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(3): 1-18.

Regan, Patrick and Errol Henderson. 2002. Democracy, Threats, and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent? *Third World Quarterly* 23(1): 119-136.

Reiter, Dan. 2003. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27-43.

Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002a. Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars. *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(6): 465-483.

Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002b. Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 29-54.

Rosendorff, B. Peter and Todd Sandler. 2005. The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 171-182.

Rosie, George. 1986. *The International Directory of Terrorism*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Co.

Ross, Jeffrey. 1993. Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model. *Journal of Peace Research* 30(3): 317-329.

Ross, Jeffrey and Ted Robert Gurr. 1989. Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States. *Comparative Politics* 21(4): 405-426.

Ross, Michael. 2004. How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. *International Organization* 58(1): 35-67.

Ross, Michael. 2005. "Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia." In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis Volume 2- Europe, Central Asia*, *and Other Regions,* eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Russell, Charles and Bowman Miller. 1983. "Profile of a Terrorist" in *Perspectives on Terror.* Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.

Sageman, Marc. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies. *Perspectives on Politics* 2(2): 259-280.

Sandler, Todd. 2003. Controlling Transnational Terrorism: Cooperation Dilemma. Unpublished Manuscript.

Sandler, Todd and Harvey Lapan. 1988. The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets. *Synthese* 76(2): 245-261.

Sandler, Todd and Walter Enders. 2004. An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism. *European Journal of Political Economy* 20(2): 301-316.

Sandler, Todd, John Tschirhart, and Jon Cauley. 1983. A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 77(1): 36-54.

Sater, William. 1981. *Puerto Rican Terrorists*: *A Possible Threat to U.S. Energy Installations*? Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Schmid, Alex. 1992. Terrorism and Democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4(4): 14-25.

Schmid, Alex and Albert Jongman. 1988. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Sen, Amartya. 1997. Inequality, Unemployment, and Contemporary Europe. *International Labour Review* 136(2): 155-172.

Serafino, Nina. 2002. *Combating Terrorism: Are There Lessons to be Learned from Foreign Experiences?* Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Shahin, Emad Eldin. 1998. *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Shapiro, Jacob. 2008. "Bureaucratic Terrorists: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Management and Finances." In *Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout*: *Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq*, ed. Brian Fishman. West Point: Combating Terrorism Center.

Shapiro, Jacob and David Siegel. 2007. Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly* 51(2): 405–429, 2007.

Silke, Andrew. 2004. "An Introduction to Research on Terrorism." In *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, and Failures*, ed. Andrew Silke. London: Frank Cass.

Siqueira, Kevin. 2005. Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2):218–236.

Siquiera, Kevin and Todd Sandler. 2006. Terrorists versus the Government: Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6): 878-898.

Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations. *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 621-632.

Smith, Alistair and Allan Stam. 2004. Bargaining and the Nature of War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 783-813.

Snider, Lewis. 1997. "Political Capacity, Growth, and Distributive Commitments." In *Political Capacity and Economic Behavior*, eds. Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler. Boulder: Westview Press.

Snyder, David and Charles Tilly. 1972. Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960. *American Sociological Review* 37(5):520-532

Starn, Orin. 1998. "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the South Central Andes." In *Shining and Other Paths*: *War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*, ed. Steve Stern. Durham: Duke University Press.

Stern, Jessica. 2000. Pakistan's Jihad Culture. *Foreign Affairs* 79(6): 115-126.

Stohl, Michael. 1988. "Demystifying Terrorism: The Myths and Realities of Contemporary Political Terrorism." In *The Politics of Terrorism* 3rd ed., ed. Michael Stohl. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Stohl, Michael. 2007. Swamps, Hot Spots, Dick Cheney, and the Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4): 257-264.

Stungis, George and Thomas Schori. 2003. A Terrorist Target Selection and Prioritization Model. *Journal of Homeland Security*

Stungis, George, Thomas Schori, Mark Asperilla, Larry Beebe, Raymond James, Rufus Lazzell, David Rice, and Wayne Salladé. 2006. A Prescription for Safeguarding Against Terrorist Attacks. *Journal of Homeland Security*

Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi. 2001. Whither Aceh? *Third World Quarterly* 22(3): 437-452.

Szajkowski, Bogdan, ed. 2004. *Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World*. London: John Harper Publishing.

Takeyh, Ray and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home? *The Washington Quarterly* 25(3): 97-108.

Taylor, Lewis. 1983. *Maoism in the Andes*: *Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru*. University of Liverpool Centre for Latin American Studies Working Paper 2

Taylor, Maxwell. 1988. *The Terrorist*. London: Brassey's.

Testas, Abdelaziz. 2004. Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(2): 253-273.

Thornton, Thomas. 1964, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation." In *Internal War: Problems and Approaches,* ed. Harry Eckstein. London: Free Press of Glencoe.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tololyan, Khachig. 1986. "Narrative Culture and the Motivation of the Terrorist." In *Texts of Identity,* eds. John Shotter and Kenneth Gergen. London: Sage.

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, 2003. *CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1.* Stanford University, University of Wisconsin, and Harvard University. 5 Jan.

UCDP/PRIO. 2009. *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*. Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). 2004. "Burma (Myanmar): Information on the Chin National Front / Chin National Army." February 26. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,47fa2a362,414ee2e24,0.html (April 2, 2010).

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 2004. *The Effects of the Madrid Terrorist Attacks on U.S. European Cooperation in the War on Terrorism*. 108th Congress, 2nd sess., March 31. http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2004/hrg040331p.html (October 8, 2009).

US Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 2005. *Testimony of Robert S. Mueller*, *Director Federal Bureau of Investigation*. 109th Congress, 1st sess., February 16. http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm (June 6th, 2007).

U.S. Department of Defense. 1988. *Terrorist Group Profiles*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 1990. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1989*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 1999. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2003. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2004. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2007. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2008. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2001. *Terrorism 2000/2001.* Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Usher, Graham. 1996. The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25(2): 21-34.

van den Bergh, Jeroen. 2007. Abolishing GDP. Unpublished Manuscript.

Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 3-42.

Wallace, Paul. 1995. "Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity." In *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Walker, Thomas, ed. 1991. *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Warner, Lesley Anne. 2007. "Vietnam 1959-1972." In *Money in the Bank*: *Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations*. RAND Occasional Paper

Weeks, Jessica. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization* 62(1): 65-101.

Weimann, Gabriel. 2006. *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Wilson, James. 1973. *Political Organizations*. New York: Basic Books

Wolf, John. 1978. Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups. *Terrorism*: *An International Journal* 1(2): 169-186.

Wooldridge, Jeffrey. 2006. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Wood, Reed and Mark Gibney. 2010. The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI. *Human Rights Quarterly* 32(2): 367-400.

World Bank. 2009. *World Development Indicators 2009*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Wright, Lawrence. 2006. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Vintage.

Yardley, Jim. 2009. Maoist Rebels Widen Deadly Reach Across India. *New York Times*, 31 October.

Young, Joseph and Laura Dugan. 2008. Veto Players and Terror. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26-29.

Young, Joseph and Michael Findley. 2009. Promise, Peril, and Pitfalls of Terrorism Research. Presented at the Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2-5.

Yusufzai, Ashfaq and Isimbard Wilkinson. 2009. "Taliban Jihad Against West Funded by Emeralds from Pakistan." April 4. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5106526/Taliban-jihad-against-West-funded-by-emeralds-from-Pakistan.html (March 27, 2010)

Zanini, Michele and Sean Edwards. 2001. "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age." In *Networks and Netwars*: *The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Ziegenhagen, Eduard. 1986. *The Regulation of Political Conflict*. New York: Praeger.