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Conflict-Induced Displacement, Understanding the Causes of Flight

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by

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To my late parents.

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ABSTRACT

An often forgotten, but very significant and lasting consequence of civil war is forced migration. Violent conflict around the world forces millions of people to flee their homes every year, placing significant burdens on the international community as well as home governments in dealing with the plight of these forgotten populations. But for every person that flees a conflict situation, there are also many people who stay behind, raising important questions for researchers and policy makers alike. Building on existing cross-national studies that emphasize a 'choice-centered' approach to the study of forced migration, I investigate variation in subnational and individual level behavior in order to better understand the factors that affect people's choices under a highly dangerous circumstance like civil war. Using secondary and primary data collected through fieldwork in Nepal, I employ multivariate analysis to explain variation in forced migration across districts and individuals in terms of the impact of such factors as

violence, economic opportunity, physical infrastructure, geographical terrain, and social networks. In addition, I explore the behavior of individuals in terms of their use of possible coping mechanisms that allow them to stay in their homes. A study of why people flee during conflict is incomplete without also understanding the behavior of people who do not flee. The empirical results provide new insights into subnational variation and individual-level behavior not captured in large-*n* cross-national studies. The present study demonstrates that subnational and individual-level variations in forced migration are affected by the conditions people find themselves in as well as the opportunities that their situations present to them.

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Chapter 1–Introduction: Conflict-Induced Displacement, Understanding the Causes of Flight

There have always been refugees –Loescher, Betts and Milner (2008)

This dissertation investigates the circumstances under which individuals decide whether or not to abandon their homes in the face of civilian conflict. One of the most important consequences of civil war is forced migration. Large-*n* cross-national studies conclude that forced migration is not an inevitable consequence of conflict and that people make choices even under extremely dangerous situations, such as wars. Not surprisingly, it is striking to note that for every individual who decides to flee during conflict, others choose to risk their lives by staying put. This indicates that choice is available even under highly unusual and stressful circumstances. While conflict around the globe continues to force millions of people from their homes every year, places such as Afghanistan and Somalia, which have been constantly under conflict for many decades, have not been completely deserted by their citizens, raising interesting and important questions for inquiry. Little is known at the subnational or individual level about why some people choose to stay while others choose to leave or about how those who choose to stay cope with conflict. The present research is motivated by puzzles such as these. Specifically, I ask why some people, even when faced with extreme violence, stay put and risk their lives while others flee. How do those who choose to stay cope with conflict, what choices do they make when life is at risk, how do those choices affect their decision to stay or leave, and what explains the variation in when people flee?

Prior research on forced migration concludes that people have a choice either to leave or stay even under highly adverse circumstances (Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; 2006; 2007; Melander and Öberg 2006; 2007). Drawing on theoretical insights from the utility maximization literature in microeconomics, this 'choice-centered' argument makes a significant contribution in laying a foundation for

analyzing forced migration within a theoretical framework. However, this literature stops at pointing out that such choices are available and does not examine the reasons behind individuals' choices, or the strategies they employ to cope with conflict or adverse circumstances. With few exceptions, for example Melander and Öberg (2006, 2007) or Edwards (2009), this literature assumes that the impact of war on citizens is uniform across a country. Finally, the existing literature uses aggregate cross national data to predict subnational and individual-level behavior.

Which factors determine individuals' decisions to leave or stay put? Which strategies do people employ when they choose to stay (i.e. coping mechanisms)? My dissertation goes beyond the existing literature on forced migration to investigate choice at a more micro level and ameliorates existing limitations in the study of forced migration. I relax the assumption that individuals across a country are uniformly affected by war. I argue that there may be variance in how individuals perceive threat of war, depending on the specific kinds of violence that have been occurring, committed by whom, where, when, against whom, and under what circumstances. In addition, some individuals may be more attached to home than others because of economic and family considerations, while social networks operating in the form of community level organizations may alter either the actual risks or the perception of risks, enabling some to stay while others leave. I test these arguments with subnational and individual-level data. The subnational and individual level analyses provide new and more refined tests of the choice-centered model of forced migration. Findings from the present study add significant value to existing aggregate cross-national analyses on forced migration by

both supporting some of the existing empirical findings and contributing new insights into explaining the causes of displacement at the individual-level.

Understanding why some people decide to stay while others leave during civilian conflict is, of course, not simply a question of academic concern. Conflict around the world continues to displace millions of people from their homes every year. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, over 43 million people were "forcibly displaced" from their homes by the end of 2009, of which 27.1 million were internally displaced (UNHCR 2010). The UN agency also reported that there were a total of 25 protracted refugee situations – a situation in which 25,000 or more refugees have been living in exile for more than five years – by the end of 2009. While these figures are astounding, it is also striking to note that for every person that leaves home during a civil war many more take extraordinary risks by choosing to stay home, making individual level choices an important phenomenon to study.

1.1 Current state of research

The core argument driving current research on forced migration is the assertion that people make a choice even under "extraordinary circumstances" (Moore and Shellman 2006: 59). This literature has made several important contributions to the field of forced migration research, but two merit special mention: (i) by drawing a line between voluntary and forced migration, the literature has tried to single out the gravity of problems facing refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and more importantly (ii) the literature has laid a foundation for developing a parsimonious theory of forced migration. Although the existing research is limited by its dependence on

national level data, this rational choice model merits further theoretical refinement and a more disaggregated analysis provides one such opportunity to refine the macro-micro linkage. As pointed out by Mason (2000), it is almost impossible to conduct an exhaustive review of existing literature on forced migration, but literature that is relevant to the present study is organized by the themes investigated in this study and summarized in the following sub-sections.

1.1.1 Armed conflict and forced migration

Prior research on forced migration concludes that conflict or violence is a major cause of forced displacement (Hakovirta 1986; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo. 1989; Clark 1989; Schmeidl 1995, 1997, 1998; Gibney, Apodaca and McCann 1996; Cohen and Deng 1998a; Cohen and Deng 1998b; Weiner 1996; Apodaca 1998; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007). Although most scholars agree that all types of violence (or war in general) generate threat, forcing people to make a difficult choice of whether or not to leave their homes, there is some disagreement as to the scope and nature of conflict required to trigger significant civilian displacement. For example, Zolberg et al. (1989) suggested that international war is a potential cause of refugee flows, and Schmeidl (1997), who conducted one of the earliest multivariate quantitative analyses of the causes of forced migration, concluded that participation of a country in international wars has a modest positive effect on refugee flows. However, Davenport et al. (2003) did not find support for the hypothesis that a country's participation in international war has a positive effect on net forced migration. On the other hand, Moore and Shellman (2004) found more specifically that the presence of foreign troops in a country is a significant producer of forced migrants.

Based on their findings from a cross-national analysis from 1976 to 1996, Melander and Öberg (2006) conclude that international territorial conflicts are not significant as producers of forced migrants and that "large forced migration catastrophes in connection with international armed conflict are exceptional" (144). Melander, Öberg and Hall (2009) also report that except for the period 1990-94 when it peaked, the post Cold War era of civilian conflict has, on average, not led to an increase in forced migration. In yet another study, Melander and Öberg (2007) report that geographical spread of conflict, rather than the intensity of violence measured by battle deaths, is a significant predictor of forced migration.

Scholars also report different findings about the association between ethnic conflict and forced migration. While a number of them report that ethnic conflict is an important determinant of forced migration (Clay 1984; Newland 1993; Kaufman 1996,1998), Moore and Shellman (2004) and Melander and Öberg (2006, 2007) did not find a significant difference between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts in producing forced migrants. That is, ethnic conflicts are not more likely than revolutionary conflicts to cause forced migration (Schmeidl 1997; Moore and Shellman 2004; Melander and Öberg 2006, 2007).

Scholars have also analyzed the impact of violence perpetrated by the government versus violence by rebels and found that both are significant predictors of displacement (Jonassohn 1993; Rummel 1994; Gibney et al. 1996; Schmeidl 1997; Apodaca 1998; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006). Some scholars have analyzed the impact of the magnitude of genocide and politicide separately and found that they are both significant predictors of forced migration (Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and

Shellman 2004). In their cross-national time series analysis of the causes of net migration for 129 countries in the period 1964-1989, Davenport et al. (2003) analyze the threats posed by the state in the form of genocide and politicide, dissidents' violent behavior, and joint threat posed by counter attacks resulting from a civil war. They found all three types of political violence strongly significant in explaining net migration (Davenport et al 2003: 43). Others report that whereas state repression is significant as a predictor of forced migration, genocide is not (Melander and Öberg 2006). Moore and Shellman (2006) also investigate the characteristics of a state that is likely to produce varied numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). They report that countries facing state-sponsored violence such as genocide or politicide produce more refugees than those undergoing civil wars, and countries surrounded by authoritarian and poor neighbors produce fewer refugees compared to IDPs. Forced migrants' choices of becoming IDPs as opposed to refugees and the refugees' choice of a destination state, are a function of their relative expectations of being victimized and of economic opportunities at their destinations (Moore and Shellman 2006, 2007).

Researchers have also investigated the impact of human rights violations on forced migration (Aga Khan 1981; Hakovirta 1986; Gibney et al. 1996; Apodaca 1998; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004). While Schmeidl (1997), who uses the Freedom House Index as a predictor, finds no significant effects of the violations of human rights and political freedoms on forced displacement, Moore and Shellman (2004) find the level of political terror significantly associated with the likelihood and magnitude of forced migration when they employ the Political Terror Scale (PTS) developed by Gibney and Dalton (1996) as an independent variable. Despite slight variations in the

findings, most research concludes that lack of both political freedoms and rule of law cause forced migration, and states that do not respect human rights produce more forced migrants than those that do.

Beyond violence and human rights violations, scholars have also analyzed the impact of regime change. While Davenport et al. (2003) find that regime transition is a significant predictor of flight, Melander and Öberg (2006) report that "regime transition reduces the number of forced migrants whereas regime collapse increases the number" (144). Moore and Shellman (2004) report that a higher level of democracy, measured by the Polity III dataset, is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of forced migration. The divergence in these findings may be driven by the way that 'transition' is defined in the conflict literature.

In sum, this body of literature suggests that when confronted by violence or threat of violence, individuals are more likely to flee from their villages in search of a safer place. However, the literature fails to establish a linkage between a general nationwide measure of violence and the circumstance individuals might find themselves in and react to. The present study argues that there is variance in levels of violence and variance in how individuals perceive the threat to physical integrity of life emanating from violence such that individuals are likely flee at different rates and at different times.

1.1.2 Economic opportunity and forced migration

The second most important factor determining the decision of individuals to flee or stay in the face of violence is economic opportunity. Scholars of large-*n* analyses have long argued that economic opportunity, measured in terms of the level of economic

development and poverty in the countries of origin and destination, is associated with forced migration (Zolberg et al. 1989; Schmeidl 1997; Wood 1994; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007. However, the empirical results, drawn largely from aggregate cross-national analyses, are mixed.

Davenport et al. (2003) and Melander and Öberg (2006) use GNP and GDP per capita as proxies for economic opportunity but do not find them to be significant predictors of forced migration. On the other hand, Schmeidl (1997) finds that when confronted with violence, countries with higher levels of economic development, measured by per capita energy consumption, tend to produce fewer refugees. Moore and Shellman (2004) also report that countries with higher GNP per capita, which implies availability of better economic opportunities, produce significantly fewer forced migrants than countries with lower per capita GNP (p.741). In their most recent works, Moore and Shellman focus on factors affecting choices of the masses on the move to become either refugees or IDPs (2006), and refugees' choices of the destination after they have decided to flee (2007). Analyzing both the push and pull factors, once again they find economic opportunities at home negative and significant in explaining forced migration, suggesting that fewer people are likely to move out of regions that have higher levels of economic development. Furthermore, they conclude that "refugees do prefer to relocate in countries with higher average wages" and their numbers tend to be lower from countries with better economic opportunities (Moore and Shellman 2007: 828). On balance, these findings suggest that economic opportunity is likely to play an important role in affecting people's decisions to leave or stay, as well as where they go once they decide to leave.

Studies conducted at the micro-level also report that beyond violence, there are important socio-economic factors that affect individuals' decisions of whether or not to flee (Engel and Ibáñez 2007; Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009). In a study of Columbia, Engel and Ibáñez (2007) find that people who owned land were less likely to leave as compared to those with "lack of economic opportunities in the community of origin" (p.357). Analyzing the case of Aceh, Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) conclude that during conflict people tend to move from rural to urban areas where economic opportunity is available (p. 411). Although some cross national studies have found a negative association between the economic conditions of the country of origin and the number of forced migrants, they have used only crude measures such as GNP or GDP per capita (Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Neumayer 2005; Melander and Öberg 2006) and per capita energy consumption (Schemeidl 1997). The two studies on Aceh and Colombia referred to above are the only exceptions.

In sum, the above studies suggest that people tend to stay when the opportunity cost of fleeing, measured in terms of forgone economic opportunity at the place of origin, outweighs a physical threat to life. However, the measures of economic wealth employed in cross-national analyses are problematic. A country's GDP or, GNP per capita or, per capita energy consumption are very crude proxies for the economic conditions an individual faces. Such aggregate measures tell us little about the economic status of an individual or household. In addition, what is missing from the existing literature is a more in-depth analysis of how individual wealth is useful in helping people to cope. Little is known about how the availability of economic opportunity or wealth can be associated with the ability of individuals to cope and stay. To capture the decision to stay or leave

made at the individual level and the role that wealth plays in enabling people to survive during a civil war, the present study uses more refined measures of economic conditions measured at the level of the individual.

1.1.3 Social networks and forced migration

Current research on forced migration tends to follow two arguments in explaining the association between social networks and forced migration. One group of scholars argues that past displacement leads to more displacement at the present or in the future (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004). Migration establishes a network between people who left and those who remained back in the first place. This network functions as a means of communication, mitigates the cost of migration for new migrants thereby inducing more displacement decisions. The logic here is simple: people who have moved in the past transmit information about their journey and place of destination to their friends and families back home; friends and family then feed this information into their decision equation of whether to stay or leave; they flee if the associated risk of leaving is lower than that of staying. Schmeidl (1997) uses a measure of cross-border network between ethnic groups from the Minorities at Risk data set (Gurr 1993) to test the network argument. The results are insignificant in predicting flight. Davenport et al. (2003) find the *net* stock of forced migrants from previous years to be a significant predictor of forced migration in the present year. Moore and Shellman (2004) argue that past migration disrupts societies, raises the cost of staying and thereby leads to more forced migration.

Edwards (2009) develops a computational model to explain the mechanism through which information is shared among individuals who are on the move and how the flow of information impacts people's choices. He asserts that "while conflict almost always drives displacement, more precisely, it is the information about the conflict that drives displacement" (Edwards 2009: 40). Certain events provide cues to individuals, these are transmitted to other individuals, who then process the information and decide first whether or not to flee, and then where to flee. The act of transmitting and processing information about threat at the societal level, it is argued, is critical to understanding forced migration decisions (Edwards 2009: 41). While this study makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of networks in explaining flight behavior, the insights from the model can also be applied to understanding the role of social networks in allowing individuals to stay in their homes. Information transmitted through social networks can play a critical role in influencing individuals' choices of whether to flee or stay behind, and not only by providing information about threats, but also about countermeasures available to members of the community.

The second argument regarding the relationship between networks and forced migration is that people care about their place of birth and personal belongings, and therefore, they develop alternative coping mechanisms to stay put rather than making a decision to flee. Networking through social and community organizations provides one such alternative mechanism. According to this argument, civil war reconfigures societies, changing the roles of existing social networks while also creating new ones (Wood 2008; Colletta et al. 2000). This enables some individuals to stay put in the first place (see chapter 2). Building on the choice-centric argument, Melander and Öberg (2006) argue

that there is a variation in the level of an individual's attachment to home, and those who remained back during the initial spell of shock were those that were less likely to flee to begin with. Edwards (2009) argues that this variation in attachment is a function of a number of variables including level of violence, economic opportunity, and 'pre-existing sociological roots.' Individuals flee when the utility of staying at home drops below a certain threshold, or a "reservation point" – the point below which an individual will rather flee (Edwards 2009, p. 55). This is the point at which 'perceived risk outweighs attachment to home' (see chapter 2 for further details on this point). This "self-selection effect" offsets the network (Schmeidl 1997) and social disruption (Moore and Shellman 2004) effects, causing forced migration to diminish over time (Melander and Öberg 2006: 142-144). While this argument is very useful in understanding why some individuals stay while others leave, the more important question in this study is *what* makes it possible for those who stay put in the first place to do so.

Wood (2008) identifies six "wartime social processes" that transform social networks in a variety of ways, including creating new ones and changing the role of existing ones. In some cases, civil war strengthens the role of existing social networks enabling some individuals to cope with their circumstances and stay behind while others are forced to leave. In their study of displacement in Columbia, Engel and Ibáñez (2007) use the number of organizations in which a household has a membership and the number of years of residence to measure social networks and find both variables positive and significant in predicting displacement. They interpret this result to mean that families with membership in a greater number of organizations and longer years of residence in their place of origin become displaced because they have extensive social networks such

that they can entrust someone from the community to look after their property while they are gone (p.357). Using the same dataset, Ibáñez & Vélez (2008) use the same two variables, membership and years of residence, to predict two outcomes – the likelihood of being victimized and the likelihood of being displaced. They found both the variables negatively associated with the probability of being victimized (with membership being statistically significant), but positively associated with the probability of displacement. The authors use membership in organizations as a proxy for leadership and expect leaders to be targeted and flee. Their empirical results somewhat contradict their theory, as the authors admit: membership in an organization appears to provide protection and reduce the probability of threat and flight, which is more consistent with a view that membership in organization is a measure of social connectedness rather than leadership (and associated vulnerability to additional threats). The same study also reports that households with longer years of residence are significantly less likely to flee because they do not want to leave behind a "web of social networks" and expose themselves to "a higher risk of victimization" (Ibáñez & Vélez 2008: 670). I argue that it is this web of social networks that enables individuals to cope with conflict and stay behind.

Case studies have found that "in situations of war – when the state and its institutions have often broken down, or turned against its citizens – informal networks gain in significance" (Harpviken 2009: 1). These networks, which are deeply rooted in communities, have been found to be instrumental in withstanding as bitter a conflict as the Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India (Varshney 2002). And academicians are

not alone in pointing out the importance of community level organization in helping societies cope with conflict and its aftermath. [1]

As noted above, except for Harpviken (2009), none of the existing literature speaks about the importance of a broader set of *coping* factors that might be negatively associated with forced migration. The migration network (Schmeidl 1997), societal disruption (Moore and Shellmand 2004), and 'displacement network' (Edwards 2009) are all treated as pull factors. Empirical work on the ability of civilians to cope with a conflict situation during civil war and avoid displacement is more limited. I argue that preexisting community level organizations may be instrumental in helping people cope with conflict situations and stay behind.

In their study of migration behavior, sociologists, anthropologists and demographers have long argued that individuals who have deep roots and large investments in their communities of origin and strong kinship ties are reluctant to leave home (Uhlenberg 1973, Irwin et al. 1999). Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of migratory processes, it is important to understand the "social and cultural context" within which migration decisions are made (Hugo 1981: 187). Social and community ties exert a strong influence on the decision-making calculus of individuals, and as such, community characteristics are strong predictors of the decision to stay (Petersen 1958; Morrison 1971; Uhlenberg 1973; Speare 1974). These community–level ties are embedded within the social and cultural aspects of a given society (Uhlenberg 1973; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Irwin et al. 1999). Attachment to

[1] See Jaspars (2010) for an example of the role of community-based organizations in North Darfur in not only addressing food security and livelihood but also negotiating with the warring parties.

home is stronger for "persons residing in tightly integrated communities with dense local social networks" (Irwin et al. 2004). But more importantly, as Graves and Graves (1974) argue, man is "neither totally active nor passive but interactive." He will interact with all the constraints imposed by his physical and social environments and "seek to overcome the problems confronting him by choosing among perceived available options" (p. 117). When confronted by war, there may be a number of options one can utilize in dealing with a conflict situation. In the next chapter, I argue that networking through social and community organizations is one such important option.

1.1.4 Physical factors and forced migration

Forced migration also involves a cost and geographical features such as mountainous terrain as well physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges play an important role in impacting individuals' decisions to move. The UNHCR lists the following factors as "obstacles to flight": lack of knowledge of route, lack of money to pay fare, poor security along the route, adverse climatic conditions, impassable terrain, closed borders, among others (UNHCR 1996). These factors, which are constant, do not cause forced migration but they affect the decision making process of individuals engaged in flight behavior (Edwards 2009).

In a time series analysis of the causes of forced migration, Schmeidl (1997) tests for the impact of flight facilitators measured by the number of countries that share a border and the proportion of shared land border relative to total country border, as well as the impact of obstacles measured by presence or absence of mountains, forests, deserts and islands (p. 296). Both types of facilitators were found insignificant in predicting

refugee flows (p. 304). Moore and Shellman (2006) reported that transaction costs, measured by distance and terrain, do not negatively affect displacement decisions. They reject the hypothesis that transaction cost will stop people from fleeing.

Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) use a measure of the presence/absence of a "bus or train station, airport, or seaport in the village" to measure transportation costs (p. 408). They found mixed evidence in support of the argument that transportation costs play a role in impacting displacement decisions (Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009: 412-413). In a study of the civil war in Nepal, Murshed and Gates (2005) employ mountainous terrain and road density to predict intensity of conflict across the country. While they did not find evidence in support of the argument that areas with rugged terrain are more prone to violence, road density predicted a lower intensity of conflict. This may be because availability of roads made it possible for people to flee or for state security forces to be able to protect civilians.

1.1.5 Rebel participation and forced migration

Finally, the literature on civil war onset and rebel recruitment suggests that some individuals may simply support the rebel organization and stay put. There can be many reasons as to why men and women participate in rebellion. One set of literature argues that insurgency arises in response to opportunities available for seeking rent, such as looting natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This "greed" story is equally plausible for those who elect to stay put and participate in a rebel movement. Those who see an opportunity to seek economic rent from the outcome of wars may chose to stay and participate. Others argue that civil war arises in response to opportunity for

expressing discontentment against discriminatory and lopsided policies of weak states (Fearon and Laintin 2003). An extension of this argument can be that people with "grievances" will stay back to participate in civil war rather than fleeing. But the most important strategy individuals may choose to avoid violence is joining a military faction that will serve as their protector (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Goodwin 2001; Mason and Krane 1989). Instead of risking one's life and possibly becoming a target of a rebel organization, individuals who care about their place of residence may choose a strategy of simply complying with rebel demands or participating in their cause.

There can be a number of reasons behind individuals' decisions to side with rebels. Literature on social revolution argues that when individuals within a social class feel that they have been relatively deprived of access to economic opportunities, they are likely to revolt against the state as rebel organizations provide an opportunity to express their grievances. For example, relative deprivation leads wage-earning laborers to revolt against landlords (Paige 1975). Similarly, peasants who are rendered landless by landed elites are more likely to revolt (Wickham-Crowley 1992). People may also participate in an insurgency due to "frustrations that arise from an individual's inability to express her concerns through 'normal' nonviolent channels" (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008: 440). Richards (1996) argues that in addition to frustration, increasing isolation of individuals from mainstream politics and deprivation from political decision making can throw them into the arms of the rebels. Individuals may also turn towards the rebels for security when the state becomes involved in using indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) argue that an alternative to a grievance-based explanation for participation in rebel activity can be found in Olson's logic of collective action (Olson 1965). According to this argument, individuals will participate only when private benefits are made available in exchange for participation. Those benefits may include money, land, loot, and so on (Lichbach 1995). But above all, "protection from violence (a 'push' factor) may be a key private benefit that fighting groups can offer (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008: 441). A key strategy for individuals to cope with violence then is simply to join the fighting group(s).

1.1.6 Other factors and forced migration

Much of existing research also uses population as a variable to control for the impact of a country's population size on forced migration (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, Melander and Öberg 2006). The argument is that a large population puts pressure on existing resources thereby 'pushing' some to relocate in search of better economic opportunities. Schmeidl (1997) argues that population pressure increases forced migration but her analysis does not support the argument. While Moore and Shellman (2004) did not find population to be a significant factor affecting the magnitude of forced migration, Melander and Öberg (2006) report that population has a significant effect on forced migration. The present study uses information about a variety of demographic factors to assess their impact on forced migration.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Building on the rational choice explanation of human behavior, I argue that individuals are attached to their homes; they are rational, and strategic in their interaction

with their physical and social environments and their conflict situation. When confronted with a civil war, they will take actions that will minimize the risk to their physical integrity of life but also keep them in their homes. Forced migration involves some degree of decision making wherein individuals examine the relative costs and benefits of staying in one place or moving to some alternative place. The decision to flee or not to flee is a function of one's expectation of being victimized and economic opportunities at the place of origin as well as the destination. The general environment of conflict and availability of socio-economic opportunities feed into the decision calculus of individuals, causing some to decide to leave and others to stay behind. Obstacles such as rough terrain and unavailability of roads also contribute to a flight decision. In addition, social networks such as community level organizations play a crucial role in the flight decision process, helping some people to cope with conflict and stay behind while others flee. Examination of this powerful mechanism of social connectedness is lacking in the existing literature. More precisely, if one thinks of an individual as choosing between leaving and staying behind in the face of conflict and if the decision to stay or leave will be influenced by an individual's assessment of the cost of staying versus moving to a new location, then the decision to leave or stay is a function not only of exposure to conflict, but also of perceived costs that impact the choice of individuals to flee or stay.

Although the rationalist explanation has made a significant contribution to our understanding of factors explaining forced migration, existing research is largely limited

to large-*n* analyses using national level data.[2] This rational choice model merits further theoretical refinement and a within-case analysis provides one such opportunity to refine the macro-micro linkage. Specifically, recent research on forced migration has pointed out that there is 'variance' in how individuals assess risks emanating from the general environment of conflict and their degree of attachment to home (Edwards 2009). There is a cost associated with one's decision to stay put, such that the individual will rather flee than stay once the perceived cost (of staying) outweighs attachment to home. However, this literature stops at pointing out that there is a cost associated with one's decision to stay but fails to explain factors that are helpful in mitigating such costs. I argue that such factors as social networks or economic opportunities keep some individuals above their 'reservation points' by dampening the perceived costs of staying. Existing literature is also silent on the duration of individuals' survival with war as it fails to identify factors that enable people to cope and stay in their homes.

I argue that individuals are strategic in their behavior. Once a civil war has begun, individuals will come in contact with the warring parties, they will assess and reassess the threats emanating from war vis-à-vis resources available at their disposal to deal with the threat. They will evaluate their personal situations, the strength of social networks and their investment in their communities and they will decide whether or not to support the rebels or comply with their demands by physically participating in the movement or by supplying economic resources. They will leave home when the risks of holding out or the cost of continuing to support becomes greater than the value of their attachment to home.

[2] Engel and Ibáñez (2007) and Ibáñez & Vélez (2008) are the few exceptions to cross-national analyses. Although Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) use village-level analysis, their data is drawn from national population census, not a public opinion survey conducted to understanding forced migration behavior.

While people are attached to home, the cost of compliance may increase over time. In addition, individuals may have different abilities to comply. Over time some people may find ways to adapt and cope; those who fail to cope will be more likely to leave sooner. Therefore, how long an individual is able to stay put is determined by the level of threat, the costs of compliance with the fighting parties, and individuals' ability and willingness to meet demands put upon them. Those who are willing and able to bear the costs and meet demands of fighting parties are likely to stay longer. People who have invested in their homes and communities will leave only when they believe that all means to cope have been exhausted, or when the costs of compliance exceed the value of staying.

Existing research on forced migration has largely focused on national-level displacement and has not taken into account the fact that there is subnational and individual-level variation in behavior and capacity. Individuals are strategic in their actions, and those that have the capacity and willingness to take risks are more likely to mobilize all available resources to be able to stay in their villages or homes. This may include participation and compliance, either forced or voluntary, in order to survive. Strategic behavior depends on the means individuals possess and their ability and willingness to act or make necessary adjustments in their lives. The greater their means, the more choices they will have and the greater their staying power will be even under conflict. Because people are attached to home, they will mobilize all means at their disposal and try to adapt to their new circumstances. They will bide their time before they are attacked and forced to flee. Once individuals choose to engage in coping strategies, these actions are likely to continue, consistent with Melander and Öberg (2006)'s findings that those who decide to stay during the initial spell of shock are increasingly

reluctant to move in subsequent years. The potential reason for their reluctance to move is that they adapt to a new way of life – living with a war.

A broad set of coping factors might be associated with conflict situations. I have identified the following three strategies: providing economic resources, providing physical support, and seeking protection through community-level social networks. As an alternative to fleeing and living in a broken social world, some villagers may comply with demands, participate, or create protective shields through the mobilization of social networks such as traditional community organizations that have been overshadowed by the war. Individuals may use one or a combination of these strategies to cope with a conflict situation and stay behind. The choices that individuals make may depend on the level of threat they experience or perceive, their endowment of resources, their political inclinations, their social connectedness, and barriers to flight, among others. These factors will affect the staying power and survival of individuals during a conflict situation.

1.3 Research design, data and methodology

To put the rationalist model of forced migration to a more rigorous test, this dissertation uses secondary as well as primary data collected through extensive fieldwork in Nepal. Nepal went through a decade of civil war beginning in 1996, in which it was estimated that over 50,000 people were displaced from their homes and another 13,000 killed. The conflict started when the Communist Party of Nepal –Maoist (CPN-M) launched a 'people's war' on February 13, 1996 by attacking police posts and state-owned banks in the mid-western region of the country with a stated objective of

abolishing the monarchy and establishing a people's republic. The most often cited causes of the conflict are political and geographical opportunities to rebel (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 2006), poverty and social exclusion (Do and Iyer 2007), income inequality (Murshed and Gates 2006), and ethnic and caste-based grievances (Adhikari and Samford 2011), among others. The conflict ended in 2006 with the signing of a comprehensive peace accord between the rebels and the government. While the Nepali government has been struggling to rebuild the country, between fifty and seventy-five thousand individuals displaced during the conflict have yet to return home (NRC 2010). The plight of the displaced continues to pose problems for the current government of Nepal and important empirical questions for the scholarly and international communities. Questions such as why some people, when faced with extreme violence, cope and stay behind while others flee, and how well those who stay cope and survive, continue to challenge social scientists and policy makers alike. Such questions can only be answered through subnational and individual-level analyses, particularly with information about those who never left.

The primary purpose of the present study is to move from a cross-national to subnational and individual-level analyses of displacement to more accurately understand why some people flee while others do not in the same contextual environment. Most scholars have focused on cross-national analyses of forced migration and they rely on aggregate-level data to draw inferences about individual-level decisions. In contrast, the present study develops a multivariate explanation of forced migration at the subnational and individual-levels in Nepal. Qualitative information gathered through field research

supplements the quantitative analyses. Nepal provides an ideal case for testing the rational choice model on forced migration for two main reasons.

Theoretically, a single country study like that of Nepal provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the rational choice model applied to forced migration – a model originally developed through the use of national level aggregate data – at the subnational and at the individual level. In addition to allowing for increasing the number of observations within a single case (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:219), a subnational analysis permits us to use variables that are more accurately measured in order to obtain a more valid causal inference (Snyder 2001: 94). For example, variables such as the number of people killed and disappeared, economic empowerment index, and road density across different districts of a country provide more refined measures of the covariates of forced migration. Use of a single case also helps us to uncover variables omitted in large-*n* analyses. As detailed in the subsequent pages of this dissertation, Nepal is a remarkably well-suited case in which to analyze the potential role of social networks in displacement decisions – a variable that has largely been omitted in existing large-*n* analyses due to the nature of the studies. The Community Forest Users Groups in Nepal has been recognized as 'a success story' for not only improving the living standards of hundreds of villagers across the country but also for helping villagers to dismantle age-old social barriers such as untouchability in order to create greater social cohesion. The Nepal case is perfect for testing the significance of social networks in mitigating the cost of peoples' decision to stay home during conflict. By moving to a "lower level of analysis" (Snyder 2001), the present study rescues the rational choice analysis from the problem of relying on national level aggregate variables to predict

individual-level displacement behavior. Finally, the study of why people flee during conflict is incomplete without also understanding why some do not flee. I use primary data gathered at the individual-level for both displaced and non-displaced persons and provide empirical test of these theoretical claims.

On a more practical level, because of the availability of data, made possible by an unusually thorough identification and documentation of the displaced persons, Nepal provides a rare opportunity for conducting a more refined test of the choice-centric approach on forced migration. Most researchers on forced migration acknowledge the fact that acquiring accurate data on forced migration is challenging, if not impossible. By focusing on one country and one conflict and using detailed displacement data from a single source, the present study arguably offers greater internal validity and precision in testing the impact of conflict on the decision to stay or flee. The present study is one of the few that simultaneously engages in a subnational and individual-level analysis of forced migration, systematically analyzing district-and-individual-level information.

Data for the present study come from field research conducted during the summer and fall of 2008 in Nepal. The empirical analyses are based on both secondary and primary data (See Appendix I and II for detailed explanations of sampling frame and data). Secondary data come from various published and unpublished sources. Primary data come from the Nepal Forced Migration Survey (NFMS) 2008. In order to collect the primary data, over 1800 randomly selected people were surveyed, including displaced and non-displaced individuals. Nepal is divided into three topographical regions (mountains, hills and plains) with 75 districts. The districts are further divided into 3,914 Village Development Committees (VDCs), each with 9 wards for a total of 35,226 wards.

I used a weighted multi-stage cluster sampling technique to go from region, to VDC, to ward level, and then randomly drew two samples, one of individual households at the ward level and another of displaced persons originating from those wards. The displaced were randomly sampled from a list generated by the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) according to individuals' ward of origin.[3] Use of wards as the sampling unit has the advantage of offering a paired design of individuals who decided to stay and those who decided to leave within the same contextual environment. Besides being a mountainous country, Nepal is very poorly served by road networks. It can take several hours simply to walk between wards. Cluster sampling down to the ward level and then randomly sampling within wards also made the project feasible given time and financial constraints.

Three different statistical models are employed to provide a more rigorous test of the theoretical arguments presented in the previous section. The empirical analysis begins with a negative binomial regression model to test a number of hypotheses about the impact of political violence, economic conditions, social networks and physical factors on the count of the number of people displaced from across the 75 districts of Nepal during the conflict. This is followed by a probit analysis of the association between factors such as violence, personal economic conditions and economic opportunity at the respondent's village, social networks and geographical terrain and their impact on the decision of individuals to stay or leave. Survival analysis is used in the final empirical

[3] INSEC (Informal Sector Service Center) is a leading national human rights organization that worked throughout the conflict to identify and return displaced persons to their homes. INSEC is credited with having generated the most comprehensive list of displaced persons from all the 75 districts of Nepal. This master list provided the population of displaced persons from which I drew a sample for the present study.

chapter to test the impact of a number of coping mechanisms on individuals' ability to cope with the conflict and stay in their villages. Qualitative information gathered through fieldwork and personal interviews adds depth to the findings throughout.

1.4 Summary of findings and contribution of the research

The empirical results provide strong evidence in support of the major hypotheses developed in the field. Beyond violence there are important economic, social and geographical factors that play a role in determining flight behavior. In addition, the findings suggest that there is variance in how individuals experience and perceive threat of war. Forced migration does not coincide with the onset of violence, as is commonly assumed. The significant variation in when people flee suggests that individuals will try to cope with their situation. They will flee only when all the means to resist flight have been exhausted. The results show that while threat of violence forces some people to flee early, economic opportunities and social networks provide important mechanisms for other individuals to cope with war and stay longer. Moreover, supporting the fighting party is an important mechanism of survival, and for remaining in one's home during civil war.

Beyond adding value to existing literature on forced migration, my dissertation identifies promising areas for future research in the field. First, social networks are found to be playing a crucial role in mitigating the impact of conflict on civilian populations. A more rigorous analysis of the role that community-level organizations play is likely to make a significant contribution to our understanding of civilian's interaction with rebel organizations. Second, the findings suggest that civilians' decisions to leave home do not

necessarily coincide with the onset of war. Rather, individuals are strategic in their mobilization of resources to deal with war before making a decision to flee. Future studies could focus more on the importance of time in analyzing forced migration. Finally, the empirical results show that economic resources are important as predictors of forced migration. Future research could analyze the separate effects of one's wealth and income from external sources such as remittance in helping people to stay in their homes duding civil war.

1.5 Road map

The major objective of my dissertation is to move from a cross national to individual level of analysis and provide a more refined test of the rationalist explanation of forced migration. I demonstrate that there is variance in how individuals perceive and assess threat of violence. Towards this end, the dissertation is presented in two stages.

In the first stage, theoretical insights gained from cross-national analyses are extended to a study of forced migration at the subnational level. In "scaling down" (Snyder 2001), Chapter 2 uses count data from the Maoists "people's war" in Nepal to conduct a subnational analysis of displacement across the 75 district of the country. The findings provide a more refined test of existing large-*n* studies on the causes of forced migration.

Chapter 3 scales it down further to the individual level. Using the NFMS data, I test a number of hypotheses regarding the impact of factors such as violence, economic conditions, physical infrastructure, social networks and demographic factors on forced migration. This chapter provides an individual-level test of the rational choice model of

forced migration, using data collected solely for the purpose of studying wartime forced migration.

Next, I present a model to understand possible coping mechanisms that individuals might use in living with conflict. Chapter 4 is devoted to explaining why the study of forced migration is incomplete without also understanding why some people do not flee during war. Using primary data collected during the survey, I provide a study of the coping strategies employed by individuals who chose to stay put during a civil war.

Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a summary of main findings and their implications for our understanding of the dynamics of forced migration. I also lay out some of the potential policy implications of my findings. A large majority of the people forcibly uprooted during armed conflicts are IDPs. This population is left at the mercy of home governments —often the very governments who have driven them from their homes. Direct involvement of the international community is discouraged until a formal request is made by the home government. Involvement in dealing with the IDPs is considered an encroachment upon a nation's sovereignty. The home governments themselves are poor as most conflicts occur in underdeveloped or developing countries. As discussed in Chapter 5, recent international political events have further aggravated the plight of the forced migrants. The empirical findings in this study offer options in dealing with this quagmire and the grave humanitarian issues by suggesting alternative mechanisms such as investment in creating economic opportunities, building social networks and other coping alternatives.

Chapter 2–The Plight of the Forgotten Ones, Civil War and Forced Migration

> *When a community experiences or fears murder, rape, kidnapping, destruction of their homes or looting, flight is a natural reaction* (Olivier Bangerter, FMR 2011).

Adding value to existing aggregate cross-national analyses on forced migration, this chapter uses sub-national level data to investigate circumstances that affect people's decisions of whether or not to flee their homes during civilian conflicts. Building on existing literature reviewed in Chapter 1, I argue that conflict by itself is not the sole factor affecting people's decisions to flee or stay. Apart from a direct physical impact, civil war can destroy economic infrastructure and expose people to economic hardships, which can contribute to displacement. In addition, flight may be impeded or facilitated by such factors as geographic features, physical infrastructure, and social conditions under which people live. Using count data from the Maoists "people's war" in Nepal, a sub-national analysis of displacement is conducted to provide a more refined test of existing large-n studies on the causes of forced migration. The empirical results are consistent with the major hypotheses developed in the field. With more precise measures of conflict, economic and physical conditions and presence of social networks, I demonstrate the importance of a rationalist framework in understanding the choice of flight.

The major objective of this chapter is to provide a new test of the rational choice model of forced migration using sub-national data in order to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of flight behavior within a country. The *Internal Displacement Monitoring Center* of the *Norwegian Refugee Council* estimated global displacement at 27.1 million persons by the end of 2009 (NRC 2010: 8). Not surprisingly and as illustrated by the citation at the beginning of this chapter, most research on forced migration tends to conclude that displacement is an obvious consequence of conflict and

that people flee because they have no choice.[1] The June 2007 special issue of *Forced Migration Review* reported that "one in six Iraqis is displaced" in the "greatest conflict–induced displacement in the history of the Middle East" (Forced Migration Review 2007: 3).[2] While this is an impressive figure indeed, it is also striking to note that five out of every six Iraqis chose to risk their lives by staying put. Choice is apparent not only in Iraq but in all countries that have experienced internal conflict. The present chapter addresses this puzzle at the subnational level. Specifically it asks, beyond violence, what are the causes of forced migration at the subnational level?

Existing research on forced migration concludes that people have a choice either to leave or stay, even under highly adverse circumstances (Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; Melander and Öberg 2006, 2007). However, this research uses cross-national data. In this chapter, I argue that regions within a country vary in terms of the endowment of natural resources, economic conditions, social networks and spread of violence. Some regions of a country are likely to experience a greater level of violence than others. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume that the impact of violence is uniform across a country. The present chapter investigates at the sub-national level a number of factors that help to explain variance in displacement. While a sub-national analysis of both push and pull factors would be ideal, given the nature of the data, the present chapter focuses only on the conditions of where

[1] For example, see Cohen and Deng 1998a, 1998b, and Weiss 1999. The only exceptions are Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) and Moore and Shellman (2004; 2006; 2007), who developed the 'choice-centered' approach for studying forced migration. Davenport et al. (2003) also formalized the use of the value-free phrase "forced migrant" to describe both refugees and IDPs. I follow their example.

[2] This figure included two million internally displaced Iraqis and another 2.2 million taking refuge in "neighboring states" (FMR 2007: 3).

people were displaced from (see Appendix 1 for detailed explanation of the sub-national data on displacement used in this chapter). The sub-national level analysis provides a new and more refined test of the choice-centered model of forced migration. What conditions make displacement more or less likely? To more precisely analyze the causes of displacement and the factors that facilitate choice, this chapter uses count data on the number of displaced persons from the 75 districts of Nepal and employs negative binomial regression analysis to test a number of hypotheses about the impact of conflict, economic conditions, social networks and physical factors on displacement.

2.1 Theoretical framework and research hypotheses

The rational choice model assumes that forced migration involves some degree of decision making wherein individuals examine the relative costs and benefits of staying in one place or moving to some alternative place. The decision to flee or not to flee is a function of one's expectation of being victimized and economic opportunities at the place of origin as well as the destination. The general environment of conflict and availability of socio-economic opportunities feed into the decision calculus of individuals, causing some to decide to leave and others to stay behind. Obstacles such as rough terrain and unavailability of roads also contribute to a flight decision. In addition, social networks such as community level organizations play a crucial role in the flight decision process, helping some people to cope with conflict and stay behind while others flee. Examination of this powerful mechanism of social connectedness is lacking in the existing literature. More precisely, if one thinks of an individual as choosing between leaving and staying behind in the face of conflict and if the decision to stay or leave will be influenced by an individual's assessment of the cost of staying versus moving to a new location, then the

size of the displaced population is a function not only of exposure to conflict, but also of perceived costs that impact the choice of individuals to flee or stay.

Availability of fairly reliable data at the subnational level provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the existing rational choice model and further our understanding of the flight decision at a more micro level of analysis. The following research hypotheses are designed to investigate, in greater depth and at a more disaggregated level, the causal mechanisms leading to variation in displacement at the subnational-level.

Existing research concludes that violent conflict and gross human rights violations are significant predictors of forced migration. Conflict of all types poses a threat to the physical integrity of individuals, forcing them to make an extremely difficult decision of whether or not leave their homes. Threats to physical integrity may take a variety of forms including death, physical and mental torture, abduction and so on. In addition, threat of violence is likely to vary even within a country. Some regions of a country are likely to experience more violence than others. People from conflict-hit areas are more likely to flee their homes when they fear a physical threat of violence, fear being caught in the cross fire, or fear being abducted for ransom or indoctrination. This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Greater threat to the physical integrity of persons is likely to produce more forced migration.*

Existing literature on forced migration emphasizes the importance of economic conditions as both a push and pull factor in explaining forced migration. In a decision to flee or not, threats to economic security may arguably be as compelling as direct physical

threats to life insofar as survival in economically precarious societies can be compromised by economic breakdown. People may be willing to tolerate some measure of physical threat in contexts where economic security is strong. Assuming a constant level of physical threat, people are more likely to flee when the opportunity cost of flight is low. Controlling for conflict, this implies that people are more likely to flee from areas where economic opportunities are poorer and development infrastructures have been harder hit. Conversely, areas with better availability of economic opportunities are likely to produce fewer displacements. This leads to the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *Incidence of displacement is negatively associated with better economic opportunity.*

Some researchers suggest that migrant networks channel information and create a pull factor that facilitates or induces more flight during conflict (Schmeidl 1997, Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Edwards 2009). Others suggest that networking through social and community organizations provides a mechanism through which individuals can cope with the conflict and stay behind (Varshney 2003; Harpviken 2009; Wood 2008). Building on the latter argument and focusing on the decision of whether or not to flee, I argue that individuals can seek protection through social networks at the place of origin.[3] One mechanism through which this can be done is by joining and mobilizing community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the place of origin.

[3] While it would be ideal to test the impact of social networks also as a pull factor, lack of information about the place of destination of IDPs and individuals who might have crossed the border to India and beyond limits the present analysis to understanding the role of social networks at the place of origin.

Community organizations may provide a foundation for developing a strong interpersonal and political network among individuals within communities (Loveman 1998: 478). They work as a protective shield against infiltration by rebels as well as security personnel into the community and can provide a sense of security to a village community decreasing the perceived cost of staying. Over time, individuals within a community form collective identities and start taking risks in order to save their community (Calhoun 1991:69). At the same time, local NGOs may be linked to regional, national and international networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Therefore, social networks are likely to become an integral mechanism for coping as the cost of attacking or abducting individuals within such communities becomes significantly higher for the warring parties. For example, murder or abduction of a member of the community is likely to invoke widespread opposition, implicating the rebels or the state army for violations of human rights. The logic is that any strong social organization creates a web that links villagers together and works as an effective channel of communication at the expense of rebel infiltration. Such webs can facilitate the transmission of information about an impending threat (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005), leading to collective action and possibly negotiation with warring parties even in extreme conflict situations like Afghanistan (Harpviken 2009).

In the case of Nepal, Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) were perhaps the most important social networks operating throughout the country during and after the conflict at the local level.[4] The CFUGs, along with many pre-existing community-level

[4] The democratic government passed a new forest Act in 1993 that categorized forest into national and private forests. With support from international organizations and donor agencies, management of the

organizations, became instrumental in creating social cohesion among villagers during the conflict. Existing traditional indigenous community-level organizations that had been overshadowed or suppressed by the ongoing conflict started uniting villagers for the cause of protecting human rights due to excesses committed by the state and rebel armies. In the process, many community-level organizations were brought together for the cause of protecting the rights of members.

The Community Forest User Groups are grassroots level members of the Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN). They operate at the Village Development Committee (VDC) level, which is the smallest administrative unit in Nepal. By the end of 1998, the community forestry program was present in all but two districts of Nepal. Around 40% of the total geographical area of Nepal is forest, with about 35% of the population involved in the community forest program (Department of Forests). By topographic zone, districts in the mountain region have an average of 28% forest area, followed by the plains with 40% and the hill region with 51% (Table 2.2). Household membership in the CFUGs averages about 11,000 in the mountain region, 8,000 in the

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national forest began to be handed over to the villagers through the formation of local community user groups called 'community forest user groups' (CFUG). By the end of 2008, a total of 14,389 user groups had been formed across the country with a participation of 1,654,529 households in them (Department of Forests). As a modus operandi, the groups meet routinely, usually once a month, and discuss issues related to the conservation of forests in their community and sharing of benefits arising from it. In addition, the group members discuss social issues and strategies to combat problems facing their community. The overall activities of the communities are overseen by the national secretariat of the Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN), which is registered as an NGO. For our purpose, the CFUGs represent a form of social network operating at the village level. They function as a medium of connecting families within the community, facilitating flow of information and providing safety nets to the members.

plains and 20,000 in the hill region (Table 2.2).[5] FECOFUN, whose stated mission includes developing leadership and providing communication channels at the local community level, became a primary instrument of transmitting information about the conflict and the impending threat since this organization had already been institutionalized (FECOFUN). Members of the CFUGs shared information about the conflict during their regular meetings and formed mechanisms for dealing with security personnel and rebels.

Because of a strong attachment to home and their community, members of some CFUGs created an alliance between local political actors, including the Maoists and members of the national army, and several other civil society organizations. This resulted in a horizontal as well as vertical linkage between community-level organizations and national and transnational organizations. Because attacking a member of the social network is costly due to the likelihood of widespread opposition from the community, conflicting parties are more likely to respect international norms and humanitarian laws in dealing with locals that are organized. According to staff members of the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a national human rights organization operating throughout the country at the VDC level, there was a drastic change in the behavior of the conflicting parties in dealing with the locals, 'particularly when locals started telling them

[5] The community forest program, which was originally launched with the objective of managing forest resources, has evolved into an organization with much broader community goals. During the conflict the CFUGs became involved in protecting human rights by joining a broader social network including human rights organizations. Contrary to what one might think, membership in the CFUGs is not strongly correlated with percentage of district covered by forest (.21), further indicating that the CFUGs represent a broader social network.

to respect the norms of war as per the Geneva Conventions.' [6] Evidence suggests that there was a considerable decrease in incidents of human rights violations and displacement as a result of NGO involvement.[7]

In addition to the CFUGs, there are many other pre-existing organizations working at the community level. One such organization discovered during fieldwork is the *Khyala Group* in Rajapur VDC of Bardiya district. This is a traditional organization that exists among the *Tharu* community. This organization meets regularly to discuss problems facing community members. The problems may range from family feuds to natural disasters to conflict related issues such as physical threat from rebels or illegal detention by state security forces. In such organizations, the villagers come together to resolve their problems through negotiations. A similar organization called *Aama Samuha* (mothers group) was encountered in a remote village of Ghale Gaun in Lamjung districts. It was revealed during the course of research that most of the households from the group had membership in the CFUGs. While some of these community-level organizations are not human rights NGOs, they are intertwined as part of a social cohesion that facilitates the flow of information among its members and allows them to better tackle social

[6] This information comes from a personal interview held during the summer of 2008 with Bhola Mahat, regional coordinator of INSEC, in Nepalgunj.

[7] One example of this was the repatriation of 280 IDPs (52 families) to their homes to Jumla district in 2005 —one year before the end of the civil war. INSEC negotiated with the local leaders of the Maoists and Nepal army, took a helicopter full of IDPs to their homes and made both parties commit that the returnees would not be harmed. That marked the beginning of the return of IDPs to their homes. This particular program was funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), UK. Seeing the success, other donors started supporting the project that continues to date. This success story demonstrates that the existence of community level organizations and their networks with national and international organizations played a critical role in mitigating conflict and reducing forced migration as well as returning displaced persons to the place of their origin.

problems or natural disasters, or in the context of the civil war enables them to assess the risk of "attachment to home" (Edwards 2009).

As pointed out by Steele (2007) insurgents or states also calculate the risk of displacing civilians during conflict. Assuming that the ultimate objective of the insurgent groups or the state is to govern the population, their "decision to displace or not relates to the costs of generating compliance among civilians and the costs of displacing" (Steele 2007: 10). The cost of displacing is likely to be higher if a community is woven into a strong web of social networks, in which case the entire community needs to be displaced. Steele (2009) also found evidence in Colombia that some communities were never displaced from home because they received protection from regional and international human rights organizations who lobbied with the state and military for protection (p. 427, *fn*. 15). Once they are able to stay behind, these individuals are likely to come together under an existing social network or form a new one. As discussed in Chapter 4, they are likely to develop coping mechanisms to deal with their situations. Individuals also assess the risk of leaving the community possibly in favor of an unknown destination, which is arguably the least preferred option.

Displacement also depends on the kind of "institutions that govern the behavior of civilians within a community" (Steele 2007: 11). If a community is governed by informal institutions such as ethnicity and kinship, displacing the community becomes even more difficult. As Toft (2002/2003) has pointed out, for some groups such as a tribal village in Northeast Indian states of Nagaland or Manipur, "territory is often a defining attribute of a group's identity, inseparable from its past and vital to its continued existence as a distinct group" (p. 86, also cited in Steele 2007: 11). A similar argument can be made

about villagers in the mountains of Nepal for whom the mountains are gods and the forest a source of livelihood. Operating as consumer groups, members of the CFUGs act together in managing forests. Most villagers are farmers, cultivating small plots of land and raising livestock. The forest provides them timber for constructing homes, schools, and other buildings. Villagers go to the forests in groups to collect wood for fuel, fodder for their animals, leaf litters used as fertilizer and other useful materials such as bamboo for use in basketry and wild fruits and vegetables such as bamboo shoots. They have a collective interest in conserving plants as they protect water sources that are vital for supplying drinking water and irrigating farms. Thus, in addition to the regular meetings about managing forest products, there are multiple ways through which villagers come together, have the opportunity to share information and develop mechanisms for coping and staying in their homes. These community level organizations, which I referred to as social networks, are imbedded within the structure of Nepali society. Unlike Edward's (2009) "displacement networks" which form among people in flight, these pre-existing social institutions are an integral part of village life that binds communities in Nepal. In the context of a civil conflict, they may play an important role in reducing the perceived costs of staying home (thus raising the reservation point) for some individuals. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *Displacement will be negatively associated with the degree of social networks present.*

Besides threat to physical integrity of life and economic conditions, other factors such as geography and access to road facilities are also likely to condition displacement. High and rough terrain provides "conditions that favor insurgency" (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Such conditions are also likely to make it easier for the insurgents to coerce people to join them without notice of the government. In addition, "[r]ugged mountains" may work as "obstacles" to people's flight (Schmeidl 1997: 289-90). Mountainous terrain may raise the transaction costs for people on the move by raising transportation costs (Moore and Shellman 2006) and increasing the risk of being attacked en-route (Edwards 2009). Lack of access to roads might prevent some people from fleeing even when they want to. Conversely, an easy way to escape may induce more people to flee during conflict. Thus, "physical obstacles can be critical" when life is at risk (Schmeidl 1997: 296). This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: *Greater barriers to escaping are likely to result in fewer displacements.*

2.2 Research design, data and measures

Data for the present chapter come from various secondary sources as well as information gathered through extensive fieldwork in Nepal. Nepal experienced a decade long civil war beginning in 1996 in which it was estimated that over 50,000 people were forced from homes and more than 13,000 killed. This chapter draws insights from existing literature to develop a multivariate explanation of forced migration at the sub-national level in Nepal incorporating conflict, economic conditions, social networks and physical factors that affect people's decisions to leave or stay. Qualitative information gathered through field research supplements the quantitative analysis. As discussed in Chapter 1, Nepal provides an ideal case for testing the rational choice model on forced migration for two main reasons.

Theoretically, a single country study like that of Nepal provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the rational choice model on forced migration. Given the variable identified as pertinent, Nepal happens to allow reliable and valid measurement across districts. Use of a single case also helps us to uncover variables omitted in large-*n* analyses. As detailed below, Nepal is a remarkably well-suited case in which to analyze the potential role of social networks in displacement decisions – a variable that has largely been omitted in existing large-n analyses due to the nature of the studies. The Community Forest Users Groups in Nepal has been recognized as 'a success story' for not only improving the living standards of hundreds of villagers across the country but also for helping villagers to dismantle age-old social barriers such as untouchability in order to create greater social cohesion. The Nepal case is perfect for testing the significance of social networks in mitigating the cost of peoples' decision to stay home during conflict. Finally, by moving to a "lower level of analysis" (Snyder 2001), the present study rescues the rational choice analysis from the problem of relying on national level aggregate variables to predict individual-level displacement behavior.

On a more practical level, because of the availability of data, made possible by an unusually thorough identification and documentation of the displaced persons, Nepal provides a rare opportunity for conducting a more refined test of the choice-centric approach on forced migration. Most researchers on forced migration acknowledge the fact that acquiring accurate data on forced migration is challenging, if not impossible. By focusing on one country and one conflict and using detailed displacement data from a single source, the present study arguably offers greater internal validity and precision in testing the impact of conflict on the decision to stay or flee. The present study is one of

the few that engages in a subnational analysis of forced migration, systematically analyzing district-level information. While I recognize the importance of both the push and pull factors in explaining forced migration, this chapter focuses mainly on the place of origin, not the destination, due to data availability (See Appendix 1). Although the use of sub-national data adds value to existing large-n studies, only having place of origin data is a limitation of the present study.

The dependent variable is the number of people displaced (DISPLACED) by the civil war from districts across the country between 1996 and 2004[8] and the 75 districts of Nepal are the unit of analysis used in this chapter. The Communist Party of Nepal, Maoists (CPN-M) launched its People's War in 1996 with the major objective of overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a republic state. The conflict ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006. According to INSEC, a total of 50,356 people were displaced between 1996 and 2004 (INSEC 2004). The state was responsible for producing approximately 8% of displacements, the Maoists for 42%, and the terror created by both sides for 50% during the conflict period covered by this study (INSEC 1996-2004). Of the total, 8% were displaced from the Eastern Development region, 10% from the Central, 14% from the Western, 55% from the Midwest, and the remaining 13% from the Far Western region of the country. Topographically, 24% of the displaced were from the mountain region, 49% from the hills and 27% from the plain region of the country. The mean displacement per district was 671 persons, with a maximum displacement of 4,464 recorded in the far western district of Surkhet. No displacement was recorded from five districts: Kathmandu,

[8] Though the war ended in 2006, detailed data on district level displacement for 2005 and 2006 are not available.

Bhaktapur, Parsa, Mustang and Manag (INSEC). Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used and Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of the dependent variable used in this chapter.

Sub-national data collected by INSEC on the total number of people killed and abducted by both the state and the rebels across the districts of Nepal are used to test the association between physical threat and displacement. Over 11,000 people had been killed by the end of 2004 (INSEC). Of this number, the state was responsible for killing on average 97 and the Maoists 53 persons per district.

The total number of people killed (TOTAL KILLED), which is the sum of people killed by both sides within each of the 75 districts, measures total casualties from the outbreak of the Maoist revolution in 1996 through the end of 2004.[9] Both the state (security forces) and the rebels (Maoists) took part in the killings. Of the total casualties by the end of 2004, the state had killed 7,279 people and the Maoists 3,989.

[9] Although the civil war ended in 2006 and figures for casualties are available through 2006 and beyond, the detailed district level data on displacements collected by INSEC is only available through the end of 2004. To coincide with the dependent variable, data on killings and abductions are cumulated totals from 1996 through 2004.

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	*Description*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Displaced	Number of people displaced	671.41	1086.84	0.00	4464.00
Economic Index	Economic Empowerment Index	31.36	12.05	10.00	62.90
Cost of War	Estimated cost of projects destroyed during conflict (in 1000s of NRS)	59514.15	40526.16	0.00	186392.30
Social Network	Number of households in community forest users groups	14810.11	10858.27	0.00	50256.00
Road	Total road length in Kilometer	224.48	198.30	0.00	813.00
Population Density	Population density	256.50	388.15	3.70	2738.80
Total Killed	Total people killed	150.24	143.63	0.00	819.00
Killed by State	Killed by state	97.05	104.81	0.00	658.00
Killed by Maoists	Killed by Maoists	53.19	45.35	0.00	246.00
Abductions	People abducted by the Maoists	623.92	922.65	0.00	6123.00
Elevation	Elevation of districts from the sea level (in meters)	1159.95	882.74	60.00	4000.00
Road Density	Road density (in square kilometers)	19.14	30.94	0.00	205.82
Border	Southern districts bordering India	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Non-Governmental Organization	Number of non-governmental organizations operating in the district	339.05	948.02	12.00	8265.00

A state of emergency was imposed in November 2001 after the first attack by the Maoists on the army. This took place after the breakdown of the first round of peace talks between the rebels and the government. The army was then mobilized to crush the Maoists. Killing escalated thereafter and the number of people killed by the state outpaced those killed by the rebels. The army started killing civilians and harassing them on suspicion of their being Maoist sympathizers. The Maoists in turn increased their atrocities after the mobilization of the army. An estimated 3.63 people were killed per day between 13 February 1996 and 31 December 2005 (INSEC, 2006). The Maoists also started indiscriminately attacking police posts and army installations, killing civilians in the crossfire. The most detailed and documented sub-national data on the number of people killed come from INSEC.

By the end of 2004, the Maoists had abducted almost 47,000 people from across the country. The average number of people abducted per district during the period was 624, ranging from 0 to over 6,000. People from the well-off social strata such as teachers, party workers, family members of the security personnel and other government employees became prime targets of the Maoists. They were "perceived as the enemy of the People's War and symbols of the corrupt state" by the Maoists (NRC 2005: 7). School children were typically abducted and held by the rebels for several days for indoctrination. Such activities forced people from their homes in search of safer locations. The variable *ABDUCTIONS* represents the cumulative number of people abducted by the rebels in each of the 75 districts, as recorded by INSEC. The total number of people killed in each district (*TOTAL KILLED*) and the total number of people abducted (*ABDUCTIONS*) are representative of the intensity of threat to life and physical

integrity of civilians and are used as measures of physical threat in the empirical model. The impacts of threat posed by the state and the rebels, measured in terms of the number of people killed, are also assessed separately.

This chapter uses measures of the level of economic development and the destruction of economic opportunities due to conflict at the sub-national level to assess the significance of the association between displacement and economic conditions. The district level information provides a more detailed account of the economic situation in the place of origin. Such an analysis is expected to uncover a more direct link between economic conditions and displacement to better understand the role that economic conditions play in shaping the choices of people to flee, or to stay and cope with their situation.

Large-*n* cross-national studies have used proxies, such as GNP, GDP and energy consumption per capita, to capture economic opportunity. Alternatively, I use the economic empowerment index (*ECONOMIC INDEX*) developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2004) for the 75 districts of Nepal to test the association between the economic conditions of a district and the number of displaced. This composite index is composed of five variables ―access to productive resources (land and its distribution), access to electricity, access to institutional credit, availability of employment opportunities in the non-agriculture sector, and per capita income. The index is higher for the more economically developed regions of the country. In the empirical model, the higher the economic empowerment index for a district the greater the economic opportunities, hence the less likely that people would leave their homes.

In addition, a measure of the estimated cost of the destruction of public infrastructure (*COST OF WAR*) is used. Public infrastructure includes telephone towers, electricity transformers, school buildings, health posts, government installations, police posts, bridges and other development projects, which provide economic opportunities. Nepal exhibits a typical dual economy. Nevertheless, several development activities were initiated in the rural areas following the restoration of democracy in 1990. Notable examples include rural road projects, micro-hydro projects and other income generating activities (Mahat 2005). The onset of the civil war shattered all such activities and led to a considerable deterioration in the economic health of the country. The Maoists started systematically attacking government owned entities at the district and village level. In the process, local police posts, offices of the VDC secretary, land registration offices, local branches of financial institutions and others came under regular Maoist attacks during the conflict (See Bray et al. 2003 for details on the nature of attacks on government installations).

For example, the state-owned Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) reported that it had incurred a cumulative loss of 478 million Nepali rupees (US $ 6.5 million approx.) by the end of 2003. The rebels had destroyed around 9,000 electricity transmission lines by then (NEA). Another example is the semi-state owned Nepal Bank Limited (NBL) from where the rebels had reportedly looted 245 million Nepali rupees (US$ 3.3 million approximately) by the end of 2003 from its branches located in different parts of the country (NBL). Most importantly, the rebels had destroyed 132 branches of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) from across the country by as early as mid-May 2002 (Bray et al. 2003: 112). The ADB is the main financial institution extending

institutional credit to farmers in the countryside. Many of its branches were either shut down or moved to the district headquarters after they became a target of the rebels. This imposed considerable difficulties on farmers in terms of access to institutionalized credit. The Maoists also destroyed several bridges in the countryside to obstruct movement of the security forces. According to data compiled by the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, a total of 3,615 such installations, including development projects, were destroyed. Nationwide, the cost of destruction and reconstruction has been estimated at Nepali Rupees 4.5 and 7.9 billions respectively (Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction). The cost estimates of destruction at the district level are used as measures of the loss of economic opportunity in districts. More people are expected to have left districts where the cost of war (*COST OF WAR*) was greater.

This chapter uses a measure of membership in a community organization at the district level to test the impact of social networks on forced migration decisions. Districts with a greater membership in community organizations are expected to produce fewer displacements because of their increased ability to cope with the threat of violence. The variable *SOCIAL NETWORK* is a measure of the number of households participating in community forest user groups at the district level. As previously discussed, presence of a dense social network decreases the perceived cost of staying at home thereby enabling some individuals to stay behind while others flee. The greater the number of households participating in these community organizations, the fewer the expected number of displacements, hence a negative relationship is expected.

Table 2.2: Comparison of Physical Infrastructure, Forest Area, and Community Forest User Groups across Topographical Regions of Nepal

Topographical Region	*Number of Districts*	*Average Road Length (km)*	*Average Road Density (sq. km)*	*Average Elevation (meters)*	*Average Land Area (sq. km)*	*Average Forest Area (%)*	*Average Household Membership in CFUG (in 1,000)*
Mountain	16	46	2	2,195	3,239	28	11
Mid-hill (without Kathmandu and Bhaktapur)	37	178	14	1,216	1,642	52	21
Mid-hill (with Kathmandu and Bhaktapur)	39	195	22	1,244	1,571	51	20
Southern plain	20	425	27	168	1,701	40	8

Sources: Department of Roads; Department of Survey; Department of Forests Government of Nepal

Nepal provides an excellent opportunity to test the importance of physical terrain and infrastructure on displacement because of its diverse topography and the unevenly developed transportation network. Topographically, Nepal is divided into three regions — Mountains, Hills and Plains. Districts in the southern plain are better served by road networks compared to the ones in hill and mountain regions. Districts with fewer roads impose a higher cost to flight and are likely to produce fewer displacements. For example, people living in a mountainous district, even when confronted with greater threat, will be less likely to leave (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1). Conversely, districts with more developed road network are likely to produce more displacements by making it easier for people to travel. 10 Because of the diverse topography and variance in

[10] This is particularly true in the case of Nepal, because the lowland, plain region of the country shares an open border with India. The number of displaced persons that fled to India was not counted by INSEC or any other organization. In the analysis, a dummy variable is used to control for the border districts that possibly had greater displacement than what is shown in the official displacement figures documented by INSEC.

infrastructure within the country, the ability of individuals to flee is expected to vary across the 75 district of Nepal.

Figure 2.1:- Topography and road network



Total length of roads measured in kilometers for each of the 75 districts and average district elevation, measured in meters above sea level, are used to test the effect of barriers to displacement. The variable ROAD is a measure of actual length of all the available roads (paved, graveled, and dirt) in a district. This variable is used to test the impact of road facilities on displacement and provide a better test of the "mountain"

factor referred to in earlier studies (Schmeidl 1997; Moore and Shellman 2006). Topographically, as shown in Table 2, districts in the mountain region have fewer or no roads as compared to the ones in the plain region. Greater displacement is expected from districts better served by roads.

In addition to the main variables of interest, population density (*POPULATION DENSITY*) has been used to control for social complexity. Prior research on forced migration uses population to control for pressure on a country's resources with an expected positive association between forced migration and the size a country's population. The present study more appropriately uses population density and posits a negative association between population density and forced migration, assuming that selective abduction and killing is more difficult in high-density areas, as densely populated cities provide protective coverage for people. Hence, higher population density is expected to be negatively associated with displacement. I argue that rather than acting as a push factor, population density can also provide a safety net for individuals by making it more difficult for the rebels as well as the security forces to engage in selective targeting.

2.3 Empirical model and analysis

Negative binomial regression models are used to analyze the association between the various factors discussed above and the count of the number of people displaced from the 75 districts of Nepal. Negative binomial regression is used because the dependent variable is a count variable, and the over-dispersion in the dependent variable makes the

choice of negative binomial more appropriate than a poisson model.[11] The following empirical model captures the theoretical argument and hypotheses discussed above:

$$DISPLACEMENT = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLICT + \beta_2 ECONOMIC\ OPPORTUNITY + \beta_3 COST\ OF\ WAR + \beta_4 SOCIAL\ NETWORK S + \beta_5\ PHYSICAL\ BARRIERS + u$$

Empirical results are presented in Table 2.3. The incident rate ratios (IRRs) for each model are also presented. IRRs report the relative impact of each of the independent variables by showing a percentage change in the expected number of displacements in response to a unit change in the independent variable (Long and Freese, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004). The logs of the total people killed (*TOTAL KILLED*), total people abducted (*ABDUCTIONS*), and sum of total killed and abducted (*TOTAL KILLED + ABDUCTIONS*) are used as the principal variables to assess impact of physical threat on displacement. The results are presented in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively in Table 2.3.[12]

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[11] The Robust standard errors are reported in the models because the variance in some of the variables is not likely to be uniform across the districts. Use of Robust standard error takes control of heteroscedastcity, which is likely under the situation of unequal distribution of variance. Robust standard errors also help correct for misspecification of models, which is always possible in social science research (Long and Freese, 2003; pp.74-75). Using OLS regression instead of negative binomial regression yields similar results. Dropping all zero cases, or using zero-inflated negative binomial instead, makes the results slightly different only in Model 1, with cost of war and population density only reaching the .11 level of significance.

[12] In Model 1, the separate impacts of violence perpetrated by the state as well as the rebels were also assessed using the log of the number of people killed by the state and the rebels. Both coefficients are positive, with all variables significant at the 5% level or better, except state killing which is significant at the 6% level.

Table 2.3: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Displacement

Independent Variables	Model 1	IRR	Model 2	IRR	Model 3	IRR
Economic Index	-0.044* (.015	0.957	-0.062* (.015)	0.940	-0.050* (.016)	0.951
Cost of War	0.298* (.123)	1.348	0.503* (.111)	1.653	0.450* (.121)	1.568
Social Network	-0.038* (.018)	0.963	-0.053* (.014)	0.949	-0.052* (.014)	0.949
Road (Kilometers)	0.002* (.001)	1.002	0.004* (.001)	1.004	0.003* (.001)	1.003
Population Density (Logged)	-0.466* (.208)	0.627	-0.419+ (.250)	0.658	-0.370 (.226)	0.691
Total Killed (Logged)	1.095* (.209)	2.989	-	-	-	-
Abductions (Logged)	-	-	0.389* (0.119)	1.476	-	-
Total Killed +Abductions (Logged)	-	-	-	-	0.645* (.155)	1.906
Constant	1.328 (1.272)	-	2.410 (1.560)	-	0.666 (1.626)	-
N	*75*	-	*75*	-	*75*	-
$_{\text{Wald}}\ X^2$	142.25*	-	106.79*	-	108.70*	-

Notes: IRR =Incidence Rate Ratios (1= no change; <1=decrease; >1 increase); * =p< .05 or better; + =p< .10; Figures in (parenthesis) are robust standard errors.

The empirical results confirm the main hypothesis — that physical threat to life is a major cause of displacement. The measures of threat to physical integrity of life provide strong evidence in support of H_1. The estimates for the coefficients of the log of the total number of people killed, the log of the total number abducted, and the logged sum of total killed and abducted are all positive and significant in explaining displacement. Turning to the relative strengths of the physical threat variables, the empirical results suggest that

killing by itself has the greatest impact on producing displacements. As can be seen from Table 2.3, the IRR for *TOTAL KILLED* suggests that a unit increase in the log of the number of total killed leads to a 199% increase in the number of displacements (Model 1), compared to a 48% increase for abductions (Model 2) and a 91% increase when these measures are combined (Model 3).[13] These results on displacement support earlier studies that found a strong association between forced migration, and violent conflict and human rights violations (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Melander and Öberg 2006).

Two measures of economic opportunity are used to account for sub-national differences in the endowment of economic wealth across the districts of Nepal. The economic empowerment index measures the level of development of a district whereas cost of war measures destruction of economic opportunities. The estimates in Tables 2.3 show that incidence of displacement is likely to be significantly lower in districts with better economic opportunities (H_2). As expected, the coefficient of the *ECONOMIC INDEX* is negative in all three models and statistically significant at the 5% level. This is substantiated by the IRRs for *ECONOMIC INDEX* in Table 2.3. The IRRs of 0.96 (Model 1), 0.94 (Model 2), and 0.95 (Model 3) suggest that a one percent increase in the economic index leads to a decrease in the number of forced migrants by 4% (Model 1), 6% (Model 2) and 5% (Model 3), keeping all other variables constant. This suggests that the more economic opportunities available in the districts, the less likely that people will

[13] IRRs show the change in displacements in response to a unit change in the independent variables, keeping all other variables constant. An IRR of 1.0 means no change; <1 means a decrease; and >1 denotes an increase (Moore and Shellman 2004: 736). The percentages can be calculated by using the following formula: (IRR – 1)*100 = % change.

leave their homes. They are likely to accept greater personal risks if they see a possibility of economic security and employment opportunities.

Conversely, destruction of the existing economic and associated opportunities is likely to produce a greater number of forced migrants. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficient for the variable *COST OF WAR* in all three models in Table 2.3 confirms this hypothesis. The IRRs for *COST OF WAR* suggest that an increase in the destruction of economic infrastructure by NRS 1000 is likely to increase the number of displacements between 35% (Model 1) and 65% (Model 2), holding other variables constant. These results support findings in the earlier literature, which suggest that forced migration tends to be low from areas with higher levels of economic development even in the face of political violence.

Individuals weigh threats to physical integrity against threats to economic security before leaving their homes. Moving to a new and unknown location involves a great deal of risk, especially for people living near the margin of subsistence. For some, it could mark the beginning of a never-ending cycle of economic hardship. Knowing that moving to a new location involves greater uncertainty, individuals tend to stay put and take personal risks so long as economic securities are intact. However, people become less willing to take those risks when such opportunities are destroyed. The empirical results confirm this hypothesis.

The empirical results also provide strong evidence in support of $H_{3,}$ as the coefficients for *SOCIAL NETWORK* are negatively signed and statistically significant in all three models. As hypothesized, communities with larger memberships in social organizations are likely to build a protective shield against physical threat. Exchange of

information through word of mouth and regular meetings among the members provide avenues for individuals to develop a variety of coping strategies to deal with threat, decreasing the cost of staying in their villages.[14] As shown in Table 2.3, the IRRs indicate that an increase of one thousand households participating in community groups in a district decreases the number of displacements by between 4% (Model 1) and 5% (Model 2 and 3), holding other variables constant. The findings are consistent with H_3, which stipulates that social networks are likely to reduce the incidence of displacement. This mechanism for coping, which has not been previously identified in the forced migration literature, may be an important missing factor in explaining variance in displacement. Chapter 4 is devoted to a detailed discussion of the role of various coping mechanisms, including the crucial role of social networks.

The empirical results also provide strong evidence in support of H_4, as the coefficient for the measure of physical infrastructure (*ROAD*) is positively associated with displacement and statistically significant at the 5% level throughout the three models. Higher kilometers of roads provide more opportunity for people to flee. As shown in Table 2.2, there is a marked difference between the plain region and the rest of

[14] Number of NGOs and number of community forest users groups operating in the districts were also used as alternative measures to assess the impact of social networks on displacement. Coefficients for both measures bear the expected negative signs and statistical significance. Number of households in CFUGs is used in the analysis as it represents the actual households participating in these community organizations. Moreover, 33% of the total 25,429 NGOs that existed in Nepal at the end of 2008 were housed in Kathmandu. I also estimated all the three models reported in Table 2.3 without Kathmandu to check for an outlier effect. The expected signs and statistical significance of the coefficients for all the variables remain unchanged, except a marginal decline in *p*-values.

the country in terms of road facilities.[15] Although not remarkable, the IRRs for *ROAD* in all the three models in Table 2.2 suggest that a kilometer increase in available roads per district has a positive, less than 1% impact on the number of displaced.[16]

The above results support the hypothesis that physical characteristics of the countryside condition people's choice to move. By using actual length of available roads at the district level, a much more precise measure of physical infrastructure, the ambiguity reported in earlier studies on the association between ease of flight and forced migration is ameliorated. Opportunity presented by physical infrastructure (or terrain) does appear to matter.

Finally, *POPULATION DENSITY*, my proxy for social complexity and urbanization, also provides evidence in support of the argument that densely populated areas provide protection against infiltration by the rebels or the security forces, making it possible for people to stay in their homes during conflict. The parameters for population

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[15] Three alternative measures were used in the analysis to test the association between cost to flee and displacement — a dummy representing districts that *BORDER* India, *ROAD DENSITY* in a district and average *ELEVATION* of the district from the sea level. The coefficients (not reported here because of problems with multicollinearity) for *border*, *road density* and *elevation* bear the expected signs (positive in the case of *border* and *road density*, and negative for *elevation*) and statistical significance. Districts in the southern plain, which provide better transport facilities, offer greater opportunity for people to flee in times of conflict. Districts in the southern plain also border India, making flight across the border a possibility. Some ambiguity on the precise impact of this measure remains because of the lack of data on refugees. Nonetheless, the empirical results suggest that opportunity to flee increases the likelihood of displacement.

[16] I also tested for the possibility of an interaction between social networks and physical infrastructure measured by road length. Theoretically, infrastructure would likely help the flow of information across social networks, making it more or less likely for people to flee. This interaction term is insignificant in all three models, possibly due to its high correlation with its constituent parts, namely .66 with social networks and .50 with roads, while the original results hold with the one exception of social networks losing its significance in Model 1.

density bear the expected negative sign and are statistically significant in two of the models. The IRRs indicate that the number of displacements decreases by between 31% (Model 3) and 37% (Model 1) for a unit increase in logged population density, holding all other variables constant. These figures are remarkable relative to the IRRs for *SOCIAL NETWORK*. Arguably, densely populated district headquarters and cities are the safest places for people to be during conflict.[17]

2.4 Conclusion

What explains the subnational-level variance in displacement in the face of civil war? The empirical results show that physical threat to life, even when combined with all other causes, remains the strongest factor in explaining internal displacement. The analyses in Table 2.3 also suggest that physical threat is not the only predictor of displacement. Economic wealth and opportunity, as well as the costs associated with the destruction of such opportunities, were also found to be important in predicting forced migration, as is the opportunity for flight. Conversely, displacement appears to be reduced when communities are more densely populated or form greater bonds through social networks. The results suggest that violent conflict is not *the only factor* affecting displacement. Even when life is under extreme threat, multiple factors affect people's choice. Beside conflict, there are considerable economic and social factors, and physical barriers that likely affect people's decisions of whether or not to flee, and thus help to explain the variation in the overall number of people displaced by conflict. These results

[17] If the capital district of Kathmandu is dropped from the analysis, the coefficient for population density is negative but only significant in Model 1.

are largely consistent with large-*n* cross national analyses but add significant value to the choice-centric approach to forced migration through the use of more refined measures and a new test of the impact of social networks.

With more precise data measured at the sub-national level, we can conclude with a greater degree of confidence that violent conflict and human rights violations are the most important factor explaining internal displacement. This implies that the killing of innocent people or the abducting of non-combatants is likely to induce more people to flee their homes. More importantly, the results also confirm that a broader range of factors, as identified in large-*n* studies conducted by scholars such as Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003), Moore and Shellman (2004, 2006, 2007), Schmeidl (1997), Melander and Öberg (2006, 2007) and others, are needed to explain variation in displacement.

The empirical results provide strong support for the argument that people do exercise a choice even in the face of unusual circumstances. Poor economic opportunities contribute to displacing people impacted by conflict. People are more likely to leave home when threatened by economic hardship. If they view the economic benefits of staying as weighing greater than the risk to physical integrity of life, people tend to stay put. Additionally, the choice to flee tends to be limited by the availability of the opportunity to flee. This finding suggests that people living in areas better served by roads and other transportations facilities are more likely to flee when faced with extreme violence. Even if people want to leave, their choice may be conditioned by physical infrastructure or geographical features.

Finally, presence of dense social networks plays a significant role in decreasing the risks for people to stay in their homes. Availability of a dense social network may

serve as a useful mechanism to cope with conflict allowing people to choose to stay in their communities. Other studies have yet to explore the effect of community organizations in facilitating people's ability to cope with the violence of civil war and avoid becoming IDPs or refugees. And, these broader factors may be even more important in predicting the variation in displacement if data on pull factors could also be included at the sub-national level in future research.

In conclusion, the findings suggest that in addition to mitigating violence, there is a strong need to sustain economic development and empower local social organizations in order to mitigate the problem of forced migration. While every civil conflict has unique features, there is no *a priori* reason to think that the relative effects of physical threats, economic opportunity, social networks, social complexity, and infrastructure in Nepal differ from those in other cases. Only further sub-national research in other contexts can confirm how representative the patterns observed in Nepal are of civil war and forced migration more generally. Meanwhile, an analysis of the impact of these factors at the individual level may provide even greater insights into understanding the causes of flight. I turn to this task in the next chapter.

Chapter 3– Conflict-Induced Displacement, Understanding the Causes of Flight


तपाई आफू विस्थापित भएको अनुभवलाई कसरी वर्णन गर्नु हुन्छ ? कृपया भनिदिनुहोस् ।

Maoists had come to my home to threaten me. The police came and killed them.
The police then accused me of hiding Maoists and beat me.
Then the Maoists came, accused me of collaborating with the state, blamed me for the death of their comrades and kidnapped me.
I was able to escape and flee to the district headquarters with my family.

–A respondent from Rolpa

In the previous chapter, I provided a test of the rational choice model of forced migration at the subnational-level. This chapter uses data from the Nepal Forced Migration Survey (NFMS) 2008 to investigate circumstances that affect individuals' decisions of whether or not to flee their homes during civilian conflicts. Building on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1, I test the argument that people make a decision to flee or stay even under highly dangerous circumstances. I test a set of hypotheses similar to those detailed in Chapter 2 regarding the impact of factors such as violence, economic opportunity, physical infrastructure or geographical terrain, and social networks on forced migration, providing an individual-level test of the choice-centered approach to studying forced migration. The empirical results are consistent with the major findings of cross-national studies, but also provide a more refined test of the factors that affect individual-level behavior. Beyond conflict, there are a number of significant economic, physical and social factors that affect individuals' choice to flee.

As discussed in Chapter 1, large-*n* cross-national studies conclude that displacement is not an obvious consequence of conflict and that people make choices even under extremely dangerous situations, such as wars. The empirical results drawn from a subnational-level analysis in Chapter 2 confirm these hypotheses, but still rely on aggregate data. In this chapter, I refine the analysis further by "scaling down" (Snyder 2001) to the individual level in order to capture the variance in individuals' responses to conflict. For every individual who decides to flee during conflict, others choose to risk their lives by staying put; there is variance in how individuals perceive and respond to a threat of violence. However, little is known at the individual level about the choices people make.

To analyze the causes of forced migration and the factors that facilitate choice, this chapter uses individual-level data to explore the impact of a number of economic, physical, social, and demographic factors that may affect displacement. I use the NFMS data and employ multivariate regression analysis to test a number of hypotheses about the association between displacement and conflict, economic opportunity, social networks, physical infrastructure and geographical terrain. The survey focused on uncovering factors associated with displacement during civil war and individuals' decisions about whether or not to flee their homes (see Appendix II for a detailed explanation of the methodology employed in conducting the survey and the data and measures used for this study).

3.1 Theoretical framework and hypotheses

The major objective of this chapter is to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of flight behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1, the rational choice model assumes that forced migration involves some degree of decision making wherein individuals examine the relative costs and benefits of staying in one place or moving to some alternative place. The decision to flee or not to flee is a function of one's expectation of being victimized and economic opportunities at the place of origin as well as the destination. The general environment of conflict and availability of socio-economic opportunities feed into the decision calculus of individuals, causing some to decide to leave and others to stay behind. The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 also shows that social networks such as community level organizations play a crucial role in the flight decision process.

Although the rationalist explanation has made a significant contribution to our understanding of factors explaining forced migration, due to the nature of the data, the cross-national analysis assumes that individuals across a country are uniformly affected by the aggregate level of violence and the cost and benefits of leaving is the same for all. An individual-level analysis provides an opportunity to refine the macro-micro linkage. I argued in Chapter 2 that there is 'variance' in how individuals assess risks emanating from the general environment of conflict and their degree of attachment to home.[1] There is a cost associated with one's decision to stay put, such that the individual will rather flee than stay once the perceived cost (of staying) outweighs attachment to home. The empirical results in Chapter 2 indicate that social networks play an important role and keep some individuals above their 'reservation points' by dampening the perceived costs of staying.

In this chapter, I develop a multivariate explanation of individual forced migration decisions. Qualitative information gathered through field research supplements the quantitative analysis. The single country design offers the advantage of internal consistency lacking in cross national studies, and the individual-level data collected for this study allow for a more nuanced, multivariate explanation of migration decisions during conflict. Below, I discuss the research hypotheses designed to investigate at greater depth the causal factors leading to variation in displacement decisions at the individual level.

[1] Edwards (2009) and Melander and Oberg (2006; 2007) make a similar argument that there is individual level variance. While Edwards (2009) argument is more theoretical in nature, Melander and Oberg's work is limited to the use of cross-national data.

Existing research concludes that violent conflict and gross human rights violations are significant predictors of forced migration. Conflict produces varying degrees of threat. Such threat can take several forms including physical injury, death of a family member, abduction, extortion, excessive demand for food and shelter by warring factions, death of a neighbor and so on. Together, they threaten physical integrity and force people to flee. I identify two means by which violent conflict may threaten physical integrity —*actual violence* and *threat of violence*. Threat occurs when an individual is affected by the general environment of violence and fear created by conflict; for example, when someone witnesses a neighbor being killed or abducted they may feel threatened even though they were not physically impacted by the act. The cumulative effect is increased fear that may force the individual from his or her home. Actual violence, on the other hand, is the actual physical assault that individuals suffer from an act directed at them or a family member, such as being abducted, which may compel individuals to leave. This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Forced migration is positively associated with actual violence or a threat thereof.*

Existing literature on forced migration emphasizes the importance of economic opportunities at the place of origin for explaining flight. Arguably, threats to economic security may be as compelling as direct physical threats to life insofar as survival in economically precarious societies can be compromised by economic breakdowns. In fact, people may be willing to tolerate some measure of physical threat in contexts where favorable economic opportunities are present. For some, personal property such as land may be extremely valuable, making it difficult for them to leave. Assuming a constant

level of physical threat, people are more likely to flee when economic opportunities also start depleting. This implies that people are more likely to flee from areas where economic opportunities are poorer and development infrastructures have been harder hit. They may also be more likely to leave when personal property such as land and crops are forcefully seized. Conversely, availability of economic opportunities or personal property is likely to induce people to take a risk and stay behind. This leads to my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a*: Incidence of displacement is negatively associated with better economic conditions.*

Hypothesis 2b*: Incidence of displacement is positively associated with destruction of economic conditions.*

As an alternative to fleeing, individuals can choose to cope with the threat caused by civil war by seeking a strategy of protection through social networks. Some research suggests that networking through community organizations provides a mechanism through which individuals can cope with the conflict and stay behind (Varshney 2003; Harpviken 2009; Wood 2008). Building on this argument and focusing on the decision of whether or not to flee, I argue that individuals can choose to cope with the threat caused by civil war by seeking a strategy of protection through social networks.

Many community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) become active in protecting civilians during conflicts. Such organizations may provide a foundation for developing a strong interpersonal and political network among individuals within communities (Loveman 1998, p. 478). They work as a protective shield against infiltration by the rebels as well as the security personnel into the community and can

provide a sense of security to a village community decreasing the perceived cost of staying. Over time, individuals within a community form collective identities and start taking risks in order to save their community (Calhoun 1991:69). At the same time, local NGOs may be linked to regional, national and international networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Therefore, social networks are likely to become an integral mechanism for coping as the cost of attacking or abducting individuals within such communities becomes significantly higher for the warring parties. For example, murder or abduction of a member of the community is likely to invoke widespread opposition, implicating the rebels or the state army for violations of human rights. The logic is that any strong social or community organization creates a web that link villagers together and works as an effective channel of communication at the expense of rebel infiltration. Such webs can facilitate the transmission of information about an impending threat, leading to collective action and possibly negotiation with warring parties even in extreme conflict situations like Afghanistan (Harpviken 2009).

In the case of Nepal, many pre-existing community-level organizations became instrumental in creating social cohesion among villagers during the conflict. Existing traditional indigenous community-level organizations that had been overshadowed or suppressed by the ongoing conflict started uniting villagers for the cause of protecting human rights due to excesses committed by the state and rebel armies. In the process, many community-level organizations were brought together for the cause of protecting the rights of members.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Community Forest User Groups, which are perhaps the most important social networks operating throughout the country, are grassroots level

members of the Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN). They operate at the Village Development Committee (VDC) level, which is the smallest administrative unit in Nepal. In addition to the CFUGs, there are many other pre-existing organizations working at the community level. These organizations provide opportunity for villagers to come together, share information and develop mechanisms for coping and staying in their homes. These community level organizations, which I referred to as social networks, are imbedded within the structure of Nepali society. These pre-existing social institutions are an integral part of village life that binds communities in Nepal. In the context of a civil conflict, they may play an important role in reducing the perceived costs of staying home (thus raising the reservation point) for some individuals. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3*: Incidence of displacement is negatively associated with accessibility of social networks to an individual.*

Cross national studies on forced migration have also pointed out that besides threat to physical integrity of life and economic opportunities, other factors such as geography and access to road facilities are also likely to condition displacement. Geographical features like "[r]ugged mountains" may work as "obstacles" to people's flight (Schmeidl 1997: 289-90). Mountainous terrain may raise the transaction costs for people on the move by raising transportation costs (Moore and Shellman 2006). Lack of access to roads might prevent people from fleeing even when they want to or have the capacity to do so. Conversely, an easy way to escape may induce more people to flee during conflict. Thus, "physical obstacles can be critical" when life is at risk (Schmeidl 1997: 296). The present study provides a more detailed and nuanced test of the impact of

physical terrain and transportation costs and shows how they impact individuals' decisions to flee in the face of violence. Nepal provides an excellent opportunity to test the importance of physical terrain and infrastructure because of its diverse topography and the unevenly developed transportation network. Topographically, Nepal is divided into three regions — Mountains, Hills and Plains. Districts in the southern plain are better served by road networks compared to the ones in mountain and hill regions, thereby providing more opportunity for individuals to escape. Because of the diverse topography even within the districts, the ability of individuals to flee is expected to vary. This leads to a fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4*: Availability of road facility is positively associated with the decision of individuals to leave.*

An armed conflict involves fighting between groups that are often associated with opposing political opinions and therefore politics arguably is an important element of present day civil wars (Misra 2008). However, existing literature on forced migration has overlooked the importance of this variable. This study assesses the impact of conflict on targeted political parties in terms of displacement. Individuals who support the rebel party are less likely to be targeted by them, whereas those opposing the movement led by the rebels are likely to be systematically prosecuted or forced from their villages.

The party system in Nepal provides an excellent example. The first democratic government of the 1950s, which lasted for only one decade, was led by the Nepali Congress (NC) party. When democracy was reinstated in 1990, the NC reemerged as the largest party forming the new government. However, in both instances, the party failed to remain in office for a full term mainly because of fighting within the party for leadership,

which caused frustration in the general public. On the other hand, the NC was strongly in favor of a constitutional monarchy in Nepal until the reign of Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, the last king of Nepal, who was forced from his palace in May 2008. When the Maoists launched their people's war in February 1996 with the major objective of abolishing the monarchy, the NC was in power. Acting on the information of preparation for an armed conflict by the Maoists, the then government mobilized police forces in November 1995 under the name of 'Operation Romeo' to suppress the Maoists. The operation resulted in gross human rights violations, including, rape, arrest, disappearances, and illegal detention of hundreds of left-leaning but mostly innocent villagers in Rolpa district (Karki and Seddon: 2003). This incident encouraged many villagers to join the Maoists, and the members of the NC came to be included in the list of the "enemies of the people's war." The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) CPN (M) is a splinter faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), formed in 1949. The CPN party was divided in its opinion over the issue of constitutional monarchy following the restoration of democracy in 1990. Those who stood in favor of constitutional monarchy came together to form the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) CPN (UML) and those who were in favor of abolishing the monarchy joined together to launch the 'people's war' in 1996. Consequently, CPN (UML) was included on the list of the "enemies" and the party supporters were systematically targeted during the conflict. The *Rastriya Prajatantra Party* (RPP), which was formed after the reinstatement of democracy in 1990 by those who used to be in the king's court during the Panchayat regime, were also openly targeted by the Maoists and often forced to flee their homes.

Therefore, members of the CPN (M) are less likely to be displaced whereas supporters of the Nepali Congress, RPP and UML are more likely to flee.

Hypothesis 5*: Displacement is negatively associated with membership in the rebel party, and conversely, positively associated with membership in the targeted political party.*

In addition to party system, ethnicity and caste system may also be associated with forced migration. Nepal has a long history of caste and class-based marginalization. From its inception as a state in 1768 until 1950, the country was ruled by despotic kings and feudalist autocrats known as the *Shahs* and *Ranas*, respectively. In the 1950s, the country underwent a brief, failed experiment with democracy, followed by another thirty years of dictatorship. One of the oft-cited causes of the civil war in Nepal was the accumulation of resentment that stemmed from its feudal past, the legacy of which was uneven development and a refusal by ruling elites to address socio-economic problems faced by the minority ethnic communities (see Murshed and Gates 2005). Nepal, even today, is a complex society with over a hundred different castes or ethnic groups that speak more than 90 different languages. However, the dynasties that ruled Nepal—the Shahs (1768-1854) and Ranas (1854-1950) attempted to undermine this diversity in their effort to unify and assert central control over the state. When Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered Kathmandu Valley in 1768 and unified the country, his government institutionalized two divisive social systems: 1) feudal bureaucracy and 2) the Hindu caste system. The feudal bureaucracy was a patrimonial system under which the state came to be organized as an "extension of the ruler's household" (Whelpton 2005, 49). For example, the government appointed a chief minister (usually someone from a royal family) who oversaw all state employees (usually members of the Brahmin, Thakuri, and

Chetri castes). These state employees were largely paid in land (Whelpton 2005). This model led to a concentration of political power as well as land and wealth in the hands of a few high caste groups, who had close ties to the royal family. The Maoist insurgency provided an opportunity for the historically marginalized people to express their dissatisfaction against the state. The Maoists promised abolition of the Hindu caste system and declaration of Nepal as a secular state. This attracted members of the lower caste Dalits (untouchables) and ethnic minorities to join the Maoists. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6*: Displacement is negatively associated with membership in the minority ethnic group, and positively associated with being a member of higher caste.*

In addition to the above factors, this study also provides an assessment of a possible impact of demographics, such as age, education, gender and number of children on forced migration. Demographic features are likely to play important roles in the decision of an individual to flee. For example, elderly people are less likely to be targeted by the rebels and they are more likely to stay back as opposed to middle-age individuals or educated youths who would flee to cities and towns in search of jobs and a safer environment. Similarly, males are more likely to flee in order to escape forced recruitment into the rebel army as compared to women who may stay put to look after their children or the elderly. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 7*: Displacement is positively associated with literacy and being male but negatively associated with old age and number of children.*

3.2 Research design, data and measures

The question of why some people, when faced with extreme violence, cope and stay behind while others flee, can only be answered through an individual-level analysis. This chapter focuses on one country and one conflict, using primary data collected through a public opinion survey and explains individual-level behavior, arguably offering greater internal validity and precision in testing the impact of conflict on individuals' decision to stay or flee.

As described in Appendix II, over 1800 randomly selected people were surveyed, including displaced and non-displaced individuals. Nepal is divided into 75 districts. The districts are further divided into 3,914 Village Development Committees (VDCs), each with 9 wards for a total of 35,226 wards. I used a weighted multi-stage cluster sampling technique to go from region, to VDC, to ward level, and then randomly drew two samples, one of individual households at the ward level and another of displaced persons originating from those wards. The displaced were randomly sampled from a list generated by the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) according to individuals' ward of origin. Use of wards as the sampling unit has the advantage of offering a paired design of individuals who decided to stay and those who decided to leave within the same contextual environment. Besides being a mountainous country, Nepal is very poorly served by road networks. It can take several hours simply to walk between wards. Cluster sampling down to the ward level and then randomly sampling within wards also made the project feasible given time and financial constraints. (See Table 3.1 for the descriptive statistics).

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N*	Mean	Stand Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
DISPLACED	1670	0.73	0.44	0	1
ACTUAL VIOLENCE	1670	0.89	0.32	0	1
THREAT OF VIOLENCE	1670	2.19	1.27	0	6
INDUSTRY PRESENT	1670	0.06	0.23	0	1
INCOME	1670	2.22	1.45	0	6
LAND (Logged)	1670	7.54	2.89	0	12.91
CROP/ANIMAL-LOSS	1670	0.69	0.85	0	2
LAND-LOSS	1670	0.29	0.45	0	1
HOME-DESTROYED	1670	0.17	0.38	0	1
INDUSTRY DESTROYED	1670	0.06	0.25	0	1
SOCIAL NETWORK	1670	0.69	0.46	0	1
MOTORABLE ROAD	1670	0.32	0.47	0	1
POLICE POST DESTROYED	1670	0.61	0.49	0	1
CPN(M)	1670	0.12	0.33	0	1
UPPER CASTE	1557	0.51	.50	0	1
DALITS	1557	0.11	.32	0	1
OTHER CASTE	1557	0.02	.13	0	1
TOTAL CHILDREN	1557	2.09	2.17	0	22
EDUCATION	1557	1.25	1.40	0	6
MALE	1557	0.59	0.49	0	1
AGE	1557	41.29	13.14	18	95
AGE SQUARE	1557	1877.29	1197.58	324	9025

* =*N* is less than 1804 due to random missing data.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether or not individuals were displaced (*DISPLACED*) during the conflict in Nepal. Displacement is coded as 1,

otherwise 0. To explain displacement, I assessed respondent's answers to an array of questions including the types of human rights abuses villagers experienced during the conflict, property and family members lost, party affiliation, ethnicity and caste, presence or absence of employment opportunities, community organizations, and mode of transportation facilities in their villages and so on. Villagers were also asked to rank the level of violence in their villages. Below, I discuss operationalization of the various independent variables used to test hypotheses proposed above.

Two variables, created from the information gathered, are employed to assess the impact of violence on individuals' decisions. Actual violence (*ACTUAL VIOLENCE*) is comprised of information based on the actual physical assault experienced by individuals. This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the respondent experienced any of the following: physical assault, abduction, physical and mental torture, sexual violence, punishment for not quitting their position with the national army, and forced recruitment into the rebel or national army, 0 otherwise.

The threat of violence (*THREAT OF VIOLENCE*) is expressed in terms of a composite index (See Appendix II for further details). This index, which measures an individual's perception of the threat of violence, is computed from six threat related factors: physical threat, political coercion, forced recruitment into either the rebel or state army, murder of a family member, physical and mental torture, and sexual harassment. Respondents were asked on a scale of 1 to 4 to indicate their perception of the severity of each type of threat in terms of the impact that it had on their lives during the conflict even though they themselves may not have experienced the act. Threat of violence is different from actual violence in that the former represents the prevailing environment of threat

created by conflict in a given community and the degree of its impact as perceived by individuals in the community, whereas the latter expresses a count of actual acts of human rights abuses realized by individuals in that community. The mean level of actual violence and threat of violence experienced by respondents during the conflict is .86 and 2.12 respectively, and the two measures are modestly correlated at .24. The extent to which conflict affects an individual's decision to flee or not may depend on the significance of both perception and realization of the impact emanating from war. For my purpose, these measures are expected to be positively associated with displacement.

The present study moves to the micro-level to assess the significance of individuals' economic conditions and economic opportunities at the place of origin. The individual level information provides a more detailed account of the personal economic situation of the individuals as well as their place of origin. Such an analysis is expected to uncover a more direct link between wealth and forced migration to better understand the role that economic conditions play in shaping the choices of people to flee, or to stay and cope with their situation. Use of individual-level data to assess the impact of wealth on displacement is also expected to ameliorate a major problem associated with cross-national studies on forced migration. The measures of economic wealth employed in cross-national analyses are problematic. A country's GDP or, GNP per capita or, per capita energy consumption are very crude proxies for the economic conditions an individual faces. Such aggregate measures tell us little about the economic status of an individual or household. To capture the decision to stay or leave made at the individual level, the present study uses two sets of measures of the economic conditions facing an individual. The first set of variables measure economic opportunities and individual

economic conditions and the second set of variables measure destruction or loss of those conditions.

The variable *INDUSTRY-PRESENT* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not at least one industry is present in the respondent's village and as a retaining factor is expected to have a negative coefficient. The variable *LAND* (logged) measures the amount of land owned by the individual family, expressed in terms of square meters. The variable has been logged to control for the highly skewed pattern of land ownership in Nepal. Land is a critical asset for an individual family in villages across Nepal and the size of holdings is likely to play a significant role influencing individuals' decisions to stay or leave. The variable *INCOME* is a measure of annual household income expressed in terms of Nepali rupees. The expected relationship between economic advantage (as measured by land and income) and displacement is ambiguous. On the one hand, families owning greater amounts of land or earning regular incomes were more likely to be targeted by the Maoists and displaced from villages. In addition landed property and monetary income may measure an individual's capacity to flee as these resources can be used to pay for transportation costs during flight or to purchase property in alternative locations, such as cities. On the other hand, individuals with greater amounts of land and higher incomes are more likely to use their resources to make a 'donation' to the rebels that allowed them to stay in their villages. Though the direction of predictions is uncertain because of the potentially contradictory effects, wealth is likely to play a role in impacting individuals' decisions. Therefore, measures of land ownership and income are included as controls in the present study.

A root cause of the recent civil conflict in Nepal lies in the nature of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few privileged classes. Because of a history of over 230 years of feudal oligarchy, coupled with direct rule by a royal dynasty, wealth (mainly land) came to be concentrated in the hands of the elites (Whelpton 2005). This landed class was labeled as 'feudal' and was targeted by the Maoists during the initial phase of the conflict. People were asked to either surrender their land or leave. The Maoists also systematically targeted villagers who were relatively better off in terms of the amount of crops produced, animals farmed and annual income earned. In the process, family-owned lands were seized and given to the landless, forcing the families to flee. Others were asked to contribute crops in the form of a seasonal tax. Many were also asked to contribute animals to feed the Maoist army. Jobholders and business owners were forced to contribute part of their income as a 'donation'. Those who defied the Maoists' orders sometimes had their crops, animals, or land seized, their homes destroyed, and were often forced from their villages. Those who complied were more likely to be allowed to stay. According to the estimates of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, around 500 homes belonging to individual families were destroyed during the conflict, and many more damaged (Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction). Nepal is an agrarian country where over 70 percent of the population lives on subsistence farming. As such, land, crops and animals are the most critical assets of a villager. If any or all of these assets are either seized or destroyed, a family is likely to suffer a crippling economic loss, and consequently is likely to be forced from their home.

Crop and animal loss (*CROP/ANIMAL-LOSS*) is a measure of whether an individual's crops, animals or both were forcefully seized by either the Maoists or the

national army during the conflict. Twenty seven percent of respondents reported that their animals were forcefully taken, 42 % were forced to give crops, and 26% lost both. No loss is coded 0. A positive loss of crops or animals is coded 1, and a loss of both is coded 2. The variable *LAND-LOSS* is a dummy, measuring whether an individual's land was seized during the conflict 1, or not 0. Many villagers lost their homes during the conflict. Their homes were either intentionally destroyed by the rebels or in the cross-fire between the rebels and the state security forces. The variable *HOME-DESTROYED* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not a subject's home was destroyed during the conflict. Individuals whose crops, animals, or land were seized, or whose homes were destroyed are more likely to flee. The variable *INDUSTRY-DESTROYED* is a dummy variable that measures whether any such industries were destroyed (1) during the civil war, or not (0) and is expected to be positively associated with displacement.

To assess the impact of social networks on displacement, the present study uses information about the respondents' knowledge of the presence or/and absence of three community level organizations operating at the village level. The variable *SOCIAL NETWORKS* is coded 1 if the respondent expressed knowledge of the presence of any of the following three organizations: community forest users groups, mothers group and small farmers' development program. Otherwise the variable is coded as zero. Presence of a dense social network is likely to decrease the perceived cost of staying at home thereby enabling some individuals to stay behind while others leave. Respondents' knowledge about the existence of any of the three community level organizations in their village is used as a proxy measure for the degree of micro-level social networking and to test the impact of community organizations on displacement. Presence of any of the

organizations in a respondent's village is expected to reduce the likelihood of displacement; hence a negative relationship is expected.

In addition, the presence or absence of police posts in the village is also assessed. During the conflict, police posts were the only institutions representing the state in the villages. This made them a target of the Maoists but also an important provider of security for villagers. Many police posts in the villages were attacked by the Maoists during the conflict, forcing them to be relocated to the district headquarters. The variable *POLICE POST DESTROYED* is a dichotomous measure of whether (1) or not (0) a police station was destroyed in the respondent's village during the conflict.

In the survey, both displaced and non-displaced people were asked about the presence or absence of a motorable road in their villages. The information provided by the individuals is used to test how a lack of physical infrastructure might impact their decision to flee. The variable *MOTORABLE ROAD* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent's village is linked by a motorable road. Presence of a road is scored 1, otherwise 0, and is expected to have a positive relationship with displacement. In the empirical analysis, the impact of elevation is also tested.

During the survey, respondents were asked to identify their political party affiliation and ethnicity.[2] This information is used to test the impact of party affiliation and ethnicity on displacement. The variable *CPN (M)* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent identified her or himself as a member of the CPN (M).

[2] Because the survey was conducted after the end of the conflict, most respondents were readily forthcoming in revealing their party affiliation; only 5% of the sample declined to identify with a specific party.

Many respondents to the survey indicated that they "joined the Maoist party" to stay back. As such, I expect the variable *CPN (M)* to be negatively signed. On the other hand, members of the Nepali Congress, RPP, and UML are expected to have fled in order to escape being systematically attacked by the rebels. The variable *UPPER CASTE* is dichotomous measure of whether (1) or not (0) the respondent belonged to the higher castes Brahmin, Chhetry or Newar. The variable *DALITS* is coded 1 if the respondent belonged to the Dalit caste, otherwise 0. The variable *OTHER CASTE* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent belonged to other caste. Minorities groups belonging to the following ethnic groups are used a based category: Janjati, Magar, Tamang, Gurung, Rai, Limbu, Tharu.

The variable *TOTAL CHILDREN* measures one's children of all ages, young and adult. People with more children could be less likely to leave because it may be more difficult to travel with children because of a fear of future uncertainties for their children's education and well-being. People with more children are also less likely to move because they are more strongly tied to their society due to their extended family size. Hence, a negative sign is expected. *EDUCATION* is a measure of the level of education attained and is expected to be positively signed. *MALE* is a dummy variable — female (0) male (1), which is expected to be positively signed. The variable *AGE* measures actual age of a respondent. The variable *AGE-SQUARE* is included in the model to capture a possible curvilinear effect of age on individuals' decision to leave or stay.[3]

[3] I also included two dummy variables in the models –one for young adults between the age of 18 and 40 and one for middle-aged individuals between 41 and 65 –to control for the possibility that there is a non-linear relationship between age and forced migration. It is possible that those who are below 40 lacked the

3.3 Empirical results and discussion

I derive the following empirical model from the above discussion and hypotheses:

$$DISPLACEMENT = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PHYSICAL\ THREAT + \beta_2 ECONOMIC\ CONDITIONS + \beta_3 SOCIALNETWORKS + \beta_4 PHYSICAL\ FEATURES + \beta_5 PARTY\ AFFILIATION\ AND\ EHNICITY + \beta_6 DEMOGRAPHY + u.$$

Binary regression models are used to analyze the impact of the various factors discussed above on forced migration in Nepal. I use a binary model because the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether or not individuals fled from their villages during the conflict. Table 3.2 reports the results from the empirical analysis. The marginal effects for a one unit change from the mean of each of the independent variables holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode assess the relative strengths of the independent variables in explaining displacement and are included in Table 3. 2. Three models are presented in the table: Model 1 excludes demographic variables and the measures of ethnicity, Model 2 includes them. Model 3 excludes the measures of the loss of crops, animals and land as they are correlated with the measure of social networks.

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autonomy and financial resources to flee while those in the middle were more able, and the aged once again less able to move. While positive, the coefficients are not significant for the two dummies.

Table 3. 2:- Probit Analysis of Internal Displacement

Variables	Model 1	Marginal Effects	Model 2	Marginal Effects	Model 3	Marginal Effects
ACTUAL VIOLENCE	1.16(.16)**	.39**	1.22(.16)**	.41**	1.10(.19)**	.39**
THREAT OF VIOLENCE	.43(.06)**	.11**	.42(.06**)	.10**	.45(.06**)	.13**
INDUSTRY PRESENT	-.64(.24)**	-.20**	-.72(.28)**	-.23**	-.61(.25)**	-.21**
INCOME	-.05(.03)	-.01	-.07(.04)*	-.02*	-.04(.04)	-.01
LAND (Logged)	.03(.01)**	.01**	.04(.02)**	.01**	.04(.02)**	.01**
CROP/ANIMAL-LOSS	.27(.08)**	.07**	.32(.09)**	.08**	-	-
LAND-LOSS	1.07(.17)**	.21**	1.14(.18)**	.22**	-	-
HOME-DESTROYED	.46(.23)*	.10**	.47(.26)*	.10**	.88(.22)**	.20**
INDUSTRY DESTROYED	.70(.28)**	.12**	.61(.32)*	.11**	.69(.32)**	.15**
SOCIAL NETWORK	-.12(.12)	-.03	-.12(.12)	-.03	-.26(.10)**	-.07**
MOTORABLE ROAD	.26(.10)**	.06**	.23(.11)**	.05**	.07(.10)	.02
POLICE POST DESTROYED	.20(.09)**	.05**	.15(.09)*	.04*	.09(.08)	.03
CPN(M)	-.58(.15)**	-.17**	-.51(.17)**	-.15**	-.64(.17)**	-.21**
UPPER CASTE	-	-	.24(.11)**	-.06**	.26(.10)**	.08**
DALITS	-	-	.70(.15)**	.13*	.46(.14)**	.11*
OTHER CASTE	-	-	.53(.31)*	.10**	.32(.32)	.08
TOTAL CHILDREN	-	-	-.05(.02)**	-.01**	-.04(.02)*	-.01*
EDUCATION	-	-	.08(.04)**	.02**	.03(.04)	.01
MALE	-	-	.16(.08)**	.04*	.22(.07)**	.06**
AGE	-	-	0.01(.02)	.003	0.02(.02)	.005
AGE SQUARED	-	-	-0.0001 (.0002)	-.00003	-0.0002 (.0002)	-.0001
CONSTANT	-1.74 (.21)**	-	-2.31 (.52)**	-	-1.90 (.46)**	-
N	1670	-	1557	-	1568	-
Wald χ^2	271.21**	-	283.69**	-	263.89**	-
% positive	72.51	-	73.44	-	73.44	-
% correctly predicted	83.59	-	83.62	-	80.87	-

Notes: *N* is less than 1804 due to random missing data; Figures in (parenthesis) are robust standard errors clustering at the ward level. ** =Significant at the .05 level or better; * = Significant at the .10 level.

The empirical results confirm the main hypothesis — that physical threat to life is an important cause of displacement. The measures of threat to physical integrity of life provide strong evidence in support of H_1. The estimates for the coefficients of actual physical assault (*ACTUAL VIOLENCE*) and threat created by a violent environment in the villages (*THREAT OF VIOLENCE*) are both positive and significant in explaining displacement. As can be seen from Table 3.2, the marginal effect for *THREAT OF VIOLENCE* suggests that an environment of terror created by conflict results in around 10 to 13% increase in the likelihood that an individual will flee, compared to 39% to 41% for actual violence, keeping other variables at their mean, or mode for dichotomous variables. The empirical results in Table 3.2 support earlier studies that found a strong association between forced migration and violent conflict (Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; 2006; Melender and Oberg 2006). The present findings add value to this literature by identifying instances or a count of individual level human rights violations, as well as *threat of violence* as an additional mechanism through which conflict produces forced migration. These results are also consistent with the findings in Chapter 2.

The measures of economic opportunity provide strong evidence in support of the argument that economic factors are very important in predicting displacement. The estimates in Table 3.2 show that displacement is significantly less likely in the presence of employment opportunities created by the presence of industry (*H2*). As expected, the coefficient for the variable *INDUSTRY* is negative in all Models and significant at the 5% level. This is substantiated by the marginal effect for *INDUSTRY*, which shows that presence of an industry reduces the likelihood of displacement by between 21 and 23

percent, keeping all other variables constant at their mean or mode. This suggests that the more economic opportunities available in the villages, the less likely that people will leave their homes. They are likely to accept greater personal risks if they see a possibility of economic security and employment opportunities. Employment opportunities may also provide a source of income, which might be used by individuals to pay a forced donation as a means of coping. The results for the measure of wealth provide further evidence in support of this possibility. The negatively signed and statistically significant coefficients for the income variable (*INCOME*) in Model 2 and Model 2 substantiate this argument. The marginal effects for INCOME suggest that for every category increase in annual income, the likelihood of displacement decreases by 1 to 2%, other things remaining the same. These results support the argument that individuals with higher incomes are likely to stay put and cope with the conflict, possibly by supporting the rebels monetarily. The coefficients for the variable *LAND* (logged) are positive and statistically significant in predicting displacement in all the Models presented in Table 3.2. The results for land owned may be interpreted to mean that individuals who owned a greater amount of land were aware of the fact they could be targeted and fled in order to avoid being attacked or were forced to surrender their property and flee. Perhaps fear of being targeted outweighs consideration of remaining in the village to prevent usurpation of their land.

On the other hand, the results indicate that destruction of the existing economic opportunities and personal property is likely to force people from their villages. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficients for the variables *CROP/ANIMAL LOSS, LAND LOSS, HOME DESTROYED,* and *INDUSTRY DESTROYED* confirm this hypothesis. The marginal effects for the economic variables in

Table 3.2 suggest that destruction of an industry in a village increases the likelihood of displacement by 11 to 15%, while land seizure increases the probability of displacement by 21 to 22 percent, holding all other variables constant. Likewise, the destruction or damage of a respondent's home increases the probability of displacement by 10 and 20 percent, keeping other variables at their mean or mode. The results for the variable *LAND-LOSS* demonstrate the fact that in a country like Nepal where over 70% of the population lives on subsistence farming, land plays a critical role in retaining people in their villages. So do the results for crop and animal seizure. The marginal effects for the variable *CROP/ANIMAL LOSS* indicate that the probability of the individual family being displaced increases by 7 to 8 percent, holding other variables constant, in the event of a loss of these properties. Comparing the results for threat of violence against loss of economic opportunities and personal property, we can see that economic conditions are a significant factor in forcing people from their villages.

These results support findings in the large-*n* cross-national studies, which suggest that forced migration tends to be low from areas with greater economic opportunities even in the face of political violence. Individuals weigh threat to physical integrity against threat to economic security before leaving their homes. Moving to a new and unknown location involves a great deal of risk, especially for people living near the margin of subsistence. For some, it could mark the beginning of a never-ending cycle of economic hardship. Knowing that moving to a new location involves great uncertainty, individuals tend to stay put and take personal risks so long as economic opportunities remain intact. However, people become less willing to take those risks when opportunities are destroyed. The empirical results confirm this hypothesis.

The empirical results also provide evidence in support of H_3, which stipulates that presence of a dense social network is likely to enable families to stay behind during conflict. As can be seen from Table 3.2, the coefficients for *SOCIAL NETWORKS* are negatively signed in all three Models and they are statistically significant in Model 3. I hypothesized that presence of community organizations in the village is likely to build a protective shield against threat. Exchange of information through word of mouth and regular meetings among the members provides avenues for individuals to develop a variety of coping strategies. Such mechanisms provide a way for dealing with threat and help people stay in their homes. The empirical results support the argument.

There is a negative association between the presence of a community organization and seizure of private property and destruction in the villages, implying that confiscation and destruction is more likely to occur in the absence of a social network. Model 3 in Table 3.2 is tested excluding these measures of personal property loss because the correlation with seizure and destruction of personal property makes presence of social networks insignificant in the multivariate models. As can be seen, the coefficient for social networks is statistically significant at the 5% level in Model 3, suggesting that the presence of social networks in the villages strongly impact individuals' decisions to stay in their villages. Marginal effects for the variable *SOCIAL NETWORKS* indicates that presence of community level organizations in a village reduces the likelihood of displacement by between 3 and 7%, keeping all the other variables at their mean or mode.

The empirical results also provide strong evidence in support of *H4,* as the coefficient for the measure of physical infrastructure (*MOTORABLE ROAD*) is positively associated with displacement and statistically significant at the 5% level in all but Model

3. Presence of a motorable road in the village provides opportunity for individuals to flee. The marginal effects for the variable *MOTORABLE ROAD* suggest that availability of a motorable road increases the probability of displacement by 2 to 6%, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. The results support the hypothesis that physical characteristics of the countryside condition people's choice to flee. By using a measure of the presence or absence of roads at the village level, a much more precise measure of physical infrastructure, the ambiguity reported in earlier studies on the association between ease of flight and forced migration is ameliorated. Opportunity presented by physical infrastructure does appear to matter.

Because of the multicollinearity between existence of a motorable road and elevation, the impact of the elevation of the countryside was assessed by replacing motorable roads with a variable that measures whether the respondent comes from a region in the mountains (3), hills (2), or plains (1). The results (not reported) suggest that people residing in the mountainous region of the country are between % (Model 1, 2) and 4% (Model 3) less likely to flee as compared to those living in southern plain region, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode.

Destruction of a police post in an individual's village seems to impact displacement. As shown in Table 3.2, the coefficient for *POLICE POST DESTROYED* is positively signed and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2 indicating that the absence of security positively impacts flight. Destruction of police post increases the probability that an individual will leave by between 3 to 5%, keeping all other variables at their mean or mode.

The empirical results provide strong evidence in support of *H5*, as the coefficient for *CPN (M)* is negatively signed and statistically significant in all three models. As posited, individuals may deliberately change partisanship and support the rebel movement instead of fleeing their homes. The empirical results show that this is an effective coping mechanism that individual might adopt during conflict. As can be seen in Table 3.2, Maoists supporters were 15 to 21% less likely to be forced from their homes as compared to individuals affiliated with the other political parties.[4]

As can be seen from Table 3.2, using ethnic minorities as the control group the coefficients for the variable *UPPER CASTE* are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in both Model 1 and Model 2. These results suggest that members of the upper caste including Brahmins, Chettries and Newars were more likely to have fled than minority groups, potentially to escape being targeted by the rebel party. Contrary to expectation, the results for *DALITS* show that members of the untouchable ethnic group were also significantly more likely than minorities to flee during the conflict. These findings could be interpreted to mean that Dalits fled from their villages knowing that they were being targeted by the Maoists for recruitment or by the state security forces as they could be easily identified and accused of being a Maoist sympathizer. I also separate the UPPER CASTE variable into its subgroups of Brahmin, Chettry and Newar. Here only Dalits are statistically significantly more likely to flee than the minorities.

[4] I also test for the impact of membership in Nepali Congress (NC), RPP, and UML on displacement separately, leaving out Maoists as the base of comparison. The results (not reported for brevity) support *H5*. All three coefficients are positively signed, while the coefficients for NC and RPP are statistically significant at 5% level throughout the three Models, implying that individuals affiliated with the NC or RPP in particular were more likely to flee than the members of the Maoists party.

The empirical results are mixed regarding the impact of demographic features on forced migration. Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 3.2 include results for the variables that measure demography. While families with a greater number of children are found significantly less likely to flee, individuals with a higher level of education are found significantly more likely to flee than those with lower levels (Model 2). Males are also found to be significantly more likely to leave as compared to females. Meanwhile, the results do not support the proposition that the association between age and displacement is curvilinear. Although positively signed, the coefficients for the variable *AGE* are not statistically significant. Likewise, although negatively signed, the coefficients for the variable *AGE SQUARE* do not bear statistical significance.

Some of the results are illustrated graphically in Figure 3.1 through Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.1: Presence of road and probability of being displaced



Figure 3.2: Elevation and probability of being displaced



Figure 3.3:- Social Network and probability of being displaced



The right-hand side of Figure 3.1 indicates that when people experience actual violence, presence of road increases the probability that they will flee as compared to those that have no access to road. Figure 3.2 supplement these results further. As shown in the right hand side of the figure, when people living in the plain region of the country experience actual violence they are much more likely to flee as compared to those that are living the hill or mountain region of the country. However, when threat of violence reaches a scale of about 5.8, people are more likely to flee no matter where they live. Figure 3.3 illustrates the impact of social network on individuals' decision to flee. The right hand side of the figure indicates that when confronted with actual violence, presence of social networks dampens the probability that they will flee. However, when threat of violence intensifies, people are more likely to flee irrespective of the presence or absence

of social networks. These results ties with my theoretical proposition that social networks provide an important mechanism for individuals to cope with their circumstances.

3.4 Conclusion

What explains individuals' decisions to flee or not in the face of civil war? The empirical analysis shows that physical threat to life, even when combined with other causes, is an important factor in explaining displacement. But in addition, economic wealth and opportunity, as well as the costs associated with the loss of such opportunities, were found to be very important in predicting forced migration, as is the opportunity for flight. Social networks play an important role in dampening individuals' assessment of risk associated with their decision to stay thereby reducing the likelihood of flight from villages where they are present. The results suggest that violent conflict is not the only factor affecting displacement decisions. Even when life is under extreme threat, multiple factors affect individuals' choices. Besides conflict, there are considerable economic, physical and political factors that likely affect people's decisions of whether or not to flee. These results, which provide a more nuanced test of the choice-centered approach to the study of forced migration, add significant value to our understanding of the causes of displacement.

With more precise data measured at the individual level, we can conclude with a greater degree of confidence that violent conflict and human rights violations are important factors for explaining displacement. This implies that actual violence or the threat thereof is likely to induce more people to flee their homes. More importantly, the results also confirm that a broader range of factors, as identified in large-*n* cross national

studies by scholars such as Schmeidl (1997), Davenport et al. (2003), Moore and Shellman (2004; 2006; 2007), Melander and Oberg (2006) and others, are needed to explain forced migration. The empirical results provide strong support for the argument that people do exercise a choice even in the face of unusual circumstances.

Poor economic conditions and loss of employment opportunities contribute to displacing people impacted by conflict. Individuals are more likely to leave home when threatened by economic hardship. If they view the economic benefits of staying as weighing greater than the risk of physical integrity to life, people may stay put. More importantly, presence of dense social networks seems to play a significant role in decreasing the risks for people to stay in their homes. Social networks promote social cohesion and thereby serve as a useful mechanism to cope with conflict allowing people to choose to stay in their communities. Other studies have yet to explore the effect of community level organization in facilitating people's ability to cope with the violence of civil war and avoid becoming forced migrants. Additionally, the choice to flee tends to be limited by the availability of the opportunity to flee. The findings also suggest that people living in areas better served by roads are more likely to flee when faced with extreme violence. Even if people want to leave, their choice may be conditioned by the lack of motorable roads. Finally, higher income and support for the dissident party may serve as a useful mechanism to cope with conflict, allowing people to choose to stay in their communities. Further research is needed to explore the effect of political factors in facilitating people's ability to cope with the violence of civil war and avoid becoming displaced.

The present findings, particularly on the decision to stay behind, raise an important question for an extension of this research. When individuals choose to stay behind and not flee from conflict, what actions do they take to cope with their situation? What are the coping mechanisms at the disposal of individuals who chose to stay behind during civilian conflicts? This question has not yet been explored in the forced migration literature and is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4 –"Should I Stay or Should I Go?" Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Conflict Endurance



Who would want to leave one's home?
Can you imagine leaving behind your place of birth, home, village, and the neighboring beautiful mountains that you grew up watching, once and for all, and all of a sudden? Your heart just won't let you go, am I right? But what can you do when you are forced to live under a constant threat of violence, when all your rights to freedom have been forcefully taken away, when you become a constant victim of injustice and atrocity? What would you do when there is nothing left except violence? You would leave, would you not? That's what happened to me and my family.
I had a beautiful life in my village; we used to spend time together with our family and neighbors. Life was good, we were happy living together as villagers. But things started falling apart with the spread of the insurgency. They (Maoists) started coming to my home. At first they asked my husband to join their party. Then they forced my son to join their army. We were forced to make food for them. Then they started looting our crops, torturing us, and the list goes on. We left when atrocities and injustices inflicted on us pushed us to the limit and our capacity to cope had been exhausted.
This is my experience of being an IDP.

–Respondent originally from Rolpa

The previous two chapters of the dissertation were devoted to refining the rationalist model of forced migration by testing hypotheses at the subnational and individual levels. In this chapter, I argue that the study of flight behavior is incomplete without a better understanding of why some people do not flee. Presenting a model to understand individuals' strategies of coping with conflict, I hypothesize that people are strategic in their mobilization of material and personal resources. Understanding how the mobilization of resources can affect people's calculations of the costs and benefits of staying home during conflict is critical to understanding how some people live with extraordinary circumstances such as a civil war. Using the Nepal Forced Migration Survey (NFMS) data, I conduct survival analysis in order to examine the impact of various factors on individuals' abilities to avoid flight and cope with their circumstances under conflict.

This chapter of the dissertation extends the idea of choice to an individual-level study of the mechanisms that allow individuals to make a choice to stay in their homes during conflict. Which strategies do people employ when they choose to stay and how effective are those mechanisms in keeping individuals in their homes? I argue that an individual's decision to stay or leave home during civil war is strategic. Flight is not an automatic consequence of conflict and a decision to flee does not necessarily coincide with the initiation of the conflict, as is commonly assumed. Rather, a decision to leave or stay is made after a careful evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with leaving or staying. I contend that individuals prefer not to flee from their homes, so they are likely to mobilize all available resources at their disposal and try to cope with their situations.

They will leave only when their situation demands flight or when their resources and other means of coping have been exhausted.

To analyze factors that facilitate survival during extraordinary circumstances, this chapter uses individual-level data to explore the impact of a number of mechanisms that may affect people's capacity to cope with war. Using primary data, collected through a public opinion survey conducted in the aftermath of a decade-long civil war in Nepal, I provide the first known study of the staying power of individuals in coping with violent conflict situations. The findings suggest that violence and ease of flight both decrease the likelihood of survival, while social networks and compliance with rebel demands are important strategies for coping with war that increases the likelihood of survival. Better economic conditions at the place of origin also increase survival rates and destruction of those conditions forces people to leave sooner.[1]

I assume that individuals prefer to stay in their homes and I investigate how people cope with conflict in their efforts to stay. I argue that displacement is a consequence of both the conflict situation individuals are under, and their means and strategies of coping with their situation. Individuals in a similar conflict situation may react to their environment and circumstances differently because of the varying resources and attitudes they posses, leading to different strategic behaviors. Understanding the coping mechanisms of civilians that chose to stay at their place of origin can help in the development of conflict resolution strategies and post conflict reconstruction policies. The primary data used in this study offers insights into the survival strategies adopted by

[1] Survival in the present study is defined as the ability of an individual to cope and stay until the time she/he left home and became displaced.

individuals who decide to stay behind during conflict, something that cannot be achieved with aggregate-level data.

As discussed in chapter 1, existing research on aggregate forced migration, which focuses on explaining the causes of flight, suggests that conflict or violence in general, is the major cause of forced displacement. Empirical work on the ability of civilians to cope with conflict during civil war and avoid displacement is more limited. In their studies of patterns of migration, sociologists, anthropologists and demographers have long argued that individuals who have deep roots and large investments in their communities of origin and strong kinship ties are reluctant to leave home (Uhlenberg 1973, Irwin et al. 1999). For example, people who have lived in a village for a long time are likely to have stronger kinship and community ties making them more reluctant to leave even in the face of conflict. Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of migratory processes, it is important to understand the "social and cultural context" within which migration decisions are made (Hugo 1981: 187). Social and community ties exert a strong influence on the decision-making calculus of individuals, and as such, community characteristics are strong predictors of the decision to stay (Petersen 1958; Uhlenberg 1973; Speare 1974). These community–level ties are embedded within the social and cultural aspects of a given society (Uhlenberg 1973; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Irwin et al. 1999). Attachment to home is stronger for "persons residing in tightly integrated communities with dense local social networks" (Irwin et al. 2004). But more importantly, as Graves and Graves (1974) argue, man is "neither totally active nor passive but interactive" (p. 117). He will interact with all the constraints imposed by his physical and social environment and "seek to overcome the problems confronting him by choosing

among perceived available options" (p. 117). When confronted by war, there may be a number of options one can utilize in dealing with a conflict situation.

I argue that networking through social and community organizations is one such option. Existing research on civil war suggests that conflict reconfigures societies, changing the roles of existing social networks while also creating new ones (Harpviken 2009; Wood 2008; Colletta and Cullen 2000; Edwards 2009). Melander and Öberg (2006) argue that "different people have different intrinsic costs and benefits for relocating" and a threshold of cost and benefits separates movers and stayers (p. 134). People who are embedded in their communities and stay during conflict are likely to have a higher threshold for leaving. Building on a choice-centric argument, Melander and Öberg (2006) conclude that a "self-selection effect" offsets the perceived risk of staying, causing forced migration to diminish over time (p. 142-44). While this argument is very useful in understanding aggregate patterns of non-displacement, the more important question in this study is *what makes it possible* for individuals to stay put in the first place? Wood (2008) identifies six "wartime social processes" that transform social networks in a variety of ways, including creating new ones and changing the role of existing ones. In some cases, civil war strengthens the role of existing social networks.

Existing literature also suggests that an individual's economic situation affects flight decisions (Zolberg et al. 1989; Schmeidl 1997; Wood 1994; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; 2006; 2007). Based on empirical results, drawn largely from aggregate cross-national analyses, these studies suggest that economic opportunity and wealth are likely to help people to stay. What is missing from the literature is a more in-

depth analysis of how individual wealth and economic opportunity are useful in helping them to cope.

The literature on civil war suggests that some individuals may simply support the rebel organization and stay put. There can be many reasons as to why men and women participate in rebellion. Some argue that insurgency arises in response to opportunities available for seeking rent, such as looting natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This "greed" story is equally plausible for those who elect to stay put and participate in a rebel movement. Those who see an opportunity to benefit may chose to stay and participate. Others argue that civil war arises in response to an opportunity for expressing discontent against discriminatory and lopsided policies of weak states (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Extending this argument, people with "grievances" against the state, such as the relative deprivation of a particular social class, may stay back to participate in civil war rather than fleeing (Paige 1975; Wickham-Corwley 1992), or may express their frustrations against a state through the use of violence (Richards 1996).

But the most important survival strategy individuals may choose is joining a rebel faction that will serve as their protector. Instead of risking one's life and possibly becoming a target of a rebel organization, individuals who care about their place of residence may choose a strategy of simply complying with rebel demands or participating in their cause (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Goodwin 2001; Mason and Krane 1989). Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) argue further that an alternative to a grievance-based explanation for participation in rebel activity can be found in Olson's logic of collective action (Olson 1965). According to this argument, individuals will participate only when private benefits are made available in exchange for participation. Those benefits may

include money, land or loot (Lichbach 1995). But above all, "protection from violence" may be a key private benefit that fighting groups can offer (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008: 441). Given the high cost of fleeing, a key strategy for individuals to cope with violence then is simply to join the fighting group(s).

4.1 Theoretical argument and research hypotheses

The empirical analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 test the rational choice theory of forced migration using more refined sub-national and individual level data. In this chapter, I take the argument one step further to explore the variation in flight decisions and the factors that allow some people to stay longer than others. When confronted with a civil war, individuals will take actions that will minimize the risk to their physical integrity of life but also keep them in their homes. Once a civil war has begun, individuals will come in contact with the warring parties, they will assess and reassess the threats emanating from war vis-à-vis resources available at their disposal to deal with the threat. They will evaluate their personal situations, the strength of social networks and their emotional and economic investment in their communities and they will decide whether or not to support the rebels or comply with their demands by physically participating in the movement or by supplying economic resources. People will leave home when the risks of holding out or the cost of continuing their support becomes greater than the value of their attachment to home.

While individuals are attached to their community and prefer to stay in their homes, the cost of compliance may increase over time. In addition, individuals may have different abilities to comply. Over time some people may find ways to adapt and cope,

while those who fail to cope will likely leave sooner. Therefore, how long an individual is able to stay put is determined by the level of threat, the costs of compliance with the fighting parties, and an individual's ability and willingness to meet demands put upon him or her. Those who are willing and able to bear the costs and meet demands of fighting parties are likely to stay longer. People who have invested emotionally and economically in their homes and communities will leave only when they believe that all means to cope have been exhausted, or when their cost of compliance exceeds their value of staying.

My theoretical argument builds on the assumption that people prefer to stay home but weigh the costs and benefits of doing so. They will bide their time before they are attacked and forced to flee. Once individuals choose to engage in coping strategies, these actions are likely to continue, resulting in an alteration in the balance of their costs and benefits of staying versus leaving. In other words, just as "different people have different intrinsic costs and benefits for relocating" (Melander and Öberg 2006, p. 134) individuals also differ in their skills and capacities as well as their endowments of socio-economic resources that affect their costs and benefits. They can engage in behavior that may *alter* the "intrinsic costs and benefits" of their decisions.

Internal and external factors can affect their costs and benefits. Factors such as indiscriminate violence or destruction of economic opportunities may be exogenous to one's capacity to cope, and an individual can do little to alter costs emanating from war. However, there are actions such as paying rent, supporting the rebel's cause, feeding the rebels, collaborating with the state army, or joining hands with a broader coalition of social networks that can alter the costs and benefits of staying. It is an individual's

endowment and the alteration in the balance of costs and benefits that leads to variance in choices on the part of individuals such that some who are willing and have the capacity to engage in these actions may chose to stay while others leave. The possibility of being able to cope establishes a "higher threshold" for those who choose to stay in the first place, and their engagement in coping strategies makes some individuals "increasingly unwilling or unable to relocate" in subsequent years (Melander and Öberg 2006, pp. 134,147). Those who stay adapt to a new way of life—they become a "select" population that chooses to live with war (Melander and Öberg 2006).

Existing research on forced migration has concluded that violence or more generally war of any type is a major factor in explaining forced migration. Conflict produces varying degrees of threat. Such threat can take several forms including physical injury, death of a family member, abduction, extortion, excessive demands for food and shelter by fighting parties, death of a neighbor and so on. Together, they threaten physical integrity and force people to flee. This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1*: Individuals with greater exposure to violence or the threat thereof will flee sooner.*

Existing literature on forced migration emphasizes the importance of economic opportunities as a retaining factor for explaining one's ability to resist flight. Arguably, threats to economic security may be as compelling as direct physical threats to life insofar as survival in economically precarious societies can be compromised by economic breakdowns. In fact, people may be willing to tolerate some measure of physical threat and stay longer in contexts where favorable economic opportunities are present. Assuming a constant level of physical threat, people are more likely to flee when

economic opportunities or resources start depleting. This implies that people are more likely to flee quicker from areas where economic opportunities are poorer and development infrastructures have been harder hit. They may also be more likely to leave when personal property such as land and crops are forcefully seized. Conversely, availability of economic opportunities or personal property is likely to induce people to take a risk and stay behind for a longer duration of time. This leads to my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a: *Better individual level and village level economic conditions are likely to help individuals to stay longer.*

Hypothesis 2b: *Destruction of economic opportunities or loss of property is likely to force people to flee sooner.*

Although researchers have long concluded that better economic conditions retain people in their villages, we do not know the exact mechanisms by which individuals are kept back by economic wealth. I argue that people who care about their place of origin and are economically better off may use their wealth to pay rent as a coping strategy to stay. Better economic conditions may enable people to cope with conflict in different ways and help them to stay put for a longer period of time. Some people may use income from their land and other property to pay rent. Salaried individuals may share part of their income with the fighting parties. In addition, the rebels may also impose a levy on the population for mobilizing financial resources to fight the war. Individuals who earn a reasonable amount of income or who have other resources such as crops, animals or land, may be able to buy their safety and cope with their situation in this manner. While a number of respondents during the survey for the present study said that they were forced

to contribute crops and animals, and make food for the rebels, one individual from Kalikot district reported “borrowing money” from relatives to pay a forced "donation." Such evidence suggests that individuals who have a strong attachment to their place of origin took actions to buy their safety to stay put in their homes. This leads to my third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3*: Individuals that have the capacity to contribute economic resources and the willingness to comply with such demands are likely stay longer by securing their safety through rent paying.*

Paying rent may not be the only way people cope with conflict. Arguably, not all individuals who stay back are able to pay rent. In the absence of a regular source of income or a surplus of crops and animals to pay a forced donation, people are likely to resort to other strategies. Even if people have chosen to contribute economic resources, there might come a time when their economic resources are exhausted and people may be left with no option but to flee or find alternative coping strategies. One of the important ways to cope with conflict would be to support the dissidents through some non-monetary means. Some individuals may join an insurgency voluntarily while others may be coerced into participating. Either situation may be a means of coping with unwanted or otherwise dangerous conditions leading to my fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4*: Individuals who expect selective benefits from supporting the rebels or complying with their demands are more likely to participate and stay longer.*

As an alternative to rent paying or participation, individuals can choose not to support either side, and instead cope with the threat to the physical integrity of life by seeking a strategy of protection through social networks. This is made possible by the

presence of social networks such as community level organizations that have the ability to negotiate with the warring parties or otherwise actively engage in protecting civilians in the village. People who are members or are aware of the presence of such networks in their village may use them for drawing the attention of transnational organizations to atrocities. These social networks can work as a protective shield against infiltration by the rebels as well security personnel within the community. This leads to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: *Individuals living in communities with dense social networks are likely to stay longer.*

Cross national studies on forced migration have also pointed out that besides threat to physical integrity of life and economic opportunities, other factors such as geography and access to road facilities are also likely to condition displacement. Geographical features like "[r]ugged mountains" may work as "obstacles" to people's flight (Schmeidl 1997: 289-90). Mountainous terrain may raise the transaction costs for people on the move by raising transportation costs (Moore and Shellman 2006). Lack of access to roads might prevent people from fleeing even when they want to or have the capacity to do so, and may compel them to stay longer. Conversely, an easy way to escape may induce people to flee quicker or as soon as the war starts. This leads to a sixth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6*: Fewer obstacles to travel, easier terrain and better road access will be associated with earlier flight.*

In addition to the above factors, I also provide an assessment of the possible impact of a number of potentially important demographic factors, such as age, education,

gender and number of children, on forced migration. For example, educated youths are likely to flee quicker to cities and towns in search of jobs and a safer environment as opposed to high school dropouts who may be more likely to stay back and join the rebels. And educated individuals in general may be more likely to have more options that allow them to flee. Elderly people, for whom the risk of being targeted by the fighting parties is low, may stay longer. They may also find it physically more difficult to flee. Males who oppose the rebel movement or don't want to fight may flee earlier to escape forced recruitment into the rebel army. Individuals with children may hesitate to leave for fear of losing their child's education and place to live, or they may leave sooner in order to protect their children. In addition, the more children an individual has the greater their kinship ties to the village may be. In societies where children tend to marry at a very young age, networks of kinship ties may be created in a village making the emotional attachment even stronger.

4.2 Data and research resign

The Nepali civil war is not dissimilar to the many civilian conflicts developing countries have faced or are currently facing. The conflict lasted for 11 years, one year less than a quarter of civil wars occurring since 1945 (Fearon 2004). Over 50,000 people were displaced during the conflict and about 13,500 were killed (INSEC various issues). Over 30,000 individuals joined the Maoist insurgency to fight against the state (Eck 2010). Property and government infrastructure worth over 500 million Rupees were destroyed during the conflict (Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction). This figure is minuscule compared to the mass exodus of people from countries such as Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. However, for a country with a GDP per capita

of $427 (World Bank, 2010), and dependency on external assistance at the scale of over 60% of the annual development budget (Ministry of Finance 2009/10), finding a durable solution to the plight of the displaced has proven to be a herculean task for the Nepali government, not to mention the pain and sufferings the displaced themselves have been forced to endure.

On theoretical grounds, most research on forced migration argues that choice is available even during civil war, such that some people chose to stay while others leave. The fact that countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia, which have been experiencing conflicts of some type for almost half a century now, have not been totally deserted by their citizens indicates that this hypothesis merits further investigation. However, existing literature stops at pointing out that such choices are available. The questions of how and why some individuals are able to take unusual risks by staying behind while others leave remain unexplored. Primary data collected at the individual level in the immediate aftermath of this decade-long conflict provides a unique opportunity to address this issue.

Hypotheses on the coping strategies of individuals during civilian conflict can only be tested with information on both displaced and non-displaced persons. To understand when and why some individuals leave during conflict, it is also important to learn why others do not flee. This chapter uses information collected from both displaced and non-displaced persons in Nepal to analyze individuals' coping strategies.

The dependent variable is the time until individuals leave home due to a failure to cope during the civil war in Nepal. A crucial element in the present analysis is the relationship between time and the costs associated with the decision to stay. Strategically, the passage

of time may allow individuals to reduce the costs of coping by allowing them to adjust to rebel demands and violence. Under such conditions, survival of individuals in their villages depends on their strategy to mobilize resources at their disposal and the severity of their conflict situation. In this sense, the dependent variable is a measure of how long people were able to cope with conflict before they fled. The maximum duration for the present study is 15 years.[2] People who had not been displaced by the day of the survey are considered as having survived displacement by the war. The last year of the war is treated as right censored. Those who left are considered as cases of failure to cope.

[2] Although the Maoists insurgency itself did not begin until 1996, the groundwork for the uprising had begun in 1991 with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) mobilizing Nepal's disaffected and historically neglected citizens to vote for the party in the first general election held after the instatement of democracy in 1990. To begin with, the party sought to win over these populations through a variety of activities, including door-to-door campaigns and cultural programs such as skits and songs (see Eck 2010). The main objective of such campaigns was to educate villagers about Maoist ideology and encourage them to participate in the soon to be launched revolution. In September 1995, the party began making preparations to launch the People's War in the mountainous western districts of Rolpa and Rukum. In November, these activities came to the attention of the government, which launched Operation Romeo. In the subsequent sweep conducted by a poorly trained police force, hundreds of villagers were arrested, some tortured and raped, and many were forced to flee from the countryside (Thapa and Sijapati 2003). Thus, time to displacement begins with t=0 in 1994, with 1995 as the first year of "failure."

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N*	Mean	Stand Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
ACTUAL VIOLENCE	1548	0.89	0.31	0	1.00
THREAT OF VIOLENCE	1548	2.19	1.27	0	6.00
INDUSTRY PRESENT	1548	0.06	0.23	0	1.00
INCOME	1548	2.22	1.46	0	6.00
LAND (Logged)	1548	7.54	2.9	0	12.91
CROP/ANIMAL-LOSS	1548	0.69	0.85	0	2.00
LAND-LOSS	1548	0.28	0.45	0	1.00
HOME-DESTROYED	1548	0.17	0.38	0	1.00
INDUSTRY DESTROYED	1548	0.06	0.25	0	1.00
TIMES RENT PAID	1548	3.58	7.32	0	52.00
SOCIAL NETWORK	1548	0.69	0.46	0	1.00
MAOIST	1548	0.12	0.33	0	1.00
PARTY CHANGED	1548	0.19	0.39	0	1.00
FORCED TO PARTICIPATE	1548	0.56	0.50	0	1.00
POLICE POST DESTROYED	1548	0.61	0.49	0	1.00
MOTORABLE ROAD	1548	0.32	0.47	0	1.00
ELEVATION	1548	1.87	0.82	0	3.00
EDUCATION	1548	1.27	1.39	0	6.00
GENDER	1548	0.60	0.49	0	1.00
TOTAL CHILDREN	1548	2.05	2.16	0	22.00
AGE	1548	41.35	13.21	18	95
AGE SQUARE	1548	1877	1198	342	9025
YEARS HOME OWNED	1548	2.81	6.78	0	70

* =*N* is less than 1804 due to random missing data

Most of the independent variables used in this chapter are the same as the ones used in Chapter 3. To analyze the impact of violence on an individual's survival during civil war, the respondents were asked about the levels of violence, both actual and

perceived, that may have contributed to their decision of whether and when to flee. Two variables created from the information gathered are employed to assess the impact of violence on the timing of individuals' flight decisions. Actual violence (*ACTUAL VIOLENCE*) is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the respondent experienced any of the following: physical assault, abduction, physical and mental torture, sexual violence, punishment for not quitting their position with the national army, and forced recruitment into either the rebel or state army, and 0 otherwise.

The threat of violence (*THREAT OF VIOLENCE*) is expressed in terms of a composite index (See Appendix II for further details). Threat of violence is different from actual violence in that the former represents the prevailing environment of threat created by conflict in a given community and the degree of its impact as perceived by individuals in the community, whereas the latter expresses an incidence of actual acts of human rights abuse realized by individuals in that community. The mean level of actual violence and threat of violence experienced by respondents during the conflict is .85 and 2.1 respectively, and the two measures are modestly correlated at .2. The extent to which conflict affects an individual's survival and decision to stay or not may depend on the significance of both perception and realization of the impact of violence emanating from war. For my purpose, these measures are expected to be positively associated with the rate of failure. That is, people experiencing actual violence or perceiving a higher threat from the war are likely to flee sooner.

Cross-national studies on forced migration have found that better economic conditions at the place of origin are a mitigating factor in forced migration. However, we do not know for sure how better economic conditions affect individuals' decision to flee

or not. Moreover, measures of economic wealth employed in cross-national analyses are problematic. A country's GDP or, GNP per capita or, per capita energy consumption are very crude proxies for the economic conditions individuals face. Such aggregate measures tell us little about the economic status of an individual or household. The present study assesses the significance of individuals' economic conditions and economic opportunities at the place of origin. The individual level information provides a more detailed account of a person's economic situation in their place of origin. Such an analysis is expected to uncover a more direct link between wealth and forced migration to better understand the role that economic conditions may play in shaping the choices of people to stay and cope with their situation or flee. To capture the role of economic resources in an individual's decision to stay, this chapter uses two sets of variables. The first set of variables measures economic opportunity in an individual's village and one's personal economic condition, while the second set measures destruction of opportunities and economic loss.

The variable *INDUSTRY PRESENT* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not at least one industry employing 10 or more people is present in the respondent's village. As a retaining factor, the presence of industry is expected to have a negative coefficient. Presence of an industry in the village may provide employment for individuals, generating a salary that they can use to buy off safety and stay longer. The variable *LAND* (logged) measures the amount of land owned by the individual family, expressed in terms of square meters. The variable has been logged to control for the highly skewed pattern of land ownership in Nepal. Land is a critical asset for an individual family in villages across Nepal. The variable *INCOME* is a measure of annual household income

expressed in terms of Nepali rupees. The expected relationship between economic advantage (as measured by land and income) and survival is ambiguous. On the one hand, families owning greater amounts of land or earning regular incomes were more likely to be targeted by the Maoists and displaced from villages early on. In addition, landed property and monetary income may measure an individual's capacity to flee as these resources can be used to pay for transportation costs during flight or to purchase property in alternative locations, such as cities. On the other hand, individuals with greater amounts of land and higher incomes are more likely to be able to use their resources to make a 'donation' that allows them to stay in their villages. Though the direction of the impact is ambiguous, wealth is likely to play a role in impacting individuals' ability to survive during war. Therefore, measures of land ownership and income are included as controls in the present study.

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The variable *LAND LOSS* is a dichotomous variable, measuring whether an individual's land was seized during the conflict (1), or not (0). Crop and animal loss (*CROP/ANIMAL LOSS*) is a measure of whether an individual's crops, animals or both were seized by either the Maoists or the national army during the conflict. Twenty seven percent of respondents reported that their animals were forcefully taken, 42% were forced to give crops, and 26% lost both. No loss is coded 0. A positive loss of either crops or animals is coded 1, and a loss of both is coded 2. Finally, many villagers also lost their homes during the conflict. Their homes were either intentionally destroyed by the rebels or in the crossfire between the rebels and the state security forces. The variable *HOME DESTROYED* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not a subject's home was destroyed during the conflict. Individuals whose land, or crops and animals were seized, or whose homes were destroyed are more likely to have fled quicker. In addition, *INDUSTRY DESTROYED* is a dummy variable that measures whether any industries

were destroyed (1) during the civil war in a respondent's village, or not (0) and is expected to cause people to flee sooner.

As a direct measure of coping, respondents were also asked to reveal the number of times they paid money to the warring parties. While a number of respondents during the survey for the present study said that they were forced to contribute crops and animals, and make food for the rebels, one individual from Kalikot district reported "borrowing money" from relatives to pay a forced "donation." Such evidence suggests that individuals who have a strong attachment to their place of origin took actions to buy their safety to stay put in their homes. The variable *TIMES RENT PAID* is a measure of the number of times an individual was forced to pay rent during the period of the civil war in Nepal. Individuals with a willingness and capacity to pay rent might have complied with rebel demands in order to stay put. As such, the expected sign of coefficient is negative and individuals who paid rent more often are expected to have stayed longer. On average, individuals reported paying rent about four times a year.

Three variables are employed to assess the impact of participation on coping. During the survey, respondents were asked to identify their political party affiliation.[3] This information is used to test the impact of party affiliation on survival during war. The variable *MAOIST* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent identified her or himself as a member of the CPN (M), the primary party of the insurgents. I expect the variable *MAOIST* to be negatively signed.

[3] Because the survey was conducted after the end of the conflict, most respondents were readily forthcoming in revealing their party affiliation; only 5% of the sample declined to identify with a specific party.

In addition, I use a measure of whether or not respondents changed their partisanship after the onset of the conflict. During the initial period of the insurgency in Nepal, Maoist supporters were disaffected youths who had historically been marginalized by the Nepali state.[4] The Maoists used a mixture of social mobilization and selective incentives for mobilizing rural peasants. In an effort to draw support from the rural mass, they promised emancipation of *Dalits* (untouchable caste), minorities, women and otherwise neglected segments of society.[5] Landless peasants were promised land. Uneducated and unemployed youths were recruited into the fighting squads and recognized as members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), a status that was apparently much better than the status quo. When initial violence broke out, violence against landlords and state employees was justified by the Maoists as attacks on the "principal agents" of socio-economic oppression and was often viewed approvingly by villagers (Eck 2010: 40). As a consequence of the failed peace talks with the insurgents in November 2001, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and mobilized the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to combat the Maoist insurgency. The army quickly earned a reputation for "indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests," torture, and disappearances (Eck

[4] Nepal has a long history of caste and class-based marginalization. One of the oft-cited causes of the civil war in Nepal was the accumulation of resentment that stemmed from its feudal past, the legacy of which was uneven development and a refusal by ruling elites to address socio-economic problems faced by the minority ethnic communities (see Murshed and Gates 2005 for the causes of conflict and Whelpton 2005 for a detailed history of Nepal). The Maoist insurgency provided an opportunity for the historically marginalized people to express their dissatisfaction against the state.

[5] I also created dummy variables to control for variation in flight by an individual's caste. The coefficients are largely insignificant. The only major caste group that seems to have behaved differently than the other castes is the Brahmins. In some of the models, the coefficient for the Brahmins is positive and significant indicating that they left sooner than members of other castes.

2010 p. 38). While the RNA viewed villagers across the country with suspicion, killing civilians and harassing suspected Maoist sympathizers, the insurgents were at work convincing the villagers that Maoist rule would provide a "powerful alternative national identity within a modern Nepal for those who have otherwise felt excluded from such national imaginings" throughout history (Pettigrew and Schneiderman 2004: 28). The well-documented excesses of the RNA drove even previously neutral Nepalis "motivated by fear of the security forces or a desire for revenge" into the arms of the Maoists (Eck 2010, 58). Not surprisingly, a number of the respondents reported that they "joined the Maoists party" in order to stay back. The variable *PARTY CHANGED* is a dichotomous measure, coded 1 if the respondent reported changing his or her party, 0 otherwise. Nineteen percent of the total respondents reported changing their party.

During the Nepali civil war, the Maoists engaged in a strategy of forced participation including indoctrination in order to increase their numbers as well as stop villagers from free-riding on the potential success of the revolution. For some individuals, force won't be necessary if they see participation as a means of ridding Nepali society of social ills and its feudal system. But for others, participation may have been used simply as a strategy to stay put. Respondents were asked if they were forced to participate in activities such as protest rallies and wall-postering during the conflict. The variable *FORCED TO PARTICIPATE* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent complied with a demand to participation in political activities.

To assess the impact of social networks on coping, the present study uses information about the respondents' membership in or knowledge of the presence/absence of three community level organizations operating at the village level. The variable

SOCIAL NETWORKS is coded 1 if the respondent expressed membership in or knowledge of the presence of any of the following three organizations: community forest users groups, mothers group and small farmers' development program. Otherwise the variable is coded as zero. These three community organizations were identified during field work in Nepal as important village level civil society groups that continued to meet during the war. Presence of a dense social network is likely to decrease the perceived cost of staying at home thereby enabling some individuals to stay longer. Respondents' knowledge and use of community level organizations in their village is a proxy measure for the degree of micro-level social networking that an individual may have engaged in. Such networking is expected to increase the duration of time until flight, hence a negative relationship is expected.

The variable *YEARS HOME OWNED* assesses the impact of one's connectedness to his or her place of origin on the decision to leave sooner or later. This variable measures the number of years an individual had owned their home when the survey was conducted. People owning their homes for a longer period of time are expected to stay longer as they are emotionally tied to their ancestral property and place of origin and likely have broader kinship ties to their communities.

The impact of the presence or absence of police posts in the village is also assessed. During the conflict, police posts were the only institutions representing the state in the villages. This made them a target of the Maoists but also an important provider of security for villagers. Many police posts in the villages were attacked by the Maoists during the conflict, forcing them to be relocated to the district headquarters. The variable *POLICE POST DESTROYED* is a dichotomous measure of whether (1) or not (0) a police

station was destroyed in the respondent's village during the conflict, possibly increasing village exposure to rebel demands.

I also control for ease of flight. The literature on forced migration argues that rough terrain and absence of physical infrastructure constrain the ability of people to move. Individuals were asked about the presence or absence of a motorable road in their villages. This information is used to test how a lack of physical infrastructure might impact an individual's decision to flee or not. The variable *MOTORABLE ROAD* is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent's village is linked by a motorable road. Presence of a road is scored 1, otherwise 0, and is expected to have a positive sign to indicate that people from villages with access to a motor road are likely to flee quicker.[6]

Finally, I control for a number of demographic factors. The variable *TOTAL CHILDREN* measures total number of children a respondent has. This variable might capture a respondent's affinity with the place of residence, the ties to home and school, and possibly the difficulty of escaping. It also represents extended family ties and, as such, is a measure of one's investment in the community. People with a greater number of children are expected to stay longer than those who are single or without children, but the level of danger that children might have been exposed to makes the predicted sign potentially ambiguous. The variable *AGE* measures actual age of a respondent. The variable *AGE-SQUARE* is included in the model to capture a possible curvilinear effect

[6] I also test for the elevation of the country using a dummy variable, *ELEVATION*, to capture the three topographic regions of Nepal: 1 for southern plain, 2 for middle hills and 3 for the mountainous regions. People in the higher elevated region of the country are expected to stay longer due to the greater difficulty of travelling.

of age on individuals' decision to stay, as the elderly may be expected to stay longer. *EDUCATION* is a measure of the level of education attained and is expected to be positively signed; those with a higher education were likely to flee more quickly to the cities in search of better opportunities. Lastly, *GENDER* is a dummy variable coded 0 for females and 1 for males and is used to test for gender differences in flight decisions.

4.3 Empirical analysis and results

Survival analysis is used to examine the duration of individuals' survival (i.e. time until flight) during the civil war in Nepal. Survival analysis takes into account the respondents that stayed till the end of the war, who are right censored. The most common survival model used in the conflict literature is the Cox Proportional Hazard model (Cox 1972). Hazard models estimate the rate at which events terminate at a certain time, given that they have survived up until that point (e.g. see Bennett and Stam III 1996). For my purpose, the hazard model estimates the instantaneous rate at which individuals left home as a function of the various covariates discussed in the previous section.

The estimated cumulative hazard over time is shown in Figure 4.1(a) and the smoothed slope of the cumulative hazard in Figure 4.1(b). The graphs show that the cumulative hazard of flight increases at an increasing rate until just after the height of the violence in 2002, and then increases at a decreasing rate thereafter. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report the results for the covariates from the empirical analysis. Two models are

presented in the tables: Model 1 excludes the variable *YEARS HOME OWNED* and Model 2 includes it.[7]

Figure 4.1: Cox proportional hazard and hazard rate



[7] The variable *YEARS HOME OWNED* is excluded from Model 1 because it is correlated with other variables and is potentially an alternative measure of social networks. Arguably, people owning home for a long period of time are also embedded members of their communities. For example, *YEARS HOME OWNED* is a good predictor of membership in a *SOCIAL NETWORK*.

Table 4.2: Survival Analysis of Conflict Endurance

Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	B (se)	Hazard Ratio (se)	B (se)	Hazard Ratio (se)
ACTUAL VIOLENCE	1.03(.12)**	2.79(.35)**	.86(.13)**	2.36(.30)**
THREAT OF VIOLENCE	.28(.03)**	1.33(.04)**	.28(.03)**	1.32(.04)**
INDUSTRY PRESENT	-.43(.17)**	.65(.11)**	-.41(.17)**	.66(.11)**
INCOME	-.02(.02)	.98(.02)	-.01(.02)	.99(.02)
LAND (Logged)	.01(.01)	1.01(.01)	.01(.01)	1.01(.01)
CROP/ANIMAL-LOSS	.18(.05)**	1.20(.06)**	.11(.05)**	1.11(.06)**
LAND-LOSS	.71(.09)**	2.04(.18)**	.69(.09)**	2.00(.18)**
HOME-DESTROYED	.10(.08)	1.10(.09)	.06(.08)	1.06(.08)
INDUSTRY DESTROYED	.17(.14)	1.19(.17)	.17(.14)	1.18(.17)
TIMES RENT PAID	-.01(.004)**	.99(.005)**	- .01(.005)**	.99(.005)**
MAOIST	-.52(.12)**	.60(.07)**	-.52(.12)**	.59(.07)**
PARTY CHANGED	.01(.09)	1.01(.09)	-.05(.09)	.96(.09)
FORCED TO PARTICIPATE	-.004(.07)	1.00(.07)	-.04(.07)	1.05(.07)
SOCIAL NETWORK	-.17(.07)**	.84(.06)**	-.08(.07)	.92(.06)
POLICE POST DESTROYED	.06(.07)	1.06(.07)	.01(.07)	1.01(.07)
MOTORABLE ROAD	.13(.07)*	1.14(.08)*	.12(.07)*	1.13(.08)*
TOTAL CHILDREN	-.04(.02)**	.96(.01)**	-.04(.01)**	.96(.01)**
AGE	.03(.01)**	1.03(.01)88	.04(.01)**	1.04(.01)**
AGE SQUARE	-.0003(.0001)**	1.00(.0001)**	-.0003(.0001)	1.00(.0001)**
GENDER	.08(.07)	1.08(.07)	.05(.07)	1.05(.07)
EDUCATION	.05(.03)*	1.05(.02)*	.05(.03)*	1.05(.03)*
YEARS HOME OWNED	-	-	-.10(.01)**	.90(.01)***
N	1548	1548	1546	1546
Number of failures	1112	1112	1111	1111
LR χ^2	651.03**	651.03**	795.82**	795.82**
Log Likelihood	-7367.08	-7367.08	-7286.10	-7286.10

Notes: Coefficients are reported in columns 1 and 3 and hazards ratios in column 2 and 4; figures in (parenthesis) are standard errors. ** =Significant at the .05 level or better; *= Significant at the .10 level.

Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 report the coefficients, and columns 2 and 4 the hazard ratios. Variables with positive coefficients are positively associated with the rate at which people fled their homes. Positive coefficients are associated with shorter survival rates and thus represent quicker flight whereas negative coefficients are associated with a longer survival and thus represent longer stays. First, I discuss results reported in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 includes regional dummies providing a robustness check for the empirical analysis in Table 4.2; these results are discussed at the end.

The empirical results confirm the major hypotheses. Physical threat to life is an important predictor of a shorter time until flight. Coefficients and hazard ratios for actual physical assault (*ACTUAL VIOLENCE*) and threat created by a violent environment in the villages (*THREAT OF VIOLENCE*) are both positive and significant in predicting failure (i.e. a shorter duration until flight). Both actual and perceived violence shorten the time people will cope with conflict. People experiencing actual violence or perceiving a greater amount of threat of violence are likely to flee quicker. The empirical results indicate that the hazard for those who experienced actual violence was between 179 (Model 1) and 136 (Model 2) times greater than for those who did not experience actual violence. Similarly, the hazard ratio for those who perceived threat of violence was over 30 times greater than those who did not feel threatened by the war. These results are consistence with H1, which stipulates that both direct and indirect threats of violence are not surprisingly likely to force people to leave sooner.

The measures of economic opportunity provide strong evidence in support of the argument that economic factors are important to flight decisions (H2a). The presence of employment opportunities created by the presence of industry in an individual's village

contributes to enabling one to cope and survive longer with civil war. As can be seen, the coefficient for the variable *INDUSTRY PRESENT* is negative in both Models 1 and 2. This is substantiated by the hazard ratio (column 2 and 4 in Table 4.2) for *INDUSTRY PRESENT*, which shows that presence of an industry, delays the time until flight by reducing the hazard by 35 to 34 times compared to villages that do not have such industries. This suggests that the more economic opportunities available in the villages, the longer people will stay in their homes. They are likely to accept greater personal risks if they see a possibility of economic security and employment opportunities. Employment opportunities may also provide a source of income which might be used by individuals to pay a forced donation as a means of coping.

These results support findings in the large-*n* cross national studies that suggest that forced migration tends to be lower in areas with greater economic opportunities even in the face of political violence. Individuals weigh threat to physical integrity against threat to economic security before leaving their homes. Moving to a new and unknown location involves a great deal of risk, especially for people living near the margin of subsistence. For some, it could mark the beginning of a never ending cycle of economic hardship. Knowing that moving to a new location involves risk and uncertainty, individuals tend to stay put and take personal risks so long as economic opportunities remain intact.

Other measures of economic wealth provide little evidence in support of the possibility that economic wealth is likely to enable people to stay longer in their villages. Although negative, coefficients for the income variable (*INCOME*) (Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.2) are not statistically significant, suggesting that people with higher incomes are

not more likely to stay longer than those with a lower income. The coefficient for the variable *LAND* (logged) is positive in both Models 1 and 2, but not statistically significant in predicting duration until displacement. The results for land owned might mean that individuals who owned a greater amount of land were aware of the fact they could be targeted and fled early in order to avoid being attacked or were forced to surrender their property and flee. Perhaps fear of being targeted outweighs consideration of remaining in the village to prevent usurpation of their land.

The results reported in Table 4.2 show that people become less willing to take risks when economic opportunities are destroyed or they are forced to contribute beyond what they can afford (H2b). Destruction of existing economic opportunities and personal property is likely to force people from their villages more quickly. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficients for the variables *CROP/ANIMAL LOSS* and *LAND LOSS,* confirm that loss of resources leads to a failure in coping. The results for the variable *LAND LOSS* demonstrate that in a country like Nepal where over 70% of the population lives on subsistence farming, land plays a critical role in retaining people in their villages. In addition, the forced contribution of crops and animals leads to greater likelihood of failure to cope. During the civil war in Nepal, the Maoists made demands on the villagers to contribute crops and animals as a "seasonal tax" to feed their army. While some villagers might have made such contributions voluntarily, for others it was an invasion of personal wealth. In either case, this amounts to a loss of wealth on the part of the citizens, forcing them to flee earlier. The results for the variable *CROP/ANIMAL LOSS* indicate that the hazard for those who were forced to give crops and animal was between 11 (Model 2) and 20 (Model 1) times greater than for those who did not

experienced such losses. Though not statistically significant, the results for the variables *HOME DESTROYED* and *INDUSTRY DESTROYED* are in the expected positive direction, indicating that destruction of home and industry forced people to leave sooner.

Moving to the coping strategies of individual during civil war, the estimates in Table 4.2 show that displacement is significantly slower the more often that people are able and willing to provide economic resources to the rebels. This is confirmed by the negatively signed and statistically significant coefficients for the variable *TIMES RENT PAID*. As can be seen from columns 1 and 3 of Table 4.2, the coefficient for the variable times rent paid is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level. This implies that rent paying is a useful strategy for coping with the conflict. For every additional time that a rent was paid, the hazard rate for the individual decreased by around one percent. Stated otherwise, survival can be bought when individuals are willing and able to pay.

The empirical results provide strong support for the hypothesis that the best strategy for surviving during a civil war is simply to join the insurgents. The negatively signed and statistically significant coefficient for the variable *MAOIST* provides strong evidence that people who identified themselves as Maoists were able to survive for a considerably longer duration compared to those who were affiliated with the targeted parties. As can be seen in Table 1, someone who is a Maoist faces only 59 (Model 2) to 60% (Model 1) of the hazard that someone who is not affiliated with the Maoists. Results for the variables *PARTY CHANGED* and *FORCED TO PARTICIPATE* are not significant in predicting survival rate.

The empirical results also provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the presence of a social network is likely to enable families to stay longer during conflict. As

can be seen from Table 4.2, the coefficients for *SOCIAL NETWORKS* are negatively signed in both Model 1 and Model 2 and statistically significant when years of homeownership is excluded. I hypothesized that the presence of community organizations in the village is likely to build a protective shield against threat. Exchange of information through word of mouth and regular meetings among the members provides avenues for individuals to develop a variety of coping strategies. Such mechanisms provide a way for dealing with threat and help people stay in their homes. The empirical results support the argument.

The empirical results also provide strong evidence in support of the argument that lack of opportunity to flee might compel people to stay longer in their villages. As reported in Table 4.2, the coefficients for the measure of physical infrastructure (*MOTORABLE ROAD*) are positively signed and statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 1 and Model 2. These results indicate that the availability of a motorable road in the village provides opportunity for individuals to flee quicker. The results support the hypothesis that physical characteristics of the countryside condition people's choice to flee.[8] This reflects the difficulty of flight from the mountainous region of Nepal. Destruction of a police post in an individual's village seems to induce people to leave quicker, but this variable is not statically significant.

The empirical results are mixed regarding the impact of demographic factors on the duration of survival during civil war. Families with a greater number of children are found significantly more likely to stay longer, possibly because of ties to their community

[8] If a measure of *ELEVATION* is included in the models, the coefficients are negatively signed, suggesting that people living in the higher elevations are likely to stay longer.

due an extended family in the village. While adults are found likely to leave sooner, elderly people tend to stay longer. Gender does not seem to matter in making a decision to leave sooner or later, individuals with a higher level of education fail at a higher rate, indicating that they are likely to flee quicker than those with lower levels of educational attainment. Finally, results for the variable *YEARS HOME OWNED* show that Individuals' personal embeddedness in their community induces them to take a risk and stay longer. Individuals who have lived in a community for a long period of time are likely to be reluctant to move sooner not only for fear of losing their property but also for fear of losing social ties. These individuals are emotionally tied to their place of origin and as such their cost of leaving may be higher considering the fact they will eventually be forced to live in a broken social world. This hypothesis is substantiated by the negatively signed and statically significant coefficient for the measure of number of years an individual has owned his or her home in the community.

To add robustness to the empirical results reported in Table 4.2, I also control for the possibility of variation in the spread of the Maoist insurgency across regions and districts of Nepal. These results are reported in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Robustness of Survival Analysis of Conflict Endurance

Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	B (se)	Hazard Ratio (se)	B (se)	Hazard Ratio (se)
ACTUAL VIOLENCE	1.04(.13)**	2.84 (.36)**	.89(.13)**	2.43(.31)**
THREAT OF VIOLENCE	.28(.03)**	1.32 (.04)**	.27(.03)*	1.31(.04)**
INDUSTRY PRESENT	-.37(.17)**	.69(.12)**	-.38(.17)**	.69(.12)**
INCOME	-.02(.02)	.98 (.02)	-.01(.02)	.99(.02)
LAND (Logged)	.01(.01)	1.01(.01)	.01(.01)	1.01(.01)
CROP/ANIMAL-LOSS	.17(.05)**	1.18(.06)**	.09(.05)*	1.11(.05)**
LAND-LOSS	.70(.09)**	2.01(.18)**	.68(.09)**	1.97(.18)**
HOME-DESTROYED	.07(.08)	1.07(.09)	.05(.08)	1.05(.09)
INDUSTRY DESTROYED	.16(.15)	1.17(.17)	.17(.15)	1.19(.17)
TIMES RENT PAID	-.02(.005)**	.98(.005)**	-.02(.01)**	.98(.005)**
MAOIST	-.54(.12)**	.58(.07)**	-.54(.12)**	.58(.07)**
PARTY CHANGED	.01(.09)	1.01(.09)	-.04(.09)	.96(.09)
FORCED TO PARTICIPATE	-.02(.07)	.98(.07)	-.02(.07)	1.02(.07)
SOCIAL NETWORK	-.13(.07)*	.88(.07)*	-.08(.07)	.93(.07)
POLICE POST DESTROYED	.04(.07)	1.04(.07)	.001(.07)	1.00(.07)
MOTORABLE ROAD	.11(.07)	1.12(.08)	.11(.07)	1.12(.08)
REGION 1	-.63(.14)**	.53(.07)**	-.39(.14)**	.67(.09)**
REGION 2	-.15(.11)	.86(.10)	-.05(.11)	.95(.11)
REGION 3	-.22(.11)**	.80(.08)**	-.18(.11)*	.83(.09)*
REGION 5	-.22(.09)**	.80(.07)**	-.12(.09)	.90(.08)
TOTAL CHILDREN	-.05(.02)**	.95(.01)**	-.04(.02)**	.96(.01)**
AGE	.03(.01)**	1.03(.01)**	.04(.01)**	1.04(.01)
AGE SQUARE	-.0003(.0001)**	.99(.0001)	-.0003(.0001)**	.99(.0001)**
GENDER	.08(.07)	1.09(.07)	.05(.07)	1.05(.07)
EDUCATION	.07(.03)	1.07(.03)**	.06(.03)**	1.06(.03)**
YEARS HOME OWNED	-	-	-.10(.01)**	.91(.01)**
N	1548	1548	1546	1546
Number of failures	1112	1112	1111	1111
LR χ^2	677.14**	677.14**	806.16**	806.16**
Log Likelihood	-7354.02	-7354.02	-7280.93	-7280.93

Notes: Coefficients are reported in columns 1 and 3 and hazards ratios in column 2 and 4; figures in (parenthesis) are standard errors. ** =Significant at the .05 level or better; *= Significant at the .10 level.

Nepal is divided into five development regions (see Figure 4.2) and the Maoist insurgency became most violent in 1996 in the Midwestern Development Region. Although violence is not the only cause of flight during civil war, the first incidences of casualties in the far eastern district of Jhapa were reported in 1999 and in Taplejung in 2001 (INSEC various issues). I created dummy variables for four of the five development regions of Nepal to control for a possible lag in the spread of the war and its likely impact on time until flight. The Midwest Region, considered the seat of the war, is the region of comparison. The empirical results in Table 4.3 show that there is some regional variation in when people left, with people staying longer in Regions 1, 3, and 5 compared to Region 4 where the war started. Other major results are largely upheld.

These results add robustness to the findings reported in Table 4.2. I also created dummy variables to control for the lag of time in the spread of violence across the districts. The results, not reported for brevity, do not affect the overall results reported in Table 4.2 and 4.3, and the district dummies are insignificant.

Figure 4.2: Topographical map of Nepal

4.4 Conclusion

What explains the variation in when people flee during conflict? While the literature on forced migration has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the causes of flight, particularly at the aggregate level, we know very little about what retains people in a conflict situation. How do countries under constant conflict, like Afghanistan, retain civilian populations in their villages? Clearly some individuals are able to live under conflict, and there is variation in when individuals decide to flee. What

coping mechanism do individuals choose and how effective are those mechanisms in keeping individuals in their homes? The present study provides important insights into the question of retention under a conflict situation.

The empirical results show that the decision to flee does not necessarily coincide with the onset of war; there is significant variation in the timing of when people flee, even in the same contextual environment. I argue that individuals are strategic in their behavior and in their means of coping with unusual circumstances such as civil war. People who are attached to their homes will mobilize their resources and engage in behavior that allows them to cope with conflict and stay in their villages.

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that while physical threat to life is an important factor in explaining how long people can cope with conflict and stay in their villages, other factors matter as well. Economic wealth and opportunity, and the costs associated with the loss of such opportunities, were found to be important in predicting the duration of individuals' ability to survive with civil war. Social networks play an important role in lengthening the time until flight. And importantly, supporting the rebels through rent paying seems to be a significant strategy people can use to cope and stay longer, suggesting that survival can be bought during a civil war. Finally, supporting the fighting parties can be an important strategy individuals are likely to adopt in their decision to stay put.

Although existing research on forced migration points out that choice is available under civil war and some people choose to stay behind while others flee, the question of whether people engage in coping behaviors that affects their ability to deal with extraordinary circumstances such as a civil war remains unanswered due to the limited

nature of the cross national studies. The primary data used in this study provides important insights into the survival strategies adopted by individuals who decide to stay behind during conflict, something that cannot be achieved with aggregate-level data. The empirical results provide strong support for the argument that individuals are rational and behave strategically even in the face of difficult circumstances.

The findings in this chapter provide a first attempt to answer important theoretical questions that remain largely unexplored in existing literature on forced migration. The study of strategic individual behavior during conflict and its impact on individuals' abilities to cope is important to our understanding of the dynamics of flight. The present study shows that in order to have a better understanding of flight behavior, we need to pay closer attention to the variation in forced migration decisions. Not all individuals face similar threats. Individual capacities are heterogeneous, as is individual behavior during civil war. And understanding how civilians interact with rebel organizations may be important to policy makers and governments dealing with civil conflict. This chapter lays a foundation for further studies of non-flight behavior under conflict and represents an important step in further refining the choice-centric model on forced migration.

Chapter 5 –Conclusion

While leaving one's home is an extremely difficult decision to make, people around the world have been forced to flee throughout human history. Threats emanating from the Thirty Year's War, the two World Wars, the proxy conflicts during the Cold War, the wars of colonial liberation, leftist movements in Latin America, the ongoing War on Terror and the various ethnic conflicts in Africa and Asia have forced millions of people from around the world to leave their homes. However, many countries that have been in conflict for several decades have not been completely deserted by their citizens, raising important questions for inquiry.[1] First, what explains why some people decide to stay while others leave during civilian conflicts, i.e. is choice available even when life is at risk? Second, how do those who choose to stay cope with their conflict situation? These two questions were raised in the previous chapters of this dissertation. The empirical analyses provide some very notable findings and make a significant contribution to the existing literature on forced migration. This chapter summarizes the major findings from my research and charts out potential areas for further research. First, I provide a brief summary of the findings and their contribution to the literature on forced migration and civil conflict and discuss their implications with reference to the case of Nepal. The policy implications are presented at the end.

[1] Events of forced migration have been relatively rare compare to the growth of human population. While the absolute number of forced migration climbed to 43.3 million by the end of 2009, this event can still be considered rare compared with the 6.8 billion world population figure at the end of the same year. Nonetheless, understanding causes of forced migration is important for the simple fact that developing countries were host to 4/5 of the world's refugees at the end of 2009 (UNHCR 2010).

5.1 Summary of findings

One of the goals of this study is to take the existing choice-centric theory on forced migration and test whether or not this literature is useful in understanding forced migration behavior at the subnational and individual level. The empirical results offer insights into the factors that explain people's decisions to stay or leave under threat. While threat to physical integrity of life is obviously an important cause of forced migration, the results also show that poor economic conditions contribute to flight. These results are consistent with major findings in the cross-national studies.

In addition, one of the main findings from the present research is that some people engage in different coping strategies, which affect their decisions to leave or not. One such strategy, which had a positive effect on people's ability to stay, was supporting the rebel party. This finding somewhat contradicts findings in large-*n,* cross-national studies and case studies in some other parts of the world. For example, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004) argue that states use mass killing as a strategy of wiping out guerrilla bases of support when insurgents receive active support from local population. Analyzing 147 wars between 1945 and 2000, the authors conclude that when insurgents receive a high level of support from local populations, governments find it difficult to single out the guerrillas from the civilian population. Therefore, the state would rather kill the entire population or a large number of people in order to empty out villages where guerrillas hide. They support their argument by empirical analysis based on aggregate data collected at the national level. In one of the earliest time-series analyses of the causes of forced migration, Stanley (1987) found the state army systematically targeting civilian population in order to destroy insurgent's bases of support in the Central

American country of El Salvador. Based on a statistical analysis of the causes of forced displacement, Stanley concludes that indiscriminate attacks by the state army against civilian populations was the main cause of Salvadoran migration to the United States during the period 1976 to 1984.

While these findings are interesting, there are a number of reasons why the case of Nepal is unique and why my findings are dissimilar to the studies mentioned above. First, it is worth noting that unlike cases such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, the state security forces in Nepal did not engage in the "intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants" during the civil war (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004, p. 377-78).[2] The civil war in Nepal was not entirely ethnic in nature and the state did not engage in a strategy of wiping out an entire ethnic population. In addition, the state did not engage in mass killings like in El Salvador for a number of reasons. First, state response to the Maoist uprising in Nepal was rather slow. The Maoists launched their war in 1996 –six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the installation of democracy in Nepal. The Nepali government did not think that the leftists posed a credible threat to the state and political parties were divided in their opinion about dealing with the rebels. While some suggested entering into a dialogue, others proposed suppressing the Maoists creating a general environment of confusion among the citizens.

In addition, Nepali politics during the 1990s remained highly unstable due to a power struggle within and among political parties, producing a total of twelve prime ministers in ten years and giving an opportunity for the palace to maneuver political

[2] The dependent variable in Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay's study is "mass killing", which the authors define as "intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants" (p. 377-78).

affairs. This resulted in a lack of confidence among citizens on the capability of political parties to rule the country, let alone their skill to deal with the issue of the Maoist insurgency.

The national army had become the object of a "tug-of-war" between the king and the civilian government ever since the writing of the 1990 constitution with both parties wanting to have control over the army (Thapa and Sijapati 2003, p. 172). The king was made commander-in-chief of the army when the constitution was promulgated. Under the provision of the constitution, the army could be mobilized only if the king declared a state of emergency. The king refused to mobilize the national army to fight the Maoists when initial proposals were made by civilian governments. Hence, the initial military response of the state to the Maoist uprising was mobilization of the poorly trained police that was quickly defeated by the insurgents. The army was mobilized only in 2001 but even then its performance was "rather dismal" (Thapa and Sijapati 2003, p. 172) because by then the Maoists had gained control of much of the countryside.

The Maoist insurgency was more of a class-based rebellion and many of the civilian killings occurred during gun battles due to crossfire. One explanation for my finding that joining or supporting the Maoists had a positive effect on people's ability to stay in their villages during the war is that the nature of the conflict in Nepal was different from ethnic wars in African countries for example where state armies were often mobilized to wipe out rival ethnic groups. In addition, the delay in the mobilization of the army due to internal political battles between the various parties in the Nepali government likely prevented the types of mass killing experienced by civilian populations in other civil wars. Thus for civilians in Nepal, joining the Maoists rebel or

supporting their cause seems to have had a positive effect on their ability to stay in their homes.

Another explanation for my findings may be that the mountainous terrain made it difficult for the state security forces to conduct combing operations in villages across the hinterlands of Nepal. Maoist Chairman Prachanda declared that the mountainous region of Nepal was very favorable for guerrilla warfare and support from the masses of the rural poor was the key to the success of the 'Peoples' War' (Prachanda 2003). As Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue, rough terrain provides safe havens for insurgents. Arguably, some people in the hinterlands of Nepal found it easier to support the Maoists and hide in the jungles than to leave home for an unknown and uncertain destination.

It is worth mentioning here that in a poor country like Nepal, state resources were stretched to the limit during the Maoist insurgency. The state army was not mobilized until November 2001 when king Gyanendra declared a state of emergency. By 2003, the insurgency had spread to much of the countryside and because of limited resources, state presence was limited to the district headquarters (Kumar 2003).[3] According to media reports, 69 of the 75 districts of the country had come under Maoist control by 2005 (Iyer, 2005). The Nepali army was nowhere to be seen in the villages, except for occasional aerial surveillance. The relative absence of the state may have been an additional factor driving individuals to support the rebels in order to survive and stay in their villages. Without state control, as Kalyvas (2006) agues, when the number of insurgents reaches a certain size, people are likely to join the rebels to avoid selective targeting.

[3] When the war progressed, the army was mobilized to protect development infrastructure.

As state presence in the village was weak and intermittent, the Maoists were in a position to tax the public. While many villagers were forced to share crops as a seasonal tax, others were forced to feed the Maoist army. Most likely, some people sided with the Maoists knowing full well that the insurgents were embedded in the village, while state army presence was intermittent and thin. Support provided by the villagers, voluntarily and involuntarily, is probably a reason why the Maoist insurgency persisted for a decade even in the absence of lootable sources to finance the war. The war ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006 with neither side winning a complete victory.

The second important finding from my research is that social networks operating in the form of community level organizations can play a crucial role in helping some people to cope with conflict and stay behind. Operating at the community level, these organizations probably act as conduits for information about military movement, alerting villagers against potential attacks. They may also work as protective shields against attacks as they are interlinked with national and international human rights organizations. Once in place, these community level organizations are likely to have their own logic and place, providing an effective mechanism for villagers to stay. Examination of this powerful mechanism of social connectedness is lacking in the existing literature. The empirical results drawn from subnational as well as individual-level analyses offer useful and illuminating ideas about what transpires within the confines of the community level organizations. The empirical results throughout the three chapters of this study suggest that the analysis of the role of social networks provides a fruitful micro-macro linkage presently lacking in the study of forced migration. Through these community level

organizations, information is transmitted among villagers, which then becomes translated into collective action for saving a community (Calhoun 1991).

The theoretical engine driving current research on forced migration is rational choice. However, empirical results on the role of social networks suggest that rationality means different things to different individuals, especially when it comes to making a decision of leaving one's place of origin. It is not easy to tally intangible benefits of our actions against their tangible costs. Forced migration is rather emotional and complex. When forced to flee home, one is hard-pressed to choose between threat to physical integrity of life and ties to one's place of origin, ancestral homes and society, friends and families, and a way of life that is thoroughly satisfying, though perhaps not always ideal. Not all individuals living in the hinterlands of Nepal or Afghanistan are happy with their economic status. But factors such as their lack of knowledge about city life, beliefs, lack of self-confidence about finding jobs in a new place, and so on may make them reluctant to leave. Those individuals may not even think of the possibility of moving, even when they are well aware of the fact that threat is imminent. Instead, they are likely to turn to their community that they grew up in for protection and seek alternative means of coping. They may consider coping as the most rational thing to do.

Under such circumstances, traditional community level organizations may play an instrumental role in proving coping mechanisms for villagers that choose to stay put by providing benefits and reducing the perceived cost of staying. Cross-national studies on forced migration have yet to capture the important role of such community level organizations as identified in this study. Such organizations can potentially play an important role in the dynamics of flight behavior. Examination of the role of social

networks in armed conflicts and forced migration may be a fruitful area for future research.

While every civil war has unique features, there is no reason to believe that individuals' attachment to land and the role that social networks played in helping Nepalis to stay in their homes differ from those in other cases. Importance to land may be a shared factor across societies. Case studies conducted in other parts of the world reveal similar findings. For example, analyzing the role of social networks operating in two villages in the district of Herat in Afghanistan, Harpviken (2009) concludes that when a state fails to protect civilians during civil wars either because it lacks the capacity or the will to do so, individuals either join one of the fighting parties or "resort to informal social networks for their protection" (p. 20-21). Likewise, Varshney (2001) reports that social networks, operating in the form of intercommunity organizations, act as "agents of peace" and play a very important role in mitigating tensions even between diametrically opposed ethnic communities such as Hindus and Muslims (Varshney 2001). Further studies in other contexts, such as Africa and Latin America, can confirm how representative the findings observed in Nepal are of the role of social networks in understanding the dynamics of civilian interaction with rebel organizations and forced migration more generally. The results may differ given the historical and cultural differences between Nepal and African or Latin American countries. They may also conform because social networks in varied forms are present in societies across the world. Future research on forced migration could look at the role of social networks in other contexts.

5.2 Policy implications

The policy implications of the present findings are significant. On the one hand, the empirical results suggest that in addition to mitigating violence, there is a strong need to promote economic development and empower local community organizations in order to mitigate the problem of forced migration. On the other hand, the results also show that people who stayed in their homes often sided with or at least assisted the Maoists. This could be taken to imply that the Nepali government should engage in dismantling economic opportunities and social networks in order to fight the Maoist insurgency. Doing so might have depopulated areas where the Maoists were operating, thereby helping the government's rural counterinsurgency effort. However, it would in the process have created serious problems for the government in dealing with mass internal migration that might have had the effect of spreading insurgency and even providing insurgents with community bases of operation much closer to the capital city and other strategic locations. The implicit implication of this result is rather counter-intuitive and contrary to reality.

The Nepali government introduced several economic packages including Bisheshwar Prasad with the Poor –a poverty eradication package named after the first elected prime minister of Nepal – and Ganeshman Peace Campaign, in an unsuccessful attempt to meet development needs of the countryside and stop the rural masses from joining the Maoists. Likewise, the Community Forest Users Group, Mothers Group and the Small Farmers Development Program, all received support from the government enhancing the strength of social networks. Arguably, part of the government money went into supporting the Maoist insurgency as people probably did everything possible to stay in their homes. The

empirical results in Chapter 4 show that people who complied with the demand to make forced donation were more likely to stay put. It is possible that part of the government aid went into supporting the Maoists. Only further individual-level research in Nepal and other contexts can confirm this possibility.

Moving beyond the case of Nepal, empirical results from the present research provide important insights into why some states engage in indiscriminate use of violence against civilian population and destroy their property at a massive level. Bosnia under Karadzic, the Rwandan genocide, and atrocities committed by the government-backed Janjaweed militias in Darfur are some of the notable examples of a systematic use of state violence against civilian population. Power struggle among and within political parties, tug-of-war between palace and parliament, as well as lack of resources to fight the insurgents likely prevented the Nepali state from killing masses of population that supported the Maoists to stay in their homes. Future study could analyze the role of resources to fight insurgencies.

More generally, while unrest around the world continues to displace millions of people from their homes every year, the policy response of the international community and forced migrant producing countries has remained unmatched with the plight of the displaced. During the 1960s and 1970s when the Cold War was ongoing, the preferred methods of durable solutions to the problems of forced migration (specifically refugees) were voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum and resettlement in a third country. Defined by the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, these solutions were expected to provide a permanent solution to the problem of refugees. People fleeing from communist countries were granted asylum in Western

countries on the assumption that repatriation was not safe. However, the end of the Cold War in 1990 made repatriation the most favored option, prompting the UNHCR to revise durable solutions to what has now become the '4Rs' –Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction. The revisions in the durable solutions were also aimed at encompassing IDP populations which started surpassing the number of refugee beginning in the mid-1990s (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008).

The 'war on terror' complicated the plight of the displaced further. While the launch of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a dramatic increase in the number of forced migrants, countries in Europe and North America have become acutely suspicious of granting asylum to refugees. The result has been an added emphasis on repatriation as the most attractive solution. As a result, forced migrants, the bulk of whom are now IPDs, are forced to live at the mercy of their home governments, often the very governments which are responsible for uprooting them from their home in the first place.

While repatriation continues to be a preferred solution, the empirical findings from the present study reveal that one of the most important factors causing forced migration is seizure of land and destruction of personal property such as homes, crops and animals. For example, while only 29% of the total respondents in the present study reported that their land was forcefully seized, 37% of the IDPs cited land seizure as the most important cause of their decision to flee. These findings suggest that return of seized property, particularly land needs to be given priority for addressing the plight of displaced populations globally. In addition, the building of social networks may help communities avoid displacement. While international donor agencies have made a tremendous contribution in the promotion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the global

south, the present study shows that efforts made by national human rights organizations to bring together existing traditional and indigenous community organizations for the cause of protecting the lives of civilians have also been important. Promotion of more such efforts may be useful for further mitigation of the problem of forced migration. The role of these micro-level organizations in protecting villagers provides a fertile area for further study. Finally, the question of the fate of forced migrants is an important topic for future research, since governments bear significant costs when large portions of the population are displaced.

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Appendix I: Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Data on Displacement

Nepal went through a decade of civil war beginning in 1996 in which it was estimated that over 50,000 people were displaced from their homes and another 13,000 killed. The focus of this study is to explain the variation in sub-national forced migration caused by the conflict. Forced migrants typically include two types of individuals, refugees who flee the country and IDPs who flee their homes but do not cross the border into another country. Given the general difficulties worldwide of obtaining accurate data on forced migration caused by conflict, a detailed account of the issue in this case and a description of the measures used in this dissertation is provided below. Appendix II describes the Nepal Forced Migration Survey 2008.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that only around 2,600 Nepalis had sought official refugee status by the end of 2006 (UNHCR 2007). This figure does not include individuals who went to India for reasons discussed below. Although the factors forcing refugees and IDPs from their homes are arguably the same, I do not have data on the district of origin for these refugees, and compared to the estimates of the total number of people displaced by the war, the official refugee figure is likely too small to influence the results for the present study, so due to data limitations, this official refugee population is not included.

The more difficult issue for this study is the displacement of individuals to India and the accuracy of the estimates of IDPs. Individuals displaced to India are not considered refugees. An open border, established in a 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and India, makes it easy for Nepalis to cross the border into India and difficult for them to be tracked. Citizens of the two countries are treated on par with each other, no travel documents are needed to cross the border, and citizens crossing the border are well tolerated. Although many Nepalis are reported to have fled to India, no refugee camps were established for displaced Nepalis and no systematic documentation was carried out by either side.

Most researchers on forced migration acknowledge the fact that acquiring accurate data on forced migration is challenging, if not impossible; Nepal is no exception to this. Figures on displacement during the Nepali civil war vary dramatically. For example, according to a study by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC 2005), between 100,000 and 200,000 people had been displaced in Nepal by the end of 2004. NRC derived this estimate based on estimated figures generated by different governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the country. Sources cited by the NRC include: the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, which estimated that some 120,000 Nepalis crossed the border in January 2003 alone; the Asian Development Bank, which estimated the IDP figure to be between 300,000 and 400,000; the Finance Ministry of the government of Nepal issued estimates between 300,000 and 600,000; the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which cited a figure of 80,000, and so on. The politics behind displacement estimates as well as the 1700 kilometer-long open border between Nepal and India further confound the issue.

Only one organization, namely the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a national human rights organization operating throughout Nepal since 1988, made a concerted effort to document and verify displacement figures. Their work was conducted on a sub-national, district by district basis. According to INSEC, 50,356 people were displaced from across the 75 districts from the start of the war to the end of 2004. There is strong reason to believe that the data collected by INSEC is the most reliable and accurate representation of relative displacement across the 75 districts of Nepal for a number of reasons. Because INSEC operates in all 75 districts of Nepal, the data collected by their district offices are more reliable than the national estimates cited above. INSEC was the only organization to collect data on displacements at the level of the village development committee (VDC), the smallest administrative unit in Nepal. The number of VDCs per district range between 13 and 115 with an average of 52 villages. In most cases, INSEC recorded not just a count of displaced but also the names of the persons affected by the conflict — displaced, killed or abducted. In addition, INSEC made a concerted effort to track individuals displaced within the country and later assist them in their return.

INSEC's primary focus was to document internal displacement. Because of the open border with India, it became very easy for individuals, especially those living in the districts along the border, to flee across the border for short periods of time to temporarily escape impending violence. The much larger figures on displacement cited by various organizations during the war likely included these temporary displacements across the border. While these figures are important to acknowledge, INSEC's data is likely the most accurate in terms of capturing the lasting impact of the war on displacement and the relative impact across districts.

The dependent variable used in Chapter 2 is INSEC's count of the number of people displaced *from* each district. The figures documented by INSEC represent the number of people who left a district, not the number of people who arrived in a district, and they made every attempt to include and document all individuals that were displaced from each district between 1996 and 2004 due to conflict. It is important to note that INSEC's data on displacements are available only by the sending districts, counted on the basis of people *absent* from a village. While INSEC was most interested in documenting incidents of human rights violations and focused on tracking IDPs with the intention of protecting their rights and assisting them in their return, ambiguity remains as to the destination of some individuals counted by INSEC. While INSEC classified the 50,356 people as IDPs displaced from their villages, in reality INSEC does not know for certain where all the displaced people went. Given the long open border with India, it is reasonable to conclude that some individuals likely crossed the border into India, temporarily or permanently, and may have gone on to a third country. While discrepancies exist as to the precise number of people displaced by the war in Nepal, and politics likely played a role in the estimates produced, especially by the government, INSEC is largely credited with having had the most extensive monitoring network and the most systematic means of data collection and documentation. Furthermore, as a non-governmental human rights organization, INSEC had far better access to the villages throughout Nepal since government officials were openly targeted by the Maoist. Indeed, according to INSEC officials, the government often turned to INSEC when it needed data on human rights violations, including displacements. In sum, the data collected on displacement by

INSEC are believed to be the most accurate figures and the means of data collection used by INSEC was consistent across all 75 districts of the country.

Although the civil war ended in 2006 and figures for casualties are available through 2006 and beyond, the detailed district level data on displacements collected by INSEC are only available for the period 1996 through 2004. While not complete, these data include the period of civil war escalation following the massacre of the then royal family in June 2001, and the peak period of violence reached in 2004.

Appendix II: Nepal Forced Migration Survey, 2008

The sampling frame used in this survey is INSEC's list of people displaced from each district. The survey was conducted during the summer and fall of 2008. The full data set used in this study consists of a national sample of 1804 respondent households from 56 village development committees (VDCs) drawn from 11 districts of Nepal, plus the capital of Kathmandu. Households were selected from 226 sampling units, called wards, from across these 11 districts. The sample represents all the five development regions (east, central, west, mid-west and far-west), three topographical zones (mountains, hills and plains), and both rural and urban parts of the country. The survey was also administered in Kathmandu where many of the internally displaced persons fled. A weighted multi-stage cluster sampling technique was used to go from region, to district, to VDC, to ward level and then two samples were randomly drawn — one of individual household at the ward level and another of displaced persons originating from those wards. Use of wards as the sampling units has the advantage of offering a paired design of individuals who decided to stay and those who decided to leave within the same contextual environment.

The sampling method involved multiple stages because it sought to ensure that the sample represents (a) districts that were hard-hit during the conflict, (b) all three topographical regions, (c) all five development regions, and (d) both rural and urban parts of the country. In addition, given resource and logistic constraints the method aimed at ensuring that samples would be drawn from areas that produced displaced persons as a result of the conflict. In the first stage, all districts that had recorded at least 500 casualties or 500 displacements during the conflict were selected. The selection criteria were based on secondary data provided by the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) on the number of people killed and displaced from each district. A total of 19 districts met this threshold. Four of the five economic development regions contained exactly two districts that met our threshold, and varied topographically, so these eight were chosen. The remaining eleven districts were in the mid-western region where the fighting originated; three out of these eleven districts were chosen, one in each topographical region. This resulted in a total of 11 districts, plus Kathmandu, being retained for sampling. Given resource constraints, the total number of interviewees was set at 1500 for the 11 districts, with a target of 1000 displaced and 500 non-displaced, with the remaining 304 interviewees coming from the capital. The number of displaced was further divided into two groups: 500 interviewees still displaced and 500 interviewees that had returned home. In each of the 11 districts the target number of interviewees was determined by the proportion of displaced identified by INSEC in each district. This captures the dynamics of conflict as well as the economic and geographical variance in the country.

Each district is divided into VDCs, with each VDC further subdivided into nine wards. Only VDCs with ten or more displaced persons were used in the sampling of respondents. From each district, 5 VDCs meeting this threshold were randomly selected, and the targeted number of respondent was determined by the proportion of displaced in each of the VDCs. Next, the targeted numbers of respondents from each of the 5 VDCs

were randomly sampled from the wards in proportion to the number of displaced in each ward. Displaced respondents were randomly selected from a list of all displaced persons originating from the wards. This list was maintained by INSEC at the ward level throughout the conflict.

The 500 Non-displaced respondents were randomly selected from the same districts/VDCs/wards in which the displaced originated. Target numbers of non-displaced from each ward were based on the same proportions used for sampling the displaced.

The table below lists the 11 districts identifying the economic development region and topographic zone where each is located, and the target number (and actual number) of displaced respondents based on the proportion of displaced originating in each of the districts out of the total number of displaced persons identified in the eleven districts. So, for example, Rolpa had 1,817 displaced out of the total 17,386 displacement in the 11 districts, resulting in a target number of 105 displaced interviewees, and 52 non-displaced. Rolpa is further broken down into the five randomly selected VDCs. Based on the proportion of actual displacement in each of the five VDCs, a target number of interviewees is given, along with the actual number of displaced persons interviewed and the number of non-displaced interviewed. The target and actual number of interviewees differs somewhat for each VDC because INSEC's and the Nepali government's identification and documentation of displacement persons as well as people injured, killed and disappeared were still on-going at the time the interviews were conducted, so the identification of conflict-induced displacement was still somewhat in flux. In addition, the monsoons were ongoing during part of the interview period. Farmers had begun to work by the time the first phase of the survey was conducted and many displaced persons were working in the fields to earn a living.

Eleven Districts Selected for Sampling with Target (and Actual) Number of Respondents Interviewed

Economic Development Regions						
Topographic Zones		**Far West**	**Mid-West**	**Western**	**Central**	**East**
	Mountains	Bajura: 84 (70)	Kalikot: 203(218)			Taplejung: 44(50)
	Hills		Rolpa: 105(96)	Lamjung: 49(47)	Ramechhap: 73(88)	
			Thawang			
			Kureli			
			Uwa			
			Mirul			
			Bhawang			
	Plains	Kailali: 118(124)	Bardiya: 94(108)	Kapilbastu: 152(151)	Chitwan: 48(43)	Jhapa: 30(17)

Rolpa as an Example of the Sampling Process

VDCs	Proportion of actual displacement in five randomly selected VDCs	Target Number of Interviewees	Actual Number interviewed	Actual Non-displaced interviewed
Thawang	0.27	28	19	28
Kureli	0.26	27	37	12
Uwa	0.23	24	20	11
Mirul	0.20	21	15	7
Bhawang	0.03	3	5	2
Total	**100%**	**105**	**96**	**60**

The survey includes responses to questions about different types of threats individuals experienced during the conflict, specific reasons behind their decisions to flee from their villages or not, whether or not they were physically assaulted by either the rebels or the state army, party responsible for displacing them and so on. It also includes information on the economic conditions of the village, demography and socio-economic conditions of the individual and households.

The overall response rate for the survey was 86.3 percent. While some of the randomly selected individuals for the sample refused to be interviewed, others halted in the middle of the survey, and still others could not be found.

Sample Size: While I have an overall sample size of 1804, the number of observations in the analyses varies due to random missing data.

Independent Variables used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4:

Crop/Animal-Loss: a measure of whether an individual's crops, animals or both were forcefully seized by either the Maoists or the national army during the conflict. No loss is coded 0. A positive loss of crops or animals is coded 1, and a loss of both is coded 2.

Land-Loss: Dichotomous variable that measures if the respondent's land was seized during the conflict (1=Yes; 0=No).

Home-Destroyed: A dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent's home was damaged or destroyed during the conflict.

Land: Area of land owned by the respondent prior to displacement. The variable, which was originally expressed in numerous measures such as pair of oxen needed to plough, kilograms of seeds needed to saw, amount of crops produced and so on, has been converted into square meters and logged.

Income: Estimated annual household income of the family. During the survey, respondents were asked to identify their annual household income from the following 6 categories: (1) < 25,000, (2) 25,000 to 34,999, (3) 35,000 to 49,999, (4) 50,000 to 74,999, (5) 75,000 to 99,999, and (6) >100,000 Nepali Rupees.

Industry Present: A dichotomous measure of whether or not any industry employing at least 10 people was present in the respondent's village at the time he or she left home (1=Yes, 0=No).

Industry Destroyed: A measure of whether or not such industries were destroyed during the conflict (1=Yes; 0=No).

Motorable Road: A dummy variable that measures if the respondent's village is connected by a motorable road.

Elevation: A dummy variable that measures the three topographic regions of the country -1 for southern plain, 2 for middle hills and 3 for the mountainous region of the country.

Social Networks: A measure of whether or not the community forest users group (CFUG), mothers group (Aama Samuha), and Small Farmers Development Program (SFDP) was present in the respondent village (1=Yes; 0=No).

Party changed: A dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondents admitted changing party affiliation during the period of the civil war.

Forced to participate: Dichotomous measure of whether (1) or not (0) the respondent was forced to participate in rebel activity or work for the state army.

Police Post Destroyed: A dichotomous measure of whether or not a police post stationed in the respondent's village was destroyed (1=Yes; 0=No)

CPN (M): A dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent indentified her or himself as a member or supporter of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).

Education: A measure of the level of education attained by the respondent prior to displacement. Subjects were asked to identify their level of education from the following 7 categories: 1) Illiterate, 2) Primary level, 3) Less than high school, 4) High school graduate, 5) Intermediate, 6) Bachelor degree, and 7) above a bachelor degree. A score of zero (0) is assigned to respondents who identified themselves as illiterate.

Gender: Female =0; Male =1.

Children: Number of children age 18 or younger living with the respondent.

Total Children: Number of children of all ages living in respondent's village.

Age: Actual age of the respondent as reported on the day of survey.

Actual Violence: Actual violence is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the respondent experienced any of the following physical or mental assaults during the conflict: (1) physical threat, (2) abduction, (3) physical and mental torture, (4) sexual harassment, (5) threat to quit national army, and (6) forced recruitment. Otherwise the variable is coded as zero.

Threat of Violence: This is a composite index that has been computed from information about the gravity of threat as perceived by each respondent on a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important) for the following six components: (1) physical threat intended at physically harming the respondent either by beating or some kind of physical assault, (2) political coercion such as forced conversion of political ideology or related acts intended at curtailing one's political freedom, (3) forced recruitment into either the rebel or state army, (4) murder of a family member, (5) physical and mental torture such as amputation, harassment, etc., and (6) sexual harassment.

Given that X_{ij}, $min(X_{ij})$, and $max(X_{ij})$ represent the actual, minimum and maximum gravity (on a scale of 1 through 4) of the i^{th} respondent (i = 1 to 1804) and the j^{th} component of threat (j = 1 to 6), then the $Threat\ of\ Violence_i$ is defined as

$$Threat\ of\ Violence_i = \sum_{j=1}^{6} \frac{X_{ij} - min(X_{ij})}{max(X_{ij}) - min(X_{ij})}.$$

The threat of violence index represents individual respondents' feeling about the level of physical and mental threat that they faced during the conflict. Equal weights have been accorded to all the 6 sources of threats mentioned above in computing the aggregate threat of violence index. Thus, the variable *THREAT OF VIOLENCE* in Tables 1 and 2 represents the gravity of threat to an individual with a possible range of 0 to 6, accounting for 6 different sources of threats. It gives us a broad measure of the perceived threat of violence to an individual, taking into account the variance in violence across the villages in Nepal.

Appendix III: Correlation Matrix (Subnational-level Analysis)

	Displaced	Economic Index	Cost of War	Social Network	Road (Kms)	Population Density (Logged)	Total Killed (Logged)	Abductions (Logged)	Total Killed+ Abductions (Logged)
Displaced	1								
Economic Index	-.32	1							
Cost of War	.19	-.34	1						
Social Network	-.15	-.22	.28	1					
Road (Kilometers)	-.08	.59	.13	-.08	1				
Population Density (Logged)	-.12	.41	.35	.08	.67	1			
Total Killed (Logged)	.39	-.42	.77	.28	.14	.27	1		
Abductions (Logged)	.31	-.62	.53	.35	-.19	-.08	.61	1	
Total Killed+Abductions (Logged)	.35	-.60	.69	.35	-.09	.06	.78	.95	1

Appendix IV: Correlation Matrix (Individual-level Analyses)

	IDP	Actual violence	Threat of Violence	Industry Present	Income	Lang (logged)	Crop/Animal Loss	Land Loss	Home Destroyed	Industry Destroyed	Social Networks
IDP	1										
Actual violence	.29	1									
Threat of Violence	.46	.15	1								
Industry Present	-.03	.06	-.05	1							
Income	-.02	-.06	.03	.05	1						
Lang (logged)	.06	.10	-.03	.11	.11	1					
Crop/ Animal Loss	.34	.04	.31	-.05	.0003	-.004	1				
Land Loss	.34	.02	.25	-.05	.04	.02	.68	1			
Home Destroy	.24	.09	.25	-.05	.01	.04	.32	.35	1		
Industry Destroy	.06	.04	.01	.58	.03	.06	.04	.01	.01	1	
Social Networks	-.06	.13	-.04	.13	.08	.04	-.13	-.17	-.08	.10	1
Motor Road	.03	.05	-.01	.27	.04	.21	-.16	-.16	-.02	.20	.24
Police Post Destroy	.10	.13	.04	.11	-.10	.17	-.05	-.02	.06	.18	-.06
CPN(M)	-.22	-.03	-.17	-.02	-.03	-.08	-.14	-.16	-.07	-.04	.03
Upper Caste	.03	-.12	.03	-.04	.15	-.11	.09	.08	.08	.01	.11
Dalits	.03	-.03	-.06	.21	-.10	-.09	-.14	-.13	-.07	.20	-.09
Other Castes	.05	.03	.08	-.03	-.08	.004	.04	-.02	.06	.02	.08
Total Children	-.05	.02	-.04	.02	-.05	-.03	.05	.004	.03	.08	.02
Education	.07	.02	.07	.09	.37	.17	-.09	-.03	.01	.08	18
Male	.07	.02	.04	.05	.06	-.01	.04	.02	-.01	.03	.08
Age	.04	.03	.02	.02	.07	.13	.08	.06	.12	.06	-.02
Age Squared	.05	.04	.03	.02	.06	.12	.08	.05	.12	.06	-.02

Appendix IV: Correlation Matrix (Individual-level Analyses, Contd.)

	Motor Road	Police Post Destroy	CPN(M)	Upper Caste	Dalits	Other Castes	Total Children	Education	Male	Age	Age Squared
Motor Road	1										
Police Post Destroy	.14	1									
CPN(M)	.07	-.05	1								
Upper Caste	.02	-.15	-.04	1							
Dalits	.06	.10	-.01	-.37	1						
Other Castes	-.03	.09	.02	-.14	-.05	1					
Total Children	-.07	.04	.07	-.04	.11	.11	1				
Education	.17	-.02	-.07	.18	-.08	.05	-.14	1			
Male	.03	-.01	.04	.07	.04	.05	.01	.26	1		
Age	.02	.03	-.10	.01	.01	.04	.10	-.22	.15	1	
Age Squared	.02	.03	-.10	.02	.003	.05	.08	-.22	.14	.98	1

Appendix IV: Nepal Forced Migration Survey-Questionnaire

SN:

Enumerator's information

Name: Gender: Age:

Caste: Education: Signature:

Statement of disclosure:

Greetings!

My name is …….. I am an employee at the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC)/Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies (NCCS). I am here to conduct a survey on behalf of Mr. Prakash Adhikari who is working on his doctorate degree in political science at the University of New Mexico in the United States. His study focuses on internal displacement in Nepal. He will aggregate the information gathered from this survey and use it in writing his PhD dissertation and future publications. He has sent a letter of commitment with me and promised to hold your responses fully confidential and not use them for any purposes other than a purely academic one. The letter also has information about Prakash and his research. I am providing you the letter.

Part I

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Place of interview:

District: VDC: Ward: Date:

Please put a check mark √ at the box next to the appropriate answer

1. Gender:
   a) Male ☐ Female ☐
2. Age: _____
3. Marital status:
   a) Single ☐
   b) Married with spouse ☐
   c) Married with children ☐
   d) Widow/widower with children ☐
   e) Widow/widower without children ☐

4. Ethnic group/caste:
   a) Bahun ☐
   b) Chettry ☐
   c) Dalit ☐
   d) Janajati ☐ Please specify caste:
   e) Newar ☐
   f) Others ☐ Please specify:

5. Religion:
   a) Hindu ☐
   b) Buddhist ☐
   c) Muslim ☐
   d) Christian ☐
   e) Others ☐ Please specify:

6. Education:

   Literate:
   a) YES ☐
   b) NO ☐

7. Highest level of formal education completed.
   a) Primary level ☐
   b) Less than SLC ☐
   c) SLC passed ☐
   d) Intermediate ☐
   e) Bachelor level ☐
   f) Above bachelor level ☐

SECTION B: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME STATUS

8. Are you currently employed?
   a) YES ☐
   b) NO ☐

   If YES, how long have you been in your current job?

9. What is your current occupation?
   a) Army ☐
   b) Armed Police Force ☐
   c) Police ☐
   d) Self employed/business ☐
   e) College teacher ☐
   f) School teacher ☐
   g) Student ☐
   h) Farmer ☐
   i) Ex-serviceman ☐
   j) Government job ☐
   k) Job in the private sector ☐
   l) Unemployed ☐
   m) Social worker ☐
   n) Other ☐ Please specify:

10. What was your occupation five years ago?
   a) Army ☐
   b) Armed Police Force ☐
   c) Police ☐
   d) Self employed ☐
   e) College teacher ☐
   f) School teacher ☐
   g) Student ☐
   h) Farmer ☐
   i) Ex-serviceman ☐
   j) Government job ☐
   k) Job in the private sector ☐
   l) Unemployed ☐
   m) Social worker ☐
   n) Other ☐ Please specify:

11. How many times have you changed jobs in the last two years?

12. Please indicate the category that includes your annual household income

a) Under Rs 25,000 ☐
b) Rs 25,000—34,999 ☐
c) Rs 35,000—49,999 ☐
d) Rs 50,000—74,999 ☐
e) Rs 75,000—99,999 ☐
f) Above Rs 100,000 ☐

13. Which of the following type of house do you own (or owned)?

a) Concrete ☐
b) Tin roofed ☐
c) Thatched ☐
d) Rented ☐
e) Don't have a house ☐

14. How much land do you currently own?

15. Has the amount of land you own increased in the last 5 years?

a) YES ☐
b) NO ☐

16. Do any of the following apply to you?

	YES	NO
a) A family member works in the British army	☐	☐
b) A family member works abroad (foreign employment)	☐	☐
c) You grow cash crops (cardamom, ginger, tea, apple, *rudrakshay*, etc.	☐	☐

If answers to all questions in 16 are NO, skip to Section C.

17. If answer to any questions in 16 is YES, approximately how much money do you get annually from these sources?

Rs. _____

SECTION C: POLITICAL ACTIVITY

18. How would you describe the level of your political activity during the last ten years?

a) Active now ☐

b) Active in the past ☐

c) Never actively participated in politics ☐

19. Which of the following political parties do you associate yourself with? Check √ all that apply.

a) Madhesi People's Rights Forum ☐

b) Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party ☐

c) Nepali Congress ☐

d) CPN (UML) ☐

e) RPP (Chand) ☐

f) RPP (Thapa) ☐

g) RPP ☐

h) NSP (Anandi Devi) ☐

i) NSP (Mandal) ☐

j) Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party ☐

k) CPN (Maoist) ☐

l) Samyukta Janamorcha, Nepal ☐

m) None ☐

n) Other Please specify:

20. Have you held any of the following party-related positions during the last ten years?

	NO	YES	Party
a) Central committee member	☐	☐	
b) District committee member	☐	☐	
c) VDC level	☐	☐	
d) Ward level	☐	☐	
e) Party cadre	☐	☐	
f) Others (please specify):			

21. Have you held any of the following public positions in the past?

	NO	YES	Past 10 years	Before 10 years	Political Party
a) Cabinet minister	☐	☐	☐	☐	
b) Member of parliament	☐	☐	☐	☐	
c) VDC chairman/*Pradhan*	☐	☐	☐	☐	
d) VDC vice chairman	☐	☐	☐	☐	
e) Ward chairman	☐	☐	☐	☐	
f) Ward member	☐	☐	☐	☐	
g) Mayor	☐	☐	☐	☐	
h) Deputy mayor	☐	☐	☐	☐	
i) VDC Secretary	☐	☐	☐	☐	
j) None of the above	☐	☐	☐	☐	
k) Others (please specify):					

22. Did you vote during the general election in 1999?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

If YES, which political party did you vote for?

23. Did you vote during the constituent assembly election in April 2008?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

Please name the political party you voted for:

Do not want to disclose ☐

SECTION D: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS & SOCIAL NETWORK

24. Which of the following were present in your village 10 years ago? Please check √ all that apply.

a) Industry that employs more than 10 people	☐
b) Hydropower or micro-hydropower projects	☐
c) Highway or road construction project	☐
d) Primary school(s)	☐
e) Lower secondary school(s)	☐
f) High school(s)	☐
g) Private boarding school(s)	☐
h) Telephone service	☐
i) Hospital	☐
j) Health post	☐
k) District headquarters	☐
l) Motorable road	☐

25. Which of the following were present or established in your VDC during the last 10 years? Please check √ all that apply.

	YES	Walking distance (hrs)
a) Security (police/army/APF) post	☐	
b) Cooperative organization	☐	
c) NGO (INSEC, Red Cross etc)	☐	
d) Community Forestry Users Group	☐	
e) *Aama Samuha*	☐	
f) Small Farmers Development Program	☐	
g) Other community groups (name them):		

26. Did you or a family member engage in any of the following activities during the last 10 years?

	You		Family member	
	YES	NO	YES	NO
a) Joined an NGO	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Formed an NGO	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Resigned from government job	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Sent family members to Kathmandu/other cities	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Joined community forestry users group	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Joined or formed any other social network groups	☐	☐	☐	☐
If YES, please mention the name:				

27. Did you ever seek help from the following?

	YES	NO	If YES, how often
a) Government	☐	☐	
b) NGO/INGO	☐	☐	
c) Political Parties	☐	☐	
d) Others (please mention):			

28. What has been the response from the government, NGO/INGO and other organizations to your request? Please describe.

SECTION E: EXPLORING THE ROOT CAUSE

29. How many times have you moved in the last three years? _____

30. Did you, or your immediate family member, or neighbor experience any of the following during the last ten years?

	You		**Your Immediate Family Members**		**Your Neighbors**	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
a) Job loss	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Land seizure	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Excessive demands for food and shelter	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Seizure of crop	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Seizure of cattle (buffalo, cow, goats, etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Forceful participation in cultural programs, political meetings etc. of CPN(M),or others	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g) Forced recruitment in the army	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

31. Have you done any of the following during the last ten year?

	YES	NO	If YES, how often?
a) Contributed money to CPN (M)	☐	☐	
b) Shared monthly salary with army	☐	☐	
c) Contributed part of your crop	☐	☐	
d) Changed partisanship	☐	☐	
e) Participated directly in Maoist movement	☐	☐	
f) Contributed family member to participate in the peoples war or the army	☐	☐	

32. How often were you interrogated by the security forces during the conflict?

a) Not at all ☐
b) Not too frequently ☐
c) Somewhat frequently ☐
d) Very frequently ☐

NOTE: Continue with Part II if the subject is still displaced or has settled; skip to Part III if the subject never left home; skip to Part IV if the subject has returned & resettled.

Part II

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE DISPLACED

Please put a check mark √ at the box next to the appropriate answer

1. Address

Permanent Address (origin)		**Present Address**	
District:		District:	
VDC:		VDC:	
Ward No.:		Ward No.:	

2. When were you first displaced?

   Year: _____

   Month: _____

3. Are you a new or old IDP?

   a) New ☐

   b) Old ☐

4. How many of your family members accompanied you when you left home? (**Exclude those born after displacement**).

   a) Alone ☐

   b) Male adults (not including children below 18) _____

   c) Female adults (not including children below 18)_____

   d) Children below the age of 18 _____

5. Please provide the following information about children that accompanied you? **DO NOT** mention their names.

	Age (in years)	Sex		Attending school?		
		Boy	Girl	YES	NO	If YES, grade
Child 1		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 2		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 3		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 4		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 5		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 5		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 6		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 7		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 8		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 9		☐	☐	☐	☐	

6. How many children are living with you now?

7. Where do you live now?
   a) IDP camp ☐
   b) With relatives ☐
   c) Rented house ☐
   d) Own (new) house ☐
   e) Back at original home ☐
   f) Other ☐ Please specify:

8. If living in own new house, how long have you owned the house?

9. How many children were born since you have been displaced?

   Female: _____

   Male: _____

10. Provide the following information about children that were born since you have been displaced:

	Age	Sex		Attending school?		
		Boy	Girl	Yes	No	If YES, grade
Child 1		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 2		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 3		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 4		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 5		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 5		☐	☐	☐	☐	

SECTION B: UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF FLIGHT

11. Who displaced you?
    a) State ☐
    b) Maoists ☐
    c) Others ☐ Please specify:

12. Principal causes of displacement. Please put a check mark √ next to all that apply (please describe the details in Annex A)

a) Lack of economic opportunities	☐
b) Job loss	☐
c) Land seizure	☐
d) Excessive demand for food and shelter	☐
e) Seizure of crop	☐
f) Seizure of cattle	☐
g) Physical threat	☐
h) Political coercion	☐
i) Forced recruitment in army	☐
j) Destruction of home	☐
k) Murder of family member	☐
l) Physical and mental torture	☐
m) Sexual harassment	☐
n) Other (please specify):	

13. Did your village experience any of the following during the civil war?

	YES	NO
a) Destruction and/or closure of industry/factory	☐	☐
b) Destruction of bridge	☐	☐
c) Destruction of VDC building	☐	☐
d) Destruction of police posts	☐	☐
e) Closure and/or destruction of dam	☐	☐

14. How important were the following reasons behind your decision to leave?

	Not Important at All	Not Too Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
	1	2	3	4
a) Lack of economic opportunities	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Job loss	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Land seizure	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Excessive demand for food & shelter	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Seizure of crop	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Seizure of cattle	☐	☐	☐	☐
g) Physical threat	☐	☐	☐	☐
h) Political coercion	☐	☐	☐	☐
i) Forced recruitment in army	☐	☐	☐	☐
j) Destruction of home	☐	☐	☐	☐
k) Murder of family member	☐	☐	☐	☐
l) Physical and mental torture	☐	☐	☐	☐
m) Sexual harassment	☐	☐	☐	☐
n) Other (please specify):				

15. Over the last ten years, have you or your immediate family members, or neighbors experienced the following?

	You		Your Immediate family members		Your neighbors	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
a) Physical threat	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Abduction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Forced recruitment in army	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Physical and mental torture	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Sexual harassment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Threatened if you did not quit the army	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

16. Which of the following had the most impact on your decision to leave?

	First Choice	Second Choice	Third Choice
a) Lack of economic opportunities (such as job loss, land seizure, etc.)	☐	☐	☐
b) Physical threat	☐	☐	☐
c) Threat to political freedom	☐	☐	☐

SECTION C: PHYSICAL TERRAIN

17. How did you leave your village? Check √ all that apply.

	Means	Hours	Minutes
a) On foot	☐		
b) By bus	☐		
c) By airplane	☐		
d) On ambulance	☐		
e) By truck	☐		
f) By train	☐		
g) By other means (please specify):			

18. Which of the following best describe the transportation link to your village? Check √ all that apply.

a) Paved motorable road ☐

b) Graveled road ☐

c) A trail ☐

19. Do any of the following apply to your village?

a) Surrounded by river (island/delta) ☐

b) You have to cross a large river before reaching home ☐

20. How significant were the following difficulties in affecting your ability to leave?

	Not at All Significant	Not Too Significant	Somewhat Significant	Very Significant
	1	2	3	4
a) Lack or distance of motorable road from the village	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Rough mountainous terrain	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Season of the year (landslide, snow, flood etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐

SECTION D: COPING

21. Do you believe you had a choice as to whether or not to leave your village?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

If the answer is YES, please explain what would have helped you stay behind:

22. Did you consider other options such as negotiating with the Maoists or the army before leaving home?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

If the answer is YES, please describe what other options were considered:

23. Did any of the following directly affect your decision to flee?

	YES	NO
a) Being asked to contribute money	☐	☐
b) Being asked to share part of your monthly salary	☐	☐
c) Being asked to contribute part of your crop	☐	☐
d) Being asked to change partisanship	☐	☐
e) Being asked to join armies (either side)	☐	☐
f) Pressure to send family member to serve armies (either side)	☐	☐

24. If you contributed money, do you believe it got to the intended party?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

25. To what extent do you think the following could have helped you to stay in your village?

	Not Helpful At All	Not Too Helpful	Somewhat Helpful	Very Helpful
	1	2	3	4
a) Contributing money	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Sharing part of the monthly salary	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Contributing part of the crop	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Changing partisanship	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Joining army (either side)	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Family member's joining the army (either side)	☐	☐	☐	☐

SECTION E: RESETTLEMENT

26. Did you do any of the following before leaving your village? Check ✓ all that apply.

	YES	NO
a) Sold landed property	☐	☐
b) You ran business and moved it elsewhere	☐	☐
c) Your were/are employed and transferred job	☐	☐
d) Bought property in Kathmandu/other cities	☐	☐
e) Sought help from family members, friends, & relatives living in Kathmandu/other cities	☐	☐
f) Sought and received help from NGO for resettlement	☐	☐
g) Sought and received help from government for resettlement	☐	☐

27. How important were the following in contributing to your <u>ability</u> to leave home?

	Not at all Important	Not Too Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
	1	2	3	4
a) Owned land and was able to sell before leaving home	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Ran business and was able to move it elsewhere	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Had a job and was able to get transferred	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Had property in Kathmandu/other cities as alternative	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Help from family members, friends, & relatives in Kathmandu/other cities	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Help from NGO	☐	☐	☐	☐
g) Help from government	☐	☐	☐	☐

SECTION F: RETURN/LIMBO

28. Did you consider the option of going to India or another country?

a) YES ☐ b) NO ☐

29. How important were the following behind your decision to remain in Nepal instead of going to India or another country?

	Not at all Important	Not Too Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
	1	2	3	4
a) Did not want to be called a refugee	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Did not have acquaintances	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Could not afford to pay bus/train/air fare	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Thought situation would improve soon	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Age –I was worried about finding a job	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) For fear of physical safety	☐	☐	☐	☐
g) I or my family member found a job here	☐	☐	☐	☐
h) Decided to stay behind and seek help from government	☐	☐	☐	☐

30. Are there any reasons other than the above ones behind your decision to remain in Nepal instead of going to India or another country?

_____

31. Do you want to return home?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

32. Why do you **NOT** want to return home? Check √ all that applies.

a) Do not feel safe to return (fear of prosecution) ☐
b) Destruction of home and property ☐
c) Land seized ☐
d) Cannot afford to pay transportation fare ☐
e) Children do not want to go back ☐
f) For fear of loosing children's education ☐
g) Lack of political stability ☐
h) Lack of employment and economic opportunities ☐
i) Others ☐

33. How likely are you to go back under the following conditions?

	Not Likely at all	Not Too Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
	1	2	3	4
a) Improvement in security	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Improvement in economic opportunities	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Return of land	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Reconstruction of your home	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) General elections/ Political stability	☐	☐	☐	☐

Part III

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND

Please put a check mark √ at the box next to the appropriate answer

1. Were you ever displaced?
   a) YES ☐
   b) NO ☐

2. Family description.
   a) Male adults (not including children below 18) _____
   b) Female adults (not including children below 18)_____
   c) Children below the age of 18 _____

3. Please provide the following information about your children. **DO NOT** mention their names.

	Age	Sex		Attending school?		
		Boy	Girl	YES	NO	If YES, grade
Child 1		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 2		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 3		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 4		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 5		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 5		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 6		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 7		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 8		☐	☐	☐	☐	
Child 9		☐	☐	☐	☐	

4. How many children are living with you now?

5. Where do you live now?
   a. Rented house ☐
   b. Own house ☐

6. If living in your own house, how long have you owned it?

SECTION B: UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF FLIGHT

7. Some of your neighbors and villagers left home and became IDPs. But you were able to stay put. Who do you think helped the most in making it possible for you to stay behind? (Please describe the details in Annex B).
   a) State ☐
   b) Maoists ☐
   c) Others ☐ Please specify: _____

8. Did you experience any of the followings during the civil war? Please put a check mark √ next to all that apply.

a) Lack of economic opportunities	☐
b) Job loss	☐
c) Land seizure	☐
d) Excessive demand for food and shelter	☐
e) Seizure of crop	☐
f) Seizure of cattle	☐
g) Physical threat	☐
h) Political coercion	☐
i) Forced recruitment in army	☐
j) Destruction of home	☐
k) Murder of family member	☐
l) Physical and mental torture	☐
m) Sexual harassment	☐
n) Other (please specify):	

9. Did your village experience any of the followings during the civil war?

	YES	NO
a. Destruction and/or closure of industry/factory	☐	☐
b. Destruction of bridge	☐	☐
c. Destruction of VDC building	☐	☐
d. Destruction of police posts	☐	☐
e. Closure and/or destruction of dams	☐	☐
f. Stoppage of a construction project	☐	☐

10. How important were the following in affecting your decision to stay behind?

	Not Important at All	Not Too important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
	1	2	3	4
a) Availability of economic opportunities	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Job security	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Family pressure	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Land & property	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Ability to meet demand for food & shelter	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Abundant production of crop	☐	☐	☐	☐
g) Plenty of cattle (*cattle farm*)	☐	☐	☐	☐
h) Physical security	☐	☐	☐	☐
i) Lack of political coercion	☐	☐	☐	☐
j) Absence of forced recruitment in army	☐	☐	☐	☐
k) Non destruction of home	☐	☐	☐	☐
l) No murder of family member	☐	☐	☐	☐
m) No physical and mental torture	☐	☐	☐	☐
n) No harassment	☐	☐	☐	☐
o) Other (please specify):				

11. Which of the following had the most impact in your decision to stay behind? Choose three most important reasons.

	First Choice	Second Choice	Third Choice
a) Availability of economic opportunities	☐	☐	☐
b) Job security	☐	☐	☐
c) Family pressure	☐	☐	☐
d) Land & property	☐	☐	☐
e) Ability to meet demand for food & shelter	☐	☐	☐
f) Abundant production of crop	☐	☐	☐
g) Plenty of cattle (*cattle farm*)	☐	☐	☐
h) Physical security	☐	☐	☐
i) Lack of political coercion	☐	☐	☐
j) Absence of forced recruitment in army	☐	☐	☐
k) Non destruction of home	☐	☐	☐
l) No murder of family member	☐	☐	☐
m) No physical and mental torture	☐	☐	☐
n) No harassment	☐	☐	☐

12. Over the last ten years, have you or your immediate family members, or neighbors experienced the following?

	You		Your Immediate family members		Your neighbors	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
a) Physical threat	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Abduction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Forced recruitment in army	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Physical and mental torture	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Sexual harassment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Threatened if you did not to quit the army	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

SECTION C: PHYSICAL TERRAIN

13. Which of the following best describe the transportation link to your village? Check √ all that apply

    a) Paved motorable road ☐

    b) Graveled road ☐

    c) A trail ☐

14. Do any of the following apply to your village?

    a) Surrounded by river (island/delta) ☐

    b) You have to cross a large river before reaching home ☐

    c) None of the above ☐

15. How significant were the following difficulties in affecting your decision to stay behind?

	Not Significant at All	Not Too Significant	Somewhat Significant	Very Significant
	1	2	3	4
a) Lack or distance of motorable road from the village	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Rough mountainous terrain	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Season of the year (landslide, snow, flood etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐

SECTION D: COPING

16. Did you ever consider leaving your village during the conflict?

    a) YES ☐

    b) NO ☐

    If YES, which of the following would have helped you the most to leave your village? Check √ all that apply

    a) Availability of motorable road in the village ☐

    b) Lack of the difficulty created my mountainous terrain ☐

    c) Fair weather and ease of traveling ☐

    d) Availability of money to pay air/bus fare ☐

    e) Having a place to go ☐

    f) Warning not to leave VDC blockade ☐

    Please explain what helped you to stay behind **OR** prevented you from leaving.

17. Did you use options such as negotiating with the Maoists or the army in making a decision to stay behind?

    a) YES ☐

    b) NO ☐

    Please describe what other options were considered:

18. Did you or your immediate family member do any of the following during the civil war?

	You		Your Immediate Family Members		
	YES	NO	YES	NO	If YES, how often
a) Contribute money	☐	☐	☐	☐	
b) Share part of your monthly salary	☐	☐	☐	☐	
c) Contribute part of your crop	☐	☐	☐	☐	
d) Change partisanship	☐	☐	☐	☐	
e) Join armies (either side)	☐	☐	☐	☐	
f) Send a family member to serve the armies (either side)	☐	☐	☐	☐	

19. If you contributed money, do you believe it got to the intended party?

a) YES ☐

b) NO ☐

Please provide the detail:

20. To what extent do you think the following helped you to stay in your village?

	Not Helpful at All	Not Too Helpful	Somewhat Helpful	Very Helpful
	1	2	3	4
a) Contributing money	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Sharing part of monthly salary	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Contributing part of crop	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Changing partisanship	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Joining army (either side)	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) Family member's joining the army (either side)	☐	☐	☐	☐

21. Did you do any of the following over the last ten years? Check √ all that apply.

	YES	NO
a) Sold landed property	☐	☐
b) You ran business and moved it elsewhere	☐	☐
c) Your were/are employed and transferred job	☐	☐
d) Bought property in Kathmandu/other cities	☐	☐
e) Sought help from family members, friends, & relatives living in Kathmandu/other cities	☐	☐
f) Sought and received help from NGOs	☐	☐
g) Sought and received help from government	☐	☐

22. How important were the following behind your decision to remain back?

	Not Important at All	Not Too Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
	1	2	3	4
a) Did not want to be called an IDP	☐	☐	☐	☐
b) Did not have family or acquaintances in Kathmandu or other cities	☐	☐	☐	☐
c) Could not afford to pay bus/train fare	☐	☐	☐	☐
d) Thought situation would improve soon	☐	☐	☐	☐
e) Age –I was worried about finding a job	☐	☐	☐	☐
f) For fear of physical safety	☐	☐	☐	☐
g) I or my family member had a job here	☐	☐	☐	☐
h) Decided to stay behind and seek help from government	☐	☐	☐	☐

23. Are there any reasons other than the above ones behind your decision to stay behind?

_____

_____

_____

24. Did you ever apply for protection or reparation?

a) YES ☐ b) NO ☐

25. How would you describe your experience from the civil war in Nepal?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Thank you for your time and participation in this survey.