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"It is Non-Summit" and "It is Abnormal" Unpacking Whiteness: Critiquing racialized and gendered representations in Non-Summit (Bijeongsanghoedam).

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THESIS

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents and their unconditional love. My dad always

encourages me to pursue what I want to do and my mom always makes me realize I am

not alone. Without my parents, I have never done this thing by myself. I love you mom

and dad.

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I focus on a Korean entertainment show *Non-Summit* as a media text through which to investigate racialized and gendered representations of transnational identities in Korean media. Specifically, I examine discursive strategies through which foreign male characters are racialized and gendered in order to interrogate the hegemonic masculinity of White, Western, and heterosexual identities. On the basis of a critical textual analysis of *Non-Summit*, I discuss *Non-Summit* reproduces and distributes representations of White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity as dominant foreign identities. Furthermore, I examine the ideological implications of such discourse on the hegemonic foreign identities given the current condition of multiculturalism in Korean society and context of transnational Whiteness. I found characterization of foreign panelists functions as a process of privileging White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity in *Non-Summit*. It reveals racialization in *Non-Summit* is insidiously and complicatedly formed through discourse of liberalism, egalitarianism, and

homonationalism as a process of "othering." Similarly, by connecting egalitarian, liberal,

and tolerative identities to White, Western, and heterosexual panelists, who are from

European countries, Canada, and the U.S., the hegemonic masculinity is dominantly

possessed by Western masculine identities. In addition, the dominant representations of

foreign characters reproduce postracial and postgender ideologies that emphasize we live

in the raceless and genderless world. However, the ideological message should be

critically evaluated and challenged in that *Non-Summit* is a media space with maintaining

the dominant visibility of White, Western, educated, middle-class, and heterosexual

masculinity.

Key words: Whiteness, *Non-Summit*, Transnational identity, Multiculturalism,

Globalization, Critical Media Studies, Critical Cultural Studies

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Introduction

Korea is one of the few countries known as an ethnically and racially homogeneous country. However, the common belief of Korean blood purity has come under question. Since the late 1980s, multiculturalism has become a significant concept in Korea given the increase of international mobility in the era of globalization. Globalization has accelerated the movement of capital, cultural resources, information, and immigrant labour, driven by international economic policies and global institutions. This increased mobility and introduction of multiculturalism has challenged racial and ethnic homogeneity in Korea. Immigrants and mixed-race descendants, who disrupt the homogeneous look of Koreans but share the same language, cultural and social experience, question what it means to be fully Korean in the newly multicultural society. Indeed, accepting foreign others not only as friends and neighbors, but also as partners and family has started to question the illusion of a single raced nation-state and ethnocentric kinship in Korea.

In order to examine these changes specifically, I contextualize the socioeconomic impetus and how multiculturalism has been implemented in Korea. The main socioeconomic force for multiculturalism is the condition of rapid economic growth. Due to a lack of natural resources and ongoing political conflict with, and threat from, North Korea, major economic development of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula has depended on export-oriented and cooperative economic growth with the United States (Cho, 2008; Han, 2015). Inevitably, rapid economic growth has led to a lack of labor force in manufacturing areas and 3D (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) occupations in

Korea (Choi, 2006). In this social context, the Korean government has opened the door to accept global capital and labour since 1990s, which subsequently meant the number of foreigners has increased noticeably (Park & Lee, 2015). This was a significant change considering Korea was one of the major countries that exported cheap labour to other countries after the Korean War. Under this nationwide change, the number of resident foreigners has increased to 200,1828 in 2016, which accounted for 3.9 % of the whole population (Yu, 2016). Additionally, Kim (2016) reported the number of foreign employees has increased to about 962,000 in 2016, which grew by 25,000 (2.6%) compared to the previous year; and about half of these workers are in the manufacturing industry. This rapid change in the influx of immigrants reveals how transnational labour has been mobilized in and through the interlocked relations with global capital flow.

Not only has economic growth led to decrease in manufacturing labor done by Koreans, but also it has led to different social issues such as the decrease in marriage and birth rates in rural areas. This decrease is due to the massive movement from rural to urban areas where there are more job opportunities. In order to deal with this domestic issue, the Korean government has encouraged international marriage since the early 2000s, especially in the farming and fishing communities (Lee, 2016). Along with male immigrant workers who provide an alternative physical labour force, many foreign brides mostly from developing Asian countries are "imported" to provide a different type of "labor" in rural areas of Korea. Among resident foreigners in Korea, there are 143,206 migrant spouses as of 2016 and 118,281 are foreign brides among migrant spouses (Korean Statistical Information Service, 2016). In brief, the socioeconomic shift has shaped two major aspects of multicultural identity in Korea: migrant labour in

manufacturing areas and foreign brides married to Korean men in rural areas. These two leading factors demonstrate how multiculturalism in Korea is a state-led solution to domestic problems such as a lack of cheap labour, decreasing marriage rate in rural areas, and low-birth-rate.

Furthermore, the increased global popularity of Korean popular media, particularly K-pop and K-dramas, has added a different aspect of multiculturalism in Korea. The global popularity of Korean popular media, referred to as the Korean Wave (*Hallyu*), has operated as an additional force in attracting foreigners since the mid-2000s. *Hallyu* is associated with the increased accessibility to digital media through which globalized popular media are distributed. According to Yi (2016), these cultural and media exports from Korea have exceeded $35 million in 86 countries in 2015, up from $21.8 million in 2014. The majority of Korean wave fans are from the Asia-Pacific (26.2 million) followed by Africa and the Middle East, United States, and Europe (Yi, 2016). Following this noticeable popularity, foreigners have become more interested in Korean culture and visited Korea beyond just enjoying global popular media. To put plainly, more foreigners with various motivations, purposes, and identities have moved into Korean society as a result of this striking increase in popularity of *Hallyu*. This dynamic change has diversified the demographic of immigrants in Korea in terms of jobs, gender, age, and nationality in addition to the cheap migrant labour and/or foreign brides from intra-Asia countries. Thus, Korean popular media as a cultural product is not only related to Korean economic development, it also diversifies the influx of foreigners by attracting people globally.

More interestingly, as the number of international immigrants has increased, Korean media has started to show more representations of foreigners in mass media. Beyond exporting cultural products, Korean media reflects transnational changes by showcasing foreign bodies on its own television shows like *My neighbor is Charles*, *The Settlement of Global Family*, *The Chatterbox of Beauties*, and *Non-summit* etc. Different from other television media such as news, soap operas, or documentaries, these entertainment shows specifically lead audiences to enjoy a narrative of cultural assimilation in Korean society (*My neighbor is Charles* and *The Settlement of global Family).* In addition, some entertainment shows (*The Chatterbox of Beauties* and *Non-summit*) are talk-shows with foreign guests who share their experiences of and opinions on Korean culture. Given the myth of a racially and ethnically homogeneous country, the increased visibility of foreigners in Korean media is a significant change. The increased appearance of foreigners in media becomes actual evidence of the moment when Korean society is at the stage of turning into a multicultural and globalized society. However, this frequent visibility of foreigners in television media need to be understood through a critical interpretation of media representation. Since media represent a selective image of multicultural society in Korea, viewers are exposed to the processed image of immigrants and multiculturalism without recognizing the difference between representation and reality. More precisely, Koreans learn who are foreign others and how their multicultural society looks through a lens of selective media representations. Accordingly, many scholarly researches have investigated these selective representations and the effects of reproducing differential images of foreigners. For instance, Korean researchers have examined how television media otherize transnational identity by presenting particular

images of immigrants, and the extent Korean media reflect the multicultural reality of the asymmetric division between well-educated foreigners and cheap labour immigrants (Chae, 2010; Kim, Yu, & Kim, 2008; Son, 2015).

In this context, I aim to participate in the scholarly dialogue and specifically focus on *Non-summit*, a famous Korean entertainment show, to explore media representations of foreign identities in Korea. *Non-summit* is a Joongang Tongyang Broadcasting Corporation (JTBC) show where there are ten to twelve transnational male panelists from countries like Turkey, Ghana, China, Japan, German, France, Italy, Canada, Brazil, and the United States, et al. In the show, foreign panelists lead a discussion in order to reach agreement on global and local issues and participate as a representative of each country. Among popular television entertainment shows in Korea, *Non-summit* offers a particularly interesting space for exploration. Given the short period of multiculturalization, it is hard to find a program in which Korean audiences see various foreigners on a screen at the same time. *Non-summit*, however, provides a unique space where foreign male panelists who have diverse identities in terms of race, ethnicity, and class, gather together and actively join discussions. Through this show, Koreans not only enjoy distinct perspectives from transnational identities about Korean society, but also learn how these foreign panelists are different from poor immigrant workers and uneducated foreign brides. When considering unique aspects of the show, I claim it is interesting to analyze the interactive discussion among foreign panelists in order to examine hierarchized relations of racial and gender identity among foreign panelists.

By analyzing representations of foreign panelists in *Non-summit*, I examine how transnational identities are racialized and gendered using a critical media textual analysis of the show. Particularly, within the specific time and space of Korea, I:1) investigate how foreign male characters in *Non-Summit* are racialized as a way of privileging White foreign body, 2) analyze how foreign male characters in *Non-Summit* are gendered, especially through highlighting the White heterosexual masculinity in the show, and finally 3) unpack the ideological implication of media representations of transnational identities in *Non-Summit*. These questions make it possible to answer questions such as whose voices are more heard, which values are prioritized, and which groups are disempowered or marginalized in this discourse among foreigners in *Non-summit*. In the following section, I provide the overall information of *Non-summit* in order to contextualize the certain space of *Non-summit*.

"It is Non-Summit" and "It is Abnormal"

To begin with, I start to address what it means and why it is crucial to analyze media representation and discourse regarding foreign identities and multiculturalism. It is significant to examine media representations because media play a crucial role in building and distributing discourses of multiculturalism. According to Hall (1997), representation is "an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture" (p.1), and representation is a practice and meaning of material objects built on its symbolic function. Furthermore, according to Straubhaar (2003), media operate to reproduce the dominant ideology that maintain

power relations in local and global contexts as part of an ideological arena by circulating media representations.

Through representation, members of a culture share meaning, language, and signs, which are related to the discursive space of constructing identity. When reading a transnational identity, we selectively ascribe a certain meaning within a specific time and space. Since this certain meaning is already connected to the dominant discourse, the ascribed meaning has to be understood as a regulation of identity. In this vein, examining this particular show is important because as Washington (2012) notes "television, as a tool for socialization, depends entirely on stereotypes to quickly and clearly express mainstream notions regarding race, gender, class, and so on" (p.265). Besides, it is possible to disclose the operation of racial, gender, and class domination by reading the gap between what has been seen through and what has been hidden from media representations (Kim, Yu, & Kim, 2009).

In addition, investigating media representation is necessary since media significantly affect the pedagogical formation of understanding the self, others, and society. As mentioned earlier, media represent foreign identities selectively to highlight a particular group as positive and natural while erasing and marginalizing others. For instance, selective images of light skinned foreigners sitting at coffee shops and doing work on their laptops are represented whereas manual labourers in manufacturing or agriculture are shown with darker skin if they are even represented in media. By being exposed to the binary and stereotypical representation of dark skin and light skin immigrants, audiences learn and internalize the racialized hierarchy in Korean society.

Hence, selective representations as controlling images operate to infuse a certain ideology of gender, race, class, and sexuality of a certain group, which further influences people's material experiences as well (Collins, 2004). Media pedagogy and its power to influence knowledge production of multiculturalism impacts nation-states where the majority of society is composed of a homogeneous ethnic and racial identity such as Korea (Kim & Yoon, 2016). Thus, it is necessary to explore how Korean media represent transnational identity differently and how the elective representation produce certain knowledge of immigrants and multiculturalism. Specifically, through media, Koreans learn who Koreans are, how Koreans interact with foreign others, and what Koreans can do with foreign others by embracing certain knowledge (Sandlin & Maudlin, 2012).

Moreover, I center the critical reading of Foucault's discourse by Stuart Hall (2001b) in order to emphasize the entangled relation of representation, discourse, and power. Discourse as a system of representation produces a certain knowledge, subjects, and practice of knowledge in a particular historical time and space. By linking knowledge and power, Foucault's approach to discourse refuses the notion of absolute truth, but rather claims that the discursive practice sustains a regime of truth entailing a specific way of seeing and knowing that reality. The discursive practice is reproduced and distributed by institutional apparatus and technologies. As an institutional apparatus, media involve in production of specific discourse, which oftentimes functions as surveillance over audiences. This approach of discourse and knowledge "helped to link 'culture' to 'representation,' and thus culture (and its hierarchies and relations of power) to media texts which represent the world in the 'information age'" (as cited in Hobbs, 2008). In this way, I explore what kind of discourse and knowledge of multiculturalism

are produced in the current time and space of Korean society by analyzing racialized and gendered representations in *Non-Summit*. Further, by doing so, it is possible to unravel who is in power and has set the regime of truth that ultimately disciplines or disempowers others.

Among popular television entertainment shows in Korea, *Non-Summit* presents a particularly interesting space for examining racialized and gendered identities because of the format of the show, main characteristics, noticeable popularity, and the prominent visibility of racially varied characters on the show. Jang (2015) reported that the popularity of *Non-Summit* is noticeable since *Non-Summit* is attracting many viewers and this popularity is proven by a viewing rate over five percent. Its popularity is attributed to the novel mode of a conference-style entertainment show and transnational characters in the program. Each episode is about 75 minutes running time. According to the official website of *Non-Summit,* the show's purpose is to suggest creative solutions to discussion topics of various issues in Korea. In every episode, ten to twelve foreign male panelists discuss a weekly topic and vote on whether the topic should be considered "normal" or "abnormal." This discussion and voting process are particularly programmed to suggest creative solutions to the problems that young Korean people currently face.

Non-Summit is based on the format of the G-20 summit. The G-20 summit is an international forum for governments from twenty major countries that gather together to discuss global issues. *Non-Summit* has a similar format. There are three Korean main facilitators mediating the discussion. Every week different guests bring up a topic and participate in the discussion as a representative of their own countries. Moreover, *Non-*

Summit visualizes a particular setting of the program as a conference center to match with the actual environment of G-20 summit. The title of program connotes two different meanings in a creative way. Since the foreign characters are not official representatives assigned by the government, the program title is named *Non-Summit*, which means it is not the well-known official summit. The title *Non-Summit* also signifies the other meaning translated as "being not normal" in Korean.[1] Therefore, *Non-Summit* as the title of an entertainment show clarifies it is not an official government meeting, so it is an abnormal meeting. Additionally, the title also highlights how the foreign panelists vote on whether topics are normal or abnormal, rather than it is supported or rejected.

In this context, it is interesting to think about the role of Koreans and foreign characters within the particular format of the program and voting process of judging the value of agenda. The Korean characters include the three chairmen who facilitate each episode, and a weekly Korean guest who offers a topic for discussion. While foreign participants are actively involved discussing global and local problems, the Korean chairmen and the weekly guests occasionally involve themselves in the discussion but mostly wait for the decision from international panelists. Thus, foreign characters are mainly qualified to judge the value of agenda items in *Non-Summit*, and it is crucial to

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[1] *Non-Summit* (비정상회담) has two different meaning since the Korean title is interpreted with the meaning of Chinese characters. 非正常 (비정상) means "being not normal" and 非頂上 (비정상) means "not qualified as summit."

interrogate who has exercised their right to speak and whose voice is more heard than others in this spatial context. In chapter two, I unpack how the format of program, title of the show, and roles of characters are interconnected with each other to create and recreate spatial power in *Non-Summit*.

In reference to the foreign participants in the show, the main panelists are all men who have different jobs such as a student, singer, fashion model, lecturer, sales man, and translator etc. In terms of complexion, it is hard to find "fully dark" characters except one main character from Ghana. Most of characters in *Non-Summit* are lighter and/or White characters, which sometimes does not match with the diverse demographics of a certain nation. For instance, the representative of Brazil appeared in the show has visibly White skin color. By showing a White body as representative of Brazil, other racially and ethnically diverse identities are recognized as not qualified to represent the nation and are erased in the show. The other interesting point of foreign participants in *Non-Summit* is that most of them originally have had different jobs such as graduate students, marketing consultant, and programmer. However, they switched their jobs to entertainer and contracted with entertainment agencies since they have been on the show. It means that their visibility as entertainers has stood out as they expand into other programs in Korean media. However, in the context of Korea where the majority of immigrants consist of foreign cheap labour and transnational brides, panelists in *Non-Summit* do not fully reflect the demographics of immigration and multiculturalism in Korea.

Although *Non-Summit* has interesting aspects to be examined, little research has explored *Non-Summit* as a cultural media text to analyze discourses of transnational

identities multiculturalism in Korea. In one recent work, Kim and Yoon (2016) focused

on a controversial issue that happened in *Non-Summit*: the issue of *Kimikayo*. *Kimikayo* is

the national anthem of Japan and it is considered as a symbol praising Japan's

imperialism among Korean audiences. When *Non-Summit* introduced a temporal

Japanese panelist in the 17th episode, *Kimikayo* was played as background music in the

program. This caused a huge backlash among Korean audiences who considered the

playing of *Kimikayo* as implicit praise of Japanese colonialism in Korea. In addition, Son

(2015) addressed the exclusively male centered representation of foreigners in *Non-*

Summit. The author highlighted how foreigners in *Non-Summit,* who are represented as

White-male characters, are framed as superior and ultimately criticized the global force

of neoliberalism and capitalism. Though she revealed the ambivalent aspect of

multiculturalism and homo-national identity in Korea, there are still binaries existing of

good/bad, legal/illegal, and helpful/damaging foreigners when it comes to sorting out

transnational identities.

There was also a positive reading of *Non-Summit* as a way of understanding other

cultures rather than forcing them to be assimilated into the dominant Korean social

structure (Park & Lee, 2015). By highlighting active participation of foreign panelists,

Park and Lee (2015) evaluated *Non-Summit* as an artificial society that Korean

multiculturalism aims for. While recognizing the academic contribution of these works, I

contend that the presence of the U.S. military base and transnational hierarchy operating

underneath the representations on the show are not fully discussed in previous works.

Rather, these works have focused on Korean nationalism to ascribe stereotypical

interpretations of foreigners in *Non-Summit*. This approach to transnational identities is

helpful to challenge Korean nationalism, but it is not critically associated with the insidious but penetrating hegemonic power of Whiteness. Even if there is obvious visibility of racially diverse identities, missing still is a space for analyzing discourses of how the main characters are racialized and gendered based on their discursive interaction with each other, particularly as a way of disempowering certain foreign identities in Korea.

In sum, recognizing *Non-Summit* as a contested media space allows us to unravel the dominant power operation in the show when representations of transnational identity are selectively articulated to underlying social cultural assumptions. In this research, I aim to deepen the understanding of media representation of racialized and gendered identities by revealing the transnational operation of Whiteness in order to problematize the visibility and discourse of naturalizing the White heterosexual male identity in *Non-Summit*. In this burgeoning multicultural society, I suggest media representations of racial and ethnic others construct the dominant ideology of Westernized White heterosexual masculinity among Korean audiences, which reinforces a familiar global hierarchy within certain time and space of Korean society.

Before delving into this research problem, it is helpful to provide a roadmap of this thesis. The following section of the first chapter addresses the historical and geopolitical spatial context of Korea. In doing so, I recognize Korean society not as a fixed background, but as a dynamic, flexible, and negotiated space in which structured contexts critically take part in identity formation. As aspects of spatial power in Korean society, I underscore three aspects of Korean society: U.S. superiority, Anti

Americanism, and gendered multiculturalism. The second section examines research on

postcolonial feminist theory as theoretical framework to challenge the centrality of

Westernized White patriarchal masculinity. Through this chapter, I demonstrate it is

essential to contextualize *Non-Summit* within the historical, social, and political space of

Korean society by centering U.S. military occupation. Furthermore, I argue a postcolonial

feminist framework is helpful to unpack the dominance of White, heteronormative, and

patriarchal ideologies produced by media representation of racialized and gendered

foreigners in *Non-Summit*.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Spatializing Korea as historical and geopolitical site

It is critical to have a contextual perspective to understand Korean society as spatial configuration of power. As Shome (2003) notes, "how our approach to power may benefit from a contextual and spatial focus where contexts are understood not as static backgrounds but as dynamic relations of force" (p.54). In this section, I focus on space, transnationalism, and identity derived from Shome's works as defining main concepts that provide historical, geopolitical, and cultural contexts for Korea and the formation of transnational identity. I consider the identity formation is a process that a foreign identity becomes hailed as a social subject in the multicultural Korean society. In addition, I recognize the spatial context of Korea actively involves the formation of each transnational identity distinctively and differentially. Hence, I understand spatializing as the process of "radical contextualism" as argued by Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg (as cited in Shome, 2003, p.43) to unpack the deployment of power and to understand the formation of cultural identity in a specific place and time. What I argue in this section is that not only does spatializing make it possible to analyze Korean society as a complicated space entangled in economic, geopolitical, and historical relations with other countries, but also to emphasize how space is dynamically constructing the symbolic and material condition of transnational identities.

I start to explain why spatialization of the globalized world is important to understand the formation of transnational identities regarding to relations of power.

Sorrells (2010) referred to globalization as a complicated and contested concept with multiple layered meanings of economic, political, and technological forces shaped by particular beliefs and ideologies. Global interconnection has not been grounded on the same power matrix, meaning that there are remaining vestiges of colonial history and hierarchy between countries. In this globalized era, the increased interdependence of nations and the development of technology seem to blur geographical nation borders by accelerating the transnational mobility of cultural identities. However, these changes do not seem to dim the binary perception especially between colonizer "West" and colonized "non-West". The increased mobility rather complicates the power configuration of the global hierarchy because we now find the West in the non-West, simultaneously, the non-West in the West. In other words, differentially privileged or marginalized cultural identities are hard to be captured based on the geographical or collective understanding of identities. For instance, Southeast Asian immigrants' identity in Korea are differently constructed in different spatial contexts such as manufacturing industry, fashion industry, or academic environment because each space has different economic, political, and cultural power configuration. Thus, it gets harder to fasten Southeast Asian immigrants as a collective group of poor, underpaid, untidy, or working-class immigrants in Korea. In this sense, it is more necessary to recognize a transnational identity in a certain time and space, so as to capture the complex operation of spatial power and the different formation of cultural identity in this globalization era.

More specifically, I argue identity depends on the space in which they are situated and what kind of relationship or hierarchy they have within that particular space. It means that space is relationally and contextually constructed, thus the understanding of space

enables us to recognize identity as historically rooted, contextually produced, and

ideologically contested (Sekimoto, 2014; Shome & Hegde, 2002a)**,** not as one monolithic

cultural identity. For instance, Shome (2003) pointed out that the power configuration of

space in the U.S.-Mexico border region and demonstrated how this space reproduces a

particular material reality to empower or disempower individual and/or collective

identity, in particular immigrants. In this work, Shome (2003) showed how the identity of

immigrants are produced by surveillance technologies, authoritative guardians, and

border checking practices. Particularly, Shome (2003) claimed it is hard to capture how

spatial power influences the empowerment of immigrants' identities, without knowing

about the cumulated historical and political context of U.S.-Mexico border. This

understanding illustrates space is not a geographical or physical place in which the

surveillance process of border checking occurs, but space is discursively and

ideologically shaped so functions as a medium of production, organization, and

distribution of power.

Based on this understanding of space and identity, I start to spatialize Korean

society as a complex and contested site of global and local power in order to examine the

identity formation of foreign panelists in *Non-Summit*. Particularly, I focus on the U.S.

military occupation, thus aim to expose the constructed preference for a White Western

heterosexual male identity in Korea. Indeed, the current military occupation by the U.S.

Army needs to be understood as one factor of spatialization of Korean society when it

comes to identity formation of transnational identities in Korea. Since 1945, U.S. military

bases have occupied Korea physically and ideologically. Under the intervention of the

U.S. military after World War II, Koreans have developed the notion of the United States

as a supporter for the economy and national defense in Korea. Inevitably, this asymmetric power hierarchy between the U.S. and Korea has shaped the contemporary neocolonial relationship. Within the market logic of neoliberalism, Korea's dependence on the U.S. has been more accelerated. Neoliberalism, the logic of economic liberalism, free trading, and privatization has forced the Korean government to participate in this hierarchized economic and political relationship. Thus, spatializing Korean society pertaining to the U.S. military occupation is significant to demonstrate the neocolonial relation between two countries. With this hierarchized national relation, it is not hard to imagine Koreans have shaped one's racial logic and racial hierarchy based on the perception of White America cultivated in Korea via the physical and symbolic presence of U.S. Army bases.

In the following section, major themes are navigated to spatialize Korean society: notions of U.S. superiority, Anti-Americanism, and gendered multiculturalism. By centering the U.S. military occupation as an important axis of producing ideological power in Korea, I intend to reveal Korean society not as a static background but as a dynamic relation of identity formation among foreign panelists in *Non-Summit*. First, the historical and cultural dominance of the U.S. armed forces is delineated to point how White or light skinned foreigners have taken a favorable position than dark skinned foreigners, which pertains to constructing the ideology of Whiteness in Korea. Second, I demonstrate how the sociocultural context frames the gendered structure regarding immigration and multiculturalism. Through examining the gendered structure, I divulge the paternalistic attitude of Korean society to immigrants from developing countries. Based on this spatialization, I consider Korean society as an already racialized and

gendered space in which *Non-Summit* is constructed as a particular media space that favors light skinned, heteronormative, and masculine foreign identities.

Whiteness as a dominant ideology in Korean society

Whiteness is a monster that keeps changing its figure to disguise its real being. It means that Whiteness is not a fixed, perpetual, and explicit concept, but keeps changing its being strategically to save the centrality. Therefore, to capture and territorialize its temporal existence, many scholars have uncovered the discursive strategy of becoming Whites as well as the sociopolitical structure of individual identity, interpersonal interactions, and media representations (Dyer, 2008; Frankenberg, 1993; Hughey, 2010; Jackson II, 1999; Nakayama & Krizek, 1995; Nakayama & Martin, 1999). Based on these critical works, many key strategies of camouflaging Whiteness were found: Whiteness as invisibility, universality, unlabeled territoriality, and normativity. As acknowledging these scholarly contributions, I center the U.S. military occupation to understand the temporal being of Whiteness in Korea. I contend that the current strategy of Whiteness has become complicated by the tension between the U.S. superiority and Anti-Americanism in Korea. However, Whiteness has still lingered in Korean society as a superior and dominant concept, but more culturally and ideologically structured. To examine how Whiteness has operated in Korean society, I focus on two major strategies of Whiteness in Korea: (1) Whiteness as a socially, historically, and culturally structured dominant ideology and (2) Whiteness as a strategic rhetoric to sustain its central territoriality by deploying representations of non-Whites. These two major aspects explain not only how Whiteness has been developed and interwoven with the presence of

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U.S. military occupation in Korea, but also how the strategic center of Whiteness has to do with the projecting non-Whites' undesirable and otherized representations.

Accordingly, I begin to elaborate on the being-ness of Whiteness: Whiteness as socially, historically, and culturally structured superiority in the spatial context of Korea. Drawing on Cho (2008), the Korean War provided the explicit moment in which the U.S. military base physically and ideologically occupied the Southern part of Korean peninsula. It was also the explicit moment that the U.S. became bluntly involved in Korea's economy, politics, and culture even more than after the Second World War. The presence of the U.S. Army bases oftentimes has been articulated as "militarized humanitarianism" to provide supplies and save poor Asian adoptees after the second World War (Pate, 2014). However, the U.S. Army base in Korea became the first place in which the United States set up an anticommunist government following World War II. As well, the U.S. military occupation has been explained as neocolonialism breaking up big colonized countries into manageable small states to make them depend on the prior imperial hegemonic power to defend themselves (Kwon, 2016). Thus, the U.S. military occupation has continued this neocolonial practice since Korean society is in the geopolitical condition of "a permanent state of war temporarily suspended." Besides, the Korean government has highlighted this dangerous geopolitical condition Koreans live in to justify why we need the military protection from the United States (Cho, 2008, p.93). Since the democratic government has acknowledged the indispensable occupation of U.S. military bases in Korea by referring to our geopolitical situation of armistice, it explicitly reveals the hierarchical relationship that we (Korea) are in with them (the United States).

Therefore, it seems Korean society has reentered the different and new colonial relationship with the U.S. after retrieving the independence from Japanese colonialism.

In this U.S. militarized context, I argue Whiteness has been historically and geopolitically constructed with a primary perception that the United States is superior and Whiteness also operates through putting the White racial identity as standard mode of knowing the U.S. (Kim, 2006). For instance, after the Korean war, Korean media, as well as U.S. media, particularly produce and circulate representations of a certain identity of U.S. Army to circulate the humanitarian and/or supportive American military image. By projecting White, heterosexual, masculine, and humanitarian soldiers as natural, positive, and good foreigners in Korea, media representations have distributed images of White America into Korean society. Furthermore, the current circulation of global popular media continues to reproduce representations of White racial identities as a standard foreign identity. The increasing circulation of globalized popular media has extended a territory of Whiteness to the cultural, social, and ideological aspects of Korean society by distributing specific media representations to mass audience in the globe. According to Kim (2005; 2011), the global world of television media, particularly U.S. popular media, have distributed individualism, cosmopolitanism, and gender egalitarianism as a Western invention. In response, Korean women realized Korean society is not "liberal" or "equal" enough compared to Western countries (Kim, 2005). This response shows Korean women accepted the ideology of individualism, cosmopolitanism, and gender egalitarianism not as a simple message of global television, but as a standard of value. When Korean women were exposed to the Westernized ideology, they considered the traditional and cultural value of Korean society as less desirable than those values of

Western society. Through this process, Korean women internalized Western values as a better or advanced one, which is also associated to the hierarchal relationship between the U.S. and Korea. This indicates the difference between Korean and U.S. society is interpreted within the context of global hierarchy, implicitly implanting ideological superiority of the Western value among Koreans.

In this hierarchized relation, it is necessary to refer to the way in which hegemonic masculinity has been developed in Korea. The U.S. military occupation replaced defective masculinity of Korean men with the desired masculinity of White U.S. troops. Sending military troops demonstrates that it is deficient for Korean masculinity to protect its own country. Not only the militarized masculinity of White U.S. Americans, as what Eguchi (2009) noted, the hegemonic masculinity of White men as "the culturally idealized form of masculine character" is inextricably highlighted in Korea. For example, the case of celebrity Daniel Henny, a mixed-race actor (White and Korean), was often cited to reveal how Korean media portrayal of light skinned celebrity is articulated as cosmopolitan, modern, liberal, and nice-looking (Lo & Kim, 2011). As hegemonic masculinity, White U.S. American men have been privileged as an admired paternal position, which reveals the gendered relation between the masculinized U.S. (a dominant and benevolent supporter) and the feminized Korea (victimized and need to be revitalized from war). However, I claim Koreans have not been only passive or victimized by this asymmetric power operation of the U.S. military occupation, but also resistant or insubordinate. By providing examples of historical conflict between the U.S. military bases and Koreans, I argue there has been mixed recognition of U.S. military occupation

among Koreans, but the ideology of U.S. superiority still remains and operates in and through Korean society.

After the fierce pro-democracy movement for 32 years, the civilian government has operated in Korea since 1993. The democratic-movement generation is different from the Korean-war generation in dealing with social issues in Korea, especially regarding U.S. military bases. There have been several nationally recognized issues of homicide cases, sexual crimes, prostitution, and environmental pollution around the U.S. military bases (Hughes, Chon, & Ellerman, 2007; Kim, 2002; Kim & Hur, 2009; Moon, 2007). Kim and Hur (2009) and Moon (2007) referred the murder of Shin Hyosun and Sim Misun by a U.S. armored vehicle in June 2002 as a significant case that exposed the unequal relationship and led to a massive candlelight protest in Korea. Although the armored vehicle killed two teenage girls, the soldiers were found not-guilty by the U.S. military court of "negligent homicide." In addition, the sexual crimes and prostitution happening around the U.S. military base have been long-term issues for almost six decades. The case of the vicious murder of Yun Geumi who was killed by the drunken serviceman, Kenneth Markle, became a symbolic case to reveal Korea's "powerless[ness] and victimization" by the U.S. (Kim & Hur, 2009). These two outrageous cases happened due to the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is an agreement between a host country and a foreign country stationing military occupations. The treaty states that the Korean government and judiciary cannot punish these servicemen if the U.S. government requires extraditing them from Korea. In response to these brutal cases, Koreans started to confront the power of the U.S. military bases by candlelight vigils with more than a million citizens. This collective action protesting against crimes and inadequate reaction

from the U.S. has been considered as Anti-Americanism (Kim, 2002; Kim & Hur, 2009). Anti-Americanism includes not only candlelight vigils but also boycott campaigns against products of U.S. companies and political activism via social media. Situated opposite this ideology of U.S. superiority, Anti-Americanism is read as a counter-hegemonic movement against the U.S. military occupation, an unfair alliance relationship, and abusive economic and political power over Korea.

However, I found the counter-hegemony is not entirely fulfilled since the cultural and ideological domination, which are insidiously prevalent among Koreans, are not fully recognized, questioned and challenged. More precisely, some Koreans still idealize the modernity, superpower military, capital, and cultural exceptionalism of the U.S. whereas some of them negatively evaluate and criticize problematic reactions from the U.S. military bases and government. For instance, "country in the heaven (Cheonjoguk)" is a newly-coined word created by online users to praise the United States in which citizens are privileged to enjoy the strongest national defense power and sufficient capital. This neologism basically means the U.S. government spends quadrillion dollars as a national defense budget, and it is usually compared to "Hell-Joseon" which is coined in order to despise the Korean government and socioeconomic inequality. When these two newly-coined words are used together in order to compare the two countries and each neologism satirizes different aspects of society, Koreans hierarchized the U.S. (country in the heaven) over Korea (country like a hell). Hence, the hierarchized relation between the U.S. and Korea still linger around the discourse of military power, capital, and advancement of the U.S. among Koreans. The Anti-American fever denounces the abusive force of the U.S. government, however, it still holds the ideological hierarchy

within capitalism and neoliberalism sustaining the global power of the U.S. In this context, I acknowledge ambivalent recognitions of the U.S. military occupation among Koreans between the militarized humanitarianism and Anti-Americanism. Hence, it is important to examine how the global popular media have reproduced White dominated ideology in this spatialized context of Korean society.

Necessarily, it is essential to investigate how the undesirable representations of non-Whites have been employed to sustain dominance of the White heterosexual male as favorable foreign identities in Korean society. This connects to the second point of Whiteness in this section: Whiteness as a strategic rhetoric to sustain its central territoriality by deploying representations of non-Whites. Media representations have been examined and criticized as a way of reproducing Whiteness by centering it as a desirable and natural norm (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995). By exploring media and popular culture as a learning process of how to be "White" and what is considered normal, Shome (2000) highlighted the critical issue of "how" media produce Whiteness rather than whether media and popular culture do produce Whiteness. In order to answer this issue of "how" media produce Whiteness, thre strategic deployment of representations of non-Whites has been interrogated to uncover Whiteness operating visibly or invisibly (Dubrofsky, 2006; Griffin, 2015; Oh, 2012; Shome, 1996). According to Nakayama & Krizek (1995), the strategic rhetoric of Whiteness is a practice to resecure the center rather than is a place itself, and non-Whites are strategically constructed and deployed to maintain the invisible territory of Whiteness. For instance, Oh (2012) noted how White privileged masculinity is protected by the binary pole of blackness and yellowness in the film, *Rush Hour*. By drawing a fence around hypersexualized black masculinity and the

asexual Asian/American eunuch, the White masculinity is sustained as natural and universal. Additionally, women of color have been represented or marked as undesirable partners for marriage or dating, and sometimes media portray them as a backdrop to sustain White femininity on television (Dubrofsky, 2006). Thus, these studies revealed stereotypical representations of non-Whites are utilized and otherized in order to place Whiteness as a taken-for-granted natural or normal centrality.

In the context of Korean media, the strategic deployment of non-White immigrants happens with classification of foreigners in Korea. Usually, non-White immigrants have been represented as lower-class labour and threatening others (Kim, Yu, & Kim, 2009) while White immigrants are projected as "superior foreigners" (Son, 2015). In this regard, Ju and No (2013) categorized foreigners in three groups based on stereotypical representations of foreign others in Korean television media: (1) longing group (foreign people from the U.S. and Europe countries), (2) nearby group (Japan and China), and (3) compassionate group (Vietnam, Philippines, and Uzbekistan). These three groups explicitly show how Koreans asymmetrically classify foreign others: Firstly, it is significant to see the difference between the longing group and the compassionate group. Each group is comprised of countries based on the cultural, ideological, and geographical binary perception. This classification is fundamentally preoccupied by the global hierarchy between First worlds and Third worlds, which is also shown in the groups' titles. Thus, foreigners from Western countries, specifically the White culture, are categorized as a group that Koreans long for. On the contrary, foreigners from Southeast and Central Asian countries, who have dark-skinned bodies, are considered as a group of people that Koreans take care of. More interestingly, when it comes to the Nearby group

including Japan and China, the title of this group more stresses on the geographic

approach. This approach seems to say that Koreans do not demarcate or discriminate

people from East Asia countries. Koreans seem to accept people from East Asian

countries, who have similar appearance to Koreans, considering them as neighbors.

However, it is contradicted by the fact that Chinese and ethnic Koreans living and

coming from China are easily stigmatized as criminals and underpaid as illegal labourers

in Korea. (Lee, 2017)

Additionally, this type of classification was also found in what Kim, Yu, and Kim

(2009) highlight as representations of racialized and gendered class of foreigners in

Korea. Kim, Yu, and Kim (2009) furthered this categorization and analyzed it as the

structural problem of a global labour market. By investigating representations of

multiculturalism, they found how working class foreign labourers are described as poor,

dark-skinned, illegal, negligent, and threatening, thus need to be well assimilated in a

host country to show their value. On the contrary, Western figured foreigners are often

represented as proud, sophisticated, and professional people, thus we Koreans learn from

and long for them. It is significant in that these works exposed differential attitude toward

foreigners in Korea, which implicitly informs the preference of Westernized identity.

Furthermore, this racially differentiated representation needs to be situated within the

feminization of global division of labour system, in order to reveal the process of

otherizing region, gender, race, and class (Kim, Yu, and Kim, 2009). This analysis

obviously furthered the categorization of foreigners in Korea by putting them in the

globally structured context of gender, race, and class. However, I argue this research still

reproduces the binary perception between the rich North and the poor South. Both articles

mentioned above demonstrate how these classified groups are successfully deployed to sustain the supremacy of Whiteness in Korea. Hence, I argue the deployment of non-White representation is more based on the group identity of foreigners in Korean media. By representing the group of immigrants from developing countries as compassionate one, Korean media situates the Westernized foreign identities at the higher or preferred position of the global hierarchy.

Gendered multiculturalism in Korea

As illustrated in the earlier section, I explained that multiculturalism in Korea has been deployed to minimize domestic problems such as a lack of manufacturing workers and low marriage rate in rural area. International marriages with women from developing countries have increased due to "marriage squeeze – a shortage of marriageable women in rural areas - caused by the widening cultural and economic gap between rural and urban areas" (Kim, 2010, p.720). As Oh (2016) stated, the percentage of international marriages in rural areas takes 22.7% of all marriages from 2011 to 2015, and most international marriages are between Korean men and foreign women. Most foreign brides are imported from developing Asian countries, principally, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Mongolia, and China into relatively developed countries, such as South Korea, Japan, and Singapore. To put it bluntly, women from developing countries serve as unpaid labours for reproduction and domestic affairs. Foreign brides are mostly available for certain groups of Korean men, such as for "never-married men in rural areas and previously married (divorced or widowed) or disabled men of 'low socio-economic status' in urban areas" (Lim, 2010, p.66). This already gendered nature of marriage

migration has reinforced patriarchy, heteronormativity, feminized migration policy, and furthers the hierarchal structure in Korea.

Along with this gendered marriage migration, transnational women are represented differently based on their racialized bodies in Korean media. Mainstream media and popular cultural products, particularly in entertainment reality shows, have circulated the representation of sexualized, assimilative, and racialized foreign women identity in Korea. (Beak & Hwang, 2009; Kim, Park, & Lee, 2009; Oh & Oh, 2015). It is not surprising to see how representations of foreign women are utilized to maintain gendered migration and Whiteness in Korea. For instance, there are two well-known television programs: *The Chatterbox of Beauties* and *Love in Asia.* These two programs depicted foreign women in a similar and different way. *Love in Asia* was programmed to show international marriage mostly between Korean men and foreign brides, and most of foreign brides were from developing countries. In order to maximize their "true" love, *Love in Asia* focused on the hardship that they faced in Korea society. At the end of most stories, the Korean husband and mother-in-law visited the family in the foreign bride's home country to understand her situation with true empathy. On the contrary, *The Chatterbox of Beauties* had a bevy of foreign beauties and mainly female foreign guests talked about various issues in Korea such as, campus culture, dating culture, pregnancy, and food etc. Different from foreign brides shown in *Love in Asia*, women guests in *The Chatterbox of Beauties* were fluent in Korean, well-educated, and came from various countries, but there was a difference of popularity between Western guests and non-Western guests (Kim, Park, & Lee, 2009). These two media representations reproduced a binary perception between educated women from Western countries and foreign brides in

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rural areas from the Third World. As well, all transnational women represented in both programs were sexualized and consumed by Korean men in different ways. Further, through this representation of transnational women, Korean society maintains the paternalistic position on immigrant women by encouraging them to overcome cultural differences (*Love in Asia*) or by consuming foreign women's ideas on already gendered topics as an entertainment factor (*The Chatterbox of Beauties*).

The gendered multicultural pathways of Korea are also expanded to the paternalized assimilation approach toward working immigrants, in particular those that are categorized as a "compassionate group" from developing countries (Ju & No 2013). Paternalized family refers to as hierarchical power of man who has control over a family for protecting the weaker and feminized subjects and pass on the man's family name to keep his family line. Thus, paternalized assimilation addresses the power of a host country, referred to as paternity, over foreign immigrants, referred as newly adopted children. Since immigrants need to secure their legal status, they should follow and assimilate into the system and rule of the host country (Oh & Oh, 2015). The discourse of assimilation has been underscored to erase the fear of losing racial and ethnical homogeneity by government and popular media. However, the paternalistic assimilation approach has been applied inconsistently. According to Oh and Oh (2015), Korea's neocolonial relationship to the United States makes Koreans situate themselves "along a neocolonial axis that privileges the United States as a paternal site from which recognition and acceptance is desired" (p.260). Indeed, the paternalized assimilation discloses not only the gendered multicultural system of Korean society, but also hierarchizes global relations among countries.

In this context, it is significant to rethink the tagline of *Non-Summit*: "The global youth gather together for the peaceful and blissful future in the globe." Among the diverse transnational identities in *Non-Summit*, I call for critical attention on the male-centered panelists in the show. At first look, the overt visibility of male dominant characters in the show explicitly reveals the male-centered space of *Non-Summit*. In order to challenge the male-centered characters, Son's research (2015) highlighted the work of gendered multiculturalism by comparing *Non-Summit* to *The Chatterbox of Beauties* in terms of discussion topics, target audience, and the format of programs. For instance, in *The Chatterbox of Beauties*, foreign women are chosen by a main male host to speak, and as the main audience, Korean men consume the sexualized femininity of the foreign women from the show. In *Non-Summit*, however, foreign male panelists freely raise their hands to participate in discussion, and Korean women consume the neoliberal and cosmopolitan masculinity of foreign panelists as main viewers (Son, 2015). Son's work (2015) also criticized *Non-Summit* as reinforcing the male privilege that entitles them to be representatives of their country and talk about political issues to make the world better. However, analyzing how White masculinity is privileged in *Non-Summit* is still needed. Besides, it is crucial to reveal how this White masculinity reproduces the gendered and racialized identity of foreign panelists by otherizing non-White masculinity. Put it another way, examination of transnational panelists is needed to see gendered representations and discourses in *Non-Summit* so as to address what is considered a dominant and desirable paternalized masculinity in Korea.

In sum, I spatialized Korean society by centering the U.S. military occupation in order to address the ideologically constructed favor of White and masculine foreign

identities, based on the dominant ideology of U.S. superiority. Through this section, I found that the current strategic being of Whiteness is the privileged identity, culture, and ideology in Korea as a way of prioritizing White or light skinned foreigners. As well, I recognized foreigners are classified and grouped as a collective identity; a group of immigrants from developing countries is degraded to reinforce a group of Westernized identity as the favorable one in Korea. Additionally, I knew gendered multiculturalism is differently applied to different racial bodies, and *Non-Summit* is already a gendered space with dominant visibility of male foreign panelists. By foregrounding ideologies of U.S. superiority, Anti Americanism, and gendered multiculturalism in Korea, I finally highlight the significance of examining *Non-summit* as a specific media space in which intersecting identities of foreign panelists are deliberately utilized to sustain the privilege of White heterosexual masculinity.

However, I deny the categorization or binary perception between the poor and the rich foreigners. This is because the binary categorization hardly capture how individual, dark skinned, and foreign identities are differently and delicately utilized to sustain the centrality of Whiteness in certain time and space. Further, this binary division neglects the intersecting power dynamics within the same categorized group. Hence, I emphasize analyzing individual foreign identities with the intersection of race, class, gender, nationality, and ethnicity, which allows me to highlight the complex operation of White dominated ideology in Korean society. Spatializing Korean society is a starting point of this thesis to make a connection to apply the feminist theoretical framework for analyzing *Non-Summit* as a mediated text. Starting from shedding light on the male-centered and White-dominant foreign representations in *Non-Summit*, I argue that the postcolonial

feminist theoretical approach is required to challenge the White heterosexual male

dominant representation of transnational identity in Korea.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Postcolonial Feminism Theoretical Framework

By drawing on feminist critique as a theoretical lens, I analyze racialized and gendered transnational identities in *Non-Summit,* so that it unravels the glocalized dominance of White heterosexual male representation in Korea. Feminist theory has evolved and branched out in many directions. Although each theory has different directions and foci, generally, the feminist theoretical framework has been applied to challenge social norms constructed and maintained by the dominant ideology of gender hierarchy and patriarchal hegemony. By problematizing the dominant hegemony, feminist theory re-situates marginalized groups to the center and provides counter-hegemonic narratives from nondominant voices (Calafell, 2012; Griffin, 2014; Kim, 2008; Ong, 1999; Shome, 2006; Shome, 2011a).

Particularly, intersectionality derived from Black feminist theory (Collins, 2000; Collins & Bilge, 2016; Collective, 1982; Crenshaw, 1989) has opened up the space for examining "how power relations are interwoven and mutually constructing; race, class, gender, sexuality, dis/ability, ethnicity, nation, religion, and age are categories of analysis, terms that reference important social division" (Collins & Blige, 2016, p.7). The intersected understanding of women's oppression is significant since each woman's oppression is differently hailed from multidirectional systemic inequality "tied to the contemporary economic and political position" of certain racial, class, gender, sexual, ethnic, and national identity (Collective, 1977, p.213). This critically nuanced

understanding of gender oppression allows us to rethink monolithic and homogenous representations of womanhood in the globalized context. As well, intersectionality brings alternative women's experiences and voices into this problematic monolithic representation to push against the underlying White-centered feminist inference. Along with the assumption that every woman experiences womanhood differently, intersectionality has to be utilized in a radical contextualization. Furthermore, the localized femininity and masculinity also have to be considered within certain historical, economic, and sociopolitical power contexts for the sheer utilizing of different womanhood. If not, it still ironically excludes other people who are experiencing differential marginalization in terms of race, sexuality, ability, ethnicity, class, and nationality in a specific time and space.

To do so, this research aims to employ the postcolonial feminist framework for challenging not only Whiteness but also hegemonic masculinity in Korean popular media in order to reveal how "unequal global relations of culture and economy continually articulate the politics of gender in any local context, and how local relations are always at work in macro global processes." (Shome, 2006, p.255). The postcolonial perspective has centered on the interrelated history of colonial domination, inequality, and injustice to address the fact that millions of people still consider and acknowledge something from the West as taken for granted or normative (Young, 2012). As what Spivak (1988) affirmed, knowledge about the Third world has been always associated with the political and economic interests of the west, and in particular for the Western audience. Ultimately, the objective of postcolonialism has to do with "a wide-ranging political project to reconstruct knowledge formations, reorient ethical norms, turn the power

structure of world upside down…" (Young, 2012, p.9). Thus, I contend that having a

postcolonial perspective is to cast a doubt on the Western-centered knowledge production

and to deconstruct the discursive colonization of the non-Western others.

Given this context, the underlying assumption of the postcolonial feminist is that

all women do not experience the same womanhood and gender hierarchy in a specific

time and space, but there are still vestiges of colonialism operating in and through

nations, cultures, economics, and desires which remain asymmetrically connected.

Unpacking continuing legacies of colonialism around the globe, postcolonial feminists

have problematized the representations of women in the "Third World" as a process of

"Othering" by dominant Western feminism (Mohanty, 1998; 2003). Frequently, the

process of otherizing Third world women accompanies centering White femininity as a

desired femininity. For instance, Shome (2011a) noted that how representational logics

articulate White women as global mothers, and critically analyzed how such

representations reproduce the transnational formation of Whiteness overall.

Furthermore, I argue the postcolonial feminist approach provides more critically

nuanced attention to transnational contexts because it denies a monolithic identity of

Third World women but insists instead on "the specificities of race, class, nationality,

religion, and sexualities that intersected with gender, and the hierarchies epistemic as

well as political, social, and economic that exist among women" (Mishra, 2013, p.131).

Thus, postcoloniality is inherently connected to the intersected interpretation of

womanhood in the Third world since intersectionality reveals the multi-faceted

construction of systematic oppression of race, class, gender, and sexuality (Eguchi &

Washington, 2016; Griffin, 2014). As well, intersectionality is not only a tool to investigate the layered oppressions of subordinate subjects but also used to problematize dominance such as Whiteness and class privilege, or in-group racialization of gender (Bilge & Denis, 2010). Thus, by decolonizing and reorienting feminism (Mohanty, 2003), postcolonial feminists divulge the multi-directed operation of power, problematize the politics of gender, and ultimately challenge the Westernized White patriarchal heterosexual centrality which is historically constructed and permeated as a normative referent globally.

In this regard, it is critical to utilize the postcolonial feminist frame as a decolonizing and counter-hegemonic approach to analyze *Non-Summit* because Shome and Hegde (2002b) noted postcoloniality "theorizes not just colonial conditions but why those conditions are what they are and how they can be undone and redone" (p.250). As mentioned earlier, the geopolitical space of Korea is imbricated with the asymmetrical and uneven relationship with U.S. military occupation. In order to address and theorize the neocolonial condition and what it is in Korea, it is imperative to understand locally constructed militarization of the U.S. Army bases, White heterosexual normativity and its implications for thinking gender in Korea. By acknowledging the production of discourse is a process of controlling, selecting, organizing, and distributing knowledge to discipline social subjects with dominant ideology (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008), I argue in this thesis that there is a certain implicated hegemonic discourse of White heterosexual normativity operating in and through representations of gendered and racialized identity in *Non-Summit*. Further this discourse occurs within the complex interconnected power between the U.S militarization, gendered multiculturalism, and racial formation in Korea.

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Therefore, finding how the neocolonial condition has been constructed by media representations to distribute certain discourse is the first step to undo the hegemonic ideology of White heterosexual normativity. I claim that postcolonial feminist theory allows us to analyze racialized and gendered representations in *Non-Summit* within a neocolonial spatial context of the U.S. military occupation in Korea. In this way, *Non-Summit* becomes a media space in which the representation of White heterosexual normativity is reproduced and distributed by the transnational identities selectively represented in the show. Therefore, the postcolonial feminist theoretical approach takes into account what is a possibly cumulative effect and power of these representations, and how the knowledge of normativity produced by media affects the global hegemonic ideology, and how different racial, national, gender, sexual, and ethnic groups are depicted differentially in this transnational context.

In summary, I explore the Whiteness and hegemonic masculinity through an examination of the representation of racialized and gendered transnational identity in *Non-Summit*. In doing so, I unpack the global and local power deployment of White hegemonic masculinity in the context of transnational space in Korea. For the data collection, I focus on episodes from the first season since there are some consistencies found in reference to main foreign characters in the show. For example, foreign male panelists have been significantly changed after the first season. For analysis, six episodes are selectively chosen based on viewing rate and sorted out based on global and local issues. More precisely, three episodes are selected based on agenda items related to global issues including key words such as discrimination, racism, multiculturalism, and global media etc. The other three episodes are picked based on agenda items related to

local issues such as domestic employment, love relationships, and domestic political

issues. Those different episodes are sorted out depending on titles of these episodes and

the overall content of discussion after viewing all episodes from the first season. For

instance, in episode 7, the discussion topic is "Marriage" and it is confusing whether this

topic is considered a local or global issue. However, the overall content is basically

criticizing the culture of marriage or love relationships in Korea. Thus, I decided to

analyze this episode as a local issue rather than a global one. Dividing topics into global

and local category is useful in two ways. First, it helps to examine how White,

heteronormative, and hegemonic masculinity is articulated as an universal truth or norm

through the discourse of global issues in *Non-Summit*. Second, it also demonstrates how

this "universal" value is centered to discuss localized issues, particularly within Korean

society, in a judgmental way. However, I acknowledge it is hard to say there is sorely

local issues because every issue is always already globalized in this transnational media

context. Providing more information on methodology, I address data collection and

research design in chapter two.

As for the further direction of this thesis, specifically, I investigate:1) how foreign

male characters in *Non-Summit* are racialized within the spatiality of power in Korea

where the U.S. military occupation is visibly and invisibly operating, 2) how foreign male

characters in *Non-Summit* are racially gendered, especially through highlighting the

hegemonic masculinity in the show, and finally 3) the ideological implications of media

representations of transnational identities in *Non-Summit* within the particular spatial

context of Korea. By doing so, I unpack how Whiteness and gendered multiculturalism

are reproduced in Korea, then connecting it to problematize White heterosexual

masculine representations in Korean media as a process of reproducing epistemology of Westernized ideology in Korea. In chapter two, analysis of the program gives details and explanations of *Non-Summit* as a global entertainment show and its production process, along with research problems guiding my work, key concepts driving this research, and the data collection procedure. Chapter three is an analysis of my findings and a discussion through the postcolonial feminist theoretical frame to challenge racialized and gendered representations in *Non-Summit*. The last section, chapter four tie all of the analyses together in order to demonstrate how *Non-Summit* reproduces the U.S. superiority and European Whiteness by distancing Asian value by discussing postracial and postgender ideologies implicitly reproduced in *Non-Summit*.

Ultimately, through this thesis, I expect to contribute to the field of communication, critical cultural studies, and Korean media studies in two main ways. First, by conducting research representations of racialized and gendered identities in Korean media, I illuminate dynamic and messy intersections of transnational identities in Korean society to rearticulate a cultural identity not as a monolithic but as an intersecting and complicated representations. Second, this research fills gaps in the field of transnational communication studies because it focuses on the analyses of racialized and gendered representations and its meaning making to reproduce Whiteness and hegemonic masculinity by Korean popular media. Most of the research conducted thus far focuses on how Korean nationalism impacts multicultural discourses in Korea through analyzing representations of foreign identities. This investigation thus opens new avenues for understanding racialized and gendered representations of foreign identities constructed by transnational Whiteness to highlight the broad operation of dominant hegemony.

Ultimately, in this thesis, I not only reveal the identity formation of foreigners in Korea, but also highlights how this formation, in turn, shapes the cultural identity of Koreans in this globalized era.

<center>**Chapter 3**</center>

<center>**Methodology**</center>

In the previous chapter, I contextualized Korean society as a historically and geopolitically contested space in which transnational identities are differentially hierarchized in terms of race and gender. Built on the previous literature review, this section focuses on the methodological approach, development of research questions, and the detailed program information. In this thesis, I apply critical textual analysis to examine the discursive strategy of representations of transnational panelists in *Non-Summit*, so as to call a critical attention to the dominant ascendancy of White heterosexual masculinity operating in and through the show. To begin, this chapter delineates the research questions, key concepts, and a concept of textual analysis in order to clarify the direction of this study. Then, detailed information of the program is addressed, particularly focusing on the production process, foreign panelists, and controversial issues related to the production crews or panelists in the show.

Research Questions

1) How are foreign male characters in *Non-Summit* racialized within the media text?

2) How are foreign male characters in *Non-Summit* gendered, especially through highlighting the hegemonic masculinity in the show?

3) What are the ideological implications of media representations of transnational identities in *Non-Summit* within the particular spatial context of Korea?

Key concepts

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Based on the research questions, I define four concepts: Representation, discourse, hegemonic masculinity, and ideology. I understand representation as a "system of meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another" (Hall, 1985, p.103). With this definition, a system of representation is not separable from ideological knowledge constructing every social practices and interactions among people. Thus, examining representation of transnational identities in *Non-Summit* refers to a process of uncovering certain ideological assumption operating in and through racialized and gendered foreign identities in Korean society. Discourse is defined as a systemic process to inscribe "what is and is not appropriate in our formation of, and our practices in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity" (Hall, 1997, p. 6). Hence, it is significant to examine discourse to recognize what kind of knowledge is considered as a relevant true in a certain context. In this paper, discourse is utilized to divulge how the racialized and gendered representation of foreign panelists are articulated to reproduce the dominant norm of the White centrality in *Non-Summit*. Hegemonic masculinity is "the currently most honored way of being a man, it requires all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimates the global subordination of women to men" (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). In the case of *Non-Summit*, hegemonic masculinity is adopted to expose how the discursive strategy of representation privileges White heterosexual masculinity as an ascendancy among foreign male panelists. Ideology, in this study, refers to "the consent of subjects of inequitable relations of power" to keep the hegemonic system as a common sense of the social relation (Stoddart, 2007, p.214). Particularly, by centering U.S. military occupation in Korea, I argue it is crucial to connect the dominant ideology of U.S. exceptionalism to the

representation of White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity as a superior transnational identity in *Non-Summit*.

As previously mentioned, I use critical textual analysis to examine the racialized and gendered representations in *Non-Summit*. In light of poststructuralism, I acknowledge that the four key concepts above are interconnected to frame the production of knowledge and hegemonic power in this study. The discourse of transnational identities shapes the system of thoughts of those who are more acceptable, favorable, or common as foreign others by representing certain images through media. Media, as an institutional site of hegemonic discourse production, circulate the stereotypical representations. Through representations, media convince individuals to participate in the consent of recognizing a White, Western, and heterosexual masculine identity as a legitimate, cultural, political, and economic identity over others. In this vein, I admit it is essential to read *Non-Summit* as an analyzable text, as a part of ideological work, since contemporary culture does involve the process of how consent to social power is produced (Stoddart, 2007). Therefore, analyzing *Non-Summit* as a media text unpacks the discursive strategies that frame racialized and gendered representations of transnational identity in the show. Finally, through my analysis, I aim to unfold the dominant ideology of the White heterosexual masculinity operating in and through *Non-Summit*.

Critical Textual Analysis

Textual analysis is a type of qualitative analysis to demonstrate "the narrative structure, symbolic arrangement, and ideological potential of media content" and thereby, popular culture media are utilized within "the underlying ideological and cultural

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assumptions of the text" (Fursich, 2009, p.239-240). For instance, Berkowitz (2005) examined news about female Palestinian suicide bombers by using textual analysis of newspaper items. It is found that journalists deployed mythical archetypes to fit in the ideological assumption of who are suicide bombers and women warriors within two realms: realities of occurrences and resonance of myths. It means journalists produced the specific texts of news articles to resonate with the taken-for-granted knowledge of representations of a suicide bomber in this postwar era. This shows both journalists and audiences produce and read off the media texts within the ideological and cultural assumptions to prove the social order that they have understood is, indeed, intact and logical. Hence, analyzing media as a cultural text is worthy to investigate in and of itself, but more valuable when it is situated within the larger structure of social relations and discursive formation.

However, analyzing texts, particularly those related to popular culture, has been criticized by a lack of engagement with the empirical approach such as the everyday practices or experiences of participants (Fursich, 2009; Phillipov, 2013). According to the criticism, reading texts reinscribes the researchers' interpretation of popular culture and to disregard the participants' context or experience of the consuming process. As what Phillipov (2013) maintained, however, it is not possible for the empirical research method to offer a purely neutral reading by participants because of "the constructed nature of participants' discursive justification" (p.217). To put it plainly, an empirical research method such as the ethnographic interview limits to reveal the structured ideological power, although the ideological operation is crucial to shape interpretations among

participants. This happens when the empirical research method sorely highlights participants' consumption part without taking into account a structural context.

Additionally, in *Encoding and Decoding,* Hall (2001a) not only emphasized the different decoding processes of messages among different audiences, but also demonstrated the connected process between encoding and decoding moments; circulation and reception are differentiated moments but they are related "within the totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a whole" (p.165). Considering each argument over analyzing media text, I emphasize the importance of applying textual analysis in shedding light on the interconnected circulation between encoding and decoding within the structured and power-involved system of discourse. I affirm if the overall communicative process necessarily occurs within the already constructed discursive system, it is significant to examine what ideological impact the media text produces, in order to implant a particular message to audiences. When it comes to the interconnected totality, this approach of reading media text and investigating the ideological potential allows audiences to have a chance for taking part in media literacy by critically engaging with media content (Kellner, 2011). Meanwhile, this approach also leads me to situate this study in the field of Critical Cultural Studies, which takes into account the politics of representation and ideological impact of the dominant reading of foreign identities in a certain time and space of Korean society. Hence, I recognize *Non-Summit* as a media text and thus analyze it as a site of "ideological potential and interpret its mediated impact" (Washington, 2012, p.255), beyond the debate over a weighted interpretation of production or consumption of media text.

In addition, I acknowledge *Non-Summit* needs to "be studied within the social-relations and system through which culture is thus intimately bound up with the study of society, politics, and economics" (Kellner, 2011, p. 8). This allows me to analyze *Non-Summit* as a media text by connecting to the larger discursive structure formed by the historical, economic, and geopolitical context of Korean society in order to unload the ideological effect of popular media. Finally, I then aim to enumerate the ways in which the media text of *Non-Summit* reproduces the discursive strategies while implicitly implanting the White-centered ideology shaped by neocolonial practice of the U.S. military occupation since 1945. Therefore, by saying "reading *Non-Summit*", I mean to watch the television show repeatedly and focus on verbal and audiovisual elements of the media text, so as to detect the discursive strategy in the representations of transnational identity in the show. Eventually, I read this discursive formation of representations by situating it within a systematic relation of historical, social, and geopolitical context of Korea. To do so, I will extend the contextual information of *Non-Summit*, in the next section, by elaborating what institutional operation is involved and how *Non-Summit* has produced a particular discourse within this context.

Non-Summit as a Relevant Text

In this section, I aim to explain different ways of shaping the specific media space of *Non-Summit*. I provide a detailed explanation of program production including information of the broadcasting company, a dispute and criticism of the show, and information of foreign panelists. Through this explanation, I demonstrate two main points: First, it is necessary to provide the broadcasting company's economic and

political standpoint since it adds an essential axis of power operation to the discursive

formation in *Non-Summit*. Second, I address the personal features of foreign panelists

more specifically to highlight the intersected layers of race, gender, sexuality, and

ethnicity as I analyze the interactions among transnational identities in *Non-Summit*.

Non-Summit as a part of broadcasting company

   Non-Summit is a representative entertainment program of Joongang Tongyang

Broadcasting Corporation (JTBC), a Korean nationwide general cable broadcasting

company. Since 2011, JTBC has opened a new private broadcasting station and produced

diverse television programs mainly including entertainment shows, soap operas, and

sports programs. In 2014, JTBC was ranked at the top of an assessment of mass media

credibility, thereby which illustrates its influence on the Korean media industry. As a

core identity, JTBC proclaims its genealogy as a Tongyang Broadcasting Corporation

(TBC)'s later self, thus TBC was rebranded as JTBC. TBC was an affiliated company to

Samsung Group, but compulsorily merged into Korean Broadcasting Company (KBS) by

the forceful media regulation from Korean government in 1980. Hence, revitalizing TBC

from the dark side of media history, JTBC seemingly represents a counterforce to the

government regulation over media. However, there has been a huge controversy over

JTBC's lack of legitimacy as a "neutral" broadcasting corporation. This is because JTBC

is owned by one dominant stockholder, Joongang Newspaper Corporation (*Joongang

Ilbo*). These connections prove problematic since Joong-ang News Corporation is mainly

owned by the Samsung group and the chairman of *Joongang Ilbo* is a family member of

Samsung's owner. This interconnected relation between the press and conglomerate is

integrally assumed when a program of JTBC is analyzed due to a specific economic and political interests between power of institutions. Therefore, media products produced by JTBC should be interpreted within the particular profit-relevant stance of capitalism, neoliberalism, and anti-government.

Additionally, JTBC's main slogan is "Diverse Enjoyment" and the Corporate Identity (CI) is the logo of a rainbow with the written slogan using the color of rainbow, which implies the pursuit of diversity and creativity while distancing it from skewed or narrow perspectives. This slogan seems to adequately qualify *Non-Summit* as a representative entertainment program in JTBC. As a type of talk-show, *Non-Summit* projects diverse foreign panelists and suggests creative resolutions of global or local issues from these panelists. In other words, *Non-Summit* is a space with which the two main slogans of JTBC perfectly match because the presence of foreign panelists explicitly signifies diverse and creative multicultural values.

> Whereas world leaders at the UN Summit discuss about an international peace and security system, the twelve foreign panelists, who insist themselves as a representative of each country, gather together and hold a "Non-Summit" in Korea for the peaceful and blissful future of the global youth (Im, 2014b).

This opening line of the show, therefore, could be understood within the concept of the main slogan of JTBC to disclose how *Non-Summit* tries to accomplish its diversity and creativity throughout the program. For instance, in the beginning of the program, twelve foreign panelists announced major news from each country as a weekly newscast. However, the short news report is not enough to show worldwide and diverse issues since

there are only twelve countries that viewers are regularly exposed to. In addition, there

have been frequent public opinions questioning the limited visibility of main foreign

countries, and requesting more inclusion from worldwide countries. Therefore, *Non-*

Summit has tried to create "global diversity" in the program. More precisely, the

production crew created a new subsidiary program is called, "*What is this country? It is*

our neighbor!" (*Mwonnara? iunnara!*). It is a subsidiary section in which a weekly

foreign representative from various countries, mostly different from the countries already

introduced, appears and presents their culture before the main foreign panelists start a

discussion. With this subsidiary program, therefore, the production crews not only did

become more inclusive, and thereby a more desirable program for audiences, but also

accomplished the main slogan of JTBC, "Diverse Enjoyment," by adding more "fresh"

foreigners that audience can enjoy.

Based on what is discussed above, I argue *Non-Summit* has to be placed under a

shadow of institutional force from JTBC. When I understand the media space of *Non-*

Summit within the influence of JTBC, it broadens or adds contexts to how and why the

foreign characters are recruited and represented in the show. In addition, revealing the

connection between *Non-Summit* and JTBC explains how a particular program forms its

identity within an institutional context. Specifically, it means that a program mostly

embodies a specific stance or purpose of the broadcasting company. Thereby, this

contextualization allows us to connect the discourse produced by a program of JTBC to

the larger power structure of broadcasting institutions, and further, of Korean society.

Therefore, the information of media institution offers me the eligibility of applying

textual analysis to this thesis because the institutional influence reveals the larger force of

social structures operates in and through representations and discourses *Non-Summit* reproduces.

Non-Summit as a negotiated media space

Since 2014, *Non-Summit* has led a new trend of "foreigners in entertainment shows." It is overgeneralized to say that *Non-Summit* is a cornerstone of this new trend of variety shows since foreign guests started appearing in Korean media. However, it is recognizable that *Non-Summit* has opened up a new media space by centering the foreign panelists as main characters who lead most of the discussion in the show and suggest varied ideas to Korean society; it is differentiated from previous programs in which foreign guests are simply portrayed as extra characters to entertain the major Korean audience by providing their struggles and experiences of assimilation in Korean society. Leading this new trend of variety shows, *Non-Summit* won an award for the best variety show at the Baeksang Art Award in 2015 (Jang, 2015). Moreover, production crews started spinning a new program off from *Non-Summit* in 2015, and selling the publication rights to China and Turkey. The increased popularity of *Non-Summit* and the export of its content not only verifies the considerable influence of *Non-Summit* on the Korean media industry, but also analytically extends its influence of the discourse that *Non-Summit* has produced and circulated as information, knowledge, and value.

This last sentence leads me to address an important point: *Non-Summit* as a negotiated media space. By introducing a new variety show in 2014, production crews of *Non-Summit* seemed to hit the "spot" in which the globalization of Korean society and fresh entertaining factors are intersected. To maximize entertaining points, producers and

writers of variety shows tend to use provocative images and exaggerated content in the

program. *Non-Summit* is not an exception, but achieves this differently. *Non-Summit* does

not sell provocative images but promotes the exotic cultural information to its audience.

Since *Non-Summit* has utilized culture, global diversity, and foreigners as entertaining

factors in the show, contents of the show is oftentimes put under critical inspections from

audience. For instance, some viewers take the content of discussion from the show as an

entertaining point, however, others focus on the informative aspect of the show and

evaluate whether panelists or production crews provide appropriate or morally suitable

knowledge to the audience. To elaborate this further, I want to discuss several disputes

about the certain information, knowledge and value produced by *Non-Summit*.

Specifically, I emphasize the specific debate over the Rising Sun Flag and *Kimigayo*

since it explicitly exposes a process of negotiation between audience and production

crews. In the 40th episode, the Rising Sun Flag was shown when a Japanese panelist

showed a picture of mega-sized and expensive tuna found in Japan, and *Kimigayo* was

for a temporal Japanese panelist as a background music in the 17th episode. It aroused

public anger from the audience since the Rising Sun Flag and *Kimigayo* symbolize

Japanese imperialism, which is a reminder to the Korean audience of their colonial

history tied with Japan. In response to criticism from its audiences, the production crew

of *Non-Summit* posted a public apology. However, this controversy was so intense that it

threatened the moral core of *Non-Summit*. Since, the Korea Communication Standards

Commission became involved in this incident to deliberate the contents of *Non-Summit*.

This example well demonstrates that audiences critically receive the information,

knowledge, and value produced by *Non-Summit* although they express different opinions

on the content or controversy from the show. Audiences not just focus or consume *Non-Summit* as an entertaining show, but also evaluate or challenge the appropriateness of contents that *Non-Summit* produces. It underlines how influential and important the representation and discourse that *Non-Summit* produces are to audiences and how audiences are critically engaged with the content of *Non-Summit*. However, most importantly, the criticism was mainly aimed at the production crew, not foreign panelists. This illuminates the role of the production crew in managing who controls certain content or opinions from foreign panelists, and the audience's perception that production crews invisibly but manifestly are involved in producing the value-laden discourse in *Non-Summit*. Therefore, it notes that audience acknowledge the authority and power of the production crew on the content of *Non-Summit* and it also enables me to center my analysis on representations and discourse of the show in this study, which resonates with my use of critical textual analysis. In sum, I provided detailed context of *Non-Summit* as a relevant media text to study. By demonstrating how the institutional power operates underneath the show, I aimed to take into account the larger structures involved in the construction of media text. Then, by examining *Non-Summit* as a negotiated site with viewers, I highlighted the production of images and discourse to be interrogated in this thesis. From the next section, I provide detailed information on the foreign panelists to stress the complex intersecting identity of transnational characters in *Non-Summit*.

The foreign representatives – The Group of twenty

Before introducing the foreign characters, I want to point out how *Non-Summit* casts the panelists. On the main website of *Non-Summit*, a section is available for

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foreigners to apply to participate in the program. A guideline is posted by the production

crew and anyone can freely post an application after becoming a member. When posting

an application, a prospective panelist needs to put his name, age, nationality, fluency in

Korean, job, degree, and period of residence in Korea. Then, the applications are

accessible only to the production crew, so it is not clearly suggested what specific

processes are involved after producers review the applications. However, one point is

obvious that the production crew for *Non-Summit* is in the position of authority to select

foreign panelists. Since the only production looks through applications and contacts

"suitable" foreigners for an interview. The main producer explains the standard they set

for casting panelists in *Non-Summit*.

> There were two main points to be considered when we cast foreign panelists:
>
> First, we looked for new foreigners who have not appeared on television shows
>
> before. Second, it was necessary to cast foreigners who have spent most part of
>
> life in their homelands. In addition, we tried to avoid casting the half-Korean
>
> foreigners since it is hard to rule out the influence of Korean's traditional values
>
> from the half-Korean family (Jung & Choi, 2014)

In this part of interview, the main producer, Jung-a Im, addressed what standards were

considered when production crew casted foreign panelists in the first season of *Non-*

Summit. According to Jung-a Im, production crews did cast the eleven foreign panelists

who are not influenced by Korean cultural traditions, thus Korean audiences enjoy the

unknown, new, and fresh foreign identities in *Non-Summit*. In addition, it is important for

production crews to cast foreign characters who could communicate their perspectives

clearly, since foreign panelists are required to express their opinions during the discussion. For example, when production crews had an interview with Robin Deiana, who is the foreign panelist from France, they thought he was qualified to join the program since he expressed opinions clearly although he was not fluent in Korean. Through this interview, it is found that the standard of selecting foreigners matches with what production aims for in *Non-Summit*: a talk show suggesting unconventional solutions from foreign perspectives. Therefore, production needs fresh, authentic, and exotic foreigners who have more experiences in their home land and are less exposed to Korean traditions. Simultaneously, producers demand foreign characters who are educated and assimilated moderately. Therefore, foreign panelists are able to express their viewpoints clearly and fluently in Korean and participate in producing the sense of "Korean comedy."

In this context, I expect to reveal what type of foreigners are picked as main characters by providing detailed information on the foreign panelists in this following section. More precisely, I select twelve foreign panelists from the first season which I concentrate on in this study. First, nine initial panelists (Patry, Alberto, Rasch, Kaya, Okyere, Zhang, Terada, Deiana, and Lindemann) who have gained popularity and public awareness through the first season are chosen. Second, three panelists (Belyakov, Rashad, and Gorito) who replaced the vacancies in the middle of the first season are added. I add these three panelists since their existence has provided many dynamic aspects regarding racialized and gendered identity in the show, which shares a context of the research goal of this thesis. To delineate the information of foreign panelists, I include the basic profiles provided by production, personal information provided by news articles

and blogs, and the particular image or characteristic of each panelist constructed throughout the show.

Guillaume Patry is from Canada. Guillaume used to work as a professional programmer, but he is currently known and working as an entertainer after appearing in *Non-Summit* as a panelist. Patry is oftentimes depicted as "cute" guy due to a particular accent and meaning of his name in Korean. Thus, his comments are interpreted as a romantic way, which is amplified with the subtitles produced by crews.

Alberto Mondi is from Italy. Mondi used to work as a dealer at Fiat Chrysler Automobiles in Korea, but he also becomes an entertainer after appearing in *Non-Summit*. Mondi majors in Chinese and he got married to Korean woman and has settled down in Korea after marriage. He has positioned himself as a romantic Italian man in *Non-Summit*. Among Koreans, his strong accented Korean has been popular by calling it "Alberto-style Korean".

Tyler Rasch is from the United States. Rasch was born in Vermont and graduated from the University of Chicago. While he was on the show, Rasch studied diplomatic science at the Seoul National University. He can speak six different languages including English, Korean, French, and Japanese. Among foreign panelists, Rasch is called "smart guy" or "power brain" since he can speak Korean fluently and make "professional" comments by mentioning the historical and cultural background of Korea.

Enes Kaya is from Turkey. After graduating from high school, Kaya moved to Korea for studying technology at Hanyang University. Besides his study, Kaya has taken an active part in Korean media by constantly appearing in movies and entertainment

shows. In *Non-Summit*, Kaya has been depicted as a unique and conservative character who is against liberal panelists from western countries. He got married to Korean woman, but he was suspected of adultery with other Korean women while he was on the show. Because of severe criticisms from the audience, Kaya dropped out from the program and flew back to Turkey with his family.

Samuel Okyere is from Ghana. Okyere was elected as a scholarship student by Korean government and studied computer engineering at Sogang University. After appearing in *Non-Summit*, he switched the gear to become an entertainer in Korea. Okyere has been in over ten entertainment shows and two movies since 2014. In *Non-Summit*, he is described as a funny character since he sometimes says something out of context or unrealistic. Particularly, other foreign panelists requests for double-checking what he said to production crews when he talks about the experience or knowledge of his hometown, Ghana in Africa because it sounds unrealistic to them.

Yuan Zhang is from China. Zhang is studying Chinese language at Seoul National University and working as a professional Chinese instructor in Korea. In *Non-Summit*, Zhang is projected as a patriarchal, Confucian, and conservative Chinese guy since his comments are frequently based on Sinocentrism and nationalism. At the beginning of the season, Zhang was at a peak of his stubborn attitude, but he has been getting "changed" or "open-minded" through discussions with other panelists at the end of the show.

Takuya Terada is from Japan. Terada is a vocalist of the group "Cross Gene" in Korea and he has appeared in a various range of Korean media such as movies, dramas, and entertainment shows. Because of his quiet and calm personality, Terada is called "a

delicate hand (*Seomseomoksu*)" in *Non-Summit*. This nickname refers a slender and delicate woman's hand and it highlights a feminine gesture made by Terada in the show.

Robin Deiana is from France. Deiana came to Korean since he has had a big interest in Korean culture, especially in *Hallyu*. In *Non-Summit*, Deiana is elected as the most handsome panelists in the show by viewers. Nicknamed the "Paris Baguette guy" in *Non-Summit*, Deiana represents an image of soft, kind, and cute French guy who has the "Korean dream" to become a popular celebrity although he is not fluent enough in Korean, compared to other foreign panelists.

Daniel Lindemann is from Germany. Lindemann came to Korea as an exchange student in Korean University, then found a job in a Korean business consulting company. Lindemann is projected as a typical German guy who has no sense of humor or who is always serious in *Non-Summit*. Lindemann has a serious attitude and tone of voice when he joins to discussion in the show. Since dropping out *Non-Summit* he has been shown in various entertainment shows in Korea.

Ilya Belyakov is from Russia. Belyakov is a medical interpreter and majoring in Korean language and literature at Yonsei University. Belyakov appeared in *Non-Summit* due to the recommendation given by Tyler Rasch. Belyakov is very fluent in Korean and he can speak three different languages Korean, Russian, and English. Thus, Belyakov is represented as "smart guy" with Tyler Rasch in the show. However, because of ideological difference, Rasch (the United States) and Belyakov (Russia) are put in both extreme positions in the discussion.

Samy Rashad is from Egypt. Rashad is invited and funded by Korean government as a scholarship student. Rashad studies Korean language and literature at Seoul National University. After Enes Kaya was dropped out from the show due to the suspicion of adultery, Rashad became a main panelist coming from an Islamic country. Rashad is depicted as a conservative panelist with Zhang Yuan in *Non-Summit*. Moreover, Okyere, and Rashad are called "African brothers" since they are from same "geographic continent" and have similar pronunciation of their names.

Carlos Gorito is from Brazil. Gorito studied Business at Sungkyunkwan University that is one of the prominent private universities in terms of business education in Korea. Gorito works at the Brazilian Embassy in Korea as a person in charge of education. Gorito was the first main panelist coming from South America. In addition, Gorito got the nickname "samba debater" since he has had intense discussion against to the conservative panelists such as Rashad and Zhang in *Non-Summit*.

Research Design

In this thesis, I aim to focus on the first season of *Non-Summit*; the first season includes 102 episodes that have been aired from the year of 2014 to 2015. The early success in getting big attention from Korean viewers is one of the reasons why I want to concentrate on the first season. *Non-Summit* has been evaluated as a novel, fresh, and sensational entertainment show in Korea in which multiculturalism is becoming a rising issue. Therefore, the first season of *Non-Summit* is easy to become an issue, only because there are foreigners who are fluent in Korean have a bit serious discussion. Its high popularity has been proved by a viewing rate. The first season had a viewing rate over

five percent, and at its highest point, reached 5.5%. In addition, during the first season, six foreign panelists have been on the show as the regular debaters, which provides a consistency of constructing a particular context in *Non-Summit*. Not surprisingly, the six regular panelists become a core identity of the program itself and they start new career as professional entertainers in Korea. Therefore, this season is to become a particularly relevant site to study since I expect there are the repetitive pattern of representations of foreign panelists and it becomes the consistent and solid identity of *Non-Summit*.

For data collection, I choose six episodes from the first season; three episodes are picked for discussing a global issue and three episodes are for a local issue. More specifically, as the first step of data collection, I classify the twelve panelists into three groups, based on how long panelists have been on the show and which episodes they appeared in. The first group includes Patry, Mondi, Rasch, Okyere, Zhang, and Lindemann who have been on the show during the whole episodes of the first season (from the first to the 102th episode). The second group has Deiana, Kaya, and Terada who have been on the show during the early stage of the season (from the first to the 53th episode). The last group contains Rashad, Belyakov, and Gorito who have been on the show during the late stage of the season (from the 53th to the 102th episode). Then, I divide 102 episodes of the first season into three parts in order to get a same chance of exposing each panelist in the show; and it is based on the classified groups of foreign panelists. The first part is from the first to the 25th episode; the second part is from the 26th episode to the 53th episode; and the last part is from the 54th episode to the 102th episode. After that, I choose two episodes, one for a global and one for a local issue, from each of three parts. Particularly, I picked two local episodes from the third part because

the number of episodes in the third part is more than other two parts, and two episodes have significant debate topics related to the purpose of this thesis. When I select certain episodes, I consider both viewing rate and the theme of debate. For instance, in the first part, I choose the 7th episode (debate topic: Marriage; viewing rate: 4.0%) as a local issue and the 22th episode (debate topic: Discrimination; viewing rate: 4.4%) as a global issue. In the second part, I select the 46th episode (debate topic: Hatred; viewing rate: 3.2%) as a global issue and the 42th episode (debate topic: Lookism; viewing rate: 4.2%) as a local issue. Lastly, for the last part, I include the 59th episode (debate topic: Gender role; viewing rate: 3.9%) as a global issue. As local issues, the 71th episode (debate topic: Gold and bronze spoon; viewing rate: 3.4%) and the 60th episode (debate topic: Multiculturalism; viewing rate: 3.7%).

With this process of collecting data, I acknowledge it is a blurred boundary between global and local issues. Although it is not clear enough to separate local issues from global ones, I did sort the episodes since I would like to highlight the glocalized power of Whiteness: (1) how the dominance of White centrality is shaped as the universal value by panelists and (2) how the universal norm is utilized to evaluate a local issue that Korean society faces. For the research procedure, I focus on examining the ways verbal and audiovisual factors of the media text constitutes repetitive and collective patterns of representations of foreign panelists. More precisely, I classify the episodes into two groups (global and local issue), then watch each group repetitively. When I first watch the show, I concentrate on how each foreign panelist approaches to each global or local agenda, what their perspectives are about each agenda, and how the agenda is judged by panelists in order to expose which perspective or value is pursued and put above others.

For the second viewing, I more focus on the ways of constructing a certain representation of each foreign panelist through the interactive conversation with other panelists. Lastly, I watch each group of episodes to observe how the representation of each foreign panelist is articulated to racialized and gendered identity in the context of *Non-Summit*. Then, I organize the pattern of representations thematically to reveal how it is discursively articulated to shape the dominance of White heterosexual masculinity in *Non-Summit*.

In sum, I aim to research the discursive strategy of representations of foreign panelists in *Non-Summit* by applying critical textual analysis. Considering media text as a site of ideological impact, I address what discursive strategies are deployed to shape the racialized and gendered representations through the particularly constructed ideology in Korea. Furthermore, critical textual analysis enables me to situate the representations within the larger discursive structure formed by the historical, economic, and geopolitical context. It is helpful to see the transnational operation of the dominant ideology of Whiteness. Ultimately, I expect to expose the dominance of White heterosexual masculinity in order to show the systematic ways of sustaining the inequality and hierarchy of racialized and gendered others, recognizing *Non-Summit* as a critical media text.

Chapter 4

Findings and Discussion

The discussion of findings is organized based on three main points. First, I examine the evolution of foreign characters in *Non-Summit* in order to reveal how each panelist is given their nicknames or certain character roles. Characterization is related to how each foreign panelist approaches a global or local agenda, what their perspectives are about each agenda, and how the agenda is judged by the other panelists. Not only does characterization affect verbal exchanges among panelists, but production crews are also involved in shaping each character's identity by editing scenes and providing subtitles. My approach to representation leads me to focus on the way in which verbal conversation and audiovisual elements, such as subtitles or background music, are used to construct each panel's characters in *Non-Summit*. Through this examination, I find that characterization and editorial voice reinforce the division between Western and non-Western panelists. I determine editorial voice as subtitles and audiovisual elements produced by production crews of *Non-Summit*. By examining editorial voice, I argue institutional influence on production process actively participates in reproducing representations of foreign panelists in the show. Furthermore, this dichotomous category between Western and non-Western panelists is complicated by an appearance of a neutral and moderate position. Second, I discuss the utility of conservative masculinity, gender egalitarianism, subsidiary programs, and homosexuality. I use the word utility to expose how othered identities are employed to sustain the heteronormative and liberal masculinity in *Non-Summit*, for instance, Conservative masculinity as an entertaining

factor and gender egalitarianism as a fantasy of Western property are discussed in this

chapter. Third, I investigate what discursive strategies emerged to separate White,

Western, and heterosexual, identities from othered groups by analyzing the discussion

about racism and groups that are hated in the show. For this purpose, the contents of

discussion and characterization of each panelist from six episodes are used to illustrate

my main argument.

West versus non-West, and the U.S.

In *Non-Summit*, each panelist shows hands to vote for discussion, and this voting

process seemingly supports individual choice and action. However, the panelists' choice

is already restricted within the dichotomous category "normal" or "abnormal," which

easily marks the binary division between liberal and conservative viewpoint.

Furthermore, this division is oftentimes extended to the boundary between the West and

the non-West, although the boundary varies according to the specific characterization of

panelists on the show. In episode 7, for instance, panelists vote on whether it is normal

for people to feel marriage is obligatory in Korean society. Zhang, Terada, Patry, and

Kaya vote for "normal", since marriage is essential for family, birth, and society. Mondi,

Okyere, Deiana, Lindemann, and Rasch vote for "abnormal" since they value individual

freedom of choice and love relationship. In this example, except for Guillaume Patry,

most of panelists voting for "abnormal" are from Western countries. Addressing his

opinion is unusual, Patry distances himself from majority of Canadians and keeps

liberalism as a dominant value in Canada. This comment subsequently clarifies an

explicit division between liberal West and conservative non-West in terms of understanding what is marriage to be.

The most noticeable difference between votes in episode 7 is between Yuan Zhang from China and Tyler Rasch from the U.S. Zhang's decision is usually against to Rasch's decision, which is linked the different characterization between Zhang and Rasch. Regarding characterization, Zhang is referred to as "a trigger of controversy" or "Yuan's attacking" (Yoon, 2015c). These nicknames and subtitles are used to mock Zhang's patriarchal standpoint because his argument is immediately challenged by Western panelists in order to interrupt or interrogate Zhang's standpoint. With this characterization, Zhang's ideas sound like rough or unfiltered conservative idea thereby his argument is taken as an attack or trigger among the dominant Western participants. For instance, in episode 59, Zhang insists clear difference in gender roles since women are naturally different from men who have stronger physical condition than women. Then, other panelists, most of Western panelists, want to cut off or refute Zhang's patriarchal or conservative idea and subtitle is shown, noting "a trigger of controversy." One of panelists challenging Zhang's idea is Rasch. Thus, when Zhang triggers a controversy among panelists, Rasch jumps in the discussion to suggest a different perspective to Zhang's idea. Contrary to Zhang, Rasch embarrasses other panelists with his academic and professional comments. Then, other panelists ask Rasch to clarify his academic idea, so that they can easily understand the argument. Based on his professional and fluent comments, Rasch's high education from the United States allows him to be referred to as a "Mr. Know-it-all" (Im, 2014a). With this different characterization,

Zhang's idea is oftentimes situated as the opposite to Rasch's. This is encoded during the following exchange between Zhang and Rasch in episode 7:

> Zhang: "My future wife will give up her bachelor [degree] and become a housewife. She always prepares breakfast, of course!"
>
> Hyun-moo: "Let's listen Tyler's idea."
>
> Rasch: "I think marriage is a strategic relationship based on love, and we should consider the marriage has positive variability in the future."

At this point in the episode, Zhang shares his fantasy about a future marriage by highlighting his submissive, docile, and domestic housewife. While Zhang n is talking, Rasch's unpleasant facial expression is caught on camera which is amplified with the subtitle of "sigh." Then, one of Korean hosts points Rasch to speak his thoughts. At this point, the subtitle line is shown noting "On contrary (to Zhang), how about Rasch who is always rational?" (Yeo, 2014). This subtitle explicitly positions Rasch as a rational or well-informed panelist. By putting Zhang's idea on the opposite side of Rasch's idea, Zhang's marriage fantasy becomes an irrational idea. The irrational idea is interrelated to Zhang's characterization, which is subsequently interpreted as being patriarchal and having a conservative understanding of marriage. In this exchange, I found the subtitles and production actively participating to construct this different position between Zhang and Rasch through characterization. Subtitles are written visual icons inside dialogue blurbs that appear on the screen simultaneously with the spoken words of the panelists. Since subtitles are a form of editorial voice with authority that offers a different interpretation of verbal dialogue, nonverbal language or psychological states of

characters, subtitles constitute the atmosphere or context of the show, to the point that they can drive the meaning making activity of audiences. Therefore, the opposite boundary between the rational and irrational idea of marriage is not only constituted by panelists' conversation, but also by the editorial authority in *Non-Summit*.

In this episode, the opposite characterization between Zhang and Rasch is extended to a binary division between the West and the East. By grouping panelists from China, Japan, Turkey, and Korea, a Korean guest notes that Eastern countries have a similar culture and tradition of marriage. Such a narrative is particularly explicit in the following exchange between Zhang and Julian Quintart from Belgium.

> Quintart: "I was surprised when Koreans ask someone when he or she is going to get married. Is it same in China, Japan, and Turkey?"
>
> Zhang: "China has a similar culture because both countries have Confucianism culture."

In this exchange, Quintart refers to China, Japan, and Turkey, in order to group them as Asian countries. By questioning the cultural similarity among Asian countries, Quintart distances himself by claiming ignorance of Asian cultural practices. In response, Zhang notes Confucianism as a connection between Korea and China, which is known for its emphasis on collective identity, social ritual, and patriarchy. After Zhang's talking point, no other Asian panelists comment on Quintart's question and, the conversation is cut. By editing or silencing alternative perspectives on Asian marriage culture, production reproduces the view of Asian countries as a homogeneous group with a tag of Confucianism. In addition, this homogenization is used to separate Western panelists

from Confucianism, which consequently leads division between the West and the East. However, this binary division between the West and the East becomes complicated when Rasch's idea of marriage is situated as a practical and in-between position. In episode 22, I found comments made by the European panelists, Alberto Mondi, Daniel Lindemann, and Robin Deiana, are articulated and equated to the romanticism of marriage that highlights emotional elements such as love, trust, and happiness. On the contrary, Asian panelists' comment are articulated to patriarchy and materialism of marriage, emphasizing the value of family, showing off, and others' opinions. In between the European and Asian panelists, Rasch argues a marriage is a strategic relationship based on love. This comment becomes a practical idea of marriage, which includes both values of romanticism and materialism. Nevertheless, patriarchy, which is not included in the Rasch's idea, still remains as a conservative tradition or idea of Asian panelists.

In episode 60, this complicated boundary of Western and non-Western identities is also found. When panelists discuss the origin, history, and invention of sports, Zhang argues that the history and origin of golf started in ancient China. For their response, European panelists raise their hands to refute Zhang's argument. Even though Zhang provides historical stories as an evidence to argue his point, his claim is fully challenged by Rasch who is specifically characterized as a judge who determines which history and origin of sports are more acceptable and genuine. A Korean host explicitly pushes Rasch to decide this argument over history and origin of sports, and other panelists start arguing to convince Rasch. When Rasch challenges Zhang's idea that golf originates from China, Rasch states, "it is important to check whether there is a historical record demonstrating how golf has spread from China to North America" (Yoon, 2015d). This narrative is

extended to an exchange between Samy Rashad and Daniel Lindemann. Rashad argues

that bowling originates from Egypt since a British archaeologist found a bowling alley in

an ancient Egyptian tomb. In this scene, Lindemann, a German panelist, argues against

Rashad's comment by saying "We are talking about the sport, not an activity. Sports

without rules are not considered as sports. In that sense, bowling as a sport originated

from Germany" (Yoon, 2015d). After, Rasch jumps into the argument to determine that

the origin of bowling is from Germany, because bowling as a sport came from Germany

to the U.S. and there is an approved record of it. These two examples reveal how the non-

Western panelists, Zhang and Rashad, are situated as opposite to Western panelists,

Rasch and Lindemann. Whereas non-Western panelists make an argument based on long

historical traces and stories, European panelists build their claims on rules, records, and

institutions that are used to distinguish the West from the non-West. This strategy

highlights that Western countries are the materialized, civilized, and scientific places,

thus panelists from those countries make an argument based on reliable evidences. On the

contrary, non-Western panelists' arguments are unverifiable and disconnected because

they do not or cannot provide solid or recorded evidence but share descriptive stories

from history. This argument implicitly reveals colonialism and imperialism has played a

role in destroying and/or delegitimizing historical records. Historically speaking,

colonization is a process of taking over one's authenticity and the role of history from the

colonized. By removing one's ability to trace history, the colonized people becomes not

authentic one, which consequently centralizes and authorizes Western identities as ones

being able to record and archive their history. Through this argument, the discourse of

authorization and authenticity is reproduced by Western panelists in the historically constructed power context of colonialism and imperialism.

However, this binary opposition is complicated when Rasch is specifically positioned as a neutral judge. For instance, Mondi argues that the origin of soccer is from Italy by stating, "Now, I talk about something Tyler likes!" (Yoon, 2015d). In addition, Mondi points out that golf is a sport that originated from ancient Rome, a version the United States Golf Association has officially approved. Further, after Mondi's comment, Zhang starts his argument by saying "Then, my story doesn't satisfy Tyler's standard" (Yoon, 2015d). In this conversation, Rasch is situated between a European panelist and an Asian panelist to determine which one's argument is more authentic. This in-between and neutral position is amplified when Rasch mentions that the United States has popularized and revitalized golf. With this, no panelist tries to verify or challenge Rasch's claim, but rather they all agree and take it as a fact. In addition, subtitles are shown highlighting an overall consent of panelists that the United States is a leading country of popularizing golf as a sport. Hence, Rasch as a neutral position is not only constructed by panelists' participations, but also by the intervention of production and the Korean hosts. This neutral position is allowed because of Rasch's particular characterization as elite and the genius in the show. However, his elite identity is certainly amplified with Americanness that has been proved by his educational institution, language, and citizenship. Since *Non-Summit* already portrays a privileged group of foreigners, Rasch's higher education degree doesn't fully explain his prominent position in the show. Given the context of neocolonial relationship between U.S. and Korea, Rasch's Americanness as well as higher education allows him to become neutral

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and value-free characterization. It further reflects the current recognition among Koreans

of the United States as a politically and universally neutral or savior role in terms of

negotiation with North Korea's military provocation in the globe. Furthermore, Rasch's

privileged identity doesn't necessarily participate in the boundary between West and non-

West as a neutral judge, but Rasch actually participates in keeping this boundary by

deeming or approving Western values more authentic and important than non-Western

ones.

The Utility of Conservative Masculinity

From the first section of analysis, I found that panelists are situated as either a

liberal West or conservative non-West identity based on each panelist's positions on

debating topic, on their characterization, and on the claims in the arguments they made.

In this section, I show how liberal value is a constructed and promoted norm in the show.

On the contrary, conservative character is primarily utilized as an entertainment factor

within the dominant context of liberalism. As mentioned earlier, Zhang's opinions are

usually against Rasch's opinions. Thus, I mark Zhang as a conservative panelist and

Rasch as a liberal panelist based on comments made by panelists and Korean hosts and

guests. For instance, in episode 46, a Korean guest refers to the U.S. as a highly liberal

country due to its diverse demographics and cultures. On the other hand, Zhang is usually

characterized as a conservative nationalist by subtitles and comments such as "Yuan's

mission is to defend China!" (Yoon, 2015b). Then, I strategically analyze other panelists'

position, based on discursive interactions with Zhang and Rasch. I acknowledge some

panelists do not fit precisely in the divided category between liberal and conservative

vlaue because of each panelist's intersecting identity. Thus, I argue liberalism as a norm is constructed in the production process by deploying the panelists' intersecting identity.

First of all, the liberal norm is reinforced by the format of the program in and of itself. At the end of discussion, panelists make a final decision whether the debate issue is concluded as normal or abnormal. This binary division is oftentimes deployed as the division between the West and the non-West, or between liberal and conservative panelists. In this way, panelists inevitably adjust their arguments to get a united consent on the debate although their comments sometimes do not fit in the binary division. Hence, it is essential to check what consent is made by panelists at the final judgement of debate topics. I found Rasch's name is included in all five episodes as the final decision. These final decisions emphasize the equality, diversity, and individuality of society, highlighting them as universal values for making the world better. Analytically speaking, Rasch as a mark of liberal identity is included, selected, and declared as part of the final decisions in *Non-Summit*. However, the final decision of each episode is predictable because Western panelists hold a majority in the discussion. Through the democratic voting system, *Non-Summit* tries to suggest a helpful solution to global and local issues. However, the voting process is already under the major influence of Western panelists. Besides, the voting system in and of itself to leads a binary thinking of either normal or abnormal which is linked to either liberal or conservative. In this system, *Non-Summit* pursues the equal, diverse, and individual idea of liberalism by covering Rasch's highly liberal identity in most of the episodes as a final direction of the program.

In this dominance of liberal panelists, conservative characters are necessary to balance and fuel the discussion, as well as to add entertaining points in the show. I define conservatism as a valorized notion to non-Western masculinity in *Non-Summit* and conservative masculinity includes patriarchal, determined, and provocative non-Western panelists in the show. Along with Yuan Zhang's conservative character, Enes Kaya from Turkey is also characterized as conservative based on his religious identity. By calling him a "stubborn guy" or an "impenetrable mind" (Yeo, 2014), Western panelists struggle with his stubborn attitude during the debate. However, Zhang and Kaya are differently characterized based on their different fluency in Korean. Since Kaya is professionally fluent in Korean, he usually quotes Turkish proverbs to make his argument. Using Turkish proverbs is a key factor of shaping his characterization, particularly his conservative identity based on Islamic culture. When Kaya delivers his conservative perspective, his idea is considered as an outdated or obsolete perception mainly possessed by past generations in Korea. Thus, Kaya's idea sounds too conservative or outrageous idea among younger generations, therefore his conservative identity becomes an entertaining part of the show for audiences.

On the other hand, Zhang's lack of Korean fluency sometimes causes chaos among other panelists, therefore, his argument sounds hard to understand, rough, or wild. In episode 59, for instance, Zhang insists that there is a difference in gender roles by noting, "Think about the quality of service. I feel more safe and comfortable if a female nurse injects me!" (Yoon, 2015c). In this scene, all panelists and Korean hosts are shocked with Zhang's sexist comment and then other panelists raise their hand to refute his comment. Thus, Zhang's conservative characterization is strategically utilized with

his nickname "a trigger of controversy." Despite this difference of characters, the conservative character is required to entertain audiences whose amusement stems from conflict among the foreign panelists. Zhang's unfiltered comments as a trigger are utilized to fuel conflict, whereas Kaya's eloquent comments as outdated extremism are utilized to make others embarrassed or shocked in the show.

After Kaya's adultery scandal,[2] the reason for him dropping the show, Rashad becomes a regular panelist who continues to bring the conservative perspective in discussions. Interestingly, Rashad is characterized as a more extreme conservative panelist than Kaya and Zhang, thereby earning him the name "the boss of conservatism" (Yoon, 2015c). Particularly, Rashad's extreme conservative idea is utilized as a scary story when a Korean host asks Rashad to share the gender taboo in Egypt.

> Korean guest: "Why is every nation a male-centered culture?"
>
> Si-kyung: "Well, I will show you more surprising thing, go Samy!"
>
> Rashad: "Okay, I will talk about a scary story now."

In this scene, the Korean host introduces Rashad who provides the extremely conservative and oppressive cases of gender taboo lingering in Egypt. To satisfy the expectation of Korean hosts and other characters, Rashad starts the story of gender taboo by referring to it as a scary story from ancient Egypt, and two panelists are caught on the camera with a subtitle "very interesting." Although the story is never applicable to the

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[2] Enes Kaya's adultery scandal broke on December 2014. See Shin, E. (2014, Dec 2) and Kuk, J. (2014, Dec 2).

current social practice in Egypt, Rashad talks about the oppressive rule where women were only allowed to go out twice during their entire lifetime. In response, a Korean woman guest is offended with the way of treating women in Egypt, and other panelists' shocked faces are caught on camera. This conversation between the Korean host and the panelist from Egypt explicitly reveals how the conservative performance of gender is depicted as a scary or unbelievable story, and utilized as an entertaining factor for other panelists and the audience of *Non-Summit*. Conversely, the link between an extreme conservative practice and gender oppression highlights the value of gender egalitarianism from Western countries. Since *Non-Summit* is dominantly a Western space with most of the White panelists proclaiming the ideology of liberalism, conservatism is not only deployed to make the show a more adaptable space for debating, but also to add entertaining parts for the program.

Gender Egalitarianism as a Western Invention

In terms of gender egalitarianism, it is necessary to examine the characterization of European panelists in *Non-Summit*. Mondi Mondi, Robin Deiana, and Daniel Lindemann are the main panelists from European countries, whose characters are frequently described as gentlemanly, romantic and egalitarian. However, each panelist's character is differently constructed based on stereotypical images of their country. For instance, Mondi is from Italy and he is characterized as a lady's man who frequently mentions his flirty stories with women in the past. Lindemann is from Germany, and he is characterized as the serious, boring, and bit conservative one who prioritizes an equal society and a reflexive attitude toward historical faults. Deiana is from France and he is

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characterized as a soft, mild, and patient guy who is sometimes feminized along with

Takuya Terada from Japan. These different characterizations, however, are generally

utilized to reinforce the myth of gender egalitarianism invented by Western countries

(Kim, 2005). However, I argue the idea of gender egalitarianism is a different version of

conservative masculinity in *Non-Summit*. In this section, I consider gender egalitarian

identity as a Westernized version of conservative masculinity, which reveals a discursive

strategy of Western panelists saving their masculine and patriarchal space under the idea

of gentleness and cultural difference. To investigate this argument, I focus on episode 7,

22, and 59 because these episodes have rich narratives of marriage, gender role, and

gender discrimination among the panelists.

By sharing his love story and enduring love for his wife, Mondi highlights his

ideas of true love and his responsibilities as a husband. In most of the discussions, Mondi

highlights liberal, generous, and hopeful ideas of global and local issues. This liberal

stance resonates with his idea of marriage, characterizing him as a man who pursues

egalitarian and true love. In episode 7, Mondi says Koreans ask too many questions when

they decide to get married, then compares it to the Italian society in which people have

more simple and open-minded perception of marriage:

> Mondi: "The real problem is Korean people feel marriages as their
>
> assignments. There are so many social pressures and lots of questions are
>
> asked to people in Korean society!...Italian people live their life freely and
>
> simply!"

In this comment, he finally highlights that a liberal atmosphere of Italian society in terms of marriage by comparing to Korean society in which people feel pressure of marriage as a social ritual. Based on his opinion of marriage, Italian society is described as a place that respects individual choice and doesn't question the decisions of others, which divorces social responsibility from individual freedom. However, when he expresses his opinion in episode 59, his saying is not consistent in terms of gender roles in family and society:

> Mondi: "Korea and Italy are both family-centered countries. Although it is hard to say there are specific gender roles in society, I believe specific gender roles exist in family. I don't have a baby now, but I know woman gives a birth in family. Thus, I acknowledge there is biological difference in terms of gender roles in family."

In this comment, Mondi refers to the biological difference between men and women in the family, which is related to childbirth and rearing. The combination of liberal marriage, gender equality in society, and a biological approach to gender role in family contradicts each other when explaining Mondi's coherent perspective on gender and relationship. At first, Mondi's comments seem to liberate women's position from socially structured gender roles. However, a family, along with education, media, and social performance, shapes an interaction with individual family members to co-construct a family-level gender identity and gender discourse (Blume & Blume, 2003). By separating social gender roles from gender roles in the family, Mondi's argument is based on the

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idea that it is not, however, a case for my family, which subsequently keeps his masculine area of patriarchy within the family.

Lindemann oftentimes refers to Germany's culture as a conservative one compared to other European countries. However, his conservative perspective is read in a manner of gentlemen, which is different from the conservatism shown by Zhang, Kaya, and Rashad. In addition, this gentlemanly conservative masculinity is considered as a part of gender egalitarianism by protecting women's rights and areas in society. In episode 59, Lindemann argues there is a distinction of gender role and points out that, "I think the gender role of men is to become a gentleman. Men should respect women's decision and opinions" (Yoon, 2015c). When Lindemann mentions this gentlemean role, classical background music is overlapped with his voice. In addition, other panelists and Korean hosts do not challenge Lindemann's gentleman role, rather his argument is reconfirmed by the subtitles at the bottom of the scene noting, "Physically strong men should consider and respect women". Although Lindemann already mentioned his thoughts and opinions derived from a conservative German society, no explicit connection is made to the patriarchal meanings of gentlemen, manners, and caring for women. The reactions from the panelists, hosts, and production to Lindemann and Mondi are strikingly different from when Zhang and Terada talked about their fantasy of future marriage and family life. Zhang's fantasy of having docile and domestic wife is evaluated as patriarchal and irrational so that many other panelists, particularly Tyler Rasch, challenged his patriarchal idea. On the other hand, Lindemann's gentleman role and Mondi's true love for maintaining family gender roles are not challenged, but are rather reconfirmed with the background music or subtitles by production.

Additionally, in episode 22, Lindemann proudly addresses the advanced social enactment of gender equality in German society demonstrated by the higher rank in Gender Gap Index (GGI). However, Lindemann also says feminism gets out of control because feminists try to change things like German grammar in order to erase the distinction of feminine and masculine nouns. Lindemann thinks that argument is too much to deal with if the German government changes a whole language for pursing gender equality:

> Lindemann: "Feminism in Germany is too serious because feminists try to change German gramma….When people speak as a neutral position, they are obliged to use masculine nouns. Feminists claim it is discriminative and try to change German grammar. Then, the whole language system will be changed."

A similar opinion is also found in Deiana's comment. Even though Deiana is proud of France's higher ranking on the GGI, he thinks feminism becomes too heavy in French society and feels that French men experience reverse discrimination:

> Deiana: "Even though there still discriminations remain, feminism is very strong in France. That is because of women rights movement starting from the French Revolution. Divorce is allowed since 1972, suffrage is given to women since 1944, and abortion is legally accepted since 1975. To be honest, I feel feminism is too strong in France."

In these comments, both Lindemann and Deiana highlight advanced legal institutions and government policy pursing gender equality in each country, thereby, they identify the

legalized system of gender equality with an individual's egalitarian perception of gender. However, their egalitarian position is also used to criticize feminism as too much, using examples of reverse discrimination and a crisis in the language system.

This narrative of gender egalitarianism as Western invention is also linked to the liberalism and egalitarianism of the United States. Different from the characterization of European panelists, Tyler Rasch, characterized as Mr. Know-it-all, usually sets his argument based on conceptual definitions, knowledge, and institutional examples. In episode 59, Rasch defines the difference between sex and gender and suggests that other panelists separate an issue of gender roles from sex. Then, Rasch continues to argue every gender role is socially constructed, although women and men have different physical bodies. Furthermore, Rasch uses an example of institutional aid to support disadvantaged groups and to seek social equality in the U.S. In episode 22, Rasch refers to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), while insisting an institutional support is essential to overcome any types of discrimination in society. To highlight the gender equality in the U.S., Rasch also provide an example of Sheryl Sandberg the chief operating officer of Facebook, and refers to her success as a way of encouraging women to keep resisting gender discrimination and inequality.

However, his idea of gender egalitarianism become less coherent when Rasch makes a comment on the custom of women dropping their maiden name and taking a new surname. More explicitly, Rasch's ambivalent perspective on gender and social construction is exposed in episode 59 when a Korean guest challenges his argument of

gender equality by arguing about the custom of dropping a maiden name after marriage as a very patriarchal practice in the U.S. In response, Rasch notes the following:

> Rasch: "That is our traditional culture. However, from the U.S. American perspective, Korean tradition seems not to accept woman as a member of family after marriage since Koreans do not give family name to their brides. I think it is just difference of perspective to see family and family name."

In this comment, two main points are found: Rasch considers the social custom of taking a surname as a cultural practice and he refuses an explicit link between the social custom and the larger patriarchal practice. Even though Rasch implicitly acknowledges a patriarchal aspect of marriage custom in the U.S., he doesn't vocalize the point but starts his argument by referring to Korea's marriage custom as more patriarchal at the first point. More precisely, two main strategies are found when Rasch makes this argument: Rasch notes Korean's marriage tradition and challenges it by asking a reverse question which one is more patriarchal? Moreover, Rasch concludes this argument by calling it a different perspective or a different approach to the customs of each country. With these strategies, however, Rasch paradoxically admits the custom of dropping a maiden name remains patriarchal by including women as a part of family while Korean's marriage custom is patriarchal by not including women as a family member.

Although Rasch contends gender is a socially constructed concept and that the U.S. has advanced institutional systems to back up the social structure for gender equality, his answer to the custom of dropping a maiden name contradicts his original

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egalitarian perspective. Even though there have been legal changes made in the custom of dropping a maid name in the U.S., Rasch doesn't explain these systemic changes, but rather refers to the custom as a traditional culture. This is because the question explicitly criticizes patriarchal idea of the U.S., Rasch doesn't want to attach a label of patriarchy to his identity as a White, heterosexual, liberal, and elite man. When Rasch actually faces to the problem and critiques of patriarchy, he doesn't explain how this custom has been changed by legal procedures and institutional supports in the U.S. Instead, he tries to distance the tag of patriarchy from himself by putting Korean's tradition under the same surveillance of patriarchy.

Through the examination of gender egalitarian as a Western invention, I discovered three discursive strategies made by Western panelists. First, these panelists depend on their liberal and equal idea of gender roles and lack of discrimination on the numerical index, law, social institutions and exemplars of successful women in their countries. Second, their personal comments, however, cause gaps between what they argue and what they actually believe. Put plainly, the panelists are proud of their advanced consciousness and system of gender equality, but simultaneously try to contain feminism, so that whole system of patriarchy is not threatened by heavy feminists. Lastly, Western panelists focus on women as a role of victims when they discuss gender roles and discrimination. However, panelists do not become critical of patriarchal systems and male-dominant structures, but instead celebrate the history of feminine social progress in gender equality. Through this discursive strategy, Western panelists keep their positions as gender egalitarians by celebrating the progressive system of gender equality, however, they still save a patriarchal space by keeping gender roles in one's family, by aiming to

be a gentleman, and by comparing their different historical perspectives of patriarchal traditions.

The utility of segments, and homosexuality

In chapter two, I briefly mentioned a subsidiary program in *Non-Summit*. As a segment, a subsidiary program is added to include various foreigners from other countries, which is related to the main slogan "Diverse Enjoyment" proclaimed by the broadcasting company. I referred to this segment to reveal that *Non-Summit* is under the influence of the institutional operation. In this section, I extend this analysis to demonstrate how segments are operationally utilized to produce the discursive strategy of Western dominance in *Non-Summit*. I argue segments are introduced to amplify foreignness and exotic culture as selling points, as well as to alleviate the White dominant visibility by including fresh foreign bodies in the show. To do so, I examine two major segments that *Non-Summit* introduced across six episodes: *Global Cultural Matchup* and *It is our neighbor!*

First, *Global Cultural Matchup* is introduced with its tagline "Knowing your own culture and casting away a prejudice on other culture." In this segment, a topic is given for sharing, then panelists provide information on each country. For instance, in episode 7, the topic is The best vacation spot. Then, each panelist introduces and shares vacation locations in each country. In this segment, each panelist's saying is characterized as an informative news or lecture, which subsequently conceptualizes panelists as a source of facts. Second, *What is this country? It is our neighbor!* is broadcasted for the longest period in the first season. This segment is basically designed for inviting a foreigner as a

guest panelist. Mostly, a foreigner is from countries that have not been introduced in the show, such as Thailand, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, India, and Cambodia, etc. A foreign guest brings exotic stories and information about his own country, and the main panelists ask questions resolving stereotypical assumptions of the country. Though each segment has different content and format, these segments are utilized to maintain the Western dominant space by deploying foreignness and pursuing diversity *in Non-Summit*. However, each segment has a strategic way of reinforcing the boundary between the West and the non-West, which subsequently keeps the Western dominant space in *Non-Summit*.

First, the characteristic of narratives made in *Global Cultural Matchup* is different from the main discussion, in that the segment provides an informative narrative. The informative narrative thereby allows viewers to focus on the content of cultural foreignness as a main entertaining point in *Global Cultural Matchup*. This segment centers the story and information of foreign countries through the visibility and description from foreign panelists, which connects to the matter of authenticity. The authenticity refers to the difference between when Korean panelists talk about other countries' cultural information and when foreign panelists share their cultural story or information. By providing the narrative of cultural information through foreign bodies, the segment utilizes the authenticity of foreign identities in order to produce cultural foreignness as an entertaining element.

However, the foreignness is deployed in different ways between panelists. Particularly, *Global Cultural Matchup* in episode 7 abounds with such context of

deploying foreignness differently. When panelists share vacation descriptions of each

country, France, Canada, and Italy are mainly recognized as well-known, never-ending,

and famous paradise for vacation. When Mondi shares the never-ending story of

vacations in Italy, the information is not fully new or unexpected, but rather reconfirms

Italy as the best vacation spot by an authentic Italian panelist in the show. On the

contrary, when Okyere shares famous vacations in Ghana, it is articulated as unknown

and not-reliable. For instance, the narrative of unknown Ghana is highlighted when a

Korean host notes, "No single Korean knows the best vacation spots in Ghana!" (Yeo,

2014). Thus, the vacations in Ghana are also articulated as unfamiliar. This is amplified

when Okyere discloses that he searched the Internet to get information of vacations in

Ghana. With Okyere's comment, vacation spots in Ghana do not become fully known

due to the lack of authenticity and familiarity. In addition, Kaya spends more time

dealing with stereotypes of Turkey as an Islamic country than demonstrate the vacations

of Turkey. Daniel Snoeks from Australia says he doesn't want to visit Turkey because the

conservative environment makes him uncomfortable. In response, Kaya explains Turkey

is known as a relatively liberal country compared to other Islamic countries and

simultaneously a subtitle appears noting, "Don't hate Turkey although you dislike Enes!"

(Yeo, 2014).

Through the different articulation of foreignness, I found the foreignness of non-

Western panelists is utilized in a similar way to conservatism, which reinforces the binary

division between the West and the Rest. As a selling point, foreignness appeals

differently to Korean audiences who do not have same expectations of each panelist's

identity. More precisely, foreign panelists are grouped as others, but the foreignness of

each panelist has a different degree of otherness to Koreans. Otherness of Western panelists, Mondi, Patry, and Deiana, is familiar foreignness that some Koreans once experienced or aspire to experience, which is its major selling point. Meanwhile, otherness of non-Western panelists, Okyere and Kaya, is unknown so that Koreans barely visualize or experience it, so it is imagined in ambiguous ways.

Second, *Non-Summit* finds a way to become inclusive with various foreign guests while maintaining the main panelists through *What is this country? It is our neighbor!* However, the inclusiveness is temporal and limited because foreign guests usually are not involved in the discussion as actively as main panelists. For instance, a foreign guest from India appears in episode 71. The foreign guest talks about tradition, religion, language, and politics in India, and answer questions from the main panelists. After this segment, however, the foreign guest makes just single comment during the main discussion of the show. This foreign guest is temporally and purposefully invited to demonstrate the diverse inclusiveness but not fully accepted in the debate as a main panelist. It becomes clear with the fact that only four panelists of color with one fully dark body appear in *Non-Summit*, and most of temporary foreign guests are from non-Western countries. Thus, fresh and temporary foreign guests are introduced to apparently diversify national identities, without disturbing the already constructed White and Western dominance in *Non-Summit*.

Arguably, I juxtapose the utility of segments with a strategic inclusion of a narrative of homosexuality in *Non-Summit* Throughout six episodes, any overt discourse of a homosexual identity and marriage is only found in episode 7. As a Korean guest,

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Seok-cheon Hong who is the first entertainer to publicly come out as a homosexual appears in this episode in which foreign panelists discuss the culture of marriage in Korea. At the end of the show, the debate topic swerves to the issue of a homosexual marriage and a subtitle is shown noting, "A special marriage which is unfamiliar to Korean society" (Yeo, 2014). *Non-Summit* includes a separate section to talk about gay marriage by devoting seven minutes in the main discussion. During this discussion, except for Kaya, most of comments are made by Western panelists such as Deiana, Lindemann, Patry, and Rasch. Western panelists share the advanced social system of legalizing a homosexual marriage in order to highlight the liberal value of embracing difference. For instance, Patry points out Canada was the fourth country to legalize homosexual marriage in 2005 and continues noting, "Instead, discrimination on homosexual people is illegal in Canada." Likewise, Deiana also addresses that homosexual people have more power in France than other countries because many homosexual entertainers and politicians appear in the public sphere. In addition, Lindemann specifically refers to a Minister of Foreign Affairs as a homosexual male in Germany to underline the open system of accepting homosexual people at higher positions. After this short debate, Seock-chon makes a comment as a representative identity of homosexuality in Korea. Seock-chon's comment focuses on expanding the general understanding of homosexuality in Korea. In this scene, Seock-chon appeals to panelists and audience in tears. As a closing scene, the subtitles are shown as noting, "Debate on understanding difference" and "Diverse ideas in *Non-Summit*," then the discussion swiftly return to the original debate topic.

By deploying the special and unfamiliar topic of a homosexual marriage, *Non-Summit* tries to become an inclusive and liberal media space in which diverse sexual orientations are embraced. However, this one-time talk doesn't make *Non-Summit* an inclusive media space, but reconfirms the White liberal heteronormative space as a mainstream in *Non-Summit*. More precisely, *Non-Summit* invites a homosexual Korean guest from outside the show, maintaining the dominant heterosexual panelists as a basic component of *Non-Summit*. Thus, the narrative of advanced legal system and exceptional examples of homosexuality are mainly provided from Western main panelists as a way of proclaiming their liberalistic value. By highlighting a homosexual male as a Korean guest, *Non-Summit* is eligible to proclaim the inclusive value of diversity, promote the foreignness of homosexuality as a selling point, and still maintain the familiar space of heterosexual dominance in the show.

Between Discrimination and Hatred: Otherizing Identity

To begin with this analysis, it is worthy to clarify the identification of foreign characters in *Non-Summit*. When each panelist is introduced at the very beginning of the show, the country of origin and panelist's name are only information given to audience. Hence, *Non-Summit* identifies foreign panelists based on where they were born in. However, this identification of foreigners turned out a slippery standard when Andreas Varsakopoulos who is a dual nationality holder in the U.S. and Greece appeared in *Non-Summit*. Although Andreas has finished most of his education in the U.S., he participated as a representative of Greece, not the U.S. in *Non-Summit*, because foreigners are identified by their country of origin not by their lifetime sociocultural exposure or

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experience. In this sense, Andreas's cultural identity is fixated on the geographical

boundary as a Greek since he needs to share cultural experience or perspective as a

representative of Greece, although his identity is more mixed with or influenced by U.S.

culture. Therefore, without information of each panelist's ethnic, racial, or cultural

background, audiences do not understand the diverse aspects of cultural identity since

they are only exposed to the fragmentary information of foreign identity.

In this context, it is necessary to point the overt visibility of White bodies in *Non-Summit*, regarding racialized representations of foreign identities. Except for one fully

dark body, Samuel Okyere from Ghana, most panelists have lighter skinned bodies.

Specifically, panelists from the U.S., Canada, and Brazil, which all have multicultural

and diverse demographics, are all White representatives shown in the show. This

representative identity becomes problematic when audiences connect the physical

visibility to the specific country of origin, and learns who is commonly considered as

U.S. American, Canadian, or Brazilian. This overt White visibility also becomes

problematic especially when panelists discuss racial discrimination or loathing to others

as a debate topic. When an issue of race is put on the table as a main issue for the White

Western panelists, racism and hatred to others become a social issue to deal with or

observe, not a daily process as which people face discrimination and oppression. Put it

plainly, diverse voices and experiences of marginalized groups are muted when the

dominant White visibility discusses and diagnoses racial conditions in the privileged

position as an observer. To examine the second point further, I closely look at the

discourse of race, discrimination and loathing produced in episode 22 and 42, thereby

answer to two themes: First, what discursive strategy of racism is produced by foreign

panelists with the overt visibility of White Western bodies. Second, who becomes the othered groups through the discourse of hatred as a way of racialization in *Non-Summit*.

Let's talk about race!

Episode 22 in particular provides an explicit narrative of race and racism in the debate. The discussion starts with the subtitle noting, "The most sensitive topic in *Non-Summit*: Racial discrimination." In this subtitle, talking about race or racism is described as sensitive or uncomfortable topic to discuss. During the discussion, two main debate questions are explicitly asked: Does racism still exist in each country? and Can people overcome racial discrimination? The first question focuses on talking about the racism currently, which consequently crystalizes the division between who are discriminated against and who are not. The second question is asked to provide suggestions for resolving racial discrimination in the world, however, the discourse of racism is concluded with the post-racial idea of we are all equal, which is encoded as friendship in the show.

With regard to the first debate question, the discourse of current racism demonstrates the boundary between who has experienced racism and who can just observe and evaluate the situation of racism. Specifically, personal experiences of racism are made only by people of color in the show. By focusing on Western panelists who have never experienced racism they make comments as a third party by pointing to social progress, historical vestiges of racism, and current discrimination against immigrants. For instance, Blair Williams from Australia explains what was the White Australia Policy, how unethical it was, and finally its erasure in current Australian society. As well,

Lindemann becomes self-reflexive by raising concerns of Neo-Nazis and Hooliganism toward Islamic fundamentalism in the discussion of racism, adding the connection between social conflict and the increased influx of immigrants in Germany. Meanwhile, Okyere shares his education of learning "White is good, and Black is bad" (Im, 2014a) in Ghana and the racial discrimination he experienced in Korea. More specifically, Okyere talks about his experience of being a background guest to White protagonists when he tries to become an entertainer with his fully dark body in Ghana. Likewise, Bobby Kim who is a Korean American holding the U.S. citizenship appears as a Korean guest, then shares experience of racism he had as an Asian American. Bobby Kim refers to Chinaman as his childhood nickname and notes some ignorant people see Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese as a same racial group. As a discursive strategy, Western panelists retrospect racism as a past event and evaluate current political and cultural changes in racism. In this discourse, Lindemann and Blair distance themselves from White supremacists in the past by expressing regret or concerns about racist past and present. Thus, Lindemann and Blair make comments as a third party not involved in racist situations as neither a racist nor a victim of racist past and present. On the contrary, the discourse from non-Western panelists, specifically the African and Asian panelists, explicitly focus on sharing personal experiences rather than assessing racism past and present. Through personal experiences, Bobby Kim considers the racism in the past as an accident made by ignorant people and Okyere expects positive progress or future free of racial discrimination at the end of his comment. Hence, Bobby Kim and Okyere are situated as victims who have been through racism past, but become a messenger for desiring better present and future.

Furthermore, race is understood as a one dimensional understanding when panelists discuss race and racism. The connection of race to culture, class conflict, ethnicity, or physical appearance is made during the debate. The prevalent understanding of race is based on different physical appearances, which is referred to as an unchangeable element of identity in episode 46. Race as a undetachable physical appearance, specifically skin colour, is explicitly addressed by panelists' comments and subtitles. As an example, Quintart from Belgium notes the different degree of racial discrimination between Italian and Moroccan immigrants. By pointing the different appearance of Moroccan immigrants from most of Europeans, Quintart says the racial discrimination against Moroccans still remains compared to Italian immigrants who are successfully accepted and assimilated in Belgium society. Following Quintart's comment, a subtitle is shown noting, "Immigrants are easily discriminated due to stereotypes of different appearances" (Yoon, 2015b). This similar subtitle is also made after Bobby Kim shares his experience of racism in the U.S., noting, "Wrong expression of others with different skin colour." In both examples, racial discrimination is understood as the stereotype of others with different appearance and skin tone, which prevalently applies to non-Western immigrants. This discourse should be interrogated critically when it comes to the invisible standard of different others. When they talk about different appearance and skin colour, Moroccans and Asians are implicitly targeted as immigrants and different others. Thus, Western identities become a standard determining who is other or not, which is subsequently amplified with the dominant White Western visibility in the show.

Besides physical appearance, racism is attached to one particular concept when each panelist explains what is racism and how people overcome it. Examples below are from the debate of racism in episode 22.

> Lindemann: "Racism cannot be eliminated because of cultural conflict between groups."

> Zhang: "Racism will not disappear unless developed countries stop taking over underdeveloped countries and exploiting local labour."

> Okyere: "Putting aside the difference in skin-colour, discrimination becomes a culture handed down from generation to generation."

> Kaya: "Turkey overcomes racial discrimination by allowing and promoting marriages between different ethnic groups."

Through these comments, each panelist indirectly connects racism to the issue of different ethnicity, class conflict, or cultural difference when they point what causes racism or what resolves racism in society. Based on these comments from Lindemann and Kaya, racism is caused by cultural conflict and can be resolved by inter-marriage between different ethnic groups. Omi and Winant (1994) notes that race has been categorized as one essential idea following through three paradigms: Race as ethnicity, class, and nation. Although Omi and Winant's approach to those paradigms are based on the context of the United States, this approach gives a useful frame to explain what is understood as racial difference or race in these comments. For instance, race is treated as a matter of ethnicity from Enen's comment, which is oftentimes related to the difference in cultural orientation according to Omi and Winant (1994). In this light, when

Lindemann points the cultural conflict between groups as a core of racism, his saying is implicitly based on the understanding race as an ethnicity-based issue. This particular core assumption of race as a variety of ethnicity, however, was "to neglect stigma, exclusion, privilege, and violence, all characteristic inherent in the 'mark of race' the phenomic, 'ocular' dimension of racial belonging" (Omi & Winant, 1994, p.40). I want to distinguish Okyere's comment from Lindemann's in terms of understanding race. Although Okyere disregards the mark of race by putting aside the matter of skin-colour, his comment of racism as culture highlights racial enculturation practice from generation to generation (Moon, 2016). Different from Lindemann's comment, Okyere refers to racism as a cultural process of learning "White is good, and Black is bad" (Im, 2014a) as a remaining legacy of colonialism in Ghana. Okyere's comment doesn't simply refer to the different cultural orientation, but consider racial discrimination as a culturally educated and embedded process. Likewise, Zhang's comment also highlights the structural force of constructing different racial positions in the world. Even though Zhang's comment is limited to the economic exploitation between developed and developing countries, this comment implicitly reveals a historical and ecopolitical pressure shaping racial inequality in the transnational context. However, comments are based on the assumption of racial essentialism because these comments are not incorporated to illustrate the layered system of racial oppression and discrimination, which enables and restrict one's identity to become a certain social subject in a certain context.

Along with this racial essentialism, the discourse of racism is resolved with general humanity which is encoded in the concept of friendship. At the end of the

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discussion, Mondi points the last comment by saying "We are all basically racists because we are instinctively afraid of different others and defend ourselves" (Im, 2014a). This last comment generalizes racial discrimination to a conclusion eliminating the boundary between who have been discriminated and who hold the power of sustaining discriminatory systems in the world. By projecting an idea that everyone becomes racist, Mondi's comment blurs the historical, social, and ecopolitical trajectory of constructing racial oppression which differently applies to each racial group. Then, two subtitles are shown by noting, "Children with different nationalities and appearances grew up together" and "These kids' race is friendship." In these subtitles, the children refer to foreign panelists in the show and their racial difference is covered by the concept of friendship. Along with Mondi's last comment, these subtitles convey the main message of race and racism in *Non-Summit*: Everyone is equally discriminative and becomes friends through conversation about racial issue. While showing childhood photos of panelists, *Non-Summit* neutralizes foreign panelists' identities as pure, raceless, and equal humans who do not know about discrimination. This connection between childhood's memory to foreign panelists' identities also allows *Non-Summit* to bring a concept of friendship. Friendship is a relational term based on the equal positions. By highlighting neutral position of childhood and relational concept of friendship, *Non-Summit* eliminates racialized identities with certain bodies and lived experiences of racism from the show.

In sum, *Non-Summit* selectively produces three steps of talking about race and racism during the limited time. The first question reveals the boundary between who have experienced racism and who diagnose current situation without racist experience. The second question illustrates racial essentialism through the conversation about solutions to

racism. Finally, equal humanity and having a friendship are highlighted as a way of harmonizing racial discrimination in the world. Through this discourse, however, *Non-Summit* fails to provide an explanation of what is race and what constitutes relatively different experience of race and racism among foreign panelists. Furthermore, this discourse doesn't clarify the differentially situated positions of racial advantages, which has been constructed by historical, economic, social, and political system of racial discrimination and oppression. The discursive formation of race and racism is finally absorbed in the post-racial ideology of colorblindness, which is encoded as friendship. Friendship allows *Non-Summit* to proclaim raceless or race-free society by having an equal relationship with others. This emphasis on a human relationship over racial oppression ultimately hides the transcendent consequences of the colonization and minimize the reality of racism (Ono, 2010).

Who becomes Others?

The discourse of race and discrimination is extended to the discourse of othered groups in episode 46. In this episode, two themes are found: First, which group identity is described as a groups that are hated. Second, how these groups become othered in the discourse of hatred and discrimination. As an overview of the episode, panelists discuss what hatred means, relevant issues of hatred in each country, and future directions or resolutions of this issue. This episode particularly provides abundant narratives of othered groups that are articulated as recipients of hatred. Like the discourse of race, othered groups are explicitly described and positioned as the opposition to White, Western, or

heterosexual identities, which subsequently reinforces the idea of normative identities in Korean society and the world.

It is important to start pointing out how *Non-Summit* defines targets of hatred. At the beginning of the debate, a subtitle is shown by defining hatred as negative or threatening words and actions toward different group of gender, sexuality, nationality, origins, religion, age, disability, and race that people cannot choose. More specifically, five different groups are referred to as groups that are hated in episode 46: Black, immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals. This definition explicitly connects a certain identity, which is considered as a different group from major groups, to the target of hatred. In this definition of hatred, identity is recognized as unavoidable or fixed categories, not as a fluid process of making or unmaking subject. When perceived as naturally given, identity is restrictively understood as one essential or fundamental element, which homogenizes intragroup diversity and minimizes layered marginalization of intersecting identities. In addition, these categorized identities are employed to target particular group as hatred subjects, when these identities are referred to within the discourse of hatred or othered groups. However, these identities are not autonomously positioned as recipients of hatred, simultaneously situating other identities as groups that are favored. It means the rest of the identities are separated from hatred subjects and marked as favorable or normative groups. For instance, Blacks are stood out as racial others when Rasch and Lindemann share each country's issue of loathing about different racial group. Particularly, African Americans are situated as the opposite to White Americans when Rasch and a Korean host talk about ruthless suppression of Blacks by White policemen. Likewise, Blacks are noted as unpleasant others in German society

when Okyere and Lindemann share about growing Neo-Nazi and racial discrimination toward Blacks.

In both examples, Blacks become a target of hatred. The main understanding of this racial group is based on the different skin colour between Black and White because White policemen and White German's identity are explicitly referred to as the opposite position to Blacks. Muting the social and historical context of oppressing racial groups with darker skins, these examples only reveals Black identity becomes a target of hatred, and simultaneously situates Whites at the opposition position as normative identity. This is also encoded when Belyakov refers to immigrants as a group that is hated in Russia:

> Belyakov: "There are many immigrants from Central Asian countries who different from Russians. Russians hate immigrants because they cause domestic conflicts and commit crimes. One of immigrants killed a White Russian guy, and other Russians beat Central Asian immigrants including that murderer."

In this comment, Belyakov positions Central Asian immigrants in the conflict relation to White Russians. By explicitly marking two identities as different racial and national groups, Belyakov otherized Central Asian immigrants as a group of people who are threatening and hated to White Russians. This otherizing of Central Asian immigrants is coupled with criminalization and racialization: Immigrants with darker bodies invade in Russian domestic economy and politics to cause social chaos by taking occupations and committing crimes.

In this otherization, I emphasize the power relation between who speaks about hatred and who are referred to as groups that are hated in the show. None of foreign panelists notes White, Western, or heterosexual group as a hatred target in their comments. This is not only because most of panelists as debaters are from European and North America countries, but also foreign panelists perceive their identities as mainstream in each society, which is marked as standard identities compared to othered groups. Thus, the setting of *Non-Summit* already authorizes voices of White, Western, and heterosexual groups to assign some identities as groups that are different, othered, and hated, which reveals an asymmetric power relation between who speaks and who can't speak. In this context, fixed identity categories allow main panelists to erase and forget those categorical thinking is already socially constructed by people in power and to keep their identities as a safe, normative, and favorable group. Furthermore, panelists do not challenge the process of categorizing or assigning different others as recipients of hatred, but criticize extreme words and action toward groups that are hated from unusual group of people. More specifically, panelists agree on the negative effects of hatred toward different groups, but describe the hatred and discrimination as exaggerated or abnormal instances from few people. This implicitly reveals panelists overlook how this hatred and discrimination are daily processes faced by specific groups. Hence, the category of different others is not broken or overcome, but the others remain as recipients of hatred. As a result, this discourse reproduces stereotypical understanding of hateful identities marked as Black, immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals, and stigmatizes these identities as groups that are hated. As well, Korean audiences, who are told and exposed to this discourse of different others, shape their perception of what

specific identities are classified as hatred or unpleasant groups in Korean society and the world.

To summarize this chapter, I provide a synthetic analysis as my answer to research questions posed based on the evidence presented earlier. In terms of research question one: How are foreign male characters racialized in the media text of *Non-Summit*?, I show how characterization mainly operates as a process of racialization in *Non-Summit*. It is not sufficient to define racial identities as a matter of corporeality in this show, due to the overt visibility of White dominant bodies as panelists. Obviously, the overwhelming visibility of White dominant panelists notes *Non-Summit* is already a raced space for well-educated, nice looking, and fluent White and Western men. In *Non-Summit,* however, racialization is more insidiously and complicatedly formed through discourses of liberalism, egalitarianism, and homonationalism as a process of othering.

According to Omi and Winant (1994), racialization is "the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group" (p.111). In that, I read characterization as a racialized process because a panelist' character is connected to certain social understanding of debating topic, and this process is the extension of panelist's identity formation in the show. As I find each panelist has expressed one's experience, perception, value, and behavior based on a specific character, characterization is an influential element of constructing who panelists are, what they can say with their identities, how they interact with others, and the way they are perceived by others in *Non-Summit*. Characterization is built on the intersecting category of corporeality, intelligence, idea, value, nationality, and experience. As I

presented earlier, Zhang's character is oppositely positioned to Rasch's character, and this different characterization is based on the degree of education, fluency in Korean, and the different values which are conveying conservative or liberal ideas. Once the connection between Zhang's East Asian identity to conservative or patriarchal character was built, Zhang's experience, idea, and value are filtered through this characterization, which ties his identity to a certain category. Recognizing characterization as racialization allows how identity category is socially, ideologically, and discursively constructed. As racialization, characterization takes time to build up the setting for situating specific characters in certain time and space. Moreover, a panelist is once characterized, there is an unessential link created between panelist and the expectation of certain perception and behavior from the panelist, which consequently controls the identity formation of panelist.

In this context, panelists from China, Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Ghana are characterized as conservative, patriarchal, irrational, stubborn, and victims of racial discrimination. Each panelist of these countries is characterized differently based on their intersecting identity, nonetheless, their identities are characterized in order to highlight White and Western panelists as a mainstream group in the show. Based on examples presented above, the space of dominant Western identities is saved by the discursive strategy of liberalism and egalitarianism, and positioned as a third-party to observe racial discrimination, which separates them from non-Western identities. This space is also sustained by production crews to keep the value of diversity and liberality through the show. As well, the dominant space of White and Western panelists is also interwoven to an idea of hegemonic masculinity in *Non-Summit*, which connects to the second research

question: How are foreign male characters in *Non-Summit* gendered, especially through highlighting the hegemonic masculinity in the show?. In chapter two, hegemonic masculinity is defined as the most honored way of being man in the certain time and space (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2007), and personal information of panelists are delineated to specify which identities are selected as main panelists. As a certain media space, *Non-Summit* aims to include male panelists who are white-collar, skilled, educated and fluent identities. In addition, the hegemonic masculinity is articulated as men who are not conservative, but romantic and gentle, through the discourse of gender roles, equality, and (multicultural) marriages. The conservative idea is interwoven with panelist's racial, national and religious identity; while denying East Asian and Muslim conservative masculinity, *Non-Summit* encoded gentlemanly conservatism from European panelists as gentle or romantic identities. The difference between two conservatisms are based on the relation to women; particularly, European's conservative masculinity is recognized as men's respect or care for women so as to protect womanhood from gender inequality. Furthermore, in terms of homosexuality, *Non-Summit* becomes a liberal and tolerant space in which heterosexual panelists embraces the diverse identities, but never identify with their masculine relationship to homosexuals. By connecting egalitarian, liberal, and tolerant identities to White, Western, and heterosexual panelists, who are from European countries, Canada, and the U.S., the hegemonic masculinity is dominantly possessed by those embodied racial and gender identities.

However, I want to complicate this analysis further by referring to the importance of intersecting identities of foreign panelists in *Non-Summit*. Although I addressed the analysis based on a grouped identity between Western and non-Western panelists, I

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acknowledge each panelist is differently characterized. For instance, Belyakov's White visibility doesn't fully participate in the group identity of Western panelists because of his nationality which shapes the ideological frame differently from the most of Western panelists. In addition, Rasch's identity is oftentimes situated as a neutral, in-between, or radical liberal identity which is distinguished from European Western identities. Zhang and Terada are as well grouped as East Asian panelists in terms of Asian traditions, Confucianism, and patriarchy. However, their masculinity is differently articulated through characterization; Zhang's rough conservative standpoint is coupled with his language barrier whereas Terada's patriarchal fantasy is feminized with his quiet and soft words and gesture. The different characterization of conservative masculinity leads different responses from other panelists during the discussion. Likewise, each panelist's identity is individually and differently characterized based on race, ethnicity, nationality, tradition, and perception conveying conservative or liberal values in *Non-Summit*. Furthermore, I recognize identities of White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity as a dominant group in *Non-Summit* in order to add power contexts that multiply marginalize others' identities. More precisely, I examine how the boundary between Western and non-Western panelists have been constructed so as to demonstrate identity formation as a discursively constructed process. Thus, the boundary understanding neither aims to categorize identities, nor perpetuate foreign identities as a homogeneous group. In the following chapter, I revisit the last research question: What are the ideological implications of media representations of transnational identities in *Non-Summit* within the particular spatial context of Korea?. By situating analyzed themes within the larger structure of Korean society and the transnational context, I further talk about the U.S.

superiority, moderate Western-ness, and implied postracial and postgender ideology in

the media text of *Non-Summit*.

Chapter 5

Discussion and Conclusion

In this section, I discuss what ideological implications are made through media representations of the transnational panelists in *Non-Summit*. I situate observations presented in the earlier chapters within the historical, geopolitical, and sociocultural context of Korean society. For the purpose of this study, I focus on the foreign panelists and discursive strategies in an attempt to uncover what *Non-Summit* implies about transnational identities and broader racial and gender ideologies. By doing so, I demonstrate how *Non-Summit* reproduces the U.S. superiority and European Whiteness by distancing Asian value. Moreover, I explore how postracial and postgender ideologies are implicitly reproduced in the discourse of Western, liberal, egalitarian, and heterosexual masculinity in *Non-Summit*. I also address limitations, contributions, and questions for further research that arise from this investigation.

In chapter one, I pointed out the asymmetric power relation between the U.S. and Korea and the insidious operation of Whiteness by centering U.S. military occupation. With the tension between U.S. superiority and Anti-Americanism, I illustrated how young Koreans have built dual perceptions of the United States. I found U.S. superiority, as a cultural and ideological assumption, lingers and operates in and through the representation of the panelist from the U.S. In *Non-Summit*, a White, heterosexual, and educated U.S. American is represented as knowledgeable, neutral, and liberal identity in order to highlight advanced institutions, social systems, and national consciousness in the U.S. Importantly, this process is supported by production's participation in maintaining

the character of the U.S. panelist with an identity that is barely challenged by other panelists and accepted as facts with which everyone concurs.

In terms of White, Western, and heterosexual dominance, I distinguished the U.S. panelist from other Western panelists because the U.S. panelist is generally situated as in-between European and non-Western panelists. This distinguished position entitles the U.S. panelist to become a neutral entity during the debate. Furthermore, the U.S. panelist is distinguished from the European panelists regarding the freedom of speech, which situates the U.S. panelist as a highly liberal identity.[3] Whereas European panelists prioritize human rights, the U.S. panelist insists on the absolute value of freedom of speech in episode 46. Silencing Asian and African panelists' presences, *Non-Summit* only allows voices of Western panelists to be heard in terms of the freedom of speech, and particularly positions the U.S. panelist as a highly liberal identity. Moving through relationships with other panelists, the U.S. panelist has constructed a unique character in *Non-Summit*: An intelligent, radically liberal, egalitarian, pragmatic, objective, and exceptional entity. When these characteristics are interpreted within the historical,

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[3] In episode 46, a Korean guest explicitly refers to an American panelist as a highly liberal identity by pointing the United States is where diverse individuals from all over the world gather, settle, and create various values. By comparing the U.S. to European countries, the Korean guest differentiates a liberal value of European panelists from the American panelist insisting firmly guaranteed freedom of individuals in this scene. The Korean guest finishes his comment by juxtaposing European's long history, same ethnics, and use of same languages with Asian countries.

economic and geopolitical condition of Korean society, the U.S. panelist acts as a symbol

for how *Non-Summit* reifies the superior ideological power of the U.S. By portraying a

privileged U.S. identity, *Non-Summit* secures the superior space of the U.S. In other

words, the representation of the unique and superior U.S. panelist reflects preferences for

White and heterosexual U.S. masculinity and the continuous neocolonial relation between

Korea and the U.S.

However, when I examine the distinction between European panelists and the

U.S. panelist, I find a different way of understanding the hegemonic ideology of

Whiteness through the European panelists in *Non-Summit*, which is illusively read as a

way of challenging U.S. superiority. In *Non-Summit*, European panelists' Western-ness

seems moderate in the context of Korean society, compared to the U.S. panelist's radical

liberalism. The moderate Western-ness means a discursive practice of Western, liberal

and egalitarian ideology with which young Koreans familiarly negotiate in Korean

society. For example, arguments from the U.S. panelist stress a legitimate, firm, and

absolute value of freedom, diversity, equality and liberty, which is interpreted as an

ideological superiority in Korea. However, the superiority of the U.S. is admirable, but

not entirely familiar with Korean audiences who have crossed from old, Confucian

conservativism and the war generation to young, Confucian liberalism, and post-war

generation. On the contrary, European panelists particularly from Italy, Germany, and

Belgium express their perspectives moving between liberal, humanistic, and egalitarian

value and soft-conservative attitude. The familiarity was illustrated by a Korean guest in

episode 46, not only by separating European countries' ethnic value from the U.S., but

also attaching European ethnic values to others, specifically Asian countries. When it

comes to European ethnicity, an agreed value of history, tradition, and language among members of society is referred, which implicitly states divergent and dynamic ethnic values of the U.S. Thus, the moderate ideology of White, Western, liberal, and heterosexual masculinity from European countries is projected as more adaptable to Korean audiences who are enabled to find a way of possessing both Westernized liberal and softly conservative identity.

When I read these different positions between European panelists and the U.S. panelist in the context of Korean society, I apply two concepts that I mentioned in the first chapter: U.S. superiority and Anti-Americanism. As a mild form of Anti-American response, the moderate and humanistic Western value from European panelists provides a discursive space for Koreans to position themselves differently from U.S. superiority. However, it is not a counterhegemonic action because U.S. superiority is admitted, reaffirmed, and not challenged by other panelists, Korean hosts, and production. Throughout the show, the advancement of laws, institutions, and social system in the United States is represented as a desirable one which other countries, in particular Korea, pursue to accomplish for better society. Furthermore, there were no trials to keep non-Western ideas as a main value when Koreans try to challenge U.S. superiority. More precisely, the tradition, value, and idea of non-Western panelists are not pursued as a way of challenging U.S. superiority but still recognized as patriarchal and Confucian conservatives, which should be distanced from the show. As a way of internalizing colonial fantasy, Korean media reproduce the idea of modernity and advancement as Western countries' exclusive properties.

Analytically speaking, the distinction among White, Western, and heterosexual panelists is relevant to the argument that there is not "a monolithic, hermetically sealed 'West' that posits itself against the rest of the world" (Nayak & Malone, 2009, p.225). In this article, the authors highlight the intra-atlantic division between Europe and the United States not only to expand Said's understanding of othering, but also to challenge U.S. exceptionalism. The authors interpret the separation as a way of othering European identities and of constructing the boundary between the U.S. and rest of the world. However, my interpretation of the distinction among Western panelists does not go along with othering processes even though I concur with non-monolithic understanding of Western identities. When the dominant visibility of White Western panelists appeared in the context of Korean society, it is hard to disregard the privilege of Anglo-Saxon identities as a group in terms of the expanded transnational force of Whiteness. Plainly, we can't ignore the privilege that White and Western identities share as a group in the transnational context. Thus, distinction among Western panelists is not understood as a otherizing process, but it could be an insidious and segmented process of reproducing White hegemony in the transnational context in which otherization is mostly designated to non-Western and non-White identities.

Hence, I argue the dominant ideology of White and Western masculinity lingers in Korean society in which the U.S. military bases have cultivated and reproduced physical, material, cultural, and ideological influence of the White U.S. superiority. In this context, I call critical attention to the postracial and postgender ideology produced in *Non-Summit*. By examining discourses of race, racism, gender equality, gender role, and hatred group, I found the postracial and postgender ideology was generally made and

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sustained by the dominant visibility and participation of White, Western, and heterosexual panelists. In *Non-Summit*, the postracial ideology is articulated through a discourse of minimizing racial reality which proclaims racism no longer hinders progress for the people (Ono, 2010). In terms of discourses of race, racism, and groups that are hated, *Non-Summit* produces three main arguments: First, people cannot disregard difference, but reject and overcome discrimination toward racial, sexual, and ethnic others; second, people can overcome an unequal system by continuous resistance; and lastly, racial equality is finally fulfilled by having a true, equal, and pure relationship between people, such as an international friendship. Even though I acknowledge there were few comments that point to the systemic oppression of racial others, the main discourse of race and racism is absorbed in the individual efforts and personal merits with supports from institutions. However, the discourse of advance of institutional supports and individual merits is connected to the already privileged transnational identities in in *Non-Summit* who are differentiated from manual, poor, and not-educated foreign workers in Korea. The dominant visibility and participation of White, Western, and heterosexual panelists who predominantly produce those discourses consequently keeps up the postracial illusion of equal opportunity and circulates messages of racelessness.

Similarly, *Non-Summit* reproduces the postgender ideology through discourses of gender discrimination and gender roles. The postgender ideology is articulated through a discourse of genderless entity that simply eliminates the factor of gender, but doesn't eliminate the factor of politics (Sattar & Rafi, 2015). In this research, I highlighted gender egalitarianism and Asian Confucian patriarchy to note how Western heterosexual masculinity is portrayed as a desirable and hegemonic masculine identity in *Non-Summit*.

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Along with the hegemonic masculinity, *Non-Summit* is already a dominant space of

heterosexual masculinity where the identity of homosexuals and transnational women is

still invisible and silenced. Without including homosexuals and transnational women as

main panelists, *Non-Summit* provides specific narratives of gender inequality and future

solutions. However, it is paradoxical for heterosexual masculine identities to diagnose

and resolve the issue of women's equal rights and social opportunities while excluding

transnational women's participation in the debate. Furthermore, gender discourses are

finally absorbed in understanding the biological difference between men and women, and

a future solution becomes an institutional support and genderless entity without

recognizing the politics of bodies in society (Sattar & Rafi, 2015). Gender equality is also

represented or exemplified with examples of successful women from Western panelists,

and proved by institutional advance in Western countries. Hence, the discourse of gender

equality is accomplished by Western panelists who elusively become blind to the factors

of gender without challenging the discursive frame they are discussing through or their

own male dominant space. In this context, the hegemonic masculinity of White, Western,

and heterosexual identities is not only built on keeping away from conservative and

patriarchal masculinity, but also on the absence of transnational women's bodies, which

consequently reproduce the gendered space of *Non-Summit*. In this sense, I argue *Non-

Summit* as a globalized media reproducing discourse of raceless and genderless exposes

how Whiteness strategically saves its centrality in the globe and what ideological impact

this strategy implies in the larger social structure. *Non-Summit* as a public sphere is

already dominated by White, Western, heterosexual, and educated identities while

apparently embracing more diverse identities such as homosexuals, Muslims, and

women. However, there is visible absence in inner-voices of this marginalized group thereby the subalterns can't speak at the public sphere, but are spoken by and through the dominant identities.

Based on this explanation, it is further required to analyze how *Non-Summit* reflects a larger structure of multiculturalism that already place in Korean society. *Non-Summit* is celebrated as a media space of declaring a diverse, embracing, and liberal multiculturalism in Korean society. Even though foreign panelists and production crews try to produce discourses of raceless and genderless society, *Non-Summit* is not a space for embracing ethnic differences of intra-Asian identities and, with it, a relevant racialization process. In the show, a Chinese panelist's masculinity is represented as stubborn, conservative, and patriarchal whereas a Japanese panelist is depicted as westernized, flexible, and feminized masculinity. Along with this different masculinity of East Asians, Southeast Asians' identities are excluded in the space of *Non-Summit* as a main panelist. Furthermore, Central Asians are referred to as a threatening group of immigrants in Russia and Muslim immigrants are labeled as a group that is hated and are stigmatized as threatening identities. With lighter skin color than Southeast and Central Asians, a Japanese panelist becomes a Westernized and liberal identity in *Non-Summit*. On the contrary, a Chinese panelist is considered as one who needs to be enlightened in order to embrace diverse and liberal ideas. Not only does *Non-Summit* keep the centrality of Whiteness by muting subalterns' voices, but also by representing selective identities, who are willing to pursue Westernized liberal values and dismissing intra-Asian ethnic diversity. Representations of Westernized Asian identities and unspoken subalterns' voices implicitly reveal current conditions of multiculturalism in Korean society.

Fantasizing Western modernity and advancement, Korean society aims to become a

multicultural place in which cosmopolitan foreigners enjoy a globalized environment and

mobility. In this process, inequality and discrimination among darker skinned and

underprivileged immigrants are erased or hidden. However, this division happens not

only between Western and non-Western identities, but also between intra-Asian identities

based on their nationality, class, race, ethnicity, and gender.

Regarding globalized media industry, it is crucial to examine *Non-Summit* as a

space of cultural production through which the postracial and postgender ideologies

reproduce, operate, and distribute in a global scale. Considering the influence of the

Korean wave (*Hallyu*) and global audiences, I argue *Non-Summit* not only constructs an

understanding of multicultural society and foreign identities among Korean audiences,

but also impacts on knowledge of racialized and gendered masculinity among global

audiences. As I briefly mentioned in chapter two, *Non-Summit* sold a copyright of

program format to China and Turkey (Yoon, 2015).[4] Not surprisingly, foreign panelists in

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[4] *Fēi Zhèngshì Huìtán* is the title of Chinese version of *Non-Summit*. Since 2015, *Fēi*

Zhèngshì Huìtán has been aired. Currently, ten main foreign panelists appear and discuss

about a weekly agenda in the show. Main panelists are from Spain, Iran, Nigeria,

England, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. *Elİn Oğlu* is

the title of Turkish version of *Non-Summit*. From 2015 to 2016, *Elİn Oğlu* was aired.

Different from *Non-Summit*, *Elİn Oğlu* has a band and audiences in a studio. As main

panelists, foreigners from England, Russia, South Korea, the United States, Japan,

Slovakia, Spain, and Italy appeared.

the version of Chinese media are visibly lighter skinned identities even though the show includes more diverse countries than *Non-Summit* does. Likewise, transnational women's identities are also silenced and invisible in both shows. Thus, a White and masculine space is transnationally kept and sustained by reproducing the same format of programs and selective foreign identities through global media.

I also suggest that audiences in the U.S. are influenced by media visibility of White dominant panelists and discourse of raceless and genderless produced by *Non-Summit*. Throughout two seasons, a White, educated, heterosexual, and intelligent masculinity is portrayed as a representative of the United States. While recognizing the representative identity is selected by an ideological impact of White supremacy in Korea society, I call specific attention to a possible ideological impact in which Asian/American audiences, more precisely Korean/American diaspora, are internalized. First, a dominant identity of White, educated, heterosexual, and professional work is articulated and reinforced as a global, mobile, able, and representative body in the United States. Second, Asian/American masculinity is further stereotyped positioned as a patriarchal and conservative one, which is portrayed as undesirable and obsolete masculinity in *Non-Summit*. Since Asian/American masculinity is positioned as opposite to the dominant White, educated, liberal, and desirable masculinity in *Non-Summit*, the binary between two opposite masculinity is reproduced and reinforced. Hence, globalized and digital media amplify Whiteness transnationally, in that Korean media reproduce, distribute, and rearticulate White supremacy among global audiences including Asian/American diasporas.

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In sum, I examined how *Non-Summit* highlights the hegemonic masculinity of

White, Western, and heterosexual identities through racialized and gendered

representations. Analyzing media texts of *Non-Summit*, I found the hegemonic identity of

White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity is shored up by othered groups such as

Asian and Muslim masculinity, homosexuals, immigrants, and transnational women.

Within the historical and geopolitical context of the U.S. military occupation, the

hegemonic masculinity is understood as operation of transnational Whiteness in Korean

society. Moreover, the current political tension between the U.S. and North Korea,

renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement(FTA), and domestic resistance to

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) have increased the international

dependence of Korea on the United States regarding national defense and economy. Each

political condition reminds Koreans of the current ceasefire condition, which clearly

places Korean government at a needy position of international relations, particularly with

the United States. Recently, Koreans re-recognize the hierarchized international influence

of the U.S. war power and political intervention, which reveals the explicit neocolonial

relationship between Korea and the U.S. In this sense, Koreans internalize the cultural

and ideological superiority of White, Western, and heterosexual identities as hegemonic

identities through media representations, particularly in *Non-Summit*. Calling this

internalized White U.S. supremacy Koreanness in this multicultural Korean society, I

finally argue Whiteness has historically and geopolitically shaped a cognition of who can

be desirable foreign identities among Koreans. Simultaneously, Whiteness has been

culturally, economically, and politically sustained and reproduced by Korean media

distributing White U.S. supremacy transnationally. Therefore, Whiteness, that is

inherently transnational and invasive, keeps fed itself up by utilizing globalized media circulation and reproducing discourse of a raceless and genderless globe.

Limitations of Research

As with other forms of textual analysis, analytical themes produced by a single coder can be a limitation. Without having another coder, it is hard for a single coder to avoid a critique of subjective understanding of television series. In terms of data collection of media text, more episodes in the first season could further enhance the analysis of characterization process in the show. The more narratives of characterization process are provided, the more discursive strategies could be found in the first season. Furthermore, some foreign panelists from the first season are not selected in this analysis, which potentially provides more diverse intersecting understanding of transnational identities. In addition, *Non-Summit* has started a new season with a great change in main foreign panelists since June 2016. Thus, the analysis could be outdated when compared to current episodes with new foreign panelists. Lastly, more episodes of segments could be collected and analyzed to deepen and expand the analysis about the utility of segments in this thesis. Even though I did have limitations in my study, I argue this research makes a significant contribution to the field of communication, critical cultural studies, and Korean media studies.

Significance of Research

Through this research, I believe I am contributing to the existing literature about transnational identities in Korean media and the strategic discourse of Whiteness, specifically in the area of media representation and discourse production. First, I

understand and analyze transnational identities as fluid and socially constructed entities, instead of dividing and distinguishing foreign identities into three or four categories of identity such as longing, nearby, and compassionate group (Ju & No, 2013). By demonstrating discursive strategies of becoming White, Western, and heterosexual identities, I try to cross categories of identity and highlight an intersecting approach to understand transnational identities in a specific time and space of Korean society and media industry. Compared to already existing literature, this research is constituted with analysis which more focus on discursive and ideological construction of foreign identities. This approach broadens the understanding of multiculturalism in Korea by shifting an analytical frame from Korean nationalism to transnational power operation of Whiteness. Second, I contribute to the literature by providing examples to demonstrate Whiteness is discursively constructed identity and how Whiteness is used to otherize or deploy non-White and non-Western identities. As Projansky and Ono (1999) argued, the issue of Whiteness is not only to figure out the representation of Whiteness, but also what Whiteness is used to do. In this research, I found Whiteness as the hegemonic masculinity of White, Western, and heterosexual identities sustains their neocolonial and patriarchal space in order to otherize non-Western, Confucian, and conservative masculinity, homosexuals, immigrants, and transnational women. However, this space is discursively maintained by strategically embracing otherized identities and discussing about issues of racial and gender discrimination and hatred groups. Hence, Whiteness is transnationally reproduced by Korean media, and this process is continuously influential in that Korean media popularity has been increased in worldwide media space.

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