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# Mobilization and Repression in the Occupy Movement

Eric Turner

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**MOBILIZATION AND REPRESSION IN THE OCCUPY  
MOVEMENT**

**by**

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BA

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of

**PhD in Sociology**

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**DEDICATION PAGE**

This research project is dedicated to my loving wife, Tara Carey. Without her, I would have not have had the dedication and consistency to carry out this project to its completion. Thanks for all the help, Tara, your work inspires me to do my part to make this world a better place and your input and encouragement in the last few years have been priceless.

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## **ABSTRACT**

This dissertation project focuses on dynamics of mobilization and repression in the Occupy movement. This movement emerged in late 2011 in the United States and sought to protest the growing economic inequality and the growing influence of corporations in politics. This project focuses on Occupy chapters which emerged in 74 out of the 100 largest cities in the United States. The first empirical chapter of this project focuses on dynamics which affect differences in protest size, measured in terms of protest turnouts relative to population. This chapter first demonstrates the importance of large student populations and greater numbers of universities in making large turnouts more likely, then focuses on accounting for the aspects of student populations and colleges which play a role in affecting protest size. The findings show that larger protests are more likely in cities with smaller, more liberal colleges, but also with low academic rankings, with institutional support from Chicano Studies and with proportions of economically disadvantaged students. The second part of the dissertation focuses on duration. In particular, this chapter seeks to explain the causes behind relative levels of duration of Occupy protest encampments. The findings show that protest size has an inverse relationship with protest duration: therefore, smaller movements are more likely to last. The findings also show that Occupy chapters can last longer by retaining key logistic resources as well as avoiding elected leader criticism in the media. The third and final empirical chapter of this dis-

sertation focuses on the role of the media in making violent repression more likely. This chapter first analyzes the role of different types of threat (including protest turnouts and protester violence and property damage) in making overall, positive and negative media coverage more or less likely. The findings show that all types of threat have a positive effect on positive and negative coverage but only turnout has a significant (and positive) effect on media praise. The second part of the analysis shows that only media criticism makes repression more likely, whereas overall media coverage and media praise have no effect.

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## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1: OVERVIEW OF THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT**

### 1.1.1: Basic Characteristics of the Occupy Movement

The Occupy movement is the broad set of demonstrations, encampments and other actions that started in mid-September 2011 with a protest in front of the Wall Street Stock Exchange in New York City. One of the main ideas brought forward by these protesters is the denouncing of the excessive influence of banks, corporations and financial institutions in both politics and society (Milkman, Bamyeh, Wilson, Williams and Gould, 2012). Occupy Wall Street also rejects conventional representative politics and politicians and, concurrently, supports the adoption of anti-hierarchical and egalitarian values in greater society.

The media has widely commented about the movement's lack of goals. However I can sketch out a few broad objectives from the movement's manifesto (New York City General Assembly, 2011) and available academic commentary (Castells, 2012; Gitlin, 2012; Gould-Wartofsky, 2015; Milkman et al. 2012; Schneider, 2013; Smaligo, 2014; Welty, Bolton, Nayak and Malone, 2012). First, there is a desire to limit, if not end, the influence of corporate money and financial interests in politics. Second, a desire to hold representatives accountable through popular participation in the form of assemblies and petitions. Third, there is a desire to reduce social and racial inequality in society, both through taxation of its wealthiest components as well as redistribution through expansion of the welfare state (including measures to reduce student fees and student debt, as well as guaranteeing better pay and working conditions).

Occupy Wall Street has also taken part in many disruptive, spontaneous and non-violent actions ranging from sit-ins, encampments, closing down of ports and disruptions of events. The most well-known encampments were those in New York and Oakland, both of which were evicted by law enforcement in November 2011. The movement was also successful in closing down the port of Oakland for a day at on November 2<sup>nd</sup> 2011 while attempting similar actions in other western ports such as Seattle, Long Beach and Portland. The movement also carried out sit-ins at banks and foreclosure court hearings in dozens of cities. Although isolated violent actions of protesters have occurred in these circumstances, the movement-at-large does not endorse these actions and sees itself as non-violent (New York General Assembly, 2011). Occupy has also taken part in more conventional actions, such as pickets, demonstrations and candlelight vigils, usually in conjunction with more institutionalized allies. The most notable of these marches were during the October 15<sup>th</sup> 2011 'day of rage' where as many as 40,000 people protested in New York City and several thousand in other major cities including Pittsburgh, San Francisco and Los Angeles.

#### 1.1.2: Roots and Context of the Occupy Protests

The roots of Occupy Wall Street lie in the world's worst recession since World War 2 (International Monetary Forum, 2009). According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the global economy went into a recession for almost two years (Anon, 2015). In the U.S. the recession manifested itself especially through the collapse of the housing market bubble. This market had driven a large part of the U.S. economy, in particular the banking and financial sec-

tors, for the previous years. In the aftermath of this crisis, private household debt soared and house prices collapsed. The Federal Government intervened in 2008 and 2009 with economic packages designed to help out banks and the financial sector. However the provisions designed to help individuals who had struggled in the recession were few and limited in scope (Chomsky, 2012; Schneider, 2013). Furthermore, there was also a growing perception of the increasingly negative influence of American corporations and financial interests in Federal and State politics. The financial bailout was one of the reasons, but the Supreme Court ruling on the Citizens United v. FEC case in 2010 was the other key factor (McAdam, 2013). This ruling effectively removed many limits on electoral campaign spending on behalf of corporations, equating their rights to spend money in campaigns to constitutionally protected free speech.

Occupy Wall Street was also inspired by many protests and revolutions that took place earlier in 2011 (Castells, 2012; Gitlin, 2012; Schneider 2013): the Arab Spring brought dictatorships to an end that year in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and strong anti-Austerity movements had emerged in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Iceland. These protests denounced rising unemployment and inequality, as well as the inability of leaders to stand up to demands for more cuts to social services by the IMF and the European Union. There were also like-minded protests in the U.S. that helped shape Occupy's identity: in Spring 2011 many thousands of public employees and activists occupied the State Capitol in Madison, Wisconsin in July 2011 and an organization called "New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts" organized a sleep-in against New York City mayor Bloomberg. According



to Schneider (2013) this protest created the activist network which was responsible for the first Occupy protest in Manhattan's Financial District.

### 1.1.3: A Brief History of Occupy

The movement's first demonstration was the notorious September 17<sup>th</sup> 2011 “day of rage”. This protest was initially called on and promoted by the Canadian magazine *Adbusters* and supported by various organizations and activists who had carried out protests on similar issues earlier that year. This included New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts, Anonymous and the Bloombergville protesters (Castells, 2012; Gould-Wartofsky, 2015). The target of the first protest on September 17<sup>th</sup> was the Wall Street Stock Exchange, and protesters set out to gather and take over Bowling Green Park, the site of Wall Street's iconic ‘charging bull’ (Schneider, 2013). However, the protesters found this area cordoned off by police and marched on nearby Zuccotti Park. Here, they set up the movement's first and most famous encampment.

In the next few weeks the protests spread beyond New York City and to most of the major U.S. cities and many other smaller localities. Castells (2012) estimates that demonstrations took place in as many as 600 U.S. cities, spreading from the nation's largest population centers, such as Chicago and Los Angeles, to small villages such as Mosier, Oregon, which had a population of 433 according to the 2010 U.S. Census. Among the 100 biggest cities in the U.S., 74 witnessed Occupy encampments. As shown on Table 1, many protests, such as those in Lubbock, TX, Norfolk, VA, and Spokane, WA, only mobilized a few dozen people. However, as also shown on this same table, some of the biggest chapters, such as those in Oakland, Boston, San Francisco, Los Ange-

les and Portland, as well as the original Occupy protest in New York City were able to mobilize several thousand protesters. In this respect, the Occupy movement enjoyed

*Table 1: Largest turnouts by local Occupy protest in first 2 weeks of mobilization, and respective dates*

City or Cities	Turnout	Date or Dates	City or Cities	Turnout	Date or Dates
New York, NY	42500	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Albuquerque, NM	350	October 15 <sup>th</sup>
Portland, OR	10000	October 6 <sup>th</sup>	Raleigh, NC; Houston, TX; Atlanta, GA and Kansas City, MO	300	October 2 <sup>nd</sup> , 6 <sup>th</sup> , 7 <sup>th</sup> and 9 <sup>th</sup>
Los Angeles, CA	5000	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Milwaukee and Madison, WI	300	All October 15 <sup>th</sup>
San Francisco, CA	4000	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Houston, TX	300	October 6 <sup>th</sup>
Pittsburgh, PA and Seattle, WA	3000	All October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Nashville, TN	250	October 6 <sup>th</sup>
Denver, CO	2200	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Riverside, CA; Reno, NV; Fort Wayne, IN; Honolulu, HI; Spokane, WA	250	October 15 <sup>th</sup>
Chicago, IL	2000	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Jacksonville, FL and Fresno, CA	220	October 8 <sup>th</sup> and 15 <sup>th</sup>
Orlando, FL	1750	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Louisville, KY; San Antonio, TX; Buffalo, NY; Winston-Salem, NC and Oklahoma City, OK	300	October 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 6 <sup>th</sup> , 8 <sup>th</sup> , 16 <sup>th</sup> and 30 <sup>th</sup>
San Diego, CA	1500	October 7 <sup>th</sup>	Cleveland, OH	150	October 6 <sup>th</sup>
Washington, DC	1500	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Anchorage, AK	140	October 5 <sup>th</sup>
Austin, TX	1400	October 6 <sup>th</sup>	Baltimore, MD	125	October 4 <sup>th</sup>
Cincinnati, OH	1300	October 8 <sup>th</sup>	El Paso, TX; Columbus, OH and Tulsa, OK	120	October 7 <sup>th</sup> , 10 <sup>th</sup> and 15 <sup>th</sup>
Miami, FL and Phoenix, AZ	1200	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Memphis, TN; New Orleans, LA and Long Beach, CA	110	October 4 <sup>th</sup> , 6 <sup>th</sup> and 8 <sup>th</sup>
Boston, MA	1000	September 30 <sup>th</sup>	Santa Ana, CA and Toledo, OH	100	All October 10 <sup>th</sup>
Las Vegas, NV and Tucson, AZ	1000	October 6 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup>	Rochester, NY	75	October 10 <sup>th</sup>
Omaha, NE	950	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Jersey City, NJ	70	October 6 <sup>th</sup>
Indianapolis, IN	900	October 8 <sup>th</sup>	Lubbock, TX	55	November 17 <sup>th</sup>
Philadelphia, PA	700	October 6 <sup>th</sup>	Fort Worth, TX and Colorado Springs, CO	36	October 10 <sup>th</sup> and 15 <sup>th</sup>
Irvine, CA	640	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Norfolk, VA	30	October 6 <sup>th</sup>
Greensboro, NC	600	October 15 <sup>th</sup>	Newark, NJ	30	November 18 <sup>th</sup>
Sacramento, CA; Minneapolis, MN; Charlotte, NC and Oakland, CA	550	October 6 <sup>th</sup> , 7 <sup>th</sup> , 8 <sup>th</sup> and 15 <sup>th</sup>	Lexington, KY	24	September 29 <sup>th</sup>
St. Louis, MO; Lincoln, NE and Detroit, MI	500	All October 15 <sup>th</sup>	San Jose, CA	24	October 7 <sup>th</sup>
Tampa, FL	400	October 1 <sup>st</sup>	Laredo, TX	20	October 22 <sup>nd</sup>
Dallas, TX	380	October 15 <sup>th</sup>			

*Sources: Local Newspaper Reports & Occupy Survey*

widespread success across many major U.S. urban centers. The largest turnouts were during the October 15th, 2011 global protests, when more than 40,000 people in New York City and more than 100,000 people nationwide took part in marches.

This very rapid pace of this mobilization was quickly followed by repressive events. On September 24th 2011, 80 protesters were arrested during a march in New York City, while 700 more were arrested a week later for attempting to block traffic on Brooklyn Bridge. While Occupy protesters did engage in a wide range of controversial and confrontational actions, encampments were the main source of contention between protesters and law enforcement officers. Protesters camped in public spaces and declared many squares in major U.S. cities 'occupied' with no end of this action in sight. The first attempt to evict one of the major Occupy encampments in Oakland in late October 2011 had ended in a PR nightmare for Oakland mayor Jean Quan, with the media reporting several episodes of police brutality, including the near-fatal injury of Iraq War Veteran Scott Olsen, who thereafter became a celebrated martyr for Occupy activists.

Thus, by the end of October 2011 "mayors and police chiefs in nearly every major metropolis in the United States were increasingly preoccupied with the question: How to dispense with the occupations without making martyrs of the occupiers, and without making themselves target of public ire?" (Gould-Wartofsky, 2015:133). Eventually, many found the answer in public safety concerns over dropping temperatures, increasing tensions, violence, sanitation issues and drug use at encampments (these latter three problems escalated as the homeless population at encampments grew). Local media outlets also raised taxpayer concerns over the cost of police overtime for patrolling these 24-

hours protests. In mid-November 2011 a meeting of 18 mayors of major U.S. cities resulted in a joint decision to evict the encampments (Castells, 2012).

*Table 2: Encampment length and number of days encamped for Occupy chapters in the cities under analysis*

City	Start of Encampment	End of Encampment	N. Days Encamped		City	Start of Encampment	End of Encampment	N. Days Encamped
Honolulu, HI	11/5/2011	8/23/2013	658		Chicago, IL	9/23/2011	1/20/2012	120
Columbus, OH	10/10/2011	9/9/2012	336		Buffalo, NY	10/8/2011	2/2/2012	118
Fresno, CA	10/15/2011	9/4/2012	326		Pittsburgh, PA	10/15/2011	2/8/2012	117
Memphis, TN	10/15/2011	8/10/2012	301		Charlotte, NC	10/9/2011	1/30/2012	114
Madison, WI	10/7/2011	5/2/2012	209		Lexington, KY	10/3/2011	1/24/2012	114
Lincoln, NE	10/15/2011	5/8/2012	207		Miami, FL	10/15/2011	1/31/2012	109
Raleigh, NC	10/16/2011	5/6/2012	204		Phoenix, AZ	10/15/2011	1/23/2012	101
Tampa, FL	10/8/2011	4/20/2012	196		Long Beach, CA	10/16/2011	1/17/2012	94
Louisville, KY	10/6/2011	4/13/2012	191		Las Vegas, NV	10/21/2011	1/19/2012	91
Lubbock, TX	10/15/2011	4/18/2012	187		Reno, NV	10/27/2011	1/25/2012	91
Kansas City, MO	10/6/2011	3/29/2012	176		Newark, NJ	11/18/2011	2/15/2012	90
Nashville, TN	10/9/2011	3/10/2012	154		Irvine, CA	10/15/2011	1/11/2012	89
Indianapolis, IN	10/8/2011	3/6/2012	151		New Orleans, LA	10/6/2011	12/30/2011	86
Orlando, FL	10/16/2011	3/13/2012	150		Denver, CO	10/5/2011	12/19/2011	76
Jacksonville, FL	11/5/2011	4/2/2012	150		San Francisco, CA	9/29/2011	12/11/2011	75
Fort Wayne, IN	10/15/2011	3/11/2012	149		Laredo, TX	10/22/2011	1/2/2012	73
Rochester, NY	11/11/2011	3/30/2012	141		San Antonio, TX	10/6/2011	12/16/2011	72
Tucson, AZ	10/15/2011	3/1/2012	139		Boston, MA	9/30/2011	12/10/2011	72
Houston, TX	10/6/2011	2/13/2012	131		Baltimore, MD	10/4/2011	12/13/2011	71
Washington, DC	10/6/2011	2/4/2012	122		Anchorage, AK	10/5/2011	12/14/2011	71
Cleveland, OH	10/6/2011	2/4/2012	122		Seattle, WA	9/30/2011	12/9/2011	71
Austin, TX	10/6/2011	2/3/2012	121		Oklahoma City, OK	10/10/2011	12/14/2011	66
Milwaukee, WI	10/15/2011	2/12/2012	121		Los Angeles, CA	10/1/2011	11/30/2011	61

Table 2 (cont.):

City	Start of Encampment	End of Encampment	N. Days Encamped		City	Start of Encampment	End of Encampment	N. Days Encamped
New York, NY	9/17/2011	11/15/2011	60		Norfolk, VA	10/10/2011	11/10/2011	32
Fort Worth, TX	10/10/2011	12/7/2011	59		El Paso, TX	10/17/2011	11/13/2011	28
Philadelphia, PA	10/6/2011	11/30/2011	56		Albuquerque, NM	10/1/2011	10/25/2011	25
Minneapolis, MN	10/7/2011	12/1/2011	56		Greensboro, NC	10/15/2011	11/6/2011	23
Colorado Springs, CO	9/30/2011	11/21/2011	53		Atlanta, GA	10/7/2011	10/26/2011	20
San Jose, CA	10/2/2011	11/18/2011	48		Tulsa, OK	10/28/2011	11/13/2011	17
Riverside, CA	10/15/2011	11/30/2011	47		Omaha, NE	10/22/2011	11/3/2011	13
Santa Ana, CA	10/22/2011	12/6/2011	46		Sacramento, CA	10/6/2011	10/18/2011	13
Dallas, TX	10/6/2011	11/17/2011	43		Cincinnati, OH	10/10/2011	10/21/2011	12
Toledo, OH	10/10/2011	11/21/2011	43		Jersey City, NJ	10/11/2011	10/18/2011	8
Oakland, CA	10/10/2011	11/21/2011	43		Durham, NC	10/16/2011	10/18/2011	3
St. Louis, MO	10/2/2011	11/11/2011	41		Spokane, WA	9/28/2011	9/30/2011	3
Detroit, MI	10/14/2011	11/22/2011	40		Norfolk, VA	10/10/2011	11/10/2011	32
Portland, OR	10/7/2011	11/13/2011	38		El Paso, TX	10/17/2011	11/13/2011	28

Sources: Local Newspaper Reports & Occupy Survey

By early December, most of the larger encampments, including those in New York City, Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Portland, were evicted, with police carrying out mass arrests. In some cities, law enforcement resorted to the use of more violent devices, including batons, tear gas and pepper spray to control protesters. As shown on Table 2, some of the encampments, such as those in Washington DC and Austin, lasted a few more months.

By the start of spring 2012, most encampments, both small and large, had disbanded, with little more than a dozen remaining. The most durable encampments were in Columbus, OH, which witnessed an 11-month long encampment, and in Honolulu, where

protesters held on for almost 2 years. Although the Occupy movement does not enjoy the same amount of attention as it did in its first few months of existence, it is still visible in various projects spurred on by its activists. These include hurricane relief efforts (Occupy Sandy), actions against foreclosures, actions in support of rights of minimum wage workers (Occupy Black Friday) as well as attempts to set up alternative banking institutions (Alternative Banking Group) (Gould-Wartofsky, 2015). Furthermore, this movement has changed the conversation profoundly on inequality in the U.S. and made this nation more aware of the disparities in its society. Thanks to the Occupy movement, the terms ‘99%’ and ‘1%’ now carry very distinct meanings in political conversations (Grusky, McAdam, Reich and Satz, 2013; Gitlin, 2012). The repression suffered by many activists has also had a lasting impact. It increased solidarity among the protesters and demonstrated the relatively low tolerance of many U.S. municipal authorities for dissent and confrontational protest.

## **1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THREE KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

### 1.2.1: What explains differences in protest size?

One of the most essential features about protests and the social movements which organize them is the ability of the latter to mobilize larger or smaller number of participants. I can refer to this feature as protest size or large versus small turnout. Scholars generally view larger protests as a form of success of social movements, because larger protests are more likely to gain media attention as well as a perception of legitimacy by elites as well as the general public. Scholars have put forth a wide variety of explanations for differences in protest size. For example, theoretical work by Zald and Ash (1966) and McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasizes the role of differences in the amount and variety in resources available to organizations, including network ties to other social movement organizations. However, Della Porta (1995) argues that larger protests are more likely to happen when political elites are more sympathetic to the protesters' grievances and less willing to repress their actions.

We also have abundant evidence for the role of students in boosting the numbers of large protests, ranging from Lipset and Altbach's (1966) and Van Dyke's (1998) scholarship on pro-Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam war protests by U.S. students in the 1960s to more recent evidence on the role of students in Latin American guerrilla uprisings (Wickham-Crowley, 2001), pro-democracy protests in China (Zhao, 1998) and protests against the rising costs of education in Chile (Bellei and Cabalin, 2013). Students have demonstrated their key role in boosting protest size across a variety of national and historical contexts. Unfortunately, we have little evidence of which characteristics of student popu-

lations and universities matter for boosting protest size. This is because most of the literature on student protests, such as the work of Lipset and Altbach (1966), Scott and El Assal (1969), Kahn and Bowers (1970), Blau and Slaughter (1971) and, more recently, Soule (1997) and Van Dyke (1998) focus on the role of these characteristics in influencing the likelihood of mobilization but not the relative capacity to mobilize greater or smaller numbers.

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter I explore the role of student population characteristics in affecting the size of protests, by looking at the Occupy protests which took place in late 2011. The Occupy movement is a good case study for the exploration of the role of student populations and their characteristics in affecting protest size for three main reasons. First, students have played a prominent role in this movement. Occupy protests took place at most major urban centers in the United States where most of the nation's student population lives. Occupy was a left-wing movement, which attracted students, who as a demographic are more likely to hold left-wing political views. We also have evidence from the news coverage of the protests that the Occupy movement supported many issues dear to students, such as government intervention to mitigate inequality, reduce tuition costs and carry out student debt forgiveness. The second reason is that the news coverage of the movement shows that the student population which participated in Occupy protests, as well as the colleges in which this population studies, present a great degree of diversity in their various characteristics. For example, some cities, such as New York City and Boston, host some of the most elite universities in the country (in this case, I refer to Columbia and Harvard) whereas many others, such as Portland, OR and Jacksonville, FL have



fewer or no elite colleges. Some cities, such as Columbus, OH and Albuquerque, NM have only one large college, whereas others such as Chicago and Los Angeles have as many as a dozen major higher education institutions. Student populations are usually pretty affluent in big east coast and west coast cities such as New York and San Francisco, but are more often from less privileged backgrounds in cities like El Paso, TX and Buffalo, NY. The third and final reason is that the Occupy movement presented great variation in protest size. On one hand, several thousand activists showed up at marches in New York City, Denver and Pittsburgh, PA. On the other hand, only less than a hundred people took part at protests in Laredo, TX; Jersey City, NJ and Norfolk, VA.

This chapter seeks to make two contributions. First, I explore the relationship between characteristics of student populations and protest size. Although we have abundant evidence of the relationship between student numbers and protest size, we do not know which types of students and which types of colleges can facilitate larger protests. However we do have some clues from the literature on the relationship between student and college characteristics and protest emergence, which can guide our conventional expectations on the relationship between these characteristics and protest size. Second, I develop a nuanced explanation for the interplay of economic factors in accounting for differences in protest size. By doing so, I encourage scholars to rethink the relationship between student characteristics and activism. Specifically, I show how, even though some non-economic factors mattered (including the size of colleges, the presence of Chicano studies departments and more liberal campus environments) it is really the interplay of economic factors which helps us draw a clear picture of the typical 21<sup>st</sup> century student activ-

ist. I find an inverse correlation between protest size and presence of elite colleges as well as a positive correlation between protest size and overall proportion of students who are not economically disadvantaged. This partly contradicts past portrayal of student activism by authors such as Lipset and Altbach (1966) and Kahn and Bowers (1970), who witnessed protests led by affluent students from elite colleges. I argue that, in this case, student activism may be fueled by a perceived status inconsistency of students from relatively wealthy backgrounds who are upset for a high cost of education which will most likely not translate automatically into a well-paid employment opportunity upon graduation.

#### 1.2.2: What explains differences in campaign duration?

As first noted by Zald and Ash (1966), one of the key characteristics of social movements is their ability to sustain a campaign over time. Movements campaigns which last longer may have a more durable impact on activists across a greater time range, leading to greater opportunities to shape political institutions, create new grievances and give salience to ones that already exist (McAdam, 1982). While movements tend to benefit from longer campaigns, it is less clear what explains variation in their duration. Davenport (2005) has shown that, for many authors, repression has a galvanizing effect on mobilization, yet many more argue that this type of action destabilizes movements. Other accounts, such as Whittier's (2010) work on the women's movement focus on the role of logistical resources, like physical meeting spaces, in helping social movements last for longer. Unfortunately, this literature has tended to overlook one key characteristic: size. One reason for this previous lack of attention is that most studies focus on one movement. Another reason for the inattention to size on studies of campaign duration is that in

work that does compare social movements, scholars tend to look at protests of approximately similar sizes, making size a constant and not a variable. For example, Kitschelt (1986) looks at four equally large anti-nuclear protests in four European countries. With regards to the past literature, the conventional expectation is that larger movements tend to last longer. This perspective is steeped in the resource mobilization approach (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), which claims that larger movements should have more resources (such as manpower and financial resources) and this will result in longer lasting campaigns. For example, Everett (1992) finds that larger and more professionalized social movement organizations tend to last for longer.

In contrast, I argue that larger movements tend to last for a shorter period of time. The first reason for this dynamic is that smaller movements are likely to be more cohesive. They are able to establish a heightened sense of community as well as an agreement over tactics and strategy. The second reason is that smaller movements are less likely to be repressed and more able to negotiate with law enforcement, which should enhance their ability to last over time. To test my claims, I look at variation in length of city-specific campaigns in the Occupy movement. The Occupy Movement is a good candidate for this study because it witnessed considerable variation in terms of the duration of its encampments, which ranged from several days in Spokane, WA and Durham, NC to 10 months or more, in places like Columbus, OH and Honolulu. The Occupy Movement also experienced a great amount of variation in the size of the protests, with several thousands showing up in New York City and Los Angeles, whereas Jersey City, NJ and San Jose, CA experienced turnouts of only a few dozen activists.

Chapter 3 seeks to make two contributions: first, there is a surprising lack of attention to movement duration in the literature. This is unfortunate, because the duration of a movement affects many other processes that are important to movements. Movements that last for less time have a lesser chance of affecting society and political institutions. Elites are not likely to grant significant concessions to protesters unless they are able to sustain a campaign over a long period of time (Giugni, 1998). For instance, the anti-Apartheid campaign in South Africa was successful in part because it was sustained for many years. Likewise, city officials in Montgomery were extremely reluctant to meet protester demands until protesters in this city carried out a more than one year long boycott. Campaigns that last over a greater period of time have a greater chance of gaining public attention and sympathy. For example, the Occupy movement's continued emphasis on the existence of a large amount of inequality in U.S. society has resulted in the term '99%' being commonly used by media and elites in discussions about economics and politics. My second contribution is that I push scholars to rethink the idea of movements and their size. Social movement leaders aim at organizing larger protests because it gives more legitimacy to their cause (Koopmans, 1993). Activists tend to find more comfort in large gatherings (de Volo, 2006) and have greater emotional energy (Collins, 2001). However, I suspect that there are some conditions in which large numbers should be thought of as a liability. I suggest that duration is one of those conditions.

### 1.2.3: Why are some movements violently repressed while others are spared?

As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) observe in their study of nonviolent campaigns, 88% of social movements experience repression on the hands of the state. Schol-

ars have long tried to explain why some movements are repressed while others are spared. Several accounts focus on the role of threat, defined by Tilly (1978) as the extent to which social movement actions and goals are acceptable to opponents, especially political institutions and law enforcement. Threat explanations often highlight the role of confrontational tactics. For example, Della Porta's (1995) analysis of police repression in Germany and Italy emphasizes the role of protester violence and property damage in inciting repression. Davenport's (1995) analysis of repression in 53 different countries shows that law enforcement tends to react more often to large protest turnouts than smaller ones.

Many scholars (Garrow, 1978; Gitlin, 1980; Koopmans, 2004, 2005) emphasize the role of the media in shaping a movement's public image and consequently making the movement more or less likely to face repression. As noted by Garrow (1978), Gitlin (1980) and Della Porta and Filleule (2004), this media coverage is often itself shaped by the characteristics of protest, including size and confrontational tactics. Thus, in many instances, social movement scholars have argued that media characteristics and threat interact to shape a movement's likelihood to face repression (Garrow, 1978; Gitlin, 1980; Della Porta and Filleule, 2004; Oliver, 2008). Unfortunately, the process by which the threat posed by protesters and media coverage interact to produce repression has seldom been tested (but see Wisler and Giugni, 1999) and threat and media explanations of repression remain mostly isolated from each other. Recent analyses of protest repression tend to focus solely on threat explanations (Davenport, 1995, 2000; McPhail & McCarthy, 2005; Earl and Soule, 2006) or on the role of the media (Koopmans, 2004, 2005).

When scholars have compared the role played by both threat and the media they have considered two factors as separate variables capturing isolated processes (Earl, Soule and McCarthy, 2003).

In this chapter I investigate how threat and media characteristics combine to explain variation in repression. I do this by looking at the Occupy Movement protests that took place in late 2011. The Occupy Movement is a good candidate for the study of repression for three main reasons. First, it witnessed considerable variation in terms of its size and its level of confrontational tactics used in the cities in which it appeared. For example, thousands of protesters showed up in cities such as Portland, Los Angeles and New York City, however protests were much smaller in San Jose, CA and New Orleans. Protesters carried out extensive property damage and violence in Oakland and Denver, whereas in Miami and Boston they remained peaceful. Second, Occupy protests received extensive newspaper coverage, ranging from very favorable in cities such as Honolulu and Buffalo to very unfavorable in Portland and Denver. Third, at least 13 of the 100 largest U.S. cities witnessed violent repression of Occupy activists. Protests in Oakland and Dallas were affected by violent police action, yet their counterparts in Chicago and Minneapolis were spared. Therefore repression did take place in several instances, but was far from ubiquitous. I first explore the way the media reacts to different forms of threat, including protest size, violence and property damage. I measure media in terms of overall amount of coverage, positive coverage and negative coverage. Then, I show the effect of these different dimensions of media coverage on repression, net of the aforementioned threat characteristics.

This chapter seeks to make two contributions. First, while many studies have demonstrated the role of threat in repression, causal dynamics behind this process are under-theorized. We know that threat matters, and that some actors, such as the media, political institutions and law enforcement can combine with protester-posed threat to produce repression. However, we don't know how this process unravels, and which dimensions of threat matter more, as well as which actors tend to react and interact with protester threat to produce repression. Second, I develop a more nuanced investigation of the role of media coverage in repression. Most studies tend to measure the effect of media by just looking at the overall amount of coverage (but see Koopmans 2004, 2005). I add more nuance to our understanding of media effects by exploring the role of positive and negative media portrayals of protesters alongside the overall amount of coverage of the protest. I also attempt to explain the reasons why some types of media coverage matter and others don't.

## **1.3 DATA SOURCES**

### 1.3.1: Choice of Sample

Having introduced the movement under study and my motivations for looking at this case, I will now provide a brief outline of this research project, including its main data sources. This project uses cities as the main unit of analysis. Although the Occupy movement attempted to form state-wide organizations in some cases, it was by far most present in cities and its city-wide chapters, such as Occupy Wall Street in New York City, Occupy Oakland and Occupy Los Angeles, which were the largest, most successful and most widely covered. This project's initial target sample was the 100 largest cities in the United States as listed by the 2010 U.S. Census (Center for New Media and Promotion, 2009). According to newspaper reports and survey respondents (detailed below), 74 out of these 100 cities witnessed an active Occupy chapter with an encampment. The sample of 74 cities includes 44 out of the 50 biggest U.S. cities and covers cities in 29 out of 50 states. It includes the largest and most visible Occupy protests which took place in major cities (such as Oakland, New York City, Boston and Los Angeles) as well as many smaller, lesser known chapters in smaller urban centers (such as Spokane, WA; Jersey City, NJ; Laredo, TX and Toledo, OH).

### 1.3.2: The Occupy Survey

I obtained a substantial amount of data for this project, including information on chapter presence, encampment presence, duration and protest turnouts, from a survey which I sent to the relevant Occupy chapters between July and December 2013. This survey was sent initially to the official Facebook page and official email addresses listed on



either the Facebook page or blog for every chapter. A new email and Facebook message were sent after weeks to chapters which did not respond. Whenever this method was ineffective at getting an adequate number of responses, other methods were used, including calling the official phone numbers listed on the websites for the chapters, contacting the chapters via Twitter and using personal contacts to connect with people who have been involved with the movement. I assumed that the people in charge of the official Facebook page and email addresses would be involved enough in each chapter's local activities to have the expertise to respond the survey. However, when clarification was needed, I stated that the general threshold for participation is frequent involvement in the local Occupy chapter, especially from the start of the movement in September 2011 to the May Day protests in May 2012. A short note, which included a summary of the purposes of the study and a bit of information about the researcher, was included in the message sent to the email addresses and Facebook pages.

The survey obtained answers from spokespeople for 61 Occupy chapters out of the 74 that were targeted, for an overall response rate of 82.4%. In the largest cities (which tend to have the biggest chapters) the response rate was particularly high- it is worth noting that 18 out of the 20 chapters in the 20 biggest cities in the U.S. did respond. Although response rates were generally skewed in favor of larger cities, there was still an abundance of answers from relatively small urban centers- Newark, NJ; Colorado Springs, CO and Tulsa, OK to mention a few. There were problems with incomplete responses in 5 out of the 61 chapters which did respond, but in general respondents gave satisfactory and comprehensive answers. Besides the aforementioned problems, these

data also had other forms of significant bias. Because information was collected from activists, there may have been an interest on behalf of respondents to overstate turnouts at the encampments and other protests, as well as potentially exaggerating the number of arrests. Activists may also commit errors in good faith when asked for precise information about turnouts and encampment length. For this reason, these data were supplemented with external data from newspaper archives.

### 1.3.3: Newspaper Content Analysis

My other main source of information on the Occupy movement is a content analysis of local newspaper coverage of Occupy protests. I use this analysis for information on the movement itself, including Occupy chapter presence, turnouts, encampment length, violence and repression. But I also take into account different instances and types of critical and positive coverage, to understand how the local media is covering the local movement. For this analysis I targeted the most widely read local newspaper in each city (a full list of newspapers is visible on Table 3). I searched the archives of each newspaper by entering key search terms (which included ‘Occupy protest’ and ‘Occupy Wall Street’) in the main online databases for newspaper archives, including LexisNexis, Newslibrary and ProQuest. Then, I discarded coverage of Occupy events happening outside of each city under analysis to focus only on coverage of local protests.

Although I rely heavily on these data in this research project, I do acknowledge that they suffer from several limitations. As pointed out by Myers and Caniglia (2004) bias in coverage of protest events takes two forms. First of all, there is bias related to the protest event itself: newspapers may or may not cover events, or may cover them to

Table 3: List of newspapers used for each city under analysis

City	Newspaper Used	City	Newspaper Used
Tucson, AZ	Arizona Daily Star	Boston, MA	Boston Globe
St. Louis, MO	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	New York, NY	New York Times
El Paso, TX	El Paso Times	Columbus, OH	Columbus Dispatch
Portland, OR	Oregonian	Chicago, IL	Chicago Tribune
Kansas City, MO	Kansas City Star	Honolulu, HI	Honolulu Star-Advertiser
Laredo, TX	Laredo Morning Times	Oakland, CA	Oakland Tribune
Miami, FL	Miami Herald	Lubbock, TX	Lubbock Avalanche-Journal
Riverside, CA	Press-Enterprise	Nashville, TN	Tennessean
Raleigh, NC	News & Observer	Jersey City, NJ	Jersey Journal
Buffalo, NY	Buffalo News	Sacramento, CA	Sacramento Bee
San Diego, CA	U-T San Diego	Atlanta, GA	Atlanta Journal-Constitution
Tulsa, OK	Tulsa World	Jacksonville, FL	Florida Times-Union
Houston, TX	Houston Chronicle	Indianapolis, IN	Indianapolis Star
Tampa, FL	Tampa Bay Times	Spokane, WA	Spokesman-Review
Omaha, NE	Omaha World Herald	Colorado Springs, CO	Colorado Springs Gazette
Lincoln, NE	Lincoln Journal-Star	Irvine, CA	Orange County Register
Reno, NV	Reno Gazette	Madison, WI	Wisconsin State Journal
San Jose, CA	San Jose Mercury	Newark, NJ	Star-Ledger
Fresno, CA	Fresno Bee	Anchorage, AK	Anchorage Daily Star
Washington, DC	Washington Post	San Antonio, TX	San Antonio Express-News
Charlotte, NC	Charlotte Observer	Austin, TX	Austin American-Statesman
Phoenix, AZ	Arizona Republic	Fort Worth, TX	Fort Worth Star-Telegram
Los Angeles, CA	Los Angeles Times	Baltimore, MD	Baltimore Sun
Albuquerque, NM	Albuquerque Journal	Oklahoma City, OK	Oklahoman
Fort Wayne, IN	Journal Gazette	Long Beach, CA	Press-Telegram
Santa Ana, CA	Orange County Register	Minneapolis, MN	Minneapolis Star-Tribune
Las Vegas, NV	Las Vegas Review-Journal	New Orleans, LA	Times-Picayune
Memphis, TN	Commercial Appeal	Pittsburgh, PA	Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Louisville, KY	Courier-Journal	Lexington, KY	Herald-Leader
Dallas, TX	Dallas Morning News	Cincinnati, OH	Cincinnati Enquirer
Philadelphia, PA	Philadelphia Inquirer	Toledo, OH	Toledo Blade
Cleveland, OH	Plain Dealer	Greensboro, NC	Greensboro News & Record
Denver, CO	Denver Post	Orlando, FL	Orlando Sentinel
Seattle, WA	Seattle Times	Norfolk, VA	Virginian Pilot
Milwaukee, WI	Milwaukee Sentinel	Durham, NC	Herald-Sun
Detroit, MI	Detroit Free Press	Winston-Salem, NC	Wiston-Salem Journal
San Francisco, CA	San Francisco Chronicle	Rochester, NY	Democrat and Chronicle

different extents and in a different light depending on the intensity and uniqueness of events as well as the notoriety and political significance of the actors who are involved. Additionally, as pointed out by Oliver and Myers (1999), coverage may vary depending on the sponsor of the event (for example, national organizations may get more coverage than local ones and more established SMOs may receive more attention to more informal groupings) as well as the type of protest event that takes place (such as marches, rallies, sit-ins, speeches and non-permitted events). Second, Myers and Caniglia (2004) point out that the context can also affect the quality and the quantity of the coverage, including the location of the protest event, the extent to which the issue being protested is salient in national political discourse and the extent to which the audience to which the protesters are speaking corresponds to the audience of the newspaper in question. Oliver and Myers (2004) add that local newspapers vary in their political leanings, with more liberal newspapers more likely to cover protest events, and do so in a more positive light.

How can we deal with these issues? The work of Ortiz, Myers, Walls and Diaz (2004) and Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule (2004) recommends triangulation with other forms of data in order to cross-examine newspaper reporting of protest events with other sources. This research project does triangulate data on Occupy chapter presence, encampment length and turnouts with data obtained from the Occupy Survey. Therefore, a substantial part of the data obtained from newspapers eschews bias through its comparison with information provided by activists. Most notably, the data on chapter presence are obtained from both sources, helping the project avoid most types of selection bias described by Earl et al. (2004). However this project does still have some forms of de-

scriptive bias, because it relies solely on newspaper coverage for information on repression and activist violence and property damage. How can we justify this bias? First of all, triangulation with activist data is not an advisable strategy for data on movement violence and disruption. Most activists are far too willing to underplay or deny that their movement causes disruption or has perpetrated violence. Second, many of the forms of bias described above do not apply to this research project. This project analyzes a single protest movement across a relatively short time period. Therefore differences in salience of the issue protested by the Occupy movement are minimal, as are differences in the SMOs which support the protests and the political significance of the events. Lastly, this project only considers coverage of each local movement by the local newspaper. This means that this research design should reduce the location bias of coverage to insignificant levels. Nevertheless, I also recognize that these bias mean that some Occupy chapters which did not respond to the survey or receive extensive coverage. Furthermore, there may be residual elite bias for data sources not covered by the survey, including information on protester violence and repression. To sum up, although not all forms of bias related to use of newspaper data are avoided, the choices carried out in the research design (including triangulation, exclusive use of local newspaper coverage of local events and coverage of events within a single movement in a short time period) should be effective in ensuring an impartial coverage of protest events.

#### 1.3.4: Other Sources

I use a wide variety of other sources of data to help me to understand the greater context behind the story of each Occupy chapter. I rely on the 2010 U.S. Census (Center

for New Media and Promotion, 2009) for essential data on each city, including the population of the city itself, the population of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which it belongs, as well as the region in which it is located. I also obtain data on the percentage of full time students in each city from the Census, as well as data on household Gini coefficients for each city from the 2010 American Community Survey (Bureau, U.S. Census, n.d.). I also use data released in 2010 by the U.S. Bureau of Labor (Anon, 2010) on the percentage of the workforce which was unemployed at the time as well as the percentage of the workforce which was member of a trade union. For political data, I rely on the U.S. Election Atlas (Leip, 1999). I use this source's data for the percentage of votes for Democrats in the presidential elections of 2004 and 2008 in the county where each city is located. Although most cities are located within the boundaries of one county, some spread across more than one. When a city spreads across more than one county, I use the mean vote from the 2 or more counties under consideration. I also use the U.S. Election Atlas to detect whether each city under analysis did or did not have a Democrat mayor at the time of the protest. I use a couple of different data sources to obtain information on law enforcement in each city. This includes the 2007 and 2010 Law Enforcement Management Survey (Anon, 2007), from which I obtain data on the percentage of city budget spent on the local law enforcement agency. I also use the Deadspin Blog data (Wagner, 2014) on police shootings of civilians in the 8 months preceding the start of the Occupy movement to measure differing levels of police brutality in each city. Every individual listing of police violence in this data source is linked to a local news report of the incident. Differences in climate may affect mobilization dynamics in the movement.

Therefore, I use 2016 U.S. Climate data (Data, U.S. Climate, 2016) on average annual temperatures, expressed in Fahrenheit. Lastly, I use several data sources for information on the characteristics of student populations in each city. First of all, I use the U.S. News Higher Education Rankings (Anon, 2017a) for the number of colleges in each city as well as each college's academic ranking, tuition fees and Pell Grant beneficiaries. Next, I rely on the Crowdpac website (Anon, n.d.a) for data on political donations of faculty members, which are an indicator of the extent to which each college presents a more or less liberal campus environment. My final source is the Start Class database (Anon, n.d.b) for information on the presence of Women's Studies, African American Studies and Chicano Studies departments in each college.

### **1.4 ROAD MAP TO THE DISSERTATION PROJECT**

In the previous pages I explored the basic characteristics of the movement under study, outlined the three key research questions to be answered and listed key data sources which will be used. In this final section of the introductory chapter, I provide a road map to the dissertation, which lists the main topics and theories explored in each chapter. Chapter 2 will focus on explaining differences in mobilization strength (size) between the Occupy chapters under analysis. After having demonstrated the prominent role of student populations and colleges in shaping mobilization, this chapter will focus on the role of specific college characteristics in shaping relative levels of weakness and strength in mobilization. In doing so, this part of the dissertation aims at showing differences between this new wave of protests and previous student mobilizations in the 1980s and 1960s. This chapter will give particular attention to differences in non-economic and economic characteristics of student populations and colleges between these recent protests and its earlier counterparts.

Chapter 3 will focus on explaining differences in the duration of Occupy chapters, measured in terms of how long protest encampments were able to endure in each city under analysis. I look at a variety of contextual factors including elected leaders, law enforcement and weather as well as characteristics of each local movement, including size, repression, amount of resources and media coverage. This chapter shows that, although other characteristics such as weather, resources and media coverage are also influential, movement size is the key explanatory factor for movement duration. This chapter emphasizes the advantages of small protest groupings, including greater sense of community,



tighter activist networks, greater internal accountability and less of a likelihood of facing repression.

Chapter 4 will focus on explaining the causes of violent repression, including tear gassing, batons, and pepper spraying, in the Occupy movement. This chapter argues for the interactive role of media coverage and threat posed by protesters (measured in terms of movement size as well as violence and property damage). Chapter 4 first carries out an analysis of the role of threat in positive, negative and overall media coverage, and demonstrates the connection between threat and all types of media coverage (with one notable exception- violence and property damage have no effect on positive coverage). Then this chapter demonstrates the crucial role of negative media coverage in shaping the likelihood of repression.

Chapter 5 is the conclusive chapter of this dissertation project. Its first section summarizes the results from all previous chapters, then compares them and draws conclusions from these comparisons. Its second section outlines limitations for these findings and provides ideas for potential future research on the topics explored by the dissertation.

**CHAPTER 2: THE ENDURING ROLE OF STUDENTS IN AFFECT-  
ING PROTEST SIZE**

## 2.1 THEORIZING MOVEMENT SIZE

### 2.1.1: Factors affecting movement size

This chapter looks at the causes behind differences in protest groups' ability to mobilize, expressed in terms of protests size. I define protest size in terms of how many people turn out to protest publicly at a social movement's zenith, standardized by population size. Therefore, I conceptualize size in terms of greater number of protesters in the streets, with an eye on the relationship between these numbers and the overall size of the population from which they are recruited. For example, a turnout of 5,000 people is more impressive if it takes place in a small city like Toledo, OH or Amarillo, TX rather than a big city like New York or Los Angeles. At several points, scholars have considered the size of a movement as a factor in its ability to achieve its goals (for example, Zald and Ash, 1966; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). However, this aspect of social movements has not been the object of extensive scholarly attention compared to other factors, such as mobilization, recruitment, repression and tactics. Yet the size of a protest is important for scholars for two main reasons. First of all, larger protests usually receive more media attention, thereby giving more exposure in public discourse to protesters' grievances. Secondly, media and political elites perceive larger protests as more legitimate because a larger section of the population is participating in them. The more legitimacy is conferred to a protest, the greater the likelihood that elites change their policies in response to protests, or negotiate potential policy changes with the protesters themselves. The existing scholarly evidence on differences in protest size includes growth in the amount of resources available to protesters (Zald and Ash, 1966; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam,

1982), organizations and network ties between them (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Walton and Ragin, 1990; Meyer and Whittier, 1994; Rucht, 1996; Earl and Soule, 2006; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007), sympathetic elites (Eisinger, 1973; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Kitschelt, 1986; Della Porta, 1995; Rucht, 1996), lack of repression (Everett, 1992; Della Porta, 1995), economic strain (Wallimann and Zito, 1984; Wilensky, 1998) and technological changes (Soule and Earl, 2005; Fisher, Stanley, Berman and Neff, 2005).

### 2.1.2: Mobilization and the role of Students and College Characteristics

This paper focuses on a specific set of explanatory factors for differences in protest size: the role of student populations and differences between student cohorts. The role of student populations in driving turnouts has been the object of significant attention: Lipset and Altbach (1966), Scott and El Assal (1969), McAdam (1982, 1986), Wallimann and Zito (1984) and Van Dyke (1998) all documented the central role of students in 1960s protests in the U.S., from the civil rights actions in the early 1960s to the anti-Vietnam war and feminist protests in the late 1960s. More recently, scholars have dedicated considerable attention to the role of students in other large mobilizations including nationalist protests in the developing world (Altbach, 1989), Latin American Guerrilla uprisings (McClintock, 2001; Wickham-Crowley, 2001), pro-democracy movements in Asia and Latin America (Altbach, 1984; Zhao, 1998), protests in the U.S. in the 1980s against Apartheid in South Africa (Hirsch, 1990; Soule, 1997) as well as recent protests against rising costs of education in Chile (Bellei and Cabalin, 2013) and Great Britain (Ibrahim, 2011). In sum, scholars who study the role of students in social movements are

virtually unanimous in their acknowledgment of their enduring role in fostering the size of protests across different contexts.

However, there is much greater contention among scholars on the relationship between specific characteristics of student populations and colleges (including the size of universities, liberal college environments, the presence of elite colleges, institutional support for protest and the economic condition of the students) with mobilization. Which of these aspects makes larger protests more likely to happen? Unfortunately, the existing literature on student mobilization (including Lipset and Altbach, 1966; Scott and El As-sal, 1969; Kahn and Bowers, 1970; Blau and Slaughter, 1971; Altbach, 1984, 1989; Soule, 1997) focuses almost exclusively on the role of these characteristics in shaping the likelihood of mobilization, while their effects on protest size are overlooked. My objective is to fill this gap in the literature by testing the relationship between several characteristics of the student body and the likelihood of larger protests taking place. Movement size is a separate, but closely related, aspect of mobilization, compared to movement emergence. Additionally, it is particularly important to focus on student population and college characteristics for studying Occupy because of the prominent role played by students in this movement, with many movement actions taking place at college campuses such as Berkeley, Davis and Harvard. The Occupy movement also embraced several grievances dear to students, including decreasing tuition costs and reducing inequality and the role of corporations in politics. Therefore, I will first review the existing literature on the relationship between student body characteristics and protest emergence. Then I

will use the insights from this past work to formulate hypotheses on the expected relationship between the aforementioned characteristics and differences in movement size.

### 2.1.3: Mobilization and College Size

Many researchers focusing on the 1960s wave of student mobilization in the U.S. focus on the role of size of colleges in determining the likelihood of mobilization. The work of Lipset and Altbach (1966) is a very important milestone in this research, because the authors use scholarly and journalistic evidence to holistically understand the causes, characteristics and implications of student unrest in the early and mid 1960s. Consequently, the authors intervene in most of the key debates in the scholarship on student mobilization. In terms of the relationship between mobilization and college size, they argue for a positive relationship. Lipset and Altbach's (1966:329) article states that "the best public institutions are large and attractive enough to support a 'non-conformist' sub-culture which is sufficiently large in absolute terms to ignore social or intellectual pressures from the more purely 'academic' or 'collegiate' sub-culture." Scott and El-Assal (1969) elaborate on this by arguing that large colleges tend to have larger bureaucratic institutions, with greater separation between students and administrators, as well as greater levels of structural complexity and heterogeneity, which tend to generate more protests. This is because in these higher education institutions "the students will feel separated, neglected, manipulated, and de-humanized to the extent that they will engage in protest activities" (Scott and El-Assal, 1969:703). Blau and Slaughter's (1971) study of 1960s student protests confirms this dynamic, with the authors arguing that larger colleges facilitate a greater number of protest events both directly and indirectly. They point out that large

institutions are statistically more likely to contain politically radical students, and they reiterate Scott and El Assal's argument by observing that impersonal treatment of individuals, leading to potential grievances, is more likely in larger colleges. Dunlap (1970) doesn't dispute the factual evidence put forth by Scott and El-Assal and Blau and Slaughter but disagrees with the authors' explanation, arguing that students in the 1960s did not manifestly express any major concerns for the nature of instruction in their campuses, but instead were motivated by political events taking place outside campuses, including the Vietnam War.

However, more recent scholarship shows that the relationship between college size and mobilization is less strong than expected. For example, Soule's (1997) analysis of tactical innovation and protest diffusion in the Shantytown protests against Apartheid in South Africa in the U.S. in the 1980s demonstrates no correlation between college size and likelihood for protest. Soule shows that protests were in fact more likely in smaller liberal arts colleges and elite colleges like Columbia and Dartmouth. However, Van Dyke (1998) carries out a longitudinal study of protests in U.S. college campuses in the 1960s and she finds a positive relationship between college size and number of protests. Yet the author observes no relationship between students to faculty ratio, leading her to conclude that while larger colleges facilitate protest, this is not due to isolation and strain. Furthermore, her main explanation for differences in rates of protests between campuses is not college size, but differences in activist subcultures across colleges. On the whole, and in spite of disagreements between authors on the causal dynamics behind this mechanism,

the vast majority of the literature supports the idea that larger colleges are more likely to foster protests.

#### 2.1.4: Mobilization and Liberal versus Conservative colleges

Which type of political orientation is more likely to mobilize a greater number of students? Due to the tendency of young people in general and students in particular to favor left of center politics (Lipset and Altbach, 1966), conventional wisdom says that more liberal college campuses should be more likely to foster protests. The historical evidence from U.S. campuses confirms this perception. Lipset and Altbach (1966) notice that liberal attitudes tend to correlate with likelihood to participate in protest as well as general support of activism. In the 1960s this predicament was confirmed by the fact that the biggest protests took place in some of the most liberal campuses in the U.S., including Berkeley in California and the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. As Altbach and Cohen (1990) point out, in more recent years students have also supported progressive causes including support for federal student aid, pacifism, affirmative action, woman's rights and disabled rights. In particular, in the 1980s students mobilized against Apartheid in South Africa, creating a mass-scale leftist student movement in a time of Conservative political dominance. In sum, students in the U.S. are far more likely to support leftist causes and form leftist movements. Although the evidence from outside the U.S. is more mixed (see Altbach, 1984 & 1989) the literature is unanimous in its depiction of the dominance of leftist politics in U.S. college campuses. Consequently, we should assume that the college campuses with the most liberal students are most likely to mobilize.



### 2.1.5: Mobilization and elite versus non-elite colleges

In terms of the relationship of the status of colleges and the likelihood of mobilization, our conventional assumption is also guided from the scholarly depiction of the 1960s wave of student protests. Lipset and Altbach (1966) note that the biggest centers of protest in this era were leading research universities, including the University of California in Berkeley, the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and the University of Wisconsin in Madison. These schools, while not as highly rated as the Ivies (such as Harvard, Princeton and Yale) had experienced significant growth, presented a very diverse student body, as well as a faculty which encouraged activism. Yet not all findings from this wave of student protest demonstrate this relationship. Scott and El Ansal (1969) show that institutional complexity is more important than status in predicting protests. Although they note that far more high quality schools observed protests in the 1960s, they also demonstrate that protests took place in most large and complex schools regardless of academic ranking. Furthermore, Blau and Slaughter (1971) show that institutional research orientation and faculty publication ratio are not effective predictors of mobilization. Yet in a more recent study, Soule (1997) demonstrates that Shantytown protests against Apartheid in South Africa which took place in the 1980s in U.S. college campuses were far more likely to take place at elite institutions than non-elite ones. The author argues that, consistently with previous findings, students who attend these higher ranking educational institutions are more likely to take part in protest. In light of these recent findings, it is more likely that elite colleges can foster mobilization than their non-elite counterparts.

### 2.1.6: Institutional Support for Mobilization

Which institutional characteristics of universities can support the development of large protests? In recent years, a growing literature has argued that colleges with research centers and departments which are most sympathetic to protesters are more likely to provide support for mobilization. This is because left-leaning faculty is more likely to provide support for a left-leaning movement like Occupy. In particular, scholars point out that the departments which are centered in studying large and disadvantaged groups in society (such as blacks, Latinos and women) are the most likely to lend support for protest. In some cases, protests take place over the threat of closure of said departments. For example, Rhoads (1998) documents the case of protests taking place at UCLA in Los Angeles in 1993 over the potential closure of this college's Chicano Studies department. The same author also reports that a strike took place at Mills College in Oakland when the college administrators sought to start admitting men and ceasing to be a woman's college. Rhoads comments that these actions all show the increasing role of identity politics and support for multiculturalism in student activism. In some cases, departments which are sympathetic to protest may also be created as the result of a sustained protest, and thus may be seen as a result of an enduring protest culture: Rojas (2006) explains that the first department of African American Studies, at San Francisco State University, was created in 1968 as a result of a Black Panthers-supported student strike. Black students across the country followed the example of their counterparts in San Francisco and were mostly responsible for the formation of 120 different African American Studies departments across the U.S. The author comments that "African-American Studies programs

are one of the black student movement's most visible and enduring achievements” (Rojas, 2006:2151). In sum, Chicano Studies programs, Women's Studies programs, and Black Studies programs can provide strong institutional support for larger protests in several ways. First of all, they educate students on issues regarding the most marginalized groups in society. Second, they are often the result of a strong legacy of student protest.

#### 2.1.7: Mobilization and Tuition Increases

My next set of hypotheses focuses on the role of economic factors in student-led protests. The rising cost of college education has become an increasingly dominant theme in the U.S. in debates about the relationship between inequality and educational standards. In just the last 20 years, the average tuition costs of a private college have more than doubled while out of state public college tuition has more than tripled and in state tuition has almost quadrupled (Mitchell, 2015). These rising costs have created an additional economic strain for students. It is therefore likely that students footing larger tuition bills may be more motivated to protest for economic justice. We have no evidence of this dynamic taking place on a systematic scale in the U.S., however recent cases of student protest in Britain and Chile show that tuition hikes can lead to student unrest. In Britain, following the government's decision to allow colleges to raise tuition threefold, a number of large marches and occupations of college campuses took place in the Fall of 2010 (Ibrahim, 2011). In Chile two waves of student protests, in 2006 and 2011, took place in response to gradual price hikes for tuition costs as well as gradual increases in interest rates for student loans (Bellei and Cabalin, 2013). Both protests represented an open rejection of the increasing costs of pursuing an education and were both spurred by a growing

number of students who saw their education become unaffordable following government reforms. Given that the cost of education in the U.S. has also witnessed dramatic rises in recent times, it is plausible that these increases will be the cause for greater unrest.

#### 2.1.8: Mobilization and Student Economic Deprivation

What relationship should we expect to take place between the relative economic status of students and their capacity to support large protests? Altbach (1984) depicts a body of activists who mostly came from affluent and educated middle class families. Yet Kahn and Bowers (1970) argue that in the 1960s students from lower socioeconomic status were more likely to protest in elite colleges and people with average socioeconomic status were more likely to protest in non-elite colleges. But this is an isolated finding. Wallimann and Zito (1984) explain that that generation's protest's emphasis on post-material values, including environmentalism, pacifism, anti-racism and feminism, facilitated protest by the wealthier components of society. Altbach (1989) shows that the dynamics are similar in the developing world, where most student protests are coordinated and supported by children of wealthy families. In sum, most evidence supports the idea that a greater concentration of affluent students is more likely to support protests.

#### 2.1.9: Formulating Hypotheses on the Effect of Student and College Characteristics on Movement Size

The final sub-section of this literature review will focus on formulating hypotheses on the relationship between college and student characteristics and protest size. These are based on the insights from the previous pages, in which I outlined the literature on the relationship between student and college characteristics and mobilization. I will first of

all focus on the relationship between protest size and college size. Conventional logic suggests that this should be a fairly straightforward relationship. Large protests depend on a large mobilization potential, which should be most effectively provided by larger colleges. The literature presents a nearly unanimous view that larger colleges are more likely to foster larger mobilizations. This includes several studies on the 1960s wave of protests, including Lipset and Altbach (1966), Scott and El-Assal (1969), Dunlap (1970), Blau and Slaughter (1971) and, more recently, Van Dyke (1998). The only exception is Soule's (1997) work on the 1980s Shantytown protests against Apartheid in South Africa, which finds no correlation between college size and mobilization. However, the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of a positive relationship between protest size and college size.

*Hypothesis 1: Larger colleges make large protests more likely*

Next, I consider the expected relationship between the political leanings of students and their college and the size of protests. In contemporary U.S. society, left-wing groups such as Occupy are usually more likely to carry out large protests, whereas right-wing organizations such as the Tea Party are more likely to resort to lobbying and fundraising as means to further their interests. Furthermore, the literature points to both recent cases of protests (such as the Shantytown protests described by Altbach and Cohen, 1990) and less recent cases (such as the 1960s era protests described by Lipset and Altbach, 1966) as being dominated by issues dear to leftists, including human rights, opposition to armed interventions and authoritarian regimes. Therefore, both the literature and the current political landscape suggest that large protests are more likely in liberal campuses.

*Hypothesis 2: More liberal college environments make larger protests more likely*

Now I move to examining the relationship between the level of prestige enjoyed by colleges and protest size. The literature on 1960s student movements presents mixed evidence on the issue. While Lipset and Altbach (1966) show that elite colleges were more likely to foster protest, the work of Scott and El-Assal (1969) and Blau and Slaughter (1971) demonstrates no significant relationship between these factors. More recent evidence by Soule (1997) on the student protests against Apartheid in the 1980s shows a positive relationship between academic ranking and mobilization. In sum, there is mixed evidence, with an equal number of studies pointing to a positive effect and no effect of college rankings on mobilization. Furthermore, if the Occupy movement claims to represent the '99%' and the less well-off population, then its key support should not come from colleges which mostly recruit students from wealthy families. Yet the more recent evidence shows that these rankings are more likely to be a factor than not. Additionally, more highly ranked colleges contain students who are mostly from wealthy families and who aim at being part of the elites for the next generation. These two factors mean that these students are more likely to have the time and the drive to engage in politics, including participating in protests. It is also hard to ignore the strong role which elite colleges have played in past student movements. Lastly, if Occupy is truly a movement of the '99%' then its grievances and goals should also speak to students from middle class families who are enrolled in elite colleges and concerned with their spiraling cost of tuition and rising unemployment. Based on these insights, elite colleges are more likely to foster greater protest turnouts than non-elite ones.

*Hypothesis 3: More highly ranked colleges make larger protests more likely*

Next, I focus on the relationship between institutional support for protest and protest size. The evidence presented by Rhoads (1998) in his study of identity-based campus protests and Rojas (2006) on the relationship between black protest and African American Studies departments is unequivocal. These authors' work suggests that the presence of Women's Studies, African American Studies and Chicano Studies departments should be conducive to fostering a stronger culture of protest inside college campuses. Therefore, these departments should also help in bolstering protest turnouts, as they are likely to raise the level of political consciousness of students.

*Hypothesis 4.1: Black Studies departments make larger protests more likely*

*Hypothesis 4.2: Chicano Studies departments make larger protests more likely*

*Hypothesis 4.3: Women's Studies departments make larger protests more likely*

I now review the relationship between cost of tuition and protest size. Recent work from Ibrahim (2011) on student protests in the United Kingdom and Bellei and Caballin on similar grievances in Chile (2013) suggests that high tuition costs can trigger mass protests by students. The fact that their counterparts in the U.S. have experienced similarly dramatic hikes in the cost of tuition suggests that this factor should be a catalyst for larger protests.

*Hypothesis 5: Higher tuition costs make larger protests more likely*

My last hypothesis focuses on the relationship between economic deprivation and protest. Here, most of the evidence, including the work of Altbach (1984, 1989) on student protests in both the developed and developing world as well as Wallimann and Zito's

(1984) work on student protests in the 1960s, supports the idea that wealthier students are more likely to protest. The only dissenting voice comes from Kahn and Bowers' (1970) study of 1960s student protests. But even then, the authors merely find that students from low socioeconomic status in elite colleges are more likely to protest, whereas in non-elite colleges, students with middle levels of income are the most politically active. Furthermore, the previous insights on the greater amount of resources and disposable time enjoyed by wealthier students applies here too. Wealthier students are more likely to find the time and willingness to protest. Their less wealthy counterparts are more likely to have to resort to part time or full time employment in order to support their studies. In sum, larger turnouts are more likely where students are wealthier.

*Hypothesis 6: A larger proportion of wealthy students makes larger protests more likely*

To sum up, in the previous pages I first of all provided a summary of all of the key explanatory factors for movement size. I then looked at the role of students in fostering size, and showed the evidence for this dynamic from the past literature. Then I outlined all of the key expectations from the literature on the relationship between different aspects of student populations and colleges, and mobilization. These include the size of colleges, their political inclination and reputation as elite colleges, the degree of institutional support for protest, the cost of tuition and the relative levels of wealth in the student population. Lastly, I formulated hypotheses on the relationship between student population and college characteristics and movement size, based on the insight from the literature on the role of the aforementioned student and college variables with mobilization. In the pages that follow, I will present the methods used to test these hypotheses,



including the types and sources of data that were used and the analytic strategy that was adopted.

## 2.2 DATA AND METHODS

### 2.2.1: Dependent Variable: Protest Size

As mentioned before, my unit of observation is the largest Occupy protest turnout in the first two weeks of existence of the local Occupy chapter in the 74 cities under analysis. My intent is to show differences in mobilization strength right after the founding of this protest movement, when this movement was able to mobilize its largest numbers. This includes the ‘International Day of Rage’ protests that took place during the weekend of October 15<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Therefore, as we can see in the aforementioned Table 1, the vast majority of protests took place in the two weeks between September 29<sup>th</sup> and October 15<sup>th</sup>. There were 3 notable exceptions: Lubbock, TX; Laredo, TX; and Newark, NJ. For these, I report turnouts for the first protest which was carried out by the local movement, either later in October 2011 or during the following month. In these cities the local Occupy group emerged a few weeks after the rest, thus was not able to mobilize until November 2011. My data are obtained from local newspaper reports of Occupy protests. Although my fundamental assumption is that newspapers may be equally biased in reporting protest turnouts, this data may still suffer from bias. More liberal newspapers, like the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune and the Boston Globe may be more sympathetic to the movement and more likely to be willing to report large turnouts. However, newspapers in smaller and more conservative communities, such as the Arizona Sun and the Orange County Register, may be less sympathetic to the movement and consequently more willing to report smaller protest sizes.

*Table 4: Student population for each city under analysis*

City or Cities	% of adult population in full time education	City	% of adult population in full time education
Madison, WI	30.1	Philadelphia, PA and Anchorage, AK	11.5
Lubbock, TX	23.3	Baltimore, MD	11.4
Irvine, CA	21.3	Honolulu, HI	11.3
Lincoln, NE	19.6	Toledo, OH	11.2
Pittsburgh, PA	18.9	San Francisco, CA and Rochester, NY	11.1
Durham, NC	18.2	San Jose, CA	11
Boston, MA	17.1	Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; San Antonio, TX and Winston-Salem, NC	10.9
Minneapolis, MN	16.9	Detroit, MI and Nashville, TN	10.8
Raleigh, NC	16.3	Laredo, TX and Los Angeles, CA	10.6
Lexington, KY	16	Oakland, CA and Spokane, WA	10.2
Cincinnati, OH	15.9	Oklahoma City, OK	10.1
Norfolk, VA	15.2	Denver, CO; Colorado Springs, CO and Orlando, FL	9.9
Columbus, OH	14.4	Fort Wayne, IN	9.8
Greensboro, NC	14.3	Kansas City, MO and Jacksonville, FL	9.7
San Diego, CA	14	New York, NY and New Orleans, LA	9.4
Austin, TX	13.9	Tampa, FL and Jersey City, NJ	9.2
Atlanta, GA; Seattle, WA and Tucson, AZ	13.8	Memphis, TN and Indianapolis, IN	9.1
Riverside, CA	13.7	Tulsa, OK	8.8
Buffalo, NY	13	Louisville, KY; Newark, NJ and Fort Worth, TX	8.7
Washington, DC and Long Beach, CA	12.9	Santa Ana, CA	8.4
Sacramento, CA and Milwaukee, WI	12.8	Cleveland, OH	7.9
Reno, NV	12.4	Houston, TX	7.8
Fresno, CA	12.3	Phoenix, AZ	7.4
El Paso, TX	12.2	Miami, FL	7.3
St. Louis, TX	12.1	Dallas, TX	7
Albuquerque, NM	11.9	Las Vegas, NV	6.6
Portland, OR and Omaha, NE	11.6		

*Source: 2010 U.S. Census (Center for New Media and Promotion, 2009)*

### 2.2.2: Independent Variables

The first set of independent variables which I use looks at the relative strength of the presence of students and colleges in each city. I measure the percentage of the overall population in each city which is enrolled in full time education, as reported by the 2010 U.S. Census (Center for Media and Promotion, n.d.). The data are visible in Table 4. I also used a second variable with a count of the number of universities in each city, as reported by the U.S. News Higher Education Rankings (Anon, 2017a) and which can be seen in Table 5. My third variable is obtained from the previous two, and shows the average size

*Table 5: Number of colleges in each city under analysis*

City or Cities	Number of colleges	City or Cities	Number of Colleges
New York, NY	48	Memphis, TN and New Orleans, LA	8
Chicago, IL	28	Omaha, NE; Indianapolis, IN; San Antonio, TX and Pittsburgh, PA	7
Boston, MA	22	Buffalo, NY; San Diego, CA; Cleveland, OH; Columbus, OH; Oakland, CA; Colorado Springs, CO and Cincinnati, OH	6
Philadelphia, PA	15	Kansas City, MO; Raleigh, NC; Dallas, TX; Denver, CO; Seattle, WA; Greensboro, NC; Winston-Salem, NC; Rochester, NY	5
Washington, DC	13	Louisville, KY; Detroit, MI; Jacksonville, FL; Austin, TX; Minneapolis, MN and Norfolk, VA	4
Houston, TX and Los Angeles, CA	12	Riverside, CA; Tampa, FL; Lincoln, NE; Charlotte, NC; Phoenix, AZ; Fort Wayne, IN and Honolulu, HI	3
Portland, OR; San Francisco, CA and Atlanta, GA	11	Tucson, AZ; Tulsa, OK; San Jose, CA; Fresno, CA; Lubbock, TX; Jersey City, NJ; Spokane, WA; Irvine, CA; Madison, WI; Newark, NJ; Anchorage, AK; Oklahoma City, OK; Lexington, KY; Orlando, FL and Durham, NC	2
St. Louis, MO	10	El Paso, TX; Laredo, TX; Miami, FL; Reno, NV; Albuquerque, NM; Las Vegas, NV; Sacramento, CA; Fort Worth, TX; Long Beach, CA and Toledo, OH	1
Milwaukee, WI; Nashville, TN and Baltimore, MD	9	Santa Ana, CA	0

*Source: U.S. News (Anon, 2017a)*

of colleges in each town. I use this variable to determine whether or not larger colleges foster larger mobilizations. I obtain it first by calculating the overall number of full time students in each city, and then dividing this number by the aforementioned data on number of colleges in each city. The resulting score gives me the average size, in number of students, of each college.

In the next set of independent variables I focus on the substantive characteristics of colleges and student populations in each city. Because not every city has a college listed in these rankings and located within its limits (Santa Ana has none) in most of these variables I include colleges within a 10 mile range. The first variable from this group focuses on the role of elite college students in mobilization. Here I use the U.S. News Higher Education Rankings (Anon, 2017a) and enter the ranking, expressed in percentage, of the highest ranked college within 10 miles of each city under analysis (Table 6 shows the full list of colleges used for this variable). In this way, I can demonstrate whether elite college students made a decisive contribution in turning out large numbers at Occupy protests. Next, I look at the degree to which colleges present a liberal environment, and how it affects the size of protests Here, I calculated the mean for the ranking of the three largest colleges within a 10 mile range of each city (see Table 7 for the full list of colleges).<sup>1</sup> The rankings were obtained from the Crowdpac website (Anon, n.d.a), and are based on faculty political donations. I expect these donations to be a good indicator of the degree to which faculty members lean towards leftwing views, which in turn can have an effect on the overall culture of the college campus in question.

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<sup>1</sup> I look at the three largest colleges in each city, when this data is available. In some cities, there were less than 3 colleges and in others the data for some of the colleges was not available. In these cases, I look at the next largest colleges. When I am unable to find data for these, I look at the 2 or 1 largest colleges

*Table 6: List of most highly ranked colleges within a 10 mile radius of each city under analysis*

City	Highest Ranked College	City	Highest Ranked College	City	Highest Ranked College
Tucson, AZ	University of Arizona	Santa Ana, CA	California State University- Fullerton	Spokane, WA	Eastern Washington University
St. Louis, MO	Washington University in St. Louis	Las Vegas, NV	University of Nevada- Las Vegas	Colorado Springs, CO	University of Colorado- Colorado Springs
El Paso, TX	University of Texas- El Paso	Memphis, TN	University of Memphis	Irvine, CA	University of California- Irvine
Portland, OR	Portland State University	Louisville, KY	University of Louisville	Madison, WI	University of Wisconsin
Kansas City, MO	University of Missouri- Kansas City	Dallas, TX	Southern Methodist University	Newark, NJ	Seton Hall University
Laredo, TX	Texas A&M International University	Philadelphia, PA	University of Pennsylvania	Anchorage, AK	University of Alaska- Anchorage
Miami, FL	University of Miami	Cleveland, OH	Case Western Reserve University	San Antonio, TX	University of Texas- San Antonio
Riverside, CA	University of California- Riverside	Denver, CO	Colorado School of Mines	Austin, TX	University of Texas- Austin
Raleigh, NC	North Carolina State University	Seattle, WA	University of Washington	Fort Worth, TX	Texas Christian University
Buffalo, NY	Buffalo State College	Milwaukee, WI	Marquette University	Baltimore, MD	Johns Hopkins University
San Diego, CA	University of California- San Diego	Detroit, MI	University of Michigan- Ann Arbor	Oklahoma City, OK	University of Oklahoma
Tulsa, OK	University of Tulsa	San Francisco, CA	University of San Francisco	Long Beach, CA	California State University- Long Beach
Houston, TX	Rice University	Boston, MA	Harvard University	Minneapolis, MN	University of Minnesota- Twin Cities
Tampa, FL	University of South Florida	New York, NY	Columbia University	New Orleans, LA	Tulane University
Omaha, NE	University of Nebraska at Omaha	Columbus, OH	Ohio State University	Pittsburgh, PA	Carnegie Mellon University
Lincoln, NE	University of Nebraska- Lincoln	Chicago, IL	University of Chicago	Lexington, KY	University of Kentucky
Reno, NV	University of Nevada- Reno	Honolulu, HI	University of Hawaii at Manoa	Cincinnati, OH	University of Cincinnati
San Jose, CA	San Jose State University	Oakland, CA	University of California- Berkeley	Toledo, OH	University of Toledo
Fresno, CA	California State University- Fresno	Lubbock, TX	Texas Tech University	Greensboro, NC	University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Washington, DC	Georgetown University	Nashville, TN	Vanderbilt University	Orlando, FL	University of Central Florida
Charlotte, NC	University of North Carolina at Charlotte	Jersey City, NJ	Stevens Institute of Technology	Norfolk, VA	Old Dominion University
Phoenix, AZ	Arizona State University	Sacramento, CA	University of California- Davis	Durham, NC	Duke University
Los Angeles, CA	California Institute of Technology	Atlanta, GA	Emory University	Winston- Salem, NC	Wake Forest University

*Table 6 (cont.)*

City	Highest Ranked College	City	Highest Ranked College
Albuquerque, NM	University of New Mexico	Jacksonville, FL	Florida State College at Jacksonville
Fort Wayne, IN	Indiana University- Fort Wayne	Indianapolis, IN	Indiana University- Indianapolis
Rochester, NY	University of Rochester		

Source: *U.S. News (Anon, 2017a)*

Next, I look at relative levels of institutional support for protest. I use three variables, each one indicating the number of colleges with African American Studies, Women's Studies and Chicano Studies programs in each city. Once again, this is a count variable. The data for these three variables come from the Start Class database (Anon, n.d.b). My last set of variables shows the relative economic conditions of student populations in each city. First of all, I calculate the mean of annual tuition costs at the three largest colleges within a 10 mile range of each city, expressed in thousands of Dollars.<sup>2</sup> My objective with this variable is to show the role of potential student grievances over cost of tuition in shaping protest size. For a full list of colleges used for this variable, see Table 8. I look at the lowest possible tuition costs, thus in-state tuition numbers are used for state colleges. Lastly, I calculate the mean percentage of students who are beneficiaries of Pell Grants at the three largest colleges within a 10 mile range of each city.<sup>3</sup> Here, I am proving whether there is a connection between the economic well-being (or lack thereof) of students, and their inclination to protest. Table 9 lists the colleges used for this variable. I obtained the

<sup>2</sup> Again, in some cases there were less than 3 colleges in each city and in others data for one or two of the colleges was not available.

<sup>3</sup> Once again, some cities have less than 3 colleges while in others data for some is missing.

Table 7: List of colleges used for rankings of most versus least liberal

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Tucson, AZ	1. University of Arizona	Santa Ana, CA	1. California State University- Fullerton 2. Chapman University	Colorado Springs, CO	1. University of Colorado- Colorado Springs
St. Louis, MO	1. St Louis University 2. Washington University in St. Louis	Las Vegas, NV	1. University of Nevada- Las Vegas 2. College of Southern Nevada	Irvine, CA	1. University of California- Irvine
El Paso, TX	1. University of Texas- El Paso	Memphis, TN	1. University of Memphis	Madison, WI	1. University of Wisconsin- Madison
Portland, OR	1. Portland State University	Louisville, KY	1. University of Louisville	Newark, NJ	1. Montclair State University 2. Kean University 3. Rutgers University- Newark
Kansas City, MO	1. University of Missouri- Kansas City	Dallas, TX	1. University of Texas at Dallas	Anchorage, AK	1. University of Alaska- Anchorage
Laredo, TX	1. Texas A&M International University	Philadelphia, PA	1. Temple University 2. Drexel University 3. University of Pennsylvania	San Antonio, TX	1. University of Texas- San Antonio
Miami, FL	1. Florida International University 2. University of Miami	Cleveland, OH	1. Kent State University 2. Cleveland State University 3. Case Western Reserve University	Austin, TX	1. University of Texas- Austin
Riverside, CA	1. University of California- Riverside 2. California Baptist University	Denver, CO	1. Metropolitan State University of Denver 2. University of Colorado- Denver 3. University of Denver	Fort Worth, TX	1. University of Texas- Arlington 3. Texas Christian University
Raleigh, NC	1. North Carolina State University	Seattle, WA	1. University of Washington	Baltimore, MD	1. Towson University 2. University of Maryland- Baltimore 3. John Hopkins University
Buffalo, NY	1. Buffalo State College	Milwaukee, WI	1. University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee 2. Marquette University	Oklahoma City, OK	1. University of Oklahoma 2. University of Central Oklahoma
San Diego, CA	1. San Diego State University 2. University of California- San Diego 3. University of San Diego	Detroit, MI	1. University of Michigan- Ann Arbor 2. Eastern Michigan University 3. Wayne State University	Long Beach, CA	1. Cal State Long Beach 2. Biola University



Table 7 (cont.):

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Tulsa, OK	1. University of Tulsa 2. Rogers State University	San Francisco, CA	1. University of California- Berkeley 2. San Francisco State University	Minneapolis, MN	1. University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
Houston, TX	1. University of Houston 2. Texas Southern University	Boston, MA	1. Boston University 2. Northeastern University 3. Boston College	New Orleans, LA	1. Tulane University 2. University of New Orleans
Tampa, FL	1. University of South Florida	New York, NY	1. New York University 2. Hunter College 3. Queens College	Spokane, WA	1. Eastern Washington University
Omaha, NE	1. University of Nebraska at Omaha	Columbus, OH	1. Ohio State University	Pittsburgh, PA	1. University of Pittsburgh 2. Carnegie Mellon University
Lincoln, NE	1. University of Nebraska- Lincoln	Chicago, IL	1. University of Illinois at Chicago 2. DePaul University	Lexington, KY	1. University of Kentucky
Reno, NV	1. University of Nevada- Reno	Honolulu, HI	1. University of Hawaii at Manoa	Cincinnati, OH	1. University of Cincinnati 2. Miami University-Hamilton
San Jose, CA	1. San Jose State University	Oakland, CA	1. University of California- Berkeley 2. San Francisco State University	Toledo, OH	1. Bowling Green State University 2. University of Toledo
Fresno, CA	1. California State University- Fresno	Lubbock, TX	1. Texas Tech University	Greensboro, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Washington, DC	1. George Washington University 2. Georgetown University 3. American University	Nashville, TN	1. Vanderbilt University 2. Tennessee State University	Orlando, FL	1. University of Central Florida
Charlotte, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Charlotte	Jersey City, NJ	1. Kean University 2. Rutgers University-Newark 3. New Jersey City University	Norfolk, VA	1. Old Dominion University 2. Norfolk State University
Phoenix, AZ	1. Arizona State University	Sacramento, CA	1. University of California- Davis 2. Cal State Sacramento	Durham, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2. Duke University 3. North Carolina Central University
Los Angeles, CA	1. UCLA 2. Cal State Northridge 3. University of Southern California	Atlanta, GA	1. Georgia State University 2. Kennesaw State University 3. Georgia Institute of Technology	Winston-Salem, NC	1. Wake Forest University 2. Winston-Salem State University

Table 7 (cont.)

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Albuquerque, NM	1. University of New Mexico	Jacksonville, FL	1. University of North Florida 2. Florida State College at Jacksonville	Rochester, NY	1. University of Rochester
Fort Wayne, IN	1. Indiana University-Fort Wayne	Indianapolis, IN	1. Indiana University-Indianapolis		

Source: Crowdpac (Anon, n.d.a)

data from both of these variables from the U.S. News Higher Education Rankings (Anon, 2017a).

### 2.2.3: Control Variables

I control for several different factors which can influence the size of a protest. Following the work of Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982) and Della Porta (1995) on the role of political elites and support from political allies, I control for the presence of favorable and unfavorable political opportunity structures. Here I use two measures: I first of all look at the mean percentage vote for the Democrats in the two presidential elections preceding the protests (2008 and 2004), measured at the county level. This is a good measurement of the portion of the population which might support the protest. I also use a dummy variable for Democrat mayors (1=Democrat mayor, 0=Republican or Independent mayor) to show the role of potential political allies of the protesters at a local level. Because Occupy is a left-wing movement, I expect their protests to be larger in places with higher levels of Democrat support and presence of Democrats among local elites. Both sets of data were obtained from the U.S. Electoral Atlas (Leip, 1999).

Table 8: List of colleges used for tuition cost estimates

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Tucson, AZ	1. University of Arizona	Santa Ana, CA	1. California State University- Fullerton 2. Chapman University	Spokane, WA	1. Eastern Washington University 2. Gonzaga University 3. Whitworth University
St. Louis, MO	1. Lindenwood University 2. St Louis University 3. Washington University in St. Louis	Las Vegas, NV	1. University of Nevada- Las Vegas 2. College of Southern Nevada	Colorado Springs, CO	1. University of Colorado- Colorado Springs
El Paso, TX	1. University of Texas- El Paso	Memphis, TN	1. University of Memphis	Irvine, CA	1. University of California- Irvine
Portland, OR	1. Portland State University 2. University of Portland 3. Lewis and Clark College	Louisville, KY	1. University of Louisville 2. Bellarmine University 3. Sullivan University	Madison, WI	1. University of Wisconsin- Madison
Kansas City, MO	1. University of Missouri- Kansas City	Dallas, TX	1. University of Texas at Dallas 2. University of Texas at Arlington 3. University of North Texas- Dallas	Newark, NJ	1. Montclair State University 2. Kean University 3. Rutgers University- Newark
Laredo, TX	1. Texas A&M International University	Philadelphia, PA	1. Temple University 2. Drexel University 3. University of Pennsylvania	Anchorage, AK	1. University of Alaska- Anchorage
Miami, FL	1. Miami Dade College 2. Florida International University 3. University of Miami	Cleveland, OH	1. Kent State University 2. Cleveland State University 3. Case Western Reserve University	San Antonio, TX	1. University of Texas- San Antonio 2. University of the Incarnate World
Riverside, CA	1. University of California- Riverside 2. Riverside City College	Denver, CO	1. Metropolitan State University of Denver 2. University of Colorado- Denver 3. University of Denver	Austin, TX	1. University of Texas- Austin 2. St. Edward's University
Raleigh, NC	1. North Carolina State University	Seattle, WA	1. University of Washington 2. Bellevue College 3. Seattle University	Fort Worth, TX	1. University of Texas- Arlington 3. Texas Christian University
Buffalo, NY	1. University of Buffalo 2. Buffalo State College 3. Canisius College	Milwaukee, WI	1. University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee 2. Marquette University	Baltimore, MD	1. Towson University 2. University of Maryland- Baltimore 3. John Hopkins University
San Diego, CA	1. San Diego State University 2. University of California- San Diego 3. University of San Diego	Detroit, MI	1. University of Michigan- Ann Arbor 2. Eastern Michigan University 3. Wayne State University	Oklahoma City, OK	1. University of Oklahoma 2. University of Central Oklahoma

Table 8 (cont.):

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Tulsa, OK	1. University of Tulsa 2. Rogers State University 3. Oral Roberts University	San Francisco, CA	1. University of California- Berkeley 2. San Francisco State University 3. University of San Francisco	Long Beach, CA	1. Cal State Long Beach 2. Cal State Dominguez Hills 3. Biola University
Houston, TX	1. University of Houston 2. Texas Southern University	Boston, MA	1. Boston University 2. Northeastern University 3. Boston College	Minneapolis, MN	1. University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 2. University of St. Thomas- Minnesota
Tampa, FL	1. University of South Florida 2. University of Tampa 3. St. Petersburg College	New York, NY	1. New York University 2. Hunter College 3. Queens College	New Orleans, LA	1. Tulane University 2. University of New Orleans 3. Loyola University New Orleans
Omaha, NE	1. University of Nebraska at Omaha 2. Bellevue University 3. Creighton University	Columbus, OH	1. Ohio State University	Pittsburgh, PA	1. University of Pittsburgh 2. Carnegie Mellon University 3. Duquesne University
Lincoln, NE	1. University of Nebraska- Lincoln	Chicago, IL	1. University of Illinois at Chicago 2. DePaul University 3. Loyola University Chicago	Lexington, KY	1. University of Kentucky
Reno, NV	1. University of Nevada- Reno	Honolulu, HI	1. University of Hawaii at Manoa 2. Hawaii Pacific University	Cincinnati, OH	1. University of Cincinnati 2. Xavier University
San Jose, CA	1. San Jose State University 2. Santa Clara University	Oakland, CA	1. University of California- Berkeley 2. San Francisco State University 3. Mills College	Toledo, OH	1. Bowling Green State University 2. University of Toledo
Fresno, CA	1. California State University- Fresno 2. Fresno Pacific University	Lubbock, TX	1. Texas Tech University	Greensboro, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Greensboro 2. Elon University 3. High Point University
Washington, DC	1. George Washington University 2. Georgetown University 3. American University	Nashville, TN	1. Vanderbilt University 2. Tennessee State University 3. Belmont University	Orlando, FL	1. University of Central Florida
Charlotte, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Charlotte 2. Queens University of Charlotte	Jersey City, NJ	1. Kean University 2. Rutgers University- Newark 3. New Jersey City University	Norfolk, VA	1. Old Dominion University 2. ECPI University 3. Norfolk State University

Table 8 (cont.):

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Phoenix, AZ	1. Arizona State University 2. Grand Canyon University 3. University of Phoenix	Sacramento, CA	1. University of California- Davis 2. Cal State Sacramento	Durham, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2. Duke University 3. North Carolina Central University
Los Angeles, CA	1. UCLA 2. Cal State Northridge 3. University of Southern California	Atlanta, GA	1. Georgia State University 2. Kennesaw State University 3. Georgia Institute of Technology	Winston-Salem, NC	1. Wake Forest University 2. Winston-Salem State University 3. High Point University
Albuquerque, NM	1. University of New Mexico	Jacksonville, FL	1. University of North Florida 2. Florida State College at Jacksonville	Rochester, NY	1. Rochester Institute of Technology 2. University of Rochester 3. St. John Fisher College
Fort Wayne, IN	1. Purdue University-Fort Wayne 2. Indiana Institute of Technology	Indianapolis, IN	1. Purdue University-Indianapolis 2. Butler University		

Source: U.S. News (Anon, 2017a)

Table 9: List of colleges used for estimates on proportion of Pell Grant beneficiaries

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Tucson, AZ	1. University of Arizona	Santa Ana, CA	1. California State University- Fullerton 2. Chapman University	Spokane, WA	1. Eastern Washington University 2. Gonzaga University 3. Whitworth University
St. Louis, MO	1. Lindenwood University 2. St Louis University 3. Washington University in St. Louis	Las Vegas, NV	1. University of Nevada- Las Vegas 2. College of Southern Nevada	Colorado Springs, CO	1. University of Colorado- Colorado Springs
El Paso, TX	1. University of Texas- El Paso	Memphis, TN	1. University of Memphis	Irvine, CA	1. University of California- Irvine
Portland, OR	1. Portland State University 2. University of Portland 3. Lewis and Clark College	Louisville, KY	1. University of Louisville	Madison, WI	1. University of Wisconsin- Madison
Kansas City, MO	1. University of Missouri- Kansas City	Dallas, TX	1. University of Texas at Dallas 2. University of Texas at Arlington	Newark, NJ	1. Montclair State University 2. Kean University
Laredo, TX	1. Texas A&M International University	Philadelphia, PA	1. Temple University 2. Drexel University 3. University of Pennsylvania	Anchorage, AK	1. University of Alaska- Anchorage
Miami, FL	1. Florida International University 3. University of Miami	Cleveland, OH	1. Kent State University 2. Cleveland State University 3. Case Western Reserve University	San Antonio, TX	1. University of Texas- San Antonio 2. University of the Incarnate World
Riverside, CA	1. University of California- Riverside	Denver, CO	1. Metropolitan State University of Denver 2. University of Colorado- Denver 3. University of Denver	Austin, TX	1. University of Texas- Austin 2. St. Edward's University
Raleigh, NC	1. North Carolina State University	Seattle, WA	1. University of Washington 3. Seattle University	Fort Worth, TX	1. University of Texas- Arlington 3. Texas Christian University
Buffalo, NY	1. University of Buffalo 2. Buffalo State College 3. Canisius College	Milwaukee, WI	1. University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee 2. Marquette University	Baltimore, MD	1. Towson University 2. University of Maryland- Baltimore 3. John Hopkins University
San Diego, CA	1. San Diego State University 2. University of California- San Diego 3. University of San Diego	Detroit, MI	1. University of Michigan- Ann Arbor 2. Eastern Michigan University 3. Wayne State University	Oklahoma City, OK	1. University of Central Oklahoma

Table 9 (cont.):

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Tulsa, OK	1. University of Tulsa 2. Rogers State University 3. Oral Roberts University	San Francisco, CA	1. University of California- Berkeley 2. San Francisco State University 3. University of San Francisco	Long Beach, CA	1. Cal State Long Beach 2. Cal State Dominguez Hills 3. Biola University
Houston, TX	1. University of Houston 2. Texas Southern University	Boston, MA	1. Boston University 2. Northeastern University 3. Boston College	Minneapolis, MN	1. University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 2. University of St. Thomas- Minnesota
Tampa, FL	1. University of South Florida 2. University of Tampa	New York, NY	1. New York University 2. Hunter College 3. Queens College	New Orleans, LA	1. Tulane University 2. University of New Orleans 3. Loyola University New Orleans
Omaha, NE	1. University of Nebraska at Omaha 2. Creighton University	Columbus, OH	1. Ohio State University	Pittsburgh, PA	1. University of Pittsburgh 2. Carnegie Mellon University 3. Duquesne University
Lincoln, NE	1. University of Nebraska- Lincoln	Chicago, IL	1. University of Illinois at Chicago 2. DePaul University 3. Loyola University Chicago	Lexington, KY	1. University of Kentucky
Reno, NV	1. University of Nevada- Reno	Honolulu, HI	1. University of Hawaii at Manoa 2. Hawaii Pacific University	Cincinnati, OH	1. University of Cincinnati
San Jose, CA	1. San Jose State University 2. Santa Clara University	Oakland, CA	1. University of California- Berkeley 2. San Francisco State University 3. Mills College	Toledo, OH	1. Bowling Green State University 2. University of Toledo
Fresno, CA	1. California State University- Fresno 2. Fresno Pacific University	Lubbock, TX	1. Texas Tech University	Greensboro, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Greensboro 2. Elon University 3. High Point University
Washington, DC	1. George Washington University 2. Georgetown University 3. American University	Nashville, TN	1. Vanderbilt University 2. Tennessee State University	Orlando, FL	1. University of Central Florida
Charlotte, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Charlotte 2. Queens University of Charlotte	Jersey City, NJ	1. Kean University 2. New Jersey City University	Norfolk, VA	1. Old Dominion University 3. Norfolk State University
Phoenix, AZ	1. Arizona State University	Sacramento, CA	1. University of California- Davis 2. Cal State Sacramento	Durham, NC	1. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2. Duke University 3. North Carolina Central University

Table 9 (cont.):

City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used	City	Colleges Used
Los Angeles, CA	1. UCLA 2. Cal State Northridge 3. University of Southern California	Atlanta, GA	1. Georgia State University 2. Kennesaw State University 3. Georgia Institute of Technology	Winston-Salem, NC	1. Wake Forest University
Albuquerque, NM	1. University of New Mexico	Jacksonville, FL	1. University of North Florida	Rochester, NY	1. Rochester Institute of Technology 2. University of Rochester 3. St. John Fisher College
Fort Wayne, IN	1. Purdue University-Fort Wayne	Indianapolis, IN	1. Purdue University-Indianapolis 2. Butler University		

Source: *U.S. News (Anon, 2017a)*

Next up, following the work of Gamson (1975) and McCarthy and Zald (1977) I look at the role of resources in fostering larger turnouts. Newspaper reports on the Occupy movement show that it gained support from trade unions in many of the cities in which it carried out actions. Therefore, I use 2010 Bureau of Labor Statistics data (Anon, 2010) on the percentage of the workforce in each city which is represented by unions. I expect Occupy turnouts to be bigger in cities with larger rates of union membership. I also look at evidence of support from social movement organizations for local Occupy groups. I use local newspaper reports to obtain counts for instances of support from various local organizations for Occupy protesters. I expect protests to be larger in cities where the local Occupy movement has received more support from these organizations.

I also look at the role of strain and levels of relative deprivation in fostering protest, following the work of Snow, Cress, Downey and Jones (1998) and Van Dyke and Soule (2002). Because the Occupy movement protested inequality, these measures of



*Table 10: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the negative binomial analysis of differences in protest size*

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
City Level (N = 74)				
Dependent Variable				
Protest Turnout (count)	1347.64	5052.53	20.00	42500.00
Independent Variables				
Student Population (%)	12.13	3.91	6.60	30.10
Universities (count)	5.82	6.88	.00	48.00
Average College Population (count)	19378.32	16308.03	.00	79192.77
Liberal College (score between 0 and 10)	7.13	1.65	.00	9.20
Academic Ranking (score between 0 and 100)	45.51	29.50	.00	98.00
African American Studies (count)	1.41	1.72	.00	9.00
Chicano Studies (count)	.43	.80	.00	5.00
Women Studies (count)	1.99	1.87	.00	10.00
Cost of Tuition (in thousands of Dollars)	18.98	10.34	4.80	49.70
Rate of Pell Grants (%)	36.50	12.40	10.00	68.00
Controls				
Democrat Vote (%)	56.51	13.64	27.70	90.85
Democrat Mayor (binary)	.74	.44	.00	1.00
Union Strength (%)	11.03	6.23	.00	27.30
SMO Support (count)	.257	.575	.00	3.00
Unemployment (%)	8.72	2.08	4.00	16.50
Inequality (ratio)	466.76	28.24	413.00	545.00
Population (Metropolitan Statistical Area, in thousands)	3522.16	4383.36	209.23	18897.11
Northeast (dummy)	.12	.33	.00	1.00
Midwest (dummy)	.20	.40	.00	1.00
West (dummy)	.31	.47	.00	1.00

deprivation can also be considered a potential movement grievance. I use two measures of economic deprivation. I look at the percentage of the workforce in each city which is unemployed, with data from 2010 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I also look at median household inequality in each city, expressed through GINI index scores on household inequality, obtained from the 2010 American Community Survey (Bureau, U.S. Census, n.d.). This index shows the proportion by which the wealthiest 20% of the population is wealthier than the least wealthy 20%. With both of these variables, I expect greater levels of deprivation, measured in terms of unemployment and inequality, to increase the likelihood of larger protests.

Lastly, I look at differences in terms of the relative population of each city as well as the regions in which the cities are located. I expect population to have a major role in determining the size of protests in different cities. Indeed, we can only learn about each movement's different abilities to turn more people out if we factor the turnouts against the population of each city. I use the population of each city's Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) expressed in thousands. These data were obtained from the 2010 U.S. Census (Center for New Media and Promotion, 2009). I use 3 dummy variables denoting 3 of the 4 U.S. Census designated regions in which the different cities in my sample are located (Northeast, Midwest and West) with South as the reference category. All of the descriptive statistics for the variables and controls which I have described in the previous pages are outlined in Table 10.

#### 2.2.4: Analytic Strategy

Having listed and described the data to be used, I will now focus on the strategy

through which I will analyze said data. I analyze my data with Negative Binomial Regression. This is the most common method when the dependent variable (in this case the Occupy protest turnouts) does not present a normal Bell curve distribution and is also over-distributed. This means that its variance is more than twice its mean. I use several tests to interpret negative binomial regression: coefficients, probability chi square, likelihood ratio chi squared, pseudo R squared, AIC and BIC. Coefficients are the main means of interpretation of individual variables and they show the extent to which the log of expected counts of the dependent variable increases or decreases for each one unit increase in the independent variable in question. Coefficients can be positive or negative depending on the direction of the relationship. For example, a coefficient of  $-.500$  means that the log of expected counts of the dependent variable decreased by half a unit every time the independent variable in question increases by one unit. By calculating the expected count I can obtain the overall expected increase or decrease in the dependent variable each time the independent variable under analysis increases by a unit. For a coefficient of  $-.500$ , I would expect a decrease in the dependent variable by  $.394$  for every unit increase in the independent variable. I interpret coefficients with a two-tailed test of significance, in order to be able to prove a negative relationship between two variables if needed. Probability chi square tests for models show whether I can reject the null hypothesis (the hypothesis stating that the model has no significant overall effect on the dependent variables): a score of  $0.05$  or less shows that it can be rejected, whereas with higher scores than  $0.05$  it cannot be rejected. The likelihood ratio chi square test for each model estimates what percentage of variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model, therefore a

higher score means that more variation can be accounted for. For example, a score of 15 in this test means that the model explains 15% of variation in the model. The pseudo R square is another means of estimating the percentage of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by variation in all independent variables in the model. Here, each hundredth of a unit corresponds to a percentage point. For example, a pseudo R square score of .050 means that the independent variables are explaining 5% of the variation in the dependent variable. Lastly, the AIC and BIC scores, which stand respectively for Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion, tell us how good of a fit each model is in terms of explaining variation in the dependent variable. A lower score denotes a better fit. The difference between the two scores is that AIC scores tend to reward larger models with more variables, whereas BIC scores tend to reward smaller and more parsimonious models.

Because I want to focus not on each city's relative ability to foster larger protests, but rather each city's protesters' ability to turn out relatively larger portions of the population (the data relative to this measure is found in Table 11), I use population as my exposure variable. I also want to always keep in account the role of political opportunity structure, resources and organizations, strain and regions in all models. Therefore all models will contain controls for the share of Democrat vote, presence of Democrat mayor, support by allied social movement organizations, strength of unions, inequality, unemployment and the regional controls. All the correlations between these controls and the independent variables are visible in Table 12. This table shows that the variable for the number of universities is highly correlated to the variables for Black Studies and Women's

*Table 11: Number of protesters per 1000 people in the cities under analysis*

City or Cities	Protesters per 1000 people	City or Cities	Protesters per 1000 people
Portland, OR	4.492	Buffalo, NY	.176
New York, NY	2.249	Minneapolis	.168
Lincoln, NE	1.655	Jacksonville, FL	.163
Pittsburgh, PA	1.273	Oklahoma City, OK	.160
Omaha, NE	1.098	Nashville, TN	.157
Tucson, AZ	1.020	Louisville, KY	.156
San Francisco, CA	.923	Toledo, OH	.154
Seattle, WA	.872	El Paso, TX	.150
Denver, CO	.865	Kansas City, MO	.147
Greensboro, NC	.829	Tampa, FL	.144
Orlando, FL	.820	Tulsa, OK	.128
Austin, TX	.816	Oakland, CA	.127
Cincinnati, OH	.610	Philadelphia, PA	.117
Fort Wayne, IN	.601	Detroit, MI	.116
Reno, NV	.588	Laredo, TX	.096
Spokane, WA	.531	New Orleans, LA	.094
Madison, WI	.528	San Antonio, TX	.093
Las Vegas, NV and Indianapolis, IN	.512	Memphis, TN	.084
San Diego, CA	.485	Cleveland, OH	.072
Winston-Salem, NC	.419	Rochester, NY	.071
Albuquerque, NM	.395	Columbus, OH	.065
Los Angeles, CA	.390	Dallas, TX	.060
Anchorage, AK	.368	Riverside, CA	.059
Charlotte, NC	.313	Atlanta, GA	.057
Phoenix, AZ	.286	Colorado Springs, CO	.056
Washington, DC	.269	Lexington, KY	.051
Raleigh, NC	.265	Houston, TX and Irvine, CA	.050
Honolulu, HI	.262	Baltimore, MD	.046
Sacramento, CA	.256	Norfolk, VA	.018
Fresno, CA	.236	San Jose, CA	.013
Boston, MA	.220	Long Beach, CA	.009
Durham, NC	.218	Santa Ana, CA	.008
Miami, FL	.216	Fort Worth, TX	.006
Chicago, IL	.211	Jersey City, NJ	.004
Lubbock, TX and Milwaukee, WI	.193	Newark, NJ	.002
St. Louis, MO	.178		

Studies departments, as well as slightly correlated to the variables for academic ranking and cost of tuition. For these reasons, I want to use the independent variables for student population and number of universities separate for the rest. Therefore, I only analyze the role in these variables in the very first model. In Model 2 I look at the role of average college size in each city, and I use this variable as the sole independent variable. In Model 3 I focus on the reputation of colleges in terms of more or less liberal as well as academic rankings. Thus I have the rankings for faculty political donations and overall academic quality as my two independent variables. Model 4 focuses on institutional support for protest by using the three independent variables of counts of African American Studies, Chicano Studies and Women's Studies departments. Model 5 looks at the economic conditions of students by including two independent variables: average tuition costs and rate of students who are beneficiaries of Pell Grants. Lastly, Model 6 is the final model which adds together all independent variables which were significant in past models, apart from those contained in Model 1. I exclude those variables because I want to focus on understanding which substantive aspects of colleges and student populations play a role in affecting mobilization size. Therefore, after proving that the number of colleges and student populations affect mobilization size, I have no need to further test this relationship.

*Table 12: Correlations between independent variables and controls used in the analysis of protest size*

	<b>Student Population</b>	<b>Universities</b>	<b>College Population</b>	<b>Liberal College</b>	<b>Academic Ranking</b>	<b>Black Studies</b>	<b>Chicano Studies</b>	<b>Women Studies</b>	<b>Cost of Tuition</b>
<b>Student Population</b>	1.000								
<b>Universities</b>	-.070	1.000							
<b>College Population</b>	.068	-.315	1.000						
<b>Liberal College</b>	.075	.163	.046	1.000					
<b>Academic Ranking</b>	.180	.480	-.207	.050	1.000				
<b>Black Studies</b>	.030	.787	-.137	.110	.583	1.000			
<b>Chicano Studies</b>	-.067	.257	.303	.201	.131	.301	1.000		
<b>Women Studies</b>	.080	.740	-.222	.172	.639	.786	.124	1.000	
<b>Cost of Tuition</b>	.017	.392	-.353	-.094	.450	.319	.030	.392	1.000
<b>Pell Grants</b>	-.304	-.138	.344	-.186	-.195	-.067	.248	-.192	-.447
<b>Population</b>	-.198	.811	.054	.138	.323	.632	.513	.551	.082
<b>Democrat Vote</b>	.018	.363	-.175	.230	.408	.425	.145	.501	.377
<b>Democrat Mayor</b>	.118	.057	-.265	-.103	.237	.103	.048	.146	.266
<b>Union Strength</b>	-.007	.155	.008	.218	.066	.229	.238	.198	.112
<b>SMO Support</b>	-.058	.431	-.165	.059	.304	.309	.083	.373	.276
<b>Unemployment</b>	-.240	-.091	.184	.036	-.120	.058	.300	-.065	-.120
<b>Inequality</b>	-.037	.304	-.203	.049	.352	.324	.078	.345	.342
<b>Northeast</b>	.012	.385	-.235	-.098	.362	.420	-.099	.426	.338
<b>Midwest</b>	.180	.067	-.169	.176	.007	.097	-.148	.185	-.008
<b>West</b>	-.078	-.196	.282	.201	-.221	-.177	.483	-.231	-.108

Table 12 (cont.):

	Rate of Pell Grants	Population	Democrat Vote	Democrat Mayor	Union Strength	SMO Support	Unemployment	Inequality	North east	Midwest	West
<b>Pell Grants</b>	1.000										
<b>Population</b>	.086	1.000									
<b>Democrat Vote</b>	-.093	.141	1.000								
<b>Democrat Mayor</b>	.055	-.106	.355	1.000							
<b>Union Strength</b>	.027	.156	.224	.012	1.000						
<b>SMO Support</b>	-.117	.375	.373	.102	.160	1.000					
<b>Unemployment</b>	.393	.057	.016	-.067	.246	-.063	1.000				
<b>Inequality</b>	.014	.128	.638	.284	-.140	.272	.044	1.000			
<b>North-east</b>	-.053	.232	.317	.124	.378	.267	-.133	.238	1.000		
<b>Midwest</b>	.185	-.057	.014	.066	.124	-.109	-.209	-.154	-.188	1.000	
<b>West</b>	-.231	-.014	-.046	-.207	.394	.056	.456	-.219	-.250	-.339	1.000



## 2.3 ANALYSIS

### 2.3.1: The First Model and the Relationship between Protest Size, Student Populations and Number of Colleges

Before I can test the hypotheses which I have outlined in the theory section, I first of all need to demonstrate that, overall, colleges and student populations were leading factors in fostering higher turnouts. Model 1 in Table 13 serves this purpose. As we can see in this model, both student populations and number of colleges have a strong and positive effect on the size of Occupy protests. In terms of the individual effect of the variables in the independent variables, every increase by a single percentage in student population results in a 0.074 increase in the log of expected counts for turnouts. This means that for every percentage increase in student population there will be .076 more protesters per 1000 people at the local Occupy protest. In a city as large as New York, this results in an increase by about 600 protesters for every percentage increase in the student population. In Spokane, WA, which is the smallest city of the sample, this means that for every percentage increase in student population 15 more protesters show up.

As for the number of universities, each unit increase in the total count of colleges in each city results in a 0.067 increase in the log of expected counts for turnouts. This means that, for each college present in each city, there is an increase of about 0.07 protesters per 1000 people. This can result in an increase which ranges between 14 protesters in the smallest city in the sample to 560 in the largest. In terms of the effect of the whole model, the likelihood ratio chi square and the pseudo R square tells us that it explains

between 2.6% and 2.9% of variation in the dependent variable. The probability chi square test shows us a score which is much lower than the 0.05 cutoff, thus I can dismiss

*Table 13: Negative binomial models estimating the effect of variables and controls on turnouts at Occupy protests, with Metropolitan Statistical Area population as the exposure variable (Models 1-3)*

	Model 1: Student Population		Model 2: Average College Population		Model 3: College Reputation	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
<b>Independent Variables</b>						
Student Population	.074*	.040	--	--	--	--
Universities	.067**	.024	--	--	--	--
College Population	--	--	-.015*	.008	--	--
Liberal College	--	--	--	--	.290***	.079
Academic Ranking	--	--	--	--	-.009*	.005
<b>Controls</b>						
Democrat Vote	-.009	.017	.010	.017	.004	.016
Democrat Mayor	.023	.293	-.209	.323	-.052	.290
Union Strength	-.055*	.033	-.054*	.036	-.071**	.034
SMO Support	.385*	.265	.611**	.288	.670***	.268
Unemployment	.001	.070	-.044	.071	-.048	.067
Inequality	-.007	.007	-.010	.008	-.007	.007
Northeast <sup>4</sup>	.005	.677	.668	.706	1.185**	.648
Midwest	.618*	.414	.795**	.442	.608*	.413
West	1.228***	.429	1.296***	.449	.905**	.440
Constant	1.369	3.091	3.782	3.127	.622	2.863
<b>Tests</b>						
LR chi2	28.90		21.99		31.68	
Prob > chi2	.002		.015		.001	
Pseudo R2	.026		.020		.028	
AIC	1125.783		1130.694		1123.003	
BIC	1155.736		1158.343		1152.956	

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; \* $p \leq .075$ ; \*\* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed)

<sup>4</sup> Dummy variable. Reference category: South

the null hypothesis and I can be confident that this model has a significant effect on the dependent variable. Lastly, the AIC and BIC indicators show us that this model is the third best fit amongst those in Table 13.

Overall, this evidence confirms that the recent case of the Occupy movement is a demonstration that, once again, students played a key role in fostering mobilization. Not only did larger student populations lead to larger mobilizations, but cities with more colleges also had greater odds of witnessing larger protests. These findings are consistent with past literature on students' involvement in wider protests, including the work by Lipset and Altbach (1966), Scott and El Assal (1969) and McAdam (1982) on protests in the U.S. in the 1960s, Altbach's (1984) depiction of student-led protests in the developing world, as well as Zhao's (1998) account of pro-democracy protests in China and Wickham-Crowley's (2001) brief history of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru. The Occupy movement can be seen in this respect as the latest case in a long history of broad protest movements which have been energetically supported and mobilized by students. However we should also be aware that there is an ecological fallacy in assuming that students were a key factor in ensuring large Occupy turnouts. The evidence displayed in this analysis only proves that Occupy was able to mobilize large numbers in cities with a large number of colleges and with large student populations. But I cannot prove that students were actually a larger proportion of protesters in cities with large student populations. This would require systematic knowledge of the characteristics of the protesters, which I do not have. However the data does show that students are likely to have played a strong role in the Occupy mobilization. This is plausible for three additional reasons. First of all,

the Occupy movement voiced grievances which were dear to students, such as denouncing inequality and high rates of unemployment, as well as protesting the spiraling rates of tuition fee debt which have affected the finances of many recent college graduates. The second reason as to why this is not a surprising finding is that Occupy protests and encampments often took place at college campuses: for example, the Seattle Times reported that Occupy Seattle was camped for more than a month at SCCC, the city's local community college and I participated at many protests at Occupy Albuquerque which took place at the University of New Mexico's main campus. Lastly, we have plenty of evidence of college student and faculty involvement at Occupy protest activities, ranging from professors leading teach-ins to students holding informational events on how to negotiate tuition fee debt (Schneider, 2013; Gould-Wartofsky, 2015).

Although we know that these findings are consistent with past literature, it is worth spending some time explaining how a large number of protesters per capita (shown in Table 11) corresponds to large student populations (shown in Table 4) and number of colleges in each city (shown in Table 5). In terms of student populations, Table 4 shows that these rates were especially high in medium to small population centers, whereas most major cities, apart from Boston, do not have relatively large student populations. In particular, Lincoln, NE and Pittsburgh, PA seem to show the strength of the relationship between college populations and protest size. These cities were two of only four cities which had a rate higher than one protester for every 1000 people. At the same time, they had some of the highest rates of students in the sample- to be precise, both almost at 20% with Lincoln the 4<sup>th</sup> highest and Pittsburgh the 5<sup>th</sup> highest. Thus, these cases show that

student populations explain why relatively small towns such as these witnessed relatively large Occupy protests. By way of contrast, Table 5 shows that, unlike student populations, the number of colleges in each city is more consistent with population counts, with New York having the most colleges, followed by other major population centers such as Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and Washington. Thus the number of colleges seems to explain high rates of protester per capita in major population centers, such as New York City, Portland, Seattle and San Francisco. On the whole, this evidence shows that small cities were able to mobilize relatively large protests thanks to large numbers of students, whereas in larger population centers a high density of colleges gave protesters more resources, which in turn made it easier for them to mobilize.

### 2.3.2: Hypothesis 1: The Role of College Size

Model 2 in Table 13 shows the effect of average college size in each city on protest size, net of controls. We can see that college size has an unexpectedly negative effect on protest size. For every unit increase in college population there is a 0.015 decrease in the log of expected counts for Occupy protest turnouts. This means that for every increase by a unit in the average number of students enrolled in each city's college there is a decrease by 0.015 protesters per 1000 people. This means that for every increase by a unit in the number of average students enrolled in colleges in each city I predict a decrease in turnout ranging between 3 protesters in the smallest city in the sample to 120 protesters in the largest city in the sample. In terms of the descriptive statistics for the whole model, the probability chi square score is bigger than that in Model 1 but still small enough that I can reject the null hypothesis. The likelihood ratio chi square and pseudo R square scores

tell us that this model explains between 2% and 2.2% of variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, this model accounts for less than a quarter of total variation in turnout. The AIC and BIC score show that this model has some of the worst goodness of fit scores in Tables 13 and 14. On the whole, this model performs worse than many other models. The effect of average college size is significant but weaker than other factors. When this variable is put in the final model with all other previously significant variables it loses its significance. Therefore, while there is some support for the inverse relationship between college size and protest size, this relationship is not significant when other important characteristics of colleges and student populations, including academic ranking, the rate of Pell Grant recipients and the political ratings of colleges, are kept in account.

These findings lead me to reject Hypothesis 1, which expected average college size to have a positive effect on protest turnouts. What are the reasons for this unexpected dynamic? There is a distinct possibility that Occupy protesters in cities like New York and Boston might have benefited from the resources gained from having many small colleges distributed across the city. Indeed, because these protests often integrated on-campus issues and sometimes even happened on campus, they may have well been galvanized by making connections to a greater number of small campus communities. Therefore, the dynamics of student protests may be very much different in this respect from the protests in the 1960s which, according to studies by Lipset and Altbach (1966), Scott and El Assal (1969) and, more recently, Van Dyke (1998) benefited from larger college campuses with bigger student populations. Another potential explanation is that campus heterogeneity which scholars of 1960s protests praise as conducive to a protest-

friendly campus environment, may not have been an asset in this case. Here, protests benefited more, or at least just as much, from having support from relatively smaller and more homogenous campus communities. Due to the lack of significance of the variable in the final model, these findings do mirror similar results obtained in more recent research by Soule (1997), who found no correlation between college size and the likelihood of campus protests. On the whole, these results show significant changes in college student protest dynamics since the 1960s: large college campuses do not facilitate larger protests and, in some cases, smaller campuses may even have greater likelihood of facilitating protest.

### 2.3.3: Hypothesis 2: The Role of Liberal College Environments

Model 3 contains the independent variables on liberal and academic college ranking which tests the hypotheses on the role on more or less liberal college environments and elite colleges. The variable on liberal college ranking has a significant and positive effect on protest size, with an increase in the log of expected counts by 0.290 every time there is a one unit increase in the ranking. This means that there is an expected increase in the number of protesters per 1000 people of 0.336 for every time that the average ranking of local colleges in each city goes up by a point (the ranking ranges from the lowest score which is 0 to the highest which is 9.2). Consequently, every time there is an increase in the ranking by a unit, depending on the size of the city, I can expect a growth in turnout ranging between 67 protesters in the smallest cities to almost 2700 in the largest. This effect remains strong in the final model (Model 6), although there is a slight decrease in the coefficient, with the log of expected counts in the dependent variable decreasing by

0.193 for every unit increase in the ranking for liberal colleges. This results in an increase of protesters per 1000 people by only 0.21 instead of 0.336, which means that the increase in number of protesters caused by an increase in this unit is only between 42 and almost 1700. On the whole, both Models 3 and 6 show strong support for a positive effect of liberal college rankings on protest turnouts.

On the basis of this evidence, I can confirm Hypothesis 2. Unsurprisingly, liberal college campus cultures are more likely to fuel protests by left-wing social movements than their more conservative counterparts. Thus, I can also confirm previous insights from Altbach and Lipset (1966) on 1960s protest movements, as well as scholarship on more recent campus-based protests, such as that by Altbach and Cohen (1990). Liberal college campuses in the U.S. have shown an enduring capacity in supporting protest movements, especially when the latter are in turn supporting cherished liberal causes, including protesting inequality and racism, supporting LGBT rights as well as women's rights and environmentalism. The protest dynamics among U.S. students still resemble those observed here in the 1960s rather than the more politically ambivalent student protests in the developing world described by Altbach (1984). With regards to the Occupy movement itself, we shouldn't be surprised with this finding since the movement's largest protest centers were in cities such as Boston, New York, Detroit and Oakland which are geographically very proximate to the most liberal college campuses in the nation, such as Boston College, Columbia, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and University of California in Berkeley.



#### 2.3.4: Hypothesis 3: The Role of Elite Colleges and Students

As mentioned before, Model 3 also demonstrates that, contrary to expectations, there is no positive relationship between college ranking and protest turnout, net of controls. On the contrary, this relationship is negative and significant, with a decrease in the log of expected counts of protest turnouts by 0.009 every time academic rankings go up by one unit. This means that there is a decrease of 0.009 protesters per 1000 people for every unit increase in this ranking, which ranges between a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 98. Consequently, for every increase by a point in the ranking I can expect a decrease in turnout ranging between about 2 protesters in the smallest city in the sample to 72 protesters in the largest. On the whole, Model 3 contains two of the variables which have the most significant effect on the dependent variable. Therefore this model is, in several respects, one of the strongest across the models in Tables 12 and 13. It has the second highest likelihood ratio chi square and pseudo R square scores (the only model which performs better in the final Model 6) with the overall effect on the dependent variable estimated to be between 2.8% and 3.2%. It also has the second lowest probability chi square score, thus I can definitely dismiss the null hypothesis in this case. Lastly, it has the second lowest AIC and the lowest BIC score, thus this model is a very good fit for the dependent variable. In terms of the variable on college ranking, its significance is confirmed in the final Model 6, where its coefficient increases, with a decrease in the log of expected counts in protest turnout by 0.120 every time there is a one unit increase in the academic ranking. This means that we can expect a decrease of 0.127 protesters per 1000 people every time there is an increase by a unit in the ranking, resulting in 25 less

protesters in the smallest city to just over 1000 less protesters in the biggest city. Therefore I can conclude that there is strong support for a negative relationship between academic rankings and protest turnouts.

These findings lead me to dismiss Hypotheses 3, which expects the presence of elite colleges to have a positive effect on protest size. Therefore, the dynamics in this case of student-led protest are different than those described by Lipset and Altbach (1966) in their account of 1960s student movements as well as the Shantytown protests depicted by Soule (1997). In the case of Occupy, elite colleges did not take a leading role galvanizing protests. There may be several potential explanations for this. As mentioned before, changes in the makeup of students in elite colleges since the 1960s may have resulted in a student body with less class diversity and a lesser degree of biographical availability for protest. In turn, these reasons may have made protest movements more unwilling to recruit students from elite colleges. However, while these reasons can adequately explain the lack of a positive relationship, how can I account for the existence of a negative relationship between college rankings and protest size? I can attempt to explain these dynamics from several angles. First of all, if tuition increases are leading causes of student grievances, we can expect students in non-elite colleges, who are still paying a high price of education, but perceive to have less career opportunities than their counterparts at Harvard and Stanford, leading to lesser paying jobs and diminished chances to pay back their debt. Non-elite colleges may also be more greatly affected by issues of institutional strain described by Scott and El-Assal (1969). Students in these colleges are more likely to protest out of their frustration over an expensive education which they perceive to be not

matched by appropriate educational and institutional standards. In sum, students at these colleges perceived that they were not getting a good value education for their money. Colleges in my sample which fit this bill include Portland State University and the University of Portland in Portland, which, as shown on Table 11, has the highest rate of protesters per 1000 people in the sample, the University of Arizona in Tucson, which has the 6<sup>th</sup> highest rate of protesters per capita, as well as University of Nebraska in both Lincoln and Omaha, which have respectively the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> highest rate of protesters per 1000 people. Therefore, I can conclude from this finding that the greatest sources of student discontent and protest are coming from more peripheral educational institutions rather than the more stable and wealthy campuses at Yale, Harvard and the University of Michigan.

#### 2.3.5: Hypothesis 4: Institutional Support for Protest

Model 4 in Table 14 contains the three variables which measure different forms of institutional support for protest inside colleges: African American Studies departments, Chicano Studies departments and Women's Studies departments. As we can see, only the variable for Chicano Studies has a significant and positive effect on the dependent variable, with an increase in the log of expected counts for protest turnouts by 0.444 every time there is a one unit increase in this independent variable. This means that there is an increase by 0.559 protester per 1000 people for every additional Chicano Studies department present in each city under analysis. This increase ranges between 112 protesters in the smallest city in the sample to almost 4500 in the largest one. This relationship is con-

firmed in the final Model 6 where Chicano Studies is still significant and has a coefficient of 0.424, very similar to that observed in Model 4. As for the variables for Women's

*Table 14: Negative binomial models estimating the effect of variables and controls on turnouts at Occupy protests, with Metropolitan Statistical Area population as the exposure variable (Models 4-6)*

	<b>Model 4: Institutional Support</b>		<b>Model 5: Economic Factors</b>		<b>Model 6: Final</b>	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
<b>Independent Variables</b>						
Black Studies	-.002	.140	--	--	--	--
Chicano Studies	.444*	.230	--	--	.424**	.190
Women Studies	-.123	.138	--	--	--	--
Cost of Tuition	--	--	.006	.017	--	--
Rate of Pell Grants	--	--	-.030**	.014	-.030**	.013
College Population	--	--	--	--	-.003	.010
Liberal College	--	--	--	--	.193**	.083
Academic Ranking	--	--	--	--	-.012***	.005
<b>Controls</b>						
Democrat Vote	.009	.017	.001	.016	-.002	.015
Democrat Mayor	-.246	.335	-.058	.330	-.123	.295
Union Strength	-.060**	.035	-.055*	.036	-.066**	.030
SMO Support	.683***	.286	.650**	.282	.637***	.239
Unemployment	-.048	.067	.022	.074	.008	.067
Inequality	-.008	.007	-.008	.008	-.006	.007
Northeast <sup>5</sup>	1.088*	.690	.786	.736	1.056**	.591
Midwest	1.010***	.432	.783**	.425	.566*	.385
West	.872**	.511	1.252***	.455	.538	.432
Constant	2.747	3.105	3.363	3.122	1.972	2.794
<b>Tests</b>						
LR chi2	23.90		26.00		42.72	
Prob > chi2	.021		.007		.000	
Pseudo R2	.021		.023		.038	
AIC	1132.787		1128.682		1117.968	
BIC	1165.044		1158.635		1154.833	

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; \* $p \leq .075$ ; \*\* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .01$  (two-tailed)

<sup>5</sup> Dummy variable. Reference category: South

Studies and African American Studies, they have a negative but non-significant effect on the dependent variable.<sup>6</sup> Model 4 does have a small enough probability chi square score to reject the null hypothesis. However, when compared to other models, Model 4 is one of the least effective ones in Tables 13 and 14 in terms of explaining variation in the dependent variable, because it contains two non-significant independent variables. According to likelihood ratio chi square and pseudo R square scores it only explains between 2.1% and 2.4% of variation in the dependent variable. Its AIC and BIC scores indicate that it has the worst goodness of fit of all models in Tables 12 and 13. On the whole, these findings show that while Chicano Studies departments had a positive effect on protest, African American Studies and Women's Studies departments had no effect at all.

These findings lead me to confirm Hypothesis 4.2, which states that Chicano Studies departments have a positive effect on protest size. However, I find no support for Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.3, which state that African American Studies and Women's studies departments will have a positive effect on protest size. Thus I find confirmation to Rhoads' (1998) observations on the mobilizing effect of Chicano Studies departments for students. Yet for Women's Studies and African American studies departments I find no evidence to support Rhoads' (1998) and Rojas' (2006) theses on their relationship with protest culture and potential as mobilizing resources. Instead, the findings for Women's Studies and African American studies confirm past observations of student protest by Lipset and Altbach (1966), Kahn and Bowers (1970) and Soule (1997) who see them as

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<sup>6</sup> In unreported models, I tried merging the three variables in order to obtain an overall measure of institutional support, however this variable had no significant effect on protest size.

being led most often by mostly white and mostly affluent individuals as well as not more likely in places with institutional support for racial and ethnic minorities.

At this point it is legitimate to try to understand the reasons behind this disconnect. Why are Chicano Studies departments influential in fostering mobilization, yet Women's Studies and African American Studies departments are not? There may be multiple potential explanations for this phenomenon. The first one is temporal. The Occupy movement mobilized in 2011, and may have missed out on the most recent wave of feminist protests on campus, with key actions over campus rape culture taking place between 2013 and 2014 at several institutions, including the most high profile protests at Stanford and Columbia. A similar case may be made for African American protests: the outcry in Ferguson, MO over the death of Michael Brown resulted in protests in 2014. These eventually sparked a national movement, Black Lives Matter, dedicated to exposing discrimination by police and other government institutions against African Americans. Thus the Occupy movement may have been unable to effectively use Black Studies and Women's Studies departments as key mobilization resources because their key constituents were not as willing to mobilize as they were a few years later. The second possible reason for these differences may be geographic. As we can see from our regional controls, Occupy protests were generally larger in Western cities, which also tend to have relatively high proportions of Latinos. However Western cities do not have significantly higher rates of women and African Americans than their counterparts in the Midwest, South and Northeast. In fact, there are higher rates of African Americans in Southern cities, which is where the Occupy movement was least able to turn out large numbers. Therefore, the

Occupy movement's ability to use Chicano Studies departments as key resources may be related to its greater success in the West of the U.S. and its greater ability to mobilize Latinos who lived there as opposed to women and African Americans. A third explanation comes from the newspaper reports on the Occupy movement and may be related to the previous reason. Newspaper reports show that in Western cities such as Las Vegas, Albuquerque, Phoenix and Los Angeles, Occupy protests had a large Latino presence and also mobilized on issues that are dear to this ethnic group, including protests for immigrants' rights and against deportations. This ability to form coalitions was not observed in cities with large black populations in the East Coast, such as Baltimore, Chicago, New York and Washington. In fact very often here the local media reported a lack of diversity in the protest groups that were formed in those cities. This was a big issue since a movement that labeled itself as representative of the 99% was unable to recruit the racial groups which make up the so-called 99%. Nevertheless, some caution in interpreting the results should also be exercised. Although I have some evidence from newspaper reports that Occupy protests in the West had a large Latino component, these findings are not systematic and I do not know if, indeed, there was a larger Latino component compared to women and African Americans. In sum, I have some evidence that shows that Chicano Studies departments may have helped foster Occupy mobilization and that Latinos as a whole may have played a strong role in these protests. However I do not know if the presence of Chicano Studies departments effectively did translate into more support from Latinos, because I do not have systematic data on the demographic components of the Occupy protests.

### 2.3.6: Hypothesis 5: Tuition Costs

Model 5 in Table 14 contains two variables which explore the role of economic factors of student populations in shaping protest size: the cost of tuition and the rate of students who have received Pell Grants, net of controls. I will first of all focus on the role of tuition costs. The variable for tuition has a positive but non-significant effect on the dependent variable, with a very small coefficient of 0.006. Therefore, I can conclude that differences in tuition costs had no sizable effect in bolstering the size of protests, although, as shown on Table 12, these variables are somewhat correlated to each other, thus to some extent the variable of the rate of Pell Grants is mitigating the effect of tuition costs on protest size.<sup>7</sup>

These findings show that Hypothesis 5, which argues that differences in tuition do have a positive effect on turnouts, should be ruled out. We cannot deny that the Occupy movement did mobilize on grievances including the high cost of tuition, in a similar vein to the protests by students against tuition increases observed in the U.K. by Ibrahim (2011) and in Chile by Bellei and Cabalin (2013). However this evidence shows that, even if the high cost of tuition may have been a catalyst for mobilization, higher costs of tuition did not motivate more people to protest. There are multiple potential factors which are at play here. First, as mentioned previously, the fact that tuition costs are decided by colleges and state governments does not lend itself well to a concerted, nationwide mobilization. Second, students may not be concerned at all about the cost of tuition when they are enrolled, because they only have to pay these costs back mostly after they graduate.

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<sup>7</sup> However, in unreported models, tuition costs have no significant effect on protest size even without the presence of the variable for the rate of Pell Grants. Therefore, the variable for tuition costs has no significant effect on protest turnout in all circumstances.



Third, even if students are highly motivated to protest against the high cost of tuition, this motivation may be shared across colleges with different tuition costs. Tuition at state colleges, for example, even if relatively cheap, may still be perceived as too expensive. For example, according to the College Board website, in-state annual tuition for a four year degree in 2011-12 ranged between \$4100 in Wyoming to \$13,500 in New Hampshire (Anon, 2017b). Students of low income families may be struggling to pay tuition regardless of their cost relative to the national average. Therefore, grievances over tuition costs may be equally felt by students across college campuses and regardless of differences between them, resulting in no significant effect of differences in tuition costs on Occupy turnouts.

#### 2.3.7: Hypothesis 6: The Role of Student Economic Conditions

Model 5 in Table 14 also contains the variable for the rate of students who are beneficiaries of Pell Grants. This is an indicator of the degree to which local students in each city are economically disadvantaged. The results show that there is a significant and negative relationship between the rate of Pell Grants and protest size. The coefficient shows that for every unit increase in the rate of Pell Grants, the log of expected counts for turnouts decreases by 0.030. This means that for every percentage point increase in the average rate of Pell Grant beneficiaries there is a decrease of 0.03 protesters per capita, ranging between an overall decrease by 6 protesters in the smallest city in the sample to 240 in the largest. The variable for Pell Grants retains its significance in a negative direction in the final Model 6 (also in Table 13), with an unchanged coefficient. As for Model 5, because it also contains the non-significant variable for tuition costs, it performs worse

than most other models, with only the fourth best (out of six) AIC score and the fifth best BIC score. In terms of its overall effect on variation in the dependent variable (measured through the likelihood ratio chi square and pseudo R square scores) estimated to be between 2.3% and 2.6%. However the probability chi square score is still small enough to dismiss the null hypothesis. However the variable for Pell Grants is also present in the final Model 6, which performs much better than Model 5. This final model has the lowest AIC score and the second lowest BIC score, which denotes that it is a better fit for the dependent variable than almost all other models. Its overall effect on the dependent variable, estimated at between 3.8% and 4.3% according to likelihood ratio chi square and pseudo R square scores, is the highest of all models. Therefore, this final model explains almost half of variation in protest turnouts. Even though the initial model in which the variable for Pell Grants rates is not among the strongest in Tables 12 and 13, this variable's significance across this model as well as the final one leads me to conclude that there is a negative relationship between the economic disadvantage of students and the likelihood of large protests.

This insight leads me to find confirmation for Hypothesis 6, which states that larger proportions of wealthy students make larger protests more likely. In this respect, the dynamics of this recent wave of protest resemble those of the 1960s wave of student protests described by Kahn and Bowers (1970), Altbach (1984) and Wallimann and Zito (1984), as well as Altbach's (1989) account of student led mobilizations in the developing world. Although in this case students were likely to be motivated by material rather than non-material grievances, the most affluent students were still more likely to drive turnout

numbers up. This may seem counter-intuitive, yet there are several potential explanations behind the plausibility of these dynamics. First, given the crippling cost of tuition in contemporary U.S. colleges, many non-Pell Grant recipients may still have had some strong economic grievances. Second, economic disadvantage makes biographical availability less likely. Pell Grant recipients are more likely to resort to full time or part time employment, which makes them less likely to have the time to participate in protests. Lastly, this finding is very consistent with the observations made by McCarthy and Zald (1977) over the role of economic resources in protests and organizations. Wealthy students are more likely than others to have a greater range of networks and organizational affiliation. These assets are crucial to help students organize effective, successful and well attended protests. However, I should accept this hypothesis with a caveat. I have no evidence of whether wealthier students were actually more likely to participate in Occupy protests, because I only know that these protests were bigger in cities where, on average, students were wealthier. Therefore, even though the data shows that this hypothesis is the most plausible, I do not know with absolute certainty whether these wealthier students were actively fostering turnout numbers.

#### 2.3.8: The Roles of Controls

Data on political opportunity structure, including the presence of Democrat mayor and Democrat vote, did not have a significant effect on protest size. There are a couple of possible explanations for this. First, Occupy was a radical left-wing protest, and thus this did not automatically guarantee them that cities with more Democrats in power and amongst the population would automatically translate into more support. Second, because

the cities under analysis are mostly large and mostly liberal, the political differences between them may not be large enough for them to be a cause of differences in support.

Although the political opportunity structure did not explain variation, sympathetic organizations and networks played a significant role in determining protest size. For union strength, it was an unexpected negative correlation. A possible explanation might be that, because Occupy was a very non-institutionalized actor, it might have been more successful at recruiting where other more stable social movements did not have a strong presence. However my variable on support from social movement organizations did lead to larger turnouts. This suggests that, when organizations other than unions supported the Occupy movement, they were effective in mobilizing a large part of the population.

The control variables on strain, inclusive of unemployment and inequality indicators, did not explain variation in protest size in the case of Occupy. This tells us that, although inequality and a lack of economic recovery after the recession were key grievances of the Occupy movement, they did not explain mobilization. In a similar vein to student tuition costs, this shows that grievances in and of themselves do not automatically result in a greater mobilization strength. The latter needs to be achieved with the help of networks, organizations as well as other crucial environmental factors.

Lastly, out of the regional controls, the ones for the West and Midwest usually had a significant and positive effect on the dependent variables. This means that larger protests were significantly more likely in the Midwest and in the West than in the South. In terms of left-wing protest, it is not surprising to see the South lagging behind, as this region is considered more conservative than the rest of the U.S. Additionally, the Occupy

movement had its biggest epicenters in New York City and in the San Francisco Bay Area. The South is the region that is geographically furthest away from these metropolitan areas. Therefore, the Occupy movement had less opportunities to spread in the South.

## 2.4 DISCUSSION

### 2.4.1: Non-Economic Factors

In terms of non-economic factors, larger protests take place in cities that have colleges which are smaller, more liberal and less prestigious than the rest, and which have Chicano Studies departments. These results partly contradict past findings on student protests in the 1960s by authors such as Lipset and Altbach (1966), Scott and El-Assal (1969) and Blau and Slaughter (1971) and Van Dyke (1998) by showing that for this time it is smaller, not larger colleges which took the lead as well as by showing that this time there is a negative relationship between mobilization and protest size. However we can observe consistency with these past results in that more liberal colleges are still more likely to draw out larger numbers. With respect to more recent work on student mobilizations, such as the articles by Hirsch (1990) and Soule (1997), these results only contradict the expected positive relationship between elite colleges and mobilization. Thus, if these results strongly contradict past findings on student mobilization, they do so less in terms of more recent findings. And, as explained in the analysis, the materialistic nature of this protest, as opposed to the more non-material student protests of the 1960s and 1980s, may provide a plausible reason for the changes in these dynamics. As Lipset and Altbach (1966) and Wallimann and Zito (1984) observed, these non-material issues were attractive grievances for students in elite colleges. Therefore, one possible explanation for this dynamic is that the material nature of the grievances put forth by the Occupy movement may have meant that, this time around, these protests were less popular in places like Berkeley and Ann Arbor. The local press coverage confirms this perception. Both the

Oakland Tribune and the San Francisco Chronicle observed that the Occupy protests in Berkeley were much smaller and calmer than their nearby counterparts in downtown Oakland and San Francisco.

On the whole, these results draw a mostly coherent picture. The larger colleges in the U.S. are usually a mixed bag when it comes to professing liberal values- they are usually more liberal than smaller private colleges which focus on subjects such as engineering, business, accounting and the hard sciences, but usually less liberal than small liberal arts colleges. Therefore it is the latter colleges which may have the more plausible centers of protest, potentially driving up mobilization numbers especially in cities in which there were many of them, such as Los Angeles, New York City and Boston. However, it was usually not the highest ranked colleges which drew numbers up. In the largest cities such as the aforementioned ones, this means that protests still had good odds of being fairly large because they presented a mixture of highly ranked and not-so highly ranked colleges. But the finding on non-elite colleges leads me to consider the role of college populations in cities such as Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania and Portland in Oregon, which do not have many colleges or many small colleges, but nevertheless have a large student population which is enrolled in relatively more liberal non-elite colleges. Not all of these characteristics overlapped in the cities with the largest mobilizations. Therefore, there is no distinct ideal-type of city or college which can certainly foster mobilization. However these results show how two distinct sets of city and college characteristics, namely cities with many liberal arts colleges and cities with liberal but non-elite colleges, may have led to larger mobilizations.

#### 2.4.2: Economic Factors

In terms of economic factors, large protests take place in colleges where a larger proportion of students do not come from an economically disadvantaged background, and irrespectively of relative cost of tuition. These results are generally consistent with past studies by authors such as Lipset and Altbach (1966), Kahn and Bowers (1971), Hirsch (1990) and Soule (1997) who emphasized the greater role played by students in elite colleges (which usually are amongst the most expensive) as well as students whose parents have high socioeconomic status. Even though this protest was over material issues, such as inequality and cost of tuition, having the largest sources of material grievances was not a precondition for protest. Instead, it is far more plausible that differences in socioeconomic condition amongst students resulted in different levels of biographical availability, with wealthier students usually being more able to sustain the cost of participation. Although here I focus on turnouts at Occupy protests, the cities under analysis also witnessed encampments, which required a great deal of commitment from activists in terms of time and also a greater degree of risk (these encampments were often targets of police actions, including evictions). Students from a lower socioeconomic background may have been unwilling to front the cost of carrying out these actions. If encampments were only attractive to students in cities where most of these students were relatively wealthy, then that might have reflected on differences in the ability of each Occupy chapter to recruit activists for marches. On the whole, the economic factors draw a clear picture of which college students took part in Occupy marches. Low socioeconomic condition was likely to be a barrier to participation, thus students who took part in these marches were more



likely to be privileged than most, but they did participate irrespective of how much they paid in tuition at their college. As discussed in the previous chapter, although there are large differences in the cost of tuition, this might feel equally unaffordable and difficult to pay back across all colleges. Therefore, high cost of tuition was likely to be neither a barrier nor an incentive to participation.

#### 2.4.3: Putting it All Together

While in some respects the results for non-economic factors and economic factors may be in contradiction, most of the conclusions from Hypotheses 1-4 sit well with each other, and the same can be said for Hypotheses 5-6. Specifically, liberal colleges are usually likely to attract relatively more affluent students. Chicano studies departments exist in affluent colleges as well, such as Columbia and Harvard. Affluent students are also often drawn to small, specialized colleges. However, it is harder to conciliate the results from Hypothesis 3 on elite colleges with those from Hypothesis 5 and 6. How can it be possible that colleges with low rankings cause turnouts to be larger while tuition has no effect and cities with higher turnouts have students who are economically better off than the rest of the population? In my opinion, these results do not contradict each other. It is, in fact, plausible that the students who participated in Occupy protests were from a relatively privileged background, but attended schools with lower ranking. These students may be paying different tuition costs, depending on whether they are attending a private or a public college, and on the state in which they live. Regardless of these conditions, one possible explanation is that these students may be all perceiving that they are paying an excessive cost for an education that will not automatically land them a well-paying

job. These students may have been perceiving their situation as a sign of declining condition in status compared to their relatively wealthy parents. In some ways, their experience can be seen as a microcosm of the overall decline of the middle class during the last recession, another issue which was pivotal for the Occupy movement. Therefore, we can see the process by which students who have fueled the Occupy protest as one in which these participants may have benefited from several conventional resources for student protests, including liberal campuses and Chicano studies departments. At the same time, part of these student participants may have also been motivated by a new form of status inconsistency (I borrow the term from Geschwender, 1968) which may have resulted in a high rate of participation by students from wealthy families in non-elite colleges.

Overall, which further insights can be gained by looking at mobilization in terms of protest size as opposed to protest presence? In some ways, this analysis has yielded results which are similar to the past evidence on movement emergence. For example, the role of the control for the support of social movement organizations as well as the variables for number of colleges and Chicano Studies departments confirm the enduring role of organizations in fostering protests, first highlighted by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977). Additionally, the relationship between size and the variable for liberal colleges confirms the role of favorable political institutions in mobilization argued by McAdam (1982) and Tilly (1978). However, other findings of this analysis cannot be as easily explained by the literature on movement emergence. For example, the fact that wealthy but non-elite college students played a strong role in bolstering turnout does not fit well in any of the theoretical accounts of mobilization, and in the previous

paragraph, I have had to account for this finding by combining theoretical elements from two theories (strain and resource mobilization) which are most often in contradiction with each other. Additionally, not all resources and opportunities mattered. The average wealth of students mattered, but not the amount which they paid for tuition. Support from Chicano Studies departments mattered, but not that from African American Studies or Women's Studies departments. The presence of liberal colleges mattered, but not the presence of liberal mayors or a liberal electorate. In sum, although some of the results show some support for some of the past theoretical accounts for protest emergence, the results as a whole do not confirm a single theory of emergence. The results show that protest size is a complex dynamic which may be influenced by many interrelated but sometimes also contradictory factors. More research needs to be carried out before we can develop an alternative theoretical framework which explains variation in movement size.

**CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF SIZE IN MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN  
DURATION**

### 3.1 THEORIZING MOVEMENT DURATION

This chapter explores the reasons behind movement endurance, or duration. I define duration as the ability of movement campaigns to sustain an action at a specific site over a period of time. In sum, I define duration as the length of mobilization. Consequently, this definition includes all actions, including sit-ins, boycotts and occupations, which require the physical presence of protesters to carry out an action which, depending on the context, may require varying levels of efforts by activists in terms of cost and risk, including liability to repression. However my definition of duration does not include campaign or organizational duration. This is because social movements might cease to carry out an action without necessarily folding and an organization, and because social movement campaigns include a variety of actions, therefore the end of an action does not necessarily signal the end of a campaign. Indeed, with the case of the Occupy movement, many local organizations carried out other types of actions after their respective encampments had folded. Thus, analyses of movement action duration focus usually on shorter periods of time, usually weeks and months, as opposed to movement campaign duration and organizational duration which are studies over the course of many years, sometimes even decades. In sum, movement duration is an important facet of mobilization, and measuring this aspect allow us to look at the level of strength and support for a social movement usually over a shorter period of time, as well as the level of dedication of its activists to the movement's chosen cause.

#### 3.1.1: Duration and the role of Size

In spite of the importance of duration to understanding a movement's capacity for

mobilization over time, this aspect of protest has been the object of scarce attention. Some scholars have devoted attention to the ability of social movement organizations and campaigns to last over time, yet in these analyses the role of size has been mostly overlooked. For example, the work of Staggenborg (1998) focuses on the roles of organizations in helping movements sustain campaigns over time. The work of Nepstad (2004, 2008) on the Plowshares Movement looks at the role of leadership and stable organizational structures in helping a movement campaign last over time. However this body of literature overlooks the potential role of one of the most basic aspects of social movements in determining how long it will last: size. Why has this aspect been overlooked? Most of the literature on movement endurance tends to explain the duration of a single movement or organization (Taylor, 1989; Simmons and Stark, 1993; Kousis, 1999; Edwards and McCarthy, 2004; Nepstad, 2004). When authors focus on more than one movement (Staggenborg, 1998; Nepstad, 2008; Kousis, 1999; Garay, 2007) they tend to focus on groups and organizations of similar size, and compare the role of other factors in ensuring survival or demise, including networks, opportunities, resources and organizational structure. Therefore, in most studies, size is a control factor, not a key variable.

If size can play a role in predicting how long movements last, what is its expected role? The political process literature, including the theoretical work of McCarthy and Zald (1977) and McAdam (1982) emphasizes the strength of numbers as a key asset to social movements. Large social movement organizations tend to have greater access to resources, greater capacity for recruitment, obtain more media coverage and have greater chances of influencing key elite figures. For example, McAdam (1982) demonstrates how

increasingly larger actions, protests and boycotts in the early 1960s, involving increasingly broader sections of the population, helped the Civil Rights movement sustain itself over time and eventually achieve significant policy changes in the 1960s. More recent work by Everett (1992) on the professionalization of protest across social movement organizations in the U.S., shows that these assets result in a greater capacity for larger movements to sustain a campaign over a prolonged period of time. Outside the U.S., Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) work on nonviolent resistance in four developing countries shows that large movements have a greater chance of success. This is because, if a movement has broad support, it can sustain itself with a greater variety of tactics, including several forms of political and social non-cooperation with the regime which the movement is targeting. In sum, these authors believe that the strength of numbers results in more tactics, resources, opportunities and networks, which help a movement succeed.

The opposing hypothesis is put forth by Staggenborg (1998), and Taylor, Whittier and Morris (1992). Staggenborg's article looks at historical changes in the local women's movement community Bloomington, Indiana, to explain how some movements are able to endure, and even thrive, at the end of a protest cycle. The author demonstrates that culture and community were most important at ensuring endurance, as opposed to political opportunities, and that movement communities with weak ties have a hard time fostering mobilization. Because smaller groups of activists have greater chances of developing stronger ties, smaller movements have a better chance of sustaining mobilization. In a similar vein, Taylor et al. (1992) analyze the development of collective identity in lesbian feminist communities. They pay particular attention to specific issues in these communi-

ties, including power dynamics, boundaries and negotiation. The authors argue that small lesbian feminist communities were most effective in carrying forward the 1960s legacy of radical feminism. They were successful in doing so thanks to a strong sense of community and collective identity. These communities provided support for women who had been victims of rape and abuse. They also frequently met in private to discuss actions to carry out in public. Through these strategies, the sense of collective identity in this group was reinforced by acknowledging and emphasizing differences between its members and the people living outside these communities. Smaller movements also have another crucial advantage: as demonstrated by Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003), larger movements are more likely to face police repression. This doesn't mean that smaller movements can always avoid repression- indeed, many small movements including the Plowshares movement and the Black Panther Party experienced extensive repression. This happens in part because of the perception on behalf of law enforcement authorities of the potential threat of the movement's ideas and actions (Davenport 1995) and in part because these authorities can often repress these small grouping without fear of public outcry against their actions (Wisler and Giugni 1999). Nevertheless, large movements are more liable to repression than smaller ones, because they tend to be more visible, more disruptive and more violent than smaller ones. Even if a large movement officially advocates peaceful tactics it may still encounter extensive hostility, such as India's independence movement and the Civil Rights movement in the U.S. Davenport (1995) and McAdam (1982) have shown that repression can have a destabilizing effect on social movement campaigns. Therefore, smaller movements are less likely to meet opposition from law enforcement, with all of



its debilitating and demoralizing effects. Larger movements, however, are more susceptible to repressive actions by law enforcement.

### 3.1.2: Other Explanatory Factors for Duration

We can divide the key explanatory factors of movement campaign duration into two types. The first set of factors centers on causal dynamics that are mostly external to the movement under consideration- including the role of key institutional actors such as political leaders and the media, as well as repressive actions by law enforcement. In terms of the role of political leaders, there is some strong evidence in the literature on the women's movement that suggests that movements may survive in spite of unfavorable political institutions and actors. In particular, Whittier (1997) and Staggenborg (1998) have explained how the women's movement was able to endure in the 1980s, an era in which, with the dominance of Reaganite ideology in national politics, progressive notions of gender equality were on the defensive. Taylor (1989) makes a similar argument for the survival of the women's movement between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> wave of feminism. This era corresponds to the four decades between the 1920s and the 1960s when women's issues were not prominent in national political debate. Outside of the women's movement literature, recent political process-oriented scholarship (especially the work of Rucht, 1996, as well as Simmons and Stark, 1993 and Garay, 2007) has counter-argued that movements may adapt to long term institutional characteristics and may be thus unaffected by them. Yet, movements may benefit from short term changes in the political environment, especially by fostering support from elected leaders and avoiding opposition from potential opponents.

In terms of the role of the media, Simmons and Stark (1993) show how an environmental protest over toxic waste gained media exposure and was able to endure thanks to the public attention that the media generated. However, the women's movement literature, in particular the work of Taylor (1989) and Whittier (1997) shows how these movements were able to survive while staying out of media spotlight.

In terms of the effect of law enforcement actions, including repression, on the duration of protests, I find contrasting perspectives in the social movement literature. Dapenport's (2005) summary of the literature on repression demonstrates that there is a great abundance of authors which argue that repression has a destabilizing effect on mobilization. However, just as many scholars have made the opposite claim, with mobilization gaining ground in the aftermath of a repressive action. For example, Garay's (2007) study of the unemployed workers movement in Argentina observes that repression, more often than not, leads to more protests, which help the movement endure and obtain a better bargaining position vis-a-vis movement opponents. Others more claim a curvilinear effect, with a greater degree of mobilization taking place at mid-levels of repression, whereas movements tend to be less reactive in cases of high and low levels of repression.

Lastly, some of the longer lasting social movement campaigns which, like Occupy, take place in outdoor settings, may be affected by differences in climate between the geographical locations in which they take place. Although Staggenborg (2015) and Tilly and Wood (2015) note that protesters will often be willing to brave bad weather to show up for key social movement actions, I expect differences in climate to affect the ability to sustain protracted actions taking place in outdoor settings.

The second broad category of explanatory factors is centered on internal dynamics of the movement under consideration. These dynamics include the presence of economic and logistic resources as well as social resources (aka social networks), and other aspects including leadership and internal organizational structure. Since McCarthy and Zald's (1977) seminal work on the key role of logistical and economic resources in social movement organizations, scholars have paid much attention to how resources sustain movement emergence and development, as well as the duration of mobilization. More recent scholarship has focused on determining which types of resources matter and why. Whittier (2010), in her work on the women's movement, has emphasized the role played by logistical resources and infrastructure, including rape crisis centers and abortion clinics. Here the emphasis is more on resources native to the movement or organization in question, and in particular a resource which grants activists the possibility to organize in a 'safe space' in which they do not fear repercussion from authorities or society-at large. In a similar vein, Nepstad (2004, 2008) emphasizes the role of stable organizations and community in the survival of the Plowshares movement. Nepstad argues that not only are logistical infrastructures essential for movements to endure, but that they need to generate strong ties between members and ensure that the movement can manage tensions and the risk of burnout, which is likely in sustained, costly and risky campaigns.

Other than resources, Pagnucco (1996) points out to religious identity as an important factor that helps movements endure campaigns for longer. In his analysis of peace movement organizations, he demonstrates that religious groups generally have a greater moral commitment to a stable set of tactics and goals. Internal unity and cohesion are also

essential tools that help campaigns endure. Pearlman's (2011) research on the Palestinian national movement shows that organizations which were internally cohesive were more likely to endure. Conversely, Nepstad's (2011) comparative work on nonviolent civil resistance shows that internal tensions during nonviolent campaigns in Kenya and China contributed to their failure and demise. An effective leadership can also play an important role in determining campaign duration. Nepstad (2008) in the case of the Plowshares movement and Pearlman (2011) in the case of the Palestinian national movement, both demonstrate how charismatic leadership helped sustain campaigns and reinforce activist commitment. Nepstad (2011) also argues that divisions among leaders can be detrimental to campaigns. Lastly, we should give some consideration to factors which are especially relevant in long term and high risk campaigns such as the one undertaken by the Occupy movement. In the case of the Freedom Summer campaign McAdam (1990) demonstrates the importance of biographical availability in determining the likelihood of activists being committed to participating in a high risk campaign. This means that movements seeking activists for these campaigns need to find individuals who are relatively free of professional and family commitments. High risk campaigns also depend on a strong amount of logistical support from key allies and leaders. For example, Sandoval (1998) credits trade unions with lending key logistical support to protest actions against the military dictatorship in Brazil. Any group of activists which seeks to carry out a successful social movement campaign needs to be knowledgeable about the key obstacles which they will face, and also understand when to deploy the necessary resources to deal with these obstacles.

In sum, I seek to put to test my argument that movement size has an inverse effect on action duration. In demonstrating the importance of size, I also aim at considering the role of repression, elite support and opposition, media coverage, and resources in shaping movement duration. My expectation is that larger movements will last for a shorter period of time, even when accounting for these factors. My argument is that small movements are better equipped to sustain a long term action than larger ones, for three reasons. First, smaller movements develop better network ties among activists, leading to a greater sense of community and cohesion. Second, this sense of greater community and cohesion means that activists develop a better consensus on goals and tactics. Third, smaller movements are less likely to experience repression, which may have a destabilizing effect on their campaigns. Repression might be an important factor in shaping the dynamics of duration, therefore its role in affecting the latter and its relationship to protest size will be the object of considerable attention throughout this paper. Although other factors may be contingent on duration, such as media coverage, elite opposition, resources and weather, I expect movement size to have a negative effect on movement action duration net of all of these factors.

## 3.2 DATA AND METHODS

This chapter looks at Occupy encampments in 74 out of the 100 largest U.S. cities. Within these 74 cities, my units of observation are the days in which the local Occupy movement is encamped. Because I want to include both the start and the end date of the encampment in the analysis, the number of observations for each city is  $n+1$  where  $n$  is the distance in days between the day in which each Occupy chapter set up the encampment and the day in which the encampment was dismantled. For example, an encampment that lasted between October 21<sup>st</sup> and October 24<sup>th</sup> would be made up of 4 observations. The aforementioned Table 2 shows the number of observations for each city in the sample.

### 3.2.1: Dependent Variables: Time and Failure Term

As stated previously, I define duration in terms of the ability of a movement action to last over time. I am considering the encampments set up by Occupy activists as the set of actions under analysis. The overall duration of each Occupy encampment in the analysis is shown in Table 2. To explore factors related to variation in encampment duration, I employ two dependent variables. The first measures the distance in time, in days, in relation to the start of the encampment, starting from 1 for the day encampment starts. The second is the presence of the failure event, in this case the day in each city in which the local encampment was disbanded. This measure is therefore binary (0= no disbandment 1=encampment disbanded). Because the end of the encampment corresponds with the end of the period of observation, the observations in which this variable has a score of 1 will always be the final observations (temporally speaking) for each city. I obtained the

data for encampment length, and the dates in which the encampments start and end, from local newspaper coverage and my survey of local Occupy chapters. I used the newspaper coverage as the main source because reporting was more precise, in that the newspaper reports are always dated, and activists in the survey usually approximated the length of each encampment and did not have to report precise dates. However, in 7 cities the local media did not report the end of the encampment; in these cases, I use the survey answers to provide an estimate.

### 3.2.2: Independent Variable: Protest Size

I measure movement size by looking at turnouts in Occupy marches in the cities under analysis. Protest turnouts are an effective measure of the size and strength of movements because they show how many people the movement can mobilize in one given action. I am looking at turnouts across a relatively long period of time, spanning, in most cases, several months. Therefore I want to be sure to capture the largest marches for each Occupy chapter even if they did not happen at the same time to demonstrate which chapters were able to mobilize numbers over several occasions.

I obtain my data for turnouts from local newspaper reports. I use a cumulative count measure. In a cumulative count measure, each observation is a count of how many people have showed up to every present and past protest at each Occupy chapter up until that point in time. I chose this measure because I expect larger turnouts to have a lasting effect and impact on local protest chapters. This means, for example, that if 1000 people turn out for a protest on the observation for day 3 of an encampment, each observation after day 3 will have a score of 1000 plus the turnout of any subsequent protests. I em-

ployed this measure to get a better understanding of the long term effects of large and potentially disruptive protests. This measure also effectively captures increases in turn-outs over time.

### 3.2.3: Controls

I focus on six sets of external movement factors that may have an impact on the length of Occupy protests: media coverage, its interaction with political opportunity structure, repression, weather, population and region. My first objective is to see how news coverage affects the length of encampments. I use two measures.<sup>8</sup> To start, I look at media criticism, or dissonance, as defined by Koopmans (2004, 2005). My measure of dissonance is derived from counts of articles criticizing the movement's goals and objectives (for example, by criticizing their attacks on corporations and elected leaders) together with counts of articles which report the cost of Occupy protests and encampments to the taxpayer (usually such observations constituted a powerful argument in the local press for calling for the encampment to be disbanded), as well as articles which contain personal attacks on protesters (including calling protesters 'dirty', 'bums' and 'criminals'). In general, I only considered articles which were critical in an argumentative fashion, and did not consider articles reporting movement violence and property damage as critical. However I did consider articles to be critical in cases where information as well as praise for the movement were also stated. Neutral coverage is made up of articles that

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<sup>8</sup> In unreported models I also looked at the effect of positive coverage (or consonance) of the movement. I counted articles which praised and described the goals of local Occupy protests (therefore, any portrayal of the ideas put forth by the movement that was unequivocally expressed in a positive light) as well as articles that humanized protesters (by telling their individual struggles and life stories) as positive coverage. Unfortunately, this form of coverage has no significant effect and had a high level of correlation to neutral coverage, therefore I did not include this variable in my final set of models. Likewise, I considered the role of overall coverage, measured in number of overall articles per day covering local movement activities. However this variable was also non-significant and highly correlated to neutral coverage.



are neither positive nor negative (for a definition of positive coverage, see footnote 8). These are both non-cumulative count variables, because they show respectively the number of instances of negative coverage per day and the number of articles containing no positive and no negative coverage per day. My measure for elected leader criticism attempts to capture the effects of the hostility of elected leaders as reported in the press.<sup>9</sup> Here, I define this variable in terms of instances per day in which the press reports criticism of local Occupy activities by a local elected leader. These leaders can include mayors, city council members, county commissioners, state legislators, governors and national congressmen and congresswomen representing local districts. My measure echoes one of the four aspects of political opportunity structure as outlined by McAdam (1996) by using clear cases of elite hostility to the movement as evidence of diminishing opportunities. This variable is also a non-cumulative count variable, which measures the number of instances per day in the local press of local elected leader criticism of local Occupy protest.

My measure for repression focuses on more violent forms, defined as police use of tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spraying and other forms of violence against protesters which took place during the days in which each Occupy chapter was encamped.<sup>10</sup> I counted each instance of each different form of violence as a separate repressive episode. These data were collected through local newspaper reports in the form of a count varia-

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<sup>9</sup> In unreported models I also used a measure of local elected leader praise, however this variable did not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, therefore I did not include it in my final set of models. I also used measures of criticism by other key local elites, including police, businesses and academics. However, they did not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, therefore they also were not included in the final set of models.

<sup>10</sup> In unreported models I also used a measure for arrests, which considered the number of police arrests of protesters for each day in which the local Occupy chapter was encamped. However, this measure had no significant effect on the dependent variable, therefore I did not include it in my final model.

ble. Therefore, I gave each observation an extra unit in this measure for every single instance of law enforcement use of one of the law enforcement tactics listed above.

In terms of internal factors, I focus chiefly on resources, but I do not consider the role of religious identity, internal cohesion and unity, and leadership. In terms of religious identity, I do not expect this to matter in a predominantly secular movement. Unity and leadership are difficult to measure on a systematic basis in a new and informal movement which I observe during a relatively short period of time. As for resources, I identify three types of logistical assets that have helped Occupy encampments endure: information booths, food stalls and libraries. Information booths were an essential logistical center found in all but the most modest of encampments. Activists could use them to make non-participants aware of the ideas of the movement, and they were also used for internal communication and as a logistical 'center' of encampments. Food stalls were essential to help encampments store and serve food. Encampments needed them in order to endure for longer than a few days. Lastly, libraries served a similar function to information booths because they also allowed information and ideas to be spread across the encamped community. They also were a form of entertainment for activists who were constantly present at the encampment. I collected data on these three forms of infrastructure from activist responses to the aforementioned survey of Occupy activists. I merged the measures for library and food stall into a single ordinal variable (with possible scores of 0, 1 and 2) because of multicollinearity issues, whereas the variable for information booth is binary (0, 1). I obtained the bulk of this data from my survey of the Occupy movement.

When data was missing because of local Occupy chapter representatives' failure to reply, I used data from the news coverage of the relevant encampment.

I also use a measure for climate. I focus on annual average temperatures in each city. Because these encampments took place in outdoor areas, it follows that camping in milder climates in cities such as Miami, Fresno and Honolulu might be easier to sustain for activists than in the colder areas of the country, especially cities in the Northeast and Midwest that witness harsh winters. I use annual, not monthly temperatures because monthly measures can become skewed by the fact that different encampments lasted different periods of time. For example, if an encampment is disbanded in January-February, monthly temperatures are usually much lower compared to encampments in similar climates which are able to last into the warmer spring and summer months. My measure for temperature is therefore a non-time varying continuous variable, reported in Fahrenheit and obtained from U.S. Climate Data (Data, U.S. Climate, 2016).

Lastly, I use four demographic control variables for city population and region, both obtained from the 2010 U.S. Census (Center for Media and Production, 2009). The first variable is made up of each city's population and is expressed in hundreds of thousands, whereas the three regional variables are binary. Out of the 4 Census U.S. regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) I use South as the reference category in my analysis, whereas the remaining three make up the three regional dummy variables. Although regional variation is somewhat correlated with weather, this is not a strong correlation, because there is considerable climatic variation within these four regions. For example, Honolulu and Seattle have vastly different average temperatures even though they are

*Table 15: Summary statistics for variables used in the survival analysis of Occupy encampment duration*

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
City Level (N = 7584)				
Dependent Variables				
Encampment Disbanded	.01	.01	.00	1.00
Time from Start of Encampment	96.78	110.01	1.00	657.00
Independent Variable				
Protest Size (Turnout, in hundreds, Cumulative score)	10.49	17.44	.00	135.50
Controls				
Neutral Coverage (Instances per day)	.08	.31	.00	6.00
Negative Coverage (Instances per day)	.03	.20	.00	4.00
Violent Repression (Instances per day)	.01	.06	.00	3.00
Library & Food Stall (Ordinal)	1.79	.51	.00	2.00
Info Booth (Binary)	.99	.11	.00	1.00
Elected Leader Criticism (Instances per day)	.01	.13	.00	2.00
Average Annual Temperature (Fahrenheit)	60.77	9.50	37.00	77.60
Population (tens of thousands)	65.44	84.80	20.89	817.5
Northeast (dummy)	.10	.30	.00	1.00
Midwest (dummy)	.23	.42	.00	1.00
West (dummy)	.31	.46	.00	1.00

both in the West. All of the descriptive statistics for the variables and controls which I have outlined in the previous pages are found in Table 15. I also provide all of the correlations between variables on Table 16. This table shows that there are no major multicollinearity issues between the main independent variable and the controls.

### 3.2.4: Analytic Strategy

Having outlined the data to be used in the analysis, I will now describe the strategy which I will use to analyze it. I control for the role of weather and differences in region and population in all models. Then I compare the effect of size, net of the aforementioned controls, with other explanatory factors, including media coverage, repression, resources and elected leader opposition. Therefore, I have a total of 6 models. Model 1 includes only size, weather, population and region. Model 2 has media coverage plus size, weather, population and region. Model 3 is the same as the previous one but replaces media coverage with repression. Model 4 has resources as well as size, weather, population and region. Model 5 is the same as the previous one but replaces resources with elected leader opposition. Lastly, Model 6 is the final model and includes all variables and controls. For interpreting coefficients, I use hazard ratios that show how likely it is that the censoring event (in this case the disbanding of encampments) takes place for every increase of one unit in the independent variable under consideration. Hazard ratios are always positive; however when the score is less than one they indicate a decrease in likelihood of the censoring event, whereas when the score is more than one they indicate an increase in likelihood of the censoring event. For example, a score of 0.5 means a 50% decrease in the hazard ratio, meaning that for every increase in a unit in the independent variable, the censoring event will be half as likely to happen. However, a score of 1.5 means a 50% increase in the likelihood of the censoring event, meaning that for every unit increase in the independent variable, the censoring event will be 1.5 times more likely to happen.

*Table 16: Correlations between independent variables and controls used to analyze movement duration*

	Protest Size	Neutral Coverage	Negative Coverage	Violent Repression	Library & Food Stall	Info Booth	Elected Leader Criticism	Average Annual Temperature	Population	North east	Midwest	West
<b>Protest Size</b>	1.000											
<b>Neutral Coverage</b>	.196	1.000										
<b>Negative Coverage</b>	.198	.006	1.000									
<b>Violent Repression</b>	.073	.076	.096	1.000								
<b>Library &amp; Food Stall</b>	.156	.029	.026	.010	1.000							
<b>Info Booth</b>	.062	.001	.004	.005	.058	1.000						
<b>Elected Leader Criticism</b>	.135	.279	.256	.059	.021	.013	1.000					
<b>Average Annual Temperature</b>	-.081	-.062	-.023	-.007	.167	-.106	-.033	1.000				
<b>Population</b>	.555	.142	.069	.054	.113	.052	.109	-.022	1.000			
<b>North-east</b>	.155	.063	.035	.007	-.125	.006	.070	-.295	.162	1.000		
<b>Midwest</b>	-.052	-.049	-.057	-.024	.022	.063	-.049	-.547	-.014	-.181	1.000	
<b>West</b>	.119	.024	.064	.030	.089	.035	.013	.369	-.047	-.217	-.367	1.000

### 3.3 ANALYSIS

Table 17: Exponential Survival Analysis estimating the effect of protest turnout and controls on the length, in days, of Occupy encampments ( $N=7584$ ) (Models 1-3)

	Model 1: Turnout & Controls		Model 2: Turnout & Media		Model 3: Turnout & Repression	
	Hazard Ratio	S.E.	Hazard Ratio	S.E.	Hazard Ratio	S.E.
<b>Independent Variable</b>						
Protest Turnout	1.016***	0.006	1.011*	0.006	1.016***	0.006
<b>Controls</b>						
Neutral Coverage	--	--	1.672**	.360	--	--
Negative Coverage	--	--	1.529	.479	--	--
Violent Repression	--	--	--	--	.001	0.009
Average Annual Temperature	.969*	.016	.971	.016	.969*	.016
Population	0.999	.001	1.000	.001	0.999	.001
Northeast <sup>11</sup>	.720	.317	.731	.324	.717	.316
Midwest	.539	.208	.581	.226	.536	.207
West	.830	.252	.823	.251	.831	0.253
Constant	.072**	.077	.060***	.065	.072**	.853
<b>Tests</b>						
Log Likelihood	-98.670		-96.054		-98.418	
LR chi2	12.05		17.28		12.56	
Prob > chi2	.061		.027		.084	

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; \* $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$  (two-tailed)

#### 3.3.1: Model 1: Protest size only

This first model in Table 17 shows the effect of protest size, net of controls for weather, population and region. We can see that size has a significant effect, with a hazard ratio of 1.6%. This means that for every 100 more protesters that show up at a local protest, eviction is 1.6% more likely. For every 1000 more protesters, the odds of eviction are 16% greater. Out of the controls, average annual temperature has a significant effect on the dependent variable, with a negative hazard rate of 3.1%. This means that for every

<sup>11</sup> Dummy variable. Reference category: South

Fahrenheit degree increase in annual temperature, eviction is 3.1% less likely. This model has less variables than all subsequent models, therefore I find a fairly low log likelihood score. The likelihood ratio chi square shows that this model explains about 12% of variation in the dependent variable. The likelihood ratio chi square test is slightly higher than the 0.05 cutoff, therefore here I cannot reject the null hypothesis, although I am unable to do so by a small margin.

### 3.3.2: Model 2: Neutral Coverage, Negative Coverage & The Case of Jacksonville, FL

Compared to the first model, Model 2 in Table 17 includes all of the previous model's variables and adds two variables, which measure the impact of critical newspaper coverage and neutral coverage on each other and net of controls. Model 2 omits the variable for violent repression but includes the variable for turnout. The variable for size is still significant, although its effect is smaller, with a hazard ratio of 1.1% for every 100 people increase in cumulative turnout. Therefore, if 1000 more protesters show up for a march, in this model eviction will only be 11% more likely. Of the two new variables, neutral coverage has a significant effect with a hazard ratio which registers a 67.2% increase for every unit increase in neutral coverage. This means that with every neutral article on the local Occupy movement, there is a 67.2% increase in likelihood for the local encampment to end. The two variables also have a mediating effect on the effect of size on duration, with a decrease in the hazard ratio for protest turnout by 0.005, or 0.5% compared to Model 1. The log likelihood and chi square probability scores show us that this model is a better fit than the previous one. The score for the latter test is lower than the 0.05 cutoff, therefore in this model I can reject the null hypothesis. Consequently, the



likelihood ratio chi square shows a greater effect of the model on variation in the dependent variables, which is up by five percentage points compared to Model 1, to 17%.

This trend is especially observable in cities which had a low level of neutral newspaper coverage. This factor, in most cases, contributed to the presence of encampments in these cities for relatively long periods of time. For example, the Occupy encampment in Jacksonville, FL lasted for 5 months, from the start of November 2011 to the beginning of April 2012, and received only 2 neutral articles. Because this encampment started later than most, when the Occupy movement had lost its novelty value to the press, coverage was scant. Indeed, the local newspaper, the Florida Times-Union, completely ignores local Occupy activity between mid-November 2011 and mid-February 2012. This case shows that, in order to survive, encampments benefited from lack of media attention rather than publicity. Media attention often fueled public demands to end encampments. However, when encampments were able to stay out of the public eye, they had better chances to avoid these demands and endure for longer. In terms of the theory, this pattern partially confirms expectations based on previous observations by Whittier (2010) and Taylor (1997) on the women's movement. These authors show that social movements are able to survive without media coverage. Here, I find that Occupy movement chapters did more than just endure in spite of lack of media attention. They were in fact able to survive in part thanks to instances of low coverage. The findings unequivocally contradict expectations set by Simmons and Stark's (1993) article about local environmental protest. Here coverage was a setback for encampments and not an asset. Lastly, the findings show that media coverage has a mediating effect on size, meaning that it

diminishes the effect of size on duration. This means that smaller protests also last for longer because they are less likely to generate negative or neutral media attention, which, as we have seen, are detrimental for the odds of Occupy chapters to survive over time.

### 3.3.3: Model 3: Violent Repression and the Case of Oakland, CA

Model 3, also in Table 17, includes the main independent variable for size alongside repression and the aforementioned controls for temperature, population and region. We can see that the effect of size here is unchanged compared to the first model, with the Hazard Ratio at 1.6%.. Repression has no effect on the on the likelihood of encampments to endure. This variable does not mediate the effect of protest turnout on duration, because the hazard ratio for protest size in this model is the same as in Model 1. Repression does still have a direct effect on encampment duration if size is removed from the equation, but all of its effect on the dependent variable can be otherwise explained by looking at movement size.<sup>12</sup> As for the statistics for the whole model, the chi squared probability shows that this model isn't a better fit than the previous two models. This model fares slightly better in terms of its log likelihood and likelihood ratio chi square scores, which show it as a slightly better fit than Model 1, but still worse than Model 2. However with the chi square the score is higher than the cutoff of 0.05, therefore here I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

The case of Occupy Oakland is very well known to those who followed current events during the rise of Occupy Wall Street to national prominence. The local protest gained traction rapidly in October 2011, resulting in a large encampment which was deemed a threat to public safety to Mayor Jean Quan (Bender, Johnson, Maher, Burt and

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<sup>12</sup> In unreported models I found repression to have a significant effect on duration if size is absent

Woodall, 2011). This resulted in a violent eviction of the encampment, which took place on October 25<sup>th</sup>, and caused a public outcry, most notably for the fact that a protester, Scott Olsen, an Iraq War veteran, was put in a coma by being hit by the police with a tear gas canister.

The press coverage of this episode turned the eviction into a public relations disaster for the mayor, who tolerated a return of the encampment in the following days. The protesters called for a general strike on November 2<sup>nd</sup>, and although the protesters successfully closed Oakland's port on that day, violent confrontations took place in the following hours. Subsequent clashes between the encampment residents and local authorities ensured that the movement stayed in the limelight until the final eviction of the encampment in Oakland on November 21<sup>st</sup>

The short history of the encampment in Oakland is one marred by large scale protests, violence and several confrontations with police and elected leaders. While police violence, protester disruption and media attention were greater here than elsewhere, this protest followed a pattern similar to other disruptive protests in other large cities, such as Portland, Seattle and Denver. In Oakland, we can see that, while repression may lead in some cases to a positive reaction by protesters, with greater levels of mobilization, as previously argued by Garay (2007), if applied over several occasions, it ultimately undermines protest, by increasing its cost and risk, and by radicalizing the few that are willing to face the negative incentives. Yet, according to the model, repression does not seem to destabilize protest, as previously argued by Kriesi (1996) and Rucht (1996). This dynamic was observed even when the observations for Oakland were removed from the

analysis. Therefore, this pattern is generalizable to protests with features similar to those of Occupy Oakland. Therefore, in most places the destabilizing effect of repression is just part of the range of collateral effects that are caused by movement size.

How can I explain the hollow effect of repression in the model? My argument is that repression is an important factor in the process through which some encampments are weakened and disbanded; however it is not the ultimate factor. Repression is the product of large protests which are met by hostility on behalf of the authorities, including media, political leaders and law enforcement. It is the main means through which these institutions are able to cut short the life of the encampment, but not the only means: in other cities, such as Seattle, authorities negotiated with protesters to bring encampments to an end. And in all places, hostile elected leaders and police tried to turn the local media against protesters. But repression did not, in and of itself, cause encampments to last less. When it did so, it was in combination with other factors, including media and political leader hostility and large and disruptive protests. These findings contradict the aforementioned literature on social movement repression: this factor does not bring significant advantages or disadvantages to Occupy chapters.

#### 3.3.4: Model 4: Resources

Compared to Model 3, Model 4 in Table 18 replaces the variable for repression with two variables, which detect the presence of libraries, information booths and food stalls in encampments. Here we can see that the Hazard Ratio for protest turnout increases by 0.3% thanks to the inclusion of these two variables. These two new variables also have a negative effect on the Hazard Ratio, which means that they make encampments

more likely to last. For the variable for libraries and information booths, the Hazard Ratio is 33.9%. The hazard ratio is even higher for the variable for information booths:

*Table 18: Exponential Survival Analysis estimating the effect of protest turnout and controls on the length, in days, of Occupy encampments (N=7584) (Models 4-6)*

	Model 4: Turnout & Controls		Model 5: Turnout & Media		Model 6: Turnout & Repression	
	Hazard Ratio	S.E.	Hazard Ratio	S.E.	Hazard Ratio	S.E.
<b>Independent Variable</b>						
Protest Turnout	1.019***	0.006	1.013**	0.006	1.015**	1.019***
<b>Controls</b>						
Library & Food Stall	.661**	0.128	--	--	.657**	0.128
Info Booth	.160***	.079	--	--	.164***	0.082
Elected Leader Criticism	--	--	3.103***	1.172	2.682**	1.328
Neutral Coverage	--	--	--	--	1.378	0.330
Negative Coverage	--	--	--	--	1.088	0.413
Violent Repression	--	--	--	--	0.001	0.003
Average Annual Temperature	.968*	.017	.970*	.016	0.971	0.018
Population	.999	.001	.999	.001	0.999	0.001
Northeast <sup>13</sup>	.612	.281	.722	.319	0.616	0.283
Midwest	.581	.231	.573	.222	0.638	0.256
West	.849	.260	.831	.253	0.856	0.263
Constant	.845	1.070	.064**	.070	0.688	0.886
<b>Tests</b>						
Log Likelihood	-91.021		-95.664		-86.647	
LR chi2	27.35		18.06		36.10	
Prob > chi2	.001		.012		0.000	

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; \* $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$  (two-tailed)

here, encampments are 84% more likely to last if they have this resource. This model also fares well in terms of its overall descriptive statistics: the log likelihood score and probability chi square score tell us that this model is a better fit than all previous ones. Here,

<sup>13</sup> Dummy variable. Reference category: South

the probability chi square score is lower than 0.05, therefore I can reject the null hypothesis. According to the likelihood ratio chi square test, this model explains slightly more than a quarter of all variation in the dependent variables.

*Table 19: Length of encampment for Occupy chapters missing one or more resources*

City	Resource(s) lacked by encampment	Local encampment length (days)
Jersey City, NJ	All 3 Resources	8
Sacramento, CA	All 3 Resources	13
Winston-Salem, NC	All 3 Resources	2
Durham, NC	Food Stall, Library	3
Fort Worth, TX	Food Stall, Library	59
Long Beach, CA	Food Stall, Library	94
Rochester, NY	Food Stall, Library	141
Santa Ana, CA	Food Stall, Library	46
Laredo, TX	Info Booth	73
Spokane, WA	Info Booth	3
Albuquerque, NM	Library	25
Cleveland, OH	Library	122
Greensboro, NC	Library	23
Lexington, KY	Library	114
Louisville, KY	Library	191
Milwaukee, WI	Library	121
Minneapolis, MN	Library	56
New Orleans, LA	Library	86
Norfolk, VA	Library	32
Oklahoma City, OK	Library	66
Toledo, OH	Library	43
<b>Overall Mean:</b>	N/A	62.9

*Sources: Occupy Survey, Local Newspaper Reports*

What explains this very strong effect of resources? As we can see in Table 19, resources matter especially because encampments which lack them last for a shorter time. The encampment in Norfolk, Virginia, exemplifies this dynamic. It lasted for about a month, much less than the sample average. It was among the smaller encampments in the sample and had a food stall and an information booth while lacking a library. Here, occupiers applied for a permit, were able to renew it weekly for about a month and were promptly evicted once this expired. Norfolk's encampment was not the most resource-poor of the encampments which lacked one or more resources, shown in Table 17. It wasn't even amongst the shortest- many folded in less than two weeks, and some lasted as little as 2-3 days. The trajectory of this encampment follows a common pattern among resource-poor encampments: they tend to have small turnouts, are met with little confrontation on behalf of elected leaders and police, and they attempt to negotiate with them. If negotiations result in these camps' inability to stay put overnight, they tend to be disbanded either spontaneously or with mild coercion, and definitely no backlash on behalf of protesters. These local Occupy chapters are too small and resource-poor to fight back, and often gain little media attention after they get evicted.

These findings confirm the importance of logistical resources, emphasized by Nepstad (2004, 2008) and Whittier (2010). The fact that food stalls, information booths and libraries created a logistical space for protesters to meet and bolstered the chances of the encampment to last is especially very similar to Whittier's observations on the women's movement and the importance of logistical resources. Yet, in some ways, the conclusion that emerges from the findings on resources is also a slight departure from Nepstad

and Whittier's work. On one hand, these authors demonstrate that, through a strong set of resources, some movements were able to endure more than others. I, on the other hand, demonstrate that through a weak set of resources, some movements were able to endure less than others. The resources I account for existed almost ubiquitously among larger Occupy chapters. While lacking them was detrimental, having them was not enough to guarantee survival. Therefore, my findings demonstrate the negative effect of lack of resources, but in no way do they show the positive effect of being resource-rich.

### 3.3.5: Model 5: Elected leader criticism

Model 5 in Table 18 includes the main independent variable for movement size, the aforementioned controls as well as the variable for elected leader criticism. Here, we can see the effect of the main independent variable on movement size dropping back down to 1.3%, yet still significant. The variable for elected leader criticism is also significant, and its hazard ratio tells us that an encampment is slightly more than twice as likely to end sooner when a local elected leader criticizes the local Occupy protest compared to when the leader does not. The log likelihood and chi square probability scores tell us that this model is a better fit than all previous models except for Model 4, and the null hypothesis can be rejected. The likelihood ratio chi square score tells us that this model explains 18% of variation in the dependent variables.

The clashes between protesters and both police and political leaders in Denver did not make national headlines like the ones in New York and Oakland. Due to protesters' decision to camp on the state capitol grounds, they confronted two forms of political authority: first, they faced off with Governor John Hickenlooper, then, they attempted and



failed to negotiate with Mayor Michael Hancock. Hickenlooper was a first hour opponent of the Occupy movement, who called for the encampment to be disbanded as early as October 10<sup>th</sup>. He quickly persuaded the city to collaborate to evict the protesters from the capitol grounds four days later.

The International Day of Rage march, taking place the day after the eviction on October 15<sup>th</sup>, galvanized protesters who managed to bring 2000 people to that march. That same day Occupy activists tried to retake the state capitol grounds but were met with resistance from the police, resulting in dozens of arrests. During the following weeks, the encampment slowly reappeared, but relations remained tense and during a protest on October 30<sup>th</sup> the police pepper sprayed protesters and made 20 arrests. Unsurprisingly, on November 12<sup>th</sup>, the police cleared the encampment again. But the encampment reappeared once again in the coming days, and was only evicted definitively on December 18<sup>th</sup>.

In spite of these repeated attempts to re-encamp, the Denver encampment still lasted only 76 days, considerably below the average of my sample of 103 days. Here, the opposition from key political figures such as the mayor and the governor was uncompromising and unambiguous from the very start of the protest. This opposition preceded the repressive acts that resulted in three separate encampment evictions, only the last of them final. It also preceded any direct criticism from the Denver Post.

Therefore the case of Denver shows that mayors and other elected figures had a key role to play in determining the duration of Occupy encampments, and more so than the media itself, even though the media was the main vehicle for expressing mayors' op-

position to encampments. While the case of Denver was unique in the degree to which the unrelenting opposition between protesters and political authorities produced a very confrontational outcome, Table 20 shows that, in almost all cases, sustained opposition by elected figures in the press produces shorter encampments. The 10 cities in which there were 5 or more instances of elected leader criticism witnessed an average encampment of 65 days, 38 days less than the sample average.

Therefore I can conclude that this analysis confirms the importance emphasized by Rucht (1996) and Garay (2007) on short term changes in the political environment: where these changes resulted in unrelenting elite opposition to Occupy protests, their encampments were cut short. Wherever elites did not intervene as energetically, Occupy

*Table 20: Length of encampment for Occupy chapters experiencing 6 or more instances of local elected criticism in the local media*

City	Total number of instances	Local encampment length (days)
Boston, MA	8	72
New York, NY	8	60
Los Angeles, CA	7	61
Nashville, TN	7	154
Philadelphia, PA	7	56
San Francisco, CA	7	75
Oakland, CA	6	43
Portland, OR	6	38
Atlanta, GA	5	20
Denver, CO	5	76
<u>Overall Mean</u>	6.6	65.5

*Sources: Occupy Survey, Local Newspaper Reports*

encampments were allowed to endure for longer. These dynamics also contradict expectations set forth by Taylor (1997), Staggenborg (1998) and Whittier (2010) who demonstrated how movements can endure in spite of political changes. Here, I find that changes in the positions of elected leaders with regards to their opinion of and attitude towards the Occupy movement matter decisively in terms of the movement's hopes to prolong the life of its encampment.

### 3.3.6: Model 6: All Variables, the role of Size and the case of Boston

Model 6 in Table 18 includes all variables previously used, adding up to a total of 12. This model shows that size has a significant effect on encampment length, even when controlling for all other factors. The hazard ratio for the variable for protest turnout is of 1.5%, therefore it is very much the same as it was in the previous 5 models- in fact even higher than its hazard ratio in 2 of these past models. This hazard ratio means that for every 100 more protesters that show up at a march the likelihood of eviction will be 1.5% more likely. As for the key controls, we can see that neutral coverage loses the significant effect that it had on the dependent variables in Model 2. The variables for negative coverage and violent repression stay non-significant. However, the variables for elected leader criticism, information booth, library and food stall stay significant. On one hand, the variables for information booth, library and food stalls have very similar hazard ratios to the ones that they presented in Model 4. On the other hand, elected leader criticism loses some of X% of its hazard ratio compared to Model 5.. In terms of the descriptive statistics for the whole model, both the log likelihood score and the chi square probability score show us that this model is a better fit than all previous models, and here too I can

reject the null hypothesis because the chi square probability score is much lower than the 0.05 cutoff. The likelihood ratio chi square shows that here the independent variables affect a little more than a third of all variation in the dependent variables.

Why does size matter so much in terms of predicting the duration of Occupy encampments? The Occupy Boston's encampment in Dewey Square provides some useful insights. This encampment started on September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2011 and was one of the first ones to emerge after the original Occupy encampment in Zuccotti Park. It was also one of the last encampments amongst the larger Occupy chapters to be evicted, as protesters were moved out by the police on December 10<sup>th</sup>. Occupy Boston took place in one of the most liberal cities in the U.S. Unsurprisingly, relations with local political authorities remained amicable here, in spite of a few scuffles, most notably the one that took place the day after the encampment started and in which 140 protesters were arrested as the police prevented Occupy Boston from expanding its encampment any further.

However, there was no violent repression or violent confrontations on the scale of what was observed in Oakland, New York City or Denver. Although some local officials criticized the encampment, the press reported a generally cordial tone in the relations between local political figures and the protesters. When the encampment was evicted, Mayor Tom Menino thanked the protesters for having courageously brought forth their message in the previous months (McGrory, 2011).

As the case of Boston shows, when protests are large, many encampments could not in most cases hope to last more than 3 months, as shown in Table 21. When they did (as in the cases of Chicago and Philadelphia), they did not exceed the sample mean of 73

days by more than 17 days. Therefore, the majority of encampments with a cumulative turnout of 3000 or under usually lasted for a period much shorter than the sample mean. In Boston, amicable relations with local political figures (including, besides Menino, soon-to-be U.S. senator Elizabeth Warren), an encampment which attracted less controversy and less repression than others organized by equally large Occupy chapters, and a movement which attempted to negotiate with local authorities on several occasions, could not stop the encampment from being evicted. The case of Boston shows that large protest encampments cannot last regardless of the best intentions of protesters and local authorities.

This case and my overall findings with regards to the role of size in movement duration run contrary to the expectations of McAdam (1982), McCarthy and Zald (1977), Everett (1992) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). In spite of all the alleged advantages

*Table 21: Length of encampment for Occupy chapters with cumulative turnouts of 3000 or more*

City	Total turnout in all Occupy marches	Local encampment length (days)
New York, NY	56050	60
Oakland, CA	13440	43
Chicago, IL	8450	120
Portland, OR	8300	38
Los Angeles, CA	8250	61
Seattle, WA	6810	71
Denver, CO	5810	76
San Francisco, CA	5009	75
Pittsburgh, PA	3900	117
Boston, MA	3760	72
Overall Mean:	7727.9	73.3

*Sources: Occupy Survey, Local Newspaper Reports*

of large numbers described by the authors, and in spite of the protesters' valiant attempts to establish friendly relations with key political figures, in this case movement size is a setback. Eventually, the cities' low tolerance for a permanent protest was much more influential than any advantages these large protests gained in terms of resources, networks and opportunities. My findings do confirm Earl, Soule and McCarthy's (2003) analysis of protest in the U.S. between 1960 and 1986. The case of Occupy Wall Street shows that once protests grow large, they cause a level of disruption and controversy which cannot be tolerated by political and law enforcement authorities. Larger movements have a limited life even when local authorities sympathize with the message and protesters attempt to negotiate, as they did in Boston. I also find confirmation in Staggenborg (1998) and Nepstad's (2004) expectations of smaller movements as more cohesive units with greater internal ties. The case of Boston shows that protesters in larger movements may strive to achieve these features. They may even achieve a degree of success in doing so. However they are not able to do so to an extent that allows them to sustain their encampment.

### 3.3.7: The role of Region, Population and Temperature and the case of Honolulu

Now that I have discussed the role of key controls and of the main independent variable, I move on to accounting for the role of the controls for region, population and temperature. The controls for region did not have a significant effect on the dependent variable. I also find no significant effect of population on encampment duration. Although the longest lasting encampments didn't tend to take place in the largest of U.S. cities, small size was no guarantee of duration. On the contrary, some, but not all of the

smallest cities of the sample, such as Greensboro, NC and Spokane, WA witnessed some of the smallest encampments.

Temperature however did have an effect on encampment length and I will try and account for the reasons behind this pattern. This variable is significant in 4 out of the 6 models. In these 4 models, the hazard ratio is negative and of between 3% and 3.2%, meaning that every Fahrenheit degree increase in temperature makes the encampment about 3% more likely to survive. The case of the Occupy encampment in Honolulu can help me explain the reasons for this effect. It stands out because it is the longest encampment in my sample, lasting for almost two years between the start of November 2011 until the end of August 2013, more than twice the length of Occupy Columbus, the second most enduring encampment in my sample. The encampment was very small in size, numbering no more than a few dozen protesters, and benefited from the city's year round mild climate and unique island culture, as noted by the local press:

“Generations of tolerance by Hawaii law enforcement and government officials toward sit-ins and occupations on public lands and in government buildings have meant that some protests have lasted for weeks and months in high profile, public locations” (Nakaso, 2012)

This seems to indicate that local culture played a greater role here than mild temperatures. I should also note that if we take Honolulu out of our model, the variable for temperature is no longer significant. Therefore, from a statistical perspective, mild weather may have played a role in facilitating a long lasting encampment here, but I cannot make the same case for the other 73 cities in our model. Indeed, among cities in our sample with a comparably mild climate, I find an equal number of cities which had long lasting encampments, such as Tampa and Memphis, and cities with encampments which

lasted the same or less than the overall average of 103 days, such as Miami, Phoenix and Laredo.

Furthermore, this city may just be fertile ground for protest encampments due to the local culture, thus in a way that is not generalizable to other cities in the sample. Therefore, the effect of weather on the model is also facilitated by this factor, since Honolulu seems to drive much of the variation caused by weather. In conclusion, and in spite of the significance in variation shown in the previous chapter, weather is not a crucial factor in determining why some encampments last longer than others. Too much of the variation is driven by a single observation, Honolulu, and in this city this exceptional encampment length may have just as easily been the result of a tolerant local culture as it may have been due to the mild weather.



### 3.4 DISCUSSION

#### 3.4.1: Overview of Theoretical Implications of Findings

The inverse relationship between protest size and duration that has been established in the previous pages confirms the observations put forth by Staggenborg (1998) on the women's movement and Taylor et al. (1992) on lesbian feminist communities. The results also contradict past observations by McAdam (1992) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) who argue that larger movements tend to last for longer. These findings show that the main advantage of smaller movements is that they foster a greater sense of community and stronger networks between their activist bases. However, small movements do not present an advantage due to their ability to avoid repression, as previously shown by Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003). Repression does not in this case play a significant role in either helping the movement last longer or contributing to its early demise. Repression here happens in movements that are both large and small. Therefore, size has no bearing on the likelihood of a movement facing repression. In turn, repression has no consequences for duration.

The results also show that neutral media coverage has a negative effect on duration, and also partly mediates the effect of size of duration. This means that movements which are smaller are less likely to receive this type of media coverage. Because this coverage has a negative effect on duration, movements which are smaller tend to survive for longer in part also thanks to the fact that they avoid receiving this type of media attention. This dynamic is similar to previous observations on the women's movement by Taylor (1989) and Whittier (1989), where this movement was able to survive while not receiving

media attention. This dynamic also follows an opposite pattern to the environmental protest observed by Simmons and Stark (1993), who argued that extensive media coverage helped this campaign last for longer.

In terms of the relationship between size, resources and duration, the results show that small movements need to be resourceful to survive for longer. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition: large movements which have lots of resources still tend to fail, and so do small movements which do not have all of the necessary logistical infrastructure. These results are similar to those of past studies by Nepstad (2004) on the Plowshares movement and Whittier (2010) on the women's movement. Resources are just as important as size in affecting the odds of a movement to survive.

Lastly, the relationship between political opportunity structure, size and duration is the only one which presents a markedly different pattern from that observed by past work on the women's movement, including Taylor (1989) and Whittier (1997). These authors emphasized the ability of this movement to endure in spite of unfavorable opportunities. However, the results here show that unfavorable opportunities are likely to lead to an early demise of Occupy encampments. In this respect, these results are more similar to those on the short term relationship between mobilization and political opportunity structure, put forth by Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Kitschelt (1986) and Della Porta (1995).

#### 3.4.2: The Benefits of Action Duration Analysis

Now that I have summarized the results, I discuss the theoretical contribution of this paper. Specifically, I want to address the following: what advantage has been gained

in terms of insight by looking at movement action duration as opposed to movement campaign duration and organizational duration? In terms of the relationship between size and duration, as mentioned before my results confirm past observations by authors who focused on organizational duration. However, my findings give these past findings a new dimension, it is not just small organizations which are more likely to last a long period of time, but also actions by a small number of people. To historical observers of social movement actions, this should not come as a complete surprise, and there is some past evidence for this dynamic. For example, 2 month long hunger strikes by a small group Irish Republican prisoners in 1981 resulted in extensive media attention and coverage for this action and radicalized Irish Republican politics. Additionally, the sit-ins in Greensboro in 1960, initiated by a group of 4 activists, were highly successful and resulted in widespread support for the cause and, eventually, the passing of the Civil Rights act.

Additionally, social movement actions usually seek to gain attention to further their cause. But these results show that media attention is more of a hindrance than an asset. Again, there is evidence of similar dynamics at place in terms of the prospects of survival of social movement organizations, but, in terms of social movement actions, this is more of a novel finding. However, the findings on the relationship between resources and action duration are less novel, since there is a near-universal consensus in the social movement literature with regards to the role of resources in enabling movements to both carry out actions and be able to survive in the long terms. Lastly, the relationship between the findings on political opportunity structure show that social movement action duration does present some significantly different dynamics compared to campaign duration and

organizational duration. Specifically, while the latter two tend to be immune to changes in political alliances and elite sympathy, social movement action duration is dependent on, at the very least, the lack of opposition from local elected leaders. What explains these differing dynamics? Because these actions have a shorter duration compared to that of organizations and campaigns, and because they require physical presence of activists, their duration is more contingent on the potential opposition of local elites.

**CHAPTER 4: REPRESSION AND THE ROLE OF MEDIA CRITI-  
CISM**

## 4.1 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

### 4.1.1: Repression and its Causes

This chapter focuses on the causes of repression directed toward the Occupy movement. In particular, I look at how media coverage and elite perception of the threat posed by protesters combine to produce repression. Tilly (1978) defines repression as “any action by another group that raises the contender's cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978:100). As such, repression is a common feature to many contentious actions by protesters. Jennifer Earl (2003) outlines three key dimensions of repression. The first is the identity of the repressive agent. Repression can be carried out by three types of actors: state agents tightly connected with national elites, such as military units and military governments; state agents loosely connected with national political elites, including local law enforcement agents; lastly, private agents, including counter-movement participants. The second dimension outlined by Earl is the character of the repressive action. Here the author distinguishes between coercive forms of repression involving use of violence (including tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper spraying) and channeling (including legal restrictions for protests and social movements as well as surveillance). Earl’s third and final distinction is the extent to which the repressive act is observable. Observable acts include actions widely reported by the media (such as the killings of protesters at Kent State and at Tiananmen Square), whereas unobserved repression includes covert actions such as COINTELPRO in the 1960s and, more recently, NSA surveillance. In Western democracies, cases of repression by local law enforcement agents are far more common than military actions against insurgents and counter-movement repression. Furthermore, Earl notes

that most work on this process focuses on more overt, and often violent forms of repression. These actions are often observable and often the object of extensive media attention and controversy in the public sphere, as shown by the work of Della Porta (1995), Wisler and Kriesi (1998) and McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy (1998). Therefore, I choose to focus on coercive and observable forms of repression carried out by local government agents.

Studies of social movement repression focus usually on either the effect of repression on mobilization or the causes behind repression. In many well known cases of repression, such as the U.S. government actions against the Black Panthers or the Chinese government's repression of pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square, repression has a stifling effect on mobilization. Yet many authors also focus on repression's galvanizing effect on protests, such as Garrow's (1978) study of the Civil Rights movement and Kurzman's (1996) analysis of the Iranian Revolution. As for the causes of repression, scholars focus on the role of movement characteristics, including elite perception of the threat posed by protesters, weakness, the interaction between the previous two factors, and the role of institutions including law enforcement and political institutions. This paper looks at the correlates of repression. Therefore, in the last part of this sub-section, I provide a brief summary of leading theories which explain the presence, or lack thereof, of repression.

First of all, I will look at the role of social movement characteristics in making repression more likely. Of all causal dynamics behind repression, elite perception of the threat posed by protesters is the most popular with scholars. McAdam (1982) defines

threat in terms of radical goals and use of confrontational and innovative tactics. The author argues that government agents will be more likely to act against a movement if the latter's actions and ideas constitute more of a threat to the established order. Later studies by Wisler and Giugni (1999) and Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) argue that large protests, due to their frequently disruptive and uncoordinated nature, can be also seen as threatening and thus elicit repressive action by authorities. Other studies of repression, such as those by Gamson (1975) and Wisler and Giugni (1999) focus on the role of weakness. Their idea is that governments will be more likely to target weaker movements. They define weakness in terms of the perception of the repressive agent of the overall strength of a movement, including its capacity for mobilization and its ability to deploy resources. Additionally, Stockdill (2002) argues that presence of ethnic and sexual minorities, as was the case with the LGBT movement, can contribute to the perceived weakness of the movement. Piven and Cloward (1977) and Stockdill (2002) also focus on the role of the interaction between threat and weakness. These authors argue that authorities are likely to repress activists when they encounter a movement which is confrontational, radical and composed of the poorer and less resourceful members of society.

Social movement repression authors also focus on the role of the institutions which determine and implement repressive actions. In particular, Tarrow (1989), Della Porta (1995) and Wisler and Kriesi (1998) look at the role of openness of political institutions to protest and their role in mitigating repression in 'civil rights' regimes, or in making it more likely in 'law and order' regimes. In sum, these authors argue that political institutions and political change are the main factor in making repression more or less



likely. Lastly, McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy (1998), Earl and Soule (2006) and Soule and Davenport (2009) focus on the role of law enforcement agencies in making repression more or less likely. These authors argue that police forces will be more or less likely to carry out repression depending on their relative degree of openness to protest, prior history of brutality and level of preparation.

#### 4.1.2: Linking Threat and Media Coverage to Repression

In spite of all of these insights the literature has not focused enough on the role of media coverage of movements. While media coverage's overall effect on movements, including tactics, framing and opportunities has been subject of much attention (see Gitlin, 1980; Baylor, 1996; Oliver and Maney, 2000; Rohlinger, 2006; Sobieraj, 2004; Rohlinger, Kail, Taylor and Conn, 2012; Amenta, Gardner, Tierney, Yerena and Elliott, 2012; Kutz-Flanenbaum, Staggenborg and Duncan, 2012), few authors have devoted their attention to understanding and evaluating the role of media coverage in repression in its entirety, apart from Wisler and Giugni (1999) and Koopmans (2004, 2005).

Most works on repression do consider the role of media in facilitating repression, yet they usually argue that media characteristics are merely a function of one of the theories listed in the previous paragraphs, and not as a factor to be analyzed in its own terms. In particular, political opportunity structure theorists such as Della Porta (1995) and Wisler and Kriesi (1998) cite media coverage as one of the factors that determine the existence of tolerant or intolerant political climate for protesters. Gamson (1975) and Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) consider media coverage to be a resource, therefore they state that low levels of press attention to protests are functions of weakness. Wisler and

Giugni (1999) link media coverage to threat, however they find that this coverage has a negative effect on repression net of threat, thus their evidence also links repression to movement weakness.

My objective is to look at the pattern through which threat and media coverage combine to produce repression. Even though past research has seldom tested the relationship between threat, media coverage and repression, there is some evidence for this dynamic in the literature. Gitlin's (1980) book on media coverage of left-wing protests in the mid and late 1960s provides insights on key issues and aspects of these dynamics such as framing, tactics, tensions and organizations. In particular, the author focuses on how the Fourth Estate's coverage of protests influences the response of authorities to activist disruption. An example of this is the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968, where the press exaggerated the impact of the confrontational tactics used by the protesters, thereby providing the police with sufficient legitimacy to carry out extensive violent actions. In a similar fashion, Garrow (1978) demonstrates the role of sympathetic coverage in legitimizing Civil Rights protesters in the early 1960s and, conversely, media criticism's instrumentality in facilitating the repression of anti-war protests that happened later in that decade. In more recent years, Della Porta and Fillieule (2004) have pointed out the role of public discourse, inclusive of TV and newspaper coverage, in shaping police response to protest. However they also concede that this coverage is shaped by the nature of violent and confrontational interactions between law enforcement and the protesters. Oliver (2008) adds that public perception of crime can help shape 'law and order'

policing regimes, which in turn can facilitate the criminalization and repression of protesters, especially when they are carrying out an illegal action.

In sum, while several authors have linked different patterns of media coverage to several repression dynamics, the literature underestimates the role of threat in shaping this coverage. My argument is that threat plays a strong role in shaping media coverage and that, in turn, this coverage plays a role in shaping the likelihood of the movement in encountering a violent response from the state. Wisler and Giugni (1999) look at data on repression of protests in Switzerland and are the only authors who have carried out an empirically testable analysis of how the media serves as a mediating factor between threat and repression. In particular, the authors demonstrate that, if protests receive relatively small amounts of coverage, repression is likely to increase because law enforcement agencies will be less afraid of a public backlash for particularly violent repressive acts.

Therefore, an analysis of media effects on repression should first of all consider the nature of the relationship between threat and media characteristics, net of controls for institutional characteristics (including political and police institutions). Then, once I establish the nature of the relationship between threat and media, I can test for the relationship between media and repression, net of controls for threat and institutional characteristics. In this way, I can calculate the extent to which the media reacts to large protest turnouts and instances of violent behavior. After that, I can show how much the media contributes to the likelihood of the movement's repression while accounting for the proportion of that causation which is independently threat-driven and institutionally driven.

#### 4.1.3: Conceptualizing Threat

The role of the perceived threat levels posed by protesters in instigating repression has been the object of abundant attention on behalf of the social movements literature. Tilly (1978) conceptualizes threat in terms of the acceptability of a group and its actions to government elites, McAdam (1982) defines threat in terms of tactical innovation and radical goals. Most accounts consider confrontational and disruptive tactics in general (Piven and Cloward, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Davenport, 1995, 2000; Earl, Soule and McCarthy, 2003; Barkan, 2006) and violence in particular (Della Porta, 1995, 1998; Davenport, 1995; Wisler and Giugni, 1999) as forms of threatening behavior. Several more works have emphasized the role of radical goals and political and cultural identity of the group involved (Tilly, 1998; Bromley and Shupe, 1983; Della Porta, 1995, 1998; Wisler and Giugni, 1999; Davenport, 2000; Earl, Soule and McCarthy, 2003; Barkan, 2006). Others focus on the role of class identities (Della Porta, 1998) as well as racial and sexual identities (Stockdill, 2002). Lastly, Wisler and Giugni (1999), Davenport (2000) and Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) have treated large turnouts and protest sizes as forms of threat, due to the disruption that they can cause.

The role of these different factors in shaping movement outcomes, including its public image and liability to repression, requires careful consideration. While protester violence as well as certain types of confrontational tactics may shape a movement's image in an unequivocally negative fashion, other types of confrontational tactics may not be seen by the media in a negative way. Large turnouts can signal the legitimacy of the protesters. And radicalism may be welcomed in some quarters (for the radical left, San

Francisco or New York) while met with hostility in other cities (such as Oklahoma City and Salt Lake City). Therefore, a nuanced analysis of the interaction of threat and media coverage and their role in producing repression needs to distinguish between the different types of threat posed by protesters and what consequences each one of them will have for different dimensions of media coverage. Specifically, following Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) violent forms of threat, including protester violence against people and property, should be defined as police threat, because it especially has an impact on the behavior of law enforcement agents patrolling the protest. Protest turnouts should be considered political elite threat, because they especially have an impact on the way elected leaders react to protest.

#### 4.1.4: Conceptualizing Media Coverage

Koopmans (2004, 2005) looks at media coverage of radical right-wing protest activity in Germany, and sets out to understand the relationship between this coverage and repression of activists. In doing so, the author provides three dimensions of media coverage: visibility, resonance (composed in itself of two sub-elements: consonance and dissonance) and legitimacy. The author defines visibility as the “number of communicative channels by which a message is included and the prominence of such inclusion” (Koopmans 2005:163), thus this indicates the overall amount of coverage received by the movement as well as the overall number of communicative channels through which this coverage was received.

Next up, we can define resonance as the level of support that a movement message receives across communicative channels. This support can go in either of two direc-

tions: it can be present in the form of favorable verbal statements, called consonance. However, resonance can also take the form of condemnation and criticism, defined as dissonance. Lastly, there is legitimacy, understood as being composed of comments from 3rd parties in the media. Legitimacy is distinct from resonance in that it includes only statements from significant institutional actors such as the police and elected officials, while resonance covers statement by the media outlets themselves. Therefore, while legitimacy ties in elements of police and elected official interactions with protesters in the media, resonance reflects the opinion of the media, independently of how salient local authorities and institutions may perceive social movements.

Out of these three dimensions, the role of visibility in repression has been tested most often in the literature (see Wisler and Giugni, 1999; Earl, Soule and McCarthy, 2003; Earl and Soule, 2006). However, outside of Koopmans (2004, 2005), the past literature does not dedicated extensive attention to the relationship that media praise and criticism (or, in technical terms, consonance and dissonance) have with repression, and no past authors test for threat's effect on positive and negative coverage. Therefore, I will outline hypotheses based on the expected effect of threat on overall coverage (or visibility), positive coverage (or consonance) and negative coverage (or dissonance), and the expected effect of visibility, consonance and dissonance on repression.

#### 4.1.5: Hypotheses

What relationships can we expect between different forms of threat and visibility? Wisler and Giugni (1999) show the positive effect violence and turnouts have on overall coverage. Yet the past literature has not tested the expected relationship between confron-

tational tactics, radical goals and visibility. Therefore, my analysis is distinct from that of Wisler and Giugni in that I explore this relationship between confrontational tactics, radical goals, visibility, consonance, dissonance, and how these factors interact to produce repression. In terms of visibility, the media is more likely to cover events when they have more participants, and more controversial or potentially controversial aspects, as shown by Gitlin's (1980) and Gans' (1979) analyses on media coverage of 1960s social movements. Therefore, we can expect all measures of threat to have a positive effect on overall media coverage.

*Hypothesis 1: All forms of threat have a positive effect on overall coverage*

While Wisler and Giugni (1999) demonstrate the effect of threat on visibility, unfortunately no past authors have tested the effect of threat on consonance and dissonance on repression. However Garrow (1978) and Gitlin (1980) suggest that movements that are more confrontational and more radical are more likely to receive more critical coverage and less sympathetic coverage. These hypotheses are far more plausible than the opposite. In the vast majority of circumstances, the media has less reasons to praise a movement and many more reasons to criticize it if activists partake in violent and disruptive behavior.

*Hypothesis 2: Violence and property damage have a positive effect on negative coverage*

*Hypothesis 3: Violence and property damage have a negative effect on positive coverage*

With respect to turnout, the evidence is more mixed. As Della Porta (1995) and Koopmans (1993) have pointed out, threat as measured by turnout signals legitimacy. If a movement has broad support from society, the media is likely to join it. Therefore turn-

outs could have a positive effect on positive coverage and a negative effect on negative coverage. However, large turnouts can also be disruptive and make repression more likely, as Wisler and Giugni (1999), Davenport (2000) and Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) have pointed out. Therefore it is equally plausible that turnouts make criticism more likely and praise less likely. Given the weight of recent evidence of U.S. police and elite reactions to large protest events, it is more likely that large turnouts will generate opposition from the media rather than support.

*Hypothesis 4: Large turnouts have a positive effect on negative coverage*

*Hypothesis 5: Large turnouts have a negative effect on positive coverage*

In recent years, scholars have often tested the relationship between overall coverage and repression. Wisler and Giugni (1999) find an inverse relationship. This is because, according to the authors, the police is more willing to carry out more violent and potentially controversial actions when they are receiving less attention and, potentially, less public scrutiny. Yet Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) and Earl and Soule (2006) test for this same relationship, and find no significant effect. On balance, there is more recent evidence from protest cases in the U.S. which supports the thesis that visibility has no meaningful effect on repression.

*Hypothesis 6: Overall coverage has no effect on violent repression*

The last 3 hypotheses test the effect of positive and negative coverage on repression, as well as media coverage's ability to mediate the effect of threat on repression, pushing research on media effects on repression beyond the scope of past analyses by Wisler and Giugni (1999) and Koopmans (2004, 2005). Because of this, they are the most



important hypotheses of the paper and testing them reveals the unique dynamics which are uncovered by this analysis. I expect critical coverage to increase the odds of a movement facing repression. Koopmans (2005) speculates that this relationship may be negative or positive. A positive relationship would show how media criticism can have a negative impact on social movements, whereas a negative relationship would give confirmation to the dictum 'all publicity is good publicity'. However it is far more plausible that, as Garrow (1978) and Gitlin (1980) suggest, critical coverage of movement activities amplifies the public's perception of the protest's disruption, and in turn makes repression more likely. This is because negative views of a protest will make law enforcement authorities feel that a backlash is less likely if they repress an unpopular movement.

*Hypothesis 7: Negative coverage has a positive effect on violent repression*

In terms of the relationship between positive coverage and repression, Koopmans (2005) expected a negative relationship, explaining that media rhetoric which favored the movement would increase the movement's chances of being successful and avoiding repression. Political opportunity structure theorists including Della Porta (1995) and Wisler and Kriesi (1998) add that a sympathetic media environment is synonymous with sympathetic elites, and thus should make repression less likely. Furthermore, if negative coverage provides law enforcement with the legitimacy to carry out repression because of lessening fear of a backlash, more positive coverage should in turn give them less repressive legitimacy. However, we have little reason to think praise would have a plausible positive correlation to repression. Yet there is a third possibility: if negative feelings and connotations drive behavior and willingness to take action, as Jasper (2011) indicates, is it possi-

ble that positive feelings and connotations have no impact on the behavior of authorities? If this is the case, positive coverage should have no effect on repression. Yet, on the whole, I find it more plausible that positive coverage has a mitigating effect on repression.

*Hypothesis 8: Positive coverage has a negative effect on violent repression*

Lastly, I want to investigate the relationship between threat and repression, first in its own terms, and second while different aspects of media coverage are controlled (or held constant). Following the work of Della Porta (1995, 1998), Davenport (1995, 2000), Wisler and Giugni (1999), Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) and Earl and Soule (2006) I expect radical goals, disruptive and confrontational tactics including violence and turn-outs to all have a positive effect on repression. However, once media variables are accounted for, there are two possible outcomes. Threat indicators could retain their strength and significance in explaining repression, and demonstrate that law enforcement reacts primarily to threats posed by the protesters. But if the effect of threat is mediated by the media variables, this would demonstrate the independent role of public media discourse in shaping the likelihood of a movement to face repression. On the basis of the recent lack of attention given by scholars to the role of media coverage on threat, I expect the latter scenario to be the most plausible.

*Hypothesis 9: Media coverage variables mediate the role of threat variables in explaining violent repression*

In conclusion, this chapter summarizes the different causal dynamics that have been linked to social movement repression in the past literature, including threat, weak-

ness, threat and weakness, political opportunity structure and police characteristics. I have also discussed the relationship between media characteristics and these theories, and have argued that the past literature underestimates the role of threat in shaping repression through the medium of media coverage. Then, I have set out three dimensions of media characteristics to be tested: visibility, or overall coverage; consonance, or positive coverage; and dissonance, or negative coverage. I have set out hypotheses linked to my expectations on how different dimensions of threat will predict these characteristics. Consequently I have also set out hypotheses based on expectations of the patterns through which these media characteristics and threat indicators combine to produce movement repression. In the next chapter, I will summarize the data that will be used in this analysis and the methods through which the data will be analyzed.

## 4.2 DATA AND METHODS

### 4.2.1: Media Variables

I use three measures of media coverage. Following Koopmans (2004, 2005) I define overall coverage, or visibility, in term of overall articles written about Occupy by main local newspaper in each city under analysis. I organize these counts into an ordinal variable with 6 different possible scores (1=very low coverage, 2 articles or less; 2=low coverage, 3 or 4 articles; 3=medium-low coverage, 5 or 6 articles; 4=medium-high coverage, between 7 and 10 articles; 5=high coverage, between 11 and 17 articles; 6=very high coverage, 18 articles or more). Next, I define positive coverage, or consonance, in terms of articles which praise and describe the movement's goals and objectives, together with counts of articles which humanize the movement by describing Occupy participants and talking about their lives. I included in this measure articles which also criticized Occupy movement activities, as long as a significant part of the article, at least one paragraph, included positive statements and/or lengthy descriptions of movement activities in a positive light. These are the two main ways in which the local press described the movement in a positive light. These two measures are collected into a single ordinal variable (0=no positive coverage, 1=one form of positive coverage, 2=both forms of positive coverage)

My measure of dissonance is derived from articles criticizing the movement's goals and objectives, together with articles which report the cost of Occupy protests and encampments to the taxpayer. While the first form of criticism is a direct opposite of one of the aforementioned forms of praise, the second one was a prominent form of media

criticism as the media formulated demands for eviction of Occupy encampments to elected leaders and police authorities. Again, criticism was counted as such even in articles which also included positive statements on the Occupy movement. However I did not count press reports of acts of protester violence and property damage as forms of critical coverage. The two types of media criticism were collected into a single ordinal variable (0=no negative coverage 1=one form of negative coverage 2=both forms of negative coverage). All media variables were obtained from local newspaper coverage of local Occupy protests between September 17th (the first day of the protests) and October 31st (the full list of newspapers is shown in Table 3).

#### 4.2.2: Threat Variable

I measure threat in terms of episodes of protester violence and property damage as well as protest turnouts which occurred on or before October 31st. I define protester violence in terms of violent acts carried out by protesters against external actors. Examples of such violent acts include physical attacks of protesters against members of the public at Occupy Atlanta and Occupy Oakland protesters hurling rocks and bottles at police during the general strike at the Port of Oakland. In terms of property damage, I include any visible damage to public property, including graffiti at Occupy Boston, broken windows of buildings during Occupy Oakland protests and damage to park benches during the Occupy Cincinnati encampment. These indicators are used by recent studies on threat-driven repression (Davenport, 1995; Earl, 2003; Earl, Soule and McCarthy, 2003). These authors also use measures on radical protest goals as a threat indicator. However, because this paper analyzes variation within one movement, and thus with uniform levels of radical-

ism, this measure makes less sense for my analysis. Yet, violent and disruptive behavior by protesters is a clear threat to safety, in the eyes of both elites and the general public, and there are significant differences in the extent to which different Occupy chapters were violent and/or disruptive. There were also large differences in turnouts, with larger gatherings causing more disruption to the public while smaller Occupy protests went on relatively unnoticed by bystanders.

Following Earl and Soule (2003), I consider these forms of threat to have different implications for the analysis: on one hand, violence and property damage are considered police threat, because they are considered as threatening behavior especially by law enforcement. On the other hand, large turnouts are not considered a direct threat to police, as also noted by Della Porta (1995), but political figures may fear them as a threat to their legitimacy. Therefore turnouts are political establishment threats.

My measures for violence and property damage are both binary variables (0=no violence/property damage, 1=violence/property damage) whereas turnouts were counts of how many hundreds of people showed up at each protest, and they were organized in a 5 way ordinal variable (1=very low, 110 protesters or less; 2=low, between 120 and 220 protesters; 3=medium, between 250 and 380 protesters; 4=high, between 500 and 950 protesters; 5=very high, 1000 protesters or more). These data were obtained mostly from newspaper coverage of local Occupy protests in the 74 cities in the sample. However, when local newspapers did not provide data on turnouts, I used data from the Occupy survey. Because my main data source here was the newspaper coverage of Occupy activities, acts of violence and property damage were more likely to be reported in cities where

the local movement received more coverage. However the results show that this isn't always the case, and in cities with relatively low levels of coverage such as Atlanta and Cincinnati the local press still reported these forms of threatening behavior.

#### 4.2.3: Repression Variable

This paper analyzes instances of violent repression, defined as police use of tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spraying and other forms of violence against protesters which took place between November 1st and 30th. These data were collected through local newspaper reports in the form of a binary variable (0=no violent repression, 1=violent repression). Although arrests were the most common form of repression in the Occupy mobilization, I do not focus on them. My first reason for taking this decision is that I seek to focus on exclusively violent forms of repression. Arrests are usually not violent, whereas the forms of repression listed above are violent by definition. My second reason is that arrests took place in almost every city which witnessed Occupy protests, and were usually not seen as controversial by the press and local elites. By way of contrast, these other forms of repression were less common but, when they happened, they often spurred outrage in the media. Amongst the most notable of such episodes there is the September 30th pepper spraying incident in New York City, as well as the 1st eviction of Occupy Oakland at the end of October, in which Iraq War veteran Scott Olsen was hit by a tear gas canister and fell in a coma. Other widely reported incidents of such nature include the pepper spraying of students at an Occupy protest at UC Davis by campus police in late November and the pepper-spraying of an 84 year old woman at an Occupy Seattle bank protest on December 1st.

These instances, which can be seen in Table 22, show that these forms of repression made authorities liable to controversy. Therefore we should not be surprised to see that, even during the month (November) in which repression was at its peak and the nation's largest Occupy encampments in Oakland, Los Angeles, Portland and New York City were evicted, only 13 of the 74 cities of my sample encountered these forms of repression.

#### 4.2.4: Controls

I use two measures of political opportunity structure. The first is the mean percentage of votes obtained by the Democratic Party in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections. The second is the presence of a Democrat mayor in the city under analysis. Therefore this is a binary variable (1=Democrat mayor, 0=no Democrat mayor). The source for both variables is the U.S. Election Atlas (Leip, 1999). I expect cities that have

*Table 22: List of instances of violent repression of Occupy protesters in November 2011*

City	Type of Harsh Repression	Date(s)
Portland, OR	Tear gas, pepper spraying, batons and other forms of violence	November 13th & 17th
Riverside, CA	Other forms of violence	November 7th
Tulsa, OK	Pepper spraying	November 2nd
Phoenix, AZ	Pepper spraying	November 30th
Los Angeles, CA	Batons	November 30th
Dallas, TX	Other forms of violence	November 12th
Philadelphia, PA	Batons and other forms of violence	November 30th
Denver, CO	Pepper spraying and other forms of violence	November 13th
Seattle, WA	Pepper spraying	November 2nd
San Francisco, CA	Batons	November 16th
New York, NY	Batons	November 17th & 21st
Oakland, CA	Tear gas, batons, rubber bullets and other forms of violence	November 3rd
Oklahoma City, OK	Other Forms of Violence	November 25th

*Source: Local Newspaper Reports*



more politically progressive populations to be more sympathetic to the movement. Therefore these factors should inhibit repression. They should also have an effect on media coverage: more liberal cities are more likely to give the Occupy movement more attention and to sympathize with its causes, and less likely to criticize its actions.

I also use two law enforcement characteristics measures to capture the type of policing environment that confronts protesters. My first measure is the percentage of the city budget spent on police, obtained from city council data on budgets for 2010 and the 2007 Law Enforcement Management Survey (Anon, 2007). My second measure is the number of police shootings of civilians which happened in the 8 months preceding the protest (between January and August 2011), obtained from the Deadspin Blog (Wagner, 2014) and measured as an ordinal variable (0=no shootings, 1= 1 shooting, 2=2 or more shootings). According to McPhail and McCarthy (2005) police forces with larger budgets are more prepared to confront protesters and are less likely to resort to more violent forms of repression. Additionally, conventional wisdom suggests that police forces which are more prone to violence against the public are more likely to carry out violent acts against protests.

Lastly, I use demographic controls for city population and region, both obtained from the 2010 U.S. Census (Center for Media and Promotion, 2009). The population data are in hundreds of thousands, whereas regional variables are binary. Out of the 4 Census U.S. regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) I use South as the reference category in my analysis, and use a combined variable of Midwest and Northeast (Midwest+Northeast) because there were no cases of violent repression in the Midwest.

*Table 23: Descriptive statistics for variables in logistic regression models predicting media coverage*

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
City Level (N = 74)				
Dependent Variables				
Overall Coverage (ordinal)	3.32	1.65	1.00	6.00
Positive Coverage (ordinal)	1.43	.60	.00	2.00
Negative Coverage (ordinal)	.49	.71	.00	2.00
Independent Variables				
Violence (binary)	.05	.23	.00	1.00
Property Damage (binary)	.08	.27	.00	1.00
Turnout (ordinal)	3.03	1.40	1.00	5.00
Control Variables				
Democrat Vote (%)	56.51	13.64	27.70	90.85
Democrat Mayor (binary)	.74	.44	.00	1.00
Police Shootings (ordinal)	.89	.84	.00	2.00
Police Budget/City Budget (%)	20.96	11.44	3.71	68.01
Population (in hundreds of thousands)	7.12	10.48	2.09	81.75
West (binary)	.31	.47	.00	1.00
Midwest+ Northeast (binary)	.31	.47	.00	1.00

Therefore this variable could not be used independently in the analysis.

#### 4.2.5: Analytic Strategy

My first three models will show the effects of threat on two different dimensions of media coverage (overall, positive and negative coverage) net of controls for political opportunity structure, police characteristics, population and region. All of the indicators for media coverage are ordinal. Therefore I use ordinal regression to analyze all dependent variables in this first set of models. The variables used for these models are shown on Table 23. Additionally, I provide correlations for the independent variables and controls in these models on Table 24. This table shows that there are no major issues of multicollinearity between the independent variables for threat as well as between these variables

*Table 24: Correlations between independent variables and controls used in analyses of media coverage and repression*

	<b>Overall Coverage</b>	<b>Positive Coverage</b>	<b>Negative Coverage</b>	<b>Violence</b>	<b>Property Damage</b>	<b>Turnout</b>	<b>Democrat Vote</b>
<b>Overall Coverage</b>	1.000						
<b>Positive Coverage</b>	.564	1.000					
<b>Negative Coverage</b>	.698	.402	1.000				
<b>Violence</b>	.354	.228	.430	1.000			
<b>Property Damage</b>	.425	.200	.429	.148	1.000		
<b>Turnout</b>	.499	.426	.456	.210	.207	1.000	
<b>Democrat Vote</b>	.424	.216	.334	.337	.212	.213	1.000
<b>Democrat Mayor</b>	.287	.323	.143	.141	.175	-.011	.355
<b>Police Shootings</b>	.224	.231	.391	.247	.277	.306	.176
<b>Police Budget/ City Budget</b>	-.154	-.017	-.099	.001	-.115	.082	-.242
<b>Population</b>	.318	.187	.254	-.036	.112	.298	.141
<b>West</b>	.099	.052	.325	.227	.228	.175	-.046
<b>Northeast+ Midwest</b>	.010	.003	-.133	-.161	.015	.113	.208

and the controls used in these models.

My fourth, fifth and sixth models explore the effect of threat and media coverage on repression net of controls for population, region, political opportunity structure and police characteristics. Specifically, my fourth model will look at the effect of threat on repression net of controls, whereas my fifth model will look at the effect of overall coverage and threat on repression net of controls. My sixth and last model will look at the effect of threat, positive and negative coverage on repression net of controls. Because in these last three models my dependent variable, repression, is binary, I use simple logit regression in these last three models. The variables used for these models are visible on Table 25. The correlations for the independent variables and controls these models are on

Table 24. This table shows that there are no major multicollinearity problems between the variables for media coverage and the threat variables as well as the controls.

*Table 24 (cont.):*

	<b>Democrat Mayor</b>	<b>Police Shootings</b>	<b>Police Budget/ City Budget</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>West</b>	<b>Northeast+ Midwest</b>
<b>Democrat Mayor</b>	1.000					
<b>Police Shootings</b>	-.039	1.000				
<b>Police Budget/ City Budget</b>	-.154	.029	1.000			
<b>Population</b>	-.106	.330	.225	1.000		
<b>West</b>	-.207	.228	-.110	-.014	1.000	
<b>Northeast+ Midwest</b>	.127	-.018	.246	.117	-.451	1.000

*Table 25: Descriptive statistics for variables in logistic regression models predicting repression*


	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
City Level (N = 74)				
Dependent Variable				
Violent Repression	.18	.38	.00	1.00
Independent Variables				
Overall Coverage	3.32	1.65	.00	6.00
Positive Coverage	1.43	.60	.00	2.00
Negative Coverage	.49	.71	.00	2.00
Violence	.05	.23	.00	1.00
Property Damage	.08	.27	.00	1.00
Turnout	3.03	1.40	-2.49	5.24
Control Variables				
Police Shootings	.89	.84	.00	2.00
Police Budget/City Budget	20.96	11.44	3.71	68.01
Democrat Vote	56.51	13.64	27.70	90.85
Democrat Mayor	.74	.44	.00	1.00
Population	7.12	10.48	2.09	81.75
West	.31	.47	.00	1.00
Midwest+ Northeast	.31	.47	.00	1.00

## 4.3 ANALYSIS

### 4.3.1: Unpacking Media Coverage


Before carrying out the regression analysis of the data, I show some general patterns of media coverage of Occupy protests. First of all, Occupy protesters were praised much more often than they were criticized. As shown on Figure 1, between September 17th 2011 and October 31st there were 366 instances of media praise in the 74 cities in my sample, as opposed to merely 56 instances of criticism. Furthermore, 70 out of these 74 cities witnessed praise of local Occupy protests, whereas only 27 cities witnessed criticism. So not only were instances of praise more frequent, they were also observed in many more cases.

*Figure 1: Overall counts of instances of positive and negative coverage*



*Source: Local Newspaper Reports*

Figure 2: Proportion (in percentage) of positive and negative coverage across period preceding repression



Source: Local Newspaper Reports

Second, there are significant differences in how frequently these forms of coverage took place across different time periods. Figure 2 shows relative occurrences of positive and negative coverage first on or before October 10th (the early phase of the protests, in which most local chapters had only just carried out their first march or were about to do so), between October 11th and 20th (this includes the biggest mobilization on the weekend of October 15th) and between October 21st and 31st (the last period in the media coverage data in which we witness the first few encampment evictions in Oakland and Atlanta). As we can see, positive coverage is at a peak in the middle of October and slightly lower before and after, but overall it is more or less constant throughout the month. In contrast, negative coverage takes place mostly at the end of October but is al-

most non-existent at the start of the month. My conclusion from these observations is that negative and positive coverage are radically different in terms of the frequency in which they happen as well as in terms of how widespread they are. They also present significant differences in how they are distributed across time, and a discussion of their causes and effects should take these factors into consideration.

#### 4.3.2: Models 1, 2 &3: Effects of Threat on Media Praise and Criticism

As discussed in the previous chapter, Model 1 and Model 2 analyze the role of threat on overall coverage (or visibility), positive coverage (or consonance) and negative coverage (or dissonance), net of political opportunity structure, police characteristics, population and regional controls. Because of the small number of variables (only 74) I have used a one-tailed test of significance.

In these two models, shown on Table 26, we can see that all types of threat play a strong and significant role in predicting overall and negative coverage, whereas only larger turnouts make positive coverage more likely, with other forms of threat having no effect. For each act of violence and property damage, overall coverage was 3 times more likely to go up by one unit in the ordinal categories for this variable, whereas critical coverage was 2 times more likely to go up by one unit. As for turnout, for every 400 more protesters showing up, it was twice more likely that all types of coverage would go up by one unit. In terms of the extent of the effects of the significant variables on the dependent variable, violence caused around 6-7% of variation in overall and negative coverage.

Table 26: Ordinal logit regression models estimating effects of threat (September 17<sup>th</sup>-October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011) and controls on media coverage of local Occupy chapters (September 17<sup>th</sup>-October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011) by local newspapers (N=74)

	Model 1: Overall Coverage <sup>14</sup>			Model 2: Positive Coverage <sup>15</sup>			Model 3: Negative Coverage <sup>16</sup>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>									
<u>Police Threat</u>									
	B	S.E.	Eta-Sq.	b	S.E.	Eta-Sq.	B	S.E.	Eta-Sq.
Violence	3.563**	1.577	.065	16.037	2782.311	.008	2.378*	1.610	.072
Property Damage	3.698***	1.141	.105	.669	1.346	.001	2.017**	1.051	.077
<u>Political Establishment Threat</u>									
Turnout	.612***	.186	.178	.675***	.219	.138	.537***	.231	.095
<b>Controls</b>									
Democrat Vote	.025	.021	.018	-.001	.024	.001	.017	.028	.011
Democrat Mayor	.936*	.575	.049	1.841***	.728	.116	.918	.814	.012
Police Shootings	-.348	.303	.014	.146	.357	.007	.422	.380	.015
Police Budget/ City Budget	-.003*	.002	.033	-.001	.003	.000	-.003	.003	.004
Population	.001**	.001	.100	.001	.001	.011	.001	.001	.031
West <sup>17</sup>	-.191	.599	.003	-.009	.694	.000	.598	.743	.019
Northeast+ Midwest <sup>6</sup>	-.272	.576	.006	-.360	.668	.006	-.858	.813	.014
Cut 1	1.434	1.396	--	-.107	1.552	--	4.250	2.069	--
Cut 2	2.830	1.399	--	3.692	1.628	--	6.726	2.195	--
Cut 3	3.976	1.431	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cut 4	5.391	1.503	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cut 5	7.349	1.670	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<b>Tests</b>									
Eta Squared for Model	.541			.323			.497		
Prob>chi2	.000			.001			.000		
Pseudo R2	.231			.230			.313		

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; Eta-Sq. Refers to effect sizes for linear models; \* $p \leq .075$ ; \*\* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed)

<sup>14</sup> 1=Very low coverage 2=low coverage 3=medium-low coverage 4=medium-high coverage 5=high coverage 6=very high coverage

<sup>15</sup> 0=No positive coverage 1=either praise or humanization of protesters 2=praise and humanization of protesters

<sup>16</sup> 0=No negative coverage 1=either criticism or report of cost of protest 2=criticism and report of cost of protest

<sup>17</sup> Reference Category: South



Property damage had a greater effect on overall coverage, with more than 10%, whereas for negative coverage the effect was only 7.7%. Turnout had the strongest effect in all models, ranging between the 9.5% effect on negative coverage to the 17.8% effect on overall coverage.

The Adjusted R Square score tells us that these three models explain between 23% and 31% of variation in the respective dependent variables. However, and partly due to small sample size, most controls did not have a significant effect, with a few exceptions: cities with Democrat mayors and larger populations were more likely to witness greater coverage, whereas cities with larger police budgets as a proportion of the city budget witnessed less coverage. Cities with Democrat mayors also witnessed more positive coverage.

On the whole, these models lead me to confirm Hypothesis 1: all forms of threat did have a positive effect on overall coverage. As for the role of violence and property damage in affecting negative and positive coverage, the findings confirm Hypothesis 2 because these forms of disruptive behavior do make criticism more likely. However I find no confirmation for Hypothesis 3, because violence and property damage have no effect on positive coverage, instead of my expectation of a negative effect. My results for turnout are similar: I can confirm Hypothesis 4, which expects a positive effect of large turnouts on negative coverage. Yet the results for positive coverage are surprising: turnouts have a positive and not a negative effect on this form of media attention. Therefore I can dismiss Hypothesis 5.

Table 27: Ordinal logit regression models estimating effects of threat (September 17<sup>th</sup> - October 15<sup>th</sup>, 2011) and controls on media coverage of local Occupy chapters (October 16<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011) by local newspapers (N=74)

	Model 1: Overall Coverage <sup>18</sup>			Model 2: Positive Coverage <sup>19</sup>			Model 3: Negative Coverage <sup>20</sup>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>									
<u>Police Threat</u>									
	B	S.E.	Eta-Sq.	B	S.E.	Eta-Sq.	B	S.E.	Eta-Sq.
Violence & Property Damage	2.300**	1.347	.022	-.602	1.175	.004	.439	1.360	.022
<u>Political Establishment Threat</u>									
Turnout	.537***	.166	.188	.627***	.193	.158	.492**	.244	.048
<b>Controls</b>									
Democrat Vote	.021	.019	.023	-.002	.021	.000	.053**	.028	.055
Democrat Mayor	1.081**	.544	.058	1.557***	.638	.093	1.963**	1.021	.032
Police Shootings	-.121	.311	.004	-.854***	.346	.090	.781**	.444	.037
Police Budget/ City Budget	-.003	.002	.017	-.002	.002	.006	.001	.003	.003
Population	.001**	.001	.058	.001**	.001	.039	.001	.001	.000
West <sup>21</sup>	.663	.568	.013	-.114	.627	.000	1.567**	.823	.061
Northeast+ Midwest <sup>22</sup>	-.284	.570	.006	-.737	.616	.017	-.299	.884	.010
Cut 1	.908	1.259	--	.204	1.314	--	8.719	2.364	--
Cut 2	2.003	1.238	--	3.155	1.383	--	10.711	2.542	--
Cut 3	2.912	1.238	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cut 4	3.981	1.271	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cut 5	5.017	1.343	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cut 6	6.306	.435	--						
<b>Tests</b>									
Eta Squared for Model	.443			.316			.384		
Prob>chi2	.000			.002			.000		
Pseudo R2	.152			.174			.303		

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; Eta-Sq. Refers to effect sizes for linear models; \* $p \leq .075$ ; \*\* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed)

<sup>18</sup> 0=No coverage 1=Very low coverage 2=low coverage 3=medium-low coverage 4=medium-high coverage 5=high coverage 6=very high coverage

<sup>19</sup> 0=No positive coverage 1=either praise or humanization of protesters 2=praise and humanization of protesters

<sup>20</sup> 0=No negative coverage 1=either criticism or report of cost of protest 2=criticism and report of cost of protest

<sup>21</sup> Reference Category: South

<sup>22</sup> Reference Category: South

However there is a timing issue with these models. They test for the role of threat characteristics, which were measured in September-October 2011, to explain media praise and criticism, which took place at the same time. This model can more effectively capture the immediate reaction to threatening events in the first month of existence of the movement. The main disadvantage, however, is that, I do not know whether the coverage precedes or follows the threatening behavior. However, it is far more likely that the media reacts to threatening behavior by protesters than the other way around. Therefore I am still confident of the direction of the correlation between the events.

In another set of models, found in Table 27, I have looked at the role of threatening behavior by Occupy activists before October 14<sup>th</sup> in explaining media praise and criticism between October 16<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup>. Due to the low number of cases of violence and property damage, in this set of models these two variables had to be merged together. The results are similar to the ones reported in the original set of models, with one exception: violence and property damage have no significant effect on negative coverage. However I am convinced that this model is more problematic and less effective in my analysis for two reasons. First, by only analyzing media coverage in late October, this model fails to capture the media's immediate reaction to threatening events that took place more than 1-2 days before the October 20<sup>th</sup> cut-off. Second, this model explains only part of the media coverage that is analyzed in the second set of models (the coverage between October 16<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup>), and only part of the threat (only the threatening actions which took place

Table 28: Simple logit regression models estimating effects of media coverage (September 17<sup>th</sup>-October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011), threat (September 17<sup>th</sup>-October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011) and controls on repression (November 1<sup>st</sup>-30<sup>th</sup>, 2011) of Occupy movement (N=74)

	Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
<b>Independent Variables</b>									
<u>Police Threat</u>									
	b	S.E.	Eta-Sq.	B	S.E.	Eta-Sq.	b	S.E.	Eta-Sq.
Violence	3.347**	1.939	.103	3.098*	1.942	.095	3.118*	1.954	.064
Property Damage	.639	1.547	.012	.361	1.614	.010	.110	1.706	.001
<u>Political Establishment Threat</u>									
Turnout	.402	.319	.020	.321	.354	.015	.096	.405	.002
<u>Media Characteristics</u>									
Overall Coverage	--	--	--	.210	.398	.000	--	--	--
Positive Coverage	--	--	--	--	--	--	.558	1.074	.000
Negative Coverage	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.663**	.816	.078
<b>Controls</b>									
Democrat Vote	-.040	.045	.009	-.050	.050	.009	-.090	.064	.016
Democrat Mayor	.806	1.162	.006	.722	1.189	.005	.742	1.421	.002
Police Shootings	-.143	.571	.001	-.065	.596	.000	-.328	.644	.004
Police Budget/ City Budget	-.006	.005	.017	-.006	.005	.015	-.008	.006	.013
Population	.001**	.001	.165	.001**	.001	.147	.001**	.001	.139
West <sup>23</sup>	1.180	1.012	.030	1.205	1.020	.030	.990	1.147	.019
Northeast+ Mid-west <sup>7</sup>	-.760	1.396	.003	-.70	1.413	.003	-.162	1.607	.000
Constant	-1.759	2.647	--	-1.715	2.647	--	-.322	3.129	--
<b>Tests</b>									
Prob>chi2	.003			.005			.002		
Pseudo R Squared	.382			.386			.462		
Eta Squared for Model	.381			.382			.431		
AIC	64.492			66.209			63.024		
BIC	89.837			93.857			92.977		

Notes: S.E. refers to robust standard errors; Eta-Sq. Refers to effect sizes for linear models; \* $p \leq .075$ ; \*\* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed)

<sup>23</sup> Reference Category: South

before October 20<sup>th</sup>). Therefore this new model does not account for a large part of variation in the three main independent variables.

#### 4.3.3: Models 3-4: Effects of Threat, Media Criticism and Praise in Repression

In the next set of Models (4, 5 & 6) found on Table 28, I analyze the role of threat, media praise and media criticism in predicting repression. Here, my dependent variable is binary, therefore I use simple logistic regression in all of these models. Once again, the test for significance is one-tailed due to the small number of variables.

In Model 4, we can observe that violence has a significant and positive effect on repression, yet the other two forms of threat do not. The coefficient shows us that for every violent act by protesters, violent repression is 3 times more likely. According to Eta-Squared scores, violence accounts for just over 10% of variation in the dependent variable, whereas the whole model explains about 38% according to both Eta Squared and Pseudo R Squared scores.

In Model 5 I retain my measures of threat, while adding my measure for overall coverage. Overall coverage does not have a significant effect on violent repression and, consequently, Model 5 isn't very different from Model 4: protester violence still has a strong effect while other independent variables do not, and the overall effect of the whole model is very similar to that of the previous one. The Eta Squared and Pseudo R Squared scores for Model 5 are only marginally better than those of Model 4. The AIC and BIC scores, which tell us how good of a fit the model is for explaining variation in the dependent variable, are worse for Model 5 than for Model 4.

In Model 6 I add the measures for positive and negative coverage while removing the measure for overall coverage, because of multicollinearity between overall and positive coverage. We can see that the significant effect of protester violence is mostly unchanged: this form of violence makes violent repression still about 3 times more likely, although the overall effect on the dependent variable is down to 6.4%. Other forms of threat still have no significant effect on the dependent variable. In this model we can see that positive coverage has no significant effect on violent repression, however negative coverage does. For every time in which the ordinal measure for negative coverage goes up by a unit, violent repression is 1.5 times more likely. Negative coverage also contributes to almost 8% of all variation in the dependent variable. The whole model's Eta Squared score shows us that it explains about 5% more variation than the previous two. This model has also a better AIC score than the previous two. However, the BIC score, which tends to reward smaller models, is better for Model 4 than Model 5. On the balance of evidence, Model 6 seems to give us better evidence of causation of repression than the previous two.

On the whole, these findings confirm expectations from the literature on the effect of overall and negative coverage on repression. I can therefore confirm Hypothesis 6, which states that overall coverage has no effect on repression. I can also confirm Hypothesis 7, which states that negative coverage has a positive effect on repression. Yet positive coverage has no effect on repression. Therefore, I can dismiss Hypothesis 8, which states that positive coverage has a negative effect on repression. Lastly, my findings confirm Hypothesis 9, which states that media variables have a mediating effect on the role of

threat in repression. The data show that, although only two of my three media variables were significant, they did mediate the effect of threat on repression by reducing the effect size and coefficient of protester violence.

## 4.4 DISCUSSION

### 4.4.1: Explaining the Effect of Threat on Media Criticism and Praise

. All forms of threat, including violence, property damage and turnout, have a positive effect on overall coverage, confirming past findings by Gitlin (1980), Wisler and Giugni (1999) and Gans (1979). My findings on threat's role in media criticism also confirm the expectation of scholars including Garrow (1978) and Gitlin (1980). Threat does have a positive effect on negative coverage. As expected by the previous literature, larger turnouts, violence and property damage do make critical coverage more likely.

Yet threat has a positive effect and not a negative one on media praise. This means that more threatening movements are receiving more sympathy, whereas less threatening movements are receiving less support from the media, and not more. Yet not all types of threat are significant: violence and property damage have no effect on media praise, but turnout does. This finding contradicts expectations of Garrow (1978) and Gitlin (1980) who would expect positive coverage to have a negative correlation to violence and property damage. However they also confirm expectations of authors such as Della Porta (1995) and Koopmans (1993) who saw large protests as more legitimate and therefore as a more likely object of praise. We also should take note of the fact that the Occupy protests didn't receive extensive attention in their first few weeks. Therefore, it is likely that many chapters managed to finally get attention, both positive and negative, in October 2011 by means of carrying out disruptive actions.

There is also another dynamic that helps explain this pattern of media reaction to threat. It is a process first explained by Michael Lipsky. He observed that “reporters de-



mand newsworthiness of their subjects in the short run, but also require reliability and verifiability in the longer run” meaning that “newspapers at first may be attracted to sensationalism, and later demand verifiability in the interests of community harmony” (Lipsky, 1968:1152). This process is similar to the changes in positive and negative coverage which I observed in Figure 2: at the start of the Occupy protests, the coverage was almost completely sympathetic and attempted to explain to the public the ideas of the Occupy movement in a sensationalistic manner. While this type of coverage went into only slight decline by late October, the sharp rise in negative coverage in this period coincides with what Lipsky refers to as the media's growing demand for verifiability in the interests of community harmony. In this case, the growing problems at encampments and the burden they caused to taxpayers in terms of property damage and cost of 24 hour patrolling by law enforcement spurred that late October drive towards more verifiability. Seen in this light, this positive effect of threat on both positive coverage and negative coverage feels more plausible. The media reacted to protester threat first by praising it and informing the public of its goals. As time wore on, its sympathy slightly waned, but its criticism mounted.

#### 4.4.2: Explaining the Effect of Threat, Media Praise and Criticism on Repression

Next up, I discuss the role of media praise and criticism in violent repression. My first consideration is that protester violence is the only form of threat to have an effect on violent repression. This shows that the direct effect of threat is not very strong in this model, and that it is mostly police threat, as defined by Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) rather than political establishment threat, to make a difference. Violence against people as

opposed to violence against property is a more visible and more controversial threat to public safety. Therefore we shouldn't be surprised that the former is more likely to invite repression than the latter. As for turnouts, as pointed out previously by Della Porta (1995), the police generally does not feel threatened by large protests, as long as they are peaceful. This explains why, for example, the police did not carry out violent repression against large but mostly peaceful Occupy protests in Boston and Chicago. Furthermore, the list of the local Occupy protests affected by repression includes large ones in cities like New York, Los Angeles and Oakland, but also relatively small ones in Dallas, Oklahoma City and Riverside. Therefore, turnout, for the most part, cannot explain violent repression.

Next, and contrary to what scholars such as Koopmans (2005), Garrow (1978) and Gitlin (1980) would have expected, positive coverage does not have a significant effect on repression. Therefore, even if media authorities are expressing positive opinions about a movement, as Della Porta (1995) and Wisler and Kriesi (1998) suggest, other elites, including law enforcement and political authorities are not responsive to these opinions. They will be just as likely to repress in cities where the local movement was the object of much praise as in cities in which the local movement received less positive coverage. For example, in large cities with very liberal local newspapers, such as Seattle, New York City and San Francisco, the local Occupy protests received abundant praise. However this praise did not in any way prevent authorities from carrying out repressive actions. Positive coverage does not make elites fear a public backlash against their repressive actions.

Yet Garrow (1978) and Gitlin (1980) are correct in expecting negative coverage to increase the chances of repression. This effect is strong enough to be significant net of threat. These findings can be linked to Jasper's (2011) observation on emotions in social movements. Here, I find that repressive forces are also more reactive to negative connotations and feelings than to positive ones. These negative connotations play a crucial role in persuading law enforcement and elected leaders to take violent action against a movement. Indeed, in cities such as Denver and Oakland, sustained opposition to the local Occupy movement by the local press included pleas to local authorities to act to remove the local encampment. An additional explanation for these dynamics can be provided by observing differences in the likelihood of negative and positive coverage: while positive coverage occurs in 70 out of 74 cities in the sample (or almost 95%), negative coverage takes place in only 27 cities (or 36%). Negative coverage has a greater impact because it is also less ubiquitous, and thus negative comments are more likely to stand out.

What are the implications of these findings? First of all, they reject past notions, put forth by Koopmans (2005) and weakness explanations which assume that movements should seek to receive all the publicity they can get from mass media outlets. Not all publicity is good publicity, and in fact this case shows that the contrary is true: certain types of bad publicity can lead to a higher likelihood of protesters encountering violent responses by law enforcement authorities. Bad publicity thus provides law enforcement authorities with the legitimacy to carry out repressive action, whereas good publicity does not do much to increase or decrease it.

The second major implication is that past work on repression has underestimated the role of threat, in the sense that it has not accounted for the media's role in amplifying it. Threat here is causally linked to negative coverage and this type of coverage, in turn, increases the likelihood of repression net of threat. Therefore, although the direct effect of threat on repression is still visible, negative coverage seems to drive repression even in some cases where threat levels are medium to low. For example, criticism drives repression even in cities like Philadelphia and Seattle which experienced relatively large but non-violent protests, as well as cities like Oklahoma City which experienced relatively small and non-violent protests.

The last implication of these findings is perhaps the most far-reaching. The media affects the likelihood of repression independently of threat and the newspaper coverage variables are uncorrelated to political opportunity structure indicators. Therefore we should start thinking of the media as an independent political actor, which is responsive to threat but also behaves independently of it. The actions of the media cannot be predicted on the basis of political alignments in each city. Indeed, the media opposed Occupy protesters in liberal New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles as much as in not-so-liberal Tulsa and Dallas. Therefore the news media is an independent institution which can shape the outcome of protest independently of the behavior of other salient city institutions.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION**

## 5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### 5.1.1: Summary of findings on differences in social movement size

The 2<sup>nd</sup> part of this dissertation focused on the causes behind differences in protest size in the Occupy movement. An initial analysis demonstrated that students and colleges played a pivotal role in increasing protest turnout. Given the pivotal role which students have played in recent and not-so-recent protests, this finding wasn't particularly surprising or groundbreaking, and led me to focus on which characteristics of student populations make larger turnouts more likely. The findings partly confirmed and partly contradicted the literature on student activism. Large protests were more likely in cities with more liberal campuses, with wealthier students and with the institutional support from Chicano studies departments.

These dynamics are very similar to those in the 1960s wave of student protests observed by Lipset and Altbach (1966), Kahn and Bowers (1970), Altbach (1984) and Wallimann and Zito (1984) as well as scholarship on more recent cases such as the works by Altbach and Cohen (1990), Rhoads (1998). However, the students who aided the Occupy movement are different from their counterparts in the 1960s protests and the more recent 1980s protests against Apartheid in two ways. First of all, they tend to increase protest size in cities where there is a larger number of smaller colleges, which contradicts past findings by Lipset and Altbach (1966), Blau and Slaughter (1971) and Van Dyke (1998). I argue that smaller colleges were an advantage to student mobilization in this case because they are more integrated and better networked communities, and the amount of direct contact in these colleges between students and administrators means that the

former may be able to rapidly mobilize more resources through the colleges. The second contradictory finding was that students from non-elite colleges were more likely to increase turnouts than students from elite colleges, in direct contradiction with past studies by Lipset and Altbach (1966) and Soule (1997), who observed the opposite dynamic in student protests. My hypothesis in this respect is that relatively wealthy students from non-elite colleges were motivated by a perception of status inconsistency. This inconsistency was due to the fact that these students knew that they would not find a good job at the end of their studies due to the relative lack of reputation of their colleges and be able to replicate their parents' socioeconomic status.

On the whole, this part has furthered our understanding of the relationship between mobilization and student protest in two different ways. First of all, it has informed us on how student protest dynamics have changed in the U.S. between the 1960s and the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Second, it has shown how student populations can influence not only the likelihood of protest presence and social movement emergence, but also differences in protest size. However, we should also acknowledge that other factors may have shaped these results. First of all, even though we know that many students partook in these protests, we have no way of knowing if their characteristics match the features of student populations which I have analyzed. Second, besides the controls for which I have accounted, other factors (which I was not able to measure) might have been highly influential in shaping turnouts, such as the networks which protest organizers could tap into. the tactics which they used to reach out to others as well as the presence or absence of tensions in activist networks at the point in time in which the Occupy protests took place.

### 5.1.2: Summary of findings on differences in social movement duration

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> part of this dissertation I demonstrated how protest size is crucial in determining the likelihood of movement campaigns to last. The case of Occupy encampments has shown that larger protests tend to last for less whereas smaller protests tend to endure for a longer period of time. These findings contradict the expectation of authors such as McAdam (1982) and Everett (1992) who see size as an asset, and argue that larger movements tend to accumulate more resources, networks and opportunities, which in turn help the protest endure. However this was not the case. Instead, the most plausible dynamic was that argued previously by Nepstad (2004) and Staggenborg (1998): smaller movements have a greater sense of community, a greater density of internal networks and a better capacity to manage tensions and burnout. Additionally, as argued by Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) smaller movements are more likely to avoid repression and the setbacks associated with it. On the whole, this part of the dissertation has demonstrated that movement size is a key disadvantage to movements that aim at carrying forward long-lasting campaigns. Furthermore, I have furthered our understanding of the dynamics behind movement campaign duration. I have done so not only by demonstrating the role of size, but also by showing that movements can last thanks to the acquisition of material resources and the avoidance of criticism by local elected leaders. Not receiving large amounts of coverage may help in some cases. Yet there is also a great degree of uncertainty on whether repression is an advantage or a disadvantage. That said, also in this case, some unmeasured factors may have been influential in shaping these outcomes. For example, the tactics, strategy and networks chosen by the activists at encampments may



have affected the availability of resources which enabled them to continue their protests. Newspapers also reported shifts in the presence of homeless people in encampments, but there is no precise data on how many of them were present at the various locations in which Occupy protesters were camped. Therefore, I cannot establish whether this factor might have played a crucial role.

### 5.1.3: Summary of findings on social movement repression

In the 4<sup>th</sup> section of this dissertation, I analyzed variation in violent repression of Occupy Wall Street protests in November 2011. My analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing between positive and negative coverage (what Koopmans, 2004 & 2005, calls consonance and dissonance) and uses a two-step process which first considers the role of threat (including turnouts, violence and property damage) in affecting the likelihood of positive and negative coverage, and then considers the role of positive coverage, negative coverage and threat in affecting repression. In doing this, I test the expectations of authors including Garrow (1978), Gitlin (1980) and Koopmans (2004, 2005) who observed that the threatening behavior of protesters makes positive coverage less likely and negative coverage more likely, and that positive coverage makes repression less likely whereas negative coverage makes repression more likely. My findings partly confirm and partly contradict the expectations of the previous literature on social movement repression and media dynamics. On one hand, negative coverage does seem to have a positive relationship with threat and it does seem to affect repression. On the other hand, the media also respond to some forms of threatening behavior, namely turnout, with more praise, and this positive coverage has no effect on repression. The most plausible expla-

nation for this is that movements need to be threatening in order to gather attention, both positive and negative. Yet different types of threat lead to different types of reaction by established institutions. Violent behavior is met with mostly negative coverage, and will make repressive actions more likely. However, large turnouts will elicit mixed (both positive and negative) coverage and do not have a direct effect on violent repression. The findings can also be explained by looking at the timing of positive and negative coverage and the different ways in which newspapers respond to a movement's emergence and continued presence. Specifically, newspapers tend to react to a new movement initially with praise and support. In spite of this, once movement actions unfold, negative coverage becomes more prominent. That said, these results might have been affected by other factors which were not measured. For instance, the extent and nature of the media coverage of Occupy might have been influenced by the extent to which each local community's economy suffered during the recession. The political leanings of the journalists who covered the movement might also have affected the coverage. Lastly, some movement characteristics, such as the relative levels of wealth, ethnic background and appearance of the protesters may have also affected the likelihood of law enforcement to use violence against them. My analysis extensively covered most aspects of social movements and their context which tends to shape repression, but this coverage was not completely exhaustive.

#### 5.1.4: Overall summary of findings

Having summarized the conclusions from each part of the dissertation, I now set out to understand the relationship between these three sets of findings, as well as the con-

sequences of these relationships for our understanding of social movements. In terms of the relationship between my findings on size and social movement duration, my first consideration is that there is an overarching role played by various types of resources and opportunities for Occupy protesters. In the section on size, they include the support from social movement organizations, large numbers of small college campuses, the presence of students who are relatively more well off than the overall population and the institutional support of Chicano studies departments. In the section on duration, they include the avoidance of elected leader criticism in the press and encampment resources including libraries, food stalls and information booths. In this respect, these results are consistent with most social movement scholarship in the last few decades (most notably McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982), which emphasizes strong role played by resources, networks and opportunities.

My second major consideration regarding these results points out to a clear contradiction between the two sections which present them. If protest size is analyzed and considered to be an asset in the first section of the dissertation, then why do the results in the third section of the paper (and partly in the third) show that this same feature is a clear setback for movement duration? From a theoretical standpoint, this shows that we shouldn't see either size or duration as an asset. Large movements can attract more attention and have a greater hope of influencing policies and elites. However they also tend to be more disruptive, more likely to be the object of controversy and criticism and more susceptible to repression. Small movements can last longer and encounter very little resistance from elites including the media and law enforcement. However they are also

more likely to be seen as irrelevant or ineffective. Ultimately, it all depends on how we measure social movement success. In the case of Occupy, if we consider giving exposure to new issues and grievances and gaining media attention as a form of success, we should consider the movement's chapters in New York City, Oakland and Los Angeles as the movement's strongest chapters. But if we measure success in terms of campaign duration and avoiding repression, then we might see the small Occupy protests in Columbus, OH, Honolulu and Memphis as the most thriving iterations of the movement.

My third consideration is that the prominent role of students in larger chapters may have played a role in the rapid demise of these encampments. Students were among the youngest of Occupy participants. As such, they may have not been the most apt at negotiating and compromising with authorities as well as establishing a sustainable encampment community in which all participants are accountable to each other. Therefore, I argue that large Occupy encampments, which were found mostly in cities with large student populations, may have had young participants who were less equipped to negotiate with authorities and develop a sustainable community within the encampment. This, alongside the common features of relatively large and small encampments described in the 3<sup>rd</sup> section of this dissertation, may have contributed to the more rapid demise of some of the largest Occupy encampments, such as those in Portland, OR and New York City. These dynamics are similar to historical perceptions (see Gitlin, 1980) of student protests in the late 1960s against the Vietnam War as being more disruptive and less organized compared to the Civil Rights movement protests in the early 1960s.

When we consider the relationship between the results from the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter of this dissertation and those from the previous 2, we may also state a similar hypothesis with regards to the role of students in repression. Students played a prominent role in bolstering turnout, which in turn had an indirect effect on repression by making negative media coverage more likely. Yet why would the press be more likely to criticize protesters in places where students played a more prominent role? Students are more likely to be idealistic, and to brush off the media and other institutions as elites whose support the movement didn't need to court. Furthermore, due to their young age, students may be less likely to have had experience in interacting with the media in the capacity of a social movement representative. This may have led to more misunderstandings and negative interactions in cities where student numbers bolstered Occupy turnouts. In turn, these misunderstandings and negative interactions led to negative coverage, which gave law enforcement the legitimacy to carry out repressive actions. Again, these dynamics resemble past historical perceptions of protests in the late 1960s which witnessed fierce repression especially during two episodes of student-led protests at the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968 and at Kent State in 1970.

Because my explanation for duration leans on the assumption that size matters because larger movements are more likely to be repressed, as argued by Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003), and because this perception is confirmed by the chapter on repression, the fact that repression does not seem to influence at all the likelihood of an eviction is a clear logical issue. If repression does not seem to matter for campaign size, why should avoiding repression be considered a strategic advantage for survival for smaller move-

ments? There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that repression did hurt the Occupy movement. However it also galvanized it, and these two effects are difficult to distinguish from each other. If this is true, both of the opposing dynamics argued in the literature on repression, and summarized by Davenport (2005) would apply. The events at Occupy Oakland definitely point towards this hypothesis. The second possible explanation is that smaller movements avoided other forms of repression that were less visible and harder to measure, such as police surveillance, denial of camping and protest permits, and that this gave them an advantage over larger movements.

The final consideration which emerges from comparing results from the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter of this project with the rest of it pertains to the following question: if size decreases the likelihood of movement campaigns to last and, indirectly, increases the likelihood of repression, why does media criticism only affect repression and not duration? The explanation here lies with our knowledge of the relative extent of media coverage received by Occupy chapters over time. Although the media gave extensive attention to Occupy chapters in their first month to two months of existence, in the vast majority of cases media attention waned after roughly two months from the start of the local chapter. Therefore, if the media played a role in the demise of some of the shortest Occupy chapters, it was marginally influential for the majority of the ones which lasted more than a month.



## 5.2 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

### 5.2.1: Limitations

There are four sets of limitations to this research project. The first pertains to the project in general, and the other three are related to the limitations for each of the empirical chapters. The first limitation concerning the dissertation in general is that the Occupy movement, during the period under analysis, had just been formed and was very informal in nature. Therefore the analysis may not adequately capture the logistical advantages that are enjoyed by large and formalized social movement organizations. Consequently, these results may not be generalizable to more formal social movements. Second, this study covers a social movement in the developed world, in a stable democracy, in a context of relatively low repression compared to states that are less democratic in nature. Therefore my analysis may not apply to social movements in developing countries and non-democracies.

With regards to the limitations pertinent to the analysis of differences in protest size, first of all, although we know that students in general played a prominent role in the Occupy protests, we have no evidence that students really did participate at greater rates in cities with larger protest turnouts. However, the chapters with larger turnouts also usually generated extensive media coverage. This coverage was fairly unanimous in acknowledging the widespread participation of students. Therefore, even though we have no hard evidence that students actually bolstered turnouts, we know that they were a significant factor. The second limitation for this chapter is that most of the data on college and student population characteristics assumes that most of the students in each city are



studying at the closest possible local colleges. Therefore, my data do not account for students who are engaged in long distance learning at colleges located far from their hometown, or students who are commuting distances greater than 10 miles. These commutes are not unheard of in the largest metropolitan areas of the U.S., such as the Bay Area, the greater Los Angeles area and the New York City-Northern New Jersey metropolitan area. However, since most college students are based at local institutions, the data are representative of the majority of students in the local area.

In terms of the limitations for the chapter on duration, my indicator for size which was the main explanatory variable focuses on cumulative protest size. However there was no significant correlation between encampment turnouts and campaign duration. Therefore, the findings only apply to size as a measure of the overall number of people which a movement can mobilize, but not size understood as the 'inner circle' of activists who are actually involved in managing the encampment and its day to day business. However, the former measure of size is the most widely used, since it measures the movement's capacity to turn out protesters as opposed to merely the total size of its highly involved activist 'core'. There were also doubts in determining when encampments started and ended, due to inconsistencies between media and activist reports, and ambiguities in the way the media defined the end of encampments. In some cases, even though the movement ended the encampment in its official capacity, some protesters stayed in the encampment. To deal with these issues, I always assumed that, in terms of the inconsistencies, the truth usually lay halfway between the media's version of facts and the protesters' version of facts. And

I considered an encampment as ended when the movement, in its official capacity, left its encampment, regardless of the decision of a few protesters to remain after the event.

In terms of the limitations pertinent to the section on repression, I make the following considerations. First, most of the movement-driven data in this analysis are taken from media sources themselves. Therefore this analysis does not evade elite bias. The difficulties encountered in collecting systematic and comparable data directly from the protesters mean that researchers have to mostly rely on information from external sources. Yet, due to the lack of alternative data sources, there is little that can be done to avoid this form of bias. Second, only newspaper coverage was used, not television coverage, social media or web coverage. Therefore, I still do not know if the findings apply to these other prominent forms of media. Yet, due to limitations of time and parsimony, it is hard to envisage an analysis that can create coherent databases for more than one type of media. Third, there were some timing issues with regards to the first part of this analysis. Due to the fast paced course of events covered by the analysis, difficulties were encountered in reconstructing a completely infallible model of temporal causation. My Table 24 attempts to provide an analytical solution to this problem, yet it cannot fully account for the full temporal interspersions of protests, episodes of disruptive behavior on behalf of protesters, media criticism and praise, and repression.

#### 5.2.2: Implications for future research

Future research should attempt to link my quantitative findings to the past and mostly qualitative findings, by way of a mixed methods project. This type of research would also have the ability to determine whether students were more of a prominent

presence in the Occupy movement in cities which had large student population. With this approach I could also demonstrate what characteristics of large protest movements makes them more vulnerable over time than smaller ones, as well as which resources really matter for movement duration and why. Qualitative and mixed methods work could also help gain further insight on whether the local media really did influence the decisions made by law enforcement and elected leaders about repression and eviction of Occupy encampments. Furthermore, future work should try and bridge the gap between the findings on duration of institutionalized and non-institutionalized movement forms. In this way we can understand whether students are more likely to join more non-institutionalized movements, such as the anti-Vietnam war protests and the Occupy movement, or whether students participate just as much in more institutionalized protest actions. This type of research could also focus on patterns of duration and repression in a heterogeneous sample of movements which includes more formalized social movement organizations as well as more informal groupings such as Occupy Wall Street. Lastly, future work should try and analyze how marches and actions by protest movements, resources, media coverage, repression and campaign duration interact to produce different outcomes, while taking in consideration the considerable contention that exists over what constitutes movement success and failure.

### 5.3 LESSONS FOR AND FROM THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT

#### 5.3.1: How can this project inform Occupy activists?

This project could not be complete without some final considerations on its relationship with the social movement which it has covered. Consequently, I will first of all explore the ways in which this project can inform Occupy activists. Then I will conclude this dissertation by stating some of the main accomplishments of the Occupy movement. On the whole, this project informs activists on the dynamics affecting three outcomes which are often cherished by protesters: mobilizing large numbers, lasting longer periods of time and avoiding repression.

If activists seek to mobilize large numbers, this project confirms that some of the most popular strategies described in the past literature are also effective here, such as targeting students and college campuses and relying on the help of other social movement organizations. My project also gives useful insights into which campuses and which student populations might be more fertile grounds for recruitment. Campuses with relatively more affluent student populations have students who usually have the biographical availability to participate to protests. However, elite college students may not be receptive to movements which seek to protest social and economic inequality. Although tuition may be a key grievance, students who are paying vastly different sums for their education may be equally good targets for recruitment. Chicano studies departments may provide strong institutional support for protest, however African American studies and Women's studies departments might be less influential. Lastly, liberal college campuses may be more receptive to left-wing protest.

In terms of the long term survival of informal movement organizations such as Occupy, this project shows that size is not an asset. Therefore, social movements should concentrate on establishing a small nucleus of committed activists to keep the movement and its cause alive over time. Other factors may also be important, such as avoiding criticism by salient local political leaders and retaining key logistical resources. However, size matters the most in making duration over time most likely. This result may seem puzzling to activists, many of whom are convinced that it is in a movement's best interest to recruit as many activists as possible. I do not deny that large movements can be useful, especially in terms of gaining media attention and influencing political outcomes. However, large levels of participation can come and go very quickly. In the long term, movements need a small but committed core of activists in order to survive periods of time in which they are not able to mobilize large numbers.

My contribution in terms of the strategies which movements should adopt in order to avoid repression is that movements should try at all costs to avoid media criticism. Activists need to be very careful about the way they communicate with the press. The press will not hesitate to portray activists in a negative light if they engage in violence against people and property. However movements are liable to be criticized even if they do not commit those acts. In these cases, activists should be careful about framing their goals and objectives in ways that do not elicit criticism from the press. They should also be careful about their impact in terms of the cost of protests to taxpayers. Established authorities generally tolerate expressions of grievances. However, if this expression ends up costing the city in terms of cleaning and police overtime, the media and law enforce-

ment may withdraw their support and sympathy. Lastly, activists should not see the gaining of extensive media coverage as a factor that will shield them from future criticism or future repression. Media sympathy and attention are generally easy to obtain, but are also equally easy to lose.

### 5.3.2: What have we learned from the Occupy movement?

The Occupy Movement has been widely criticized by opponents and allies alike. Most notably, the movement's insistence on using an informal organizational structure with no clear membership or established hierarchies and divisions of roles among activists has meant that Occupy has failed to mobilize and gain attention after its peak mobilization in late 2011 (Dong, 2012). Furthermore, many of the anti-austerity movements in Europe have made a significant impact on their respective political systems, either by giving birth to a new political party (in Spain, Indignados activists formed the Podemos political party, which has been moderately successful in local and national elections) or by lending support to an existing political formation (in Greece, support from anti-austerity protests helped the left-wing SYRIZA party gain power in 2015 and in the U.S. the Tea Party galvanized the Republican party and brought the election of many Tea Party friendly candidates). However the Occupy movement has not formed a viable national political movement. Furthermore, while some of its activists support the Democratic party, this support has not resulted in electoral successes, with Democrats losing control of both chambers of congress in 2014 and losing the 2016 Presidential election to Donald Trump.

This criticism should be taken seriously. In spite of its ability to mobilize and galvanize activists as well as gaining lots of media attention, it is hard to deny that it has had a limited ability to conserve its momentum after the peak of mobilization. Political returns have also been limited, compared both to its foreign and domestic counterparts. Yet the movement can still claim some important contributions to activist culture as well as political discourse and political institutions. Its first and most notable contribution has been to raise awareness about social and economic inequality in a society which has historically had a limited awareness of these issues. Although economic differences have been a feature of U.S. society from its inception, the gap between the wealthy and the poor has been constantly climbing since the 1980s and reached historically high levels at the peak of the financial crisis (Stone, Trisi, Sherman and Horton, 2016). In this respect, the Occupy movement has been a controversial but necessary messenger for an inconvenient truth.

The Occupy movement's myriad of local actions also increased awareness of salient issues in the communities where they took place. Occupy Sandy helped boost community-based relief efforts in New York and New Jersey after Hurricane Sandy. This was a welcome effort for people who were not able to obtain relief and help from government agencies. Occupy activists also protested against bank foreclosures of homes and raised awareness of this issue in many cities, including Atlanta, New York and Oakland. Lastly, Occupy activists have also participated and lent support to strike actions by hotel workers' unions in Los Angeles and nurses and teachers in Chicago.

The third contribution of this movement is that, thanks to its lack of goals, it has provided a platform for left-wing activists of different persuasions to engage in a fruitful conversation with each other. In a society increasingly dominated by single-issue movements and grievances, the Occupy movement tried to summarize all of the different demands and ideologies of the American left in a single social force, in spite of all the issues of incoherence and lack of cohesiveness that came with this effort. This process within this movement, in all likelihood, has provided a political springboard for later movements in the American left, including Black Lives Matters and other movements against police brutality, the protests against the North Dakota Access Pipeline and the recent protests against Donald Trump.

My last argument is that the movement's impact on American politics, however smaller than that of its counterparts in the U.S. and abroad, should not be underestimated. A part of the movement is committed to supporting left-wing Democratic candidates, and has voiced important support for successful candidates such as Bill De Blasio, who was elected mayor of New York City in 2015 and Elizabeth Warren, who has been representing Massachusetts in the U.S. Senate since 2013 (Krieg, 2016). However the biggest sign of the impact of the Occupy movement on the Democratic party has been Bernie Sanders' unsuccessful bid to be the party's candidate for the 2016 Presidential elections. Although Sanders eventually lost the primaries to Hilary Clinton, he was far more successful in the primaries than any other recent radical-left presidential candidate with a strong message of economic inequality, like Dennis Kucinich in 2004 and 2008 and Mike Gravel in 2008. Although the Democratic party still is in many ways an organization which supports cor-



porate interests, the success of Sanders makes demands for greater economic justice and equality harder to ignore. Only time will tell us whether these ideas, first championed by Occupy, will eventually gain an opportunity to be a priority for plans to reform American society.

**CHAPTER 6: APPENDIX**

## 6.1 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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