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Yann P. Kerevel

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**AMBITION, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND  
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION IN MEXICO, 1997-2009**

**by**

**YANN P. KEREVEL**

B.A. Criminal Justice, Grand Valley State University, 2003  
M.A. Latin American Studies, University of New Mexico, 2006

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy  
Political Science**

The University of New Mexico  
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## **DEDICATION**

To

Ruth Lucile Hollinger

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**ABSTRACT**

Explaining legislative behavior in the Mexico represents a puzzle given the state of existing theory. Despite a ban on consecutive reelection, Mexican legislators engage in many behaviors thought to be the result of seeking reelection. Furthermore, existing theories of progressive ambition also cannot explain the tendency of many Mexican legislators to seek less prestigious offices after serving for a single term. This dissertation develops a novel theory of political ambition that accounts for the movement up and down the career ladder by Mexican federal legislators, and highlights several behavioral implications of the pursuit of political careers in a context where reelection to the same office is not possible. To test the theory, I collected data on the past and future career choices of all federal deputies who served from 1997 to 2009, as well as data on bill sponsorship, pork-barreling, and roll-call voting. The empirical chapters then examine the influence of electoral competition on careers and behavior, career patterns among deputies and the factors that shape and constrain particular career paths, how pork-



barreling and bill sponsorship relates to the individual career goals of deputies, and how the pursuit of a political career in this environment encourages frequent party switching. The findings indicate that federal deputies are loyal to those who put them in office and to those who control their future careers. Furthermore, where deputies seek future office matters, as it shapes their behavior while in office.

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## **CHAPTER 1: Introduction: Ambition and Democratic Representation**

The concept of political ambition lies at the heart of democratic theory. When James Madison in Federalist 51 claimed “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition” to argue for the separation of powers, he recognized that the institutional design of a representative democracy must fundamentally deal with the individual goals of ambitious actors to foster representation, accountability, and protect citizens against an abusive government. Over a century and half later, Joseph Schlesinger (1966, 1) wrote in his classic work on political careers in the United States that “[a]mbition lies at the heart of politics.” Without political ambition, there cannot be electoral competition, a necessary component of a healthy democracy. Also, without ambition, no variation in the design of democratic institutions can induce representatives to represent citizen interests. Finally, absent political ambition, citizens cannot hold representatives accountable, since representatives have no desire to stay in office and thus, citizens have no mechanism by which to punish or reward a representative’s behavior.

Electoral institutions play a critical role in this process, as they structure the opportunities available to ambitious politicians, they shape the way representatives behave and how citizens hold them accountable (Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Carey and Shugart 1995). One particular electoral institution, reelection, is largely taken for granted in most theories of democratic representation. Reelection provides an avenue for ambitious politicians to develop long political careers (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Maestas et al. 2006), fosters an “electoral connection” between representatives and constituents (Mayhew 1974), and the threat of periodic elections in the future is one of the primary mechanisms voters have to reward or sanction their

representatives (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). For example, the goal of reelection plays a crucial role in many theories of U.S. congressional behavior, from explaining bill sponsorship behavior (Campbell 1982; Schiller 1995; Koger 2003), position taking (Mayhew 1974; Hill and Hurley 2002; Rocca 2007), roll-call voting (Miller and Stokes 1963; Fiorina 1974; Erikson 1978; Hill and Hurley 1999), and the organization of committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005), to decisions legislators make on serving particularistic vs. general interests (Arnold 1990) and the costs and benefits of pursuing a particular type of political career (Black 1972; Maestas et al. 2006).

However, what happens when the goal of reelection is removed? Are ambitious individuals still attracted to politics? How does one develop a political career without the possibility of reelection? Do representatives still have an incentive to represent? Can voters still hold representatives accountable? These are not just abstract questions, as not all institutional environments allow for or encourage reelection. For example, term limits are now a regular feature of state-level politics in the U.S. (Carey, Niemi, Powell, and Moncreif 2006), Mexico and Costa Rica prohibit consecutive reelection for all elected offices, while Ecuador and the Philippines used to (Carey 1996), several other countries prohibit consecutive reelection to sub-national office (e.g. Nicaragua, Colombia), while in still others (e.g. Argentina, Panama), reelection rates are so low that seeking reelection to the same office is not often a viable goal (Altman and Chasquetti 2005; Jones et al. 2002; Otero Felipe 2008). Across Latin America, legislators are largely inexperienced, with most legislators serving only two terms before moving on to other positions, suggesting that even when reelection is possible, it is not often probable (Martínez Rosón

2008, 240; 2011). In short, the concept of the single-minded reelection-seeker, at least across Latin America, may be the exception rather than the norm.<sup>1</sup>

Since much of political science resorts to assuming reelection as a major goal to explain a wide variety of behavior and outcomes, much less is known about how individual politicians will behave or how democracy works without reelection. Some have suggested democratic representation and accountability can still occur, even without reelection, as long as voters focus their energy on selecting a “good type” (prospective voting) rather than “sanctioning poor performance” (retrospective voting) (Fearon 1999). Yet, Fearon’s model has not been tested, nor do we have much theoretical or empirical insight on how politicians will behave when the goal of reelection is removed.

For example, many studies of legislative behavior assume reelection as the primary goal driving legislative behavior (e.g. Mayhew 1974), while others recognize that legislators may have multiple goals besides reelection, such as seeking influence within the legislature or pursuing policy goals (Fenno 1973). Even if one assumes legislators have multiple goals outside of reelection, these additional goals are intricately tied to the possibility of reelection and to one another. Seeking influence within a legislature is predicated on the assumption that legislators can accumulate seniority over time, while the ability of an individual legislator to pursue policy goals becomes increasingly difficult if they cannot establish any influence within the legislative body, nor have the experience and expertise that comes with multiple terms. Thus, without reelection, it is unclear from a theoretical standpoint why legislators would do anything at all.

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<sup>1</sup> For more data on legislative reelection rates in Latin America, see: <http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatura/reeleccion.htm>, accessed June 12, 2012.



One possible solution to this problem of understanding how representation works without reelection is to assume political actors are progressively ambitious, or seek alternative office after serving a term in another position, rather than statically ambitious, i.e. seek reelection to the same office one or more times (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Samuels 2003). Earlier studies of legislative politics in Latin America highlighted the importance of ambition and careers for understanding legislative behavior, but recognized the difficulty of applying the ‘Mayhewian’ model of single-minded reelection-seekers outside the United States to countries with much more complicated political career paths and varying types of electoral institutions (Morgenstern 2002a; 2002b; Weyland 2002). In addition, a critical assumption of progressive ambition theory is that ambitious actors desire to move up the career ladder to more prestigious positions. Existing theory provides little explanation for why a seemingly ambitious actor would seek a less prestigious future office, as is often the case in Mexico and in a number of other Latin American countries (Langston and Aparicio 2008; Martínez Rosón 2011).

Research on the consequences of progressive ambition is certainly not new, and a number of studies have attempted to look at how representatives behave differently based on whether or not they pursue static or progressive ambition (e.g. Herrick and Moore 1993; Leoni, Pereira and Rennó 2004; Maestas 2000; 2003; Maestas et al. 2006; Micozzi 2009; Padro I Miquel and Snyder 2006; Samuels 2003; Victor 2011). Yet, much research on the relationship between elections, ambition and representation takes place where it is possible for individual representatives to pursue static and progressive ambition. In the U.S., many legislators at the state and federal-level pursue reelection, or static ambition, for multiple terms until opportunities arise that allow them to obtain higher office. Since

U.S. legislators typically have little control over exogenous opportunities to seek higher office (such as the vacancy of a sought-after office due to retirement or the ambitions of another legislator), the consequences of progressive ambition on legislative behavior may be muted. Term limits at the state-level in the U.S. make it easier to look for the consequences of progressive ambition, although term-limited legislators still have the potential to seek reelection for several terms before pursuing higher office and since not all legislators are term-limited at the same time, it may be somewhat difficult to disentangle the effects of progressive ambition versus static ambition. In Brazil, where legislative turnover is high and scholars have argued progressive ambition better explains legislative behavior, nearly 2/3 of legislators still pursue reelection (Leoni, Pereira and Rennó 2004; Samuels 2003: 39). In Argentina, where progressive ambition has also been argued to be a better characterization of the ambitions of legislators, researchers are faced with a closed-list proportional representation electoral system, making it potentially difficult to determine a linkage between individual representatives and voters regardless of the type of ambition they display (Micozzi 2009).

Thus far, studies of political ambition have lacked empirical data from cases where static ambition is not a possibility and electoral systems do not complicate the existence of a principal-agent relationship between voters and representatives. Even in studies that have attempted to address this issue (e.g. Taylor 1992; Carey 1996), the lack of systematic career path data and data on legislative outputs has hampered the development of convincing theoretical models of behavior in this particular institutional context. Furthermore, theoretical studies of ambition have ignored explanations of career paths that are neither static nor purely “progressive.”

In order to understand what happens in a democracy when we relax the assumption of reelection, I turn to the case of Mexico, where institutional design forces politicians to choose either between discrete or progressive ambition. Since consecutive reelection is prohibited for all elected offices, and most valuable bureaucratic posts are political appointments coterminous with the terms of elected office, individuals who wish to pursue a career in public office in Mexico must possess progressive ambition. Because of this institutional environment, the Mexican case provides an excellent opportunity to examine the strategic behavior of ambitious politicians when reelection is not an option, and the consequences of this behavior.

This dissertation has two major goals. The first goal is to develop a theory of political ambition that explains how rational, ambitious politicians pursue their goals when they cannot seek reelection. The second major goal is to determine the behavioral consequences of the pursuit of progressive ambition in this environment. In order to accomplish these goals, I collected a wide variety of data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies over the period 1997-2009, including the prior and future career paths of over 2000 legislators who served during this time period, and individual level data on bill sponsorship, roll-call voting, and pork-barreling activities during the negotiation of the annual federal budget. I complement this information with interviews of former and current legislators, legislative staff members, and academic experts.

The Chamber of Deputies provides an ideal window into the pursuit of ambition and its consequences in the Mexican case, as it lies somewhere in the middle of the opportunity structure for ambitious politicians. Many federal legislators attempt to move on to higher office, such as becoming senators, governors, big city mayors, and even

President. Federal legislators also enter the Chamber with a wide variety of experience. The time period was selected for three reasons. I begin the study in 1997, as several important types of data needed to test the theory become much more difficult to obtain prior to 1997. 1997 is also a reasonable starting point for the democratic period in Mexico, and this study is primarily interested in studying political ambition within a democratic context.<sup>2</sup> I end the study in 2009 in order to be able to study where federal legislators who left office in 2009 pursued future office. Finally, there is a large literature suggesting that prior to 1997, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies was primarily a rubber-stamp legislature, engaged in very little activity, and was not particularly influential in the policy process (e.g. Ugalde 2000; Casar 2002; Nacif 2005; Jiménez Badillo 2006). The loss of majority control of the Chamber in 1997 by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party led to rapid and important changes in executive-legislative relations where now one observer notes, the “Congress proposes and the president disposes (Nacif 2005, 3).”

The Mexican case also provides a number of other benefits for understanding the nature and consequences of progressive ambition in a comparative context. First, Mexico uses a mixed-electoral system where the majority of legislators must win office through single-member districts, making it possible for citizens to identify their representative,

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<sup>2</sup> When authoritarianism ends and democracy begins in the Mexican case is certainly not a clear-cut affair since the transition towards democracy was a slow-going affair that spread unevenly at the sub-national level over a long period of time (e.g. Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley 1999; Eisenstadt 2004; Greene 2007). Most studies start at some point in the 1990s, although 1997 was the date the ruling PRI first lost majority control of Chamber of Deputies, and not until 2000 did the PRI lose majority control in the Senate and lose the Presidency. The fraudulent presidential elections of 1988 were one of the main catalysts that led to a number of important electoral reforms, starting with the 1991 mid-term elections that eventually allowed opposition parties to compete in a much more open environment.

and for representatives elected at the district level to target specific constituencies without the potential confounding factor of competing representatives such as in Brazil's open-list proportional representation system. The Mexican case also provides the added benefit of examining how varying electoral rules influence political ambition and behavior, since the remaining large minority of legislators are elected through closed-list proportional representation. The unique rules of Mexico's mixed-electoral system (Kerevel 2010) compared to most other mixed-systems, as well as the presence of both single-member district and proportional representation elections, make Mexico an ideal case to examine how variation in electoral rules alters the strategic decisions of ambitious politicians and the consequences of these decisions. In all other studies of political ambition, the electoral rules are constant, and thus provide little theoretical leverage on how electoral rules constrain and shape the behavior of ambitious actors (e.g. Maestas et al. 2006; Micozzi 2009; Samuels 2003). Throughout the dissertation, I consider the influences and consequences of differing modes of election on the behavior of Mexican legislators.

Second, Mexico's federal political system provides a number of opportunities for ambitious politicians to pursue their careers, and variation in the size of states, the number of opportunities available, and the nature of sub-national party competition provide interesting variation to examine the consequences of progressive ambition and how variation in electoral competition influences behavior. Existing studies of political ambition consider the electoral environment (e.g. nature of party support in a particular district/state) to be a critical factor in the decision-making calculus of ambitious politicians (Rohde 1979; Maestas et al. 2006). Recent studies of Mexican politics have emphasized the increased role for state governors in candidate selection and the

policymaking process (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), therefore I am able to consider how governors at the state level influence the careers and behavior of federal legislators. Thus, Mexican federalism provides an excellent opportunity to examine how various components of the electoral environment at multiple levels of governance influence the decisions and behavior of ambitious politicians.

Finally, Mexico went through a transition towards democracy in the 1990s, which involved a rapid change in the level of electoral competition, and had a profound effect on the party system. Up through the 1980s, Mexico was easily characterized as a one-party dominant regime with only small pockets of support for opposition parties around the country. By the late 1990s, Mexico had a competitive three-party system, with a number of other minor parties. In addition, prior to the 1997 mid-term elections, the ruling PRI won nearly every single-member district race for the Chamber of Deputies, with opposition parties only winning seats through proportional representation. From 1997 and on, the three major parties can all seriously compete for at least a subset of the district races. These dramatic changes in electoral competition and the party system provide an opportunity to examine how these changes influenced the decision-making calculus and behavior of ambitious political actors over time (Canon and Sousa 1992).

### **1.1 Theoretical approach and potential criticisms**

This dissertation adopts a rational-choice institutionalist (RCI) approach to understanding political careers and legislative politics in Mexico. A pure rational choice argument assumes purposive actors with pre-defined goals. These actors have choices among a set of alternatives to reach those goals, and rational individuals are maximizers, meaning that they will choose the best alternative available to attain their goal, weighing

the costs and benefits associated with each course of action (Lichbach 2003; Geddes 2003; March and Simon 1981; Riker 1980; Downs 1957; Olson 1965). A number of rational choice scholars have moved on from singular assumptions of universal rationality based on human nature (Lichbach 2003; Simon 1985), towards rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalist arguments still assume rational maximizers, but recognize that the particular institutions under which they are constrained shape the set of alternative choices from which rational actors can choose. Institutionalists recognize that in many instances, political actors act on preferences that are developed as a result of the institutional constraints under which they act, and that as the institutional context changes, so do the observed preferences of actors (Immergut 1998). Institutions, in short, shape the strategies political actors will use to obtain their goals, and the costs and benefits associated with any particular strategy (Geddes 2003; Lichbach 2003).

Adopting a RCI approach to study legislative politics and political careers is not particularly controversial, as nearly all studies of this nature, in the United States or comparatively, adopt a similar theoretical approach (although see Weyland 2002). While I argue that the RCI approach can teach us a lot about the behavior of Mexican legislators, there are some potential limits to this perspective in its current form that might warrant future research under alternative approaches or a refinement of the theory I adopt in Chapter 2. First, not all Mexican politicians may be rational utility maximizers. I argue that Mexican politicians are primarily office-seekers, and in the context of non-consecutive reelection, they will act strategically in their current office to obtain a desired future office. Thus, federal deputies have a set of predefined career goals, and while

serving in the legislature, they act strategically by weighing the costs and benefits of particular actions in order to achieve their goals.

However, other research on Mexican politics suggests that there exist a subset of Mexican politicians that are “message-seekers” rather than “office-seekers” (Greene 2007). This difference is due to the unique history of opposition political party development under a single-party regime for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Kenneth Greene (2007) argues that as a result of the unfair playing field created by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) combined with selective repression, members of opposition parties (especially members of the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)) were committed activists more interested in spreading their message and transforming society, rather than winning office. As electoral competition became more free and fair in the 1990s, divisions opened up within opposition parties between the committed activists and those interested in winning office and developing a political career. Furthermore, politicians from the PRI in their rhetoric often speak of party life and their careers in military-like terms, such as engaging in party work as “working from the trenches,” or if speaking about where they will seek a future position, they often suggest they will go where the party most needs them, as if they are performing a service to the party, rather than pursuing their own self-interested goals.<sup>3</sup> The extent to which message-seekers are still significant actors within political parties is unknown, but it should be expected that message-seekers will engage in behavior fundamentally different from that of office-seekers, regardless of the impact these actions

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<sup>3</sup> Based on general impressions over years of reading about Mexican politics. I don't have a particular citation to back up this claim at this point.



have on their future career. Adopting a more historical or cultural approach to Mexican legislative politics could highlight some of these larger differences.

Despite the possible presence of message seekers within the Congress it is still plausible to assume that the overwhelming majority of legislators are ambitious office-seekers. The extent to which message-seekers continue to play an important role in legislative politics is likely to work against many of my particular hypotheses regarding legislative behavior, and therefore is unlikely to bias the findings in favor of any specific hypothesis. The RCI approach can help explain a lot about Mexican legislative behavior, as I attempt to do in this work, but it cannot explain it all. Hopefully other researchers interested in how the particular historical development of party politics influences current behavior in the democratic period, or how the political culture within each political party and in congress influences careers and behavior, can draw from the insights of this work.

A second potential criticism of the RCI approach as applied here, is that it assumes actors possess enough information to act strategically, know their own goals as well as the goals of other relevant actors, and actors exist within a stable and well-known environment with repeated interactions in order to develop efficient strategies (Geddes 2003; Lichbach 2003). This study begins at the tail end of the democratic transition in Mexico, which raises two possible concerns with the application of a RCI approach. First, politicians may possess highly imperfect information regarding what types of behavior will be most useful in pursuing a future political career since they may have little experience to draw from as examples. They may not have access to polling data, or the electorate may be too volatile in a particular constituency to predict with any degree of certainty how they will act in an upcoming election. Second, especially regarding the

earlier period of the study (1997-2003), many political actors may not have engaged in enough strategic interactions to understand what types of behavior are the most efficient, suggesting that many actors are still learning how to operate in a democratic and competitive environment. Furthermore, the uncertainty regarding information and the electoral environment may vary by state, by the types of office pursued, and the level of previous experience held by any particular actor.

At this point, there is not a good strategy for accounting for this potential uncertainty that Mexican political actors face. One potential solution would be to collect more data from the 1991 – 1997 legislatures in order to trace how more drastic changes in the competitive environment influenced individual deputies. While there is substantial evidence post-1997 (presented in Chapter 3) that legislators were still engaged in a learning process, after 2003 there is a certain stabilization in the behavior of legislators, which has continued to the present. However, the extent of this differing level of uncertainty between the 1997-2003 and 2003-2009 period should not be overstated. In most of the chapters I present evidence for each legislative term and tend to find similar patterns across all four legislative terms, which suggests Mexican deputies were quick to adopt strategies to achieve their goals. Furthermore, if Mexican deputies did not possess enough information to act strategically, the consequence of this uncertainty would likely show up as null findings in the empirical results. Nevertheless, future research should examine more carefully what types of information are available to deputies to engage in cost-benefit analysis, and how it might vary across states, the level of experience, and the desired future office of the deputy.

In addition, the importance of democratization in the Mexican case and its potential consequences for behavior should not be overstated, at least after 2000. Institutionally, little has changed in Mexico from the authoritarian to the democratic period, other than the important adoption of independent electoral management bodies in the 1990s designed to guarantee free and fair electoral competition (Eisenstadt 2004). The electoral rules, prohibition on consecutive reelection, the constitution, and the major political parties have been largely constant throughout the transition. This stability in the institutional environment, excepting a few minor changes, suggests that even after the historic 2000 presidential election when the PRI lost control of the presidency for the first time, political actors already had a grasp on the nature of the political environment in which they were to pursue their goals.

The remainder of this introduction outlines the subsequent chapters and the general arguments made throughout the text.

## **1.2 Outline**

In the next chapter, I develop a rational choice theory of political ambition where reelection is assumed not to be a possibility. This theory draws on the insights of the classic theories developed for the U.S. context (Black 1972; Rohde 1979), but also draws on recent modifications (Maestas et al. 2006) and is then adapted to account for the particular institutional environment in Mexico. I demonstrate why, even in cases where reelection is prohibited, most political actors will possess progressive ambition, rather than discrete ambition. However, when reelection is prohibited, the concept of progressive ambition changes. Previous studies of progressive ambition only consider

movements from “lower” to “higher” office, such as from state legislature ⇒ House ⇒ Senate ⇒ Presidency in the U.S. case, or from legislative to executive positions in Brazil or Argentina. I demonstrate why it is rational for progressively ambitious actors that cannot pursue reelection as a viable strategy to choose to temporarily climb “down” the career ladder only to climb higher later on, such as from House ⇒ state legislature ⇒ Senate if U.S. lawmakers were unable to pursue consecutive reelection. Finally, this theory develops a number of empirical implications on what types of behavior one might expect from ambitious politicians who cannot seek reelection, and how the electoral environment and particular institutional rules, such as the electoral system and centralized candidate selection, influence a rational actor’s decision-making and behavior.

In chapter 3, I examine how changes in electoral competition in Mexico coincided with changes in the political careers of Mexican legislators and drastic changes in their behavior. I argue in this chapter that general increases in electoral competition during the transition towards democracy had profound effects on the political careers of Mexican legislators. Increased competition altered the political opportunity structure of Mexican politics by increasing the value of legislative seats and also by making municipal and state-level offices valuable positions for pursuing successful political careers. Prior to democratization, administrative office, rather than elected office, was more valuable for climbing the political career ladder. I make the case that electoral competition altered the political opportunity structure by introducing meaningful competition for elected offices and also by increasing the importance of the Mexican Congress in the national-policymaking process, altering the way strategic political actors used a congressional seat to pursue their career goals. Increases in electoral competition also had a profound

influence on the party system, by encouraging all parties to professionalize and reduce their previous reliance on political amateurs. As the party system changed and became much more competitive, the increased professionalization of the political parties as vehicles to channel the ambitions of their members led to dramatic changes in behavior as the increasing relevance of Congress in the policy-making process vis-a-vis the Executive Branch was both a cause and consequence of strategic legislators using the tools at their disposal to pursue their career goals.

Chapter 3 draws on secondary literature that examines the career paths and legislative behavior prior to 1997 as well as aggregate data from the 1997-2009 period to demonstrate how changes in electoral competition and the party system led to changes in the career paths of legislators and their individual behavior. This chapter also introduces some of the empirical data used in the following chapters. Understanding these structural changes in the Mexican political system are crucial for setting up the subsequent chapters and for interpreting some of the results.

Chapters 4 through 7 then test several implications of the theory developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 makes the case that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious. Since Mexican deputies cannot pursue static ambition, it is also possible they pursue discrete ambition. However, I demonstrate this is not the case, that the overwhelming majority of Mexican legislators are professional politicians with a wealth of experience and that many go on to other political offices after being elected to the Chamber of Deputies. I find that most legislators pursue their careers at the sub-national level and most of them seek future elected office rather than appointed positions. I also find significant differences in the careers of legislators based on their mode of election.

Chapter 5 examines the propensity of progressively ambitious legislators to target their future constituencies through pork-barreling during annual federal budget negotiations. Previous research on Mexican legislative behavior has suggested legislators have few incentives to engage in constituency service or pork-barreling activities due to the prohibition on consecutive reelection, party voting in the electorate, and strong party control over the candidate selection process (Nacif 2002). Nevertheless, the theory from Chapter 2 demonstrates why this should not be the case for progressively ambitious legislators seeking to further their careers. In this chapter I find that legislators seeking a future state-level office are more likely to engage in ‘pork-barreling’ behavior in order to claim credit with their selectorate (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). This chapter argues that despite institutional rules that appear to eliminate incentives for legislators to be responsive to constituents and seek a personal vote, Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious and therefore use these interventions into the budget process as a form of credit claiming to further their political careers after leaving Congress.

In addition to seeking ‘pork,’ federal deputies have a few other resources at their disposal while in office to attempt to win a future office. The ability to sponsor legislation is one resource that all legislators possess and as a result, progressively ambitious legislators may draft bills to claim credit with future constituencies and to target specific interest groups. Chapter 6 therefore examines the determinants of bill sponsorship behavior and how bill sponsorship relates to the future career paths of federal legislators. While a prohibition on reelection may have negative consequences on legislative specialization, I argue in this chapter that legislators seeking a future legislative office (at

the state level or in the Senate), have incentives to dedicate time to legislative work in order to increase their chances of pursuing future legislative office.

Chapter 7 examines the consequences of banning consecutive reelection on the Mexican party system as a whole through an examination of party switching across the political careers of federal deputies. In this chapter, I argue that the ban on consecutive reelection provides a unique opportunity to study party switching in a stable party system, primarily because after every term of office, Mexican political actors must decide with which party to affiliate to continue their careers. The lack of incumbency creates a situation whereby all competitors for political office are challengers, and also dramatically increases the number of potential competitors. I further elaborate the theory of political ambition developed in Chapter 2, identifying party switching as a rational strategy for career advancement. I then identify a number of empirical implications from the theory, examining the frequency and motivations for party switching among Mexican federal deputies. This chapter also fills a gap within the party switching literature by examining a country with a stable party system and strong, highly disciplined and programmatic political parties (Carey 2003; Klesner 2005; Rosas 2005; Samuels 2006), and by examining switching throughout the political careers of Mexican federal deputies, rather than focusing solely on switching within a legislature.

Chapter 8 concludes, addresses some of the large implications of the findings, and identifies areas for future research.

## **Chapter 2: A ‘Snakes and Ladders’ theory of political ambition: The implications of pursuing a political career in the context of no reelection**

A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that citizens are allowed to choose their representatives through periodic elections. Through elections, citizens can make a choice regarding who will best represent their interests. The threat of future elections is the major institutional mechanism by which citizens can control their representatives, rewarding or punishing them depending on how they behave while in office. Implicit in the relationship between elections and democratic representation is the assumption that politicians are self-interested actors that pursue their own goals (Stone 1990). Self-interested political actors may seek power, fame, policy, wealth, or any number of possible goals, but in order to achieve their goals, they should serve the interests of those responsible for putting that actor in office and keeping them there. The threat of periodic elections induces self-interested political actors to serve the interests of their constituents in order that the politician may continue to pursue their own selfish goals. In this way, elections are supposed to produce representation within a democracy.

For democratic representation to work, self-interested politicians must also be ambitious. Without ambition, political office holders have no incentive to be responsive to voters or act in the best interests of their constituencies. Thus, representatives who hold discrete ambition, or do not desire to remain in political office after serving a single term in a legislature have no institutional incentives to listen or respond to their constituents, and citizens have no mechanism to hold their representatives accountable (Schlesinger 1966; Maestas et al. 2006).



The importance of political ambition for ensuring representation, accountability and electoral competition has not gone unnoticed, and a wide literature has developed to explain the various career choices made by political actors (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972; Levine and Hyde 1977; Rohde 1979; Brace 1984; Maestas et al. 2006), as well as the consequences of political ambition and particular career choices on different types of behavior and key political outcomes (Canon and Sousa 1992; Herrick and Moore 1993; Maestas 2000; 2003; Padró I Miquel and Snyder 2006; Victor 2011). However, much of our understanding of political ambition and its consequences comes from the 20<sup>th</sup> century United States,<sup>4</sup> and only recently have scholars attempted to adapt the theoretical insights from the U.S. literature on ambition to a comparative context (Altman and Chasquetti 2005; Barrie and Gibbins 1989; Botero 2008; Leoni, Pereira and Renno 2004; Martínez Rosón 2011; Micozzi 2009; Samuels 2003). As one attempts to adapt existing theoretical models of ambition to different contexts, it becomes clear that many assumptions that underlie models of ambition developed for the U.S. no longer apply.

In this chapter, I develop an alternative model of political ambition for the Mexican context, drawing on the insights from the U.S. literature, but also highlighting several of the shortcomings and complications that exist when applying these models to alternate institutional environments. I first review existing rational-choice models of political ambition, and then develop an alternate model that more accurately reflects the reality of the Mexican context. This model should also be applicable, with minor modifications to account for different electoral institutions, to other contexts with strong party systems and where progressive, rather than static, ambition is the norm. I then

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<sup>4</sup> Although see Kernell (1977) and Carson and Engstrom (2005) for studies of the 19<sup>th</sup> century U.S.

discuss in more detail several of the critical inputs in the model that influence the decision-making calculus, namely individual behavior, the electoral environment, and electoral institutions. The insights developed in this chapter serve as the basis for the empirical analysis in the following chapters.

## **2.1 Existing rational choice models of political ambition**

Early studies of political ambition adopted a rational-choice approach to explaining the career decisions of political actors (Black 1972; Rohde 1979). In this work, a simple model was developed whereby a potential candidate would seek office if the probability of winning the office times the benefits of holding office was greater than the costs of obtaining the office.

$$U(O) = PB - C$$

where,

$U(O)$  is the utility of holding the office

$P$ =the probability of winning office

$B$ =the benefits of holding office

$C$ =the costs of obtaining office

According to Black (1972), potential candidates will seek office when  $PB > C$ , and when the utility of holding office is greater than the utility of some other career alternative,  $U(O) > U(A_i)$ , where  $U(A_i)$  represents all other possible career alternatives an individual could pursue besides political office.

However, once an individual wins political office, they face three possible choices: retire from office after a single term (discrete ambition), seek reelection to the same office (static ambition), or to move on to an alternative, or higher, office

(progressive ambition) (Black 1972; Rohde 1979). Since most empirical studies of political careers find that politicians either pursue static or progressive ambition, and rarely leave office after a single term, most work has focused on the decision to stay in the same office (seek reelection) or to seek a different political office.

Rohde (1979) adopts a very similar approach to Black (1972) but assumes that all political actors possess progressive ambition, or the desire to seek higher office. As Rohde (1979, 3) suggests, all House members would accept a Senate seat or governorship if it were offered to them without any cost or risk. However, not all members of the House are risk-takers, and thus we see a large number pursue reelection as a safer strategy of maintaining their political careers. In this model, political officeholders will pursue higher office when the expected utility of holding higher office is greater than the expected utility of holding the same office again (Rohde 1979, 4-5). Thus,

$$E(U_{\text{higheroffice}}) = P_h B_h - C_h$$

$$E(U_{\text{sameoffice}}) = P_l B_l - C_l$$

Political officeholders will only seek higher office when  $E(U_{\text{higheroffice}}) > E(U_{\text{sameoffice}})$ .

Maestas et al. (2006) build off the original models from Black (1972) and Rohde (1979) by making a distinction between general decisions to seek higher office, and the decision to enter a particular race. They question Rohde's assumption that all officeholders possess progressive ambition and therefore one must first explain the possession of progressive ambition. Then, if an officeholder possesses progressive ambition, it becomes important to explain the strategic decision of when to run, or when to act on one's ambitions. For Maestas et al. (2006), progressive ambition is a function of the expected utility of holding a higher office.

$$\text{Progressive Ambition} = f(E(U_{\text{higheroffice}})) = P_h B_h - C_h + M$$

The cost-benefit analysis is the same as before, but they also suggest that there may be personal motivations (M) outside the cost-benefit analysis that influence the decision to seek higher office. In this model, individuals who find the benefits outweigh the costs possess progressive ambition and then face a second decision, when to run for higher office.

In the second stage of this decision model, ambitious officeholders weigh their electoral chances in a given race, the costs of giving up their current office, and their general chances of winning the race, regardless of the particular circumstances surrounding any given election (Maestas et al. 2006). For an individual who is progressively ambitious, the decision to enter a particular race is still based on a cost-benefit analysis ( $P(\text{Enter})=PB - C$ ), but the probability of winning (P) will change from race to race, just as the costs (C) may change over time. For those without progressive ambition (i.e. where the costs outweighed the benefits in the first stage), the probability they would enter a race for higher office is zero.

This rational-choice approach to political ambition is a reasonable approximation of the decision-making process for political actors in the U.S. context but includes a number of assumptions that do not travel well to alternative institutional environments. As others have argued, political goals are shaped by the available opportunities, and the “political opportunity structure” is shaped by existing institutions (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972). In the U.S., seeking reelection (or static ambition) is a viable strategy for pursuing a political career. Rates of reelection are high, and political actors have a real choice between staying in their current office, or attempting to obtain an alternative

office. In other contexts, reelection is either prohibited (i.e. Mexico, Costa Rica), or rates of reelection are so low that reelection is either an extremely risky endeavor, or not a viable option (Altman and Chasquetti 2005; Jones et al. 2002; Martínez Rosón 2008; Morgenstern and Nacif 2002). In these cases, where reelection is impossible or unlikely,  $E(U_{\text{sameoffice}})$  will be zero or very close zero because the benefits of maintaining the same office will be zero where reelection is prohibited, or very close to zero when the probability of winning the same office again are small.<sup>5</sup> When that is the case, we should see much more evidence of existing officeholders pursuing alternative offices since  $E(U_{\text{higheroffice}})$  will always be greater than  $E(U_{\text{sameoffice}})$ .

Alternatively, it might be possible in cases where reelection is unlikely that many political actors possess discrete ambition and more closely resemble the ideal of a “citizen legislator” (Carey 1996, 190-94). However, drawing on the insights of Maestas et al. (2006) and Black (1972) I suggest it is unlikely, even in situations where reelection is prohibited, that political actors possess discrete ambition. Assuming reelection is prohibited, potential candidates will seek public office ( $U(O)$ ) when the probability of winning office ( $P$ ) times the benefits of holding office ( $B$ ) are greater than the costs of obtaining office ( $C$ ), or  $U(O) = PB - C$ , and when  $U(O) > U(A_i)$ , where  $U(A_i)$  represents all other career alternatives besides public office. If  $U(A_i) > U(O)$ , then an individual will not attempt to run for public office. However, if  $U(O) > U(A_i)$ , and the actor makes this

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<sup>5</sup> One might wonder why a politician who is unlikely to win reelection to the same office would be likely to win an alternative office. For example, in Argentina, legislators rarely seek reelection, but instead seek to pursue their careers at the sub-national level (Jones et al. 2002; Micozzi 2009). The reason reelection is unlikely in this particular case is that party leaders control access to the closed-list PR ballots, and for a variety of reasons, are not interested in legislators building strong careers within the legislature. There, sitting legislators have greater chances of competing for a sub-national office.

decision knowing the existing political opportunity structure of their environment, it is probable this actor will value holding a public office over some other alternative in many cases. If that is not the case, then that individual is unlikely to have attempted to seek public office in the first place. We do not have to assume this, but can test this proposition with evidence on career paths of Mexican legislators. Mexico is an ideal case to test the proposition that even where reelection is not possible, political actors are still ambitious politicians that attempt to pursue long careers in public office since Mexico prohibits consecutive reelection at all levels of elected office.<sup>6</sup> One implication is that most current officeholders are unlikely to be amateurs, and are also unlikely to return to non-political office after serving a term in public office.

Thus, the decision to pursue progressive ambition likely takes place before an individual decides to pursue a career in politics. In an environment where reelection is prohibited or unlikely, nearly all political actors are likely to possess progressive ambition. According to Maestas et al. (2006), once an individual possesses the ambition for higher office, the strategic decision involves the decision on when to run. However, this formulation assumes reelection is possible, since the decision on when to run involves the costs of giving up the current office. Where reelection is not a viable strategy, the costs of giving up the current office are essentially zero. For progressively ambitious actors that cannot seek reelection, the important strategic decision is not so much *when* to run but *where* to run. The decision of when to run for a particular office still involves a temporal component, but since the ambitious actor has to run for some

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<sup>6</sup> In addition, the length of terms in Mexico's highly politicized bureaucracy largely coincide with the terms of elected office, since newly elected presidents, governors and mayors often appoint their own supporters to these offices.

office or retire at the end of their term, the decision on where to run at the end of a term can have important consequences for the length and success of their career.

If we accept they are progressively ambitious and desire public office over some other alternative, they must attempt to obtain a public or political office to maintain a political career. A progressively ambitious politician may have a single goal in mind, such as being governor or becoming mayor of their home town, but to achieve this goal, they develop some sort of reputation with voters and connections to other important political elites that will make it possible for this individual to reach their goal. One potential strategy for this individual would be to just run for the office they desire most and keep running until they win. However, if this individual has few political connections and little visibility among voters, they are not likely to win or even get on the ballot. Losing an election is not always the best way to win the same election in the future, and therefore a progressively ambitious actor would likely enter public office at a lower level to develop connections with other elites and visibility and support among voters in the hope of winning their most desired office in the future.

Yet, in a system where reelection is prohibited and all politicians are pursuing a similar strategy, it should always be more valuable to possess some type of political office versus returning to private life for a short period of time since connections to voters and other elites are the currency that matters for maintaining a political career. For example, two federal legislators (A & B) from state X may desire to hold the mayor's seat of the largest city in the state.<sup>7</sup> After serving one term in the federal legislature,

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<sup>7</sup> This scenario is a real possibility in Mexico, as many large cities have multiple federal representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (e.g. Ciudad Juárez, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, Ecatepec, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Morelia, Tijuana), as well as a variable number of

legislator A competes for mayor at time  $t$  and loses, while legislator B competes for a state legislative seat at time  $t$  with a similar jurisdiction as the city and wins. Legislator A may return to private life until the next election, or attempt to obtain an appointed position in the state government or do party work. It may seem that legislator B took a step backward in her political career, but she also now has (at least) two electoral wins under her belt, can continue engaging in constituency service, and continue to develop connections with voters and elites that may be useful for winning the mayoral seat at time  $t+1$ . When the next election happens ( $t+1$ ), legislator A and legislator B may both compete for the same mayoral seat, but legislator B is likely to have greater political capital at time  $t+1$  than legislator A, and thus may have a greater probability of winning the election.<sup>8</sup>

In the above example, each legislator made two decisions. Both legislators possessed the same ultimate career goal (mayor), but made different decisions on when to run for that particular office. Also, both legislators had to make a decision on where to run after their legislative term was up, but made different decisions for which office to compete. To formalize this decision process, let us assume a political environment where there are three potential offices an ambitious actor can hold, federal legislator (F), state

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other legislators elected through proportional representation who may have residency in that particular municipality.

<sup>8</sup> The assumption that  $\Pr(B_{\text{winning}}) > \Pr(A_{\text{winning}})$  is of course predicated on the assumption that what legislator A did during time  $t$  and time  $t+1$  had little value for advancing their political career. If this assumption is false, then the strategy pursued by legislator A may have been the optimal strategy given his particular circumstance. For example, legislator A may have run in the election, possibly expecting to lose, but also knew that after the election he would receive an appointment in the governor's cabinet or become leader of his party in the state. Both of these positions possess benefits for increasing connections to voters and elites, potentially more so than being a state legislator. Running a campaign, even if legislator A lost, still has the benefit of increasing name recognition, and is good practice if A seeks to run for the same office in the future.



legislator (S), and mayor (M) and this actor holds a preference ordering where  $M > F > S$ . Let us also assume that this actor won their first election to one of these three offices, but can only serve a single term before having to move on to another office. To continue with the above example, a federal legislator at the end of their term faces the decision to run for state legislative office (S) or mayor (M). According to this actor's preferences, they would most like to run for mayor at the end of their term. The expected utility of holding the mayor's office is based on the probability of winning the office ( $P_m$ ), the benefits of holding that office ( $B_m$ ), and the costs incurred in running for that office ( $C_m$ ). The same can be said for the expected utility of holding a state legislative seat, except we can also assume that  $B_m > B_s$  due to the actor's preference ordering and the increased power and visibility an executive has over a legislator. Thus,

$$E(U_m) = P_m * B_m - C_m$$

$$E(U_s) = P_s * B_s - C_s$$

Even if the actor prefers to be mayor over state legislator, they will run for state legislator at time  $t$  if  $E(U_s) > E(U_m)$  depending on the values of  $P$  and  $C$ . We can assume  $C_m > C_s$  in most cases, but  $P_m$  and  $P_s$  may change drastically from election to election. If  $P_m$  is much lower than  $P_s$ , such as in a case where there is a strong alternative candidate for mayor in the same party, or a different party, or the individual's political party does not allow them to run for mayor in a particular election,<sup>9</sup> then it is perfectly rational for this actor to run for state legislator at time  $t$ . They will only run for mayor when  $E(U_m) \geq E(U_s)$ . At time  $t+1$ , our individual now faces the choice between running again for federal legislator or to run for mayor. If  $E(U_m) \geq E(U_f)$ , they run for mayor, but if  $E(U_f) >$

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<sup>9</sup> These particular scenarios are extremely common in Mexican elections.

$E(U_m)$ , they then run for federal legislator again. Therefore, even though we may know the actor's preferences, his decision on when and where to run are largely based on the probability of winning office and the costs of running for office.

Because of the more complicated nature of pursuing a political career where consecutive reelection is not a viable option, individual career trajectories are likely to display a trend where for every two steps made up the career ladder, an individual may take one step down due to changing circumstances that influence the probability of winning and the costs of running. While individual politicians may possess a preference for a linear career trajectory, such as moving from city councilor, state legislator, federal legislator, mayor, senator, to governor, the inability to pursue reelection to the same office will often lead ambitious actors to make short-term decisions throughout their career that would appear to outside observers as a step down the career ladder, rather than up. Much like a game of Snakes and Ladders,<sup>10</sup> ambitious actors in this environment start at the bottom of the career ladder, and may both possess the desire to be president. However, to reach the highest office (or win the game), the path will not likely be linear and may be drastically different for each actor, as they calculate the risk of each future move, sometimes moving down the ladder, and sometimes moving up. The factors that will likely influence the probability of winning and the costs of running for any future office are individual, contextual, and institutional. Below I examine each factor separately.

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<sup>10</sup> Or Chutes and Ladders, the two games are identical.

## 2.2 Responding to constituent interests

At the individual level, an ambitious actor can use their current office to engage in any type of behavior they see as likely to increase the probability of winning a future office. For a legislator, this could involve constituency service, bill sponsorship, pork-barreling, speaking for certain interests, promoting the interests of a particular group, or seeking leadership roles to increase their influence within the legislature and visibility outside of it. While most work on national legislatures, and nearly all work on the United States Congress assumes that legislators primarily seek reelection to the same office (e.g. Mayhew 1974), assuming progressive ambition does not make legislators any less strategic.

In many cases, representatives that are progressively ambitious seek future constituencies that include the constituency that first elected them to office.<sup>11</sup> Thus, scholars who have studied this issue find that progressively ambitious legislators are not only responsive to their current constituency, but to citizens of their potential future

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<sup>11</sup> For purposes of this analysis, I assume progressively ambitious legislators seek future constituencies that include their former constituencies. However, this assumption could certainly be tested with available data. After analyzing career path data on over 2000 legislators, the number of legislators who move to different municipalities or states during or after their term in office is extremely low. Residency and connection to the constituency in which a politician is hoping to seek office is extremely important in Mexican politics and therefore, it is not often an ambitious politician is willing to risk their existing political capital in a particular area to move. The most common switch, although still rare, occurs among politicians who move from their state of origin to the Federal District. Some notable examples include the former Jefes de Gobierno (commonly referred to as mayor of Mexico City, but equivalent in stature to that of a governor) of the Federal District, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (1997-2000) who was from Michoacán, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2000-06), who was from Tabasco. For ambitious legislators who do not seek elected office, this assumption is somewhat less likely to be true, especially if they engage in party work or obtain an appointment in the federal bureaucracy. However, even in these cases, individuals largely return to their states of origin.

constituency since these constituencies typically overlap (Squire 1988; Maestas 2000; 2003; Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). For example, in the U.S., state legislators may seek a position in the House of Representatives, while House members may seek a Senate seat. Outside the U.S., Brazilian and Argentine legislators may seek to become governor or mayor (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). In all these cases, current and future constituencies are likely to overlap, suggesting that representatives can only neglect constituent interests at their peril if they wish to maintain a political career.

Thus, progressively ambitious legislators are likely to use the tools at their disposal to increase the probability of winning a future political office. Federal legislators who wish to pursue a subnational career are likely to attempt to direct resources and effort towards serving future constituents. One way they can serve future constituents is to provide constituency service, such as helping individuals gain access to federal social welfare programs and other federal benefits, help resolve legal or administrative disputes, or provide access to services such as education and health care.<sup>12</sup> Constituency service in a strong party system may not be done in order to secure a personal vote in a future election, but could also be considered as working for the party in order to improve the party's reputation and to increase the likelihood that party elites in positions to supply future ballot access or other positions will consider the individual legislator as a viable and loyal candidate (Taylor 1992; Carey 1996). In either case, providing constituency service to secure a personal vote or as party work, legislators are likely to engage in this behavior as a strategy to pursue a future political career.

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<sup>12</sup> Some examples of how Mexican legislators provide constituency service based on interviews and reading of websites of currently serving federal legislators.

Another way legislators can influence their probability of pursuing a sub-national career is to secure federal resources for a particular electoral constituency, such as money for a road, school or hospital. Legislators that are able to provide greater levels of constituency service and claim credit for the transfer of resources to help a particular constituency should have a higher probability of winning a future office in that constituency compared to a potential opponent who cannot claim credit for these activities.

However, due to the non-linear trajectory of most career paths in a system without reelection, legislators in office may have a first preference of where they would like to pursue future office, as well as a list of sub-optimal preferences within similar constituencies. For example, a legislator in Mexico may wish to be mayor of their hometown, but also has the possibility of obtaining a state-wide appointment or a state-wide elected office, or a state-legislative seat with a constituency that may include other municipalities besides their hometown. A federal legislator, recognizing that they may not obtain their first preference after their term is over, may also adopt a strategy of representing their entire state or directing resources towards multiple targets within the state, since it is unlikely they will know with much certainty the exact position they will compete for after the legislative term is over.

Previous political experience is also likely to influence the probability of winning. In the U.S. literature, incumbency is a major factor in explaining the probability of winning an election (Rohde 1979; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006). However, where reelection is prohibited, incumbency is impossible. Previous political experience is a more general version of incumbency, and therefore, the more relevant experience an

individual has, the greater probability they will have of securing desirable future posts and the greater the probability they will seek a higher office than someone without similar levels of experience. Due to the ‘two steps forward, one step backward’ nature of career paths in a system without reelection outlined above, we should see that among individuals who hold the same office (e.g. federal legislators), those with more relevant experience prior to serving in the federal legislature (e.g. former mayor, governor, senator, cabinet minister) will be observed to aim higher after leaving the federal legislature compared to an individual with little to no relevant experience prior to winning their current seat. The implication is that we should see variation in the future career paths of federal legislators based on previously held office, rather than observe a group of similarly situated individuals (e.g. federal deputies) pursue similar career paths.

### **2.3 The electoral environment**

Contextually, an ambitious actor needs to take into account the competitive environment in which they seek to pursue future office (Rohde 1979). In political systems where reelection is the norm, incumbency is an important factor that will influence the competitive environment. Potential candidates are less likely to try and compete against an incumbent when the probability of winning is typically low (Jacobson 1989; Cox and Katz 1996; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006). For example, in the U.S., state legislators are ideal potential candidates for House seats, but because most House seats are held by incumbents, very few state legislators actually run for the House in any given election. As Maestas et al. (2006, 196) highlight for the 2002 election, state legislators ran in only 45 out of a potential 435 races, even though over 7500 individuals hold state legislative office in the U.S. In political systems where elections are more competitive,

we are likely to see greater numbers of potential challengers competing against incumbents. However, the popularity, strength, and resources of the incumbent (or incumbent party) are likely to be a factor in the decision to enter a race. Thus, for potential candidates in a system with reelection, incumbency is a potentially strong deterrent to running for a particular office, as it reduces the probability of winning, and likely also increases the costs of running.

However, in a system without consecutive reelection incumbency does not exist, and in systems where reelection to the same office is unlikely or discouraged by party elites, many races will take place between multiple challengers. Does this mean that in a system without reelection it will be easier for current officeholders to run for another elected office since there are never any incumbents? Not necessarily. The challenge in a system without reelection is that there are no candidates who remain in their current office, increasing the number of potential competitors for future office. For any given election year, the number of potential competitors for a single office is likely to be extremely large, since no officeholders have the luxury of keeping their same office and waiting for a more favorable electoral environment to try their luck.<sup>13</sup> In Mexico, nearly all state legislative, federal legislative, and municipal elected offices have three-year terms, and all officeholders cannot seek consecutive reelection to the same office.<sup>14</sup> There

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<sup>13</sup> Not all offices are renewed at the same time. However, there are incentives to leave as soon as possible. For example, a federal deputy elected for the 2006-09 period may come from a state where local elections are held in 2007 and 2010. They may leave their legislative seat in 2007 to compete for a local office, or wait until 2010. However, leaving in 2007 and losing is largely costless, except for campaign costs incurred and the loss of salary during their leave of absence. If this individual loses the 2007 election, they can come back to the Chamber and reclaim their seat to serve out the remainder of their term.

<sup>14</sup> There is a movement at the local level to increase the terms of mayors from 3 years to 4 years. Coahuila has had 4-year terms since their 2005 elections, Hidalgo implemented

are a total of 1139 state legislative seats in the country spread across 32 states, 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, plus 2,439 mayoral seats (1 for each municipality) and a countless number of city council seats that are renewed every three years.<sup>15</sup> In addition, there are 128 seats in the Senate and 32 governorships that are renovated every six years. While state-level elections are staggered, current officeholders at the state level have an incentive to leave their current office and try to run for a federal office, and vice versa for federal officeholders seeking state-level positions, since if they lose they can always come back to serve out their term.<sup>16</sup> In addition to individuals leaving office after their term and current officeholders, potential candidates in a system without reelection also face a large group of individuals with partisan and administrative appointments who are seeking to run for elected office,<sup>17</sup> as well as any past candidates who held or competed for the position before and for one reason or another, failed to obtain a political or public office in the most recent term.

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4-year terms starting in 2011, and Veracruz just recently passed state-level constitutional reforms in 2012 to adopt 4-year terms. Other states, such as Durango, are also considering increasing mayoral terms from 3 to 4 years. For more info, see Arteaga (2012), Avila (2012), Mota (2011), and Estrada (2012).

<sup>15</sup> 31 states and 1 Federal District. I count the Federal District as a state, the *Jefe de Gobierno* position (mayor of Mexico City) as a governor, and the *jefe delegacional* position (borough chief) as a mayoral position. I calculated the number of state legislative seats by counting the number of state legislators elected in each of the 32 states in 2007, 2008 or 2009. Data taken from: “Integración de las legislaturas de los estados,” Cámara de Diputados, <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cedia/biblio/archivo/edos/>. The total number of municipalities was taken from: Enciclopedia de los municipios y delegaciones de México, <http://www.e-local.gob.mx/work/templates/enciclo/>.

<sup>16</sup> Since all elected officeholders are elected along with alternates (*suplentes*), state and federal laws allow officeholders to take leaves of absence to compete for alternative offices. It is up to the officeholder whether or not they decide to return if they lose an election. A similar phenomenon exists in Brazil, see Samuels (2003). Also see footnote 9 above.

<sup>17</sup> Since most administrative appointments are held at the whim of the current elected officeholders (i.e. mayor, governor, president), individuals who hold these positions for all intents and purposes face the same term limits as the elected official.



Therefore, without reelection, the potential and actual number of competitors for any given position is likely to be extremely large due to the systematic need for ambitious political actors to move on from their current position every three to six years. Potential candidates must take into account who their potential competitors are for any given position, as this environment will influence their probability of winning future office and subsequently, their decision on which office to seek in the immediate future. Because of this complicated electoral environment with a large number of potential competitors, we should see current officeholders pursue a wide variety of future career paths after leaving office, even if a particular group of officeholders may possess a similar set of goals, since each individual will have a different probability of winning a desired future office, and face different costs for obtaining that office. While we cannot know the most desired office for each individual officeholder, nor calculate  $P$  and  $C$ , one observable implication is that a group of similar officeholders will pursue widely different careers after their term is up. If this reasoning is faulty, we would observe a majority of legislators seeking a similar office, such as mayor of their town, or senator in general election years.

If one is running for an office that is considered “safe” for this individual’s political party, the probability of winning is much higher than if the actor belongs to a party that has never won that office before. Thus, the less competitive the district, the greater the probability of winning for members of the governing party and the lower the probability of winning for members of opposition parties. Similarly, the more competitive the electoral district, the lower the probability of winning for all potential candidates. Electoral competition is also likely to influence the cost of running. For members of governing parties in uncompetitive districts, the cost of running may be

lower (since victory is more certain) than if the same member was running in a highly competitive district where victory for any party is more uncertain.

Federal legislators pursuing future office will likely consider these costs and the probability of winning in any future election contest. However, the margin of victory of a legislator is not likely to elucidate much information about where that legislator will pursue future office in a system without reelection for a number of reasons. For one, any future elected position will likely involve at least a slightly different constituency than the one which elected the federal legislator, and thus, the margin of victory in the legislative district will not provide much information about the legislator's support in a new constituency. More importantly, and described in more detail below, party elite control over candidate selection weakens a direct link between voter support and internal party support for a potential candidate. Margin of victory may provide information about support for an individual candidate or support for a particular party in a district, but it does not provide a reliable signal about an individual's support among party elite gatekeepers who control ballot access. Especially in "safe" districts for particular political parties, party elites may not need to consider the popular support among voters for a particular candidate and instead may be more likely to satisfy internal party constituencies and factions when populating ballots. Legislators capable of winning in more competitive districts, especially if they were able to unseat an incumbent party, may have greater political capital within their political party, but may also desire future posts where the probability of winning is higher and the cost of running lower, rather than continue to compete in a highly competitive and uncertain electoral environment.

In addition, partisanship is likely to influence the available opportunities open to politicians seeking future office. For example, being a member of the governor's party will influence both the probability of winning and the cost of seeking some future post at the state-level, influencing the decision on where to seek future office. Since governors control a number of political appointments, members of the governor's party leaving office are likely to have an excellent chance of obtaining a political appointment in the state bureaucracy without incurring much cost. Even if the benefits of holding an appointed office are low, the probability of winning the office are high and the costs are low, suggesting that for some members of the governor's party, the expected utility of holding a state bureaucratic position will be potentially higher than attempting to win elected office.

A similar logic applies to members of the President's party. Executives control a large number of political appointments, and especially for federal legislators who are already working at the federal level, the expected utility of holding a federal bureaucratic appointment may be higher than attempting to run for elected office. However, since most federal appointments are based on political considerations, and possibly the possession of relevant experience, legislators who share the partisanship of the President will be more likely to pursue and obtain federal appointments than members of opposition parties, since the probability of securing a federal appointment for co-partisans will be much higher than for opposition legislators. Thus, for members of the president's

party, we should see a large number seeking federal appointments after leaving office due to the high probability of winning and the low cost of securing the appointment.<sup>18</sup>

## **2.4 Electoral institutions**

The U.S. literature on progressive ambition makes two assumptions about the nature of electoral institutions that must be addressed when moving to a comparative context. In the American context, it is assumed that all politically ambitious actors run in winner-take-all, plurality elections. It is also assumed that ambitious actors control their own fate in terms of deciding to run for an office and that there are no barriers to ballot access other than the support from voters (e.g. primaries) and the resources they possess to campaign. In many other contexts, proportional representation is used to decide elections, and party elites control access to the ballot. To develop a theory of progressive ambition for Mexico, it is critical to take into account the mixed-nature of the electoral system, i.e. the presence of both single-member districts, plurality elections and closed-list proportional representation, as well as the centralized control over ballot access by party elites. These two factors have a significant impact on the probability of winning an election, the costs of obtaining office, and independent effects on individual behavior that are likely to have indirect effects on future career paths.

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<sup>18</sup> A legislator from the President's party does not necessarily also have a greater chance of winning elected office. The probability of winning elected office has more to do with local and state-level circumstances, which may or may not be favorable towards the President's party. However, legislators from the governor's party may in fact have greater chances to win elected office, although the decision to pursue a local elected office versus a state bureaucratic appointment comes down to comparing the benefits of each particular office. Except for mayors of large cities and state congressional leaders, other local elected offices hold potentially fewer benefits than a high level state bureaucratic position, such as a cabinet or sub-secretary appointment.

In the U.S., the electoral system and methods of candidate selection both encourage a direct relationship between citizens and their representatives. In the American context, incumbents periodically seek re-election from voters in single-member districts. In the case of open seats or internal party conflict, primary elections are held in which voters select between competing candidates. While not all voters in the U.S. can participate in primaries, becoming a party member is relatively costless. Furthermore, it is voters, not party elites, that determine ballot access for ambitious actors. Assuming a potential candidate has the resources and enough support, they are free to contest primary elections in the hope of obtaining a spot on the general election ballot.

Attempting to develop a theory of political ambition and its consequences in other institutional contexts must deal with this critical assumption regarding the relationship between voters and representatives. In many other political systems, various actors and institutions serve as mediators between voters and representatives. Electoral rules serve as one institutional mediator between voters and representatives, since in many countries some form of proportional representation with multi-member districts is used, making it difficult for representatives to identify a specific territorial constituency to which they should respond and for voters to identify specific representatives they should hold accountable. Political parties also serve as mediators between voters and representatives (Schattschneider 1960). Regardless of the type of electoral system used, parties may have direct control over ballot access or indirect control by restricting access to necessary resources (e.g. campaign finance) to pursue a political campaign. When mediation between voters and representatives occurs, representatives are likely to have greater incentives to respond to party elites and other important party constituencies in order to

maintain and further their political careers. These mediating institutions are also likely to greatly influence the probability of winning office, and the costs of obtaining it.

#### *2.4.1 The electoral system*

Mexico uses a mixed electoral system whereby a proportion of officeholders run in districts of small magnitude, and others reach office through closed-list proportional representation in districts of high magnitude. The nature of the electoral system varies by office and by level of government. For the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 300 members are elected through single-member district, plurality elections, and 200 members are elected through closed-list proportional representation in five 40-member districts. State legislatures employ a similar formula, although the percentage of proportional representation seats varies widely by state. For the Senate, each party proposes two-member slates, and each state elects three members, for a total of 96 members elected at the state level. The top vote-getting party sends their two members to the Senate, while the second place party sends the candidate listed first on the two-member slate. In addition, there are 32 senators elected by closed-list proportional representation on a single national list. Voters for legislative office only receive one ballot to vote for district (or statewide) candidates, unlike most other mixed-member electoral systems (Kerevel 2010). Mayors, governors and presidents must win a plurality of votes to win. For mayoral races, city council seats are proposed as a slate along with the mayoral candidate, thus voters do not get to vote individually for city council seats. A vote for the mayor means a vote for that party's slate of city council candidates. In addition, many municipalities have proportional representation city council positions, and therefore

losing parties in mayoral races also gain some representation on the city council, which may or may not include losing candidates for mayor.

Although the Mexican electoral system is extremely complicated, for our purposes here it suffices to focus on the difference between having to campaign for votes, such as running in a district race for legislative office, or a municipal or statewide office for mayor, governor or senator, and not having to campaign for votes, such as obtaining a candidacy on a proportional representation list or a city council slate. Simply, in Mexico, some candidates must campaign for a personal vote, while others do not (Carey and Shugart 1995).

In many other mixed-electoral systems, such as Germany, Japan, and New Zealand, the difference between candidates who run in district races and those on the proportional representation lists are blurred due to the presence of dual candidacy and best-loser provisions (Massicotte 2004; Ferrera, Herron and Nishikawa 2005; Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). Dual candidacy refers to the practice of district candidates also populating the proportional representation lists, where even if a candidate loses the district race, they can still obtain office through the list vote. The best-loser provision in Japan refers to the practice whereby the ranking on the proportional representation list is determined by the smallest margin of loss for a party's candidates. Candidates who lost by the fewest votes in a district race are then ranked higher on the PR list than candidates who lost by wider margins. In these cases, most candidates, regardless of how they eventually reach office, must campaign for votes and thus the cost of obtaining office is very similar for candidates who win district races and those who reach office through proportional representation. In Mexico, dual candidacy is restricted by law and not

widely used in practice (Kerevel 2010) and thus, there is a much more clear-cut distinction between district and PR candidates, which has an impact on the individual probability of winning and the costs of running.<sup>19</sup>

The factors that influence the probability of winning office are going to differ for potential candidates depending on whether or not they seek or obtain a district candidacy or a PR candidacy. For example, let us consider a federal legislator who is seeking a state legislative seat after their term ends. Candidates seeking state legislative office are likely to factor in their party's performance in previous elections in their district, as well as the party's general performance in the state. Potential candidates who have the option of running in a safe district should be more likely to seek a district candidacy, than a candidate who is a member of a party that rarely or never wins in that district. The party's general state-wide performance is also important for candidates thinking of running for state legislative office. Proportional representation seats are allocated based on the percentage of votes a party receives across all district races, creating a negative relationship between a party's statewide performance and the number of proportional representation seats they are likely to win. This negative relationship occurs because as parties win a greater percentage of district seats, there are entitled to a fewer number of proportional representation seats. For example, a party who won all the district races would not win any proportional representation seats, while smaller parties who lost most or all of the district races, but still obtained a percentage of votes above the

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<sup>19</sup> Some Mexican states use dual candidacy and best-loser provisions for state legislative offices, but little research exists on this particular topic to inform us on how widespread it is, or its effectiveness (But see, Gonzalez and Milazzo 2011).



representational threshold, would gain most or all of their seats through proportional representation (Calvo and Abal Medina 2002).

Potential candidates from parties who dominate a particular electoral environment are much more likely to seek a district race than a spot on the PR lists, since dominant or majority parties are much less likely to win any proportional representation seats due to legal caps on the number of seats a party can hold in the legislature. As a party's percentage of statewide votes declines, the more attractive a spot on the PR lists becomes, unless they have the opportunity to run in a district where their party performs well. For small parties (e.g. receive less than ~10% votes statewide), candidates who run in district races are largely sacrificial lambs who are necessary for obtaining votes to be eligible for PR seats, but have little to no chance of winning on their own.<sup>20</sup>

The costs of running are also likely to differ widely based on whether or not a potential candidate seeks a district or PR candidacy. Since dual candidacy is hardly an important factor in Mexican elections, candidates on the PR lists largely do not campaign for votes. They may engage in behind the scenes work, but do not have to engage in debates, organize campaign events, go door to door, give speeches, produce advertisements or engage in clientelist practices.<sup>21</sup> In contrast, a candidate running in a

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<sup>20</sup> See Calvo and Medina (2002) for a discussion about how difficult it can be for parties to coordinate effectively under this system, especially without previous experience. For example, the PRD miscalculated in the 1997 elections for the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, by putting most of their experienced candidates on the PR lists. When they swept the district races, their experienced candidates were unable to reach office through PR.

<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, clientelism and vote-buying is a regular feature of Mexican elections for all parties. Some examples might include free t-shirts and hats with campaign images on them, organizing events where free services are offered, from haircuts to medical exams, or even the direct handing out of money. Campaigns in rural areas might include candidates giving away cement or fertilizer to potential voters. Where the money comes

district race for votes must typically engage in all of these activities. If the race is extremely competitive, the costs are likely to be even higher than if the race is not competitive.

While all potential candidates would probably prefer to pay no costs to winning office, political parties need candidates to run in these district races and therefore, the benefits of holding office after winning a district election are likely to be different than holding office won through a spot on the PR list. Candidates who can win district races are likely to be valuable to political parties, and the act of winning a district election is also likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder. A winner of a district race is likely to have greater name recognition and connections to voters in a given district. They also have ties to a territorially-defined constituency which can be used to provide constituency service and be used as an area where they can claim credit for their activities while in office. These activities are likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder for their future political careers after their current term is over. Officeholders who obtained their position through proportional representation are unlikely to accrue these same benefits since they have no easily identifiable territorial constituency, have not demonstrated they can win votes in an election, and voters are unlikely to know who they are absent other unrelated factors.<sup>22</sup>

Legislators elected under PR pay fewer costs to reach office, especially when there are district candidates doing much of the campaigning. For candidates at the top of the list, the probability of winning office is extremely high, which suggests that political

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from to pay for these activities is unknown. I have personally observed some of these activities, as well as gleaned evidence of it from newspaper reports and interviews.

<sup>22</sup> However, some legislators elected through PR obtain high profile leadership positions, which can be useful for pursuing a future elected office.

parties are strategic in who they place at the top of the list since they are fairly certain these individuals will reach office regardless of the party's overall electoral performance. Especially in a system without reelection, party control over the top of the list provides one mechanism for parties to place more experienced and loyal candidates in office who can take charge of the party's agenda and business inside the legislature. For legislators at the top of the list, the probability they will secure an important leadership position once they reach office is also much higher compared to district candidates or PR candidates lower on the list (Kerevel 2010). These leadership positions are desirable as they often come with added financial benefits, additional staff, and increased influence over policy.

These differential benefits, as well as the variation in the probability of winning office and the costs of running, suggest that we will see differences in behavior among officeholders based on their mode of election, as well as differences in the career paths of officeholders by mode of election. There is already a large literature suggesting that legislative behavior is likely to vary based on their mode of election, with legislators elected through single-member districts much more likely to engage in personal-vote seeking behavior compared to legislators elected through some form of proportional representation (e.g. Lancaster 1986; Carey and Shugart 1995; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006; Heitschusen, Young and Wood 2005). Since the benefits of holding a legislative seat won through a district race include the increased possibility of providing constituency service, which serve to further individual career goals, we should expect to see officeholders elected in single-member districts to engage in much more constituency service and pork-barreling activity than officeholders elected through PR. However, officeholders elected through PR should not be assumed to be any less ambitious, but

since they are much less likely to use constituency service and pork-barreling as a way to further their career goals, they should be more likely to use the other tools available to them than district officeholders, namely bill sponsorship and influence within the legislature through the obtainment of leadership posts.

Differences in behavior while in office are also likely to translate into differences in career paths for officeholders elected through different methods. District officeholders should be much more likely to build on the political capital accumulated through winning an election by seeking office in the same or overlapping constituency in which they were originally elected. In contrast, PR officeholders have no clearly defined constituency other than their own party, and thus we should expect these individuals to pursue offices where they do not need to gain the support of a clearly defined territorial constituency, such as a bureaucratic appointment, future proportional representation seats, or to work within the party organizations. Since PR officeholders may also be more likely to engage in legislative work such as drafting bills and chairing committees, they should also be somewhat more likely to seek a future legislative office since their skills will be transferable, and parties in a system without reelection need to rely on a subset of skilled legislators to conduct legislative business when building seniority in a specific legislative chamber is not possible.

#### *2.4.2 Candidate selection methods*

The way in which candidates are selected to run for elected office is also likely to influence the probability of an ambitious individual winning office and the costs of running for office. In much of the existing literature on political ambition, candidate selection is largely ignored. In the American context, incumbent officeholders rarely have

to battle to secure a spot on the ballot, and even if there is an intra-party challenge to a candidate's placement, the decision is left up to voters to decide in a primary election. In Brazil, where significant work has been done on ambition outside the United States, incumbent officeholders possess the right to a spot on the ballot in future elections for the same office, and also possess the right to use the same party label under which they won office in the first place, regardless of what party leaders might want (Samuels 2003). Thus, in most studies of political ambition that focus on current officeholders who either seek reelection or seek alternative office, the issue of candidate selection is rarely accounted for in explaining the strategic behavior of ambitious politicians. However, in many other contexts, Mexico and Argentina included, being an incumbent is not necessarily a sure way to secure a spot on the ballot in a future election (De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002). Political parties control ballot access and may seek to satisfy a number of different interests that may not always coincide with the individual goals of ambitious politicians.

In competitive environments, elites responsible for selecting and supporting candidates are likely to privilege electability over other factors, such as personal relationships or ideological compatibility. In an uncompetitive environment, an ambitious politician wishing to gain or maintain office must cater to party members or other elites who control access to the ballot. When one party dominates a particular environment, voters have little voice at the ballot box, other than to ratify decisions made by party elites. Internal competition within the party for ballot access is likely to be related to a number of factors, such as loyalty to the party or an individual, connections to particular powerful elites, clientelist linkages, or as the result of a quota system for particular

organized groups critical to the maintenance of one-party dominance (e.g. De la Garza 1972; Smith 1979). Thus, in uncompetitive environments, ambitious politicians have little incentive to try and distinguish themselves from other competitors in front of voters or the public in general, removing incentives for politicians to work hard and represent their constituents, and instead cultivate the necessary relationships for gaining or maintaining future office.

However, in a competitive environment, the logic changes, even if party elites still control ballot access. Parties now must win elections to maintain or gain power, and voters ultimately must ratify decisions taken by political parties. When electoral competition is fierce, party members and elites may still desire to satisfy internal requirements for ballot access but are much more likely to privilege a potential candidate's electability over the above mentioned factors, since the party gains little by losing an election. Ambitious actors within this environment are likely to recognize that not only will they have to satisfy a party's internal constituency, but must also demonstrate their ability to work for the general public. Politicians in office thus have a greater incentive in competitive environments to represent their constituencies not only to curry favor with voters, but also to demonstrate to party elites that they can work hard for the party, can mobilize voters, and hopefully win future elections.

Evidence from Mexico supports this logic. Under the one-party dominant system of the PRI prior to democratization in the 1990s, PRI candidates for office were typically named by the President or other high-level leaders in highly undemocratic procedures (Castañeda 2001; De la Garza 1972; Greene 2007; Langston 2001; Smith 1979; Wuhs 2006). Furthermore, candidates for legislative office were typically named to satisfy

quota requirements for the labor, peasant, and popular sectors that made up the territorial organization of the PRI (Smith 1979). Districts were pre-assigned to a particular party sector, and then members of the various organizations would rotate in and out of legislative office. Since there was little real competition for these seats, the internal decisions of the PRI ensured victory for individuals granted ballot access up until the early 1990s (Wuhs 2006). Due to this particular system of candidate selection and the dominance of the PRI in nearly all levels of government, individual PRI legislators had little incentive to engage in behavior that might help them win an election. Instead, they served as representatives of their particular sector of the dominant party. Evidence of legislative behavior during PRI-party rule underscores this point. Congress largely served as a rubber stamp for policies emanating from the executive branch, and legislators engaged in very little work (de la Garza 1972; Weldon 2002; Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 2009; Nava Polina and Yáñez López 2003), nor were legislative seats considered valuable positions for pursuing a political career. A legislative seat occupied the lower-strata on the political opportunity structure, and most of the important political elites and future presidential candidates of the PRI regime rarely ever had any legislative experience, instead considering a position in one of the federal government ministries as key to reaching the highest levels of office (Smith 1979).

However, as the one-party dominant regime slowly collapsed, other parties became more competitive and started to win elected office (Eisenstadt 2004; Greene 2007; Klesner 2005). One result of the increased electoral competition was a reform of existing candidate selection methods, leading to greater local input and greater participation from voters and local party members (Langston 2001; Wuhs 2006). Party

leaders began to recognize that it was important to select candidates with a chance of winning an election, rather than just selecting party loyalists (Freidenberg 2010). It is important to note that the decentralization in methods of candidate selection since the 1990s has not been a linear process. Up to the present, the national party organizations possess a great deal of power in deciding how local candidates are selected and as Freidenberg (2010) has argued, there has been some movement towards more centralized control in recent years. Nevertheless, what is clear is that where parties are competitive, electability seems to be the overriding factor in candidate selection, rather than only catering to internal party constituencies as the PRI did prior to democratization (Freidenberg 2010).<sup>23</sup>

Candidate selection methods in Mexico have varied widely across time, across parties, and even across districts in the same election within parties. All three major parties, the PAN, the PRI, and the PRD, have statutory discretion in their ability to use closed primaries, polling<sup>24</sup>, district or state conventions of party notables, or unilateral nomination by the national party organizations to decide which candidates will appear on the ballot (Corona Armenta 2004; Freidenberg 2010; Reveles Vázquez 2003a; 2003b; Wuhs 2006).<sup>25</sup> This variation in selection methods is also common in Argentina, another

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<sup>23</sup> As Freidenberg (2010) highlights, decentralized candidate selection does not necessarily mean electability. Local party structures could be controlled by relative extremists within the party who have a tendency to select candidates who may not be very competitive in a general election.

<sup>24</sup> Public opinion polls run by the party organizations to survey preferences among party members.

<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, since the major parties typically run in coalition with other minor parties, any statutory rules regarding selection methods no longer apply. How candidates are selected is a key component of any coalition agreement and running in a coalition increases the discretionary power of party leaders above and beyond any restrictions that may exist in party statutes (Freidenberg 2010).



country where legislative reelection is not the norm (De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002). Methods of selection are typically negotiated between state and national party leaders. Governors also have an enormous amount of control over candidate selection for their co-partisans in the states (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010). In some cases, national party leaders will impose candidates to avoid potential intra-party strife that could damage them in the election, or to ensure that an electable candidate is chosen, rather than a party ideologue, in key races (Freidenberg 2010). Where competition is less salient, because the party already has a high probability of winning regardless of the candidate, then parties often negotiate candidacies to satisfy the various factions within each of the major parties to avoid major state- or national-level splits in the party (Freidenberg 2010).

Furthermore, the methods for selecting candidates on the PR lists varies by party, although the process is much more centralized. Typically, national party leaders control access to the top spots on the PR lists to ensure that their future congressional leaders will reach office, and as rewards to other key members and intellectuals that have little chance of winning a district race (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010; Kerevel 2010). Thus, candidates for the PR lists are drawn from a somewhat different pool of potential candidates, and are selected for reasons fundamentally different than for those used to fill the district race slots. One implication of this difference in selection methods for the two modes of election, is that officeholders should display different backgrounds prior to entering office and pursue different careers after leaving office. Since PR candidates for federal legislative office are likely to have greater ties to national party leaders responsible for their selection, we should see a greater number of legislators elected through PR to come from national party positions and the federal bureaucracy than

legislators elected through district races. PR legislators are also somewhat less likely to have the state-level connections to pursue future office at the sub-national level and therefore we should see that PR legislators are less likely to pursue a sub-national office.

The nature of candidate selection in Mexico, combined with a prohibition on consecutive reelection is likely to lead to conflicts between the individual goals of ambitious politicians and the collective goals of parties who want to win elections (Carey 1996). On the one hand, individual actors should demonstrate a high degree of loyalty to their political parties, since it is the party who largely determines future ballot access, or access to other appointed positions in public office. Political party organizations should be fairly strong, and individual members should display a high degree of loyalty to their parties. However, an ambitious actor may have individual goals that occasionally conflict with party goals. For example, a federal legislator from party A may wish to run for the mayor's seat of an important city after their term is over. Party leaders in party A at the city, state, and national level may have one or several candidates in mind they think can win the mayoral election, and this ambitious federal legislator may not be on the list of potential candidates. However, the federal legislator may have been working throughout their term to build up a constituency and name recognition in this city, and may feel they have a good chance to win the mayoral election, regardless of the party label they run under. Leaders in Party A now face a potentially difficult choice. They feel they have a better candidate that is more likely to win the mayor's seat, but if they ignore the legislator also competing for the seat, some weaker party B may court the legislator to run under their party label. If the legislator leaves Party A for Party B, Party A risks a potential split in their own ranks, which may negatively influence them in the election.

However, if the other candidate for party A is ignored in favor of the legislator, this other candidate also faces the option of switching to Party B or some other political party. In a multi-party system, even holding open primaries is unlikely to address this conundrum faced by party A, since the losers of a primary election can still leave Party A for Party B after the primary is over.<sup>26</sup>

Ambitious politicians in this situation are likely to desire most a spot on the ballot. Without a spot on the ballot, the probability of winning the election is zero. However, switching from Party A to Party B also entails a number of high costs. First, the party label is likely to influence the probability of winning. Even if a potential candidate is popular, they may face a much greater chance of winning the election if they ran with Party A than if they ran with Party B. Second, since the political parties themselves prize loyalty among their members, a potential candidate who has been developing a political career with party A is likely to lose much of their political capital if they switch parties. Other members of Party B are unlikely to trust the party switcher, and members of Party A will likely hold a grudge against this individual if they ever attempt to return to Party A after switching parties. Even if the party switcher wins the election, they still face a choice at the end of their term on where to seek a different future office. Since leaders of Party B now have control over the future of this individual's career, they may not trust the individual to work in the party's interest due to the short time they have been a party member, and also face resistance from other members of Party B who have been loyal for much longer. Depending on the particular confluence of factors in any given situation, the party switcher may be successful in developing a new political career

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<sup>26</sup> This is true assuming that primaries are run by the parties and not run by the state or all held on the same day, which is the case in Mexico.

with Party B, or may face a shortened political career as leaders in Party B pass this individual over for others. Of course, the individual could continue to switch parties every election. Yet, because party loyalty is valued by all political parties, and excessive switching may turn off voters, it is unlikely that ambitious actors in this particular type of system would pursue a continuous strategy of party switching over multiple elections.

As a result, the costs of switching parties could be extremely high and signal the end of one's political career if the ambitious actor does not make a wise decision. Because of the potentially high costs of switching parties, we should see a high degree of party loyalty where reelection is prohibited since the probability of winning and the benefits of holding office for a single term are likely to be lower than the costs of switching to obtain ballot access. However, in some cases, an ambitious actor may perceive their probability of winning to be high and the benefits of holding a particular office to be high, outweighing the potentially high costs of switching parties. Thus, on the surface, the prohibition on reelection and party control over ballot access has two potentially contradictory consequences. While in office, we are likely to see high levels of party loyalty from individual members, as loyalty to one's party is the best way of securing a future office. However, during election periods, we are also likely to see high levels of party disloyalty, or party switching, as conflicts over candidate selection and securing future office become the most critical issue for ambitious actors. While politicians join parties for a number of reasons, such as ideological affinity, and may also switch parties for a number of reasons that have little to do with the institutional rules in place, under the combination of non-consecutive reelection and party control over ballot access, one is likely to observe that most ambitious politicians who do switch parties will

do so over candidate selection conflicts, since the prohibition on reelection forces many actors to focus primarily on political survival and obtaining the next position.

## **2.5. Conclusion**

In a game of snakes and ladders, the object of the game for each player is to reach 100 at the top of the board. To play the game, each player rolls a die to move up the game board from the starting position of 0 to the final position of a 100. Along the way, a player may land on a ladder, which puts them ahead a variable number of spaces, or they may land on a snake, sending them in reverse, potentially all the way back to the beginning of the game.

Ambitious actors who pursue a political career without reelection play in an environment much like a game of snakes and ladders. They all desire to reach the highest office, or 100, but along the way they may advance rapidly for a period of time, and then suddenly appear to “regress” and pursue a lower position than what they currently hold. The important point for ambitious actors in this environment is that they must keep playing the game, constantly seeking the highest office even if they occasionally must return to a lower office. By staying in the game, actors still have the potential to “win” or reach their most desired office. In the American context, ambitious actors tend to quit playing the game when they land on a snake. While nothing prevents a politician in the U.S. from competing for lower office after possessing a higher office, almost no actors do, suggesting that a step down the career ladder for an American politician is not a viable strategy for reaching high office. To further the analogy, American politicians will tend to play the game as long as they move up, and if they are comfortable in their current position, refuse to roll the die. In other contexts where reelection is not possible

or highly uncertain, it is always preferable to roll the die and stay in the game, regardless of the outcome.<sup>27</sup>

In this chapter I have attempted to develop a theory of political ambition to explain why it is rational for political actors in a context of no reelection to always roll the die, or potentially compete for an office of lower prestige after serving in a higher office and why political careers in this environment are likely to resemble a game of snakes and ladders. Pursuing a political career in this institutional environment has consequences for the types of observable behavior one will see from strategic legislators, and will likely influence the type of representation citizens receive from their individual representatives as well as their political parties. While the theory is closely tied to details of the Mexican case, the hope is that the discussion is sufficiently general that the theory could be applied to other contexts where the pursuit of static ambition is an extremely risky endeavor.

In the following chapters, I put several implications of this theory to the test. Not all of the possible implications of this theory are empirically tested, and will have to await future research. In the next chapter, I examine how changes in electoral competition coincided with changes in the career paths of legislators and changes in their behavior. The following chapters (4-7) then develop specific testable hypotheses based on the theory presented here, and examine career paths, pork-barreling, bill sponsorship, and party switching separately.

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<sup>27</sup> I would like to thank Michael Rocca for helping me flesh out this analogy.

### **Chapter 3: The consequences of increasing electoral competition**

In this chapter, I argue that general increases in electoral competition during the transition towards democracy had profound effects on the political careers of Mexican legislators, which in turn, influenced the behavior of legislators while in office. Increased competition altered the political opportunity structure of Mexican politics by increasing the value of elected office and also by making municipal and state-level positions valuable positions for pursuing successful political careers. Prior to democratization, administrative office, rather than elected office, was more valuable for climbing the political career ladder (Smith 1979; Nacif 1996). I make the case that electoral competition altered the political opportunity structure by introducing meaningful competition for elected offices and also by increasing the importance of the Mexican Congress in the national-policymaking process, altering the way strategic political actors used a congressional seat to pursue their goals.

Increases in electoral competition also had a profound influence on the party system, by encouraging opposition parties to professionalize and reduce their previous reliance on political amateurs. As the party system changed and became much more competitive, the increased professionalization of the political parties as vehicles to channel the ambitions of their members led to dramatic changes in behavior as the increasing relevance of Congress in the policy-making process vis-a-vis the Executive Branch was both a cause and consequence of strategic legislators using the tools at their disposal to pursue their career goals.

This chapter draws on secondary literature that examines career paths and legislative behavior prior to 1997 as well as aggregate data from the 1997-2009 period to

demonstrate how changes in electoral competition and the party system led to changes in the career paths of legislators and their individual behavior. Understanding these structural changes in the Mexican political system are crucial for setting up the subsequent chapters and for interpreting results based on individual-level data.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. I first describe changes in the competitive environment, from one of one-party dominance, to a competitive three-party system. As a result of changes in the competitive environment, the political parties and individual politicians adopted new strategies in an attempt to cope with increasing levels of competition. The second part of this chapter examines changes in the career paths of legislators across the three major parties, demonstrating that as competition increased, the political parties increasingly drew upon more experienced, professional and locally-connected candidates to compete for political office.

The third part of this chapter examines the consequences of changes in the party system and the electoral environment for legislative behavior. As the party system became more competitive, the parties and individual politicians had greater incentives to engage in behavior to increase credit claiming for particular policies in the hope of attracting greater vote shares. I find that increases in electoral competition led to a rapid increase in congressional activity and productivity as legislators increasingly sponsored more bills. Similarly, the loss of majority control in the legislature by the President's party reduced the legislative success of the executive, while increasing the importance of Congress in the policy-making process. Legislators also increasingly engaged in behaviors that are consistent with a shift towards more candidate-centered politics. Over time, federal deputies increasingly sponsored more single-authored bills as one way to



engage in credit-claiming and position-taking, and were less likely to co-author bills with other deputies. Deputies also increasingly began attempting to secure federal resources for their municipalities and states during the annual budget process and away from federal programs with diffuse targets.

In sum, this chapter demonstrates that increased electoral competition and an increasingly competitive party system led to more experienced and locally connected legislative candidates, who then became increasingly productive while in office and increasingly represented local, rather than strictly partisan, interests.

### **3.1 The decline of one-party dominance**

The former ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had a solid hold on power from its formation in 1929 until the late 1980s, although it did not lose the presidency until 2000 when it was defeated by the National Action Party (PAN). The roots of the PRI can be traced back to the Mexican Revolution (1910-20) as leaders of the revolutionary state attempted to consolidate their power. The original incarnation of the PRI was formed by former president Plutarco Elías Calles in 1929 under the name, National Revolutionary Party (PNR). The party switched names again in 1938 under president Lázaro Cárdenas to the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) and then became the PRI in 1946 (Greene 2007).

One important mechanism used by the PRI-state to maintain control over the political system was the constant reform of electoral rules (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni 2001). The most important and long lasting reform was the ban on consecutive reelection instituted in 1933. In 1933, the Mexican Congress approved a constitutional amendment that prohibited consecutive reelection for federal deputies and senators, as well as for

state legislators and municipal presidents (i.e. mayors) (*Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, Art. 59 and Art. 116). Governors, as well as the President, are barred from reelection for life.

There were several reasons why the PRI (actually the PNR in 1933) implemented term limits in the mid-1930s. Prior to 1933, the justification for presidential term limits was to reduce the instability over presidential succession that had plagued Mexico since the end of the Revolution. The ban on presidential reelection has stabilized alternation in power since 1934. In addition, the reform was seen as implementing a key tenet of the Revolution, “*Sufragio Efectivo, No Reelección*,” or “Effective Suffrage, No Reelection,” which had been raised by Francisco Madero against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz in 1910 (Weldon 2003, 33).<sup>28</sup> However, the ban on reelection for all public offices was not part of the revolutionary platform, and Jeffrey Weldon (2003) argues it was put in place for other motives. A ban on consecutive reelection contributed to the centralization of power in the hands of the PRI’s national party leaders and the President, and also centralized power nationally by weakening local political parties and local power structures (Weldon 2003, 34). In 1964-65 there was an attempt in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies to allow reelection for federal legislators. However, after the reform passed in the lower house, the Senate unanimously rejected it. Careaga (2003, 54-55) argues that the reform was struck down because the PRI saw the ban on consecutive reelection as a key mechanism for their permanence in power, and contributed to the stability of the political system.

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<sup>28</sup> Porfirio Díaz also used the same slogan in the 1870s to obtain power (Drake 2009).

In addition to implementing term limits for all offices, the PRI continually reformed electoral rules for legislative office as a way to maintain the legitimacy of the one-party dominant system, while giving some political space to opposition parties (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni 2001). Prior to 1963, legislators were elected by plurality in single-member districts, which were nearly all dominated by the PRI (Nacif 1996). In 1963, a restricted form of proportional representation was instituted that would provide some minor representation to opposition parties. The reason for the implementation of this system under the PRI was to increase the political system's legitimacy. Although the PRI rhetorically claimed Mexico was a democracy, the composition of the legislature and the electoral fortunes of opposition parties suggested otherwise. The PRI dominated the electoral playing field, but depended on minor parties continuing to compete in elections, in order to justify the PRI's continuance in power and differentiate the regime from other authoritarian states in the region. However, in no way was the competition fair as the PRI was able to use state coffers and patronage to maintain itself in power. Kenneth Greene (2007) argues the PRI's use of state resources and the politicization of the federal bureaucracy, combined with the selective use of fraud and repression, made it nearly impossible for opposition parties to compete on a level playing field. Not until the economic crisis of the 1980s, which seriously depleted the PRI-state's ability to plunder the treasury and resources of state-run businesses for electoral gain, did the political system open up the possibility for opposition parties to win elected office.

The National Action Party (PAN), founded in 1929 by conservatives and Catholic activists in response to the semi-socialist state-led reforms of the revolutionary regime, has been Mexico's most consistent opposition party, although it failed to gain any

significant office until the late 1980s (Mizrahi 2003). The PAN had for many years advocated for the introduction of proportional representation in order to increase the presence of other parties in the political system, and it seems that the PRI adopted their idea in order to add some legitimacy to its democratic claims, while also silencing internal and external critics of the PRI's authoritarian practices (Bejar Algazi 2004; Mabry 1973).

The electoral system was substantially reformed again in 1977, leading to the creation of a mixed-member system with 300 SMD seats and 100 PR seats. Mexico in the 1970s witnessed substantial increases in political violence, while the democratic facade of the PRI regime was seriously challenged. In the 1976 presidential election, the PRI candidate ran uncontested as the PAN failed to agree on a candidate. In an attempt to bring new political parties into the fold, as well as regain some legitimacy for electoral politics, the 1977 electoral reform promoted the creation and participation of a number of new opposition parties while giving them an increased chance to win seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Greene 2007; Rodríguez Araujo 1989). From 1988 on, the Chamber of Deputies has been made up of 300 plurality seats, and 200 closed-list PR seats. Since 1994, the electoral rules also stipulate that no party can win more than 300 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which prevents a single party from being able to reform the constitution without participation from at least one other political party (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 2001:225-229).

Not until 1988, when the PRI faced its first serious challenge in the presidential campaign due to an internal split in the PRI over the presidential nomination, did the opposition parties begin to present themselves as serious contenders to the PRI. The

National Democratic Front coalition of disgruntled members of the PRI and numerous small left parties, led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, that competed in 1988 went on to form the other major opposition party in Mexico, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) (Bruhn 1997). In 1989, the PAN won the governor's seat in Baja California, the first governorship to be held by a party other than the PRI since its founding in 1929.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, opposition parties were also increasingly winning elections at the municipal and state levels. While there was a certain level of sub-national democratization prior to alternation in power at the national level, it is not quite accurate to characterize the slow-moving process of democratization in Mexico as a largely bottom up process. Parallel to opposition victories by the PAN in such states as Baja California, Guanajuato, and Chihuahua, and local level victories by the PRD in Michoacán, a number of states governed by the PRI, such as Puebla, Oaxaca and Tabasco, ignored pressures from the PRI national leadership to accept opposition victories and instead entrenched a type of authoritarian politics that was no longer subject to oversight by the federal government (Cornelius 1999; Eisenstadt 1999; 2004; Greene 2007; Snyder 1999; Ward and Rodriguez 1999). Many of these sub-national authoritarian regimes persisted long after 2000, despite democratic multi-party competition at the national level and a general weakening of the PRI's hold on national political power.

Table 3.1 presents the breakdown of seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 1982 through the 2006 elections. As can be seen in the table, the PRI held the large majority of seats in 1982 and 1985, suffered a slight blow to its congressional dominance in 1988, but then recuperated until it finally lost majority control of the Chamber in 1997. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the PRI's decline graphically. As is very apparent in figure 3.1, the PRI


had a stranglehold on nearly all the single-member district seats to the Chamber until the 1997 elections, while most opposition party representation came from the proportional representation seats. A similar story exists for the Senate, as shown in Figure 3.2. The PRI held nearly all seats in the Senate until the 1990s, and did not lose majority control of the upper-chamber until the 2000 elections.

**Table 3.1: 1982-2006 Elections to the Chamber of Deputies**

Party	1982		1985		1988		1991		1994		1997		2000		2003		2006	
	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR	SMD	PR
PRI	299	0	289	0	233	27	290	30	273	27	165	74	132	79	161	63	62	41
PAN	1	50	9	32	38	62	10	79	20	99	64	57	136	71	80	71	137	69
PRD*	-	-	-	-	29	108	0	41	7	64	70	55	24	27	56	41	91	36
Other parties	0	50	2	68	0	3	0	50	0	10	1	14	8	23	3	25	10	54


Sources: Nacif 1997 for 1982-88 data. *Pdba.georgetown.edu* for 1991-1997 data; *ife.org.mx*. \* Results for 1988 reflect individuals elected as part of the Frente Democratico Nacional, which became the PRD in 1989.

Figure 3.1: PRI Electoral Results in the Chamber of Deputies, 1982-2006





**Figure 3.2: PRI Election Results to the Senate, 1982-2006**



### **3.2 Increasing electoral competition and political career paths**

Recent research in Mexico has suggested that electoral competition, even without reelection, has increased democratic responsiveness and government performance (Coppedge 1993; Beer 2003; Langston 2003; Solt 2004; Hecock 2006). This body of work argues that increasingly competitive elections alter political recruitment patterns, legislative roles, and the formulation of public policy, leading to more locally connected candidates, stronger and more professional legislatures, and the development of representative institutions. This result is due to the pressures political parties face in a competitive environment, leading them to select candidates more popular with voters and promote policies that voters support. For example, Caroline Beer (2003) argues that competition has led to increasingly professional legislatures in a sub-national comparison of state legislatures, Douglas Hecock (2006) finds that competition leads to increases in educational spending, and Matt Ingram (2009) finds greater competition leads to increases in judicial spending. Despite the wealth of findings, others suggest that electoral competition has no effect on responsiveness when looking at municipal government performance (Cleary 2007).

Primarily, this work is based on aggregate spending data, at either the municipal or state level, and therefore fails to identify and directly test the relationship between electoral competition and individual responsiveness and performance. Here, I further pursue the hypothesized relationship between increased electoral competition, the career paths of legislators, and the behavior of legislators while in office by using individual-level data from Mexican legislators.

One potential consequence of an increasingly competitive environment is that political parties that seek to win elections should be more likely to choose qualified, experienced candidates that are popular with voters. Especially in a context where parties run candidates in single-member districts, candidate quality should be a major concern of office-seeking political parties. In Mexico, the outcomes of the SMD races are also crucial for the allocation of proportional representation seats, since it is solely through the votes obtained in the SMD races that PR seats are distributed (see Kerevel 2010 for more on the mechanics of the electoral system). The opposite should also be true. Where there is little electoral competition, political parties should be more likely to satisfy other goals, such as rewarding important interest groups in choosing candidates, rather than individuals who can win votes.

Defining a quality candidate is not necessarily an easy task, although one potential measure of quality would be a candidate who has already held previous elected office (e.g. Jacobson 1989; Carson and Engstrom 2005). By adopting this definition, I can compare the previous elected office experience of federal deputies during a period when elections for the Chamber of Deputies were not very competitive (1982-1991), to the more recent period of competitive legislative elections (1997-2009).

Benito Nacif (1996) presented information on the elected office experience of federal deputies for the 1982-91 period as well as the type of elected office experience deputies had during this period. In order to make comparisons between the non-competitive period to the competitive period, I replicated Nacif's analysis for the 1997-2009 period, and used his results for the 1982-91 time frame. Table 3.2 displays the comparison. For the uncompetitive period, just over half of PRI deputies had no prior

experience in elected office, while nearly three-quarters of opposition deputies had no prior elected office experience. While the PRI exerted strong control over access to elected office, most politicians who reached the Chamber of Deputies had not previously been elected to any other office. While Nacif's data is limited, other work on the career paths of legislators under one-party dominance suggests similar findings. Peter Smith (1979, 149), in a study of political careers in Mexico throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century finds for the 1946-71 period:

“The “electoral” track continued to be rather self-contained and isolated from the other offices. As before, people moved with relative ease from posts in the party hierarchy or sindicatos[unions] or municipal governments (via state-level bureaucracies) to the Chamber of Deputies, there to repeat or retire.... One also gets the impression that seats in the Chamber of Deputies came to furnish rewards for loyal service in the party and in local government, and they may also have served to cut off rising union leaders from their grass-roots constituencies, thus making them dependent on the centralized hierarchy for further political advancement. Except for a weak link to the Senate, the Chamber has not provided much of a springboard to higher office.”

Other studies also suggest that the PRI used legislative office as a reward to members of the individual sectoral organizations that made up the party, the worker's sector, the peasant sector, and the popular sector (De la Garza 1972; Nacif 1996). Many deputies during this time period came from union organizations closely tied to the party, and after serving a three-year term in the Chamber, would return to their organization. In a number of cases, members of these sectoral organizations would serve multiple terms in the Chamber over their political careers (De la Garza 1972).

**Table 3.2: Elective Office Experience in the Chamber of Deputies, 1982-2009**

#of offices held	<i>1982-91 Average</i>				<i>1997-2009 Average</i>			
	PRI	PAN	Other minor parties	Total	PRI	PAN	PRD	Total
0	50.5%	70.0%	70.0%	56.6%	29.6%	44.1%	53.6%	40.1%
1	27.5%	20.0%	21.7%	25.5%	33.6%	35.7%	30.0%	33.6%
2	14.2%	10.0%	6.7%	12.3%	27.0%	16.5%	12.7%	20.0%
3	5.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.5%	8.2%	3.7%	3.5%	5.5%
4 or more	4.8%	0.0%	1.7%	2.2%	1.7%	0.2%	0.3%	0.8%

Source: 1982-91 data from Nacif 1996. 1997-2009 author's compilation

Examining the results in Table 3.2 for the competitive period, 1997-2009, we see a large increase in the percentage of deputies with previous elected office experience. Among the PRI, a large majority of federal deputies have served in at least one prior elected office, and about 37% have served in two or more prior elected positions. For the PAN, which has been around much longer than the PRD, a small majority of legislators have prior experience in elected office, but this is a drastic change from the 1982-91 period where 70 percent of PAN deputies had no prior elected office experience. Among PRD deputies, a slight majority of legislators have no prior elected office experience, although this is changing rapidly. Table 3.3 examines in more detail the elected office experience for the three major parties across 4 legislative terms from 1997-2009. Among the PRI and the PAN, the percentages of deputies with prior elected office experience remains fairly constant across time, while members of the PRD are becoming increasingly experienced in elected office. During the LVII Legislature (1997-2000), 67% of PRD deputies had not held prior elected office, but this percentage dropped to

44% in the LX Legislature (2006-09). Since the PRD is a much newer party than the PAN or the PRI, and was the victim of much greater repression by the PRI during the 1990s (Bruhn 1997; Eisenstadt 2004), it is unsurprising that it was not until very recently that members of the PRD were able to gather elected office experience.

**Table 3.3: Elective Office Experience in Chamber of Deputies by Term among Major Parties Only, 1997-2009**

#of offices held	<i>PRI</i>					<i>PAN</i>					<i>PRD</i>													
	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX	LX									
0	30.3%	32.2%	29.0%	23.8%	44.0%	48.6%	38.7%	43.5%	67.2%	56.6%	46.9%	44.1%	33.8%	29.3%	38.5%	31.4%	37.1%	35.6%	38.0%	33.3%	25.6%	32.1%	29.6%	33.9%
1	27.4%	26.9%	24.9%	30.5%	17.2%	13.5%	18.0%	17.9%	6.4%	9.4%	16.3%	17.3%	8.1%	9.1%	5.4%	12.4%	1.7%	2.4%	4.7%	5.3%	0.8%	1.9%	7.1%	3.9%
2	8.1%	9.1%	5.4%	12.4%	1.7%	2.4%	4.7%	5.3%	0.8%	1.9%	7.1%	3.9%	0.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
3	0.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
4 or more	0.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%

Source: Author's compilation

In addition to a general increase in the elected office experience of federal deputies across all three major parties, there is also a change in the types of previous experience federal deputies are bringing to the Chamber, as seen in Table 3.4. During the uncompetitive period, we see that most deputies with elected office experience have either been federal deputies during a previous legislature, highlighting the repetition alluded to by Smith (1979) above, or have served as state legislators. Except for a few members of the PRI, almost no deputies had previously been senators or governors. It is also apparent from Table 3.4 the serious lack of opportunities the PAN and other opposition parties had at the municipal level, with very few members of these parties having experience as a city councilor or mayor. However, with the increase in electoral competition, there is a major change in the types of elected office experiences deputies are bringing to the Chamber. While there are some differences across the three major parties, there is clearly a trend across all parties to elect deputies that have previous elected office experience at the local level. During the uncompetitive period, the most common experience deputies had was prior service in the same office. Under increased electoral competition, it is much more common for deputies to have previously served as state legislators, mayors or city councilors. In addition, there is a small but important increase in the presence of former senators and governors in the Chamber, suggesting the Chamber is no longer a dead end for ambitious politicians as it was prior to the onset of electoral competition.



**Table 3.4: Type of Elective Office Experience Among Federal Deputies, 1982-2009 (Percentage of Deputies who held office at least once)**

Type of office	<i>1982-91 Average</i>				<i>1997-2009 Average</i>			
	PRI	PAN	Other minor parties	Total	PRI	PAN	PRD	Total
city councilor	14.7%	7.5%	8.3%	12.5%	15.1%	24.8%	11.9%	18.0%
mayor	13.2%	0.0%	5.0%	10.0%	30.1%	11.2%	13.4%	19.5%
state legislator	21.0%	10.0%	10.0%	15.5%	41.0%	32.8%	26.3%	34.8%
federal deputy	20.1%	17.5%	11.6%	18.2%	24.0%	8.7%	11.4%	15.6%
senator	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	7.0%	2.4%	3.2%	4.5%
governor	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	1.8%	0.4%	0.5%	1.0%

Source: 1982-91 data from Nacif 1996. 1997-2009 author's compilation

Table 3.5 further breaks down the type of previous experience in elected office for the 1997-2009 period. Again, we see a gradual increase in the types of experience held by PRD deputies. Especially for local offices, such as city councilor, mayor, and state legislator, relatively few PRD deputies had experience in these offices during the LVII Legislature, compared to PRD deputies in the LX Legislature. For the PRI and the PAN, there is no evident increase in the type of experience brought to the Chamber over this time period. If career path data were available for the 1991-97 period, it is likely that this time period is when we would see changes in the types of experience among deputies of these two parties.

**Table 3.5: Type of Elective Office Experience Among Federal Deputies by Term, 1997-2009**  
**(Percentage of Deputies who held office at least once)**

Type of office	<i>PRI</i>					<i>PAN</i>					<i>PRD</i>					
	LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX	LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX	LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX	LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX
city councilor	15.8%	13.0%	17.2%	13.3%	24.1%	25.5%	24.7%	24.6%	7.2%	11.3%	11.2%	17.3%	7.2%	11.3%	11.2%	17.3%
mayor	29.9%	27.4%	29.4%	37.1%	5.2%	10.1%	14.0%	13.5%	5.6%	11.3%	19.4%	17.3%	5.6%	11.3%	19.4%	17.3%
state legislator	38.5%	42.3%	43.0%	40.0%	31.9%	27.9%	41.3%	31.9%	19.2%	17.0%	30.6%	33.9%	19.2%	17.0%	30.6%	33.9%
federal deputy	23.9%	27.4%	17.7%	30.5%	14.7%	4.8%	9.3%	8.7%	6.4%	9.4%	19.4%	11.0%	6.4%	9.4%	19.4%	11.0%
senator	6.0%	8.2%	4.1%	13.3%	0.0%	1.4%	0.7%	5.8%	1.6%	7.6%	3.1%	3.2%	1.6%	7.6%	3.1%	3.2%
governor	0.4%	2.4%	2.3%	2.9%	0.9%	0.0%	0.7%	0.5%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%

Source: author's compilation

Another important consequence of increased electoral competition is that elected office has become increasingly attractive for ambitious politicians. As alluded to earlier, elected office under one-party dominance was not a very attractive position, and especially for members of the Chamber of Deputies during this period, serving in the legislature provided few opportunities for advancement. For the most successful politicians during one-party rule, such as those in the federal cabinet or the presidency, it was rare to find many of these individuals with any elected office experience (Smith 1979; Nacif 1996). Instead, ambitious politicians seeking to move up the career ladder sought positions within state and federal bureaucracies. For example, of the five Presidents of Mexico from 1970-2000, not a single President had prior experience in any elected office before becoming President, and it was virtually required to be a cabinet member to be considered as a PRI presidential candidate (Castañeda 2001; Musacchio 2002).<sup>29</sup>

However, this situation has changed drastically with the increase in electoral competition. President Vicente Fox (PAN, 2000-06) had previously been governor of Guanajuato, and competed against two other former governors, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas

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<sup>29</sup> PRI Presidents – Echeverría (1970-76), was Secretario de Gobernación prior to becoming President, no prior elected office experience. López Portillo (1976-82), was Secretario de Hacienda prior to becoming president, no prior elected office experience. De la Madrid (1982-88), was Secretario de Programación y Presupuesto prior to becoming President, no prior elected office experience. Salinas de Gortari (1988-94), was Secretario de Programación y Presupuesto prior to becoming President, no prior elected office experience. Zedillo (1994-2000), was Secretario de Educación Pública prior to becoming President, no prior elected office experience. For the period from 1946-70, the backgrounds of the Presidents is a little more varied, although all had federal cabinet positions prior to becoming President. Alemán Valdés (1946-52) had previously served as governor of Veracruz. Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) had prior experience as a federal deputy and as governor of Veracruz. López Mateos (1958-64) did not have prior experience in elected office. Díaz Ordaz (1964-70) had served as federal deputy and senator.

(PRD, former governor of Michoacán and former mayor of Mexico City), and Francisco Labastida (PRI, former governor of Sinaloa). Current President Felipe Calderón (PAN, 2006-12) was a former federal deputy, and competed against Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD), a former mayor of Mexico City, and Roberto Madrazo of the PRI, former federal deputy, senator, and governor of Tabasco. For the upcoming 2012 Presidential elections, almost all the potential candidates have prior experience in elected office. For the PRI, the main pre-candidates were Enrique Peña Nieto, former governor of the State of México, and Manlio Fabio Beltrones, former governor of Sonora, federal deputy and current senator. For the PRD, the main pre-candidates were López Obrador again, and Marcelo Ebrard, current mayor of Mexico City and former federal deputy. For the PAN, the main pre-candidates are Josefina Vázquez Mota, former federal deputy and PAN caucus leader during the LXI Legislature, Santiago Creel, former federal deputy and current senator, and Ernesto Cordero, current Secretary of the Treasury and the only major potential candidate without previous experience in elected office. Now, most candidates for higher office are likely to have elected office experience, either as legislators, mayors of large cities, or governors (Beer 2003; Langston 2006).

### **3.3 Increasing electoral competition and bill sponsorship**

Due to the increased role of elected office experience for advancing within the Mexican political system, it is likely we will see individuals in these offices behave in ways to advance their careers. For example, in a competitive environment, ambitious legislators may sponsor more bills, give more speeches, or increase constituency service, all in an attempt to claim credit and advance the policy interests of key constituents in order to obtain a future office. In an uncompetitive environment, legislators have little

incentive to engage in these activities, since their political future is not tied to electoral performance.


While data is not available to demonstrate that legislators changed their behavior in all of these different ways, data is available to look at changes in bill sponsorship over time. It is likely that since electoral competition spread slowly throughout Mexico (e.g. Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley 1999; Eisenstadt 2004), that changes in legislative behavior will be gradual, not only because some legislators are coming from uncompetitive environments or sub-national authoritarian regimes while others come from competitive environments, but also because politicians require a learning period to adapt to changes in their environment. Figure 3.3 looks at the change in bill sponsorship by federal deputies, state legislatures, and the President, from 1991 to 2009.<sup>30</sup> What figure 3.3 demonstrates is that in the period from 1991-97, prior to the PRI losing majority-control of the Chamber of Deputies, federal deputies did not sponsor very many bills, and sponsored a similar amount of bills compared to the President. Even though deputies sponsored a somewhat similar amount of bills as the President, most bills originating in the Chamber did not pass. For the LV Legislature, only about 22% of bills sponsored by deputies passed, and in the LVI, this figure dropped to near 15%. In contrast, for the period 1991-97, about 99% of bills sponsored by the President passed. While the specific data is not present in figure 3.3, studies that have examined bill sponsorship throughout the period of one-party rule have found a similar trend (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 2009; Bejar Algazi 2004). When elections were not competitive, and the PRI held large majorities in the legislature, most legislative activity originated in

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<sup>30</sup> Data for 1991-97 taken from Nacif 2006. Data for 1997-2009 compiled by author from Sistema de Información Legislativa, Secretaría de Gobernación.

the Executive branch, and legislators had little influence in the policy-making process (See Appendix I for data on bill passage rates).

**Figure 3.3: Bill Sponsorship in the Chamber of Deputies, 1991-2009**



The importance of the Chamber of Deputies in formulating policy changed drastically following the PRI's loss of majority control following the 1997 mid-term elections. First, as can be seen in figure 3.3, federal deputies increasingly sponsored more legislation. In the LV Legislature, federal deputies only sponsored 117 bills throughout the 3-year term. During the LX Legislature, federal deputies sponsored 2691 bills. While the passage rate of bills sponsored by federal deputies stayed fairly constant across time, around 15-20 percent of total bills presented, deputies were certainly more active and have had a greater influence on policy (Nacif 2006). The President's legislative success also declined somewhat over the same time period. In the LV Legislature, the President sponsored 124 bills, of which 122 passed. During the LX Legislature, the President sponsored only 42 bills, of which 38 passed. While the passage rate of Presidential bills is still rather high, the decrease in bills emanating from the Executive reflects the strategic calculations of the President. Executives should be more likely to sponsor bills they know will get through the legislative process, rather than court failure by sponsoring legislation that has little chance of passage. Nevertheless, Presidents are likely to make some strategic miscalculations, or draft bills designed for political impact without much hope of passage, and send bills to the legislature that fail to pass. President Vicente Fox (PAN, 2000-06) was particularly unsuccessful, even though he presented fewer bills than most of his PRI predecessors. During the LVIII Legislature, 87% of Fox's bills passed, and in the LIX Legislature, only 63% of Fox's bills passed.

The drastic increase in bill sponsorship can also be explained by legislators seeking to claim credit for individual activity, a behavior consistent with politicians seeking to win elected office (Mayhew 1974). Ambitious legislators are likely to engage



in particular activities within the Chamber for which they can claim credit, such as drafting a particular bill. Table 3.6 displays the percentage of deputies who did not sponsor any bills across four legislative terms. In the LVII Legislature, a majority of deputies (55.3%) did not sponsor any legislation. By the LX Legislature, the percentage of deputies who did not sponsor any legislation drastically decreased, to 14.4%. At the same time, the average number of bills sponsored increased over time, from 1.1 bills during the 1997-2000 term, to 5.6 bills in the 2006-09 period.

**Table 3.6: Bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009**


Congress	Years	Mean bills sponsored	Mean cosponsors per bill	% of deputies with no sponsored bills	% of deputies with no cosponsored bills
LVII	1997-2000	1.1	7.1	55.3%	2.7%
LVIII	2000-2003	2.0	8.0	40.0%	1.4%
LIX	2003-2006	5.5	3.2	22.1%	3.4%
LX	2006-2009	5.6	2.8	14.4%	3.0%

Source: Author's compilation from the Gaceta Parlamentaria and the Diario de los Debates. Proprietarios only. "Sponsorship" refers to bills presented in the Chamber of Deputies. "Cosponsorship" refers to bills signed (but not presented) by individual deputies.

In addition, due to the lack of clear rules within the Chamber of Deputies on the authorship of individual bills (see Chapter 6 for a larger discussion), individual deputies may be more likely in a competitive environment to draft single-authored bills for which they can easily claim credit, rather than work collectively with other deputies on bills

where it may be more difficult to claim credit for individual effort. Figure 3.4 displays trends in co-sponsorship across time. During the first two legislative terms for which I have data on co-sponsorship, roughly half of bills were single-authored, but in the last two legislative terms, more than three-quarters of all bills sponsored in the Chamber of Deputies were single-authored bills. There is also a decline in the number of bills sponsored that have more than ten co-sponsors over time.

**Figure 3.4: Number of cosponsors per bill, Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009**



### **3.4 Increasing competition and pork-barrel politics**

Above, I described how electoral competition led to increasing numbers of locally-connected legislators with more experience in local elected office. Is there evidence that legislators with greater levels of experience in local office are representing more local interests in office? Recent research suggests that there is a state-level dimension in roll-call voting in Mexico (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), but beyond this, little empirical evidence exists to suggest what kinds of interests legislators are representing in the Chamber. One way to examine the types of interests legislators are representing is by examining individual amendments to the federal budget submitted by federal deputies.

Previous research on Mexico suggests that changes in electoral competition altered the way in which the federal budget was debated and approved. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) used federal spending in an attempt to shore up existing support bases as a strategy to stunt the growth of opposition parties (Costa-I-Font et al. 2003; Magaloni 2006). However, research shows that individual legislators rarely engaged in any pork-barreling behavior until the PRI lost majority control of the lower house in 1997, or did little else other than approve the budget as submitted to the Chamber by the President (Weldon 2002). The increased uncertainty in election outcomes post-1997 likely created incentives for locally connected candidates to pursue strategies to shore up their party's support in the district as well as a strategy to increase the chance of obtaining a future political position.

Federal deputies make requests to amend the budget to fund a myriad number of projects. Some of the requests are particularistic, such as to build a road, hospital, or

water treatment plant in a particular community, while others are fairly general, such as to increase the general education or health care budgets, or to increase funding for certain disadvantaged groups like women, indigenous people, the disabled or the elderly. In addition, some deputies request money to benefit particular interest groups, like bean farmers, tequila producers, former railroad workers, or a specific group of unionized workers. Some requests are very specific, for example, 100,000 pesos to pave a particular road in community X and where the money should come from. Other requests are very general and vague, such as the Budget Committee should consider allocating more money to primary education than what was proposed by the executive branch.

To begin to make some sense of the types of funding that deputies request, I created 19 different categories of budget amendments that summarize the variety of amendments while still preserving some of the diversity. In Appendix II I describe in more detail how I categorized the various budget amendments.

Table 3.7 provides a first look at the types of funding requests made by federal deputies. The first thing to notice is that deputies are making more requests over time. During the LVII Legislature, deputies only made 55 requests to amend the budget. Three terms later, deputies made 484 amendment requests during the LX Legislature. We also see a change in the priorities of legislators over the four terms examined here. Since so few requests were made during the LVII Legislature, it is hard to make strong conclusions, but most of the requests related to social services and welfare, such as requests to increasing funding towards various anti-poverty programs and to increase social security pensions, education spending, and miscellaneous government spending. During the LVII Legislature, most of the miscellaneous requests related to government

programs dealing with the banking and financial crisis of the 1990s. Almost all funding requests made during the 1997-99 budget debates related to federal programs, providing little in the way of specific individual credit claiming opportunities that might be useful for pursuing a future elected office.

**Table 3.7: Funding requests during annual budget process from federal deputies, 1997-2009**

	LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX
agricultural producers	3.6%	9.2%	2.0%	2.5%
aid to workers	3.6%	9.2%	2.0%	2.7%
arts and culture	0.0%	2.8%	4.7%	4.8%
agricultural and rural development	10.9%	1.8%	2.3%	5.6%
economic development	5.5%	0.9%	2.3%	5.0%
education	12.7%	11.9%	11.3%	11.6%
environment	0.0%	2.8%	2.3%	3.3%
govt spending priorities	5.5%	4.6%	12.5%	2.5%
health care	0.0%	7.3%	7.8%	4.6%
human rights and minorities	9.1%	11.9%	9.0%	7.0%
migrants and ex-braceros	0.0%	2.8%	3.5%	3.7%
misc govt spending	18.2%	1.8%	2.3%	1.7%
mixed requests	5.5%	1.8%	3.9%	4.1%
public works	0.0%	2.8%	5.5%	12.2%
science and technology funding	1.8%	1.8%	3.1%	0.6%
security and defense	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	1.0%
social services/welfare	20.0%	10.1%	4.3%	5.8%
transportation	1.8%	9.2%	11.7%	13.8%
utilities	1.8%	7.3%	6.6%	7.6%
Percentage Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total	55	109	257	484

Source: Individual Puntos de Acuerdo relating to funding requests during the annual budget process submitted by federal deputies. Author's compilation from Diario de los Debates and Gaceta Parlamentaria, Chamber of Deputies

In the LVIII Legislature, nearly 20% of funding requests related to funding for specific agricultural producers and aid to organized workers. Both of these categories represent attempts to transfer federal funding to specific interest groups. We also see over 40% of requests being targeted to largely federal programs that transfer money to

education, health care, human rights and disadvantaged groups, and poverty reduction programs.<sup>31</sup> Thus, during the 2000-03 term, roughly 60% of funding requests were directed towards specific interest groups or to policy areas of a largely federal nature where it would be somewhat difficult for legislators to claim credit with specific constituency groups to pursue a future career in sub-national office.

By the LX Legislature, we see a transformation in the priorities of legislators. Not only do we see a dramatic increase in the number of budget amendments, suggesting that legislators are strategically trying to use the budget process as a way to claim credit with particular constituencies in order to pursue their goals, but we also see a greater percentage of amendments being directed towards specific infrastructure projects in particular municipalities and states. For example, compared to the LVIII Legislature, only about 30% of funding requests during the 2006-09 term relate to mostly federal programs dealing with education, health care, human rights and poverty reduction and only about 5% of requests target specific interest groups. There is also an increase in funding requests dealing with specific infrastructure requests related to public works, transportation and utilities that overwhelmingly target particular geographic areas. In the LVII Legislature, these types of requests amounted to less than 4% of the total number of requests, and increased to about 20% of amendments in the LVIII Legislature. By the LX Legislature these types of amendments increased to almost 35% of funding requests. In sum, these results from Table 3.7 suggest federal legislators are increasingly attempting to use the budget process to direct funds towards specific constituencies rather than

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
<sup>31</sup> Adding the categories of education (11.9%), health care (7.3%), human rights and minorities (11.9%), and social services/welfare (10.1%).



towards particular interest groups that may be linked to their political party or towards federal programs that target dispersed constituencies.

However, just by looking at the policy areas in which budget amendments are targeted does not convincingly demonstrate the increasingly decentralized nature of funding requests. Figure 3.5 more clearly shows the increasing focus of federal deputies towards states and municipalities. In Figure 3.5, I classify the target of each budget amendment as benefiting a municipality (or group of specific municipalities), a state, a regional group of states (such as the northern border region), a federal constituency, or a particular interest group that is not geographically specific.

**Figure 3.5: Geographical target of funding requests from federal deputies during annual budget negotiations**



The results in Figure 3.5 demonstrate the changes in the way in which deputies attempt to influence the budget over time. In the LVII Legislature, only about 11% of requests targeted specific municipalities or states, increasing slightly to 15% in the next term. As suggested in Figure 3.5, the overwhelming majority of requests during the 2000-03 term were targeted towards federal programs (56%) or towards interest groups (18.4%). The contrast with the LX Legislature is stark. By the 2006-09 term, over 60% of funding requests targeted municipalities and states, a 49% increase since the LVII Legislature. Furthermore, federally targeted requests are cut almost by two-thirds, dropping from 78% of requests during the LVII Legislature to about 31% of requests in the LX Legislature. We also see a drastic reduction in the percentage of requests that have a regional focus and that target interest groups, as it is likely hard for legislators to claim credit for funding that is dispersed across multiple states.

In sum, the results from an analysis of all budget amendments submitted by federal deputies across four legislative terms suggest that the increasingly competitive nature of elections has altered the incentives and goals of legislators, leading them to focus more of their energy on representing state and municipal interests, and less time on funding federal programs and organized interests. We can clearly see from the individual amendments the increasing sub-national focus of federal legislators during the annual budget process.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

Changes in electoral competition and the decline in the electoral fortunes of the PRI led to dramatic changes in the types of candidates running for legislative office, the productivity of the legislative branch, and the behavior of individual legislators. As

electoral competition increased, candidates winning office in the Chamber of Deputies were more experienced, and had greater connections to their local communities. These more professional and experienced legislators, combined with the loss of majority control in the Chamber by the PRI in 1997, dramatically altered the role of the Chamber of Deputies within the Mexican political system. The Chamber became increasingly productive and influential within the policy-making process, while the Executive was weakened. Federal deputies also began to recognize the credit-claiming abilities available to them while in office in order to advance their career goals, and began to sponsor increasing levels of legislation for which they could claim sole credit, and also increasingly tried to secure resources for their local communities and states.

Generally, this chapter also demonstrates that electoral competition matters. Increasing electoral competition for public office pressures officeholders and political parties to professionalize and to cater to the interests of constituents. Parties and individual representatives in an increasingly competitive environment also face pressure to represent the interests of voters, or risk losing office. Furthermore, the increase in electoral competition also opens up the number of potential offices for which ambitious politicians can compete, which not only allows for greater participation in the political process, but diffuses power away from the Executive branch towards representatives with closer ties to local constituencies. These dramatic changes brought on by electoral competition have serious consequences for the type of public policies produced, the behavior of politicians, and the way in which citizens are represented in a political system.

The findings in this chapter also challenge the notion that term limits reduce the professionalization of legislative bodies (Kousser 2005). Clearly for the Mexican case, term limits have been a constant for many years, but the increased level of electoral competition led to pressures to professionalize the Chamber of Deputies and its members as demonstrated here. Changes in levels of competition also led to similar trends at the state-level (Beer 2003).

This chapter painted a broad picture of major changes in the electoral environment in Mexico, and how democratization influenced the political careers and behavior of federal legislators. It also highlighted how competition influences the strategic decisions made by ambitious actors to pursue a political career, with different types of experience and behavior considered more valuable in competitive versus uncompetitive environments. The following chapters examine in more detail the career paths and behavior of Mexican federal deputies during the 1997-2009 period, by putting the theory developed in Chapter 2 to the test. The information presented here provides important background information regarding dramatic changes in the Mexican political system that helps contextualize the empirical results in the following chapters.

## **CHAPTER 4: Are Mexican legislators progressively ambitious?**

In Chapter 2 I outlined a theory of political ambition in a context where reelection is prohibited. In this chapter, I begin to test several implications of this theory using data on the career paths of over 2000 Mexican federal deputies across four legislative terms from 1997-2009. I argue that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious political actors. Since Mexican deputies cannot pursue static ambition, it is also possible they pursue discrete ambition. However, I argue this is not the case, that the overwhelming majority of Mexican legislators are professional politicians with a wealth of experience and that many go on to other political offices after leaving the Chamber of Deputies. Most legislators have previous experience at the sub-national level, either as local deputies or mayors, and many legislators seek elected office at the state-level after serving their term. Even though it may appear some Mexican legislators seek offices of lower prestige after leaving the Chamber, this is short-term strategic behavior that is a consequence of not being able to pursue reelection to the same office, and long term trends in the careers of federal deputies suggest that over time they do seek higher office.

This chapter is organized as follows. I first review the theory of political ambition presented in Chapter 3 and the hypotheses that will be tested here. I then discuss the data on career paths and how it was collected. Finally, I present empirical evidence on the previous experience of Mexican legislators and the future offices they sought or obtained after entering the Chamber of Deputies.

### **4.1 Pursuing political ambition without reelection**

For a rational political actor, the expected utility of holding a particular public office is simply determined by the probability of winning office, the benefits of holding office,

and the costs incurred in obtaining the office (Black 1972). Once in office, political actors face three possible decisions: stay in the same office for another term, move on to an alternative office, or leave office at the end of the term. When reelection is prohibited, the possible career decisions open to a rational actor are to leave public office (discrete ambition) or move on to an alternative office (progressive ambition).

However, it is extremely unlikely, even in situations where reelection is prohibited, that political actors possess discrete ambition. Assuming reelection is prohibited, potential candidates will seek public office ( $U(O)$ ) when the probability of winning office ( $P$ ) times the benefits of holding office ( $B$ ) are greater than the costs of obtaining office ( $C$ ), or  $U(O) = PB - C$ , and when  $U(O) > U(A_i)$ , where  $U(A_i)$  represents all other career alternatives besides public office (Black 1972; Maestas et al. 2006). If  $U(A_i) > U(O)$ , then an individual will not attempt to run for public office. However, if  $U(O) > U(A_i)$ , and the actor makes this decision knowing the existing political opportunity structure of their environment, they are likely to value holding a public office over some other alternative in many situations. If that is not the case, then that individual is not likely to have attempted to seek public office in the first place.

Imagine a scenario in which a potential candidate for public office, such as a lawyer, professor, or businessman, is weighing the decision to run for public office. If they know that a single term in public office lasts three years without the possibility of consecutive reelection, the costs of leaving their current position and the possible uncertainty of regaining it after three years are likely to outweigh the benefits of holding a public office for a short period. Unless the benefits of holding public office for a single term are extremely high, such that the individual could retire to private life and leave

their profession after a three-year term, then it does not seem particularly likely that the large majority of potential candidates for public office enter with the goal of only serving one term and hope to be able to return to their profession afterwards.

If this reasoning is correct, then in the context where reelection is prohibited, we should observe that the large majority of public officeholders have previous experience in public office, and current public officeholders then attempt to continue in a different public office after their term ends. In short, prohibiting reelection is unlikely to encourage the emergence of so-called “citizen legislators” who enter public life for a short period and then return to their private pursuits. Using data on the career paths of Mexican federal deputies, two testable hypotheses emerge:

H<sub>1</sub>: More legislators should enter office with previous experience in public office compared to legislators who enter office from a non-political position

H<sub>2</sub>: More legislators should pursue a public office after their term is over than legislators who return to a non-political office

Thus, the decision to pursue progressive ambition likely takes place before an individual decides to pursue a career in politics. In an environment where reelection is prohibited or unlikely, most political actors are likely to possess progressive ambition.

Once an individual has decided to enter public office where reelection is prohibited, the next strategic decision they have to make is how and where to pursue their career goals. Once an individual term is over, a political actor must decide on where to seek future office. I assume there is a hierarchy of possible positions of which an ambitious political actor may choose from, and that in the ideal scenario, they are able



climb this career ladder from the bottom to the top over the course of their political career.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, ambitious individuals have a clear preference ordering for which office they would like to possess after leaving their current position. Despite the theoretical existence of a career ladder and preference ordering, it is unlikely that in a situation without reelection, that we would observe similarly situated politicians pursuing similar offices after their term is over. To illustrate why, let us assume a political environment where there are three potential offices an ambitious actor can hold, federal legislator (F), state legislator (S), and mayor (M) and this actor holds a preference ordering where  $M > F > S$ . A federal legislator at the end of their term faces the decision to run for state legislative office (S) or mayor (M). According to this actor's preferences, they would most like to run for mayor at the end of their term. The expected utility of holding the mayor's office is based on the probability of winning the office ( $P_m$ ), the benefits of holding that office ( $B_m$ ), and the costs incurred in running for that office ( $C_m$ ). The same can be said for the expected utility of holding a state legislative seat, except we can also assume that  $B_m > B_s$  due to the actor's preference ordering and the increased power an executive has over a legislator. Thus,

$$E(U_m) = P_m * B_m - C_m$$

$$E(U_s) = P_s * B_s - C_s$$

Even if the actor prefers to be mayor over state legislator, they will run for state legislator at time  $t$  if  $E(U_s) > E(U_m)$  depending on the values of  $P$  and  $C$ . We can assume

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<sup>32</sup> This assumption is similar to Rohde's (1979) assumption that if pursuing higher office entailed no risk, then all members of the U.S. House would prefer to be governors or Senators.

$C_m > C_s$  in most cases, but  $P_m$  and  $P_s$  may change drastically from election to election. If  $P_m$  is much lower than  $P_s$ , such as in a case where there is a strong alternative candidate for mayor, or the individual's political party does not allow them to run for mayor in a particular election,<sup>33</sup> then it is perfectly rational for this actor to run for state legislator at time  $t$ . They will only run for mayor when  $E(U_m) \geq E(U_s)$ . Therefore, even though we may know the actor's preferences, his decision on when and where to run are largely based on the probability of winning office and the costs of running for office. One observable implication of this method of pursuing a political career when reelection is not allowed is that similarly situated individuals on the career ladder will pursue widely different positions after leaving office. Another observable implication is that for individuals who are stepping down the ladder by entering the Chamber of Deputies, they will be more likely to seek a higher position on the career ladder than someone who is moving up the ladder by becoming a federal deputy. Finally, if it is indeed the case that federal deputies weigh the probabilities of winning and the costs and benefits of obtaining a particular office, we should observe federal deputies who step down the ladder (i.e. take a less prestigious position) have a greater rate of success in obtaining the position, compared to federal deputies who attempt to climb up the ladder to higher office.

H<sub>3</sub>: Federal legislators who came to office from lower-level positions (e.g. city councilor) will more likely seek a future office of lower prestige than federal legislators who reached office after serving in higher-level positions (e.g. senator).

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<sup>33</sup> These particular scenarios are extremely common in Mexican elections.

H<sub>4</sub>: Federal legislators leaving office at time t will pursue a myriad number of future offices rather than similar types of office

H<sub>5</sub>: Federal deputies who seek lower positions after their term (i.e. city councilor, state legislator) should be more successful at winning than federal deputies who seek higher positions (i.e. senator, governor, mayor).

Partisanship is also likely to have a large influence on the potential opportunities available to deputies when considering their future career choices. Executives have control over a number of political appointments, which might suggest that deputies who share the partisanship of an executive may be more likely to receive bureaucratic appointments at the state or federal levels, including cabinet-level positions. Not all appointed positions come with high visibility, but even if the potential benefits of holding an appointed office are low, the probability of winning the office are high and the costs are low, suggesting that for some deputies who share the partisanship of either their state's governor or the president, the expected utility of holding a bureaucratic position will be potentially higher than attempting to win an elected office. Thus, deputies who share the partisanship of their state's governor or share the partisanship of the president (PRI from 1929-2000, PAN from 2000-present) should be more likely to seek or obtain a bureaucratic appointment than deputies from other political parties.

H<sub>6</sub>: PAN deputies leaving office in 2000, 2003, 2006 or 2009 should be more likely to seek a federal bureaucratic appointment than deputies from other political parties

H<sub>7</sub>: Federal deputies should be more likely to seek a state-level bureaucratic appointment if they share the same party label with their state's governor at the end of the legislative term.

In addition to examining general trends in the career paths of ambitious politicians where reelection is prohibited, it is also necessary to take into account the institutional environment in which these actors pursue their goals. Political goals are shaped by the available opportunities, and the “political opportunity structure” is shaped by existing institutions (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972). The U.S. literature on progressive ambition makes two assumptions about the nature of electoral institutions that must be addressed when moving to a comparative context, as these institutions are likely to influence the probability of winning (P) and the costs of running (C). In the American context, it is assumed that all politically ambitious actors run in winner-take-all, plurality elections. It is also assumed that ambitious actors control their own fate in terms of deciding to run for an office and that there are no barriers to ballot access other than the support from voters (e.g. primaries) and the resources they possess to campaign. In many other contexts, proportional representation is used to decide elections, and party elites control access to the ballot. To understand progressive ambition in Mexico, it is critical to take into account the mixed-member electoral system as well as the centralized control over ballot access by party elites. These two factors have a significant impact on the probability of winning an election and the costs of obtaining office that are likely to influence the career paths of federal deputies.

District officeholders should be much more likely to build on the political capital accumulated through winning an election by seeking office in a similar or overlapping

constituency in which they were originally elected. In contrast, PR officeholders have no clearly defined constituency other than their own party, and thus we should expect these individuals to pursue offices where they do not need to gain the support of a clearly defined territorial constituency, such as a bureaucratic appointment, future proportional representation seats, or to work within the party organizations. One testable hypothesis is that legislators elected through single-member districts should be more likely to pursue future elected office than legislators elected through proportional representation.

H<sub>8</sub>: SMD legislators should be more likely to pursue future local elected office than PR legislators

The way in which candidates are selected to run for elected office is also likely to influence the probability of an ambitious individual winning office and the costs of running for office. Candidate selection methods in Mexico have varied widely across time, across parties, and even across districts in the same election within parties (Corona Armenta 2004; Freidenberg 2010; Reveles Vázquez 2003a; 2003b; Wuhs 2006). Nevertheless, candidate selection for district races is often much more decentralized compared to selection methods for populating the proportional representation lists, and in a competitive environment, candidate selection for district races is likely to privilege electability over other factors. Access to the top spots on the PR lists is controlled by national party leaders to ensure that their future congressional leaders will reach office, and as rewards to other key members and intellectuals that have little chance of winning a district race (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010; Kerevel 2010). Thus, candidates for the PR lists are drawn from a somewhat different pool of potential candidates, and are selected for reasons fundamentally different than for those used to fill the district race slots. One

implication of this difference in selection methods for the two modes of election, is that officeholders should display different backgrounds prior to entering office and pursue different careers after leaving office. If parties are in fact choosing candidates who they feel are electable to fill the district candidacies, then we should observe a greater number of federal deputies elected in single-member districts to come from previous elected office, since these individuals likely already have an electoral base and some visibility that will be useful for winning the federal deputy seat. Moreover, since PR candidates for federal legislative office are likely to have greater ties to national party leaders responsible for their selection, we should see a greater number of legislators elected through PR to come from national party positions and the federal bureaucracy than legislators elected through district races. PR legislators are also somewhat less likely to have the state-level connections to pursue future office at the sub-national level and therefore we should see that PR legislators are less likely to pursue a sub-national office.

H<sub>9</sub>: SMD legislators should be more likely to come from a previous elected office compared to PR legislators

H<sub>10</sub>: PR legislators should be less likely to come from a sub-national office compared to SMD legislators

H<sub>11</sub>: PR legislators should be less likely to pursue future sub-national office compared to SMD legislators

## **4.2 Data and Methodology**

To explore political ambition in the Mexican case it was necessary to collect individual-level data on the career paths of Mexican deputies. I collected information on the previous positions held by federal deputies prior to obtaining office, as well as any

position they sought or obtained after being elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The sample of cases includes nearly every individual legislator who was elected to the Chamber as a principal (*propietario*) legislator, and any alternate (*suplente*) legislator who took the oath of office.<sup>34</sup> The possible universe of cases I could examine for the four legislative terms between 1997-2009 include 4008 individuals who were elected as either a *propietario* (2004) or *suplente* (2004).<sup>35</sup> My sample includes 2,345 individuals, 2,003 of whom are *propietarios* and 342 of whom are *suplentes*. Therefore, I attempted to collect career path data on almost every single legislator that was elected or took the oath of office as *suplente* across four legislative terms. Of the *propietarios* in my sample, I was able to collect information on future careers for 95% of the individuals in my dataset. For the *suplentes*, I found future career information for 73% of those who served some time in office. The difference is almost certainly due to the fact that *suplentes* are much weaker candidates in terms of experience and in the types of positions they can reasonably compete for in the future. Thus, *suplentes* are more likely to seek lower

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<sup>34</sup> One legislator, Carlos Cornejo Torres (PRI, Edomex-15) from the 58<sup>th</sup> Legislature does not enter my data set since he was arrested for murder after the July 2000 elections but before taking the oath of office. Hidalgo, Claudia. 2000. "Formal prision a Cornejo Torres." *El Universal*, 29 October.

[http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id\\_nota=20447&tabla=estados](http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=20447&tabla=estados)

<sup>35</sup> There are four extra *propietario-suplente* pairs in the universe of cases due to the original pairs vacating office. Replacement deputies only come in to cover vacated PR seats, and the new deputy-*suplente* pair are the next on the list who are able to take office. Vacated SMD seats are left vacant until the next election. In the 58<sup>th</sup> Legislature, Luis Ariel Canto García (PAN-3<sup>rd</sup> Cir.) replaced Roger Antonio González Herrera (*propietario*) and Lizbeth Evelia Medina Rodríguez (*suplente*), after they both took leaves of absence. Arturo Díaz Ornelas (PAN-2<sup>nd</sup> Cir.) replaced Ricardo Francisco García Cervantes (*propietario*), whose *suplente* could not take office after García Cervantes took a leave of absence. In the 59<sup>th</sup> Legislature, Beatriz Mojica Morga (PRD-5<sup>th</sup> Cir.) replaced Carlos Zeferino Torreblanca Galindo (*propietario*) and Carlos Alvarez Reyes (*suplente*), after they both took leaves of absence. In the 60<sup>th</sup> Legislature, José Francisco Melo Velásquez (CONV-3<sup>rd</sup> Cir.) replaced Alberto Esteva Salinas (*propietario*) whose *suplente* could not take office after Esteva Salinas took a leave of absence.

positions in municipal or state government in which it is difficult for a researcher to uncover where they went after leaving office. It is also likely the case for those propietarios in my dataset with missing information that they either took a position so small it was impossible to uncover, failed in their attempt to continue their political career, or decided to return to private life. In some cases, it is possible an individual deputy cannot afford to continue their political career. As one deputy told me in an interview, he was too poor to wage another campaign and had used most of his legislative salary to engage in constituency service.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, since I found some information for the overwhelming majority of my observations, any conclusions I draw from the data will be generally representative of legislators and will paint a fairly accurate picture of career paths in the Mexican political system. Due to the differences in data collected between propietarios and suplentes, and the fundamental differences between the two types of legislators in terms of experience, I restrict my discussion to propietarios in subsequent analysis.

These data come from a variety of sources, such as official candidate lists from the federal and state level electoral institutes, information requests for CVs of former deputies made to government agencies (if they currently held a position at the time of data collection), official biographies maintained by Congress and the Secretaría de Gobernación, published secondary sources on the biographies of Mexican politicians, national and local newspapers, government websites at the municipal, state, and federal levels, and websites maintained by the political parties and individual politicians. In order

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<sup>36</sup> Interview with Gerardo Ramírez Vidal, PRD deputy (Morelos-3), LVII Legislature, October 28, 2011 at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City. Even though parties receive public financing, legislators who run in district races often have to use their own finances to campaign.



to be thorough, I collected as much information as possible on any office sought or held prior to and after leaving legislative office, not just positions held immediately prior to and immediately after leaving office. In Appendix III, I describe in more detail the sources used to construct the career path database.

Despite the time-consuming nature of this data collection process, there are gaps in the information. The goal was to collect complete career path information for every legislator in my dataset. However, because of constant rotation of positions in the Mexican political system due to the prohibition on reelection, it is not always possible for ambitious politicians to hold some political office at all times. The large majority of legislators are also teachers, academics, doctors, agriculturalists, lawyers, or run their own business. When legislators fail to obtain office immediately after leaving the Chamber, they often return to their profession for short periods of time until they can seek another office. There are numerous reasons for an ambitious politician in Mexico to engage in this type of behavior. Primarily this is due to the electoral calendar for state-level elections. In the time period I am studying here, federal elections were held in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. State-level elections can occur in the same year as federal elections, or any year in-between. For example, a legislator from the state of Hidalgo elected in 2000 had the possibility of leaving office early to compete in the 2002 state elections, or finish their term and wait until the 2005 state elections. Furthermore, a legislator leaving office in 2003 may have wanted to run for Senate, but had to wait until 2006 to do so. Depending on political opportunities in their state, their party affiliation, and their financial situation, they may seek an office in the interim three years, or just wait three years to compete for the senate seat. Data collected on the previous career

paths of legislators prior to taking office in the Chamber of Deputies confirms that legislators sometimes experience gaps in their political careers.

Because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in seeking and maintaining a political office within the Mexican political system, it was not always possible to determine what a legislator did immediately after leaving office. The strategy taken here was to code a legislator's ambition based on the most proximate position they sought or obtained either while in office or after leaving office. For over 90% of individuals on which I have future career path data, I was able to find an office they held within three years of leaving office, and the overwhelming majority of these cases involve future career decisions taken the year they left office or one year later. I am not particularly concerned with some of these gaps in the data, since I assume that legislators are strategic actors that work towards certain career goals. If they are acting strategically it is not difficult to assume that their behavior within the legislature should be related to an office they desire in the near future, whether that happens to be an office they obtain immediately after leaving the Chamber or in two or three years. Because I was much more likely to find information on legislators seeking an elected office or other major appointed position any gaps in the future career paths of legislators in my data are likely due to the legislator either taking a lower position while waiting to pursue their major career goals, or briefly returned to private life in order to wait for a better opportunity.

### **4.3 Career Paths of Mexican Legislators**

In this section, I trace the career paths of Mexican legislators that have served between 1997-2009 and test the hypotheses developed above. The first step in demonstrating that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious requires examining their previous

experience. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the large majority of legislators will have prior experience in public office, and this is exactly what I find. When individuals enter the Chamber of Deputies, they are not in-experienced “citizen legislators” but political actors with a wide variety and depth of political experience at multiple levels of government.

Table 4.1 demonstrates the variety of experiences legislators have had prior to entering the Chamber. This table just reflects the different types of experiences legislators have had at any point in their career prior to entering Congress, not the extent of that experience nor the position they held immediately prior to being elected federal deputy. For example, across the four legislative terms, around 35 percent of legislators have had at least some previous experience in a state legislature.<sup>37</sup> 16 percent have served prior terms as federal deputies, and a much smaller percentage have previously served as senators. A large number of legislators have also served in previously elected office at the municipal level. Around 17 percent of federal deputies have previously served as a city councilor<sup>38</sup>, and about 19 percent of legislators have previously been mayors. What the table also demonstrates is that it is relatively more common for federal deputies to have previously experience in elected office at the state level, rather than rotate back and forth between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

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<sup>37</sup> This table only codes individuals with previous legislative experience as a propietario (principal) legislator. Many legislators have also previously been elected as suplentes, but since it is nearly impossible in any systematic way to determine if they actually served as a legislator for any significant period of time, I do not code a legislator’s previous experience as a suplente. Suplentes do not receive salaries and have no duties. In many cases, suplentes hold some other office while they are a suplente, such as serving as congressional staff in some capacity.

<sup>38</sup> *regidor* or *síndico*.

**Table 4.1: Previous Experience of Federal Deputies, 1997-2009**

	LVII (1997- 2000)	LVIII (2000- 03)	LIX (2003- 06)	LX (2006- 09)	Overall Ranking
State Party	65.6%	64.7%	69.3%	62.5%	65.5%
Municipal Party	45.6%	51.7%	57.1%	46.9%	50.3%
National Party	44.8%	41.7%	48.9%	50.1%	46.4%
State bureaucracy	38.8%	39.3%	45.3%	39.3%	40.7%
State Legislator	31.4%	31.7%	39.9%	34.5%	34.4%
Federal bureaucracy	30.4%	31.1%	34.9%	30.7%	31.8%
Municipal bureaucracy	23.0%	28.7%	35.7%	36.3%	31.0%
Mayor	17.2%	16.8%	22.0%	18.6%	18.6%
City Councilor	15.4%	17.8%	17.4%	18.8%	17.3%
State Party Leader	19.2%	15.4%	16.2%	16.4%	16.8%
Federal Legislator	16.4%	15.4%	15.8%	16.4%	16.0%
State Cabinet	8.8%	8.8%	9.4%	7.4%	8.6%
Senator	3.6%	5.2%	2.6%	7.2%	4.6%
National Party Leader	1.0%	4.0%	1.6%	2.4%	2.3%
Governor	0.8%	1.0%	1.2%	1.2%	1.1%
Federal Cabinet	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
N	500	501	501	501	2003

Percentages reflect the percentage of federal legislators who have experience in a given position prior to taking office in the Chamber of Deputies. Analysis restricted to proprietarios only.

In addition to elected office, federal deputies possess a wealth of experience from serving in bureaucratic and party posts and all levels of government. These findings suggest that gaining political and administrative experience prior to entering the Chamber of Deputies is highly valued and an important step on the way to becoming a federal deputy. These findings also reinforce those by Camp (2010, 46-73), who has argued that party militancy has become increasingly important in the democratic era for the pursuit of a political career. Furthermore, we generally see that more legislators have experience at the municipal and state levels, either in bureaucratic or party positions, than compared to having experience working at the national level. The figures for working experience in

the federal bureaucracy and in the national parties also obscure the fact that most of the positions are held by legislators in their states of origin. They may have been employed by one of the numerous federal bureaucracies, but were responsible for administering federal programs in their state. National party organizations also commonly appoint delegates of the organization to each state for a number of reasons that are separate from state or municipal party organizations.

The final piece of evidence we can draw from Table 4.1 is that legislators more often have experience at lower-level positions, and are much less likely to return to the Chamber after serving in more powerful positions such as senator or governor. This trend suggests that Mexican politicians do possess a hierarchy of goals and typically seek to move up to more powerful positions over time. We do see evidence that federal legislators have experience in every single office except the Presidency, but this does not mean Mexican politicians just move from office to office without some goals in mind to seek a higher office than the one they currently possess. Part of the reason we see individuals who have previously been governors, have served in the presidential cabinet, or have been national-level party leaders is that the enforced rotation in office sometimes requires politically ambitious actors to use a federal deputy seat as a waiting period before pursuing a higher office. These individuals may also be much more likely to hold important leadership positions within the legislature, which come with many more added benefits than being a regular backbencher within the Chamber.

In sum, federal legislators possess a variety of previous political experience, but they are much more likely to have served as state legislators than federal legislators, and very few senators return to a seat in the Chamber. We also see that more legislators come

with municipal and state-level experience than experience at the national level. Finally, we can see that federal deputies possess some idea of a hierarchy of positions, and see a seat in the Chamber as a mid-level position between lower level positions at the municipal and state level<sup>39</sup>, and much more coveted positions, such as serving in a gubernatorial or presidential cabinet, serving as a senator or governor, or as a national party leader.

While Table 4.1 demonstrates the wide variety of experiences that federal deputies possess, it does not tell us where they came from immediately prior to serving in the Chamber. Table 4.2 displays the position a legislator possessed just before entering the Chamber, and provides a stronger confirmation of hypothesis 1. To the extent possible, the prior position reflects the last known office a federal deputy held before running for election. For example, a legislator in the LVIII Legislature won in July 2000, so the table reflects the position they held either in 1999 or early 2000. In the few cases where it was not possible to determine what the legislator was doing right before running for office, I coded their last known position. This issue is most apparent in Table 4.2 by looking at the figures for federal legislator. Since consecutive reelection is prohibited, it is impossible for a federal deputy to have held the same position prior to entering the Chamber. However, of the 1.5 percent of federal deputies who seem to have been ‘reelected’, the large majority of these individuals were previously serving as suplentes

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<sup>39</sup> It is not always clear where the position of mayor fits within the political opportunity structure, since the importance of the position is related to the population of the municipality. Being mayor of a small, rural municipality is not likely to be a particularly coveted position, except for individuals who do not want to leave their communities, since rarely do individuals from these municipalities move on to higher office. However, being mayor of medium and large cities is likely to be more coveted than being a state or federal legislator and serve as a jumping off point to higher office, such as governor, state cabinet, or senator.

and thus, never took office.<sup>40</sup> There are only a handful of individuals for which their last known position was a federal deputy seat held three years prior to winning office.<sup>41</sup>

**Table 4.2: Previous Position of Federal Legislators Prior to Entering Chamber of Deputies**

	LVII (1997- 2000)	LVIII (2000- 03)	LIX (2003- 06)	LX (2006- 09)	Overall Ranking
State Legislator	14.0%	18.2%	21.8%	18.0%	18.0%
State Party	19.0%	13.2%	10.4%	8.6%	12.8%
National Party	10.6%	8.2%	10.8%	11.6%	10.3%
State Bureaucracy	5.8%	5.8%	7.2%	8.8%	6.9%
Mayor	4.4%	6.4%	8.6%	7.6%	6.7%
Federal Bureaucracy	6.0%	6.4%	5.6%	7.0%	6.2%
Municipal Bureaucracy	4.4%	6.2%	6.2%	7.6%	6.1%
Union	8.8%	4.4%	6.0%	4.8%	6.0%
Non-political office	7.2%	4.0%	5.8%	6.6%	5.9%
City Councilor	3.4%	5.2%	4.0%	3.8%	4.1%
Municipal Party	3.8%	6.6%	3.8%	2.2%	4.1%
Senator	2.4%	5.2%	1.0%	6.2%	3.7%
State Cabinet	2.8%	2.8%	4.2%	3.6%	3.4%
Congressional Staff	3.2%	5.2%	3.0%	1.4%	3.2%
Federal Legislator	1.4%	1.8%	1.2%	1.6%	1.5%
Interest Group/Social Movement	2.6%	0.6%	0.2%	0.6%	1.0%
Governor	0.2%	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
N	500	501	500	501	2002

Proprietarios only. Figures for city councilor, mayor, and legislative positions include previous suplente positions. State and national party positions contain leadership positions.

<sup>40</sup> Suplentes who never took the oath of office and served as a federal deputy are not barred from running in the following election for either a propietario or suplente seat. However, once a propietario or suplente takes the oath of office for any length of time, they are then barred from running for either position in the next election, thus preventing a rotation over time between propietario and suplente pairs.

<sup>41</sup> Of the 31 individuals coded as previously serving as a federal deputy prior to entering the Chamber of Deputies (again), 24 of these individuals were suplentes. For the remaining 7 individuals, I have no information on what these individuals did for the three years between terms. Since the information on previous experience almost entirely comes from official congressional records, these 7 individuals also did not consider it noteworthy enough to specify what they did for those three years.

The most common position from which federal legislators come is a state legislative seat, with around 18 percent of federal legislators coming immediately from a state legislature to the federal Chamber of Deputies. These figures understate the extent to which state legislators attempt to move from the state to the federal level for two reasons. First, I only have data on state legislators who were successful at reaching the Chamber. Certainly many more tried and lost the election, and as I will demonstrate in more detail below, federal deputies are not always successful at winning state legislative seats after leaving the Chamber. Second, not all state legislative terms are coterminous with the Chamber of Deputies. For example, a politician entering the LX Legislature in 2006 may have exited their state legislature in 2004 or 2005, and then obtained a bureaucratic or party position in the interim one or two years before running for a congressional seat.

To a certain extent this table demonstrates that legislative experience is a valuable commodity to possess prior to entry into the Chamber of Deputies. While coming from a state legislative seat is common, and probably more common than what is displayed in Table 4.2, we also see a small number of senators who come to the Chamber after their senate term. Five to six percent of deputies in 2000 and 2006 came from the Senate.<sup>42</sup> We also see a small number of individuals who worked as congressional staff, either at the

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<sup>42</sup> In 1997, 32 proportional representation senators were elected for the first time. The 1980s and 1990s saw several reforms to the election of senators. Previously, 2 senators were elected from every state and the Federal District and the body was renewed entirely every six years. In 1988, the staggered election of senators was introduced, with 32 senators elected for six years, and 32 senators elected for 3 years. In 1991, 32 senators were elected, and for the 1994 elections, an additional 32 senators were elected, raising the total membership to 96. PR senators were introduced in 1997 to serve a three-year term, raising the total membership of the Senate to 128. 2000 saw the return of the entire 128-member Senate being renewed every six years.



state or federal level immediately prior to entering the Chamber. Future chapters will explore in more detail the value of this legislative experience for understanding behavior in the Chamber of Deputies.

After serving as state legislator, the next most common set of positions are state and national party positions, and state and federal bureaucratic positions. Overall, about 27 percent of legislators come from some type of party position, either at the municipal, state, or federal level. The importance of holding a party position likely reflects the partisan control over candidate selection and how the electoral system interacts with candidate selection mechanisms. Since the national party organizations are largely in charge of populating the proportional representation lists (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010), it makes sense to see the importance of holding a national-level position to be considered for a spot on the PR list. Likewise, candidate selection for district races is decentralized at either the state or municipal level, and thus the importance of serving in prior positions at the level of candidate selection. Another 19 percent of legislators come from appointed administrative or bureaucratic positions at the municipal, state and federal levels. The large majority of these bureaucratic positions are appointments made by mayors, governors, the president or cabinet members at the state and federal levels, and thus individuals with these positions possess close relations with important political elites that are likely to have an influence over candidate selection.

With the widespread use of term limits for all offices, one might expect to see more inexperienced individuals attempting to run for office. However, this is not the case. Only around 6 percent of federal legislators entered the Chamber from a non-political office, such as a teacher or university professor, doctor, lawyer or as a member of the

business sector. Moreover, the figures in table 4.2 for individuals coming from a non-political office overstate the percentage of legislators who have no prior political or government experience. A number of these individuals have at least some political or administrative experience, but for a variety of reasons, were working in the private sector immediately prior to running for office. In addition to individuals coming from the private sector, we see a fairly small number of individuals coming from a political activist background, either as part of a union, an interest group or politically-oriented NGO, or from a social movement. These types of individuals may be more likely to lack the necessary skills to work as an effective legislator, and with the possible exception of unions, are also probably less likely to have the connections to party elites involved in candidate selection. The higher percentage of individuals coming from unions is due to the corporatist structure of the PRI and the many unions that are tied to that party's organization. Many of these "group delegates" (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008) rotate between party, union, and elected offices through their career. In sum, the evidence in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provides strong confirmation of hypothesis 1, suggesting that Mexican federal deputies are ambitious politicians that bring a variety of political experiences to the Chamber.

Hypothesis 2 suggests that most federal deputies will pursue a future public office after their term is over in the Chamber, while Hypothesis 4 suggests that deputies will pursue a wide variety of future positions, rather than seek similar positions. The results in Table 4.3 find support for both of these hypotheses. Table 4.3 demonstrates that most deputies seek to pursue their careers at the state level, typically in some sort of elected office, and that only a very small minority do not seek or obtain a political office. For

legislators leaving office in 2003 and 2009, the most common position to seek was mayoral office, followed by a federal appointment in 2003 and a state legislative position in 2009.<sup>43</sup> For those leaving office in 2000 and 2006, it was most likely that a federal deputy would seek a senate position, then followed by mayoral office. In general, a large number of federal deputies pursue some sort of elected office at the state level<sup>44</sup> after leaving the Chamber, with a notable increase over time. For deputies leaving during mid-term election years, nearly 40 percent sought an elected office at the state-level if their term ended in 2003, increasing to 53 percent of deputies whose term ended in 2009. For deputies leaving office in general-election years, about 50 percent of deputies sought either a state-level elected office or a seat in the Senate if their term ended in 2000, which increased to 60 percent of deputies leaving office in 2006. The data in Table 4.3 also likely understates the extent to which deputies pursue future elected office. For example, if a deputy leaves office in 2003, but is from a state that has elections in 2004 or 2005, they are likely to obtain some sort of party or administrative position in the interim.

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<sup>43</sup> Deputies leaving in 2003 pursued a state legislative seat or federal appointment at almost identical rates.

<sup>44</sup> Mayor, state legislator, governor or city councilor

**Table 4.3: Immediate Position Sought or Obtained by Federal Legislators after Leaving Office, Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009**

	LVII (1997- 2000)	LVIII (2000- 03)	LIX (2003- 06)	LX (2006- 09)	Overall Ranking
Mayor	10.6%	16.9%	17.3%	22.6%	16.9%
State Legislator	8.7%	15.2%	11.9%	19.0%	13.7%
Senator	20.3%	3.0%	23.7%	0.2%	11.8%
Federal Bureaucracy	9.1%	15.9%	9.5%	11.3%	11.4%
Governor	7.8%	5.5%	5.6%	8.8%	6.9%
State Bureaucracy	7.2%	7.8%	4.9%	7.3%	6.8%
National Party	6.4%	8.9%	4.1%	6.3%	6.4%
State Party	4.2%	6.8%	3.3%	6.3%	5.1%
Union	5.1%	4.0%	1.9%	2.5%	3.4%
State Cabinet	2.3%	4.7%	3.7%	2.7%	3.4%
Non-political office	3.8%	1.9%	3.7%	3.4%	3.2%
Municipal Bureaucracy	4.2%	1.9%	2.7%	3.1%	3.0%
City Councilor	3.2%	1.7%	1.4%	2.5%	2.2%
Interest Group/Social Movement	2.5%	1.3%	1.7%	2.5%	2.0%
Federal Legislator	2.1%	1.7%	2.9%	0.2%	1.7%
Retired/died/banned from office	0.9%	2.1%	0.4%	0.8%	1.1%
Federal Executive	0.4%	0.6%	1.0%	0.2%	0.6%
Municipal Party	1.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	0.5%
Total Percentage	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	472	473	486	478	1909

Proprietarios only

Besides seeking elected office, most of the remaining deputies sought or obtained a bureaucratic post or a position within their political parties. 21 percent of deputies leaving the LVII Legislature sought a bureaucratic post<sup>45</sup>, which increased to 26 percent following the LVIII Legislature. The percentage of deputies seeking a bureaucratic appointment dropped to 17 percent after the LIX Legislature and raised again slightly to 22 percent following the LX Legislature. Fewer deputies seek positions in their political parties after leaving office. Nearly 12 percent of deputies leaving the LVII Legislature sought or obtained a party position, which increased to about 16 percent of those deputies leaving the LVIII Legislature. Only about 8 percent of deputies leaving the LIX

<sup>45</sup> At the municipal, state, or federal level.

Legislature sought or obtained a party position, and about 13 percent sought a post in their party following the LX Legislature. With the exception of leadership positions within the parties, most other party positions do not provide substantial visibility or power<sup>46</sup>, and thus, are likely not the first preference of deputies who obtain these positions after leaving the Chamber.

Thus, large numbers of federal deputies seek elected office after serving in the Chamber of Deputies, consistent with the argument that Mexican federal deputies are progressively ambitious. However, because each individual deputy has to calculate the probability of winning and the costs of obtaining a future office based on their unique circumstances, we should observe they pursue a wide variety of offices, which we in fact do find in Table 4.3.

How successful are deputies at obtaining the positions they seek immediately after leaving office? The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that when reelection is prohibited, the number of potential competitors for any office is likely to be very large. In this environment, we may see some federal deputies move “down” the career ladder, such as becoming city councilor or state legislator, while others move “up” the career ladder, such as becoming mayor, senator, or governor, as each individual weighs the probability of winning, and the costs of obtaining any particular position. One observable implication is that federal deputies should be more successful at winning lower positions, and less successful at winning higher positions. We should also observe a large number of federal deputies seeking or obtaining appointed positions rather than pursue a much more uncertain elected office, since  $P$  will likely be higher, and  $C$  very low.

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<sup>46</sup> Many party positions do not provide pay either, although party finances in Mexico are a bit of a black box.

Table 4.4 tests Hypothesis 5 by examining the success of federal deputies in pursuing their future careers. One note of caution is in order in interpreting Table 4.4. I attempted to gather as much information as possible about future career paths of federal deputies. For those who obtained candidacies for elected office, it was easy to determine where they sought future office and whether or not they were successful. However, a number of federal deputies sought elected office but failed to even get the candidacy. To the extent possible, I tried to obtain information on the aspirations of deputies who sought candidacies but failed to win a position on the ballot. Newspapers frequently cover intra-party competition and therefore it is not extremely difficult to find evidence of politicians seeking the candidacy for some particular office. Furthermore, conflict over candidate selection is exceedingly common in Mexican politics, and a fair number of these conflicts lead to party-switching (see Chapter 8), which garners media attention, or lead to cases in the electoral courts, which leave a record. This data is certainly imperfect, although the extent to which I can more accurately measure a deputy's ambitions, rather than just the office they obtained, the more accurate my conclusions will be. Thus, I used any information that was available to me for each individual deputy to code their success in obtaining office. For deputies that obtained office, this decision was easy. For those that did not obtain office, they may have secured a spot on the ballot, but lost the election, or attempted to secure the candidacy but failed to make it on to the ballot.<sup>47</sup> It is also much more difficult to obtain information about deputies who seek non-elected office but fail, thus the high perception of success in obtaining non-elected offices in Table 4.4. The only non-elected offices for which it was possible to obtain evidence of failure with any

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<sup>47</sup> In the future, I could break this down further into aspired to office/official candidate but lost/won office.

degree of certainty are competitions for party leadership positions at the state and national level. The media frequently covers these competitions and therefore it is easier to identify losing candidates for these leadership positions.

**Table 4.4: Success of Obtaining Immediate Position Sought by Federal Legislators after Leaving Office, Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009**

	<i>LVII (1997-2000)</i>		<i>LVIII (2000-03)</i>		<i>LIX (2003-06)</i>		<i>LX (2006-09)</i>		<i>LXI (2009-12)</i>		
	Obtained	Not Obtained	Obtained	Not Obtained	Obtained	Not Obtained	Obtained	Not Obtained	Obtained	Not Obtained	
Mayor	68%	32%	50	63%	80	69%	84	80%	106	71%	29%
State Legislator	59%	41%	41	22%	72	50%	58	59%	90	47%	53%
Senator	60%	40%	96	93%	14	68%	115	100%	1	66%	34%
Federal Bureaucracy	2%	98%	43	3%	75	0%	46	4%	54	2%	98%
State Bureaucracy	0%	100%	34	0%	37	0%	24	3%	35	1%	99%
Governor	84%	16%	37	96%	26	74%	27	95%	42	88%	12%
National Party	10%	90%	30	12%	42	15%	20	10%	30	11%	89%
State Party	15%	85%	20	9%	32	13%	16	20%	30	14%	86%
Union	0%	100%	24	0%	19	0%	9	8%	12	2%	98%
State Cabinet	0%	100%	11	0%	22	0%	18	15%	13	3%	97%
Non-political office	0%	100%	18	0%	9	0%	18	0%	16	0%	100%
Municipal Bureaucracy	0%	100%	20	11%	9	8%	13	7%	15	5%	95%
City Councilor	13%	87%	15	38%	8	14%	7	25%	12	21%	79%
Interest Group/Social Movement	0%	100%	12	0%	6	0%	8	0%	12	0%	100%
Federal Legislator	90%	10%	10	100%	8	93%	14	-	0	94%	6%
Retired/died/banned from office	0%	100%	4	0%	10	0%	2	0%	4	0%	100%
Federal Executive	100%	0%	2	0%	3	40%	5	100%	1	45%	55%
Municipal Party	40%	60%	5	0%	1	0%	2	0%	1	22%	78%
N		472	473		486		474		1905		

Proprietarios only. Some percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.



Notwithstanding the incomplete nature of the data, we can draw some tentative conclusions from the available information. First, very few deputies seek to return to a city council position<sup>48</sup> but for those who do, a large majority of them win. Except in very large municipalities, a city council position is not especially attractive and also a large step backwards for deputies with progressive ambition. Furthermore, as evident in Table 4.2, few deputies come directly from city council positions, suggesting this is a much lower position on the career ladder in many municipalities.<sup>49</sup> Second, as we have already seen, a large number of deputies seek office in their state legislature or as mayor. Deputies are slightly more successful at obtaining a state legislative position after leaving office than becoming mayor, but in both cases we see a slight decrease over time in the success rate of deputies who ran for these positions. While running for state legislative office immediately after leaving the Chamber of Deputies may seem like a step backward, it may be that some deputies wish to pursue a legislative career, and due to the ban on consecutive reelection, the only real option is to alternate between state and federal arenas.<sup>50</sup> It is also possible that the potential for obtaining an important leadership position within the local legislature (such as caucus leader or chair of an important committee) is actually a step up the career ladder. Third, a number of deputies attempt to run for governor after leaving office, but most of them are not successful. Without other

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<sup>48</sup> Voters in municipal elections elect a mayor (presidente municipal) along with a slate of city councilors (regidor or síndico). Voters cannot individually vote for city councilors.

<sup>49</sup> I would like to thank Francisco Sales, Director of the Centro de Estudios Sociales y Opinión Pública in the Chamber of Deputies, for pointing this out to me. A city council position in a large municipality (e.g. Guadalajara, Monterrey) is a desirable office, but in small towns these positions come with very few perks.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with Vidal Llerenas Morales, PRD deputy (DF-8), LXI Legislature, October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies. He said he wants to be a state legislator after leaving office since reelection is not an option.

relevant experience, a seat in the Chamber of Deputies does not seem to be the best starting point from which to launch a campaign for governor. Finally, of the 115 deputies who sought a seat in the Senate in 2006, less than a third were successful. Slightly more deputies were successful in obtaining a Senate seat in the 2000 election (40 percent), but competition for Senate seats is fierce due to the smaller number of seats available, and many federal deputies fail at obtaining a seat in the upper chamber. In sum, Table 4.4 demonstrates that a large number of federal deputies do seek a higher office after their term, such as mayor, governor or senator, but many fail in their attempts. Federal deputies have an easier time obtaining a lower office, such as city councilor or state legislator, or seeking an appointed position.

Up to this point I have discussed the experience and previous posts of federal deputies, and where they have sought office immediately after leaving the Chamber. However, I have not yet examined how future career paths vary based on previous experience, and hypothesis 3 suggests that the type of position a federal deputy will seek in the future is, in part, conditional on their past experience. Table 4.5 examines the three most common positions a deputy sought based on their prior post. The evidence used to generate this table is available in Appendix IV. This table most clearly shows the nature of progressive ambition in the Mexican context and for the most part, we see federal deputies seek the next most logical career position based on previously held office. For example, deputies who were previously city councilors are most likely to seek a federal appointment after leaving the Chamber, followed by state legislator and then mayor, while previous state legislators most commonly then seek to become mayors. Mayors who enter the Chamber of Deputies most commonly seek to return to the same office

after a three-year term, then followed by seeking to be governor. Deputies who were previously senators or held a position in the state cabinet are most likely to seek gubernatorial office. In general, the majority of federal deputies who pursue their political careers at the state level seem to be using their service in the Chamber of Deputies as a way to move up the career ladder in state office from the lower positions of city councilor and state legislator, to mayoral office, the state cabinet, and up to one of the most desired offices, that of governor.

**Table 4.5: Progressive Ambition of Mexican Federal Legislators, 1997-2009**

<b>Previous post</b>	<b>Top 3 future positions</b>		
	<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>3rd</i>
<i>City Councilor</i>	federal bureaucracy	state legislator	mayor
<i>Mayor</i>	mayor	governor	state legislator
<i>State Legislator</i>	mayor	senator	state bureaucracy
<i>State Bureaucracy</i>	state bureaucracy	mayor	federal bureaucracy
<i>State Party</i>	mayor	state legislator	senator
<i>State Cabinet</i>	governor	senator	mayor
<i>Senator</i>	governor	federal bureaucracy	state legislator
<i>Federal Bureaucracy</i>	federal bureaucracy	state legislator	national party
<i>National Party</i>	national party	senator	state legislator
<i>Interest Group</i>	interest group	senator	state legislator
<i>Non-political office</i>	mayor	non-political office	senator
<i>Overall Most Sought Positions</i>			
<i>mid-term elections</i>	mayor	state legislator	federal bureaucracy
<i>presidential elections</i>	senator	mayor	state legislator

*Proprietarios only.*

The evidence to this point suggests that Mexican deputies are progressively ambitious and do attempt to advance their political careers, but due to the high degree of uncertainty about obtaining a future position, deputies will often take a step backward before attempting to compete for a more prestigious political office. However, there are also a number of constraints that are likely to influence the individual calculus of the costs and benefits of where to pursue future office. One of those constraints is

partisanship, as suggested in Hypotheses 6 and 7. In Table 4.6 I test these two hypotheses, looking at the influence of a deputy's partisanship on their likelihood of obtaining a future bureaucratic appointment.

**Table 4.6: The importance of partisanship in the pursuit of bureaucratic appointments among Mexican federal deputies**

	57th Legislature (1997-2000)	58th Legislature (2000-2003)	59th Legislature (2003-2006)	60th Legislature (2006-2009)	Overall
<i>Federal-level appointments</i>					
PAN deputies	0.17*	0.33*	0.29*	0.24*	0.27*
Other deputies	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.04
<i>State-level appointments</i>					
Share partisanship of state governor	0.11	0.21*	0.13*	0.17*	0.15*
Do not share partisanship of state governor	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.05

Cell entries are percentages of deputies that sought or obtained a bureaucratic appointment, including cabinet-level posts, after leaving the Chamber of Deputies. \* $p < .001$  according to a two-tailed t-test.

Under the period studied here, 1997-2009, PAN deputies should be much more likely to obtain a federal bureaucratic appointment compared to other deputies, primarily because the PAN won the presidency in 2000 and 2006, and deputies leaving the Chamber in this period will be entering a political environment where the PAN controls the presidency. To test this hypothesis, I compared the percentage of PAN deputies who sought a federal appointment to other deputies and find that a much greater proportion of PAN legislators sought federal appointments. Over the four legislative terms studied here, 27 percent of PAN deputies sought federal appointments compared to only 4 percent of deputies from all other political parties, as seen in Table 4.6. 38 PRI deputies

across the four legislative terms also sought federal appointments, although 21 of these deputies were PRI deputies leaving the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature, and an additional 10 left the 58<sup>th</sup> Legislature. Since Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI, President from 1994-2000 did not leave office until December 2000, and the legislative term officially ends in August 2000, PRI deputies who left the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature, especially if they left before their term was over, still had the opportunity to secure at least a short-term federal appointment. Furthermore, Vicente Fox of the PAN, President from 2000-2006 was much more open to appointing individuals from other political parties (Camp 2010), which also explains the slightly higher level of opposition party deputies seeking federal appointments after the 57<sup>th</sup> and 58<sup>th</sup> Legislatures.

Hypothesis 7 suggests deputies who share the partisanship of their home-state governor should be more likely to seek a state-level bureaucratic appointment. To test this hypothesis, I coded the partisanship of the governor for each deputy's home state at the time the legislative term ends in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>51</sup> In Table 4.6 I find that deputies who do share the partisan of their state's governor are more likely to seek a state appointment. Across all four legislative terms, 15 percent of deputies who share their governor's party label seek a state appointment, compared to only 5 percent of deputies who do not.

Finally, I hypothesized that the mixed electoral rules and variation in candidate selection methods are likely to influence the career paths of federal deputies by acting as constraints on potential future opportunities. Hypotheses 8 through 11 suggest that SMD

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<sup>51</sup> It is important to code partisanship at the end of the term, since many gubernatorial elections are staggered, leading to the possibility that the partisanship of the governor from any particular state will switch during the legislative term.

deputies should be more likely to come from sub-national office and elected office, and also be more likely to pursue their future careers at the state level or in an elected position, compared to PR deputies. Table 4.7 tests these propositions through a series of t-tests. Looking first at the immediate prior positions held by federal deputies before reaching the Chamber, I find that PR deputies are much less likely to come from a state-level office or an elected office, but are more likely to come from a federal position. 46 percent of PR deputies came from a state-level office, compared to 75 percent of SMD deputies. Only 13 percent of SMD deputies came from a federal office compared to 40 percent of PR deputies. While at least a plurality of PR and SMD deputies come from state-level office, these findings do suggest that elites in charge of candidate selection are drawing from somewhat different pools of potential candidates. Furthermore, since the number of state-level positions is much larger than the number of possible federal offices, it is not particularly surprising that most individuals, regardless of mode of election, come from a state-level office.

**Table 4.7: Influence of electoral institutions on the career paths of Mexican federal deputies, 1997-2009**

	SMD	PR
<i>% immediate prior office</i>		
state-level office	0.75	0.46*
federal office	0.13	0.40*
elected office	0.39	0.27*
<i>% seeking future office</i>		
state-level office	0.68	0.45*
federal office	0.24	0.44*
elected office	0.58	0.47*

\*differences significant at the  $p < .001$  level according to a two-tailed t-test. Proprietarios only. For each mode of election, state and federal office percentages do not add to 100 since I did not count non-political office, interest group and union positions as state or federal office.

State-level office: city councilor, mayor, state legislator, governor, state and municipal bureaucracy, state and municipal party, state cabinet. Federal office: federal deputy, senator, national party, federal bureaucracy, federal cabinet. Elected office: city councilor, mayor, state/federal legislator, senator, governor.

Looking at deputies who were elected after previously serving in any elected office, I find that 39 percent of SMD deputies came from an elected office, compared to only 27 percent of PR deputies. This difference is statistically significant, although much smaller than the differences evident between state and federal office. Nevertheless, this finding suggests that parties are more likely to populate the district candidacies with individuals leaving another elected position, as these individuals may have greater chances of winning the district race, rather than place these individuals on the PR lists.

The differences found in the previous careers of federal deputies by mode of election continue to be evident when examining where they seek future office after

serving in the Chamber. 68 percent of SMD deputies attempt to obtain a state-level position after leaving office compared to only 45 percent of PR deputies. In contrast, 44 percent of PR deputies seek a federal position compared to only 24 percent of SMD deputies. In addition, it seems that SMD deputies are more likely to build on their political capital after winning their position as federal deputy to pursue a future elected office compared to PR deputies.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

I have argued in this chapter that Mexican federal deputies are progressively ambitious political actors that enter the Chamber with a wide variety of political experience and seek to pursue their future careers in higher office once their term is over. However, because of the high degree of uncertainty that exists in pursuing a political career when consecutive reelection is prohibited, federal deputies pursue a wide variety of future careers based on the probabilities they have of obtaining a particular office. This uncertainty leads some deputies to seek less prestigious positions after their term in the Chamber, while others seek higher office, conditional on the type of prior political experience they had before entering the Chamber.

Moreover, the institutional environment in which deputies pursue their careers has important effects. It appears that the existence of mixed electoral rules and the consequent differences in candidate selection for each mode of election, has a significant influence in the way in which ambitious politicians pursue their careers within the Mexican political system. While electoral rules do not provide rigid barriers that block individual legislators from pursuing any particular career, they do seem to provide



incentives for deputies elected in single-member districts to pursue a different set of offices than deputies elected by proportional representation.

## **Chapter 5: Electoral rules, ambition, and pork-barreling in the Chamber of Deputies**

Research on Mexican legislative behavior has suggested that legislators have few incentives to engage in constituency service or pork-barreling activities due to the prohibition on consecutive reelection, party voting in the electorate, and strong party control over the candidate selection process (Casar 2002; Freidenberg 2010; Nacif 2002; Ugues, Jr., Medina Vidal and Bowler 2012; Weldon 2002; Wuhs 2006). Reelection plays a key theoretical role in the behavioral studies of legislators, including decisions to serve general or particularistic interests (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). Moreover, studies of the effects of term limits and ‘shirking’ among legislators in their final term find they are less attentive to their constituency, participate less, and less likely to direct government resources to their districts (Carey et al. 2006; Herrick, Moore and Hibbing 1994; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000), providing a strong argument for why legislators who cannot seek reelection would not provide constituency service or particularistic benefits.

However, most Mexican legislators are career politicians, even if they are not career legislators. If one assumes that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious, as is common in studies of legislatures where reelection is less frequent than in the U.S. Congress (e.g. Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009; Taylor 1992), and as I argued in Chapter 4, then one should expect them to engage in activities while in office to further their careers after leaving Congress. For example, federal legislators seeking to run for mayor, state legislator, or governor after serving in the legislature may engage in activities that target their future constituency. Legislators seeking a future sub-national office should be more likely to engage in ‘pork-barreling’ behavior in order to claim credit with their ‘selectorate’ (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). However, not all legislators in federal

systems seek a sub-national office, and thus variation in ambition should lead to variation in providing particularistic benefits.

Moreover, some recent research has suggested that increased electoral competition, and the increased importance of federalism has led to greater pressures on Mexican federal deputies from governors to represent local and state interests due to the influence governors have over the careers of co-partisans from their state (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011). Gubernatorial influence over federal deputies may pressure deputies to represent constituent interests despite the lack of a reelection incentive, and is another indicator that legislators are engaging in strategic behavior to further their political careers after leaving a three-year term in the Chamber of Deputies.

In addition to the personal motivations of legislators to further their careers, electoral rules may also influence whether or not legislators engage in pork-barreling (Lancaster 1986; Stratmann and Baur 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006). Although all legislators come from some geographic region, individuals elected in single-member districts (SMD) are likely to have greater ties to specific constituencies and also feel greater pressure from district interests or ‘attentive publics’ (Arnold 1990; Bickers and Stein 1996) to deliver compared to individuals elected through closed-list proportional representation (PR). In addition, due to variation in the candidate selection methods for SMD and PR deputies in Mexico, competing principals may exert different pressures on SMD and PR deputies (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011; Wuhs 2006). Fortunately, the presence of a mixed-member electoral system in Mexico where 60 percent of deputies are elected through SMDs and 40 percent

are elected by closed-list PR allows for the examination of the effect of electoral rules on pork-barreling behavior.

Despite competing theoretical reasons regarding the propensity of Mexican legislators to engage in pork-barrel politics, scholars know very little about the individual behavior of Mexican federal deputies and their provision of particularistic benefits. One way to examine this issue is a study of their behavior during negotiations over the budget debated annually in the Chamber of Deputies, where legislators attempt to provide benefits to their constituents through the submission of amendments to the federal budget. I argue that despite institutional rules that appear to eliminate incentives for legislators to be responsive to constituents and seek a personal vote, Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious and therefore use these interventions into the budget process as a form of credit claiming to further their political careers after leaving Congress. Furthermore, I argue the mixed-electoral system creates diverging incentives for legislators to respond to different constituencies. Deputies elected at the district-level are likely to feel greater pressure to “bring home the bacon” and attempt to amend the budget regardless of their career aspirations, while deputies elected through proportional representation are less likely to request that federal spending be directed towards particular states or municipalities if it does not serve their career goals.

As I have previously argued in Chapter 3, electoral competition has altered the way ambitious politicians in Mexico pursue their careers, which has consequently affected their interests and the way in which they represent their constituents. One way in which this change is evident is the evolving nature of budget amendments and their intended targets. Beginning in 1997, federal deputies increasingly began to participate in

the annual budget negotiations in order to alter the distribution of resources proposed by the President. Federal deputies also increasingly attempted to direct resources towards municipalities and states through geographically targeted budget amendments and away from federal programs and interest groups.

In this chapter, I move on from an analysis of the aggregate changes in budget amendments over time, to an individual-level analysis that examines the determinants of submitting geographically targeted amendments and what this behavior can illuminate about the career goals of individual deputies. In the remainder of the chapter, I review previous research on the determinants and consequences of pork-barreling, and how electoral rules alter the incentives of legislators to be attentive towards specific constituencies. I then develop a number of specific hypotheses that can be tested with available data. Finally, I discuss the data and methodology of the empirical analysis and present the results.

### **5.1 Previous research**

Prior research on pork-barreling and constituency service largely comes from the United States where it is assumed that nearly all legislators seek reelection to the same office (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). One strategy incumbent legislators can use to increase their chances of reelection is by distributing federal resources to their districts to claim credit for serving constituent interests, and several studies have found evidence that this is the case (Stein and Bickers 1994; Bickers and Stein 1996; Alvarez and Saving 1997).

In a comparative context, many assumptions taken for granted in the U.S. case must be examined before addressing the reasons and consequences of pork-barreling. In

many countries, legislators do not seek repeated reelection or possess static ambition, such as in Brazil and Argentina (e.g. Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009), and in Mexico, seeking consecutive reelection is prohibited by the Constitution. In cases where legislators are more likely to possess progressive ambition, reasons for pork-barreling are likely to differ and so are the potential targets. In Brazil, pork-barreling is used to further careers in the municipal and state arenas rather than seek reelection to the same office, and therefore there is evidence to suggest that individually submitted budget amendments in that country target potential future constituencies (Ames 1995; Samuels 2003). The logic is similar to the U.S. case, although the potential target of pork-barrel politics is different. If we assume static ambition as in the U.S. case (e.g. Mayhew 1974), then incumbent legislators should seek to target the constituencies that elected them to office. However, if we assume progressive ambition, then incumbent legislators should target the constituency where they seek to pursue their future careers. An incumbent who wishes to pursue a career in their municipality or state should spend more time directing resources to these geographic areas. Conversely, incumbents seeking careers at the federal-level, such as in the federal bureaucracy, should spend less time on geographically targeted budget amendments, as this kind of behavior will likely have little impact on achieving their career goals.

H<sub>1a</sub>: Legislators seeking careers at the municipal/state level should attempt to direct more resources to the municipal/state level

H<sub>1b</sub>: Legislators seeking federal level careers should spend less time on geographically targeted distributive politics than other legislators

It is also important to account for variation in electoral system design when studying pork-barreling in a comparative context. The plurality, single-member district (SMD) system of the United States makes it easy for constituents to identify their representative, and for representatives to target a specific geographic region. This territorial link between constituents and representatives provides credit-claiming incentives for individual legislators elected through SMDs to engage in distributive politics (Mayhew 1974; Lancaster 1986; Carey and Shugart 1995). However, under proportional representation, where many legislators may represent the same district, the incentives to distribute pork to particular geographic areas is reduced, since legislators will have a harder time claiming credit for their efforts and constituents will not have clear information on who is responsible for any particular transfer of resources (Lancaster 1986).

While there is much theory to support the notion that electoral rules will influence incentives to engage in pork-barreling (Lancaster 1986; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006), little concrete evidence exists to support the theory. Previous research in comparative contexts either faces the same problem as the U.S., where all legislators are elected under the same rules (e.g. Ames 1995; Samuels 2003), or relies on rather indirect measures of pork-barreling and constituency service such as legislator surveys (Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Heitschusen, Young, and Wood 2005) or committee membership (Stratmann and Baur 2002). Furthermore, previous research on this particular topic in countries with mixed-electoral rules (e.g. Stratmann and Baur 2002; Heitschusen, Young, and Wood 2005) is somewhat hampered by the widespread use of dual candidacy, since many legislators elected through proportional representation have campaigned in single-

member districts and seek to do so in the future.<sup>52</sup> Studying pork-barreling in the Mexican case provides an ideal opportunity to examine the role of electoral rules on pork-barreling, since dual candidacy is restricted by law in Mexico and rarely used by the major political parties (Kerevel 2010). Therefore, I hypothesize legislators elected through single-member districts will engage in more pork-barreling than legislators elected through proportional representation.

However, electoral system effects on the propensity to provide particularistic benefits to local constituencies are likely to interact with the future career goals of individual deputies. Legislators elected in single-member districts will not only face pressure from district constituencies to provide benefits, but are also more likely to capitalize on their local connections to pursue a future political career in the district or state. Moreover, those responsible for getting the SMD legislator on the ballot in the first place will likely be influential elites at the district or state level who may be in a better position to help the legislator pursue a future political career back home, rather than seek a national-level post. In contrast, legislators elected through proportional representation are typically nominated by national-level party elites (e.g. Wuhs 2006) and are more likely to be beholden to national elites for their future careers than their SMD

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<sup>52</sup> Dual candidacy refers to the practice whereby individual legislators run in a district race and are also placed on the PR lists. Candidates who lose in the district race still have a chance to win a PR seat. Dual candidacy is thought to reduce or eliminate any potential electoral system effects since candidates elected through PR may have still campaigned in a district and may still try to cultivate a support base in that district for a future election (Ferrara et al. 2005; Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). Mexico restricts the extent to which parties can use dual candidacy, but the political parties rarely use the option nor is there evidence they are strategic in the placement of candidates who are dually-listed. Most mixed-systems employ dual candidacy, such as Japan, Germany and New Zealand, and the practice is fairly widespread (Massicotte 2004). For more on this topic and data on dual candidacy in the Mexican case, see Kerevel (2010).



counterparts. However, many PR legislators may still wish to pursue careers at the state or municipal level after leaving office and for those that do, they may attempt to engage in behavior similar to the SMD legislators in an attempt to win future office. Thus, I hypothesize electoral system effects will be most pronounced among deputies seeking a future national post, and more muted among those seeking sub-national office.

H<sub>2</sub>: SMD legislators should engage in more pork-barreling than PR legislators, conditional on where they pursue future office.

Candidate selection methods are also likely to influence the behavior of legislators, independent of the method by which they are elected to office. Political parties in Mexico hold exclusive control over ballot access and therefore possess strong control over the candidate selection process and the future careers of politicians. One way in which candidate selection methods are likely to influence a deputy's propensity to amend the budget is through the influence of co-partisan governors. Mexican governors have an enormous amount of control over candidate selection for their co-partisans (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010), and if they outlast the term of the federal deputy, can provide a future administrative post or ballot access in a future election after the legislator leaves office.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, governors are particularly interested in the annual budget process since over 90 percent of state resources come from federal transfers, and spend time meeting with their deputies in the Chamber during budget negotiations to ensure their interests are represented (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011).<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Federal deputies serve 3-year terms and cannot be consecutively reelected. Governors serve 6-year terms and can never be reelected.

<sup>54</sup> Interview on October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies with Vidal Llerenas Morales (PRD, DF-8), Secretary of the Budget Committee.

Due to the strong influence of the governors over their co-partisan deputies and their keen interest in the outcome of the budget negotiations, one might expect that deputies with co-partisan governors in the Mexican context will submit more budget amendments than deputies who do not share a co-partisan governor. However, there are a number of reasons why one should not expect to see this relationship in the available data. First, the budget amendments (*puntos de acuerdo*) are primarily a credit claiming tool used by deputies rather than a direct reflection of influence in the budget process.<sup>55</sup> Much of what goes on during the negotiation of the federal budget is unobservable by researchers (Sour 2006; Sour and Munayer 2007). Second, while gubernatorial influence is present in the budget process, it is informal and not transparent. Not only do governors hold sway over their co-partisan deputies, but they are also important members of their respective parties and can therefore negotiate with their caucus leaders to advocate for more state resources and push to get their deputies on the Budget Committee (Langston 2010).

Thus, gubernatorial influence is likely to manifest itself in seemingly counter-intuitive ways in the budget amendment data. For example, governors and their co-partisan deputies are likely to privilege informal over formal ways to influence the budget. Federal deputies who share co-partisan governors are also less likely to need to engage in more public credit-claiming activities to try to secure a future political post, since it is more likely the governor will also help the deputy in pursuing their political ambitions. On the other hand, federal deputies who do *not* share a co-partisan governor are likely to have much fewer opportunities to pursue their political career in their home

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<sup>55</sup> Interview on October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies with Vidal Llerenas Morales (PRD, DF-8), Secretary of the Budget Committee.

state since administrative posts are largely partisan appointments, and many of the appointments are controlled by governors. Thus, these deputies should be more likely to engage in credit-claiming activities in an attempt to influence the budget negotiations, since they are unlikely to benefit from the informal influence of their governor.

H<sub>3</sub>: Federal deputies who share a co-partisan governor should sponsor fewer budget amendments than deputies whose partisanship differs from the governor

One of the primary ways in which governors can influence federal deputies is by the promise of a future political appointment, as discussed above. However, not all gubernatorial terms outlast the term of federal deputies due to the staggered nature of elections in Mexico's federal system. It is likely for many deputies that the governor who helped them reach office will no longer be there when the legislative term is over, and may be unable to hold much sway over the deputies behavior while in office, or offer much in the way of future political benefits. For example, a federal deputy elected in the LX Legislature serves from 2006-2009, but they may come from a state where a new governor will be elected in 2007, 2008 or 2009. Thus, deputies who outlast their gubernatorial "sponsor" may not benefit from informal influence in the budget negotiations and instead engage in more public credit-claiming activities. This leads to the final testable hypothesis:

H<sub>4</sub>: Federal deputies from states where the governors switch during the legislative term should sponsor more budget amendments than deputies from states where the governor outlasts the legislative term.

## 5.2 Negotiation of the federal budget in the Chamber of Deputies

The annual budget is submitted in the fall of every year by the executive branch to the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber has exclusive authority over the portion of the budget related to spending, and most of the debate takes place within the Budget and Public Accounts Committee (*Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública*, hereafter Budget Committee). The Chamber has the authority to amend the budget as it sees fit, which then has to be passed and signed by the President. For many years, there was debate over whether or not the President had the authority to veto the budget, but this issue was cleared up in 2005 when the Supreme Court ruled that the President does have this right (Weldon 2002; Fernández Villaseñor 2010).

Previous research on budgeting prior to 1997 suggests that deputies largely abdicated their authority to amend the budget while the PRI was in power, until that party lost a majority of seats in the lower house in 1997 (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni 1998; Weldon 2002). Even though the formal powers of the Chamber of Deputies regarding their ability to amend the budget are similar to those of the U.S. Congress (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni 1998), the Chamber majority effectively gave the President complete control over the budget until the 1990s. Since 1997, federal deputies have increasingly used their prerogative to amend the budget.

The link between the formal amendments and the final budget approved by the Chamber of Deputies is unclear, as there is little transparency in the negotiation process within the Budget Committee (Sour 2006; Sour and Munayer 2007). What is clear, is that post-1997 the Chamber of Deputies does modify a significant portion of the budget submitted by the President. In the LVII Legislature, more than half of budget line items

(*ramos*) were modified in any given year, and during the LVIII and LIX Legislatures, at least 75% of budget line items were substantially modified (Sour 2006). While federal deputies, senators, state legislatures and committees can submit formal amendments to amend the budget, it is difficult to determine which, if any, amendments are taken into consideration by the Budget Committee. In an interview with a secretary of the Budget Committee with first hand knowledge of the budget negotiations, I was told that many deputies do get what they want included in the budget, although it is much easier for a deputy to get money for a road than more complicated projects, such as a water treatment plant.<sup>56</sup> However, the deputy claimed the budget amendments were primarily used as a credit-claiming tool by individual deputies intended for public consumption. The credit-claiming nature of the amendments is supported by the fact that some amendments fail to specify specific spending amounts and where the money should be taken from, and instead are general suggestions to increase or decrease spending in a particular area.<sup>57</sup>

Despite this ambiguity about the effectiveness of the budget amendments, what is certain is that federal deputies have increasingly used this legislative tool in recent years (as shown in Chapter 3) and the Chamber of Deputies does alter the budget submitted by the President to a substantial degree. Even if federal deputies only use the amendments as a form of credit-claiming without any hope that their personal preferences are included in the final budget, a study of these amendments can provide critical insight into the goals and preferences of individual legislators.

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<sup>56</sup> Interview on October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies with Vidal Llerenas Morales (PRD, DF-8), Secretary of the Budget Committee.

<sup>57</sup> It would be possible to identify amendments that do include specific spending criteria and then compare the amendments to the final approved budget to see if it was included in the modifications made by the Chamber of Deputies. However, that task is beyond the scope of this work and will be left up to future research.

### 5.3 Data and Methodology

To examine pork-barreling in the Mexican context, I collected the requests submitted by federal deputies related to the spending portion of the federal budget (*Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación*). Senators and state legislatures also have the right to submit amendments to the budget, and have increasingly exercised this right, but here I only focus on those amendments submitted by federal deputies.<sup>58</sup> Most requests relating to the budget are submitted directly to the Budget Committee, although if deputies are submitting a request related to a specific government program that is under the jurisdiction of another committee, they may submit the request to that committee instead. In addition, many committees submit their own requests for spending to the Budget Committee, and thus in some cases deputies will submit a funding request to another committee before that committee submits their requests to the Budget Committee. Therefore, I collected all *puntos de acuerdo* relating to the annual budget process, regardless of where they were sent. *Puntos de acuerdo* from the 1997-2003 period were gathered from the *Diario de los Debates*, the official congressional debate record, and from the *Gaceta Parlamentaria* for the 2003-09 period.<sup>59</sup> I used only amendments related to funding requests for the following year's budget.<sup>60</sup>

For the remainder of the analysis, I focus only on the 2006-2009 period. I do this because the focus is primarily on amendments targeting states and municipalities. This strategy proves nearly impossible for the LVII Legislature because there are only six

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<sup>58</sup> The overwhelming majority of amendments come from deputies.

<sup>59</sup> The *Gaceta Parlamentaria* does not have any records of *puntos de acuerdo* prior to the LIX Legislature (2003-06).

<sup>60</sup> I did not include funding requests that focused on the current budget, requests for information from the executive and other government ministries, technical requests to alter wording, and requests for new taxes and revenue.

budget amendments with sub-national targets. For the LVIII and LIX Legislatures, nearly 70 percent of legislators did not sponsor a budget amendment with a state or municipal target. By the LX Legislature, 47 percent of deputies had sponsored at least one amendment, making a statistical analysis more feasible.<sup>61</sup>

### 5.3.1 *Dependent variable*

To develop the dependent variable, I first coded the target of each budget amendment as federal, state, or municipal. Budget amendments that targeted multiple states or interest groups were dropped from the analysis. I then summed the total number of budget amendments for each geographic target submitted by each individual deputy. At the bivariate level, I look at the number of sponsored amendments for each of these three targets. For the multivariate analysis, the dependent variable is a sum of the total number of budget amendments sponsored by an individual legislator that target either a state or a municipality.<sup>62</sup>

The way in which budget amendments (and all *puntos de acuerdo* generally) are sponsored is very similar to bills in the Mexican context (see Chapter 6), but sponsorship patterns in Mexico differ fundamentally from the U.S. Congress. These differences warrant attention as they influence the coding of the dependent variable and how sponsorship is modeled. *Puntos de acuerdo* can be anything from requests for

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<sup>61</sup> Percentages based on *propietario* legislators only. In previous iterations of the paper, I did experiment with zero-inflated negative binomial regression to model amendment behavior across the 2000-2009 period. However, I found the results to be highly subject to model specification, especially the logit model explaining the large number of zeros in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the results generally confirmed those presented here.

<sup>62</sup> The range of this count variable is from 0 to 25, with mean 1.2, standard deviation 3.5, and median 0. I added together state and municipal budget amendments because of the overall relatively few amendments submitted by deputies, and because in practice, the distinction between the two is not always clear.

information from other government offices, ideological and symbolic pronouncements, to specific requests for resources. They are presented to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies, and if they are considered urgent, are voted upon immediately. Otherwise, *puntos de acuerdo* are turned over to the relevant committee, and in the case of budget amendments, usually the Budget Committee. In some cases, committees respond to the *punto de acuerdo*, accepting or rejecting whatever action is requested, but in the case of the Budget Committee, a response regarding a spending request is not directly linked to any change in the federal budget. For example, in negotiations for the 2007 annual budget in late 2006, the Budget Committee issued a report stating that all *puntos de acuerdo* relating to the 2007 budget had been dealt with, with no specifics regarding the inclusion or exclusion of any specific request into the approved budget.<sup>63</sup>

In the U.S., legislative rules state bills must have a single author, or sponsor, and after 1978, can have an unlimited number of cosponsors (Campbell 1982; Thomas and Grofman 1993). Similar rules exist in Argentina (Micozzi 2009; personal communication). In Mexico, no such rules exist that clearly delineate between the author of a bill (or *punto de acuerdo*) and cosponsors. Instead, the relevant distinctions are between those who “present” or “propose” a bill, and those who “sign” a bill. In the case of budget amendments, many are presented by a single deputy, with no other signatories attached to the bill. However, other amendments are presented by more than one deputy with the possibility of additional signatories. Still other amendments are presented by, for

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<sup>63</sup> “Dictámen de la Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública, por el que se consideran atendidas todas las proposiciones con punto de acuerdo relacionadas con el Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal de 2007, aprobado por la Cámara de Diputados y publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación.” *Gaceta Parlamentaria*, Cámara de Diputados, número 2236-III, jueves 19 de abril de 2007.



example, “The Parliamentary Group of the PAN”<sup>64</sup> or a multi-party group of deputies, without specifying a specific presenter. In these cases, there are only signatories to the amendment. Because of the varying nature of the way deputies sponsor amendments, making clear distinctions between “sponsors” and “co-sponsors” as is typical in legislative studies is very difficult in the Mexican case.

For the purposes of this chapter, I consider any signatory to an amendment as a sponsor. Nevertheless, since many fewer deputies present *puntos de acuerdo* than sponsor one, I control for the number of amendments presented by individual deputies in the multivariate analysis.<sup>65</sup> I also include an analysis with the number of presented budget amendments as my dependent variable, to demonstrate that similar patterns hold regardless of how the dependent variable is constructed.

### 5.3.2 Independent variables

The first key independent variable is mode of election. Legislators elected through proportional representation are coded 1, and coded 0 if elected in a district. I expect legislators elected through PR to sponsor significantly fewer budget amendments and thus expect a negative relationship.

The second major independent variable is future state office. I classified the future positions of federal deputies into two categories, national office and state office. National office refers to positions in the federal bureaucracy, in the executive branch, in the

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<sup>64</sup> In almost no cases do amendments presented by a specific parliamentary caucus include the entire party. Instead, they typically include a small subset of party members.

<sup>65</sup> The inclusion of this control does not alter the significance of the other findings in the model.

national party organizations, and future positions in Congress.<sup>66</sup> State office refers to any elected office at the state-level (city councilor, state legislator, mayor, governor), positions in the governor's cabinet, in the state and municipal bureaucracy, and in the state and municipal party organizations.<sup>67</sup> I expect deputies who sought or obtained a future office at the sub-national level to have been engaging in strategic behavior while in Congress and therefore submit more municipal- and state-targeted budget amendments.<sup>68</sup> I include a control variable in the multivariate analysis for those deputies who pursued future careers that did not fit into the national/sub-national dichotomy. These other deputies held positions in unions, social movements, ngo's, left political office, died, or retired.

In addition to mode of election and future state office, I include an interaction term between the two variables. I expect PR and SMD deputies to behave similarly regarding the submission of budget amendments if they are pursuing state office, but expect SMD deputies who went onto national office to sponsor more budget amendments than their PR counterparts.

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<sup>66</sup> Future positions in the Senate or Chamber of Deputies might be considered a state-level office, although this possibility is potentially muted by the existence of the PR lists, suggesting local constituencies are not as important. Data on the backgrounds of legislators reinforces this point. For example, of all the legislators in my dataset with previous Senate experience, 88 percent of them were elected to the Chamber through the PR lists. For those with previous experience in the Chamber of Deputies, 63 percent of them were subsequently elected through the PR lists.

<sup>67</sup> Percentages in Table 5.1 for state and national office do not add to 100% because of some deputies who sought or obtained positions in unions or social movements, left political office altogether, retired or died.

<sup>68</sup> While this measure of progressive ambition is temporally after the legislator's term in office, it is a measure of the office or constituency in which they would like to pursue their future political careers after leaving the Chamber. Therefore, if this measure is an accurate representation of their immediate ambitions, legislators should act strategically while in office in the hope of obtaining this position.

Gubernatorial influence in the budget process is measured in two ways. I include a dichotomous variable that captures partisan congruence between the deputy and the governor at the beginning of the deputy's term, in this case, 2006.<sup>69</sup> Deputies with co-partisan governors are coded 1, 0 otherwise, and I expect a negative relationship between party congruence and the number of sponsored amendments. The other way in which I capture gubernatorial influence is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the governor of a deputy's state switched during the 2006-2009 legislative term, and 0 otherwise.<sup>70</sup> I expect deputies from states where the governor switched during the term to sponsor more budget amendments.

I use a number of other independent variables to control for other possible factors related to amendment activity at the state level. In terms of individual characteristics, I capture each legislator's gender and education.<sup>71</sup> Previous research has suggested that women in the Mexican legislature and the U.S. legislature are more active than men (Anzia and Berry 2011; Kerevel and Atkeson 2011), therefore I expect females to sponsor more budget amendments than men. However, since the state political arena is somewhat inhospitable for women in the Mexican context (Kerevel and Atkeson 2011), it is also possible there is no difference between genders in sponsoring budget amendments. Previous research suggests that legislators with more education sponsor more bills, and as a result, I expect it may be positive here as well (Kerevel and Atkeson 2011).

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<sup>69</sup> This measure captures party congruence between governors elected in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 and deputies elected in 2006.

<sup>70</sup> This measure captures governors who left office in 2007, 2008 and 2009.

<sup>71</sup> Gender: Male=0, Female=1. Education: primary=1, secondary=2, high school=3, technical=4, some college=5, college degree=6, at least some master's level education=7, at least some doctoral level education=8.

I also include controls for institutional position within the Chamber of Deputies. Each legislator is coded 1 if they were a committee chair, a committee secretary, a party leader (caucus leader or speaker), or a member of the Budget Committee. I expect legislators with these positions to have informational advantages over other legislators that may allow them to more effectively participate in the budget amendment process and therefore I expect legislators with these positions to sponsor more amendments.

Since all Mexican deputies are elected along with an alternate (*suplente*) in case the primary legislator takes a temporary or permanent leave of absence, I control for alternates in the data. Alternates are generally much weaker legislators in terms of influence, experience, and time in office. Most alternates come into office near the end of the legislative session, typically in the spring, and are thus also much less likely to be active during the budget negotiations in the fall. Therefore, I expect alternates to sponsor fewer amendments than principal legislators. In addition to alternates, I also include the natural log of the number of days in office served by each individual deputy.<sup>72</sup> Deputies who serve only a short time, regardless if they are an alternate or primary legislator, are

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<sup>72</sup> All terms in office run from September 1<sup>st</sup> of the election year, to August 31<sup>st</sup> of the third year of their term. The number of days in office was calculated by collecting all the leaves of absence (*solicitudes de licencia*) recorded in the *Diario de los Debates* and the *Sistema de Información Legislativa* and subtracting any days in which the deputy was absent. For the LX Legislature, nearly 32 percent of principal legislators did not serve their entire term. I use the natural log rather than a count of the number of days since I expect little differences between deputies who serve the entire term and those who took off a few weeks, but much larger differences among deputies at the lower end of the spectrum. There is a high correlation between alternates and number of days in office (-.81). However, in results not shown here, the inclusion or exclusion of one or both of these variables has little effect on the substantive results of the model, nor does it effect the size of coefficients of any of the other variables. If alternate is excluded, days in office is positive and significant, while other variables are virtually identical to those presented in Table 5.2.

unlikely to participate very much in the legislative process compared to those who have served most or all of their term.

Partisanship is also likely to influence legislative behavior, which is measured by a series of dummy variables with the PAN as the left out category.<sup>73</sup> Since the executive during this period was from the PAN, it is more likely President Felipe Calderón submitted a budget closer to the preferences of PAN deputies. Members of opposition parties should therefore be more likely than PAN deputies to amend the budget.

### *5.3.3 Modeling techniques*

The dependent variable in the budget amendment model is a count, and therefore requires techniques that accurately reflect the nature of count data. Typically for count data a poisson regression is used. However, the dependent variable is overdispersed, meaning the variance is greater than the mean. When there is overdispersion it is more appropriate to use negative binomial regression (Gardner, Mulvey and Shaw 1995). I then use Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) to generate predicted values of the dependent variable based on changes in the independent variables.

## **5.4 Explaining pork-barreling in the Chamber of Deputies**

Table 5.1 demonstrates the relationships between amending the budget, electoral rules, and progressive ambition. I first discuss the relationship between electoral rules and budget amendments. The table looks at the mean number of budget amendments that

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<sup>73</sup> Dummy variables are included for the PRI, PRD, PVEM and PT. Another dummy variable, “other minor parties” captures members of PASC, PANAL, and Convergencia. A total of 10 deputies switched parties during the LX Legislature. In general, I code a deputy’s party as the one under which they were elected, except for 4 deputies who switched after being elected but prior to actually taking office on September 1, 2006. 2 deputies declared themselves independent, but not until near the end of their term in 2009. Thus, there are no deputies coded as independents in this legislature.

target the federal, state, and municipal levels, as well as the overall mean number of sponsored and presented budget amendments by mode of election. The means are fairly small due to the small number of legislators who do sponsor amendments, but the trends evident in the table confirm theoretical suspicions about the effects of electoral rules on pork-barreling. Overall, legislators elected in single-member districts (SMD) sponsor significantly more amendments than those elected through proportional representation. When we disaggregate amendments by their geographical target, we see that the difference is most evident in amendments that target states and municipalities. SMD legislators submit roughly two to three times as many budget amendments that target states and municipalities than their counterparts elected through PR. There is no significant difference in the average number of budget amendments targeting federal programs by mode of election.

**Table 5.1: Electoral rules, progressive ambition and pork barreling in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 2006-09**

	SMD <sup>1</sup>	PR	Progressive Ambition <sup>2</sup>	
			National Office	State Office
<i>Mean # of Sponsored Amendments</i>				
Federal target	1.29	1.26	1.36	1.23
State target	0.87	0.51*	0.49	0.83+
Municipal target	0.99	0.37*	0.36	0.79
<i>Total</i>	3.37	2.32*	2.33	3.08
<i>Mean # of Presented Amendments</i>				
Federal target	0.31	0.26	0.29	0.29
State target	0.39	0.15*	0.09	0.37*
Municipal target	0.38	0.08*	0.09	0.30+
<i>Total</i>	1.18	0.54*	0.48	1.04*
<i>% seeking office</i>	<b>Progressive Ambition<sup>2</sup></b>			
National office	0.11	0.34*		
State office	0.89	0.66*		

\*significant at the  $p < .05$  level according to a two-tailed t-test; + $p < .10$ .  
 Suplentes excluded from the results in this table. 1: N=501. One PR deputy from CONV entered office in January 2009 after previous propietario/suplente "dupla" both left, leading to an extra propietario in the data. 2: N=434. Deputies who pursued future careers in unions, social movements, ngos, some other non-political office, died, or retired are excluded from these results. Their exclusion does not affect the significance of these results.

Table 5.1 also demonstrates a significant difference in the career paths of deputies based on mode of election. I find that legislators elected in single-member districts are much more likely to pursue their careers at the state-level compared to those elected through PR. 89 percent of SMD legislators sought or obtained a state-level position after leaving the Chamber compared to 66 percent of PR legislators. The flipside is true for those seeking national office. Legislators elected through PR are almost three times as likely to seek a position at the national-level compared to SMD legislators. The likely

explanation for this difference is due to the differences in candidate selection for legislators elected through the two methods. While the political party organizations in Mexico are very strong and fairly centralized, candidate selection for district races is typically decentralized to the state or district level, whereas the PR lists are populated by the national party organizations (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2008; Wuhs 2006). Thus, differences in candidate selection are likely to be reflected in the behavior of the legislators while in office, but also where they are going to pursue their careers after leaving Congress.

Finally, Table 5.1 demonstrates the relationship between progressive ambition and the types of amendments offered. Federal legislators seeking to pursue their careers at the state-level not only submit more budget amendments overall, but submit more budget amendments targeting municipalities and states than legislators seeking office at the national-level. However, the level of significance varies based on whether one focuses on all sponsored amendments, or just those presented by an individual legislator. Nevertheless, the trends in both cases are very similar. The reduced level of budget amendment activity for legislators pursuing national office suggests the decreased importance of cultivating specific constituencies through funding to pursue a political career, while legislators seeking state office are more likely to attempt to claim credit for particular benefits sent towards the state or municipality in which they want to gain future employment.

To pursue the relationships evident in Table 5.1 further, I turn to multivariate analysis. Table 5.2 displays the results of a negative binomial regression predicting the number of state-targeted budget amendments sponsored by an individual legislator. Table



5.3 provides a number of estimates generated using Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) based on Model 1 in Table 5.2. Estimates were generated for each of the three major parties, with other variables set at their median. Also included in Table 5.2 is a second model where the dependent variable is the number of presented amendments, although I argue Model 1 represents a more accurate representation of sponsorship behavior with regards to budget amendments. I first provide an in-depth discussion of the results of Model 1 based on the estimates in Table 5.3 then briefly discuss the differences between the two models.

**Table 5.2: Negative binomial regression predicting number of sponsored budget amendments targeted towards states and municipalities, Chamber of Deputies 2006-09**

	<i>Model 1</i>			<i>Model 2</i>		
	DV: # of sponsored amendments			DV: # of presented amendments		
	coefficient	s.e.	sig.	coefficient	s.e.	sig.
# of presented budget amendments	0.47	0.07	**			
gender (female=1)	0.02	0.18		0.64	0.25	**
education (8-point scale)	0.16	0.07	**	0.12	0.09	
mode of election (PR=1)	-1.13	0.32	**	-1.81	0.56	**
state-level progressive ambition	-0.10	0.28		0.30	0.44	
mode of election*state-level ambition	0.82	0.36	**	0.68	0.59	
other future office	0.25	0.32		0.26	0.53	
committee chair	-0.03	0.26		-0.11	0.37	
committee secretary	0.05	0.16		0.51	0.23	**
party leader	-0.22	0.51		0.82	0.63	
budget committee member	-0.37	0.29		0.54	0.34	
PRI	0.71	0.22	**	1.32	0.33	**
PRD	0.27	0.23		1.92	0.31	**
PVEM	-0.11	0.55		0.79	0.93	
PT	0.56	0.48		1.51	0.75	**
other minor parties	0.38	0.34		1.85	0.51	**
# of days in office (log)	0.26	0.30		-0.31	0.47	
alternate (suplente=1)	-1.36	0.66	**	-2.60	1.27	**
partisan congruence w/governor	-0.85	0.17	**	0.21	0.25	
governor switch during term	1.24	0.17	**	0.53	0.28	*
constant	-3.07	2.12		-1.11	3.34	
Log likelihood	-652.06			-393.94		
LR chi <sup>2</sup>	226.35		**	115.01		**
N	523			523		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.15			0.13		

\*\*p<.05; \*p<.10. Alpha is significantly different than zero in both models.

**Table 5.3: Predicted number of sponsored budget amendments that target states and municipalities among each major party, LX Legislature**

	PRI		PAN		PRD	
	Predicted value	95% CI	Predicted value	95% CI	Predicted value	95% CI
Future state office						
SMD	1.5	(0.9, 2.3)	0.7	(0.5, 1.0)	1.0	(0.6, 1.5)
PR	1.1	(0.7, 1.8)	0.5	(0.3, 0.8)	0.7	(0.4, 1.1)
Future national office						
SMD	1.7	(0.8, 3.0)	0.8	(0.5, 1.3)	1.1	(0.5, 2.0)
PR	0.5	(0.3, 0.9)	0.3	(0.1, 0.4)	0.3	(0.2, 0.6)
Partisan congruence w/governor						
No	1.5	(0.9, 2.3)	0.7	(0.5, 1.0)	1.0	(0.6, 1.5)
Yes	0.6	(0.4, 0.9)	0.3	(0.2, 0.5)	0.4	(0.3, 0.6)
Governor switch during term						
No	1.5	(0.9, 2.3)	0.7	(0.5, 1.0)	1.0	(0.6, 1.5)
Yes	5.3	(3.0, 8.4)	2.5	(1.8, 3.6)	3.4	(1.9, 5.7)
Education						
Primary (min)	0.7	(0.3, 1.5)	0.4	(0.2, 0.7)	0.5	(0.2, 0.9)
College degree (median)	1.5	(0.9, 2.3)	0.7	(0.5, 1.0)	1.0	(0.6, 1.5)
Doctoral studies (max)	2.1	(1.1, 3.4)	1.0	(0.6, 1.6)	1.3	(0.7, 2.3)
Ballot Position						
Suplente	0.5	(0.1, 1.6)	0.2	(0.0, 0.7)	0.3	(0.1, 1.0)
Propietario	1.5	(0.9, 2.3)	0.7	(0.5, 1.0)	1.0	(0.6, 1.5)

Estimates based on Model 1, Table 5.2. All other variables set at their median.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 specify a number of relationships between mode of election, progressive ambition, and pork-barreling behavior, and the results in Model 1 lend support to these hypotheses. For legislators pursuing future careers in sub-national office, there is little significant difference in the number of sponsored budget amendments between SMD and PR legislators. Among members of the PRI, SMD deputies are expected to sponsor on average 1.5 amendments, compared to 1.1 for PR deputies, an insignificant difference. However, for legislators that seek a future national office, there is a large difference in sponsorship behavior based on mode of election. Across all three major parties, PR deputies who seek a future national-level post sponsor roughly three times fewer budget amendments than those elected through SMDs. Furthermore, while there is little evidence to suggest that the propensity to sponsor budget amendments

differs among SMD deputies based on their future careers, PR deputies sponsor about twice as many budget amendments if they are seeking a sub-national post.

These results suggest a number of interesting conclusions. First, legislators elected through single-member districts are likely to face much greater pressures from various interests in their district and state to secure federal resources, and their behavior differs little based on where they pursue future office. Second, this finding regarding SMD legislators is also fairly surprising since most previous research on pork-barreling suggests the motive to engage in this type of activity is primarily motivated by a desire for reelection. However, the evidence presented here suggests that even when reelection is prohibited, legislators still face pressures to represent particular interests in a competitive environment. Finally, PR deputies exhibit a wider range of behavior which seems to be largely based on where they want to pursue future office. PR deputies may lack some of the constituent pressures faced by SMD deputies and therefore choose to engage in behavior consistent with their career goals.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 address the potential implications of gubernatorial influence in sponsoring budget amendments and the results of the model perform as expected. The estimates in Table 5.3 suggest that federal deputies who do not share a co-partisan governor sponsor about 2.5 times more budget amendments than those deputies who are from states with co-partisan governors. While the result may seem counter-intuitive, it is not if one recognizes the budget amendments primarily as a credit-claiming activity.

In addition, I find that a gubernatorial switch has the strongest effect of any of the variables on sponsoring amendments. For example, among PRI deputies, the median legislator sponsored 1.5 state-targeted budget amendments, but if the PRI deputy

experienced a switch in gubernatorial office during their legislative term, they are expected to sponsor, on average, a little more than 5 budget amendments. The large effect of a gubernatorial switch not only suggests the importance of governors in the budget process, but also the potential influence governors have over the future careers of federal deputies.

In terms of the other variables in Model 1, I find that education has a significant effect, with the least educated deputies sponsoring fewer budget amendments than the most educated. However, the magnitude of the effect of education is somewhat muted, considering that most federal deputies have college degrees. Deputies that have begun or completed doctoral degrees only sponsor about 0.3 to 0.6 more budget amendments than those with college degrees.

As expected, *suplentes*, or alternates, sponsor significantly fewer budget amendments than primary legislators. While primary, or *propietario*, legislators sponsor about three times more budget amendments than alternates, the effect of the variable is substantively not very interesting. Since most alternates are not in office during the fall term in which the budget is actually negotiated, and the large majority of them enter office during the final spring term before new elections, most alternates rarely have a chance to effectively participate during the budget negotiations.

Partisanship also explains some differences in the submission of budget amendments targeting states and municipalities, although the biggest difference seems to be between the PRI and the PAN. The median PRI deputy (1.5) sponsors about twice as many budget amendments compared to the median PAN deputy (0.7). The PRD falls somewhere in the middle, with the median PRD deputy sponsoring 1 budget amendment,

although the estimates are not precise enough to suggest the PRD's behavior is significantly different from the PRI or the PAN.

The other variables in the model have little significant effect. I find few differences by gender in terms of sponsoring budget amendments, nor does institutional position seem to have any effect. Members of the budget committee do not sponsor any more or less budget amendments than deputies not on the committee.

Turning to Model 2, the results compared to Model 1 are slightly different although do generally confirm those presented in Model 1. The interaction effect between mode of election and progressive ambition is still present, although not as strong. For example, among PRD deputies pursuing a future national-level post, the average SMD deputy presents 1.0 budget amendments compared to 0.2 for the average PR deputy, a significant difference with 95 percent confidence. Among PRD deputies pursuing future state-level office, the average SMD deputy presents 1.2 budget amendments compared to 0.4 for the average PR deputy. There is no significant difference among SMD deputies based on where they pursue future careers, while the difference between PR deputies is only significant with 90 percent confidence. A gubernatorial switch during a deputy's term has a much weaker effect on presenting amendments, with the average PRI deputy presenting 0.7 amendments compared to 1.2 amendments among those who experienced a gubernatorial switch, a difference significant at the  $p < .10$  level.

There are a few interesting differences between Model 1 and Model 2. Female deputies do present budget amendments more often than males. The average PRD female deputy presents 2.3 amendments compared to 1.2 for men. Partisanship also seems more important in terms of presenting budget amendments. Nearly all the parties except the

Green Party (PVEM) present more budget amendments than the PAN. Finally, committee secretaries present more budget amendments than backbenchers, although it is not clear why this would be the case.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

Pork-barreling is a recent phenomenon in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. However, legislators operating in this new competitive environment are increasingly using budget amendments as a credit-claiming method to pursue their future career goals at the sub-national level. The lack of a reelection incentive does not mean that Mexican federal deputies do not attempt to serve their constituents. However, due to the varied nature of career paths, deputies who seek to return to the municipal or state arena, do not share partisanship with their state's governor, or come from state where the gubernatorial office changed hands in the middle of the legislative term are much more likely to engage in credit-claiming activity during federal budget negotiations. Furthermore, the electoral system matters for understanding legislative behavior in Mexico. Legislators elected through single-member districts are much more likely to represent municipal and state interests in the federal budget process, suggesting they are much more tied to the geographic constituencies that elected them compared to their counterparts elected through proportional representation. These electoral system effects are most likely due to differences in candidate selection for the two tiers, pressures from governors, as well as variation in how each group of legislators pursue their future career goals.

In general, the findings suggest that Mexican deputies are strategic actors that largely engage in behavior in hopes of obtaining future political office. Removing the reelection incentive does not lead all deputies to 'shirk' or to ignore their constituents.

Yet, these findings also suggest that the search for future political office conditions the extent to which deputies do attempt to secure federal resources for current and/or future constituents.



## **Chapter 6: Who sponsors and why? Bill sponsorship and legislative participation in the Chamber of Deputies**

Are there incentives to participate in legislative life when reelection is not allowed?

Many studies of legislative behavior assume reelection as the primary goal driving legislative behavior (e.g. Mayhew 1974), while others recognize that legislators may have multiple goals besides reelection, such as seeking influence within the legislature or pursuing policy goals (Fenno 1973; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000). Even if one assumes legislators have multiple goals outside of reelection, these additional goals are intricately tied to the possibility of reelection and to one another. Seeking influence within a legislature is predicated on the assumption that legislators can accumulate seniority over time, while the ability of an individual legislator to pursue policy goals becomes increasingly difficult if they cannot establish any influence within the legislative body, nor have the experience and expertise that comes with multiple terms. As Wawro (2000) argues, members of the U.S. House primarily engage in “legislative entrepreneurship” to advance to leadership posts within the body. Yet, this goal rests on the assumption that legislators serve multiple terms, since advancement from a backbencher to chair of a powerful committee in a single term is extremely unlikely (even in Mexico). Thus, without reelection, it is unclear from a theoretical standpoint why legislators would do anything at all.

Nevertheless, while Mexican legislators cannot seek consecutive reelection, they do participate in legislative life, and have increasingly done so in recent years (Nacif 2006; Kerevel 2010; Chapter 3). This chapter seeks to understand who participates and why in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. I argue that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious, or desire to seek alternative office after serving a term in the

Chamber and thus, use the tools at their disposal to pursue their career goals. One of those tools, bill sponsorship, is the focus of this chapter. After examining the determinants of bill sponsorship within the Chamber of Deputies, I then demonstrate that legislators who sponsor more bills are more likely to attempt to pursue future legislative office than other careers.

### **6.1 Why sponsor legislation?**

Previous research on legislative participation generally and bill sponsorship specifically identifies a number of potential reasons for why individual legislators would be more or less active. Bill sponsorship primarily serves an agenda-setting function (Schiller 1995; Woon 2008). Legislators can use bills to advance the goals of their constituents (Schiller 1995; Hall 1996) and also promote their own policy goals (Wawro 2000). Bill sponsorship and cosponsorship can also serve a position-taking function, providing valuable signals to legislative leaders, voters, interest groups and other party members (Campbell 1982; Highton and Rocca 2005; Koger 2003; Mayhew 1974; Rocca and Gordon 2010; Wilson and Young 1997). Sponsoring salient or controversial legislation may also lead to media coverage for the legislator(s) involved, providing valuable benefits such as name recognition and publicity (Highton and Rocca 2005).

While most of the existing literature on bill sponsorship is based on the U.S. Congress (but see Micozzi 2009), and assumes reelection as a primary goal of most legislators, assuming progressive ambition changes little. In fact, most studies of bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. find little to no relationship between electoral marginality and legislative participation (Schiller 1995; Hall 1996; Koger 2003). The ability to influence the legislative agenda serves the goals of progressively ambitious

legislators, as it signals to party leaders, other legislators and future constituents that the individual is an effective legislator, a potentially useful skill for advancing to another office. Progressively ambitious legislators still have an incentive to use sponsorship to advance the goals of future constituents, and where parties are strong and have strong influence over the future careers of legislators, as in Mexico, legislators also have an incentive to use bills to advance the policy priorities of their parties and groups responsible for electing the legislator to office.<sup>74</sup> Position-taking and the potential for media coverage also serves the goals of progressively ambitious legislators, as increased publicity should also help legislators advance their goals of achieving future office. In Mexico, there is a tendency in the media to measure the quality and effectiveness of legislators by the number of bills they introduce, providing an incentive to ambitious legislators to engage in bill sponsorship and avoid the (potentially misguided) criticism of a “do-nothing” legislator (Merino 2011).<sup>75</sup>

Previous chapters have demonstrated why a large majority of legislators who cannot be reelected are progressively ambitious, rather than return to private life. Starting with the assumption that legislators in this environment are progressively ambitious, the question then becomes, where do they seek future office and do they behave strategically while in the legislature to obtain this future office?

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<sup>74</sup> Political parties within the Chamber of Deputies also screen legislation sponsored by their members prior to its introduction on the floor to make sure it is consistent with the policy views of the party. Interview with Vidal Llerenas, federal deputy, LXI Legislature, October 11, 2011.

<sup>75</sup> In an interview with a former legislator, I was told they introduced a bill primarily to avoid the criticism that he was there three years and didn't sponsor a single bill, even though he knew the bill he sponsored had no chance of passing.

At the individual level, an ambitious actor may use their current office to engage in any type of behavior they see as likely to increase the probability of winning a future office. For a legislator, this could involve constituency service, bill sponsorship, pork-barreling, speaking for certain interests, promoting the interests of a particular group, or seeking leadership roles to increase influence within the legislature and visibility outside of it. While most work on national legislatures, and nearly all work on the United States Congress assumes that legislators primarily seek reelection to the same office (e.g. Mayhew 1974), assuming progressive ambition does not make legislators any less strategic. When legislators in the U.S. decide to pursue higher office, evidence suggests that their behavior reflects these different goals (Herrick and Moore 1993; Padró I Miquel and Snyder 2006; Victor 2011).

In most cases, representatives that are progressively ambitious seek future constituencies that include the constituency that first elected them to office. Thus, scholars who have studied this issue find that progressively ambitious legislators are not only responsive to their current constituency, but to citizens of their potential future constituency since these constituencies typically overlap (Squire 1988; Maestas 2000; 2003; Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). For example, in the U.S., state legislators may seek a position in the House of Representatives, while House members may seek a Senate seat. Outside the U.S., Brazilian and Argentine legislators may seek to become governor or mayor (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). In all these cases, current and future constituencies are likely to overlap.

Thus, progressively ambitious legislators are likely to use the tools at their disposal to increase the probability of winning a future political office. However, since

legislators possess multiple tools (constituency service, pork-barreling, bill sponsorship, agenda-setter), the first question that must be answered is to explain why some legislators use certain tools over others, or in this case, why some legislators sponsor more bills than others. Once we have a better understanding of the determinants of bill sponsorship activity, we can then turn our attention to the relationship between this tool and a legislator's future career goals.

## **6.2 Determinants of bill sponsorship**

Electoral rules are one important factor that are likely to influence the behavior of legislators, and there are a number of studies suggesting that the way representatives are elected influences the type of behavior they engage in once in office (Carey and Shugart 1995; Crisp et al. 2004; Lancaster 1986; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006; Heitschusen, Young and Wood 2005). For example, the more a legislator has to rely on a personal vote to get elected, the more likely they will engage in activities, like constituency service, to increase support in their district. Crisp et al. (2004) find that as candidate selection is increasingly decentralized, individual legislators are more likely to initiate bills that address parochial rather than national issues. These findings are in line with the theoretical expectations regarding electoral system effects on legislative participation. Legislators elected in single-member districts (SMD) are particularly concerned about representing the interests of their district as it influences their future political career. Thus, SMD legislators will be more interested in engaging in types of legislative activity that will allow them to claim credit with their constituents. In contrast, PR legislators are relatively more anonymous, face reduced incentives to engage in credit-claiming activity in the legislature, and should be expected to engage in activity

that is more likely to benefit the party at the national level (Bawn and Thies 2003; Crisp et al. 2004; Crisp 2007).

Since Mexico uses a mixed-electoral system whereby a proportion of officeholders are elected by direct vote, and others are elected through closed-list proportional representation, it is important to consider how mode of election might influence bill sponsorship behavior once in office. For the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 300 members are elected through single-member district, plurality elections, and 200 members are elected through closed-list proportional representation in five 40-member districts. Voters for legislative office only receive one ballot to vote for district candidates, unlike most other mixed-member electoral systems. Furthermore, in Mexico, dual candidacy is restricted by law and not widely used in practice and thus, there is a much more clear-cut distinction between district and PR candidates (Kerevel 2010).

Since dual candidacy is hardly an important factor in Mexican elections, candidates on the PR lists largely do not campaign for votes. They may engage in behind the scenes work, but do not engage in debates, organize campaign events, go door to door, give speeches, produce advertisements or finance clientelist practices.<sup>76</sup> In contrast, a candidate running in a district race for votes must typically engage in all of these activities.

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<sup>76</sup> Unfortunately, clientelism and vote-buying is a regular feature of Mexican elections for all parties. Some examples might include free t-shirts and hats with campaign images on them, organizing events where free services are offered, from haircuts to medical exams, or even the direct handing out of money. Campaigns in rural areas might include candidates giving away cement or fertilizer to potential voters. Where the money comes from to pay for these activities is unknown. I have personally observed some of these activities, as well as gleaned evidence of it from newspaper reports and interviews.

While all potential candidates would probably prefer to pay no costs to winning office, political parties need candidates to run in district races and therefore, the benefits of holding office after winning a district election are likely to be different than holding office won through a spot on the PR list. Candidates who can win district races are likely to be valuable to political parties, and the act of winning a district election is also likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder. A winner of a district race is likely to have greater name recognition and connections to voters in a given district. They also have ties to a territorially-defined constituency which can be used to provide constituency service and be used as an area where they can claim credit for their activities while in office. These activities are likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder for their future political careers after their current term is over. Officeholders who obtained their position through proportional representation are unlikely to accrue these same benefits since they have no easily identifiable territorial constituency, have not demonstrated they can win votes in an election, and voters are unlikely to know who they are absent other unrelated factors.

Legislators elected under PR pay fewer costs to reach office, especially when there are district candidates doing much of the campaigning. For candidates at the top of the list, the probability of winning office is extremely high, which suggests that political parties are strategic in who they place at the top of the list since they are fairly certain these individuals will reach office regardless of the party's overall electoral performance. Especially in a system without reelection, party control over the top of the list provides one mechanism for parties to place more experienced and loyal candidates in office who can take charge of the party's agenda and business inside the legislature. For legislators at

the top of the list, the probability they will secure an important leadership position once they reach office is also much higher compared to district candidates or PR candidates lower on the list (Kerevel 2010). These leadership positions are desirable as they often come with added financial benefits, additional staff, and increased influence over policy.

These differential benefits suggest that we will see differences in behavior among officeholders based on their mode of election, as well as differences in the career paths of officeholders by mode of election. Since the benefits of holding a legislative seat won through a district race include the increased possibility of providing constituency service, which can serve to further individual career goals, we should expect to see officeholders elected in single-member districts to engage in much more vote-seeking activity than officeholders elected through PR. Legislators are busy and have many demands on their time, thus for legislators who spend more time engaging in vote-seeking activities, it is less likely they will have as much time to engage in other legislative business, such as drafting legislation. However, officeholders elected through PR should not be assumed to be any less ambitious, but since they may be much less likely to use constituency service and pork-barreling as a way to further their career goals, they should be more likely to use the other tools available to them than district officeholders, namely bill sponsorship. This discussion leads to the first testable hypothesis.

H<sub>1</sub>: PR legislators should sponsor more legislation than SMD legislators

Candidate selection methods may also be likely to influence the behavior of legislators, independent of the method by which they are elected to office. Political parties in Mexico hold exclusive control over ballot access and therefore possess strong control over the candidate selection process and the future careers of politicians. One way



in which candidate selection methods are likely to influence a deputy's bill sponsorship behavior is through the influence of co-partisan governors. Mexican governors have an enormous amount of control over candidate selection for their co-partisans (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010), and if they outlast the term of the federal deputy, can provide a future administrative post or ballot access in a future election after the legislator leaves office.

Previous research has suggested that co-partisan deputies function as the agents of governors, which can lead to gubernatorial influence over voting behavior in the Chamber (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), and as I suggested in Chapter 5, governors can also influence the budget amendment behavior of individual deputies. While speculative, it is also possible that governors have a role in the bill sponsorship behavior of individual deputies, pressuring their co-partisans in the Chamber to sponsor legislation beneficial to state interests. While state legislatures also have the constitutional right to sponsor legislation in the Chamber of Deputies, these sub-national bodies rarely take advantage of this opportunity as shown in Chapter 3<sup>77</sup>, and in many cases it may make more sense for governors to get their deputies to sponsor legislation rather than the state legislature, as the deputy will actually be in the Chamber working to get the bill passed. If governors are pressuring their deputies to sponsor bills, then I would expect to see deputies with co-partisan governors to sponsor more bills, while deputies from states where the governor switches during the legislative term to sponsor fewer bills, since a gubernatorial switch is likely to break the principal-agent relationship

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<sup>77</sup> For more on the role of state legislatures in the policy-making process, see Medina Vidal, Ugues, Jr., and Bowler (2012).

between governors and deputies. This discussion leads to two exploratory hypotheses that can be tested with available data:

H<sub>2</sub>: Deputies with co-partisan governors from their states should sponsor more bills than deputies without co-partisan governors

H<sub>3</sub>: Deputies from states where the governor leaves office prior to the end of the legislative term should sponsor fewer bills than deputies from states where the governor outlasts the legislative term

In addition to electoral rules, institutional position with the Chamber of Deputies is also likely to have an influence on bill sponsorship activity (Padró I Miquel and Snyder 2006; Woon 2008). The possession of leadership positions confers agenda-setting powers upon the legislators lucky enough to hold them, and these positions come with greater resources and staff (Schiller 1995; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000; Rivera Sanchez 2004; Kerevel 2010). Therefore, legislative leaders should have greater incentives and greater opportunities to engage in bill sponsorship compared to backbenchers.

H<sub>4</sub>: Legislative leaders should sponsor more bills than backbenchers

In addition, serving on committees provides an informational advantage to the committee's members (Krehbiel 1991). Legislators should be much more likely to sponsor bills related to the committees they serve on (Schiller 1995), and if they serve on a larger number of committees, they should have increased opportunities to sponsor more bills.

H<sub>5</sub>: The more committees a legislator sits on, the more bills they will sponsor

Party membership is also likely to matter a great deal in the propensity to sponsor bills. The U.S. literature suggests that members of the minority party cosponsor more

bills than members of the majority party since they are likely to be more dissatisfied with the status quo (Campbell 1982; Koger 2003). In a multi-party presidential system such as Mexico, a similar logic should apply. Members of opposition parties (parties not in control of the presidency) should engage in greater levels of bill sponsorship as a form of position-taking (Mayhew 1974) and as a way to express dissatisfaction with the status quo.

H<sub>6</sub>: Members of opposition parties should sponsor more bills than members of the President's party

Finally, there are a number of individual characteristics of legislators that should influence bill sponsorship activity. The educational level of legislators should have an influence on the ability of individuals to perform legislative work. Legislators with higher levels of education should be more comfortable understanding and participating within the legislative process, and will likely pay fewer transaction costs in drafting a bill than legislators with lower levels of education. Especially in Mexico where most legislators have little previous legislative experience to develop the necessary skills to sponsor bills, educational levels are likely to be extremely important in understanding legislative behavior. While a legislator can always hire an advisor, and the political parties in the Chamber of Deputies do provide a group of advisors to help their legislators, I was told in an interview that the educational background of legislators does influence the bill drafting process. Deputies with the relevant educational or professional background are able to draft their own bills, especially shorter, credit-claiming or position-taking bills, without the help of advisors, while those without the relevant educational background are

less able to do this task on their own, which is likely to reduce the amount of legislation a less educated deputy can produce.<sup>78</sup>

H<sub>7</sub>: More educated legislators should sponsor more bills than less educated legislators

While reelection is not possible, a number of legislators do enter the Chamber of Deputies with some previous legislative experience that they acquired at the state or federal level at some point in their political careers. Much like with the case of reelection, where legislative effectiveness increases with tenure (Padró I Miquel and Snyder 2006), legislators with previous legislative experience should be more comfortable with the legislative process than those with no experience, and face less of a learning curve. However, previous legislative experience in the Mexican case may be less important than realized, since for most individuals with previous experience, they spent several years doing some other type of activity in between legislative terms, reducing the likelihood they will be able to capitalize on any skills developed in their previous term. Moreover, for many members of the Chamber of Deputies, previous experience was gathered in rubber-stamp legislatures either at the state level, or under PRI dominance, suggesting there may have been few opportunities to develop useful skills applicable to the current situation in the Chamber. Nevertheless, I hypothesize:

H<sub>8</sub>: Legislators with previous legislative experience should sponsor more bills than legislators with no previous experience

Finally, it is important to consider the gender of the legislator. Previous research on Mexican legislators suggests that women sponsor an equal or greater number of bills

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<sup>78</sup> Interview with Vidal Llerenas, federal deputy, LXI Legislature, October 11, 2011.

than men (Kerevel and Atkeson 2011). One potential explanation for why women might sponsor more bills is that women face greater discriminatory hurdles in entering public office, and must work much harder than men to reach the legislature (Anzia and Berry 2011). Thus, women legislators may be likely to possess greater skills and be more highly qualified than their male colleagues, which may translate over into bill sponsorship activity.

H<sub>9</sub>: Female legislators should sponsor more bills than male legislators

### **6.3 The use of bill sponsorship for pursuing future career goals**

Differences in behavior while in office are also likely to translate into differences in career paths for officeholders elected through different methods. Legislators who dedicate a significant amount of time to legislative work, such as bill sponsorship, not only signal their desire and capability to engage in this type of work, but also prepare themselves to move on to a future legislative office or other position where their recent experience and skills will be useful. Especially in Mexico where candidate selection is centralized (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010), party leaders concerned with the party's performance in office and electoral prospects should have strong incentives to select high performing legislators for future legislative positions, rather than support legislators who have not performed well. Obviously legislators have many duties and can demonstrate their legislative effectiveness in many ways, as negotiators, orators, leaders, and agenda-setters. Bill sponsorship is only one indicator of performance and effectiveness, but is at least one implication of the above theory that can be tested.

H<sub>10</sub>: Legislators who invest more time in legislative work (i.e. sponsor more bills) should be more likely to pursue legislative careers than those who invest less time

There may also be electoral system effects on where legislators pursue their future careers. District officeholders should be much more likely to build on the political capital accumulated through winning an election by seeking office in the same or overlapping constituency in which they were originally elected. In contrast, PR officeholders have no clearly defined constituency other than their own party, and thus we should expect these individuals to pursue offices where they do not need to gain the support of a clearly defined territorial constituency, such as a bureaucratic appointment, future proportional representation seats, or to work within the party organizations. Since PR officeholders are also more likely to engage in legislative work such as drafting bills and chairing committees (Kerevel 2010), they should also be somewhat more likely to seek a future legislative office since their skills will be transferable, and parties in a system without reelection may need to rely on a subset of skilled legislators to conduct legislative business when building seniority in a specific legislative chamber is not possible.

H<sub>11</sub>: PR legislators should be more likely to pursue future legislative office than SMD legislators

The influence of governors over the candidate selection process and the future careers of co-partisan legislators is also likely to have an effect on how current deputies pursue future political office. However, it is not clear specifically how gubernatorial influence will affect the decision to pursue a future legislative seat. Deputies who share co-partisan governors may be able to use this connection to obtain a spot on the ballot in a future election, but as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, these same deputies are much more likely to pursue a bureaucratic appointment due to the low costs of obtaining the position and a high probability of securing an appointment from a co-partisan governor. If they

are more likely to seek an appointed position, then deputies with co-partisan governors may be less likely to immediately pursue legislative office after leaving the Chamber. While the direction of gubernatorial influence is unclear, I speculate deputies with co-partisan governors will be less likely to pursue legislative office, primarily based on previous findings in Chapter 4.

H<sub>12</sub>: Legislators who share co-partisan governors should be less likely to pursue future legislative office than deputies who do not share a co-partisan governor.

Finally, the structure of available opportunities and the number of legislative seats for which deputies can reasonably compete is likely to have a large influence over the pursuit of a future legislative career. If there are fewer legislative seats for which to compete, it is much less likely deputies will pursue this type of future position. In mid-term election years, deputies leaving the Chamber are not able to compete for the Senate, thus they will have fewer legislative opportunities and will be less likely to pursue future legislative office.

H<sub>13</sub>: Deputies that leave the Chamber of Deputies in mid-term election years (i.e. 2003, 2009) should be less likely to pursue future legislative office than deputies leaving in general election years (i.e. 2000, 2006).

#### **6.4 Data and Methodology**

Studying bill sponsorship in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies is a more complicated affair than in the United States. In the U.S., legislative rules state bills must have a single author, or sponsor, and after 1978, can have an unlimited number of cosponsors (Campbell 1982; Thomas and Grofman 1993). Similar rules exist in Argentina (Micozzi 2009). In Mexico, no such rules exist that clearly delineate between the author of a bill

and cosponsors. Instead, the relevant distinctions are between those who “present” or “propose” a bill, those who “sign” a bill and those who “adhere” to a bill. In most cases, legislators who present a bill are the authors of the bill, and since the majority of bills only have a single legislator attached to the bill (see Chapter 3), considering the presenters of a bill as its sponsor(s) is a reasonable decision. Previous research I have conducted on bill sponsorship has relied only on the “presenters” of a bill (Kerevel 2010; Kerevel and Atkeson 2011). Adherents to a bill are legislators who ask for their name to be attached to a bill when it is presented on the floor before it is turned over to committee. The names of bill adherents are not attached to the versions of bills available to researchers, and thus are notoriously difficult to recover.<sup>79</sup>

When bills are introduced into the Chamber, they include the name(s) of the presenter, and anyone who signed the bill. However, those who signed the bill prior to its introduction may or may not be cosponsors in the U.S. sense of the term. Individuals who sign the bill may have been asked to sign the bill after it was written, may have been the primary author of the bill, or may have participated in the drafting of the bill with several other legislators and staff members. Moreover, bills may be presented by more than a single legislator, and the presenters of a bill may not actually be the primary authors of the bill. For example, there are many bills in the Chamber of Deputies that were “presented” by two, three, or more legislators, and which may or may not also contain

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<sup>79</sup> For currently sitting legislators (in the LXI Legislature, 2009-12), the Chamber of Deputies website breaks down these three distinctions for each individual legislator, identifying which bills they proposed, which ones they signed, and to which ones they adhered. But, these distinctions are not available for previous legislatures. It is also possible to read through the debate records to find evidence of legislator’s asking for their names to be attached to a bill. The time necessary to recover this data will have to await future research.



additional signatures. Bills can also be presented by entire committees, entire political parties, or by the internal organ called the *Junta de Coordinación Política* (JCP), which is the leadership group of all the caucus leaders in the Chamber. When bills are presented by a committee, or in the name of a committee, they are likely to be presented by the committee chair or one of the committee's secretaries. Whether or not the member presenting the legislation is actually the author of the bill is extremely difficult to determine.

An example of the problem may help. In the LVII Legislature, PRD deputy Gerardo Ramírez Vidal helped draft a bill that included a variety of constitutional reforms to strengthen the legislative branch, such as lengthening the duration of congressional sessions, increasing the length of the congressional term from three to four years, among many other proposed changes.<sup>80</sup> The bill was presented by PRD deputy Israel Petronio Cantú Najera, and signed by deputy Gerardo Ramírez along with five other deputies. However, in an interview with Gerardo Ramírez, he claimed to be the primary author of the bill, but since the bill was presented while the Chamber was out of session, deputy Cantú Najera presented it in place of deputy Ramírez Vidal, even though deputy Cantú Najera had little to do with the actual drafting of the bill.<sup>81</sup>

Obviously, interviewing every deputy involved with every bill that has more than a single signature to determine their role in the drafting of the bill is an impossible task.<sup>82</sup>

Furthermore, since there is no rule restricting the number of “presenters” or sponsors to a

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<sup>80</sup> The bill can be found in the *Gaceta Parlamentaria: De reformas y adiciones a los artículos 51, 65, 66, 71, 89 y 93 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, *Gaceta Parlamentaria*, número 425, miércoles 12 de enero de 2000. (578).

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Gerardo Ramírez Vidal, Mexico City, October 28, 2011.

<sup>82</sup> And, assuming deputies are truthful about the extent of their involvement in a particular bill may be highly dubious.

bill, it is unclear how to code the participation of each legislator who was part of the bill. The strategy I decided to employ here is to code every signature attached to each bill as equal, and in the multivariate analysis, I control for the number of bills a legislator presented. Since legislators who sign a bill prior to its introduction can reasonably claim credit for its existence, and the drafting of bills often involves the help of staff members, so that even single-authored bills may not truly be authored by the legislator presenting them, coding each signature on a bill is a reasonable strategy to get at the bill sponsorship activity of Mexican legislators.

Mexican legislators also seem to have realized the ambiguity of the situation and their ability to claim credit for legislation that has multiple signatures. For example, during the LVII Legislature (1997-2000), about 52% of all bills introduced were single-authored bills, and almost 15% of bills had more than 10 signatures. By the LX Legislature (2006-09), 76% of all bills introduced were single-authored bills, 14.6% of bills had 2-4 signatures, and only about 5% of bills had more than 10 signatures. In addition, the percentage of deputies who did not present a bill on the floor has dropped drastically over time, while the percentage of deputies who did not sign any bill has remained relatively constant. During the LVII Legislature, over 55% of legislators did not present a bill, while this figure dropped to under 15% in the LX Legislature. However, during the LVII Legislature, only 2.7% of legislators did not sign any bill, compared to 3% in the LX Legislature. These figures suggest an increasing tendency among Mexican legislators to adapt their behavior to the existing ambiguous rules on bill sponsorship to claim credit for their work in the Chamber.

Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, I coded the number of times a legislator signed (i.e. sponsored) a bill. This count variable serves as the measure of bill sponsorship used here, and is the first dependent variable.<sup>83</sup>

The second dependent variable used here is a dichotomous variable on whether or not a legislator who served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1997-2009 sought future legislative office, either as a senator or state legislator, immediately after their term in the Chamber. The data on future career paths was collected from candidate lists at the state and federal level, newspapers, published biographies of Mexican politicians, and any available CVs of each legislator, if they are still in public office.<sup>84</sup> Due to the centralized nature of candidate selection in Mexico, not all legislators were successful at winning a spot on the ballot. Therefore, I had to rely on additional information besides official candidate lists to determine if federal deputies publicly attempted to pursue future legislative office. Therefore, the dependent variable reflects any available evidence on whether or not a legislator in my database tried to gain a future legislative seat, regardless if they made it onto the ballot or won the seat. More details on the future career path data are available in Chapter 4.

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<sup>83</sup> Bill sponsorship data is available through the official organs of the Chamber of Deputies, the *Gaceta Parlamentaria* and the *Diario de los Debates*. Information on bill sponsorship can also be found through the Sistema de Información Legislativa run by the Secretaría de Gobernación. I primarily relied on the *Gaceta Parlamentaria* for its ease of use, the systematic formatting of the necessary information which allowed me to code the data into a useable format, and because the *Gaceta* also includes information on the bill's trajectory through the legislative process. On very few occasions, there were noticeable errors in the *Gaceta*, and so I turned to the *Diario de los Debates* to check the information.

<sup>84</sup> Candidate lists for state level office were obtained through the state-level electoral institutes, either on their websites or through freedom of information requests. For information on candidates aspiring to a candidacy, I relied primarily on newspaper archives of *El Universal*, *La Jornada* (including regional editions), *Reforma*, *Proceso*, *Excelsior*, *Milenio*, as well as numerous other local papers.

#### 6.4.1 Independent variables

Background information on the legislators who served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1997-2009 was available through the *Sistema de Información Legislativa* run by the *Secretaría de Gobernación*.<sup>85</sup> I coded the gender of each legislator, 1 if they were female, 0 if they were male. I expect female legislators to sponsor more bills than males. I also expect female legislators to be more likely than males to pursue future legislative office. Due to widespread gender discrimination in Mexico, female politicians have a reduced set of opportunities. Very few women win mayoral or gubernatorial office, and in general, do much better when elected through proportional representation or seek an appointed office. Since all state legislatures and the Senate include proportional representation seats, I expect more women to try and pursue legislative careers.

Education is coded on an 8-point scale, from primary education to at least some doctoral studies. I expect higher levels of education to be positively related to the number of bills sponsored. I have no expectations for education regarding its effect on future legislative office, but include it as a control. I also include age (in years) in the ambition model as a control. I expect older legislators to be more likely to retire than seek another legislative office, and therefore expect a negative relationship between age and future legislative office.

I code the previous legislative experience of federal deputies as a series of dummy variables. Each legislator is coded 1 if they have previous experience as a state legislator, senator, or federal deputy, and 0 if they do not. Very few legislators have served more

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<sup>85</sup> Additional background information was collected from a variety of sources when the SIL was incomplete. See Chapter 3.

than one prior term in any of these offices, and therefore I do not code years of service. I expect legislators with prior legislative experience to sponsor more bills, although as I mentioned above, there may be no relationship due to the lack of continuity in legislative life for many federal deputies. I also include previous legislative experience in the ambition model, although the expectations are ambiguous. On the one hand, current legislators who have previous legislative experience may represent a subset of politicians who desire a legislative career and as a result, be more likely to pursue future legislative office. However, current legislators with previous legislative experience may also be more seasoned and well-known politicians who desire a more prestigious office after leaving the chamber, such as mayor, governor, cabinet member or national party leader. If that is the case, then, previous experience may have a negative influence on pursuing future legislative office. Both potential explanations may also be partially true for different groups of legislators, thus leading to no statistically significant relationship between previous legislative experience and the pursuit of future legislative office.

Besides a legislator's background, I also include a number of independent variables to capture their institutional position within the Chamber. Separate variables are included for deputies that are committee secretaries, committee chairs, and party leaders (caucus leader or Speaker).<sup>86</sup> Legislators are coded 1 if they hold one of these positions, 0 otherwise. I expect legislative leaders to sponsor more bills than backbenchers. I include these measures in the future legislative office model as controls, but have no directional expectations. Leaders have the skills and may desire future legislative office, but may

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<sup>86</sup> A party leader is considered any legislator who served as caucus leader (*coordinador parlamentario*) or Speaker (*presidente de la Mesa Directiva*).

also seek more prominent leadership or sub-national executive positions after leaving office.

Deputies elected through proportional representation are coded 1, and 0 if they were elected in a single-member district. I expect PR legislators to sponsor more bills and be more likely to pursue future legislative office.

To capture gubernatorial influence, I measure the partisan congruence between a deputy and their home state governor at the beginning of the legislative term for the bill sponsorship model, and at the end of the term for the ambition model. I expect partisan congruence between deputies and governors to lead to higher rates of bill sponsorship, but a lower probability of pursuing future legislative office. In the bill sponsorship model, I also include a measure that captures whether or not a governor from a deputy's home state left office prior to the end of the legislative term. I expect gubernatorial switches to lead to lower rates of bill sponsorship.

Additionally, in the bill sponsorship model I include a count of the number of committees a legislator served on throughout their term. According to internal rules, a legislator can only sit on three standing committees at any one time. However, there are a large number of special committees and sub-committees that exist for only a single term, or for a partial term, and these committees do not fall under the three committee limitation. Rotation on committees is also high within the Chamber of Deputies, and therefore, even with the limit on serving on three standing committees, many legislators end up serving on four or five different ordinary committees plus a variable number of special committees. The count of the number of committees includes the total number of any type of committee a legislator served on throughout their three-year term, regardless

of how long they served on any one committee. I expect legislators who serve on more committees to sponsor more bills, given the greater opportunities they have to participate in a wider variety of legislative business.

I include a number of dummy variables to capture partisanship, with the PRI as the left out category. I expect opposition parties to sponsor more bills than presidential parties. The PRI held the presidency during the 1997-2000 period, while the PAN held the presidency from 2000-2009. I have no expectations for the party variables in the ambition model, but include them as controls.

I also include fixed effects for legislative term in the bill sponsorship model to account for the increasing levels of bill sponsorship activity over time, as shown in Chapter 3. In the ambition model I include a dummy variable for legislators leaving office during a mid-term election (left office in 2003 or 2009), since these individuals can only seek state legislative office, rather than those leaving during a general election who can seek a seat in the Senate or state legislative office. Due to the reduced number of opportunities, I expect deputies leaving during a mid-term election to be less likely to seek future legislative office.

The dependent variable in the bill sponsorship model, the number of bills sponsored, is included as an independent variable in the ambition model. I expect legislators who sponsor more bills to be more likely to pursue a future legislative position.

Finally, in the bill sponsorship model I include the natural log of the number of days in office served by each individual deputy. Deputies who serve only a short time are

unlikely to participate very much in the legislative process compared to those who have served most or all of their term.<sup>87</sup>

I also make a few methodological decisions that are important to mention before proceeding. First, in all the subsequent results, I limit my analysis to principal (*propietario*) legislators, excluding any alternates (*suplentes*) that are in my dataset. Many alternates enter legislative office for a very short time, and are much less experienced candidates than the primary legislators originally elected to office. Alternates sponsor many fewer bills than principals, and also are much less likely to seek future legislative office (or any elected office for that matter). I am primarily interested in the behavior of those individuals actually elected to office and who served most of their term, and exclude alternates from the analysis to avoid any bias in the results. Second, in the bill sponsorship models, I exclude the Mexican Ecological Green Party (PVEM) from the analysis for a few reasons. First, they are an extreme outlier in terms of number of bills sponsored during the first three legislative terms studied here compared to the other parties.<sup>88</sup> Second, for nearly all of the LVII and LVIII Legislatures, and part of the LIX

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<sup>87</sup> All terms in office run from September 1<sup>st</sup> of the election year, to August 31<sup>st</sup> of the third year of their term. The number of days in office was calculated by collecting all the leaves of absence (*solicitudes de licencia*) recorded in the *Diario de los Debates* and the *Sistema de Información Legislativa* and subtracting any days in which the deputy was absent. For the LX Legislature, nearly 32 percent of principal (*propietario*) legislators did not serve their entire term. I use the natural log rather than a count of the number of days since I expect little difference between deputies who serve the entire term and those who took off a few weeks, but much larger differences among deputies at the lower end of the spectrum.

<sup>88</sup> Mean number of bills sponsored by PVEM members: LVII – 49 bills for PVEM versus 7 bills for other deputies; LVIII - 71 bills for PVEM members versus 13 bills for other deputies; LIX – 145 bills for PVEM members versus 12 bills for other deputies; LX – 17 bills for PVEM members versus 14 bills for other deputies. The decision to exclude the PVEM was also suggested to me by several scholars in Mexico familiar with behavior in the Chamber of Deputies.



Legislature, all bills presented by the PVEM were presented by the entire party and thus, there is little variation among individual PVEM members for the first three legislatures. Some of the other minor parties engage in similar behavior, but since they are not such extreme outliers, I decide to control for them in the model, rather than exclude them like the PVEM.

## **6.5 Results**

I start by examining levels of bill sponsorship in the Chamber of Deputies and some simple bivariate relationships between independent variables of interest and sponsorship in Table 6.1. The average number of bills sponsored by individual legislators has increased over time, although the greatest increase was between the LVII Legislature and the LVIII Legislature, from about 7 to 13 bills. There is also some initial support for several of the hypotheses regarding bill sponsorship. On average, female legislators sponsor 3.5 more bills than men, and PR legislators sponsor about 3 more bills than SMD legislators. Legislative experience seems to have little relationship to the number of bills sponsored, although legislators with previous experience in the Chamber of Deputies sponsor about 1 more bill than legislators without this experience.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Comparing 12.7 to the overall mean of 11.6.

**Table 6.1: Bill sponsorship in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009**

Mean # of bills sponsored	
<i>Legislative Term</i>	
LVII	7.2
LVIII	13.4
LIX	11.9
LX	13.9
Overall	11.6
<i>Gender</i>	
Male	10.9
Female	14.4*
<i>Electoral System</i>	
SMD	10.5
PR	13.3*
<i>Experience<sup>1</sup></i>	
Previous state legislator	12.0
Previous federal legislator	12.7*
Previous senator	10.4

\*Significantly different at the  $p < .05$  level according to a two-tailed t-test. 1: Means are compared against legislators without this experience. PVEM and alternates excluded.

Table 6.2 presents two negative binomial regressions predicting the number of bills sponsored by individual deputies. Model 2 includes the number of bills presented as a control to determine the robustness of the results found in Model 1. While there is some difference in the results, namely a reduction in the size of the coefficients for education, the leadership variables and previous experience, the relationships are largely similar and therefore, I rely on the results of Model 1 to discuss the magnitude of the effects of the various independent variables.

**Table 6.2: Negative binomial regression explaining sponsorship in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	coefficient	s.e.	sig.	coefficient	s.e.	sig.
Proportional representation	0.07	0.03	**	0.06	0.03	**
Female	0.23	0.04	**	0.21	0.03	**
Education (8-point)	0.06	0.01	**	0.03	0.01	**
Committee chair	0.09	0.05	**	0.05	0.04	
Committee secretary	0.11	0.03	**	0.08	0.02	**
Party leader	0.50	0.09	**	0.28	0.07	**
# of committees	0.09	0.01	**	0.04	0.01	**
Previous state legislator	0.03	0.03		-0.01	0.02	
Previous federal legislator	0.05	0.04		0.06	0.03	*
Previous senator	-0.22	0.07	**	-0.13	0.06	**
PAN	-0.14	0.04	**	-0.11	0.03	**
PRD	0.31	0.04	**	0.23	0.03	**
PT	0.81	0.10	**	0.90	0.08	**
Other minor parties	0.48	0.09	**	0.11	0.07	
LVIII Legislature	0.60	0.04	**	0.54	0.04	**
LIX Legislature	0.42	0.04	**	0.16	0.04	**
LX Legislature	0.39	0.04	**	0.16	0.04	**
# of days in office (log)	0.93	0.07	**	0.81	0.06	**
Partisan congruence w/governor	-0.02	0.03		-0.01	0.03	
Gubernatorial switch	-0.28	0.03	**	-0.20	0.03	**
Total # of bills presented				0.06	0.00	**
Constant	-5.19	0.51	**	-4.09	0.45	**
alpha	0.26	0.01		0.14	0.01	
LR chi-square		1031.71**			1723.44**	
Log likelihood		-5994.13			-5658.27	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.08			0.13	
N		1905			1905	

DV: Total number of bills sponsored. Alternates and PVEM excluded from the model. \*\*p<.05 level; \*p<.10 level.

In general, I find support for nearly all of my hypotheses regarding bill sponsorship. PR and female legislators sponsor significantly more bills than SMD and male legislators. Legislators with higher levels of education also sponsor significantly more bills. Possessing a leadership position, such as committee chair, committee secretary, or party leader, also has a significant and positive effect on the number of bills sponsored. And, the more committees a legislator serves on, the more bills they sponsor.

Previous legislative experience for the most part has no influence in bill sponsorship, but I do find an odd and negative relationship between previous senate experience and number of bills sponsored. It is possible federal deputies who have previously been senators are trying to use their seat as a jumping off point to higher office, such as governor or mayor of a large city, and therefore spend more of their time campaigning or providing constituency service instead of in the Chamber. However, this is currently speculation and more research needs to be done to understand this particular relationship.<sup>90</sup> I find that opposition parties, namely the PRD, PT, and other minor parties<sup>91</sup> sponsor significantly more bills than the PRI, while the PAN sponsors fewer bills than the PRI. The left parties, PRD and PT, also sponsor significantly more bills than the PAN.<sup>92</sup> Finally, there is some evidence of gubernatorial influence on sponsorship behavior. Partisan congruence seems to have little effect, while a gubernatorial switch in a deputy's home state leads to lower rates of bill sponsorship among deputies.

In order to determine the magnitude of the effects found in Model 1 of Table 6.2, I use CLARIFY (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) to generate some expected values of the number of bills sponsored while holding other variables at their median or mode. Since it is unclear what the median party of legislature is, I present results for each of the three major parties in Mexico, the PAN, PRI, and PRD for three different legislative sessions. The results are displayed in Table 6.3. First, the effect of electoral rules is fairly

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<sup>90</sup> It is also possible most deputies with previous Senate experience are from the PRI, and previously served in the authoritarian period, which would not provide much relevant experience in drafting bills or instilled a different legislative culture among these particular individuals.

<sup>91</sup> PASC, PAS, PSN, PANAL, Convergencia, and independents

<sup>92</sup> Testing for the equality of coefficients, I found PT sponsors significantly more than PRD, and both sponsor significantly more than PAN or PRI.

modest, with the median PR legislator sponsoring anywhere from 0.8 to 1 more bills than the median SMD legislator, depending on party and term. While the effect is small, it is not particularly surprising given that many of the other independent variables are related to mode of election. For example, female legislators, legislative leaders, legislators with previous legislative experience, and legislators from minor parties are all much more likely to be elected through proportional representation (Kerevel 2010; Kerevel and Atkeson 2011). While the substantive impact of electoral rules is fairly small, it is surprising they have any influence at all after including these other independent variables.

**Table 6.3: Predicted effect of selected variables on the number of bills sponsored from Model 1 of Table 6.2**

	Expected # of bills sponsored					
	Median PAN		Median PRI		Median PRD	
	Legislator, LVIII		Legislator, LIX		Legislator, LX	
	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Mode of election (SMD=0, PR=1)	12.1	12.9	11.2	12.0	15.3	16.3
Gender (Male=0, Female=1)	12.1	15.2	11.2	14.1	15.3	19.2
Education (8-point)	9.1	13.6	8.4	12.6	11.4	17.2
Committee chair=1	12.1	13.3	11.2	12.3	15.3	16.8
Committee secretary=1	12.1	13.6	11.2	12.6	15.3	17.2
Party leader=1	12.1	20.1	11.2	18.6	15.3	25.4
# of committees	8.4	32.9	7.8	30.4	10.7	41.5
Previous senator (no=0, yes=1)	12.1	9.8	11.2	9.1	15.3	12.4
Gubernatorial Switch (no=0, yes=1)	12.1	9.2	11.2	8.5	15.3	11.6

The median legislator is male, elected in a single-member district, has a college degree, has no previous legislative experience, served on 4 different committees, and has no leadership position. Values were generated using CLARIFY, holding variables at their median or mode, selecting the party and term, and varying the relevant variables from their minimum to maximum values (or from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables)

Gender has a much stronger effect than mode of election, with the median female legislator sponsoring about 3-4 more bills than the median male legislator. These results confirm what was found in Table 6.1. Education also has a fairly strong influence on bill

sponsorship behavior, with legislators with some doctoral studies sponsoring about 4-6 more bills than deputies with only a primary education.

Institutional position has varying effects. Individuals who are committee chairs or secretaries only sponsor about 1-2 more bills than the median backbencher, while being a party leader has a much stronger effect. Party leaders sponsor about 7-10 more bills than the median backbencher. Maybe somewhat unsurprisingly, the number of committees a legislator sits on has the strongest effect on the number of bills sponsored, with an increase of anywhere from 23-31 more bills sponsored as one moves from the minimum number of committees (0) to the maximum (15).<sup>93</sup>

Finally, the median legislator with senate experience sponsors about 2-3 fewer bills than the median legislator without this experience, and deputies from states where the governor leaves office before the end of the legislative term sponsor around 3-4 fewer bills than legislators from states where the governor outlasts the legislative term.

Do legislators use bill sponsorship as a tool to pursue future legislative careers? Table 6.4 examines this question in more depth through a logistic regression predicting whether or not a legislator attempted to pursue future legislative office. Table 6.5 examines the substantive effects of the model.

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<sup>93</sup> Legislators who serve on 0 committees either left office very quickly after being elected, or spent much of their time on the Mesa Directiva (Board of Directors of the Chamber of Deputies). While legislators serve on the Mesa Directiva, they cannot simultaneously serve on a committee.

**Table 6.4: Influence of bill sponsorship on future ambition for legislative office, Mexican Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009**

Model 1			
	coefficient	s.e.	sig.
Total # of bills sponsored	0.01	0.00	**
Proportional representation	0.04	0.12	
Female	0.32	0.14	**
Age (in years)	-0.02	0.01	**
Education (8-point)	0.05	0.05	
Committee chair	0.22	0.18	
Committee secretary	-0.12	0.12	
Party leader	0.13	0.35	
Previous state legislator	0.06	0.12	
Previous federal legislator	0.17	0.16	
Previous senator	-0.78	0.34	**
PAN	-0.13	0.14	
PRD	-0.63	0.17	**
PVEM	0.33	0.42	
PT	0.06	0.40	
Other minor parties	-0.45	0.39	
Mid-term election	-0.79	0.11	**
Partisan congruence w/governor	-0.33	0.12	**
Constant	-0.21	0.46	
LR chi-square	120.91	**	
Log likelihood	-1026.38		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.06		
N	1953		

Logistic regression. DV: Immediately sought or obtained a state legislative or senate seat after leaving office. Alternates excluded from the model. \*\*p<.05 level; \*p<.10 level

**Table 6.5: The influence of selected variables on the probability of seeking future legislative office for the median legislator based on Table 6.4**

	Predicted Probability of Seeking Future Legislative Office	
	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
# of bills sponsored (min=0, max=31)	0.15	0.18
Gender (Male=0, Female=1)	0.16	0.20
Age (min=21, max=95)	0.22	0.08
PRD (not member=0, member=1)	0.16	0.09
Previous Senator (no=0, yes=1)	0.16	0.08
Partisan congruence with governor (no=0, yes=1)	0.21	0.16
Mid-term election (no=0, yes=1)	0.29	0.16

Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY. All variables were set to their median or mode, and selected variables then varied from their minimum to maximum values (or from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables). For the bill sponsorship variable, I used the 95th percentile value (i.e. 31) for the maximum, rather than the actual maximum of 295, which is an extreme outlier.

I find that the number of bills sponsored has a positive effect on the probability of seeking future legislative office, although the effect is somewhat modest. As the median deputy moves from sponsoring no bills to sponsoring 31 bills, they are 3 percent more likely to seek a future legislative post. Contrary to my hypothesis, I find no significant relationship between mode of election and the pursuit of future legislative office, although the coefficient is positive and in the expected direction.

Several of the other variables in the model do have a somewhat stronger effect on the probability of pursuing legislative office. Female legislators have 4 percent greater probability of pursuing a legislative career compared to their male colleagues. Age has a



strong effect, with younger legislators much more likely to pursue another legislative office compared to older deputies. In general, party has little impact on the pursuit of legislative careers, although PRD members are much less likely to pursue a future legislative office.<sup>94</sup> Previous senators are also much less likely to pursue a future legislative office, again suggesting that individuals with senate experience may be seeking a more prestigious sub-national executive position or other high office at the national level. Partisan congruence with one's home state governor reduces the probability of pursuing future legislative office by 5 percent, suggesting that these deputies may be more interested in securing a state-level appointment as found in Chapter 4. Finally, the strongest effect on pursuing a legislative career is temporal. Legislators who leave office during a mid-term election only have a 16 percent probability of pursuing a future legislative office, compared to a 29 percent probability for legislators leaving during a general election. The magnitude of this effect is not surprising, given that in a mid-term election, legislators do not have the opportunity to compete for a Senate seat and thus, their available opportunities are substantially reduced.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

The results of this chapter suggest that Mexican federal deputies are strategic actors that take into account the opportunities available to them to pursue their future career goals. In terms of explaining bill sponsorship activity in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, institutional position seems to matter most. Sitting on more committees and serving as a party leader have strong effects on the opportunities legislators have to sponsor bills. In addition, gender and education also have fairly strong and independent

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<sup>94</sup> This finding may be related to internal party rules, but I need to examine these rules more to explain this finding.

effects. While I hypothesized that mode of election would have an effect on levels of bill sponsorship, and the bivariate results provide some support for this idea, the multivariate results suggest only a more modest relationship.

I also found that legislators who sponsor more bills are more likely to pursue a future legislative position. However, there are also a number of individual factors that matter, such as age and gender, as well as the structure of opportunities available to a legislator upon leaving office.

## **Chapter 7. Party Loyalty and Disloyalty in the Mexican Party System**

Why do ambitious politicians join political parties? A large literature has developed to answer this question, suggesting that political parties are instrumental in the pursuit of goals among ambitious political actors (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Aldrich 1995). Whether politicians are primarily seeking office, votes, policy, influence, or government resources, parties aid politicians in obtaining their goals.

However, in many cases it is difficult to determine empirically why politicians join parties, why they join the parties that they do, and which goals predominate in their affiliation decisions. One reason the answer to this question is difficult is that observing the decision to affiliate to a particular political party is extremely rare. A number of scholars have tried to address this issue through studies of party switching, as observing a politician switch parties provides a number of insights into the ‘why parties?’ question (Aldrich 1995; Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2009a), the defining characteristics of a given party system, and the goals of political actors.

Party switching studies in the United States suggest that party switching will be most common in periods of partisan realignment, and that during other periods where the party system is stable, incumbency is a large deterrent against switching to another political party due to the potential electoral costs of switching (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Canon and Sousa 1992; Grose and Yoshikawa 2003). Since partisan realignments have been rare in the United States, party switching has also consequently been quite rare (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Nokken 2000; Nokken and Poole 2004).

Outside of studies of the United States, nearly all comparative studies of party switching focus on cases where party switching is extremely high, personalistic politics

predominate, mass partisanship is low, and/or the party system is undergoing major realignment (Desposato and Scheiner 2008; Mershon and Shvetsova 2008; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames 2007; Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad 2005).<sup>95</sup> What is missing from the debate is an examination of party switching in cases where parties are programmatic, mass partisanship is relatively high, and the party system is relatively stable.

Theoretical studies of party switching have suggested that in institutionalized party systems, the frequency of party switching should be very low (Desposato 2006; Kreuzer and Pettai 2009). Only in rare instances in institutionalized party systems should one observe politicians “hopping” from one major party to another, or from a major party to a minor party (Kreuzer and Pettai 2009, 279-81). However, the Mexican case presents somewhat of a puzzle among institutionalized party systems, primarily because these types of switches are relatively common, as I demonstrate below, and are not limited to the transitional period before 2000.

Furthermore, most studies of party switching focus on just a few legislative terms and ignore the extra-parliamentary political careers of politicians, even though most studies of party switching recognize the primary theoretical importance of political careers and ambition to decisions to switch (Canon and Sousa 1992; Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2008).<sup>96</sup> Ignoring extra-parliamentary careers is likely to bias conclusions about the motivations and consequences of party switching especially across

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<sup>95</sup> See Heller and Mershon (2008; 2009b, 11-13) for some comparative data on party switching.

<sup>96</sup> See Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) for the sole example of which I am aware that examines party switching outside of switches within a legislative term.

Latin American countries where parliamentary careers are often very short (Martínez Rosón 2008).

In this chapter, I argue that the ban on consecutive reelection across the Mexican political system provides a unique opportunity to study party switching in an institutionalized and stable party system, primarily because after every term of office, Mexican political actors must decide with which party to affiliate to continue their careers. The lack of incumbency creates a situation whereby all competitors for political office are challengers, and also dramatically increases the number of potential competitors. I further elaborate the theory of political ambition developed in Chapter 2, identifying party switching as a rational strategy for career advancement. I then identify a number of empirical implications from the theory, examining the frequency and motivations for party switching among Mexican federal deputies. This chapter also fills a gap within the party switching literature by examining a country with a stable party system and strong, highly disciplined and programmatic political parties (Carey 2003; Klesner 2005; Rosas 2005; Samuels 2006), and by examining switching throughout the political careers of Mexican federal deputies, rather than focusing solely on switching within a legislature.

In the rest of the chapter, I review and expand upon the theory of political ambition without reelection developed in Chapter 2, identifying testable implications from the theory. I then provide some discussion of the Mexican party system, situating the party switching in context. Next, I discuss the data and methodology, and then present empirical results.

## 7.1 Party affiliation and party switching in the pursuit of political ambition

When a potential candidate decides to seek office, they must decide with which party to affiliate to run for said office. The Aldrich and Bianco (1992) calculus of party affiliation is largely the same as the Black-Rohde “calculus of candidacy” model (Black 1972; Rohde 1979), in which a potential candidate would seek office if the probability of winning the office times the benefits of holding office was greater than the costs of obtaining office. In the Aldrich and Bianco model, the expected utility of running under party  $i$  is equal to the probability of winning under party  $i$  times the utility of holding office under party  $i$ , minus the costs of running for office.

$$EU(A_i) = P_i * U(O_i) - C$$

A political actor will run under party  $i$  over some other party  $k$ , if and only if the expected utility of running under party  $i$  is greater than zero, and is greater than the expected utility of running under party  $k$ .

$$EU(A_i) > 0$$

$$EU(A_i) > EU(A_k)$$

Contextually, an ambitious actor needs to take into account the competitive environment in which they seek to pursue future office (Rohde 1979), as the electoral environment is going to influence the probability of winning under each possible party label, and the utility of holding office under each potential party. In political systems where reelection is the norm, incumbency is a major factor that will influence the probability of winning and the costs of running for potential challengers. Potential candidates are much less likely to try and compete against an incumbent when the

probability of winning is typically low, especially against incumbents who share the same party label (Jacobson 1989; Cox and Katz 1996; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006). Where elections are more competitive, we are likely to see greater numbers of potential challengers competing against incumbents. However, the popularity, strength, and resources of the incumbent (or incumbent party) are likely to be a factor in the decision to enter a race. Thus, for potential candidates in a system with reelection, incumbency is a potentially strong deterrent to running for a particular office, as it reduces the probability of winning, and likely also increases the costs of running.

Incumbents seeking reelection are also much less likely to switch political parties, as they are likely to face substantial costs trying to win ballot access in the new party, and also face electoral costs in terms of lost votes in the general election since their reputation and past electoral support is tied to a specific political party (Grose and Yoshinaka 2003; Heller and Mershon 2009c). Once a politician reaches office under a party label in a stable party system, if they decide to pursue reelection, the costs of switching to a new party are likely to outweigh the benefits absent some exogenous shock (Canon and Sousa 1992).

However, in a system without consecutive reelection, incumbency does not exist. Does this mean that in a system without reelection it will be easier for current officeholders to run for another elected office since there are never any incumbents? Not necessarily. The challenge in a system without reelection is that there are no candidates who remain in their current office, increasing the number of potential competitors for future office. For any given election year, the number of potential competitors for a single

office is likely to be extremely large, since no officeholders have the luxury of keeping the same office and waiting for a more favorable electoral environment to try their luck.

Therefore, without reelection, the potential and actual number of competitors for any given position is likely to be extremely large due to the systematic need for ambitious political actors to move on from their current position every three to six years. The highly competitive battle for ballot access in a context without incumbency opens up the possibility to ambitious political actors to constantly reevaluate their party affiliation. Potential candidates must take into account who their potential competitors are within their current party as well as alternative parties for any given position, as this environment will influence their probability of obtaining ballot access and winning future office. If this is the case, then one should observe more politicians switching parties at specific points throughout their career, rather than others, related to specific points in time when politicians transition from one position to another (Mershon and Shvetsova 2008).

For currently sitting legislators, most switches should occur near the end of their three-year term, specifically in the last legislative session prior to new federal elections, compared to other times during the term. The reason is that throughout the legislative term, an individual deputy will likely engage in strategic behavior that will be beneficial to their future careers, and in a strong party system, that would likely involve serving party interests throughout the term. However, when the end of the term nears and future elections are on the horizon, an ambitious actor may realize their current party is not going to serve their immediate career interests, and then decide to reevaluate their party



affiliation. For similar reasons, one should also observe more legislators switching parties before and after their term in office, rather than during their legislative service.

H<sub>1</sub>: More legislators will switch during the final legislative session of their 3<sup>rd</sup> year in office compared to other points in the legislative cycle.

H<sub>2</sub>: Legislators will be more likely to have switched prior to entering office or more likely to switch after leaving office, rather than switch during their term.

The nature of candidate selection in Mexico, combined with a prohibition on consecutive reelection is likely to lead to conflicts between the individual goals of ambitious politicians and the collective goals of parties who want to win elections (Carey 1996; FriedenberG 2010). On the one hand, individual actors should demonstrate a high degree of loyalty to their political parties, since it is the party who largely determines future ballot access, or access to other appointed positions in public office. Political party organizations should be fairly strong, and individual members should display a high degree of loyalty to their parties. However, an ambitious actor may have individual goals that occasionally conflict with party goals. For example, a federal legislator from party A may wish to run for the mayor's seat of an important city after their term is over. Party leaders in party A at the city, state, and national level may have one or several candidates in mind they think can win the mayoral election, and this ambitious federal legislator may not be on the list of potential candidates. However, the federal legislator may have been working throughout their term and their larger political career to build up a constituency and name recognition in this city, and may feel they have a good chance to win the mayoral election, regardless of the party label they run under. Leaders in Party A now face a potentially difficult choice. They feel they have a better candidate that is more

likely to win the mayor's seat, but if they ignore the legislator also competing for the seat, some weaker party B may court the legislator to run under their party label. If the legislator leaves Party A for Party B, Party A risks a potential split in their own ranks, which may negatively influence them in the election. However, if the other candidate for party A is ignored in favor of the legislator, this other candidate also faces the option of switching to Party B or some other political party. In a multi-party system, even holding open primaries is unlikely to address this conundrum faced by party A, since the losers of a primary election can still leave Party A for Party B after the primary is over.<sup>97</sup> If conflicts over ballot access are what is driving decisions to switch, then one should observe politicians switching more often to obtain ballot access under a different party, rather than over policy, ideological or factional conflicts within parties, or to obtain greater influence within the legislature.

H<sub>3</sub>: Politicians will be more likely to switch to obtain ballot access, rather than over differences in policy, ideological conflicts, or intra-party factional conflicts, or to obtain greater parliamentary influence.

Ambitious politicians in this situation are likely to desire most a spot on the ballot. Without a spot on the ballot, the probability of winning the election is zero. However, switching from Party A to Party B also entails a number of high costs. First, the party label is likely to influence the probability of winning. Even if a potential candidate is popular, they may face a much greater chance of winning the election if they ran with Party A than if they ran with Party B. Second, since the political parties themselves prize loyalty among their members, a potential candidate who has been

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<sup>97</sup> This is true assuming that primaries are run by the parties and not run by the state or all held on the same day, which is the case in Mexico.

developing a political career with party A is likely to lose much of their political capital if they switch parties. Other members of Party B are unlikely to trust the party switcher, and members of Party A will likely hold a grudge against this individual if they ever attempt to return to Party A after switching parties. Even if the party switcher wins the election, they still face a choice at the end of their next term on where to seek a different future office. Since leaders of Party B now have control over the future of this individual's career, they may not trust the individual to work in the party's interest due to the short time they have been a party member, and also face resistance from other members of Party B who have been loyal for much longer. Depending on the particular confluence of factors in any given situation, the party switcher may be successful in developing a new political career with Party B, or may face a shortened political career as leaders in Party B pass this individual over for others. Of course, the individual could continue to switch parties every election. Yet, because party loyalty is valued by all political parties, and excessive switching may turn off voters, it is unlikely that ambitious actors in this particular type of system would pursue a continuous strategy of party switching over multiple elections.

H<sub>4</sub>: Among politicians who have switched parties at least once during their careers, the proportion who have switched only once will be greater than the proportion of those who have switched more than once.

As a result, the costs of switching parties could be extremely high and signal the end of one's political career if the ambitious actor does not make a wise decision. Because of the potentially high costs of switching parties, we should see a high degree of party loyalty where reelection is prohibited since the probability of winning and the

benefits of holding office for a single term are likely to be lower than the long-term costs of switching to obtain ballot access. However, in some cases, an ambitious actor may perceive their probability of winning to be high and the benefits of holding a particular office to be high, outweighing the potentially high costs of switching parties. If party switching is not generally a function over the office-seeking goals of politicians, but rather related to ideological or policy conflicts with a member's current party, then one is likely to observe indiscipline among these legislators prior to a party switch. But if switching is primarily related to office-seeking, there should be no relationship between switching and party discipline.

H<sub>5a</sub>: Legislators who switch parties during office will be as disciplined as other members of the party under which they were elected.

H<sub>5b</sub>: Legislators who switched parties prior to entering office or who switch parties after leaving office will be as disciplined as other members of the party under which they were elected.

Thus, on the surface, the prohibition on reelection and party control over ballot access has two potentially contradictory consequences. While in office, we are likely to see high levels of party loyalty from individual members, as loyalty to one's party is the best way of securing a future office. However, during election periods, we are also likely to see high levels of party disloyalty, or party switching, as conflicts over candidate selection and securing future office become the most critical issue for ambitious actors.

## **7.2 The evolution of the Mexican party system**

For most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mexico can easily be characterized as a hegemonic party system, with the founding of the PRI in 1929 (Greene 2007). Until the 1977

electoral reform which opened up the party system and added 100 proportional representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies, opposition to the PRI was limited to an extremely weak PAN, and two small parties closely tied the PRI, the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). The PARM was formed in 1954 with the support of then president, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, to incorporate disgruntled sectors of the military into the political system. The PPS was formed by influential labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano as a left alternative to the PRI. However, both PARM and PPS supported PRI candidates for President until 1988, and had little outside support base. Except for a handful of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, PARM and PPS had little presence in the Mexican political landscape and largely served the PRI regime's goals of maintaining a facade of democratic competition (Mabry 1974; Smith 1979).

The political opening in 1977 saw a surge in the number of small left parties that began to compete for political office. The Mexican Communist Party (PCM), banned in 1929, and again in 1940 after a brief opening under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40), obtained legal registration to participate in the 1979 elections. The opening also saw the founding of a number of other small left parties, including the Socialist Worker's Party (PST), the Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRT), and the Mexican Worker's Party (PMT), among others. During the 1980s, the PCM joined with the PMT to first found the United Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) and then the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) (Flores Andrade 2005; Greene 2007; Rodríguez Araujo 1989).

The run-up to the 1988 elections was a watershed moment in the history of the Mexican party system, as a faction within the PRI, the Democratic Current led by

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, upset over the increasingly rightward turn of the PRI, decided to split from the PRI and run Cárdenas as their presidential candidate for the 1988 elections. Officially, the PARM gave Cárdenas their registration, but a large coalition of minor parties formed in 1988, called the National Democratic Front (FDN), made up of the PARM, the PPS, the PMS, the PST, the Green Party (PV, later PVEM), the Liberal Party (PL), the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction (PFCRN), and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), along with other activists and social movements (Bruhn 1997). The PRT never joined the FDN and instead ran their own candidate, Rosario Ibarra, in the 1988 elections.

As a result of the allegedly fraudulent 1988 elections where the PRI narrowly won, Cárdenas and certain members of the FDN decided to found the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The PRD was largely made up of the former PMS, former members of the PRI, members of the various other minor left parties, and allied unions, activists and social movements. The consolidation of the left into the PRD also saw the disappearance of most of the other minor opposition parties by 2000, as individual members joined one of the now three major parties, and parties like the PPS, the PARM, the PRT, and PFCRN lost their party registration status due to poor electoral performance.

From 1991 onward, the major national competition in the Mexican party system has been between three major parties, PRI, PAN, and PRD, although at the state level, competition is usually restricted to two parties, either between PRI and PAN in the north, or PRI and PRD in the south (Klesner 2005). In addition, a number of other minor parties have managed to maintain a strong enough presence to keep their party registration over

the years, including the Worker's Party (PT), the Convergence Party (PC, or Convergencia)<sup>98</sup>, the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), and since 2006, the New Alliance Party (PANAL) (Cedillo Delgado 2007). In addition to these small parties, there have been a number of attempts to form other parties that have not been able to last much more than one election cycle, including the Nationalist Society Party (PSN), the Social Alliance Party (PAS), the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM), and the Alternative Social Democratic and Peasant Party (PASC, later just Social Democratic Party, or PSD), among others (Flores Andrade 2005).

The fairly consistent competition between three major parties in Mexico has led to a fairly stable and institutionalized party system, with PAN commonly characterized as being on the center-right, PRD on the center-left, and PRI as a centrist party, although ideologically, the major parties are somewhat fluid and function like catch-all parties (Klesner 2005). The other minor parties are somewhat ambiguous in terms of their ideological stances, although at the national level PT is commonly on the left, Convergencia on the center-left, while PVEM and PANAL could be placed anywhere on the right to the center. At the sub-national level, most parties have aligned with each other in various states for gubernatorial elections, suggesting that evidence of ideological coherence of Mexican parties at the national-level masks much unexplored variation in the Mexican states (Reynoso 2010).<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Convergencia changed their name to Movimiento Ciudadano (Citizen Movement) just prior to the 2012 general elections.

<sup>99</sup> For example, PAN and PRD have formed coalitions in a number of states, PVEM has allied with PAN, PRI, and PRD in different elections, and while PT and Convergencia often align with the PRD at the national level, they have aligned with rival parties in various sub-national elections. For some more background, see Reynoso (2010).

This fluidity in the ideological underpinnings of the major parties is also evident in the movement of individual members across parties, regardless of ideological proximity. There are several key historical events in the development of the Mexican party system that can explain certain party switches, although a substantial number of party switches are unrelated to these major fissions. For example, the founding of the PRD was largely related to major divisions in the PRI over policy, ideology and presidential candidate selection (Bruhn 1997) and thus it should be evident that a number of PRD members would have former membership in the PRI. Table 7.1 examines the previous party identification of sitting legislators who have served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1997-2009 and does demonstrate that at least 52 legislators from the PRD during this period were former *PRIistas*.<sup>100</sup> However, just a focus on this historical split that helped spawn the current party system masks a substantial amount of movement across multiple parties. First, a number of legislators elected under the PAN have also been former members of the PRI, and there is also evidence of switching between the PRD and the PAN. Convergencia was formed as a splinter group from the PRI (Reveles Vázquez 2006), and thus it is not surprising to see that many members of this party are also former PRI members.

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<sup>100</sup> 52 is likely understating the extent to which members of the PRD used to be in the PRI, since the data is from official biographies, and candidates often have an incentive to hide former party affiliations. See the discussion of the data collection in the next section for more details.



**Table 7.1: The prior partisan affiliation of sitting legislators, 1997-2009**

<i>Party ID while in office</i>	<i>Previous Party ID</i>					
	PRI	PAN	PRD	PVEM	PT	Other
PRI	-	1				1
PAN	25	-	2	1		5
PRD	52	9	-		3	2
PVEM	7			-		
PT	2		3		-	3
Convergencia	14	1	3			
Other	5					4

N=143. Suplentes excluded from the table. For legislators with more than one previous party ID, I took the most recent affiliation, except for one deputy whose most recent prior affiliation was with the PCD but was previously in the PRI and elected under the PRD. Other category includes PANAL, PASC, PARM, PFCRN, PMP, PMS, PMT, PRT.

Changes in party affiliation among sitting legislators is rare in Mexico, and most switches involve legislators declaring independence rather than affiliating with another party, as can be seen in Table 7.2. However, there is still evidence of ideological fluidity among switches within the Chamber of Deputies, as six PAN deputies during these four legislative terms switched to PRD or PT.

**Table 7.2: Party switching within the Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009**

<i>Party ID when elected to office</i>	<i>New Party ID</i>							
	PRI	PAN	PRD	PVEM	PT	Convergencia	PASC	Independent
PRI	-		3					27
PAN		-	3	2	3			6
PRD	4		-		3	2		4
PVEM	1			-	1			2
PT	1		1		-	1	2	
Convergencia			1			-		
PASC		1					-	

N=68. Suplentes excluded from this table. Deputies who declared themselves independent but then joined another parliamentary group are coded with the group.

Events surrounding the 2006 elections witnessed a number of intra-party disputes that had a major impact on the party system, although these changes had little effect on the stability of the three major parties. The consequence of these events can be seen in Table 7.3, primarily with a major split in the PRI that led to the founding of PANAL, and a split within the PRD that led many members of that party to switch affiliation towards PT and Convergencia.

**Table 7.3: Party switching among federal deputies after they leave office, 1997-2009**

<i>Party ID when elected to office</i>	<i>Future Party ID after leaving office</i>										
	PRI	PAN	PRD	PVEM	PT	Convergencia	PANAL	Ind.	CONV-PT Coalition	PAN-PRD coalition	Other
PRI	-	16	19	2	3	7	28	4	1	2	5
PAN	10	-	3	1		6	2	19	2		3
PRD	7	8	-	4	11	10	3	8	2		9
PVEM			1	-		1	4				2
PT		1	5		-	1		1			4
Convergencia						-	1	1			
PANAL							-	1			
Other					1						

N=219. Suplentes excluded from this table. A future independent either renounced their party, or were expelled. If a future switch was to a coalition with a major party (PRD, PAN, or PRI), it is coded under the major party. If there are multiple switches, I code only the most proximate switch. Other includes PAG, PARM, PAS, PASC, PCD, PFD, PLM, PSD, PUP, PJS.

The split in the PRI that led to the founding of PANAL in 2006 involved a leadership dispute between the President of the PRI and eventual PRI presidential candidate, Roberto Madrazo, and the leader of the national teacher’s union, the National Union of Education Workers, (SNTE), and secretary general of the PRI, Elba Esther Gordillo. In 2003, Gordillo was elected head of the PRI caucus in the Chamber of Deputies, but had a conflict with Madrazo rooted in disagreements over the legislative agenda and over Madrazo’s desire for the presidential nomination. In 2004, this conflict culminated in the removal of Gordillo as party leader (Camp 2010, 84-85; Pacheco Mendez 2009). This removal led Gordillo to resign her position as federal deputy, and to eventually form PANAL to compete in the 2006 elections, throwing their support behind the PAN. For many years, the SNTE was a key component of the PRI party structure and is one of the most powerful unions in Mexico. The teachers were a critical component of the base organizing structures of the PRI, and in exchange for their support, often received key elected and appointed positions at the municipal, state, and federal levels.

While in the 1990s the SNTE officially broke its linkage with the PRI, in practice most structures of the SNTE in the Mexican states continued to work closely with the PRI (Muñoz Armenta 2005). A number of PRI federal deputies elected in 2003 were members of the SNTE and at the end of the legislative session, many of these individuals declared their independence from the PRI and subsequently ran for elected office under PANAL. As is evident in Table 7.3, 28 deputies of the PRI that had served at some point between 1997 to 2009 left the PRI to join PANAL, with most of these individuals coming from the 59<sup>th</sup> Legislature (2003-06).

The PRD loss in the 2006 presidential elections, and the resulting actions of their candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) led to an internal split within the PRD. AMLO's decision to claim fraud, form his own "legitimate government", and occupy downtown Mexico City created a severe ideological split between the more radical factions of the PRD, who supported AMLO, and the more moderate factions, who wanted to move beyond the severe conflict. While AMLO and his supporters never officially left the PRD, and AMLO is again the PRD's candidate for president in 2012, the relationship became strained and many of AMLO's supporters shifted their support to PT and Convergencia. A number of members of the PRD ran under the PT and Convergencia label in the 2009 elections, as is evident in Table 7.3, where 23 former PRD deputies shifted their support to these other minor parties.

However, despite a number of major intra-party schisms, there are still a large number of politicians who have switched from one party to another for reasons distinct from the above conflicts. There is a certain degree of fluidity between PRI and PRD evident in Tables 7.1 and 7.3, as individuals from one party join the other and vice versa

that have little to do with the initial split in the PRI surrounding the 1988 elections. To a somewhat smaller extent, at least among federal deputies, the same pattern exists with PRI and PAN, with members of both parties joining the other for a variety of reasons. What is also evident in Tables 7.1-3 is the role the minor parties play in providing space for disgruntled members of the three major parties. While there is some evidence of movement from minor parties to major parties, most of the movement is from members of PRI, PRD and PAN joining PANAL, PT, Convergencia, and PVEM. In many cases, these movements are related to candidate selection conflicts within the major parties, as I discuss and demonstrate in more detail below.

### **7.3 Data and Methodology**

In order to test the above hypotheses, I rely on two sources of data. The first source comes from data collected on the career paths of Mexican federal deputies who have served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1997 to 2009. These data come from a variety of sources, such as official candidate lists from the federal and state level electoral institutes, official biographies maintained by the Chamber of Deputies and the *Secretaría de Gobernación*, published secondary sources on the biographies of Mexican politicians, national and local newspapers, government websites at the municipal, state, and federal levels, and websites maintained by the political parties and individual politicians. For the entire 1997-2009 period, I have future career path information on 95 percent of principal legislators (*propietarios*), and 73 percent of alternates (*suplentes*), although I limit the subsequent analysis to *propietarios*. More details on the data collection process are available in Appendix III.

From the career path data, I identify three possible periods of switching for each individual legislator: a switch prior to entering office, a switch while in office, and a switch after leaving office. Most data on prior switches come from official biographies and CVs of sitting legislators and thus are likely to understate the extent of prior party switching. To the extent possible, if a legislator held a prior elected office, I investigated to determine under which party they were elected for that prior office, in case the official biography or CV did not state prior party affiliation. Since many members of the PRD were previous members of the PRT, PMT, or PMS prior to the formation of the PRD, I did not code these individuals as switches. I also ignored other slight changes in official party names among many smaller parties over time.

Party switches while in office are the easiest to identify, as this information is available in official biographies maintained by the Chamber of Deputies, in each legislator's voting record, and from official requests to change party affiliation in the *Diario de los Debates*, the official debate record of the Chamber of Deputies. For every legislator that switched while in office, I searched for newspaper articles that explained the switch in order to determine the reason behind the legislator's decision to change party affiliation. Included in the 'switch while in office' category are legislators who switched affiliation after federal elections in July but before taking office on September 1<sup>st</sup>.

Evidence of future party switches come from official candidate lists for state and federal offices, and local and national newspapers. Whenever evidence of a future switch was found in official candidate lists, I searched for newspaper articles about the party switch in order to determine the reasons behind the switch. The larger data collection

process for future career path data also involved extensive searches for information on the future careers of each individual legislator. If any evidence was found that the legislator was expelled from their political party, actively supported another political party in a future election resulting in expulsion from their current party, or renounced their current political party, I also classified these instances as a party switch to independent status. The evidence of future party switches is also likely to understate the extent of party switching, but still provides an illuminating picture into the nature of political careers and party affiliation decisions within the Mexican party system. There is no reason to suspect that any missing data will result in bias in favor or against any of the hypotheses. Appendix V provides a complete listing of every legislator from 1997-2009 who switched at some point in their careers and the direction of the switch.

In addition to the career path and party switching data, I also collected roll-call voting data for each legislative term from the *Gaceta Parlamentaria* to examine party discipline among switchers and non-switchers. Electronic roll calls were not implemented in the Chamber of Deputies until the middle of the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature (1997-2000), and therefore, roll call data from the first legislative term is much more incomplete. There are also some votes that are missing from the electronic record, although there is no reason to suspect the inclusion of these votes would bias the results (Cantú, Desposato and Magar 2012).

From the roll call data, I create ideal points for each individual legislator using the first coordinate of W-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). After generating the ideal points, I create a measure that captures each legislator's distance from their party's median ideal point. Legislators further away from the party's median ideal point (closer

to 1) vote more often against most other co-partisans, while legislators closer to the party's median ideal point (closer to 0) more often vote with their co-partisans.

#### **7.4 Results**

Hypothesis 1 suggests that if legislators primarily switch parties while office, it is to pursue their political career goals, rather than other reasons, such as to increase their influence in the legislature (Yoshinaka 2005) or to escape party discipline (Heller and Mershon 2008). If this is the case, then one should observe more switching at particular points in the legislative cycle, rather than others (Mershon and Shvetsova 2008). In the case of Mexico, I hypothesized that more legislators would switch near the end of their terms, specifically in the last legislative session prior to new federal elections when all legislators would be required to leave office and seek future employment elsewhere. Switching at other points in the legislative cycle may be evidence of policy or ideological disputes between a legislator and their party, an attempt to increase influence over the agenda in the Chamber, or be related to the pursuit of sub-national office in states with staggered elections.

To determine the timing of party switches during each legislative term, I divided each three-year term into six sessions, with one session of each year encompassing the months of August through December, and the other session encompassing the months of January through July. This division closely follows the actual division of when the Chamber of Deputies is in session. The Chamber of Deputies has two ordinary sessions a year, one from September 1<sup>st</sup> to December 15<sup>th</sup>, and another from February 1<sup>st</sup> to April



30<sup>th</sup>.<sup>101</sup> Extraordinary sessions can also be called by the President or Congress in the intervening periods when Congress is not normally in session. The date of each legislator's switch was taken from the *Diario de los Debates*, as all changes in party affiliation are reported by the switching legislator and the leader of the party receiving the legislator. Table 7.4 displays the timing of party switches during each of the four legislative terms.

**Table 7.4: Timing of switch during parliamentary cycle, Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009**

	Legislative session						Total # of switchers
	<i>1st session</i>	<i>2nd session</i>	<i>3rd session</i>	<i>4th session</i>	<i>5th session</i>	<i>6th session</i>	
	August - December	January - July	August - December	January - July	August - December	January - July	
<b>1997-2000 (LVII)</b>	3	0	3	3	3	8	20
% of total switchers	15.0%	0.0%	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%	40.0%	
<b>2000-2003 (LVIII)</b>	1	2	1	2	1	5	12
% of total switchers	8.3%	16.7%	8.3%	16.7%	8.3%	41.7%	
<b>2003-2006 (LIX)</b>	0	1	1	1	2	21	26
% of total switchers	0.0%	3.8%	3.8%	3.8%	7.7%	80.8%	
<b>2006-2009 (LX)</b>	3	1	1	1	0	4	10
% of total switchers	30.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	0.0%	40.0%	

While relatively few deputies do switch parties during their term, I do find that a plurality of legislators wait to switch until their final months in office. For the 57<sup>th</sup>, 58<sup>th</sup>, and 60<sup>th</sup> Legislatures, about 40% of all switches took place during the last legislative session. For the 59<sup>th</sup> Legislature (2003-2006), over 80 percent of switches took place during the final session. This drastic increase in switches in this particular term can almost wholly be explained by PRI deputies tied to the SNTE declaring their independence, with most of them joining PANAL for the 2006 general election.

<sup>101</sup> The session from February 1<sup>st</sup> to April 30<sup>th</sup> used to be much shorter, but was lengthened starting in 2005. Prior to 2005, this session ran from March 15<sup>th</sup> to April 30<sup>th</sup>.

When to switch parties is a critical decision made by all potential switchers, and is not just limited to the parliamentary cycle. If ambitious politicians are primarily concerned about obtaining future office, then evidence of switching should be most apparent prior to entering elected office, rather than during a term. Hypothesis 2 examines this possibility, and suggests that in a system without reelection, most evidence of party switching will take place during campaign periods rather than during the possession of an elected office. In the case of federal deputies, one should observe more legislators who have switched parties in the past or switched parties after leaving the Chamber, compared to switches during the legislative term. Table 7.5 displays the results.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Any evidence of trends in increasing or decreasing levels of party switching across time should be interpreted with extreme caution. Most of the data was collected from late 2010 to early 2012, and includes all available information on switching across an individual's career. For legislators from the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature (1997-2000), there are nearly 12 years in which a former legislator could switch after leaving office, while legislators from the 60<sup>th</sup> Legislature (2006-09), only have about 3 years after their term is up to switch in order to enter the data set. Evidence of this issue can be seen in the table, as 14.9% of deputies from the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature have switched after leaving, compared to 5.6% for deputies from the 60<sup>th</sup> Legislature. These data should not be interpreted to suggest future party switching is declining, only that the number of opportunities to switch is greater for deputies from the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature compared to deputies from the 60<sup>th</sup> Legislature. However, evidence of trends in prior switches is somewhat more reliable, and does suggest that over time, an increasing number of legislators have previous experience in another party different from the one under which they were elected.

**Table 7.5: Percentage of federal deputies that have switched parties during their political career, 1997-2009**

	% switched prior to entering office	% switched while in office	% switched after leaving office	% switched at any time during career	% of deputies who have made two or more switches among all switchers <sup>1</sup>
LVII (1997-2000)	5.6%	4.0%	14.9%	18.8%	22.3%
LVIII (2000-2003)	3.6%	2.4%	11.8%	14.8%	13.5%
LIX (2003-2006)	7.2%	5.2%	13.6%	19.8%	17.2%
LX (2006-2009)	12.2%	2.0%	5.6%	17.6%	10.2%
Total	7.2%	3.4%	11.5%	17.7%	16.1%
# of switchers	143	68	219	355	57
Total sample N	2000	2003	1910	2003	355

Percentages exclude suplentes. 1: These figures do not include switches to Independent, returns to a party of which the deputy was previously a member, or formal changes in party name

What I find in Table 7.5 provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. Overall, about 7 percent of all legislators have switched parties at least once in their past, and nearly 12 percent of deputies across the four legislative terms under study have switched to another party after leaving the Chamber. These figures compare to only about 3 percent of deputies who switched while serving in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, of the total 355 federal deputies for which I have evidence of switching, only 68, or 19 percent, switched while in office, with the remainder switching parties prior to or after serving in the Chamber.

However, not very many deputies switch more than once in their political careers. Since party switching can be extremely costly for individual politicians in a stable party system, multiple switches should be relatively rare, as suggested by Hypothesis 4. Indeed,

I find that among party switchers, only about 16 percent have switched two or more times, and among all deputies, only about 3 percent have done so.<sup>103</sup>

Hypothesis 3 posits that most party switches will be due to conflicts over candidate selection and ballot access, as politicians reevaluate their party affiliation to pursue their political career, rather than other factors, such as intra-party ideological or policy disputes, or related to power within the Chamber. In order to test this hypothesis, I classified each party switch while in office and each future party switch into 1 of 7 categories.<sup>104</sup> Switches were classified as 1) conflicts over ballot access and candidate selection, 2) a legislator demonstrating active support for a candidate of another party, 3) an intra-party split that led a group of legislators to form a new party, or join an existing party, 4) an individual switch due to conflicts over policy, ideology, or a specific vote in the Chamber, 5) a switch related to influence in the legislature, 6) some other reason (see Table 7.6 notes for details), and 7) switches for which I was unable to determine the reason. Table 7.6 displays the results.

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<sup>103</sup>  $57/355 = 16.1$  percent.  $57/2003 = 2.8$  percent.

<sup>104</sup> Reasons behind prior party switches were much more difficult to come by, and therefore I have decided not to include the evidence I do have available for prior switches.

**Table 7.6: Reasons to switch parties, Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009**

	(1) Ballot Access/ candidate selection	(2) Support gubernatorial/ presidential/ other party candidate	(3) Intra- party split	(4) Policy/ Ideology/ Voting	(5) Parliamentary influence	(6) Other reason	(7) Don't know/ unclear	Total # of switchers
<b>1997-2000</b>								
Switch during term	5	2	2	3		1 <sup>a</sup>	7	20
Switch after term	44	4	10		1	2 <sup>a</sup>	9	70
<b>2000-2003</b>								
Switch during term	9						3	12
Switch after term	35	4	11				6	56
<b>2003-2006</b>								
Switch during term	7	1	18					26
Switch after term	34	4	20	1	1	1 <sup>a</sup>	5	66
<b>2006-2009</b>								
Switch during term	3		1	1	2	1 <sup>b</sup>	2	10
Switch after term	19	2	1	2		2 <sup>c</sup>	1	27

A: expelled from PAN for corruption. B: Based on coalition agreement between PRI and PVEM, seat belonged to PVEM, but legislator was a priista and only registered under PVEM to comply with agreement. C: One legislator was previously member of PT but joined PASC while in office to preserve parliamentary representation of PASC. After leaving office, returned to the PT. Another legislator renounced PANAL while he was under investigation for corruption.

Many of these categories overlap to a certain extent, and can be related to the career ambitions of legislators in various ways. For example, categories 1 and 2 are both related to individuals seeking a future office. However to be classified in category 1, I needed evidence that a deputy was competing for an elected office and switched to obtain ballot access. In category 2, a deputy likely switched to throw their support behind another candidate who thought they could provide them with an appointed position after they won the election, rather than compete individually for an elected post. For category 3, most individuals classified in this category are former members of the PRI tied to the SNTE who then left the PRI to join PANAL, or former members of the PRD who supported the more radical wing of the party and joined or ran for office under Convergencia or PT after 2006. In both of these major splits within PRI and PRD, most of the party switchers secured candidacies in the new party, and thus one could make the argument the switches were made to pursue individual career goals, rather than for ideological or political reasons related to the larger split in these major parties. Since it is impossible to really know the personal reasons behind a party switch, and particular switches such as PRI to PANAL, and PRD to Convergencia/PT post-2006 are part of larger intra-party disputes, I decided to classify these switches in category 3 rather than categories 1 or 2.

While party switches over individual votes or ideological issues are rare, they do occur. For the few individuals that were classified in category 4, the switches were related to a particularly controversial vote over the federal budget in 1999, or to disagreements over the PAN-PRD coalitions in sub-national elections in 2010 and 2011. Individuals who were classified in category 5 were known to have switched parties to

maintain the PT's representation in the Senate, and the PASC's representation in the Chamber of Deputies. These switches took place among other left parties in order to ensure these smaller party caucuses maintained their parliamentary rights.

What I find in Table 7.6 is consistent with Hypothesis 3, that most party switches are related to conflicts over candidate selection and ballot access. The evidence that most switches are the result of candidate selection conflicts is strongest among future party switches, while legislators who switch during their term in office tend to switch for a wider variety of reasons. 63 percent of party switching deputies from the 57<sup>th</sup> and 58<sup>th</sup> Legislatures switched because of candidate selection conflicts after leaving office, while 52 percent of party switching deputies from the 59<sup>th</sup> Legislature and 70 percent of deputies from the 60<sup>th</sup> Legislature switched for the same reason. The next most common reason to switch parties, at least for the 57<sup>th</sup> through 59<sup>th</sup> Legislatures, relates to intra-party splits. If one ignores the unclassified party switches for switches that occurred while in office (category 7), it is also evident that a plurality of switches during the 57<sup>th</sup>, 58<sup>th</sup>, and 60<sup>th</sup> Legislatures were the result of candidate selection conflicts. The only exception to this trend is the high number of PRI deputies tied to the SNTE who left the party in the 59<sup>th</sup> Legislature (as seen in category 3 for the 2003-2006 term).

Finally Hypothesis 5 suggests that one should see little differences in party discipline between party switchers and non-switchers since most switches are about career goals, not policy or ideological divisions (as also demonstrated in Table 7.6). In order to test Hypothesis 5, I compared the mean ideal point distance from each individual party's median ideal point between switchers and non-switchers. If party switches were primarily about ideological, policy or discipline issues, then one would expect that

individuals who have switched during office or switched after leaving office would be less disciplined than other members of their party, since their current party affiliation would not accurately reflect their underlying policy preferences. For legislators who have switched prior to reaching office, one might expect these individuals to be more disciplined than other members, since if policy or ideology was important in the decision to switch, they theoretically would switch to a party closer to their ideal policy preferences. However, if party switching is largely unrelated to policy or ideology, as I suggest in this paper, then we should see little evidence of differences in party discipline between switchers and non-switchers.

Table 7.7 compares the mean distance of each legislator from their party's median ideal point between switchers and non-switchers for switches prior to entering office, during office, and after leaving office. I find virtually no differences in party discipline between switchers and non-switchers, nor do I find consistent trends across legislative terms. Sometimes switchers are closer to their party's median ideal point, and sometimes they are further away. The only case in which I find a large difference between switchers and non-switchers took place in the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature, where I find that party switchers are more than twice as far away from their party's median ideal point compared to non-switchers. In this instance, a small number of deputies from the PRD and PT switched parties while in office after a controversial budget vote, one of the very few instances in four legislative terms where there is evidence that deputies switched parties over conflicts related to policy and party discipline. With the exception of this one instance during the 1997-2000 legislative term, the evidence generally supports Hypothesis 5.



**Table 7.7: Party Discipline Among Party Switchers, Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009**

		<i>Mean Distance from Party's Median Ideal Point</i>				
		LVII	LVIII	LIX	LX	Overall
<i>Prior Party Switch</i>						
No		0.05	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.12
Yes		0.04	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.11
<i>Party Switch during Term</i>						
No		0.05	0.12	0.15	0.16	0.12
Yes		0.12*	0.14	0.12	0.18	0.14
<i>Future Party Switch</i>						
No		0.05	0.12	0.16	0.14	0.12
Yes		0.06	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.10

\*difference is significant at the  $p < .001$  level according to a two-tailed t-test. Values compare the mean distance of a deputy from their party's median ideal point generated using W-Nominate.

## 7.5 Conclusion

This chapter began with the question: why do politicians join political parties? The empirical evidence presented above suggests that ambitious politicians join parties because they serve their career interests. When parties no longer serve that function for an individual member, they may leave their old party in search of a new one that will better serve their office-seeking goals. The results of this chapter suggest that party switching occurs at specific points in a politician's career, generally right before they seek a future office. It is relatively rare for Mexican legislators to switch parties in the middle of their term, or to display any type of disloyalty to their current party since this type of behavior is unlikely to be advantageous in obtaining a future political post. Examining the reasons behind party switches throughout the careers of federal deputies, these individuals most often switch for reasons directly related to obtaining ballot access

or future office, and only rarely switch because of policy or ideological disagreements with their parties.

This study of party switching in the Mexican context also suggests three broader conclusions about the nature of the party system. First, it seems likely that certain institutional features of the political environment encourage party switching. The prohibition on reelection provides a level of uncertainty for nearly all ambitious politicians regarding their future careers that encourages them to constantly reevaluate their party affiliation in order to survive in a complex political environment. Centralized control over candidate selection also removes some individual control over where an ambitious individual can reasonably seek a future office, regardless of their own desires. This lack of control over one's own career can occasionally create intra-party conflicts, leading to switching one's party affiliation.

Second, the nature of switching in the Mexican context also illuminates several features about the continuing presence of minor parties in the party system. While the proportional representation component of the electoral system has independent effects on the ability to sustain small parties, a study of party switching also suggests why many of these parties formed, what their goals are, and who their members are. Nearly all the minor parties in the Mexican party system are ideologically ambiguous, suggesting that one of their primary functions is not so much to represent distinct policy or ideological interests not represented by the major parties, but to serve as office-seeking vehicles for politicians that have not been successful at pursuing their careers in the major parties.

Finally, the tendency of the major parties to accept members from other parties across the ideological spectrum, as well as the tendency of major party members

switching to a wide range of minor parties, suggests that one of the primary functions of parties is to serve as office-seeking cartels for their members. If this is the case, that the major parties privilege office-seeking over policy-seeking, especially in an environment where individuals cannot be reelected but political parties can, it calls into question the ability of the parties to provide distinct choices to voters and also the ability of voters to hold parties accountable for their actions.

## **Chapter 8: Conclusions and extensions**

This dissertation has attempted to answer three related questions. First, how do politicians pursue their goals when reelection is not viable? Second, do electoral institutions influence the pursuit of political ambition? And finally, what are the consequences of pursuing a political career in such a highly complex electoral environment without reelection? These questions are important because reelection plays such a critical role in many theories of political behavior, and not only the possibility of reelection but the desire to seek reelection to the same office is key in many theories of political ambition and its consequences. However, much of this theory has been developed based on the U.S. experience, and exported with only minor changes to other countries, ignoring how complex political careers can be in many other environments, nor recognizing how unlikely reelection can be in many other environments. Furthermore, existing theories of political ambition have largely ignored how electoral rules can shape and constrain the political opportunities available to ambitious politicians, and how these constraints can shape behavior. This study begins to fill a gap in the theoretical literature on political ambition by developing a theory that better explains observed career trajectories in environments where continuous reelection to the same office is rare, and provides a substantial amount of novel empirical support for the theory. In the rest of this concluding chapter, I summarize the main argument and findings, and identify areas of future research.

Chapter 2 develops a theory of political ambition that explains why it is rational for some political actors to occasionally move down the career ladder, before moving up at a later date. In the context of no reelection, politicians in elected office must decide at

the end of every term *where* they will pursue future office. Unlike in other environments with reelection, where politicians choose between staying in the same office or moving up, and if they want to pursue higher office, *when* they decide to move up becomes the critical choice. Without reelection, the decision of where to pursue a future political career becomes the much more important question, since the ‘when’ has already been decided. In making this decision, ambitious politicians then calculate the costs and benefits of each potential future office, as well as the probability of obtaining that office after their current term is over. In many cases, a politician may realize the probability of winning a higher office is extremely low, while winning a lower office is much higher, leading the ambitious actor to step down the career ladder. The key point is that actors in this environment still possess progressive ambition and the desire to obtain a higher office. They are *not* ‘regressively’ ambitious, but may only appear that way based on their decisions of where to pursue future office in the short term. Federal legislators who compete for city council seats, or governors who compete for mayoral seats still possess progressive ambition, but in the short term, these individuals must occasionally move down the career ladder in order to move up at a later date. Based on this particular insight about the nature of political careers in a context of no reelection, I then highlight how individual behavior and previous experience, the electoral and partisan environment, and variation in electoral rules and candidate selection methods will influence the strategic-decision making calculus of ambitious politicians.

The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 identifies a number of empirical implications, which I then expand upon and test in the following 5 chapters. In Chapter 3, I examined how changes in electoral competition altered the way ambitious actors

pursued political careers. As competition increased in Mexico, political parties increasingly drew upon more experienced, professional and locally-connected candidates to compete for political office. I found that under competitive elections, individual federal deputies were more likely to have previous elected office experience at the local level, specifically as city councilors, mayors and state legislators, than under non-competitive elections. Furthermore, more competitive elections provided greater incentives for individual politicians and the parties to engage in behavior to increase credit-claiming for policies and services in the hope of attracting greater vote shares. I found that after elections became more competitive, federal legislators increasingly sponsored more bills, were able to get more bills passed, while at the same time transformed the Mexican Congress into an important policy-making body that was able to block more Presidential initiatives than under non-competitive elections. I also found that increasing competition pressured the parties to increasingly use the budget process to direct more federal resources to the local level.

Chapter 4 examined the career paths of Mexican federal deputies and found patterns and behavior consistent with the theory described in Chapter 2. I found that many federal legislators enter office with previous experience in administrative and party positions, and a wealth of experience in local elected office, such as state legislators, city councilors and mayors. A few deputies also entered the Chamber with higher office experience, such as previous senators, governors, and cabinet ministers. When deputies leave office, I found that a number of them do attempt to pursue higher office, such as competing for the Senate, for governor, or mayor, but many federal legislators also move to lower office, such as state legislator, lower level political or partisan appointments, or

even city councilor. Why would federal legislators seek a lower office after their term in the Chamber of Deputies? The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that legislators will seek future office where their expected utility from holding that office is the highest. Consistent with this theory, I find that federal legislators are much more successful at winning lower elected office, such as state legislator or city councilor, compared to federal legislators who want to be senators, governors or mayors. However, these findings do not mean that federal legislators are not progressively ambitious. I find that based on their previous experience, deputies often seek the next highest position on the career ladder. For example, former mayors in the Chamber often attempt to either return to the same position or compete for governor, former senators and state-level cabinet ministers in the Chamber often go on to compete for governor, and former state legislators most often go on to compete for mayor. Overall, federal deputies do seek more prestigious and visible positions after leaving the Chamber, with many attempting to run for either mayor or senator.

Finally, I found in Chapter 4 that partisanship and electoral rules often shape the career paths of federal deputies. Deputies who share partisanship with the President or their state's governor are much more likely to seek an appointed position at the respective level, as I argue that shared partisanship with federal and state executives reduces the cost of seeking these positions, and increases the probability of winning these offices. Furthermore, electoral rules act as constraints on the career paths of deputies. Federal deputies elected in single-member districts are more likely to have previous experience in state-level elected office and appointed office, while deputies elected through proportional representation are more likely to have experience in national-level office.

This previous experience influences the range of viable opportunities available to each deputy, as more SMD deputies seek future experience in elected office and at the state-level, while PR deputies are more likely to seek a future career at the national level.

Chapter 5 turns to examine how the pursuit of a political career in Mexico influences the behavior of deputies while in office as it relates to amending the annual federal budget. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the Chamber of Deputies has increasingly amended the federal budget as submitted by the Executive branch, and that individual deputies have increasingly sponsored amendments to the budget to target specific constituencies. Chapter 5 found that this behavior is tied to political ambition. I found that federal deputies in pursuit of a future sub-national office were more likely to pursue a strategy of sponsoring budget amendments that targeted municipalities and states, while deputies seeking a future national office were much less likely to engage in this behavior at all. In addition, I found that governors were in a strong position to influence individual legislative behavior regarding the budget, as governors have a keen interest in the outcome of budget negotiations, and are in a position to provide future political appointments and influence candidate selection in a deputy's home state. Legislators without gubernatorial sponsors were much more likely to engage in the credit-claiming activity of sponsoring budget amendments, given that these individuals were more likely to face uncertain political futures in their home states. Chapter 5 also found that electoral rules and the way they constrain the career paths of deputies influenced individual behavior regarding the budget. SMD deputies with their much stronger local connections to their constituency were much more likely to sponsor budget amendments regardless of where they pursue future office. However, PR deputies had much greater leeway in their



behavior, with PR deputies who sought future sub-national careers sponsoring more locally-targeted budget amendments than PR deputies seeking future national office.

Chapter 6 examines bill sponsorship behavior within the Chamber, and bill sponsorship is related to the career goals of individual legislators. I argue in this chapter that deputies will use bill sponsorship to claim credit with attentive publics, including other political elites, as one strategy to increase their chances of obtaining some future political post. While the results of this chapter are somewhat more modest, I do find evidence that is consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 2. I found that much sponsorship behavior in the Chamber is related to individual characteristics, such as education, as well as institutional position within the Chamber. However, I do find that deputies who lose gubernatorial sponsors in their home state do tend to sponsor fewer bills, which leads to speculation that a certain amount of bill sponsorship activity in the Chamber is related to pursuing the policy goals of state-level actors who may control the political futures of federal legislators. I also found that deputies who seek a future legislative office do sponsor more bills, suggesting that federal deputies may be attempting to develop specialized skills and signal to other party elites that they will make a good future legislator, either at the state-level or in the Senate.

The final empirical chapter changes the focus from legislative behavior to the party system by examining the implications of pursuing a political career without reelection on political parties. At the end of every term in office, a Mexican politician must decide where to pursue future office. In addition, since they cannot pursue a static career in the same position, the incentives to remain in the same political party over time are also reduced. Therefore, politicians in this environment also have the opportunity to

reevaluate their party affiliation at the end of every term as it relates to their probability of winning some future office, and the costs and benefits of winning said office. I argue that this particular confluence of factors leads to the seemingly contradictory behavior of extremely loyal and disciplined legislators while in office, up until the point when federal deputies realize that their party ID is hindering their political ambitions, leading to party switching during periods of electoral campaigning. I found in this chapter that most party switching takes place at specific points in time in the careers of federal deputies. Specifically, more federal deputies have switched parties before entering or after leaving the Chamber, and if they do decide to switch as a sitting legislator, they most often switch in the few months prior to the end of their term. I also found that while federal deputies change their party affiliation for a variety of reasons, most tend to switch for reasons related to their career goals and specifically as a result of conflicts over candidate selection. Party switching in the Mexican context is highly related to the office-seeking ambitions of legislators, with little evidence that deputies commonly switch over ideological or policy conflicts with the party leadership. Not only did I find that few legislators switch for ideological reasons, but I also found that party switchers are just as disciplined as non-switchers during their term in office, suggesting that switching has little to do with policy conflicts and much more to do with ambition.

In general, the evidence in Chapters 3 through 7 provide substantial empirical support for the ‘Snakes and Ladders’ theory of political ambition described in Chapter 2. A number of general conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence presented. The most obvious conclusion, as many studies of ambition have previously argued, is that representatives are loyal and responsive to those who control their future careers.

Whether those individuals are voters, party elites, other elected officials, or other influential elites, the evidence presented in this work suggests Mexican federal deputies respond to those who can provide them with future office. In addition, as the theory of ambition in Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of the decision of where to pursue future office, the evidence also suggests that *where* individual deputies choose to pursue their careers matters. Not only does this individual choice influence the career paths of deputies, but it also affects their behavior while in office, to whom they are most loyal and responsive, and the type of representation the constituents of these elected officials receive. Finally, as a result of deputies making individual short-term decisions of where to pursue future office, the representative nature of the political party system is likely to be affected due to frequent switching across seemingly programmatic partisan lines in the pursuit of political survival.

A more controversial conclusion that one may draw from the previous chapters is that the role of reelection in many theories of legislative behavior needs to be re-examined. For example, in Mayhew's (1974, 49-73) classic account of the U.S. Congress, he assumes members are single-minded reelection seekers that engage in three primary activities to influence their reelection chances: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Mexican legislators engage in the same types of activities, but clearly do not do so to seek reelection. In fact, if legislators who cannot seek reelection engage in similar types of activities as legislators who continuously seek reelection to the same office, then assuming the goal of reelection as the motivation for certain types of behavior to create an "electoral connection" may not be particularly helpful in explaining patterns of behavior. Instead, if one is interested in generating more generalizable theories about

legislative politics, it might be more useful to identify to whom do legislators rely on to get elected, and to whom must they be responsive in order to continue their career. The difference between a focus on just reelection versus a slightly more complicated focus on candidate selection and ambition may be subtle, but may also provide a more fruitful avenue for developing theoretical models of legislative behavior.

### **8.1 Research extensions**

The completion of this study has led to the realization that the theoretical and empirical work conducted here is only the beginning to understanding political careers and their consequences in political environments where reelection is unlikely. Here, I highlight two general topics of study where future research should be conducted. First, there are a number of potential opportunities to extend this work to other areas of legislative politics as they relate to Mexico, some with existing data already collected, and others with new data. Second, the method adopted in this work of mapping out political careers can be applied to other related areas to further our understanding of political behavior and ambition.

#### *8.1.1 Mexican legislative politics*

One initial task to extend this work is to apply the theory developed here to the Senate. The Mexican Senate has become an extremely influential institution with the advent of democratization, since it shares many of the legislative powers of the Chamber of Deputies (except for its involvement in the spending portion of the budget) and is made up of many more experienced legislators than the Chamber. In addition, senators occupy a higher position on the career ladder compared to federal deputies, and it may provide an interesting complement to this study to examine a different group of

politicians at a different stage in their political careers to test and refine some of the implications of the theory.

Collecting data on senators and their behavior will also allow for the development of a number of interesting future research projects regarding bicameralism and the strategic behavior of Mexican legislators. While bicameralism in Mexico has largely been ignored, it is an important feature of Mexican politics that deserves attention. Much like in the U.S., senators and deputies represent different constituencies and are loyal to different elites, which has consequences for the passage of important legislation. While many observers of Mexican politics consider party leaders and party organizations to be the most influential actors in the policy-making process, a focus on parties as monolithic actors cannot explain why legislation originating in the Chamber of Deputies is killed in the Senate, or vice versa. A deeper understanding of bicameral politics can provide an illuminating peek into divisions within the major political parties and can examine how and why party leaders in each chamber are sometimes unable to coordinate over policy.

Furthermore, a fascinating feature of Mexican legislative politics involves cross-chamber co-sponsorship of legislation and budget amendments. Deputies can introduce bills in the Senate, and senators can introduce bills into the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, bills introduced in one chamber often include sponsors from both. Even though the Chamber of Deputies has exclusive authority over the spending portion of the federal budget, this does not mean the Senate has no influence as many senators are involved in sponsoring budget amendments introduced in the Chamber. Some of this behavior is puzzling, especially when legislators from one chamber introduce legislation

in the other, rather than in their home chamber. Explaining this cross-chamber sponsorship behavior may also highlight some interesting features of the party system.

Another way to extend the current study would be an examination of constituency service among federal legislators. The best way to study this would be through a survey of a sample of legislators that includes sufficient variation by partisanship, geography and mode of election, combined with some observation of their district offices. While the prohibition on reelection might lead observers to think federal legislators have no incentive to engage in constituency service, many of them do and it is considered an important aspect of their jobs. However, no studies exist that study this behavior empirically, or provide a theoretical explanation for why they would engage in this type of service. Mexican legislators do have a “home style” and it deserves further study.

What legislators do in committees also needs to be examined. While party control over who sits on which committee is strong in Mexico, and party leaders can remove individual members temporarily or permanently if they do not represent the party’s interests, committee work is still an important aspect of Mexican politics that has not received enough attention. I originally had planned to study an aspect of participation in committees for this work, but quickly realized that much of the available data is somewhat unreliable, and that there is little transparency in what goes on within these meetings. Future study of committee work would likely need to combine on-site observation as well as in-depth interviews with members of each committee under study.

The theory presented in Chapter 2 also suggests that obtaining leadership positions within the Mexican Congress is likely to be related not only to legislator experience, but also their future career goals. There are some previous studies that have

examined leadership within the Chamber of Deputies (Aparicio and Langston 2009; Kerevel 2010), but there have not yet been any studies that examine how leadership promotes the future careers of legislators.

The data gathered for this study also provides an opportunity to further examine how legislator experience and future career goals relate to the content of legislation they sponsor. Examining the content of legislation will provide a window into the type of substantive representation citizens receive from their representatives.

Finally, the initial discussion of pork-barreling in the Chamber of Deputies in Chapter 5 highlights a number of potential avenues for future research. It is possible to compare the budget submitted by the executive to the final budget approved by the Chamber in order to determine what specific changes were made by legislators. This initial examination would strengthen some of the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3 regarding the changing focus on local and state constituencies over time during the budget process. It may also be possible to link changes in the budget to individual amendments, providing a measure of pork-barreling “success” for individual deputies. One limitation of the current examination of pork-barreling is the small number of amendments introduced from 1997-2006. The 61<sup>st</sup> Legislature (2009-2012) introduced more than twice as many budget amendments as submitted during the 60<sup>th</sup> Legislature, suggesting that adding in the most recent legislative term will provide some more leverage on examining pork-barreling behavior. The amendments studied here also do not capture amendments to the budget made on the floor during the debate and passage of budget, which if incorporated into the analysis may provide interesting new information.

### *8.1.2 Candidate selection and extra-legislative networks*

The way in which candidates are recruited and selected by political parties is a critical component of any political system, and understanding the way in which candidates are selected can provide valuable insight into individual behavior, the nature of the party system, and executive-legislative relations (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Throughout this work, I have mentioned the importance of candidate selection procedures as they related to differing behavior and careers between SMD and PR deputies, how it influences the political careers of legislators, how candidate selection conflicts can lead to frequent party switching, and how it influences to whom legislators are loyal. However, I have not presented any individual-level data on methods of candidate selection. A further examination of candidate selection is warranted as it may provide invaluable insights into why legislators behave the way they do.

One potential avenue for future research on candidate selection would attempt to identify the way in which each legislator was selected, either through designation by a party leader, through a vote in a party assembly, through opinion polls, or through a competitive primary election. While collecting this data for the period under study would be extremely time consuming and difficult, it may be a valuable undertaking for at least a single legislative term in order to determine what, if any, influence selection procedures have on how federal deputies behave in office. One recent study has attempted to map out selection procedures for a subset of legislative elections (Freidenberg 2010), suggesting that it is possible to engage in this task. Furthermore, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) has some information on selection procedures for more recent elections, suggesting that in the future it may be easier to identify the procedures used to select candidates in each




district by party. An examination of all cases presented to the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) related to candidate selection conflicts is also likely to provide an interesting peak into candidate selection procedures within each political party.

Another more indirect way of examining candidate selection is through developing a typology of officeholders based on their backgrounds. Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008, 10) identify four general types of candidates: the party loyalist, the constituent servant, the group delegate, and the entrepreneur. For the Mexican case, a fifth candidate type may also be present: the technocrat (Camp 2010). I have begun to identify individual deputies as one of these types based on their career backgrounds, as it is likely that candidate types will influence the behavior of deputies. Entrepreneurs, or independents or outsiders with only a tenuous relationship to a political party, are likely to behave much differently than party loyalists, also pursue different types of future careers, and potentially be more likely to switch parties. Group delegates, depending on the group they represent, such as a particular union, are likely to focus more of their attention on certain policy areas or on directing resources to a particular constituency, and probably more likely to seek a future career where they can continue to represent their group. Constituent servants may be more likely to try and pursue a future elected office, or develop their careers in a single municipality, and spend their time in congress attempting to benefit those constituents. Technocrats may be highly specialized in certain policy areas, which will influence their behavior in congress, and they may be more likely to pursue future administrative careers. Party loyalists make up the largest component of Mexican federal deputies, and are likely to display the widest variation in their career paths, moving frequently from partisan, administrative, and elected offices.

While identifying individual deputies as one of these five types is fraught with potential problems, it is also a worthwhile endeavor as it will likely explain some variation in legislative behavior and careers that is currently relegated to the error term. In addition, the identification of entrepreneurs or outsiders is likely to provide some interesting insights into the party system and why parties select different types of candidates in different districts.

A final and potentially exciting future avenue of research into candidate selection would be to adopt a social networks approach to studying the extra-legislative networks of individual deputies. While not discussed much in this work, Mexican politicians are members of dense formal and informal networks (Camp 2002) that are likely to have direct and important influence on how legislators are selected as candidates in the first place, to whom they are responsive while in office, and the range of opportunities for future careers after leaving the Chamber. A recent and growing trend in legislative politics is the study of intra-legislative social networks, primarily through examining cosponsorship patterns (Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonhufvud 2004; Fowler 2006a; 2006b Alemán and Calvo 2010; Alemán forthcoming; Tam Cho and Fowler 2010; Calvo and Leiras 2010; Kirkland 2011; Bratton and Rouse 2011). However, very few scholars have examined how networks with actors outside the legislative arena influence behavior inside a legislature (although see Victor and Koger 2011). Especially in political environments where legislative careers are short, it is likely that extra-legislative networks are likely to be more important predictors of legislative behavior, rather than examining why legislators co-sponsor with some legislators but not others.

Appendix I. Bill Passage Rate in the Chamber of Deputies, 1991-2009



## Appendix II. Categories of funding requests

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- agricultural producers: This category comprises requests that target specific producers of foodstuffs, such as beans, sugar, wine, tequila, cactus, citrus fruit, rice, and corn.
- aid to workers: This category includes requests to either increase pensions or salaries for specific groups of workers, nearly all of them unionized, such as health care workers, teachers, fishers, and ex-railroad workers.
- arts and culture: This category includes funding for the arts and other culturally relevant projects, such as museums, art centers, and funding for the excavation of various archeological ruins.
- agricultural and rural development: This is a more general category where deputies request a package of projects to support agriculture and rural economic development
- economic development: This category primarily includes requests relating to small and medium businesses, as well as requests to encourage tourism.
- education: Education funding can include general federal expenditures towards specific levels of education, to building and aiding a particular school or university
- environment: This category includes a variety of projects related to conservation and environmentally-friendly development.
- govt spending priorities: This category primarily consists of requests to alter the funding formula for transferring federal money to states and municipalities, as well as requests to generally reduce government spending and to prevent the privatization of government parastatal
- health care: This category includes general requests to increase government health care spending, as well as money to build hospitals and funding for different types of medical research and treatment
- human rights and minorities: This category includes funding designed to benefit government human rights organizations, and disadvantaged groups like women, indigenous, the disabled and the elderly.
- migrants and ex-braceros: Request to aid the braceros (Mexican migrants who worked in the U.S. from 1942-64) are fairly common. Deputies also request funds to be directed towards consulates in the U.S. as well as other government programs designed to help Mexican nationals in the U.S. and recently returned migrants.
- misc govt spending: Spending related to government salaries, the judicial branch, public broadcasting, military, transparency, and during the LVII Legislature, requests related to the bank bailout (FOBAPROA)
- mixed requests: This category includes requests that combine two or more of the other categories in this list, as well as requests for natural disaster relief, civil society promotion and issues related to the oil sector (mostly communities affected by oil spills and environmental
- public works: Funding for various public infrastructure projects such as bridges, dams, ports, parks and beaches.
- science and technology funding: Funding directed towards government programs that promote science and technology research
- security and defense: Funding requests related to public security issues and support for public security agencies.
- social services/welfare: Funding for social security programs, unemployment programs, and poverty reduction programs
- transportation: This category primarily includes requests to build, pave, or maintain roads, but also includes requests related to airports and trains.
- utilities: This category includes requests related to water, electricity and gas.
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### **Appendix III. Compiling the career path data**

Putting together career path data on Mexican federal legislators is an arduous task. In order to build the data set, I had to rely on a large variety of sources, some of them specific to an individual legislator. In this appendix, I describe the major sources used and then how I went about building the data set. Since political careers are constantly developing and a large majority of the legislators in my dataset are still active in public life, the conclusions drawn from the data are largely going to be time-specific to the period in which the data was collected. I began collecting the career path data in August 2010 and finished in September 2011. Much of the dissertation was then written between September and December 2011. From January to March 2012, I then went through the entire career path data to examine legislators where I was missing information and managed to fill in some holes.

The process of creating the database started with a list of the 2,345 legislators for which I planned to collect information. I then went through the list one individual at a time, and examined some or all of the sources listed below until I had a generally complete chronology of their career, or I exhausted all the sources at my disposal.

#### *1. Candidate lists from state-level electoral institutes*

The first task to building the data was to gather candidate lists for all municipal, statewide and federal elections that took place between 1997 and 2011. From these lists, I was able to determine where individual legislators had competed for future elected office. To collect this information, I took advantage of the spread of transparency laws across the Mexican states, and filed information requests with each electoral institute. Many

candidate lists for recent elections are available online, but for earlier elections, I had to file the requests and wait for a response. Occasionally I had to travel to pick up the information in person, in several other cases I received the lists through the mail, and in the remaining cases I received electronic files from the electoral institutes. Since a large number of the lists I have only in hard copy, or as scanned images, the search through the lists was extremely long and tedious since I could not just electronically search the document for an individual's name.

### 2. *Sistema de Información Legislativa (SIL)*

<http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/portal>

The SIL website, maintained by the Secretaría de Gobernación, possesses a wealth of information about deputies, senators, and legislative business from the 57<sup>th</sup> Legislature to the present. SIL was my primary source for background information on each deputy, and occasionally it would provide some information on where they sought future office.

### 3. *Biographical sources*

The following publications were useful for finding background information on a number of legislators who, for whatever reason, did not have information available in the SIL.

The Pérez Franco book was particularly useful for information on PANista legislators.

Camp, Roderic Ai. 2011. *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009*, Fourth ed. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis. 2008. *Legislaturas XXVII-LX (1917-2009): Diputados Integrantes*. México, D.F.: Cámara de Diputados, LX Legislatura.

González Oropeza, Manuel. 1994. *Los diputados de la nación*. México D.F.: Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión.

Greyson, George. 2002. *A Guide to the Leadership Elections of the PRI, PAN, & PRD*. Policy Papers on the Americas, CSIS Americas Program.

Instituto de Estudios para la Transición Democrática. 1999. *Diputados y senadores: quién es quién en el Congreso*. México, D.F.: IETD.

Instituto de Estudios para la Transición Democrática. 2002. *Diputados y senadores: quién es quién en el Congreso*. México, D.F.: IETD.

López Díaz, Pedro. 2006. *La clase política mexicana: diccionario*. México: La Jornada.

Musacchio, Humberto. 2002. *Quién es quién en la política mexicana*. México, D.F.: Plaza y Janés.

Pérez Franco, Aminadab Rafael. 2008. *Índice biográfico de legisladores federales del Partido Acción Nacional, 1946-2008*. México: Tatevari ediciones.

#### *4. Leave of absence requests (solicitudes de licencia)*

I collected all leave of absence requests submitted by individual deputies to the Chamber leadership as part of creating a variable that measures the number of days served for each individual legislator. Most of these letters do not contain useful information, but occasionally a deputy will specify why they are leaving office (such as receiving an appointment in the state government, or to compete for another office), which I then incorporated into the data set.

#### *5. Individual CVs from current officeholders*

If I found any former legislator who held a current public office in a local, state, or national office, I filed an information request to obtain a CV of the individual if it was not already available online.

## *6. Newspapers and Magazines (national and selected regional)*

I relied on a lot of newspaper articles to fill in gaps on legislators who attempted to compete for positions, but either failed to gain ballot access or lost internal party competitions for leadership posts. Newspapers were also helpful for finding information about individuals who did not seek future elected posts. *El Universal* and *La Jornada* were especially useful, but I searched archives of many other newspapers as well.

*El Imparcial*

*El Informador*

*El Porvenir*

*El Siglo de Torreón*

*El Universal*

*Excelsior*

*La Crónica*

*La Jornada* (national and regional publications)

*Milenio*

Organización Editorial Mexicana ([www.oem.mx](http://www.oem.mx), includes several regional papers)

*Proceso*

*Reforma*

*Vanguardia*

## *7. Internet searches*

I conducted internet searches on every individual in my data set. To conduct a thorough search, I performed multiple searches with variations on the deputy's name, including any known nicknames. If it was not clear from a particular search result that the individual I found was the former deputy, I did not use the information. In many cases, these searches turned up newspaper stories I was not able to find through searching individual archives. The internet searches were also very useful in turning up cases filed with state and national level electoral institutes that involved the individual in some dispute. Many of these cases were about disputes over candidate selection, providing important information for my data set. In addition, I found through the searches



information on individuals who held current posts in party organizations and government bureaucracies.

*8. Other sources*

The following two sources were useful in corroborating information about individuals who had held state legislative or mayoral positions.

Cámara de Diputados, Integración de las legislaturas de los estados, <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cedia/biblio/archivo/edos/>

Enciclopedia de los municipios y delegaciones de México, <http://www.e-local.gob.mx/work/templates/enciclo/>

Appendix IV: Tables used to generate Table 4.5 in Chapter 4.

**Table IV.1: Career Paths and Progressive Ambition of Mexican Federal Legislators, 1997-2009**

Immediate office sought/obtained	Previous Federal Level Post			
	<i>Federal Legislator</i>	<i>Senator</i>	<i>Federal Bureaucracy</i>	<i>National Party</i>
<i>City Councilor</i>	0.0%	2.7%	0.6%	1.5%
<i>Mayor</i>	21.4%	8.2%	10.7%	7.2%
<i>State Legislator</i>	7.1%	11.0%	16.1%	13.9%
<i>Federal Legislator</i>	3.6%	0.0%	1.8%	3.6%
<i>Senator</i>	7.1%	6.9%	9.5%	14.9%
<i>Governor</i>	7.1%	30.1%	4.8%	9.7%
<i>Federal Bureaucracy</i>	10.7%	12.3%	22.0%	6.2%
<i>National Party</i>	14.3%	9.6%	11.9%	15.4%
<i>Federal Executive</i>	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	3.1%
<i>State Bureaucracy</i>	10.7%	4.1%	8.3%	6.7%
<i>State Party</i>	7.1%	2.7%	4.8%	4.6%
<i>State Cabinet</i>	3.6%	4.1%	3.0%	3.1%
<i>Interest Group</i>	7.1%	6.9%	1.2%	4.6%
<i>Non-political position</i>	0.0%	1.4%	1.8%	4.6%
<i>Retired/died/banned from office</i>	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.0%
<i>Total Percentage</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	28	73	168	195

*Proprietarios only*

**Table IV.2: Career Paths and Progressive Ambition of Mexican Federal Legislators, 1997-2009**

Immediate office sought/obtained	Previous Post	
	<i>Interest Group</i>	<i>Non-political office</i>
<i>City Councilor</i>	0.8%	0.9%
<i>Mayor</i>	9.0%	28.0%
<i>State Legislator</i>	12.0%	7.5%
<i>Senator</i>	18.1%	13.1%
<i>Governor</i>	4.5%	5.6%
<i>Federal Bureaucracy</i>	3.8%	9.4%
<i>National Party</i>	3.8%	4.7%
<i>State Bureaucracy</i>	5.3%	5.6%
<i>State Party</i>	3.8%	4.7%
<i>State Cabinet</i>	2.3%	4.7%
<i>Interest Group</i>	33.8%	0.9%
<i>Non-political position</i>	3.0%	15.0%
<i>Total Percentage</i>	100%	100%
N	133	107

*Proprietarios only*

**Table IV.3: Career Paths and Progressive Ambition of Mexican Federal Legislators, 1997-2009**

Immediate office sought/obtained	Previous State Level Post						
	City Councilor	Mayor	State Legislator	Governor	State Bureaucracy	State Party	State Cabinet
<i>City Councilor</i>	3.8%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	4.6%	2.8%	0.0%
<i>Mayor</i>	16.5%	29.5%	22.8%	0.0%	17.6%	16.3%	11.9%
<i>State Legislator</i>	20.3%	10.9%	12.7%	0.0%	16.5%	16.3%	7.5%
<i>Federal Legislator</i>	2.5%	2.3%	2.3%	0.0%	0.4%	2.2%	1.5%
<i>Senator</i>	8.9%	8.5%	14.1%	66.7%	4.6%	14.4%	13.4%
<i>Governor</i>	1.3%	14.0%	2.3%	0.0%	2.3%	6.3%	23.9%
<i>Federal Bureaucracy</i>	22.8%	6.2%	8.1%	0.0%	16.9%	12.2%	7.5%
<i>National Party</i>	7.6%	2.3%	3.8%	33.3%	3.1%	5.6%	3.0%
<i>Federal Executive</i>	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.3%	1.5%
<i>State Bureaucracy</i>	7.6%	9.3%	13.5%	0.0%	18.0%	7.8%	6.0%
<i>State Party</i>	2.5%	7.8%	7.8%	0.0%	5.0%	6.3%	6.0%
<i>State Cabinet</i>	0.0%	3.9%	3.8%	0.0%	3.5%	1.9%	11.9%
<i>Interest Group</i>	5.1%	0.0%	3.8%	0.0%	3.1%	3.5%	3.0%
<i>Non-political position</i>	0.0%	3.1%	1.4%	0.0%	3.1%	3.5%	3.0%
<i>Retired/died/banned from office</i>	1.3%	2.3%	0.9%	0.0%	1.2%	0.6%	0.0%
<i>Total Percentage</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	79	129	347	3	261	319	67

*Proprietarios only*

**Appendix V. Table V.1: Party Switchers from the LVII Chamber of Deputies (1997-2000)**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LVII	Party Switched To during LVII	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Acosta Zavala, Gerardo			PT	PRI	PASC/PSD/ PRD	~2008/2009/2010
Albores Guillen, Roberto Armando			PRI		IND	2006
Alejo Domínguez, Cupertino			PRI		PANAL	2006
Alvarado Gudiño, Ruperto			PRI		CONV	2009
Alzina Campos, Edmundo Augusto	PRI	n/a	PRD		CONV	2001
Arceo Corcuera, Alvaro	PRI	1997	PRD			
Armenta Beltrán, Ricardo	PRI	1997	PRD			
Aubry Orozco, María del Socorro			PRD		PVEM	2010
Barajas Olea, Roselia Margarita			PRD		CONV	2000
Barboza Llamas, Maximiano			PRD	PT	CONV	2003
Barraza Ayala, Israel			PRD		PAS	2003
Bátiz Vázquez, Bernardo	PFD/PAN	1992 (left PAN for PFD), 1994 (join PRD)	PRD			
Berganza Escorza, Francisco Javier			PAN	IND	PRI/CONV/ PANAL	2000/2002/ 2011
Bueno Torio, Juan	PRI	1994	PAN			
Buganza Salmerón, Gerardo			PAN		IND	2010
Cabello Sánchez, Antonio			PRD		PRI/PAN	2003/~2005
Canedo Vargas, Jorge			PRI		PJS	~2002
Capuchino Herrera, Elba Margarita			PRD		PVEM	2002
Cárdenas Fonseca, Manuel			PRI		PANAL	2006
Carrillo Zavala, Alfonso			PRI		PRD coalition	~2006
Castellanos Gallegos, Carmita			PRI		CONV/ PANAL/PAN	2003/2006/ 2009
Castillo Juárez, Laura Itzel			PRD		PT	2009
Ceballos Trujeque, Ana Lila			PRD		PAS	2003
Chabolla García, Rogelio			PAN	PT (PCD, but no parl. Rep.)	PCD/PT/ CONV	2000/2003/ 2009
Chedraui Obeso, Irma			PRI		PAN	~2004
Cifuentes Negrete, Alberto			PAN		IND	2003
Colín Lira, Rosa			PRI		PANAL	2006
Contreras Rivera, Martín	PRI	1994	PAN			
Damián Huato, Pioquinto	PRI	1997	PRD			
De la Rosa Blancas, Ángel	PRI	1996	PRD		PT	2003
De Souza Mayo Machorro, Francisco			PRD		PAN-PVEM coalition	2000
Deniz Macías, José Adán			PAN	PT	PCD	2000
Dzul Noh, Baldemar			PAN	PT	PAS	2001
Ebrard Casaubón, Marcelo Luis	PRI	1995	PVEM	IND	PCD/PRD	2000/2002

**Appendix V. Table V.1: Party Switchers from the LVII Chamber of Deputies (1997-2000), cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LVII	Party Switched To during LVII	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Esquivel Farías, Susana	PRI	1989	PRD			
Fuentes Larios, Juan Ignacio			PAN		IND	2001
Galván Gascón, Víctor Armando			PRD	PRI		
García Camarena, Leonardo	PDM	1993	PAN			
García Guzmán, Emilia			PRI		PAN	2009
García Sainz Lavista, Ricardo	PRI	1997	PRD			
Garza Vázquez, Miguel Ángel			PVEM	PT		
González Cuevas, Isaías			PRI		PLM	2003
González Davar, Juan José			PRD		PRI	~2004
González Márquez, Emilio	PDM	1991	PAN			
González Sánchez, Alejandro			PRI		PRD	2000
Guajardo Anzaldúa, Juan Antonio	PAN	1994	PRD		PT	2002
Guzmán Reyna, Justiniano			PRD	PRI	PSD	2009
Ibarra Pedroza, Juan Enrique			PRI		PT	2005
Jiménez Flores, Elsa Patria			PRD		CONV	2003
Joaquín Coldwell, Addy Cecilia			PRI		PAN	2005
Ku Herrera, Enrique			PRI		PANAL	2006
Lagunas Angel, Antonio	PRI	1989	PRD			
León Díaz, Jorge			PRD	PT		
Lonche Castellanos, César			PRD	IND	PARM	2000
López Cruz, Víctor Manuel			PRI		PRD	~2003
López Romero, Armando			PRD	PT		
Luna Calvo, Martha Irene	PRI	1997	PRD	PRI		
Luna Kan, Francisco Epigmenio	PRI	1996	PRD			
Maciel Ortiz, María Mercedes	PRD	1993	PT			
Magaña Guerrero, Pedro			PRD		PT	2000
Maldonado Bautista, Jesús Samuel	PRI	1989	PRD			
Martínez Almazán, Raúl			PRI		CONV	~2002
May López, María del Socorro			PRI		PT	n/a
Mendoza Ayala, Eduardo			PAN		PRI	2003
Mendoza Ayala, Rubén	PRI	1995	PAN		IND/PRD	2009/2012
Monreal Avila, Ricardo			PRI	IND	PRD/PT	1998/2008
Montaño Yamuni, Joaquín			PAN		IND	2010
Morales Vázquez, Carlos Orsoe	PRI	1995	PRD			
Moreno Garavilla, Jaime Miguel			PRI		CONV	2001
Muñoz Ledo, Porfirio	PRI	1989	PRD	IND	PARM/PT	2000/2009
Navarro Quintero, Miguel Angel			PRI		PRD/PAN	2005/2009
Núñez Jiménez, Arturo			PRI		PRD	2005

**Appendix V. Table V.1: Party Switchers from the LVII Chamber of Deputies (1997-2000), cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LVII	Party Switched To during LVII	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
O'Farrill Tapia, Carolina	PRI	1997	PVEM	IND	CONV	2003
Ontiveros y Romo, Ricardo Arturo			PAN		CONV	~2004
Ordaz Montes de Oca, Salvador			PRI		PLM	2000
Ordorica Saavedra, Alejandro Victoriano			PRD	IND	PARM	2000
Padilla Sánchez, Enrique			PRI		PAN	n/a
Paoli Bolio, Francisco José	PMT	1991	PAN		IND	2009
Parra Rodríguez, Gilberto			PRD		PT	2009
Patiño Pozas, Luis			PT		PRD	n/a
Peñaloza García, Bonfilio			PRD	PRI	PVEM	2003
Pérez de Alva Blanco, Roberto			PRI		PANAL	2006
Pérez García, Manuel	PRI	1989	PRD			
Rangel Hernández, Armando			PAN		IND	2007
Robles Colín, Leticia			PRD		PRI	2010
Rodríguez Aguirre, Felipe			PRD		PT	~2009
Rodríguez Prats, Juan José	PRI	1994	PAN			
Rojas Arreola Gonzalo, Pedro Bárbaro			PRD		PT-CONV- PVEM coalition	2003
Rubiano Reyna, Miguel Antonio			PRI		PRD	~2010
Sánchez Campos, José Luis			PRD		PT/return to PRD	2000/(n/a)
Segura Rivera, Bernardo	PRI	1996	PRD			
Soberanis Sosa, Eraclio			PRI		CONV	2006
Sodi de la Tijera, Demetrio Javier	PRI	1994	PRD		PAN	2006
Valdés Arias, Sergio			PRI	PRD	PAN	2000
Vázquez Osorno, Violeta Margarita			PRD		PT/PAN	2003/2006
Vega Murillo, Wintilo			PRI		PSD	2008
Velasco Oliva, Jesús Cuauhtémoc			PRD		CONV	2000
Vucovich Seele, Alma Angelina	PAN	1997	PRD		PARM/PAS	2000/2001

**Appendix V Table V.2: Party Switchers from the LVIII Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003)**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LVIII	Party Switched To during LVIII	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Aldana Burgos, Luis Artemio			PAN		IND	2007
Alvarado García, Edgar Eduardo			PAN		PRD/ (return to PAN)	2004/2010
Anaya Gutiérrez, Alberto	PMS	1990	PT			
Andrade Sánchez, Justino Eduardo			PRI		IND/ (return to PRI)	2006/2008
Antunes Flores, Zeferino	PRI	1997	PRD			
Arnaud Carreño, Pablo de Jesús			PAN		IND	2010
Bañales Castro, José			PAN	PRD		
Barrón Fonseca, José Jaime			PRI		PANAL	2006
Buenfil Montalvo, Edilberto Jesús			PRI		PRD/ (return to PRI)	2006/2009
Bueno Campos, Roberto Eugenio			PAN		CONV/PRI/PT/ PRD	2004/2006/ 2009/2010
Buenrostro Díaz, Gustavo César Jesús			PAN		PRD	2006
Castellanos Hernández, Félix			PT		IND/CONV	2006/2008
Castillo Cruz, Bonifacio			PRD		PAN/ (return to PRD)	2007/2009
Círigo Vázquez, Víctor Hugo			PRD		CONV	2009
Cosío Gaona, Salvador			PRI		PRD/CONV	2006/2008
Cota Montaña, Rosa Delia	PRI	1999	PT		PRD	~2004
Cruz Andrade, Mario	PRI	1989	PRD			
Dip Rame, Elías			PRI		PRD coalition	2003
Elías Cardona, Alfonso Oliverio	PRI	1998	PRD			
Esquivel Martínez, Hilario			PAN	IND	PFD	~2009
Estrada Colín, Ismael			PRI		CONV	~2006
Galarza González, Adrián Salvador			PAN		IND	2003
Gandarilla Carrasco, Víctor Manuel			PRI		PRD/ (return to PRI)	2006/2010
Garcés Martínez, José Delfino	PRI	2000	PRD			
García Vera, Jorge Luis			PRI		PANAL	2006
García Zalvidea, Juan Ignacio			PAN	PVEM	PRD/PRI	2004/2007
González Aguilera, José Luis			PRI		PAN	n/a
González Molina, Concepción			PRI		CONV	~2008
González Nájera, Rosalío			PAN	PVEM	PRD	2006
Hernández Hilaria, Justino			PRI		PANAL	2006
Herrera y Bruquetas, Angel Enrique	PRI	1997	CONV	PRD		
Huerta Díaz, Mauro			PAN	PVEM		
Jiménez Olan, Neftalí			PRI		PRD	~2008
López Cruz, Esther	PFCRN	~1998	PRI			
López Escoffie, Silvia América			PAN		CONV-PT coalition	2007
Manterola Sáinz, Pedro			PRI		PAN	~2009
Martínez Aldana, Tereso			PAN		PRI	2009
Martínez Bárcenas, Celia			PRI	IND (PRD)	PRD	2001

**Appendix V Table V.2: Party Switchers from the LVIII Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003),  
cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LVIII	Party Switched To during LVIII	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Martínez Cue, Fernando Josaphat			PAN	PRD	PRI	~2009
Martínez Veloz, Jaime Cleofas			PRI	PRD		
Mayáns Canabal, Humberto Domingo			PRI	PRD	PRI	2006
Meléndez Pérez, Enrique			PRI		PANAL	2006
Montelongo Gordillo, Maricruz			PRI		PANAL	2006
Morales Reyes, Rogaciano	PRI	1989	PRD			
Moreno Bastida, Ricardo			PRD		IND	2010
Narro Céspedes, José			PT		PRD	2009
Noguera Ruiz, Juan José			PRI		PRD	2004
Núñez Monreal, Magdalena del Socorro			PRD		PT	2009
Ochoa Camposeco, Victor Manuel			PRD		Mexico Posible	2003
Olvera Castillo, Amado			PAN		IND	2003
Orozco Alfaro, J. Jesús			PRI	IND	PRD	2003
Ortiz Ortíz, Héctor Israel			PRI		PAN	2004
Padilla Silva, J. Clemente			PAN	PRD		
Peredo Aguilar, Rosalía	PRT	n/a	PT		PAN/Partido Socialista	2006/2010
Piñeyro Arias, Antonia Irma			PRI		PANAL	2006
Regis Adame, Juan Carlos			PT		PRD	2009
Reyes Roel, César Patricio			PAN		IND	2010
Riojas Santana, Gustavo	PARM	n/a	PSN			
Ríos Alarcón, Francisco			PRI		PAN/ (return to PRI)	~2007/2010
Rodríguez Cabrera, Rufino			PRD		PRI or IND	~2004
Rodríguez Ferrusca, Javier			PAN		CONV	2006
Rodríguez Lozano, Amador			PRI	IND	PT	2001
Rodríguez Pasos, Jorge Alberto			PT		PSD	~2009
Romero Reyna, Valdemar	PRI	1996	PAN		PRI	2005
Rosas López Elizabeth			PRI		CONV	~2007
Salgado Macedonio, J. Félix	PFCRN	1991	PRD			
Sánchez López, Héctor			PRD		PUP/PASC- PSD/PANAL	2004/2005/ 2010
Santibañez García, Luis Miguel			PAN		PVEM	2004
Servín Maldonado, Rafael	PRI	1989	PRD			
Simental García, Bertha Alicia	PARM	~1990	PSN			
Sotelo Rosas, David Augusto	PRI	1999	PRD			
Soto Martínez, José			PRI		CONV	2007



**Appendix V Table V.2: Party Switchers from the LVIII Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003),  
cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LVIII	Party Switched To during LVIII	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Soto Reséndiz, José Ramón			PAN		IND	2009
Torres Mercado, Tomás	PRI	1997	PRD		PVEM	2010/2012
Torrijos Mendoza, Miguel Angel	PVEM	2000	PAN			
Uriarte Rico, Olga Margarita			PRI		PANAL	2006
Urias Germán, Gregorio	PRI	1989	PRD			
Vaca Betancourt Bretón, José Sergio Rodolfo			PAN		CONV/ (return to PAN)	2004/2010
Varón Levy, Eddie James			PRI		IND	~2006
Vidal Pérez, Julio César			PRI		PRD	2006
Zamora Cruz, Adolfo			PRI		PAN-PANAL coalition	2007

**Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006)**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LIX	Party Switched To during LIX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Aguilar Bueno, Jesús			PRI	IND		
Aguirre Rivero, Angel Heladio			PRI		PRD coalition	2010
Agúndez Montaña, Narciso	PRI/PAN/PT	1995/1995/~2003	PRD			
Alvarado Villazón, Francisco Xavier			PVEM		PSD	~2008
Alvarez Romo, Leonardo	PCD	2001	PVEM			
Arce Islas, René			PRD		IND/PVEM	2009/2011
Arechiga Santamaría, José Guillermo			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Argüelles Guzmán, Jacqueline Guadalupe			PVEM		PANAL	~2008
Avila Camberos, Francisco Juan			PAN		IND	2009
Avilés Nájera, Rosa María			PRD		PT/CONV (but still PRD)	2009
Barrera Zurita, Baruch Alberto			PAN		PRI	2010
Boltvinik Kalinka, Julio	PRI	n/a	PRD			
Briones Briseño, José Luis			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Bustillos Montalvo, Juan			PRI		PRD/PAN	2007/2010
Calderón Centeno, Sebastián	PRI	1999	PAN			
Camacho Solís, Víctor Manuel	PRI/PCD	1995/2000	PRD			
Camarillo Zavala, Isidro			PAN	IND		
Campa Cifrián, Roberto Rafael			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Candelas Salinas, Rafael	PRI	2000	PRD		PVEM	2007
Canul Pacab, Angel Paulino			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Cárdenas Sánchez, Nancy			PRD		PSD	2009
Carrillo Guzmán, Martín			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Clouthier Carrillo, Tatiana			PAN	IND	PANAL	2009
Colín Gamboa, Roberto	PDM	1994	PAN			
Córdova Wilson, Ariel Baltazar			PRI		PRD	2012
Cota Cota, Josefina	PRI	1999	PRD		PT (but still PRD)	2006
Cruz Martínez, Tomás			PRD		CONV (but still PRD?)	2009
Cruz Silva, Isabel Carmelina			PRI		IND	2010
De la Vega Asmitia, José Antonio Pablo	PRI	2000	PAN			
Díaz Nieblas, José Lamberto			PRI		PAN	2009
Díaz Palacios, Socorro	PRI	2003	PRD			
Echeverría Pineda, Abel			PRI		IND	2011

**Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006),  
cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LIX	Party Switched To during LIX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Espino Arévalo, Fernando	PRI	2003	PVEM		PANAL/ PRI	2006/2009
Flores Mendoza, Rafael	PRI	~1998	PRD			
García Domínguez, Miguelángel	PRI	2002	PRD			
González Roldán, Luis Antonio	PRI	n/a	PVEM		PANAL	~2009
González Ruiz, Alfonso			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Gonzalez Salas y Petriccioli, Maria Marcela	PRI	2003	PRD		PRI	2009
González Schmal, Jesús Porfirio	PAN/PDM/ PRD	1993/1997/ 2001	CONV			
Gordillo Morales, Elba Esther			PRI		PANAL	2005
Guajardo Anzaldúa, Juan Antonio	PAN/PRD	1995/2002	PT			
Guillén Quiroz, Ana Lilia	PRI	1989	PRD			
Guizar Valladares, Gonzalo			PRI		PAN	2010
Gutiérrez Corona, Leticia			PRI	IND		
Hernández Ramos, Minerva			PRD		PAN	2010
Huizar Carranza, Guillermo			PRD		PT	2007
Ibáñez Montes, José Angel			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Jiménez Sánchez, Moisés			PRI	IND	PANAL	~2006
Kahwagi Macari, Jorge Antonio			PVEM		PANAL	2006
Leyson Castro, Armando			PRI		PAN	2007
Lujambio Moreno, Julio Horacio	PRI	2003	PVEM		PRD coalition	2009
Magaña Martínez, Sergio Augusto	PRI/PAN	2001/2003	PRD			
Maldonado Venegas, Luis	PRI	~2003	CONV			
Martínez Alvarez, Jesús Emilio	PRI	2001	CONV			
Maya Pineda, María Isabel	PAN	2000	PRI			
Mejía Haro, Antonio	PRI	1998	PRD			
Méndez Galvez, Alberto Urcino			PAN		PASC/ PAN/PRI	2007/2009/ 2010
Mendivil Morales, Guadalupe			PRI		PAN	2009
Mendoza Ayala, Rubén	PRI	1995	PAN		IND/PRD	2009/2012
Meza Cabrera, Fidel René			PRI	IND	PRD/PAN	2007/2009
Montiel Fuentes, Gelacio	PRI	1998	PRD			
Morales Rubio, María Guadalupe	PAN	2002	PRD			

**Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006),  
cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LIX	Party Switched To during LIX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Moreno Garavilla, Jaime Miguel	PRI	2001	CONV			
Moreno Ramos, Gustavo			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Moreno Valle Rosas, Rafael			PRI		PAN/PAN-PRD coalition	2006/2010
Muñoz Muñoz, José Alfonso			PRI	IND		
Nahle García, Arturo	PRI	2001	PRD		PRI coalition	2009
Nava Altamirano, José Eduvigés			PRI		CONV-PT coalition	2009
Obregón Espinoza, Francisco Javier	PAN	1999	PRD		PT	2006
Ochoa Fernández, Cuauhtémoc	PRI	1999	PVEM			
Orantes López, María Elena			PRI		PRD coalition	2012
Orozco Gómez, Javier	PRI	1988	PVEM			
Ortiz Pinchetti, José Agustín Roberto	PRI	1969	PRD		CONV	~2009
Pano Becerra, Carlos Osvaldo			PRI		PVEM	2007
Pavón Vinales, Pablo			PRI		PAN	2010
Penagos García, Sergio			PAN		IND	2010
Perdomo Bueno, Juan Fernando	PRI	2002	CONV			
Pérez Cárdenas, Manuel	PRI	1999	PAN			
Pérez Zaragoza, Evangelina			PAN		IND	2009
Ramos Salinas, Oscar Martín			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Rangel Hernández, Armando			PAN		IND	2007
Reyes Retana Ramos, Laura			PRI	IND	PRD	2006
Rincón Chanona, Sonia			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Rodríguez Anaya, Gonzalo			PRI		PAN	2008
Ruiz Esparza Oruña, Jorge Roberto			PAN	IND	PANAL	2007
Ruiz González, Tomás José			PRI		PANAL	2006
Sagahón Medina, Benjamín			PRI	IND	PVEM	2006
Sánchez Hernández, Alfonso			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Sandoval Urbán, Evelia			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006
Serrano Crespo, Yadira			PRD		IND	2011
Serrano, Jiménez, Emilio	PRI		PRD			

**Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006),  
cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LIX	Party Switched To during LIX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Silva Valdés, Carlos Hernán	PAN	2003	PRD			
Tentory García, Israel	PRI	2001	PRD			
Torreblanca Galindo, Carlos Zeferino			PRD		PAN	2012
Trujillo Fuentes, Fermín			PRI		PANAL	2008
Ulloa Pérez, Gerardo			PRD		CONV	2009
Valencia Monterrubio, Edmundo Gregorio	PRI	2000	PAN			
Vázquez García, Quintín			PRI	IND		
Vázquez Saut, Regina			PAN		PRI	2007
Vega Carlos, Bernardo			PRI	IND	PAN-PRD coalition	2010
Vega Murillo, Wintilo			PRI		PSD	2008
Vega y Galina, Roberto Javier			PRI	IND	PRD coalition	2006
Yunes Linares, Miguel Angel			PRI	IND		
Zanatta Gasperín, Gustavo	PAN	2002	PRI			
Zebadúa González, Emilio			PRD		PANAL	2006
Zorrilla Fernández, Guillermo			PRI		PAN	2010
Zúñiga Romero, Jesús			PRI	IND	PANAL	2006

**Appendix V Table V.4: Party Switchers from the LX Chamber of Deputies (2006-2009)**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LX	Party Switched To during LX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Abad de Jesús, Juan	PAN	2000	CONV			
Aguilar Jiménez, Rubén	PRT	~1990	PT			
Aguilera Rico, José Luis	PRI	2002	CONV			
Aispuro Torres, José Rosas			PRI		PAN-PRD coalition	2010
Almonte Borja, Ramón	PRI	2004	PRD			
Altamirano Toledo, Carlos	PRI	dk	PRD			
Armendáriz García, Pedro	PRI	2001	PAN			
Arvizu Rivas, Aída Marina	PMP-PAS-PDS	2005	PASC			
Bellizia Rosique, Pascual	PRI	2002	PVEM			
Bermúdez Viramontes, Andrés	PRD	~2004	PAN			
Bravo Padilla, Itzcóatl Tonatiuh	IND	1994	PRD			
Buganza Salmerón, Gerardo			PAN		IND	2010
Cárdenas Fonseca, Manuel	PRI	2006	NA			
Cárdenas Hernández, Raymundo			PRD		IND	2010
Cárdenas Márquez, Elías	PRI	1999	CONV			
Carrasco Altamirano, Diódoro Humberto	PRI	2006	PAN			
Castellanos Hernández, Félix			PT	CONV		
Castillo Romero, Patricia Obdulia de Jesús	PRI	2001	CONV			
Castro de la Rosa, Osiel	PRI	2005	PAN			
Cervantes Rodríguez, Aurora	PRI	2001	PRD			
Conde Rodríguez, Elsa de Guadalupe	PMP	2005	PASC			
Dagdug Lützwow, Moisés Félix	PRI	n/a	PRD		PAN	2012
Dávila Esquivel, Humberto	PRI	2006	NA			
De la Torre Jaramillo, Eduardo Sergio	PMP	2005	PASC	PAN		
De la Torre Sánchez, José	PRI	2000	PAN			
Del Toro, Mario Enrique	PRI/PAN	~2000/2003	PRD			
Díaz Garibay, Felipe	PRI	1995	PAN			
Espejel Lazcano, Jaime			PRD		IND	2009
Esteva Salinas, Alberto	PRI	~2000	CONV			
Félix Holguín, Armando Jesús	PRI	2000	PAN			
Flores Maldonado, César	PRI	~2005	PRD			
Franco Cazarez, Ricardo	PRI	1999	PAN			
Gálvez Rodríguez, Fernel Arturo	PRI	~1997	PRD			
García Reyes, Beatriz Eugenia			PAN		CONV/ (return to PAN)	2009/2012
García Vivián, Raúl			PAN		CONV	2010
Godoy Cárdenas, Jorge	PRI	2000	CONV			
Gómez Pasillas, Jacinto	PRI	2006	NA			
González Macías, Jesús	PAN	2002	PVEM			

**Appendix V Table V.4: Party Switchers from the LX Chamber of Deputies (2006-2009), cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LX	Party Switched To during LX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
González Roaro, Benjamín Ernesto	PRI	2006	PAN			
Hernández Hernández, Sergio	PRI	n/a	PRD		PANAL	2011
Hernández Silva, Benjamín	PRI	2000	PRD			
Hernández Valadés, Delio			PT	PASC	PT	2009
Herrera Solís, Anuario Luis	PRI	n/a	PT			
Jiménez Godínez, Miguel Ángel			NA		IND	2009
Jiménez Valenzuela, María Eugenia			PRD	IND		
Joaquín Coldwell, Addy Cecilia	PRI	2005	PAN			
Lizárraga Peraza, Víctor Manuel	PRI	n/a	PRD		PANAL	2011
López Lena Cruz, Humberto			PRD	CONV/IND	PANAL	2010
López Rojas, Alberto			PRD		CONV	2009
Ludlow Kuri, Lorenzo Daniel	PRI	2006	PAN			
Luna Munguía, Alma Lilia			PRD		PRI	2009
Luna Rodríguez, Silvia	PRI	2006	NA			
Macedo Escartín, Miguel Angel	PRI	2003	PRD		PSD	2009
Maciel Ortiz, Ma. Mercedes	PRD	1990	PT			
Manuell-Gómez Angulo, Dolores de María			PAN		PT-CONV coalition	2010
Matías Alonso, Marcos			PT	PRD		
Mendoza Arellano, David	PT	n/a	PRD			
Mollinedo Hernández, Agustín			PAN		PRI	2010
Monreal Ávila, Susana	PRI	1998	PRD			
Morales García, Elizabeth			PVEM	PRI		
Morales Manzo, Jesús Ricardo			PRD		PT/PVEM	2010/2010
Morales Vázquez, Carlos Orsoe	PRI	1995	PRD			
Murillo Flores, Francisco Javier	PRI	2006	PAN			
Navarro Quintero, Miguel Ángel	PRI	2005	PRD		PAN	2009
Ochoa López, Nabor	PRI	2003	PAN	IND	PRI	2009
Orcí Martínez, Juan Adolfo	PRI	2002	PRD			
Ostoa Ortega, Aníbal	PRI/PRD	~1997/ 1998	CONV			
Pacheco Llanes, Ramón Félix	PT	~2003	PRD			
Patrón Montalvo, Jesús Manuel			PRI		PAN-PRD coalition	2010
Pedro Cortés, Santiago Gustavo			PT	PASC		
Peña Sánchez, Miguel Ángel	PRI	1989	PRD			
Peraza Valdez, Ismael			PRI		IND	2010
Pérez Bolaños, Ana Elisa	PRI	2006	NA			
Piñeyro Arias, Irma	PRI	2006	NA			
Pulido Pecero, Pedro	PRD	2005	PAN			

**Appendix V Table V.4: Party Switchers from the LX Chamber of Deputies (2006-2009), cont'd**

Deputy	Prior Party Affiliation	Year of Prior Party Switch	Party Elected Under for LX	Party Switched To during LX	Future Party Affiliation	Year of Future Party Affiliation
Ramos Becerril, Rafael Plácido			PRD	CONV		
Rasgado Corsi, Gloria			PRD		IND	2010
Rivera Villanueva, Erick Marte	PRI	1994	PAN			
Rodríguez Prats, Juan José	PRI	1994	PAN			
Rodríguez Uresti, Enrique	PRI	2006	PAN			
Salgado Amador, Manuel Salvador	PRI	n/a	PVEM			
Samperio Montaña, Juan Ignacio	PRI	n/a	CONV			
San Martín Hernández, Juan Manuel			PRD		CONV	2009
Sánchez Barrios, Carlos			PRD		PAG/ (return to PRD)	2008/2009
Sansores San Román, Layda Elena	PRI/PRD	1996/2001	CONV			
Santos Arreola, Francisco Javier	PAN	2004	PRD			
Suárez del Real y Aguilera, José Alfonso			PRD		IND	2010
Tagle Martínez, Martha Angélica	PRI	1999	CONV			
Torres García, Daniel	PRI	n/a	PRD			
Ulloa Pérez, Emilio			PRD		CONV	2009
Uscanga Cruz, Robinson	PRI	2004	CONV			
Valdés Chávez, Ramón	PRI	2001	CONV			
Varela Lagunas, Tomás José Luis	PRI	n/a	CONV		IND	2010
Vela González, Joaquín Humberto			PT		PRD	2009
Velasco Oliva, Jesús Cuauhtémoc	PRD	2000	CONV			
Verástegui Ostos, César Augusto	PRI	1995	PAN			
Zavaleta Salgado, Ruth			PRD		IND	2009



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