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Jail Incarceration and Violent Crime Rates: A cross-sectional exploratory analysis in Albuquerque, New Mexico

Saundra Trujillo

Saundra Trujillo
Candidate

Sociology
Department

This thesis is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:

Approved by the Thesis Committee:

Dr. Maria Vélez , Chairperson

Dr. Christopher Lyons

Dr. Lisa Broidy

JAIL INCARCERATION AND VIOLENT CRIME RATES:
A CROSS-SECTIONAL EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS IN ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

by

SAUNDRA TRUJILLO

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
B.A., SOCIOLOGY

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"Those who trust in the Lord will find new strength. They will soar high on wings like eagles. They will run and not grow weary. They will walk and not faint." Isaiah 40:31

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Saundra Trujillo
The University of New Mexico
B.A., Sociology

ABSTRACT

A core idea in the collateral consequences literature is that incarceration stimulates residential instability – a process referred to as coercive mobility – which in turn weakens community social organization and elevates local crime levels. I test this idea with an exploratory cross-sectional analysis of Albuquerque neighborhoods (2000-2001) using a general linear model with a negative binomial response function. Net of rigorous controls I find that jail incarceration increases violent crime rates. Further I find that the positive effect of jail incarcerations on violent crime is weakened at relatively high levels of jail incarceration for majority Latino neighborhoods. Whereas, in non Latino neighborhoods, jail incarceration increases violent crime at relatively low levels of incarceration. By studying jail sanctions which are often shorter and for less serious crimes than prison sanctions, this study is well positioned to provide a broader snapshot of how our expansive criminal justice net has captured residents of many communities for short-term punishment that has long term consequences.

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Introduction

For nearly thirty years, an increasing proportion of the population has experienced jail incarceration. Yet, over these same years there has been a decrease in the rate of reported crimes. This practice of incapacitating record numbers of criminal offenders has been discussed at length in legal, criminological and penology literature. As recently as 1992, The U.S. Office of Policy Development published *The Case for More Incarceration* and argued that the United States needed to continue its tough stance against crime by building more prisons and incarcerating more criminals in the name of public safety (Department of Justice 1992). Since the late 1960s, politicians have run campaigns founded on "tough on crime" rhetoric. Indeed, local and national anti-drug and crime policies have paved the way for the United States to be the industrialized country with the largest prison population in the world (sentencingproject.org). This move toward mass incarceration has prompted criminologists to assess the effects of a mounting criminal justice system on a variety of macro outcomes. In general, research shows that at the neighborhood level concentrated prison incarcerations yield high levels of unemployment, high levels of poverty, familial breakdown, poor health outcomes, political disenfranchisement and often increasing levels of crime (Carlson &Cervera 1992; Freeman 1992; Edin& Lenin 1997; Lynch and Sabol 2003, 2004; Pager 2003& 2007; King &Mauer; 2004; Pettit & Western 2004; Western 2006; Pager &Quillian 2005; Thomas &Torrone 2006; Uggen et al., 2006; Mauer 2006; Clear 2007; Scheyett et al., 2010). Such works have suggested that the expansion of severe criminal justice sanctioning may have dire "costs" to our communities. This literature sparked a debate between the scholars who argue that incarceration potentially harms communities and

decreases community safety versus those who argue that incarceration deters crime thus making community life safer. The current work seeks to join the debate.

Much of the above literature on the relationship between criminal justice sanctions and subsequent crime has focused on *imprisonment* and neglected the more frequently imposed sanction of jail incarceration. The overemphasis on prison sanctions is problematic because it may underestimate the extent to which the expanding criminal justice net affects our communities. There are approximately 5 million more citizens caught-up in the criminal justice system than what is reflected in prison incarceration alone. Yet, to my knowledge, there is little research on how this has affected community safety. Between 2000 and 2006, the average daily jail population increased by roughly 24% (Bureau of Justice Statistics; 2009). Jail incarceration is generally the second step in the criminal justice sanctioning process; it occurs after criminal charges and arrest. As such, jail incarceration is imposed upon those charged and/or convicted of less serious crimes then subsequently released back into the community under probation supervision-restrictions. Thus, jail incarceration captures the more frequent "ins and outs" of offenders. In contrast, prison sanctions aim to remove the most violent, dangerous residents from the community for extended periods of time. What happens to a community's level of violent crime when incarceration reflects the activities of less serious, non-violent offenders including misdemeanor crimes such as traffic violations? It may be that when coercive mobility reflects minor crimes it is particularly destabilizing and crime producing.

Figure 1 Here

The current project assesses the role played by jail incarceration rates in shaping violent crime levels across 136 Albuquerque neighborhoods in the early to mid-2000s. It contributes to the community, collateral consequences and crime literature in two ways. First, previous research on the relationship between criminal justice sanctions and crime has focused on imprisonment; in contrast, the current study specifically explores how tract-level jail incarceration—the more commonplace criminal justice sanction-- affects crime rates in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Second, Albuquerque has significant Latino representation across neighborhoods. Specifically, forty-one census tracts of Albuquerque's 136 tracts are more than 50% Latino. Sixty-one percent of Albuquerque's majority Latino tracts also experience a high amount of jail incarceration. While much of the incarceration literature has examined how incarceration effects African American communities (Rose & Clear 1998; Clear et al., 2003; Renauer et al., 2006; Clear 2007; Hipp & Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009), little research assesses its impact on majority Latino communities. This study seeks to uncover the extent to which jail incarceration differentially affects majority Latino communities as compared to non Latino neighborhoods. It may be that the tightly knit social networks prevalent in Latino communities facilitate their ability to withstand the pernicious influence of jail incarceration, compared to non Latino neighborhoods often characterized by fewer social ties. It also might be that the effect of incarceration becomes redundant in majority Latino neighborhoods given their "ceiling" or high levels. Whereas in, non Latino neighborhoods, the "floor" or low levels of incarceration means a little incarceration

yields a major increase in violent crime. Given the extensive direct and indirect reach of the criminal justice system involvement into the lives of U.S. residents and a lack of knowledge on how jail incarceration affects our communities, there is a need for understanding whether and how it affects our communities regarding community safety and crime.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, drawing on four general theoretical perspectives, (two that suggest sanctions decrease crime, and two that suggest sanctions may increase crime,) I derive hypotheses about the relationship between jail and crime. Next I present the data and methods used for the current analysis. Finally, I explore the results of the analysis, note limitations of the study and suggest avenues for future research.

Four Frameworks on Community Safety and Imprisonment

Community and Procedural Justice suggest rising crime rates

Most criminological scholars agree that up to a point, criminal justice sanctions such as incarceration can be beneficial for the community. As seen with some deterrence and incapacitation arguments, criminal justice sanctions can potentially reduce crime in a community for a short time. However, the community justice framework, or coercive mobility hypothesis, expects that after a tipping point in the numbers of adult offenders relocated to and from prison, mechanisms within the community are set in motion that lead to an increase in crime over time thus reducing public safety. Coercive mobility literature suggests that the missing variable in attempting to explain why some communities do not to experience long-term positive, crime reducing effects of incarceration is due to the number of incarcerated residents in the community itself.

Mass imprisonment literature suggests that the incapacitation of the most serious criminals generally increases public safety by removing the most dangerous criminal residents from the community; however, after those offenders have been removed, the subsequent instability created by continued residential sanctioning of less threatening offenders harms important components of community organization (Taylor et. al., 2009). Drawing on social disorganization and systemic theories, residential stability enables communities to organize against crime via social networks within and outside the community; residential stability also provides a basis for collective efficacy and effective informal social controls (Shaw and McKay 1942; Bursik 1988). However, repeated removal of adults from the community for criminal sanctioning may, ironically, disrupt informal control mechanisms such as family formation, economic prospects, civic participation and conventional social networking through strong and weak ties (Clear 2007; Renauer et al 2006; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009). In this way, incarceration can be considered an adverse neighborhood condition similar to other noted conditions present in socially disorganized communities such as poverty, unemployment, residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity.

Coercive mobility, the residential relocation of accused criminals to and from jail, often ensures that the same people who are removed from a community also return to that community; this differs from the traditional conceptualization of residential instability. The traditional conceptualization of residential instability has encompassed the "assimilation of *newcomers* into the social fabric of local communities" that is temporary but still a barrier to the generation and maintenance of social ties (Sampson & Groves 1989). However, returning probationers or parolees are generally not newcomers to the

community. Often, probationers or parolees are returning to their community saddled with the baggage of long-term consequences of criminal sanctioning that burdens the community and strains conventional familial and friendship networks (Clear 2007, Western & Wildeman 2009; Moore 1996; Renauer et al., 2006). Prison and jail incarcerations cause a strain or break in strong and weak social ties (Clear 2007; Hipp & Yates 2009). Upon release from jail or prison, the ex-inmate must be re-integrated into community life. This process of reintegration rather than new integration is either one of relief or a further strain on the community. Close family and friendship networks that once depended on the incarcerated resident for support may be relieved by their return. The return of a resident who faces long-term economic, emotional and psychological stresses of reintegration may also be a severe strain on family, friendship and on neighbor networks.

Although the returning community member may be reuniting with strong ties, often the criminal justice system stipulates with whom the offender can associate. Prison sanctions generally have subsequent parole conditions; jail sanctions also have "conditions of release" that may include many forms of treatment plans, orders of protection against alleged victims, and probation conditions. Since jail sanctions are often brief, the subsequent conditions that the offender and the community must adapt to are changes that abruptly force the offender to redefine "normal" life. When the offender cannot interact with those who are traditionally strong ties, for example family members, the offender must attempt to reintegrate without necessary support. This places strain on strong ties as well as community members who must become weak ties in order to compensate for this strain. Although a returning community member may desire to join

the economic network of that community, conventional employment is often very difficult to obtain with a criminal record (Western 2002; Pager 2007). Even when incarceration has been short, there is the potential for job loss, income decrease, and difficulty obtaining new employment or replacing lost income. These strains can exacerbate already disadvantaged or disorganized communities and lead to more crime (Rose & Clear 1998; Clear et al., 2003; Renauer et al., 2006; Clear 2007; Hipp & Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009). Drawing on the above literature, my first hypothesis is that high jail incarceration rates will decrease crime when incarceration is at low levels, but as incarceration rates increase or become more concentrated, subsequent crime will increase.

The procedural justice framework posits that policing and criminal justice sanctions work to reduce crime when the community views the criminal justice system as legitimate, fair and effective (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler & Wakslak 2004; Tyler 2003). However, when residents of marginalized communities, groups such as racial minorities or the socioeconomically disadvantaged, are over-policed or feel as though they are targets of the criminal justice system, the community may stop cooperating with criminal justice actors and resort to retributive crimes to solve problems. This process, developed in procedural justice theories, logically suggests that large levels of criminal justice sanction will lead to increased crime in the community.

Since arrests and incarceration are so closely linked, I assume that in communities where residents are all too familiar with criminal justice sanctions, and where crime is still on the rise, the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system is in question. A Longitudinal study conducted in New York concluded that communities suffering from

extreme disadvantage, over-policing and police misconduct, had a higher violent crime rate; researchers suggested that the higher violent crime rate was the result, in part, of residents taking the law into their own hands (Kane 2006,) reacting violently to those who violate a "code of the street" (Anderson 1999). In California and New York communities where police misconduct was perceived due to over-policing or perceived racial profiling, residents lost trust in and were reluctant to cooperate with police and viewed the criminal justice system as unfair or illegitimate (Tyler and Wakslak; 2004). Where residents do not cooperate with the police or criminal justice system, they also limit their formal, legitimate access to crime control agents; this naturally allows criminals to flourish and crime to rise.

Although the current study will not be able to measure potential procedural justice elements at work, variation in criminal justice involvement and minority population across census tracts may pick-up on a procedural justice effect in some communities. In communities where jail incarceration and criminal justice sanctioning are concentrated, a subsequent higher violent crime rate may be due in part to lost trust, decreased perceptions of legitimacy, and uncooperative residents who feel it necessary to use violence in policing each other. Much of the research involving procedural justice has focused on minority majority communities. This research has been particularly relevant in better understanding policing practices such as racial profiling, police misconduct and community trust (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Kane 2006). Nevertheless, the procedural justice literature provides some basis for my second hypothesis. In neighborhoods where the community is more than 50% Latino, perceptions of criminal justice system unfairness due to perceived over-policing or racial profiling may lead to a lack of

cooperation with legal authorities and may make it more difficult for Latino communities to keep crime low (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Kane 2006). My second hypothesis is drawn from a combination of implications based in community and procedural justice frameworks. I hypothesize that high jail incarceration rates will increase crime where incarceration rates are high and that this process should be particularly obvious in Latino neighborhoods (due to some structural differences and perhaps over-policing or racial profiling). Areas with relatively high levels of jail incarceration will be less able to withstand the impact of incarceration and thus will have higher subsequent crime rates than white communities with similar amounts of jail sanctions.

Deterrence and Incapacitation Suggest Sanctions Decrease Crime

In contrast to coercive mobility and procedural justice perspectives, deterrence and incapacitation support the idea that criminal justice sanctions may decrease crime. Traditionally the relationship between formal criminal justice sanctions, such as incarceration, and crime has been discussed using deterrence theories. In fact, the U.S. criminal justice system itself is largely based on the idea that formal sanctions should deter unwanted criminal behavior (Bentham 1907). Deterrence theory suggests that most human beings are rational actors who weigh the costs of committing a crime against potential benefits (Becker 1968). When criminal punishment is enforced with the proper amounts of severity, certainty, and swiftness, the threat of punishment might deter crime in a community where the risk of punishment is known and punishment for wrong-doing is expected by residents. Simply said, "to be deterred is to refrain from doing something out of fear of consequences" (Grasmick&Bursik; 1990). According to deterrence theory, most humans will view the discomfort of incarceration and inconvenience or

embarrassment of formal sanctioning as too great a cost for the benefit of criminal behaviors.

A common topic found in deterrence literature is that of the tipping point or threshold; there is fairly widespread agreement that up to a point, criminal justice sanctions deter crime but at some point this effect shifts as crime rates begin to stabilize or increase. Therefore, although deterrence literature predicts an overall deterrent effect of criminal justice sanctioning on subsequent criminal activity it does not claim that sanctioning produces a permanent deterrent effect. An examination of cities and counties in Florida led researchers to discover a critical threshold of arrests/crimes known; before the threshold is reached, deterrence has little to no effect on subsequent crimes in the community (Tittle & Row 1974). That is, once the percent arrested per known crimes in Florida communities reached 30%, the crime rate in that community decreased. This threshold suggests that the certainty of criminal justice sanction for criminal behavior is transmitted throughout the community thus deterring future crime. A qualitative experimental study performed in 55 Minneapolis high crime hot-spots identified a "threshold dosage" of police presence necessary to produce a deterrent effect (Koper 1995). When visible crimes occurred in public, and police responded to those crimes for a period of at least ten minutes but no more than fifteen, crime in those areas began to decrease as opposed to areas where offenders were whisked away or where police spent extended periods of time watching and detaining offenders. A visible, active, decisive and fair police presence (noted by a brief but efficient police/offender interaction) in a community had the effect of a noticeable increase in crime deterrence community-wide. Police actions lasting longer than fifteen minutes may be overlooked and ignored by

community members; if police actions are too quick, community members may not see the police action at all, thus quashing potential community deterrent effects. The decline in Minneapolis hot-spot crime was the result of appropriately timed police presence and action that had a community-wide deterrence effect. This tipping-point or threshold lends support to the curvilinear effect seen in coercive mobility literature. Up to a point, coercive mobility decreases crime but then it too reaches a tipping point that may contribute to crime increase. Recently, a longitudinal study conducted on New York police precincts concluded that up to a point increased threat in a neighborhood (measured as arrests per officer in a given police precinct) decreased the occurrence of robbery and burglary in that precinct (Kane 2006). This most recent study however, notes a tipping-point in police vigor, or threat of sanction transmitted throughout a community. Once the tipping-point is reached, crime increases back up to its original level, but up to that tipping point, crime decreases as a result of deterrence.

Another facet of deterrence theory is incapacitation. If the threat of punishment is not enough to deter crime then incapacitation will at least prevent some future crimes by removing criminals from communities into secure facilities. The use of incapacitation is a social fail-safe that has had mixed empirical support regarding crime reduction. The logic behind incapacitation seems simple: removing criminal offenders from a community to a secure institution such as jail will reduce crime. Removing those criminals who commit a large number of crimes, and are thus responsible for the bulk of criminal activity, will even more effectively reduce crime and do so at a faster rate. Problems with this theory arise when attempting to determine how many crimes an individual offender is prevented from committing while incapacitated, and who the

criminal offenders are that will be responsible for committing the most crimes (Cohen 1983). Theoretical and empirical assumptions, such as how many crimes an incarcerated offender would be committing if not incapacitated, must be made in each test of incapacitation. These assumptions may mean that all we really know is that people convicted of committing a crime are not continuing to commit crimes in the community while they are incarcerated. In this sense, incapacitation is the ultimate deterrent to criminal activity in a community.

Most deterrence studies find little support for the deterrence hypothesis but they acknowledge that most if not all citizens know of some legal consequences for criminal activity; however, this knowledge does not always translate into the general public's perceived likelihood of swift, severe or certain punishment for most crimes (Kleck et. al.; 2005). Although the current project focuses on macro level data and processes, deterrence research that focuses on micro level processes aids in understanding some underlying mechanisms that may be important in future research. For example, some research has suggested that the era of mass imprisonment has decreased the stigmatization of prison sanctions, or perhaps has embedded many with the perception that prison terms are "just a part of life" (Pettit and Western 2004; Clear 2007; Mauer 1999). Similar processes may be at work regarding jail sanctions. It is possible that police action is different dependent on criminal charges or when arresting those with warrants for lesser crimes. Perhaps if police spend more time with those who are or will be charged with lesser crimes such as petty theft, community members view this time spent as unnecessary thus damaging the saliency of the punishment actions. If deterrence isn't effective at the individual level, then it is doubtful that deterrent

messages are transmitted throughout the community. Research on juvenile delinquency and deterrence does not seem to suggest that deterrence works for the younger offenders any better than it does for their adult counterparts. An examination into the influence of delinquent peers on perceived certainty of punishment for delinquent behavior showed that certainty of punishment only deterred juvenile delinquency for those juveniles that had no or few delinquent peers (Matthews and Agnew; 2008); the reasons for this are unclear, but may suggest that the severity of punishment is not high enough to deter misbehavior even when punishment is certain.

Recent scholarship that is pertinent to the current study examined prison population growth for 1980-2000 in 58 Florida counties. The Florida research was a macro-level, time-series study that looked specifically at whether or not a visible increase in imprisonment reduced county crime rates over time. All things equal, researchers found "no support for the more prisoners, less crime thesis" suggesting that high rates of imprisonment did not deter future criminals from engaging in criminal activity (Kovandzic and Vieraitis; 2005). The current study will not specifically measure deterrence in a community; however, if there are Albuquerque neighborhoods that have a high number of incarcerations, but a lower subsequent crime rate, this may suggest that crime decreases and stays lower in areas where many residents have experience with this initial criminal justice sanction. Since arrest and subsequent jail incarceration is the first step in criminal sanctioning, and because the nature of jail incarceration means that the relocations are short-lived but with long-lasting consequences, there may be a threshold of incarceration that can be investigated in future research to pinpoint deterrent effects.

Figure 2, below, is a conceptual path model that depicts the two hypothesized relationships and the expected direction of those relationships. Although the current research cannot measure the mechanisms involved between jail and neighborhood decline, (noted as violent crime,) prior research has suggested that there are mechanisms that are the indirect effects of incarceration on neighborhood decline (for a review of the mechanisms see: Lynch and Sabol 2004; Clear 2007; Clear et al., 2003; Mauer 1999).

Figure 2 Here

Data and Methods

The data used in this current study come from three sources. Crime information (2004-2006 aggregated counts) was gathered from the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) on 136 census tracts under the jurisdiction of APD. The Bernalillo Metropolitan Detention Center (BMDC) is the local Albuquerque jail that serves all 141 census tracts in Bernalillo County. BMDC provided jail booking data including offender demographic characteristics and the most serious crime that the offender was arrested for during a given event. Control variable measures common in social disorganization literature for each census tract (2000) were gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau. A complete list of variables, their measures and the data source are listed in Table 1 below.

Table1 Here

Dependent Variable

Three years of violent crimes known to the police according to the 2000 Census tracts was obtained from the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). APD serves 136 census tracts of the 141 total census tracts in Bernalillo County. The tracts included in the

current analysis are limited to the 136 within APD jurisdiction. The violent crime measure includes the sum numbers of murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery and aggravated assaults known to the police for the years 2004-2006. During those years, Albuquerque census tracts experienced a minimum of 3 violent crimes, a maximum of 504 violent crimes and a mean number of 111 (see graph 3 in the appendix for a frequency distribution of 2004-2006 violent crime).

Independent Control Variables

The issue of reverse causality (simultaneity) in incarceration research is well-documented throughout previous studies (Marvel and Moody 1994; Levitt 1996; Lynch and Sabol 2004; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor 2009) and is recognized in the current work. It would be ideal to address the issue of reverse causality using longitudinal data, or by identifying an instrumental variable (Lynch and Sabol 2004); however, for this exploratory analysis I address the aforementioned limitations by using three sequential time points (1996, 2000-2001, and 2004-06). The use of time points not only captures the change experienced by communities over time, but also removes much of the direct link between crimes at time one, incarceration at time two, and subsequent crimes at time three. To understand how jail incarceration might affect crime in 2004-2006, it is important to control for prior crime. This prior crime measure is the violent crime rate in each census tract for 1996. In 1996, tracts ranged in their amount of violent crime from 0 violent crimes known to the police to 286 with a mean of 47 violent crime incidents. The rate of violent crimes per 100,000 in 1996 ranged from 0 to 90 with a mean of 12. To correct for the skewed distribution in the 1996 violent crime rate, the rate was then logged (see graphs 1 and 2 in the appendix). Given the importance of the tipping-point

found in coercive mobility as well as deterrence literatures, I also created and include in one model of the negative binomial regression analysis a squared term of the log in custody rate.

Neighborhood level controls: the social disorganization literature notes several variables that should shape neighborhood crime. It would be ideal to have the census measures for each specific year 2004-2006; however, there is little change in these measures from year to year (Ellen and Turner 1997; Hipp et al., 2009). Social disorganization theory highlights the importance of adverse neighborhood conditions in producing social disorganization and subsequent heightened levels of crime. To account for neighborhood social disorganization and economic conditions, I created a *Concentrated Disadvantage Index* (CDI) (Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). The CDI is defined as: the summed Z scores of Proportion Female Headed Households, Proportion Living below the Poverty Level, Proportion Receiving Welfare Assistance, and Proportion Unemployed. General residential stability in a neighborhood is known to keep crime low due to the number and strengths of ties within the neighborhood. For this reason, I control for general residential stability by using "residents age 5 and older who lived in the same residence five years ago (Residential Stability)" as a control for residential stability. Previous research has identified a relationship between crime and the community's young male population. For this reason, I also control for the percentage of young males in a tract (Young Males).

Independent Variable

Admissions data were obtained from the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention center. In 2000, the BMDC provided booking data that contained 172,254 cases. Once

the cases were reduced by removing all non-Bernalillo county addresses, transients, homeless, refusal to answer, and prison inmates, there were 147,551 cases. Each person ID had several addresses attached to each person/booking number. Duplicate booking numbers were removed in order to maintain the integrity of the random representative data. A 30% random sample was drawn thus resulting in the final number of cases of 7,802 bookings. An identical process was followed for 2001 BMDC data resulting in the final number of 6,806 bookings. All address information from admissions records were checked for legitimacy, then sorted by zip code and aggregated to the appropriate 2000 census tract. Addresses that could not be verified as legitimate addresses within the Albuquerque census tracts were excluded from the study, as were addresses in Bernalillo county that were not under the jurisdiction of the Albuquerque Police Department. Given prior research conclusions on thresholds and dosages of criminal justice sanctions in a community, the cut-off used in determining an area with high rates of coercive mobility is any tract where the percent of the tract population in custody is higher than the mean of 1.2%. In order to properly compare the concept of coercive mobility across neighborhoods, the sum number of residents in custody from a given tract was divided by the total population, multiplied by 1000 and this value was then logged to create the "log in custody rate".

City Characteristics

The city of Albuquerque's demographics and structure are somewhat unique in that it is almost a majority Latino city without the usual disadvantaged urban center. This means that it is a prime area to investigate the differences between Latino and white communities, but since it is unlike the typical urban metropolitan cities common in

criminological literature (like Chicago,) it requires a bit more description. There is substantial variation across the 136 census tracts with respect to the percent of residents in jail custody. Two census tracts (A & B) had no residents in custody at any point 2000-2001. Tracts A & B can be described as affluent, majority white, and with well-educated residents. The violent crime rate in tracts A & B was negligible in 2000 as well as in 2004-2006. The census tract with the most jail incarceration experienced 19.26% of its tract population in jail custody throughout 2000-2001. Not surprising given years of criminological tract level research, the census tract with the most jail incarcerations, racial/ethnic diversity, extreme concentrated disadvantage and one of the highest crime rates is the downtown census tract. In the downtown tract, the proportion of white residents is .335, American Indian is .074, Hispanic is .433, Black .074, and Asian .026. It experienced 177 violent crimes in 1996, and 504 violent crimes throughout 2004-2006. The census tract with the highest crime rate in 2004-2006, is characterized by a significant amount of concentrated disadvantage, a relatively large population, (I refer to this tract as "gangland" due to its high amount of gang activity known to residents, police and watch groups), and roughly 75% of the residents are Hispanic. The crosstabulation below (Table 2) shows the characteristics of majority Latino communities versus non-Latino communities with respect to Logged violent crime rates in 2004-2006 and percent in custody 2000-2001. Tracts deemed to have a high proportion of Latino residents are defined as tracts with more than 50% Hispanic residents. There are 41 tracts in the APD tract population that are high Latino, and 95 that are low (less than 50% Hispanic). Low *v*. High crime and in jail custody categories were determined using rates and percentages above or below the mean, respectively.

Table 2 Here

The cross tabulations found in Table 2 show that across the 136 Bernalillo county census tracts examined, majority Latino communities have higher crime and higher incarceration rates than their non-majority Latino counterparts. It also highlights that majority Latino communities in Bernalillo County suffer more structural disadvantage than non-majority Latino communities.

Jail Incarceration Characteristics

Local jails nationwide are used for a variety of criminal justice reasons; primarily, the jail is used to contain inmates that are awaiting trial, need protective supervision due to mental health or drug problems, or those who have been convicted of a lesser crime and must serve a sentence of incapacitation for one year or less (Applegate et al., 2003). Table 3 includes the related descriptive statistics on the numbers of inmates in BMDC 2000-2001 by the most serious charge (recall that this is a random 30% sample of 2000 and a 30% sample of 2001). Information on the number of prison inmates held in BMDC awaiting court proceedings in not available in this analysis. The category "major felonies" includes inmates that are in BMDC for felony murder or material witness charges. "Felonies" is the category that includes inmates charged with non-murder 1^{st}-4^{th} degree felonies; these types of felony charges in New Mexico are reserved for aggravated assault (assaults with weapons or assaults that have been committed during the commission of a felony level property crime, driving while intoxicated with open containers found in vehicle, any assault against a police officer, robbery with a weapon present, etc.) property crime that includes theft over a certain dollar amount, or damage to property over a certain dollar amount. "Misdemeanors" is the category that includes

inmates charged with petty theft, traffic citations, domestic violence that did not result in gross injury or was not committed with a weapon, and property damage below a specific dollar amount. The "warrants" category includes all types of warrants. Many of the notes on the inmate's charges were specific to a particular Judges' orders (compliance with specific conditions of release on undocumented prior charges,) however, this category also contained warrants that were specific to traffic citations, failing to appear to driving school, failure to pay a traffic or parking fine, alleged violation of a protective order etc. Those inmates charged with protective custody are those whose family, friends or neighbors were concerned for the safety of the inmate or others based on substance abuse or mental health issues; officers arrest such inmates and hold them in the jail until proper medical or psychiatric assessments can be performed. Generally, those inmates being held in protective custody are not charged with a criminal act of any kind. Finally, there were some booking numbers with attached charge notes that I could not code into one of the specific charge categories; those that had indeterminate charges were placed into an "unknown charges" category. Regression analysis results that include controlling for residents in custody for categories of charges are presented and discussed in the endnotes section of this paper.[i]

Table 3 Here

Analytic Strategy

Following Clear et. al's (2003) exploratory analysis of coercive mobility in a Florida city, the final analysis of Albuquerque census tract data was performed using a

general linear model with a negative binomial response function. This technique allows for better understanding the magnitude and direction of relationships between a dependent count variable and independent controls. Given the typical overdispersion present in Albuquerque crime variables, using a negative binomial regression technique is appropriate. Models were run with the dispersion, or exposure, variable "total population," logged or proportion independent variables and the dependent count crime variable. The use of the exposure variable further increases the predictive power of the negative binomial function (Osgood 2000).

Although the current analysis of coercive mobility is cross-sectional in that it focuses on jail incarceration at one time point (2000-2001), the analysis controls for 1996 crime, 2000 census demographic variables, and predicts 2004-2006 violent crime counts. Recall that scholars point to problems of simultaneity in the incarceration and crime relationship (crime likely causes incarceration and incarceration causes crime) as well as endogeneity (an effect between incarceration and crime merely reflects a third unmeasured variable). Nonetheless, I take measures that help to assuage concerns of endogeneity and simultaneity that taint research on incarceration and violent crime at the neighborhood level. Controlling for 1996 crime rates enables me to capture neighborhood crime trajectories prior to the jail incarceration rates. Since jail incarcerations function as a criminal justice sanction response to crime (Applegate et al., 2003, Kovandzic and Vieraitis 2006, Levitt 1996, Marvell and Moody 1994) it is appropriate to capture existing levels of prior crime in a community. Using 1996 violent crime rates may remove some of the suspicion that the incarceration rates in 2000-2001 are a direct result of prior crimes that typically would be captured in jail incarceration

rates. That is, it is likely that jail incarceration sentences were imposed and served sometime during 1996, 1997, or 1998 depending on when the sentencing took place for the 1996 crime. However, this paper does not have variables to address any mechanisms at work within the communities and it is therefore unable to thoroughly address the issue of endogeneity.

Often jail incarceration sentences are postponed in lieu of probation and conditions of release. Probation from an incapacitative sentence can last up to 5 years, during which a convicted offender could be incarcerated if the probation condition(s) are violated. The 1996 crime rates are on the border of that time-frame, however they must suffice for this study because they are the earliest available crime rates in Albuquerque that are tract-level. Controlling for census demographics in 2000 are the most accurate depiction of tract-level demographic characteristics for the 2000-2001 incarceration rates. Finally, predicting violent crime counts in 2004-2006 is also an appropriate time-lag given the nature of jail incarceration sentences (1 year or less) together with previous research strategies on coercive mobility (Clear 2007; Renauer et al 2006; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor 2009). A deterrent effect of coercive mobility may be evident if in fact 2004-2006 crime rates are lower in tracts that experienced high coercive mobility than tracts that experienced low coercive mobility. If procedural justice or community justice processes are more salient than deterrence, 2004-2006 crime rates should be higher in any communities that experienced coercive mobility, but particularly obvious in communities that experienced more coercive mobility in 2000-2001.

After the initial evaluation of variable descriptive statistics, there was concern regarding statistical outliers. Hat values are used to assess the potential leverage that a variable may have in the regression model, defined as follows,

$$h_i = \frac{1}{n} + \frac{(x_i - \bar{x})^2}{(n-1)S_x^2}$$

Hat values are used to determine how much leverage that a variable may have depending on how far the independent variable value is from the mean (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). One tract had a higher than expected hat value, so further analysis of outlying observations was conducted. In order to exhaust any potential influence that outlying census tracts may have on the overall regression shown in Table 4, I proceeded to examine both the CooksD values and Dfbeta values for any effects of leverage and discrepancy. Eleven census tracts were deemed to have slightly higher than expected CooksD values. CooksD (Cooks Distance) is a common method used for examining the influence of a case on the overall regression results. This method measures the effect of deleting a given observation.

The criterion to indicate high leverage (CooksD formula) is as follows:

$$D > 4/n$$

After identifying the eleven census tracts with slightly high CooksD values, I turned my investigation to Dfbetas values. The Dfbetas is another traditional tool that is used to assess the influence of a case. The case is considered an influential outlier if:

$$|\text{dfbetas}| > 2\sqrt{n}.$$

Upon thorough examination of the related Dfbetas values, only one census tract had an abnormally high value in the primary independent variable. Any other higher dfbetas

values were on control variables and do not affect the regression line. Therefore, models were run with and without the census tract with identifiable leverage. In the final model the sample size remained 136 and no tracts were dropped because there was no significant change in any of the variables' strength or direction after removing the influential tract.

The nature of the data required extensive diagnostic evaluation of multicolinearity potential. As expected, the logged rate of crime in 1996 is highly correlated with the number of violent crimes in 2004-2006 (.765). However, although this correlation was the highest, the correlation between the primary independent variable jail incarceration and crime 2004-2006 also had a strong correlation (.742) (see appendix for correlations). For this reason, I chose to run a preliminary regression analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the ability to evaluate Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) when the linear and quadratic terms for the logged in custody variable and logged in custody square variables were both included in the analysis. The squared term showed statistical significance once included in the OLS regression; however, the logged in custody variable maintained direction with and without controlling for the square term. VIFs were analyzed and remained much lower than the standard cutoff of 10.

Given the known strong colinearity between social disorganization variables, ethnic minority measures, crime and imprisonment, an analysis of the variance inflation factors (VIF) was performed. The mean VIF for all variables was 2.72. As expected, the VIF for the concentrated disadvantage variable was highest at 4.75; the second highest VIF was on the primary independent variable Rate of Residents in Jail Custody at 4.57. Suspecting colinearity between the two variables was somewhat troubling, therefore

another regression was performed including an interaction variable. The interaction variable was constructed as follows:

> First, the variable rate of residents in jail custody was centered by subtracting the mean from each observation by (InCustody - mean). The centered variable InCustodyC was then multiplied to each respective cdi observation (InCustodyC*cdi) = CdiJail.

Although there was not a statistically significant effect of the interaction variable between residents in custody and concentrated disadvantage, I constructed an interaction variable to explore other potential interaction effects. Again, using the centered rate of residents in jail variable I constructed another interaction variable with tracts that have a high proportion of Latino residents. Previous research would suggest that over-policing of minority-majority communities may create such an interaction. Recall that high proportion Hispanic is defined as census tracts where 50% or more of the residents are Hispanic. The interaction variable is defined as (HighHispanic*centered rate of residents in jail custody). Finally, I explored the potential interaction effect between High Proportion Hispanic and a centered log violent crime rate 1996. Where the interaction variable = (HighHispanic * centered logged rated of violent crime 1996). None of the above interactions yielded statistically significant results; nor did they affect much change in the direction or strength of any other relationships between independent variables and the dependent variable.

Results

Table 4 presents two negative binomial regression models. Model one includes all control variables and the primary independent variable, Log Rate of Residents in

Custody. Based on the idea of testing for a tipping point, model two explores the potential implications of introducing a square term for the log rate of residents in custody to the original model.

Table 4 Here

There is very little difference between the two models therefore discussion of the results will focus on model 2. All things equal, the variables that are statistically significant and predict an increase in subsequent violent crime include: prior crime (Log Violent Rate 1996), rate of residents in jail custody, and the proportion of Hispanic residents in a tract. Net of other factors, the variables that are statistically significant and predict a decrease in subsequent crime include: proportion of foreign born residents, percent of young males in tract and residential stability.

My first hypothesis that high jail incarceration rates will decrease crime when incarceration is at low levels, but as incarceration rates increase or become more concentrated, subsequent crime will increase is only partially confirmed with the first two models. Net of all other crime and demographic characteristics in a tract the rate of residents in custody increases subsequent violent crime. More specifically, as the jail incarceration rate in a tract increased 1.19, there was one more violent crime in that tract. Said another way, a 10% increase in the rate of incarcerations can predict roughly 1.5 more violent crimes. Importantly, I find no support for the idea of a tipping point across the whole sample. Although substantively this interpretation seems quite insignificant, when aggregated to the county level, net of other factors, this means that a 10% increase

in the rate of incarceration throughout the county predicts roughly 204 more violent crimes over a 3 year period. These findings are consistent with the recent conclusions that deterrence and incapacitation do little to prevent future crime and seem to suggest that the use of jail incarceration as a deterrent has no saliency. Future investigation into the mechanisms driving this phenomenon in Bernalillo County should be conducted.

Table 4 provides results of the negative binomial regressions in the split sample (table 5). In order to better understand whether or not there is a differential effect on crime in majority-Latino versus non-majority Latino neighborhoods, I split the sample and re-ran both above models. Following the advice of Patternoster et al., 1998, I performed a z-test using the following formula in order to determine if there is truly a statistically significant difference between the majority Latino and full sample coefficients.

The formula used is defined as follows:

$$z = \frac{b_1 - b_2}{\sqrt{SEb_1^2 + SEb_2^2}}$$

On the basis of the above test, the z-score is -1.83 and I can conclude that the effect of coercive mobility on subsequent violent crime rates is different in majority Latino communities than it is in non-majority Latino communities. Since there is a statistical difference between the coefficients of the models, it is appropriate to present and interpret the analysis of the majority Latino neighborhoods to that of the non-majority Latino neighborhoods.

My second hypothesis was influenced by the literature that suggests relatively high rates of jail incarceration increase crime and I hypothesized that this process should be particularly obvious in Latino neighborhoods due to some structural differences,

perhaps over-policing as well as potential racial profiling (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Kane 2006t). Therefore, I hypothesized that areas where there are relatively high levels of jail incarceration and a higher percentage of Hispanic residents would show an increase in crime due to the difficulties associated with withstanding the impact of incarcerations on community organization against crime.

Table 5 Here

Net of other factors, when a tract's population is 50% or more Latino, a 10% increase in the rate of residents in custody predicts 4 more violent crimes per tract over a three year time period. This suggests that jail incarceration does indeed differentially affect majority Latino communities. The direction and strength of the squared term result (-.1587) suggests that violent crime in Latino communities increases sooner as more residents are taken into jail custody, reaches a tipping point and then seems to stabilize. Figure 3 provides a visual description of this relationship. The difference is interesting not only in that crime increases sooner, but that there is something about the Latino community that facilitates a stabilization of the violent crime rate (even though residents are still going to and from jail) as opposed to the continuing increase of violent crimes in the non Latino communities. It is important to note that the stabilization of violent crime in the majority Latino communities may be potentially capturing a deterrence effect working in tandem with community mechanisms unique to majority Latino communities. The results of the split sample regressions lend support for the community justice and/ or the procedural justice frameworks. However, research into

the mechanisms that contribute to the differential effects in Bernalillo County's Latino communities is suggested and is discussed more thoroughly in the implications section of this paper.

Figure 3 Here

My analysis suggests that increased levels of residents in jail custody destabilizes communities, and differentially effects communities that are majority Latino; in some communities coercive mobility hampers the ability for the community to organize against future crime. The findings of the current study, although limited, have contributed to the current debate regarding incapacitation and community safety. Not only does the pattern of increased crime occur with prison sanctions, but the effect is similar when the sanctions are short-lived jail sanctions. The current study also contributes to our understanding of how majority minority communities are affected by criminal justice sanctions within the community. The majority Latino communities in Albuquerque suffer from structural disadvantage, higher crime and higher incarceration than their majority white counterparts. This may explain why, at lower levels of incarceration, the majority Latino communities' seem unaffected by coercive mobility, but at a certain point of higher jail incarceration the community experiences deterrence evident by the stabilization of subsequent predicted crime rates. In contrast, majority white communities that are less familiar with crime and jail incarceration are "shocked" into deterrence at low levels of jail incarceration but as incarceration rates increase, the

sanction loses its effectiveness as a deterrent and subsequent crime rates rise as well as remain unaffected by jail incarceration at increasing rates.

Implications for Theory and Policy

Previous research on this era of mass imprisonment and incarceration has suggested that criminal justice sanctioning does not have the overall intended effect of increasing community safety. The results of this current project are consistent with the community justice (coercive mobility) and procedural justice frameworks, finding that where jail incarceration sanctions are concentrated, subsequent crime increases. This finding is a significant contribution in that jail incarceration is the more frequently utilized type of incapacitation sanction compared to imprisonment, and captures many more citizens in the ever-widening criminal justice system net. It offers support for the coercive mobility hypothesis: that increases in incarceration destabilize community networks and have a positive relationship to violent crime, and suggests that criminologists have underestimated the overall community destabilization that has occurred due to criminal justice sanctions.

I realize that many readers of this current work may be reluctant to accept the results due to the effects of simultaneity (Marvel and Moody 1994; Levitt 1996; Lynch and Sabol 2004; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor 2009). Simultaneity is a statistical bias that occurs when the relationship between the independent variable (in the current work, Log Incarceration Rate 2000-2001), is tested to predict the dependent variable (in the current work, Violent Crime Rate 2004-2006) when it is also likely that the relationship works the other way around. This bias is a significant known problem in coercive mobility studies because some argue that higher crime inevitably causes higher incarceration rates (Clear 2007; Marvel and Moody 1994; Hipp and Yates 2009; Lynch

and Sabol 2004). Higher incarceration rates may also be the result of local justice system actions that react to increasing crime by turning to the use of incapacitation sentences (Marvell and Moody 1994). A recent scholarly work by Kevin Smith finds no support for the traditional thoughts that increasing crime actually causes increasing prison incarceration rates (2004; Kovandzic and Vieritis 2006). However, in this primarily cross-sectional analysis it is difficult to dismiss simultaneity bias altogether and the results should therefore be considered preliminary suggestions until they are confirmed using a longitudinal analysis that mediates more of the simultaneity bias.

My findings parallel those found for prison incarceration. But because jail incarceration is a more pervasive sanction it suggests that its cost for communities may be far more extensive than previously thought. Limiting coercive mobility and other sanction-type study to the more serious crimes and punishments (like murder and prison) neglects the pervasive consequences of an expanding criminal justice system net. Although the effects of coercive mobility have been most devastating to already disadvantaged African American communities (Clear 2007; Renauer et al 2006; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor 2009, Mauer 1999), this current analysis suggests that criminal justice sanctions involving coercive mobility are impacting community safety in communities apart from urban-ghettos.

Results of the current project also add to the debate by including the differential effect of jail incarceration in majority Latino communities as opposed to white communities. To my knowledge, this is the first coercive mobility study that has focused on investigating the difference between reactions to coercive mobility in majority Latino and majority white communities. Two major conclusions can be drawn regarding

the differential effects. First, Majority Latino communities experience increases in their crime rate sooner and more dramatically after concentrated numbers of residents are placed in jail custody than do white communities. Second, majority Latino communities' crime rates seem to stabilize after a certain point of residents in custody whereas this effect is not seen in majority non-Latino communities. This finding might reflect the redundant effect of incarceration when it is at "ceiling levels" or that deterrence emanates from high incarceration in Latino communities.

The current analysis is not equipped to draw definite conclusions regarding why majority Latino communities show a stabilization of crime rates and majority non-Latino communities do not; however, based on previous crime research, I suspect that this stabilization is a result of community context as well as individual level factors characteristic in certain ethnic communities. As noted by Ramiro Martinez Jr., in his work on *Latino Homicide* (2002), Latino communities (especially those with a high amount of recent immigrants,) may suffer from more poverty and generally have a lower per capita income than their white counterparts, but as a result of immigration majority Latino communities have a "widening circle of formal and informal ties to work, and creating or extending niches that serve *all* Latinos" (Martinez 2002; pp.138).
That is, although majority Latino communities, or "barrios", aren't generally as structurally advantaged as white communities, they are better-off than black urban ghettos and may have more within-community ties that enable them to organize against crime even better than white communities with more economic resources (Vélez 2006, 2009).

Again, the current study cannot conclude why majority Latino communities' crime rates stabilize despite disadvantage and coercive mobility, but I suggest that this result offers support to the importance of individual-level factors in a neighborhood context. I believe that the stabilization seen in majority-Latino communities reflects the conclusion drawn by Sampson et al., 2005: "The lower rate of violence among Mexican Americans compared with Whites was explained by a combination of married parents, living in a neighborhood with a high concentration of immigrants, and individual immigrant status." That is, I suspect that the stabilization effect seen in majority-Latino communities in this study is due, at least in part, to stronger within-community ties as well as married parents, and a high concentration of immigrants.[ii]

Although the current study is limited by its cross-sectional nature, it has made a conservative attempt to understand how jail incarceration not only affects community but also how it differentially affects majority Latino communities. Future investigation on jail incarceration should be longitudinal and include a larger sample of incarcerations, if not the whole population. It would also be interesting to continue this type of analysis in an area where the effects of jail incarceration could be included with prison incarceration effects.

The present great recession has presented policy makers and politicians with necessarily scaling-back economic resources devoted to incapacitating criminal offenders. Newspaper headlines of jail closures stretch across the nation: "Broward closing jail space; will suspects be released?: Sheriff 'forced' to reduce inmate count to save money" (Wallman; 2010); "E.St. Louis will miss deadline to submit plan for next

budget; councilman suggests closing jail" (Lamb 2002). Whether or not this practice negatively affects community safety largely rests on whether the incapacitation of less-serious criminal offenders has, to this point, positively affected community safety by reducing crime. However, like the current research, some recent scholarship on several cities across the United States has suggested that increased incarceration may not have the intended effect of subsequent crime reduction. Rather, this research adds to the chorus of those who argue that increases in criminal justice sanctioning may set in motion processes that prevent communities from organizing to keep crime low (Rose & Clear 1998; Clear et al., 2003; George et al., 2005; Renauer et al., 2006; Clear 2007; Hipp & Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009). It is both substantively and theoretically important for criminologists to continue investigating how the era of mass imprisonment has affected our communities in terms of crime and public safety. As many communities broach scaling back the use of sanctions such as incarceration, the current research offers further preliminary support for the idea that scaling back the use of jail incarceration (for those offenders who are not the most serious criminals) yield lower levels of violent crime and thus increase public safety.

Appendix: Figures and Tables

Figure 1



Bureau of Justice Statistics

Figure 2: Conceptual pathways from incarceration through theoretical perspectives to crime



Figure 3: Majority Latino v. Non-Majority



Table 1

Variable	Variable Measure and Data Source
Outcome Variables	
Violent Crime Rate 2000-200 centered around 2000 census	The number of violent offenses reported to APD (Albuquerque Police Department) for each tract year divided by the tract population and multiplied by 1,000 each year
Jail Incarcerations	Addresses of persons sent to jail in a given tract year (2000-2001) are geocoded to corresponding census tract, divided by the tract population and multiplied by 1000. Data gathered from the Bernalillo Metro Detention Center.
Control Variables	
Race/Ethnicity of Offenders	Offender's race/ethnicity in a given tract year (2000-2001) Data gathered from the Bernalillo Metro Detention Center.
Gender of Offenders	Offender's gender in a given tract year (2000-2001) Data gathered from the Bernalillo Metro Detention Center.
Age of Offender	Offender's birthdate subtracted from their booking date (2000-2001). Data gathered from the Bernalillo Metro Detention Center.
Type of Crime	Most serious type of crime that offender was arrested for (jail) in given tract year for each booking event (2000-2006). Data gathered from the Bernalillo Metro Detention Center.
Race/Ethnicity of tract	Racial composition of census tracts (US Census)
Percent living below the poverty level in tract	(US Census)
Percent Divorced in tract	(US Census)
Percent with High School Diploma in tract	(US Census)
Percent Unemployed in tract	(US Census)
Percent Foreign Born in tract	(US Census)
Median home value in tract	(US Census)
Residential stability as the percent of residents who have stayed in their residence for the last five years	(US Census)

Table 2: Crosstabulation of Community Ethnic Characteristics

	Non-Majority Latino	Majority Latino
Low Violent Crime Rate Community	84.3%	26.4%
High Violent Crime Rate Community	15.7%	73.6%
Low Number in Jail Custody	84.3%	28.3%
High Number in Jail Custody	15.7%	71.7%
Low CDI Score	80.00%	16.00%
High CDI Score	20.00%	84.00%

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics				
	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Dependent Variable				
Sum Violent Crime 2004-2006	3	504	111.23	97.713
Logged Sum Violent Crime 2004-2006	1.10	6.22	4.3159	.97111
Independent In-Custody/Incarceration Variable				
Rate of Residents in Jail Custody 2000-2001	.00	385.24	23.5146	37.02653
Logged Rate of Residents in Jail Custody	-.95	5.95	2.6302	1.05344
Independent Control Variables				
Violent Crime Rate 1996	.00	90.06	11.8104	11.97606
Logged Violent Crime Rate 1996	-.90	4.50	1.9795	1.13679
Proportion non-Hispanic Black Population	.000	.159	.02883	.023440
Proportion non-Hispanic Am. Indian Population	.000	.137	.02927	.026094
Proportion Hisp./Latino population	.015	.904	.40201	.217017
Proportion of population who are foreign born	.007	.357	.08075	.062228
Percent in tract that are Males 15-19 years old	1.21	17.16	3.5891	1.63604
CDI (concentrated disadvantage index)	-1.33	1.62	-.0245	.67826
Proportion of population age 5+ residing in same house 5 years ago	.056	.708	.49302	.143523
Inmates in jail for a major felony	.00	3	.3235	.66536
Inmates in jail for a felony	.00	96	12.6103	15.29811
Inmates in jail for a misdemeanor	.00	237	35.2059	40.96523
Inmates in jail for a warrant/administrative violation	.00	331	51.1029	53.24747
Inmates in jail under protective custody	.00	13.00	.5956	1.40570
Inmates in jail but no charge identified	.00	36	.8235	4.83641
Valid N Listwise	136.00			

Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression on Violent Crime 2004-2006

	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Log Violent Rate 1996	.4362211**	.0346854	.4354676**	.0348291
Log Rate of Residents in Custody	.1782109**	.042841	.188777**	.0612198
Proportion of Hispanic Residents	1.130504**	.189413	1.125605**	.1905352
Proportion of Black Residents	2.440099	1.283144	2.452375	1.283834
Proportion of American Indian Residents	1.722843	1.406739	1.732936	1.410651
Proportion Foreign Born Residents	-1.680603**	.5295147	-1.68658**	.5295076
Percent of Young Males in tract	-.0653622**	.0159746	-.0657874**	.0160717
Residential Stability	-1.355407**	.2335416	-1.355619**	.2335813
Concentrated Disadvantage Index	-.0320481	.0756984	-.0274442	.0780454
Square term: Log Rate of Residents in Custody			-.0038113	.01575
Total Population (exposure)				
Constant	-4.725457	.1935201	-4.735014	.1974357
N	136		136	
A	.0647004	.0099286	.0646816	.0099257
-2Log Likelihood	1229.610		1229.551	

p<.05* p<.01**

Table 5 : Negative Binomial Regression on Violent Crime 2004-2006 Split Sample by Proportion Hispanic	Tract is 50% or more Hispanic Model 1		Tract less than 50% Hispanic Model 2	
Log Violent Rate 1996	.3637191**	.061645	.4174718**	0.0453169
Log Rate of Residents in Custody	.9667441*	.4353858	.2450774**	0.0685056
Proportion of Black Residents	7.756508**	1.784348	-1.823465	2.300121
Proportion of American Indian Residents	-1.726488	0.459057	1.289019	1.970653
Proportion Foreign Born Residents	-0.136225	.6116223	-1.763889	1.138486
Percent of Young Males in tract	-.0298948	.0258	-.0861761**	.0213862
Residential Stability	-.8647757*	.3759075	-1.389147**	.3034921
Concentrated Disadvantage Index	.0007919*	.0896165	.1765274	.1408541
Square term: Log Rate of Residents in Custody	-.1587738^	.0862132	-.0198827	.0203388
Total Population (exposure)				
Constant	-6.198403	.9573087	-4.177939	2.638049
N	41		95	
A	.0306153		.0859332	
-2Log Likelihood	392.83134		827.98324	
p = .066 ^ p<.05 * p<.01**				

Spearman's Rho Correlation Matrix

		Violent Crime 2004-2006	Logged Violent Crime Rate1996	Logged Rate of Residents in Custody	(Logged Rate of Residents in Custody) Squared	Proportion Hispanic	Proportion Non-Hispanic Black	Proportion Non-Hispanic American Indian	Proportion Foreign Born	Percent Young Male	Residential Stability	Concentrated Disadvantage Index
Violent Crime 2004-2006	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.765**	.742**	.705**	.667**	.346**	.566**	.566**	-.044	-.218**	.764**
	Sig.(1tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.307	.005	.000
Logged Violent Crime Rate1996	Correlation Coefficient		1.000	.694**	.683**	.483**	.286**	.475**	.487**	.030	-.099	.756**
	Sig.(1tailed)		.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.365	.125	.000
Logged Rate of Residents in Custody	Correlation Coefficient			1.000	.974**	.684**	.179*	.446**	.550**	.010	.047	.771**
	Sig.(1tailed)			.	.000	.000	.019	.000	.000	.455	.292	.000
(Logged Rate of Residents in Custody) Squared	Correlation Coefficient				1.000	.643**	.163*	.405**	.547**	.009	.046	.761**
	Sig.(1tailed)				.	.000	.029	.000	.000	.458	.297	.000
Proportion Hispanic	Correlation Coefficient					1.000	.118	.293**	.502**	.170*	.107	.687**
	Sig.(1tailed)					.	.085	.000	.000	.024	.107	.000
Proportion Non-Hispanic Black	Correlation Coefficient						1.000	.475**	.073	-.003	-.461**	.334**
	Sig.(1tailed)						.	.000	.198	.485	.000	.000
Proportion Non-Hispanic American Indian	Correlation Coefficient							1.000	.215**	-.130	-.474**	.540**
	Sig.(1tailed)							.	.006	.065	.000	.000
Proportion Foreign Born	Correlation Coefficient								1.000	-.009	-.090	.555**
	Sig.(1tailed)								.	.459	.148	.000
Percent Young Male	Correlation Coefficient									1.000	.091	.140
	Sig.(1tailed)									.	.147	.052
Residential Stability	Correlation Coefficient										1.000	-.185*
	Sig.(1tailed)										.	.016
Concentrated Disadvantage Index	Correlation Coefficient											1.000
	Sig.(1tailed)											.

p<.05* p<.01**

Endnotes

[i] To my knowledge this investigation of coercive mobility due to jail incarceration is the first of its kind and as such I felt that it was important to investigate coercive mobility by types of criminal charges. I thought that breaking-down the incarceration rates into incarceration for a specific category of crimes might better explain some of the variation in subsequent crime rates. The felony, misdemeanor and warrants categories account for roughly 98% of the jail incarceration charges in 2000-2001. Negative binomial regressions were performed with all controls and one of the incarceration categories in each model. Breaking down the incarceration rates into rates of incarceration for specific categories of crimes did not explain any more of the variation in predicted violent crime 2004-2006.

Endnote Models Here

[ii] After obtaining the result that shows the stabilization of violent crime in majority-Latino communities, (figure 3), I examined the proportion of foreign born residents in Albuquerque census tracts as well as the crime and proportion female-headed household characteristics of tracts where foreign born residents are more than 10% (that is, high foreign born tracts have a proportion higher than the mean). This was done in order to investigate whether or not Albuquerque tracts with majority-Latino residents are similar to those described by Martinez (2002) and Sampson et al., (1997 and 2005). The similarities are confirmed: 56.1% of the tracts with a high foreign born population are in

tracts that are majority Latino. 77.3% of the tracts that have a high foreign born population have low (less than 50%) female-headed households. Such similarities suggest that majority-Latino neighborhoods in Albuquerque have stronger strong ties and more numerous weak ties that enable them to better re-organize against crime in the face of concentrated coercive mobility and economic disadvantage.

Endnote Models: Negative Binomial Regression on Violent Crime 2004-2006 Controlling for Incarceration Charge Type

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Log Violent Crime Rate 1996	.4669474**	.0350866	.4330916**	.0347995	.4355416**	.0340922
Proportion Hispanic	1.368521**	.188704	1.100157**	.1908769	1.147783**	.1828466
Proportion Black	3.250296*	1.310988	2.433146	1.278737	2.26467	1.272109
Proportion American Indian	2.537769	1.479107	1.742278	1.408221	1.899059	1.376627
Proportion Foreign Born	-1.686645**	.5753663	-1.662336**	.5297017	-1.620279**	.5236261
Percent Young Male	-.0682696**	.0167323	-.0584194**	.0161764	-.0670649**	.0157832
Residential Stability	-1.163898**	.2381569	-1.31508**	.2304143	-1.377419**	.2299425
Concentrated Disadvantage Index	.0189745	.0803841	-.0166004	.0741507	-.0579951	.075505
Log Rate Felonies	.0102805	.0062864				
Log Rate Misdemeanors			.1822567**	.0430612		
Log Rate Warrants					.24438**	.0512488
Constant	-4.573018**	.1978984	-4.592848**	.1883397	-4.788828**	.1926854
Total Population (exposure)						
alpha	.0719389	.0109272	.0642053	.0099	.0623577	.0095983

p<.05* p<.01**

Graph 1: Distribution of crimes known to the police 1996



Graph 2: Distribution of crimes known to the police 1996 (logged rate)



Graph 3: Violent Crimes known to the Police 2004-2006



Graph 4: Logged Rate of Violent Crime 2004-2006



Graph 4: Distribution of Residents in Jail Custody 2000-2001



Graph 5: Distribution of Residents in Jail Custody (logged rate) 2000-2001



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