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MOBILIZING THE MINORITY VOTE: A COMPARISON OF MOBILIZATION METHODS AND EXAMINATION OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCING VOTER TURNOUT AMONG MINORITIES

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BY

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DISSERTATION

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my children:

Carter, Chase, Emily and Abigail.

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My advisor once told me that taking classes does not earn you a Ph.D. "A Ph.D. is earned by writing a dissertation," she said. She explained that it is the work of designing and implementing a study, of collecting, analyzing and getting to know your data; of deciding the best way to present the data and convey it in a meaningful way. At the time, I do not think I fully understood how true her statement was. First and foremost, I am grateful to my advisor and mentor, Dr. Lonna Atkeson, for all of her guidance, advice, input and encouragement not only through this project, but through my entire graduate career. She is truly a mentor and a friend and I thank her for everything she has done for me.

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the challenges of getting unlikely voters to the polls and mobilizing new citizens for participation in politics, focusing on racial and ethnic minorities, as well as naturalized citizens. Findings suggest that mobilization may not be a one-size-fits-all approach, as many campaigns assume, but rather that when engaging low-propensity voters, especially those who are unfamiliar with American political parties or the election process, additional factors such as co-ethnic contact and community may play a role. The findings are based on four field experiments conducted during the 2010 general election in four major urban areas in California. The field experiments were conducted using traditional mobilization techniques, including direct mailers, live phone calls and door-to-door canvassing; and utilized the same scripts in all locations and across minority groups. An examination of heterogeneity of treatment effects shows that mobilization is not equally effective for all people; there is variation by mode of contact, geography, nativity and ethnicity. This study is novel in that most mobilization studies target only one minority group, in one location, and often vary either only the mobilization message

being delivered or the mode of contact used. This approach, modeled after real world mobilization campaigns, allows me to have a deeper understanding of how large mobilization efforts really impact various groups of citizens.

This study also includes a survey of a subset of the experimental sample to gather additional individual level information such as measures of group consciousness, political interest, political knowledge, length of residency and SES information. Coupling the survey data with the experimental data, allows for a deeper understanding of how mobilization works beyond controlling for publicly available demographic information. The results show that Asian Americans are more difficult to contact, as are foreign-born citizens who have been in the U.S. an extended period of time. Those who were less interested in politics and those who were less likely to engage in political discussion were also less likely to be successfully contacted.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

An early Saturday afternoon in mid-October, a young Latina mother is taking laundry out of the dryer while her three children play in the backyard. There is a knock at the door. She answers to find two young people who want to talk to her about the upcoming election in November. They ask if she is registered to vote. They ask if she plans to vote. They talk to her about an issue that is going to be on the ballot and encourage her to vote against the measure. She takes the pamphlet the offer with more information about the issue, thank her for talking and leave. After the brief exchange, she returns to her chores and goes on with her day.

Three hundred miles away, on the same day, canvassers knock on the door of a Korean woman. She peeks out the window, looking puzzled, clearly not recognizing the people standing at her door. They tell her they are there to talk about voting and the upcoming election. She shakes her head, indicating she is not interested in talking and does not want to open the door. They ask if they can leave information for her and place a pamphlet on her door. The canvassers leave not knowing if she will ever read the information, mark the contact down on their canvassing sheet, and go on to the next house.

Wednesday night, the week before the election, a canvasser places a phone call to a Chinese immigrant. The canvasser reads from the script and the man on the other end stays on the line and listens to the entire script. He follows up with questions about the ballot issue, informs the canvasser he does plan on voting, the

canvasser thanks the voter and they hang up. The canvasser feels that his contact made an impact and notes successful contact with the man.

The obvious goal of all of the exchanges described above is to increase participation in an upcoming election, but more than that it is to increase turnout among populations of citizens that are among the least likely to participate in politics. Across the country, in hundreds of elections, canvassers go door-to-door and make phone calls, engaging people in conversations about politics, or they may send mailers to lists of people for several weeks before an election to provide information about an upcoming election. Canvassers campaign for candidates, issues, and simply to increase turnout. Some of these exchanges make an impact and those individuals show up at the polls on Election Day, leaving their mark on the election. Others chose not to participate. The brief contact they had with the canvassers did not make enough of an impact to drive them to the polls.

Why is that asking someone to vote works on some people but not on others? How does a two or three minute conversation with a stranger, which seems relatively easy to dismiss, work to motivate some people enough to go out and vote, while others ignore the conversation all together, or even refuse to engage from the outset? Is there something inherently different about the people who are responsive? Maybe some have an underlying interest in politics that has yet to translate to active participation through voting, while others simply do not care at all about politics and dismiss the contact without a second thought.

Most mobilization studies control for covariates, such as gender, political party affiliation, voting history and age through random assignment, but do not

delve into the attitudes, knowledge or previous behaviors of the people they are contacting or examine how these cognitive resources make a difference to the success of mobilization efforts. It is assumed that random assignment controls for all of these differences. This study combines both mobilization experiments and survey research to examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects to start to get at the mechanisms of how mobilization works on those contacted. This will allow us to have a better understanding of whom we are able to make successful contact with, and once contact is made, whom we are able to mobilize. If we are going to increase turnout more than a percentage point here and there, we are going to have to do a better job of understanding what it is about brief contact and fairly impersonal socio-cultural exchanges at the door or on the phone (or even through impersonal means) that make a difference.

This study primarily focuses on the mobilization of minorities, both foreign and natural born, because they are some of the least likely people to vote in any election, but especially in midterm elections, which is when the experiments in this study were run.[1] Minority groups have the potential to be influential in electoral outcomes, especially at the local level (Hajnal 2009; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005), but are currently underrepresented at all levels of government. If participation leads to better representation, it is important to the success of our democratic system to figure out how to best invite them to become voters and turn their potential into reality.

[1] When I use the term 'minority' throughout this dissertation, I am referring to Latino or Hispanic and Asian populations. While African-Americans are a minority population, they are not part of the focus of this dissertation and therefore are not part of the minorities that I am referring to throughout.

The dissertation begins by looking at the existing literature on minority political participation and previous mobilization experiments that have focused on increasing minority turnout. Chapter two will describe the four experiments conducted as part of this study, present the results of those experiments and examines for heterogeneous effects of mobilization treatments on voter turnout across minority groups and foreign born citizens. Chapter three will use statistical matching corrections to verify the findings from chapter two, and attempt to see if different statistical matching techniques produce different results. Chapter four will present the results of the survey data, focusing on political resources such as political knowledge, attitudes, trust and efficacy, all of which are known to influence political participation. Chapter five will combine data from the experiment and survey to see if those resources had an impact on whom we were able to contact and who turned out to vote in the election. The dissertation will conclude with a discussion of the findings and how mobilization works on individuals and where future research should focus in order to increase our understanding of the mobilization process.

Minority Participation and Mobilization

The United States is and always has been a nation of immigrants and is made up of people from various backgrounds and experiences. In the last three decades the U.S. has experienced major changes to the demographic composition in the population, largely driven by the population growth of Latinos, who are now the largest minority group in the U.S. and comprised 16.3 percent of the population in 2010, up from only 6.4 percent in 1980 according to the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). People of Asian descent make up the second largest growing group in the United States, more than tripling the percentage of the population they make up between 1980 (1.5 percent) and 2010 (4.9 percent). Figure 1 shows the demographic makeup of the U.S. from 1950 through 2010, and includes projections out until 2060. [2] It is clear that the U.S. is going to continue to get more diverse as time goes on, with minorities collectively outnumbering whites around 2040.

Ethnic diversity seems to pose a challenge to quality representation in the United States. Throughout history, as today, minorities and immigrants have participated in lower numbers than whites or natural born citizens due to both institutional constraints such as citizenship or access to the ballot (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Chung 1996; Garcia and Arce 1988; Lien et al. 2001; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Lopez 2011; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989) or sociological

[2] In Figure 1, whites represent non-Hispanic whites. Hispanics/Latinos includes people of any Hispanic/Latino background as defined by the Census Bureau (Puerto Rican, Mexican, South American, Cuban, etc.). Asian includes people of any Asian decent as defined by the Census (Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, Nepali, Philippine, etc.).

(Leighley and Nagler 2013; Lewis-Beck et al. 2009; DeSipio 1996; Lien 1994) and psychological (Tam Cho 1999; Lien et al. 2004) resources related to participation.

If we define representation in terms of members of congress voting the way a constituent would vote on any piece of legislation, given a dichotomous choice between yay and nay, low participation by some individuals *may* not create a threat to representation, but when we begin to think about representation in terms of descriptive or symbolic representation, or the idea of having people who "look like us" in positions of power, systematic low participation by certain groups in society causes us to question just how representative government is (Sanchez and Morin 2011; Mansbridge 1999, 2003; Pitkin 1967). But, if representation is measured in terms of overall substantive outcomes, then the idea that large segments of the population who may have drastically different needs and concerns due to their various backgrounds and socioeconomic status are underrepresented is troubling.

California provides an excellent case study to help us gain a better understanding of minority political participation and political behavior. California is home to the largest percentage of minorities in the United States and has the highest number of foreign-born residents. Demographic change in California far outpaces change in the rest of the country. From 2000 to 2010, the Latino population in California increased by 27.8% and Latinos now account for approximately 37.6% of California's total population. Even with that dramatic increase, it was those of Asian descent who made up the fastest growing population in California. The Asian population increased 31.5% over the last ten years and now account for 13% of the total population in California. In addition to an increasing number of immigrants, a

greater percentage of immigrants are choosing to naturalize (Passel 2007). According to the Office of Immigration Statistics, 9.8 million immigrants naturalized between 1996 and 2008, with the largest number of new Americans living in California (Rytina and Caldera 2008).

Changes in the demographic makeup of the state and an increased number of naturalized immigrants could create changes in the political landscape as well, but minorities, especially foreign-born citizens have long been, and continue to be, underrepresented in the electorate. In 2010, Asians made up 12% of the voting eligible population in California and 9% of registered voters, while Latinos made up 23% of the voting eligible population, but only 14% of registered voters. Whites, on the other hand, are over represented in the electorate, making up 62.8% of the voting eligible population but 66.2% of registered voters (PPIC 2010).[3] Turnout has historically been even more disproportionate, with whites casting 70% of the votes in the 2000 election in California (Citrin and Highton 2002). Turnout among minorities is increasing however, and in the 2010 general election minorities voted in higher numbers than in any previous midterm election. Latinos accounted for almost 19% of the total number of votes cast in the 2010 election in California and Asians accounted for nearly 9% of the vote (Romero 2010). While this is something to be celebrated, the percent of the vote made up by Latinos and Asians still fell far short of representative of the voting eligible population.

[3] Like turnout in general, minority turnout tends to be higher and has been increasing in presidential elections but not state or local elections (Niven 2004).

Figure 1.1. The Changing Racial/Ethnic Composition of the United States, 1950-2060



Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, "*Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990*, *For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States*", *"Census 2010"*, and *"2012 National Population Projections: Summary Tables"*.

Projections estimate that if current trends hold steady that over the next several decades, the participation gap will persist in California, with whites still outvoting Asians and Latinos in 2040, long after Latinos have become the majority (Citrin and Highton 2002). Increasing the turnout and closing the participation gap is important for several reasons. One reason especially important for our newest citizens is that participation has been found to enhance democratic citizenship (Putnam 2000). Participating in elections may help new citizens incorporate into their new communities and increase their level of trust in government. More importantly, literature has shown that when people vote, politicians are more likely to respond to their preferences (Fiorina 1999; Verba, et al., 1995) and provide more

substantive representation through policy outcomes (DeLuca 1995;Hill and Leighley 1992). As California and the United States struggle with an ever-changing economy, competition for social goods and services will continue. Those who do not participate are likely to be left out of the conversation, underrepresented, and possibly benefit less from governmental economic and social programs. In an effort to gain information on how to better close the participation gap that exists, this study proposes to gain understanding of who a minority voter is and how to best invite them into the political system and encourage participation. By including both Latinos and Asians in the study, the two fastest growing minority groups in the U.S., this study aims to expand our knowledge about the similarities and differences between the two groups when it comes to political participation and the ability to mobilize low-propensity voters. I test traditional mobilization methods aimed at increasing participation to determine how to effectively mobilize minority and immigrant voters. Learning more about how to mobilize minorities in California has implications for political participation of minorities nationwide.

Mobilization and Resources: Key to Minority Participation

Many studies have examined the act of voting and political participation by minorities. Previous research tends to focus on one of four areas: (1) *demographic or socioeconomic resources* such as age, ethnicity, education, income or citizenship status (Uhalner, Cain and Kiewiet 1994; Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Leighley 2001; Lien 2004; Barreto 2005; Barreto, Ramierez and Woods 2005; Xu 2005; Garcia and Sanchez 2008), (2) *cognitive resources* such as knowledge, trust, efficacy, and ethnic identity (Lien 1994; Tam Cho 1999; Stokes 2003; Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004;

Hero and Tolbert 2004; Lien 2004; Chong and Rogers 2005; Sanchez 2006), (3) *mobilization efforts* encouraging minorities to participate (Michelson 2003a, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Ramirez 2005, 2007; Panagopoulos and Green 2011; Wong 2005; Michelson and Garcia Bedolla 2007, 2009; Green and Michelson 2009; Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011) or (4) *structural barriers to participation* such as ballot language or voter ID laws (Jones Correa 2005; Xu 2005; Barreto, Nuno and Sanchez 2009; Atkeson, Bryant, Hall, Saunders, and Alvarez 2010). I propose that these items cannot and should not be treated as exclusive causes of participation, but that they all work together, motivating individuals to vote. This concept is similar to the idea of the sociocultural cognition model proposed, but not tested, by Lisa Garcia-Bedolla and Melissa Michelson (2012), which states that mobilization's effectiveness is rooted in the effect it has on individual cognition, what I refer to as cognitive resources, and that cognition must be situated within (the voter's) sociocultural context (Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson 2012, p.3). They argue that mobilization works on those individuals who are willing to adopt the schema of a voter through a brief sociocultural interaction (e.g., canvassing or phone calls) (p.9). Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson limit their model to data available in voter registration files, essentially demographic variables such as age, gender and ethnicity, to try to identify what may cause some individuals to be moved to vote, and use these demographic variables as their measure of "identity" (i.e., either a voter or non-voter) to determine who adopted the schema and who did not.[4]

[4] It is important to note that their use of the word schema opens a debate on what schema really means. In context, their use of the term schema seems to represent an internal self-identification or an identity. When I am speaking about creating voters through mobilization, I am referring to

Combining relatively rich observational and survey research with field experiment methodology to deal with major shortcomings in both areas, such as a lack of externally valid causality in cognitive resources literature, and field experiments literature that fails to unpack heterogeneity of effects or examine the mechanisms behind increased turnout, this study takes the sociocultural cognition model a step further by modeling and testing the ideas Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson begin to develop in their book, adding a level of understanding to mobilization by looking beyond descriptive demographics to cognitive resources such as political knowledge, interest in politics, or previous political experience. These resources exist prior to any attempted contact by a mobilization campaign and when confronted with the decision to act on the encouragement to vote they may be the key to successful mobilization. It is hard to believe that someone who had no interest in politics will be moved by a two-minute conversation at the door and be moved to the point that they begin to identify as a voter, but someone who has a moderate level of interest is likely to be much more receptive to the conversation and possibly the message being presented and be moved - or mobilized - to action.

As is shown in the model in Figure 2, cognitive resources for a potential voter consist of political interest, political knowledge, political discussion, trust in government, efficacy, and non-voting participation. In this study, we are studying minority voters specifically and the experiments are focused on tapping into

creating an identity as a voter. One can see themselves being an active participant in the political process as part of how they see themselves and the varying parts of their identity (e.g., I am a mother, I am a brother, I am an engineer, I am a citizen, I am a voter).

identity as a minority and a sense of group consciousness, so I also include group consciousness or a sense of linked fate as a cognitive resource. These resources are certainly affected by one's background, demographics and socio-economic status, and as the arrow shows, I expect that they both play a role on whether or not one turns out to vote. Before I begin to test the model, it is important to understand the existing literature on minority political behavior and mobilization of minorities.

Figure 1.2. Resources Contributing to Voting by Minorities



Participation and Minorities

Previous research suggests that low rates of citizenship or issues relating to immigration status are a possible explanation for disproportionately low turnout when looking at turnout as a percentage of the population, (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Chung 1996; Garcia and Arce 1988; Lien et al. 2001; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Lopez 2011; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989) but even when we look only at those immigrants and minorities that have naturalized or were born in the United States, participation lags behind that of whites or African Americans. Of the 13.4 million Latinos in California, only 40% are eligible to vote, whereas 57% of Asians and 77% of whites are eligible to vote. Even though Asians have a higher percent of their total population that are eligible voters, they lag approximately 18% behind Latinos in terms of turnout when controlling for eligibility and population size (Citrin and Highton 2002). One reason for this may be because Asian eligible voters

in California are more than twice as likely as Latino eligible voters to be naturalized or foreign born citizens, at 70% and 28%, respectively (Pew Hispanic Center 2010), and research shows that foreign born citizens of both ethnic groups are less likely to vote than natural born citizens (Citrin and Highton 2002; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004).[5]

Low turnout among minority groups may also be related to demographic causes such as low income, low education or a younger population (Chung 1996; Conway 2000; DeSipio, 1996; Hero and Campbell 1996; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, et al. 1995). This traditional SES model seems to work well for Latinos, however it does not work when explaining low turnout among Asians (Lien, Conway and Wong 1997; Uhlaner, Cain and Kieweit 1989). Asians tend to be comparable to whites in terms of income and some Asian groups have higher average levels of education than whites. Previous research shows that when controlling for traditional socioeconomic indicators related to voting, Asian voting lags as much as 20% behind whites (Citrin and Highton 2002; Jamieson, Shin and Day 2002).

Another likely reason turnout is low among Latinos and Asians is that they are often the least likely to be mobilized or contacted by campaigns, parties or interest groups (Barreto 2005; Chung 1996; Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000; Wong 2006) and mobilization has been found to play an important role in participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). As Rosenstone and Hansen stated, "people

[5] Although research on Latinos has shown that the context of the election, such as presence of an immigration related ballot issue, may change this in a given election (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espendshade 2001). Additionally, research has shown that over time, foreign-born Latinos are indistinguishable from native-born Latinos in terms of participation (Barreto, et al. 2005).

participate in electoral politics because someone encourages or inspires them to take part" (1993, 161) and mobilization studies have shown that door-to-door canvassing, telephone calls and direct mailing are all effective ways to increase turnout (Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011; Gerber and Green 2000, 2001; Green and Gerber 2008; Green and Michelson 2009; Michelson 2003a, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Michelson and Garcia Bedolla 2007, 2009; Panagopoulos and Green 2011; Ramirez 2005, 2007; Wong 2005), however, many political campaigns do not reach out to the minority communities. When candidates and campaigns ignore a large segment of the population, they send an implicit message that they are not interested in those citizens' votes and likely, their opinions or interests. If the increasing minority populations were turning out in greater numbers, candidates would no longer be able to ignore what equates to a sizeable amount of the population. One way to increase turnout, and end the vicious circle of lack of voting and lack of mobilization efforts by major parties and candidates, may be through targeted mobilization efforts by grass roots efforts through interest groups, or community-based organizations.

Mobilization: Modes of Contact and Mixed Results

Mobilization, or the act of asking or encouraging someone to participate, or more specifically to 'get out the vote', can increase turnout anywhere from 1 to 12 percent depending on the method of mobilization used, the person contacted and the context of the campaign (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber, Green and Green 2003; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003; Mann 2010; Michelson 2003a, 2006, 2006-7; Nickerson 2006; Ramirez 2005, 2007; Wong

2005), but in many cases mobilization efforts may not increase turnout at all and given that information, it is important to try to narrow down why previous results are so mixed. If targeted mobilization efforts can increase participation, that may be key to help close the participation gap that continues to exist in California and nationwide. This research proposes to examine the effects of targeted mobilization efforts on minorities, especially targeting those new Americans that are increasing in record numbers in an attempt to find a way to increase turnout.

Mobilization studies, field experiments in particular, have focused on the modes of mobilization most commonly used by campaigns during elections. The most common modes of mobilization are door-to-door canvassing, phone calls (both live and robocalls) and direct mailers.

If you ask anyone who studies mobilization, they will tell you that personal contact, especially face-to-face contact, is the most effective way to mobilize voters. Years of survey research show that there is a positive relationship between personal contact and turnout (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993; Leighley 2001; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1987; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) In the first major field experiment on mobilization, Gerber and Green (2000) find that door-to-door canvassing significantly increased turnout by about 9.8 percent. Follow up studies have consistently supported their results in a variety of types of elections, locations and among low-propensity voters (Arceneaux 2005; Green and Gerber 2008; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003; Matland and Murray 2008; Michelson 2003a, 2005, 2006).

Phone calls are ineffective when done by commercial call centers (Gerber and Green 2000, 2005; Cardy 2005), but can have small, yet significant effects when done by campaigns, organization members or local volunteers (Nickerson 2004; Ramirez 2005; Wong 2005). Both non-partisan messages and partisan messages have produced an increase in turnout, but among targeted populations (Michelson, Garcia-Bedolla and McConnell 2009; Nickerson 2004; Ramirez 2005; Wong 2005), while both partisan and non-partisan GOTV messages in the general population produced no results (Cardy 2005; Gerber and Green 2000; McNulty 2005). Gerber and Green (2000, 2001, 2005) suggest that professional phone banks, especially located out of state, with obvious generic scripts may be the reason for low to no effect, however studies with local live phone banks have also produced no effects (Cardy 2005; McNulty 2005). When it comes to live phone calls it could be the quality or content of the message that matters. While quality is difficult to control because it may vary by volunteer, this study will use the same content across all groups and regions and all phone calls will be made by live, local, primarily bi-lingual, volunteers.

Direct mail has consistently been least effective at mobilizing, however a few cases have found that mobilization is possible with direct mailings, especially when voters receive multiple mailings (Gerber and Green 2000), when utilizing social pressure to turnout (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008; Green and Gerber 2010) or when the target is minority, low-propensity voters (Matland and Murray 2008; Wong 2005). In fact, Matland and Murray (2008) found that direct mail targeting Latinos in a high visibility election in Texas had a stronger effect than mail in most

previous studies.[6] They hypothesize that this is because there was very little outreach to Latino voters during the election, so mail may be more effective for those who are low-propensity and often largely ignored by parties and campaigns. However, several other studies targeting similar voters (Ramirez 2003, Ramirez, Gerber and Green 2003, Trivedi 2005) have found mail to have no significant effect. The largest effect for direct mail was found in Brownsville, TX, while no effects were found in places such as Brooklyn, NY and Los Angeles, CA. These inconsistencies could be attributed to the context of the elections or even the physical environment.

A few studies have tested the effects of different messages in Get Out the Vote and partisan campaigns. Again, results have been inconsistent. Most studies have shown that message does not matter (Carrillo 2008; Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson 2009; Gerber and Green 2000; Matland and Murray 2008; Michelson 2003a; Nickerson 2008), however recent studies have begun to indicate that message may play a role in effective mobilization. Gerber and Rodgers (2009) found that voters who received a message telling them the upcoming election would be high turnout actually turned out in higher numbers than those who received a message telling them that the election would be low turnout and Valenzuela and Michelson (2011) have found that GOTV messages increase turnout more than placebo messages. Additionally, and more directly related to this study, they found that only a Latino identity based message moved Latino voters to turnout in greater numbers. Similarly, Trivedi (2005) found that a U.S. citizen message had a greater effect than a generic GOTV message for Asian Indians in New York. These findings may suggest

[6] With the exception of social pressure studies.

that for low-propensity or new voters, who may not be familiar with U.S. politics or have a long history of political participation, a simple GOTV or informational message about politics or policy may not be effective. These newest and least likely voters may need a more personal appeal telling them how participation can affect either their ethnic or social group or how policies will affect the community in general.

Field experiments on mobilization have occurred in almost every type of election, from school board to presidential; have targeted low-propensity voters, likely voters, voters on the fence, new voters, minority voters or all registered voters; and have been conducted in every region of the country. This may be one reason that there have been very different, and sometimes inconsistent, results for each of the main modes of contact. Looking at the existing literature it appears that it may be harder to mobilize voter in larger cities than smaller ones, and that both personal contact and the messenger (local as opposed to professional phone center) also matter. Additionally, the attitudes of the voter may play a role in the effectiveness of mobilization campaigns. If context of the election is contributing to the effectiveness of mobilization, as previous research suggests it might (Valenzuela and Michelson 2011), it is important to continue studies in an effort to find what conditions consistently determine success so that we can begin to effectively increase voter turnout in an efficient manner across electoral contexts.

Latino Mobilization Studies

There have been a handful of mobilization studies on Latinos over the last decade. These studies have focused on all types of contact, including door-to-door

canvassing, mailers, live phone calls, robocalls, and have even explored the effects of co-ethnic contact (Michelson 2003a, 2005; Michelson, Garcia-Bedolla and McConnell 2009; Ramirez 2005; Sinclair et al. 2007). While studies have taken place across various communities, each individual study is generally conducted in one community. The proposed study here expands the current literature on Latino mobilization by including natural born and foreign-born Latinos in three very different cities in California.

Previous research shows that Latinos can be mobilized using appropriate targeting and personal methods such as door-to-door canvassing and phone calls (Michelson 2003a, 2005; Michelson, Garcia-Bedolla and McConnell 2009; Ramirez 2005; Valenzuela and Michelson 2011) and co-ethnic and co-partisans appear to be more effective in some circumstances (Michelson 2005, 2006), but have not been successfully mobilized with mailers (Michelson, García Bedolla and Green 2007, García Bedolla and Michelson 2009). Research has shown that co-ethnic contact may increase turnout (Barreto and Nuno 2009; Michelson 2003a; Sinclair et al. 2007), however the results have been mixed on this finding, with at least one experiment finding that canvassers of any ethnicity were equally effective (Michelson 2006).

Many studies have primarily focused on either a single location or a single method of contact in the design, although a few have compared multiple methods of contact. Melissa Michelson did the groundbreaking work in the study of Latino mobilization field experiments, and in her first field experiment on Latino voter mobilization, Michelson (2003) found that face-to-face canvassing was effective in

the small community of Dos Palos, CA. While she did test different messages (ethnic solidarity versus civic duty), she only used door-to-door contact in the experiment. Follow up door-to-door studies in Fresno and Maricopa County continued to show that face-to-face contact could increase turnout among Latinos, but that the messenger also matters, with co-ethnics and co-partisans being more effective at mobilization (2005).[7] A study in a heavily Latino community in 2004 (Matland and Murray 2008) found that both door-to-door canvassing and mailers had a positive effect on turnout. A large-scale six-city study in 2002 found that Latino turnout was not increased by robocalls or direct mail, but was increased by live phone calls (by bilingual staff) did increase turnout (Ramirez 2005).

Given the different findings could be due to differences in election context, it is critical to replicate these findings during one election. Holding election constant provides better ability to examine the role that the mobilization modes themselves are having by limiting the a large amount of the effect that the candidates, issues, level of information available, or average rate of turnout across different types elections has on the results. Missing from the existing studies is a field experiment that covers multiple types of mobilization in the same election in the same areas, such as one modeled after the Green and Gerber 2000 study that compares live phone calls, door-to-door canvassing and direct mail. Further, there are few studies that of Latino mobilization that take place in more than one area. Using the same mailers and scripts in different locations may help us understand some of the

[7] Although as mentioned previously, another study of Michelson's showed that co-ethnic contact did not increase turnout (2006), so this may be a product of the election, the quality of the canvassers or the community.

variation in findings in pervious mobilization studies. It could be that personal contact is more successful among minorities in smaller towns, while less personal forms of contact, such as mailers or phone calls are more successful in urban areas where people are more likely to live in apartment complexes or even less likely to open the door to strangers. The proposed study aims at addressing both of these gaps in the current literature, by contacting Latinos in multiple cities through various methods of contact in each location to determine the which, if any, is the most effective form of mobilization among Latino minorities.

Asian Mobilization Studies

Unlike studies on Latino mobilization, there have been very few experimental studies that focus on the fastest growing immigrant population, Asian Americans. Janelle Wong (2005) had the first major experiment on Asian-American mobilization, which was conducted on Asian Americans in highly dense Asian neighborhoods in Los Angeles. The study used both phone calls and direct mailers, although participants only received one or the other, not both treatments. The study found that both mail and a live Election Day phone call appeared to increase turnout.[8] The study also found that the effects varied for those with different national origin, with Chinese-Americans having lower turnout out than other Asian groups (Koreans, Filipinos, Japanese, and Indian) who were contacted. This study used a simple GOTV message reminding voters of Election Day, with no partisan, civic duty, ethnic or issue appeals.

[8] Statistically significant using a one-tailed test, as is common practice in many mobilization studies.

The finding that Chinese-Americans voted in much lower numbers is interesting and important in exploring the effect of mobilization and low turnout among Asian Americans. Chinese-Americans are the primary minority group in the San Francisco region of the study and it will be interesting to see if the same effects hold true. Chinese have large, dense communities in Los Angeles (where Wong's study took place), but have a greater presence and more political power in San Francisco. If the effects are different, this would suggest that community and possibly even a higher sense of group consciousness may play a role in the effectiveness of mobilization campaigns. If the findings are similar, this may suggest that there is something unique about the Chinese culture that is affecting their current turnout, such historically low trust in government (Ong and Nakanishi 1996) or a history of a lack of electoral opportunities or participation in China (Guo 2007), especially at a statewide or national level.

A study on Indian (Hindu and Sikh) Americans (Trivedi 2005) suggests that mail contact can increase turnout, regardless of the message used, but that a U.S. citizen appeal had a higher effect than any other message. Although the findings of this study did not reach statistical significance because of small sample size, they are important to consider because they focus on an understudied population and question and may have important implications about the effect of messages used to increase turnout, especially among new citizens. Additionally, the finding that mail may have increase turnout among another Asian minority group is important for this study, which seeks to examine how modes of mobilization may produce different results for different groups.

Also using mail in their studies, an experiment on Asian-Americans in Texas (Gimpel, Cho and Shaw 2005) found that mail focusing on neighborhood interests did increase participation, but with limited statistical power, while a studies on mail and live phone calls in Southern California (Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson 2009) found that live phone calls do result in higher turnout, but that multilingual mail, in the form of an, a voter guide, does not increase turnout among Asian Americans.

Taking the experimental studies on Asian Americans into account, telephone calls and mailers have been tested and the results have largely failed to reach statistical significance or have been mixed, finding that successfully increasing turnout through mobilization efforts may depend on the group being targeted, the number of contacts and that message may matter. What has not been studied for Asian Americans in an experimental setting is the mobilizing effect of contact through door-to-door canvassing.

Gaps in the Current Literature

This purpose of the current study is to further explore the effects of targeted mobilization efforts to address and explore a few of the gaps in the mobilization literature. One of the major gaps in the literature is the lack of studies that examine Asian-American mobilization, especially using the mobilization technique that has been found most effective, door-to-door canvassing. If personal contact is key in increasing turnout, as has been found in previous mobilization research, and supported by the finding that personal telephone calls are effective for mobilizing Asian Americans, researchers should be exploring the effects of face-to-face contact with this low propensity voting group. It is not out of the question that door-to-door

contact may not be as effective with a group that has lower levels of group consciousness or trust, as has been found with Asian Americans (Chung 1996; Lien et al. 2004), however it is worth exploring, as this study aims to do.

Another key area this study addresses, that has largely been ignored in the mobilization literature, is testing the same mobilization efforts across multiple minority groups (Asians and Latinos) by the same organization, using the same mailers or scripts, in the same election. Past experiments, even those focusing on multiple ethnic groups (Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson 2013; Michelson, Garcia-Bedolla, and Green 2007) tend to isolate experiments in particular areas, limit themselves to one election, or focus on one ethnic group at a time and then perform a meta-analysis of the data. This experiment allows us to determine if mobilization can be applied to all minorities and new immigrants in the same way, in one large campaign and have the same effect across minority groups, or if efforts must be targeted to a specific ethnic group by a specific ethnic group.

While several Latino mobilization studies have tested the effects of co-ethnic contact, only a few studies have focused on the effects of different messages on minorities (Michelson, García Bedolla, and Green 2007; Valenzuela and Michelson 2011), especially for naturalized citizens. Although not statistically significant, Trivedi (2005) found that using a U.S. citizen appeal had a greater effect than generic GOTV messages for the South Asian population in her study. I examine if this holds true for additional minority groups outside of South Asians and I incorporate a test comparing a civic duty based message to an informational message in the study.

Most importantly, this study aims to address one of the biggest problems in the current mobilization literature, understanding why mobilization works. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) proposed that if people were asked to vote, encouraged to vote, made to think that elites care about their opinions, they would be more likely to turnout, and yet many people are successfully contacted and asked to vote in mobilization campaigns, and still do not turnout. Why not? It could be that they do not see the benefits of voting. It could be that they simply are not interested. By looking at the characteristics of individuals as more than just covariates, this study will add to our understanding of how mobilization is working, or more specifically, who is mobilization turning out and who it is not?

Examining these additional questions using field experiments during the 2010 general election and a follow up survey of those in the treatment and control group, I aim to fill some of the gaps that exist in the current mobilization literature and further knowledge of how to increase participation among some of our newest citizens and least likely voters.

CHAPTER 2

Mobilizing Minorities: Four Field Experiments in California

The demographic makeup of the United States is ever changing and nowhere is that more evident than in California, making it a great case study for minority mobilization. The 2010 Census reports show that California is a minority majority state, with minorities now making up 60% of the state's population. More than one-fourth (28%) of all Hispanics in the U.S. now reside in California and in the last ten years the number of Asians in California has increased by almost 32% (U.S. Census 2010).[9] Latinos make up approximately 38% of the state's population and Asians now comprise 13% of the state's population. These changes in the demographic makeup and an increased number of immigrants from different cultural and political backgrounds could create changes in the political landscape of the state,

[9] The terms Hispanic and Latino will be used interchangeably in this chapter and where the masculine term Latino is used, it is used to refer to both Latinos and Latinas, rather than using the more inclusive Latin@.

and possibly the entire country, but minorities have long been underrepresented in the electorate and continue to turnout at rates lower than expected based on population estimates. In 2000, Asians made up 12% of the population in California, but only 8% of those registered to vote and cast only 7% of the votes in that year's presidential election (Citrin and Highton 2002). Previous research shows that even when controlling for traditional socioeconomic indicators related to voting, Asian voting lags as much as 20% behind whites (Citrin and Highton 2002). This same research shows similar numbers when looking at Hispanic participation, who lag 18 percent behind whites in turnout, although their overall gap is reduced somewhat after taking into account citizenship status.

Closing the participation gap is important for all minorities, but especially for immigrants. Political participation helps immigrants become accepted as members of the political community and provides representation for the racial and ethnic groups to which they belong (Citrin and Highton 2002). Minorities also tend to live in areas with high concentrations of co-ethnics and other minorities. When they participate in lower numbers, those cities are likely to see a turnout effect bias that could directly affect minorities (Hajnal 2010).

One way to increase turnout among minorities may be to simply ask them, or invite them into the process through mobilization. It has been widely accepted that mobilization is key to increasing voter turnout (Leighley 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and research shows that in the past minorities, especially naturalized citizens, are less likely to be contacted by political parties and interest groups than other citizens (Barreto 2005; Wong 2005; Lien, et al 2004).

Many studies on voter mobilization focus on a personalized mobilization technique such as phone calls (Ha and Karlan 2009; Ramírez 2007; Nickerson 2006; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006; Bennion 2005), door-to-door canvassing (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2010; Gerber and Green 2004; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003; Michelson 2003a, 2006). Other studies focus on indirect methods such as mailings (Mann 2010; Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008; Green and Gerber 2004) or radio advertising (Panagopoulos and Green 2008, 2011). There are several studies (Nickerson 2005; García Bedolla and Michelson 2009), including the groundbreaking New Haven study in 2000 (Gerber and Green) that combine some or all of the traditional methods of mobilization in the experimental design.

Most mobilizations studies of minority populations examine the same modes of contact as the New Haven study and how ethnicity plays a role in receiving mobilizing cues. Several studies have focused specifically on Latinos (Panagopoulos and Green 2011; Ramírez 2007; Michelson 2003a, 2006), but there have been only handful of studies on Asian Americans (García Bedolla and Michelson 2009; Wong 2005). Even fewer have looked at heterogeneous groups of minority voters across varying geographic locations. The notable exceptions are studies by Michelson, García Bedolla and McConnell (2009), which targeted groups not likely to be voters, including young voters, Latinos and Asian Americans in four separate experiments, with different election contexts and different messages; a study by Valenzuela and Michelson (2011) that looked at Latinos in neighboring cities; and a series of reports which summarize a collection of experiments conducted in California by various

outreach organizations from 2006 through 2008 (Michelson, García Bedolla and Green 2007, 2008, 2009).

Where this study differs from many previous studies of mobilization is that it uses the same treatments in terms of scripts and mailers, across both multiple groups of minority, immigrant and low-propensity voters and multiple geographic locations in a single election. This approach allows us to examine how effective traditional methods of campaigning are across heterogeneous groups and communities. While most experiments on mobilization of minorities have used one or two scripts in a single location (García Bedolla and Michelson 2009; Michelson 2003a, 2006), or in the case of Michelson, García Bedolla and McConnell (2009), in two neighboring minority neighborhoods, few studies have used the same treatment on different targeted minority populations across quite varied locations. This study fills an important gap in the literature by reversing the traditional mobilization experimental design. Where as most designs hold the population and location (A) constant and vary the mode of contact or message (B), this study uses the same messages and modes of contact (B) and varies the location and population (A). Besides being a novel approach to the study of mobilization, this is important practical examination of mobilization political campaigns because candidates, interest groups, and grassroots organizations often produce only one script or strategy for all voters in a state, (or even for use nationwide) and it is unconfirmed by research that mobilization techniques work the same for all people in all areas.

Why Focus on Mobilizing Minorities?

Understanding how mobilization works for minorities is essential if we are going to increase turnout among these low-propensity groups, which is important for several reasons. In terms of both political representation and political outcomes, democracy may be most directly affected by voting because policy makers are most likely to respond to those who show up at the polls and participate (Hill and Leighley 1992; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), so when Asians and Latinos consistently turn out in low numbers, their needs are not addressed and they may lack substantive representation (Hajnal 2010).

One reason for low turnout among minority groups may be related to demographic causes such as low income, low education, and a younger population (Chung 1996; Conway 2000; DeSipio, 1996; Hero and Campbell 1996; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, et al. 1995). This traditional SES model seems to work well in explaining turnout behavior for Latinos, however it does not work when explaining low turnout among Asians (Lien, Conway and Wong 1997; Uhlaner, Cain and Kieweit 1989). Asians tend to be comparable to whites in terms of income and some Asian groups have higher average levels of education than whites.

Another likely reason turnout is low among Latinos and Asians is that they are often the least likely to be mobilized or contacted by campaigns, parties or interest groups (Barreto 2005; Chung 1996; Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000; Wong 2006), and mobilization has been found to play an important role in participation. As Rosenstone and Hansen stated, "people participate in electoral politics because someone encourages or inspires them to take part" (1993, 161) and mobilization

studies have shown that door-to-door canvassing, telephone calls and direct mailing are all effective ways to increase turnout (Gerber and Green 2000; Michelson 2003a; Wong 2005), however, many political campaigns do not reach out to the minority communities. When candidates and campaigns ignore a large segment of the population, they send a message that they are not interested in those citizens' votes and subsequently their opinions or interests. If the increasing minority populations were turning out in greater numbers, candidates would no longer be able to ignore what equates to a sizeable amount of the population. One way to increase turnout may be through targeted mobilization efforts by interest groups, grass roots or community-based organizations, which is the focus of this study.

Previous research shows that Latinos can be mobilized using appropriate targeting and personal methods such as door-to-door canvassing and phone calls (Michelson 2003a, 2005; Michelson, Garcia-Bedolla and McConnell 2009; Ramirez 2005; Valenzuela and Michelson 2011). Research has also shown that co-ethnic contact may increase turnout when personal contact methods are used (Barreto and Nuno 2009; Sinclair et al. 2007), however the results have been mixed on this finding, with at least one experiment finding that canvassers of any ethnicity were equally effective (Michelson 2006). Impersonal methods such as direct mailers have failed to produce many significant increases in turnout among Latinos (Michelson, García Bedolla and Green 2007, García Bedolla and Michelson 2009), but the results on this have been mixed as well (Matland and Murray 2010).

Unlike studies on Latino mobilization, there have been very few experimental studies that focus on the fastest growing immigrant population, Asian Americans.

Janelle Wong (2005) had the first major experiment on Asian-American mobilization, which found that both mail and a live Election Day phone call appeared to increase turnout. Trevidi (2005) and Gimpel, Cho and Shaw (2005) also both found that mail could increase turnout among Asian populations. However, Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson (2009) found that while live phone calls were effective at increasing turnout for Asians, direct mail was not.

Given that minorities and foreign-born citizens historically have been less likely to be the target of mobilization campaigns they may be more susceptible to successful mobilization when they are contacted, even when contacted by means that have historically been found to have little effect on turnout such as direct mail. The hypotheses tested in the field experiments in this study are as follows:

H1: Phone calls will increase voter turnout across minority groups and geographic locations

H2: Direct personal contact through door-to-door canvassing will increase voter turnout across minority groups and geographic locations

H3: Direct mail will increase voter turnout across minority groups and geographic locations

The Field Experiments

To further examine the role of mobilization on increasing turnout among minorities and naturalized citizens, four field experiments were conducted simultaneously in California during the 2010 General Election. This was an interesting election year for the study and in California in particular. Nationwide,

Democrats feared losing control of the House, including several seats in California. A large number of changed seats meant that California's own Nancy Pelosi would lose her position as Speaker of the House. Longtime Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer was in a highly competitive race and at risk of losing her seat to popular Republican candidate Carly Fiorina. In addition to exciting federal races, the California governor's race was on the ballot during the midterm election. With Schwarzenegger leaving office, California would have a new non-incumbent governor for the first time in seven years. There were several statewide ballot initiatives receiving national attention as well, such as Proposition 19, which would legalize and tax the sale of marijuana, however there were no issues that specifically dealt with minority or immigrant policies.

The lack of minority focused issues in this election environment is quite beneficial, given that previous research has found that minorities and foreign-born citizens are more easily mobilized when there are ballot issues that affect them directly, such as California Propositions 187 and 209 (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espendshade 2001). California Proposition 187 was a 1994 ballot initiative that created a state-run citizenship-screening program to prevent illegal immigrants from using health care, public education and other social services in California. Proposition 209 was an initiative that prohibited public employers and universities from considering sex, race or ethnicity for admissions, which ultimately lead to lower enrollment for minorities at many of the state's

universities.[10] The lack of minority-focused propositions and an exciting midterm election provides a good environment to study the effects of minority and foreign-born targeted mobilization efforts.

The field experiments were designed and conducted by partnering with the non-partisan group based out of San Francisco, California. The partner organization is a California Collaborative 501 (c)(3) that was established in 2004 as the first ever statewide collaborative that focused on multi-ethnic mobilization, with an extra focus on voter education and increasing turnout among naturalized citizens. The organization was active during the 2004 Presidential election, the 2006 General election, and several local elections between 2004 and 2008, but has not previously utilized testing of their mobilization efforts to determine if their techniques and messages are having an effect. The parent organization works with over 100 community-based groups to register, educate, and mobilize their constituents; however, there is five main coordinating groups that serve as the coordinating committee for the partner organization. These five groups played an important role in defining the sample used in this study and were the main groups that took part in implementing the treatment/control study.

Four Cities

In an effort to examine the effectiveness of mobilization across the states, four cities with concentrated minority populations were chosen for the study, two in

[10] While there were no statewide initiatives, it is important to note that there were minority candidates on the ballot in the various regional locations that may have worked to mobilize minority and foreign-born citizens in those areas. Specifically, there were three Chinese Americans on the ballot for local races in San Francisco that may have mobilized voters there. However, it is important to note that there is no reason to expect that these candidates worked differently on the Chinese Americans in the treatment groups than those in the control group.

the Southern part of the state, Los Angeles and San Bernardino, and two in the Northern part of the state, San Francisco and San José. The overall sample is made up mostly of Latinos and Asian Americans, but ethnic composition varies by region.

Los Angeles (L.A.) is a large, diverse urban area, with many highly segregated neighborhoods. In Los Angeles, Korean Americans and Latinos were the two primary ethnic groups in the study. The Asian-American mobilization efforts focused on the Korean population in a part of Los Angeles known as Koreatown, or K-Town, and were run primarily under the direction of a local organization in the neighborhood. K-Town is home to the majority of Koreans in Los Angeles, although there is a large Latino population as well. K-town is a highly dense area, with approximately 300,000 people in a three square mile area. As expected in such a dense area, many residents live in apartment complexes and the neighborhood appears to be primarily working class. In recent years, the area has been undergoing revitalization, but most business signs and even many street signs are still written in Korean. Additionally, there is a Korean language newspaper, doctors that specialize in Korean medicine, Korean banks, a Korean Neighborhood Council and Korean television is available. According to the center director of the local partner organization, residents of the area can largely live their day-to-day lives without speaking English, but the center is there to support citizens in the area with language issues when they arise, including help with translation or with completing legal or governmental forms. Neighborhood may play an important role in the success of mobilization, given that those in neighborhoods with greater

cohesiveness, in terms of co-ethnic population density, are more politically engaged (Garcia-Bedolla 2005).

Previous studies on Latino mobilization in L.A. have usually concentrated on one or two Latino neighborhoods, such as Montebello and East Los Angeles (Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Valenzuela and Michelson 2011), but in this study Latino mobilization efforts were conducted across several neighborhoods, including North Hollywood, Pacoima, Panorama City, San Fernando, Sun Valley and Van Nuys. The neighborhoods range from 57% Latino (North Hollywood) to 90% Latino (San Fernando)(L.A. Times 2009). Most neighborhoods are far less dense than K-Town, but are still quite urban and fairly densely populated. Most of the neighborhoods are working class, but there are also poverty stricken areas, such as Pacoima. There are many Latino businesses in these areas and several Spanish language television stations, radio stations and newspapers in Los Angeles. Conducting the study in areas of varying Latino population density allows us to examine if the impact is the same throughout one large urban area or if neighborhood context in terms of the Latino population makes a difference.

In San Francisco, mobilization efforts focused primarily on Chinese-Americans in two areas with dense Chinese populations. San Francisco is 36.6% Asian, of which 20.2% are Chinese-American (Census 2010). The neighborhoods in the study are Council Districts 1 and 4. District 1 is located in the Northwest part of San Francisco, majority Chinese American and contains an area called "New Chinatown". District 4 is in the West Central area of San Francisco, has a large Chinese American population, many Chinese owned businesses, has the highest

percentage of Chinese voters of any district in San Francisco (San Francisco Chronicle 2000). District 4 has long been the most conservative district in San Francisco. Both areas have a mixture of high cost housing and neglected parts of the city and Chinese in area cover a broad spectrum of income variation. Chinese American representatives represent both of these districts in the city council, so there is a history of Chinese political involvement.

In San Bernardino, mobilization efforts took place throughout the city and included all minorities and foreign-born citizens, however the majority of minorities were Latino. San Bernardino is located 60 miles west of Los Angeles and is part of the Inland Empire. The city is approximately 60% Latino, with nearly 40% of people living in poverty (Census 2010). Hispanics are primarily located in the central, west, and east sides of the city, all of which contain a large number of low-income housing units. Driving through San Bernardino, it was evident that many parts of the city are older and are not well maintained. San Bernardino was hit hard by the economic recession and nearly 20% of commercial buildings were vacant at the end of 2009 (Vincent 2009). There are several Latino professional organizations in San Bernardino, but very few active Latino political organizations.[11] Currently, despite the high percentage of Latinos, only one out of seven wards in San Bernardino is represented by a Latino/a, suggesting a low level of political involvement or power in the community.

San José is referred to as the capital of Silicon Valley and is home to many high-tech jobs. The city has the highest median income in the country (Census

[11] In fact, the parent partner organization had a difficult time finding an organizer to run the operation in San Bernardino for the election.

2009). San José is an attractive, well maintained city with a mixture of a very modern downtown and historic buildings. Unlike the other three regions in the study, the areas canvassed in San Jośe were not near a distinctly ethnic business district and there were very few signs of any type in a foreign language(s) or obvious indicators of large minority populations.

In San José, the sample included all minority and foreign-born groups and mobilization campaigns were run throughout the city.[12] San José is 33% Latino and 35% Asian (Census 2010). Approximately 95% of the Latino population is of Mexican descent, but the Asian population in San José is much more varied than in the other study areas. Of the Asian population, approximately 33% are Vietnamese, 21% are Chinese, 18% are Filipino, 15% are Asian Indian, 4% are Japanese, and 4% are Korean (Census 2010). There are neighborhoods in San José that are predominately Asian, but walking some of these areas, it was clear that they were fairly pan-ethnic, with no clear majority Asian population in any one neighborhood. There were, however, several predominately Latino neighborhoods. Of the neighborhoods visited, the predominately Asian neighborhoods seemed solidly middle class, while the Latino neighborhoods appeared to be slightly more working class.

The cities and neighborhoods where the study takes place vary in ethnic density, diversity and socioeconomic conditions, all of which can be correlated with minority participation (Bledsoe et al. 1995; Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Gay 2004; Valenzuela 2010). Including multiple types cities and neighborhoods may help

[12] In San Bernardino, one ward was excluded from the sample area for door-to-door canvassing because local police personnel had identified it as an unsafe neighborhood to send canvassers.

provide important information on how the environment may play a role in the effectiveness of mobilization efforts.

Field Work

The groups in charge of running the campaigns in specified areas provided the sample characteristics used to draw the sample population. For example, in the Greater Los Angeles area, the partner organization provided a list of precincts they wished to target and asked that the population consist of native and foreign-born Latinos.[13] The parent organization director and the author ultimately decided on the treatment group sizes, but the director of the local groups also provided input as to the manpower they had available through volunteers or hired canvassers to estimate the size of the treatment groups they could realistically expect to attempt to contact within the mobilization campaign period from August 28, 2010 through November 4, 2010. Once the sample population was drawn for each region, it was randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups: mail, phone banking, door-to-door canvassing or a control group.

Volunteers were used to deliver the face-to-face and live telephone calls. Phone calls were made locally, in each location, mainly from the local organization's home offices. Three of the regions began with phone banking in September, but San Bernardino began their efforts the last weekend of August. Most phone bank volunteers were bilingual and messages were delivered in English, Spanish, Korean and Mandarin Chinese, depending on region. San Bernardino had volunteers nearly

[13] The precincts were spread throughout the area in places such as North Hollywood, Pacoima, Panorama City, San Fernando, Sun Valley and Van Nuys.

every night and attempted phone calls most weeknights between 5 p.m. and 9 p.m. The other regions largely limited their phone calls to Thursday and Friday evenings.

Door-to-door canvassing took place on the four weekends (and Friday afternoons) before the election in most regions.[14] Canvassers walked neighborhoods in pairs. Many door-to-door canvassers were bilingual, and efforts were made to pair English only speakers with a bi-lingual partner when possible. In all regions, volunteers were made up mostly of college age students who were active with the organization.[15] Canvassers carried their contact lists and one of the treatments scripts with them as they walked (see Appendix A for copies of the scripts). Canvassers were not given both scripts in order to avoid treatment contamination. In San José and the Koreatown section of Los Angles, canvassers left a voter information guide after talking to voters.[16]

The direct mail pieces were printed and mailed by a professional printer previously used by the parent organization. Each voter assigned to the mail treatment groups (policy or values) received four mailings, sent on Monday of each week in October. Prior to each of the four mailings, the addresses were matched to the most recent change of address file to reduce the number of undelivered pieces of mail.

Using voter registration information acquired through a third-party vendor that included information about minority group membership and foreign-born

[14] San Francisco had extremely hard rains for two of the weekends and their door-to-door canvassing was cancelled for two of the four weekends, lowering the number of face-to-face contacts in that region.
[15] In San Bernardino a local college gave credit in Political Science classes for volunteering, so many volunteers came directly from the college but had not previously volunteered with the campaign.
[16] If no body answered the door, they made a note that they did not make successful contact.

status, the researcher and the organization comprised the sampling frame. Because the partner organization's focus is on minorities, especially those that are foreign-born, these were the primary qualifications used to filter the voter file, as was geographic location, focusing on neighborhoods within the urban areas that had high minority and foreign-born populations. In addition, low-propensity voters, or those who were registered but did not turn out in 2006 or 2008 were included in the sampling frame. To avoid possible stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) violations (Mann and Klofstad 2012; Sinclair 2011; Nickerson 2008), the sampling frame was also limited to one voter per household and only those voters who had telephones.

Once the sample frames were compiled, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three treatment groups or the control group by geographic area, for a total of four sample populations.[17] In the month before the election, registered voters in the treatment groups received mailings, a phone call, or a face-to-face canvass at their home encouraging them to turn out to vote and support two propositions on the California ballot. Those registered voters in the control group were not assigned to receive any contact from our study.

The sample frames varied by region based on the organic makeup of communities and the goals of the partner organizations. In San Francisco, Chinese Americans, including foreign-born Chinese citizens were the primary population of interest. In Los Angeles, the two primary groups of interest were Korean Americans and Latinos. While San Jośe was comprised primarily of Latinos and

[17] Because of budgetary constraints and a limited number of personnel and volunteers the number of subjects in each region/treatment group were set by the partner organization.

Vietnamese, San Bernardino was mostly Latinos and low-propensity voters of various racial/ethnic backgrounds including African Americans and Caucasian voters. Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of the individuals by geographic location.

The three treatment groups, or attempts at mobilization, in this study were voter contact through a live phone call, door-to-door canvassing, or by direct mail. Mailers and scripts for phone banking and door-to-door canvassers were designed to be similar in intent of the message as well as actual text (see Appendix A).[18] The messages encouraged support for ballot Proposition 24, which was a statewide ballot proposition on the California ballot allowing voters to close tax loopholes for corporations based in California. The issue was somewhat controversial due to the fact that the state legislature passed the "loopholes" during a closed door, late night session. Even though the partner organization involved in this study is focused on increasing turnout among naturalized citizens specifically, and minority citizens more broadly, they did not want to focus on immigration policies or immigration reform in their messages. While previous studies have shown that mobilization among the foreign born is successful when there is a salient issue, such as immigrant rights (Ramirez 2002; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001), this study aims to determine how to effectively mobilize low turnout voters in the absence of mobilizing racial or ethnic issues.

[18] There are copies of two messages because the intent of the researcher was to examine the effect of message content on turnout. However, due to incomplete and error plagued recording of this information by the partner organizations, this part of the analysis was dropped from the analysis. The only analysis that can be performed with confidence is the effect of message (treatment) assignment. Initial examination of message effects on turnout produced no significant differences due to message treatment assignment.

Each individual assigned to receive contact by mail received four separate mailers.[19] One mailer was sent out each week in October leading up to the election, starting on Monday, October 4th, 2010. All of the mailers used images of minorities that were representative of the ethnic group being targeted and the text was bi-lingual, being printed with either a combination of English and Spanish, Korean, or Mandarin depending on the group being targeted.[20] The mail pieces portrayed images such as minorities handing over their cash to businessmen or climbing a treacherous hill while businessmen in suits easily crossed the finish line in a race. Prior to each mailing the voter addresses were run through the National Change of Address Registry, which resulted in very few pieces of mail being returned.[21] Because there were so few mailers returned and because it is hard to know which member of the household actually read the mail, this analysis assumes that all subjects in the mail group received their mail as intended. If people did not receive their mail however, this should actually weaken the effect that we can observe of being assigned to the mail treatment, which would further strengthen any significant finding on the effects of mobilization through mail.

Volunteers made up primarily of college-age students of Chinese, Korean and Latino backgrounds performed phone banking and door-to-door canvassing attempts. The volunteers were recruited through the local branches of the

[19] Individuals in the mail treatment group received either four pieces of mail with the values message or four pieces of mail with the policy message. The treatment was consistent throughout the election period.
[20] There were no mailers printed in Vietnamese and in San Jośe, the population received English/Spanish mailers because Latino was the primary group being targeted in that community.
[21] The author did not receive exact voter names for which mail was returned, but the total amount returned was reported to be less than 1% of the pieces of mail sent by the organization and their mail vendor.

organization and most were bi-lingual.[22] Phone banking occurred from August 28th through November 1, 2010 and calls were generally conducted on weeknights (Monday through Thursday) between the hours of 5 p.m. and 9 p.m. in an effort to reach people at home.[23] A minimum of two attempts was made for each voter that was assigned to the phone treatment.

The door-knocking campaigns were scheduled for Fridays and Saturdays from October 16th through October 30th, 2010 and when time allowed they would attempt to return to a house if the voter was not available or no one was home during the first attempt.[24] Door-to-door canvassers would meet at the neighborhood they were concentrating on and then break up in pairs to go to the houses on their lists. At the door, the canvassers would deliver their message if person at the door was the voter, however, if the voter was unavailable, they would notify the person at the door about their efforts and ask if they could leave information for the voter on their list in the form of bi-lingual printed pamphlets that contained the information similar to the message they were going to deliver verbally. Both phone bankers and door-to-door canvassers were instructed to stick to the script as much as possible, but they were also instructed to respond to questions from voters and carry on conversations in a natural manner so that they did not sound overly scripted or rehearsed (Nickerson 2007).

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[22] In San Francisco the organization sought volunteers who spoke Mandarin and English, in Los Angeles two groups were involved in volunteer recruitment, one that organized Korean speaking volunteers and one that recruited Spanish speaking volunteers. In San Bernardino many of the volunteers spoke Spanish and in San Jośe there was a mix of bi-lingual volunteers, including those that spoke Spanish and Mandarin.

[23] The dates that phone banking began and ended varied by region. San Bernardino was the first to begin on August 28th. The rest of the cities did not begin until September.

[24] Very heavy rains plagued San Francisco for most of the month of October and this affected door-knocking efforts. At least two weekends were cancelled out of safety concerns for the volunteers.

Sample Composition and Covariates

After the sample was compiled, randomized treatment and control assignment was completed, here was a large amount of variance in-group size among the regions and treatments. The sample sizes by region and treatment assignment are shown in Table 2.1.

To examine the effects of the mobilization efforts this study will use *voter turnout* as the dependent variable. Voter turnout data was obtained from the California Secretary of State's Office in April 2011, after all of the counties had updated their vote history records. Turnout is a dichotomous variable where one (1) represents voting in the 2010 General Election and zero (0) represents not voting.

Covariates included in the study include whether or not the voter is foreign born (0=U.S. born, 1=foreign born), voter ethnicity as dummy variables for Latino, Asian and then additional dummies for Asian sub-groups, including Korean, Chinese and Vietnamese, as appropriate by region. Additional demographic covariates included are female (0=male, 1=female) and the voter's age in years at the time of the election. Political covariates include whether the voter is a registered Democrat or Republican, with Independents/Declined-to-State voters being left out as the comparison category as well as voter history from the 2008 presidential and 2006 general elections.[25] Controlling for voter history should help us further understand if mobilization efforts themselves are having an effect, or if the same people show up to the polls regardless of additional mobilization efforts. Table 2.1 shows the

[25] 2006 voter history is not included for San Bernardino analysis as votes are not recorded in the SOS file for this county for the 2006 election.

composition of covariates by geographic location and treatment assignment. Statistical tests show that there is significant imbalance between the control group and some assignment groups, especially when it comes to foreign-born status, ethnicity and vote history. [26]

[26] As Table 2.1 shows, there is imbalance between the covariates between both location and treatment assignment. Chapter 3 will use a variety of matching techniques including nearest matching, coarsened exact matching and genetic matching to confirm the robustness of the findings and to determine the best approach for analyzing unbalanced experimental data.

Table 2.1 Compositions of Experimental Conditions by Location and Treatment
(Numbers reported in percentages unless noted)

	(Assigned)	Foreign Born	Latino	Asian	Chinese	Korean	Vietnamese	Female	Age (in years)	Voted 2008	Voted 2006	Dem	Rep
Los Angeles	10,775	36%	51%	27%	4%	21%	0%	51%	48	51%	19%	51%	16%
Control	2178	36	29	38	7	30	0	51	54	52	30	48	19
Phone	3301	41	75	12	2	10	0	53	42	48	9	53	15
Door	2568	30	48	30	5	25	0	49	45	56	21	51	16
Mail	2728	35	43	33	6	26	0	51	54	52	24	52	16
San Bernardin	8,883	17%	43%	1%	0%	0%	0%	54%	46	54%	##	55%	24%
Control	3770	15	44	1	0	0	0	54	47	52	##	53	26
Phone	1230	22	57	1	0	0	0	54	51	51	##	52	25
Door-	2002	15	43	1	0	0	0	55	47	57	##	56	24
Mail	1881	17	37	1	0	0	0	53	45	50	##	57	22
San Francisco	6,514	64%	0%	99%	99%	0%	0%	51%	54	75%	39%	37%	11%
Control	1250	64	0	99	99	0	0	52	54	75	38	37	12
Phone	389	69	0	100	100	0	0	53	51	77	34	32	11
Door	500	64	0	98	98	0	0	50	56	70	35	38	10
Mail	4375	63	0	99	99	0	0	50	54	75	40	37	11
San Jośe	13,452	71%	31%	28%	0%	3%	20%	48%	48	72%	41%	51%	18%
Control	7845	53	31	22	3	0	15	49	46	69	38	53	16
Phone	1524	100	28	40	4	0	30	46	51	75	46	46	20
Door	1904	85	38	31	2	0	25	52	50	82	48	51	18
Mail	2179	100	27	37	3	0	25	45	51	70	40	45	21

- The Secretary of State file reported that there were no voters in San Bernardino in the 2006 General Election. This suggests that the San Bernardino Election's Clerk did not update the voter history with the state following the election.

In addition to imbalance, there is evidence of two-sided non-compliance, where 115 members of the control group were inadvertently treated. All of the defiers (treated control group members) in the sample are located in Los Angeles, however, they should not cause concern for the validity of the overall sample because there are 2,340 compliers between the assignment groups in Los Angeles, so the sample should have a resilient complier average causal effect (CACE) estimator (Gerber and Green 2012).

Treatment Effects Analysis, Results and Discussion

Contact and turnout rates for the treatments were collected and compared, then analyzed using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, where successful contact was used as an explanatory variable and the treatment group assignments (phone or door-to-door canvassing) were used as instrumental variables.[27] Because successful contact cannot be measured for those in the direct mail assignment, this assignment group was analyzed using logistic regression.

[27] In most get-out-the-vote field experiments over the last decade, researchers have used two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to analyze the data. Two-stage least squares allows the researcher to account for the intervention (or instrumental variable) to see the effect of the variable on the outcome when the instrument is correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, conditional on the other covariates. That is, 2SLS attempts to estimate the causal effect of some variable *X* on another *Y*, using a third variable *Z* which affects *Y* through its effect on *X*, given that *Y* is correlated with other explanatory variables of *X*. For example, suppose a campaign wants to increase voter turnout (*Y*) among particular voters (*X*). They believe that through successful contact (*Z*), they can alter the behavior (*Y*) of those voters. In this case, variable *Z* is the instrumental variable, or the intervention, that is believed to cause a change in *Y*. 2SLS is required because *Z* (successful contact), may be correlated with other explanatory variables of turnout, such as gender, age, party, that determine how easy it was to contact voters and how likely they were to participate to begin with. This is stage one of the regression; all *X*'s are regressed on *Z*. In stage 2, *Y* is regressed on the predicted values from stage one to determine the effect of the intervention. If everything is held constant, or is similar among the *X*'s in both the treatment and non-treatment groups, and behavior changes, then it can be determined that *Z* is the cause of that change.

Intent-to-treat effects

In Los Angeles all three treatment groups saw significantly higher turnout than the control group's turnout rate of 26.2%. Table 2.2 reports turnout rates, contact rates and intent-to-treat effects for all regions and treatment assignment groups in the study and shows that turnout among those who were assigned to the phone treatment group in L.A. had a turnout rate of 28.5%, resulting in an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of 2.3 percentage points ($p<.1$) increase in turnout.[28] The door-to-door canvassing treatment group had a turnout of 30.8%, which produces an ITT effect of 4.6 percentage points ($p<.01$) increase in turnout. Those in the direct mail group had 36% turnout, which creates an intent-to-treat effect of 9.8 percentage points and is significant at the $p<.001$ using a two-tailed test. This is the only city in which mail had a significant ITT effect and it is unusual for mail to produce such a strong and significant increase in turnout.

While imbalance may play some part in the sizeable ITT effect of mail, there are also possible theoretical explanations as well. The recipients of the treatments in L.A. were targeted in very specific neighborhoods. As is shown in Table 2.1 approximately 21 percent of the sample in L.A. were Korean Americans and about 51 percent of the sample was Latino. These populations were not dispersed throughout the city, but rather were located in ethnically segregated neighborhoods. The mobilization of Korean Americans took place in an area known as "Koreatown", which is just northwest of downtown L.A. The area operates in the Korean language,

[28] Given the directional nature of the hypotheses being tested, it would be statistically sound to use a one-tailed test of significance, however all of the significance levels reported here are calculated using a two-tailed Fisher's exact test, which produces a more conservative estimate of the effects than a one-tailed test.

from newspapers to street signs to Korean banks and at the heart of the neighborhood is where one of the partner organization's offices are located. The direct mailers sent to these recipients were printed in English and Korean language and included the name of the partner organization. Korean college students, who were bi-lingual, performed the phone calls and door-to-door canvassing.

Targeting of Latino citizens in Los Angeles was very similar to that of the Korean population. Because the Latino population is much larger, there were more neighborhoods targeted, but in general they were largely neighborhoods that are densely populated by both foreign and native-born Latinos, dominated by the Spanish language and familiar with the partner organization. In all of these neighborhoods, Latino and Korean, there were many apartment dwellers and homes with gates on them. This sort of densely populated, urban community where it is difficult to canvass may be ideal environment to find positive effects of mail.

Table 2.2 Contact Rates and Intent-to-Treat Effects by Region and Assignment Group

	Los Angeles (N=10,775)	San Bernardino (N=8,883)	San Francisco (N=6,514)	San Jośe (N=13,452)
Control				
% Voting^	26.2 (570/2178)	37.6 (1417/3770)	56.3 (704/1250)	55.0 (4313/7845)
Mail				
% Voting^	36.0 (982/2728)	35.5 (668/1881)	58.2 (2548/4375)	56.0 (1220/2179)
ITT#	**9.8 (1.3)*** **	-2.1 (1.37)	1.9 (1.6)	1.0 (1.2)
Phone				
% Voting^	28.5 (940/3301)	33.5 (412/1230)	55.0 (214/389)	58.5 (892/1524)
ITT#	**2.3 (1.2)***	**-4.1 (1.6)****	-1.3 (2.9)	**3.6 (1.4)****
Contact Rate##	27.6 (912/3301)	20.2 (248/1230)	34.2 (133/398)	24.2 (368/1524)
Door				
% Voting^	30.8 (791/1777)	41.9 (839/2002)	53.4 (267/500)	70.0 (1332/1904)
ITT#	**4.6 (1.3)*** **	**4.3 (1.3)*** **	-2.9 (2.6)	**14.9 (1.3)*** **
Contact Rate##	23.1 (592/2568)	31.7 (635/2002)	12.2 (61/500)	42.23 (804/1904)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
^ The numbers in parentheses are the number who votes/the total number in the assignment group
# Standard errors are in parentheses
The numbers in parentheses are the number successfully contacted/the total number in the assignment group

In San Bernardino, the mobilization efforts produced quite different results. Turnout for the control group was almost 38 percent, while turnout for those in the direct mail assignment had turnout at 36 percent. This 2.1 percentage point difference is not statistically significant, and consistent with most research mail failed to produce a positive (or significant) ITT effect (for a review see Green and Gerber 2008; also Michelson & Nickerson 2011, Garcia Bedolla and Michelson 2009). Door-to-door treatment assignment shows that turnout was 41.9%, or an ITT effect of an approximately 4.3 percentage point (p<.01) increase in turnout. Phone

banking appears to have produced an ITT equivalent to a 4 percentage point decrease in turnout ($p<.05$) with only 33.5 percent of those in the assignment group casting a ballot. While most current mobilization literature often uses one-tailed tests and may write this finding off as not finding support for the research hypothesis that phone calls will produce a significant increase in turnout, it is important to note that there appears to be a significant decrease in turnout and that phone calls may have a positive or negative effect, depending on the target audience and election context. One possible explanation of phone calls causing a decrease in turnout could be that those who have received phone calls are more likely to answer the phone and may be receiving too many political calls during a campaign period. They react by adopting a behavior opposite of that which they are being pressured to engage in (Mann 2010, Panagopoulos 2010), in this case, not voting.[29]

The results in San Jośe were much more typical than the previous two cities. Turnout among the control group was 55 percent and turnout among those in the mail assignment had a turnout rate of 56 percent. This one percentage point increase (ITT=0.1) was not statistically different than turnout for the control group. Phone banking and direct contact assignment both showed positive and significant ITT's. Almost 59% of those in the phone-banking group showed up to vote, while nearly 70% of those in the door-to-door canvassing group turned out. This resulted in an ITT effect of .36 ($p<.05$), or an equivalent of a 3.6 percentage point increase in turnout for those in the phone treatment group and an ITT effect of .149 ($p<.01$) or a

[29] It is worth nothing that Gerber and Green (2000) had a similar finding, which was then challenged by Imai (2005) who found that after using propensity score matching, phone calls had a positive overall effect. This was then addressed with a series of publications questioning the methods (Arceneaux, Gerber and Green 2010; Gerber and Green 2005).

14.9 percentage point increase in turnout for those in the door-to-door canvassing assignment. While the increase for phone treatment is within the expected range of increase for mobilization experiments, this is a large finding for door-to-door canvassing and further examination of the results is warranted.[30]

Mobilization efforts in San Francisco failed to produce any significant increases in turnout and appears to produce negative effects for phone banking and door-to-door canvassing. This is likely because of low contact rates in San Francisco due in part to weather and in part to lack of volunteers. Although not statistically significant, it is interesting to note that turnout in the mail assignment group was 58.2%, which is 1.9 percentage points higher than the control group (56.3).

The ITT effect results produced mixed findings across the regions, with door-to-door canvassing assignment having the most consistent increase in turnout, followed by positive ITT effects for phone banking. In Los Angeles, all of the assignment groups produced positive and significant ITTs. Of the mail studies that have been done on minorities, few have been done in large urban areas (excepting García Bedolla and Michelson 2009 and Wong 2005), but the findings in L.A. (and a hint of a positive effect in San Francisco) may suggest that future studies of mail should concentrate on densely populated minority urban areas as well as smaller cities and towns with high minority populations such as Brownsville, TX (Matland and Murray 2010) to determine if direct mail is more effective in urban areas, where it is often hard to reach people face-to-face or by landlines.

[30] Comparison of the balance between the control group and door-to-door (DTD) canvassing shows that there are large differences of several covariates. The large number of foreign born in the DTD group may be partially responsible for the large ITT effect, but turnout in 2008 was also much higher in the DTD treatment group than in the control group and is likely related to the high ITT effect.

CACE/ATT Effects

Further examination of treatment effects was done using two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis, both with bivariate models, shown in columns with (a) at the top and including covariates, indicated by columns labeled (b), with standard errors shown in parentheses. Because there was two-sided non-compliance, the coefficients presented are estimates of the average treatment on treated effect (ATT) among compliers, or subjects who received treatment (even if they were assigned to the control group), and are referred to as the complier average causal effect (CACE) rather than just the ATT (Gerber and Green 2012). The results of the 2SLS regressions are shown in Table 2.3.[31] Simple bivariate analysis confirms the ITT effects were significant in Los Angeles, San Bernardino and San Jośe, while San Francisco had no statistically significant results.

The CACE for Los Angeles shows an average treatment-on-treated effect size of an 8.3 percentage point ($p<.10$) increase in turnout for those in the phone banking assignment group and 20 percentage points ($p<.01$) for those who received the door-to-door canvassing treatment. The effect of mail stays the same at a 9.8 percentage point increase in turnout ($p<.01$) because the instrumental variable model is not used since successful "contact" or receipt of the mailers is unknown. Adding covariates to the model further increases the effect sizes for all treatments, but once again, due to imbalance among the covariates between treatment and control groups, these should be taken as indicative of the direction of the effect, rather than numerically sound.

[31] Full models including all covariates are shown in TablesA1-A4 in Appendix A. They were not placed in a combined table due to size constraints.

Table 2.3 Effect of Treatment on Voter Turnout in the 2010 General Election by Location
(Change in percentage points)

	Phone		Door-to-Door		Mail	
CACE	(a)	(b)	(b)	(b)	(b)	(b)
Los Angeles	**8.3***	**40.9*****	**20.1*****	**33.5*****	**9.8*****	**10.4*****
Robust SE	(4.5)	(6.3)	(5.7)	(6.4)	(1.3)	(1.2)
San Bernardino	**-20.3***	-10.5	**13.6****	6.4	-2.1	-0.4
Robust SE	(7.9)	(6.7)	(4.3)	(3.6)	(1.4)	(1.1)
San Jośe	**14.7****	1.8	**35.5*****	**24.3*****	1.0	0.4
Robust SE	(5.7)	(5.7)	(3.0)	(2.9)	(1.2)	(1.2)
San Francisco	-3.8	-4.2	-23.9	-6.3	1.9	2.0
Robust SE	(8.5)	(7.3)	(21.7)	(18.6)	(1.6)	(1.4)
Covariates	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Complier Average Causal Effect estimated with two-state least squares regression. Random assignment to treatment conditions used as instrument for voting in the 2010 General Election. Coefficients are reported as percentage points of the population. The effects are the estimated percentage point difference between the control group and each of the treatment conditions. See Appendix B for the full regression results including covariates.

The bivariate results for San Bernardino confirm that door-to-door contact was positive and successful, showing a 13.6 percentage points (p<.05) increase in turnout for those successfully contacted. The treatment-on-treated estimate for those who received phone calls once again failed to find a positive effect. Additionally, there was no significant finding for receiving mail.

In San Jośe both phone calls and door-to-door canvassing had positive and significant treatment-on-treated effects. The bivariate regression shows that phone calls shows that there was a 14.7 percentage point increase (p<.05) for those contacted and direct in-person contact at the door had a 35.5 percentage point increase (p<.01). Adding covariates as controls in the model for the door-to-door contact, which as previously stated were not balanced against the control group,

reduces this effect size to a 24.3 percentage point ($p<.01$) increase in turnout among those contacted.

If the numbers presented in this analysis prove to reduce in size once a correction to the imbalance is found, the direction of the results for turnout suggest a strong and positive effect for door-to-door canvassing and phone calls in communities with high numbers of low-propensity, minority and foreign born voters, supporting hypotheses two and three. Additionally, the positive effects of mail in Los Angeles, in a treatment group where the imbalance is not as drastic as those in San Jośe, suggest that mail may be more effective than previously thought among certain populations or sub-groups such as those who are foreign born.[32] Although not statistically significant, the positive relationship between mail and turnout in San Francisco, the second most densely populated city in the study, suggests support for hypothesis one, that phone calls will increase voter turnout, although further research is needed.

Heterogeneity of the Treatment Effects

One of the main questions of this research is to determine if canvassing works the same across different ethnic and nativity groups. To do this, I compare the Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE), which is simply the average treatment effect (ATE) for one defined subset of the subjects (e.g., Latinos) against another (Asians) (Green and Gerber 2011). To examine heterogeneity in these experiments, I look at the turnout rate in those treatments that had significant

[32] See Table B1 in Appendix B.

effects in the field experiment.[33] Live phone calls produced a significant increase in turnout in three of the four experiments, but did live telephone calls work equally well for both foreign born and natural born citizens, or for both Asian and Latino voters? The results of the heterogeneity tests for telephone calls, presented in Table 2.4, show that there are no statistically significant differences in effects between foreign born and natural born citizens.[34]

[33] Heterogeneity was examined using logistic regression and the post-estimation techniques lincom and prchange to determine the probability of turning out to vote as one moves from Control (0) to treatment (1) group.

[34] While there were significant effects for telephone calls in Santa Clara County, due to the imbalance in foreign born citizens between treatment and control groups, there was not enough power to run the logistic regression to test for heterogeneity.

Table 2.4 Heterogeneity Tests of Treatment Effects on Turnout for Live Phone Calls

	Los Angeles	San Bernardino	Santa Clara/ San Jośe
Nativity			
CATE Foreign Born	21.55**	1.12	---
	(9.73)	(14.87)	
CATE Natural Born	1.68	-27.51*	---
	(8.15)	(7.93)	
Difference in CATE	19.87	28.63	---
	(12.69)	(16.85)	
Heterogeneity	*No*	*No*	---
Ethnicity			
CATE Asian	32.30*	---	0.51
	(12.79)		(9.64)
CATE Hispanic	10.47	-19.32*	-1.13
	(10.09)	(9.39)	(1.07)
CATE Other	-7.58	-22.10*	19.39*
	(15.31)	(10.55)	(9.67)
Difference in CATE	21.84	---	1.63
(Asian/Hispanic)	(16.29)		(14.43)
Difference in CATE	18.05	2.78	-20.52
(Hispanic/Other)	(18.34)	(14.12)	(14.45)
Difference in CATE	39.89*		-18.89
(Asian/Other)	(19.95)		(13.66)
Heterogeneity	***Yes***	*No*	*No*

Note: Standard Errors presented in parentheses
*p<.05, ***p<.001

Turning attention to the differences between ethnic groups, there is evidence of heterogeneous effects in Los Angeles, but not in San Bernardino or Santa Clara County/ San Jośe.[35] In Los Angeles, the conditional average treatment effect for Asians is 32.3 percentage points, suggesting that telephone calls were very successful among the Asian, primarily Korean population in Los Angeles. The differences in CATEs were not significant for Latinos or 'others' (non-Asian/non-

[35] Asians are left out of the heterogeneity test in San Bernardino because there were not enough Asians in the population to include them in the analysis.

Latino).[36] The difference in effects between Asians and Latinos was not significantly different, but the difference between Asians and 'others' was significantly different. Because the effect for 'others' was negative, the difference in CATEs was 39.9 percentage points. While this does not meet the 95 percent confidence threshold, it is a large difference and is likely limited by sample size. Looking at the difference in probabilities of turning out to vote if assigned to the phone treatment group helps create perspective on what this means in terms of increasing turnout. The treatment effects had a positive and significant effect on Asians, where assigned to the phone treatment had an increased probability of .07, or 7 percentage points higher turnout over Asians in the control group ($p<.05$), while there was no significant effect on non-Asian/non-Latino 'others'; those in the phone treatment group had a probability of -.01 ($p>.05$), or 1 percentage point decrease in turnout compared to non-Asian/non-Latino 'others' in the control group.

The presence of heterogeneous effects was more pronounced among those who were assigned to the door-to-door canvassing groups than in the phone treatment groups. Table 2.5 shows that in Los Angeles there were differences in effects for both foreign born citizens and between ethnic groups. Foreign born citizens had an average treatment effect of 42.6 percentage points ($p<.001$), while for natural born citizens it was only 15.4 percentage points, or a difference of 27.2 percentage points in treatment effects. This difference is statistically significant, with an increased probability of turnout of .095 or almost 10 percentage points higher for foreign born citizens in the treatment group than those in the control

[36] The group 'other' consists of non-Asian, non-Latino citizens, primarily white, African-American or African, and Native American Indian individuals.

group, compared to an increase of only .029, or about 3 percentage points over the control group for natural born citizens in the treatment group.

Table 2.5 Heterogeneity Tests of Door-to-Door Canvassing Treatment Effects on Turnout

	Los Angeles	San Bernardino	Santa Clara/ San Jośe
Nativity			
CATE Foreign Born	42.58**	10.29	---
	(10.77)	(14.41)	
CATE Natural Born	15.37	19.57*	---
	(8.18)	(6.14)	
Difference in CATE	27.19*	-9.28	---
	(13.52)	(15.66)	
Heterogeneity	***Yes***	*No*	---
Ethnicity			
CATE Asian	44.84**	---	56.06**
	(10.44)		(10.58)
CATE Hispanic	-2.04	2.15	50.98**
	(11.15)	(30.53)	(9.19)
CATE Other	32.78*	28.31***	65.86**
	(13.42)	(7.48)	(9.22)
Difference in CATE	46.87*	---	5.07
(Asian/Hispanic)	(15.27)		(14.01)
Difference in CATE	-34.81*	-23.46*	-14.88
(Hispanic/Other)	(17.45)	(11.40)	(13.02)
Difference in CATE	12.06	---	-9.80
(Asian/Other)	(17.00)		(14.03)
Heterogeneity	***Yes***	***Yes***	*No*

Note: Standard Errors presented in parentheses
*p<.05, ***p<.001

Heterogeneity in treatment effects between ethnic groups for door-to-door canvassing was present in both Los Angeles and San Bernardino, but not San Jośe. In Los Angeles, there were significant differences in treatment effects between Asians and Hispanics and between Hispanics and 'others'. Asians in the treatment group had an increased probability of voting of .104, or 10.4 percentage points higher turnout than Asians in the control group. There was virtually no difference

in turnout between Latinos in the treatment and control groups (pred. prob = .004), but 'others' in treatment group had increased predicted probability of .057, or voted at a rate of 5.7 percentage points higher than those in the control group. Both Asians and 'others' experienced a positive effect from the door-to-door canvassing in Los Angeles, while Latinos experienced no such effect.

In San Bernardino, where only Latinos and non-Latinos are compared, there was a significantly positive ATE for non-Latino (28.3, $p<.05$), but not for Latino (2.15, $p>.05$). Non-Latinos in the treatment group had a predicted probability of .07, or 7 percentage points higher turnout than those in the control group, while Latinos saw a predicted probability change of only .012, or about a one percentage point increase in turnout.

The only city where there is a significant treatment effect for direct mail is Los Angeles. In the experiment, direct mail increased turnout among those in the treatment group by about 10 percentage points. Looking at how the treatment had an effect for different populations in the sample, it appears that there were no heterogeneity effects by nativity, with a significant positive effect for both foreign-born and natural born citizens. Looking at differences across minority groups shows that there were significant differences in the role direct mail played at increasing turnout. There was a large, significant CATE for Asian Americans, primarily Koreans in this population, as well as for non-Latino/non-Asian others, but not for Latinos. Comparing the Conditional Average Treatment Effects between groups, it is clear that there is heterogeneity in treatment effects between all three groups.

The large effect for Asian Americans is not surprising, given that the mail had a return address of the partner organization based in Koreatown, a known and trusted source in the community. The large effect for non-Asian/non-Latino 'others' is surprising given that direct mail is usually not very effective at increasing turnout. One possible explanation, based on canvassing observations in Los Angeles, is that in highly dense urban neighborhoods door-to-door canvassing was very difficult and many of the houses and apartment buildings had security such as wrought iron gates, so that canvassers could not even get to the door to talk to individuals. In this environment, where personal contact is limited, mail be a more effective way of getting your message out to potential voters, especially when sent from a well-known and trusted source that serves an important role in the community.

Table 2.6 Heterogeneity Tests of Treatment Effects on Turnout for Direct Mail

	Los Angeles
Nativity	
CATE Foreign Born	57.24**
	(10.22)
CATE Natural Born	40.33**
	(8.03)
Difference in CATE	16.91
	(13.00)
Heterogeneity	*No*
Ethnicity	
CATE Asian	74.93**
	(10.01)
CATE Latino/a	16.58
	(11.07)
CATE Other	45.92**
	(12.81)
Difference in CATE (Asian/Hispanic)	58.35**
	(14.92)
Difference in CATE (Hispanic/Other)	-29.33*
	(16.93)
Difference in CATE (Asian/Other)	29.01*
	(16.25)
Heterogeneity	***Yes***

Note: Standard Errors presented in parentheses
*p<.05, ***p<.001

Discussion

Minorities and foreign-born citizens are often overlooked when it comes to mobilization campaigns. Their historically low turnout, coupled with a lack of knowledge about how to effectively mobilize minority populations may lead candidates and parties to avoid efforts to court their votes. This study used four field experiments, conducted simultaneously, to examine which traditional mobilization efforts are most effective at increasing turnout among those least likely to participate.

The results of the study lend support to all three hypotheses to some degree. In Los Angeles, the most densely populated city in the sample, there was evidence that direct mail, phone banking and door-to-door canvassing all had a positive impact on turnout. In San Bernardino, only door-to-door canvassing had a positive effect. In San Jośe, the city with the largest percentage of foreign-born citizens in the sample, both phone banking and door-to-door canvassing had positive effects on turnout.[37]

The finding on direct mail in Los Angeles was the most outstanding finding of the study. Previous studies of mail to mobilize minorities have produced mixed results. Studies by Wong (2005), Trevedi (2005) and Matland and Murray (2010) found positive effects for mailers, while Garcia Bedolla and Michelson found that informational mailers had no effect on turnout (2009). The finding here suggests that mailers may only work under certain conditions, specifically when they are sent to a targeted minority audience from a known and trusted source.

Phone-banking produced positive significant increases in two of the four cities, increasing turnout about 2.3 percentage points in Los Angeles and 3.6 percentage points in San Jośe.[38] Phone banks in both of these cities were well organized and were manned by bi-lingual volunteers and the treatment group in both cities had high numbers of foreign-born citizens.

Door-to-door canvassing was shown to have a positive effect on turnout in three of the four cities in the sample. Intent-to-treat effect sizes ranged from a 4.3 percentage point increase in turnout to a 14.9 percentage point increase in turnout.

[37] There were no significant findings in San Francisco.
[38] ITT effect sizes.

This is consistent with previous research on door-to-door canvassing for minorities (Matland and Murray 2010; Michelson 2003a, 2006). This study supports consistent findings that personal contact is the most consistently effective way to mobilize voters.

Thinking about the goals of this study, it is clear that the first part of the question has been answered: minorities are able to be successfully mobilized using traditional techniques. However, further examination of the treatments show that there are heterogeneous treatment effects across all types of contact and geographic, ethnic and nativity classifications. In Los Angeles, mobilization of Asian Americans and Foreign Born citizens was successful across the board, with phone calls, door-to-door canvassing and direct mail all producing increases in turnout over those in the control group, but the same was not true for Latinos and natural born citizens. In Los Angeles, there were no significant CATEs for Latinos, resulting in significant differences in CATEs between Asians and Latinos for both door-to-door canvassing and direct mail, and only direct mail produced a significant positive difference in CATE for natural born citizens. In San Bernardino, there were only heterogeneous treatment effects for live phone calls, where non-Latinos saw a significant and positive effect, while Latinos did not. There was no heterogeneity in the treatments in San Jośe.

It is clear that mobilization efforts were not equally effective across all areas or populations. One possibility is that the differences can be attributed to differences in the campaigns across study areas. For example, in Los Angeles the partner organization based in Koreatown was very well organized, used primarily

Korean language canvassers and phone bank volunteers, and was very aggressive with their campaign, while in San Bernardino the campaign was manned primarily by student volunteers, who were not heavily invested in the efforts, and was run by someone unfamiliar with the community.

An alternative explanation is that these heterogeneous effects across ethnic groups and foreign/natural born citizens emphasize to the need for further examination of who we were able to contact and who turned out to vote beyond just ethnic background or demographic variables. It could be that Asians feel closer to other Asian as a group than Latinos, and when being mobilized by co-ethnics they are more responsive due to some sense of linked fate or group consciousness. This will be explored in more detail in chapters 4 and 5.

As the population continues to change, it is important to encourage increased political participation among minorities. If minorities continue to lag behind in turnout, they will likely not benefit from all that representative democracy has to offer. Their preferences will be ignored and policy may not adequately reflect their needs. Future research should continue to examine how to most effectively mobilize low turnout populations by expanding the sample size and ethnic populations. As with turnout, research on Asian American and Latino participation lags far behind research on the rest of the population. Continued scholarship that examines questions of minority participation and turnout may provide answers on how to effectively mobilize those currently least likely to turnout.

CHAPTER 3

Using Matching to Save Experimental Data that Suffers from Unbalanced Treatment Groups

Experiments are primarily designed to answer questions of causation. They are, in effect, measuring the net difference in outcomes between treated and non-treated groups and attempting to attribute that difference to an intervention, given that all other things are held constant. To some degree this separates experiments from observational studies that may be interested in causation as well, but also issues beyond causation, such as study context and mediating and moderating relationships between variables.

Comparing treatments (i.e., treatment and control groups) to identify causation works best when co-variants are balanced, or appear in equal proportion between the treatment groups. This allows researchers to be confident that the one item that varies, the treatment, is what is causing differences in outcomes. When

groups are unbalanced researchers cannot be certain that differences in the population such as gender, ethnicity or voting history are not leading to differences in outcomes. "In an experimental design, randomization ensures that all the relevant characteristics, either observable or unobservable, of the studied units are balanced (this means, they are equally distributed) between treatment and control group and, because of this, the difference in mean outcomes correctly estimates the impact of the intervention (or treatment) (Heinrich, Maffioli and Vázquez 2010)." In the absence of (true) randomization, however, the groups may differ not only in their treatment status (assignment to treatment or control), but also in their values of *X(s).* In this case, which is what occurred with the experiments discussed in Chapter 2, it is necessary to account for these differences to avoid potential biases and (potentially) false conclusions about the treatment or intervention.

One of the ways that we can account for or correct imbalance is through propensity score matching or balance score matching. The matching process identifies treated individuals who share the same background characteristics as untreated individuals, finding individuals with similar covariate values, to create balance between the treatment and control groups. The goal is that after matching on covariates, the data set resembles one that would result if perfect randomization had occurred and any remaining difference between groups can be attributed to the effect of the treatment. (Arceneaux, Gerber and Green 2006; Stewart 2011; Ho et al. 2011; Rubin 1974).[39] When the data is perfectly balanced, controlling for X(s) is

[39] It should be noted that by matching and creating balance only on observed characteristics leaves open the possibility that unobserved differences between the groups can still generate biased parameter estimates.

unnecessary, and a simple difference in means on the matched data can estimate the causal effect on Y. When the data is near (or approximately) balanced, controlling for X(s) in the model is still required, but there is less model dependence and reduced statistical bias than without matching (Iacus, et al. 2011; Stuart 2010; Ho et al. 2007).

Obtaining Balance: Matching Techniques

There are multiple matching techniques available, which could produce different results depending on how the algorithms for the distance measure work (Krosnick and Lupia 2011; Stuart 2010; Sekhon 2009). This chapter will use three common matching techniques to explore if the results in balance and treatment effect vary by the type of matching (i.e., distance measure) used.

Regardless of the type of matching used, there are some similarities across methods. In all forms of matching, groups are created with at least one treated unit and at least one control unit in each group (Ho et al. 2011). Some cases will be dropped. In any data set, the number of individuals with exact characteristics will be small, if not zero, thus statistical matching matches similar individuals and generally not individuals with the exact values of covariates (Rässler 2002) unless specified in the model.

Matching methods generally follow four steps: (1) Define the closeness: the "distance" measure used to determine whether an individual is a good match for another; (2) Implement a matching method, given the measure of closeness; (3) Assess the quality of the matched samples (and iterating steps 1 and 2 as necessary

to get good matched results); (4) analyze the outcomes and estimation of treatment effects, given the matching used in step (3) (Stuart 2010, p5).

Nearest **–** Nearest neighbor matching selects the best control matches for each individual in the treatment group using a distance measure. Matches are chosen for each treated unit one at a time, from largest to smallest distance (created by logit) (Ho et al., 2011). That is, nearest matching is a 1:1 matching that selects the control individual *i* with the smallest distance to treated individual *i*. One potential drawback is that the order in which the treatment subjects are matched may change the quality of the matches as distances are likely to increase the further down an observation is in the matching process (Stuart 2010).

Another potential drawback is that nearest matching will discard any individuals for which there is not a match (Stuart 2010) possibly resulting in a loss of power. However, if the treatment group stays the same size and observations are only dropped from the control group, the overall power may not be reduced by the smaller sample size (Stuart 2010; Ho et al., 2007). The loss of observations also may lead to better estimates of the outcomes because the comparison of similar *t/c* groups will lead to lower standard deviations of the estimates (Stuart 2010; Smith 1997).

CEM **–** Coarsened exact matching is designed so that adjusting the imbalance on one variable had no effect on the maximum imbalance of the other variables (Ho et al. 2011). CEM is designed to eliminate all imbalances caused by multivariate nonlinearities, interactions, and other distributional differences "beyond the chosen level of coarsening" (Iacus et al., 2012). CEM coarsens each variable by recoding, so

that "substantively indistinguishable values are grouped and assigned the same numerical value…Then the "exact matching" algorithm is applied to the coarsened data to determine the matches and to prune unmatched units. Finally, the coarsened data are discarded and the original (uncoarsened) values of the matched data are retained," (Iacus et al., 2012). By grouping the data on coarsened values of X(s), CEM creates strata of treated and control observations with similar values and assigns the weights to each individual within a stratum. This limits the small imbalances that remain to within the coarsened strata. The

weights are then applied to individuals within the stratum, so that every observation in a particular stratum is given the same weight in the analysis.

Genetic - Genetic matching uses matching with replacement. Genetic matching focuses on the SATT, which is the sample average treatment effect on treated, meaning that it keeps all of the treated observations and drops only control observations so that the quantity of interest (treated observations) remains the same (Iacus et al. 2011). This may introduce bias because the dependent value of interest of the treated case, $Y_i(1)$, is always observed, while the value of the control case, $Y_i(0)$, is estimated based on the matching algorithm (Iacus et al. 2011).

Finding Balance in the Experiments

As discussed in Chapter 2, all four of the experiments in this study had imbalance on at least one or more covariates. This is due in part to the inexperience of the researcher and in part because of concessions that one must make when

working with campaigns during a real election mobilization period.[40] For all four cities, the groups that would be doing the mobilization on the ground had input into the target population they would be contacting and the neighborhoods where mobilization would take place.

Los Angeles

In Los Angeles, there were two groups responsible for the groundwork, one that focuses on Asian American mobilization and is based in the Koreatown section of Los Angeles, the other focuses on immigrant rights more broadly. Both of these groups were focused on targeting as many foreign born citizens as possible and then Koreans and Latinos, respectively. One group was hesitant to expand their attempts too far outside of the Koreatown neighborhood due to an unsuccessful mobilization experiment with another researcher in the previous election cycle, and was very specific about the neighborhoods they would like the sample to be drawn from. The other partner organization provided a broader range of neighborhoods, but they were limited to areas with a high percentage of Latinos. The partner organizations provided the researcher with the number of contacts they could attempt for each mode of contact based on the number of employees and volunteers they were able to obtain for the mobilization efforts. The concentration on getting a population large enough to have enough potential contacts on the treatment lists led to significant imbalance between all three of the treatment assignments and the control group. Table 2.1 in the previous chapter shows a summary of the imbalance,

[40] The researcher takes full responsibility for not running the appropriate balance tests as part of the randomization process. After randomization was complete, the researcher should have run multinomial logit to check for correlation between treatment groups.

but it is easier to see the exact differences in the first three columns of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. The biggest and most important disparities are those between foreign-born status and ethnicities. The balance among Latinos is a problem for all three treatment groups because of the comparatively low number in the control group (28.3 percent), but this is especially problematic in the phone treatment group. The mail treatment is comprised of 43.5 percent Latinos, for a 15 percentage point difference from the control group (28.3 percent). The door-to-door canvassing group is 47.8 percent Latino for a difference of 19.5 percentage points, and the phone treatment group has the largest difference with 74.6 percent Latino, for a difference of 46.3 percentage points.

In the phone treatment group, there are large differences in the percent of Asians (diff=26.04%) between the treatment and control groups. This was primarily driven by Koreans who had a difference of 20.6 percentage points between treatment and control groups. The difference in the balance of Asians is much smaller for the door-to-door canvassing (7.4) and mail (4.3) treatments. There is an 11 year difference in age between the phone treatment and control group, with the average age in the treatment group being 42.3 years and the average age in the control group being 53.6 years. The difference between door-to-door treatment and control is approximately 9 years, but age is near balanced (.15%) for the mail treatment.

When I ran the balance models for all four of the experiments, I ran the three estimations (Nearest, CEM and Genetic) for phone/control, door/control and

mail/control.[41] This makes for a total of nine matching models per experiment. Matching was conducted in R using the MATCHIT program (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 2011). All of the covariates of interest were included in the matching models. Co-variates include age, gender, foreign-born status, ethnicity (Asian, Latino, Vietnamese, or Chinese depending on area), political party according to the voter registration file, and vote history for 2008.[42] The dependent variables, having voted in the 2010 general election, and successful contact were not included in the matching model, as it is important to leave out any variables of interest that would be affected by the treatment (Stuart 2010; Greenland 2003). Output for matching produces the percent of the sample by covariate, the difference in makeup of the covariates between the treatment and control group, and a percent balance improvement for each covariate. I have also calculated the percent overall improvement or average percent improvement across the covariates by matching type. Table 3.1 shows the balance results of the matching for Los Angeles subjects who were assigned to the live telephone call treatment and the control group. Table 3.2 shows the balance results for the door-to-door canvassing treatment and control group and Table 3.3 shows the balance results for those in the direct mail and control treatments. Because of the way the matching works, not all people in the

[41] All three of the matching techniques discussed were used to balance the data. Because the data was organized such that there was only one control group, the same pool of individuals is used as the control group in each of the balance matching tests. That is, the people in the control group are the same for each matching set, while those in the treatment groups are uniquely assigned to only one treatment group. Each of the treatment/control dichotomies has it's own set of propensity scores used as weights (Imbens 2000).

[42] Because of the large number of new registrants in 2008, including vote history for 2006 in the model resulted in a loss of a large number of cases.

control group or treatment groups will stay in the analysis across different matching methods. One person who remains in the control group for one type of matching may drop using a different matching method or when compared against a different treatment assignment.

Starting with the phone treatment and control group balance results, nearest matching in a loss of 4,549 observations, leaving 910 cases for analysis (550 phone treatment, 360 control group). After matching, imbalance remained across all of the covariates, ranging from 0.11 percent (age) up to 2.6 percent difference in vote history. The balance results are in Table 3.1. Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) dropped 969 cases, leaving 4,490 cases for analysis (2,812 phone treatment, 1,678 control). The overall percent balance improvement was 99.9%. Imbalance only remained in age with a difference of .11%, or an average age of 41.28 years old in the treatment group and 41.39 years old in the control group. The differences in Latino, Asian and foreign born are balanced with 37.77% foreign born, 74.22% Latino and 11.13% Asian in both the treatment and control conditions.[43] Genetic matching drops 933 cases from the control group, leaving a total of 4,526 cases for analysis (3,297 treatment/1,229 control). The overall percent balance improvement is 96.11%.

The results were similar in the door-to-door treatment/control group comparisons. Nearest matching dropped 3,574 cases, leaving 1,141 for analysis (426 treatment, 715 control), and left a small amount of imbalance in all of the covariates, the smallest being 0.31% in Latino to 2.44% in vote history. The average

[43] There is also balance among Koreans, important to the Los Angeles analysis, with 9.89% in both treatment and control.

percent balance improvement was 73.91%. There were only 819 cases dropped using CEM, leaving 3,896 cases for analysis (2,097 door treatment, 1,799 control). The average percent balance improvement was 99.84%, with balance being achieved in all but age, which left a difference of .10% between the treatment and control groups. Genetic matching dropped 830 cases, leaving 3,885 for analysis and produced the highest average percent balance improvement of 99.93%. All groups were balanced except age, which has a difference of .12% (44.64 years in the treatment group, 44.52 years in the control group).

Nearest matching for the Los Angeles mail and control treatment groups results is a loss of over 3,000 observations, with only 1,260 observations left for analysis (450 in the mail treatment group and 810 in the control group). Nearest matching left imbalance in almost all variables, with the largest remaining imbalances being among Foreign Born citizens, Asians, Koreans and Vote history (Table 3.3). The overall percent balance improvement, averaged across all variables, is 31.93%. If outlier covariates are removed, the overall improvement is 69.9%.[44] CEM results in the loss of 872 observations, leaving 3,992 observations for analysis (2,268 in the mail treatment and 1,724 in the control group). Balance improvement was significantly better using CEM, with imbalance remaining only for age and quite small, approximately one month difference (51.88 years in the treatment group and 51.80 years in the control group). The overall percent balance improvement was 94.9%. Genetic matching fared better than nearest, but did not perform as well at

[44] The imbalance for foreign born nearly doubled, having a difference of 0.96% with no matching and 2.28% with nearest matching. This resulted in a worsening of the balance, or an improvement of -138.41%. The same is true for age, which was only off by .15% with no matching, and had a difference of 1.26% after nearest matching, for an improvement of -740.3%.

balancing the groups as CEM. The overall percent balance improvement was 84.44%, with small imbalance left in four covariates: foreign born, Asian, age and vote history, all less than one percent.

Table 3.1 Los Angeles Phone: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	69.52	46.48	23.04	69.52	68.76	0.76	96.69	69.33	69.31	.00	99.89	69.52	69.53	.00	99.95
Foreign Born	40.67	36.26	04.41	40.67	38.60	2.07	53.04	37.77	37.77	.00	100.00	40.67	40.67	.00	100.00
Latino	74.55	28.31	46.25	74.55	72.52	2.03	95.60	74.22	74.22	.00	100.00	74.55	74.55	.00	100.00
Asian	11.89	37.93	-26.04	11.89	14.16	-2.27	91.29	11.13	11.13	.00	100.00	11.89	11.89	.00	100.00
Korean	9.61	30.20	-20.59	9.61	11.33	-1.72	91.69	9.89	9.89	.00	100.00	9.61	9.61	.00	100.00
Female	52.93	50.69	2.23	52.93	53.75	-0.82	63.03	51.49	51.49	.00	100.00	52.93	52.62	.00	86.42
Age(in years)	42.28	53.59	-11.31	42.28	42.62	-0.11	96.98	41.28	41.39	-.11	99.06	42.28	42.24	.04	99.64
Democrat	53.05	48.24	4.81	53.05	54.12	-1.07	77.60	58.07	58.07	.00	100.00	53.05	53.05	.00	100.00
Republican	15.35	19.43	-4.08	15.35	15.91	-0.56	86.24	11.34	11.34	.00	100.00	15.35	14.33	.01	75.09
Voted 2008	48.01	52.08	-4.07	48.01	45.41	2.60	36.03	51.46	51.46	.00	100.00	48.01	48.01	.00	100.00
N	3297	2162		550	360			2812	1678			3297	1229		
Unmatched	-	-		2747	1802			485	484			-	933		
Average % Improvement							78.82				99.90				96.11

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1 and 2 contained the majority of observations, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 8; Generations run: 13

Table 3.2 Los Angeles Door-to-Door: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Methods

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	57.78	49.85	7.93	57.78	57.55	0.23	97.06	58.45	58.41	0.04	99.45	57.78	57.78	0.00	99.99
Foreign Born	30.28	36.26	-5.98	30.28	29.30	0.98	83.66	28.09	28.09	0.00	100.00	30.28	30.24	0.04	99.35
Latino	47.83	28.31	19.52	47.83	48.14	-0.31	98.39	50.83	50.83	0.00	100.00	47.83	47.83	0.00	100.00
Asian	30.55	37.93	-7.38	30.55	28.89	1.66	77.46	25.70	25.70	0.00	100.00	30.55	30.55	0.00	100.00
Korean	24.95	30.20	-5.25	24.95	23.47	1.48	71.87	22.84	22.84	0.00	100.00	24.94	24.95	0.00	100.00
Female	48.96	50.70	- 1.73	48.96	50.21	-1.25	28.00	47.02	47.02	0.00	100.00	48.96	48.96	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	44.64	53.59	- 8.95	44.64	45.15	-0.51	94.34	43.81	43.91	-0.10	98.90	44.64	44.52	0.12	99.99
Democrat	51.35	48.24	3.11	51.35	52.61	-1.26	59.40	54.79	54.79	0.00	100.00	51.35	51.35	0.00	100.00
Republican	16.45	19.43	- 2.98	16.45	16.19	0.26	91.34	12.64	12.64	0.00	100.00	16.45	16.45	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	55.97	52.08	3.98	55.97	58.41	-2.44	37.46	55.13	55.13	0.00	100.00	55.97	55.97	0.00	100.00
N	2553	2162		426	715			2097	1799			2553	1332		
Unmatched	-	-		-	-			456	363			0	830		
Average % Improvement							73.91				99.84				99.93

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1 contained the largest number of matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 8; Generations run: 13

Table 3.3 Los Angeles Direct Mail: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	57.14	53.57	3.57	57.14	57.11	0.03	99.27	56.97	56.95	0.02	99.54	57.14	57.11	0.03	99.29
Foreign Born	35.31	36.26	-0.96	35.31	33.03	2.28	-138.41	32.01	32.01	0.00	100.00	35.31	34.79	0.52	45.78
Latino	43.45	28.31	15.14	43.45	42.28	1.17	92.27	43.96	43.96	0.00	100.00	43.45	43.45	0.00	100.00
Asian	33.68	37.93	-4.25	33.68	37.31	-3.63	14.44	32.98	32.98	0.00	100.00	33.68	33.57	0.11	97.39
Korean	26.42	30.20	-3.78	26.42	28.84	-2.42	36.11	27.82	27.82	0.00	100.00	26.42	26.42	0.00	100.00
Female	51.44	50.69	-0.75	51.44	51.59	-0.15	80.22	51.59	51.59	0.00	100.00	51.44	51.44	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	53.74	53.59	0.15	53.74	55.00	-1.26	-740.30	51.88	51.80	0.08	49.41	53.74	53.61	0.13	13.32
Democrat	52.74	48.24	4.50	52.74	52.32	0.42	90.73	57.10	57.10	0.00	100.00	52.74	52.74	0.00	100.00
Republican	16.21	19.43	-3.22	16.21	17.66	-1.45	91.34	13.01	13.01	0.00	100.00	16.21	16.21	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	52.41	52.08	0.32	52.41	56.82	-4.41	54.80	54.89	54.89	0.00	100.00	52.41	52.44	-0.04	88.59
N	2702	2162		450	810			2268	1724			2702	1292		
Unmatched	-	-		-	-			434	438			0	870		
Average% Improvement							31.93				94.90				84.44

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1 contained the largest number of matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 6; Generations run: 11

San Bernardino

San Bernardino was unique in the way the experiment was conducted in several ways. First, there were no local partner organizations running the experiments or doing the groundwork involved. The person in charge of the San Bernardino campaign was brought in from out of town by the primary or parent organization overseeing the statewide effort and canvassers/telephone workers were recruited through local colleges and universities.[45] Because the people overseeing the campaign were not as familiar with the area, rather than breaking it up in to pre-determined neighborhoods or turfs that were targeted, minorities and foreign-born citizens within the city limits of San Bernardino were included in the experiment.[46]

Possibly because there were fewer restrictions on the randomization, the imbalance in San Bernardino's randomization is not as pronounced as in Los Angeles. Latino is the main variable of interest where imbalance persisted, as is shown in Tables 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14. The control group is 43.86% Latino, while the mail treatment is 36.93% Latino (diff= -6.94%), the phone treatment is 56.83% Latino (diff=12.97%) and the door-to-door canvassing treatment group is 42.62 (diff = -1.24%). There were very few Asian Americans in the San Bernardino voter file overall, and only about one percent of the sample population is Asian; as a result differences between treatment and control groups are all less than one percent.

[45] The workers/canvassers received credit in political science classes for the time they spent working with the mobilization group.

[46] The person in charge of San Bernardino also wanted to include African Americans as a target population, but there are very few people in the voter file that are actually flagged as African Americans or Black. There are a few citizens from Africa, and those voters are flagged as being foreign born and in many cases their country of origin is listed.

Foreign born citizens make up 14.89% of the control group, 16.62% of the mail treatment group (diff = 1.73%) and 14.81% of the door-to-door group (diff = -0.09%). The biggest difference is in the phone treatment group, which is 22.03% foreign born, for a difference of 7.14%. Beyond those, there are small difference among the covariates Age, partisan ID and vote history. The majority of the differences are less than three percent; however there are a few exceptions. In the direct mail treatment, there are 3.87% more Democrats in the treatment group and 3.82% fewer Republicans than in the control group. In the door-to-door treatment, there are 5.09% more people who voted in 2008 in the treatment group than in the control group.

Using nearest matching in the San Bernardino sample for the phone treatment produced results similar to Los Angeles. As is shown in Table 3.12, the sample size is reduced considerably to only 1,037 cases (205 treatment, 832 control), down from 4,990 (1,230 treatment, 3,760 control) in the original sample. The average percent balance improvement was 77.14%, leaving small imbalances in almost all of the covariates, many less than a half a percent. The largest remaining imbalances are among Latinos and foreign born, which are both covariates of interest to this study. CEM had an average percent balance improvement of 99.93% and dropped only 469 cases, while Genetic matching had an average balance improvement of 99.95% and dropped 1,675 cases from the control group. CEM balanced all of the covariates except age, which was off by only .01% after matching. Genetic matching balanced all covariates.

For the door-to-door canvassing sample (Table 3.13), nearest matching resulted in a loss of 4,799 observations, leaving 960 for analysis (333 treatment, 627 control). Imbalance remains in all of the covariates, although they are very small, all less than 1 percent; the most pronounced being Latino and vote history, which are both off by .32% (42.62% treatment, 42.94% control for Latinos and 57.48% treatment, 57.80% control for vote history). The average percent balance improvement is 62.3%, however if the poor performance in balance improvement in age is removed, the average balance improvement is 69.73%. Nearest was again the poorest performing matching method for achieving balance across covariates.

CEM created an average balance improvement of 98.38%, dropping only 314 cases from the analysis. Balance was achieved in all covariates except age, proving once again to be trouble for San Bernardino. The treatment group average age is 46.46 years with CEM weights, while the control group average age is 46.43 years. The difference of .26 years is unlikely to produce different results. Genetic matching produced results that fall between Nearest and CEM, with balance in all but three covariates. Gender, age and vote history all have slight imbalance remaining after matching, but all a tenth of a percent or less. Genetic matching dropped 976 cases from analysis, all from the control group, as Genetic matching tries to balance the control group means to the treatment means (as they are without matching). The average balance improvement using Genetic matching for door-to-door treatment was 96.95, slightly lower than CEM matching.

The mail treatment group contains 5,637 subjects when no matching is used. Nearest matching drops this down dramatically to only 940 subjects (313 in the

mail treatment group, 627 in the control group). Balance using nearest matching was slightly more successful in this experimental mode than in door-to-door canvassing, with 78.8% average improvement. Nearest matching once again left small imbalance across all covariates, but all less than 1%. The largest imbalances remained for foreign born citizens and Latinos, being .53% and .50% out of balance, respectively. Table 3.14 shows the exact percentages of imbalance for all matching methods among the mail and control groups for San Bernardino.

CEM left only one covariate out of balance. The average age among those in the mail treatment is 44.60 years, while the average age in the control group is 44.67 years, resulting in a difference of .73 years. Overall, CEM performed very well, dropping only 360 cases from the data and achieving an average balance improvement of 99.56%. Genetic also performed well on the mail subjects. Small imbalances remained in gender and vote history, but both being less than one percent off balance. The overall improvement was 97.24%.

It is interesting to note that the same variables presented problems for particular types of matching across treatment modes. For nearest neighbor matching, Latino and age were consistently out of balance, for CEM balance for age was elusive across all three modes and for Genetic matching, gender and age were all unbalanced in two of the three matching approaches.

Santa Clara/San Jose

The most dramatic imbalances appear in the Santa Clara/San Jose (SC/SJ) randomizations. SC/SJ had an extremely well organized organization in charge, and like the Latino focused partner organization in Los Angeles, they had very specific

turfs pre-determined for mobilization efforts, specifically targeting neighborhoods with pre-dominantly immigrant populations and areas with a high number of Asian residents.[47] The partner organization in SC/SJ had a very committed group of volunteers to do door-to-door canvassing and phone banking in these areas and had bi and tri-lingual canvassers in all door-to-door groups.[48] [49]

Not surprisingly, the biggest imbalances in the SC/SJ treatments are among foreign born, Asian, Latino (in door-to-door canvassing only) and vote history. Gender, age and partisan ID are also out of balance in multiple treatments, but not to the extent that the proceeding variables are. Foreign-born status has imbalance across all three modes, 46.66% in phone calls, 31.75% in door-to-door canvassing and 46.66% in direct mail. The treatment groups all have more foreign-born citizens than the control group and in two treatments the subjects are all foreign born citizens.[50] Latino is fairly well balanced in the phone (27.68%)/control (30.18)

[47] The partner organization, being focused primarily on immigrant rights and education was very clear about wanting to target primarily foreign born citizens; however they were also willing to canvass some natural born minorities after much persuasion by the directors at the parent partner organization and the researcher.

[48] Unlike other areas, the organizers in San Jose wanted to test multiple mode contact effects (e.g., phone/mail, door-to-door/mail, or phone/door-to-door), and we tracked those people who received multiple modes of contact, but the sample sizes and contact rates are too small to include in analysis. I mention it here because it did result in a reduction of the single treatment group sample sizes by a small amount, which makes the control group appear abnormally large compared to the treatment groups.

[49] The author went door-to-door canvassing in San Jose and was paired with a Chinese immigrant who was fluent in Mandarin. She was a recent immigrant, who was brought to the U.S. for marriage and the partner organization had assisted her with divorce and citizenship papers. Walking with her and seeing the interactions between immigrants from various backgrounds led to some interesting insights by the author, which are explored in the survey chapters.

[50] This is the result of the researcher using the turfs or neighborhoods the campaign wanted to contact for treatment assignment and attempting to use similar or matching neighborhoods for the control group. The organization was unwilling to skip houses in door-to-door canvassing especially, so would not allow houses in those neighborhoods to be assigned to the control group. The researcher used the VAN file, not the Secretary of State file, and knowledge of the organization, to

mode, off only 2.51% and 2.84% in the mail (27.34%)/control (30.18%) pairing. The greatest imbalance is in the door-to-door canvassing (37.81%)/control pairing (30.18%), where there are 7.63% more Latinos in the treatment group than the control group. Asian has a higher level of imbalance across all treatments. There are 17.79% more Asians in the phone treatment group (40.43%) than the control group (22.64%). Door-to-door canvassing is 31.12% Asian, which 8.48% higher than the control group and Asians make up 36.79% of the mail treatment group, which is 14.15% higher than the control group.

Creating balance through matching is probably more important to the SC/SJ experiment than any of the other experiments in this study. Not surprisingly, in the phone treatment, nearest matching is the worst performing, dropping 7,733 of the 9,280 cases in the experiment and averaging only 65.84% balance improvement (see Table 3.15). After matching an imbalance of 13.4% persists among foreign born (100% treatment/86.6% control). There are smaller imbalances across the other covariates as well, the highest being in vote history (7.10%), Latino (2.91%) and age (2.08 years). CEM performed much better by dropping non-foreign born citizens, leaving 5,388 cases for analysis (1495 treatment, 3893 control). For all practical purposes, balance between phone treatment and control was attained in all covariates.[51] The average balance improvement was 99.99%. Genetic matching, which matches on and keeps all of the treatment observations, dropped 4,979

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create the sample file. After matching the file to the Secretary of State file after the fact, the number of foreign born citizens in the similar neighborhoods was significantly less than in the treatment neighborhoods. If I were to replicate the study, I would match neighborhoods in advance using Secretary of State and Census block data. CEM and Genetic matching will drop non-foreign born citizens from analysis in the mail and phone treatments.

[51] There is a small difference of .001 years in age.

control group observations, for a total of 4,301 cases for analysis. Balance was achieved for all covariates except age, which had a difference of .03 years between treatment and control. The average balance improvement was 99.95%.

For the door-to-door and mail treatments, the various matching techniques performed similarly to the phone group. Nearest matching left imbalance across all covariates, although did much better in the door treatment, leaving only Latinos with an imbalance of nearly 3%, while all others were less than 2% out of balance. The overall balance improvement for door-to-door was 79.29%, compared to only 55.73% average improvement for the mail treatment. In the direct mail matching, foreign born (13.66%), Asian (8.42%), vote history (4.26%) and age (3.53 years) all had sizeable imbalances. CEM and Genetic matching averaged over 99% balance improvement in the door-to-door and mail treatments. Balance was achieved in all variables except age for both treatment conditions, and the differences in age were less .10 years.

San Francisco

As mentioned in the last chapter, San Francisco faced many challenges during the mobilization campaign. A local partner organization was spearheading the telephone and ground efforts. They wanted to focus exclusively on Chinese Americans, which make up the largest single minority population in the city (21.4% of the population) as of 2010. There were several competitive races going on at the local level during the general election period and the partner organization was spread thin trying to campaign for several candidates as well as issues. At the last minute, they drastically reduced the number of contacts they would be able to

attempt for this experiment and the randomization had to be rerun. In addition, October 2010 was an extremely wet one in San Francisco and two of the four weekends of door-to-door canvassing were cancelled due to heavy rains.

San Francisco had only 6,423 people total in the experiment, the majority of which were in the direct mail treatment. San Francisco also had the fewest problems with balance, between the control and treatment groups. The phone and door-to-door treatment groups have several variables with imbalances over one percent, including foreign born, partisanship, vote history and average of two years difference in age, as is shown in tables 3.18 and 3.19. Table 3.20 shows that in the mail treatment group, the only difference over one percent from the control group is in gender, with the mail group being made up of 50.8% women and the control group being 52.1% women, a difference of 1.3 percentage points. All other variables have a difference of less than one percent.

According to the analysis in Chapter 2, the experiments in San Francisco had no significant results, which is not surprising given the sample size. Even though the treatments were not as out of balance in San Francisco as they were in the other experiments, I ran the matching models to see if the small imbalances would have an impact on the results, especially given the small sample sizes. As with all of the experiments, across all three treatments, I find that nearest matching did not achieve balance across all variables (see Tables 3.18, 3.19, 3.20). In fact, in all three treatments, nearest matching did not produce balanced groups in any of the covariates. CEM again performed well in the telephone/control treatment, leaving only age out of balance by less than a year and dropping only 231 cases, for a total

sample size of 1,386 and an average balance improvement of 99.11%. Genetic matching achieved balance in all groups except age, which was also off by less than a year and Republicans, which left the control group with .26% fewer Republicans than the treatment group. 655 cases were dropped from the control group, leaving a total sample size of 962 and an average balance improvement of 93.88%.

As is shown in Table 3.19 in the door-to-door treatment, CEM far outperformed the other matching techniques, with a 99.44% average balance improvement. Nearest matching produced only a 55.68% improvement and Genetic a 66.69% improvement, both techniques not achieving balance across almost all covariates. Similar results were found in the mail treatment (Table 3.20), with CEM achieving an average balance improvement of 97.15%, while Nearest and Genetic matching were far less successful at 39.25% and 89.92%, respectively.

Overall Balance Improvement

Overall, coarsened exact matching produced the greatest balance improvement across all treatment/control groups. Table 3.4 shows a summary of balance improvement across matching techniques and experiments. Averaging all of the experiments, CEM produced an average balance improvement of 99.01%, while Genetic had an improvement of 93.72% and nearest only 69.49%. Given these findings and how close Genetic matching and CEM results were in some of the treatment/control pairings, all of the analysis will be run using analytic weights for both CEM and Genetic matching. I expect that the results will be similar.

Table 3.4 Summary of Balance Improvement Using Matching

	Nearest	CEM	Genetic
	Percent Improvement		
LA Phone	78.82	**99.90**	96.11
LA Door	73.91	99.84	**99.93**
LA Mail	69.90*	**94.90**	84.44
SB Phone	77.14	99.93	**99.95**
SB Door	76.67*	**98.38**	96.95
SB Mail	78.80	**99.56**	97.24
SC/SJ Phone	65.84*	**99.99**	99.95
SC/SJ Door	79.29	**99.99**	99.99
SC/SJ Mail	55.73*	**99.88**	99.57
SF Phone[ə]	73.06	**99.11**	93.88
SF Door[ə]	55.68	**99.44**	66.69
SF Mail[ə]	39.25	**97.15**	89.92
Average Improvement	69.49	**99.01**	93.72

* These means were affected by an outlier. The numbers presented here exclude the outlier. Please see tables for full numbers.

[ə] These means do not include Latino or Korean, given people in these ethnic groups were not included in the San Francisco campaign.

Contact Rates and Treatment Effects

Using balanced data I reexamine the analysis presented in Chapter 2 for all four experiments and all treatments. Regressions to determine the treatment effects were run using two-stage least squares (2SLS), just as they were in Chapter 2, with CEM analytic weights and Genetic matching analytic weights. Intent-to-treat (ITT) effects and contact rates were also calculated using weighted data.[52]

The ITT effects and contact rates for Los Angeles are shown in Table 3.5. In the phone treatment, the contact rate with no matching is 27.6%, meaning 27.6% of the people assigned to the phone treatment were successfully contacted. This increases slightly to 28.0% using CEM and because Genetic matching attempts to

[52] The ITT effect is simply the difference between the numbers of people voting who are assigned to the treatment group compared to those who are assigned to the control group. Because this does not account for contact, it is referred to as the intent to treat effect, instead of the actual treatment effect.

match to the treatment group, there should be little to no change in the contact rate, and in the LA phone analysis the contact rate stays in the same with the Genetic weights. The ITT effect with no matching is .23, or a 2.3 percentage point increase in voter turnout. With CEM weights this increases to 8.5 percentage points and with Genetic weights it increases to 10.1 percentage points. The results remain statistically significant with balanced treatment/control groups.

The first two columns of Table 3.6 shows the complier average causal effects (CACE), or treatment effects controlling for those who were successfully contacted or 'complied' with treatment (see Chapter 2 for more discussion of CACE) using no matching and balancing techniques for the phone treatment group. With no matching balance and no covariates, the effect of treatment on treated is an 8.3 percentage point increase in turnout (column a under phone treatment). When covariates were added (column b), this jumped to a 35.5 percentage point increase in turnout. This large increase when covariates are added is one of the indicators that matching is necessary.

Using CEM weights, the increase in turnout among those successfully contacted jumps is 30.3 percentage points. This is much closer to the model (b) including covariates in the unbalanced data than the model without covariates (a). There is little change in models (a) and (b) when CEM weights are used. This is what is expected given that the treatment and control groups are balanced (and what is expected more generally in randomized t/c experiments. Genetic matching produces an even larger effect size than CEM matching, with a 36.5 percentage point increase in turnout (36.2 including covariates).

Table 3.5 Contact Rates and Intent-to-Treat Effects by Matching Type and Assignment Group for Los Angeles

	No Matching	CEM	Genetic
Phone			
Treatment % Voting^	28.5 (940/3301)	29.4 (826/2812)	28.5 (939/3297)
Control % Voting	26.2 (570/2178)	20.9 (350/1678)	18.4 (226/1229)
ITT	**2.3*** **(1.2)**	**8.5***** **(1.4)**	**10.1***** **(1.5)**
Contact Rate##	27.6 (912/3301)	28.0 (788/2812)	27.6 (911/3297)
Door			
Treatment % Voting^	30.8 (791/1777)	30.3 (636/2097)	30.9 (791/2553)
Control % Voting	26.2 (570/2178)	23.0 (414/1799)	22.5 (300/1332)
ITT*	**4.6 *** **(1.3)**	**7.3***** **(1.4)**	**8.4***** **(1.5)**
Contact Rate##	23.1 (592/2568)	24.4 (511/2097)	23.2 (592/2553)
Mail			
Treatment % Voting^	36.0 (982/2728)	37.3 (846/2268)	36.3 (981/2702)
Control % Voting	26.2 (570/2178)	27.3 (470/1724)	26.1 (337/1292)
ITT#	**9.8***** **(1.3)**	**10.0***** **(1.5)**	**10.2***** **(1.6)**

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

^ The numbers in parentheses are the number who votes/the total number in the assignment group

Standard errors are in parentheses

The numbers in parentheses are the number successfully contacted/the total number in the assignment group

Given that CEM was most consistently the best at producing balanced groups, and that the CEM results appear to be a little more conservative than Genetic estimates, the are likely the best estimates to use to interpret effect sizes. In this case, all of the findings are significant and positive, and both CEM and Genetic produced increases well above the unmatched data, indicating that the effect is

likely larger than 8 percentage points among those contacted by phone. While I would be hesitant to claim that there was a 30 percentage point increase because this would be an unheard of effect size, it does seem that there is strong evidence that the phone campaign was effective in L.A..

With no matching for balance or covariates in the analysis, the treatment on treated effect for the door-to-door canvassing was a 20.1 percentage point increase in turnout (model a); including covariates increases that to a 36.9 percentage point increase (model b). The difference in results was not as dramatic as in the phone treatment, but still requires further investigation. Using CEM weights for balance, the results show about a 30 percentage point (pp) increase in turnout for those successfully contacted (30.1 pp without covariates, 30.2 including covariates). Again, using Genetic matching balance weights creates a large effect of 36.4 pp increase in turnout.

For the mail treatment, in which contact or receipt of mail cannot be verified, using balanced groups did not change the results very much. Before balance, the effect was approximately a 10 percentage point increase with or without covariates, and it remained the same after balancing.

Overall, the results for L.A. are positive, suggesting that mobilization efforts were effective at increasing turnout among those contacted by phone and door-to-door canvassing and those who were sent direct mailers.

Table 3.6 Effect of Treatment on Voter Turnout in the 2010 General Election by Treatment Group and Matching Type for Los Angeles

	Phone		Door-to-Door		Mail	
CACE	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**
Covariates	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
No Matching	**8.3***	**35.5*****	**20.1*****	**36.9*****	**9.8*****	**10.4*****
Robust SE	(5.0)	(5.6)	(6.00)	(0.07)	(1.3)	(1.2)
CEM	**30.3*****	**30.4*****	**30.1*****	**30.2*****	**10.1*****	**10.0*****
Robust SE	(4.8)	(4.4)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(1.5)	(1.3)
Genetic Matching	**36.5*****	**36.2*****	**36.4*****	**36.4*****	**10.2*****	**10.2*****
Robust SE	(5.3)	(4.9)	(.07)	(.06)	(.02)	(1.4)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Complier Average Causal Effect estimated with two-state least squares regression using weighted and unweighted data. Random assignment to treatment conditions used as instrument for voting in the 2010 General Election. The effects are the estimated percentage point difference between the control group and each of the treatment conditions.

Turning to San Bernardino, which as previously mentioned did not have the leadership experience or volunteer base that Los Angeles did, the results are not as positive. When analysis is run without balance weights from matching, live phone calls, with a contact rate of about 20%, results in a negative intent to treat effect, producing a decrease of 4.1 percentage points in turnout. Door-to-door canvassing, on the other hand, with a contact rate of almost 32%, produced an increase of 4.3 percentage points in turnout. Direct mail had no significant ITT effect on turnout. These results are shown in Table 3.7.

Looking at the CACE effects, the negative impact of phone calls is even more pronounced. With no balance matching, it appears that having actually been contacted with a live phone call decreased turnout by 20 percentage points, when covariates are not included (a). When covariates are included, the decrease in turnout drops to only 11.5 pp, offering strong support that imbalance in the covariates is having an effect on the results.

Table 3.7 Contact Rates and Intent-to-Treat Effects by Matching Type and Assignment Group for San Bernardino

	No Matching	CEM	Genetic
Phone			
Treatment % Voting^	33.5 (412/1230)	33.6 (396/1178)	33.5 (412/1230)
Control % Voting	37.6 (1417/3770	35.7 (1194/3343)	35.6 (741/2085)
ITT	**-4.1** **(1.6)**	-2.1 (1.6)	-2.1 (1.7)
Contact Rate##	20.2 (248/1230)	20.0 (236/1178)	20.2 (248/1230)
Door			
Treatment % Voting^	41.9 (839/2002)	42.0 (813/1935)	41.9 (838/1999)
Control % Voting	37.6 (1417/3770)	39.6 (1388/3510)	39.9 (1111/2784)
ITT*	**4.3***** **(1.3)**	**2.5*** **(1.4)**	1.9 (1.4)
Contact Rate##	31.7 (635/2002)	31.7 (613/1935)	31.7 (633/1999)
Mail			
Treatment % Voting^	35.5 (668/1881)	35.8 (647/1809)	35.4 (665/1877)
Control % Voting	37.6 (1417/3770)	36.2 (1255/3468)	37.1 (981/2648)
ITT#	-2.1 (1.4)	-0.4 (1.4)	-1.6 (1.5)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

^ The numbers in parentheses are the number who votes/the total number in the assignment group

Standard errors are in parentheses

The numbers in parentheses are the number successfully contacted/the total number in the assignment group

After matching, the negative effect for the phone treatment disappears. Table 3.8 shows that both CEM and Genetic matching still produce results that trend in a negative direction, but the size of the negative effect of contact is cut in half and is no longer statistically significant, supporting the null hypothesis of no effect.

The CACE for door-to-door canvassing is a 13.6 percentage point increase, but when covariates are included, it is reduced to a 6.3 percentage point increase,

again providing evidence that imbalance in the covariates in playing a role in the results. CEM created the best balance improvement in San Bernardino's door-to-door canvasing treatment group and using those weights shows that there was an increase of approximately 7.8 pp in voter turnout among those successfully contacted. Genetic matching produces a significant increase of approximately 6.4 percentage points when covariates are included.[53] Canvassing is the only mode of contact that produced a significant increase in turnout in San Bernardino, as direct mail appears to have no effect, even after balancing the data.

Table 3.8 Effect of Treatment on Voter Turnout in the 2010 General Election by Treatment Group and Matching Type for San Bernardino

	Phone		**Door-to-Door**		**Mail**	
CACE	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**
Covariates	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
No Matching	**-20.3****	**-11.5***	**13.6****	**6.3***	-2.1	-0.4
Robust SE	**(7.9)**	**(6.8)**	**(4.2)**	**(3.6)**	(1.4)	(1.1)
CEM	-10.4	-10.4	**7.8***	**7.7****	-0.4	-0.3
Robust SE	(8.1)	(6.8)	**(4.4)**	**(3.6)**	(1.4)	(1.1)
Genetic Matching	-10.2	-10.0	6.3	**6.4***	-1.6	-1.4
Robust SE	(8.6)	(7.2)	(4.5)	**(3.7)**	(1.5)	(1.2)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Complier Average Causal Effect estimated with two-state least squares regression using weighted and unweighted data. Random assignment to treatment conditions used as instrument for voting in the 2010 General Election. The effects are the estimated percentage point difference between the control group and each of the treatment conditions.

[53] This is very similar to the results found in the data with no matching when covariates were included. Again, this makes sense given that Genetic matching balances to the treatment group variables.

With imbalance in the data, the intent to treat effects for Santa Clara/San Jose show that both live phone calls and door-to-door canvassing lead to an increase in voter turnout. Live phone calls had an ITT effect of a 3.6 percentage point increase in turnout, while door-to-door canvassing created a 14.9 pp increase in turnout. Direct mail had no statistically significant effect on turnout. Contact rates were very good in SC/SJ, with an average of a 24% contact rate in live phone calls and a 42% contact rate in door-to-door canvassing.

When CEM matching is used to balance the treatment/control groups, the ITT effect for direct phone calls drops to .6 percentage points and is no longer statistically significant. The ITT effect for door-to-door canvassing remains positive and significant with an increase of 11.3 pp in voter turnout. The ITT effect for mail drops from 1.1 pp to .2 pp increase, and not surprisingly, is still not significant.

Genetic matching produces the same results at CEM in the phone treatment group, an ITT effect of .6 pp, but not significant. In door-to-door canvassing however, the ITT effect increases to a 35.5 percentage point increase in turnout. This large discrepancy between Genetic matching and CEM and no matching, which are much closer together, is another reason to be skeptical of using Genetic matching for results in this study.

Table 3.9 Contact Rates and Intent-to-Treat Effects by Matching Type and Assignment Group for Santa Clara/San Jose

	No Matching	CEM	Genetic
Phone			
Treatment % Voting^	58.5 (892/1524)	58.7 (878/1495)	58.5 (889/1521)
Control % Voting	54.9 (4313/7845)	58.1 (2263/3893)	57.9 (1608/2780)
ITT	**3.6****	0.6	0.6
	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
Contact Rate##	24.2 (368/1524)	24.0 (359/1495)	24.1 (366/1521)
Door			
Treatment % Voting^	69.9 (1332/1904)	69.8 (1315/1885)	69.9 (1327/1899)
Control % Voting	54.9 (4313/7845)	60.2 (3889/6455)	58.6 (2231/3808)
ITT*	**14.9*****	**11.3*****	**35.5*****
	(1.3)	**(1.4)**	**(2.9)**
Contact Rate##	42.2 (804/1904)	42.2 (796/1885)	42.2 (802/1899)
Mail			
Treatment % Voting^	56.0 (1220/2179)	56.5 (1205/2134)	56.0 (1215/2169)
Control % Voting	54.9 (4313/7845)	56.3 (2252/4003)	56.4 (1779/3153)
ITT#	1.1 (1.2)	0.2 (1.3)	-0.4 (1.4)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
^ The numbers in parentheses are the number who votes/the total number in the assignment group
# Standard errors are in parentheses
The numbers in parentheses are the number successfully contacted/the total number in the assignment group

As is suggested by the ITT effects, when the balanced data is used to determine the CACE effects on treated individuals, the 3.6 pp increase created by live phone calls in Santa Clara/San Jose disappears. With both CEM and Genetic matching the effect drops to a 2.5 pp increase, but neither are statistically significant.

Also suggested by the original data and by the ITT effects on the balanced data, direct mail had no effect in SC/SJ.

Where real effects are seen is in the door-to-door canvassing. The original data suggests that there are large treatment effects from door-to-door canvassing, producing a 35.5 pp increase without covariates and a 24.4 pp increase in turnout with covariates. This 11.1 point difference again requires that the data be examined with balanced treatment/control groups so that false conclusions are not driven by the covariates.

When CEM weights are applied for balance, the CACE with no covariates is a 22.5 pp increase in turnout (model a). When covariates are added (b) the result is nearly the same, with a 21.8 pp increase in turnout. Using Genetic weights produces slightly higher results, with over a 26 pp increase in turnout. While both Genetic and CEM matching resulted in an average balance improvement of 99%, the CEM estimates are more conservative, which seems appropriate for this study.

Table 3.10 Effect of Treatment on Voter Turnout in the 2010 General Election by Treatment Group and Matching Type for Santa Clara/San Jose

	Phone		Door-to-Door		Mail	
CACE	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**
Covariates	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
No Matching	**14.7****	1.8	**35.5*****	**24.4*****	1.1	0.4
Robust SE	**(5.7)**	(5.7)	**(2.9)**	**(2.9)**	(1.2)	(1.2)
CEM	2.5	1.5	**22.5*****	**21.8*****	0.2	0.3
Robust SE	(6.2)	(5.7)	**(2.9)**	**(2.8)**	(1.3)	(1.2)
Genetic Matching	2.5	1.6	**26.8*****	**26.0*****	-0.4	-0.3
Robust SE	(6.5)	(5.9)	**(3.2)**	**(3.0)**	(1.4)	(1.2)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Complier Average Causal Effect estimated with two-state least squares regression using weighted and unweighted data. Random assignment to treatment conditions used as instrument for voting in the 2010 General Election. The effects are the estimated percentage point difference between the control group and each of the treatment conditions.

Table 3.10 shows that San Francisco had no significant results for ITT effects with or without balanced data. For the phone and door-to-door canvassing treatment, the ITT effects were negative and remained negative after balance matching. The ITT effect for direct mail is positive, but decreases with balanced data and remains insignificant.

Table 3.11 Contact Rates and Intent-to-Treat Effects by Matching Type and Assignment Group for San Francisco

	No Matching	CEM	Genetic
Phone			
Treatment % Voting^	55.0 (214/389)	55.6 (210/378)	55.0 (213/387)
Control % Voting	56.3 (704/1250)	59.0 (595/1008)	55.8 (321/575)
ITT	-1.3 (2.9)	-3.4 (2.9)	-0.8 (3.2)
Contact Rate##	34.2 (133/389)	33.9 (128/378)	34.4 (133/387)
Door			
Treatment % Voting^	53.4 (267/500)	56.5 (261/462)	53.5 (265/495)
Control % Voting	56.3 (704/1250)	57.3 (603/1052)	56.6 (363/642)
ITT*	-2.9 (2.6)	-0.8 (2.7)	-3.0 (2.9)
Contact Rate##	12.2 (61/500)	12.3 (57/462)	12.1 (60/495)
Mail			
Treatment % Voting^	58.2 (2548/4375)	59.7 (2470/4140)	58.7 (2531/4311)
Control % Voting	56.3 (704/1250)	58.9 (716/1214)	57.9 (689/1189)
ITT#	1.9 (1.6)	0.7 (1.6)	0.8 (1.6)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

^ The numbers in parentheses are the number who votes/the total number in the assignment group

Standard errors are in parentheses

The numbers in parentheses are the number successfully contacted/the total number in the assignment group

Similarly, when the 2SLS regressions are performed with balanced data, there are still no statistically significant effects for San Francisco. Table 3.11 shows the regression results to determine the CACE on treated individuals. Even using an instrument for successful contact, the direction of the effect is negative, although insignificant. The effects for mail remain (barely) positive, but also insignificant. At

the end of the day, the San Francisco experiment likely had to too small of a sample size to see any effect of mobilization efforts.

Table 3.12 Effect of Treatment on Voter Turnout in the 2010 General Election by Treatment Group and Matching Type for San Francisco

	Phone		Door-to-Door		Mail	
CACE	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(a)**	**(b)**
Covariates	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
No Matching	-3.8	-4.1	-23.9	-6.3	1.9	2.0
Robust SE	(8.4)	(7.3)	(21.7)	(18.4)	(1.6)	(1.4)
CEM	-10.2	-10.1	-6.6	-6.9	0.7	0.6
Robust SE	(8.8)	(7.7)	(22.4)	(18.9)	(1.6)	(1.4)
Genetic Matching	-2.3	-2.3	-25.1	-18.2	0.8	0.7
Robust SE	(9.5)	(8.4)	(24.8)	(20.7)	(1.6)	(1.4)

Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Complier Average Causal Effect estimated with two-state least squares regression using weighted and unweighted data. Random assignment to treatment conditions used as instrument for voting in the 2010 General Election. The effects are the estimated percentage point difference between the control group and each of the treatment conditions.

Discusssion

Experiments rely heavily on the assumption that randomization of subjects will create balanced or near balanced treatment and control groups. When this assumption is violated, the results of the experiment may not be statistically significant and make it problematic or even unethical to draw conclusions from the results. Because randomization is sometimes flawed and because experiments are time consuming, expensive and often impossible to replicate exactly, statistical tools to save the data have been developed. One of the most common approaches is to force the treatment groups in the data to balance through matching techniques.

Due to randomization problems in the experimental design in this study, there were significant imbalances between the treatment and control groups across experimental conditions and contact modes. To obtain balance in the data, multiple types of matching techniques were utilized, including nearest neighbor matching, coarsened exact matching and genetic matching. Nearest matching consistently produced less successful balance between treatment groups than the two other matching techniques, averaging only a 69.5% improvement in balance. Coarsened exact matching was the most successful matching technique with a 99.01% average balance improvement. Genetic matching fell between the other two, with an average balance improvement of 93.72%.

The weights from CEM and genetic matching were then used in two-stage least squares regression to determine if intent-to-treat and complier average causal effect sizes would differ from the original findings in Chapter Two. Using CEM to look at effects because the higher success in creating balanced groups, fewer dropped cases, and more conservative estimate of effects, all of the ITT and CACE treatment effects in Los Angeles held, were statistically significant and were slightly higher than the original models suggested. In San Bernardino, the negative effect for live telephone calls disappeared after matching, but the positive effect of door-to-door canvassing held, and showed that the true effect size was an increase in turnout of approximately 7 percentage points. In Santa Clara County/San Jose the positive effect of live telephone calls also disappeared with balanced treatment groups. Again, the positive effects of door-to-door canvassing with an ITT effect of approximately 11 percentage points and a CACE of about 22 percentage points, held

and were statistically significant. San Francisco had no significant findings in either the original or matched analysis.

Like many voter mobilization studies before, door-to-door canvassing was the most successful form of mobilization overall. Direct mail and live telephone calls only produced significant increases in Los Angeles. This could be due to highly organized, highly motivated groups working the campaign in Los Angeles, but further studies using minority focused mobilization groups are needed to make a definitive conclusion. In two of the cities in this study, balancing the covariates resulted in the live telephone effects changing from significant to insignificant. While this is a disappointing finding for the positive effect initially found in SC/SJ, it is good to know that phone calls are not depressing turnout as it first appeared in San Bernardino.

The more important point of this chapter and matching analysis is to see how different matching techniques can produce various results. The good news is that flawed data can be saved and analyzed to determine the direction of causal effects, even if the exact size of the effect may fluctuate or be elusive. Additionally, it seems that the results produced by different balancing techniques yield consistent results in terms of significant findings. Running multiple techniques and producing the same results leads further support to causal effect claims.

Additional Tables:

Table 3.13 San Bernardino Phone: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	26.20	24.14	2.05	26.20	26.21	-0.01	99.36	26.07	26.07	0.00	99.86	26.20	26.19	0.01	99.83
Foreign Born	22.03	14.89	7.14	22.03	20.58	1.45	79.59	19.35	19.35	0.00	100.00	22.03	22.03	0.00	100.00
Latino	56.83	43.86	12.97	56.83	58.46	-1.63	87.40	57.81	57.81	0.00	100.00	56.83	56.83	0.00	100.00
Asian	1.14	0.82	0.31	1.14	1.11	0.03	90.00	0.42	0.42	0.00	100.00	1.14	1.14	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.00	0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.02	38.92	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Female	54.31	53.80	0.51	54.31	54.71	-0.4	21.53	54.58	54.58	0.00	100.00	54.31	54.31	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	44.48	46.95	-2.47	44.48	44.68	-0.2	91.93	44.10	44.09	0.01	99.41	44.48	44.49	0.00	99.66
Democrat	51.63	53.35	-1.73	51.63	51.50	0.13	92.62	52.89	52.89	0.00	100.00	51.63	51.63	0.00	100.00
Republican	24.88	25.61	-0.73	24.88	25.04	-0.16	78.00	23.68	23.68	0.00	100.00	24.88	24.88	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	50.65	52.39	-1.74	50.65	50.79	-0.14	92.03	50.51	50.51	0.00	100.00	50.65	50.65	0.00	100.00
N	1230	3760		205	832			1178	3343			1230	2085		
Unmatched	-	-		-	-			52	417				1675		
Average % Improvement							77.14				99.93				99.95

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1 and 2 contained the majority of
matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 8; Generations run: 13

Table 3.14 San Bernardino Door-to-Door: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	34.95	34.59	0.36	34.95	34.94	0.01	97.91	35.00	35.00	0.00	99.56	34.95	34.95	0.00	99.99
Foreign Born	14.81	14.89	-0.09	14.81	14.87	-0.06	21.96	13.13	13.13	0.00	100.00	14.81	14.81	0.00	100.00
Latino	42.62	43.86	-1.24	42.62	42.94	-0.32	73.97	43.00	43.00	0.00	100.00	42.62	42.62	0.00	100.00
Asian	0.75	0.82	-0.07	0.75	0.80	-0.05	35.85	0.05	0.05	0.00	100.00	0.75	0.75	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.00	0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.02	14.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Female	54.88	53.80	1.07	54.88	54.94	-0.06	93.76	55.19	55.19	0.00	100.00	54.88	54.78	0.10	90.69
Age (in years)	46.79	46.95	-0.16	46.79	46.96	-0.17	-4.57	46.46	46.43	0.26	84.19	46.79	46.82	-0.03	79.78
Democrat	56.28	53.35	2.93	56.28	56.24	0.04	98.55	57.47	57.47	0.00	100.00	56.28	56.28	0.00	100.00
Republican	24.11	25.61	-1.50	24.11	24.08	0.03	97.69	23.26	23.26	0.00	100.00	24.11	24.11	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	57.48	52.39	5.09	57.48	57.80	-0.32	93.64	57.62	57.62	0.00	100.00	57.48	57.53	-0.05	99.02
N	1999	3760		333	627			1935	3510						
Unmatched				-	-			64	250						
Average % Improvement							62.30				98.38				96.95

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. All subclasses were of fairly equal size. Numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 3; Generations run: 8

Table 3.15 San Bernardino Direct Mail: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	34.18	32.86	1.32	34.18	34.05	00.13	90.50	34.12	34.11	0.01	99.02	34.18	34.17	0.01	99.62
Foreign Born	16.62	14.89	1.73	16.62	16.09	0.53	69.07	14.26	14.26	0.00	100.00	16.62	16.62	0.00	100.00
Latino	36.92	43.86	-6.94	36.92	37.42	-0.50	92.75	37.31	37.31	0.00	100.00	36.92	36.92	0.00	100.00
Asian	0.08	0.82	-0.03	0.80	0.78	0.02	42.05	0.06	0.06	0.00	100.00	0.80	0.80	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.00	0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.02	25.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Female	53.06	53.08	-0.74	53.06	53.10	-0.04	95.28	53.57	53.57	0.00	100.00	53.06	53.01	0.05	92.80
Age (in years)	44.83	46.95	-2.12	44.83	45.02	-0.19	90.70	44.60	44.67	-0.73	96.55	44.83	44.83	0.00	99.80
Democrat	57.22	53.35	3.87	57.22	57.14	0.08	97.95	58.37	58.37	0.00	100.00	57.22	57.22	0.00	100.00
Republican	21.79	25.61	-3.82	21.79	22.03	-0.24	93.74	21.06	21.06	0.00	100.00	21.79	21.79	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	50.24	52.39	-2.15	50.24	50.45	-0.21	90.47	50.53	50.53	0.00	100.00	50.24	50.67	-0.43	80.21
N	1877	3760		313	627			1809	3468			1877	2648		
Unmatched								68	292			0	1112		
Average % Improvement							78.80				99.56				97.24

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1, 2, and3 contained the largest number of matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 10; Generations run: 15

Table 3.16 Santa Clara/San jose Phone Calls: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	27.06	14.30	12.77	27.06	23.93	3.13	75.44	27.08	27.08	0.00	99.99	27.06	27.06	0.00	99.98
Foreign Born	100.00	53.34	46.66	100.00	86.60	13.4	71.28	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00
Latino	27.68	30.18	-2.51	7.68	30.59	-2.91	-16.22	27.02	27.02	0.00	100.00	27.68	27.68	0.00	100.00
Asian	40.43	22.64	17.79	40.43	38.93	1.50	91.53	40.60	40.60	0.00	100.00	40.43	40.43	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.26	0.19	0.07	0.26	0.24	0.02	73.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.26	0.26	0.00	100.00
Female	46.09	48.46	-2.37	46.09	47.99	-1.90	20.00	45.82	45.82	0.00	100.00	46.09	46.09	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	50.93	45.89	5.04	50.93	48.85	2.08	58.62	50.87	50.87	0.01	99.89	50.93	50.96	-0.03	99.56
Democrat	46.09	52.38	-6.29	46.09	47.36	-1.27	79.78	46.56	46.56	0.00	100.00	46.09	46.09	0.00	100.00
Republican	20.25	16.38	3.87	20.25	18.57	1.68	56.68	19.73	19.73	0.00	100.00	20.25	20.25	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	75.21	68.48	6.74	75.21	82.31	-7.10	-5.29	75.59	75.59	0.00	100.00	75.21	75.21	0.00	100.00
N	1521	7759		254	1293			1495	3893			1521	2780		
Unmatched	-	-		-	-			26	3866			0	4979		
Average % Balance Improvement							65.84±				99.99				99.95

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1 and 2 contained the majority of
matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 5; Generations run: 10

± The mean for balance improvement is 50.52 if the outliers for Latino and Voted 2008 are included in the calculation. The figure 65.84 excludes these values.

Table 3.17 Santa Clara/San Jose Door-to-Door: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	26.31	18.03	8.28	26.31	25.98	0.33	95.92	26.32	26.32	0.00	99.99	26.31	26.31	0.00	99.99
Foreign Born	85.10	53.34	31.75	85.10	84.01	1.09	96.56	85.15	85.15	0.00	100.00	85.10	85.10	0.00	100.00
Latino	37.81	30.18	7.63	37.81	34.82	2.99	60.80	37.77	37.77	0.00	100.00	37.81	37.81	0.00	100.00
Asian	31.12	22.64	8.48	31.12	32.56	-1.44	83.00	31.03	31.03	0.00	100.00	31.12	31.12	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.26	0.19	0.07	0.26	0.26	0.00	89.26	0.05	0.05	0.00	100.00	0.26	0.26	0.00	100.00
Female	51.50	48.46	3.04	51.50	51.30	0.20	93.53	51.41	51.41	0.00	100.00	51.50	51.50	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	49.76	45.89	3.87	49.76	49.33	0.43	88.87	49.79	49.79	0.00	99.92	49.76	49.76	0.00	99.96
Democrat	51.29	52.38	-1.09	51.29	50.38	0.91	16.63	51.62	51.62	0.00	100.00	51.29	51.29	0.00	100.00
Republican	17.85	16.38	1.47	17.85	18.13	-0.28	80.91	17.61	17.61	0.00	100.00	17.85	17.85	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	81.46	68.48	12.99	81.46	79.82	1.64	87.38	81.70	81.70	0.00	100.00	81.46	81.46	0.00	100.00
N	1899	7759		317	1293			1885	6455			1999	3760		
Unmatched				-	-			14	1304			0	976		
Average % Balance Improvement							79.29				99.99				99.99

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. All subclasses were of fairly equal size. Numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 8; Generations run: 13

Table 3.18 Santa Clara/San Jose Direct Mail: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	34.51	18.31	16.20	34.51	30.16	4.35	73.14	34.51	34.51	0.00	99.98	34.51	34.51	0.00	99.99
Foreign Born	100.00	53.34	46.66	100.00	86.34	13.66	70.72	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00
Latino	27.34	30.18	-2.84	27.34	30.57	-3.23	-13.43	27.18	27.18	0.00	100.00	27.34	27.34	0.00	100.00
Asian	36.79	22.64	14.15	36.79	28.37	8.42	40.46	36.69	36.69	0.00	100.00	36.79	36.79	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.09	0.19	-0.10	0.09	0.06	0.03	64.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.09	0.09	0.00	100.00
Female	45.09	48.46	-3.37	45.09	46.09	-1.00	70.27	44.99	44.99	0.00	100.00	45.09	45.09	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	50.85	45.89	4.96	50.85	47.32	3.53	28.73	50.65	50.71	-0.06	98.76	50.85	50.85	0.00	99.91
Democrat	45.04	52.38	-7.33	45.04	43.28	1.76	75.94	45.50	45.50	0.00	100.00	45.04	45.04	0.00	100.00
Republican	21.44	16.38	5.06	21.44	21.90	-0.46	90.94	20.76	20.76	0.00	100.00	21.44	21.44	0.00	100.00
Voted 2008	69.57	68.48	1.10	69.57	65.31	4.26	-289.10	70.29	70.29	0.00	100.00	69.57	69.62	-0.05	95.79
N	2169	7759		362	1293			2134	4003			2169	3153		
Unmatched				-	-			35	3756			0	4606		
Average % Balance Improvement							55.73±				99.88				99.57

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1, 2, and3 contained the largest number of matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 10; Generations run: 15

± The average percent balance improvement of 55.73% does not include the outlier value for the variable 'Voted in 2008' (-289.10). If this value is included, the percent improvement is 21.25%.

Table 3.19 San Francisco Phone Calls: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	Percent Improvement	Phone	Control	Difference (T-C)	Percent Improvement
Distance	24.67	23.70	0.96	24.67	24.52	0.15	84.46	24.74	24.71	0.03	97.20	24.67	24.64	0.03	97.68
Foreign Born	68.99	64.07	4.93	68.99	68.51	0.48	90.26	69.58	69.58	0.00	100.00	68.99	68.99	0.00	100.00
Latino	0.00	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asian	100.00	99.92	0.08	100.00	99.94	0.06	31.66	1.00	1.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.00	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	52.71	52.03	0.68	52.71	52.42	0.29	56.21	52.91	52.91	0.00	100.00	52.71	52.71	0.00	100.00
Age (in years)	51.40	53.92	-2.52	51.40	51.83	-0.43	82.75	51.31	51.42	-0.11	95.67	51.40	51.50	0.10	95.70
Democrat	32.30	36.91	4.61	32.30	33.29	-0.99	78.47	32.54	32.54	0.00	100.00	32.30	32.30	0.00	100.00
Republican	10.85	11.46	0.61	10.85	10.93	-0.08	86.87	9.26	9.26	0.00	100.00	10.85	10.59	0.26	57.69
Voted 2008	76.74	75.20	1.54	76.74	76.34	0.4	73.78	77.51	77.51	0.00	100.00	76.74	76.74	0.00	100.00
N	387	1230		65	205			378	1008			387	575		
Unmatched								9	222			0	655		
Average % Balance Improvement							73.06				99.11				93.88

Note: Latino and Korean were not included in matching models because they were not included as targets in the San Francisco campaign.

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. While all subclasses were nearly equal in size, subclasses 1 contained the majority of matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 1; Generations run: 5

Table 3.20 San Francisco Door-to-Door: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Door	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	30.23	28.08	2.14	30.23	28.99	1.24	42.61	28.60	28.59	0.02	99.22	30.23	30.20	0.03	98.78
Foreign Born	65.05	64.07	0.98	65.05	64.31	0.74	25.24	65.37	65.37	0.00	100.00	65.05	65.66	-0.61	38.50
Latino	0.00	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asian	97.78	99.92	-2.14	97.78	99.87	-2.09	2.12	1.00	1.00	0.00	100.00	97.78	97.78	0.00	100.00
Korean	0.00	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	50.10	52.03	-1.93	50.10	49.85	0.25	86.98	50.65	50.65	0.00	100.00	50.10	50.91	-0.81	58.16
Age (in years)	56.16	53.92	2.24	56.16	56.56	-0.4	82.35	55.44	55.35	0.09	96.30	56.16	56.53	-.36	83.78
Democrat	37.78	36.91	0.87	37.78	38.42	-0.64	25.45	38.96	38.96	0.00	100.00	37.78	36.97	0.81	6.82
Republican	10.10	11.46	-1.36	10.10	10.26	-0.16	88.50	7.36	7.36	0.00	100.00	10.10	9.70	0.40	70.34
Voted 2008	69.90	75.20	-5.30	69.90	69.48	0.42	92.15	72.94	72.94	0.00	100.00	69.90	71.11	-1.21	77.15
N	495	1230		83	205			462	1052			495	642		
Unmatched				-	-			33	178				588		
Average % Balance Improvement							55.68				99.44				66.69

Note: Latino and Korean were not included in matching models because they were not included as targets in the San Francisco campaign.

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclass 2 was the largest, however all subclasses were of fairly equal size. Numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 2; Generations run: 7

Table 3.21 San Francisco Direct Mail: Treatment and Control Sample Balance by Matching Method

	No Matching			Nearest*				CEM				Genetic**			
	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement	Mail	Control	Difference (T-C)	%Balance Improvement
Distance	77.81	77.78	0.03	77.81	77.79	0.02	43.86	77.82	77.82	0.00	98.73	77.81	77.81	0.00	99.16
Foreign Born	64.16	64.07	0.09	64.16	64.18	-0.02	80.42	64.73	64.73	0.00	100.00	64.16	64.18	-0.02	75.94
Latino	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asian	99.93	99.92	0.01	99.93	99.92	0.01	24.32	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	99.93	99.93	0.00	100.00
Korean	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	50.75	52.03	-1.28	50.75	51.33	-0.58	54.96	51.50	51.50	0.00	100.00	50.75	50.78	-0.03	98.19
Age (in years)	53.79	53.92	-0.13	53.79	53.89	-0.1	19.62	53.41	53.38	0.03	78.48	53.79	53.74	0.05	68.44
Democrat	37.65	36.91	0.74	37.65	36.93	0.72	2.69	37.66	37.66	0.00	100.00	37.65	37.60	0.05	93.71
Republican	11.00	11.46	-0.47	11.00	11.19	-0.19	59.01	9.71	9.71	0.00	100.00	11.00	10.97	0.03	95.05
Voted 2008	75.41	75.20	0.21	75.41	75.26	0.15	29.08	77.27	77.27	0.00	100.00	75.41	75.43	-0.02	88.87
N	4311	1230		719	205			4140	1214			4311	1189		
Unmatched				-	-			171	16			0	41		
Average % Balance Improvement							39.25				97.15				89.92

Note: Latino and Korean were not included in matching models because they were not included as targets in the San Francisco campaign.

* Nearest matching resulted in 6 subclasses. Balanced was not achieved for all subclasses. Subclasses 1, 2, and 6 contained the largest number of matches, however numbers shown are mean results of matching across all subclasses.

** Solution found: Generation 2; Generations run

CHAPTER 4

Are Minorities Homogenous in their Political Views and Behaviors?

As discussed in Chapter 1, many mobilization studies fail to gather information about the targeted population beyond the personal characteristics available in the voter registration files, but this limited information such as gender, age and political party affiliation may not be enough to help us understand the mechanism that makes mobilization efforts effective, especially when we focus on those who are least likely to vote. We might mobilize voters more effectively and with more targeted methods if we understand more clearly how voter characteristics and backgrounds interact with mobilization efforts.

This study is trying to examine how to mobilize not just the general population, as many mobilization studies do, but racial and ethnic minority Americans and especially those who have immigrated to the United States and are naturalized citizens. There is evidence that there were heterogeneous treatment effects between Asians, Latinos and non-Asian/non-Latino 'others' in the field experiments. It is possible that there were differences in effects because of mobilization efforts and campaign quality, even when using the same messages, forms of contact and electoral context, but it is also possible that there was heterogeneity in effects because the populations come from different backgrounds and may not be receptive to contact, political discussion and mobilization efforts in the same way.

Earlier, I described a model where mobilization and cognitive resources work together to create a voter. The next two chapters examine how the populations of interest in this study are similar (or different) with regards to those cognitive resources and examine what role those played in successful contact and voter turnout.

"Scholars *need* frameworks that allow them to situate individuals and their political behavior within (an individual's) relevant sociocultural and historical contexts" (Garcia Bedolla and Michelson 2012, 7). Understanding differences among the people targeted in mobilization campaigns is especially important when we are reaching out to groups such as immigrants and minorities, considering the variety of cultural backgrounds and historical experiences with politics. If an immigrant has relocated to the United States from the People's Republic of China, where the Communist Party remains in full control of all elections and the majority of elected officials gain their seats through either indirect elections or appointments, they are likely to have very little to no experience with direct elections or electoral participation when they arrive in the United States. In fact, coming from a background where the one party controls all elections and political discussion about issues and government is largely kept online and monitored (Zhou 2009), they may be reluctant to discuss or engage in politics at all, much less with a stranger knocking at their door or calling on the phone. Conversely, an immigrant from Mexico, who is used to a system of direct elections, with multiple parties competing, may be much more likely to take an interest in politics and engage with and be

responsive to political canvassers.[54] These different backgrounds and previous experiences with politics work to create a model of individual political behavior or political self-identity in individuals. If the self-identity is one of an informed, efficacious citizen, then we can expect that they would be interested in the political world and may be more responsive to mobilization campaigns. However, if the self-identity is that politics are not necessarily personal, they have little interest politics or they have low levels of efficacy, we could expect that they would be less likely to seek out political knowledge, less willing to engage in political discussion, less likely to be politically active, and generally unreceptive to political mobilization from candidates or issue campaigns.

To determine if there is heterogeneity in the political attitudes and behaviors between Asian Americans and Latinos, I examine five of the major areas, or cognitive resources, known to impact political engagement and political participation (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Aldrich 1993; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). These include (1) political interest, (2) political discussion, (3) political knowledge, (4) political trust and efficacy and (5) non-voting political participation. These resources are likely interrelated when it comes to political engagement and participation (Carillo 2008), as is shown in Figure 4.1, and may be crucial in understanding how mobilization works, because engagement, encouragement and creating an interest in participation are cognitive activities themselves. When canvassers or organizations are reaching out to inactive registered voters, or those with a record of little or no turnout, they are

[54] However, immigrants from Mexico prior to 2000 may be more like Chinese immigrants given that there was one party control in Mexico by the PRI from the 1930's until the late 1990's.

attempting to tap into a schema or identity within the potential voter that allows them to see themselves as an active voter (Bedolla and Michelson 2012) and help them overcome cognitive barriers that are keeping them from the polls.

In addition to the cognitive resources, I will examine the role of 6) minority or group identity and sense of linked fate among the respondents, which has been shown as a factor known to influence individual behavior (Tate 1991; de la Garza et al. 1992; Lien 1994; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; G. R. Sanchez 2006; McClain, Johnson Carew, Walton, and Watts 2009). When thinking about minority political participation, issues like racial threat, racial or ethnic coalitions or immigration may play a special role, and could either increase or decrease responsiveness to mobilization efforts. Additionally, because the partner organization was focused on mobilizing immigrants, and specifically used messages of improving immigrant status as a mobilization tactic, understanding how respondents view themselves in terms of being an immigrant or a minority and having a sense of commonality or linked fate may be important. In this chapter, I will examine the six resources listed above and test for difference between Asians, Latinos and non-Asian/non-Latino 'others'. The following chapter will then use those variables to examine the role they played in successful contact and turnout.

Figure 4.1. Cognitive Resources Contributing to Voting and Voter Mobilization



The purpose of the survey is to get a deeper understanding of how mobilization campaigns work beyond the basic understanding that contact increases turnout. Who does contact work for? How does mobilization work? Is it only those that are politically interested or efficacious that turnout after being contacted, or does mobilization work on those that have very little interest in politics as well? Existing research on mobilization does little in terms of moving beyond testing the effects of contact itself. To a large degree, it does not explore the covariates. In fact, according to Gerber and Green (Gerber and Green 2012) it is assumed that as long as treatment groups are balanced, covariates should not matter for measuring effects of mobilization, which is true mathematically, but balanced treatment groups do not help us understand who is responsive within the experimental groups and do not help us have a deeper understanding of how

mobilization works at its core.[55] This study aims to help explain how to improve voter turnout moving beyond simply understanding *that* contact works and get a better understanding of *how* it works and who is affected by mobilization efforts.

Lisa Garcia Bedolla and Melissa Michelson (2012) address this issue for the first time with the creation of the Sociocultural Cognition Model of Voting Behavior (SCM), pointing out that we know *that* contact matters to voter turnout, but that we do not know much about *how* or *why* successful contact matters. While they develop a theory as to why they think mobilization is effective for increasing turnout, they do not test the SCM directly in their studies. I have yet to find any mobilization studies where researchers attempted to gather individual level information about the study subjects beyond what it is available in public records such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, political party and vote history, as I do here. As scholars we should seek to understand how contact works and on whom it is working to better understand the underlying mechanisms of mobilization and improve our understanding of how to more effectively increase turnout.

Political Interest

Political interest is strongly related to participation (Campbell et al. 1980; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Stein, Leighley and Owens 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and may play a vital role in political mobilization. If a canvasser knocks on the door or

[55] For experimental research and determining causation, balancing treatment groups is considered standard practice. When treatment groups are balanced prior to treatment, it is assumed that differences in characteristics such as interest and knowledge will be equally distributed. It is argued that some people are easier to contact (e.g., older citizens, those with landlines, etc.) and that they may also be more likely to turn out and vote and may be driving some of the success of mobilization efforts. However, examination of these explanations does not move beyond demographics available in voter registration or political party databases.

reaches a person on the phone who has little political interest, they are not likely to change a non-voter to a voter with a 60 second conversation, if they even get the targeted recipient to answer the phone or open the door. If there is a disparity in the level of political interest among racial or ethnic groups, it could impact successful mobilization of those populations.

Mobilization studies have not examined the role of political interest in mobilization efforts, possibly because there is an underlying assumption that if someone is registered to vote, they are inherently interested in politics. This might not be the case in general in the modern day era of supermarket voter registration blitzes, but may be even less so with this population in particular. This sample includes a large number of foreign-born citizens, who are routinely registered to vote during the naturalization process, possibly with little interest in politics or voting. A majority of the remaining sample are racial or ethnic minorities, who have been targets of voter registration drives in the last several elections by groups such as ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now), SIREN (Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network) and local community service centers such as the Korean Resource Center in Los Angeles, and the Chinese Progressive Association in San Francisco. Having a better understanding of political interest for registered minorities may help us better understand how mobilization works among these groups.

Previous studies on political interest have shown that Latinos (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012) and Asians (Lien et al 2004) have lower rates of political interest than whites in the United States. Few studies incorporate direct comparisons between

Latinos and Asians in political participation indicators such as political interest, but the National Annenberg Election Surveys use a nationally representative sample that includes sizeable amount of both minority groups that allow us to compare between them.[56] In the 2004 Annenberg Survey, respondents were asked how often they follow politics. Forty-two percent of whites reported that they follow politics most of the time, compared with only 23 percent of Latinos and 28 percent of Asians. Although Asians report following politics at a higher rate than Latinos, I expect the opposite to be true given the different political context of 2010 and the media coverage of Arizona's SB1070.[57]

Hypothesis 1a: Latinos will have higher levels of political interest overall than Asians.

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[56] The 2004 National Annenberg Survey has a sampling frame of adults in the U.S. who can be reached by telephone. The sample included 1,221 Asians and 6,155 Latinos. It is not limited to registered voters, which is the sample population in this study.

[57] In 2010, Arizona passed a piece of legislation known as Senate Bill 1070 (SB-1070). SB-1070 was signed into law in April 2010 and was scheduled to go into effect in July 2010. The anti-illegal immigration law was part of national news coverage regularly in 2010 and while couched in language that appeared to apply to all citizens, it was clearly targeted at Latinos, primarily those of Mexican decent, who make up the largest percentage of Latinos in the Southwest (Census 2010). U.S. federal law requires that all immigrants over 14 years old, who stay in the U.S. for longer than 30 days, are required to register with the federal government (8 USC §1302) and carry registration documents with them at all times (8 USC §1304). Arizona's SB-1070 extends this law by requiring police officers to check the immigration status of anyone whom they arrest or detain and allows them to stop and arrest someone if they suspect that the person may be an undocumented immigrant (AZ SB1070§2b). Section 3 of the bill makes it a crime to be in Arizona without valid immigration papers; section 5(c) makes it a crime to apply for or hold a job without proper immigration papers; and section 6 allows a police officer to arrest someone, without a warrant, if the officer believes that the person has committed a crime, at some point in time, that could cause him to be deported. The law does not provide instruction or state how police are supposed to determine that a person may be an undocumented immigrant.

The national public outrage was largely over the amount of discretion that was left to the police and the potential for racial profiling, unwarranted detention, deportation, and general harassment of Latino citizens (Archibold 2010). This media attention and perceived threat to Latinos in particular likely piqued political interest and news consumption among Latinos in the months before this election, especially about this topic.

Political Discussion

Research also shows those who are more aware of current events, and have higher levels of political interest and knowledge may be more likely to engage in and discuss politics with friends, family and co-workers (Eveland, Jr. 2004; McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy 1999; Moy and Gastil 2006). Political discussion could play a very important role in the ability to mobilize voters, given that the most effective means of mobilization are likely to be door-to-door canvassing and live phone calls (Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Green and Gerber 2008; Nickerson 2007). If minorities are reluctant to engage in political discussion with those around them, it is even less likely that they would want to engage with a stranger at their door or on the phone.

> *Hypothesis 2a: Given their previous limited experience with open political discussion, Asian citizens will have lower levels of political discussion than Latino citizens*.

Political Knowledge

Political knowledge is generally acquired through agents of socialization such as schools, churches, our friends and family, the media and life experiences. All of these things work together to inform and engage citizens. Political knowledge is important, because it influences almost all areas of political life, and is a strong predictor of participation (Verba 1987). Knowledge informs decisions, reduces decision-making costs, and effects efficacy (Delli Carpini and Keeter1997; Galston 2001; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). Political knowledge plays a role in the

ability and desire to engage in political discussion (Prior 2005a; Richardson 2003), which can play a role in the ability of groups to engage in successful contact.[58] Those individuals who are more knowledgeable are more likely to receive policy messages that require a background in politics, while those who are less knowledgeable are likely to be targeted with simple issue appeals or culturally based themes (Abrajano 2010; Abrajano and Alvarez 2012). All of these factors related to political knowledge can influence how effective mobilization efforts are when contacting minorities.

Political knowledge varies by individuals, and to some degree, by demographic groups. For example, research shows that there are differences in knowledge by gender, with women knowing less about state, local and national politics than men (Delli Carpini and Keeter1997). Differences also exist between racial groups, with blacks and Hispanics both having lower levels of political knowledge than whites (Delli Carpini and Keeter1997; Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura 2006; Abrajano and Alvarez 2012;) and Hispanics having lower levels of knowledge than blacks (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Adams 2010).[59]

Lower levels of political knowledge among minorities can exist for many reasons, one of which is the quality of formal education they receive. Formal education exposes children to factual information about government, socializes

[58] Likewise, political discussion influences political knowledge (Prior 2005) and this is one of the goals of campaigns, especially during issue-based efforts.

[59] Interestingly, most the major research on political knowledge, including almost all research using the National American Election Studies, do not include Asians as a comparison category for political knowledge measures, most likely due to small sample sizes. The Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS, 2000) contains three political knowledge questions, but the survey is conducted only among Asians, so no comparison against other groups can be made with the data. In the follow up NAAPS (2008) there were no political knowledge questions, as the focus was moved to the 2008 presidential election.

them in understanding the importance of citizen participation, and facilitates general learning (Delli Carpini and Keeter1997). School districts with large populations of minority students are often substandard to those with high white populations (Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, and Gary Orfield 2003; Niemi and Junn 2005) and receive lower levels of funding and resources for teacher and curriculum development (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Niemi and Junn 2005). In fact, financial constraints have led many majority-minority school districts to eliminate civics education all together (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Kozol 2006), making the acquisition of political knowledge for minorities through formal education even more challenging.

For first and second-generation minorities, the acquisition of political knowledge outside of formal education may be even more difficult. If they, or their parents were not born in the U.S. they do not have experience with U.S. political institutions and parties (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Kozol 2006), both of which act as primary agents of socialization and providers of political information, and thus, knowledge. If citizens have no experience with the U.S. political process, they may feel that their participation will be of little significance, especially if they come from backgrounds with low levels of participation to begin with. Given that canvassers often only have the attention of the potential voter for a few minutes, especially on the phone, there is very little time to do extensive education on issues or on voting, so low political knowledge, especially of current events, could lead to difficulty in mobilizing these citizens.

Given the historical and cultural lack of experience with electoral systems, I hypothesize that Asians will have lower rates of political knowledge than Hispanics. I also hypothesize that foreign-born citizens of both Asian and Latino descent, having gone through the naturalization process where a citizenship test is administered, will have levels of political knowledge similar to natural born citizens, if not higher.

Hypothesis 3a: Asians will have lower levels of political knowledge than Latinos.

Hypothesis 3b: Foreign-born citizens will have higher levels of political knowledge than natural born citizens.

Political Trust and Efficacy

At the core of political participation and mobilization there is political trust. Although results have been mixed on the direct effect of trust and participation among voters over time (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000; Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring 1979; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Shaffer 1981), it stands to reason that when trying to mobilize low-propensity voters or new voters, that if they do not have trust in government, they are unlikely to have an interest in traditional forms of participation such as voting.

Like other components of participation, trust could be highly related to ethnic origin. Asian Americans come from a variety of backgrounds, and their level of trust may be affected by perceptions of government from their home countries,

which could influence their attitudes toward the U.S. National government (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Results from the 2008 NAAS show that Asian American overall have fairly low levels of trust in the national government, with less than half saying they agree (either somewhat or strong) that they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right and nearly 40% agreeing that they should "avoid contact with government" if possible (Wong 2011).[60] Interestingly, Latinos report lower levels of trust in the federal government to do the right thing than Asians. In the 2006 LNPS, only 31% of Latinos said that they trust the government to do what is right "always" (12%) or "most of the time" (19%). When asked about avoiding contact with government, however, only about 30% either "strongly" (15%) or "somewhat" (16%) agree that "people were "better off if they avoided contact with government". This would suggest that although minorities may not overwhelmingly trust the national government, they do not necessarily think that avoidance or alienating oneself from government is necessary or beneficial in some way. Comparing national surveys suggests that Asians and Latinos are fairly close in their level of trust, however, due to the political climate in 2010 and the pervasive discussion about federal immigration reform that focused on those of Mexican descent in particular, I expect that Latinos in 2010 will express lower levels of political trust in federal government than Asians.

Hypothesis 4a: Latino citizens will have lower levels of political trust than Asian citizens.

[60] However it does show that those who are members of community groups or organizations have slightly higher trust in government than those who are not.

Even though home country perceptions and experiences, such as coming from a country with a non-democratic government could work to lower levels of trust among foreign-born citizens, I hypothesize that it is possible they could work in the opposite direction and actually produce a higher level of trust in the U.S. government than natural born citizens have, given that foreign-born citizens chose to emigrate to the U.S. and become a citizen. Higher levels of trust could play a role in effective mobilization, as it may be easier to move people to engage in the system if they have trust in the system. If one is already skeptical or mistrusting of government, there may be a greater psychological or cognitive barrier to overcome to move them to action.

> *Hypothesis 4b: Foreign-born citizens will have higher rates of trust in government than natural born citizens*.

Highly related to trust, although different, is the idea of political efficacy. Political efficacy is the idea that an individual can influence the political process through their actions (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954). Those who feel they have little influence or impact will be less likely to participate in politics and may express little interest in politics. Studies of political behavior of the general population have shown that citizens who have a strong sense of efficacy are more likely to follow politics, pay attention to elections and campaigns, discuss politics and turnout (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Abramson 1983; Campbell et al. 1960; Clarke and

Acock 1989; Pattie and Johnston 1998). Questions of efficacy have been largely overlooked in national studies of ethnic groups, with both the original Latino National Political Survey (1996) and the original Pilot National Asian American Political Study (2000) excluding questions on internal and external efficacy. The most recent version of the LNPS includes two questions related to efficacy and 52% of Latinos reported that they agree that "people like them do not have a say in what government does", including 29% who "strongly" agreed with the statement. Likewise, nearly 60% of respondents agreed with the statement that "government seems so complicated that a person (like them) can not really understand what is going on." These low numbers are consistent with previous research on Latinos that show they have lower levels of efficacy than both blacks and whites (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Michelson 2000), although other studies have found that they do not differ in efficacy from the general population (Buehler 1977).[61]

There have been very few studies that look at Asian American levels of efficacy and because of their low numbers in the ANES studies they are often not examined independently using that data. One study on the effects of direct democracy on efficacy finds that context matters for minorities, including Asian Americans (Hero and Tolbert 2005) and one study finds that efficacy is not a significant predictor of Asian American political participation (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Lien et al 2004). Although there is little research to inform expectations of political efficacy for Asian Americans, I expect that for many because of historical

[61] It should be noted that neither Michelson (2000) nor Buehler's (1977) studies were nationally representative samples, but rather both were studies on Midwestern Latino/Mexican-American populations, in Chicago and Michigan respectively.

experiences with government and the ability to influence (or not influence) the political process, Asians will have lower levels of efficacy than Latinos. Likewise, I expect that foreign-born citizens who are new to the system or do not have a history of involvement in the U.S. political process will be less likely to think that they can influence government or government officials and will have lower levels of efficacy. Efficacy, or the belief that one can make a difference in government should be correlated with successful mobilization. Those who believe that their voice matters should be easier to move to the polls than those who believe that government has little interest in what they say or how they vote.

Hypothesis 4c: Asian citizens will have lower levels of political efficacy than Latino citizens.

Hypothesis 4d: Foreign-born citizens will have lower levels of political efficacy than natural born citizens.

Non-Voting Political Participation

Many minorities born in the U.S. do not participate in electoral politics (and many foreign-born citizens are excluded from electoral politics before they become a citizen), but this does not mean that they are entirely excluded from the political process or participation of some sort. Non-voting political participation has been found to be highly related to turnout and could be an important consideration in the ability to mobilize minorities and turn them into voters, as it may be that it is

easier to mobilize those who are already engaged in non-voting political participation than those who engage in no political activity at all.

There are various types of non-voting political participation that may be attractive to minorities, including taking part in marches or demonstrations, working on campaigns, working with communities or grassroots organization on political issues or policies, or even donating to campaigns or candidates, and previous research has found that minorities, particularly Latinos, participate in these other ways (Garcia and Arce 1988; Leal 2002). This non-voting participation may increase minorities' feelings that they are part of a group and increase their feelings of efficacy. Abrajano and Alvarez state that, "In deciding to become involved in politics, Hispanics have to feel like they are part of a community or group" (2010, p.20) and it is likely that the same holds true for Asian Americans (Lien 1994).

Looking at past studies of participation in non-voting activities by ethnicity, it appears that group consciousness matters for participation (Chong and Rogers 2005; Lien 1994). Both Asians and Latinos with higher levels of group consciousness participated in more non-voting activities than those with low levels of group consciousness, but the effect was slightly higher for Asians. Given that Asians have been found to have lower levels of group consciousness or a pan-ethnic identity, this could mean that they will be less likely to engage in non-voting political activities overall. Latinos, on the other hand, generally have a higher level of group consciousness than Asians, and therefore may be more likely to engage in non-voting activities, especially protest and demonstrations (Chong and Rogers 2005) and ultimately electoral politics.

Hypothesis 5a: Asian citizens will have lower levels of non-voting political participation than Latino citizens.

As stated earlier, non-citizens may also participate in many non-voting political activities, and many studies of non-citizen residents have shown that they are active in some areas, such as signing a petition or attending a public meeting, but that their level of activity was far below that of citizens (Leal 2002). This suggests that blocks to formal participation may result in lower participation in other areas as well (De la Garza and DeSipio 1994). Because of this, I expect foreign-born participants in my study to have lower levels of non-voting participation.

Hypothesis 5b: Foreign-born citizens will have lower levels of non-voting political participation than natural born citizens.

Minority Identity and Linked Fate

For better or worse, people tend to speak and think about minorities as a collective group. Politicians make reference to courting the minority vote, we talk about minority-majority districts and there are implied collective minority interests, such as affirmative action. But do minorities have a 'minority' identity where they see themselves linked to minorities outside of their own racial or ethnic group?

Previous research on minority identity has largely focused on ethnic identity and linked fate and shown that there is large variation in how people view themselves in terms of identity. African Americans have a high level of group

identity, where they share historical experiences with racism and race functions as a meaningful way to align interests with political expectations, decisions, and behaviors. Latinos and Asian Americans, however, have varied histories both within the U.S. political context and outside of the U.S., and may not have as strong a sense of group identity or linked fate.

Unlike most African-Americans, Latinos in the U.S. are comprised of people from several different national origins, including Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican, among others, and have different personal experiences and backgrounds. Previous research shows that there has been growth in a pan-ethnic identity among Latinos in the last 20 years. In 1989, the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) found that only about 20% of Hispanics believed that they had common interests with members of other Hispanics from different national backgrounds (e.g. Mexicans and Puerto Ricans), whereas the 2006 LNPS found that this number had increased to about 50% (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012). The increase in a pan-ethnic identity may be linked to anti-immigrant and anti-Hispanic initiatives (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Kerevel 2011) and rhetoric that permeated the political landscape in the 1990s and throughout the 2000s. If that is the case, there should be a high sense of linked fate or group identity in the Latino survey responses in this survey, given the national attention to Arizona's SB-1070 legislation.

Asian Americans are similar to Latinos in that they come from extremely different backgrounds. Creating an identity as an Asian American or American of Asian descent is likely complicated by the fact that Asian has come to be defined in different ways by the U.S. government. Immigrants are labeled as Asian by federal

immigration agencies (such as Immigration and Naturalization Services) if they come from anywhere included within a pre-defined land mass, including places such as China, Korea, India, Turkey and Iran (Wong 2011), whereas the Census bureau limits racial identification of Asian residents and citizens to seven specific categories, including Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Asian Indian, Korean, Vietnamese and Other Asian (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The majority of Asian Americans are foreign-born, are quite socioeconomically diverse, and have had very uneven growth rates depending on ethnic or national background (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004) and, as an ethnic group, have had less time in the U.S. than other immigrant groups, such as Latinos (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Wong 2011), so there has been less opportunity to form pan-ethnic identities as "Asian Americans".[62]

The 2008 National Asian American Survey (Ramakrishnan, Junn, Lee, and Wong 2012) tested the idea of pan-ethnicity by asking Asians about their commonality with other Asians in the United States. Overall, the majority of Asians reported having commonality across the four areas: race (55%), culture (64%), economic interests (54%), and political interests (37%), but when they were asked about a sense of linked fate with other Asians, a majority (55%) reported that they were either 'not very' or 'not at all' linked to the fate of other Asians.[63] This stands in

[62] For example, from 1924 to 1965 Asian immigration to the U.S. was very low because the 1924 Immigration Act deemed Asian immigrants "undesirable" and immigrants were only allowed on a case-by-case basis, primarily for political reasons, such as skilled labor during World War II. When the 1965 Immigration Act was passed, there was a wave of Asian immigration, as the borders were opened to Asian immigrants for the first time in just over fifty years (Ewing 2012).

[63] Question wording was similar across all questions. "What, if anything do Asians in the United States share with one another? Would you say they share a common race?", "Would you say they share a common culture?", "Would you say they share common economic interests?", "Would you say they share common political interests?", and "Do you think what happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what happens in your life?" (NAAS 2008)

contrast to 71% of Latinos who believe that their fate is at least somewhat tied to the fate of other Latinos, according to the 2006 Latino National Survey (Fraga et. al. 2006).[64] Also, unlike Latinos, there have been relatively few anti-immigrant policies that have been outwardly directed at Asians since immigration reform in the 1960's, most likely because there is not a perceived "illegal" immigrant problem with Asians. However, previous research also finds that like Latinos, *when there was a perceived policy threat* Asians form together through collective action and electoral participation and begin to take on a pan-ethnic identity (Espiritu 1993; Okamoto 2006).

The National Asian American Survey (2008) and Latino National Survey (2006) also asked respondents about the commonality or closeness they felt to groups outside their own ethnic or racial group. Asians reported very low levels of commonality with other groups, especially minority groups: 45% reported having little or no commonality with whites, 55% reported little or no commonality with Latinos and 59% reported little or no commonality with blacks (Ramakrishnan, Junn, Lee, and Wong 2012). Latino responses to commonality questions were similar, although reflect a slightly higher sense of commonality with African Americans than whites or Asians. Nearly 42% of Latinos report little or no commonality with whites, 37% report little or no commonality with blacks, and 54% report little or no commonality with Asians (Fraga, et al. 2012). Low levels of commonality could mean that mobilization efforts that center on a collective identity as a minority or immigrant may not be equally effective across all recipients.

[64] The question wording for the linked fate question in the Latino National Survey is "How much does (Latino/as) 'doing well' depend on other (Latino/as) doing well?, A lot, some, a little or not at all."

Low levels of commonality could also play a role how well canvassers are able to connect with potential voters at the door or over the phone. If a Latino canvasser knocks on the door of an Asian American, or vice versa, the potential voter may be less receptive to the message being delivered if they do not feel a sense of commonality or shared interest with the person delivering the message (Michelson 2006).

Hypothesis 6a: Asians feel less close to non-Asian ethnic groups than Latinos.

Hypothesis 6b: Asians are less likely than Latinos to have a sense of linked fate with other immigrants.

Hypothesis 6c: Asians are less likely to support increased legal immigration than Latinos.

Data and Methods

To examine the similarities and differences across ethnic groups, I conducted a survey that asked questions about individuals' backgrounds, immigration, length of residence in the US, and demographic information, as well as questions that cover the five major areas related to political engagement, such as political interest, efficacy, discussion, and knowledge.

The survey was conducted between September 28, 2010 and January 31, 2011. Initially, a random sub-sample of 10,000 registered voters was taken from the larger sample of 43,380 registered voters used for the treatment/control experiment. Those 10,000 registered voters consisted of both people who received

treatment in the experiment and those who did not. All members of the sub-sample were initially contacted with identical post-cards, asking them to take an online survey. The post-card, shown in Appendix C, opens with a line eluding to the immigration debate surrounding Arizona's Senate Bill 1070 in 2010 and how the media was representing the story. I chose to use immigration, media and politics as a hook to increase interest in the survey given that the sample was comprised primarily of immigrants and minorities that may be interested in the issue of immigration. Additionally, because I was trying to capture political attitudes and interest, focusing on a current event and media attention seemed like a recruitment tactic that was less likely to influence responses than directly stated that I was interested in their electoral behavior (Groves, Presser, and Dipko 2004).

Response from the initial postcard, which was written primarily in English, with three foreign language lines indicating where the survey could be taken, generated extremely low response rates, with only 68 completed survey responses. In an effort to boost response, the next post-card sent out was bilingual. Individuals in the survey sample, who had not yet taken the survey, received a post card in English and Spanish, English and Korean, or English and Mandarin Chinese. These languages were identified as the most common among the sample by the partner organization and the decisions as to who received which mailing was determined by the partner organization and was based on factors such as geographic location,

surname, and ethnicity as identified in the voter file.[65] Again, the survey was offered only online and response rates were extremely low, with only 48 responses.

In an effort to improve response from this hard-to-reach population[66], who may be less likely to have access to the Internet than the general population, I included a paper copy of the survey (see Appendix C) in both English and either Chinese, Korean or Spanish along with a postage paid business reply envelope to a sub-sample of 1,000 people out of the original 9,884 people in the survey sample[67]. One hundred and twenty-eight people returned the paper copy of the survey sample, bring the total sample size to 244 after duplicate responses and incompletes were removed.[68] The total response rate of 2.5% (AAPOR, RR1) is well below the average response rates seen in most surveys, even among hard-to-reach populations.[69] In order to see if non-response has created bias in the sample, I compare known characteristics such as age, ethnicity, and gender between the survey respondents and the study population. As Table 4.1 shows, there are sizeable differences between the complete study population and the survey

[65] These are the same languages that were used in the direct mailings in the experiment portion of this study.
[66] This population can be defined as hard-to-reach based on both their frequent omission from sampling frames and because they are disproportionately frequent non-responders (Nicola Brackertz 2007).
[67] The 116 respondents from the first two mailings were removed to pull the second sub-sample.
[68] The paper survey was mailed from Albuquerque, NM on December 20, 2010 and likely hit most mailboxes in California right around Christmas. It would have been ideal for the paper surveys to hit mailboxes closer to the election (and not during a holiday week), but at that time I was still hopeful that response rates would improve with the bi-lingual postcards. The process of transferring the survey to paper and getting the survey and business reply envelopes printed consumed more time than desired.
[69] Although, 12.8 percent of those invited with a paper survey responded, which is much closer to typical survey response rates.

respondents. These differences require that non-response weights be used (Groves 2004; Groves et al. 2009). [70]

Table 4.1 Comparison of Population Characteristics in Study Sample to Unweighted and Weighted Survey Respondents

	Total Study Sample	Survey Respondents (weighted)	Survey Respondents (unweighted)
Latino	35.1	35.1	27.9
Asian	31.4	31.4	48.4
Some Other Ethnicity	33.5	33.5	23.8
Foreign Born	36.9	36.9	53.2
Female	50.6	50.5	46.4
Age:			
18-25	12.2	11.9	6.2
26-35	17.7	17.9	8.8
36-45	16.8	16.5	16.3
46-55	18.2	18.7	24.2
56-65	15.2	14.9	21.1
66-75	9.8	9.9	16.7
Over 75	10.2	10.1	6.6
Mean Age	48.3	47.9	52.2

A Profile of Survey Respondents

As in the total study population, the survey respondents are comprised of citizens of Asian decent (31%), Latino descent (35%) and a mixture of people of African American (5%), Caucasian (15%), Native American (2%) and 'other' decent (9%).[71] Of the Asian Americans in the sample, 66% are of Chinese descent, followed by 17% Koreans, 7% Vietnamese, 4% Hongkonger, 3% Pilipino, and 2% reporting

[70] In order to make inferences to the study population, I weight the data by diving the proportion in the complete study population by the proportion in the survey respondent's sample for the following characteristics: foreign-born status, ethnicity, gender and age (by category). I then create a total weight by multiplying these four weights together. The results presented in this chapter are using weighted data. Tables with unweighted data for results in this chapter are presented in Appendix D.

some other Asian origin. The Latino population is 77% Mexican descent, 10% Central American, 4% Latin/South American, 4% Spanish, 2% Puerto Rican and 2% report that they are some other Latino origin.

Approximately 37% of the sample is foreign born, with an average length of stay in the United States of 28 years. Asians have a slightly shorter average length of stay in the U.S. with 26 years, while Latinos have an average of 29 years of residency, but these differences in length of residency are not statistically significant differences. However, 62% of the Asian Americans respondents are foreign born which is significantly higher ($p<.01$) than the 38% of Latinos that report being foreign born and the 19% of those listed as 'other' who are foreign born. Of the respondents in our sample that were born in the United States, 50% of them are first generation Americans, having at least one parent that was born outside of the US. That means, fully 87% of the sample is either foreign born or first generation Americans, which is important when thinking about participation in electoral politics, with foreign born and first generation Americans being less likely to participate in the absence of a racial issue or candidate(Barreto 2007; Garcia and Sanchez 2007; Sanchez 2006).

The average age of the respondents is 47.9 years old and women make up 51% of the survey respondents. The average age of Asians in the sample is 50 years old, while the average age of Latinos is 44 years old, although this difference is not statistically significant. The average income of respondents is between $30,000-$39,000, with no difference between Asians and Latinos, however, both of these groups report higher incomes than respondents who fall in one of the 'other' ethnic

categories, who report an average income between $20,000-$29,999. Approximately 21% of the sample has a high school education or less, while 28% report having some college, 31% report having a four year college degree and 19% report having at least some post-graduate work or a graduate degree.[72] While there is no difference in educational attainment among Asians and 'others', as is consistent with past findings (Abrajano and Alvarez 2012; Garcia and Sanchez 2007), Latinos have the lowest levels of education among the three groups with an average response falling between "High school degree" and "Some college".

Survey Results

Political Interest and Discussion

The survey attempts to measure political interest and attitudes through a series of questions about how closely respondents follow news in general, as well as about the specific issue of the Arizona SB1070 immigration law. Table 4.2 shows that there are indeed some significant differences between Latinos and Asians when it comes to following political news and expressing interest in politics.

The first question asked on the survey related to political interest was "How closely have you followed news about the candidates or political issues in your state or local races?" Because this survey took place during the 2010 general election, there were no presidential races, so all of the races on the ballot were limited to statewide or local races. On a four-point scale, where 4= Very Closely and 1 = Not at All, only 16% of Asian respondents report having followed the state and local politics "very closely" and had a mean of 2.6 (between not very closely and

[72] This is a highly educated sample, which could affect results on variables of interests, such as political knowledge, interest and turnout.

somewhat closely), while 25% of Latinos report following state and local races "very closely" and had a mean of 3, or somewhat closely. The largest gap appeared in the response category "not very closely" with 42% of Asian choosing this response, as opposed to only 20% of Latinos. On average, Latinos report following news about candidates or political issues in state or local races more closely than Asians ($F=7.51$, $p<.01$).

The next political interest questions was "How closely have you followed news stories and other information about what has happened or is currently happening in another country, such as stories from Mexico, Korea, China, Japan, India, Vietnam or the Philippines?" The countries listed in this question were thought to be the most common countries of origin among the foreign born in the sample. The question was included in the survey as an attempt to get at political interest in home country politics to see if the differences we see among Asians and Latinos in political participation and interest can be attributed to continued home ties and interest in homeland politics as opposed to US politics. Among Asian Americans, 62% report paying "very close" or "somewhat close" attention to foreign news, while 77% of Latinos reporting similar attention levels. Although Latinos appear to be paying attention to foreign news at slightly higher rate than Asians, there is no statistical difference in foreign news consumption ($F=3.31$, $p=.07$).[73] Given that there are significantly more foreign-born Asians in the sample than Latinos, it is somewhat surprising that they pay attention to foreign news at similar

[73] It is interesting to note that there is no difference in Asian and 'others' consumption of foreign news ($F=.7$, $p=.41$) however, there is a difference between Latinos and 'others' with Latinos paying slightly more attention to foreign news ($F=5.11$, $p<.05$), however this is not surprising given the low number of foreign born citizens in the 'other' category.

(or even slightly lower) rates, however it does seem that there is still an interest in foreign politics among all respondents.

The third question relating to political interest was an issue specific question about SB1070. Because this law was aimed specifically at Mexican immigrants, and the effects of the law could potentially be felt by both legal and illegal Latinos, it is not surprise that Latinos report paying much more attention to SB1070 coverage than Asians ($F=21.39$, $p<.001$). In fact, Latinos in the sample report paying more attention to SB1070 coverage then they do state and local politics in California. This level of reported interest over Asians in immigration specific news supports Hypothesis 1b.

When asked "How interested are you in politics and what is going on in government in general?" Asians once again report the lowest levels of interest in politics, with only 24% saying they are "very interested", compared with 45% of Latinos and 52% of other respondents. On average, Asian interest is significantly lower than both Latinos ($F=8.83$, $p<.01$) and Others ($F=5.13$, $p<.05$) supporting Hypothesis 1a, but there is no statistical difference in political interest between Latinos and Others ($F=.02$, $p=.88$). Given that Asian interest in politics is lower than other ethnic groups, it makes sense that they have the largest participation gap of any group in California (Citrin and Highton 2002) and may be more difficult to increase participation, even through the most aggressive mobilization efforts.

Looking at the frequency of discussion it is clear that Asians and Latinos behave differently when it comes to discussing politics. 31% of Latinos report that they discuss politics pretty frequently, between 5 and 7 days a week, while only

14% of Asian respondents reporting engaging in political discussion this often. Lack of political discussion could be driven be the that fact that respondents have starkly different opinions than their friends and family and do not feel comfortable expressing those opinions, or it could be that it is part of their culture to not engage in political discussion. Either way, when over 60% of respondents report rarely discussing politics with those closest to them such as friends and family, it is likely that getting them to discuss politics with a strangers and mobilizing them through traditional means may be difficult.

Table 4.2 Following Political News, Interest in Politics and Political Discussion

	Asian	Latino	Other	Total
Follow State/Local Politics				
Very closely	16%	25%	34%	25%
Somewhat closely	37%	52%	39%	43%
Not very closely	42%	20%	23%	28%
Not at all	6%	3%	4%	4%
Mean	2.6	3.0	3.0	2.9
Follow Foreign News				
Very closely	22%	33%	14%	23%
Somewhat closely	40%	44%	51%	45%
Not very closely	34%	20%	22%	25%
Not at all	4%	3%	13%	7%
Mean	2.8	3.1	2.7	2.9
Follow AZ-SB1070				
Very closely	14%	43%	34%	31%
Somewhat closely	46%	40%	48%	44%
Not very closely	24%	16%	15%	18%
Not at all	17%	2%	3%	7%
Mean	2.6	3.2	3.1	3.0
Interest in Politics/Government				
Very Interested	24%	45%	52%	41%
Somewhat interested	45%	39%	28%	37%
Only slightly interested	28%	13%	14%	18%
Not at all interested	3%	3%	7%	4%
Mean	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.1
Discuss Politics				
0-2 days per week	63%	41%	45%	49%
3-4 days per week	23%	28%	34%	29%
5-7 days per week	14%	31%	21%	23%
Mean	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.7

By regressing personal characteristics traditionally related to political participation on political interest and discussion variables, we can see if differences between Asians and Latinos persist. Table 4.3 shows the results of regressing ethnicity (using Latino as the comparison group), foreign-born status, gender, age, education, and length of stay in the U.S. on the political interest and discussion

variables.[74] The results show that there are no statistically significant differences between Asian Americans and Latinos in interest in politics and political news. No other personal characteristics seem to make differences across all areas of political interest, however it seems that age may play an interest in following state and local politics. One significant finding is that when it comes to following the news about SB1070, there is an interaction effect between age and being foreign born. This makes sense, given those that emigrated here prior to the controversy may be interested in how it could affect them.

Turning from following news to self-reported political interest in general, it appears that Asian Americans do have a significantly lower interest in politics than Latinos. The number of years in the U.S. appears to have a negative effect on interest in politics, however this is not the case in the interaction between years in the U.S. and foreign-born status, suggesting that the declining interest in politics is being driven by native born citizens. As expected, there is a positive relationship between education and interest in politics.

The results of the ordered logistic regression offer mixed support for either Hypothesis 1a. Asians do have self-reported less interest in overall politics than Latinos, however when it comes to following certain types of political information, there are no differences. This may suggest that political interest should not cause differences in the ability to successfully mobilize people to the polls, although if

[74] I ran all of the ordered logistic regression models including income as an independent variable, but it was not significant in any of the regressions and did not change the effect size or significant of any of the other variables in the model. Including income in the models reduced the N by an additional 58 observations due to the number of people who did not answer the question or chose the "Decline to State" option, so I opted to leave it out of the final models presented here in an effort to keep those 58 observations.

Asian Americans express they are less interested on a survey, they may be more likely to express they aren't interested to canvassers during contact attempts.

Perhaps a better indicator of political interest and the ability to mobilize citizens through traditional means such as door-to-door canvassing or phone calls is to see how often they engage in political discussion with friends and family. People who engage in political discussion more often are probably more likely to be receptive to means of mobilization where canvassers attempt to engage in dialogue with registered voters about the upcoming election, candidates, and issues on the ballot. Those who are less likely to engage in political discussion with their family and friends are probably less likely to be receptive to having these conversations with strangers. Looking at self-reported political discussion, Table 4.3 shows that Asians participate in political discussion significantly less than Latinos, supporting hypothesis 2a.

Table 4.3 Ordered Logistic Regression Results of Personal Characteristics on Political Interest and Discussion

	Follow State/ Local News	Follow Foreign News	Follow SB1070 News	Interest in Politics	Discuss Politics
Asian	-0.533	-0.725	-1.139	-1.053*	-1.263*
	(0.520)	(0.609)	(0.610)	(0.503)	(0.634)
Other	0.096	-0.494	-0.041	0.015	-0.718
	(0.486)	(0.532)	(0.533)	(0.514)	(0.511)
Foreign Born	-1.744	1.050	-1.573	-1.439	-2.199
	(1.049)	(1.110)	(1.001)	(0.898)	(1.440)
Years in U.S.	-0.034	-0.029	-0.029	-0.046*	-0.026
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Female	-0.139	-0.287	-0.103	-0.773*	0.303
	(0.328)	(0.351)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.374)
Age	0.131**	0.069	0.034	0.035	0.006
	(0.046)	(0.074)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.092)
Age2	-0.001*	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.055	-0.077	0.051	0.418**	0.278
	(0.139)	(0.128)	(0.153)	(0.145)	(0.166)
Asian*FB	-0.549	-0.871	-1.210	-0.417	1.302
	(0.725)	(0.764)	(0.719)	(0.603)	(0.837)
Other*FB	0.574	-1.305	-1.255	-0.884	3.040
	(0.850)	(0.938)	(0.765)	(1.125)	(1.644)
Years*FB	0.028	-0.010	0.062**	0.030	0.0207
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Political Interest					1.393***
					(0.400)
Constant (cut 1)	-1.137	-2.232	-3.021*	-2.917	4.630*
	(1.191)	(1.698)	(1.466)	(1.523)	(2.032)
Constant (cut 2)	1.334	-0.142	-1.285	-0.991	6.262**
	(1.155)	(1.638)	(1.505)	(1.500)	(2.032)
Constant (cut 3)	3.363**	1.873	0.940	0.961	
	(1.165)	(1.623)	(1.519)	(1.495)	
Observations	206	206	203	205	186

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Political Knowledge

To measure respondents' political knowledge, the survey asked a series of eight questions about US national politics and foreign leaders. Respondents answered the questions right over 50% of the time on all questions except "Do you happen to know who is the most recent justice to join the Supreme Court?" On this question, only 42% of answers were correct, with no difference in correctness

between Asians, Latinos and others. This may have been most difficult political knowledge question on the survey because it required paying attention to current events to answer correctly. Justice Elena Kagan was confirmed and appointed to the Supreme Court in August 2010 and the session began in October 2010, so she had only been on the court a few weeks when survey requests began hitting mailboxes.

On average the question with the highest percentage of correct answers was regarding the office held by Joe Biden. 83% of respondents answered Vice-President, with no difference in responses between ethnic groups. Sixty-two percent of respondents knew that that the Democratic Party held a majority in the House of Representatives at the time of the survey and 61% correctly responded that a two-thirds majority was required to override a Presidential veto.

The biggest differences in response were in the questions about foreign leaders. The survey specifically chose leaders from a Latin American country and an Asian country with the expectation that there may be different levels of knowledge among ethnic groups regarding the leaders, especially among foreign born who are more likely to follow news from their home country or region. Also included was a question about a Middle Eastern leader, with the expectation that there would be no difference in responses between Latinos and Asians. 64% of the overall sample correctly answered the question, " What position does Kim Jong Il currently hold", choosing the answer Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea.[75] However, 82% of Asian Americans respondents correctly answered this

[75] I originally had Supreme Leader of North Korea on the survey as the answer, since this is how he referred to himself and how he was often presented in the media, but the Korean language consultant working on the survey insisted that the title recognized by the South Korean government be used on

question, while only 45% of Latino respondents correctly identified Kim Jong Il as the North Korean leader. This was the largest gap in correct answers among any of the knowledge questions and the difference between Asians and Latino is statistically significant ($F=23.2$, $p<.001$).

The second largest gap in correct answers was in response to the question, "What position does Hugo Chavez currently hold?" 71% of respondents answered the questions correctly, however among Latinos, 86% had the correct response, while only 71% of Asians had the correct response. This 15 point gap was statistically significant at the $p<.05$ level. When asked about the position Mahmoud Ahmadinejad held, only 59% of respondents correctly identified him as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and while both Asians (66%) and others (63%) both answered correctly more than Latinos (50%) there was no statistical difference between ethnic groups.

To see the effects of demographics on political knowledge, I created a count variable of correct answers that ranged from 0 to 8. Overall, Asians answered 5.6 of the 8 questions correctly, Latinos answered 5 out of 8 questions correctly, and all others answered an average of 4.9 questions correctly, but Model I in Table 4.4 shows that there was no significant difference in political knowledge between ethnic groups. Women did score nearly a full point lower than men. This is consistent with past research on political knowledge, where women have long scored lower than men on measures of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter1997; Mondak and Anderson 2004; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). Also consistent with past

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the survey given that the study population was primarily of South Korean descent and because of ongoing conflicts between North and South Korea.

research, education has a positive and significant effect on political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter1997; Jennings 1996; Milner 2002), increasing correct responses by over half a point.

Because political knowledge does not develop in a vacuum and is most likely influenced by the extent of one's political interest as well as the social experience of discussing politics with others, I included political interest and political discussion in the political knowledge model.[76] As Model II in Table 4.4 shows, when controlling for interest and discussion, Asian Americans have higher levels political knowledge than Latinos, all things equal, opposite of the hypothesis offered (3a). Interestingly, women still appear to have lower levels of political knowledge than men even when we control for political interest and discussion. There are no significant differences in political knowledge between foreign born and natural born citizens, supporting hypothesis 3b.

Political knowledge may play a key role in effective mobilization. Those who have high levels of political knowledge may not need more information to push them to the polls, they may have been more likely to vote anyway and successful contact itself has no effect, or they may be more likely to disregard information from canvassers if the information does not align with knowledge or opinions they already possess (Zaller 1992). On the surface, findings suggest that there are no differences in political knowledge between Latinos, Asian Americans and others, but

[76] It could be easily argued that political knowledge leads to political interest instead of vice versa, but because some of the questions in the survey are about current events and knowledge of current leaders, as opposed to general knowledge information learned in civics education or in preparation for a citizenship exam, I proceed under the assumption that one must be interested to keep seeking out up-to-date political information. Similarly, it could be argued that political discussion is more likely among those with high levels of knowledge, but one could also gain information from engaging in political discussion. There is most likely reciprocal causation among all three variables.

when we explore knowledge a little deeper by adding in political interest and political discussion, we see that Asians have higher levels of political knowledge than Latinos, and that there is no difference between levels of political knowledge between foreign and natural born citizens.

Table 4.4 Regression Results of Personal Characteristics on Political Knowledge

	Model I	Model II
Asian	0.277	0.973*
	(0.601)	(0.473)
Other	-0.349	-0.232
	(0.539)	(0.412)
Foreign Born	-1.714	-0.841
	(1.227)	(0.976)
Years in U.S.	-0.009	0.005
	(0.025)	(0.021)
Female	-0.951**	-0.672*
	(0.344)	(0.283)
Age	0.039	0.016
	(0.058)	(0.048)
Age2	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.617***	0.380**
	(0.149)	(0.144)
Asian*FB	0.472	0.592
	(0.826)	(0.724)
Other*FB	-0.770	-0.361
	(1.097)	(0.954)
Years*FB	0.0265	0.005
	(0.026)	(0.021)
Political Interest		1.161***
		(0.181)
Political Discussion		0.193**
		(0.058)
Constant	3.018*	-0.898
	(1.223)	(1.151)
Observations	190	183
R^2	0.202	0.453

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Political Trust and Efficacy

When thinking about how to engage people in the political system, their level of trust in the system itself may be of critical importance. When we ask people to

vote in state, local and national elections, we assume that they view political institutions and the actors therein as legitimate. If they do not trust the institution of government or elected officials, they are unlikely to want to participate, even if asked nicely and in person.[77] To further understand trust among minority and foreign-born populations, the survey asked a series of questions examining these areas. Table 4.5 presents the results of survey questions regarding levels of trust of state, local government and national government, trust for the US government versus foreign governments, expectations of the government to "do the right thing", and political efficacy.

The survey question asked, "How much of the time do you think you can trust your state and local government officials to do what is right?" Respondents had the choice to answer, "All of the time (4), most of the time (3), only some of the time (2), or none of the time (1)." The modal response was "only some of the time" regardless of ethnicity, with an average of 67% of respondents choosing this answer. Although both Asians (22%) and Latinos (21%) were higher than others at choosing that they trust state and local officials "most of the time", there were no statistically significant differences among the three groups. Along the same lines, respondents were asked, "How much of the time do you think you can trust national government officials to do what is right?" Once again, the majority of all groups responded that

[77] While trust may not work as an indicator of participation among the general U.S. population, trust may play a role when asking an immigrant or minority to engage with the government. Immigrants have a different experience with state and federal government than natural born citizens and if they do not trust the government out of fear of policies targeting minorities, such as immigration policies, they may be less likely to be convinced that participating in political activities is right for them.

they trust national officials, "only some of the time" and there were no statistical differences between groups.

Table 4.5 Political Trust and Efficacy by Ethnic Group

	Asian	Latino	Other	Total
Trust State/Local Government				
All of the Time	4%	4%	7%	5%
Most of the Time	22%	21%	11%	18%
Only some of the Time	70%	65%	67%	67%
None of the time	4%	10%	15%	10%
Mean	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2
Trust National Government				
All of the Time	3%	5%	5%	4%
Most of the Time	24%	20%	19%	25%
Only some of the Time	65%	62%	62%	64%
None of the time	8%	14%	14%	7%
Mean	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.3
Government Right/Wrong (1=Always wrong, 10=always right)				
Mean: 10 point scale	5.6	4.7	5.7	5.3
Trust U.S. Government More than Home (Foreign born respondents only)				
More	65%	77%	51%	68%
About the same	28%	23%	21%	25%
Less	7%	0%	28%	6%
Mean	2.6	2.8	2.2	2.6
Public Official – Attention				
A lot of attention	2%	2%	6%	4%
Some attention	24%	30%	28%	28%
Very little attention	56%	50%	35%	47%
No attention	18%	18%	31%	22%
Mean	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.7
Personal Influence on Government				
A lot of influence	4%	6%	12%	7%
Some influence	20%	20%	24%	21%
A little influence	48%	38%	34%	40%
No influence	28%	35%	30%	31%
Mean	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.0

Comparing the results between state and local and national government responses, we can see that, overall, trust was slightly lower for the national government than it was for state/local government officials. This is consistent with previous findings on trust, where the further removed from the level of government

a citizen is, the lower the levels of trust (Jennings 1998) and this is especially true for Latinos who trust national officials much less than local elected officials (Wenzel 2006).[78] Using paired t-tests, the survey results that Latinos trust national government officials less than state and local government officials is statistically significant ($F=7.59$, $p<.01$), likely being fueled by the fact that 14% of respondents reported they trust national officials "none of the time". There is no significant difference in trust between state/local officials and national officials for Asians or other respondents.

To further examine group feelings toward government, the survey asked respondents to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represents they expect the government do the wrong thing most of the time and 10 represents that they expect the government to do the right thing most of the time. The average placement for all respondents was 5.3, slightly higher than the mid-point, just leaning towards expecting government to do the ''right thing' most of the time. Latinos, who assign an average placement of 4.3 of the scale, are significantly lower in their expectations of government to do the "right thing" than either Asians ($F=6.58$, $p<.05$) or others ($F=4.0$, $p<.05$). Overall, the results of the questions regarding trust do not support Hypothesis 4a, that Asians trust government less than Latinos, and in fact support the opposite, that Latinos have the lowest levels of trust, at least in national government and national level officials.

[78] African Americans are different in the dynamics of trust, where they report higher levels of trust in national government than they do in state and local governments (Rahn and Rudolph 2005). This is a direct result of their experiences with oppression through state and local governments and the role of the national government in historical events, such as desegregation, the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act (Dawson 1995).

Hypothesis 4b states that foreign-born citizens will have higher trust in government than natural born citizens and the results of the survey suggest this may be true. Looking at the questions regarding trust for state and local officials, trust of national government officials and expecting the government to do the "right thing" most of the time, t-tests show that foreign-born status does not appear to play a significant role in any of these measures.[79] While foreign born citizens do not differ from natural born citizens in their level of trust of state and local officials or their expectations of government to do the "right" thing most of the time, they do have significantly higher trust of national government officials than natural born citizens ($F=4.4$, $p<.05$). This could be because all of the foreign-born respondents in the survey have gone through the naturalization process and had extensive personal experience with the federal government employees and officials. One question in the survey that was asked only of foreign-born citizens asks them to compare their trust in the US government with their homeland government. Foreign-born citizens overwhelmingly (68%) report trusting the US government more than their homeland government. This makes sense, given that (most) naturalized citizens chose to come to the US voluntarily, and in many cases, most likely overcame great obstacles to immigrate here and gain citizenship. Seventy-seven percent of Latinos, 65% of Asians and 58% of other foreign born respondents report trusting the US government more than their homeland government, and while these differences appear large, they are not statistically different.

[79] Table 4D.1 in Appendix D shows the results of regressions for the trust and efficacy questions, with a control for foreign-born status included, along with other covariates.

Trust in government and levels of external efficacy are certainly related to each other, although they capture different very different feelings of individuals. To get at measures of external efficacy, the survey asked two questions about the respondent's ability to influence government. The first question asks respondents if they think a local government official would pay attention to them if they had a complaint. Seventy-four percent of Asians, 68% percent of Latinos, and 66% of others thought that local elected officials would pay little or no attention to them. These differences are not statistically significant, and suggest that across the board, the respondents have low efficacy. The second question asks directly, " How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local government decisions?" The question asked about local government, because it is the most accessible form of government, and has the highest levels of trust from citizens. Once again, the responses were quite negative, with 76% of Asians, 73% of Latinos and 64% of others responding that they have little or no influence over local government decisions. Once again, there are no differences among the groups. Interestingly, there were also no differences between natural and foreign-born citizens in terms of efficacy. Overall, the tests for efficacy did not support either Hypothesis 4c or 4d, and (somewhat depressingly) show that all of the respondents have little faith that their elected officials will be responsive or that they feel they can influence government.

Political Engagement/Activity

Respondents in the survey may be more influential when it comes to government than they give themselves credit for. When campaigns and politicians

think about mobilization, they often target certain types of people, for example, partisans. One of the other criteria that is used for mobilization efforts is determining who is most likely to respond to their efforts by participating (e.g. voting) (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). To determine who is most likely to respond to GOTV efforts, they can look to non-voting political participation. Those people who already see themselves as "participants" in the community or in the political arena may be more easily turned into voters or issue supporters. Again, this relates to the concept that we have internal identities, that can be triggered through mobilization efforts (Bedolla and Michelson 2012).

To see how active the people in my study are, I asked a series of nine questions about non-voting political participation. The questions ranged from simple tasks like signing a petition, to more involved tasks like working with others in the community on a political issue. Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of respondents who reported doing each activity in the last four years. Overall, the respondents are a fairly participatory group, with the average respondent participating in two activities.[80] Approximately 31% of respondents report participating in none of the activities listed, 46% report having done 1-3 of the activities listed, 21% engaged in 4-6 activities and 3% reported taking part in 7-9 of the activities listed.

[80] Although, this may not be too surprising, considering they voluntarily took a survey about media, politics, immigration, etc.

Figure 4.2. Participation in Non-Voting Political Activities



Looking at the various types of activity, it is clear that signing a petition was the most common type of participation. Signing a petition is fairly low cost, as people often ask you in public places such as markets or public events and gather signatures as people pass by. Petitioners may even go door-to-door collecting signatures, or making the process even easier, signatures may be collected over the Internet for initiatives, referendums or recall petitions.[81] The second and third most common reported types of participation, however, are much higher in cost than singing a petition. Respondents reported that "working with others in (their) community" and "attending a public meeting, political rally or fundraiser" were their other most common types of non-voting political participation. Depending on how

[81] California SOS, California Internet Voting Task Force - Technical Committee Recommendations (www.sos.ca.gov/elections.ivote/appendix_a4.htm)

people perceive "working with others", these are both fairly high cost activities in terms of personal time investments and suggest a great deal of interest in politics. The lowest reported participation was for serving on a government board or commission. This activity would be the most time consuming, provide the most barriers to participation, and would suggest very high levels of political interest. Voting would clearly fall somewhere in between signing a petition and actually serving in a political position. It is interesting to note that participation between Latinos and Asians appears fairly close in activities such as donating to a campaign, signing a petition and writing a letter to the editor, but when we look at activities that require higher levels of social engagement, such as working with community members or attending a protest, the participation gap between Asian and Latinos begins to spread, and Asians do not even appear in the most demanding social activity, which is serving on a board.

To evaluate which if any personal characteristics affect non-voting political participation, I ran a series of logistic regressions on each of the 9 activities listed in Figure 4.2. Each activity was coded as a 1 if the responded answered "Yes" they had engaged in the activity and 0 if "No". The results show that the most consistent variable that matters is education, with a positive, significant effect in four activities: writing or phoning a government official ($p<.001$), donating to a campaign ($p<.05$), attending a public meeting, political rally or fundraiser ($p<.001$) and working with others to solve problems in your community ($p<.01$). Age and ethnicity also appear to have an affect on a variety of types of participation.

To get a better overall understanding of what influences participation in non-voting activities, I ran a regression on the count variable, which ranged from 0 to 9, for the number of activities in which respondents reported participating. Model I, shown in Table 4.6, includes the basic individual characteristics used in previous sections of this chapter and there is no statistical difference in the number of activities that Asians and Latinos participate in. Foreign-born citizens participate in fewer activities than natural born citizens, older people participate in more activities than young and women more than men.

Because non-voting participation is likely affected by other factors, such as political interest and political knowledge, I included these variables in an additional model. Model II shows that that both political interest and political knowledge have a positive and significant effect on political activity. The results also show that controlling for these additional factors, the differences in participation between foreign born and natural born citizens and age go away, however the differences for gender and education remain. Given the lack of support for hypotheses 5a and 5b, and the finding that there are no differences between foreign born, or those from different ethnic backgrounds, it is unlikely that previous participation will help explain differences in contact or turnout in Chapter 5.

Table 4.6 Regression Results of Personal Characteristics on Non-Voting Political Participation

	Model I	Model II
Asian	-0.717	-0.456
	(0.565)	(0.512)
Other	-0.507	-0.451
	(0.473)	(0.425)
Foreign Born	-2.228*	-1.425
	(1.032)	(0.963)
Years in U.S.	-0.0265	-0.0265
	(0.020)	(0.022)
Female	0.330	0.708*
	(0.314)	(0.307)
Age	0.100*	0.0770
	(0.049)	(0.056)
Age2	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Education	0.626***	0.445***
	(0.137)	(0.130)
Asian*FB	-0.671	-0.924
	(0.776)	(0.678)
Other*FB	-0.181	-0.117
	(1.032)	(1.101)
Years*FB	0.045	0.030
	(0.023)	(0.021)
Political Interest		0.490**
		(0.160)
Political Knowledge		0.254***
		(0.073)
Constant	-1.334	-3.557**
	(1.079)	(1.254)
Observations	209	186
R^2	0.197	0.371

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Minority Identity and Linked Fate

Often overlooked in traditional models of participation, but important to minority participation, is the idea that minorities may be driven to participate by cuing their identity as a minority, which is what the organizing group I worked with in this study counts on. They attempt to mobilize minorities based on the premise that minorities and foreign-born citizens share common concerns and will collectively identify as 'minorities'. Research has found that minorities do

tend to participate in higher numbers when there is a co-ethnic minority on the ballot or minority issues are at stake (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and Rim 2008; Lien et al 2004; Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984), but this research has generally focused on the behavior of the minority that is associated with the particular race or issues, for example, how Latinos respond when there is a Latino on the ballot. However, minorities do not always support other (non-co-ethnic) minorities in elections; for example, in the 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral runoff election, 8 out of 10 African American voters voted for James Hahn, an Anglo, whose father had previously represented a black district, over Latino Antonio Villaraigosa (Blood 2005; Kaufmann 2004). Barreto's (2007) study of Latino candidate mobilization on Latinos, Asians, Blacks and Whites across five major urban areas shows that Asian Americans are not mobilized by Latino candidates to the extent that Latinos are, but more so than African Americans. All of this suggests that just because one is a minority, does not mean they feel they share similar experiences, have the same political goals or needs or support the same candidates.

The survey attempted to gain further understanding of how members of minority groups feel about each other as well as towards members of other minority groups and toward undocumented immigrants in general, or if feel that they share problems and concerns as other ethnic groups, specifically in regards to immigration issues. If there are differences in how minorities feel linked to one another, that could help explain the heterogeneous effects of the mobilization efforts. It could be that mobilization by a group named 'Mobilize the Immigrant

Vote' was not as effective among those who do not have a sense of linked fate with other immigrants or minorities.

To assess how respondents viewed members of their own ethnic group as well as members of other ethnic groups, they were asked to place how close they felt to others on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being “not very close” and 10 being “very close”. Not surprising, Table 4.7 shows that using the mean scores, Asians report feeling closest to other Asians (8.2 out of 10) and Latinos feel closest to other Latinos (9.1 out of 10). The ‘other’ ethnicity group of respondents report feeling closest to whites, most likely because nearly half of those in the “other ethnic group” category self identified as white. Looking at attitudes toward other racial groups, Asians report

Table 4.7 Minority Respondents Feelings Toward Other Ethnic Groups, Linked Fate and Immigration

	Asians	Latinos	Other	Total
On a scale of 1-10, how close do you feel toward the following: (*Mean*)				
Whites	5.7	6.2	6.7	6.2
Asians	8.2	5.0	5.4	6.2
Latinos	4.8	9.1	5.8	6.7
Blacks	4.1	5.8	5.3	5.1
Undocumented Immigrants	3.2	6.8	3.8	4.7
Foreign Born ONLY				
Do you think what happens to other groups of immigrants in this country will generally affect what happens to you?				
Yes	66%	80%	16%	66%
No	34%	20%	84%	34%
Do you think it will affect you a lot, some or not very much?				
A lot	22%	51%	___	36%
Some	63%	49%	___	55%
Not very much	15%	0%	___	8%
Mean	2.1	2.5		2.3
All respondents:				
Would you support legislation increasing the number of legal immigrants allowed in to the U.S. each year?				
Yes	64%	85%	54%	68%
No	36%	15%	46%	32%
Overall, do you think that illegal immigration has a positive, negative or no effect on the economy?				
Positive effect	30%	66%	27%	43%
Negative effect	62%	24%	58%	47%
No effect	8%	10%	14%	11%

feeling closest to Whites (5.7), then Latinos (4.8), Blacks (4.1) and felt the least close to undocumented immigrants (3.2). It is interesting to note that, with the exception of whites, Asian respondents ranked everybody below the midpoint of the scale. They were the only group to give ratings this low, suggesting that they do not feel very close to other members of their communities.

Latinos had the highest sense of closeness to illegal immigrants (6.8). This was a statistically significant difference from the ratings that both Asians (F=42.5,

p<.001) and Others (F=19.05, p<.001) gave undocumented immigrants, and much closer, reporting a number more than twice that of the other groups. Most illegal immigrants in California (and the entire United States) are Latino - primarily of Mexican descent - so the fact that Latinos report feeling closest to them is not surprising. The bigger surprise here is that Asians clearly distance themselves from illegal immigrants, maybe because the opportunity to emigrate here from Asia without going through legal means is much more difficult than from Mexico, with whom California shares a border. In terms of mobilizing minorities, and especially immigrant groups, based on shared immigrant causes, this is very important to know. Issues that have historically mobilized Latinos in California, such as education and healthcare for illegal immigrants (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto, Manzano, and Ramirez 2009), may not be effective for mobilizing or building coalitions with Asian Americans. In terms of coalition building between Asian Americas and Latinos, their feelings toward each other also suggest it may not be too easy. Asians ranked Latinos a 4.8 out of 10 and Latinos gave Asians a 5.0 out of 10. There is no statistical difference between these lukewarm scores.

When looking at the results overall, Asians gave statistically lower rating to blacks than both Latinos (F=12.9, p<.001) and Others (F=5.1,p<.05) and as stated above, statistically lower ratings to illegal immigrants than Latinos. They also gave statistically lower scores to whites and Latinos than those in the "other" ethnic group. And lower scores to whites than Latinos did. Overall, Asian respondents gave statistically lower rankings to all 'out groups' or groups other than their own, then

their fellow respondents, which supports Hypothesis 6a, that Asians feel less close to ethnic out groups than Latinos.

Survey takers were asked, "Do you think what generally happens to other groups of immigrants in this country will affect what happens to you?" This question was intended to get a better understanding of a sense of linked fate or identity as a minority or immigrant in this country and was asked only to foreign-born citizens. Eighty percent of Latinos and sixty-six percent of Asians responded that yes, they did feel that they would be affected by what happens to other immigrants. Even though it appears that Latinos have a higher sense of being affected, there is no statistical difference between the two groups. Conversely, those immigrants who self identified in some other ethnic group did not feel that what happened to other immigrants would affect them. As a follow up, respondents who answered yes, were then given a follow up question asking if they thought it would affect them, "a lot", "some" or "not very much". Again, although Latinos appear to have a higher sense of being connected to other immigrants, with 51% of respondents saying they will be affected "a lot" and only 22% of Asian choosing the same response, although there is no statistical difference between the two groups.[82] These results suggest that there is not enough evidence in this sample to support hypothesis 6b, that Asians are less likely than Latinos to have a sense of linked fate with other immigrants.

[82] It is important to note that the differences in responses would be significant at the $p<.10$ level, suggesting that there is some evidence that Asians do not feel as effected as Latinos by what happens to other immigrants, but the number of respondents for this question make it difficult to have enough power for the difference to be significant at the $p<.05$ level. The other ethnicity responses do not appear in the follow up question, because there were too few foreign born respondents and no variance among the few who did respond (100% said yes).

Hypothesis 6c states that Asians are less likely to support increased legal immigration than Latinos and survey takers were asked directly if they would support increasing the number of legal immigrants. A majority of all respondents answered that they would like to see an increase in the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the U.S. each year. Latinos were the most supportive, with 85% answering yes, Asians followed with 64% and 54% of others said they would support the increase. The difference between Latinos and Asians was statistically significant ($F=7.67$, $p<.01$), as was the difference between Latinos and others ($F=10.9$, $p<.01$). Given the amount of attention that Latinos receive in the immigrant discussion, especially during the time this survey was in the field, with the SB1070 debate, it is not surprising that Latinos support increases in immigration in higher numbers. While Asians still support increasing the number of legal immigrants allowed, it is lower than Latinos, thereby lending support to hypothesis 6c.

To get a better sense of how the respondents felt toward illegal immigrants, which could affect their likelihood of responding to mobilization efforts targeting immigrants, such as the group responsible for mobilization efforts in this study, they were asked if they thought illegal immigrants had a positive or negative impact on the economy. Again, the majority of Latinos (66%) thought that illegal immigrants have a positive impact on the economy, while only 30% of Asians and 27% of others feel the same. These differences are large and are statistically significant ($p<.01$). The fact that Asian Americans overwhelming feel that illegal immigrants have a negative effect on the economy demonstrates that there is at least one real political divide between the primary groups of interest. Because the partner organization as

well as other political groups often uses economic issues as a mobilization tactic, assuming that most immigrants and minorities have similar views when it comes to economic issues, it is important to realize that when it comes to these issues, it may be hard to mobilize citizens using the same message.

Discussion

The survey results show that there are many similarities and differences in psychological characteristics such as attitudes and behaviors among those in the sample population. Hypotheses in this chapter centered around the idea that participation is related to many factors other than simply being asked or encouraged to vote. Political knowledge and interest may play a large role in a desire to participate and those with higher levels of interest and knowledge may be easier to move to the polls, making mobilization more effective. The survey data produced mixed results on political interest, showing that Latinos have higher levels of self-reported interest in politics than Asians, but that there is no difference in the behaviors related to political interest such as following news about government and political issues.

Another resource that may play a role in how effective mobilization can be is political knowledge. Those who have some knowledge of politics and issues may be more receptive to encouragement. On the other hand, increased knowledge could lead individuals to be more likely to reject the campaign or mobilization message being delivered if it does not align with ideas, beliefs or opinions already formed on particular issues. In this study it was shown that after accounting for political interest, Asian Americans have slightly higher levels of political knowledge than Latinos. Interestingly, there are no differences in political knowledge between foreign born and natural born citizens, even accounting for ethnic background.

There were also no difference by ethnic group or nativity for trust in government or political efficacy and very few differences in political participation.

Foreign-born citizens appear to participate in non-voting political activities at a slightly lower rate, so it is possible that they could be more difficult to contact or mobilize effectively, but when political interest and knowledge are accounted for, there difference disappears. I expect that political interest will play a key role in successful mobilization, given the impact it appears to have on all of the other indicators of participation.

Lastly this study examined the idea of group consciousness, linked fate and how close minority groups felt to one another. This could be extremely important to the effectiveness of mobilization campaigns targeting minorities, and the campaigns in this study in particular, which focused on the idea of mobilizing minorities as a coalition based on shared interests and concerns about state government. If minorities do not have similar interests, this type of organization and campaigns in general may have to rethink the notion that minorities can be targeted as a singular group.

Asking about linked fate, it appears that both Latinos and Asians believe that what happens to other immigrants in this country could have effects on them. However, Asians are less likely to support increases in legal immigration and do not feel as close to other ethnic groups as Latinos. Based on previous literature, this suggests that while Asians profess a sense of linked fate, they may be less likely to be successfully contacted or mobilized by those outside their own ethnic group.

As the two largest minority populations in California, and the lowest likely groups to vote in many parts of the U.S., identifying how Asians and Latinos are similar and different in their beliefs and behaviors and responsiveness to

mobilization efforts may help in the quest to increase voter turnout among these least represented populations.

CHAPTER 5

Participation Predictors, Successful Contact and Turnout

In Chapter 1 and throughout the study, I discussed a model where personal background characteristics and cognitive resources play a role in successful contact and mobilization.[83] Chapter 4 examined the survey that was given to a subsample of people in the field experiments to gain a better understanding of how those resources differ - or are similar - between Latinos and Asian Americans. This chapter will couple those resources to determine what, if anything played a role in successfully contacting and mobilizing minority voters to the polls.

Combining the survey data with the voter turnout data acquired from the California Secretary of State (SOS), as well as the canvassing data from the field experiments, will allow us to see which variables are related to voting. In the turnout models, there are additional variables that were not used in the previous chapter. The dependent variable is turnout in the 2010 General Election, as recorded by the SOS, where 1 means the registered voter cast a vote and 0 means they did not. According to the Secretary of State's records, 73% of the survey respondents voted in the 2010 General Election.[84]

The variable contact relates to the mobilization efforts by the partner groups, where 1 indicates successful contact with the respondent during the field experiment, as recorded by the canvassers, and 0 means there was no successful

[83] See Figure 1.2 for model diagram.
[84] Turnout is 80% if using the self-report from the survey, but since over-reporting voting is common in surveys, the official record from the SOS will be used as the turnout measure.

contact recorded by the mobilizing groups. According to the canvassing records, 12% of the survey respondents were successfully contacted during the election period, although 87% (212) of respondents report that some group contacted them during the campaign.[85] This is an example of how much noise can be present in mobilization studies when there are multiple mobilization efforts going on during campaign periods. Of those that reported being contacted, only 4% specifically recall being contacted by our study partner, however 6% recall being contacted by a partner organization in Koreatown, 5% by a partner group in San Francisco, 5% by a Latino focused partner group in Los Angeles and 3% by our partner organization in Santa Clara county, all groups on the ground during the mobilization campaign and connected to our parent partner organization. Interestingly, 2% recall being contacted by the group Immigrants Vote!!, which is a fictitious group I included in the survey at an attempt to gauge accuracy of responses, suggesting that to a small degree citizens have some error in their recall of who was contacting them and encouraging them to vote.

Successful Contact

Past mobilization studies have done little to explain who is being successfully contacted during mobilization campaigns beyond simple demographics such as age. Theoretically, certain segments of the population are easier to contact simply because they are more accessible (Green and Gerber 2008), like older registered voters, who may be retired and therefore more likely to be available when

[85] There is no record of attempted contact for 30 survey respondents. They are all residents of San Francisco where several canvassing events were cancelled due to weather. They have been dropped from analysis in this chapter.

canvassers are making phone calls or knocking on doors. I look at the traditional demographic variables in addition to a number of resources such as political interest and political activity that may also play a role in the ability to be successfully contacted. I expect that political interest, in particular, may play a role in successful contact, given that one who is interested in politics may be more likely to answer and stay on the phone or open the door to someone who wants to talk about politics.

Because of the small sample size, bi-variate logistic regression was run on each of the independent variables of interest for the dependent variable contact (0=no contact, 1= successful contact). The bi-variate regressions produced significant findings, showing that Latinos were more likely to be successfully contacted than Asians or non-Latino/non-Asian 'others'. Those with higher levels of education were less likely to be successfully contacted. The only positive significant results was for foreign born citizens, who were more likely to be successfully contacted than natural born citizens in the bi-variate analysis. None of the psychological or other political resources such as political interest, knowledge, trust, non-voting activity or linked fate produced significant results.

Moving to the multivariate analysis produces a better overall picture of factors that play a role in successful contact of minorities. Beginning with a basic model using demographic variables to help explain contact, it shows that Asians and non-Latino/non-Asian 'others' were less likely to be successfully contacted than Latinos. This is interesting given the findings in Chapter 2, that Asians were the most successfully mobilized in Los Angeles, an area where face-to-face contact and

even phone banking was a challenge. It is possible that although they were difficult to reach, contact was very successful at increasing turnout among those who were reached. The only other variable that was significant in the basic demographic model is the interaction between foreign-born status and the number of years in the U.S. It appears that as foreign-born citizens have been in the U.S. longer, they become more difficult to contact. This may be another way to support the idea that the longer an immigrant resides in the U.S., the more they become acculturated, or begin to think and behave like natural born citizens (Michelson 2003b; García Bedolla 2005; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). The upside is, the longer one has been in the U.S. the more likely they are to turnout (Kam, Zeichmeister and Wilking 2008).

Looking at cognitive resources that may play a role in successful contact, it appears that there are no significant relationships between psychological resources and successful contact. The psychological/political resources model in table 5.1 shows that once again, Asians were less likely to be contacted than Latinos, and foreign born and older citizens were more likely to be contacted, however the negative interaction effect persists for immigrants who have been in the U.S. for longer periods of time. None of the psychological factors have any significant relationship with successful contact for the full sample population.

One may expect that linked fate would play a role when an organization focusing on the voice of minorities and immigrants is in charge of the mobilization campaign. The messages and materials being used attempt to link all minorities together as having shared concerns about political issues and encourages participation based on a minority identity. Examining the role of linked fate, there is

no significant relationship with successful contact. It is possible that the idea that contact was specifically being done by an organization that focuses on immigrant and minority participation and the linked fate mechanism was not fully activated in those contacted. Additionally, one would have to know that it was an organization centered on immigrant interests that was *trying* to contact them prior to answering the phone or opening the door for linked fate to play a role in successful contact. If linked fate is going to have an effect, we should expect that it would be on turnout after successful contact, not in explaining that a registered voter could be contacted.

Table 5.1 Logistic Regression Results of Successful Contact

	Demographics (Model I)	Psychological/ Political Resources (Model II)
Asian	-18.347***	-18.801***
	(0.820)	(1.554)
Other	-1.657*	-1.548
	(0.909)	(1.183)
Foreign Born	2.928	10.190***
	(1.941)	(3.108)
Years in U.S.	0.002	0.044
	(0.029)	(0.064)
Female	0.302	-0.487
	(0.544)	(0.672)
Age	-0.016	0.466***
	(0.139)	(0.133)
Age2	0.000	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.285	0.367
	(0.221)	(0.290)
Home Owner	-0.135	-0.970
	(0.627)	(0.857)
Asian*FB	16.290	14.050
	-	.
Other*FB	0.754	-1.902
	(1.605)	(2.228)
Years*FB	-0.069*	-0.227***
	(0.041)	(0.066)
Cognitive resources		
Political Activity		-0.302
		(0.205)
Political Interest		-0.689
		(0.599)
Political Knowledge		0.138
		(0.190)
Political Discussion		-0.313
		(0.468)
Linked Fate Immigrants		
Constant	-1.403	-16.82***
	(4.202)	(4.911)
N	186	154

Standard errors in parentheses
* $P < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Voter Turnout

In addition to understanding who is successfully contacted, this study seeks to have a deeper understanding overall of minority political behavior and especially turnout. While only 12 percent of survey respondents in the survey sample were successfully contacted, it is important to remember that the vast majority, 87 percent, reports that somebody tried to mobilize them. That in and of itself is good news compared to past literature that found minorities were among the least likely to be contacted and asked to participate.

To examine turnout among the survey respondents, I again first ran a logistic regression using only the traditional demographic characteristics and successful contact by the partner organization. As Table 5.2 shows, successful contact has a positive and significant effect on turnout, as we expect it would.[86] There are no significant differences in turnout between Asians and Others with Latinos. So, despite the lower likelihood of being able to successfully contact Asians, they turned out in numbers similar to Latinos in the survey sample. Once again, education has a positive, significant on turnout, as is consistent with years of voting behavior studies (Campbell, Converse, et al 1960; Wolfinger 1980; Leighley and Nagler 1992b; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Lewis Beck, et al 2009). Asians and 'others' in the survey appear to turnout at the same rates as Latinos, and foreign-born citizens turnout at rates similar to natural born citizens. Homeowners in the sample, of which 60 percent (146) of the survey respondents were homeowners, turned out at

[86] Or at least as we always hope it does, although as stated earlier in Chapter 2, there is no reason to expect it would depress turnout.

higher rates than those who are renters (33 percent) or those living with family or friends (6 percent).[87]

[87] It should be noted that 36% of the people successfully contacted were not home owners, but were primarily renters, which if they live in an apartment, as many in the experiment sample did, can make them very difficult to contact.

Table 5.2 Logistic Regression Results on Voter Turnout in the 2010 General Election

	Demographics (Model I)	Resources (Model II)
Contact	1.173	1.694*
	(0.767)	(0.920)
Asian	0.563	0.748
	(0.798)	(0.821)
Other	0.428	1.273*
	(0.589)	(0.707)
Foreign Born	-0.652	-0.084
	(1.473)	(1.481)
Female	0.652	0.747
	(0.412)	(0.507)
Age	0.043	0.072
	(0.080)	(0.088)
Age2	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Years in U.S.	0.021	0.015
	(0.031)	(0.035)
Home Owner	1.008**	1.118**
	(0.447)	(0.553)
Education	0.289*	0.182
	(0.180)	(0.223)
Asian*FB	0.393	0.185
	(1.052)	(1.189)
Other*FB	-0.712	-1.295
	(1.172)	(1.280)
Years*FB	0.023	0.024
	(0.032)	(0.031)
Cognitive resources		
Political Interest		-0.255
		(0.386)
Political Discussion		0.284
		(0.367)
Political Knowledge		0.230*
		(0.135)
Political Activities		0.064
		(0.131)
Constant	-3.469*	-4.782**
	(1.847)	(2.436)
N	154	154

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

There are 0 failures and 8 successes completely determined in the model, eliminating any meaningful coefficient for successful contact outside of the interactions.

Model II in table 5.2 adds psychological variables to the model to measure their effect on turnout. Once again, successful contact is positive and significant and being successfully contacted increases the probability that one will turn out by 17 percent (pr. prob=.173). Accounting for psychological or political resources, non-Latino, non-Asian 'others' in the survey sample turnout a higher rate, which is somewhat disappointing given the efforts and goals of the study. Political knowledge is the only political resource variable that has a significant effect on turnout. Going from the lowest level of political knowledge, getting none of the knowledge question correct, to the highest level, getting all eight answers correct, increased the probability of turnout by 32 percent (pr. prob =.324).

Running a model that interacted the psychological/political resource variables with successful contact showed that higher turnout among 'others' and homeowners persist, however, interacting successful contact with political knowledge, the effect for knowledge disappears. While the N was too small to produce meaningful or consistent results (and thus the results are not included in Table 5.2), the interactions in the models of successful contact suggest that being engaged in political activities significantly decreased the likelihood of being successfully contacted. In the voter turnout model, the interaction between successful contact and those engaged in non-voting political activities results in a decrease in turnout. If the sample were not registered voters, it could be hypothesized that this relationship exists because those who are unable to vote are engaging in politics through other means, which very common among minority and immigrant populations (Tam Cho 1999; Ramakrishnan and Epsenshade 2001;

Barreto and Muñoz 2003; Wong, Lien and Conway 2005); however, this is counter-intuitive to what is expected, given the sample consists of registered voters.[88]

Discussion

As with the mobilization and survey results, there is heterogeneity across groups in what determines successful contact and voter turnout. Asian Americans born in the U.S. are consistently harder to contact than Latinos. The results presented here must be taken as suggestive of results we would expect to see in a larger study, but it appears that attempted contact was more successful among foreign-born citizens; however, the longer an immigrant lives in the U.S. the less likely they were to be contacted. Cognitive resources made very little difference in the ability to contact most registered voters.

When it comes to turnout, successful contact had a positive, significant and sizeable effect on the likelihood that one would turnout at the polls, increasing the probability of turnout as much as 17 percent for the total survey sample and 31 percent among foreign born. Political knowledge continues to play a role in turnout.[89]

The findings in this chapter begin to help answer questions about how mobilization is working and whom it is working on, but additional analysis of the demographic variables. While there were not significant relationships for many of the psychological variables, that is likely a product of sample size and power. Most

[88] The finding that one who is engaged in a higher number of non-voting political activities would be less likely to vote when asked, is most likely a product of the small number of people engaged in activities in the interaction term (n=15).

[89] It should be noted that I ran models about contacting foreign born citizens and the role of linked fate. The N's were too small to draw meaningful results and there was not enough variance on the dependent variables, however, the results suggested that linked fate played a small role in turnout.

of the interaction terms had positive coefficients, suggesting there is a need for future research in determining the causes behind effective mobilization.

CONCLUSION

During the evening news, a woman is reminded that the next day is Election Day. She mentally runs through her list of tasks for the next day, deciding if she has time to vote. Then she vaguely recalls a couple of young people who knocked on her door a few weeks before, encouraging her to turn out and sharing information about the upcoming election with her. She decides that she can probably make it on her lunch hour.

On the same night, an older Chinese man is sitting at a city council meeting discussing politics with his friend. They talk about the next day's election and how they think the results will come in. He tells his friend that there seems to be a lot of political activity going on this election and he had some very interesting phone calls from campaigns. Excited by the process, he tells his friend he will definitely be at the polls the next day.

A Korean woman in wakes up on Election Day glad that it is finally here, she is tired of political advertisements, and is relieved that people will no longer be trying to call her and there will be fewer strangers knocking on her door.

None of these reactions are unique reactions. Voting is a somewhat time consuming activity and people make a conscious decision about whether or not they want to participate. Around the time people are making this decision, they are likely to be encouraged to vote either through indirect contact, such as the mail or a television advertisement, or through more personal means, such as someone knocking at their door or calling them on the phone. Some people are energized by political campaigns and mobilization efforts, some people find them useful and a

good way to learn more about the election, and some are simply annoyed by them and relived when they are over.

Individual differences make people have different reactions to being contacted and asked to participate, want to engage in political conversation or even pay attention to politics at all. Various backgrounds and cultural differences may play a large role in how likely someone is to be responsive to political mobilization. Those interested in politics and active in politics, such as the Chinese man, may be very excited to engage in a canvassing call, while a woman who feels less connected to others or has little interest in politics may be very unlikely to even answer the door or phone, especially if she knows it is about politics.

Mobilization campaigns attempt to increase turnout or increase issue support and past research has found they are largely successful in moving some people to the polls. The most interesting thing yet to be answered about mobilization campaigns is not how well they work, or under what wide variety of circumstances they work, but *how* they work? The experiments and survey in this study were done to help understand how mobilization works and specifically, if mobilization efforts works differently across ethnic minority groups or foreign-born citizens.

This purpose of this study was to deepen our understanding of *how* and *why* targeted mobilization efforts work, to address and explore gaps in the existing mobilization literature. Prior to the 2000's, most of what political scientists knew about political behavior and voter turnout was informed by surveys. With Green and Gerber's seminal piece on voter mobilization, an experimental study done in

New Haven, Connecticut, published in 2000, the discipline began to change. Most new studies on voter turnout, and especially on voter mobilization are field experiments, creating an almost dogmatic approach in the discipline that surveys have nothing left to offer about understanding who votes or how to increase voter turnout. The problem with this approach is that randomized experiments can only tell us that mobilization works, but offer very little in terms of progressing our understanding of who is responsive and actually being mobilized.

This study attempts to marry the two approaches to understanding voting behavior and turnout, performing four randomized field experiments and conducting a survey among those same individuals in an attempt to identify the shared characteristics those most responsive to mobilization. This study focuses on minority registered voters, with a large population of foreign-born citizens, because they are among the least likely to vote in elections at all levels.

First the mobilization experiments found that minorities are responsive to all types of mobilization, including door-to-door campaigns, live telephone calls and in an important finding, even direct mailers. Direct mail is very popular because it is a cost effective way of communicating with potential supporters and voters, but it has been found to have very little effect. In this study, it was found that in densely populated Los Angeles, direct mailers were highly effective.

The findings show that there are some important differences between Latinos and Asians when it comes to successful contact and mobilization. Latinos express higher levels of political interest than Asian Americans, are more likely to discuss politics with friends and family on a regular basis and are more active in

non-voting political activities. All of these factors played a role in successful contact, especially among foreign-born citizens. While the sample size here is small, these findings help set the stage for future research and understanding about why mobilization is effective on some people and not others and could be very important to mobilization organizations who are trying to increase turnout among minorities.

Another important finding that has implications for real world mobilization campaigns is that Asians generally report feeling less close to those not in their same ethnic group, including Latinos, and especially do not feel close to "illegal" immigrants. If social groups try to mobilize minorities using messages aimed at triggering a collective identity as a "minority" or an "immigrant", they may have less success at mobilization than they would with Latinos, who report higher levels of closeness overall to different ethnic groups, and especially to "illegal" immigrants. Additionally, both the survey and experimental results suggest that mobilization organizations and political parties may be more successful at increasing support and turnout when using co-ethnics to contact Asian American individuals. The success of the partner organization based in Koreatown in one of the field experiments in this study shows that co-ethnic and native language contact may be key to increasing turnout in elections.

All together the results of the study suggest that there are some meaningful and interesting differences among respondents that could help explain differences in successful mobilization of minorities, and most likely the general population.

Future research on mobilization needs to look beyond the simple demographic information that is readily available from voter registration files and

needs to begin to explore what it is about these brief contacts or simple mailers that make people respond. This study had a low response rate to the survey, although not usually small given the target population. Future studies on mobilization should not write off survey research as inaccurate or useless, but should use them along side experimental research to learn more and to inform future experimental designs. By learning more about individuals and individual responses to mobilization efforts we have the best chance at real change in the electorate. When we understand what makes potential voters responsive, we have a better chance at targeting them correctly, increasing turnout and hopefully building a larger base of engaged, active, and vocal citizens. This is, of course, the ultimate goal of mobilization campaigns and mobilization studies; learning, understanding and sharing information about how to increase participation for the sake of a better, more representative democracy.

APPENDIX A

Mailer 1 – Values

Front: (Image of minority woman hiking a hill, could be Asian or Latina, next to an image of white men in business suits running through a ribbon at the finish line of a track)

Text: Isn't it time to level the playing field?

Back: (Image of a business man's hand reaching out to take money from a working class citizen)

Header: With the economy so tight, we should all pay our fair share**.**

Text: California lawmakers have given big corporations some sweetheart tax loopholes over the years. These tax breaks—mostly for big, out-of-state corporations—take **billions of dollars from our schools, healthcare and the elderly and most vulnerable.**

That's why we should vote YES on Proposition 24, which will repeal three major tax breaks given to corporations, but not to individuals.
Let's vote YES on Proposition 24. It's time to level the playing field.

Mailer 1 – Policy

Front: (Image of minority woman hiking a hill, could be Asian or Latina, next to an image of white men in business suits running through a ribbon at the finish line of a track)

Text: Why should corporations have an unfair advantage?

_____

Back: (Image of a business man's hand reaching out to take money from a working class citizen)

Header: **With the economy so tight, we should all pay our fair share.**

Text: California lawmakers have given big corporations some sweetheart tax loopholes over the years. These tax breaks—mostly for big, out-of-state corporations— Prop 24 ends three tax loopholes that were handed out to big corporations:

- **Loss-Carryback: Corporations get refunds for taxes paid in past years by writing off new losses.**
- **Sharing Tax Credits: Corporations that get more tax credits than they can use can give them to affiliated companies.**
- **Single Sales Factor: Corporations that do business in other states can select whichever of two different formulas that would allow them to pay the least in taxes**.

That's why we should vote YES on Proposition 24, which will repeal three major tax breaks given to corporations, but not to individuals.
Let's vote YES on Proposition 24. It's time to level the playing field.

Phone Bank/Door-Knocking Script for Values Driven Message

Hello, my name is _____(your first name)
Is _____(first name) there?
Hi, I'm a volunteer with San Bernardino (Organization Name). We're calling our neighbors to ask them a couple of questions about voting. Do you have a quick minute?

1. As you probably know, this year our community will vote on several important ballot initiatives. Do you plan to vote in the November elections?[mark their response]

   [if yes]

   Great! We are working to pass Proposition 24, which will ensure that a few big corporations pay their fair share of state taxes. It repeals three special corporate tax loopholes that were handed out to big corporations **without any requirements to create or keep a single job in California. Proposition 24 keeps class sizes smaller, funds children's healthcare and keeps in place the safety net for the elderly and vulnerable.** Will you support Proposition 24 to close corporate tax loopholes? [mark their response, do not try to persuade]

   [if no or unsure]

   What concerns do you have or what information are you looking for before making your decision to vote? [Do not read the rest until after the person tells you or unless the person is completely stalled. Do not try to persuade them at this point]

   Well, we are working to pass Proposition 24, which will ensure that a few big corporations pay their fair share of state taxes. It repeals three special corporate tax loopholes that were handed out to big corporations without any requirements to create or keep a single job in California. Proposition 24 keeps **class sizes smaller, funds children's healthcare and keeps in place the safety net for the elderly and vulnerable**. Will you support Proposition 24 to close corporate tax loopholes? [mark their response, do not try to persuade]

2. Do you support Comprehensive Immigration Reform?

3. We are working to make sure every eligible citizen exercises their right to vote. Is everyone in your family who is a citizen registered to vote?

4. [Optional: if they are excited/supportive] Would you like to volunteer to help pass Prop 24?

Thank you for your time. Have a great day/night!
[After they get off the phone]: 1) Mark language spoken. If bilingual, mark English;
2) Mark, "Supportive of (Organization)/Progressive", if so; 3) Mark, "Do not call", if requested

Phone Bank/Door-Knocking Script for Policy Driven Message

Hello, my name is _____(your first name)
Is _____(first name) there?
Hi, I'm a volunteer with San Bernardino (Organization Name). We're calling our neighbors to ask them a couple of questions about voting. Do you have a quick minute?

1. As you probably know, this year our community will vote on several important ballot initiatives. Do you plan to vote in the November elections?[mark their response]

   [if YES]

   Great! We are working to pass Proposition 24 to ensure that big corporations pay their fair share of taxes. Prop 24 ends three tax loopholes that were handed out to big corporations:
   - **Loss-Carryback: Corporations get refunds for taxes paid in past years by writing off new losses.**
   - **Sharing Tax Credits: Corporations that get more tax credits than they can use can give them to affiliated companies.**
   - **Single Sales Factor: Corporations that do business in other states can select whichever of two different formulas that would allow them to pay the least in taxes.**

   Will you support Proposition 24 to close corporate tax loopholes? [mark their response, do not try to persuade]

   [if NO or unsure]

   What concerns do you have or what information are you looking for before making your decision to vote? [Do not read the rest until after the person tells you or unless the person is completely stalled. Do not try to persuade them at this point]

   Well, we are working to pass Proposition 24 to ensure that big corporations pay their fair share of taxes. Prop 24 ends three tax loopholes that were handed out to big corporations:
   - **Loss-Carryback: Corporations get refunds for taxes paid in past years by writing off new losses.**
   - **Sharing Tax Credits: Corporations that get more tax credits than they can use can give them to affiliated companies.**
   - **Single Sales Factor: Corporations that do business in other states can select whichever of two different formulas that would allow them to pay the least in taxes.**

   Will you support Proposition 24 to close corporate tax loopholes? [mark their response, do not try to persuade]

2. Do you support Comprehensive Immigration Reform?

3. We are working to make sure every eligible citizen exercises their right to vote. Is everyone in your family who is a citizen registered to vote?

4. [Optional: if they are excited/supportive] Would you like to volunteer to help pass Prop 24?

Thank you for your time. Have a great day/night!
[After they get off the phone]: 1) Mark language spoken. If bilingual, mark English;
2) Mark, "Supportive of (Organization)/Progressive", if so; 3) Mark, "Do not call", if requested

APPENDIX B

Table B1: Los Angeles Treatment-on-Treated Effects on Turnout, 2010 General Election

	Baseline Mail	Covariates Mail	Baseline Phone/Door	Covariates Phone/Door
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Mail	0.098***	0.104***		
	(0.013)	(0.012)		
Phone			0.083*	0.409***
			(0.045)	(0.063)
Door			0.201***	0.335***
			(0.057)	(0.064)
Foreign Born		0.034**		0.018
		(0.012)		(0.011)
Latino		-0.022		-0.088***
		(0.025)		(0.020)
Asian		0.034*		0.037**
		(0.025)		(0.014)
2008 Vote		0.368***		0.337***
		(0.013)		(0.010)
Female		-0.010		-0.014
		(0.012)		(0.010)
Age		0.003***		0.003***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Democrat		0.036**		0.035***
		(0.014)		(0.011)
Republican		0.031		0.047***
		(0.018)		(0.014)
Constant	0.262***	-0.123***	0.262***	-0.063***
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.018)
R2	0.011	0.227	0.006	0.148
N	4906	4864	8047	8012

Note: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001

Table B2. San Bernardino Treatment on Treated Effects on Turnout, 2010 General Election

	Baseline Mail	Covariates Mail	Baseline Phone/Door	Covariates Phone/Door
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Mail	-0.021	-0.004		
	(0.014)	(0.011)		
Phone			-0.203*	-0.105
			(0.079)	(0.067)
Door			0.136**	0.064
			(0.043)	(0.036)
Foreign Born		0.005		0.001
		(0.015)		(0.014)
Latino		0.004		-0.003
		(0.011)		(0.010)
2008 Vote		0.470***		0.452***
		(0.011)		(0.011)
Female		-0.044***		-0.053***
		(0.011)		(0.010)
Age		0.004***		0.004***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Democrat		0.049***		0.035**
		(0.014)		(0.013)
Republican		0.005		-0.015
		(0.016)		(0.015)
Constant	0.376***	-0.074***	0.376***	-0.048**
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.017)
R2	0.000	0.323	NA	0.296
N	5651	5637	7002	6989

Note: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001

Table B3. San Jośe Treatment-on-Treated Effects, 2010 General Election

	Baseline Mail	Covariates Mail	Baseline Phone/Door	Covariates Phone/Door
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Mail	0.010	0.004		
	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Phone			0.147**	0.018
			(0.057)	(0.057)
Door			0.355***	0.243***
			(0.030)	(0.029)
Foreign Born		-0.066***		-0.061***
		(0.011)		(0.011)
Latino		0.030**		0.016
		(0.011)		(0.010)
Asian		0.170***		0.142***
		(0.014)		(0.013)
2008 Vote		0.302***		0.271***
		(0.011)		(0.010)
Female		0.006		0.002
		(0.009)		(0.009)
Age		0.005***		0.005***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Democrat		0.050***		0.055***
		(0.011)		(0.010)
Republican		0.043**		0.053***
		(0.014)		(0.013)
Constant	0.550***	0.097***	0.550***	0.103***
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.015)
R2	.000	0.147	0.010	0.139
N	10024	9928	11273	11179

Note: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001

Table B4. San Francisco Treatment-on-Treated Effect on Turnout , 2010 General Election

	Baseline Mail	Covariates Mail	Baseline Phone/Door	Covariates Phone/Door
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Mail	0.019	0.020		
	(0.016)	(0.014)		
Phone			-0.038	-0.042
			(0.085)	(0.073)
Door			-0.239	-0.063
			(0.217)	(0.186)
Foreign Born		-0.020		0.007
		(0.013)		(0.021)
Chinese		-0.114		0.074
		(0.215)		(0.125)
2008 Vote		0.532***		0.545***
		(0.013)		(0.022)
Female		-0.002		0.006
		(0.012)		(0.019)
Age		0.003***		0.003***
		(0.000)		(0.001)
Democrat		0.041**		0.048*
		(0.013)		(0.021)
Republican		0.056**		0.057
		(0.019)		(0.032)
Constant	0.563***	0.085	0.563***	-0.124
	(0.014)	(0.216)	(0.014)	(0.128)
R2	0.000	0.244	NA	0.257
N	5625	5541	2139	2112

Note: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001

APPENDIX C

C.1:Front – Post Card #1

Concerned Citizen:

As you know, there has been a lot of talk about immigration and immigration reform in the news over the past couple of months. In an effort to understand how this is impacting citizens like yourself, we would like to ask you to take a short survey about the news media and politics. **Only a few citizens were randomly chosen to participate in this study, therefore, your participation is *extremely important* to the success of this valuable research**.

Please assist us by taking a few moments to complete our fun Internet survey at **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu** (note there is no www or @ sign in the web address). Upon entering the survey website, please use your six digit identification code, which is located following your name on the mailing label of this post card (e.g. ID#xxxxxx).

If you do not have access to a computer, we still need the vital information you possess! Please **request a mail survey** by calling our toll free number at 1-(888)-774-7132. We will mail it out immediately at no cost to you. Please be assured that your answers will be held in confidence and your answers will never be associated with your name. Your participation is, of course, completely voluntary, so if there are questions that you would prefer not to answer, simply skip them and go on with the survey.

Esta encuesta también está disponible en Español en http://CAsurvey.unm.edu

這項調查也在下列網址以中文提供 **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu**

이 설문조사 내용은 웹사이트 **http://CASurvey.unm.edu** 에서 한국어로 작성 하실 수 있습니다.

If you have questions, please call us toll free or at: 505-277-5104 or e-mail us at lbryant@unm.edu. If you have other concerns, please contact the Institutional Review Board at the University of New Mexico, 1717 Roma NE, Room 205, Albuquerque, NM 87131, (505) 277-2257 or toll free at 1-866-844-9018.

C.2: Front – Post Card #2 with Spanish Translation

Hello Again ~

A few weeks ago, we sent you a post-card asking you to take a survey about current events. If you have already completed the survey, I thank you for your participation. If you haven't completed the survey, please take this opportunity to have your opinion count. I am especially grateful for your help, because **only a few citizens were randomly chosen to participate in this study, so, your participation is *extremely important* in understanding the concerns of citizens today.**

Completing the survey is easy:

1. Go to **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu** (note there is no www or @ sign in the web address).
2. Enter the six digit ID# from the front of this card (e.g. ID#xxxxxx).
3. Choose the language you would like to take the survey in and complete the survey.

If you do not have access to a computer, we still need the vital information you possess! Please **request a mail survey** by calling our toll free number at 1-(888)-774-7132. We will mail it out immediately at no cost to you.

Hace pocas semanas, nosotros le mandamos un postal que rogó su participación en una encuesta sobre la política contemporánea. Si ya Ud. ha terminado la encuesta, le agradezco la participación. Si todavía Ud. no la terminó, no pierde esta oportunidad de vocalizar sus opiniones. Yo estoy muy agradecida por su ayuda, porque para este estudio, **solo escogí un número selecto de ciudadanos. Entonces, para entender las preocupaciones de los ciudadanos de hoy, su participación es de suma importancia.**

Completar la encuesta es fácil:

1. Váyase a la página web **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu** (nota que no requiere www o una arroba (@) en la dirección).
2. Entre el código de seis números que está en el frente de este postal (por ejemplo ID#xxxxxx)
3. Escoja la lengua que Ud. prefiere utilizar para la encuesta y Complete la encuesta.

Si Ud. no tiene acceso al internet, todavía necesitamos su información valiosa. Por favor, pida una encuesta por correo. Para una encuesta por correo, llame el 1-(888)-744-7132. La llamada es totalmente gratis y le mandaremos una encuesta, sin costo alguno, a Ud. ~ **Espero oír de Ud. y muchísimas gracias por la participación**

I thank you for your participation and look forward to your response!
Lisa A. Bryant, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

C.3: Front - Post Card #2 with Korean Translation

Hello Again ~

A few weeks ago, we sent you a post-card asking you to take a survey about current events. If you have already completed the survey, I thank you for your participation. If you haven't completed the survey, please take this opportunity to have your opinion count. I am especially grateful for your help, because **only a few citizens were randomly chosen to participate in this study, so, your participation is *extremely important* in understanding the concerns of citizens today.**

***Completing the survey is easy**:*

4. Go to **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu** (note there is no www or @ sign in the web address).
5. Enter the six digit ID# from the front of this card (e.g. ID#xxxxxx).
6. Choose the language you would like to take the survey in and complete the survey.

If you do not have access to a computer, we still need the vital information you possess! Please **request a mail survey** by calling our toll free number at 1-(888)-774-7132. We will mail it out immediately at no cost you.

안녕하세요?

몇 주 전에 "뉴스에 대한 관심이 정치에 대한 지식에 끼치는 영향에 관한 설문조사"의 용지를 보내드렸습니다. 이미 작성하신 것이라면, 참가 해 주셔서 감사합니다. 아직 작성하지 않으셨으면 설문 조사에 응해주시면 감사하겠습니다. 일부 임의로 선택 된 시민권자에게만 이 설문조사를 보내드렸기 때문에 이 설문조사에 참여하시는 것은 오늘날 시민들의 관심사를 이해하는 것에 있어 매우 중요합니다.

설문조사를 작성하는 것은 쉽습니다:

1. 인터넷 http://CAsurvey.unm.edu 를 방문하십시오 (www 는 필요없습니다)
2. 카드의 전면에 있는 6 자리주 ID 번호를 기입하십시오 (예: ID#xxxxxx)
3. 언어를 선택하십시오 ("한국어" 가능). 설문조사를 작성하십시오

컴퓨터를 사용하지 못하셔도 설문에 참여하실 수 있습니다 1-888-774-7132 로 전화하셔서 종이로 된 설문 용지를 요청하십시오. 바로 보내드리도록 하겠습니다. 꼭 설문 조사에 참여 해 주십시오.

I look foward to hearing from you and thank you for your participation!

Lisa A. Bryant, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

C.4: Front - Post Card #2 with Chinese Translation

Hello Again ~

A few weeks ago, we sent you a post-card asking you to take a survey about current events. If you have already completed the survey, I thank you for your participation. If you haven't completed the survey, please take this opportunity to have your opinion count. I am especially grateful for your help, because **only a few citizens were randomly chosen to participate in this study, so, your participation is *extremely important* in understanding the concerns of citizens today.**

***Completing the survey is easy**:*

7. Go to **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu** (note there is no www or @ sign in the web address).
8. Enter the six digit ID# from the front of this card (e.g. ID#xxxxxx).
9. Choose the language you would like to take the survey in and complete the survey.

If you do not have access to a computer, we still need the vital information you possess! Please **request a mail survey** by calling our toll free number at 1-(888)-774-7132. We will mail it out immediately at no cost to you.

您好：

數星期前，我們寄上明信片請您填寫一份關於目前時事的問卷。假如您已把問卷填回，我非常多謝您的參與。如果您仍未完成有關問卷，請把握這個機，會表達您的意見。我誠懇地呼籲您協助把問卷填回，**因為只有一少部份的市民被抽樣地選出參與這項研究，您的參與對了解現今市民的關注極為重要。**

您可以透過下列步驟簡易地把問卷完成：

1. 往訪網站 **http://CAsurvey.unm.edu**（注意：該網址並沒有 www 或 @ 的英文字母或符號）
2. 輸入印在咭上六位數字的識別號碼（例如 ID#xxxxxx）。
3. 選擇您希望用來填寫問卷的語言。 把問卷完成。

如果您沒有可使用的電腦，我們依然需要您擁有的重要資料！請撥打我們的免費電話 1-(888)-774-7132 要求一份郵寄的調查問卷，我們將會即時把問卷免費寄上。 **我熱切期望收到您填回的問卷，敬謝參與!**

I look forward to hearing from you and thank you for your participation!

Lisa A. Bryant, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

C.5: Letter with English/Spanish

(Sent with paper surveys in both languages)

December 6, 2010
[VOTER NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[CITY, STATE, ZIP]

Dear [VOTER NAME]:
A few weeks ago you may have received a post card asking you to participate in a survey. My records indicate I haven't heard from you and in an effort to make it easier for you to participate in this very important research, I am enclosing a paper copy of the survey along with a postage paid return envelope. **I know you are extremely busy, but you are part of a select group of people I have asked to participate in this research, therefore your response is extremely important.** The answers from the survey will remain anonymous and will never be tied to your name. Your participation in the survey is completely voluntary.
Your input is very important and highly valued. I encourage you to take a few minutes to complete and return the enclosed survey and make your opinion count.
Gratefully,
Lisa A. Bryant
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM, USA

Hace pocas semanas, nosotros le mandamos un postal que rogó su participación en una encuesta sobre la política contemporánea. Si ya Ud. ha terminado la encuesta, le agradezco la participación. Si todavía Ud. no la terminó, no pierde esta oportunidad de vocalizar sus opiniones. Yo estoy muy agradecida por su ayuda, porque para este estudio, **solo escogí un número selecto de ciudadanos. Entonces, para entender las preocupaciones de los ciudadanos de hoy, su participación es de suma importancia.**

~ **Espero oír de Ud. y muchísimas gracias por la participación**

C.6: Letter with English/Korean

(Sent with paper surveys in both languages)

December 6, 2010
[VOTER NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[CITY, STATE, ZIP]

Dear [VOTER NAME]:
A few weeks ago you may have received a post card asking you to participate in a survey. My records indicate I haven't heard from you and in an effort to make it easier for you to participate in this very important research, I am enclosing a paper copy of the survey along with a postage paid return envelope. **I know you are extremely busy, but you are part of a select group of people I have asked to participate in this research, therefore your response is extremely important.** The answers from the survey will remain anonymous and will never be tied to your name. Your participation in the survey is completely voluntary.
Your input is very important and highly valued. I encourage you to take a few minutes to complete and return the enclosed survey and make your opinion count.
Gratefully,
Lisa A. Bryant
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM, USA

안녕하세요:
몇 주 전에 "뉴스에 대한 관심이 정치에 대한 지식에 끼치는 영향에 관한 설문조사"의 용지를 보내드렸습니다. 이미 작성하신 것이라면, 참가 해 주셔서 감사합니다. 아직 작성하지 않으셨으면 설문 조사에 응해주시면 감사하겠습니다. 일부 임의로 선택 된 시민권자에게만 이 설문조사를 보내드렸기 때문에 이 설문조사에 참여하시는 것은 오늘날 시민들의 관심사를 이해하는 것에 있어 매우 중요합니다.
꼭 설문 조사에 참여 해 주십시오.

C.7: Letter with English/Chinese

(Sent with paper surveys in both languages)

December 6, 2010
[VOTER NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[CITY, STATE, ZIP]

Dear [VOTER NAME]:
A few weeks ago you may have received a post card asking you to participate in a survey. My records indicate I haven't heard from you and in an effort to make it easier for you to participate in this very important research, I am enclosing a paper copy of the survey along with a postage paid return envelope. **I know you are extremely busy, but you are part of a select group of people I have asked to participate in this research, therefore your response is extremely important.** The answers from the survey will remain anonymous and will never be tied to your name. Your participation in the survey is completely voluntary.
Your input is very important and highly valued. I encourage you to take a few minutes to complete and return the enclosed survey and make your opinion count.
Gratefully,
Lisa A. Bryant
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM, USA

您好：
數星期前，我們寄上明信片請您填寫一份關於目前時事的問卷。假如您已把問卷填回，我非常多謝您的參與。如果您仍未完成有關問卷，請把握這個機會表達您的意見。我誠懇地呼籲您協助把問卷填回，因為只有一少部份的市民被抽樣地選出參與這項研究，您的參與對了解現今市民的關注極為重要。
我熱切期望收到您填回的問卷，敬謝參與!

C.8: Survey Instrument

THE UNIVERSITY of NEW MEXICO

Please read and answer the following questions. Thank you for your interest in our survey.

1. On average, how many days per week do you do the following activities?	Zero/None	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six	Every Day	Don't Know
Watch news on TV	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Read a daily newspaper	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Read an online newspaper, blog or other Internet news source	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Discuss politics with friends or family	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

2. How closely have you followed news about the candidates or political issues in your state or local races?
   - O Very closely
   - O Somewhat closely
   - O Not very closely
   - O Not at all
   - O Don't know/Not sure

3. Which of the ballot initiatives on this year's ballot did you feel was the MOST IMPORTANT issue on the ballot? (**Choose ONE**)
   - O Proposition 19: Legalize, Tax and Regulate the Sale of Marijuana
   - O Proposition 20: Redistricting Congressional Districts by Redistricting Committee
   - O Proposition 21: $18 Vehicle Surcharge for State Parks and Wildlife Programs
   - O Proposition 22: Prohibits State from Using Local or Transportation Funds
   - O Proposition 23: Suspension of Air Pollution Control Laws until Unemployment is Reduced
   - O Proposition 24: Repeal Legislation which Allows Business to Pay Lower Taxes
   - O Proposition 25: Requirement to Pass State Budget Changes from 2/3 to Simple Majority
   - O Proposition 26: Increase State Legislature Levies Vote to 2/3 for a Pass
   - O Proposition 27: Eliminates State Commission on Redistricting
   - O No one proposition was the most important
   - O Don't know/Not Sure

4. Did you vote in support of Proposition 19, which would have legalized, taxed and regulated the sale of marijuana in the State of California?
   - O Yes
   - O No
   - O Don't Know/Not sure

5. Did you vote in support of Proposition 24, which aimed to stop corporate tax breaks that would go into effect in 2010 and 2012?
   - O Yes
   - O No
   - O Don't Know/Not sure

6. How closely have you been following news about the law in Arizona (SB1070), which requires police to check the immigration status of citizens suspected to be in the U.S.illegally?
   - O Very closely
   - O Somewhat closely
   - O Not very closely
   - O Not at all
   - O Don't know/Not sure

7. In your opinion, should Arizona and other states have the right to make their own laws regarding immigration, or should immigration laws be under the control of the federal government?
   - O States should have the right to create their own laws regarding immigration
   - O The federal government should be in charge of immigration laws
   - O Don't know/Not Sure

8. How closely have you followed news stories and other information about what has happened or is currently happening in another country, such as stories from Mexico, Korea, China, Japan, India, Vietnam or the Philippines?
   - O Very closely
   - O Somewhat closely
   - O Not very closely
   - O Not at all
   - O Don't know/Not sure

9. How interested are you in politics and what is going on in the government in general?
   - O Very interested
   - O Somewhat interested
   - O Only slightly interested
   - O Not at all interested
   - O Don't know/Not sure

10. Did you vote in the 2008 Presidential Election?
   - O Yes
   - O No
   - O Don't Know/Not sure

11. Did you vote in this year's election (November 2, 2010)?
   - O Yes
   - O No
   - O Don't Know/Not sure

12. Would you say that you are someone who votes: **(MARK ALL THAT APPLY)?**
   - O In Presidential elections
   - O In state elections when the governor is running
   - O In local elections, such as mayor or school board
   - O I never vote/have never voted
   - O Don't know/Not sure

13. The political parties, candidates and organizations, as well as other political groups, try to contact as many people as they can to get them out to vote. During the past 4 years, have you received any letters, email or telephone calls from a political party, candidate, organization or other political group about voting or a political campaign?

   - O Yes **(Go to question 13b)**
   - O No **(Skip to question 14)**
   - O Don't Know/Not sure **(Skip to question 14)**

13b. Which party or political group was that?
   - O Democratic Party/Candidate
   - O Republican Party/Candidate
   - O Other political party/candidate
   - O A political or interest group
   - O Don't know/Not sure

14. Were you contacted by any groups that encouraged you to vote or asked for your support on certain issues **this past election (November, 2010)?**
O Yes **(Go to question 14b)**
O No **(Skip to question 15)**
O Don't Know/Not sure **(Skip to question 15)**

14b. Which party or political group was that?
(Check ALL that apply)
O Democratic Party/Candidate
O Republican Party/Candidate
O Other political party/candidate
O Mobilize the Immigrant Vote (MIV)
O Sierra Club
O Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA)
O Service, Immigrant Rights and Edcuation Network(SIREN)
O Korean Resource Center
O Other Interest Group:_____
O Don't know/Not sure

14c. How were you contacted by the groups or candidates?
(**Mark ALL that apply)**
O In person, they came to your door
O By telephone, a live person called you
O By telephone, a recorded message
O Through the mail, with flyers or letters
O Don't know/Not sure

Next, I have a few questions concerning your view of U.S. government officials:

15. How much of the time do you think that you can trust your STATE and LOCAL government officials to do what is right?
O All of the time
O Most of the time
O Only some of the time
O None of the time
O Don't know/Not sure

16. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington D.C. to do what is right?
O All of the time
O Most of the time
O Only some of the time
O None of the time
O Don't know/Not sure

17. Placing yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represents expecting the government to do the wrong thing and 10 represents the government doing the right thing most of the time, would you expect the government to do the wrong thing most of the tie or the right most of the time?

Wrong									**Right**	DK/NS
O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

18. If you had some complaint about a government activity and you took that complaint to a local public official, do you think that he/she would pay a lot of attention to what you say, some attention, very little attention, or no attention to what you say?
O A lot of attention
O Some attention
O Very little attention
O No attention
O Don't know/Not sure

19. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local government decisions
O A lot of influence
O Some influence
O A little influence
O No influence
O Don't know / Not sure

20. Were you born in another country, outside the U.S.?
O Yes **(Go on to question 21)**
O No **(Skip to question 26)**
O Don't Know/Not sure **(Skip to question 26)**

21. Do you feel that you can trust the U.S. government officials more, about the same, or less than the government officials in your home country?
O More
O About the same
O Less
O Don't know/Not sure

22. Were either of your parents born in the U.S.?
O Yes
O No
O Don't know/Not sure

23. How many years have you lived in the United States?

_____ years (ex. 23 years)

24. If you are a U.S. citizen, what year did you gain citizenship?

_____ (ex. 1998)

25. Do you think what generally happens to other groups of immigrants in this country will affect what happens to you?
O Yes (**Go on to question 25b)**
O No **(Skip to question 26**)
O Don't know/Not sure **(Skip to question 26)**

25b. Do you think it will affect it a lot, some or not very much?
O A lot
O Some
O Not very much
O Don't know/Not sure

26. Were either of your parents born outside the U.S.?
O Yes
O No
O Don't know/Not sure

27. How long have you lived In your present city or town?

_____ years (ex. 5 years)

28. Would you support legislation increasing the number of legal immigrants allowed in to the U.S. each year?
O Yes
O No
O Don't know/Not sure

29. Overall, do you think that illegal immigration has a positive effect, a negative effect, or no effect on the economy?
O A positive effect on the economy
O No effect on the economy
O A negative effect on the economy
O Don't know/Not sure

30. Do you belong to any organization or take part in any action that represents the interests and viewpoints of immigration or minority groups in America?
O Yes **(Go to question 30b)**
O No **(Skip to question 31)**
O Don't know/Not sure **(Skip to question 31)**

30b. How active are you as a member?

O Very active
O Somewhat active
O Not too active
O Not active at all
O Don't know / Not sure

31. Which of the following activities have you participated in during the last four years?	Yes	No	Don't know/Not sure
Written or phoned a government official	O	O	O
Contacted an editor of a newspaper, magazine or TV station.	O	O	O
Donated money to a political campaign.	O	O	O
Attended a public meeting, political rally or fundraiser.	O	O	O
Worked with others in your community to solve a problem.	O	O	O
Signed a petition for a political cause.	O	O	O
Served on any governmental board or commission.	O	O	O
Taken part in a protest or demonstration.	O	O	O
Other: _____	O	O	O

32. Do you know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives?
O Democratic Party
O Republican Party
O Don't know/Not sure

33. Do you happen to know who is the most recent justice to join the Supreme Court?
O Ruth Bader Ginsburg
O Elena Kagan
O Samuel Alito
O Sonia Sotomayor
O Don't know/Not sure

34. How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and House to override a Presidential veto?
O A bare majority (50% plus one)
O A two-thirds majority
O A three-fourths majority
O Don't know/Not sure

35. Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Joe Biden?
O Majority of the Senate
O Secretary of State
O Vice-president of the United States
O Don't know/Not sure

36. If one of the parties is more conservative at the national level, which party would you say that is?
O The Democratic Party
O The Republican Party
O Neither party is more conservative
O Don't know/Not sure

37. What position does Kim Jong Il currently hold?
O Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea
O President of the People's Republic of China
O U.S. Ambassador to South Korea
O Don't know/Not sure

38. What position does Mahmoud Ahmadinejad currently hold?
O President of the Republic of Iraq
O Prime Minister of Israel
O President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
O Don't know/Not sure

39. What position does Hugo Chavez currently hold?
O President of Argentina
O President of Venezuela
O President of Mexico
O Don't know/Not sure

40. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being not very close and 10 being very close, how close would you say you feel to the following groups?

Whites:

O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK/NS

Not very close ____ Very Close

Asians:

O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK/NS

Not very close ____ Very Close

Latinos:

O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK/NS

Not very close ____ Very Close

Blacks:

O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK/NS

Not very close ____ Very Close

Undocumented Immigrants:

O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK/NS

Not very close ____ Very Close

41. How would you describe your views on most matters having to do with politics?
O Very liberal
O Somewhat liberal
O Middle-of-the-road
O Somewhat conservative
O Very conservative
O Don't know/Not sure

42. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or of another political affiliation ?
O Republican (**Go to question 43**)
O Independent **(Go to question 44)**
O Democrat **(Go to question 43)**
O Other party **(Go to question 44)**
O Don't know/Not sure **(Go to question 45)**

43. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or strong Republican?
O Yes **(Go to question 45)**
O No **(Go to question 45)**
O Don't know/Not sure **(Go to question 45)**

44. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?
- O Republican Party
- O Democratic Party
- O Neither Party
- O Don't know/Not sure

45. Would you describe your race/ethnicity as:
- O Latino/a or Hispanic **(Go to question 46)**
- O African American/African **(Go to question 49)**
- O Asian or Pacific Islander **(Go to question 47)**
- O Caucasian/White **(Go to question 49)**
- O Native American/American Indian **(Go to question 49)**
- O Mixed race **(Go to question 49)**
- O Other:_____

46. If you indicated Hispanic/Latino, would you describe your Hispanic/Latino origin as:
- O Mexican
- O Cuban
- O Central American
- O Puerto Rican
- O Other: _____
- O Spanish
- O Latin/South American
- O Don't know/Not sure

47. If you indicated Asian or Pacific Islander, would you describe your Asian origin as:
- O Chinese
- O Japanese
- O Korean
- O Taiwanese
- O Indian/Pakistani
- O Other: _____
- O Vietnamese
- O Hongkonger
- O Filipino/a
- O Don't know/Not sure

48. You answered that you identified as Mixed Race, please indicate your ethnic background as you would describe it:

_____

49. What language do you usually speak at home with family?
- O English
- O Korean
- O Spanish
- O Mix between English and some other language
- O Other:_____
- O Vietnamese
- O Chinese
- O Japanese

50. What language do you usually use to conduct most personal and business transaction?
- O English
- O Korean
- O Spanish
- O Mix between English and some other language
- O Other:_____
- O Vietnamese
- O Chinese
- O Japanese

51. Do you or your family own your own home or do you rent your home?
- O Own/buying your home
- O Rent our home/apartment
- O Other (ex: live with family/friends)
- O Don't know / Not sure

52. Are you:
- O Male
- O Female

53. What year were you born? (Please indicate the year)

_____ (ex: 1965)

54. What is your marital status?
- O Married **(Go to question 55)**
- O Divorced **(Go to question 56)**
- O Never married **(Go to question 56)**
- O Widowed **(Go to question 56)**
- O Separated **(Go to question 56)**

55. What is your spouse's ethnic/racial origin?
- O Latino/a or Hispanic
- O African American/African
- O Asian or Pacific Islander
- O Caucasian/White
- O Native American/American Indian
- O Mixed race
- O Other:_____

56. What is the highest grade of education you have completed?
- O Grade school or less
- O Some high school
- O High School degree
- O Some college
- O Completed vocational/trade school
- O College degree
- O Some graduate school
- O Post-graduate degree
- O Decline to state

57. Have you received any of your education/schooling in the United States?
- O Yes
- O No
- O Don't know/Not sure

58. Were you educated *mainly* in the United States?
- O Yes
- O No
- O Don't know/Not sure

59. What is your current employment status?
- O Employed full -time
- O Self-employed
- O Employed part-time
- O Unemployed/laid-off
- O Homemaker
- O Student
- O Decline to state

60. If you added together the yearly incomes of all the members of your household living at home last year, what would the total be?
- O $10,000 – 19,999
- O $20,000 – 29,999
- O $30,000 – 39,999
- O $40,000 – 59,999
- O $60,000 – 59,999
- O $60,000 – 79,999
- O Over $80,000
- O Decline to state
- O Don't know/Not sure

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. If you have any comments or questions about the survey, please feel free to contact me at 1-888-774-7132 or email me at lbryant@unm.edu.

C.9: Frequency Summary of Survey Responses

1. On average, how many days per week do you watch TV news?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Zero days	27	11.2
One day	19	7.9
Two days	12	4.9
Three days	14	5.8
Four days	11	4.6
Five days	24	10.0
Six days	22	9.1
Every day	108	44.8
Don't know	4	1.7
	N = 241	

2. On average, how many days per week do you read a newspaper?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Zero days	64	26.9
One day	30	12.6
Two days	29	12.2
Three days	15	6.3
Four days	11	4.6
Five days	14	5.9
Six days	9	3.8
Every day	59	24.8
Don't know	7	2.9
	N = 238	

3. On average, how many days per week do you read online news?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Zero days	62	27.1
One day	12	5.2
Two days	15	6.6
Three days	22	9.6
Four days	20	8.7
Five days	21	9.2
Six days	12	5.2
Every day	60	26.2
Don't know	5	2.2
	N = 229	

4. On average, how many days per week do you discuss politics with friends or family?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Zero days	43	18.0
One day	34	14.2
Two days	35	14.6
Three days	40	16.7
Four days	20	8.4
Five days	16	6.7
Six days	7	2.9
Every day	26	10.9
Don't know	18	7.5
	N = 239	

5. How closely have you followed the news about the candidates or political issues in your state or local races?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very closely	58	23.9
Somewhat closely	100	41.2
Not very closely	72	29.7
Not at all	10	4.1
Don't know/Not sure	3	1.2
	N = 243	

6. Which of ballot initiatives on this year's ballot do you/did you feel was the MOST IMPORTANT issue on the ballot? (Choose ONE)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Proposition 19: Legalize, Tax and Regulate Marijuana	51	21.3
Proposition 20: Redistricting Congressional Districts by Redistricting Committee	12	5.0
Proposition 21: $18 Vehicle Surcharge	12	5.0
Proposition 22: Prohibits State from Using Local or Transportation Funds	10	4.2
Proposition 23: Suspension of Air Pollution Control Laws until Unemployment is Reduced	27	11.3
Proposition 24: Repeal Legislation which Allows Business to Pay Lower Taxes	7	2.9
Proposition 25: Requirement to Pass State Budget Changes from 2/3 to Simple Majority	30	12.6
Proposition 26: Increase State Legislature Levies Vote to 2/3 for a Pass	7	2.9
Proposition 27: Eliminates State Commission on Redistricting	3	1.3
No one proposition was the most important	60	25.1
Don't know/Not sure	20	8.4
	N = 239	

7. Did you vote in support of Proposition 19, which would have legalized, taxed and regulated the sale of marijuana in the State of California?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	79	32.6
No	150	62.0
Don't know/Not sure	13	5.4
	N = 242	

8. Did you vote in support of Proposition 24, which aimed to stop corporate tax breaks that would go into effect
in 2010 and 2012?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	99	41.2
No	88	36.7
Don't know/Not sure	53	22.1
	N = 240	

9. How closely have you been following news about the law in Arizona (SB1070), which requires police to check the immigration status of citizens suspected to be in the U.S. illegally?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very closely	65	26.4
Somewhat closely	104	42.3
Not very closely	49	19.9
Not at all	19	7.7
Don't know/Not sure	9	3.7
	N = 246	

10. In your opinion, should Arizona and other states have the right to make their own laws regarding immigration, or should immigration laws be under the control of the federal government?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
States should have the right to make their own laws	56	23.3
The federal government should be in charge of immigration	159	66.3
Don't know/Not sure	25	10.4
	N = 240	

11. How closely have you followed news stories and other information about what has happened or is currently happening in another country, such as stories from Mexico, Korea, China, Japan, India, Vietnam or the Philippines?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very closely	61	24.8
Somewhat closely	111	45.1
Not very closely	57	23.2
Not at all	12	4.9
Don't know/Not sure	5	2.0
	N = 246	

12. How interested are you in politics and what is going on in the government in general?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very interested	91	37.1
Somewhat interested	87	35.5
Only slightly interested	50	27.4
Not at all interested	11	4.5
Don't know/Not sure	6	2.5
	N = 245	

13. Did you vote in the 2008 Presidential Election?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	211	87.2
No	26	10.7
Don't know/Not sure	5	2.1
	N = 242	

14. Did you (will you) vote in this year's election (November 2, 2010)?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very likely / Yes	195	79.6
Somewhat likely	15	6.1
Not very likely	6	2.5
Not at all likely / No	23	9.3
Don't know/Not sure	6	2.5
	N = 245	

15. Would you say that you are someone who votes: **(MARK ALL THAT APPLY)?**

Presidential Elections:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	226	91.1
No	22	9.9
	N = 248	

Statewide Elections:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	200	80.6
No	48	19.4
	N = 248	

Local Elections:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	175	70.6
No	73	29.4
	N = 248	

Never Votes:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	10	4.0
No	238	96.0
	N = 248	

Don't Know when I vote:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	9	3.6
No	239	96.4
	N = 248	

16. The political parties, candidates and organizations, as well as other political groups, try to contact as many people as they can to get them out to vote. During the past 4 years, have you received any letters, email or telephone calls from a political party, candidate, organization or other political group about voting or a political campaign?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	214	87.4
No	26	10.6
Don't know/Not sure	5	2.0
	N = 245	

17. Which party or political group was that?

Democratic Party:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	153	61.7
No	95	38.3
	N = 248	

Republican Party:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	85	34.3
No	163	65.7
	N = 248	

Other Political Party:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	43	17.3
No	205	86.7
	N = 248	

Interest Groups/Organizations:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	62	25.0
No	186	75.0
	N = 248	

Contacted but don't know who:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	24	9.7
No	224	90.3
	N = 248	

18. Were you contacted by any groups that encouraged you to vote or asked for your support on certain issues **this past election (November, 2010)?**

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	75	68.8
No	26	23.9
Don't know/Not sure	8	7.3
	N = 109	

19. Which party or political group was that? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)

Democratic Party/Candidate:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	57	43.5
No	74	56.5
	N = 131	

Republican Party/Candidate:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	35	26.7
No	96	73.3
	N = 131	

Other Political Party/Candidate:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	18	13.7
No	113	86.3
	N = 131	

Mobilize the Immigrant Vote:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	5	3.8
No	126	96.2
	N = 131	

Sierra Club	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	8	6.1
No	123	93.9
	N = 248	

California Taxpayers Association:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	13	9.9
No	118	90.1
	N = 131	

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA):	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	6	4.6
No	125	95.4
	N = 131	

Service, Immigrant Rights & Education (SIREN):	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	4	3.1
No	127	96.9
	N = 131	

Korean Resource Center (KRC):	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	8	6.1
No	123	93.9
	N = 131	

Chinese Progressive Association:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	6	4.6
No	125	95.4
	N = 131	

Asian American Center of Santa Clara County (AASC):	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	3	2.3
No	128	97.7
	N = 131	

Filipino Community Support (FOCUS):	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	0	0.0
No	131	100.0
	N = 131	

Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	1	0.8
No	130	99.2
	N = 131	

Immigrants Vote! :	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	3	2.3
No	128	97.7
	N = 131	

Other Interest Group:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	8	6.1
No	123	93.9
	N = 131	

Don’t know/Not sure:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	15	11.5
No	116	88.5
	N = 131	

20. How were you contacted by the groups or candidates? (**Mark ALL that apply)**

In-person/door-to-door:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	12	9.2
No	119	90.8
	N = 131	

Live phone call:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	44	33.6
No	87	66.4
	N = 131	

Mailers:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	67	51.2
No	64	48.8
	N = 131	

Don't know/Not sure:	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	5	3.8
No	126	96.2
	N = 131	

21. How much of the time do you think that you can trust your STATE and LOCAL government officials to do what is right?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
All of the time	12	5.0
Most of the time	45	18.6
Only some of the time	151	62.4
None of the time	21	8.7
Don't know/Not sure	13	5.3
	N = 242	

22. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington D.C. to do what is right?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
All of the time	10	4.1
Most of the time	58	23.7
Only some of the time	149	60.8
None of the time	17	6.9
Don't know/Not sure	11	4.5
	N = 245	

23. Placing yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represents expecting the government to do the wrong thing and 10 represents the government doing the right thing most of the time, would you expect the government to do the wrong thing most of the tie or the right most of the time?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
1 – Wrong thing	14	5.7
2	8	3.2
3	19	7.7
4	25	10.1
5	49	19.8
6	33	13.3
7	42	16.9
8	24	9.7
9	5	2.0
10 – Right thing	13	5.2
Don't know/not sure	16	6.5
	N = 248	

24. If you had some complaint about a government activity and you took that complaint to a local public official, do you think that he/she would pay a lot of attention to what you say, some attention, very little attention, or no attention to what you say?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
A lot of attention	9	3.8
Some attention	53	22.1
Very little attention	109	45.4
No attention	46	19.2
Don't know/Not sure	23	9.6
	N = 240	

25. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local government decisions?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
A lot of influence	15	6.2
Some influence	44	18.0
A little influence	98	40.1
No influence	72	29.5
15	15	6.2
	N = 244	

26. Were you born in another country, outside the U.S.?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	127	52.5
No	113	46.7
Don't know/Not sure	2	.8
	N = 242	

27. Do you feel that you can trust the U.S. government officials more, about the same, or less than the government officials in your home country? (if foreign born only)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
More	79	61.2
About the same	33	25.6
Less	6	4.7
Don't know/not sure	11	8.5
	N = 129	

28. Were either of your parents born outside the U.S.? (if foreign born only)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	52	46.9
No	58	52.2
Don't know/Not sure	1	.9
	N = 111	

29. Were either of your parents born in the United States? (if foreign born only)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	8	6.2
No	116	89.9
Don't know/Not sure	5	3.9
	N = 129	

30. How many years have you lived in the United States? (if foreign born only)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
0-10 years	6	4.7
11-20 years	23	17.9
21-30 years	48	37.5
31-40 years	33	25.8
41-50 years	14	10.9
51-60 years	1	.8
61-70 years	3	2.3
Mean (in years)	N = 128	28.9

31. If you are a U.S. citizen, what year did you gain citizenship? (Presented as years as a citizen, if foreign born)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
0-10 years	39	32.2
11-20 years	28	23.1
21-30 years	32	26.5
31-40 years	12	9.9
41-50 years	6	4.9
51-60 years	2	1.6
61-70 years	2	1.6
Mean (in years)	N = 121	19.5

31. How long have you lived In your present city or town?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
0-10 years	59	24.8
11-20 years	43	18.1
21-30 years	58	24.4
31-40 years	39	16.4
41-50 years	23	9.7
51-60 years	12	5.0
61-70 years	1	.4
71-80 years	3	1.3
Mean (in years)	N = 238	25.0

32. A. Do you think what generally happens to other groups of immigrants in this country will affect what happens to you? (if foreign born)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	72	53.7
No	38	28.4
Don't know/Not sure	24	17.9
	N = 134	

B. Do you think it will affect it a lot, some or not very much? (if "Yes" to 33A)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
A lot	21	29.6
Some	42	59.2
Not very much	5	7.0
Don't know/not sure	3	4.2
	N=71	

33. Would you support legislation increasing the number of legal immigrants allowed in to the U.S. each year?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	124	51.5
No	67	27.8
Don't know/Not sure	50	20.7
	N = 241	

34. Overall, do you think that illegal immigration has a positive effect, a negative effect, or no effect on the economy?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
A positive effect on the economy	84	34.4
No effect on the economy	21	8.6
A negative effect on the economy	103	42.2
Don't know/not sure	36	14.8
	N=244	

35. A. Do you belong to any organization or take part in any action that represents the interests and viewpoints of immigration or minority groups in America?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	25	10.1
No	214	86.6
Don't know/Not sure	8	3.2
	N=247	

B. How active are you as a member? (if yes to 36A)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very active	4	16.7
Somewhat active	6	25.0
Not too active	12	50.0
Not active at all	0	0.0
Don't know/Not sure	2	8.3
	N=24	

36. Which of the following activities have you participated in during the last four years?

	Relative Frequencies			
	Yes	No	DK/NS	N
Written or phoned a government official	29.5	69.1	1.4	220
Contacted an editor of a newspaper, magazine or TV station.	16.9	82.2	0.9	213
Donated money to a political campaign.	26.7	70.6	2.7	221
Attended a public meeting, political rally or fundraiser.	29.0	67.7	3.2	217
Worked with others in your community to solve a problem.	33.0	65.2	1.8	221
Signed a petition for a political cause.	59.3	39.8	0.9	221
Served on any governmental board or commission.	2.8	95.3	1.9	211
Taken part in a protest or demonstration	20.1	78.0	1.9	214
Other	16.3	67.4	16.3	141

37. Do you know which political party has a majority in the U.S.House of Representatives (prior to November 2010)?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Democratic Party	153	62.4
Republican Party	47	19.2
Don't know/Not sure	45	18.4
	N=245	

38. Do you happen to know who is the most recent justice to join the Supreme Court?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Ruth Bader Ginsburg	1	0.4
Elena Kagan	98	41.5
Samuel Alito	4	1.7
Sonia Sotomayor	68	28.8
Don't know/Not sure	65	27.5
	N=236	

39. How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and House to override a Presidential veto?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
A bare-majority (50% plus one)	12	5.0
A two-thirds majority	145	60.7
A three-fourths majority	16	6.7
Don't know/Not sure	66	27.6
	N=239	

40. Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Joe Biden?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Majority leader of the Senate	3	1.2
Secretary of State	5	2.1
Vice-President of the US	200	82.6
Don't know/Not sure	34	14.1
	N=242	

41. If one of the parties is more conservative at the national level, which party would you say that is?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
The Democratic Party	21	8.5
The Republican Party	180	73.2
Neither party is more conservative	21	8.5
Don't know/Not sure	24	9.8
	N=246	

42. What position does Kim Jong Il currently hold?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Chairman of the NDC of North Korea	153	64.0
President of the People's Republic of China	10	4.2
U.S. Ambassador to South Korea	10	4.2
Don't know/Not sure	66	27.6
	N=246	

43. What position does Mahmoud Ahmadinejad currently hold?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
President of the Republic of Iraq	16	6.7
Prime Minister of Israel	4	1.7
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran	142	59.4
Don't know/Not sure	77	32.2
	N=239	

44. What position does Hugo Chavez currently hold?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
President of Argentina	5	2.1
President of Venezuela	168	70.6
President of Mexico	14	5.9
Don't know/Not sure	51	21.4
	N=238	

45. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being not very close and 10 being very close, how close would you say you feel to the following groups?

	Whites	Asians	Latinos	Blacks	Undocumented Immigrants
1 – Not very close	8.4	6.1	10.0	16.1	28.1
2	2.6	4.4	3.0	10.3	6.8
3	7.0	5.7	6.5	7.2	6.8
4	3.5	4.8	6.5	8.5	5.9
5	18.1	10.0	11.3	16.1	9.5
6	8.4	7.0	10.8	7.2	5.9
7	11.4	7.4	8.2	9.4	7.7
8	11.4	16.2	8.7	6.7	3.6
9	8.8	10.0	6.5	5.8	5.9
10 – Very close	14.5	22.3	23.8	6.7	10.4
Don't know/not sure	5.7	6.1	4.7	5.8	9.5
Mean Rating					
N	227	229	231	223	221

46. How would you describe your views on most matters having to do with politics?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Very liberal	27	11.1
Somewhat liberal	56	22.9
Middle-of-the-road	67	27.5
Somewhat conservative	51	20.9
Very conservative	20	8.2
Don't know/Not sure	23	9.4
	N=244	

47. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or of another political affiliation ?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Democrat	112	46.5
Independent	48	19.9
Republican	43	17.8
Other party	11	4.6
Don't know/Not sure	27	11.2
	N=241	

48. A. If Republican, would you call yourself a strong Republican?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	15	32.6
No	19	41.3
Don't know/Not sure	12	26.1
	N=46	

B. If Democrat, would you call yourself a strong Democrat?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	56	49.6
No	40	35.4
Don't know/Not sure	17	15.0
	N=113	

C. If Independent, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Democrat	25	40.3
Republican	14	22.6
Neither party	19	30.7
Don't know/Not sure	25	40.3
	N=62	

49. Would you describe your race/ethnicity as:

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Latino/a or Hispanic	66	27.4
African American/African	7	2.9
Asian/Pacific Islander	115	47.7
Caucasian/White	27	11.2
Native American/American Indian	3	1.2
Mixed Race	9	3.7
Other	13	5.4
Don't know/Not sure	1	0.4
	N=241	

B. If you indicated Hispanic/Latino, would you describe your Hispanic/Latino origin as:

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Mexican	51	75.0
Central American	8	11.8
Latin/South American	3	4.4
Puerto Rican	1	1.5
Spanish	3	4.4
Don't know/Not sure	1	0.4
	N=68	

C. If you indicated Asian or Pacific Islander, would you describe your Asian origin as:

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Chinese	71	62.3
Korean	18	15.8
Vietnamese	9	7.9
Filipino/a	6	5.3
Hongkonger	6	5.3
Japanese	1	0.9
Other	3	2.6
	N=114	

50. What language do you usually speak at home with family?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
English	114	47.3
Chinese	35	14.5
Spanish	26	10.8
Korean	16	6.6
Vietnamese	8	3.3
Japanese	1	0.9
Mix of English/other	34	14.1
Other	4	1.7
Don't know/Not sure	2	0.8
	N=241	

51. What language do you usually use to conduct most personal and business transaction?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
English	199	81.6
Chinese	11	4.5
Spanish	3	1.2
Korean	8	3.3
Vietnamese	1	0.4
Japanese	2	0.8
Mix of English/other	17	7.0
Don't know/Not sure	3	1.2
	N=244	

52. Do you or your family own your own home or do you rent your home?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Own/buying your home	147	60.0
Rent our home/apartment	83	33.9
Other: live w/family or friends	14	5.7
Don't know/Not sure	1	0.4
	N=245	

53. Are you:

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Male	129	54.2
Female	109	45.8
	N=238	

54. What year were you born? (reported as age)

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
18-25 years	14	6.1
26-35 years	20	8.7
36-45 years	37	16.1
46-55 years	56	24.4
56-65 years	49	21.3
66-75 years	38	16.5
Over 75	16	7.0
Mean (in years)	N=230	52.4

55. What is your marital status?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Married	121	50.0
Divorced	31	12.8
Separated	4	1.7
Single	67	27.7
Widowed	14	5.8
Decline to state	5	2.1
	N=242	

56. What is your spouse's ethnic/racial origin?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Caucasian	13	10.9
Asian/Pacific Islander	61	51.3
Latino/a or Hispanic	38	31.9
Other	7	5.9
	N=119	

57. What is the highest grade of education you have completed?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Grade school or less	11	4.6
Some high school	15	6.2
High school graduate	31	12.8
Some college	46	19.0
Vocational/technical school	16	6.6
College graduate	74	30.6
Some graduate school	13	5.3
Post-graduate school	30	12.4
Decline to state	6	2.5
	N=242	

58.Have you received any of your education/schooling in the United States?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	90	69.8
No	34	26.4
Don't know/Not sure	5	3.9
	N=129	

59.Were you educated *mainly* in the United States?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
Yes	50	54.9
No	40	44.0
Don't know/Not sure	1	1.1
	N=91	

60.If you added together the yearly incomes of all the members of your household living at home last year,
what would the total be?

	Absolute Frequency	Adjusted Relative Frequency
$10,000 – 19,999	31	13.3
$20,000 – 29,999	18	7.7
$30,000 – 39,999	32	13.7
$40,000 – 59,999	37	15.8
$60,000 – 79,999	20	8.6
Over $80,000	51	21.8
Decline to state	29	12.4
Don't know/Not sure	16	6.8
	N=234	

C.10: Additional Tables from Chapter 4

Table C.11 – Frequencies of News Consumption versus Political Discussion by Race/Ethnicity

	Asian	Latino	Other	Total
Watch TV News				
0-2 days/week	33%	11%	33%	25%
3-4 days/week	11%	13%	14%	13%
5-7 days/week	56%	76%	53%	62%
Mean	2.2	2.7	2.2	2.4
Read Newspaper				
0-2 days/week	54%	46%	70%	57%
3-4 days/week	14%	14%	9%	12%
5-7 days/week	32%	40%	21%	31%
Mean	1.8	1.9	1.5	1.7
Read Online News				
0-2 days/week	34%	31%	47%	38%
3-4 days/week	22%	24%	11%	19%
5-7 days/week	44%	45%	42%	44%
Mean	2.1	2.1	1.9	2.1

Table C.12: Regression Results of Personal Characteristics on Trust and Efficacy

	State/ Local	National	Governm ent Right	Trust US#	Complain	Influence Local Gov
Asian	0.111	-0.190	0.751*	-0.029	-0.093	0.104
	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.378)	(0.287)	(0.154)	(0.168)
Other	-0.102	-0.152	0.745	0.284	-0.154	0.323
	(0.139)	(0.124)	(0.519)	(0.492)	(0.199)	(0.213)
Foreign Born	-0.038	0.172	-0.506		-0.080	0.131
	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.335)		(0.135)	(0.158)
Female dummy	-0.106	-0.164	-0.176	0.020	-0.058	-0.157
	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.363)	(0.246)	(0.141)	(0.152)
Respondent's age	-0.008	0.002	0.010	-0.088***	0.011	-0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.020)
AgeSq	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001**	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.046	-0.025	0.065	-0.268**	0.033	0.019
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.161)	(0.094)	(0.054)	(0.066)
Constant	2.406***	2.307***	4.800**	7.788***	1.823***	2.102**
	(0.381)	(0.398)	(1.457)	(0.856)	(0.522)	(0.648)
Observations	198	203	199	97	185	198
R^2	0.075	0.083	0.048	0.152	0.018	0.042

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
# Foreign born omitted from model because question was only asked of foreign-born citizens.

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