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Understanding Intersections And Impact: Planning, Police Violence, And Reform

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**UNDERSTANDING INTERSECTIONS AND IMPACT: PLANNING, POLICE
VIOLENCE, AND REFORM**

by

Rachel Hassna

B.A. Global Studies, California State University, Monterey Bay, 2009

THESIS

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UNDERSTANDING INTERSECTIONS AND IMPACT: PLANNING, POLICE VIOLENCE, AND REFORM

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ABSTRACT

Although public safety has long been an integral aspect of planning, issues such as police violence and reform have been left to other professions and fields of study. Despite the fact that planning policy is executed and enforced by police power, and despite the fact that planning has a lengthy history of perpetuating structural inequality that condemns marginalized communities to higher rates of police violence and premature death, planners are rarely encouraged to consider the intersections of planning and police violence. By reviewing the history of planning and policing as interconnected mechanisms of social engineering and control, this research attempts to broaden the scope of responsibility for planners to include police violence and reform. This research will examine police-community relations meetings as a reform approach and demonstrate that while police-community meetings have been praised as progressive and innovative reform, city officials and police administrators have actually been using processes like the collaborative as far back as the 1960s. This research specifically examines policing in Albuquerque and the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations launched by the City of Albuquerque as a planning process ostensibly to address police violence. However, by analyzing power dynamics embedded within the design, process and participation of the ACPCR, this research will argue the Albuquerque collaborative served to shore up police legitimacy rather than transform policing as it was practiced in Albuquerque.

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GLOSSARY

APD	Albuquerque Police Department
ACPCR	Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations (colloquially referred to as "The Collaborative," or the ACPCR)
CPD	Cincinnati Police Department
CPCRC	Cincinnati's Police-Community Relations Collaborative
DOJ	The United States Department of Justice
FHA	The United States Federal Housing Administration
ISR	Institute for Social Research at the University of New Mexico
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics teams, refers to special branches of US law enforcement which uses specialized military equipment and tactics.

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INTRODUCTION

In 2016, approximately 1,080 people were killed by American law enforcement, averaging around three people per day.[1] Of those killed, about 43% were people of color, and roughly 15% were unarmed.[2] According to the watchdog website Mapping Police Violence, in 2015 30% of people of color killed by police were unarmed. In an article featured by The Guardian, journalist Isabel Wilkerson found current statistics of police shootings of black men are on par with lynching statistics from the early twentieth century.[3] Although media coverage tends to focus on victimization of black men, intersectional analyses have shown First Nations communities, Latinx, women of color and the LGBTQ community are also at unusually high risk of police violence. Moreover, approximately 1 of every 4 persons killed by police suffers from severe mental illness. Police violence disproportionately impacts people of color, the poor, or people struggling with mental illness, representing a public health crisis for these marginalized communities.[4] In reaction to daily officer-involved shootings, protests across the country have galvanized public debate on police violence and the need for reform. Law enforcement and politicians alike consistently respond to public outrage by framing the issue of police violence as mere isolated incidents resulting from a "few bad apples." The Obama Administration's Task Force on 21st Century Policing characterized rising tensions as a "breakdown in trust" and "rifts in relationships," recommending "inclusive community-based initiatives" to restore trust and

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[1] "The Counted: People Killed by Police in the United States – Interactive | US News | The Guardian." 2015. Web. 10 Mar. 2016.

[2] Ibid

[3] Wilkerson, I. "Mike Brown's Shooting and Jim Crow Lynchings Have Too Much in Common. It's Time for America to Own up." 25 Aug. 2014. Web.

[4] Garcia, J, and M Sharif. "Black Lives Matter: A Commentary on Racism and Public Health." *American Journal of Public Health* 105.8 (2015): 27–30. Print.

legitimacy.[5] However, critics of law enforcement rebuked the administration's position, pointing out firstly that trust between police and the communities who have historically bore the brunt of police violence never existed to begin with. And secondly, the role of law enforcement within disenfranchised communities was never to serve or protect, but rather control and incriminate. In Albuquerque, New Mexico from 2010 to 2014, 41 people were shot by Albuquerque police officers, and 28 of those shootings resulted in loss of life. To offer some perspective, Albuquerque, a city of roughly half a million people was experiencing eight times more officer-involved shootings than New York City, a city of 8.5 million people.[6] In 2014, Albuquerque police shootings accounted for 20% of total homicides in the city.[7] Broaden the focus to include officer-involved killings from all agencies (Sheriff and Marshals Service), the number increases to 30% of total homicides were committed by law enforcement.[8] In fact, a study conducted by the Center for Disease Control found that between 2000-2010 the most distinctive cause of death in New Mexico was "legal interventions" or "injuries inflicted by the law enforcement or other law-enforcing agents."[9] In the spring of 2014, while already under federal investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for complaints of excessive force, Albuquerque police shot and killed a mentally ill homeless man camping in the foothills of the Sandia Mountains. Video capturing the man's brutal death spurred fury and protest across the city. Not long after, the DOJ

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[5]*Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015. Print.

[6] Pinto, Nick. "When Cops Break Bad: Albuquerque's Police Force Gone Wild." *Rolling Stone*. 2015. Web. 20 Jan. 2015.

[7] "Police Violence Reports." *Mapping Police Violence*. 2015. Web.

[8] Ibid

[9] "The Most Distinctive Causes of Death by State, 2001-2010." *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*. 2016. Web. 20 Jan. 2016.

released a report finding, among many things, a pattern practice of excessive use of fatal force by the Albuquerque Police Department. The mayor's office replied to the report by issuing a brief that denied each and every allegation, 18 denials in total.[10]

Most Distinctive Causes of Death

A. Tuberculosis
B. Meningococcal infection
C. Septicemia
D. Syphilis
E. Human immunodeficiency virus
F. Other and unspecified malignant neoplasms of lymphoid, hematopoietic and related tissue
G. Other nutritional deficiencies
H. Other acute ischemic heart diseases
I. Atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, so described
J. Atherosclerosis
K. Influenza
L. Other and unspecified acute lower respiratory infections
M. Pneumoconioses and chemical effects
N. Acute and rapidly progressive nephritic and nephrotic syndrome
O. Other disorders of kidney
P. Hyperplasia of prostate
Q. Inflammatory diseases of female pelvic organs
R. Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified
S. Water, air and space, and other and unspecified transport accidents and their sequelae
T. Accidental discharge of firearms
U. Legal intervention
V. Discharge of firearms, undetermined intent
W. Other and unspecified events of undetermined intent and their sequelae

Data source:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research

Image 1: "Most Distinctive Causes of Death by State, 2001-2010" (Boscoe & Pradhan, 2015)

It is within this context of indifference that the mayor and city council launched the

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[10]Correia, David. "In Federal Court Mayor Richard Berry Denies DOJ's Allegations of Wrongdoing by APD." *La Jicarita*. 2014. Web.

"Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations (colloquially referred to as "The

Collaborative," or the ACPCR)." At a press conference, city officials described the ACPCR as a

"collaborative, not top down" process that consisted of a "series of dialogues focused on creating

a sustainable action plan to help transform police-community relations." However, before

dialogue meetings even started, the collaborative was criticized as a disingenuous distraction

rather than meaningful accountability. Once underway, criticism of the collaborative only grew

as community residents complained the process lacked transparency, outreach and engagement.

For instance, though much of APD's violence occurred in the southeast and southwest quadrants

of the city, many dialogue meetings were hosted in the northeast heights. Meeting times, dates,

and locations shifted from one week to the next, services like transportation and childcare were

not offered or even considered, and meeting discussion was restricted to finding solutions for

problems not defined. As the collaborative unfolded and confusion flourished, the questions

guiding this research began to emerge. If the official position was that there was no problem with

APD, what did the collaborative actually aim to do? Where did this approach to police-

community relations come from? What accounted for the process? Was it merely poorly

planned? Or, was the negligence intentional? And lastly, when it comes to police violence, what

role do planners have in reform?

Although public safety has long been an integral aspect of planning, issues such as police

violence and reform have been left to other professions and fields of study. Furthermore, despite

the fact that planning policy is executed and enforced by police power, and despite the fact that

planning has a lengthy history of perpetuating structural inequality that condemns marginalized

communities to higher rates of police violence and premature death, planners are rarely

encouraged to consider the intersections of planning and police violence. By reviewing the

history of planning and policing as interconnected mechanisms of social engineering and control, this research attempts to broaden the scope of responsibility for planners to include police violence and reform. This research will demonstrate that while police-community meetings have been praised as progressive and innovative reform, city officials and police administrators have actually been using processes like the collaborative as far back as the 1960s. This research specifically examines policing in Albuquerque and the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations launched by the City of Albuquerque as a planning process ostensibly to address police violence. However, by analyzing power dynamics embedded within the design, process and participation of the ACPCR, this research will argue the Albuquerque collaborative served to shore up police legitimacy rather than transform policing as it was practiced in Albuquerque.

Methodology

        To quote professor of qualitative research and feminist methodology, Patti Lather, "just as there is no neutral education there is no neutral research." From the start, this research applied a feminist lens with the aim of producing what Lather calls "unabashedly ideological research" that challenges and changes the status quo.[11] To understand with depth the power dynamics embedded within the planning and policing policy examined in this paper, this research employed the following questions: Whose interests were served? Whose interests were silenced? What are the implications for those with the least power? Recognizing my own social location and subject position, (feminist, woman, graduate student, etc.), this research adopts the position that objectivity is a myth and so this research does not aim to adhere to a positivist paradigm of qualitative research, or research in general. Therefore, this research is interested in revealing the subjectivity of planning and policing policy.

Qualitative Data

        From October 2014 to May 2015, I worked with the Institute for Social Research (ISR), a research organization at the University of New Mexico. The ISR offers program evaluation and policy research in New Mexico, and was tasked with program evaluation of the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations. As a graduate research assistant, my primary responsibilities included attending collaborative meetings, collecting field data, and compiling observational and comparative reports. Out of 23 total meetings, I was present for 16. The meetings were mostly open to the public, however, of the 16 meetings I attended, 3 were

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[11]Lather, Patti. "Fertile Obsession: Validity after Poststructuralism." *The Sociological Quarterly* 34.4 (1993): 673–693. Web.

privately held sessions. In addition to qualitative data, I collected all literature given out at meetings.

For each of the 16 meetings, I recorded most interactions from pre-dialogue meeting mingling to post-dialogue lingering. These interactions included, but were not limited to, meeting introductions and ground rules, participant-to-participant interactions and body language, as well as participant and facilitator interactions. I used classic participatory observational methods that yielded approximately 80 pages of field notes. Participants were assigned numerical identifiers to protect privacy. Participants were asked by city officials to register prior to the meeting date in order to staff dialogue meetings with the appropriate number of facilitators. In some cases, if there were numerous participants, the meeting was split up into smaller sub-groups, each group containing at least two facilitators. One facilitator would record notes while the other facilitator guided discussion. The ISR often assigned more than one researcher to attend. However, on occasion there was insufficient ISR staff coverage for some meetings, or some sub-groups. For this reason, and for other triangulation purposes, this research utilizes reports produced by facilitators. Participants were told facilitator reports were available upon request. Facilitator reports used in this research were acquired through the request of members of the public.

The ISR did not have an established evaluation research protocol; research focus and guidelines were developed through an iterative process. This includes guidelines for the collection of specific qualitative data like participant performance, body language, or the collection of quantitative data like demography. Initially I attempted to track basic demography like gender, race, and age, as well as uniformed participants (law enforcement, first responders, etc). However, neither the city officials responsible for organizing the collaborative nor ISR

leadership identified demographics as an important source of data to collect. All of my field notes, as well as facilitator notes acquired by the public, were coded and analyzed with the qualitative data software Atlas T.I. This process helped to expose, and weigh the value of, various themes raised in dialogues.

Literature Analysis

Within the meetings, knowledge was disseminated not only in the form of dialogue but also through printed literature. For example, Albuquerque city staff provided a guide for discussion, as well as a meeting calendar, and a meeting evaluation form. Occasionally the APD provided informational brochures. Some meeting participants brought in their own literature to share with the larger group. Materials provided at the meetings were analyzed by looking at how information is presented, who the literature was created by, what audience the literature aimed to engage, and what, if any, issues are raised in the literature.

Quantitative Data

Attendance: An obvious way of analyzing the reception and momentum of the meetings is through participation and attendance. The Albuquerque collaborative was modeled after a process that took place in Cincinnati. Cincinnati's collaborative has been praised as a model primarily because participation was considered high, with around 3,000 people participating in surveys and/or meetings. The ISR produced a final report for the city offering amongst other things, an accounting of the number of unique meeting participants, as well as an estimate of repeat participants.

CHAPTER 1: THE LONG HISTORY OF PLANNING AND POLICING

To understand the Albuquerque collaborative process, this research looks to planning theory and history as a guide. How can planning inform a thorough analysis of the nature of the Albuquerque collaborative process, who it served, and who it silenced? In the essay, "High Authoritarian Modernism," scholar James C. Scott opens his examination of state power with a metaphor on maps, emphasizing that although maps chart out seemingly ordinary information, what and who is represented in the map is just as telling as what and who is missing from the map. Understanding who is performing the *charting* versus who is being *charted* can expose telling power dynamics as well. Because, as Scott points out, "transformative power resides not in the map, of course, but rather in the power possessed by those who deploy the perspective of that particular map." Maps, like blueprints and zoning ordinances, illustrate more than just graphic representations of space, they reveal the power structure and value system of those deploying plans and policies in our cities.

The modernist state, according to Scott, was rooted in Western industrialization and guided by a philosophy of progress and growth. Science, technology, rationality, and order were the means to a utopian end of "control over nature including human nature." "The path from description to prescription" was paved, standardized, and future-fixated. Tradition and the natural world were relics of the past and "the past is an impediment, a history that must be transcended." To actualize progress and order the state necessitated three things: 1. A vast administrative apparatus to count and track everything and everyone. 2. Absolute use of state power to realize plans. 3. An ineffectual citizenry to minimize resistance. In other words, the state in it's infinite wisdom and power, projected values, norms, and agendas on a vulnerable civil society. Because progress and order could be inserted anywhere, social engineering of the human experience

stretched from the personal to the public. Order of this scale, in which physical and social space were arranged according to a particular set of values and norms, required not only a monopoly on power but also the use of force. Giving rise to what Neocleous' refers to as the "regimented" or "well-ordered police state." As a result, police jurisdiction encompassed "everything that might be necessary to maintain order within a community."[12]

Jane Jacobs might have summarized the modernist planning approach as "top-down planning," wherein communities were planned upon, not planned with.[13] Power dynamics were hierarchical and reinforced through knowledge production and application. The state and state actors, be they politicians, academics, or professionals, claimed to be acting in the best interest of communities, whether or not communities agree. In the interest of time, this kind of planning process limited public input as the public lacks the expertise and skills necessary to make and

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[12]Neocleous, M. *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power*. Pluto Press, 2000. Print.

"Police Violence Reports." *Mapping Police Violence*. 2015. Web.

[13] Greenspan, Elizabeth. "Top-Down, Bottom-Up Urban Design." *The New Yorker*. N.p., 2016. Web.

achieve plans. Le Corbusier, considered one of the most influential architects and urban planners of the modernist movement, is credited with saying, "Revise the shelter and one improves the people." In hindsight, critics contend Le Corbusier and the modernist movement "can now be better understood as equal parts optimistic and fascistic."[14] Systems, institutions and policy, Scott warned, can become vectors of repression and oppression.

Image 2: Detroit Mayor Mayor Albert Cobo (1950-1957) pointing to areas slated for redevelopment ("Detroit: The Blood that Never Dried", 2017)

The extensive federal urban renewal and revitalization projects of the postwar era personified the modernist paradigm. With the Housing Act of 1949 and 1954, Congress ratified a 25 year plan to modernize cities by focusing on slum clearance and redevelopment. Police power and eminent domain gave politicians and planners the authority to execute massive urban renewal projects. Although "police power" is commonly regarded as a legal term defining the state's ability to regulate, protect, and/or advance "the health, morals, safety or general welfare of the community," it is also instructive to consider police power as a literal mechanism used to dispatch plans and enforce laws. Throughout history, police have been complacent administrators of destructive and discriminatory laws. During this period of redevelopment, officers were regularly deployed to intimidate, harass, and evict tenants.[15] Accomplishing redevelopment projects meant families were dispossessed, communities uprooted, and whole neighborhoods

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[14] Hill Lamont, Marc. *Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond*. New York, NY: Atria Books. Print.

[15] Ibid

flattened to build luxury apartments, corporate buildings, and highways. Many who lost

businesses or homes, did not receive adequate compensation or relocation assistance.[16]

Urban renewal, many planning scholars recount, did not operate in a vacuum. The

perception of poor neighborhoods as "slums" underpinned sweeping "regenerative" development

policy, which disproportionately destroyed low-income communities of color. By 1966, Urban

Renewal projects were responsible for leveling approximately 400,000 housing units, over

300,000 families were displaced, half of which were people of color.[17][18] Though legislation

specified for every housing unit demolished a new unit would replace it, many of the displaced

simply relocated to other impoverished neighborhoods, exacerbating congestion and poverty.

Furthermore, as part of the renewal vision, massive high-rise public housing projects were

erected in place of dilapidated tenements. Towering housing structures packed in thousands of

tenants, concentrating poverty like never before. Containment in public housing projects also

affected how marginalized communities were policed, in that public housing became spaces of

surveillance and persecution.[19]

While the Housing Act transformed urban cores, the Federal Housing Administration

(FHA) financed white flight to the suburbs. White flight, the out-migration of white Americans

from increasingly diverse inner cities to more homogenous, commuter belts, accelerated

suburbanization and expansion of the highway system. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956

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[16] Bernstein, Andrea et al. "Transportation Nation | Back of the Bus: Race, Mass Transit and Inequality." WNYC.   Web. 20 Apr. 2015.

[17] Collins, W. J., and K. L. Sister. "The Economic Effects of Slum Clearance and Urban in the United States." Vanderbilt University. 1-42, Sept. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.

[18] Bullard, Robert D. *The Black Metropolis in the Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. Print.

[19]Denvir, D. "Criminalizing the Hustle: Policing Poor Peoples Survival Strategies from Eric Garner to Alton Sterling." 2016. Web.

provided the roads for white, middle class America to commute easily from sanitary suburbs into "cleaner" city centers for work and retail.[20] Massive highway plans were often located in the heart of black neighborhoods. Highway construction bisected whole communities and devastated prosperous economic corridors. Whereas the roads and highway system favored and freed white America, transportation planning ostracized and imprisoned black communities as thoroughfares became physical manifestations of color and containment lines.

It is within this context of planning and policing, whereby both systems worked together to evict, segregate, and control that police violence catalyzed some 300 riots in predominately black communities between 1964-1972.[21] In response to the rebellions, President Johnson blamed poverty as the culprit justifying the administration's urban renewal programs. However, critics of Johnson's poverty reduction initiatives, namely Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and James Baldwin, noted that the razing of poor and black communities under the guise of "renewal" or "revitalization" to the detriment of people of color, actually led to further instability within black communities.[22] As police in the south enforced Jim Crow, northern police enforced urban renewal evictions or what Baldwin aptly termed "Negro Removal."[23]

The Johnson administration responded to waning public and political support of urban renewal by creating the Model Cities program as part of the War on Poverty. Model Cities aimed

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[20] Avila, Erica, and Mark H. Rose. "Race, Culture, Politics, and Urban Renewal: An Introduction." *Journal of Urban History* 35.3 (2009): 335–347. Print.

[21] Camp, Jordan T., and Christina Heatherton. "Thug Nation: On State Violence and Disposability." *Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter*. London: Verso. 15–33. Print.

[22] Hill Lamont, Marc. *Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond*. New York, NY: Atria Books. Print.

[23] Baldwin, James. *Conversations with James Baldwin*. Jackson and London: University Press of Mississippi, 1989. Print.

to address the "physical, economic, social, educational, and health needs experienced by residents of the most chronically impoverished urban neighborhoods."[24] However, many have characterized Model Cities as an ambitious program, too ambitious considering the scope and scale of the program's mission, which necessitated much more funding than was allocated. At the same time, in reaction to increasing tension between law enforcement and marginalized communities, the Johnson administration released the 1967 report on the police, called the *Task Force Report: The Police*. The report largely focused on the various challenges police faced and barely mentioned misconduct or abuse of power as contributing to the social unrest of that time.[25] The report did introduce community planning and policing as a method of stemming crime. According to the report, bringing the community into policing would not only serve crime reduction goals, but also provided opportunities for good public relations as the rebellions or "riots" represented a crisis of legitimacy for law enforcement.

By the time the report was published, approximately 38% of cities with populations of over 100,000 were experimenting with various "police-community relations" measures. Cities piloting police-community relations measures included San Francisco, Houston, Newark, Dayton, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Richmond, St. Louis, and the list goes on.[26][27] Police-community relations took two primary forms: 1. "Team-policing" wherein police officers were designated to regular beats (neighborhoods) under the premise that police officers could build better relationships by interacting regularly with community members to address public

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[24]"Making Sense of Model Cities." Urban Omnibus. 2016. Print.

[25] Greene, Helen Taylor, and Shaun L. Gabbidon. *Encyclopedia of Race and Crime*. Sage Publications, Inc, 2009. Print.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Department of Justice. "Task Force Report: The Police." 1967. Web.

safety issues (a central tenant of what we know today as "community-policing"). 2. "Police-Community Relations Units," varied in their purpose, some units were simply a public relations office that disseminated information to the press, while others hosted community meetings with the aim of bringing the community and police together to discuss crime and safety concerns.[28]

Image 3: *Ebony Magazine* feature on one of the early police-community collaboration models (*Ebony Magazine*, 1969)

In many ways the Police-Community Relations Units epitomized Scott's classical "top-down planning." Police-Community Relations Units were organized entirely within departments without any supervising body and therefore self-regulating. The hierarchy of power and importance one could argue was expressed in the mere phrasing of the relations units: Police-Community Relations Units, "Police" first, "Community" second. Rules of engagement were prescribed for community members prior to participation, again, also expressed in the phrasing: "Police-Community Relations Units". The community, at the behest of the police, would relate.

[28] Johnson, D, and R Gregory. "Police-Community Relations in the United States: A Review of Recent Literature and Projects." *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, 62.1 (1971): 94–103. Print.

Police-community relations meetings were usually designed by professionals or academics who led community members and police officers through the process. Meeting structure ran the gamut from role-playing to guided conversation.[29] Meeting logistics, like guidelines for discussion, meeting location, and selected participants, were managed by organizers.[30] The community, not considered an equal or enforcer, was not consulted in the process of creating the relations units. The community would not control, counsel, or monitor the police. Participants included police officers, community members, and local leaders. In most settings, there were equal numbers of community participants and police officers. Power dynamics were stratified, with meeting organizers sharing the same rank and prestige as officers after which community participants followed. Officers often attended meetings dressed in uniform, and some meetings were even held at police departments.[31]

Although officers participated in the police-community relations unit meetings, many did so begrudgingly. In one study conducted by Yale University mental health professionals, community members and police officers were instructed to role reverse, wherein community members played the role of officer, and officers as community bystanders. Community members enjoyed role-playing as they felt they were able to show officers how they often felt forced to bend to the will and whim of law enforcement's irrational discretionary power. In response, police officers became defensive and angry, threatening to abandon the meetings. The issue of "blame" came up repeatedly in that police officers were hesitant to participate because they felt

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[29] Klein, E, C Thomas, and E Bellis. "When Warring Groups Meet: The Use of Group Approach in Police-Black Community Relations." *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 6.2 (1971): 93–99. Print.

[30] Bittner, Egon. *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models*. 1970: 1-119. Print.

[31] Bell, R et al. "Small Group Dialogue and Discussion: An Approach to Police-Community Relationships." *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* 60.2 (1969): 242–246. Print.

they would be forced to endure unfair finger-pointing.[32] In some situations, either based on presumption or based on real accusations made by community members during meetings, police officers outright refused to participate.[33]

Outcomes from the police-community relations meetings varied. Some participants were recorded as feeling better understood by officers as well as developing better understanding of officers. Other relations meetings buckled under the tension of defensive police officers and were terminated prematurely.[34] In the article, "Police Responsiveness to Minority Community Needs," the researcher documented police-community relations units "cherry-picking" participants sympathetic to police to attend meetings so as to avoid having police authority challenged while still giving the impression that police departments were engaging with the community.[35] "When Warring Groups Meet: The Use of Group Approach in Police-Black Community Relations", an article from 1968 described how community members were merely tolerated and ultimately dismissed as complainers. And in some cases, those leading the discussions were observed siding with officers.[36]

Based on the literature, it is hard to say whether the police-community relations units meetings were a success or failure. The relations meetings certainly seemed to benefit police. To begin, the meetings did not change power dynamics, police authority might have been

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[32] Klein, E, C Thomas, and E Bellis. "When Warring Groups Meet: The Use of Group Approach in Police-Black Community Relations." *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 6.2 (1971): 93–99. Print.

[33] Ibid

[34] Bell, R et al. "Small Group Dialogue and Discussion: An Approach to Police-Community Relationships." *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* 60.2 (1969): 242–246. Print.

[35] Decker, J. "Police Sensitivity and Responsiveness to Minority Community Needs: A Critical Assessment." *Valparaiso University Law Review* 12.3 (1978): 467–535. Print.

[36] Ibid.

challenged but remained in tact. As well, police officers were not any more accountable for misconduct after meetings than before. Meetings gave police the opportunity to socialize community members by imparting their knowledge and expertise. From the community's perspective, however, the meetings offered little in the way of relief. Meetings did not increase community capacity or access to power or justice. Rather, meetings shifted focus away from holding law enforcement accountable to making communities responsible for understanding police.

The turmoil and transformation emblematic of the 1960s signaled a crisis of state legitimacy. Marginalized communities across the nation were fighting for rights historically denied them. Planning and policing deepened instability within the communities they sought to order and control. Under pressure, both systems experimented with new methods considered inclusive, participatory, and community-based. Oddly enough, while the Johnson administration recommended law enforcement incorporate community planning and partnerships with marginalized communities to improve relations, police departments were also stockpiling military-grade weaponry.[37]

The piloting of police-community relations units marked the beginning of a shift in policing ideology from what is known as the Professional era (1930-1970), to the Community-Policing era (1980-present). Community policing consists of three primary aspects: 1. Some version of problem-oriented policing, in which crime is understood within a larger context 2. Prevention of disorder and crime 3. Partnership between police and the "community" to prioritize and address public safety and crime concerns. However, while law enforcement agencies pivoted rhetorically towards community cooperation, in actuality departments were

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[37] Camp, Jordan T., and Christina Heatherton. "Thug Nation: On State Violence and Disposability." *Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter*. London: Verso. 15–33. Print.

anything but community-oriented. With the War on Crime, then the War on Drugs, bipartisan expenditure on law enforcement budgets continued to grow, bolstering militarization of local police departments particularly urban inner cities.[38] Since 1980 police budgets have quadrupled.[39],[40] The Reagan administration in particular increased federal spending on street crime and drug-law enforcement by providing incentives to local departments willing to make the drug war top priority. In turn, local law enforcement agencies received military equipment, technology and training.[41] The deployment of Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT) increased from a couple hundred in 1972, to three thousand in 1980, and thirty thousand in 1996. In the book, *The New Jim Crow*, author, Michelle Alexander, described how incentives to local police department wrecked havoc in communities all under the guise of community policing,"Drug arrests skyrocketed, as SWAT teams swept through urban housing projects, highway patrol agencies organized drug interdiction units on the freeways, and stop-and-frisk programs were set loose on streets."

It is within this context that the seminal article shaping community policing as we currently understand it is published. In the article, "Broken Windows, The Police and Neighborhood Safety," social scientists, James Wilson and George Kelling, focus on crime concentrated in "disorderly" neighborhoods. Wilson and Kelling argued that signals of disorder, like a broken window, gave the criminal element an impression of neglect, putting communities

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[38] Gascon, G, and T Foglesong. "Making Policing More Affordable: Managing Costs and Measuring Value in Policing." 2010. Print.

[39] Ibid

[40] Reaves, B, and M Hickman. *Police Departments in Large Cities, 1990-2000*. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002. Print.

[41] Danksy, K. *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing*. New York, NY: ACLU Foundation, 2014. Print.

at risk for more crime. According to Wilson and Kelling, disorder encouraged deviant behavior, by rooting out low-level delinquency like jaywalking or public-intoxication, a community is able to avoid more serious crime. With broken windows (also known as "order-maintenance policing"), law enforcement increases its presence and expands discretionary powers of individual officers as a means of identifying disorder.

Examination of the path from Kelling and Wilson's "description to prescription," reveals some serious concerns. First, determining what and who is "disorderly" and "orderly" is in the end a judgment call. From a community-development planner's perspective, "disorder" such as a broken window can be understood as signals of disinvestment or structural inequality. Problems resulting from structural inequality demand social service-oriented solutions, like investment in education, employment, and affordable housing. However, from the Broken Windows lens, "disorder" is simply a precursor to crime and the perception by police of poor neighborhoods as "disordered" combined with vast police discretion to "stop and frisk" the disorderly, has meant poor communities have been the target of arbitrary policing. Despite being pitched as race-neutral, studies have shown officers are more likely to "stop and frisk" and arrest people of color for low level offenses. Though police officials and politicians defend "stop and frisk" as preventative and proactive rather than reactive to crime, many scholars and activists contend the practice has led to widespread violation of constitutional rights as well as advancing criminalization of communities of color and the poor, mass incarceration, and officer-involved shootings.[42]

Wilson and Kelling in their own article recognized the potential for police abuse, "How

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[42] Mitchell, D, K Attoh, and L Staeheli. "Broken Windows Is Not the Panacea: Common Sense, Good Sense, and Police Accountability in American Cities." *Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter*. London: Verso, 2016. 237–257. Print.

do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry? We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question." Kelling maintains that while Broken Windows was never intended to be a mass arrest program, that is how it has played out in many cities, most notably in New York City. In an article, "Don't Blame My 'Broken Windows' for Poor Policing," Kelling acknowledges that while the policing strategy relies on discretionary power of police officers, police are expected to utilize the "least intrusive means" and collaborate with community partners (social workers, clergy, medical professionals) to address order maintenance issues.[43]

Some of these "least intrusive means" of collaboration have translated into law enforcement creating their own community partners. For example, the Police Athletic League (P.A.L.), a nonprofit that pairs officers with young people for mentorship. Some experts suggest such organizations foster positive interactions between law enforcement and young people. Other police led programs include, "Coffee with a Cop" a program that hosts events usually at local coffee shops wherein community members can meet and talk with law enforcement "to improve trust and build relationships one cup of coffee at a time"; the Citizens Police Academy is a program lead by local police departments that engages citizens in a curriculum modeling cadet training with the aim of "producing informed citizens." Even community relations meetings, like those discussed in this research, are pointed to by police and political leaders as creating lasting community partnerships. Critics, however, question the intent of these tactics, suggesting that these programs simply offer law enforcement favorable media attention while at the same time working to indoctrinate the community to be uncritical of law enforcement. Author Naomi Murakawa advises community members to pay attention to what community-

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[43] Kelling, G. "Don't Blame My 'Broken Windows' Theory For Poor Policing." *Politico*. 2015. Web.

policing says versus what is does, that the various law enforcement led community programs are merely the face of community policing. Adding that departments invest in public relations experts to better manage their image with the media while so-called community policing continues to militarize departments and victimize the poor and people of color with violence.

      As this review shows, planning and policing in general, and community policing more specifically, have a much longer, complicated, and contradictory history than the public is lead to believe. If police violence has persisted even with community-based policing reform, what purpose do the police-community relations meetings serve? Particularly in times of intense scrutiny, the police themselves become champions of community policing and community meetings. Should that not be a signal to investigate further what police have to gain from the meetings? In the next section, this research will argue that these community meetings serve to restore legitimacy to police departments struggling to maintain their authority by redirecting attention away from accountability to appropriated community spaces that manufacture consent and acquiescence through bureaucratic processes and police propaganda.

CHAPTER 2: ALBUQUERQUE, NM POLICE-COMMUNITY COLLABORATIVE

In the wake of protests and national negative media attention, Albuquerque Mayor Berry hired consultants, Scott Greenwood and Tom Streicher, to assist with DOJ negotiations as well as deteriorating police-community relations. Streicher, former Cincinnati chief of police, and Greenwood, a civil rights attorney, were both involved in the DOJ reform of Cincinnati police 10 years prior. Not long after hiring Streicher and Greenwood did the mayor introduce city initiatives aimed at improving police-community relations. Specifically, Mayor Berry launched City Council Resolution R-2014-052, "establishing a community outreach process known as the 'Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations.'" The Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations (ACPCR) was a series of meetings bringing police and community members together for mediated dialogue as a means of "transforming police-community relations."

The Albuquerque collaborative was adapted from a process in Cincinnati called the "Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative" (CPCRC) that has been praised by experts as an effective model for police reform and police-community relations repair. Like so many other police departments, Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) had been the focus of federal investigation following accusations of racial profiling and excessive use of force. Only weeks after a suit was filed against CPD, did officers shoot an unarmed young black man. Cincinnati's Over the Rhine neighborhood, a majority-black community, responded with a week long rebellion calling for justice. As part of the settlement to the suit, the affected parties were instructed to alternatively resolve issues through a dispute resolution method of collaborative dialogue. Dialogue meetings would bring together police and community members for conversation on solutions for improved relations. All in all, about 3,500 people participated in

8 — Citizen Control

7 — Delegated Power

Degrees of Citizen Power

6 — Partnership

Image 4: Arnstein's *Ladder of Citizen Participation*

5 — Placation

4 — Consultation

Degrees of Tokenism

3 — Informing

2 — Therapy

Nonparticipation

1 — Manipulation

FIGURE 2 Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation.

Cincinnati's Police-Community Relations Collaborative. Because the process was mandated by a court, goals for improved relations would be incorporated into a legally binding settlement agreement between CPD, the city, and litigants. Many have been quick to promote Cincinnati as a model for other cities confronting police reform and police-community relations.[44] However, this research questions whether the praise is merited. Although the dialogue process was an attempt to collaboratively resolve issues amongst litigants, although the court mandate appeared to raise the status of citizen-participants, although goals reached through the CPCRC were theoretically binding, power dynamics prior to and throughout the process have raised concerns. Furthermore, the collaborative did not bring victims of police violence closer to justice or

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[44] Rothman, J., and Land, R. "The Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative." *Criminal Justice*, 18.4 (2004): 35–42. Print

improve accountability mechanisms.[45] Additionally, CPD harassment and violence continues to plague Cincinnati's communities of color.[46]

Analysis of the Albuquerque collaborative derives directly from my observation as a graduate research assistant employed by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) to collect qualitative data from collaborative meetings. This analysis follows a chronology of meetings I attended beginning October 2014 and ending April 2015. By examining the planning process of the ACPCR, power dynamics expressed through the process, and who the ACPCR served and silenced, this research will demonstrate how use of the collaborative as a bureaucratic planning process establishes and reinforces the authority of the state, the police, and city officials. This research applies Arnstein's *Ladder of Citizen Participation* model to understand how the police-community meetings distributed or concentrated power. Arnstein's *Ladder of Citizen Participation* ranks eight types of citizen participation along a ladder, with the least powerful position at the bottom rung and the most powerful position at the top rung. The ladder hierarchy beginning with least powerful participation type is defined as Manipulation, then, Therapy, Informing, Consultation, Placation, Partnership, Delegated Power, and Citizen Control at the top considered the most powerful ranking for citizen participation.

Analysis of Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations

The ACPCR started with a "Mayor's Kick-Off" meeting held at the Albuquerque Convention Center on October 21, 2014. The room was situated so that panel speakers were on a stage facing the audience. Most of those in the audience were uniformed police officers.

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[45] Weichselbaum, S. (2014). Cincinnati: Ferguson's Hope or Hype? Retrieved January 03, 2017

[46] Ridgeway, G., Schell,T., Gifford, B., Saunders, J., Turner, S., Riley, K. and Dixon, T. (2009). Police-Community Relations in Cincinnati. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

According to a meeting pamphlet, the collaborative was coordinated by the Office of Alternative

Dispute Resolution and the Office of Diversity and Human Rights in collaboration with the

Mayor's Office and Albuquerque police. Lead Facilitator, Kathleen Oweegon, opened the

meeting by stressing two points:

1. The city is seeking to draw the largest base of participants, and therefore solutions,
   through the dialogue process.

2. Optimum success will come from "evoking collaborative dialogue rather than
   combative".

Image 5: Mayor's Kick-Off for the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations (KRQE)

Next, Albuquerque Mayor Berry briefly described the process and emphasized the collaborative

as a "tremendous opportunity". Next, City Council President Sanchez offered information

regarding negotiations with the DOJ, and characterized the ACPCR as a "defining moment." On

behalf of APD, Chief Eden affirmed the department's commitment to collaborative efforts for

improved community relations. Lastly, Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Tyson

Hummel, outlined the collaborative process step by step. The ACPCR included a triphasic

process, concluding with Phase 3:

Table 1: The three phases of the ACPCR as outlined by Alternative Dispute Resolution
Coordinator, Tyson Hummel

PHASE	DESCRIPTION
ONE	Listening, consisting of stakeholder meetings in which meeting participants provide suggestions for improved relations through a dialogic process facilitated by contracted mediators and guided by a framework of questions.
TWO	Processing, involves a process of condensing information culled from meetings.
THREE	The point at which suggestions become components of community action plan disseminated by the community, APD, and city government.

The resolution identified stakeholders to be engaged in the ACPCR and included:

Mental Health Community and Related Service Providers	First Responders
Aggrieved Families and Personally Affected Citizens	Faith Based Community
Business Community	Access to Justice Organizations
Underserved Communities	Non-Profit Organizations
Educators and Academic Community	Government and Policy Makers

Table 2: Stakeholders to be engaged in the ACPCR

The collaborative was limited to specific questions that included:

1. What are your goals and expectations for police-community relations in Albuquerque?

2. What are your goals and expectations for police-community interactions and conduct in
   Albuquerque? Why are these goals and expectations important to you (what experiences,
   values, beliefs, feelings influence your goals)?

3. How do you think your goals can be best achieved?

4. What are your specific suggestions and ideas

The Kick-Off event for the ACPCR seemed to set the tone for what would follow over the coming months. The meeting was solely informative and restricted public comment to questions at the end. Although, Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Tyson Hummel, described the collaborative as "inclusive, collaborative, and not top-down," a power structure within the process was apparent as the panel of speakers was made up exclusively of city officials and lacked any community representatives. None of the speakers made mention of collaborating with community organizations in preparation of the ACPCR, nor was there a call for community activists to assist in the planning process. When commentary was opened to the floor, the few community members in attendance voiced concern about the event's poor outreach and publicity. One woman identified herself as a member of APD Forward, a community coalition, stating she had not received any notification about the event or upcoming police-community relations meetings. Others asked what kind of information the city was looking for and whether recommendations from the ACPCR would be integrated into the consent decree. The last community member to speak was Mike Gomez, local resident and father whose son had been killed by APD in 2011. Directing his question to the mayor, Gomez asked, "Do you feel APD has a problem?" The mayor replied, "The DOJ is identifying challenges." This particular exchange is important to highlight leading up to the collaborative meetings, as neither the mayor nor the chief publicly acknowledged any problem with or wrongdoing by Albuquerque police. Moreover, the DOJ wasn't just "identifying challenges." According to the DOJ findings letter, APD's unlawful policing "stems from systemic deficiencies in oversight, training, and policy. Chief among these deficiencies is the department's failure to implement an objective and

Image 6: A "not top down" pamphlet for ACPCR

rigorous internal accountability system."[47] In other words, APD did have a problem, many

problems, and in the context of the ACPCR, the mayor's stance undermined any sincerity of the

process.

In contrast, the resounding message by the public was that Albuquerque police were out

of control and needed to be held accountable for their actions. Like Mike Gomez, the community

was calling for acknowledgment and justice. Despite a mountain of evidence provided by the

DOJ, those in positions of power (namely the mayor and APD chief) were redirecting the

conversation away from APD's history of violence to a future of improved police-community

relations. In effect, by rejecting any misconduct and focusing on solutions, one could argue the

ACPCR was serving to render APD's violence invisible. By reframing the narrative, setting the

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[47]Correia, David. "In Federal Court Mayor Richard Berry Denies DOJ's Allegations of Wrongdoing by APD." *La Jicarita*. 2014. Web.

ACPCR agenda, limiting who had access to decision-making, and excluding and devaluing the concerns of the lesser powerful, the mayor was reinforcing a power structure, value system, and norms. Strategies for how to move forward were not co-produced by city officials and the community, power was not shared. Rather power was concentrated and strategies were imposed. Preparation of the ACPCR did not appear to be "inclusive or collaborative" as proclaimed. Had the city engaged the public in preparation of the ACPCR, had the city fostered community ownership and legitimacy the kick-off meeting presumably would have reflected the community and community priorities.

The first collaborative meeting took place on a Monday evening, October 27th 2014 at 6pm until 9pm. This meeting focused on the stakeholder group "*Mental Health Community and Related Service Providers*." There were over 30 people in attendance of which maybe five were uniformed police officers. This meeting was held at a community center called the North Domingo Baca Multigenerational Center in the northeast heights suburb of Albuquerque. By car, it took about 20 minutes to get from Downtown Albuquerque to the center. By bus, Google Maps estimated travel time was about two hours. The meeting location posed accessibility concerns, especially when considering meeting coordinators did not offer any transportation or carpooling options. Much of the police violence has been centralized in the city's southeast and southwest areas, if participants from these areas wanted to attend and were relying on public transportation, getting to this location could have taken three to four hours round trip. In that case, many people would need to set out an hour so before meeting start time and plan on not returning home or wherever until well after 10pm.

The meeting was located in a large auditorium and split into two groups. Each group had two facilitators, one facilitator took notes while the other guided participants through discussion

questions. Participants sat in rows that were positioned in half circles facing facilitators and a screen. Participants who had registered were told to sit in the front rows, those who had not registered were told they could only observe and had to sit in the outer rows. Facilitators emphasized that attendees register if they wanted to participate so that meeting organizers could adequately staff each group. Many attendees appeared confused that they could not participate when they were unaware of a registration component. This raised questions about community outreach and engagement prior to launching the collaborative. As well, this specific aspect of not allowing the "unregistered" to participate in discussion raised questions as to the process' approachability and openness. Additionally, discussion questions were posed in succession, which meant facilitators were asking questions to participants one by one. In this way there was not much actual dialogue or exchange between participants. Furthermore, because discussion was limited to "goals" and "solutions," there was no discussion about police violence or the DOJ investigation, or accountability or justice. Rather, conversation was abstract and rendered the problem of police violence nonexistent.

The second meeting "Aggrieved Families and Personally Affected Citizens" was held in the same location in the northeast heights, Saturday, November 8th. There were considerably less people compared to the first meeting, and no identifiable police officers in attendance. The meeting was split into two groups in two separate rooms, with most of the participants filling the first room. People eventually filed into the second room, however because there were less people than had registered there was some confusion as how to proceed. Leading facilitators to encourage observers and those who had not registered to participate for a "more generalized conversation." In contrast to the first meeting, although meeting discussion was restricted to the questions on goals participants strayed from the script to voice their frustrations with APD.

When participants raised concerns about police violence or abuse of power, facilitators continuously redirected discussion back to the prescribed questions. In some instances, ACPCR facilitators appeared annoyed by participants unwilling to jump into goals.[48] For example this excerpt from the facilitator report:

> With a couple of exceptions, the overall input by participants was profuse with harsh criticism for the police department and the Mayor. Although the facilitator did her best to keep the meeting on track, most of the participants seemed to need to ventilate their anger and frustration with past events, and seemed not yet ready to focus enough on the future to answer the questions put forth. The participants seemed to feed off each other as they used phrases such as '*Dismantle this out of control monster'; 'It's a 6 bit badge pinned on a 2 bit person'*; and *'Only one percent of Albuquerque Police are professional.'* A few of the participants expressed that they felt the process was useless and would not accomplish any changes. Others expressed gratitude for the opportunity these dialogues provide. Some of the participants felt they were not involved in a dialogue with each other and were frustrated with their inability to have a conversational exchange. The level of frustration and anger for some was high evidenced by the shouting, the passion, and the lack of respect for the process.

To be clear, this particular meeting was for "Aggrieved Families and Affected Citizens," there were participants who had actually been victimized by police. Despite the facilitator's characterization, the reality is that many residents attended meetings looking for accountability, assuming the ACPCR might be a means to that end. Instead, community members, invited to their own community centers by city officials, were expected to participate in conversation that was sanitized or summarily revisionist. Furthermore, criticism was not isolated to the police, participants also began criticizing the collaborative process. At this meeting, participants remarked on the meeting location, and one participant referred to the northeast heights as the "northeast whites." Facilitator notes reflect this complaint:

> People were concerned about why this topic was in this location. Why is this stakeholder group in this area of town? It should be in the Cesar Chavez Community Center: or the International Zone..People in those areas have had more negative interaction with police than these areas the NE Heights. This is 'Whiteyville.'

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[48] Terhorst, R. *ACPCR Facilitated Meeting Report: Aggrieved Families and Personally Affected Citizens*. Albuquerque, NM: Mayor's Office, 2014. Print.

Although organizers of the ACPCR explained the intent to stagger meeting times and location was meant to optimize participation, many found the meeting locations and schedule hard to nail down as there was no consistency. Participants also brought up police involvement in the collaborative. For some, the police presence was intimidating, leading some participants to wonder whether police participants might stifle conversation.[49] For others, police participation was welcomed. Interestingly, participants who wanted police to attend meetings also admitted to not having much interaction with police in general, let alone negative interactions. This issue of lack of consent, of not asking the community what it wanted or needed as resolution prior to implementing a process, surfaced in meeting conversation again and again, demonstrating a process that was inherently "top-down."

The third meeting for "First Responders" was held at the Palo Duro Senior Center, Monday, November 17th 3:30pm to 6:30 pm. The time of the meeting is important to highlight for a couple of reasons. First, many people are still working during these hours. Secondly, participants had indicated at other meetings that the schedule was difficult to nail down as dates, times, and locations kept changing. Why collaborative coordinators did not take the time to survey participants to find out which days and times would best accommodate participants is unclear. This location was also about a 15 minute drive from Downtown, and about an hour trip using public transportation. This meeting was split into two groups in two separate rooms. There were about 20 people in attendance, with many police officer participants as this was the "First Responder" stakeholder group. Community members seemed impressed that police officers were participating in the meeting. Similar to the first meeting, this group did not discuss APD's

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[49] Ibid

violence or police violence in general. Rather than addressing "goals for police-community

relations," officers were given more leeway to express thoughts outside of the scripted meeting

questions. For instance, one officer complained that the community, not just the police, need to

be held accountable,

> Accountability for the community, not just police, false allegations are happening more and more. The media is infamous...folks trying to set-up officers, take responsibility for behavior

Although police participants were "venting" and complaining, facilitators did not redirect them

back to the questions. Furthermore, the facilitator reports did not even record officers complaints

of biased media, or lack of community and individual accountability, as complaints. Instead, the

facilitators reframed the complaining as expertise and knowledge,

> Unlike previous dialogues, representatives of the Albuquerque Police Department were present as participants. Their presence added a dimension not previously experienced. The group seemed to be much more cohesive and they demonstrated a team approach to the answers to questions. There was a good interaction between participants as they processed the questions. The police were able to answer questions about procedures that allowed for mutual understanding. All citizen participants expressed their appreciation and joy at having the officers present.

While police participants dominated meeting discussion, the absence of any talk about police

violence was stark. A co-researcher also observing the discussion, turned with a confused

expression and whispered, "You wouldn't be able to tell there's a problem. We are here because

there is a problem."[50]

By the fourth meeting, "Faith Based Community," officers were outright denying there

were any problems with police. This meeting was hosted by the Highland Community Center,

more centrally located in the Nob Hill area of Albuquerque, Wednesday, December 3rd 2014.

There were about 9 people in attendance with two officer participants. As soon as meeting

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[50] Terhorst, R. *ACPCR Facilitated Meeting Report: First Responders*. Albuquerque, NM: Mayor's Office, 2014. Print.

conversation started, one of the officer's introduced himself by stating,

> I'm a sergeant with APD. Looking at the questions, I also want to help change. It is not us against them. Cops are also part of community. Don't pay attention to everything in the news, the sky is not falling, there is no racial profiling here. I don't know about other departments. But this is not about race. I'm mixed.

When community participants attempted to raise concerns about police violence specifically affecting people with mental illness, officers took over the conversation by accusing the city and state government of not properly funding treatment. Facilitators recorded this sentiment in their report noting, "APD officers are not professional mental health providers therefore discrepancies exist as to how officers should deal with mental illness on the streets." Officers went on to blame the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) for prescribing drugs to inmates, they also blamed lack of involvement by families and schools with early intervention. Any accusation of police misconduct was met with dismissal or deflection. The conversation became so skewed that during a break, one woman left the meeting to go to a vigil organized by the Black Student Union at UNM because that's where she felted she "needed to be."

The fifth meeting held Saturday, December 13th 2014, for the "Business Community and Neighborhood Associations" was again located at the North Domingo Baca center in the northeast heights. This meeting also consisted of two groups split up into two rooms. There were no APD officer participants in the group I observed, though one of the participants was a former sheriff from California. The other group did have officer participants in attendance. Although the facilitator opened the meeting by saying, "people come into meeting with old upsets, we need to focus on the future," some participants raised concerns about news reports of APD violence, militarization of the police, and police culture as violent and racist. The conversation appeared to include more open analysis of police, whether this is a result of the lack of officers as part of this specific group I cannot say. However, the facilitator notes from the other group with APD

officers recorded similar themes as past meetings with officers. For another example, an officer from that group was noted as saying, "if you want police officers who are calm, collected, educated, who know how to handle themselves, you need to pay them more. You get what you pay for."[51]

The sixth meeting was a privately held session for the Chamber of Commerce. Though most meetings were opened to the public, a few were closed. As far as this research is aware, the ACPCR hosted about three private sessions including: 1. Chamber of Commerce, 2. Domestic Violence/Substance Abuse Network 3. Sankofa Men's Group (a grassroots network of black men). Why these sessions were privately held is still unknown. These meetings were not listed on the collaborative calendar. It is not clear how they were organized, if the groups reached out to city coordinators, or vice versa.

In January I was absent for two meetings "Access to Justice Organizations and Providers" and "Minority and Underserved Communities." "Educators and the Education Community" was the seventh meeting I attended but was the ninth meeting of the schedule. This meeting located at the Highland Community center in the Nob Hill neighborhood of Albuquerque, had three groups in different rooms. The group I observed had about 8 participants, 4 were police officers. Although this stakeholder group was designated for the education community, only one participant was a retired teachers. This meeting, much like past meetings with officer participants, focused very little attention on police violence and spent a great deal of time criticizing individuals and institutions. Many officer participants accused the educational system of not teaching children respect for law enforcement. Additionally, officers accused the media of

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[51] Lawrence, J. *ACPCR Facilitated Meeting Report: Business Community and Neighborhood Associations*. Albuquerque, NM: Mayor's Office, 2014. Print.

misrepresentations. On the other hand, when a community member expressed concern for police militarization an officer participant swiftly interrupted her to explain how "the public must be careful with misconceptions." He went on to say that the military vehicles acquired by police departments were "hollowed out of their military gear" and that military vehicles can be beneficial to the community for instance if there was a school shooter. Another officer said that because New Mexico is one of the poorest in the country, combined with the recession, unemployment is high, graduation rates are low and crime is rising. "These factors have led to a more dangerous criminal. Criminals who would like to hurt police." Police violence if not completely erased from the conversation was reframed to position officers are victims. Again, because the community was the problem and not the police, solutions for improving police-community relations centered on positive press of police work, officer visits to local schools, or police ride-alongs so that the community could better understand what police deal with daily. One participant suggested requiring new drivers watch a public service announcement about police before receiving their license.

The next meeting, "Government and Policy Makers" was held Wednesday, February 11th 2015 at the Highland center in Nob Hill. This meeting consisted of three groups in three different rooms. The group I observed had a total participant count of 9, four of which were uniformed officers. Like so many of the other meetings dominated by police participants, many of the same police narratives were noted. For instance, "police are part of the community too," "there are 'bad apples' in every job," "we need trust and respect." Surprisingly, some community members challenged these assertions. One community member in particular stated, "The reason we're here today is not because they did a good job. It's they didn't do a good job. The difficulty of the job, I think that's been overused." The police officers in the room exchanged glances and one officer

responded by saying, "Police are not mental health professionals, we are not clinicians. Police cannot fix all societal problems." Though police participants were continually establishing themselves as experts in the meetings, when criticism of police surfaced officers often deflected attention away from culpability by claiming the opposite, they weren't psychologists, they weren't social workers, there were bad apples in every job, and the community expected too much from them.

After a while, meetings became fairly predictable. If officers were present, the conversation usually focused on police as victims. Victims of poor wages and working conditions, of negative media coverage, of violent criminals. Rarely would discussion acknowledge police violence in general, or APD violence specifically. Though police officers ranted and finger-pointed just like community members, their complaining and blame was reiterated as authority and expertise. On the other hand, if police officers were not in attendance, community members seemed more comfortable to verbalize concerns and criticism. Although, some community members were unphased by police participants and continued to raise misgivings about APD and the collaborative process. Still, when community members criticized APD of violence or misconduct reaction by officers proved reliable. "Neither the police nor the community is perfect," "police commands need to be honored, " and "police need community support."

CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSION

The Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations worked to silence criticism of APD by mapping out specific parameters for conversation. Informational pamphlets provided at each ACPCR meeting described in detail acceptable conversation subject matter. Pamphlets included ground rules, an explanation of what dialogue is and can do, meeting agenda, and the specific questions facilitators would ask participants. "What are your goals and expectations for police-community *relations*?" "What are your goals and expectations for police-community *interactions*?" "How do you think your goals can be best achieved?" and "What are your specific suggestions and ideas?" These questions were not designed by accident. Focusing on the future, not the past, focusing on defining goals, not problems served to render APD's violence invisible. Essentially, absolving APD of any blame and therefore accountability. This is the exact scenario that played out in Cincinnati, the city from which Albuquerque adopted the collaborative model. In preparation of the Cincinnati collaborative, the program director, Jay Rothman, held meetings with city and police administration, and suit plaintiffs to discuss various approaches to the dialogue process. Rothman proposed a problem-identification method, which encourages individuals to define the problem and share their experiences as part of a greater conflict resolution and healing process. Defining and framing the problem also helps to pinpoint specific solutions. However, when Rothman proposed this method, police leadership refused it. To police and city attorneys, "If the process was adversarial, they would prefer simply to take it to court since they denied wrongdoing." "The police and city attorneys," Rothman noted, "were unwilling to engage in an effort to define a problem...that they simply did not agree existed." In response, Rothman substituted the problem-identification approach for a "goal-oriented" process so as to keep police from abandoning the process altogether.

Similar to Albuquerque, Cincinnati's process was described as "bottom up, participatory and inclusive."[52] However, there could be no clearer contradiction than police officials and city attorneys wielding their power and threatening to leave the process if there was the slightest hint of criticism. The use of power by police officials and city attorneys to control the dialogue process was distinctively "top down" planning as the powerful few were able to determine and direct the process for all. In retrospect, Rothman lamented capitulating to the pressure, "I believe I gave in to this resistance and these fears too quickly. I did not spend adequate time explaining how a problem framing process need not be adversarial, but rather can reveal mutual misunderstandings..."[53] The goal-oriented approach was a misstep Rothman thinks severely inhibited Cincinnati's collaborative process as individuals were forced to solve for problems not defined. Concentrated decision-making reinforced power structures and dynamics, effectively silencing those who might have been critical of police, those who also happened to have the least amount of power.

Whatever the reason, preventing the potential for criticism seemed to be an intentional strategy for the Albuquerque collaborative. Rather, ACPCR meetings seemed to discourage criticism that implicated law enforcement. Because on the contrary, a fair amount of conversation was devoted to blame. As shown throughout this research, police participants and those sympathetic to the police regularly accused the media of sensationalized portrayals of police violence. Or blamed the community's lack of understanding of police work for misperceptions. Or blamed schools and parents for not properly teaching students to respect law

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[52] Rothman, J., and Land, R. "The Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative." *Criminal Justice*, 18.4 (2004): 35–42. Print

[53] Rothman, J. "Identity and Conflict: Collaboratively Addressing Police-Community Conflict in Cincinnati, Ohio." *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution*, 22.1 (2006):105-132.

enforcement. Or blamed terrorism for increased militarization of police. Or complained about the lack of personal responsibility of those who find themselves the target of negative police attention. Though meeting conversation was to focus solely on goals and solutions, community members who did not follow dialogue guidelines were continually returned to meeting questions. Officers, on the other hand, were given more latitude and frequently took advantage of a captive audience. Officer narratives usually followed two threads: blame or complaints. Complaints about how poorly APD was staffed, how poorly police officers are paid, how dangerous police work is, how often criminals made false allegations of brutality, how police are part of the community too, how police officers are just trying to do their job, how a "few bad apples" become the focal point of mainstream media, how the good things officers do go unreported, how lapel cameras don't tell the whole story, how expectations of officers are unreasonable, how community members should not question an officer's authority, how innocent people do what they're told, how the community lacks understanding, how the community needs to support police. Embedded in the subtext were binaries that polarized participant discussion: with us or against us, pro-police or pro-reform. Victimhood was narrated by police and appropriated from those actually victimized by police violence. Discussion centered on understanding the danger of police work, but there was little understanding of the danger faced by communities most affected by police violence. These accusations aimed at the community and individuals critical of law enforcement, were reflected in the collaborative's report of compiled goals, which included: Community Education, APD/Community Communication and Collaboration, and lastly, Improvements to APD.

Considering the community was the problem and not law enforcement, ACPCR meetings became a space for police propagandizing. For example, APD spokeswoman, Celina Espinoza,

handed out a brochure titled "What should I do if I am stopped by a police officer?" Participants were told to search YouTube for a video made by APD that supplemented the brochure. Officers encouraged participants to visit and "like" APD's Facebook page to get information on crime alerts, or updates on all the good work APD was doing. ACPCR planners passed out a sheet of "community initiatives" that included "talkwithacop.com," a website for "anyone who would like to submit praise, questions or concerns" to APD, and "Coffee with a Cop" wherein businesses or community organizations can host an event for officers and community members to "discuss community issues while building relationships." A participant of the ACPCR, whose son was an officer, passed out bumper stickers that said " Albuquerque Moving forward with APD." Officers also spoke to community members' fears about crime, telling them to call their area substation commander to schedule shift meetings in their neighborhood to show more police presence.

Though the terms "community" and "collaboration" were used repeatedly in the ACPCR meetings, the community was a guest in an invited space. The community's role was restricted to accessory, not collaborator. There was little to no decision-making shared with the community prior to the meetings, and limited decision-making opportunities throughout the process. Employing Arnstein's "*Ladder of Participation*" the ACPCR process could be best understood as "Consultation" wherein community input is solicited but "not combined with other modes of participation...and offers no assurance that citizens concerns and ideas will be taken into account." Because the Albuquerque collaborative was only driven by the City Council Resolution and not mandated by a court as in Cincinnati, long-term commitment to the collaborative process and goals gleaned from the community remains unclear. According to Arnstein, "when powerholders restrict the input of citizens' ideas to this level participation

remains just a window-dressing ritual." Or as one participant from the Albuquerque collaborative

described the meetings as "political theater." Despite the public's demands for justice, despite the

DOJ findings of a pattern of excessive use of force, despite the District Attorney indicting the

officers who shot and killed James Boyd, and in spite of advice from its Cincinnati predecessor

of the importance of engaging in honest discussion not placation, the ACPCR meetings diverted

attention away from accountability to acquiescence. Not surprisingly, only about 250 people

participated in the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations. Individually, the

above issues were conceivably innocent missteps. However, combined, poor planning, lack of

transparency, the lack of community engagement and outreach gave an impression of the

ACPCR as a negligent distraction.

       Since ending the ACPCR, Mayor Berry's hired Cincinnati consultants have been mired in

controversy. Both Streicher and Greenwood have billed the city for costly meals and bar tabs, as

well as lodging that included a $100 pet-boarding fee. Greenwood, who was supposedly ordered

not to fly by his doctor, racked up about $15,000 in travel expenses alone.[54] Additionally, it was

discovered that both Streicher and Greenwood have connections to APD's taser contractor, Taser

International as both men have acted as public endorsers of Taser International products.[55]

Moreover, Greenwood's contract has raised concerns. Originally, the attorney was contracted

with the city for about $70,000 in services, which meant city council did not need to approve his

hiring. However, the mayor's office has requested an additional $280,000 to pay Greenwood's

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[54] Jensen, Tina. "City Contractors Change for Fancy Hotels, Steak Dinners." *KRQE*. 2014. Web.

[55] Taser International, who hired former APD chief of police, Ray Schultz, as a consultant shortly after Mayor Berry replaced him, was given a no-bid contract with the APD.

continuing legal fees.[56] As for the collaborative's report on goals and action plan that would

supposedly "transform police-community relations," neither the city nor APD has provided any

status updates. This research was not able to locate any information as to whether any strategies

from the collaborative have been implemented or objectives achieved. This research did find that

in 2014 several members of the Police Oversight Board (POB) resigned, and more recently the

POB accused the chief Eden of not complying with discipline rules.

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[56] McKay, D. "Auditor: 'Very Clear Violations' in ABQ'S Taser Dealings." *Albuquerque Journal*. 2015. Web.

CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

What to do? Rather, what was already being done? While city officials were busy creating a space that actively erased APD's violence with the *Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations*, community activists and organizers were working towards the exact opposite. In direct response to community appeals for acknowledgment and accountability, community organizations conducted a six-month investigation from September 2014 to February 2015 interviewing people across the city routinely affected by police harassment and violence. The investigation culminated into a report, "Targeted: Prejudice and Racial Bias in the Albuquerque Police Department," and corroborated findings by the Department of Justice that APD violated citizens' rights with excessive force between 2009-2011. However, whereas the DOJ limited its examination to specific allegations of excessive force for a two-year period, this people's investigation documented a very long history of systemic racism, rampant violence and harassment within APD. The 2015 report was presented at the People's Tribunal on Police Brutality. Tribunal activists spoke openly and pointedly about APD's volatility and impunity. Unlike the Albuquerque collaborative, the People's Tribunal provided more than just ornamental placation, the tribunal recognized the value of community consent and community knowledge. In addition to thoroughly recording APD's unconstitutional policing of marginalized communities in Albuquerque, the report also provided numerous "expectations." Some of the expectations included: community oversight and outreach, decriminalization of the homeless, accountability, and transparency to list a few.[57]

The People's Tribunal is just one local example of how communities are creating counter spaces that challenge dominant narratives on police and police violence. Protests across the

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[57] "Targeted: Prejudice and Racial Bias in the Albuquerque Police Department." 2015. Web.

country have galvanized public debate on police violence. Social movements such as Black

Lives Matter have raised the national conversation to consider connections between unjust

policing and unjust policy that has kept the racialized poor over-policed and under-protected.

Many activists and scholars are renewing calls for prison and police abolition, not reform.

Advocating for the complete dismantling of the prison and police system as we know it.[58][59] What

would replace local law enforcement varies depending on who is asked. Some are organizations,

like Cure Violence in Chicago, are experimenting with unarmed mediation and intervention

teams as means of resolving community conflict. Other community spaces are offering "peace

circles" wherein community members are welcome to share experiences of being hurt and

hurting others. Proponents of the peace circles contend this method of conflict resolution has

been practiced by indigenous cultures the world over when people were figuring out how to

solve problems without modern day police.[60] Other activists suggest abolishing police and

investing comprehensively and equally in communities through services like restorative justice,

education, and health care and mental health services that work to nurture people rather than

neglect.[61]

    As for the collaborative itself, it is not the position of this research that the collaborative

could have been improved. The aim of the collaborative was not to heal wounds by holding

honest dialogue that would air honest problems and then yield honest solutions. Nor was the aim

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[58] Gilmore W, R. *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis and Opposition in Globalizing California*. University of California Press, 2007. Print.

[59] Davis, Angela. *The Meaning of Freedom: And Other Difficult Dialogues*. City Lights, 2012. Print.

[60] Dukmasova, Maya. "Abolish the Police? Organizers Say It's Less Crazy than It Sounds. Grassroots Groups around Chicago Are Already Putting Abolitionist Ideas into Practice." *Chicago Reader*. N.p., 2016. Web.

[61] Smtih D, M. "Abolish the Police. Instead, Let's Have Full Social, Economic, and Political Equality." 2015. Web.

of collaborative to hold a violent police department accountable. As far as this research found,

the purpose of the collaborative was to retrench the power structure and power dynamics through

a public process posing as community-based and collaborative. The collaborative worked to

silence the critics, propagandize the skeptics, and stroke the supporters. However, if Albuquerque

collaborative coordinators wanted to improve their process they would not have had to look very

far. For instance, in order for the Cincinnati collaborative to be successful, in that community

members would actually participate, a vast public awareness campaign was launched prior to the

dialogue meetings. As well, an advisory council made up of litigants to the suit, helped lend

legitimacy and ownership from the start of collaborative process. Albuquerque did not appear to

dedicate as much time or resources on an outreach or engagement effort. This was reflected in

the total amount of participants, about 250 in Albuquerque versus 3,500 in Cincinnati. Although

Mayor Berry and his hired consultant, Greenwood, had expected "'thousands and thousands' of

Albuquerque residents to share their vision for APD," this was simply not the outcome. Even

simple cost effective options like promoting the Albuquerque collaborative through social media

sites such as Facebook or Twitter was not, to the knowledge of this research, pursued. Moreover,

it was disclosed by city officials that the local advertising agency responsible for promoting the

ACPCR was coordinated by APD, posing a potential for conflict. If APD did not perceive the

collaborative a priority, the budget for the collaborative could have been suppressed. Effectively

reinforcing the utility of community engagement in preparation of the ACPCR. An advisory

council of community leaders and activists representing various stakeholders could have lent key

insight and expertise for logistics like when and where to hold meetings, whether the ACPCR

could find volunteers to provide childcare for participants, carpooling for those with

transportation barriers, how to best utilize existing resources for outreach, and the like.

The meetings, like the violence, are not new. And what took place in Albuquerque is not unique. If approaches to reform, like these community meetings, have not stemmed the violence or brought to heel more officers, can their use still be justified? Moreover, reviewing the history and interdependence of planning and policing, can planners honestly take a backseat to the issue of police violence? Planning as a profession, like it or not, has depended on the violence of police power to execute and enforce projects and plans. Continuing to deny this reliance on police power makes planners complicit partners to state-sanctioned violence. Continuing to support measures simply because the language is familiar or comforting, is not only shortsighted and a waste of taxpayer dollars, but also serves to further marginalize those most vulnerable to police violence. With so many legitimate community-driven and community-based alternatives, maybe now is the time to imagine a world without police. Because really what do we have to lose? A world with fewer dead marginalized peoples and fewer institutions maintaining inequality is a world worth envisioning.

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