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Youth ... Power ... Egypt: The Development of Youth as a Sociopolitical Concept and Force in Egypt, 1805-1923

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Youth...Power...Egypt: The Development of Youth as a Sociopolitical Concept and Force in
Egypt, 1805-1923

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History

by

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on youth as a symbol, metaphor, and subject involved in processes related to Egypt's modernization, colonialization, and liberation from the beginning of the nineteenth century through the 1919 Egyptian Revolution. It demonstrates that youth was not simply an unchanging stage of development between childhood and adulthood, but a construct reflecting the political, social, and cultural interests of specific eras and perspectives. I critically analyze the local and global discourses on Egypt's modernization, colonialism, and nationalist movement to understand how changing power relations within and outside the country affected conceptions of youth and youthfulness. Additionally, I suggest by the time of the 1919 Revolution, representations of an ideal youth transferred into a real political and social force. This dissertation argues that the transformation of self-identity, embodied in a growing pride in the youthful spirit of a deep-rooted, old civilization helped drive Egypt's modern "awakening." While this project focuses its attention specifically on Egypt, I situate all these developments within a global context in order to showcase the paradoxical connections of youth culture formation between the colonized and colonizer, as well as between generations within this era of modernization and dramatic social transformation.

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Ashley, TAS and my inspiration

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION

I have used the system of transliteration of Arabic words followed by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Arabic diacritical marks are omitted, except for the `ayn (ّ) and hamza ('). The Arabic letter *jim* has been rendered as *j*, except where the Egyptian pronunciation (*gim*) is more common. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.

1. Introduction: Youth, Power, Egypt

In April 2011, while conducting research in Egypt, I visited the well-known Egyptian publishing company, Dar al-Hilal, on Muhammad Ezz al-Arab Street in Cairo's Sayyida Zaynab neighborhood. After finishing my work there that day, as I walked back to the nearby Sa`d Zaghlul metro station I noticed a billboard in a public garden at the corner of Muhammad Izz al-`Arab and Mansur streets. The board contained a picture of hundreds of Egyptians standing in Cairo's Tahrir Square holding a long Egyptian flag during the protests against the government of Hosni Mubarak sometime between January 25 and February 11, 2011 (Figure 1). In the foreground, a young girl held a smaller flag and a placard that read, "Egypt, my love" (*ya Habibti ya Masr*). What caught my eye was the expression in the bottom right corner of the picture, "Youth...Power...Egypt" (*al-Shabab...Quwa...Masr*). What exactly did this mean?

It is no secret that young people played a significant role protesting and mobilizing against Egypt's *ancien regime* in early 2011. The extent of their involvement in those heady days have since been remembered and analyzed by Egyptians and non-Egyptians alike.¹ I hasten to

¹ These range from published scholarly articles to reflective pieces, preserved documents to memorabilia sold in Tahrir Square. For scholarly analysis see for instance Dina Shehata, "The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End," in *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 26-32; Dina Shehata, "Youth Movements and the 25 January Revolution" in Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, eds, *Arab Spring in Egypt. Revolution and Beyond* (New York: AUC Press, 2012); Nadine Sika, "Youth Political Engagement in Egypt: From Abstention to Uprising," in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 2 (2012): 181-99; Atef Shahat Said, "The Tahrir Effect: History, Space, and Protest in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2014). For reflective pieces see Isma`il Serageldin, "A Salute to the Great Youth of Egypt," *Bibliotheca Alexandrina*, February 12, 2011, accessed March 25, 2011, <http://www.bibalex.org>; Selim H. Shahine, "Youth and the Revolution in Egypt," in *Anthropology Today* 27, no. 2 (April 2011): 1-3. One may also survey the online documents from 2011 containing pieces mentioning or authored by young people at <http://www.tahrirdocuments.org>. One could also view Jehane Noujaim's documentary, *The Square*, as a piece of evidence showing youth involvement in the revolutionary movement.



Figure 1. “Youth...Power...Egypt.” Photo by author, April 2011.

point out that prior to the uprising becoming known as the January 25 Revolution,” it was referred to in Egypt as the “Youth Revolution” (*Thawrat al- Shabab*).² The reasonings behind the name change is up for debate. Obviously, Egyptian youth were not alone at the focal points of the uprising. They participated with and among a wide range of individuals and groups hailing from different ideological orientations, social movements, and age groups. However, for a short time it was the young who were chosen as the symbols of the popular movement that challenged Egypt’s traditional structure of political authority. These representations created a direct linkage between youth, the nation, and the revolutionary movement; associating the promise of the young with Egypt’s political, social, and economic future. Indeed, “Youth...Power...Egypt” conveyed a strong message meant to advance a revolutionary vision, to mobilize Egyptians toward revolutionary goals, and to legitimate a revolutionary narrative.

² Tangible evidence supporting this point includes key chains, T-shirts, framed photographs, banners, hats, and stickers produced and sold in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in March-June 2011 containing the phrase “*Thawrat al-Shabab*.”

Nevertheless, the meanings associated with these representations of Egypt's youth proved ephemeral following a number of violent clashes between Egyptian security forces and young Egyptians in later months of 2011 and early 2012.³ As a result, youth suddenly appeared as threats to Egypt's social and political stability.

This dissertation demonstrates that historically it is common to find variations in the concepts and meanings of youth. The fluidity of such understandings reflects the political, social, and cultural interests and priorities of an era. The notion of youth is a socially and culturally determined category, a transitional phase between childhood and adulthood that has shifted in modern history as a result of changing local and global processes. In Egypt during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conceptions of youth were closely tied to emerging projects of modernization, colonialism, and nationalism. Yet, existing historical narratives about Egypt's encounter with these projects during this period generally do not acknowledge youth involvement or symbolism therein. Thus, the dynamics of this for Egypt are examined here.

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were pivotal periods in Egyptian history. The country underwent considerable change beginning in the nineteenth century as a result of forces associated with Egypt's modernization. These processes began with Napoleon's arrival in 1798. As a result, Egypt became the first Ottoman province occupied by a European power. Napoleon's adventure in Egypt only lasted until 1801 but his exodus allowed for the emergence of a new dynasty led by Muhammad `Ali. In the period during which Muhammad `Ali and his progeny had nearly exclusive control over Egypt (1805-1882), the country's rulers implemented

³ On this particular point the most notable clashes occurred between Egyptian security forces and the al-Ahlawy Ultras, a football fan club, mirroring those in Europe and made up mostly of young males, who frequently protested the SCAF government through the end of 2011. In February 2012, the Ahlawy Ultras were involved in clashes at Port Said with fans of the local club, al-Masry that left 74 people killed and more than 500 injured.

extensive reforms and established the foundations of the modern Egyptian state. During his tenure, Muhammad `Ali initiated bureaucratic, agricultural, economic, military, educational, and social projects meant to modernize Egypt and cement his dynasty's hegemony in the country. Partly as a result of these efforts, Muhammad `Ali's descendants would rule Egypt until the Free Officer Revolution in 1952.

Occurring alongside domestic transformations, Egypt's foreign relations underwent considerable modification as Muhammad `Ali and his successors worked to achieve a semblance of autonomy from the Ottoman sultan and to foster ties to Europe. While he succeeded in gaining his dynasty the right of hereditary rule in 1841, Muhammad `Ali's ambitions in Egypt and the region aroused the suspicions of western powers absorbed in the "Eastern Question." Following Muhammad `Ali's death in 1848, his grandson `Abbas attempted to close off Egypt to western influence in Egypt. However, once he died in 1854 and Muhammad `Ali's fourth son Sa`id took the throne, the new ruler reopened Egypt to European penetration by burrowing large sums of money from western banks and lending houses, allowing an influx of foreign capital and goods into the country, and granting concessions to European entrepreneurs with unfavorable terms for Egypt. In fact, Sa`id can be credited with granting the most notable concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps to build the Suez Canal. Sa`id's successor, Isma`il, (r.1863-1879), aspired to make Egypt a *part* of Europe by accelerating agrarian reform and infrastructural development. The Khedive's insatiable appetite to transform his country and live a luxurious lifestyle left Egypt facing mounting foreign debt and financial crisis by 1876. Egypt's bankruptcy facilitated European powers gaining greater authority within the country and ultimately led the British to spearhead the successful effort forcing Isma`il to abdicate in 1879.

By the time the Ottoman sultan placed Isma`il's son, Tewfiq, on the throne, an indigenous reform movement had emerged to challenge Europe's political and economic penetration of Egypt. The movement also contested the power and resources of the local Ottoman-Egyptian aristocracy. This competition for hegemony in Egypt waged between multiple parties worsened the country's predicament, which eventually led to the outbreak of the proto-nationalist `Urabi Revolt and the British invasion in 1882. Even while Egypt technically remained a province of the Ottoman Empire, the British established themselves as an occupying force and assumed *de facto* control over the country's military, finances, and government structure until their declaration of an official protectorate in 1914. While Egypt's nationalists suffered a humiliating defeat to the British in 1882, their activities continued and gradually strengthened through the turn of the twentieth century.

During World War One (1914-1918), Egypt swiftly became an essential supplier to the British war effort. The conditions imposed by the British during this period exacerbated the anger and hostility felt across Egyptian society toward Egypt's colonial masters. At the end of the war, many Egyptians held out hope Britain would grant Egypt nominal independence for their sacrifices during the conflict. When these hopes were seemingly dashed in early 1919, Egyptians from all walks of life broke out in an uprising against the British led by Sa`d Zaghlul and members of his *Wafd* Party. Over the course of the next few years, unrest continued sporadically across the country until February 1922 at which time the British announced their willingness to recognize Egypt as an independent state.

Existing scholarship has shown that the formation of modern Egypt involved processes that extended beyond the high political and economic realms. These developments included the formulation of new relationships between the state and its populations, the creation and

normalization of new identities, and the learning and practice of new habits by men, women, and children alike.

This dissertation draws attention to Egyptian youth who were increasingly incorporated into these modernization processes as subjects and objects from the beginning of the early nineteenth century through the 1919 Revolution. In the early nineteenth century, youth, young men in particular, were conscripted or volunteered for Muhammad `Ali's army, navy, factories, educational system, and burgeoning bureaucracy. At the same time, intellectuals and state-servants in the employ of the government depicted youth as essential national subjects, surrogates of the nation, endowed with novel responsibilities and duties uniquely essential to the progress and modernization of Egypt.

Just as Egypt continued its modern development in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, its increasing involvement in international affairs and its burgeoning economic ties encouraged a growing Western influence in the country and a demand for knowledge about the character of Egyptians and their rulers in Europe. As representations of Egypt generally validated the West's political and cultural superiority, images of youth and childishness served to ridicule and scorn members of the country's ruling dynasty in the British political and popular discourses. As it will become clear in later chapters, the ascription of particular cultural meanings to these images built a powerful legitimacy for western colonialism across Asia and Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Egyptian nationalists, reformers, and intellectuals were well aware of Western ideas concerning development, progress, and childhood. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century, nationalist offered their own concepts concerning childhood, youth, and national development as a part of their struggle for hegemony in Egypt. In fact, they adopted

and transformed tropes of the child and youth to challenge Western depictions of Egypt, promote collective solidarity, and mobilize Egyptians toward nationalist goals. After the turn-of-the twentieth century, young Egyptians, influenced by images of an ideal, heroic youth, demonstrated their zeal for the nationalist movement by organizing and mobilizing against the British occupation. At this point in time, as youth symbolized the strength and energy of the nation in the nationalist discourse, their participation in the anti-colonial movement provided the shock troops for Egypt's rejuvenation and repossession.

The 1919 Revolution culminated a century's worth of reforms and discussions whereby young Egyptians became associated with Egypt's modern development. In the course of the revolution, student political activism contributed a significant force to the mass movement against the British presence in Egypt and in demanding the nation's independence. Like all other segments that participated in the revolutionary events, Egypt's youth had unique grievances against the colonial authority that blended into the national struggle. While their mobilization against the British was one component of the revolutionary movement, it would be youth and women who would be remembered and symbolize the Revolution.

Despite the populist characteristics of the 1919 Revolution, much of the existing historiography places the culmination of the revolutionary moment exclusively within the realm of elite politics. Recently, studies have attempted to break this mold by recognizing the importance of a myriad of political, social, and cultural movements developing parallel to or in conjunction with the broader nationalist movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Innovative research in government documents, literary discourses, and visual and mass media have provided new strands of scholarship on gender, labor movements, and popular culture.

However, much work remains to be done to explain other transformations occurring within the Egyptian sociopolitical arena in the century leading up to the 1919 Revolution.

In an effort to contribute to the existing historiography, this dissertation addresses the symbolism of Egyptian youth (*al-Shabab*) within the discourses on Egypt's modernization, colonialization, and the nationalist movement. I analyze the designations for youth found within periodicals, memoirs, and archival material during this era. From these sources, I focus on the discovery of youth within these discursive fields, tracing the contours within the intellectual debates that contributed to both the development of early politicized "youthful" subjects and newly emerging social generations within the nationalist movement. In addition, this project focuses on inserting the voices and activities of youth into the Egyptian nationalist movement. Young Egyptians deserve recognition as agents within the political and cultural discourse of the era. They engaged in new daily practices and group activities that symbolized the formation of new politicized identities that reached fruition in 1919.

Thus, in addition to focusing on youth as a symbol, this dissertation turns to addressing the street politics leading up to and during the 1919 Revolution. The important synergetic combination of intellectual discourse on national identity and youth with mass culture in the first two decades of the twentieth century provided a space whereby collective ideologies and subjectivities could be acted on in the streets during times of social upheaval. Thus, I scrutinize reports from the British Foreign Office, Public Records Office, and Parliamentary Papers in an effort to gauge the extent to which Egyptians embraced and practiced new ideas of youth and collective unity in expressing their grievances toward their colonizers, most notably in student strikes, in the aftermath of the Dinshaway incident of 1906, and during the 1919 Revolution. Additionally, I interpret the British perspective of these unfolding events as well as British

contributions to these developments. My primary focus, however, remains to explore Egypt's emergent sense of self as a modern nation, and one deserving of and ready for independence. This dissertation argues that it is the transformation of self-identity, embodied in a growing pride in the youthful spirit of a deep-rooted, old civilization that drove Egypt's modern "awakening." While this project focuses its attention specifically on Egypt, I situate all these developments within a global context in order to showcase the paradoxical connections of youth culture formation between the colonized and colonizer, as well as between generations within the era of modernization and dramatic social transformation.

2. Creating a Few Good Men: Egypt's Youth and Youthfulness in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

The French occupation of Egypt (1798-1801), the first military incursion into the Middle East by Europe during the early stages of modern Western industrialization and expansionism, ushered in a long period of gradually increasing Western hegemony in Africa and Asia. Yet, the events that immediately followed the French exodus from Egypt can be best summed up as a period of local innovation and reform. That reform was undertaken during the reign of Muhammad `Ali, who was appointed viceroy of Egypt and given the title of Pasha by the Ottoman Sultan Selim III in June 1805. Muhammad `Ali's official recognition by the Porte and his ensuing reforms led to the proclamation of the Pasha as, "the Founder of Modern Egypt," at the centenary celebration of the beginning of his reign in 1905.¹

In the period during which Muhammad `Ali Pasha and his descendants (1805-1882) ruled Egypt, the region came to be referred to as a nation, defined in the modern sense of the term, as a result of policies of state development and modernization. As a component of these developments, we find the fashioning of new relationships between Egyptian individuals and Egyptian society, between individuals and the Egyptian state, and between the state and society. In analyzing these new relationships in Egypt, one finds similarity to what Dipesh Chakrabarty referred to as the development of the "phenomena of political modernity," described as:

¹ See the debate on this proclamation in a special issue of *al-Ahram Weekly* commemorating the bicentennial anniversary of the Muhammad `Ali's reign, No. 768, November 10-16, 2005. Also, Yoav Di-Capua's discussion on this particular topic in *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth Century Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

Impossible to think of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and concepts...concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality...²

Beginning during the reign of Muhammad `Ali (r. 1805-1848), the development of political modernity within Egypt produced new relations between the Egyptian state and Egyptian youth. Through the policies of the nascent Egyptian state, Muhammad `Ali, his household regime, and state servants employed youth in unprecedented ways. Youth, young men in particular, were conscripted, forced, demanded, or volunteered to become members of the Pasha's army, navy, factories, educational system, and burgeoning bureaucracy. This "discovery" of youth resulted in Egyptian young people becoming incorporated into projects in state building and modernization schemes. Through such practices, Egyptian youth became intertwined in the aspirations and policies of the Egyptian state, their lives and duties defined by the state. They became, in a sense, the Pasha's youth.

At the same time, intellectuals and state-servants in the Pasha's employ formulated new constructs of Egyptian national identity and depicted Egyptian youth in profoundly novel ways, fashioning ideal youthful subjects with new ideals of proper up-bringing, nation-family social structure, and responsibilities or duties to the nation. Through these processes, new forms of power were assumed by the Egyptian state officials who conceptualized the nation's youthfulness and youth as an essential part of the body politic. These processes unfolded in two distinctive ways. First, in defining the nation, Egypt's imagined youthfulness and the characteristics associated with such came to be regarded as a necessary ingredient undergirding

² Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4.

the nation's ability to progress and develop. Second, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the prominent Egyptian reformist, translator, educator, and state servant, Rifa`a Rafi' al-Tahtawi, began to articulate novel conceptions of Egyptian youth, intimately linking imagined Egyptian youth as essential national subjects within his articulations of the imagined, modern Egyptian *watan* (nation). In his major works, al-Tahtawi conceptualized Egyptian youth as a fundamental socio-political entity, the nation's building-block, interrelated through nation-familial bonds and endowed with novel national responsibilities and duties uniquely essential to the progress and modernization of Egypt.

The overall goal of this chapter is to shed light on the areas mentioned above by dissecting the ways in which youth were "discovered," utilized, and imagined by the Egyptian state and its intellectuals during the early to mid-nineteenth century. The first half of this chapter proceeds to evaluate these interrelated developments through a close reading of important works from the existing historiography focused on Muhammad `Ali's ascension to power in Egypt, the consolidation and extension of his household government, state development, and bureaucratic social transformation. The latter half of the chapter will focus on the major writings of Rifa`a Rafi' al-Tahtawi, deciphering his novel depictions of youth and youthfulness in relation to his articulations of the Egyptian nation and national identity.

Consolidating Power in the Hands of the Pasha: The First Phase of Muhammad `Ali's Rule, 1805-1821

Muhammad `Ali's rule inaugurated the beginning of a new period in Egyptian history, directly coinciding with the destruction of Mamluk power in Egypt. After Napoleon's departure from Egypt in 1801, the leadership of the Mamluks fell to two rival amirs, `Uthman Bardisi Bey and Muhammad Alfi Bey. The antagonism between the two factions left Egypt unmended from the French occupation, thus creating a power vacuum the Ottoman Sultan Selim III sought to fill.

With the French gone, the Ottoman Sultan dispatched troops to Egypt to end the Mamluk menace in the prized Ottoman province. Among these forces, Muhammad `Ali was second in command of a small Albanian contingent of troops, known for their fierce and effective fighting skills. It was with this force that Muhammad `Ali established his control in Egypt by waging war against the Mamluks, all the while ingratiating himself with the `ulema, merchants, and notables of Cairo. When the Porte's appointment of *wali* (governor) was not accepted by the Cairene population, the sultan acquiesced to local support for Muhammad `Ali by appointing the Albanian *wali* of Egypt in 1805.³

Following this appointment, Muhammad `Ali gradually secured his family as hereditary rulers of Egypt and undertook various measures to change Egypt's position within the Ottoman Empire, strengthen its economic ties with Europe, and radically alter Egypt's social and cultural purview through both innovation and imitation all the while adhering to Ottoman ruling culture and norms.⁴ For example, the Pasha continued the Ottoman and Mamluk practices in Egypt of provincial centralization. He spoke Ottoman Turkish, not Arabic. He introduced the Rumi architectural style emulating from the imperial capital of Istanbul, identifiable in the mosque bearing his name overlooking Cairo against the backdrop of the Muqattam plateau.⁵ Additionally, portraits show the Pasha adopting the new dress and tarbush required by Sultan

³ Khaled Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali Pasha, 1805-1848," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt* vol. 2, *Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, M.W. Daly, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 139-44.

⁴ This characterization of "innovation and imitation" is implied in many works but is explicitly stated in Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 18.

⁵ Ehud R. Toledano, *State and Society in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 55.

Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) in the 1830s.⁶ The Pasha continued the traditions of minting only Ottoman coins in Egypt, using the sultan's name in Friday prayers, and sending the annual tribute to Istanbul required of him.⁷ In most cases, Muhammad `Ali and his emerging dynasty took great care to preserve the symbols of Ottoman sovereignty, seeking the sultan's legitimizing power in many cases even to the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. In the first stage of his rule, Muhammad `Ali balanced playing the loyal servant of the Porte and carving out his own *de facto* niche within the sultan's domain.

To secure his place in Egypt, Muhammad `Ali invited his immediate family and close, trusted friends from Kavalla, Albania to take up residence and positions of importance within his military and civil administration, securing political power in the hands of one man and one household.⁸ In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the elimination of competing households as potentially destabilizing power bases facilitated Muhammad `Ali's grip on Egypt.⁹ Large households were integral to the reproduction of the Ottoman ruling class, both in Istanbul and in the provinces.¹⁰ Thus, the Pasha assembled his household with numerous male and female slaves and kept multiple concubines. To solidify his grip on the state, harem slaves were trained to become the wives and mistresses of ruling-class men, cementing patron-client bonds

⁶ Kenneth Cuno, "Egypt to c. 1919" in *The New Cambridge History of Islam* vol. 5, *The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance*, Francis Robinson, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 80.

⁷ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 146.

⁸ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 145. Also see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad `Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 75-99.

⁹ Ehud Toledano, "Social and Economic Change in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'" in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 2, M.W. Daly, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 257-58. In addition to Toledano, insights into Ottoman and Egyptian Mamluk household structure can be found in the work by Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdaglis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

¹⁰ Cuno, "Egypt to c. 1919," 80.

between households. Male slaves were trained to become members within the military and administrative postings, enhancing the influence of their master and helping facilitate predominance to Muhammad `Ali's household by 1811 and thereafter.¹¹

The men of Egypt's new, single household elite were of four types: the blood relatives of Muhammad `Ali; his in-laws; freed white slaves, or mamluks; and those not related to him who entered the Pasha's service through private agreements or were clients by virtue of their household affiliation.¹² Having strengthened his household's position in Egypt, in March, 1811 the Pasha dealt the Egyptian Mamluks a final death blow by massacring four hundred and fifty Mamluk amirs at the foot of the Citadel. Over the next few days, Muhammad `Ali's Albanian troops ravaged Mamluk homes in Cairo. In the following year, the Pasha's son, Ibrahim Pasha, was sent on an expedition to Upper Egypt against the remaining Mamluks where his forces succeeded in defeating them, thus ending their effective presence in Egypt.¹³

Extending Control over Egypt

In the years that followed, Muhammad `Ali continued to consolidate his control over wider areas of Egypt by confiscating large tracts of land from Mamluk families and from the *ulema*, placing them under state control. Later, the Pasha gave these tracts to members of his family, Ottoman elite, and Egyptian notables, for their loyalty and service to the ruling household. Through the acquisition of these land holdings, the Ottoman-Egyptian elite became

¹¹ Kenneth Cuno, "Ambiguous Modernization: The Transition to Monogamy in the Khedival House of Egypt," in *Family History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender*, Beshara Doumani, ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 254-55; Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 176; F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 20-32; Toledano, "Social and Economic Change," 256.

¹² F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 23.

¹³ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 146-47.

invested in Muhammad `Ali, his policies, his projects, and state development. Thereafter, the Pasha's emerging state sought to increase the agricultural output of Egypt by undertaking irrigation projects and mandating production and cultivation of cash crops such as long-staple cotton, sugarcane, indigo and flax for export in order to maximize profits for the state coffers. Likewise, Muhammad `Ali imposed a monopoly over the export of grain and other cash crops. The combination of successful profits from the monopoly of these agricultural products and the results of the cadastral survey of 1813-1814 have led scholars to argue that these developments spelled the end of the traditional tax-farm (*iltizam*) system that had existed in Egypt in favor of direct collection of a land tax by the state through its local functionaries. Wielding these new tactics, the Pasha increased his financial resources thus enabling him to expand his state-building projects, increase his own personal wealth, and deprive the traditional landed elite of a source of local power and personal income.¹⁴

The effects of all these policies and practices entrenched the Pasha more securely in Egypt and were intensely felt by all members of Egyptian society, urban and rural inhabitants alike. The *fellahin* (Egyptian peasants) suffered from the monopolies the Pasha introduced and from the increasing demands placed on their backs by the Pasha's agricultural projects in addition to being dragged into service as *corvee* gangs whose work was needed to maintain the existing irrigation canals or dig new ones as well as other public works programs. Under such conditions, peasants began to realize their lives and livelihoods were controlled increasingly by the Pasha's state and less by their former bosses, the *multazim* (the holders of *iltizam*). The

¹⁴ Kenneth Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 106-11. For a focused assessment of Muhammad `Ali's life and his impact on Egypt, see Khaled Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt* (Oxford: One World Press, 2009).

contemporary Egyptian chronicler al-Jabarti noted the *fellahin* rebuke to *multazim* demands, “Your days are finished and we have become the Pasha’s peasants.”¹⁵ Townspeople, the *ulema*, urban notables, and merchants were affected by Muhammad `Ali’s new system of taxation and the expansion of monopolies on a growing list of commodities.¹⁶ Given the circumstances, the Pasha was gradually encroaching upon all peoples of the Nile Valley, not just the *fellahin*.

The tools, techniques, policies, and facilities that Muhammad `Ali’s burgeoning state utilized in controlling Egypt resulted in what one scholar has referred to as a “rural and urban squeeze.”¹⁷ Yet, in analyzing the historiography on the Pasha’s rule, some contemporary scholars focusing on political and economic development have been quick to point out the benefits of Muhammad `Ali’s tactics for Egypt. For instance, these policies and practices introduced a stability and security in Egypt that had been lacking for the most part over the last decades. As Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot points out in her study of the era of Muhammad `Ali’s rule, the financial and commercial life of the country, agricultural production, and trade had suffered greatly due to the movements of armies, banditry, and the British blockade of Egyptian ports prior to and in the early years of Muhammad `Ali’s reign. Being that the cornerstone of the Pasha’s internal policy was law and order, Muhammad `Ali was able to win the initial support of the *ulema*, merchants, and notables through his tactics of centralization and pacification.¹⁸ Over the course of the “long nineteenth century,” rural and urban revolts declined.¹⁹ Additionally, the state’s medical policies proved to be beneficial for the population, especially the opening of

¹⁵ al-Jabarti, *‘Aja’ib*, IV, 207, quoted in Fahmy, “The Era of Muhammad `Ali,” 150; and quoted in Cuno, *The Pasha’s Peasants*, 5.

¹⁶ Fahmy, “The Era of Muhammad `Ali,” 150.

¹⁷ Toledano, “Social and Economic Change,” 262; for more depth see, Toledano, *State and Society*, 181-220.

¹⁸ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 100-01.

¹⁹ Toledano, “Social and Economic Change,” 262.

small clinics around the country and a nation-wide program of vaccination for children.²⁰ In this light, it is therefore safe to argue that a certain amount of stability and security in the nineteenth century can be attributed to the increasing hegemonic centralization of power in the Pasha's household as well as to the increasing abilities of the state to eliminate sources of resistance to its policies.

Modernizing the Army, the Early Educational System, and the Changing Social Base of the Bureaucracy in the Second Phase of Muhammad `Ali's Reign

The efforts and strategies of Muhammad `Ali outlined above consolidated power in the hands of the Pasha and his household. In the second phase of his reign, 1821-1848, Muhammad `Ali built a modern standard army, established institutions and industries to support the military, and funded student missions to Europe. These developments marked the further encroachment of the burgeoning Egyptian state into the lives of its subjects.

In conscripting his new army, Muhammad `Ali relied heavily on *fellahin* from Upper Egypt. Little information exists about the social and biological factors that determined conscription policies or informed army recruiters about their work. As the state bureaucracy, industrial-technical field, and military expanded, so too was there an increase in the demand for educated men who could serve as technocrats, industrial administrators, and military-related experts. Muhammad `Ali's solution to this issue consisted of sending students to Europe to obtain Western expertise in technical, governmental, and military matters. Indeed, from 1824 onward Egyptian young men were tools of the state building process.

In the first phase of Muhammad `Ali's reign, military campaigns into the Arabian Peninsula against the Wahhabi-Saudis (1811-18), Yemen (1819), and northern Sudan (1820-22)

²⁰ Fahmy, *Medmed Ali*, 107-08.

extended the influence and prestige of the Pasha well beyond the Egyptian Delta and Nile Valley. Muhammad `Ali's expeditions to the Arabian Peninsula were undertaken mostly in the service of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, who ordered the Pasha to subdue the Wahhabi rebellion.²¹ While the expeditions to Arabia were successful, the overall failure of the Sudan expedition, due to disease among the Pasha's troops and his inability to raise a sizable number of Sudanese men for his army, required the Pasha to develop a solution for creating a standing army at his service.

Therefore, over the next decade Muhammad `Ali filled the lower ranks of his new army with men from Upper Egypt. He imposed mandatory conscription on the *fellahin*, creating a system that would train, discipline, and organize them. In a letter to the governor of an Upper Egyptian province, the Pasha wrote in 1822, "since the Turks are members of our race and since they must be spared the trouble of being sent to remote and dangerous areas, it has become necessary to gather a number of soldiers from Upper Egypt. We thus saw fit that you conscript around four thousand men from these provinces."²² The Pasha also sought to attract Ottoman-Turkish speaking men from all over the Ottoman empire to Egypt in order to serve the Pasha as commanders within his new army, cementing the linguistic divisions in the army as well as preserving the existing ethnic hierarchy of the empire.²³

²¹ Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his army, and the making of modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 40-41.

²² Dar al-Wathaiq, S/I/50/2/145 on February 18, 1822, cited in Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 154.

²³ Timothy Mitchell characterized this effort as the beginning of the Egyptian state employing "implicit obedience" on the masses. See Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 175.

The effort to develop a new army, known as the *Nizam al-Jadid*, was much inspired by the *Nizam-i Cedid* of Sultan Selim III prior to his overthrow in 1807. While historically rooted in Ottoman reform, the French influence on the Pasha's army became discernible after 1825 when a French military mission arrived in Egypt to restructure the officer corps.²⁴ Through such initiatives, the Pasha expanded his army to over 130,000 troops by the 1830s, providing the numbers to satisfy his military ambitions and safeguarding his position against the intrigues of outside influence.²⁵ Within Egypt itself, the methods and policies of conscription ushered in a period where the new relationship between the government and the governed is clearly visible. These new policies and the population's reaction to such resulted in what was aptly characterized as a process bent on transforming "the face of Egyptian society and to drastically alter the relationship between the government and the populace ... introducing new techniques of control and surveillance that had not been tried in Egypt before."²⁶

To this end, the Pasha conscripted Egyptian *fellahin*, trained and disciplined his new recruits, and employed them in the maintenance and expansion of his hegemony. Khaled Fahmy describes this historical period and provides insightful analysis of issues pertaining to conscription, the reasonings for military expansion, the nature of these developments in relation to power and representation, the reaction of the *fellahin* to the new "colonial" order, and the role the army played in the creation of Egyptian nationalism during the nineteenth century. As to conscription methods, Fahmy informs us that the early attempts at conscripting the fellah proved ineffective, given that, "the conscripting officers, on receiving their orders, would descend upon

²⁴ For further reference of the French military mission see James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Egypt* (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 115-17.

²⁵ The last two statements are referenced from Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 154-55.

²⁶ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 97. For a detailed analysis of the process outlined above, see Fahmy's second and third chapters in *All the Pasha's Men*, 76-159.

any given village and seize as many men as could be found ‘without any order, arrangement, inscription, or lot-drawing’” with no discretion toward the medically unfit or the age of the recruit.²⁷ Such methods led many *fellahin* to resist conscription through various means such as rebellion/revolt, desertion from villages, and self-maiming. Accordingly, the government sought to rectify such issues by instituting a more thorough system of policing, building a medical establishment to prevent and/or cure physical maladies, and by obtaining more precise information about the population such as age, gender, residence, and occupation through censuses.

His determination to collect such information speaks volumes about Muhammad `Ali’s increased consciousness about and concern for recognizing, organizing, standardizing, and manipulating its subject population based on biological data. From the outset, government authorities knew that “no consistent conscription policy could properly be implemented without such information (population size, its age composition, location, professions, etc).”²⁸ Fahmy clearly states that the *fellahin*’s aversion and resistance to conscription, coupled with the government’s early failures to implement a thorough and capable system of recruiting, necessitated a new scheme for controlling and governing Egypt. Therefore, as early as 1825, various lists and registers were compiled and in 1827 the Pasha ordered a general accounting of the countryside culminating in the first national census of 1845-1848.²⁹ This process of

²⁷ Sir John Bowring, “Report on Egypt and Candia,” Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners 21 (1840), 52, quoted in Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 98-103.

²⁸ Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 107-08

²⁹ Fahmy addresses the various orders to compile the registers and implement the census taking of 1845 in *All the Pasha’s Men*, 108. Dealing in more detail with the significance of the nineteenth century censuses see, Kenneth Cuno and Michael Reimer, “The Census Registers of Nineteenth-Century Egypt: A New Source for Social Historians,” in the *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no. 2 (November 1997): 193-216.

“inscribing reality” sought to tap into Egypt’s human resources by formally documenting its demographic composition. The previous erratic and imprecise methods were far too inefficient to meet the Pasha’s demands in raising a modern army.³⁰

Central to the success of constituting the Pasha’s new army was recognizing and incorporating young Egyptian men into the Pasha’s service. Take for instance Article 15 of the *Qanun al-Filaha* from 1830:

In the event of a fellah hiding himself among the Bedouins, wearing their clothes, and being discovered among them afterward...the tribesman who hides him will be conscripted into the military service if he is *a young man (shab)*, and if an old man (*ikhtiyar*), he will be sent to jail (*Liman*) for six months.³¹

The Egyptian government thus came to realize that young men were indispensable to the state’s ability, in the short term, to conscript an army and, in the long-term, control, manipulate, and govern the lands around the Nile. Specifically implied within the government’s novel techniques of conscription and surveillance was the recognition of youth (s. *shab/p. shabab*) as the essential demographic entity to the successful implementation of state building projects. In this era, youth thus became targeted by the state in uniquely unprecedented ways and subjected to new government efforts to discipline, control, and order its population.

The Founding of the Early Educational System

The second phase of Muhammad `Ali’s reign constituted a watershed. The culmination of the successful cultivation of cash crops, in particular long-staple cotton, and the founding of a

³⁰ Fahmy uses the terminology of “inscribing reality” to depict the discursive techniques involved in conscription to recognize both the agent and subject behind such processes. See Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 156-59.

³¹ Filib Jallad, ed., *Qamus al-Idara wa’l-Qada’*, vol. 3 (Alexandria, 1890-92), 1325, quoted in Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 123; Emphasis mine.

modern conscription-based army proved thereafter to be the intimately linked pillars of the Pasha's regime. Muhammad `Ali used growing profits from cotton sales to construct the new army and navy, and to found additional institutions essential to the advancement of the modern military, new industries, a modern medical school and facilities, and other educational institutions. These developments, to quote Fahmy, "radically changed the nature of Egyptian agricultural enterprises, altered Cairo's relationship with the provinces (with growing hegemony assumed by the rulers in Cairo), increased Egypt's link to the European economy, and significantly increased the government's budget." The policy of conscripting Egyptians for the army, "triggered the need to found more and more institutions which together radically transformed the face of Egyptian society."³²

Between 1815 and 1823, the Pasha therefore attempted to introduce a European system of training and organization into the army by setting up military schools, staffed by Ottoman and European advisors and instructors. The successes of his western-trained army divisions in the Arabian Peninsula and the Greek Campaign (1824-1828) encouraged Muhammad `Ali to establish additional military-related schools to bolster his new army and related reforms. The newly founded schools included the school of pharmaceutics (1829), school of maternity (1831), veterinary school (1827), schools of music (1824), cavalry school (1831), artillery school (1831), infantry schools (1832), high school (1826), naval schools (1825), school of war munitions (1833), school of mineralogy (1834), school of engineering (1834), school of applied chemistry (1829), civil schools (1829), school of signaling (1830), school of arts and crafts (1831), school of irrigation (1831), school of translation (1836), and a school of agriculture (1833).³³ The

³² Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 11-12.

³³ For specific details on the establishment of these schools see Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 115-57.

establishment of these schools represented the foundations of the Egyptian educational system, while its beginnings were clearly rooted in the Pasha's desires to reform the military.

Following the Greek Campaign, the Pasha's state reforms expanded into the industrial sector in order to turn out war products and oversee the buildup of the arsenal works at Alexandria. The founding of a new medical school in 1827 at Abu Za'bal to care for the needs of officers and soldiers of the nearby training camp of Jihad Abad, at Khanqah north of Cairo was designed to form a new medical corps. Muhammad `Ali recruited Arabic-speaking students from al-Azhar and trained them under the direction of a Frenchman, Dr. A.B. Clot Bey. Young men were, once again, employed by the state to fulfil these new functions. Moreover, the establishment of these schools has been heralded by historians, yet they remain but one initiative of military-related reforms begun by Muhammad `Ali in the 1820s.

In his text on the beginnings of the Egyptian educational system, James Heyworth-Dunne argued that from a very early date Muhammad `Ali had made up his mind to adopt new methods of organization in Egypt, particularly in relation to education. This position is evidenced by the Pasha's early educational institutions as well as his sponsorship of student missions to Europe as early as 1809 where they observed, learned, and analyzed the arenas in which Europeans excelled. European-trained students alleviated the Pasha's biggest problem of introducing reform in Egypt: the lack of qualified men with backgrounds or knowledge in technical fields. These young members of the student missions were expected to return to Egypt to establish factories, arsenals, and other technical departments or to open schools where Western learning could be taught to Egyptians in the service of the state. Between 1809 and 1818, Muhammad `Ali sent a total of twenty-eight students to Italy, France, and England to study military sciences, ship-building, printing, engineering, the management of ships, and mechanics. Most of the students'

names from the earliest missions are impossible to trace, therefore their ages and familial history of the students remain mostly unknown.³⁴ Heyworth-Dunne nonetheless states, “most of them were Muhammad `Ali’s picked men, whether Turk, Armenian, or Egyptian, gradually forcing the idea in official administrative circles that training and specialization abroad was the hallmark of education.”³⁵ Regardless of the perceived benefits of education abroad, no Egyptian students were sent to Europe between 1818 and 1826.

Given the lack of evidence for the early educational missions, it is without surprise that many scholars have neglected contributing much effort to detail these missions within the historical narrative. By contrast, a substantial amount of attention has been given to the first large educational mission sent to France by the Pasha in 1826 by and large due to the evidence left by its most famous member, Rifa`a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, who was sent as the mission’s *Imam*. The 1826 educational mission consisted of forty-four students. The large number was justified by the Pasha’s desire to dispense of European advisors and administrators employed by the Egyptian state. At the conclusion of their education in France, the students were expected to return to Egypt in order to head various institutions and/or serve in administrative posts.³⁶

³⁴ Daniel Newman, in the introduction to his translation of Rifa`a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, *Takhils al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz aw al-Diwan al-Nafis bi-iwan Baris*, tells us in a footnote that a fire at the Citadel in 1820 destroyed the records of the early student missions. See Rifa`a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi *An Imam in Paris: An Account of a Stay in France by an Egyptian Cleric (1826-1831)*, trans. Daniel Newman (London: al-Saqi Books, 2004), 17.; However, Newman states that the first student to be sent to Europe in 1809 was a Turk by the name of ‘Uthman Nur al-Din (1797-1834) where he remained for eight years; in 1815 the Pasha sent Syrian-born Niqula Massabiki to Milan at the age of fifteen; The point I want to make here is that Nur al-Din was twelve years old when he was sent and returned at twenty. Collectively, he and Massabiki were both within the age parameters of “youth” furthering the argument that the government increasingly utilized youth to serve its ambitions.

³⁵ Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 169-70.

³⁶ Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 104-06 and 157-58; I will cover in further detail the student mission of 1826 later in this chapter.

Students were chosen from the elite families of Cairo, all with personal and/or official ties to the Pasha. The birth places for thirty-seven are known: seventeen were born in Cairo, al-Tahtawi in Tahta, and the remaining nineteen were Circassians, Greeks, Georgians, Armenians, and Turks. In terms of age, the youngest was fifteen whereas the oldest was thirty-seven, while the average age was twenty-one. Commenting on the students' curriculums and the rigid socio-political hierarchy of Egypt at the time, scholar Daniel Newman argues that the Turks, Circassians and Armenians were slated for military and administration-related courses while the "second class" native Egyptian students were given more practical fields of study such as natural history, metal founding, mechanics, engraving, typography and chemistry, all apparently deemed less important by the Pasha.³⁷

The sponsorship of students to Europe for study continued up to the British occupation of 1882, having up to 115 students abroad at one time during its height. In 1934, Prince `Umar Tusun calculated that between 1813 and 1849 311 students were sent to Europe (France, Italy, Austria, and England) while contemporary scholars cite the number closer to 360.³⁸ Under the successors of Muhammad `Ali who ruled from 1849 to 1882, the official total number of students sent to Europe was 298. Needless to say, these missions and these students provided many of the later officials in governmental posts and gradually led to the development of a new upper stratum in Egyptian society and politics increasingly with landed, Egyptian roots and Western-educated expertise and worldview.³⁹

³⁷ al-Tahtawi, *An Imam*, 27-28; also see the full list of participants in Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 159-64.

³⁸ The statistics in this paragraph as well as the Price `Umar Tusun reference is found and cited in al-Tahtawi, *An Imam*, 78-79.

³⁹ For summaries and insightful statistical and biographical compilations of the student missions, see Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*.

The rationale behind establishing the early Egyptian state educational system and funding educational missions to Europe is important to reiterate here. On the one hand, the foundations lie in the Pasha's desire to reform the military, solidify its loyalty to him, and offer a bulwark against the prerogatives of the sultan to remove him from his position in Egypt. On the other hand, the growth of the state's bureaucratic responsibilities increased the need for a growing cadre of educated elite, fit to carry out the administrative, legislative, and technical functions of a modern state. Over time, through such efforts members of the indigenous Egyptian population came to fill these roles in increasing numbers. Between 1809 and 1849, eleven thousand Egyptian youth passed through Muhammad `Ali's schools, destined for assignment in the military corps or the expanding civil service, thus ushering in consequences both intended and unintended.⁴⁰ The gradual emergence of a cadre of Egyptian technocratic elite, men in their youth educated in European politics and sciences, stimulated changes within the ruling system and lessened the socio-political distinctions between the Arabophone Egyptians and their Ottoman-Turkish speaking counterparts during the era of Muhammad `Ali's decedents' rule.⁴¹ This effort to educate and employ young men versed in technical and military fields yet again signals the government's growing awareness of the essentiality of youth in meeting its aims to fill slots within the bureaucracy or the military. The changing social, cultural, and political processes initiated through increasing incorporation of Egyptian youths into the civil service, would prove to be a quite influential social development over the course of the nineteenth century.

⁴⁰ Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 103.

⁴¹ Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 41.

Evaluating the Changing Social Base of Egyptian Government

The appointment of Egyptians began sparingly during Muhammad `Ali's rule and gradually expanded thereafter. The Pasha had first introduced native Egyptians into the bureaucracy in limited numbers and into the military through his practice of conscription. During the reigns of `Abbas I (r. 1849-1854), Sa`id (r. 1854-1863), and Isma`il (r. 1863-1879), Egyptians continued, increasingly, to be brought into the administration. Some rose to positions of high rank. By Isma`il's reign, Egyptians could be found in every government office and at every government rank.⁴²

Three generations of high bureaucrats emerged during the reigns of Muhammad `Ali and his successors. The first generation, with a few exceptions, was recruited from among the Pasha's family, associates from Kavalla, and skilled Armenian bureaucrats. These men were commonly recruited because of their personal loyalty to the Pasha or because they had a skill pertinent to the effective rule of the state. The second generation was educated during Muhammad `Ali's reign and ascended to power in the dispute between `Abbas and other members of his grandfather's dynasty. These men reached their career peaks before Isma`il's enthronement in 1863. Most left office by his dethronement in 1879. These men generally had a scientific background and were recruited because they had knowledge of a European language or a technical skill acquired in Europe or in a European-styled school. The second generation witnessed a pattern toward the increasing recruitment of Europeans and Egypt's rural notables into the burgeoning civil bureaucracy. They amassed large landed property by way of land grants from Muhammad `Ali and his successors for their loyalty and service to the Khedival

⁴² Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 52.

state. The third generation of high officials consisted of the sons of the second-generation, educated in a much more Europeanized fashion, eventually playing a role in the Egyptian nationalist movement to 1919 and the creation of the modern nation-state of Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century.⁴³

It is during the ascent of this latter generation into high bureaucratic office that the administration of Egypt underwent major structural growth. It is important to note here that the trajectory of such growth initiated three distinctive trends: one, more members of the elite were born and raised in Egypt as the nineteenth century progressed; two, over time the elite assumed a more administrative, bureaucratic rather than a military character; and three, this elite portrayed more indigenous, socio-cultural components and behaviors at the expense of the Ottoman element.⁴⁴ In other words, they became more Egyptian.

Arguably, the gradual appointment of Egyptians from families of provincial notability to high administrative positions brought the viceroy's household government into contact with men who possessed personal, intimate knowledge of the countryside, its resources and inhabitants. These connections created familial-like bonds to the ruler's household, shaping a new administrative culture, sharing common linkages to the state, Cairo, and the provinces. Ties to the land among those in the Khedival household, provincial notability, and civil service increasingly cemented bonds of shared interest among these groups. The increasing number of Egyptians in high office and other positions in the service of maintaining the hegemony of the

⁴³ See Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 82-83; Toledano, "Social and Economic Change," 264-65; and Toledano, *State and Society*, 41-49.

⁴⁴ Hunter, "Egypt under Muhammad `Ali's Successors," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 2, M.W. Daly, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 190-91; and Toledano, "Social and Economic Change," 266.

Khedival household fostered the formation of an Egyptianized bureaucratic elite, subsequently contributing to the development of office holders with more localized interests.

Robert Hunter suggests that high-ranking Egyptian officials generally supported government programs designed to advance and protect their positions within the government as well as profit from their own landholdings. Inherent in such strategies was their interest in continuing reform. Astutely aware of the ideas and material culture of Europe, these Egyptian officials were, “prepared to work for and support changes of a fundamental nature. Implicit in this orientation was the notion of ‘decline,’ the ideas that Egypt had fallen behind and must somehow catch up with the rest of the world.”⁴⁵ “Reform-minded” officials were thus more inclined toward the adoption of European techniques, technology, ideas, and worldviews. The dynamics involved in the gradual creation of a cadre of Egyptian state servants was an important component in the Egyptianization of the Khedival bureaucracy.⁴⁶ Most importantly, the gradual incorporation of Egyptians into the Pasha’s service, whether into his household, his military, or his bureaucracy, laid the groundwork for the creation or invention of an Egyptian national identity. By the 1870s, this imagined national identity would facilitate the rallying cry, “Egypt for the Egyptians,” in the pursuit of spurring indigenous action against foreign encroachment especially manifest in the `Urabi Revolt of 1882.

But before reaching that point, in the middle of the nineteenth century we find the original articulation of an Egyptian territorial patriotism and early formulations of an Egyptian national identity. Scholars have devoted much ink to analyzing these ideological processes and

⁴⁵ Hunter, “Egypt Under Muhammad `Ali’s Successors,” 191.

⁴⁶ For further discussion on the creation of this elite see Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 80-122; for further insight into Egypt’s officials and their interests see, 123-76.

tracing the local, regional, and international influences within each. Upon a reevaluation of the early writings on the modern Egyptian nation as an imagined community, one finds novel representations of youth. These conceptions were as innovative as the idea of the Egyptian nation itself and it is toward these depictions that I now turn.

Depicting Youth and Youthfulness in the Modern Watan (Nation)

Projects of political, social, and economic modernization and state development under the reigns of Muhammad `Ali and his descendants led to the defining of Egypt as a nation in the modern sense of the term during the nineteenth century. As a component of these developments, we find the fashioning of new relationships between Egyptians, Egyptian society, and the Egyptian state in ways both real and imagined.

The creation of Egyptian political modernity in the nineteenth century involved Egyptian youth as essential components of the processes of state modernization. Complimenting these developments, new conceptions of youth in relation to the imagined Egyptian nation were being articulated in the writings of Egypt's best known early reform-minded intellectual, nationalist, translator, and educator, Rifa`a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873). Scholars have tended to agree that al-Tahtawi introduced the ideas of nationalism into Egypt and was directly responsible for tweaking the meaning of the Arabic term, *watan*, to express the concept of "national territory." al-Tahtawi's *watan* drew from the same political and social principles that "the nation" was articulated in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe generally and the term *patrie* in France specifically.⁴⁷ As a cultivator of knowledge, al-Tahtawi's position as a prominent

⁴⁷ For more on this discussion see Anwar Luqa, *Voyageurs et Ecrivains Egyptiens en France au XIXe Siècle* (Paris: Didier, 1970); Gilbert Delanoue, *Moralistes et Politiques Musulmans dans l'Egypte du XIXe Siècle (1798-1882)* 2 vols. (Cairo: Institut Francais d' Archeology Orientale du Caire, 1982); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939*, 11th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Benjamin Geer, "The Priesthood of

educator and intellectual within the emerging hegemonic discourse in nineteenth century Egypt has garnered much attention. However, his depictions of youth and youthfulness in relation to the Egyptian *watan* and the implications of such have yet to be fully analyzed in a detailed study.

The remainder of the chapter addresses this lacuna through an examination of al-Tahtawi's three major works, *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* (An Extraction of Gold in a Summary of Paris, published 1834), *Manahij al-Albab al-Misriya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-'Asriyya* (The Paths of Egyptian Hearts in the Joys of the Contemporary Arts, published 1869), and *al-Murshid al-Amin li-l-Banat wa-l-Banin* (The Trustworthy Guide for Girls and Boys, published 1872). Two dominant trends appear in these texts. One, al-Tahtawi consistently depicted the Egyptian nation as possessing the characteristic of youthfulness. This conception was heavily influenced by contemporary western trends, philosophies, and ideologies merging national development and modernity with the organic life-cycle. He connected characterizations of a nation's youthfulness, maturity, or old age to a nation's progress, vitality, degeneration, or obsolescence. Thus, he positioned Egypt relative to other nations of the world and showcased its potential for development.

Second, al-Tahtawi's innovative writings portrayed Egyptian youth as the ideal "national" subject, endowed with novel "national" responsibilities, and bearing the prospects for "national" regeneration. He depicted Egypt's *watan* as a parental figure, a mother or father, and represented Egyptians as the offspring, youth or children, of the *watan*. The relations between these terms implied reciprocal duties, behaviors, and loyalties, couching national collectivity in the imagery of a familial unit. This conception transposed hierarchical familial relations onto the

Nationalism in Egypt: Duty, Authority, Autonomy," (PhD Dissertation, University of London, 2011).

hegemonic relationality between the state and society. al-Tahtawi also discussed Egyptian youth as those real inhabitants of Egypt who had not reached the demarcation line of biological or socially constructed adulthood. Al-Tahtawi elucidated this context of youth in clear connection with education and upbringing as will be demonstrated below.

al-Tahtawi's Early Life in Egypt and the 1826 Educational Mission to France

Rifa`a Rafi' al-Tahtawi's early life can be traced back to the west bank of the Nile in Upper Egypt to the market town of Tahta where he was born in 1801. On his father's side, his lineage extended back to the Prophet Muhammad via his daughter, Fatima. His mother's family traced their ancestry back to the Medinese Khazraj tribe who are commonly designated as *al-Ansar*, the supporters of the prophet in Medina after he arrived from Mecca in 622 CE. Because of this line of descent, his family enjoyed considerable respect and standing within Tahta. As a result of Muhammad `Ali's land reforms in 1813, however al-Tahtawi's father had his land expropriated by the Pasha, reducing the family to impoverishment. Afterwards, the family relocated several times in Upper Egypt. During this period, the young al-Tahtawi was taught the Quran under the supervision of his father and uncles and studied religious texts used at al-Azhar. The family returned to Tahta in 1816, where his father died soon afterwards, overworked and penniless.

In 1817, al-Tahtawi enrolled at al-Azhar where he began his classical training in religious sciences and Arabic grammar and rhetoric. After four years at al-Azhar, he received several *ijazas* (certificates of religious authority and knowledge) from his teachers, enabling him to begin lecturing on various subjects at the renowned Islamic university. In 1824, his reformist-minded mentor, Shaykh Hasan al-`Attar, intervened on his behalf and secured al-Tahtawi a post as *Imam* in a unit of Muhammad `Ali's newly founded army, the *Nizam al-Jadid*. This

opportunity afforded al-Tahtawi first-hand knowledge of and experience with the driving force behind the Pasha's modernization programs in Egypt. Two years later in 1826, when Muhammad `Ali decided to send the first large educational mission to France, al-`Attar again recommended the 24 year-old al-Tahtawi to serve as the mission's *Imam* while they remained in France.⁴⁸ The cumulative effect of these two experiences left a profound impact on the young, al-Azhar-trained scholar. Albert Hourani claimed that al-Tahtawi's experience with the army left him conscious of the military virtues of the Pasha's army, motivating the young man in his studies while in France, 1826-1831. Indeed, al-Tahtawi's sojourn to France were the most formative years of his life, providing profound influence on his worldview and intellectual ambitions.⁴⁹

When the Egyptian students arrived in Paris in 1826, a special school, the *Ecole Egyptienne de Paris*, had been created for them under the direction of the French Orientalist, Edme-Francois Jomard. Heyworth-Dunne points out that, "much ado has been made about the cultural gain to France as a result of Muhammad `Ali being urged to makes use of (France) for the education of his young men, but this was only accidental."⁵⁰ The Pasha's rationale behind the student mission was simply to aid in his work towards military transformation, modernization, and conquest. This focus on military needs is reflected in the curriculum and subjects studied at the school by the Egyptian students.⁵¹ Though he had not been sent as a formal student, al-Tahtawi embraced this unique opportunity to learn with an extraordinary zeal, leaving many to argue that he was most successful and influential member of the mission. Upon arriving in

⁴⁸Newman's introduction to al-Tahtawi, *An Iman in Paris*, 29-34.

⁴⁹ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 69.

⁵⁰ Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 158-59.

⁵¹ For the specific curriculum and studies of each of the participants, see Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 159-66.

France, al-Tahtawi began studying French and once his proficiency in the language was superior, specialized in translation of French texts into Arabic. Armed with an intense motivation, he diligently read books on ancient and contemporary history, Greek Philosophy and mythology, geography, arithmetic, military sciences, cosmology, and French poetry. He also read a biography of Napoleon, Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son, and works of eighteenth-century French social and political thinkers including Voltaire and Condillac as well as Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* and Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws*.⁵²

al-Tahtawi provided information on his experiences in France in, *Takhils al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz*, published in 1834. Described by Roger Allen as "one of the very first examples of a whole series of narratives in which Arab visitors to Europe have recorded their impressions," the book is divided into six total essays, or *maqalaat*, chronicling al-Tahtawi's perceptions of France, its society, people, and institutions.⁵³ Specifically, the first two essays are personal accounts detailing al-Tahtawi's journey from Cairo to Paris and his experiences throughout. The third essay was written to expose and describe the people and institutions of France with topics ranging from French sciences, topography, politics, clothing, private and public life, hygiene, eating habits, entertainments, charity, religion, and education among other things. The fourth essay described the organization of instruction and supervision for the Egyptian educational mission and includes letters from the Pasha to the students and correspondences between al-Tahtawi and his instructors. The fifth essay took up the events of the French Revolution of 1830, which the mission's members witnessed firsthand. The final essay focused on the division of

⁵² For a complete list of the works studied and translated by al-Tahtawi while in France, see his account of French educational mission, Tahtawi's *Takhils al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz aw al-Diwan al-Nafis bi-iwan Baris*. In *An Imam in Paris*, 288-302.

⁵³ Roger Allen, *The Arabic Novel: An Historical and Critical Introduction* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 20.

French arts and sciences, the classification of languages, the art of writing, notes on logic, Aristotle, arithmetic, and the science of history. The account itself provides insight into the personally intimate impressions of al-Tahtawi during his time in France and has since provoked many differing analytic interpretations.

Albert Hourani stated that al-Tahtawi's time in France and his specific studies of the French Enlightenment left an undeniable mark on him, "and through him on the Egyptian mind."⁵⁴ While it has been argued above that the Pasha's reasoning for the student missions may not have been for cultural interaction, when considering the later works of al-Tahtawi many have agreed with Hourani and argued that Western cultural influences did in fact permeate the Shaykh's worldview and gradually were filtered into Egypt by way of his work and his students.⁵⁵ al-Tahtawi's place as a cultural innovator thus seems quite reasonable. However, the gradually changing social and cultural trajectory of Egypt, produced by Muhammad `Ali's modernization projects, also resulted in the rise of new kinds of cultural consumers.⁵⁶ One finds within such a fluid cultural field new opportunities for particular knowledge producers emerging over time.⁵⁷ Perhaps al-Tahtawi's contributions to the intellectual discourse on Egypt struck at the most opportune historical moment when Egypt was most open to his work. While it is not the overall goal of this chapter to discuss the evolving dynamics of consumer culture in relation to or as a result of cultural producers, the fact that al-Tahtawi's career did experience its own ups and

⁵⁴ Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 69.

⁵⁵ For instance, Hourani suggests that al-Tahtawi's idea of the nation, *watan*, was possibly derived from Montesquieu, *Arabic Thought*, 70.

⁵⁶ I would argue this is an entirely recognizable phenomenon considering the findings and conclusions of Robert Hunter and Ehud Toledano mentioned earlier in the chapter regarding bureaucratic, social, and economic change in Egypt during the course of the nineteenth century.

⁵⁷ On the relationship between cultural producers and consumers see Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 252-53; applying this relationship to al-Tahtawi and Egypt see Geer, "The Priesthood of Nationalism in Egypt," 107-08.

downs, depending on which “cultural consumer” sat on the khedival throne cannot be dismissed.⁵⁸ Regardless, al-Tahtawi’s growing influence after his return from France in 1831, given his access to audiences of students, intellectuals, and government officials, was unique within this historical milieu. Such access granted him lasting influence in diverse political and social strata.

Imagined Commonalities, Shared Epistemology: Locating the Nation in al-Tahtawi’s France and Egypt

al-Tahtawi’s agenda and role in France has attracted much attention as scholars have sought to reassess his iconic significance. Specifically, older scholarship has situated his studies in France and his descriptions of France as marking the moment when formerly backward Egypt came into contact with the progressive, modern West and thereafter set Egypt off on a process of modernization.⁵⁹

Recently, scholars have challenged such theories of Egypt’s disconnect and stasis with emphasis on Egypt and Europe’s relationality. Peter Gran has asserted that there is no expression of any real amazement about France or French culture in al-Tahtawi’s, *Takhlis*. Gran contends the benefits and relationships al-Tahtawi enjoyed with his instructors in France implied shared structural and cultural affinities amongst this cohort. Furthermore, upon al-Tahtawi’s return to Egypt in 1831, the acceptance in Egypt of many of his ideas about politics, society and

⁵⁸ In making this assertion, I am thinking specifically of al-Tahtawi’s “exile” to the Sudan (1850-54) during the reign of `Abbas I. For an excellent study into this period of al-Tahtawi’s life see chapter one of Eve Troutt-Powell’s, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

⁵⁹ This has undoubtedly been critiqued as a Eurocentric interpretation. It should also be mentioned that this interaction took place on Europe’s own turf nonetheless. Older Eurocentric paradigms have also depicted Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt in 1798 in similar fashions, i.e. Napoleon ushering in Western modernity to the backward/traditional East. See for instance, Dror Ze’evi’s article, “Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the Middle East,” in *Mediterranean Historical Review* vol. 19, no. 1 (June 2004): 73-94.

culture, clearly influenced by his studies in France, suggests the extent of compatibility between local Egyptian ideas and those borrowed from France. Through such a comparative lens, Gran posits that al-Tahtawi saw aspects of French knowledge bases, social advancement, and political development as realizable models for modernizing Egypt. Indeed, this notion could have been facilitated by the mindset that France was more like Egypt than it was different.⁶⁰ Sandra Naddaf reasons such through her analysis of al-Tahtawi's self-recognition in a mirror on the wall of a French café:

This moment of self-recognition is a crucial one in the text. In distinguishing his own image, in recognizing the potential strangeness of the self and familiarity of the other, al-Tahtawi diminishes the alienating power of the distant presences which the mirror gives back. No longer does the mirror serve solely as a device to maintain a threatening status of difference and otherness. Rather it becomes both a means by which the unfamiliar can be accommodated and ultimately assimilated, as well as a means by which the familiar can be rediscovered and re-presented. The mirror can reflect both subject and object.

It is significant that at this point in the text al-Tahtawi pauses to consider, rather digressively, the presence of reflecting surfaces in his own culture and that, in so doing, he switches from simple narrative into the poetic mode for which classical Arabic literature is particularly known. The poetic meditations on the status of mirrored reflection in Egypt which follow al-Tahtawi's descriptive prose serve not only to bring the passage to its rhetorical close, but, more importantly, emphatically assert the presence of an oriental tradition-both literary and epistemological-in a treatise which purports to speak solely of western distinction. The west does not finally stand, for al-Tahtawi, in a relation of absolute difference to the east. It presides not as a presence to be observed, to be reflected, to be described for its differential value. Rather it provides a locus of exchange, of mutual reflection, of interactive relationships between two seemingly oppositional forces. The representation of another culture does not become finally a means of distancing oneself from the other; it becomes instead a means of integration, of investigating the possibility of mirrored images between east and west.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Peter Gran, "Tahtawi in Paris," *al-Ahram Weekly* no. 568 (January 10-16, 2002).

⁶¹ Sandra Naddaf, "Mirrored Images: Rifa`ah al-Tahtawi and the West," in *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no. 6 (Spring 1986): 76.

Considering Naddaf's points above, it seems the paradigms emphasizing irreconcilable differences between East and West fall by the wayside to an interpretive analysis founded on engaging the extent of exchange, similarity, interaction, and integration. Armed with such a comparative lens, the dynamics of interaction hint at relative fluidity and reciprocity between East and West, as opposed to the orientation of closed systems exemplified by the "clash of civilizations" narrative.

Exposing representational similarities creates the potentiality to further address the interconnections and exchange across the Mediterranean in the nineteenth century (and begs the question if in fact it ever did not exist). If we position *Takhlis* within the larger processes of Muhammad `Ali's strategies at building the state, particularly in the multifaceted ways these strategies reconfigured the relationship among the state, its citizens, and the world outside Egypt's borders, what kinds of understandings emerge? Lisa Pollard addresses this dynamic and indicates the ethnographic themes and resemblances of *Takhlis*, suggesting the Egyptian state's growing interest in the domestic realm of citizens at home and abroad. Pollard found the tropes and images utilized by the Egyptian state in defining its own modernity was influenced heavily by the same criteria utilized in Europe. She traces the descriptive similarities of *Takhlis* to Conrad Malte-Brun's, *Geographie Universalle*. In both works, Pollard contends scientific analysis was conflated with the habits and customs of a nation's peoples. These served as analytical rationale in measuring a nation's position along a "yardstick" of modernity.⁶² To this point within *Takhlis*, one finds al-Tahtawi cited in the fourth essay his extensive readings with his teacher, Monsieur Chevalier, on geography, noting Malte-Brun's, *Geographie*, specifically.⁶³

⁶² Lisa Pollard, Chapter One, "My House and Yours," found in *Nurturing the Nation*, 15-47. The "yardstick" reference to measuring modernity also comes directly from Pollard, 46.

⁶³ al-Tahtawi, *An Imam*, 290.

In line with Pollard's argument noted above, al-Tahtawi's exposure to popular Western scientific-ethnographic works had an incredible impact.

Upon his return to Egypt in 1831, al-Tahtawi's professional activities focused on the translation, reproduction, and integration of European ethnographies and technical-military manuals into Arabic. Pollard cites the translation of European ethnographic studies by the translation bureau, *Dar al-Asun*, (founded in 1835, al-Tahtawi was the first director), reflected the exigencies of the state's modernization project. Similar conclusions can be reached regarding the integration of European thought the institutionalization of such ethnographic paradigms. Pollard identifies in the curriculum of Egypt's nascent primary and secondary schools by the 1870s clear examples of European influences.⁶⁴

In terms of al-Tahtawi's contributions to Egyptian nationalism, he integrated European, French specifically, concepts of nationalism into the Egyptian political milieu. Anwar Luqa, Gilbert Delanoue, and Albert Hourani, as well as other scholars, have analyzed al-Tahtawi's general ideas about nationalism within the context of local and global intellectual processes shaping Egypt and the Arab Middle East during the nineteenth century.⁶⁵ Benjamin Geer has recently addressed the specific development of themes and terminology within seventeenth and eighteenth century French nationalism that made their way into the early articulations of Egyptian nationalism by way of al-Tahtawi's writings.⁶⁶ Geer asserts that within an analysis of the basic elements of al-Tahtawi's Egyptian nationalism, one finds a conceptual mix from Arabic

⁶⁴ For insight into this curriculum and its impact on the cultivation of Egyptian nationalism see Pollard's chapters four, "The Home, the Classroom, and the Cultivation of Egyptian Nationalism, and five, "Table Talk: The Home Economics of Nationhood," in *Nurturing the Nation*.

⁶⁵ For direct reference to these works see footnote forty-nine above.

⁶⁶ Geer, "The Priesthood of Nationalism in Egypt," 90-165.

and Egyptian literary traditions (one “input”) and French nationalism (another “input”).

According to Geer, similarity facilitated integration of concepts. At the same time, al-Tahtawi introduced uniquely new traits from French nationalism into Egyptian nationalist thought: the notion of national duty. He writes:

We can analyze the basic elements of al-Tahtawi’s nationalism as a conceptual blend, whose inputs are (a) concepts drawn from the Arabic literary traditions...and (b) concepts drawn from French nationalism...It includes a generic mental space, which contains an abstract concept common to all the input spaces: a place is conceptualized as a parent, and its inhabitants are conceptualized as its children. The generic space thus captures a commonality that would have made it easier for al-Tahtawi to conceptualize the three inputs as equivalent. As we have seen, this concept generates an inference about duty in French nationalism, but not in Arabic literature before al-Tahtawi. Hence in the generic space, this inference is absent. It is present in the blended space (Egypt) because it has been projected from the input space of French nationalist concepts. This input space also provides the concept of nation...⁶⁷

Geer argues the commonality of the two input spaces above rested upon a familial relationship existing between a place (as parent) and its inhabitants (as children). This shared relationship further facilitated the amalgamation of French and Arab-Egyptian concepts involving national territory and its inhabitants. In the case of the French, the *patrie* was commonly conceptualized as a parent or parents as evidenced in the French revolutionary hymn, *La Marseillaise*. Penned in 1792, the song addresses its listeners (the “*citoyens*” referred to in the chorus) as “*enfants de la patrie*.”⁶⁸ Here citizens and children are amalgamated into a single entity bonded through common parentage, the nation. Lynn Hunt’s study of the family politics of the French

⁶⁷ Geer, “The Priesthood of Nationalism,” 149.

⁶⁸ Peter McPhee, *The French Revolution, 1789-1799* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 101. It is worth pointing out that al-Tahtawi translated *La Marseillaise* into Arabic in 1841 and modeled parts of his patriotic poems, published in 1856 after the rhetoric and themes of the French anthem. See *Diwan Rifa’ a al-Tahtawi*, ed. Taha Wadi (Cairo: al-Hay’ a al Misriyya al-Amma li l-Kitab, 1979), 97-102; Gilbert Delanoue, *Moralistes et Politiques Musulmans*, 624-26; and Geer, “The Priesthood of Nationalism,” 118.

Revolution demonstrates the imaginative and symbolic significance of family bonds to the national, social, and political order during the period of the French Revolution.⁶⁹ Hunt insists that configurations of paternal authority, female participation, and fraternal solidarity were contingent on the social and political patterns produced during France's revolutionary period. The image of the family and the reciprocal relations of parents and children within a family played out on the French revolutionary stage. Through an analysis of similar conceptual variables in the Egyptian context, depictions of Egypt's nation-family, fathers, mothers, and children/youth display similar fluidity. In fact, Egyptian conceptions of the family and its members were as directly contingent on such political and social processes as the revolutionary French as well as consistently invoked and as readily present in the language and representations of Egypt's political and social transition in the nineteenth century.

If we accept the imagined constructions of nation-family in both the French and Egyptian models, what is left to be addressed centers around the functional application of the *patrie/watan* conceptualizations. Geer contends that from the early creation of the French *patrie* beginning in the sixteenth century, the nation gradually took on characteristics of both a parent and as a god. Under such a convention, the French equation infers duties, filial piety, and service from the body politic to the *patrie* generating powerful political and social significance and meaning in the relationship between the *patrie* and the nation/*citoyens*. Geer points out, "the *patrie* is located on Earth and is identified with a particular territory. Territories can be attacked and defended. Hence it is straightforward to infer that one has a duty to defend the *patrie* in warfare, just as one would have a duty to defend one's parents if they were attacked."⁷⁰ In the Egyptian

⁶⁹ Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

⁷⁰ Geer, "The Priesthood of Nationalism," 95-96.

context, al-Tahtawi's nationalism was based on concepts derived from Arabic and Egyptian literary heritage blended with French concepts of *patrie*. He defined the Egyptian *watan* territorially as well as inhabitants attached to the *watan* through physical attachment and emotional longing but devoid of the principles of duty or service. al-Tahtawi's integration of French nationalism into Egyptian nationalism rectifies this void by inferring duty and service to the *watan* upon Egyptians, its youth and children in particular.⁷¹ Residing as central actors in such nation-family designations and shouldering such obligatory duties in the later writings of al-Tahtawi, Egyptian youth and youthfulness took on political and social prestige and stigmatism, acquired specific meanings and responsibilities, as well as were prescribed particular behaviors essential for participating in the nation-family and demonstrating national modernity.

Youth and Modernity in Takhlis al-Ibriz, fi Talkhis Bariz

al-Tahtawi's *Takhlis al-Ibriz, fi Talkhis Bariz*, originally published in 1835, has attracted much attention from scholars. But the scholarship lacks critical insight on al-Tahtawi's references to French youth. Scholarship also lacks critical discussion of al-Tahtawi's use of metaphoric language, which ties characteristics of youth to his new conceptions of modernity. If, as Roger Owen has stated, *Takhlis* represents a recording of al-Tahtawi's impression of France and its peoples, should not French youth find their way into his description?

In fact, there is sparse mention of French youth or youth as a metaphor in al-Tahtawi's travel account. al-Tahtawi devoted much discussion to the French educational system, the subjects of academic study, and the general importance of education to the French. In the few areas he does mention youth or children, he first notes them in relation to education and learning,

⁷¹ Geer, "The Priesthood of Nationalism," 149-50.

pointing out the aptitude of youth to absorb knowledge during this unique phase of their lives. al-Tahtawi thus portrays youthhood-childhood as the most essential phase for education and development. At the same time, al-Tahtawi depicted youthfulness in *Takhliis* as a metaphor, comparing youth with national progress and with the processes of modernization. He related the phases of life to notions of national development and characterized youthfulness as vitality and all other phases to stagnation or degeneration.

The only direct mention of French youth by al-Tahtawi in *Takhliis* is found in the third essay. He stated that the French were naturally inclined toward learning and toward the acquisition of knowledge. He specifically describes French youth stating, “The same is true of their children; from a very early age they are extremely proficient.”⁷² He elaborates in the same paragraph, further qualifying his statement:

Their children are always prepared to learn and acquire knowledge, and enjoy an excellent upbringing. However this is equally true for all French people. It is customary among them not to marry their children before they have completed their studies, which is usually between the ages of 20 and 25. There are only few people who by the age of 20 have not attained a degree of schooling or acquired the craft they wish to exercise...It is at the above-mentioned age that most of the skills of a person and his good fortune manifest themselves. As the poet said: *If the tip of the lance misses its target, what hope is there for victory for its shaft? If a boy reaches the age of twenty without achieving his goal, that is a shame.*

This age marks the end of the perfection of noble men in all nations. Behold, for instance, al-Akhdari, who, at the age of 21, already wrote and commented on his treatise entitled, *al-Sullam*. And what about the eminent scholar al-Amir, who also wrote his collection before the age of 20, and could thus say, like al-Akhdari: *He who first reaches the age of twenty-one forgiveness is easily given to him since he wrote a book on an even harder subject before he reached that age.*⁷³

⁷² al-Tahtawi, *Takhliis*, 257-58; in Newman’s translation, *An Imam*, 253-54.

⁷³ al-Tahtawi, *Takhliis*, 257-58; in Newman’s translation, *An Imam*, 254-55. Emphasis mine.

Here al-Tahtawi places persuasive emphasis on early education and learning among children, specifically connecting French children's learning and knowledge acquisition within an assumed proper notion of upbringing. al-Tahtawi gives the impression that French children undertake these studies with a sense of duty and discipline, two important attributes of "modern" citizenry. At the same time, al-Tahtawi, utilizes biological parameters such as age to delineate the ideal period for learning and absorbing knowledge. He privileges the youthful stage of the life cycle before twenty/twenty-one, even explicitly declaring the perfectibility of "noble men in all nations" during this stage nonetheless. al-Tahtawi's motive here lay in imparting to his readers the potential of Egypt's youth to assume its own perfectibility and place of notoriety.

al-Tahtawi's juxtaposition of Arab literary and historical figures following his description of French children, insinuates similarities of French and Egyptian youth. French youth are educated, dutiful, and disciplined and there is no logical reason for Egyptian youth not to assume or absorb the same tenets and behaviors. al-Tahtawi's account of French and Arab youth integrates the two cultures, exposing the potential for perfection of the Egyptian youth once they receive a proper, modern education and upbringing. The nation stands to benefit from its perfectly educated, disciplined, cultivated youthful citizens. Youth will facilitate national progress.

al-Tahtawi's uses of youthfulness as a metaphor correlates behavioral attributes of youth with national progress and modernity. He locates youthfulness as a positive ideal. In the introduction to *Takhlis*, he clarified Muhammad `Ali's reasons for sending student missions to France, lays out a progressive ethnography of specific nations, and explains the necessity of Egypt's development in light of the recent history of the Arab lands of Islam. To do so, he relies on the images of youth:

There is a famous saying: *the most intelligent kings are those who are more mindful of the consequences of things*. This is why the ruler of Egypt has made it his goal to restore to Egypt its former youth (شبابها) and revive its faded splendor. Since the start of his reign he has concentrated on treating an illness, which without him would have remained incurable...No one can deny that Western arts and skills in Egypt are thriving now, they prosper after not existing...Look at workshops, factories, schools, and the like. Look at the organization of the military...The necessity of such reorganization can be understood only by one who has seen the lands of the Franks or witnessed the developments. The long and short of it, is that the hopes of the Benefactor (Muhammad 'Ali) are always related to constructing things. And from the well-known saying, *building is like life, and ruin like death*. The Benefactor hastened to improve his country.⁷⁴

“Youthfulness” in the above context symbolizes a state of being, a possession of vitality, a brio, a vigor, a national swagger. Furthermore, youthfulness depicts a state of immunity to the implied “disease” of lethargy in old age, an inescapable consequence of chronologic time. Ironically, youthfulness represents a status that can be achieved outside of temporal boundaries. Even if the nation has its roots in time immemorial, its youthfulness can be restarted in the present. How does one achieve such a state? Muhammad `Ali’s investment in establishing, improving, and/or organizing the “Western arts and skills” of industry, military science, and education have, according to al-Tahtawi, restored Egypt’s youth. He does not use the words “modern” or “modernity” in contextualizing these endeavors. Instead, he ostensibly locates modernity in the mention of the “lands of the Franks” and insinuates this state of modernity is a realizable goal for Egypt if it restores its former “youth.”

Al-Tahtawi’s account of French youth and his equation of youthfulness with progress and modernity within *Takhlis al-Ibriz* is particularly important. For him, youthhood represents a unique phase of the organic life cycle, essential for education and development, for “perfectibility.” Youthfulness signifies national progress and the processes of modernization, a

⁷⁴ al-Tahtawi, *Takhlis*, 70-71; in Newman, *An Imam*, 108-09. Emphasis mine.

avored notch along modernity's path. The relational significance of youth and nation implies obedience and service as well as youthful behavior. At a ceremony in 1831 to distribute prizes to the outstanding Egyptian students in Paris, a French general made a speech in which he implored the young Egyptian students to return to Egypt and embark upon regenerating their *patrie*.⁷⁵ Armed with Western knowledge and skills, the youthful students had a duty to their nation. The general's command obviously made quite an impression on al-Tahtawi as the concepts of national duty and service saturate his later, most influential works. The following illustrates these themes and analyzes al-Tahtawi's perspectives on how these obligations impacted the Egyptian nation.

National Duties and Egypt's Youth in Manahij al-Albab al-Misriya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-'Asriyya and al-Murshid al-Amin li-l-Banat wa-l-Banin

Al-Tahtawi's, *Manahij al-Albab al-Misriya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-'Asriyya* (The Paths of Egyptian Hearts in the Joys of the Contemporary Arts, published in 1869), contained his views on Egypt's economic, moral, and social issues. At the same time, the book was intended to provide instruction for the teachers and students at the government schools.⁷⁶ *Manahij* paints the merits of economic, military, and educational development in Egypt. It urges the government to usher in progress and change. al-Tahtawi grounded many of his suggestions in Islamic thought. Through such design, the work engaged a wide audience, offering new and innovative ideas in a

⁷⁵ Anwar Luqa, *Voyageurs et Ecrivains Egyptiens en France*, 45.

⁷⁶ In addition to Hourani and Geer already cited, Charles Wendell's contribution to the discourse on al-Tahtawi and themes within *Manahij* cannot be overlooked. See Charles Wendell's chapter 4, "The Egyptian *Umma* in the Nineteenth Century: Part 1," in *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

language his readership could understand. As a result, *Manahij* influenced the nationalist discourse in Egypt for decades after its publication.

In contrast to *Takhliis*, *Manahij*, contains many vivid conceptions of youth and youthfulness in relation to Egypt's modernization. In *Manahij*, al-Tahtawi continued his portrayals of youthfulness as the ideal development phase in the life-cycles of men and nations.. al-Tahtawi expounded on the thematic association of love of one's nation with youthfulness and reclaiming one's own youth. The most striking variation from *Takhliis* to *Manahij* however, involves al-Tahtawi's articulations of the essentiality of youth to the projects of Egypt's modernization, especially the specific duties of youth to modernizing the *watan* itself.

Scholars have written extensively on the distinctiveness of *Manahij* compared to al-Tahtawi's earlier works. Geer, for example, goes to great length in describing al-Tahtawi's ideas about Egyptian national duties in regards to *Manahij*'s prominent themes.⁷⁷ But in pressing the duties of Egyptians to modernization and the *watan*, al-Tahtawi consistently characterized Egypt's inhabitants as the youth and children of the Egyptian *watan*. Under such associative terminology, the political implications are not difficult to discern within the historical context of nineteenth century Egypt. Thus, al-Tahtawi's correlation of national duties to Egypt's conceptual youth implied obligation of real Egyptians, young and old, to abide by paternalistic aspects of top-down state modernization and development. His synthesis of ideas about the nation and the family provided a politicized component to the tangible meanings of the nation-family structure.

In the introduction to *Manahij*, the reader finds romantic expressions of youthfulness and concepts of youth associated with nationalism or love of the nation. In both cases, al-Tahtawi

⁷⁷ For instance, see Geer, "The Priesthood of Nationalism," 119-26.

depicts youthfulness and youthhood as perfect states of being or as a stage where dutifulness to the *wata* serves to help the nation achieve a perfect state of civilizational being. To this point, al-Tahtawi quoted a poem from Ibn al-Rumi that reads, “If people remember their nations, it remembers them and returns the nation to its youthfulness... a country befriends youth and youthfulness, covering it with the appearance of life and it is renewed.”⁷⁸ These two stanzas are rich in symbolism. al-Tahtawi depicts youth not only as “friends” of the nation, but their characteristics are transposed onto a national canvass. We find implicit reference to the responsibility of inhabitants to their *watan*, to make it youthful, youthfulness denoting vitality, development, or even a nostalgic past. Following this line of thought if one wants one’s nation to progress (or come alive), one must be dutiful to the *watan* as a child is to its parents/family.

al-Tahtawi’s dual concepts about youth emerges throughout *Manahij* (ex. on the one hand youth meaning all inhabitants of Egypt/the *watan* as parent; on the other hand, real youth meaning Egyptians not considered adults). He varies the meanings quite frequently. In the introduction al-Tahtawi explicitly states, “If nationalist enthusiasm appeared amongst the children of Egypt igniting the benefits of civilization, then nothing would prohibit the spread or defeat of this most important force.”⁷⁹ Egypt’s youth/children must devote themselves to the progress or development of the *watan*, their dedication will not go unrewarded.

Yet, on topics such as education and upbringing in *Manahij*, the reader understands that references to Egyptian youth/children are meant specifically for those Egyptians who have not

⁷⁸ Rifa`a Rifi` al-Tahtawi, *Manahij al-Albab al-Misriya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-`Asriyya* (1869; repr., Cairo: al-Majlis al-`Alia lil-Thaqafa, 2002), 10.

⁷⁹ al-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, 19.

reached biological or social constructs of adulthood. In a section entitled “The upbringing of children,” al-Tahtawi wrote:

He who yearns for a trade and this permissible trade is beneficial to the inhabitants of his *watan* then he should learn it, after his instruction in elementary learning which all members of society should participate, this includes writing, reading, math and the like, swimming and equestrian activities from horsemanship, throwing and using spears, swords, and instruments now used in war for training to defend and protect his *watan*. These things benefit public character which makes it necessary to train children in the time of their youth, this is for boys.⁸⁰

From this statement, al-Tahtawi clearly discusses youth as the stage in the biological life-cycle prior to mature adulthood. Education is given an essential place within the life of a youth, harkening back to his arguments on the perfectibility of men in all nations in *Takhlis*. Education in this context is a tool for promoting and protecting the nation’s wellbeing and sovereignty. Beyond the basic educational requirements of every inhabitant of the nation, if one has ambition in a particular field, that field is acceptable if it benefits the *watan*. Thus, the relationality of youth and youthful activities are implicitly and explicitly essential to the progress of the nation.

al-Tahtawi encouraged his readers throughout *Manahij* into accepting his arguments regarding the place of Egypt in the hearts of Egyptians. Yet, in the final section of the book he makes his most bold assertions regarding the obligations of Egyptians to their *watan*. In the first sentence of the section al-Tahtawi states, “We say this, it is incumbent on the children of the nation that they perform their rightful duties to their nation regardless of their social rank...”⁸¹ al-Tahtawi goes on to describe unspecified duties as bettering the nation and its political groups

⁸⁰ al-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, 65-66.

⁸¹ al-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, 433.

and improving the nation's condition. He states the nation will in return thank its children. The vagueness of such duties is obvious, yet the force behind the statement cannot be underestimated.

al-Tahtawi fully explained how the nation would thank its children in *Al-Murshid al-Amin li-l-Banat wa-l-Banin* (The Trustworthy Guide for Girls and Boys, published in 1872). The work represents an expanded version of previously introduced themes in *Manahij al-Albab al-Misriya* concerning the nation and its youth. al-Tahtawi's intended for *al-Murshid* to be a work on the proper education/upbringing of children and youth. Within the text, the author intertwined his previous understanding of national progress with the education of Egypt's youth (both biologically and socially defined). He infers the importance of engraining ideals of duty and service in youth toward the nation. In *al-Murshid* we find al-Tahtawi employing the same dualistic characterization of youth as in *al-Manahij*. Indeed, a central tenet of *al-Murshid* involves the love of the nation within the hearts and minds of Egypt's children and youth rhetorically depicted both as the ambiguous offspring of the imagined parental-nation and real, biologically defined, youth. In both instances, al-Tahtawi represents Egypt as a family writ large. He made little distinction in *al-Murshid* between the essentiality of education for boys AND girls, expounding at length on the virtues of both. In fact, al-Tahtawi emphasized the education of all the nation's children in relation to the progress of the collective Egyptian nation-family. In emphasizing the education of Egypt's youth, al-Tahtawi refers explicitly to youth in its pre-adulthood biological form.

In the early pages of *al-Murshid*, al-Tahtawi goes straight to the heart of detailing the essence of youth to the prospects of the nation. He emphasized the relationship between the good education of individuals and children to the success or happiness of a society and nation:

The good upbringing (تربية) of the individual is the basis of good education/upbringing of society, meaning the nation... by the good upbringing of the nation's children they are happy to serve their nations, it is a happy and commendable nation... a nation is not frightened to entrust its children to the nation's happiness.⁸²

al-Tahtawi denoted not only the essential “national” upbringing of Egypt's children ensuring the nation's happiness, but privileges the willingness of youth to sacrifice itself to, to serve, and guide the nation.

Essential to the education and sacrifice mentioned above is the engraining of the love of the *watan* within the hearts and minds of Egypt's young people. al-Tahtawi spared no time in equating love of one's nation to an expression of faith and religion. “Love (like this) for one's brothers and the peoples of one's nations, this is a sign (on the door) of faith.”⁸³ In a similar vein, the author states, “Its people (Egypt's) are people of dignity and loved by the children of the nations committed to the saying, love of the nation is a part of faith.”⁸⁴ The semblance of expressions of nationalist sentiment with religious forms of expression are easily recognizable in the previous quote. As discussed in Geer's arguments above, the connections between the spiritual and temporal realms provided divine legitimacy to the Egyptian nation. However, the most important emphasis in the former quote should go to the usage of “love for one's brothers.” Considering the familial imagery of the *watan* and the real duties prescribed to the nation-family, the characterization of brotherhood holds both tangible and intangible, real and imagined connotations and meanings.

⁸² Rifa`a Rafi' al-Tahtawi, *al-Murshid al-Amin li-l-Banat wa-l-Banin* (1872; repr., Cairo: al-Majlis al-`Alia lil-Thaqafa, 2002), 6

⁸³ al-Tahtawi, *al-Murshid*, 10.

⁸⁴ al-Tahtawi, *al-Murshid*, 93.

The fourth chapter of *al-Murshid* is a treasure trove of the author's conceptualizations of Egypt and its inhabitants. In it, al-Tahtawi prized the preeminence and the imagined collectiveness of the Egyptian nation-family, directing these concepts at Egypt's imagined sons and daughters, i.e. all Egyptians. The clear elements of familial imagery are seen in the first paragraph of the chapter, "Allah has prepared the nation's children to cooperate in reforming their nation like members of a single family as if the nation is the home of their fathers and mothers and the place they were raised."⁸⁵ The construction of this last point is particularly revealing. The home is equated with the nation; the setting in a youthful period of life. Children are expected to cooperate or share, the character and nature of the household is predicated upon such. But there is also an implied weight given to the imagined children, it is they who will reform the home through collaboration, the home is not changed through top-down directives.

In the second section of chapter four entitled, "On the Nation's Children and What is Required of Them," al-Tahtawi powerfully articulates the crucial relationship of youth to Egypt and the imagined Egyptian nation to its children:

The nationalist, sincerely in love with the nation sacrifices everything for his nation and serves it exerting everything he possesses while sacrificing his soul and defends it from all exposure to harm as a father defends his son from harm, the nation's children must always possess honorable intentions toward their nation's righteousness and virtuousness and do not commit a thing which violates their nation's and their brother's rights... and furthermore the nation itself defends its collective son (ابنه جميع)... nationalism does not only summon people to ask the nation for their rights, it is incumbent on them also to perform their duties to the nation, if one of the children of the nation does not provide to his nation he loses his civil rights that are entitled by his nation.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ al-Tahtawi, *al-Murshid*, 93.

⁸⁶ al-Tahtawi, *al-Murshid*, 94-95.

al-Tahtawi's asserts directly that the nation-family are bonded by reciprocal responsibility of security, well-being, and political rights. In this relationship the nation defends children so long as its children preserve the sanctity and virtuousness of the nation. Likewise, sacrifice for the nation is akin to sacrifice for the family. The violation of the nation's sanctity amounts to the family's sanctity rendering the violator devoid of privileges entitled from the nation-family.

Conclusion

The above discussion has illustrated a little studied aspect of the transformation of the Egyptian political, social, and economic landscape during the period of reign under Muhammad `Ali and his dynasty during the nineteenth century. This era witnessed a reformative period in the relationship between Egyptian individuals and Egyptian society, between individuals and the Egyptian state, and between the state and society. The industrialization, modernization, and state-building projects begun by Muhammad `Ali fostered a new period of political modernity in Egypt. As an important component of these schemes, Egyptian youth, both real and imagined, were targeted and absorbed into the burgeoning hegemonic aspirations, policies, and institutions of the Egyptian state during the nineteenth century; their representations, duties, and responsibilities to the nation subjected to the burgeoning discourse of state officials. Through these processes, new forms of power were assumed by the Egyptian state in conceptualizing the nation's youthfulness and its youth as an essential part of state development and the body politic. Thus, a politics of youth were front and center in the course of developing Egypt's modernity, incorporating both local and foreign influences within this particular dynamic.

Nonetheless, the myriad of influences coupled with Egypt's historical trajectory lent these conceptions of youth a particular fluidity and ambivalence. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the depictions of Egypt's youth and the nation's youthfulness were again

reimagined, reflecting the changing hegemonic relations between Egypt and Europe. As the next two chapters posit, British travel writing, memoirs, official reports, and the popular satirical press provided a much different formulation of Egypt's youth and its youthfulness. In fact, these new constructions became part of the rationalizations calling for direct British interaction in Egypt and justifying the continuance of occupation after 1882.

3. A Great Man and his Degenerate Dynasty: Representations of Muhammad `Ali and his Successors in the British Discourse on Egypt

The projects developing the state and elements of the Egyptian body politic enabled multifaceted transformation along the banks of the Nile under the rule of Muhammad `Ali and his successors during the nineteenth century. Through initiatives designed to reform the military, education, and the bureaucracy, youth were incorporated into Egypt's modernization schemes as essential constitutive components. Additionally, Egyptian state intellectuals such as Rafa`a Rafi' al-Tahtawi assumed new forms of power through state patronage, producing works meant to discipline the nation's youth and define the identity of youth as modern national subjects.

Occurring alongside domestic transformations, Egypt's foreign relations underwent modification as Muhammad `Ali and his successors worked to achieve a semblance of autonomy from the Ottoman Porte and foster ties to Europe. Muhammad `Ali's favored policies of European-styled reform coupled with territorial expansion eventually succeeded in gaining hereditary rule for his heirs in 1841, but the Pasha's political and economic ambitions aroused the suspicions of western powers absorbed in the "Eastern Question."¹ In the decades that followed, Egypt's economic independence was slowly undermined by European intervention in the country's affairs, the influx of foreign capital and goods into the country, and by financial obligations incurred to European banks and lending houses.² At the time Muhammad `Ali's

¹ On the issue of Muhammad `Ali unsettling European attitudes, see the last few chapters of Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad `Ali* and chapter one in Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971).

² Marsot argued that the stipulations of the treaty of Balta Liman (1838) significantly crippled Egypt's ability to thwart Europe's economic encroachment while the Treaty of London (1840/41) left Muhammad `Ali with no international support in his struggle with Istanbul. The combined result of these two treaties meant the "undoing" of Muhammad `Ali's ambitions for expansion and independence. See Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 232-248; and Hunter, "Egypt under the Successors of Muhammad `Ali," 180-97.

grandson Isma`il assumed the throne in 1863, the excessively pro-European ruler aspired to make Egypt a *part* of Europe through agrarian reform and infrastructural development.³ The Khedive's insatiable appetite to transform his country left Egypt facing mounting foreign debt and ultimately financial crisis by 1876. In that fateful year, Egypt's bankruptcy led to Europe gaining greater authority in northeastern Africa through the formation of the Public Debt Commission staffed by British and French officials to oversee Egypt's government finances. Over the next several years, an indigenous reform movement emerged to challenge Europe's political and economic penetration of Egypt as well as the power and resources of the local Ottoman-Egyptian aristocracy. The competition for hegemony in Egypt between multiple parties deepened the country's predicament and eventually led to the invasion and occupation of Egypt by Great Britain in 1882.⁴

During the nineteenth century, Europe's knowledge about Egypt grew exponentially as a result of the West's growing fascination with Egypt's Pharaonic past and its contemporary condition, increasingly defined by the "habits and sexual politics of the upper-class and the squalor of the peasants' hovel," resulting in depictions of Egypt as a distinctive "national entity, full of particularly Egyptian institutions, behaviors, and proclivities."⁵ During this era, British

³ Emphasizing this point, Isma`il stated in 1879 to a one of the members of the European Control Commission, "My country is no longer in Africa, it is in Europe." See P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt*, Third Edition (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 73.

⁴ The two studies that stand out in regards to addressing the political and social developments in Egypt from the 1870s through the British invasion as well as the diverse parties involved are Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!: The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878-1882* (London: Ithaca Press, 1981); and Juan Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁵ See Pollard's second chapter, "Inside Egypt: The Harem, the Hovel, and the Western Construction of an Egyptian National Landscape," in *Nurturing the Nation*, 48-72. The specific quotations come from pages 48 and 50.

officials grew more conscious of Egypt as a nation but also a player within the regional contest for hegemony. The demand for official knowledge on Egypt's situation drove British officials to sponsor delegations to Egypt to report upon its state of affairs. Likewise, officials consulted Western travel accounts and memoirs to increase their understandings about Egypt and its rulers. As a result, official British knowledge on Egypt became informed as much by what could be measured in trade routes, state development, and foreign debt as it was in what was thought to go on in private spaces within the palace or the *fellahin*'s homes.

The present chapter concerns itself with the construction and formulation of British knowledge about Egypt and its rulers in the first half of the nineteenth century. In examining this discourse, one is struck by how often descriptions of Egypt's rulers were informed by gendered and aged constructs. For instance, in the 1830s British discussions on Egypt routinely lauded Muhammad `Ali for his masculine, patriarchal role in guiding Egypt's regeneration. Yet, as the Pasha's political and economic ambitions aroused Western political interest and incited direct British involvement in the eastern Mediterranean in the latter half of that decade, discussions on the Pasha and his household's character turned dramatically to ridicule and scorn. In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the imagined childishness of Muhammad `Ali's dynasty was commonly evoked in British travel writing as proof of Egypt's degenerating national character and condition. The childishness of the Pasha's progeny was constructed through descriptions of their physical weakness, financial frivolity, incompetence, and reckless behavior. The possession of these unmanly qualities, it was argued, illustrated that Egypt's rulers were unfit to govern and in need of direct supervision. In fact, by the time the British occupation of Egypt was *un fait accompli*, the childishness of Egypt and its rulers would become part of the justifications for maintaining the British presence.

Intriguingly, at precisely the same time that Egyptian state officials such as Rafa`a Rafi` al-Tahtawi were penning works praising Egypt's youth, the nation's youthfulness, and the benevolent, paternal nature of its rulers, British understandings of Egypt were quite different. These facts alone confirm that the meanings behind depictions of youth and youthfulness were neither fixed nor uniformly shared. In fact, these terms were directly tied to historical context, defined and redefined in accordance with changing political and social relations.

An Ignorant Barbarian and a Self-Made Man: British Representations of Muhammad `Ali in the 1830s

Direct western involvement in Egypt during the modern period began on the heels of Napoleon's campaign into the eastern Mediterranean region in 1798. While Napoleon returned to France in 1799 and the French were ousted from Egypt by British arms in 1801, British officials became increasingly alarmed by French ambitions in the region and the potential threats these posed to Britain's Mediterranean and Asian interests. The Greek revolt in the 1820s drew further attention from the Russians, British, and French into the region as the Powers grew suspicious of Muhammad `Ali's intentions in Morea as well as the Pasha's hints at independence from the Porte. The disaster at Navarino Bay in 1827 did little to quell the plans of the Pasha whose rearmament activities peaked the curiosity of the Powers who were keen to uphold Ottoman territorial integrity and protect their interests in the eastern Mediterranean.⁶

Egypt's invasion of Syria by Muhammad `Ali's son Ibrahim in November 1831 began the intensification of debate in Europe over how to handle Egypt and Muhammad `Ali's state-building projects and ambitions. Ibrahim's victories in Greater Syria caused the Ottoman Sultan

⁶On this affair see Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 206-20; and Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali Pasha," 157-65.

Mahmud II to turn to the Powers for support, and when none was forthcoming the Porte entered into an alliance with Russia in 1833. The combined impact of Muhammad `Ali's threat to Ottoman integrity and direct Russian involvement in the eastern Mediterranean risked setback to British political and economic interests in the Middle East and Asia.⁷ Lord Palmerston, the Secretary of State, responded to these developments by affirming British support for the Ottomans and signing a new economic agreement with the Porte, the treaty of Balta Liman, in 1838. While the treaty itself served as a nail in the coffin for monopolies in the Ottoman Empire, it also signaled the British intentions to champion a policy of "aggressive, free-trade imperialism" at the expense of Muhammad `Ali's bid for autonomy and Russian intrigue in Istanbul.⁸

After the Ottoman army initiated fighting and was defeated again by Ibrahim Pasha at the Battle of Nezib in June 1839, Palmerston used political and diplomatic pressure to sway the European Powers into an agreement to force Muhammad `Ali into submission. On July 15, the act for the "Pacification of the Levant" was signed with a clause spelling out the coercive measures to be used against the Pasha.⁹ The following summer British commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Robert Stopford, sent a small naval fleet under Commodore Charles Napier to the coast of Syria to compel the Egyptians to withdraw. After a series of British bombardments of cities along the Syrian coast from August to November, Napier proceeded to Alexandria where he enforced a blockade of the city. From November 25-27, 1840, Napier personally negotiated a treaty on behalf of the Powers with Muhammad `Ali

⁷ See Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 226-31 and Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad `Ali," 173-76.

⁸ This expression on British economic policy was taken from Kenneth Cuno, "Egypt to c. 1919," 86.

⁹ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 232-44.

resolving the conflict, ending the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and guaranteeing the continued rule of the Pasha's dynasty in Egypt.¹⁰ The declaration was followed on June 1, 1841 by the issuance of the sultan's *firman* naming Muhammad `Ali governor of Egypt and giving his family hereditary rights to office. In return, the Pasha was forced to limit his army to 18,000 men and respect the economic treaties signed by the Porte in recent years.

Much debate has been made over the British change of strategy in the 1830s from abstaining to directly engaging Muhammad `Ali's occupation of Syria to spearheading the European effort to force a settlement on Egypt. Yet, we find consensus in the literature regarding Lord Palmerston's role and personal resolve to put an end to the Pasha's ambitions and disgrace him in the public and political arena. As Afaf Marsot notes, "To justify to British public opinion interference in that instance of Ottoman-Egyptian affairs, Palmerston sought to discredit the person of Muhammad `Ali along with his policies, and so resorted to *ad hominem* arguments."¹¹ An example of this tactic can be found in a letter Palmerston wrote to the Earl Granville:

For my part I hate Mehemet Ali, whom I consider as nothing but an ignorant barbarian, who by cunning and boldness and mother wit has been successful in rebellion...I look upon his boasted civilization of Egypt as the arrantest humbug; and I believe that he is as great a tyrant and oppressor as ever made a people wretched.¹²

¹⁰ The London Treaty of 1840 has been officially recognized as the agreement granting Muhammad `Ali and his dynasty hereditary rule of Egypt, yet the original negotiation of its stipulations was undertaken by Commodore Napier without the consent of London or Istanbul. This "Convention" between Napier and Muhammad `Ali, reported by various outlets of the British press in December, 1840, was originally denounced by Lord Palmerston but later ratified by the Sultan in January, 1841. See *Times* (London) December 18, 1840; and *Spectator* December 19, 1840. Also see Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 246-48; and Fahmy's, *All the Pasha's Men*, 289-305.

¹¹ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 244.

¹² Harold Temperly, "British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey: 1830-1914," in *Cambridge Historical Journal* 4, no. 2 (1933), 89, cited in Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 243.

The secretary of state clearly understood the role of representation in steering public and political sentiment. Palmerston focused his tactics on the fact that the Pasha had to be stopped, not simply because he crossed British interests in the region, but as a result of his moral character. In reducing Muhammad `Ali to a particular stereotype and generalization, Palmerston identified markers outside of ordinary political issues that justified British hostility toward the Pasha despite a lack of evidence in the letter to support the accusation.

Interestingly, Palmerston's opinion of Muhammad `Ali was not as widely or passionately shared outside of the government prior to 1839. As early as 1832, Samuel Briggs, a former British pro-consul to Egypt turned trader-entrepreneur, steadfastly petitioned Palmerston to support the independence of Egypt, pointing out how much the Pasha would be a favorable ally in trade.¹³ In 1837, Thomas Waghorn, a British steam agent in Egypt, wrote a pamphlet titled, "Egypt as It is," which he sent to his government to plead for support toward Egyptian Independence.¹⁴ In the published version of the pamphlet, released a year later, Waghorn continued to advocate for a British alliance with an independent Egypt. Aside from including data detailing Egypt's economic development under the Pasha, Waghorn specifically praised Muhammad `Ali for his leadership in Egypt. He stated in one instance:

Who made the desert and wandering robber Arab tribes, bordering on the Red Sea and Egypt, to respect the lives and property of the Franks, which they never did before, but

¹³ Apparently, Briggs and his company enjoyed cordial relations with Muhammad `Ali up to 1841. The company was noted for supplying grain from Egypt to the British in Malta from the 1820s-1840s. On Briggs' relationship to the Pasha and his attempts to persuade Palmerston see Frederick Rodkey's, "The Attempts of Briggs and Company to Guide British Policy in the Levant in the Interest of Mehmet Ali Pasha, 1821-41," in *The Journal of Modern History* 5, no. 3 (University of Chicago Press, 1933), 324-51. Marsot also briefly mentions Briggs' attempt to sway Palmerston in *Egypt in the Reign*, 237.

¹⁴ Marsot tells us that the pamphlet was presented to Palmerston and not made public because Waghorn hoped that Egypt would be granted independence in 1837. When this did not happen, Waghorn published the pamphlet in 1838 to attempt to stir public support. See Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 237-38.

Mahomed Ali? Who converted them into as many faithful guides to so many of my countrymen who have of late crossed those deserts? This is, in my opinion, the masterpiece of that most wonderful and extraordinary man; but at his and his son's death, in all probability, these tribes will, for the want of that stern rigour with which their misdeeds have been visited, return to their original habits, and if so, what becomes of Egypt, as well as of our steam communications through Egypt?¹⁵

Waghorn's description of the Pasha, whose "wonderful and extraordinary" character and firm guidance of Egypt improved the country, must have agitated certain British officials. Shortly thereafter, Palmerston assumed a more active role in the construction and dissemination of knowledge about Egypt.

In late 1837 Palmerston sent John Bowring to Egypt and Syria to study and report to Parliament on the economic conditions of the two provinces.¹⁶ After a nearly two year stint in

¹⁵ Thomas Waghorn, *Egypt as It is in 1838* (London: Thomas, Elder and Co, 1838), 32-33.

¹⁶ Bowring (b. 1792-1872), was a British politician, diplomatist, and writer. In his early career, he founded an import/export business which allowed him to travel widely across Europe. In 1820, he was introduced to Jeremy Bentham, who became his mentor and whose anthology Bowring completed and published after Bentham's death in 1832. During his travels, Bowring wrote extensively of his experiences and translated into English many works of literature from the countries he visited. After a series of failures to secure a position within the British government, in 1831 Bowring was appointed a commissioner to investigate commercial relations between Great Britain and France. In 1835 he was elected to a seat in Parliament but lost it in 1837. Later that year, Lord Palmerston sent him on a year-long commercial fact-finding mission to Egypt and Istanbul. Upon his return to London, he won a seat again in Parliament and served for seven straight years. In 1848, Palmerston offered him the vacant consulship at Canton (Guangzhou) which he held until 1853 when he was appointed plenipotentiary and chief superintendent of trade in the Far East and governor, commander-in-chief, and vice-admiral of Hong Kong. In 1854, he was knighted before returning to China. Bowring resigned his post in 1859 and returned to Britain where he remained active in public life, wrote, and published. In addition to his editorial work and contributions to reviews and magazines on a wide variety of subjects, including political, literary, and philological articles, hymns, poems, and verse translations, he published over thirty books and pamphlets, and wrote his memoirs. His most successful book, *The Kingdom and People of Siam* (2 vols., 1857) was republished by Oxford University Press in 1969. "Sir John Bowring (1792-1872)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), online edition (2009), www.oxforddnb.com, accessed November 11, 2013.

Egypt and Syria, Bowring delivered his findings to the government.¹⁷ Immediately following Bowring's submission, Palmerston issued a memorandum concerning the report. Despite the fact that Bowring had been hand-picked for his task, the Prime Minister demanded in his note:

I wish the manuscript of the Egyptian and Syrian report to be looked over with care, and that any passages of a political tendency and which may have a bearing on the question now pending may be marked and submitted to me. Under this head would come any *exaggerated praises* of Mehemet Ali.¹⁸

An examination of the original draft and final report issued to Parliament found that Palmerston cut twenty-five pages out of the manuscript draft as well as edited phrases, titles, and numeric figures to harmonize Bowring's findings with official government opinion toward Egypt at that time.¹⁹ Unfortunately, we do not know Bowring's reaction to Palmerston's revision. Regardless, Bowring argued in his report that it would be in Britain's interest to grant greater latitude to Egypt's autonomous development in order promote trade between Britain and Egypt as well as secure British communication lines to India through the Levant.²⁰ Perhaps out of a desire to capitalize on his findings or to simply make these public, Bowring personally published his report later in 1840.

Despite the political wrangling that preceded the issue of the report, Bowring's account included a long section detailing the author's impression of the character of the Pasha after being given an official audience with the Pasha. Description and analyses of the sort was not

¹⁷ Bowring's published study, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, can be found at *Parliamentary Papers*, 1840, XXI.

¹⁸ Palmerston's Memorandum issued February 2, 1840, PRO, FO 78/385, cited in Frederick Rodkey, "Colonel Campbell's Report on Egypt in 1840, with Lord Palmerston's Comments" in *Cambridge Historical Journal* 3, no.1 (1929), 102. Emphasis mine.

¹⁹ Frederick Rodkey, "Colonel Campbell's Report," 102-03.

²⁰ See John Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London: Clowes and Sons, 1840), 153; and the recent reprint, Sir John Bowring, *Report on Egypt 1823-38: Under the Reign of Muhammad 'Ali* (1840; repr., London: Triade Exploration, 1998), 397.

uncommon among western travel writing during the nineteenth century. European travel writers during this period wrote extensive accounts of the nature of the Egyptian government as a result of their admission to the inner spaces of the palace and first-hand access to Egypt's rulers and officials.²¹ Bowring's *Report*, in common with travel writing from the era, provided significant contributions to British knowledge about Muhammad `Ali and his character through the inclusion of material from his personal conversations with the Pasha and his experiences in the inner spaces of the palace. One finds in these sections frequent usage of gendered and aged images to describe the Pasha's character and in effect Egypt's attributes as a nation. The gendered imagery and representations found here offer evidence of the existing hegemonic relations and a developing power hierarchy not just between the individuals involved, but also the political entities of Great Britain and Egypt during this period.

From the Forward of the recent reprint of Bowring's *Report on Egypt*, we find explicit references and metaphors elaborating Muhammad `Ali's manliness, his role in guiding Egypt toward modernity, and the specific characteristics that constituted the Pasha's gendered and aged identity:

John Bowring's report fossilized Egypt at the end of the reign of Mohamed Ali (1769-1849), one of Egypt's greatest all time leaders. Obviously, the description is the report of a single man and one embarked, moreover, in a diplomatic career. They are therefore the private observations of a man who misses no occasion to bring himself forward, particularly where his dealings with the viceroy are concerned. This makes his conversations nonetheless interesting since they allow the student of Mohamed Ali's character to see how the Pacha dealt with the various representants of the nations who gravitated around him, and *reinforce our estimate of this self-made man* who, through

²¹ In reference to the "conversations" found in travel literature, Pollard states, "One of the conventions of Victorian travel literature that appeared more and more frequently as the century progressed was that of the "conversation" between travelers and Egyptians, in which the most revealing information about Egypt came from its most private spaces. It was such a trope that frequently allowed for the exposure of the "real" nature of Mohammad `Ali's rule: travelers could claim to "know all about him" through alleged dialogues with members of the harem or his inner circle of ministers." See Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 65-67

acute intelligence not to say occasional ruthlessness, carried Egypt into the modern era with long and lasting effects.²²

The status of the “self-made man” was compiled based on several factors: attracting audiences with foreign dignitaries, possessing “acute intelligence,” heroic virtue, even “occasional ruthlessness.” Despite the negative implication of the last characteristic, the Pasha “carried Egypt into the modern era with long and lasting effects.” The symbolic weight of these characterizations is immense, validating aspects of Muhammad `Ali’s masculinity along an expected yardstick of a middle-class Victorian masculinity that would have been intelligible to a British audience.²³ Furthermore, the Pasha’s imagined possession of similar gendered conventions and ideals fosters a notion of equivalence between the subject of the report and the reading audience. In this light, the effect of identity politics acting in the construction of power relations is seemingly minimized. The Pasha’s depiction resembles the “self-made man” of the audience’s culturally attuned imagination.

The character qualities mentioned above go on to be further repeated in Bowring’s chapters on Muhammad `Ali. In fact, similar to other travel writers of the period, the author drew strong parallels between the nature of the ruler and that of his domain. Bowring stated, “In all oriental countries where the influence of free institutions and public opinion is small, so much depends upon the character both intellectual and moral of the rulers, that I shall be perhaps

²² While not technically part of Bowring’s original report, the statements and depictions made in the Forward do provide a relevant gendered and aged representation of Muhammad `Ali based on the editor’s interpretation of Bowring’s findings and descriptions. See the Forward to Bowring, *Report on Egypt 1823-38*, 3. Emphasis mine.

²³ In referring to the accepted tropes of middle-class Victorian masculinity, I am speaking specifically to the possession or performance of values such as intelligence, reason, vision, industriousness, and heroic virtue.

excused for briefly referring to Mahomet Ali's history and character."²⁴ Along such a line of thought Bowring depicted the characteristics of Egypt as dependent upon the character of Muhammad `Ali. The myth of Egypt's "self-made man" came to essentialize the gendered and aged nature of Egypt.

The ingredients producing the Pasha's manliness, for Bowring, were rooted in Muhammad `Ali's possession of intelligence, industriousness, and vision. Bowring wrote, "The restlessness, which is almost the invariable companion of strong intellect, is prominent in Mahomet Ali's character. His passions and his powers must have a field of action."²⁵ The following passage further illustrated these same masculine characteristics:

Nothing has so contributed to the formation of Mahomet Ali's character as that desire of information by which he is distinguished. He has had translated for his own use a great portion of the works published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. No intelligent traveler visits Egypt without obtaining access to his presence and adding to the stores of his knowledge. His curiosity is boundless, and he has the rare but felicitous art of abstracting from his visitors that species of instruction which they are particularly fitted to communicate. He converses with everyone on the subjects they best understand; I have frequently known him to revert to topics in which his mind had been left in an unsatisfied state, either for the purpose of filling up some vacancy in the information itself, or in solving some doubt or perplexity which had occurred to him after meditating on what had occurred. With the names of almost every distinguished statesman in Europe he is perfectly familiar, and of the more eminent among them he knows the history. Nothing more awakens his attention than the progress of mechanical arts, and he will often require the most detailed descriptions of instruments on machinery whose operation have been pointed out to him.²⁶

Although Muhammad `Ali's intelligence, passion, and curiosity are the qualities underscored in this portrayal of the Pasha, his abilities to exert power and control over conversations as well as possess and utilize personal knowledge of his guests' "history," implied a status of authority and power in the context of these meetings and conversations. Scholars who have studied and

²⁴ Bowring, *Report on Egypt*, 372.

²⁵ Bowring, *Report on Egypt*, 375.

²⁶ Bowring, *Report on Egypt*, 376.

written extensively on aspects of gender have noted that masculinity in particular exists and is exercised as a hegemonic social status, demonstrated or performed in specific social contexts.²⁷ Through this depiction of the social scene, Bowring clearly situated the representation of Muhammad `Ali as the hegemonic, masculine subject.

For the skeptical reader, the depictions of Muhammad `Ali's hegemonic identity by Bowring raises questions concerning Great Britain's own gendered positionality vis-à-vis the Oriental *Other*. Edward Said remarked concerning the Western representations of the Orient that depictions of the other were rooted in a binary opposition, validating the West's superiority to the Orient's inferiority.²⁸ In an interesting twist of discussion points within the report, Bowring expanded his analysis of Muhammad `Ali's character to making relational claims of Britain's own masculine-modern status.

While we find the tactic of comparative descriptors present in Bowring's report, the expected differentiation between Great Britain and Egypt is not present. Instead, Bowring surprisingly depicted the Ottomans as the subordinate *Other* in relation to hegemonic Great Britain *and* Egypt. In fact, the central metaphor connecting the transition from Bowring's discussion of Muhammad `Ali's character to a description of Great Britain's relational superiority remained the representation of manliness and masculinity. The equation of a nation's

²⁷ There are many works to cite here that emphasize this particular point, but a good starting place for discussing theories of masculinity and the application of these theories to historical analysis, see John Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Great Britain: Essays on Gender, Family, and Empire* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005).

²⁸ Said argued in *Orientalism* that relational constructs produced contrasting symbolism between a strong and weak partner to produce an "ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority." These distinctions were upheld by a vast literature grounded in a body of politicized knowledge that consistently vindicated, whether explicitly or implicitly, the West's privilege, cultural strength, and power. See Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Press, 1979), 31-49.

masculinity in this case was constituted by the qualities of that nation's men in relation to an *Other*. This formation is expressed from a conversation Bowring had with Muhammad `Ali.

Bowring recalled the Pasha proudly declaring:

What Turkey wants is what England has got-men, men fit to govern: but the Turks are proud and ignorant, and their pride and ignorance will lead to their overthrow. I came to Egypt and I find the country inhabited by barbarians; there was scarcely one person in the country able to read or write. In fact, only one man I discover who was fit for a secretary. Now I have done what I can to civilize the country. I knew that Europe was more advanced than Egypt, and I endeavored to bring to Egypt the knowledge of Europe...I have educated at my own expense some thousands of people. I have sent some of them to Europe, and I am told that even in the schools of Europe many of my young men have distinguished themselves...I have much to learn, and so have my people; and I am now sending Edhem Bey with 15 young men to learn what your country can teach. They must see with their own eyes; they must work to learn with their own hands; they must examine your manufactures; they must try to discover how and why you are superior to us; and when they have been among your people a sufficient time they must come home and instruct my people. The English have made many great discoveries but the best of their discoveries is that of steam navigation." I told him the inventor of steam navigation was an American, and he replied, "*had they not had fathers like you they would not have been such clever children.*"²⁹

In this passage from the *Report*, we find the same masculine traits from before repeated as values that added up to calculate a "man." These included intelligence, education, humbleness, industriousness, and devotion to the advancement of the nation. In relation to Great Britain, Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) and Egypt, prior to its bringing up by the Pasha, possessed characteristics of pride, ignorance, barbarity, and illiteracy relegating them to inferiority by way of their lack of these qualities. The equation of these qualities with gendered status is completed through the relation of ability to govern. In his case again, gendered representations play a central role in formulating the dominant status of Great Britain and Egypt while the imagined possession of subordinate gendered qualities relegated the Ottomans to a status of inferiority.

²⁹ Bowring, *Report on Egypt*, 379-80. Emphasis mine.

But taking a second look at this passage, we find a novel construction that contributed additional affirmation toward an imagined masculine status, the insertion of the characteristic of fatherhood. The depictions of both Great Britain and Muhammad `Ali as benevolent fathers is easily recognized through characterizations emphasizing familial bonds and responsibilities such as those to metaphoric national dependents/children. In this example, the productive activities of the father played a determining role in the nation's modernization or growing up. We can deduce that the speaker meant to represent the idea that Egypt and Egyptians would not be on the path to maturity/modernity without its masculine, fatherly ruler, nor the United States without its masculine father, Great Britain.

Judging these conditions, one could argue that the relational dynamic depicted in the passage resembled an imagined family order. Great Britain and Muhammad `Ali, as metaphoric fatherly figures, embodied the fully masculine subject through possession of the ability to speak for dependents as well as transmit their name and assets to future generations. The gendered and aged image of the father figure afforded Britain and Muhammad `Ali the locus of authority to direct and maintain the national household.³⁰ And finally the representation of patriarchal, fatherly status implied a naturally sanctioned power hierarchy, preconfiguring relations amongst "familial" members that were gendered, aged, and seemingly organic.³¹

³⁰ In discussing patriarchy and masculinity, John Tosh argues that it is imperative that we gauge masculinity as a social status, demonstrated in specific social contexts, and thus provided meaning for patriarchal relations and structures. Tosh pointed to three such social contexts where patriarchy and masculinity were configured and identifiable for most societies. These included: setting up a household, controlling production or maintaining the household, and open-access to the public sphere or all-male associations. Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities*, 35-39.

³¹ Anne McClintock writes that in most national narratives nations are frequently figured through the iconography of familial and domestic space. She insists that in this discourse the trope of the family offered a natural power hierarchy, an organic unity of interests, and a natural trope for figuring historical time. While McClintock focuses exclusively on nationalist discourse, I contend that the utilization of this trope and its inherent meanings can be found in many other

Through the formulation of Muhammad `Ali's masculine adult-likeness and patriarchal status, Bowring's depictions constructed notions of power and hegemony that contested the discourse advanced by his government about Egypt at the time the report was published. This marked a watershed moment in terms of the relations between Egypt and Great Britain. Over the next three decades, Egypt increasingly became a focal point of British intrigue and debate as the political and economic interests of these two countries were increasingly intertwined. The discourse describing Egypt, its politics, and its relations with Great Britain reflected the shifting political dynamics of the period, yet representations of gender and age continued as a discursive site where power was constructed, legitimated, and challenged.

“The Great Man” and his Degenerate Dynasty: Depicting Egypt’s Rulers during the forgotten years of the Nineteenth Century

The events of 1840-41 proved to be a watershed moment for Egypt. Muhammad `Ali secured hereditary rights to the office of viceroy for his extended family while surrendering his possessions in Syria back to the Porte. Egypt was partially reintegrated into the Ottoman Empire albeit as a vassal state, but Muhammad `Ali retained the ability to maintain his own local administration and privileges. The Pasha also had to accept demobilization of his army as well as losing the right to set Egypt's import tariffs. The impact of these developments on Egypt's industry was profound. The Pasha's large army had been the largest consumer of the country's industrial products while Syria offered Egypt a protected market for those products as well.

expressions of hierarchical relations. See Anne McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism, and the Family,” in *Feminist Review: Nationalisms and National Identities* no. 44 (Summer 1993): 61-80.

With the loss of both of these, Egypt's manufactured goods lost out to European competition that benefited from the new tariff differential.³²

Despite processes resembling a “deindustrialization” of domestic manufacturing through the mid-decades of the nineteenth century, Egypt's economy continued to grow as international demand increased for its cash crops, especially cotton.³³ By the late 1850s, Great Britain emerged as Egypt's primary trading partner. With the completion of the Cairo-Alexandria railway in 1852 and the Cairo-Suez railway in 1858, the country was opened up further to European penetration. The increase of tax revenue from the cotton boom and overland transportation development in the 1860s facilitated the Egyptian government's ability to hire Europeans and Americans as mechanics, engineers, teachers, and military training staff. The cumulative result of Egypt's increasing economic ties with the West saw the European population in Egypt grow from 10,000 in 1848 to 100,000 at the beginning of the 1880s.³⁴

The new international context that enveloped Egypt in these decades produced what Robert Hunter considers three important agents of change within the country. The first involves the proliferation of cotton production and related facilities to promote trade. The demand for cotton drove the construction of new projects to improve Egypt's transportation infrastructure as noted above. In addition to the railways, Viceroy `Abbas (r. 1848-1854) permitted the improvement of road communications from Cairo to Suez during this short reign. Owing to the rapid expansion of agriculture and trade, the viceroys were compelled to expand the bureaucratic reach of the government through the establishment of new administrative, judicial, and

³² Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 249-50.

³³ Ehud Toledano gives credit to Charles Issawi for the term “deindustrialization” to characterize Viceroy Abbas and Sa'id's economic programs during their rule. See Toledano, *State and Society*, 13.

³⁴ Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 191-93.

agricultural institutions into the provinces.³⁵ At this time, European consuls were increasingly embroiled in the affairs of the Egyptian state on behalf of their expatriate citizens marking this as the second agent of change. Consuls worked to widen the scope of privileges and rights granted to Europeans and their local protégés at times to the detriment of local Egyptians and at other times to the benefit of local officials.³⁶ Additionally, European consular influence on Egypt's rulers was noted in the establishment various companies such as the first River Navigation and Transport Company in 1854, and a commercial Navigation Company in 1857 to buttress Egyptian foreign trade.³⁷ Of course, the most egregious example of European influence over Egypt's rulers during this period was the example of Sa'id's (r. 1854-1863) grant of the Suez Canal concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1854. The awarding of this concession to the Frenchman marked the beginning of Egypt's plunge into debt, the third agent of change. This agent involved the buildup of foreign debt by the Egyptian state to European banks and lending houses as a result of Sa'id and Isma'il's (r. 1863-1879) use of foreign loans to support the extension of cash crops and undertake the construction of public works projects and transportation infrastructure.³⁸ While Sa'id's and Isma'il's ambitious development pursuits brought financial ruin to Egypt by the 1870s, it can also be said that these schemes increased the material value of the country, generated a new class of land-owning elite, and increased the

³⁵ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 37. Of course, the extension of the Egyptian state's power to control, regulate, and discipline its territory and citizenry during this period is most notably analyzed in Timothy Mitchell's seminal work, *Colonising Egypt*.

³⁶ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 37-38. Juan Cole discusses at length the occasional hostility, conflict, and reactions to European-Egyptian rivalries during this time period. See Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 194-204.

³⁷ Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt*, 72-73.

³⁸ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 38-40.

state's willingness to train or educate thousands of Egyptians to meet the labor demands of either the market or government.³⁹

As the political and economic relationship between Europe and Egypt advanced over the course of the nineteenth century, European tourists, explorers, and sojourners rushed to that territory in increasing numbers as well. It has recently been suggested that works produced by these travelers to Egypt during this century played a dominant role informing Western audiences about Egypt and Egyptian identity. Lisa Pollard in particular argues that the knowledge base spawned by travel writing informed British understandings of Egyptians, the territory they occupied after 1882, their plans for reform after occupation was a *fait accompli*, and the guidelines to their terms of withdrawal from Egypt.⁴⁰

Pollard's analysis of Western characterizations of Egypt in nineteenth century travel writing provides particularly useful insight to scholars investigating the construction of Egypt's imaginative identity in Western discourse. Pollard contends that as characterizations of Egypt's body politic turned more critical in travel writing during the second half of the nineteenth century, the upper-class harem became a symbol of depravity, isolation, and sensuality; the *fellahin* hovel a sign of neglect, destitution, ignorance, and laziness.⁴¹ Travelers opined that the deleterious effects of the Egyptian home and the condition of its female inhabitants had a direct effect on producing and enabling despotic, tyrannical, and irrational men. These domestic conditions rendered ill effects on the body politic by supplying generations of men who were unfit to rule. As nineteenth century explorers and scholars combed the Egyptian countryside

³⁹ On the specific impacts of these developments on the land-holding elite, intellectuals, bureaucracy, and urban masses, see Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*.

⁴⁰ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 48-72.

⁴¹ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 63-65.

seeking artifacts of ancient Egypt's glorious achievements and constructed studies highlighting such, the imagined disorder and backwardness of Egypt in the present was interpreted as further evidence of Egypt's political degeneration.⁴² The "facts" accumulated through this knowledge base facilitated calls for reform in Egypt especially with regards to Egyptian women, their education, and their training in order to break the degenerative cycles fostered in the home. Thus, travel literature in the nineteenth century evolved from depicting travelers' experiences in Egypt toward a discourse full of visions and goals for Egypt's political and social reform.⁴³

My reading of the representations of gender and age in British travel discourse from the "forgotten years" of the nineteenth century reveals similar trends.⁴⁴ During the middle decades, the trope of the conversation continued to frequently illustrate Egypt and the private lives of Egyptians within British travel literature. In the mid-1850s, Nassau William Senior (1790-1864), a British lawyer and political economist, sojourned to Egypt and recorded his activities and interactions in a personal journal. Senior's account provided insightful details to a Western audience on the character of Egypt's rulers and their regime. Despite the fact that Senior's two volumes of *Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta* were written in 1855-56 but not published until 1882, the accounts therein played a significant role informing British knowledge

⁴² Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 71. For two excellent studies on Egyptology, European interest in Egypt's pharaonic past, and the role of ancient history in shaping modern Egyptian identity see Elliot Colla's, *Conflicted Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, and Egyptian Modernity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) and Donald Reid's, *Whose Pharaoh's? Archeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War One* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

⁴³ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 67-69.

⁴⁴ My usage of, "the forgotten years," refers to Ehud Toledano's coinage of the term to categorize the historical unit from around 1841 through the reigns of Ibrahim, Abbas, and Sa'id to 1863. Toledano's usage was meant to mark this period as possessing a historical coherence quite unique from what preceded and succeeded it. In my examination of travel writing from the period, I too find a coherence in depictions of gender and age that distinguished this period as well. See Toledano, *State and Society*, 25-26.

about Egypt's ruling dynasty immediately before and after the imposition of colonial occupation.

Senior's daughter, the editor of the journals, attempted to negate the time lapse between the original writing and publication in *Conversations* preface explaining:

In publishing my father's *Conversations* I have always endeavoured to seize the moment when the countries whose politics and habits they record were objects of especial interest. There surely will never be a more opportune occasion than the present for the appearance of his Journals in Egypt and Malta... The lapse of a quarter century has relieved me almost entirely from the necessity of omitting either names, facts, or opinions; and yet the present volumes cannot be considered out of date; for, as my father says in one his *Conversations*, "The East does not change."⁴⁵

Despite the clear passage of nearly three decades, the timeliness and influence of the publishing of Senior's account cannot be discounted. Given the clear shift in British attitudes and vision toward Egypt by the 1870s, Senior's characterization of the Khedival dynasty's degeneration proved fodder to advocates of British intervention into Egypt. It is telling how Senior's conversations proved their resonance and impact on informing British readership when several were retold in later official reports and memoirs of British men on the spot including Lord Cromer's, *Modern Egypt*.⁴⁶

My emphasis in analyzing Senior's *Conversations* derives from the last statement the author made upon leaving Alexandria onboard a steamer to Malta after several months in Egypt. In a moment of reflection on his experience in the lands around the Nile, Senior climatically wrote, "Rapid degeneracy, physical and moral, seems to characterise a Mussulman dynasty."⁴⁷

The obvious question here is, how does Senior explain this depiction? The theme of

⁴⁵ M.C.M. Simpson in Nassau William Senior, *Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta in Two Volumes* vol. I (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882), iii-iv.

⁴⁶ One particular story that originated with Senior and makes its way into Cromer's *Modern Egypt* comes from Isma'il's coachman and tells of Isma'il's spendthrift habits in Paris. This story will be discussed further below but see Senior *Conversations* vol. II, 226; and Earl of Cromer (Evelyn Baring), *Modern Egypt* vol. I (London: MacMillan, 1909), 143.

⁴⁷ Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 229.

degeneration was implicitly and explicitly prevalent in comparing and contrasting Muhammad `Ali to his successors in *Conversations*. In fact, gendered and aged images were often used to formulate Senior's conclusions. Muhammad `Ali continued to be fashioned as a "self-made man," while the viceroys of the middle decades were frequently imagined as possessing inferior or subordinate subjective identities, often through depictions of their youth-like or childish character.⁴⁸ By analyzing the depictions of childishness and adult-likeness in Senior's *Conversations*, we can continue to explore how images conveyed relationships to power--of domination and subordination—in the discourse on Egypt in order to understand a bit more how these images informed the burgeoning knowledge base on Egypt during the nineteenth century.

Noting its influence on the construction of the Western knowledge base on Egypt, Senior's accounts have been mined by other scholars in studies focusing on the western perspective of Muhammad `Ali and his dynasty.⁴⁹ In my particular reading of Senior, I argue that we should consider this account as a conjunctive expression of European and Ottoman-Egyptian elite perspectives on the country. For instance, in many of these conversations, Senior served the role of interviewer, recorder, and transcriber.⁵⁰ In these cases, it was the interviewee that offered evidence on Egypt and the interviewee's perspective that was privileged in the conversation. Many of the most revealing insights on Egypt from Senior's account came from

⁴⁸ Toledano discusses an aspect of the inferiorizing of Abbas and the implications of these representations in distorting the perception of the viceroy in the historical narrative. See Toledano's two chapters on Abbas and his "demon-image" in *State and Society*, 108-48.

⁴⁹ For instance, Pollard cited Senior extensively in her second chapter of *Nurturing the Nation*. Toledano also cites Senior's travelogue from Egypt in his chapter on, "The demon-image of Abbas Pasa," in *State and Society*, 108-34.

⁵⁰ This is, of course, in acknowledgement that Senior's conversations could have been edited or misremembered by the author prior to the publication. Additionally, Senior framed the questions therefore baiting his interviewees at times. This opens up another debate on using memory and recollection as a historical source.

conversations with members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. Their experiences, knowledge, and perspectives informed the discussion and flavored its depictions. This role cannot be discounted. By contextualizing the gendered and aged representations of Muhammad `Ali and his dynasty from Senior's *Conversations* within Egypt's political context, the intricacy of power relations during the middle decades is revealed.

A particular example illuminating the complexity of these relations can be found in a conversation Senior had with Yusuf Hekekyan Bey, an Armenian Catholic and a prominent member of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite.⁵¹ In the conversation, Hekekyan depicted the Pasha's masculine adult-likeness stating:

Mehemet `Ali did not know what was the number of his subjects, or the amount of his revenue, or the amount of his expenditure. He received no reports or returns that he could trust; he was enlightened by no public opinion. But while most of his faults were those of his position, his merits were his own. His industry, his forethought, his love of knowledge, his decision, his toleration, his desire of lasting reputation, his wish to improve the country which he governed, the providence with which he sacrificed present advantages in the hope of producing distant results—all these were eminently un-Turkish, indeed un-Mussulman, qualities; he acquired them not by his education, but in spite of it. He was *a great man* and a great sovereign.⁵²

⁵¹ Hunter's examination of the bureaucratic elite offers essential insight into the formation of this strata and essential personal-professional background of its prominent members. See Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 80-122. Yusuf Hekekyan Bey was a prominent member of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. He held the office of Presidency of the Board of Health under Abbas as well as offices in the government under Sa`id. Toledano discusses Hekekyan in *State and Society*, and Hunter discusses him in *Egypt under the Khedives*. But the most in-depth look at the life and impact of Hekekyan Bey in modern Egyptian history can be found in Paul Sedra, *From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers, and Education in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). Sedra reports that in 1824, at the death of Yusuf's father, Muhammad `Ali assumed responsibility for Hekekyan and from that period on the young man was dependent on the Pasha financially, socially, and politically. See Sedra, *From Mission to Modernity*, 63-83.

⁵² Senior, *Conversations* vol. I, 250. Senior was very fond of Hekekyan as evidenced in a footnote of *Conversations* vol I, 200-201. Emphasis mine.

The constitution of Muhammad `Ali's greatness here is very potent. On the one hand there were obvious markers of the Pasha's manliness: He was industrious, ambitious, selfless, he valued knowledge; these are all gendered qualities privileged by a particular Western audience at that time. Additionally, the contrast of Muhammad `Ali with Turk and Muslim established a binary opposition, implying a notion of superiority and inferiority in the formulation of the Pasha's subjective identity in relation to a cultural *other*. This of course would have also been interpreted easily by a Western audience because it coincided with their own identity politics.

On the other hand, we can view this construction of the Pasha's masculine adult-likeness as a unique reflection of the struggle for power in Egypt among members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. While the contrast of Turk and Muslim to "a great man and a great sovereign" exhibited a relationship rooted in binary opposition, the pertinent question to raise here is, *why* do we see this differentiation? This question is the more important than simply, *what* differentiated the Pasha as "a great man?" The answer comes in two parts. The first involves the totality of Hekekyan's conversations with Senior in the journals. In these conversations, Hekekyan consistently critiqued the rule of `Abbas and Sa`id by equating their political incompetence and failures with their Turkishness.⁵³ The problem with relying solely on an ethnic-cultural stereotype to define this differentiation is that in Egypt during this period, ethnicity mattered little to members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. To Hekekyan Bey, an Armenian and a Christian, the basic unit of identity formation was more firmly entrenched in

⁵³ For instance, Senior asked if change from Sa`id to Achmad would improve the condition of Egypt. Hekekyan responded by stating, "Not much improvement is gained by exchanging one Turk for another...", *Conversations* vol. II, 223. Also see other examples from *Conversations* vol. I, 251, 264, 270.

socio-cultural Ottoman-Egyptianness.⁵⁴ Therefore, while the differentiation of Turk and “great man” may have served the means of *Othering* for a Western audience in gendered and aged terms, it reveals very little about the deeper roots of the struggle for power among members of the elite strata in Egypt at this time.

On this topic, Toledano offers revealing insight into Hekekyan’s life and his political and social status. In fact, Toledano contends that Hekekyan’s standing was quite vulnerable to the whims of the viceroys, as was other members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. In order to regain a sense of power, he turned to ridiculing the viceroys privately in his diary.⁵⁵ If we consider Hekekyan’s conversations with Senior in a similar fashion, as a vehicle to invert power relations, the answer to *why* we find these particular representations becomes much clearer. Despite the fact that the Pasha allegedly tried to poison him and when this failed posted him to a desolate part of Upper Egypt, Hekekyan’s personal and professional connections within elite circles protected him.⁵⁶ And despite the fact that Muhammad `Ali was quite cruel to Hekekyan on occasion, he never felt he had his power arbitrarily removed.

Hekekyan’s comments to Senior reveal deeper meanings when grounded in Egypt’s political and social context of the late 1850s. Hekekyan’s rocky relationship with `Abbas and Sa`id left him in and out of government service based on the intrigues and power politics of the day.⁵⁷ His powerlessness is most evident in a conversation with Senior, who asked if there would

⁵⁴ On the socio-cultural concept of Ottoman-Egyptian elite Identity, See Toledano, *State and Society*, 68-93.

⁵⁵ Toledano goes to great lengths to describe Hekekyan, his interactions with Abbas, and the role of gossip in flavoring the perceptions of the viceroys in this historical milieu. See *State and Society*, 112-16.

⁵⁶ For the background to these occasions see Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 143-46.

⁵⁷ In his first conversation with Senior, the Englishman asked Hekekyan what the difference was between the character of Abbas and Sa`id. Hekekyan replied with, “I am perhaps impartial; for if

be any difference if Sa`id was removed in place of a new viceroy. Hekekyan replied, “Not much is gained by exchanging one Turk for another, especially if the second was born a prince.

Absolute power, the society of slaves, the absence of public opinion...blinds and intoxicates them all...”⁵⁸ Hekekyan’s emphasis on “absolute power” is very telling because it spoke directly to his inferior status at that particular moment in time. Consciously aware of being down and out, Hekekyan’s depictions of the Pasha and his successors were fashioned by his present relationship to Egypt’s political hierarchy. Thus, Muhammad `Ali’s depiction as “unTurkish, unMussulman” and “a great man and a great sovereign” directly correlated with `Abbas and Sa`id’s Turkishness and “absolute power.” Hekekyan was not unique in holding these feelings of powerlessness. In fact, his insecurities toward the absolute power of the viceroys was a common sentiment among members Ottoman-Egyptian elite during this era.⁵⁹

Beginning with Sa`id’s reign in 1854, the European interest and presence in Egypt burgeoned, including their appointments as directors and deputy directors of major government departments. It was not new for Europeans to work for Egypt’s government at this point, Muhammad `Ali had employed many as technical, professional, and military experts to implement his reform schemes. Hunter tells us that by the middle decades Europeans were everywhere in government especially within the Department of Public Works, Transportation, and Communications Administration.⁶⁰ Europeans made up a growing sub-group within the elite

I have to complain of Abbas for having turned me out, I have to complain of Sa`id Pasha for not having restored me.” Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 202.

⁵⁸ Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 223-24. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁹ On the insecurities of office holding and power of the viceroys, Toledano wrote that, “Though Armenian, Hekekyan and Nubar do not reflect merely the insecurity of a non-Muslim minority. In fact, there can be little doubt that they echoed widespread sentiments among members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite.” *State and Society*, 97-98.

⁶⁰ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, 93-99.

strata from the middle decades of the century, participating and competing with other members of the elite for power and prestige in Egypt. Senior's *Conversations* included many meetings with members of this sub-group. Examining these accounts, Egypt's European elite expressed common gendered and aged images of Egypt's ruling dynasty in comparison to Hekekyan's portrayal. One such European who Senior met with on a number of occasions was the Frenchman, Eugène Mougel, known as Mougel Bey in *Conversations*. Mougel had been hired by Muhammad `Ali in 1842 to build barrages and fortifications along the Rosetta and Damietta branches of the Nile where they divided just north of Cairo. In 1853, `Abbas, apparently unhappy at the slow progress of the project, dismissed Mougel Bey and hired another engineer to finish the works based on Mougel's plans.⁶¹ In one of his conversations with Senior, Mougel discussed Muhammad `Ali with anecdotes to describe Egypt's ruler:

Mehemet Ali employed cruelty, and on a large scale, but only as a means. He was naturally kind; and he was patriotic. The object of his reign was to make Egypt great and powerful; he often mistook the means, as much better instructed sovereigns have done. He adopted the measures, often, as I have said, erroneous, which he sincerely thought the best, without scruple, without pity, and without remorse; but he was not selfish.⁶²

As with Hekekyan Bey, Mougel's depiction of the Pasha implied the status of a "great man." We find comments repeating the complexities of the Pasha's character similar to what has been described above in my analysis of Bowring's and Hekekyan's accounts. Muhammad `Ali may have been cruel, but Mougel minimized this trait with lengthy descriptions of the Pasha's intelligence, reason, morality, industriousness, and heroic virtue. Likewise, Ferdinand De Lesseps, the French diplomat and later developer of the Suez Canal, offered a comparable perspective on Muhammad `Ali during one of his conversations with Senior. De Lesseps' close

⁶¹ Sir William Willcocks, *Egyptian Irrigation* Vol. II 3rd Ed. (London: E. and F. Spon, 1913), 633-34.

⁶² Mougel Bey in Senior, *Conversations* vol. I, 27-28.

relationship with the royal family has been well documented and we see this reflected in his description:

Mehemet 'Ali's establishments were too great, not for the objects at which he aimed, but for the strength of the nation. He was a man of genius and of a strong unrelenting will. He proposed to himself to raise Egypt into a great country. For this purpose he stimulated his people to efforts that were exhausting, but they produced their effect. He made the country secure within, and formidable without. He gave to it improved agriculture and industry. He educated his sons and his grandsons to follow his footsteps. When I returned last year to Egypt, after seventeen years absence I was astonished at its progress. Egypt had passed from barbarism to civilization.⁶³

De Lesseps' account portrayed Muhammad 'Ali not only as intelligent and driven, but he commanded the labors of his people for the progress of his country, demonstrated to his dynasty the proper behaviors of his position, and saw to training of his progeny to ensure the perpetuation of his styled leadership. Add up these characteristics, the Frenchman's description totaled a hegemonic, masculine image of Egypt's ruler.

Through these representations of the Pasha's "manliness," an epistemic frame was formulated, encoding notions of power and dominance in the imaginative figure of Muhammad 'Ali. In contrast, the Pasha's descendants in Senior's *Conversations* did not receive similar gendered and aged flattery. Instead, 'Abbas, Sa'id, and Isma'il were often depicted in subordinate or inferior terms and images. These particular representations are evidence of the shifting power dynamics in Egypt during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. As members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite, Europeans, and rising numbers of indigenous Egyptians increasingly engaged in Egypt's political, economic, and social spheres, the viceroys' absolute control over these arenas became contested territory. I argue one particular product of these changing relations was the inferior gendered and aged representation of the viceroys.

⁶³ Ferdinand de Lesseps in Senior, *Conversations* vol. 1, 47.

Senior's *Conversations* never portrayed `Abbas as a "great man," but he also was never explicitly rendered its gendered and aged binary opposite either, an effeminate child or youth. Instead, `Abbas was consistently maligned for being ignorant, irrational, jealous, and selfish. Mougel Bey described the viceroy as, "the *mauvais ideal* of selfishness. He cared for nothing but the gratification of his sensuality, of his vanity, and of his spite."⁶⁴ De Lesseps expressed a similar opinion, "`Abbas Pasha, who wanted money for his palaces and his pleasure, cut down Mehemet `Ali's establishments ignorantly and rashly."⁶⁵ The portrayal of `Abbas among Senior's informants was not exceptional. Their images were part of wider efforts to construct and disseminate a "demon-image" of the viceroy.⁶⁶ The construction of this negative representation was a result of the competition for power and prestige within Egypt's political and social arena at the time, emanating from `Abbas' challenge to the interests of powerful factions within the Ottoman-Egyptian elite and European community shaped the attitudes toward and representations of the viceroy from the middle decades onward.⁶⁷ With few apologists to set the record straight, the demon-image of Abbas has largely remained unimpeded in the annals of Egyptian history to the present.⁶⁸

When Abbas died in 1854, Sa`id succeeded him as viceroy of Egypt until his own death in 1863. Sa`id's reign marked a breaking point, in comparison to `Abbas, in the attitudes of many

⁶⁴ Mougel Bey in Senior, *Conversations* vol. I, 28.

⁶⁵ De Lesseps in Senior, *Conversations* vol. I, 47.

⁶⁶ Toledano, *State and Society*, 108.

⁶⁷ See in particular Toledano's fifth and sixth chapters in *State and Society*.

⁶⁸ Yoav Di-Capua discusses the role of historians in perpetuating stereotypes of Abbas as demonic and reactionary. According to Di-Capua, Egyptian nationalist/populist historians such as `Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi`i labeled Abbas' reign as the "age of reaction" in his work, *Asr Isma`il*. The writings of royal historians did little to challenge such stereotypes of Abbas, viewing him as a temporary deviation from the monarchic path forged by Muhammad `Ali. See Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past*, 162-64.

members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite and Europeans toward Egypt's ruler. Sa'id's re-incorporation and re-empowerment of influential Ottoman-Egyptian elites alienated by his predecessor along with the promotion of European interests and openness to Western culture directly affected the image of the latter viceroy in local gossip circles and in the Western discourse on Egypt.⁶⁹ To put it simply, Sa'id was cast in a very different light compared to his predecessor.

Of course, the cost of Sa'id's rapprochement was a double edged sword. The political and economic developments enabled during Sa'id's reign in particular crippled the viceroy's ability to act without outside interference.⁷⁰ The Egyptian nationalist historian `Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i's underscored this trend by grouping the reigns of Abbas, Sa'id, and Isma'il into one period he called *`Asr Isma'il* (The Era of Isma'il), correlated by the unchecked foreign encroachment into Egypt in these eras.⁷¹

The inferior status of Egypt's new political, social, and economic developments became often represented through images of Sa'id and Isma'il as childish and youth-like in Senior's *Conversations*. Through these images, the theme of degeneration found expression and meaning.

⁶⁹ See Toledano's chapter, "The demon-image as a product of elite culture," in *State and Society*, 135-48.

⁷⁰ Toledano, *State and Society*, 10.

⁷¹ This is of course referring to `Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i's book, *`Asr Isma'il* 2 Vols 1932 (1932; repr., Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1987). Di-Capua talks extensively about the historiographical debate on the reign of these viceroys in *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past*, 164-172. Studies of note on Egypt's and the general Middle East's incorporation into the modern global economic system are: David Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958); Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); Roger Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914: A Study in Trade and Development* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), and *The Middle East in the World Economy* (London: Methuen Press, 1981); and Kenneth Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants*.

We first find this formulation in a discussion between Senior and Mougel Bey. Mougel Bey began:

I saw the Viceroy [Sa`id] today, and we talked about the sons of the Sheykhs. “The Sheykhs and their families,” he said to me, “were the most ignorant ragged and useless aristocracy that ever were seen. They would not work, they could not read; they passed their lives in smoking and contriving how to oppress the Fellahs, and to defraud the Government. They owe forty years’ arrears of conscription; I take from them the arrears of only twenty years, and I shall return their sons in a year or two educated and civilized, with more knowledge of men and of things than they would have acquired in ten years squatting before the gates of their villages in the sun in winter, and in the shade in summer. “Your highness,” I answered, “has treated them with justice, but it was justice *a la Turque*.”

Senior: Was not that a bold speech?

Mougel: Not to Said; *il est bon enfant*, and is not easily offended when he suspects no wish to offend. Perhaps he took it as a compliment.⁷²

This particular example reveals two relational power dynamics at work. In the first, Sa`id expressed his own dominant hegemonic status over Egypt’s rural areas through his abilities to govern, control, and nurture the sons of the shaykhs. Indeed, through these characteristics Sa`id constructed a power hierarchy, legitimating relations of dominance and subordination through the notion of patriarchy. The viceroy’s depiction formulated his authority according to a familial model based on his own ability to supersede the control of the shaykhs over their own progeny. The statement conveyed the viceroy’s understanding of his own hegemony derived from the notion of patriarchy.

There is of course, the response by Mougel Bey to Sa`id’s statement that provides a second way to analyze the viceroy’s relation to authority, “*il est bon enfant*.” The childishness or youth-likeness of Sa`id was the common gendered and aged depiction of the viceroy in *Conversations* among the Ottoman-Egyptian elite and European informants. Mougel Bey’s

⁷² Mougel Bey in Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 55-56.

construction of the viceroy as a good child was not complex, the formulation of this image rested on two characteristics, Sa`id's Turkishness and his naiveté. The possession of these characteristics served to negate the dominant patriarchal status of Sa`id and subordinate the viceroy to Mougel Bey, Senior, and the reading audience through the sarcastic formulation of the *bon enfant*. European readers would have surely caught the irony; Sa`id would be left remembered as a *bon enfant*.

The formulation of Sa`id as childish or youth-like extended beyond the particular traits provided by Mougel Bey. During his visit in Egypt, Senior met with the Englishman Lee Green (Green Bey), an agent of the Egyptian communications administration and appointed by Sa`id in 1855 as director of Egypt's Railway and Communications. In *Conversations*, Green expressed a deep frustration at the interference of the Egyptian government in the management of the railway.⁷³ His explanation of the problem incorporated characteristics that ultimately determined the root of the issue, Sa`id's childishness. Elucidating his concern Green stated:

A railway depends on punctuality and on arrangement, and the Turks have no ideas of either. Yesterday, Sabbatier, the French Consul, persuaded the Viceroy, without consulting anybody, to issue an order that no train should leave Alexandria before eleven in the morning. That delay may enable him three or four times in a month to get his letters on the day that the packet enters, and for this petty convenience the trade between Alexandria and Cairo is deranged, and the passengers reach Cairo in the dark... I have sent word to the Pasha that if he will merely tell me on one day what he will want on the next, I will provide for him. But he is a *child* with a new plaything, and wishes to have it always in his hand. It is useless to remonstrate with a Turk; he cannot reason, and therefore does not understand you, and supposes that you are making difficulties for some purpose of your own.⁷⁴

⁷³ Further reading on the history and impact of Egypt's transportation and communication infrastructure on the conceptions of time see On Barak's, *On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

⁷⁴ Lee Green (Green Bey) in Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 56-57. Emphasis mine.

Green's formulation of Sa'id as a child rested upon the representation of the viceroy as despotic, irrational, whimsical, easily manipulated, and defensive. Through this description, the reader can easily discern the characteristics by which the speaker inferiorized the viceroy and insinuated his own superior status through his sole ability to control, arrange, and reason. Green's image of Sa'id was the product of the contest for control over the railway, the act of representing the viceroy as a subordinate gendered and aged subject once again served as a vehicle for reformulating power.

By the time Senior's *Conversations* were published, Sa'id's reign had long since concluded and the governorship of Egypt had passed from Isma'il to Tewfiq in 1879. With the passage of time, the political and financial situation in Egypt had dramatically changed. Despite this fact, Senior's accounts from the middle decades of the nineteenth century left an indelible mark upon British understandings of Egypt, cementing Isma'il's subordinate status through the image of his childishness. Upon his departure from Egypt, Senior by coincidence made the acquaintance of an Englishman who had been a coachman in the service of Isma'il. In their ensuing conversation, the coachman described his experiences with and duties to Isma'il while in Egypt and on a trip to Paris with the prince and his brother, Mustapha. This account continued Senior's contention of providing insightful "truths" on the character of Egypt's ruling dynasty by way of informants with access to the inner realms of the government and private, domestic spaces. The dialogue proceeded:

Coachman: He [Isma'il] has about 20 carriage-horses, all English, and about 150 saddle-horses, but very seldom rides, and then only a quiet horse with a saddle high before and behind, so that he cannot fall. He bought in Paris an English hunter, a fine horse, for 300 guineas; mounted it twice, was thrown each time, and then had it broken to harness. His carriages are large and heavy, so that the Arab horses are too small for them. He paid 200 and 300 guineas apiece for his carriage-horses, but they are getting spoiled by the carelessness of those about his stable. Sometimes there is no straw, sometimes no barley. Nothing is regular in his household. He is very mean about trifles, but wastes large sums

thoughtlessly. He and his brother Mustapha, when they were in Paris, used to buy whatever they saw; *they were like children*, nothing was fine enough for them; they bought carriages and horses like those of Queen Victoria or the Emperor, and let them spoil for want of shelter and cleaning.

Senior- How long was Isma`il Pasha in Paris?

Coachman- About four months.

Senior- And what did he spend?

Coachman- About 70,000LE, as I was told.

Senior- And how did it go?

Coachman- In buying things, and on women.

Senior- In what society did he live?

Coachman- The people he liked best to talk to were his servants: the lads who brought him his pipes and stood before him with their arms crossed. He sometimes sat on his sofa, and smoked, and talked to them for hours, all about women and such things.

Senior- In what language?

Coachman- In French; it is the only language which he speaks fluently-he learned it from his nurses.

Senior- Did he ever read?

Coachman- I have known him sometimes try to read a French novel, but he would be two hours getting through a page- once or twice I saw him attempt to write. His letters were half an inch high like *those of a child's copybook*; I don't think that he ever finished a sentence.

Senior- Does he take any exercise?

Coachman- None, except driving about in his carriages. He comes out of his harem about eight or nine in the morning, smokes till he takes his drive, and when that is over he returns to his harem, and does not show himself again until the next morning.

Senior- What sort of a man is he in appearance?

Coachman- Mean; about five feet two inches high, and not strong for his size.⁷⁵

In sizing up Isma`il, the dialogue here clearly conveyed the impression that the prince was hardly the ideal gendered and aged subject, far from it as a matter of fact. In this description, Isma`il was embodied as powerless over his impulsiveness for women and vice. The coachman inferred

⁷⁵ Senior with Isma`il's coachman, *Conversations* vol. II, 226-29.

that the prince's hegemonic status as a member of Muhammad `Ali's lineage was defiled through his socialization with servants. Isma`il's competency in reading and writing French implied his ignorance while his daily routine and lack of impressive physique rendered the prince immature in mind and body "like children." The coachman's representation configured a subjective identity of the prince that would have been considered physically and morally inferior by a Western audience, impacting the reputation and image of Isma`il for decades to come.

Conclusion

In closing my analysis of the depictions of Egypt's rulers in Senior's *Conversations*, I wish to reiterate two points. The first rests on emphasizing that the transition of the gendered and aged position of Egypt's rulers from "great" men to "degenerate" children expressed a changing relationship to power during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The steady relapse of gendered and aged representations from the manliness of Muhammad `Ali to the childishness of the Pasha's dynasty closely correlated with the political and economic imperatives that gave birth to the power struggle between parties hailing from the Ottoman-Egyptian elite and European community in Egypt. It is my argument that these gendered and aged images reified notions of difference in the construction of official British understandings of Egypt in the nineteenth century.

To come full circle, it is worth including one last example from Senior's own perspective to iterate the scope of which gendered and aged imagery extended beyond characterizations of Egypt's ruling regime. Upon his departure from Cairo to Alexandria, Senior emphatically declared:

We left Cairo yesterday morning, having spent there nearly three months instructively and on the whole agreeably, but it is not a place to which I wish to return. There is something, indeed there are many things, amusing in the first aspect of a barbarous

population; the dress, the customs, and the sounds are strange; but it soon becomes painful to live among beings whom you cannot sympathise. The servility and degradation of the lower classes, the tyranny and insolence of the higher, and the rapacity and *childishness of all*, disgusted me more and more every day. The government seemed everyday to get worse and worse; not that it really did so, but because I saw more and more of its working. I carried to Egypt strong prejudices against Mahometanism and despotism; four month's experience has convinced me that I undervalued the mischiefs of both.⁷⁶

While Senior differentiated the social classes to a degree, in striking a generalized characteristic the author utilized the gendered and age trope of *childishness* to essentialize Egypt as a distinctive national entity. In this case, childishness was equated with barbarity, strange customs, servility, degradation, tyranny, insolence, mischief, and inferiority. As debate concerning the "Egypt Question" intensified in the late 1870s, these characteristics would inform the British understanding of the country it was on the precipice of invading. Once the occupation was in place, it was Egypt's maturation that would relieve Britain of its patriarchal role in the lands around the Nile.

⁷⁶ Senior, *Conversations* vol. II, 155. Emphasis mine.

4. Egypt as a Knave, Beast, and Child: Depicting the “Egypt Question” in the British Satirical Press, 1869-1895

I always loved cartoons. At my private school at Brighton there were three or four volumes of cartoons from *Punch*, and on Sundays we were allowed to study them. This was a very good way of learning history, or at any rate of learning something... Many is the youthful eye that has rested upon their designs and many is the lifelong impression formed thereby. ---Winston Churchill, “Cartoons and Cartoonists,” -----*Strand Magazine* Vol. LXXXI, June 1931

Professor of the Noble Art of Self-Defence: “NOT UP TO IT YET, YOUNG’UN.”----
Textual Commentary to the cartoon, “The ‘Egyptian Pet’.”
-----*Punch, or the London Charivari*, November 21, 1891

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, political and economic developments in Egypt gradually brought the country into the European dominated modern world system. The increasing involvement of Egypt in international affairs and trade encouraged a growing Western demand for knowledge about the character of the country and its rulers. This particular knowledge base derived from travel writing, memoirs, and official reports describing as much about Egypt’s geography, history, and economy as it did surmise upon Egyptian society and the interactions that took place within its private spaces. The nature of these sources fashioned a representation of Egypt as a distinctive national entity, steeped in stereotypes and generalizations, with little mention of recent reforms meant to modernize the state and its subjects. As I traced in the last chapter, depictions of Egypt’s rulers turned increasingly critical as power relations in the eastern Mediterranean transformed, resulting in representations inferring the inferiority and subordinate status of `Abbas, Sa`id, and Isma`il. Ultimately, these images served as a backdrop against which Western depictions of the “Egyptian Question” were contextualized in the decade leading to the British occupation.

The processes that gave birth to this knowledge base contributed significantly to the understandings of Egypt among the British political elite. However, the sources examined in the

last chapter are limited in terms of addressing the broader awareness among Britons concerning Egypt and its contemporary affairs. During the nineteenth century, satirical journals containing political cartoons and caricatures such as *Punch, or the London Charivari* (1841), *Fun* (1860), and *Judy, or the London Serio-Comic Journal* (1867) gradually became some of the most read and studied periodicals across Great Britain. While the art form associated with cartoons and caricatures has a long history, the synthesis of technology, growing literacy rates, and the increasing affordability of printed materials facilitated mass publication of these journals, enabling them to reach to an ever widening readership during the Victorian era. Over this period newspapers, humor magazines, and journals of opinion increasingly incorporated cartoons and caricatures into media reflecting an awareness of the capacity for these visual images to express an opinion as well as form it. By these means, cartoons and caricatures became embedded in everyday political culture.

It is precisely the ability of a political cartoon to depict and convey a quick and poignant message to a wide reaching audience that this chapter seeks to explore. The contest over control of Egypt generated a considerable amount of debate in Great Britain popularly known by the late 1870s as the “Egypt Question.”¹ Given the increase in British attention to Egypt over issues regarding the accessibility of trade routes, Egypt’s financial debt to Europe, and discussions concerning regional power relations, cartoonists encapsulated these topics and debates in their political cartoons and caricatures with growing frequency. Thus, the representation of Egypt and

¹ The celebrated public exchange in 1877 on the “Question” between Edward Dicey and W.E. Gladstone in the British journal, *The Nineteenth Century*, galvanized the political intrigue and debate concerning British strategies and interests in northeastern Africa. See Edward Dicey, “Our Route to India,” *The Nineteenth Century* 1 (1877): 665-86; Dicey, “The Future of Egypt,” *The Nineteenth Century* 2 (1877): 3-14; W.E. Gladstone, “Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East,” *The Nineteenth Century* 2 (1877): 149-66.

its rulers in drawings from *Punch*, *Fun* and *Judy* assumed great political and cultural significance during the period from 1869-95. Indeed, for many the images of Egypt found in these satirical journals became perhaps the most powerful and longest lasting representations of the country at the time.

The present chapter reflects on *how* cartoonists depicted the interactions between Great Britain and Egypt in the late Victorian era, *how* these images expressed a developing hierarchy of status, to use David Cannadine's terminology, and *how* the merits of British imperialism in Egypt were packaged and sold to the British public in satirical journals. Of course, while the political discourse discussed the value and necessity of Britain's involvement in the lands around the Nile, cartoons and caricatures provided a graphic opinion to the political debates and developments during this era. As such, Egypt and its rulers came to be consistently visually depicted by cartoonists in various guises, each increasingly subordinated in imperial social scenes alongside icons of the British Empire. In this visual equation to the British colonial discourse, cartoonists contributed to the dissemination of cultural tropes for mass consumption, facilitating popular identification with imperial projects, and thus edified Britons to the necessity of imperial projects through the visual reproduction of difference between Great Britain and its Egyptian *Other*.

The Political Cartoon and Caricature in Victorian Britain

At a time when the study of modern history was neglected from the British public school curriculum, the periodical press was a main source of knowledge for the young and old alike on

the recent past and current events.² An editorial in *The Times* from 1914 at the death of Sir John Tenniel, the most notable *Punch* cartoonist of the nineteenth century and illustrator of Lewis Carroll's, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, asserted that his works could possibly be, "the most attractive text-book of modern history known to many of the younger generation."³ More recently it has been stated that Tenniel's cartoons, "infiltrated the unconscious thinking of all ages."⁴ Winston Churchill's comments above on his affection for cartoons and *Punch* in particular is often cited as an example of the significant impression political cartoons had on the formulation of knowledge about British politics, society, and culture. Churchill admitted he learned from the pages of *Punch* about Britannia rising up to "give hell to somebody" in the Crimea, the British lion's vengeance on the Bengal tiger for the Indian Mutiny, and the North and South as "two haggard old men" grappling in the American Civil War. Churchill confessed that in his childhood *Punch* caused him to erroneously imagine William Gladstone as an idealized Caesar while his sympathy for France in the Franco-Prussian War rested upon his fascination with the beautiful, blonde cartoon, Marianne.⁵ Before the advent of the news

² As late as 1899 only a quarter of all British elementary schools taught history. In secondary schools, history become compulsory in 1900. For an excellent study on imperialism, the development of a history curriculum in state schools, and debates concerning textbooks see John M. MacKenzie's chapter, "Imperialism and the School Textbook," in *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 171-96.

³ "The Cartoonist," *Times* (London) February 27, 1914.

⁴ Frankie Morris, *Artist of Wonderland: The Life, Political Cartoons, and Illustrations of Tenniel* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 246. See Morris' section, "The Readers," for further insight into the impact of political cartoons on formulating British knowledge, shaping public opinion, creating myths, and a source of patriotic imagery, 244-47.

⁵ Churchill, "Cartoons and Cartoonists," *Strand Magazine* 81 (June 1931): 582-85.

photograph, cartoons expressed a visual reality for a great many, influencing British perceptions of their world just as the cartoonists were busy depicting it.⁶

Punch was not the only periodical containing cartoons popular with British consumers, however it had the highest circulation numbers compared to its contemporaries. Its circulation in 1870 was around 40,000 weekly while *Judy* was not far behind. *Fun* was estimated at 20,000 a week in the same year.⁷ By the 1870s, *Punch*'s editors deliberately attempted to position the journal as the mouthpiece of mainstream politics, appealing to a middle and upper class audience.⁸ The success of these endeavors led it to be compared to *The Times* in terms of expressing the "true" flavor of metropolitan public opinion.⁹ *Judy* and *Fun* were both the main competitors of *Punch* and thus sought to attract readers with alternative political approaches on popular subjects of the day. *Judy* was avowedly conservative, adhering to the policies of the Conservative party while appealing to the lower middle classes due to its price a full penny cheaper than *Punch*.¹⁰ *Fun* sought to capture the attention of a more liberal audience, positioning itself politically to the left of *Punch*. Its audience consisted mostly of members from the lower to lower middle class.¹¹

⁶ An amusing anecdote from American history tells us that after Thomas Nast drew a cartoon in the September 21, 1871 issue of *Harper's Weekly* of "Boss" Tweed, the Tammany Hall politician, as a vulture picking at the bones of New York City Tweed allegedly declared, "Stop them damn pictures, I don't care so much what the papers write about me. Most of my constituents can't read. But, damn it, they can see pictures." This example is often retold in scholarship on political cartoons, I first came across it while reading Peter Duus's article, "Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong--The Development of the Japanese Political Cartoon," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60 no. 4 (November 2001): 966-67.

⁷ Alvar Ellegard, "The Readership of the Periodical Press in Mid-Victorian Britain: II. Directory," in *Victorian Periodicals Newsletter* no. 13 [Vol. 4, no.3] (September 1971): 20.

⁸ Ellegard, "The Readership," 22.

⁹ Morris, *Artist of Wonderland*, 248.

¹⁰ Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism, and Ambivalence, 1860-1914* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 136.

¹¹ Ellegard, "British Readership," 21.

The cartoons and caricatures within these satirical journals, with their accessibility, expressibility, quick perception time, and immediate impact, were choice vehicles to deliver representations of Great Britain in all its imagined national and imperial guises. By these means, cartoons and caricatures contributed to the formation of British national identity through drawings distinguishing the British nation from relational subjects depicted as the *Other*. From their inception in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, *Punch*, *Fun*, and *Judy* regularly employed vernacularized national symbols and icons such as John Bull, the British lion, the British bulldog, Britannia, or significant political figures in social scenes whereby through unspoken reference to accepted cultural norms, these visual interactions functioned to impart a political message by differentiating the “we” from “they.”

In their depictions of scenes from the British imperial reality, cartoonists often underscored gendered, aged, racial, class, ideological, or physiognomic characteristics of the *Other* leaving individuals, peoples, nations, or civilizations unmasked, exposed, ridiculed, and defined.¹² The deployment of satire by cartoonists in constructing this visual representation had little to do with simply eliciting humor. Rather, these depictions served an allegoric or emblematic purpose whose function was to pique an audience’s interest, to sympathize, and to think.¹³ The exaggerated forms of subjects in cartoons and caricatures of the empire conveyed

¹² Julie Codell makes the point in an article that images of the empire were, “marked by a discourse of difference not only between European and non-Europeans, but also among British contributors with diverse opinions on empire.” See Codell, “Imperial Differences and Culture Clashes in Victorian Periodicals Visuals: The Case of *Punch*” in *Victorian Periodicals Review* 39, no.4 (Winter 2006): 412.

¹³ In investigating the role of political cartoons at depicting Benjamin Disraeli’s Jewishness during his second ministry (1874-1880), Anthony Wohl stresses that we should not underestimate the power of ridicule and caricature in steering public opinion and formulating a sort of reality. Wohl asserts that as a form of rhetoric, viewers frequently forget that caricatures are distortions or exaggerations, thus political cartoons and caricatures often become interpreted as reality by viewers. Coupling this, since cartoons have profound capabilities to avoid

meanings distinguishing the same ontological space between colonizers and colonized that today we identify with Edward Said's, *Orientalism*.¹⁴ In this space, power and hegemony was represented, formulated, and reified; by way of this space the viewer could comprehend why, for instance, Egypt was "not up to it yet" as *Punch* referred to it in November 1891. By inferring status through representations of difference, political cartoons and caricatures were timely instruments in which the imperial *raison d'être* could be depicted, justified, and even naturalized for the captivated national community.¹⁵ As such, cartoons and caricatures acted as disseminators of imperial ideology in an era of colonial expansion undergirded by calls to "Take up the White Man's burden," to save the "half-devil," and to nurture the "half-child" toward modernity.¹⁶

editorship, they commonly serve as vehicles to publicly express stereotypes and prejudices. Applying theories found in literature on the psychological and sociological significance of cartoons and caricatures, Wohl concluded that cartoonists used hostile and damning expressions of prejudice and stereotypes to portray Disraeli's Jewishness. These depictions eventually subsumed other characteristics of the Prime Minister in satirical journals, whereby these images of Disraeli's Jewishness had a profound influence on his public image and ultimately public opinion of the PM. According to Wohl, the image of Disraeli's Jewishness came to be depicted as his whole character, played a dominant role guiding his policies, and was ultimately steering the nation toward a devious international Jewish plot. See Anthony Wohl, "Ben JuJu: Representations of Disraeli's Jewishness in the Victorian Political Cartoon," in *Jewish History* 10, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 89-134.

¹⁴ In this sense I am referring to the stereotypes and generalizations which undergirded the development of an epistemology on the East known in the West as "Orientalism." See Edward Said's classic, *Orientalism*.

¹⁵ The cartoon's ability to get a point across to a literate and illiterate viewership made it perhaps the most effective form of print communication for the era. For instance, Thomas Milton Kemnitz speculated in an article on cartoons as a historical source that, "the cartoon is more likely to get its point across than other printed means of communication. Many more people grasp the point of the cartoon on the editorial page than read the editorials or signed columns." See Kemnitz, "The Cartoon as a Historical Source," in *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4, no. 1 (Summer 1973): 84.

¹⁶ This is of course a reference to the first stanza of Rudyard Kipling's, "The White Man's Burden," (1899).

“See What it Unites!” Egypt in Political Cartoons Prior to the British Invasion

In July, 1882 the British fleet, anchored off Alexandria, began a bombardment of that city and later landed their army on the northern Egyptian coast. In September, they marched to Tal al-Kabir and defeated an Egyptian army under the command of General Ahmad `Urabi. The British defeat of `Urabi ended what many Western diplomats and observers characterized as a brewing crisis in Egypt and marked the formal marriage of Egypt’s interest with that of Great Britain. Western concern over Egypt’s significance to European affairs had been debated and discussed in the political discourse for well over a decade prior to the British invasion. As developments in Egypt embroiled European powers in the lands around the Nile, Egyptian affairs were thrust to the front of British political consciousness by way of the popular press which increasingly depicted developments and happenings in Egypt for its reading and viewing audience. As concerns for Egypt turned to outright worry and panic over the course of the 1870s, the depictions of Egypt would gradually transform to reflect Western distress and portray particularized solutions to solving Egypt’s predicament. Just as in the general press and political discourse, images of Egypt in cartoons mirrored the ongoing debates over what precisely Egypt meant to Britain across the late Victorian period.

In the two decades following the signing of the Treaty of London in 1841 giving Muhammad `Ali and his family dynastic powers in Egypt, successive British governments had maintained in principle that that the only condition that would warrant their direct interference in Egyptian affairs would be an imminent French occupation.¹⁷ The signing of the Suez Canal agreement in 1854 represented such a threat, igniting a fire storm in Parliament concerning French engagement in Egypt by way of Ferdinand de Lesseps’ Suez Canal Company. Lord

¹⁷ Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 3.

Palmerston led the British opposition to the canal scheme. Through pressure on Istanbul, the Prime Minister managed to slow the start and the progress of work on the canal. But despite Palmerston's hostility to the project, the canal had a growing number of supporters in London including William Gladstone who remarked, "What would be more unwise than to present ourselves to the world as the opponents of a scheme on the face of it beneficial to mankind...?"¹⁸

Canal construction continued through the death of Egypt's Viceroy Sa'id and the succession of Isma'il to the throne in 1863. At this time, the British again stepped up their pressure, remonstrating to the Porte that the concession granting the Suez Canal Company the rights to undertake the canal project had not been approved by the Sultan. Following proceedings of the Commission of Arbitration headed by the French Emperor Napoleon III, the Company conceded its concession. As a penalty, Isma'il was forced to pay 130 million francs to the Company as compensation for abandoning their rights granted in the original canal agreement. In the following year, the sultan issued a *firman* approving the Suez Canal Company's scheme, securing the involvement of de Lesseps and the French in Egypt. In the long run, the agreements of 1863-64 were a first step toward Isma'il and Egypt's financial ruin and heightening British suspicions over Egypt's growing strategic importance in European affairs.

The celebrations accompanying the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 produced mixed feelings in Great Britain regarding the potential political consequences this accomplishment held. To commemorate the opening, *Punch* and *Judy* published their first cartoons of Egypt, showing a ranging degree of sentiment regarding the engineering achievement. *Punch's*, "From the Great Pyramid" (Figure 1), reflected on the opening of the Canal, casting a moderate skepticism on the consequences of forging this new link between Europe, Africa, and Asia.

¹⁸ Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 4.




Figure 1. “From the Great Pyramid.” *Punch*, November 27, 1869.

In the drawing, major heads of state such as the Russian Tsar, the Emperor of Austria-Hungry, and the King of Prussia look with interest at the Canal while France’s Napoleon III engaged in discussion with Egypt’s Isma`il and the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Aziz. Despite the presence of these powerful men in the drawing, the dominant meaning delivered by the cartoon comes from the iconic, feminine symbols of the British and French nations, Britannia and Marianne. *Punch’s* concern can be discerned through Britannia’s gesture toward the Canal and her retort of, “Think what it may divide!” to France’s pronouncement of, “See what it unites!”¹⁹ The implication of

¹⁹ *Punch, or the London Charivari*, November 27, 1869.




Figure 2. “The Meeting of the Waters.” *Judy* (London), November 17, 1869.

the cartoon is that in either event, Egypt’s significance to European affairs could not be taken lightly, peace in Europe could possibly ride on the Canal.

In contrast to *Punch*, *Judy*, expressed exuberance at the implied introduction of the East and West by Ferdinand de Lesseps upon the completion of the Canal in, “The Meeting of the Waters” (Figure 2).²⁰ *Judy*’s enthusiasm is rooted in the economic potential and material value of the opening illustrated by the exchange of wooden crates from the female figure representing the Mediterranean World for the bundles of raw materials bound for Marseilles and Liverpool provided by the feminine icon depicting India. Aside from the dichotomy of goods, *Judy* put considerable effort into differentiating the East from the West in this particular drawing. India is

²⁰ *Judy, or the London Serio-Comic Journal*, November 17, 1869.

stereotyped in the background by Mughal domes, palm trees, and camels while the image of the West exhibits smoke emanating from industries and the masts of ships waiting to transport goods. The serious look of Eastern merchants contrasts the enthusiasm of John Bull and a British sailor while a figure depicting the Khedive Isma`il gazes, seemingly aloof and indifferent. The uncharismatic depiction of Isma`il, who is almost hidden in the background, is a far cry from the images that will become prominent of the Khedive as subsequent events were to occasion significant transformation in the way cartoonists represented Egypt and its rulers' character.

European concerns regarding Egypt would grow following several failed attempts by Isma`il to stave off financial ruin in the early 1870s. Much of Egypt's dire financial straits was owed to Egypt's ruler who managed to increase Egypt's foreign debt from 3.3 million to 98.5 million Egyptian pounds between his accession to the throne in 1863 and 1876.²¹ Isma`il's indebtedness was a result of his desire to revitalize and modernize Egypt through urban and agrarian reforms, improving education, and transforming consumption patterns.²² These developments necessitated the viceroy to borrow beyond his means and accept loans with interest rates anywhere between 12 to 26 percent.²³ Isma`il also contributed to his debt by paying the Ottoman Sultan handsomely for the title of Khedive in 1867 along with the right to change the law of succession in Egypt. Adding insult to injury, the Khedive spent lavishly on building new palaces and hosting extravagant celebrations such as the one commemorating the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.

²¹ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 76.

²² See for instance Mona Russell's chapter on Isma`il, his household, and his consumption habits in her study, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863-1922* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 11-28.

²³ Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 5.

Following the Suez Canal's opening, Isma`il attempted to remedy his situation by restructuring his loans with foreign banks, revising Egyptian tax codes, and forcing landowners to expand the production of cotton for export. When these efforts did not assuage Egypt's debt, Isma`il decided to sell off some of his and his family's royal estates. In 1875, Egypt faced financial crisis, compelling Isma`il to sell Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal Company to Great Britain in order to stave off declaring bankruptcy. Up to this point the British had been reluctant to take on a more direct role in Egypt but as British shipping through the Canal increased upwards of 2,000,000 tons by 1875, the vital importance of the Canal and Egypt to British political and economic interests necessitated action.²⁴

Punch's opinion toward direct involvement in Egypt at this time hovered between a clear approval for moves by the government under Benjamin Disraeli to buy Isma`il's shares in the Canal and trepidation over whether the move would further enable the Khedive to the detriment of British interest.²⁵ The journal issued cartoons in December 1875 and February 1876 by its most prized cartoonist, John Tenniel, praising Disraeli's decision to purchase Egypt's shares for 4,000,000 sterling. In both cartoons, the Canal and Egypt were deemed to be the key to India, an obvious reference to a long-standing British foreign policy concern. In the cartoon, "Mosè in Egitto" (Figure 3), Disraeli was depicted carrying away Egypt's most prized possession, the Suez

²⁴ Robert Kubicek tells us that in 1870, the British only passed about 300,000 tons of shipping through the Canal. But, by 1875 British tonnage had increased to 2,000,000, almost 3,500,000 in 1880, and 5,300,000 in 1890. See Kubicek, "British Expansion, Empire, and Technological Change" in *The Oxford History of the British Empire* vol. III, Andrew Porter, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 252.

²⁵ The approval of Disraeli's actions in Egypt belied the fact that Britain had only purchased forty-six percent of the Suez Canal Company's shares, a fact that opponents in Westminster were keen to point out after the proceedings. Gladstone, as leader of the opposition, called the plan and British involvement in Egypt, "an act of folly fraught with personal danger" to which Disraeli simply retorted, "but it was not I who built the Suez Canal." See Mansfield, *British in Egypt*, 7-8.




Figure 3. “Mosé in Egitto!!!” *Punch*, December 11, 1875.

Canal key, while telling the Sphinx to remain silent.²⁶ The cartoon evoked common imagery of the PM from the period, playing up his “Eastern-ness” in the head covering and the citation of Italian Gioachino Rossini’s 1818 opera, “Mosè in Egitto,” loosely based on Moses leading the exodus of the Jews from Egypt. Tenniel’s genius in this image is evident in the sheer depth of its

²⁶ *Punch*, December 11, 1875.



Figure 4. “The Lion’s Share.” *Punch*, February 26, 1876.

meaning; the image incites a sense of British superiority through the simple possession of the Suez Canal key as well as in Disraeli’s action toward the Sphinx. The Sphinx’s wry grin infers his complicity with the events or even perhaps his resignation.

Following the developments of 1875, the visual theme of Britain now possessing position and influence in Egypt became more pronounced. Tenniel’s cartoon, “The Lion’s Share” (Figure 4) depicted a new power dynamic, one in which British supremacy in Egypt was clearly insinuated by the British lion’s possession of the Suez Canal key to India and his serious fixture on the horizon, resolutely guarding his “share.” Tenniel firmly asserted an opinion of resoluteness of Britain’s engagement in Egypt providing the warning, “*gare à qui la touche,*” to

those who may try to meddle in Egypt.²⁷ Disraeli's gift to the Khedive behind the alert lion implies a recognition and consent of the Prime Minister's proceedings by the iconic figure of the British nation. Isma'il's figure shows no exaggeration of form, implying acquiescence without struggle or challenge to Britain's advances.

By the spring of 1876, Egypt's insurmountable debts from constant borrowing and unchecked government investment forced Isma'il to admit bankruptcy.²⁸ European powers intervened to assist the Khedive, leading to the formation of the Public Debt Commission on May 2, 1876. The creation of the Commission sprang out of the panic that ensued among Isma'il's creditors. The four chief European creditor nations, representing the interests of their bond holders, set up the Commission in order to supervise the Egyptian budget and economy. France and Great Britain appointed two controllers to oversee Egypt's state revenue and expenses, the "Dual Control" as it came to be known. Through the setup of this new system Egypt effectively lost much of its political and economic independence. The Khedive's new relegated role limited him to oversight from the controllers who oversaw much of the affairs of the state. However, Isma'il and his ministerial staff were allowed to stay on the job in order to provide the public appearance of order and Khedival authority.

²⁷ *Punch*, February 26, 1876. This particular phrase may have come from the coronation ceremony of Napoleon Bonaparte as King of Italy in Milan in May, 1805. After Napoleon was invested with the insignia of royalty by the Cardinal Archbishop of Milan he ascended the altar and took the iron crown, placed it on his head, and exclaimed, "*Dieu me la donne, gare à qui la touche*" (God gives it to me, beware whoever touches it).

²⁸ For a fuller examination of the processes that lead to this admission, see Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* (London: Methuen, 1981); and David Landes, *Bankers and Pashas*.



Figure 5. “A Friend Very Much in Need.” *Judy*, April 19, 1876.

As the level of alarm stemming from Isma`il’s financial predicament rose in the first half of 1876, *Punch* and *Judy* marked the occasion by weighing in on these noteworthy developments. In April, *Judy*’s depiction of Egypt bore a strikingly different image of Isma`il compared to earlier cartoons. In, “A Friend Very Much in Need” (Figure 5), Isma`il was depicted as a beggar with empty pockets, a patch over his left knee, carrying a heavy load of “debt upon debt” and “ruinous interest” on his back.²⁹ The Khedive’s expression connoted a naive bemusement at his condition. In the scene, Stephen Cave, who had returned to London from Egypt in March after heading a mission to inquire upon Egypt’s finances, asks for a restructuring of Isma`il’s debts assuring Lord Derby, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that Egypt

²⁹ *Judy*, April 19, 1876.

could pay off its burdens if given some relief. Cave's message to Derby in the image closely aligned with the premise of his report, that Egypt could meet its liabilities if it was managed properly.³⁰ This characterization of Isma`il as a friend by *Judy* would be the last, as subsequent events further intertwined Europe in Egypt's affairs. As a result of these developments, the struggle for power in Egypt would have a direct impact on Isma`il's image as the figure of the Khedive was to take on even greater blame for Egypt's dilemma in the popular press.

In the period following the creation of the Public Debt Commission in early May 1876, the British and French governments worked out arrangements with their bondholders and Isma`il, resulting in the issuance of the Goshen-Joubert Settlement by November, marking the beginning of the Anglo-French Dual Control. George Goschen and Edmond Joubert had worked for months to reach a compromise agreement in which Egypt's total debt charges would be around seventeen million sterling a year, about two-thirds of Egypt's annual revenue.³¹ During the period of negotiation, *Punch* issued two caricatures depicting the new relationship between Great Britain and Egypt, containing an entirely new image of the Khedive. In the caricature, "Great Easterns. "Down!" (Figure 6), *Punch* expressed British frustration with the depiction of John Bull clearly irritated by his interaction with Isma`il and the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Aziz.³²

³⁰ See Cave's, *Special Report on Egypt*, 1875-76.

³¹ Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 95-98.

³² *Punch*, May 26, 1876.



Figure 6. “Great Easterns.” *Punch*, May 26, 1876.

Punch mocked the two rulers as sponge and balloon sellers, pesky and persistent with their cheap wares, provoking the ire of John Bull who simply had “quite enough” of their antics. *Punch*’s, “Harlequin Goschen” (Figure 7) advanced the image of a knavish Isma`il, mischievously burning Egypt’s finances from both ends of the candle, a lark to the ruinous effect of his country.³³ As the examples from *Punch* show, by this point satirical journals and their cartoonists settled on Isma`il as the chief obstacle to Egypt’s development and British designs on Egypt. The subsequent visual representations of the Khedive would all bear similar characteristics in the

³³ *Punch*, December 9, 1876.




Figure 7. "Harlequin Goschen." *Punch*, December 9, 1876.

years leading to his disposition of Egypt's throne in 1879, formulating a powerful image of Isma`il that has resonated to present day.

The struggle for control of Egypt left Isma`il, various elements of the Egyptian elite, and Europeans all engaged in a contest for authority concerning Egypt's domestic and foreign affairs.

European influence in Egypt had grown largely unabated since Isma`il's ascension to the throne. In the 1860s, Egypt had become enmeshed in the global economy through the exportation of cotton and the importation of manufactured goods from Europe. Egypt's commercial opportunities and modernization projects resulted in attracting growing numbers of Europeans from the middle decades of the nineteenth century. From 1840 to 1880 the European population in Egypt had increased from just six thousand to around ninety thousand.³⁴ Due to long standing agreements between the Ottoman Empire and Europe involving the capitulations, a growing number of Europeans were able to get around Egyptian laws giving them a decisive advantage over Egyptians competing for large-scale projects in commerce, finance, and construction.³⁵ Coinciding with the founding of the Public Debt Commission, the establishment of the Mixed Courts in 1876 furthered the legal benefits afforded to Europeans in Egypt. Auckland Colvin, the British Controller of Egyptian Finance from 1880-83, stated that the judges in these courts not only interpreted their own laws, but they "decide what is the nature of their own powers. Should they act in a manner which may appear to a minority of judges, the Egyptian government, or to the public, to be *ultra vires*, all are alike powerless to take action."³⁶ The cumulative resentment against increasing European presence, involvement, and privilege in Egypt, especially after 1876, agitated Isma`il and helped ignite the nationalist movement in Egypt in the latter half of the 1870s.

³⁴ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 79.

³⁵ Donald M. Reid, "The `Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest, 1879-1882," in the *Cambridge History of Egypt* vol. II, 220. Also see Marsot's comments on the capitulations and their impact on Egyptian attitudes toward Europeans in Egypt, *Egypt and Cromer*, 5-6.

³⁶ Auckland Colvin, *The Making of Modern Egypt* 3rd Ed. (London: Seeley and Co, 1906), 202-03.

Isma`il's foreign policy and ambitions in the Sudan provoked equally strong resistance from both Europe and his Egyptian army officers in the years leading to 1879 as well. Due to pressure from the Anti-Slavery Society in Great Britain, Isma`il signed the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention in 1877, committing Egypt to abolish the trade of African slaves and allow the participation of British soldiers in his campaigns. Isma`il's dreams for an Egyptian empire in Sub-Saharan Africa met additional challenges as the government's financial issues hindered its ability to properly supply the army that had been fighting an unresolved conflict against Abyssinia since 1869. As losses mounted along this front, Egyptian officers blamed their Circassian superiors for their defeats, contributing to the growing resentment of ethnic Egyptians in the military against the authority of their Turkish-speaking elites.³⁷

As the limits of the new relationship between Isma`il and the Dual Control became exposed, the Commissioners and Controllers informed their respective governments that Egypt's financial predicament was unresolvable under the current political format. In 1878, Isma`il was urged by the British and French to hand over governing powers to a new ministry containing two European members. Shortly thereafter, Isma`il ordered the formation of a new executive cabinet under Nubar Pasha, an Armenian, and staffed with European ministers. The formation of the new cabinet signaled a turning point, representing the unprecedented empowerment of the office of Prime Minister, who assumed new powers in government as well new responsibilities as liaison between the Khedive and the Europeans.³⁸ The establishment of Nubar's cabinet immediately led to the formation of secret, political societies made up of disgruntled members of the recently reconvened Chamber of Deputies. One society in particular, the National Society, drew up a

³⁷ For further discussion on this topic, see Eve Troutt Powell's, *A Different Shade of Colonialism*, 65-68.

³⁸ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 78.

platform for Egypt's reform which limited European involvement only to financial affairs and granted greater power to the Chamber of Deputies. Coinciding with the rise of secret societies, in February 1879 Egyptian army officers and their men protested over arrears and the forced retirement of 2500 Egyptian officers. During the commotion of the protests, a group of soldiers assaulted Nubar and Rivers Wilson, the British Minister of Finance in Nubar's cabinet.³⁹

In the aftermath of these challenges and as a convenient excuse, the Khedive dismissed Nubar and his cabinet, sending shockwaves through the British and French governments. In April 1879, Isma`il formed a new cabinet without European membership under Muhammad Sherif Pasha. Upon taking office, Isma`il instructed Sherif to draft a new constitution that included an organic law for an elected chamber. Later that same month, Isma`il and Sherif submitted a new financial plan to pay bondholders a half percent less on the floating debt in order to prevent Egypt having to claim bankruptcy once again. As these developments in Egypt unfolded, European officials scrambled to decide their next course of action. No one in the concert of Europe was willing to directly intervene in Egypt at this time, thus the most viable recourse available was to assert pressure on the Sultan to deal with his vassal in Cairo. In May 1879, Germany, Great Britain, and France sought out the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1908), demanding the Sultan force Isma`il to abdicate his throne. Abdulhamid, harboring his own resentment against Isma`il, acquiesced to these demands in June by ordering the deposition of Isma`il in favor of his son, Tewfiq.

³⁹ See Juan Cole's discussion on secret societies in *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*.



Figure 8. “Fast and Loose.” *Punch*, March 8, 1879.

As the new political dynamic in Egypt emerged following 1876, cartoons in satirical journals contributed a rising number of visual depictions of European involvement in Egypt. The panic in Britain following the Isma`il’s appointment of Muhammad Sherif’s cabinet occasioned a variety of reactions from the British satirical press beginning in March with *Punch*’s, “Fast and Loose,” (Figure 8).⁴⁰ *Punch* left no doubt who was responsible for Egypt’s precarious position, depicting the Khedive bound tightly by ropes labeled “ministerial responsibility” and “financial control.” *Punch* repeated a similar theme in April’s, “Poor Fella,” caricaturing Isma`il riding an

⁴⁰ *Punch*, March 8, 1879.



Figure 9. “Poor Fellah!” *Punch*, April 19, 1879.

overburdened donkey, symbolizing the Egyptian *fellahin* (Figure 9).⁴¹ The representation of the non-personified Egyptian nation in the form of the donkey contrasts greatly to the depictions of the British lion. The burdened beast means to signify the plight of Egypt’s peasants, beaten with taxation and weighed down with debt, insolvency, and a portly Isma`il. The citation of Khedival extravagance and corruption was nothing new for *Punch*, but in depicting the beat-down Egyptian *fellahin* it broke new ground in representing the Egyptian nation. From this point forward, the depiction of a non-personified, impoverished nation in the form of an animal will become more commonplace. Likewise, Isma`il’s image took on new traits as the Khedive was no longer simply characterized as shrewd or as a lark, he was now represented as unjust and immoral too.

⁴¹ *Punch*, April 19, 1879.




Figure 10. “Turkey’s Virtuous Indignation.” *Fun*, April 23, 1879.

For a moment, the attitudes of British satirical journals toward Isma`il converged around the particular “wickedness” of Isma`il and the necessity to rid Egypt of its burden. *Fun* remarked in “Turkey’s Virtuous Indignation” (Figure 10) that even the Sultan was repulsed by Isma`il’s conduct.⁴² *Fun*’s opinion that Turkey had lost patience with the down-and-out Khedive left little choice for Egypt’s ruler, who stares toward a pistol on the floor tagged with a note stating “coup d’etat.” The following week, *Judy* was content to issue warning to the Khedive not to irritate the

⁴² *Fun*, April 23, 1879.



Figure 11. “If They Will Irritate Him.” *Judy*, April 30, 1879.

British lion or else he would “take the consequences” (Figure 11).⁴³ The social setting of *Judy*’s cartoon expressed a clear deviation of Isma`il’s image from previous ones. The journal now regarded him as a part of grander British imperial schemes, an inferior bug to the superiority of the British Empire’s Lion.

As the developments of the late spring 1879 left European powers determined to rid themselves of a noncompliant Isma`il once and for all, *Punch* considered the moment of Isma`il’s forced abdication in, “How About the Donkey?” (Figure 12).⁴⁴ In this cartoon, Tenniel attempted to pose a serious question, what becomes of the Egyptian nation after Isma`il? While the Khedive was again depicted burdening his Egyptian donkey, his expression of “Bismillah!

⁴³ *Judy*, April 30, 1879.

⁴⁴ *Punch*, July 5, 1879.



Figure 12. “How About the Donkey?” *Punch*, July 5, 1879.

Who’s to get on?” exposed *Punch’s* ambivalence concerning the fate of the nation under the “Franks” or Tewfiq with the Sultan “behind him.” Tenniel’s implication questions what the nation’s burden will be going forward and whether the weight of Egypt’s new ruler(s) will also be more than it may bear.

At the time Tewfiq became Khedive, he was viewed by European political and financial figures as more malleable and thus suitable to rule Egypt than his father. To the British specifically, Tewfiq’s appointment as Khedive guaranteed a stable transfer of power in Egypt while also safeguarding British political and economic interests in the region. While Tewfiq did not represent a significant threat to the British, his proclivities toward a more constitutional,

liberal-styled government appeased those in Great Britain calling for reform in Egypt to enable the development of a modern, independent nation.⁴⁵

Between Tewfiq taking power in 1879 and the invasion of Egypt by the British in 1882, the struggle for power in Egypt pitted the interests of the new Khedive against a collection of oppositional parties in Egypt made up of landowners, army officers, and government officials. Following the issuance of a manifesto by some members of the Chamber of Deputies and army officers demanding autonomy of Egypt from outside influence and checks on Khedival authority in November 1880, Tewfiq was forced to grapple with this local opposition. Following a speech in December in which Tewfiq appeared to be conciliatory to the demands of the Chamber, Great Britain and France issued a joint-note in January 1882, promising support to the Khedive. The issuance of the note convinced many Egyptians that the European powers planned on increasing their involvement in Egyptian affairs, resulting in multiple oppositional parties in Egypt throwing their collective support behind Ahmed `Urabi, igniting a new panic in Europe concerning these new political developments in Egypt.

At the time of the issuance of the joint-note in January 1882, *Punch*, *Judy*, and *Fun* took the opportunity to remark on the nature of the move after generally neglecting to focus on events occurring in Egypt since Tewfiq's ascension. It was in *Punch* where the greatest ambivalence toward the British and French joint-note was expressed. "The Two Memnons-Jointly Noting," (Figure 13) depicted the British and French as the Colossi of Memnon, gazing apprehensively at

⁴⁵ For a more specific discussion of British attitudes concerning the ascension of Tewfiq and the events leading to the 'Urabi Revolt, see Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 79-81; Mansfield, *British in Egypt*, 13-15; Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 4-10.




Figure 13. "The Two Memnons." *Punch*, January 28, 1882.

one another, yet the image projected the timelessness and magnificence of European power and control through the symbols of Pharaonic statues overlooking the banks of the Suez Canal.⁴⁶ In

⁴⁶ *Punch*, January 28, 1882.



Figure 14. “The Throne of Egypt.” *Fun*, January 28, 1882.

contrast, *Fun* and *Judy* expressed a more explicit message, Europe would now be involved in assisting and guiding Egypt and its ruler. *Fun*'s, “The Throne of Egypt” took no exception to defining who was responsible for maintaining support of the Khedive: the Conservative government of William Gladstone and the Marquess of Salisbury.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, *Judy* remarked on the occasion by John Bull and a French army figure leading Egypt, now a toddler, by the hand, showing him “the way he should go” (Figure 15).⁴⁸

⁴⁷ *Fun*, January 28, 1882.

⁴⁸ *Judy*, January 28, 1882.



Figure 15. “Leading Him the Way.” *Judy*, January 28, 1882.

This representation of a young Egypt recalled similar representations described in the works of al-Tahtawi. Over the course of the next two decades, the symbolism of youthfulness will become more frequently utilized in the satirical press to offer visually constructed justifications as to why Britain took on and maintained a colony along the Nile. But before this could happen, Great Britain had to come to terms with Egypt’s growing nationalist threat, provoking new visual representations of Egypt by cartoonists yet again.

“Taming the Crocodile” to Care for “the Little Ducky-Wucky””: Cartooning the British Invasion and Occupation of Egypt, 1882-84

Scholarship focused on the 1882-84 period in Egypt has generally agreed that the issuance of the Joint Note in January 1882 radically influenced subsequent political

developments in Egypt.⁴⁹ These developments emboldened British politicians and observers alike calling for direct intervention in Egypt based on the perception that the country's political and economic institutions were "threatening and unstable," thus endangering Western strategic and economic interests in the region.⁵⁰ The descriptive language utilized in the political discourse and popular media foreboding crisis in Egypt played a significant role influencing British Parliament to support Egypt's invasion and its eventual occupation. In these two years, the number of cartoons and caricatures published in *Punch*, *Judy*, and *Fun* depicting events in Egypt increased dramatically compared to the previous decade.⁵¹ Considering this, we may argue that cartoons certainly played a role in shaping public opinion toward Egypt at this critical historical juncture.

Matters in Egypt came to a head in the wake of the issuance of the British and French Joint Note. The Note, interpreted by the `Urabists and members of the Chamber of Deputies as an unacceptable intrusion into Egyptian affairs, united these two groups in favor of a constitution limiting the powers of the Khedive and in opposition to European intervention. The Chamber moved with stiffened resolve to vote on administering unassigned revenue in the state budget but their attempt to gain authority over this segment of Egyptian finances was met with opposition and hostility from the Egyptian Prime Minister Muhammad Sharif, the Khedive, and the

⁴⁹ Where scholarship has often differed pertains to the reasoning and motivating factors behind Egypt's invasion and its eventual occupation. The classic text focusing on the topic is Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny's, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1981). For arguments contesting Robinson and Gallagher's conclusions, see A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," in *The Journal of African History* 27, no. 2 (1986): 363-91; John Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, no. 4 (1978): 471-88; and Alexander Scholch, "The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882," in *The Historical Journal* 19, no. 3 (1976): 773-85.

⁵⁰ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 85.

⁵¹ *Punch*, *Judy*, and *Fun* produced 21 images depicting events in Egypt the period from 1869-1881. These journals published over 60 images between 1882 and 1884.

European Controllers. Following this ordeal, a deputation of Egyptian notables went to Tewfiq to ask for the removal of Sharif and the appointment of a new government. The Khedive reluctantly acquiesced to these demands and appointed Muhammad Sami al-Barudi, an `Urabist candidate, as Prime Minister and Ahmed `Urabi as Minister of War in early February 1882.

Between February and June 1882, events unfolded rapidly in Egypt exacerbating the distrust and suspicion between the Egyptian Nationalists, the Khedive, and the European powers. Upon assuming his new office, `Urabi set about restructuring the army by promoting five hundred Arabophone Egyptian officers and applying pressure on al-Barudi to dismiss European officials from the government. In April, the situation in Egypt became more intense when an alleged Circassian plot to murder `Urabi was uncovered. Fifty Circassian military officers including former Circassian Minister of War, `Uthman Rifqi, were arrested, court martialed, and sentenced to death. Following the sentencing, the Khedive refused to endorse their penalty of death, instead commuting it to exile in the Sudan on the advice of the British Consul General at the time, Edward Malet. On May 15, al-Barudi offered his resignation to Tewfiq for failing to persuade the Khedive to change his mind regarding the Circassians' punishment. When Tewfiq could not find a replacement for al-Barudi's government, the British and French issued a second Joint Note on May 27 asking `Urabi to go into voluntary exile. The British and French reinforced this request by positioning a combined naval squadron off the Alexandria coast. Despite these moves by the Khedive and the Europeans, `Urabi and the Nationalists gained strength through popular support, eventually forcing Tewfiq to reappoint `Urabi to his post. The cumulative effect of these events weakened the standing of the Khedive and intensified British concern over their strategic and economic interests in Egypt.

British officials watched the development of the Nationalist Party with a certain amount of reserved optimism since `Urabi had marched to Abdin Square in front of the Royal Palace on September 9, 1881 to demand that the Khedive appoint a new cabinet under Muhammad Sharif, convene the constituent assembly, and raise the number of soldiers in the army to 18,000.⁵² Following `Urabi's stand at Abdin, Edward Malet wrote to the British Foreign Affairs Secretary at the time, the Earl of Granville, stating, "On the whole our horizon seems to be brightening, and I am less anxious about it at present than I have been for some time past."⁵³ In November, Lord Granville sent a dispatch to Malet in which he laid down the British Government's policy on Egypt: "It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partisan ministry in Egypt...The only circumstance which could force us to depart from the course of conduct which I have above indicated would be the occurrence in Egypt of *a state of anarchy*."⁵⁴ As political developments engendered threats to European influence in Egypt in the first half of 1882, "anarchy" became a key word in British diplomatic correspondence regarding Egypt, shaping British political opinion and ultimately having a great influence on representations of Egypt in popular media.⁵⁵

As the shockwaves caused by the Joint Note altered the Egyptian political landscape in the first half of 1882, the language employed by British men on the spot describing the situation in Egypt became more emotionally charged and the threat of "anarchy" a point of emphasis. In late January Auckland Colvin, the British Controller in Egypt from 1881-83, assessed the

⁵² Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 25-28; 32-33.

⁵³ Malet's note to Lord Granville comes from Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 27.

⁵⁴ Granville to Malet, November 4, 1881, quoted in Cromer, *Modern Egypt* vol I, 203. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁵ Marsot wrote that in the early months of 1882, British and French Consul-Generals "dangled the threat of anarchy in Egypt under the eyes of the Powers, for though the threat was perhaps an imaginary one, it was also the *sine qua non* of intervention." See Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 18.

country's political situation as, "rapidly approaching a state of affairs which differed little, if at all, from anarchy...the collective note has intensified the spirit of opposition."⁵⁶ Shortly after `Urabi became Minister of War in al-Barudi's cabinet in early February, Colvin reiterated his evaluation of Egypt's menacing condition in a memorandum to the Foreign Office stating:

It is for Her Majesty's Government to decide when, and at what point, anarchy is established...in my judgement, the country is at this movement without an effective government, and in imminent danger of disorder. The War Minister controls the Khedive and the Council, the army controls the War Minister.⁵⁷

Colvin's appraisal of political developments up to June 1882, whether calculated or simply alarmist, stirred discussion within the British cabinet yet did little to unite the ministers on what action to take in Egypt. On June 11 skirmishes in Alexandria began that under suspicious circumstances turned into antiforeign demonstrations resulting in a number of deaths. In the aftermath of these events, the British cabinet swung toward taking immediate action beginning with convening a conference in Istanbul to discuss the unfolding issues in Egypt.⁵⁸ Despite the Ottomans not sending an envoy to participate at the proceedings, Lord Dufferin, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, announced the British government's new position on Egypt:

It is no exaggeration to say that during the last few months absolute anarchy has reigned in Egypt. We have seen a military faction, without even alleging those pretenses to legality with which such persons are wont to cloak their designs, proceed from violence to violence until insubordination had given place to mutiny, mutiny to revolt and revolt to a usurpation of the supreme power...This state of things has placed in extreme jeopardy those commercial interests in which the subjects of all the Powers are so deeply concerned.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ FO 78/3448.

⁵⁷ FO 78/3436.

⁵⁸ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 20-23.

⁵⁹ Lord Dufferin's Speech in Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 23.



Figure 16. “Hold On!” *Punch*, June 10, 1882.

While the conference did not achieve European consensus on Egypt or even acknowledge recent conciliatory agreements between `Urabi, the Khedive, and the Sultan, Dufferin’s speech foretold of an increasing British determination to find an immediate remedy to growing concerns over Egypt as well as signaled the terminology in which its actions would be justified.

Depictions of Egypt in satirical journals during the latter half of the 1870s generally utilized images of the Khedives, Isma`il and Tewfiq, as representative models to encapsulate developments in Egypt for British viewers. These visions of the Khedives had emphasized particular characteristics, based on perceptions both real and imagined, to reflect on and persuade public opinion on the reasonings behind why Egypt had for example faced a financial crisis or why Isma`il had been forced to abdicate in favor of Tewfiq. Egypt had been generally imagined as synonymous with the character and leadership of the rulers until 1879 when the nation was



Figure 17. “The Neddy of the Nile.” *Punch*, June 24, 1882.

increasingly represented as a donkey. In the context of events occurring between June and August 1882, satirical journals were infected with renderings of Egypt in crisis again, but this time around, the most common image of Egypt was that of an untamed crocodile.

The novel effects determining Egypt’s new image derived from the context and expression inscribed upon the nation’s new rebellious image. The day before the riots in Alexandria broke out, *Punch* issued “Hold On” (Figure 16) to comment on the situation unfolding along the banks of the Nile.⁶⁰ Tenniel’s reflection captured a crocodile, the Egyptian nation, thrashing about as John Bull attempted to keep a tight grip on its reins while the French narrowly hold on to the reptile’s tail. Toward the end of June, at the time Dufferin’s conference

⁶⁰ *Punch*, June 10, 1882.




Figure 18. “Taming the Crocodile.” *Fun*, July 26, 1882.

was held in Istanbul, *Punch* noted on developments concerning Egypt again in “The Neddy of the Nile” (Figure 17), this time depicting the nation not as a dangerous crocodile but an unbridled mule, challenging European control while a clownish Sultan Abdul Hamid pulled its rope.⁶¹ In this image, the French were mocked as riding the Egyptian mule backwards, hanging on only by their grip on Bull’s coat, as the iconic figure of the British nation sternly eyed the mischievousness of the sultan. We find a noticeable transformation in the depiction of the Egyptian donkey, passive and beaten down in earlier cartoons to defiant and resistant here.

By July, developments in Egypt had reached a boiling point with the Khedive taking refuge in Alexandria, the sultan refusing to take a stand against `Urabi, the British cabinet

⁶¹ *Punch*, June 24, 1882.

worrying over access to the Suez Canal, and the `Urabists continuing to build up their political and military power in Cairo. When the British ultimatum to stop work on defenses in Alexandria was refused by the Egyptian government on July 10, the British fleet bombarded Alexandria the following day. *Fun* greeted Gladstone and his government's actions with "Taming the Crocodile" (Figure 18).⁶² The basic narrative of the image shows Gladstone taking a stand, aiming his revolver into the mouth of the Egyptian nation, imaged again as a crocodile pleading for his life. The metaphor of Gladstone's stand proved significant import, showing a willingness and power to face the Egyptian nation alone as the French Marianne and German Chancellor Bismarck watched behind a screen after other European countries refused to contribute troops to Egypt's invasion.⁶³ The image of Egypt's ruler certainly no longer connoted a hegemonic status, Tewfiq haplessly hung on by the narrowest of margins.

On August 20, the British landed troops at Port Said and quickly secured the Suez Canal before moving inland. The war for Egypt came to an abrupt end on September 13 at Tal al-Kabir, where the British defeated Ahmad `Urabi and his forces. The resolution of the `Urabi Revolt spelled the beginning the British occupation of Egypt and an opportunity for the satirical journals to remark on these momentous developments. *Judy* demonstrated a sense of contentment in "The Modest Victors" (Figure 19) at the killing of the Egyptian crocodile with

⁶² *Fun*, July 26, 1882.

⁶³ Gladstone had just given a speech in the House of Commons on July 22 where he stated, "The insecurity of the canal is a symptom only and the seat of the disease is in the interior of Egypt, in its disturbed and its anarchical condition.... We feel that we should not fully discharge our duty if we did not endeavor to convert the present state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to peace and order." Parliamentary Debates, IV series, CCLXXII, Collections 1586ff, cited in Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 27.



Figure 19. “The Modest Victors.” *Judy*, September 27, 1882.

the sword of John Bull while Scottish and Irish soldiers appear jolly at their accomplishment.

The modest victors could now decide how to proceed with their big game.⁶⁴

A new British policy began to be shaped in November 1882 when Lord Dufferin was dispatched to Egypt by Gladstone to investigate the political condition of the country and submit a report to London.⁶⁵ Up to the time of Dufferin’s mission, the British cabinet mulled over what

⁶⁴ *Judy*, “The Modest Victors,” (September 27, 1882).

⁶⁵ Dufferin’s Report and Correspondences, FO 78/3454 and FO 78/3455. The literature discussing Dufferin’s report and the ambiguities of its conclusions has been covered in depth by a number of first-hand accounts. Alfred Milner’s, *England in Egypt* (London: E. Arnold, 1892) offers a good starting point for examining how British policy unfolded and the premises that undergirded the establishment of Britain’s, “Veiled Protectorate” in Egypt. Another excellent first-hand account dealing with how the British justified and exercised their presence in Egypt is Evelyn Baring’s (Earl of Cromer), *Modern Egypt* (London: Macmillan, 1908). In terms of more

to do with Egypt, disagreeing over outright annexation, establishing a paramount British influence in Egypt, immediately turning the reins of government back over to the Khedive, or maintaining a force in the country to safeguard European interest in the Suez Canal.⁶⁶ Dufferin's recommendations to the British government would go on to serve as the foundation in which British rule in Egypt would eventually unfold and the parameters determining Britain's exit, outlined in a circular authored by Foreign Secretary Lord Granville in January 1883:

The course of events has thrown upon Her Majesty's Government the task, which they would willingly have shared with other Powers, of suppressing the military rebellion in Egypt, and restoring peace and order in that country. The object has happily been accomplished; and although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquility, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country, and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority, will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress.⁶⁷

With that, British involvement in Egypt subsequently expanded to meet new two purposes: pacification of the country and the reform of its political institutions.

Granville's statement on Egypt seemingly defined a new relationship between Great Britain and Egypt based upon what has been called a "policy of ambiguous policy," through which the decision to stay or go could be legitimated.⁶⁸ While a debate on the merits of Egypt's occupation was waged in Parliament and in the British political discourse through the end of

recent secondary literature, Marsot's, *Egypt and Cromer*, and Pollard's *Nurturing the Nation*, offer insightful examinations on the debates, decisions, and myriad justifications cited by men on the spot to foster Britain's seemingly unending occupation of Egypt.

⁶⁶ See Marsot's discussion of the topic in *Egypt and Cromer*, 27-30.

⁶⁷ "Foreign Secretary Granville's Circular Outlining British Policy in Egypt, January 3 1883" in J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914* vol. I (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc, 1956), 197.

⁶⁸ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 85.




Figure 20. “Cleopatra Before Caesar.” *Punch*, October 7, 1882.

1884, the cartoons and caricatures reflecting on Britain’s presence in Egypt employed images that left no ambiguity in depicting the new power relationship in Egypt after ‘Urabi’s September defeat. In fact, cartoons issued from October 1882 onward increasingly depicted developments regarding Egypt and its rulers in which representations of new power relationships were symbolized by an array of images. On October 8, *Punch* issued “Cleopatra Before Caesar” (Figure 20) in which the Egyptian nation was represented in one of a few instances as the female figure of Cleopatra, disrobed and exposed but seemingly aware of her allure to the querying eyes of Gladstone who sternly examined her, weighing what to do with her, her fate in his hands.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ *Punch*, October 7, 1882.



Figure 21. “The Egyptian Baby.” *Fun*, October 11, 1882.

Fun saw fit to depict Gladstone as a father-figure to Tewfiq in “The Egyptian Baby” (Figure 21), who had come to rescue the Khedive and coddle him after the Sultan had neglected his care.⁷⁰ The very next week, *Fun*’s, “On the Way to Westminster” (Figure 22), employed a similar age dichotomy to ridicule the Grand Old Man and his children, Egypt and Ireland.⁷¹ No longer a threat per se, the image of the Egyptian nation as an animal was largely dropped from this point forward by cartoonists, the relational dynamic between these parties best represented in

⁷⁰ *Fun*, October 11, 1882.

⁷¹ *Fun*, October 18, 1882.



Figure 22. "On the Way to Westminster." *Fun*, October 18, 1882.

the display of patriarchal power: a dominant British figure opposite Egypt imagined as a woman (Cleopatra) or a child; or a British figure caring for an infantilized Khedive.

These particular representations of the new power dynamic would prove to have staying power in the long-term depictions of the British presence in Egypt as the occupation brought trouble upon Gladstone and his government in 1883-84 from three different sources: his own cabinet, the Mahdist uprising in Sudan, and from within Egypt itself. These troubles



Figure 23. “Nurse Gladstone.” *Punch*, August 25, 1883.

proved that a policy of “rescue and retire” was not feasible for the British, prolonging the occupation and cementing the patriarchal politics of the British presence.⁷²

The irony of Gladstone’s predicament was reflected by *Punch* in “Nurse Gladstone” (Figure 23) ridiculing the Prime Minister by depicting him as a nurse to his “little ducky-wucky” Egypt that he would never leave “til it can run quite alone; Never!!!”⁷³ It is hard to imagine just

⁷² Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 38.

⁷³ *Punch*, August 25, 1883.



Figure 24. “The False Prophet.” *Fun*, December 5, 1883.

how right Tenniel ended up being. Once the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan began to occupy the British in 1883, the tenuousness of the situation prompted Evelyn Baring, appointed Consul-General in Egypt in the late summer of that year, to point out that the British army would have to take over the duty of protecting Egypt from the Mahdist forces, delaying evacuation until the threat was negated or Egypt could be taught to protect itself. *Fun* greeted the events in December 1883 with “The False Prophet” (Figure 24), portraying an infantilized Tewfiq,



Figure 25. “Always Willing to Run.” *Judy*, January 23, 1884.

frightened by the Mahdi, cowering behind a brave, manly John Bull.⁷⁴ *Judy* followed in January 1884 with “Always Willing to Run” (Figure 25) to critique the Prime Minister for his stated unwillingness to reconquer the Sudan. The Egyptian nation, shown as a child, throws a tantrum but is seemingly ignored by Gladstone and Lord Granville who carry him away while the statue of a sphinx, adorned with the face of Disraeli, sleeps on and the Mahdi dances.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ *Fun*, December 5, 1883.

⁷⁵ *Judy*, January, 23, 1884. For details on Gladstone’s decision see Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 40-41.



Figure 26. “Dual Control.” *Fun*, January 23, 1884.

Meanwhile in Egypt, the British were met with growing obstacles to their hegemony stemming largely from French remonstrations and from the continued burden of managing Egypt’s finances. In October 1882, Muhammad Sharif sent a note to Edward Malet asking for the abolition of the Dual Control in favor of the appointment of a single British advisor. Sharif reasoned that the maintenance of the Control produced abuses in Egypt’s administration and lessened the authority of his government.⁷⁶ The diplomatic confrontation between the French and British governments inspired *Fun* to issue “Dual Control;” or the Egyptian Infant” (Figure

⁷⁶ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 41-42.



Figure 27. “Another Attempt.” *Fun*, August 8, 1884.

26) in January 1884 showing a matronly Mrs. John Bull holding her baby Tewfiq and telling her alluring French nanny that she could manage him herself.⁷⁷ Tewfiq’s image of a baby in arms and his assumed fright at the Mahdi Jack-in-the-Box underscore his powerlessness. As Egypt faced a financial deficit again in 1884, the British government sought to unilaterally resolve

⁷⁷ *Fun*, January 23, 1884.

these concerns in the summer by sending Lord Northbrook, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Egypt to report on the situation and offer a solution.⁷⁸ Again, *Fun* illustrated the events by publishing “Another Attempt” (Figure 27) showing Northbrook coaxing the Egyptian Cleopatra to attempt the turbulent waters of reform and liquidation as Tewfiq, depicted as a youth, struggles to keep afloat.⁷⁹ The image of Cleopatra, plump, covered, and with a darker complexion conveys a striking different image than *Punch*’s earlier depiction. We cannot be sure whether Cleopatra’s hesitancy resulted from the sight of a bond in the mouth of the seagull or Northbrook’s assurances that he will teach her. Nevertheless, the implication of “teaching” the Egyptians the merits of proper governance would serve as part of the bedrock for continued British interaction along the banks of the Nile.

As the politics of the British occupation began to unfold by 1884 there was no question as to where power rested in the new relationship between these two countries. Cartoonists therefore followed suit, turning increasingly to depict the patriarchal politics of the British presence in images that best expressed these relations. As British declarations of a quick invasion followed by an expedient withdraw once reforms were enacted were replaced by pronouncements that evacuation would commence once Egypt was able to fully defend and take care of itself, i.e. be taught, a single representation became most common in satirical journal, the childishness of Egypt and its ruler.

⁷⁸ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 43-44.

⁷⁹ *Fun*, August 8, 1884.

“Not Up to it Yet, Young’Un:” Egypt under the Veiled Protectorate



Figure 28. “The ‘Egyptian Pet.’” *Punch*, November 21, 1891.

Textual Supplement to “The ‘Egyptian Pet’”:

Professor of the Noble Art of Self-Defence (the “Pet’s” Trainer), loquitur:

Change in *my* attitude? Nay, not a bit of it!
Like Joan’s true Darby I’m “always the same.”

Parties may flout, but I can’t see the wit of it;
Surely they ought to be fly to my game.

Such “disquisitions” are strangely unfortunate,
Pain us extremely, delighting our foes;

Worry one too, like a busy, importunate Fly on
one’s nose.

Don’t know the play of our pugilist system,
“Pet,” Parties abroad who give heed to such
chat.

Rival lot out of it; nobody’s missed’em, “Pet,”
(Nobody ever knew what *they’d* be at).

Now, in position of “greater freedom,” “Pet,”
Fancy they’ll badger *me* into a hole.

One thing is certain, nobody will heed’em,
“Pet,” *Poor little soul!*

They were nice trainers and backers for you, my
lad.

Pretty nigh muffed any small chance you’d got.

Square up those shoulders a little bit, *do*, my
lad!

That form won’t put in a slommo king shot.

Their fumbling style and contemptible
flabbiness

Clings to you yet. Ah! Thanks be, you’ve
changed hands.

They’d crab our swim, but the Old Scuttler’s
shabbiness Bull understands.

We didn’t bring you out, put you in training,
“Pet,” Or crack you up as the Coming Young
Copt.

(Straighten up, boy! Such corkscrewing and
craning, “Pet,” Never a rib-roasting wunner in-
popt.)

No, you’re a legacy! Would not deceive you,
“Pet,” You are a stick, and have cost a good bit.

Still we have charge of, and don’t mean to leave
you, “Pet,” Till you are “fit.”

Biceps? Ah, verily, feeling your muscle, “Pet,”
Isn’t a job that brings Sandow to mind.

Where would you be in a real hard tussle, “Pet”?

You’re not a Pug of the wear-and-tear kind.

Foes many menace you. Champions, boy, you
know, Challenge all comers; they *have* to-you
bet.

When you can do so, I’ll leave you with joy, you
know.

But-‘tish’t yet!

Thanks to our care, you’re improving, my “Pet,”
a bit.

Promising Novice, of that there’s no doubt.

But up to Champion form? No, not yet a bit.

Just try that on, and you’ll soon get knocked out.

Can’t say exactly how long we must bide with
you, Help you develop grit, muscle, and pipe;

But we must own you to-day-(though we side
with you)-*Not* “Cherry Ripe!”

[Left putting the “Pet” through his paces.]

Punch, November 21, 1891

By the time *Punch* published “The Egyptian Pet” on November 21, 1891, the occupation and governance of Egypt by Great Britain had been underway for close to a decade. During this span of time, British policy in Egypt had been mostly shaped under the leadership of Evelyn Baring, anointed Lord Cromer earlier the same year. Up to that point, Cromer oversaw the establishment of a system of British administration designed to supervise and train Egypt and Egyptians toward managing their own capable, modern government, finances, and military. But from the outset of Baring’s arrival in September 1883 to take his post as British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, the British presence in that country had been a cause of international and domestic suspicion regarding the intent behind the British position there. Despite assurances of evacuation after carrying out reforms, Cromer and the British successfully grew their power in Egypt, turning a temporary expedition into a seemingly unending occupation of the lands around the Nile termed by Alfred Milner as the “Veiled Protectorate.”¹

During this period, Egypt maintained its own central authority, a constitution, bureaucratic institutions, and a liberal economy but the real power in Egypt laid in the hands of the British men on the spot. Cromer remarked that governing Egypt required, “one set of persons who carried on the government and another set of persons who told them how to do it.”² The simultaneous usage of anecdotes and representations in the political discourse articulating Egypt’s inferior status proved to be an influential weapon in the arsenal of colonial ideology. The congruence of the real and the imagined politics of the occupation served to justify Britain’s

¹ See the chapter by the same name in Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt* (London: Edward Arnold, 1892), 29-43.

² Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 66.

patriarchal domination of Egypt; a nation and a people increasingly treated and thought of *in statu pupillari*.³

Punch's "The Egyptian Pet" (Figure 28) representing Egypt as morally deficient, childish, and in need of "manly" British tutelage offered the first reflection in the satirical press on the relationship between Egypt and Great Britain in several years. Publication of the cartoon came on the heels of British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury's speech at the Guildhall in London on November 9, 1891 where he outlined government policy on Egypt.⁴ The contents of Salisbury's speech were hardly earth-shattering at the time. In fact, *The Times* summarized Salisbury's comments stating, "Our position in Egypt has lately become a topic of discussion...and Lord Salisbury did well to place on record, in his lucid and clear-cut language,

³ One need not look very far into Cromer's official correspondences, speeches, and published memoirs to find depictions of Egyptians being likened to children. The expression I use above comes from Cromer's essay, "The Government of Subject Races," where he wrote, "that in dealing with Indians or Egyptians, or Shilluks, or Zulus, the first question is to consider what course is most conducive to Indian, Egyptian, Shilluk, or Zulu interests. We need not always inquire too closely what these people, who are all, nationally speaking, more or less *in statu pupillari*, themselves think is best in their own interests, although this is a point which deserves serious consideration. But it is essential that each special issue should be decided mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge and experience tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for the subject race..." The essay was originally published in *The Edinburgh Review* (January 1908) and can be found in Earl of Cromer (Evelyn Baring), *Political and Literary Essays: 1908-1913* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1913), 3-53.

⁴ The relevant excerpt from Salisbury's speech went, "We desire that within that legal position Egypt should be strong enough of herself to repel all external attack and to put down all internal disturbance. That position is not gained in a day. We are advancing towards it. We earnestly hope that we shall soon reach it, or reach it within a reasonable time...But until that end is achieved it must be the force of another power that will keep Egypt from slipping back into a condition exposed to the attacks of barbarians without and intrigues within, and that other power must be England...the better habits and stronger institutions and the traditions of a better political science must form themselves in that country, and must gain stability and strike their roots in the soil, before she will be strong enough to maintain her own against all these dangers." Lord Salisbury, "Speech at the London Guildhall," November 9, 1891 in *Times* (London), November 10, 1891.

the declaration that in this matter, English policy has not changed and will not change.”⁵ The speech did not provoke a strongly worded reaction from the daily press because by that point the patriarchal nature of the occupation was a given, however the depiction it triggered from *Punch* provided a visual archetype whereby the British presence in Egypt would become commonly reflected on and explained in the satirical press after 1891.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the synthesis of notions of cultural superiority with new concepts on childhood and the doctrine of progress convinced skeptics and advocates alike on the merits of Western intervention in “less developed” societies.⁶ As a result, depictions of child-likeness or childishness became synonymous with being primitive, undeveloped, or uncivilized and thus the need to raise or guide the colonized toward their “maturity” became firmly embedded within colonial ideology.⁷ The potent symbolism conveyed by “The Egyptian Pet” derived from a homology between gender, age, and power enabled through a cultural consensus in which political and economic dominance was represented by depictions of adult, masculine men over childish, emasculated youth or feminized subjects. As the patriarchal

⁵ *Times* (London), November 10, 1891.

⁶ See Ashis Nandy, “The Psychology of Colonialism,” in *The Intimate Enemy Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Knopf, 1962); Lloyd deMause “The Evolution of Childhood,” in deMause, ed., *The History of Childhood* (New York: The Psychohistory Press, 1974), 1-73.

⁷ Edward Said pointed out in his tour de force, *Orientalism*, that the relational construct of a child-adult was a common representation within the Western discourse on the “Orient” during the nineteenth century. This particular relationship, as well as others Said discusses such as the feminization of the Orient, harnessed the contrasting symbolism between a strong and weak partner to produce an “ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.” These distinctions were upheld by a vast literature grounded in a body of politicized knowledge that consistently vindicated, whether explicitly or implicitly, the West’s privilege, cultural strength, and power. See Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 31-49.

politics of the occupation played out, these particular relational representations would assume a prominent position in the British imperial iconography.⁸

Punch's publication of "The Egyptian Pet" illustrates the ideals through which the occupation of Egypt had become championed and conveyed in the British political and popular discourse after 1884. The privileging of the Professor's manly character through the description of his political competence, determination, and resoluteness in the face of adversity epitomized attributes of Victorian masculinity.⁹ The Professor's assurances of benevolent intentions for the "progress" of the "Pet" expressed his certain moral purity. The didactic lesson, attitude, and tone of the Professor toward his young, Egyptian trainee reinforced a power hierarchy rooted in a moral and masculine relationality; dominance and power symbolically rooted in the possession of these traits. The cartoon implied similar meanings through the Professor's image as a mature, male adult while the nondescript Egyptian as a feeble-looking, half-naked, male "young-un." The illustration communicated a taxonomy differentiating the colonizer and the colonized in the physical specimen of the male body.¹⁰ The location of authority clearly resided with the strong,

⁸ I use the expression patriarchal politics to distinguish the hierarchical qualities expressed through the formulation of gendered and generational aspects of power: the hegemonic masculine adult over the feminine and/or childish subject. My usage is informed by Kate Millett's work that argued patriarchy had two components: 1. the power of men over women; and 2. the power of older men over younger men. She called this second component the generational aspect of patriarchy. See Millett, *Sexual Politics* (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1970).

⁹ In summation, Roper and Tosh inform us that for most of the period of the 1840s until the 1930s, the proper definition of "manliness" in Britain as a code of conduct for men emphasized to varying degrees moral courage, sexual purity, athleticism and stoicism. It must be recognized that the authors make clear that there are marked shifts in the codes of manliness over time and across society due to various factors. Nonetheless, these changes and transformations speak to the diversity and mutability of masculinity over time. See Michael Roper and John Tosh, *Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain since 1800* (London: Routledge, 1991), 3.

¹⁰ Wilson Jacob's first chapter, "Imagination: Projecting British Masculinity" has been very useful in my thinking about English masculinity as a constitutive element in producing and being influenced by the "national imagination" of a consuming "national body" in Britain during the

athletic, physically imposing Professor over the skittish, scrawny Egyptian young'un. We may argue that "The Egyptian Pet" represented an ideal vehicle to formulate and disseminate the politics of Britain's presence in Egypt to a wide-reaching audience. Through these processes, the consumers of satirical journals would have become familiar with the patriarchal politics of Egypt's occupation and thus understand the factors that necessitated Britain's presence in Egypt and what would determine its evacuation.

While the characterizations depicting Egypt's childishness in "The Egyptian Pet" appropriately symbolized the politics of the veiled protectorate, circumstances in Egypt in early 1892 coincidentally provided an opportune moment for cartoonists to repeat similar gendered and aged images. The unexpected death of Khedive Tewfiq on January 7, 1892 and the ascension of his eldest son `Abbas Hilmi II (r. 1892-1914) to the throne of Egypt generated a tremendous amount of attention in both the daily presses and weekly satirical journals at that time. `Abbas Hilmi II (`Abbas) had been enrolled as a student at the Theresianum in Vienna at the time of his father's death and at his arrival in Alexandria on January 17, 1892 he was nearly six months from his eighteenth birthday. Previous scholarship has suggested that the new Khedive was greatly influenced by his stay in Austria and his frequent visits to the court where he saw a monarch who practiced an absolute fashion of rule.¹¹ These experiences shaped the character of `Abbas and the interpretation of his authority upon his arrival in Egypt. In the first few years of `Abbas' reign the Khedive's challenge to the existing hegemonic structure intensified the power struggle between the British and the monarch. Once this struggle gained popular attention, the British press exploited the age and inexperience of `Abbas by depicting

last quarter of the nineteenth century. See Jacob, *Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

¹¹ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 98; Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 150.



Figure 29. “Le Khedive Est Mort.” Punch, January 23, 1892.

him with characteristics closer to that of a rascally, pre-pubescent child than an educated, ambitious late adolescent/early adult.¹² The combined impact of the British patriarchal politics in Egypt with `Abbas’ characteristics facilitated the frequent usage of tropes and representations implying the “childishness of it all” following these developments at the turn of 1891-92.¹³

¹² Interestingly, `Abbas was not the only head of state to be depicted as a child around this period. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany in the late 1880s was briefly drawn by cartoonists in the guise of a child. Richard Scully comments, “The child as a representative figure is by nature autocratic, expecting the world to revolve around his or her every whim and desire, and this aspect of the image of ‘William the Little’ or ‘Wilful William’ would not have been lost on readers of *Punch*, *Judy*, and *Fun*.” These meanings would also have been equally interpreted by readers once they were employed to depict the young Khedive. See Scully, *British Images of Germany*, 215.

¹³ The expression I use here recalls two examples: specifically, Senior’s concluding comments from his *Conversations on Egypt*; and a part of Lord Dufferin’s correspondence with the Foreign



Figure 30. “Abbas Hilmi II.” *al-Hilal*, January 27, 1892.

The appointment of `Abbas as Egypt’s new ruler in early 1892 occasioned comments across the British popular press weighing on the prospects of a new relationship between Egypt and Great Britain. On January 8, an editor of *The Times* wrote:

It is impossible to suppose that serious politicians, whether they have regard to the interests of Egypt alone or of the countries to which the well-being of Egypt is of importance, will gravely argue in favour of leaving the new Khedive, little more than a boy as he is, to exercise almost despotic powers unguided and unchecked, or, still worse, to deliver him over to the distracting supervision of a board of control representing the divergent views of rival Powers.¹⁴

Office in 1883. Since I have already provided Senior’s comments I will only give Dufferin’s example here. In a memorandum to the Earl of Granville from February 1883 Dufferin stated, “A certain quality which can best be expressed by the term ‘childishness’ seems to characterize the Egyptian people; and that they can proceed at once to exercise full-blown constitutional functions, which occasionally come to a deadlock in highly organized communities, is not to be expected.” FO 141/168, Dufferin to Granville, February 14, 1883.

¹⁴ *Times* (London), January 8, 1892.



Figure 31. “The Guardian of the Weak.” *Judy*, January 27, 1892.

Taking its cue from *The Times*, *Punch* expressed a similar sentiment at the end of the month in “Le Khedive est Mort!” (Figure 29) by depicting the British Lion assisting the Khedive at his arrival into Cairo.¹⁵ The most notable feature of the cartoon lies in the differentiae distinguishing the two figures and the symbolism behind these forms. `Abbas’ awkwardly sized uniform, his unusually small stature, and his boyish appearance accentuated characteristics inferring immaturity and inferiority; the man-lion’s mature build connoting strength and dominance. The extent of Tenniel’s embellishment of `Abbas’ age and physical attributes in the cartoon is clearly

¹⁵ *Punch*, January 23, 1892.



Figure 32. “John Bull’s Egyptian Baby.” *Fun*, February 3, 1892.

evident when compared to a picture of `Abbas on the cover of the Egyptian cultural and literary magazine *al-Hilal* published just a month after Punch’s cartoon (Figure 30).¹⁶ Intriguingly, *Judy* around this time chose not to use the gendered and aged dichotomy produced by *Punch* to comment on the events. Rather, it repeated more familiar images of the British lion and Egyptian crocodiles in “The Guardian of the Weak” (Figure 31).¹⁷ While the implication of power

¹⁶ *al-Hilal* 1, no. 7 (March 1, 1892).

¹⁷ *Judy*, January 27, 1892.

relations is quite evident, this particular depiction of Egypt in *Judy* stood alone in comparison to its rivals at the time. In the first week of February 1892, *Fun* remarked at the ascension of `Abbas by issuing “John Bull’s Egyptian Baby” (Figure 32) whereby the journal’s representation of events was again captured in gendered and age imagery. The obvious contrast in the subjects’ form evoke similar meanings compared to *Punch*’s earlier cartoon, but in this instance the message was more potent: Britain meant to steer the new Khedive rather than simply assist him.¹⁸

Collectively, the messages implied by *Punch* and *Fun*’s cartoons seem relatively clear: Like a child possessing potential but incapable of autonomy, Egypt and its new ruler needed the guidance and supervision of Great Britain. Indeed, `Abbas was young and inexperienced in the practice of ruling a country, however over the course of 1892 the more favorable attitude of the British men on the spot toward `Abbas gradually turned sour as the young Khedive sought to affect change within the government in order to make a bid for independence. The first “crisis,” as Cromer called it, began in December 1892 over the Khedive’s nomination of Tigrane Pasha, a Christian Armenian, to the position of Prime Minister replacing Mustapha Fahmi who had fallen seriously ill.¹⁹ While the crisis was all but over by the end of January 1893 when Cromer and `Abbas agreed on appointing Riaz Pasha as Egypt’s Prime Minister, the episode sparked an animosity between the Consul-General and the Khedive.²⁰ In the aftermath, Cromer’s tone

¹⁸ *Fun*, February 3, 1892.

¹⁹ The foreign correspondences between Cromer and Lord Rosebery, British Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, is saturated with incendiary remarks and generalizations revealing the Consul-General’s irritation at the Khedive’s obstinacy toward Cromer’s “advice.” See the correspondences between January 1 and 19 in FO 141/296-299 and FO 78/4517.

²⁰ For a full analysis of these incidents see Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 98-130 and Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 150-60. Of course, one should also consult Cromer’s, *Abbas II* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1915) and `Abbas’ memoirs translated and edited by Amira Sonbol, *The*



Figure 33. “The Thin Brown Line.” *Punch*, January 14, 1893.

toward the Khedive turned dramatically, with references to `Abbas henceforth in derisive terms such as the “self-opinionated boy,” the “petulant boy,” and the “foolish youth” while handling the Khedive meant teaching him a “lesson.”²¹ `Abbas’s challenge to Cromer

Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II (Ithaca: Ithaca Press, 1998) for insightful descriptions from the primary participants in the “crisis.”

²¹ For Cromer’s terms referring to `Abbas, see Cromer, *Abbas II*, 10, 15, and 34; Regarding teaching `Abbas a lesson, in early January Cromer wrote to Rosebery, “He (`Abbas) is an extremely foolish youth. It is difficult to know how to deal with him... I think he will have to receive a sharp lesson sooner or later – and the sooner the better.” On January 15 in a telegram to Rosebery, Cromer wrote, “If, however, we once give the Khedive a lesson, it is probable that no further troubles will arise.” Also in January, Cromer wrote, “The lesson which the Khedive has now received will, I am of opinion, cause His Highness to be very careful in his conduct for the present.” See Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 155; and Cromer, *Abbas II*, 24, 41.

shook the patriarchal structure of the occupation without breaking it, but in the aftermath of the crisis the most significant damage was to `Abbas' image. From this point forward, cartoonists relied exclusively on various representations of childishness to depict the Khedive and to comment upon his attempts to exercise authority in Egypt.

The prevalence of British concerns regarding Egypt progressing or growing up under British tutelage continued to undergird the colonial discourse beyond the reflections given to the new Khedive. Prior to the popular presses breaking the power struggle between `Abbas and Cromer regarding the nomination of a new prime minister, *Punch* reiterated the British colonial ideology in "The Thin Brown Line" (Figure 33) in which it recalled a similar representation of Egypt used in "The Egyptian Pet" a year earlier.¹ Egypt, this time in the guise of a *fellah* soldier, is shown standing alongside Tommy Atkins, the generic name for a common British soldier, who praises Egypt for, "improvin' from a scuttle to a first-class fighting man...and in time you may be equal to a round with Fuzzy-Wuz! (slang term for the warriors fighting with the Mahdi in Sudan). Egypt's image here is more mature than in "The Egyptian Pet," not nearly the masculine, physical specimen as the Tommy, but mustached and capable of holding up his rifle. The cartoon disseminated a certainty and confidence in the British "mending" of Egypt, who "may yet shoulder stand to shoulder with me in a British square!"² Self-congratulatory, the cartoon matched the rhetoric issued by *The Times* caption praising the "remarkable progress" of Egypt and its fellahin soldiers. Indeed, Egypt might have been progressing in a certain light, but the determinate date of when the British would leave its young protégé remained to be seen or mentioned; Egypt was to be trained until it grew up.

¹ *Punch*, January 14, 1893.

² This is the last line from the textual supplement to *Punch's* "The Thin Brown Line."



Figure 34. “H.M.S. ‘Toko.’” *Punch*, January 27, 1893.

As the news of the power struggle between `Abbas and Lord Cromer came to light at the end of January, satirical journals and their cartoonists tuned their attention on happenings in Egypt back toward mocking the Khedive, underlining `Abbas’ childishness as the basis of his inferiority and as justification for the British presence in Egypt. On February 1, *Judy* issued a vignette summing up the episode by drawing attention to `Abbas who was, “a very short while since, a schoolboy. He still shows some disposition to behave in schoolboyish fashion.”³ The journal then praised Lord Cromer, who knew how to deal with the situation because he is, “a

³ *Judy*, February 1, 1893.



Figure 35. “Visions in Smoke.” *Punch*, July 22, 1893.

counsellor who understands how schoolboys should be treated, and who has no intention whatsoever of allowing Abbas to be a King in his own country.” *Punch* followed on February 4 with an illustration (Figure 34) of an infantilized `Abbas playing with toy soldiers, rousing the ire of Nurse Britannia who informs him of the arrival of British soldiers that he, “mustn’t play with.”⁴

⁴ *Punch*, February 4, 1893; Following shortly after the crisis, Cromer asked Lord Rosebury for additional troops to strengthen the British garrison in Egypt. Telling the British government that the present atmosphere resembled that from the time of `Urabi, Rosebury was able to convince the cabinet to send additional troops. See Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 156.

The impetuous, childish image of `Abbas only became more apparent to readers of satirical journals as time progressed.⁵ In July 1893, the Khedive went on a state visit to Istanbul intending to gain support from Sultan Abdul Hamid II against the British in Egypt. Likewise, a delegation of Egyptian notables and *ulema* traveled to Istanbul to show public support of `Abbas. Rumors swirled in official circles that `Abbas hoped to convince the Sultan to send a Turkish garrison to Egypt to take over from the British. The visit came to nothing for `Abbas who returned to Egypt with no promises from the Sultan nor encouragement from representatives of Russia, Germany, Austria, France, or Italy whom Tigrane Pasha had met with while in the Ottoman capital.⁶ `Abbas' ploy to seek the assistance of the Sultan was met by *Punch* with "A Turkish Occupation;" Or, Visions in Smoke" (Figure 35) in which the child-like Khedive sits with the elder Sultan, envisioning his liberation of Egypt from the clutches of the British lion.⁷ The dialogue accompanying the cartoon captures `Abbas complaining of the politics of the British presence in Egypt while being assured by the Sultan to "Keep your eye on your father-or Suzerain-and he will pull you through" at the additional cost of tribute foreseen in Abdul Hamid's smoke.

Just six months later, the disparaging remarks made by the Khedive to Herbert Kitchener, the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, regarding the performance of the troops during a military parade at Wadi Halfa in Upper Egypt ignited the animosity between Cromer and `Abbas again. Cromer interpreted the comments as a direct assault on the authority of the British officers in the

⁵ *Judy* was content to issue a cartoon titled, "Shying: Britannia in Egypt" on February 8, 1893 showing Britannia riding on and pulling at the reigns in the mouth of an Egyptian crocodile. However, this illustration of Egypt as a crocodile was the last issued in the satirical press between 1893 and 1895.

⁶ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 118-19; Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 156-57.

⁷ *Punch*, July 22, 1893.



Figure 36. “E Dunno Where ‘E Are!” Punch, February 3, 1894.

Egyptian army; potentially encouraging disloyalty and disobedience among the soldiers against their own officers.⁸ Cromer seized the opportunity to send a more powerful message to `Abbas in order to teach the Khedive another lesson. In later days, Cromer and Rosebery fanned the threat of `Abbas' insubordination, citing in correspondences the dangers of undermining discipline in

⁸ Cromer, *Abbas II*, 52.

the army because, “the memory of the events of 1882 was still fresh in the minds of the public.”⁹ Rosebery’s letter to `Abbas on January 24 informed the Khedive that, “should His Highness refuse to give just satisfaction (to British officers), it will become incumbent on Her Majesty’s government to consider stringent measures which will places the Egyptian army under more direct control and which will protect British officers from injurious treatment.”¹⁰ Moreover, Rosebery threatened to publish the affair noting, “I can scarcely doubt that publication would produce a deep effect on British public opinion.” The impact of these threats was hardly lost on `Abbas who issued a commendatory order in the following days.¹¹

It was following the “Frontier Incident” that *Punch* and *Judy* turned more aggressive toward `Abbas in the now well-established paradigm of the childish Khedive and more explicit in depicting relations of power in Egypt. *Punch* issued its toughest statement on `Abbas to date in February’s, “‘E Dunno Where ‘E Are,” (Figure 36) depicting the Khedive as an immature, enraged, despotic commander shouting at his much more mature looking Egyptian soldiers.¹² The cartoon included a lengthy text in which `Abbas was characterized as a “little angry kid” who:

‘E once was werry fond ‘o playin’ at sojers,
But no ‘e’s not a biby on all fours;
No ‘e cracks of “inefficiency,”
And thinks off Kitchener ‘e scores.
‘E want to “discipline” the native force
Take my word they’d make again black Fuzzy-Wuz,
Led on by a little angry kid!
...Wants to kid us, though ‘e’s but a kid, Which shows the josser dunno where ‘e are!

⁹ Cromer, *Abbas II*, 53.

¹⁰ FO 141/305, January 24, 1894, cited in Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 123.

¹¹ For a more thorough examination of the entire episode see Cromer, *Abbas II*, 50-61; Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 121-24; and Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 158-59.

¹² *Punch*, February 7, 1894.

LONDON: *February 2, 1894.*

ONE understands now why Lord Cromer was not, as some expected, made Governor-General of India.



A STERN MAN.

It was because his work in Egypt was too important to be left. He has to keep Khedive Abbas in order; and Khedive Abbas is a very trying young man—a young man, in short, who tries it on whenever he thinks he sees a chance.

But one is inclined to call the young man Bab-bas rather than Abbas, on account of his exceedingly infantile behaviour. What he did was to say that he liked the Egyptian troops commanded by Egyptian officers better than the Egyptian troops commanded by English officers. The preference is intelligible enough. The young man is still of an age when he may be expected to prefer toy soldiers to real ones. At the same time, if he wishes to lead a peaceful and quiet life, he would be well advised to keep that preference to himself. Lord Cromer is a stern man who stands no nonsense. One feels that there are circumstances under which no

would restrain him from placing the Khedive across his knee and spanking him.

May happier things befall, as it seems certain that they will. Fortunately (for the Khedive) it seemed to Lord Cromer that the sending of an ultimatum might serve as well as a spanking. Events have proved that he was right. The Khedive is in the position of one who has been told to "consider himself spanked." He has retracted all his objectionable observations, and apologized for having made them. Lord Cromer has forgiven him, and warned him that he had better be more careful for the future.

Figure 37. "Consider Himself Spanked." *Judy*, February 7, 1894.

Likewise, *Judy's* quarter page sized space given to address the incident and its aftermath could not hide the criticism it inflicted upon `Abbas, nor the loss of patience toward dealing with his "infantile behavior."¹³ The cartoon of Cromer as "A Stern Man" (Figure 37) and the text certainly illustrated very effectively the convention of depicting the Khedive as a child, but went even beyond earlier impressions of how to deal with `Abbas by advocating for "placing the Khedive across his (Cromer's) knee and spanking him." The reference to spanking serves to

¹³ *Judy*, February 7, 1894.

reiterate the British impression that Egypt's ruler was young and challenging, but also reinforce the notion that `Abbas possessed very little power in his relationship with the British. Indeed, *Judy* may have realized the gravity of its advised procedure in stating, "The Khedive is in the position of one who has been told to "consider himself spanked."” Luckily the “trying young man” accepted Cromer’s ultimatum.

Conclusion

In hindsight, `Abbas’ challenge to British hegemony in Egypt came at a heavy cost. The cumulative effects of nearly three years’ worth of power struggle managed to change British rule in Egypt from covert to overt.¹⁴ The final straw for Cromer and Rosebery occurred in early 1895 when `Abbas decided to remove Nubar Pasha as Prime Minister because he was, “too pro-British for the Khedive’s liking.”¹⁵ The uproar at the British residency in Egypt over the Khedive’s course incited Rosebery to issue a strong response via Cromer, who informed `Abbas that the move would be interpreted as a direct provocation against the British government. `Abbas capitulated, seeing the writing on the wall and henceforth used more discrete means to contest the British presence in Egypt.

Nevertheless, the childish representation of Egypt and its ruler lived on in the British political and popular discourse well into the twentieth century. Tutelage, progress, guidance, and reform continued to serve as justificatory themes informing the minds of officials and the public on the British presence in Egypt whereas the images generated by these keywords assumed

¹⁴ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 126.

¹⁵ Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 124.




Figure 38. "Silent." *Punch*, March 6, 1895.

prominent places in the British imperial iconography. While developments in Egypt such as the reconquest of Sudan, the incident at Fashoda, and the Entente Cordiale with France kept British attention on the lands around the Nile, the image of `Abbas remained relatively unchanged despite his acquiescence and a turn toward more covert activities in supporting the renewed

nationalist movement. Consequently, the lasting impression of the Khedive and the British occupation is perhaps best summed up in *Punch's* March 1895 cartoon "Silent" (Figure 38).¹⁶ In keeping with the depiction of the "Little Khedive," *Punch* reasserted the continuation of British power in Egypt through the stone-cold silence of the Sphinx while the poetic verses accompanying the cartoon reiterated this opinion:

With a thoughtless boy-boldness, but is he the Khedive keen Ismail foresaw,
Of character 'stablished on justice, of force firmly founded on law?
Poor boy, eager-eyed, half exultant, he lifts, half inquiry half plaint,
His Voice of Appeal to the Sphinx, On the air of the desert how faint
Sound his words, "Is it Egypt, O Sphinx, for Egyptians?" There comes no reply,
But straight o'er the sands, as of old, staring forth to the weird desert sky,
Unmoved, unresponsive, indifferent, gazes that stony face still,
Incarnation of calm most colossal, cold patience, immovable will,
Looking far beyond time, far above human hope, mere midge-fret of the day,
Into-what? There's no mortal who knows, and the Sphinx, if it know, doth not say.
'Tis silent-with silence that means not consent to the youth's wild appeal;
Still, still the set face which is stone gazes forth on a sky which is steel!

And yet, despite the British understanding that their veiled protectorate was premised on notions of regenerating a young Egypt, it would be the characteristics of youthfulness that Egyptian nationalists would lay their claims that the nation was primed for exacting its own independence. For as the patriarchal structure of dominance relied on the submission of youth to their more mature elders, nationalist would seize upon the promise and ambition of youth to call upon the overthrow of their patriarchs and thus end the occupation.

¹⁶ *Punch*, March 6, 1895.

5. Disobedient, Dimwitted, Heroic, Hope of the Future: Representations of Children and Youth in the Egyptian Nationalist Discourse, 1879-1908

At this point, it should be clear that Great Britain's motives behind maintaining their "Veiled Protectorate" in Egypt did not just derive out of economic and political concerns. The ascription of particular cultural meanings to British domination in Egypt, as well as across Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth century, built a powerful legitimacy for colonialism. The new doctrine of progress convinced skeptics and advocates alike that Western intervention in "less developed" societies ensured the maturation of these more primitive peoples toward modernity and civilization. Running parallel to this ideology, the development of a modern Western concept of childhood claimed that children were innocent, required protection from adult society, and needed moral training and education to ensure their proper growth to maturity. Whereas previously children had been seen as smaller versions of adults, now childhood was viewed as a period different from and inferior to adulthood.¹ The colonial discourse picked up these new ideas on growth and development and drew a correlation between primitivism and childhood.² Western arguments contended that colonialism would guide childish or child-like colonial subjects toward a civilized adulthood defined and exemplified by Europe. Given the frequency of Egypt's childishness in the colonial discourse, these representations proved useful in legitimating Britain's presence in Egypt.

¹ While his work has been critiqued on a number of levels, Phillip Aries is given credit for being the first to describe how the idea of childhood came to be seen as a category ontologically different from adulthood in Western society. See Aries, *Centuries of Childhood*.

² This particular argument is expanded in Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy*, and Bill Ashcroft's, "Primitive and Wingless": The Colonial Subject as Child," in *On Post-Colonial Futures: Transformations of Colonial Culture* (London: Continuum Publishers, 2001), 36-53; and Jo-Ann Wallace's, "De-scribing *The Water Babies*: The Child in Post-Colonial Theory," in *De-scribing Empire*, Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson, eds. (London: Routledge, 1994), 171-84.

Egyptian nationalists, reformers, and intellectuals were well aware of Western ideas concerning development, progress, and childhood from their travels and studies in Europe as well as through their education and interactions with Europeans in Egypt. In addition, Western media exposed Egyptians to representations of Europe's colonized "children" that helped justify European imperial expansion across Africa and Asia. From last quarter of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century, nationalists offered their own concepts concerning childhood, youth, and national development as a part of their struggle for hegemony in Egypt. Hardly the innocent or ignorant children of the colonial imagination, nationalists actively adopted and transformed tropes of the child and youth to challenge Western depictions of Egypt, promote collective solidarity, and mobilize Egyptians toward nationalist goals.

From the late 1870s to the early 1880s, Egypt's nationalists frequently employed tropes associated with childhood and development in the printed press to ridicule khedival politics and resist Western representations of Egypt's childishness in order to promote the legitimacy of the nationalist movement. Nationalists accomplished this by portraying Khedives Isma`il and Tewfiq as ignorant, disloyal, and incorrigible children contrasting images of nationalist leaders as adult-like, heroic, and fatherly. Having subordinated Egypt's rulers in the discourse, nationalists attempted to break the Western frame of reference by depicting themselves in social scenes as more manly than Europeans. By these means, nationalists both collaborated with and resisted European representations of Egypt's childishness to assert their claims of patriarchal authority over the country.

The defeat of Ahmad `Urabi by the British in September, 1882 proved to be a dramatic setback to the nationalists in the face of Egypt's loss to foreign occupation. Nevertheless, after a decade of relative hibernation, a new generation of nationalist *effendiyya* emerged in the 1890s to

contest British colonial-styled rule. Over the next few decades, the *effendiyya* articulated new visions of Egypt, Egyptians, and “Egyptian-ness” through indigenous mass media, linking national transformation to the cultivation of new men, women, children, families, and homes. These representations reflected the *effendiyya*’s own self-conception as exemplary national subjects and a privileged social formation intimately tied to Egypt’s modern, national development.³ Moreover, these efforts of self-representation revealed a central strategy of the *effendiyya* to resist imperial control by attempting to gain authority through the production of knowledge, culture, and subjects.

Around the turn-of-the twentieth century, Mustafa Kamil contributed to the emerging politics of representation by introducing the figure of the heroic youth into the nationalist discourse. Kamil gained notoriety during this era as an outspoken nationalist, social reformer, editor, and representative of a new, confident, young Egypt through his tireless activism for his country’s independence. In his articles and speeches, Kamil contested earlier representations of Egypt’s childishness by portraying the figure of the heroic youth as the symbol and vanguard of Egypt’s rejuvenation and repossession. There is little doubt that Kamil’s depiction of the heroic youth, as well as his own exemplary status, was instrumental in building collective solidarity among Egypt’s young *effendiyya* and in generating their energy against the British occupation. As a result of his efforts, the representation of the heroic youth gained a prominent place among

³ This is the characterization Wilson Jacob applies to the *effendiyya* in *Working Out Egypt*, 46. My thinking on the *effendiyya* has also been influenced by Lucie Ryzova’s work, “Egyptianizing Modernity through the ‘New *Effendiya*,’ in *Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919-1952*, eds. Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A. Salmoni (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 124-63; and *The Age of the Efendiya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

other iconic images of the nation, symbolizing Egypt's hope for the future, unity among its "children," and devotion to the defense of the *watan*/motherland.

The Development of Egypt's Nationalist Movement and a National Consciousness

The origins of the Egyptian nationalist movement lay in the in the unprecedented institutional and infrastructural transformations occurring over Egypt's long nineteenth-century. Muhammad `Ali's (r. 1805-48) consolidation of power and establishment of a modern centralized state with expanding state institutions laid the foundations for dramatic change across Egypt's political, socioeconomic, and cultural landscape. These transformations over time heralded structural changes of Egypt's elite from Ottoman-Egyptian to Egyptian as indigenous notables and their kin ascended to high positions in the military, central bureaucracy, and rural administration. Simultaneously, Egyptian-Arabic cultural identity replaced Ottoman components as Egyptian-born officials increasingly integrated into the elite ranks.⁴ Muhammad `Ali founded state-sponsored schools to meet the demands of his expanding military and bureaucracy. These schools offered indigenous Egyptians a path of upward mobility through state service or employment in the liberal professions. Isma`il (r. 1863-79) expanded Egypt's educational system following years of abandonment and neglect under his predecessors `Abbas (r. 1848-54) and Sa`id (r.1854-63). During Isma`il's reign, tens of thousands of Egyptian students entered the burgeoning public school system to feed Egypt's expanding state bureaucracy and its institutions.⁵ These changes over time played a significant role differentiating Egypt politically,

⁴ See Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 82-83; Ehud Toledano, "Social and Economic Change," 264-65; and Toledano, *State and Society*, 41-49.

⁵ See my discussion of the Egyptian education system in Chapter One as well as Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt*, 330-92.

socioeconomically, and culturally from Istanbul; introducing a sense of Egyptian national identity to the growing number of Egypt's middle and upper social strata.

These gradual transformations created the ideal conditions for social conflict and the emergence of a proto-nationalist struggle once Egypt's political and economic crises intensified in the late 1870s. At that time, a "challenger strata" within Egyptian society coalesced into an oppositional movement to demand a share of power with the older dominant elite and voice their discontent at growing European influence in Egypt.⁶ Participants in this movement united not only behind their material interests but also in their sense of ethnic solidarity and territorial patriotism following Ahmed `Urabi and members of the Egyptian army voicing their grievances against Ottoman-Egyptian discrimination and reductions in the numbers of Egyptian officers and enlisted men in the army.⁷ Having been seemingly ignored by the khedival regime, `Urabi led a military demonstration to `Abdin Palace in September, 1881. After the demonstration, national media played a crucial role delegitimizing the ruling regime, uniting diverse social forces, and mobilizing mass support for the `Urabist movement under the slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians." The printed press' ability to reach both a literate and illiterate audience supplied Egypt's masses with a sense of collective participation in current national events and stimulated proto-national awareness.⁸ Inasmuch that printed media served to focus public attention on economic inequalities, political corruption, and foreign intervention, the images and rhetoric found in this discourse delivered potent nationalist symbols and messages to a wide mass of Egyptians who were entertained and shaped by their meanings.

⁶ See Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*.

⁷ Cole, *Colonialism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, 234-72.

⁸ Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 59-60.

Of course without extensive infrastructural investment occurring prior to the `Urabist Revolt, the ability of national media to reach broad distribution and nurture the growth of national consciousness would not have been possible. Ziad Fahmy convincingly argues that the development of Egypt's transportation and communication infrastructure increasingly connected Egypt's rural and urban areas, unifying Egyptians across geographic and social divides with the help of new tools such as the railroad and postal service. By 1876, Egypt's railroad lines stretched 2,112 kilometers (1,325 miles), crisscrossing the Nile Delta and connecting Lower Egypt to cities and towns as far south as the Sudan. These lines transported people and goods in increasing numbers around Egypt with dramatic economic repercussions.⁹ Additionally, the railroad's circulation fostered a growing connectivity between the central hub of Cairo and Egypt's outlying provinces, strengthening the capital's political, economic, and cultural influence over the rest of the country. The establishment of the Egyptian postal service supplemented the railroad in fostering exchange as the primary carrier of materials such as newspapers, periodicals, and personal mail. The expansion of the postal service contributed to the circulation of these printed "cultural materials," exposing a growing number of Egyptians to news, gossip, and culture from Egypt's urban centers. By the time of the `Urabi Revolt, these transformations contributed to the development of a politicized public sphere as print media and its associated materials were increasingly available and accessible across the country.¹⁰

⁹ These numbers come from Fahmy's discussion on Egypt's railroad and its economic implications in *Ordinary Egyptians*, 25. On the economic dimension see Roger Owen's, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914* and *The Middle East in the World Economy*; and Robert Tignor's, *Modernization and British Rule in Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). On aspects of the central government extending control over Egypt's peripheries, see Mitchell's *Colonising Egypt*.

¹⁰ Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 25-37.

By the 1870s, the Egyptian press had several decades of development behind it. During the reign of Muhammad `Ali Pasha, the Egyptian state founded an official printing house in the Cairo neighborhood of Bulaq and other printing shops to publish books, mostly translations of European texts but also original works as well as public notices, administrative circulars, diplomatic documents, and official newspapers.¹¹ In 1828 the Pasha ordered the publication of an official newspaper known as *al-Waqa`i al-Misriyya* (Egyptian Events) to disseminate practical information, state news, and details of development schemes to government officials, local notables, senior `ulema, and teachers in the new state schools.¹² The official nature of *al-Waqa`i al-Misriyya* and its type of journalism would dominate the press until the ascension of Isma`il in 1863 who facilitated the introduction of modern journalism into Egypt.¹³

Under Isma`il the Egyptian press underwent a major transition from exclusively featuring official administrative, economic, and judicial items of information to becoming overtly politicized and stylized. Isma`il's enthusiasm for the press derived from his general approach toward Egypt's westernization and modernization. The Khedive encouraged, funded, and protected journalists and writers who hailed from Egypt and other parts of the Islamic world.¹⁴

¹¹ Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East, a History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 13-14.

¹² Ayalon, *The Press*, 15.

¹³ Abbas Kelidar, "The Political Press in Egypt, 1882-1914," in *Contemporary Egypt: through Egyptian Eyes*, Charles Tripp, ed. (London: Routledge, 1993), 3.

¹⁴ The involvement of non-Egyptians in establishing Arabic presses in Egypt during this era has been well documented. Beginning in 1873, the Syrian, Greek Orthodox emigrants, Salim and `Abduh al-Hamawi began a political and literary weekly in Alexandria entitled *al-Kawkab al-Sharqi*. In 1875, the Syrian Christian brothers Salim and Bishara Taqla began to publish their weekly, *al-Ahram*. Several papers were inspired by the Iranian born, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Among al-Afghani's followers was the Syrian Christian Adib Isaq who published *Misr, al-Tijara, Misr al-Fatah, and Misr al-Qahira* during the 1870s. Two more Syrian Christians of note, Salim Naqqash and Salim `Anhuri established newspapers in Egypt in this era as well. See Ayalon's, *The Press*, 39-46.

Isma`il's approach stimulated the establishment of presses around Egypt but other long-term factors such as Egypt's increasing urbanization, an expanding educational system, and rising public literacy expanded the market for private journalism. The growth of Egypt's communicative and transportation infrastructure mentioned above with increased integration into the European dominated global market heightened prosperity among some segments of the population as well as spiked general public interest in the penetration of foreign economic capital and political influence into the country.¹⁵ At the end of Isma`il's reign in 1879, Egyptians and non-Egyptians alike published sixteen journals/newspapers, ten of which were written in Arabic.¹⁶ Estimated circulation statistics reflect the incredible growth Egypt saw in the number of publications as readership of Arabic newspapers was virtually nonexistent in 1860, but by 1881 circulation rose into the tens of thousands.¹⁷

The political crises of the late 1870s and early 1880s boosted demand among newspaper readership as contributors began to relate political matters to a range of issues from Islamic reformism to Egypt's westernization and foreign encroachment, Isma`il's extravagance and autocratic rule to demands for increased political participation. The imposition of the Dual Control in 1876 ignited fierce criticism of Isma`il from journalists calling for constitutional rule in Egypt and the cessation of European interference in Egyptian affairs. The dissemination of political ideas increased with the removal of Isma`il and the ascension of his son Tewfiq to the Egyptian throne in 1879. Over the next three years the press attacked the new Khedive for his willingness to cooperate with the European controllers as well as repeated calls for reform and

¹⁵ These developments are discussed in depth in Juan Cole's fourth chapter, "The Long Revolution in Egypt" in *Colonialism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, 110-32.

¹⁶ Kelidar, "The Political Press in Egypt," 3.

¹⁷ Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 126.

greater participation of Arabophone Egyptians in politics. Tewfiq reacted to the press' vehement criticism by issuing the Press Law of 1881, enhancing the government's powers to suppress or shut down any publication in the interest of public order or propriety.¹⁸

Despite the risks, publishers and their journalists continued issuing sharp condemnations of Tewfiq, his government, and the growing European influence in Egypt. The most outspoken publications contributing to the protest movement in the year before the British invasion included those edited by the Syrian Christians Adib Ishaq (*Misr al-Fatat*) and Salim Naqqash (*al-Mahrusa* and *al-`Asr al-Jadid*), the Egyptian Christian Mikha'il `Abd al-Sayyid (*al-Watan*), and Muslims Hasan al-Shamsi (*al-Mufid*), Hamza Fathalla (*al-Burhan*) and `Abdullah Nadim (*al-Ta`if*).¹⁹ In the months leading to the British invasion the press provided a crucial aid to the `Urabist uprising, informing their audience on the political events of the period while putting an "anti-Establishment spin on the news."²⁰ Indeed, the Egyptian intelligentsia exercised significant power and influence through their publications and thus wielded a menacing weapon against the Khedive and the British at the time. The abilities of the press to voice dissent, shape collective consciousness, and spur popular mobilization did not go unnoticed by Tewfiq and his supporters. Following the British victory at Tal al-Kabir in September 1882, the regime moved quickly to take into custody "rebels" associated with the nationalist movement; the intelligentsia comprising seventy-eight percent of those arrested.²¹

¹⁸ Kelidar, "The Political Press," 4-5; and Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 133-34.

¹⁹ Kelidar, "The Political Press," 4-5; and Ayalon, *The Press*, 44-45.

²⁰ Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 244.

²¹ Cole states that while the intelligentsia did not pose the same political threat as the rebellious officers, they nonetheless were deemed as the most threatening social force stirring up the masses in support of `Urabi through their political clubs, dominance in the government and religious bureaucracy, connections to the military, and their access to and control over the media. See Table 9.3 and the associated pages in Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 241-49.

The Childish Khedives and Manly Heroes of Egypt, 1879-82

Publishers and journalists utilized an array of rhetoric and images to criticize the khedival regime and European intervention in Egypt as well as to promote the ideals of the nascent nationalist movement. Frequently, the press adopted the trope of childishness to ridicule Isma`il and Tewfiq similarly to the images I discussed from British satirical journals in Chapter Three. These portrayals in the Egyptian press insinuated the incompetence and foolishness of Egypt's rulers to run the country as well as demonstrated their powerlessness in the face of European encroachment and nationalist upsurge.²²

Among the most popular and outspoken journals at the time, Yaqub Sannu`s, *Abu Naddara Zarqa`* (The Man with the Blue Glasses), employed representations of childishness to level scathing criticism at the Khedives. Sannu`s journal first appeared in Egypt in 1877 but it was after his forced exile to Paris in June 1878 that the journal`s popularity grew immensely across Egypt. Sannu`s adept usage of colloquial Egyptian Arabic and satirical illustrations in *Abu Naddara* facilitated the accessibility and impact of the journal across the literate/illiterate divide. Sannu` showed a keen interest in reaching a wide audience and in this he succeeded like other illustrated satirical journals of the same era. In fact, the English writer and journalist Blanchard Jarrold who was traveling in Egypt at the time likened *Abu Naddara* to the British *Punch*, even calling the journal the “Arab Charivari.”²³ While Sannu` claimed to have achieved a circulation of 10,000 copies of *Abu Naddara* in 1879, but this is questionable when compared

²² Of course this was not the only trope utilized by Sannu` to ridicule or satirize the Khedives. Lisa Pollard has shown Sannu` used the trope of the family to lampoon the ruling elite, to scorn their private lives and domestic habits, and remind readers why constitutional government had not been established in Egypt. See Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 132-39.

²³ Blanchard Jarrold, *Egypt under Ismail Pacha: Being Some Chapters of Contemporary History* (London: Samuel Tinsley, 1879), 218.

to estimates for other newspapers.²⁴ Nevertheless, Swiss traveler and writer John Ninet remarked at the time on *Abu Naddara*, “there was hardly a donkey boy of Cairo, or of any of the provincial towns, who had not heard them read, if he could not read them himself; and in the villages I can testify to their influence.”²⁵ Jerrold added, “The satire was so thoroughly to the taste of the public, that the paper was sold in immense quantities. It was in every barrack, in every Government-office. In every town and village it was read with the liveliest delight.”²⁶

Sannu`’s insight into Khedival politics was a product of his close relationship to those in power. His father Rafa`il Sannu`, an Italian Jewish emigrant to Egypt, served as a tutor and advisor to Ahmad Pasha Yegen, Muhammad `Ali Pasha’s nephew. Ahmad Pasha introduced the elder Sannu` to court circles and took a keen interest in Yaqub, agreeing to fund his education in Italy from 1852 to 1855. When Sannu` returned from Italy he tutored members of the royal family until in 1863 he joined the Cairo Polytechnic Institute, a state-sponsored school founded by Muhammad `Ali Pasha to train soldiers, engineers, lawyers, and government employees. Sannu` turned his talents toward writing theatrical satire under the aegis of Isma`il in the early 1870s. However, the playwright ran into trouble with the Khedive for his controversial satire and criticism of the political establishment and Egyptian elites, resulting in Isma`il banning Sannu`’s plays in 1872.²⁷ After his censorship, Sannu` founded two cultural salons: the first, *Mahil al-Taqaddum* (The Circle of Progress) in 1872; and the second *Jami`at Muhibbi al-`Ilm* (The Society of Lovers of Knowledge) in 1875. Khedival spies managed to infiltrate both of these groups, leading to their break up by the state. Afterwards, Sannu` joined the freemasons

²⁴ Cole, *Colonialism and Nationalism*, 123.

²⁵ John Ninet, “Origins of the National Party,” in *The Nineteenth Century* 13 (1883), 127-28.

²⁶ Jerrold, *Egypt under Ismail*, 218-19.

²⁷ The background provided on Sannu`’s life comes from Irene Gendzier, *The Practical Visions of Ya`qub Sannu`* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1-40.

and became an active member in the British Star of the East order.²⁸ Research suggests that Sannu's involvement in freemasonry provided him a fertile milieu for networking, debating, and mobilizing with other political discontents in the late 1870s.²⁹ The newspapers founded by members of these orders formed a primary vehicle for the dissemination of ideas and critiques concerning Egypt's political crises and thus held a significant place in shaping collective consciousness in the run-up to the `Urabi Revolt.³⁰

Sannu's sharp-eyed critiques in *Abu Naddara* extended beyond mere polemic against the Khedives. Members of the khedival government and household as well as representatives of European nations in Egypt were targeted in equal measure. In contrast, ordinary Egyptians (whether members of the urban working classes or peasants), officers in the army, and notables in the Chamber of Delegates were frequently cast in scenes lamenting the paucity of their involvement in politics, defying khedival and European hegemony, and heralding their support for constitutional rule. Sannu exhibited no reserve in broadcasting where his political allegiances lay. He posed arguments in favor of Isma'il's rival for Egypt's throne, the Khedive's uncle Muhammad `Abd al-Halim Pasha, as well as Ahmed `Urabi and his fellow army officers. Sannu often displayed his strong support for the nationalist movement in *Abu Naddara* through iconic representations of politics, gender, and age. In contrast to the depictions ridiculing

²⁸ Egyptians joined freemasonry chapters as early as the 1840s and were admitted to European orders after 1869. See the insightful discussion on Egyptian freemasonry during the 1870s in Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 137-53. Another useful source on Egypt's freemasons and other secret societies is Jacob Landau's, "Prolegomena to a Study of Secret Societies in Modern Egypt," *Middle Eastern Studies* 1, no.2 (1965): 135-86.

²⁹ Members included the Egyptian notables, European officials, Syrian Christians, members of the *ulema*, journalists, poets, dramatists, military officers, seminary students, and government employees among others. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 139-40; and Gendzier, *The Practical Visions*, 47-48.

³⁰ Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 153.




Figure 1. "Punish him with a belt." *Abu Naddara*, June 24, 1879.

khedival childishness, Sannu` produced images of `Abd al-Halim Pasha and `Urabi in social scenes then proceeded to inscribe characteristics of an ideal national masculinity upon their representations. These depictions included traits such as devotion to the nation, strength, courage, honor, and benevolence. Moreover, Sannu` often times employed images and textual labels connoting familial relations among his subjects, imagining the nation as a family unit.³¹ In

³¹ Nationalists everywhere frequently imagined nations as one family and used familial metaphors in national narratives to create a sense of relatedness and belonging amongst diverse peoples. Anne McClintock argues that trope of the nation-family provided a "natural" organization among its members, sanctioning a social hierarchical order within a "putative organic unity of interests." See her article, "Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family,"

this vein, the trope of the family served a dual purpose to critique khedival politics and construct an idealized representation of the nation-family.³² In this case, the criteria formulating the ideal masculine subject expanded to include a novel conception of fatherhood determined by devotion to and the patronage of the nation. Accordingly, Sannu' calculated the childishness of the khedives by their refusal to provide security and stability for the nation- family as well as listen to the wishes of its members. Thus, Sannu's illustrations in *Abu Naddara* reflected a unique negotiation of Western concepts of development and modern childhood with Egyptian nationalist ideology, rendering constructs of gender and age as symbolic of the political struggle for hegemony in Egypt at the time.

Sannu's exile to Paris in 1878 posed little hindrance to his ability to stay informed of events and developments in Egypt.³³ He published bold attacks against Isma'il at the time of Egypt's financial crisis and during the period Tewfiq ascended to the khedival throne. In June 1879 Sannu' issued his first caricature (see Figure 1) employing the image of childishness to ridicule Isma'il. The image captures the former Khedive's bare buttocks exposed as a figure resembling the German Chancellor Bismarck spans him. Meanwhile, Tewfiq and his European audience watch on as an Egyptian peasant (*fellah*) holds Isma'il's feet. The Arabic caption reads, "The *fellah* says: Punish him with a belt. Give him one on his arse. He's a disobedient

63. Beth Baron also addresses the trope of the family in her work, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

³² At the height of the "Egypt for the Egyptians" movement, the family began to appear, according to Lisa Pollard, as a trope to criticize khedival politics and European intervention in Egyptian affairs as well as voice opposition to constitutional government. My reading of the discourse suggests the trope of the family also provided a critical unifying imagine of the nation which ultimately helped catalyze social mobilization across Egypt in support of Ahmed `Urabi and the nationalist movement. See Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 134.

³³ Gendzier discusses Sannu's contacts and informants at length in *The Practical Visions*, 73-76.



Figure 2. “The milk of knowledge.” *Abu Naddara*, August 19, 1879.

boy. He doesn’t listen to what our leader says.”³⁴ The scene itself clearly conveys Egypt’s new power dynamic and Isma`il in particular as an inferior, infantilized subject put in his place by the dominate parties who orchestrated his abdication.

Tewfiq’s image would suffer a similar fate in the August 19 edition (see Figure 2) of *Abu Naddara* depicting the new Khedive as a baby nursing at the breast of his Prime Minister Muhammad Sharif Pasha.³⁵ The French caption states that Sharif “offers his master the milk of

³⁴ *Abu Naddara*, June 24, 1879.

³⁵ *Abu Naddara*, August 19, 1879. Upon taking office in April 1879, Sharif set up a new cabinet with no European members as well as drafted a new constitution that included an organic law for an elected chamber. Later that same month, Sharif submitted a new financial plan to pay

knowledge.” The Arabic caption reads, “Sharif the wet nurse offers his teat to the little Pharaoh. The great nations have brought him toys which they use to satisfy him upon the arrival of the *firman*. The sons of Egypt witness this and are agonized.” One reading of this caricature suggests Sharif’s failure to infuse the virtue of nationalism through his milk to Tewfiq perpetuated flawed khedival rule in Egypt, unsound mothering determining Egypt’s unsound politics.³⁶ I see the cartoon communicating a potent political message through the association of nationalist sentiment with the conception of modern childhood. It is quite clear that Sannu` intended to point out the political risk to Tewfiq and the nationalist movement as a result of European interference in Egypt. His representation of the khedive as a baby provided a fitting metaphor to depict Tewfiq’s impressionability and powerlessness in the face of European pressure. The modern construct of childhood supported this notion as many viewed children as being innocent, irrational, and subordinate to adult influence. But, while Sannu` does not give the impression that baby Tewfiq had been weaned from the breast of his mother Sharif yet, the agony of Egypt’s sons connoted an ominous future ahead.

bondholders which ignited the movement that resulted in the forced abdication of Isma`il. Sharif stayed on as Egypt’s premier at the ascension of Tewfiq but resigned shortly thereafter at the new Khedive’s unwillingness to support constitutional politics.

³⁶ This reading comes from Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 137-38.



Figure 3. “Father Halim, Egypt’s darling.” *Abu Naddara*, December 9, 1879.

Sannu` initially reserved the vitriol extended toward Isma`il in his depictions of Tewfiq early in the new khedive’s reign. However, in late summer 1879 Tewfiq’s decision to establish a collaborative cabinet and reinvigorate the powers of the Dual Control signaled to the constitutionalists that the political improvements they hoped for would not come to fruition. With the reentrenchment of khedival authoritarianism, Sannu` issued direct statements in opposition to the regime and in support of a rival to the throne, Muhammad `Abd al-Halim Pasha. The December 1879 issue of *Abu Naddara* (see Figure 3) again referenced gender, age, and kinship metaphors to ridicule the regime, but this time around Sannu` elevated the representation of `Abd al-Halim to the status of patriarchal authority. In this caricature ‘Abd al-Halim stood atop the smoldering ruins of Egypt beating away Isma`il and his “children”

portrayed as owls.³⁷ Sannu` conveyed a clear political message through the dichotomy of these images as `Abd al-Halim, the heroic, masculine savior, contrasts Isma`il and his cronies charged with being responsible for the nation's ill-fated existence. Sannu` communicated a rich symbolism in this caricature through the interplay of visual and textual components. The Arabic caption proclaims, "Father al-Halim, Egypt's darling, drives out the owl (Isma`il) and his children for joyfully ruining the land while gratuitously dividing it up amongst themselves." Sannu`'s skillful representation of `Abd al-Halim communicated a close relationship between fatherhood, the nation, and patriarchal authority within the family. In turn, the reader/viewer could relate to the duty of the child to honor their patriarch, their support and obedience providing him legitimate authority. Thus, the contrast between `Abd al-Halim and the ruling regime would have been quite powerful. The cartoon inferred the regime carried the responsibility for the nation's misfortune because it violated the covenant of the nation-family while the nationalist hero `Abd al-Halim deserved the loyalty of Egyptians as a fatherly protector because of his devotion to and defense of the nation.

In the next issue of *Abu Naddara* from January 1880, Sannu` again emphasized the symbolism of patriarchal authority and family bonds by equating Tewfiq's childishness and his illegitimacy to rule based upon his refusal to take the "medicine made of the love of the people

³⁷ *Abu Naddara*, December 9, 1879. In Arab and Iranian culture, owls are seen as omens of calamity. For a fascinating analysis on the depiction and meaning of owls in Islamic and pre-Islamic poetry, see T. Emil Homerin, "Echoes of a Thirsty Owl: Death and Afterlife in Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry," in *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3 (July 1985): 165-84.



Figure 4. “The Little Pharaoh.” *Abu Naddara*, January 15, 1880.

and the nation” (Figure 4).³⁸ In the cartoon Tewfiq sat on his chamber pot pointing to his preferred remedy, the large syringe held by Isma`il. The captions demeaned Tewfiq as “the little Pharaoh” (*Le petite Pharaon*, French) and “the boy” (*al-wad*, Arabic), associating the new Khedive’s inferiority and inability to rule with his rejection of the nation. Sannu’ clearly meant to emphasize the violation of the nation-family covenant, the very essence of legitimate authority.

³⁸ The quote is from the French caption. *Abu Naddara*, January 15, 1880.



Figure 5. “Aiding Prince Halim to the top.” *Abu Naddara*, February 5, 1881.

Sannu` repeated this formulation in a February 1881 cartoon depicting “Father” `Abd al-Halim ascending to the top of a pyramid with the assistance of the “honorable sons of Egypt” (see Figure 5).³⁹ The cartoon invoked thoughts of the modern game of “King of the Hill” or “Tom Tiddler’s Ground” in which the object of the activity is to climb to the top of a mound, hill, or stones. In this zero-sum game, occupation of the top spot conferred dominant status upon the occupier; the winner determined by one’s ability to prevent other competitors from reaching the top. Sannu`’s positioning of `Abd al-Halim near the top of the pyramid signified his

³⁹ The title and expression come from the Arabic caption, *Abu Naddara*, February 5, 1881.

hierarchical standing in relation to Tewfiq, but more importantly the support of the nation validated his patriarchal status and hence the label “father.”

While Sannu`’s admiration and support of `Abd al-Halim in *Abu Naddara* continued, new political developments in Cairo during the early months of 1881 inspired the publisher to champion new masculine heroes of the nationalist cause, the Egyptian army and its junior officers. In January 1881, Colonels Ahmad `Urabi, `Abdallah al-Hilmi, and `Ali Fahmi received word that the Turkish Minister of War, `Uthman Rifqi, planned to introduce measures to replace officers of Egyptian *fellah* origin in the army with Circassian (Ottoman-Egyptian) officers. Already agitated by measures introduced the previous year by Rifqi, the colonels perceived these plans as further evidence of discrimination against Arabophone Egyptian officers. In opposition to the conspiracy, the army officers issued a petition to Egypt’s Council of Ministers on January 17 calling for the removal of Rifqi. After careful deliberation between Tewfiq and his government, it was decided that `Urabi, al-Hilmi, and Fahmi were to be arrested and court martialed. When, on February 1, the colonels were summoned to Qasr al-Nil barracks to be tried, Egyptian officers of lesser rank and their regiments intervened to forcibly rescue them. Surveying this development, Tewfiq was unable to offer resistance to the rebellious army units and thus reinstated the three colonels, dismissed Rifqi, and appointed Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, a known sympathizer of `Urabi, as Minister of War. These events began the first phase of the `Urabist Revolution as the army increasingly intervened in the Egyptian political realm with disparate groups involved in the nationalist cause.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ A more detailed discussion of the events and intrigue leading to the reinstatement of colonels can be found in Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, 135-143; also see Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 234-35; Donald Reid provides an excellent synopsis of these developments in his chapter, “The `Urabi Revolution and the British conquest, 1879-1882” in *The Cambridge History of Egypt* vol. II, 224-26. One may also consult the classic by `Abd al-



Avant son départ, père Blignières voulait bénir l'union de John Bull avec
 miss Riazina dont la dot est la vallée du Nil. L'armée indignée, empêche cette union
 et châtie le Khédive infatigable. ابونا بلونوراده يزوج المستر بول والصعيد ريوضا الي مهرها واري النيل -
 اما فرسان الجهاد به تمازفت له ومنعت هذه الحياثة وارتب الواراهيل الي هو الاله ارفي اللعب
 LITH. LITTOYRE. N. DU CAIRE. 87. 89. 1881.

Figure 6. “Bligni eres blessing the wedding of Mr. Bull to Miss Riazina.” *Abu Naddara*, May 1881.

Over the next year and a half, Sannu` published multiple cartoons advocating the nationalist cause and praising military involvement on its behalf.⁴¹ In May 1881, Sannu` issued a vivid denunciation of French and British involvement in Egypt with Egyptian soldiers playing the idealized role as the nation’s saviors (see Figure 6).⁴² The caricature depicted the French consul M. de Bligni eres blessing the wedding of John Bull to Egyptian Prime Minister Riyad Pasha, “Miss Riazina,” whose dowry was the key to the Nile Valley. However, Egyptian soldiers interrupted the proceedings to rescue Egypt from this fate, seemingly enacting their masculine

Rahman al-Rafi`i, *al-Thawrah al-`Urabiyyah wa al-Ihtilal al-Injilizi* 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, 1939).

⁴¹ In fact, Gendzier tells us that Sannu` somehow smuggled copies of *Abu Naddara* directly to the army and obtained information concerning military plans in advance so that he timed his publications and their content to coincide with developments. Gendzier, *Practical Visions*, 80.

⁴² *Abu Naddara*, May 1881.

prerogative to protect and defend the nation. In the background, we can locate an Egyptian soldier kicking a childish Tewfiq, shown as too preoccupied with a toy to notice what is going on. The textual commentary further ridiculed Tewfiq by labeling him as the “child Khedive” (French) and the “dimwitted boy” (*al-Wad al-`Ahhbal*, Arabic), which in fact Sannu` used consistently thereafter in referencing the Khedive. Moreover, the cartoon demonstrated *Abu Naddara*’s continued reliance upon gendered and aged representations to delineate notions of superiority and inferiority even as the nationalist movement received new participants.

The military demonstrations of September 9, 1881 allied the nationalist movement and the military in unprecedented fashion against Riyad Pasha. On that day, Colonel Ahmad `Urabi and other junior officers led their largely *fellah*-origin regiments to the square in front of `Abdin palace to confront the Khedive. There `Urabi demanded from Tewfiq the dismissal of Riyad Pasha’s cabinet, the reconvening of the chamber of delegates, and the restoration of the army to 18,000 men.⁴³ Tewfiq had little choice but to acquiesce given the show of force by the army and the attendance of a large number of Cairenes who surrounded the square in support of `Urabi. In the aftermath, the Khedive responded by dismissing Riyad Pasha and calling for Muhammad Sharif to once again form a cabinet.

⁴³ Reid, “Urabi Revolt,” 226. In addition to these demands, Cole states that `Urabi also demanded the drawing up of a constitution and repeated his earlier complaint regarding Ottoman ethnic dominance, see *Colonialism and Revolution*, 235.



Araby-Bey dit à John Bull « Tant que je garderai les Portes du Paradis du Nil, tu n'y mettras pas les pieds. Il n'y a que le prince élu d'Allah qui doit y entrer. L'Egypte est pour les Egyptiens ». — John Bull s'épouvante. — Les Puissances applaudissent Araby-Bey.

(أريد الأوطان لنيل للبربر) وما دام إبراهيم محافظي ما تماشى مظهرها يا مستر بول لون ما حشيش
 برشلا الرواوية الموعود إبرا (المستر بول برتعبا بيلقان والدول نقول للبربر الأوطان عفاً)

Figure 7. “The Door of Paradise.” *Abu Naddara*, November, 1881.

Thereafter, public interest in Colonel `Urabi soared much to the credit of the nationalist press that promoted him as a national hero.⁴⁴ Sannu` seized the moment to represent `Urabi as an ideal masculine subject in a November 1881 caricature depicting him as guarding the door to Egypt, now visualized as a paradise in contrast to its image of ruin two years earlier (see Figure 7).⁴⁵ The French caption read, “`Urabi says to John Bull, “As long as I guard the door of the paradise of the Nile, you will not step foot in it. Only a prince chosen by God can enter. Egypt is for the Egyptians.” John Bull is frightened while the powers applaud `Urabi’s dissent.” Here, Sannu’ repeated many of the same characteristics to distinguish his dominant masculine subject:

⁴⁴ Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians*, 177-88.

⁴⁵ *Abu Naddara*, November, 1881.

courage, strength, dignity, and devotion to the nation. Perhaps, more striking is the cartoonist's portrayal of John Bull who is clearly taken aback by `Urabi's show of strength as Europeans had not been drawn as subordinate subjects up to this point.

The revolution entered its second phase in February 1882 following the dismissal of Muhammad Sharif as Egypt's prime minister and the appointment of Mahmud Sami al-Barudi and his cabinet, which included Ahmad `Urabi as the new Minister of War. In the preceding months, the elected Chamber of Delegates wrestled with Sharif's government over control of Egypt's finances not already budgeted to paying off the state's debts to European creditors. The delegates' arguments on this point were bolstered by popular and military support, much of which was a result of the large number of ethnic Egyptian or Arabized Circassians who made up the chamber. Sharif's obstinacy on the issue led the delegates to call for his removal. Therefore, on February 3 Tewfiq complied with the chamber and approved their candidate for Prime Minister, Mahmud Sami al-Barudi. The formation of al-Barudi's cabinet signaled a major transformation, enabling nativist forces but in the long run dividing the political arena along ethnic and socio-economic lines in an unprecedented fashion.⁴⁶ Despite the political turmoil, these changes did not so much effect European interests in Egypt. The new cabinet insisted that it would meet its financial obligations on foreign debts and it hesitated to dismiss European officials in the government.

⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis of the period see Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians*, 194-218; and Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 236-38.



Figure 8. “Egypt for the Egyptians.” *Abu Naddara*, February 17, 1882.

These political developments inspired Sannu` to publish caricatures in consecutive issues of *Abu Naddara* further embodying `Urabi as the nationalists’ new masculine hero. The February 1882 issue of *Abu Naddara* portrayed `Urabi in the foreground standing at attention while holding his sword in one hand and in the other hand a flag emblazoned with, “Egypt for the Egyptians” (see Figure 8).⁴⁷ Behind him, his fellow officers clean up the mess personified by the former Prime Minister Muhammad Sharif and Khedive Tewfiq. Sannu` described the scene in Arabic stating, “`Urabi, the leader of the Arabs, says that Egypt is for the Egyptians amidst Abdullah sweeping out the dimwitted boy (Tewfiq) and Fahmi improving the area as Baba Sharif

⁴⁷ *Abu Naddara*, February 17, 1882.




Figure 9. “Better tenderness than violence.” *Abu Naddara*, March 4, 1882.

steps out.” The next issue *Abu Naddara* showed `Urabi as the mythical sphinx guarding Egypt while figures representing the great powers bring him food and drink, assumingly to conciliate Egypt’s powerful guardian (see Figure 9).⁴⁸ These presents strikingly contrast the toys brought to baby Tewfiq in a cartoon from three years earlier perhaps to say that `Urabi was not one persuaded by such frivolous, infantile gifts. Furthermore, `Urabi dominates the power dynamic in this cartoon, no doubt reiterated by the French expression, “Better tenderness than violence.” Sannu` summed up the nationalist mood at the turn of events in the Arabic text stating, “Deliverance of our savior `Abd al-Halim is not so far away.”

⁴⁸ *Abu Naddara*, March 4, 1882.

While nationalist optimism reached new heights in the first half of 1882, their hopes were dashed as riots unfolded in Alexandria during June of that year followed by the British bombardment of the city the following month. The revolution ended with Great Britain's invasion of Egypt in September, the defeat of `Urabi at Tal al-Kabir, and the surrender of Cairo shortly thereafter.⁴⁹ Sannu`'s reaction in Paris to this news was a "mixture of shock and disbelief" according to Gendzier.⁵⁰ The publisher helped raise `Urabi to heroic stature in the eyes of the public and thus his quick demise was a most unexpected surprise.⁵¹

Mustafa Kamil, Heroic Youth, and the Struggle for Egypt at the Turn-of-the Twentieth Century

The defeat of the `Urabist movement by Great Britain in September 1882 opened a new chapter in modern Egyptian history and ushered in a period of almost exclusive British control in Egypt. Despite Lord Dufferin's assurances that evacuation would commence once order was established and reforms were carried out, the ascription of particular cultural meanings to British domination provided a powerful legitimacy for maintaining the occupation. In the years prior to the 1919 Revolution an understanding emerged that only once Egyptians learned and demonstrated a new assortment of virtues, morals, and behaviors would the British relent their supervision. Thus, over time both British officials and Egyptian nationalists sought to refashion men, women, children, families, and homes in order to symbolize Egypt's progression toward becoming a modern nation. The public education system played an important role inculcating the habits, relationships, and performances related to this process of transformation.⁵² However,

⁴⁹ On the developments between May and September 1882 see Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians*, 226-305; Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution*, 238-72; and Reid, "The `Urabi Revolution," 230-37.

⁵⁰ Gendzier, *Practical Visions*, 85.

⁵¹ Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians*, 298.

⁵² On Egypt's education system and the debates between British administrators and Egyptian officials as it related to curriculum and the formation of modern subjects see Pollard's chapter,

given the British willingness to exert control over education and circumscribe curriculum prior to the empowerment of Egyptian officials in the Ministry of Education in 1906, mass media provided Egyptians a more accessible arena for discussions on reform and national socialization.

The immediate weight of the occupation left many Egyptians in shock. The simultaneous enforcement of the Press Laws of 1881 and the arrest or deportation of many journalists stifled the political press as well as induced an “intellectual paralysis” in Egypt for nearly a decade.⁵³ Nonetheless, the temporary hibernation of overt nationalist activity and their subversive press served a useful purpose allowing Egyptians to reorient themselves to the new challenges facing the country.⁵⁴ Lord Dufferin emphasized in his report on Egypt the importance of maintaining a free press in order to facilitate the reform and functioning of Egyptian institutions under British guidance. After his appointment to Consul-General in 1883, Lord Cromer generally allowed for the unimpeded development of the press, interfering only when its conduct was excessively antagonistic.⁵⁵ The death of Tewfiq in early 1892 and the ascension of his son `Abbas Hilmi II to Egypt’s throne shook the political status quo and marked a turning point for the reestablishment and growth of the political press.⁵⁶ `Abbas encouraged, protected, and funded

“The Home, the Classroom, and the Cultivation of Egyptian Nationalism,” in *Nurturing the Nation*, 100-31; the second part of Mona Russell’s, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman*; and part one of Barak Salmoni’s dissertation, “Pedagogies of Patriotism: Teaching Socio-Political Community in Twentieth-Century Turkish and Egyptian Education” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2002). Moreover, on education in Egypt during the British occupation see the relevant chapters in Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, and Gregory Staretz, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and National Transformation in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

⁵³ This point is made in Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 139; and Ayalon, *The Press*, 51. Ayalon also makes a similar argument in his chapter, “Political Journalism and its Audience in Egypt,” in *Culture and History* 16 (1997): 109.

⁵⁴ Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 62-63; Kelidar, “The Political Press,” 5.

⁵⁵ Ayalon, *The Press*, 52.

⁵⁶ Kelidar, “The Political Press,” 8.

the press to promote his own position as a counterweight to British influence in Egypt. Furthermore, the new khedive reached out to Egyptian nationalists as well as pardoned previously exiled or arrested nationalist journalists such as `Abdallah Nadim. These conciliatory gestures coupled with Cromer's reluctance to curtail freedom of the press led to its reawakening with political implications.

Once he returned to Egypt in the spring of 1892, `Abdallah Nadim almost immediately began publishing the journal, *al-`Ustadh* (The professor/teacher).⁵⁷ In it, Nadim presented short articles and Egyptian colloquial dialogues containing what he perceived as "authentic" Egyptian values as well as implicit warnings on the impact of Western encroachment upon local traditions and beliefs.⁵⁸ In addition, he contributed to the debate on educational reform in Egypt, providing what Linda Herrera called an, "anticolonial, proto-nationalist, conservative Islamic, yet 'modern' approach."⁵⁹ Nadim advocated the necessity of spreading education in Egypt especially among the Muslim population in order to rid the country of foreign domination. Here he stressed the role of teachers as paramount to direct Muslim youth and incorporate them into the nation's cultural, social and political projects. Thus, many of the articles in *al-`Ustadh* were written to have a didactic and political effect on the journal's audience.⁶⁰ In the nearly two years it was

⁵⁷ *al-`Ustadh* has since been reprinted in a two volume set, *Majallat al-`Ustadh: min turath `Abdallah al-Nadim* (Cairo: al-Hayah al-Miṣriyah al-`Ammah lil Kitab, 1994).

⁵⁸ Ziad Fahmy discusses at length the rapid growth of the colloquial press from 1890 to 1910, its impact in the public sphere, and the reoccurring themes found in these journals. On these themes he states that Nadim was consistently "troubled by everything from the Europeanization of clothing styles and the encroachment of Western culture to the apparent decrease in economic opportunity for the average Egyptian," to "the perceived collapse of 'moral' order in Egypt," and even mixed comedic effect with linguistic branding to create a sort of national consensus "reinforcing the notion that Cairene Egyptian Arabic was the only authentic national Egyptian dialect." See *Ordinary Egyptians*, 64-67; 74-82.

⁵⁹ Linda Herrera, "'The Soul of the Nation'-`Abdallah Nadim and Educational Reform in Egypt (1845-1896)," in *Mediterranean Journal of Education Studies* 7, no. 1 (2002): 1.

⁶⁰ Herrera, "'The Soul of the Nation,'" 9-18,

published, *al-`Ustadh*'s popularity soared owing to the accessibility of its language, its biting satire, and the appeal of its sentiment. Given these effects, British officials pressured `Abbas to re-exile Nadim and shut down the journal. Despite *al-`Ustadh*'s brief publication, political agitation and resistance to British rule increased dramatically following Nadim's return to Egypt with printed media providing an essential medium for the expression of political sentiment and for shaping public consciousness.⁶¹

From this point onward the press engaged in lively debates on a range of topics related to the "Egypt Question" as well as expressed new notions of "Egyptian-ness" that helped define Egypt, its history, its body-politic, and its place in the world. Among these topics, members of the *effendiyya* articulated a politics of the home, defining the constitutive elements of Egypt's modernity through the reimagination and refashioning of domestic space and its occupants. Articles in the press discussed familial politics, science, history, financial self-sufficiency, and even table manners as a means to expose and shape all Egyptians toward a common, bourgeois national culture. Whilst women figured centrally in articles as better or educated mothers, wives, partners, and consumers, these discussions were not wholly about women nor their liberation.⁶² Men were expected to benefit from what they learned in the home and apply their lessons in the public realm. Thus, the argument has been made that these articles intended to construct an analogy between the home, its members, and the nation; equating the achievement of modern

⁶¹ Fahmy states that *al-`Ustadh* and Sannu`'s *Abu Naddara* (which was still being smuggled into Egypt), were, "the beginning of a tidal wave of similarly designed satirical periodicals that flooded the Egyptian public sphere in the early decades of the twentieth century." In fact, as Fahmy points out, from 1890-1910 more than 400 new periodicals were introduced to Egyptians. See, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 66.

⁶² For an insightful analysis of the ways urban women were impacted by these developments in Egypt during the nineteenth and twentieth century, see Russell's, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman*.

habits and customs in the domestic realm with national progress and resistance to British claims of Egypt's cultural backwardness.⁶³

At the same time contributors to the press sought to create Egypt's new woman and reshape her domicile, members of the *effendiyya* introduced a novel exemplary masculine subject into the nationalist discourse.⁶⁴ Following his premature death in 1908, the *effendiyya* fixated on the person of Mustafa Kamil as the iconic figure of politics and masculinity, inscribing traits and characteristics upon Kamil to qualify him as both modern and thoroughly Egyptian. The formulation of Kamil as a "great man" provided a response to the colonial discourse that emasculated and infantilized Egyptians while also promoted the *effendiyya*'s own self-conception as a privileged social formation and the "bearers of a national mission."⁶⁵ To this effect, Kamil's greatness was measured on a scale of talent, education, and patriotism while his association to the nation was legitimated through the notions of *wakil* (proxy or trustee; literally, one who is entrusted) and local familial kinship.⁶⁶ Through the unique configuration of Kamil as the exemplar of an ideal gendered subject, the *effendiyya* staked their claims to patriarchal authority, resisted the discourse calling for the continuation of colonial tutorage, and interwove a respectable Egyptian masculinity in the story of Egypt's history and future.

Alongside treatises on women, men, and homes, children and childhood figured prominently as an object of reform as well. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,

⁶³ The material discussed in this paragraph is also covered in Pollard's chapter, "Table Talk: The Home Economics of Nationhood," in *Nurturing the Nation*, 139-65.

⁶⁴ Wilson Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 44-64.

⁶⁵ The quote comes from Joel Beinin's chapter, "Egypt: Social and Economy, 1923-52," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt* vol. II, 314.

⁶⁶ Shortly after Mutafa's death in 1908, his brother compiled and published a biography of Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil Pasha fi 34 Rabi`an*. The forward was written by Muhammad Farid who succeeded Kamil as the leader of the Nationalist Party. See Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 51-56.



THE RAW MATERIAL.

Figure 10. “The Raw Material.” Stanley Lane-Poole, *Cairo*, 1898.

British officials and Egyptian nationalists found common ground in representing childhood as an important period of life different from adulthood and in advocating reform of the country’s child-rearing practices and educational system as essential components of Egypt’s advancement.

However, these opinions diverged as the British imperial imagination fixated on ideas noting the physical body and culture of Egyptian peasant children suited them for agricultural work while also contending that Egyptian parents’ unwillingness to pay for education equated to their lack of interest in schooling.⁶⁷ To great effect, British policy makers placed severe restrictions upon the national educational system to maintain Egypt’s “agricultural spirit” and limit the growth of an educated class that could challenge Britain’s hold on the country.⁶⁸ Like other policies enacted at

⁶⁷ Heidi Morrison, *Childhood and Colonial Modernity in Egypt* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 28-33.

⁶⁸ As Pollard states, any other type of education may have “diverted energies and resources away from agriculture, threatening the supply of cotton to the mills back home.” See *Nurturing the Nation*, 114-18; Wilson Jacob also interestingly describes British discussions on the refashioning of Egyptian effendis into obedient servants and proper men to suit the needs of building a good and modern government in Egypt. According to this logic, the apparent qualities of traditional

the time, the British position on education sought to entrench a colonial hierarchy and protect their interests in Egypt. It is quite telling of the imperial imagination regarding education and Egyptian children that the British oriental numismatist and historian Stanley Lane-Poole described Britain as the only nation fit to teach Egypt “the way she should walk” while portraying an Egyptian child simply as the “raw material” (see Figure 10) of this development process.⁶⁹

For their part, Egyptian nationalists, reformers, and intellectuals sought to effect change in child-rearing and education, according to Heidi Morrison, in order to strengthen the nation and resist European imperialism through the creation of “an educated and strong future generation of Egyptians (who) could govern Egypt on its own.”⁷⁰ Far from blind imitation of European models, Egyptians justified modern reforms of childhood in an authentic, indigenous vernacular. Toward this goal, Rafa`a Rafi` al-Tahtawi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad `Abduh, Rashid Rida, `Abdallah al-Nadim, Qasim Amin, and Taha Husayn sanctioned modern child-rearing practices through Islamic heritage. These intellectuals and reformers claimed religious precedent legitimated the appropriation of foreign ideas in order to facilitate transformation across society. Moreover, they placed considerable emphasis on instilling proper morals at a young age as children were believed to be the “surrogates of the nation.”⁷¹ Discussions on morals drew from the localized heritage of *adab* literature to provide instructions on cultivating proper manners, hygiene, and conduct. Inasmuch that these individuals sought the formation of a new, modern

“effendi types” plagued Egypt’s development and thus necessitated colonial intervention and continued British oversight of projects related to the formation of new subjects. See Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 46-49.

⁶⁹ Stanley Lane-Poole, *Cairo: Sketches of its History, Monuments, and Social Life* (London: J.S. Virtue and Co, 1898), 282 and 292.

⁷⁰ Morrison, *Childhood and Colonial Modernity*, 14.

⁷¹ Morrison, *Childhood and Colonial Modernity*, 24.

child, their visions did not champion the creation of a sovereign and autonomous subject as in the West. Rather, the actualization of the child's self was relationally tied to the community as a whole. By way of these discussions, the nationalist contributors challenged colonial representations of the country's backwardness and charted a course for the nation's progress through reformed practices of raising its children.⁷²

It cannot be overstated that British officials, Egyptian intellectuals, and reformers alike played an important role formulating new ideas about childhood, youth, and education in Egypt. But in these discussions, the voices of Egyptian young people were largely absent; their present and future defined, guided, and protected by adult society. From the 1890s until his premature death, the young firebrand Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) challenged the subordination of Egypt's children and youth to adult authority by injecting youth politics and perspective into the Egyptian public sphere. Like other nationalists at the time, Kamil believed young people existed in a stage of becoming, as adults-in-the-making, the hope of the nation's future. Yet, his rhetoric and actions in defining and symbolizing Egyptian nationalism and anti-British resistance promoted the notion that Egypt's youth were equally essential to the nation's present. Kamil exhibited an acute understanding of the dual significance of youth in the struggle for Egypt's rejuvenation and repossession. Through his articles, speeches, and organizational activities, he modeled, represented, and institutionalized the figure of the heroic youth in the nationalist discourse and as

⁷² Morrison elaborates on all the points found here in her first chapter titled, "Reforming Childhood in the Context of Colonialism," in *Childhood and Colonial Modernity in Egypt*, 23-42. Barak Salmoni's unpublished dissertation iterates many of these same points, especially ideas regarding education as a vehicle ensuring national progress. However, Salmoni goes into more depth regarding trends in educational thought and concerns among Egypt's pedagogues, intellectuals, and aspiring political leaders who popularized education's role as a nationalist socializer. He draws attention to the ability of education to communicate values of national sentiment and thus analyzes the ideological components informing these discussions. See Salmoni, "Pedagogies of Patriotism," especially Part One as it pertains to the pre-1923 period.

a result galvanized the political sentiments of the young *effendiyya* who became aware of their symbolism and real power as a political subjectivity. Thus, the following offers insight into the ways in which Kamil, as the exemplar of the Egyptian heroic youth, understood and interpreted his world as well as contested earlier representations of Egypt's children, youth, and youthfulness.

"Love your School, Love Your People, Love Your Nation:" Childhood, Youthhood, and National Identity in Kamil's, *al-Madrasa*

Kamil was born in Cairo in 1874 to an ethnically Egyptian family. His father served the Egyptian government for nearly a half century as an army engineer. Kamil, the son, was only eight years old when the British invaded Egypt and thus came of age like others of his generation under the weight of the occupation. He received his education in government schools where he became politically active, founding several student organizations including one called *Jam'iat Ihya' al-Watan* (Society for the Revival of the Nation). Upon his graduation from secondary school in 1891, Kamil enrolled in the Khedival Law School and in the following year entered the French School of Law in Cairo where he continued his political activities. In February 1893 he founded the stridently nationalist journal, *al-Madrasa* (The School), the first Egyptian journal published by a student.⁷³

⁷³ Mustafa Kamil's life, his nationalist politics, and his efforts as an editor and leader of the *Watani* Party has been extensively studied. Notable works include `Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil: Ba'ith al-Haraka al-Wataniyya Tarikh Isr al-Qawmi min Sana 1892 ila Sana 1908* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma`arif, 1984); Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Fritz Steppat, "Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil: Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Ägyptischen Nationalbewegung" in *Die Welt des Islams* New Series vol. 4 (1956): 241-341; Arthur Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic*, ed. P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 308-33; Goldschmidt, Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., "The Egyptian Nationalist Party," (PhD Dissertation,

al-Madrasa expanded the reach of Kamil's efforts to propagate his political ideas, collectivize sentiment, and generate energy among students for the nationalist cause. In it, he hailed the phases of childhood and youthhood as crucial periods for nurturing the development of Egypt's youth people through proper upbringing, modern education, and the learning of patriotic sentiment. The journal announced its slogan on the cover of the first edition, "Love your school, Love your People, Love your Nation," and in its successive editions included articles, nationalist anthems, and dialogues between teachers and students, friends, and family members discussing the topics mentioned above.⁷⁴

Kamil's constructs of childhood and youthhood did not deviate far from the prevailing attitude of the period regarding the significance of these two stages in the progression of life. He described children as innocent and in need of protection and proper rearing from adult society while youthhood symbolized the stage where obtaining a modern education, entering a profession, serving the nation, and being obedient to those in authority ultimately served to rejuvenate Egypt. In the fourth issue of *al-Madrasa* published in May 1893, Kamil laid out these concepts in an article titled, "The Phases of Life."

The human life goes through different phases in various forms and unique actions that can be classified under four categories: childhood (*al-tufuliyya*), youthhood (*al-shabiba*), manhood (*al-rajuliyya*), and old age (*al-kahuliyya*).

The phase of childhood is the first of the four stages. It begins the day a person is born and ends at the age of 14 after one goes from being a child to a young boy to a youth. The phase of childhood is the one where happiness or unhappiness depends on the child's upbringing and education. If the child is brought up well and is given essential and

Harvard University, 1968); and Hourani, "Egyptian Nationalism," in *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 199-209. Additionally, scholars have mined Kamil's biography published and edited by his brother, `Ali Fahmy Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil Pasha fi 32 rabi'an: siratuhu wa a`maluhu min khutab wa rasa'il siyasiyya wa `umraniyya* 9 Vols. (Cairo: al-Liwa' Press, 1908).

⁷⁴ The first edition of *al-Madrasa* was published on February 13, 1893. Every published edition can be found in Kamil, *`Awwaq Mustafa Kamil: al-Maqallat* Vol. 1, Yuaqim Rizq Murqus ed. (Cairo: al-Hay`a al-Misriyya al`Amma lil-Kitab, 1986), 12-71.

necessary knowledge and lessons in good manners, then the child will turn out well. The child has no responsibilities for they all fall on his parents, they are the ones that have to provide completely for the upbringing of both the body and the mind. They do this by taking care of his health by providing him with regular meals and by making sure he doesn't mingle with other children with bad upbringing because they will teach him bad qualities or bad behavior... If they take care of him and bring him up properly and give him enough attention not only will they provide their offspring with a good future and plenty of prosperity they will provide the offspring of their offspring with those good qualities... It is needless to say that this phase is the most important.

The phase of youthhood begins at the end of the first phase and finishes between his thirties and forties. This is the phase that one learns one's promise in arts, industry, or another profession for the benefit of his people and country (*baladuhu*). The young man obeys and complies with the authority of his guardians who strive to cultivate his success and happiness. It is essential for him to not strive toward anything except learning and work with diligence and seriousness to obtain his education and retain his knowledge and morals. The youth completes his schooling in the first half of this momentous phase and spends the latter half in making his own living bearing what he learned in his schooling. Most youth (*al-shabaan*) complete this stage with marriage while not hesitating to remember from the past the careful duty of choosing a good wife.⁷⁵

Having defined childhood and youthhood and described those stages' development milestones, Kamil turned his themes increasingly toward conveying in more detail the traits constituting the figure of the heroic youth. To this end, Kamil included dialogues in nearly every edition of *al-Madrasa*, modeled on those found in *al-Ustadh* and as a result garnered the attention of `Abdullah Nadim who counseled the young publisher on strategies to advance his political agenda.⁷⁶ In the following dialogue from the second edition published in March 1893, a teacher informs his student, Ahmad, on the symbolism and meaning of *al-Madrasa*'s slogan by emphasizing the importance of education and drawing upon familial metaphors to inspire love, loyalty, and obedience to the nation. In addition, the teacher cautions Ahmad, and all society, if

⁷⁵ *al-Madrasa*, May 17, 1893, in Kamil, *Awraq* vol. 1, 34-35.

⁷⁶ Background on the founding of *al-Madrasa* and the relationship between Nadim and Kamil is discussed in al-Rafi`i's, *Mustafa Kamil*, 34-38; and Fahmy's, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 67.

he failed to take up his responsibility of adhering to the “natural” bonds Egypt’s children owed to their nation-mother.

Teacher: Have you read a journal (*al-Madrasa*) Ahmad?

Ahmad: I read it, Sir.

Teacher: Did you understand its contents?

Ahmad: I understood it well except it was hard to understand a sentence written on the cover.

Teacher: What is this sentence?

Ahmad: It says sir, “Love your School, Love your People, Love your Nation.”

Teacher: Why didn’t you understand this?

Ahmad: Because I didn’t know the meaning of the word nation (*al-watan*).

Teacher: How does it appear from the placement of this sentence on the cover?

Ahmad: It seems to me that it is an important sentence.

Teacher: If it is important then why are you late to ask me about it?

Ahmad: I was hindered by the sickness of a member of my family, otherwise I would have sought out the meaning of everything important.

Teacher: You’re excused this time Ahmad but do not wait to ask me about anything that is difficult for you to understand. So I will tell you the meaning of the word *al-watan*. You know well, son, that your family is made up of your father, your mother, your brothers, your sisters, your close relatives, and your servants living together. All people in the world are of no different to your’ s living together in families whether it be in Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Rasheed, Mansoura, Tanta, Asyut, Sohag, etc... and in the urban and rural areas it is no different, this makes up the country (*al-qatar*) of Egypt, this is your nation (*al-watan*) and it is an obligation for you to love it as much as you love the family that you live with.

Ahmad: Are all people in the world a nation (*watan*) like this?

Teacher: Yes, all the nation’s people make up part of the Arab people which are part of an Arab nation (*bilad al-Arab*) and Khalid is Turkish so he is a part of the nation of Turks and Umar is Sudanese which is part of the nation of Sudan, etc...

Ahmad: If Egypt is my nation (*watani*) then why do I have to love it and if it is necessary to love it, how do I do this?

Teacher: It is necessary to love the nation because it is like a mother's affection for you as her children are members of a family that breath the same air and eat the same food and drink water together just as the water of the Nile is for brothers of their motherly nation. This means to love the nation is to seek to benefit it and provide good to it.

Ahmad: What happens if two or three neglect to love it and leave it behind?

Teacher: It causes great damage because they would have to cope with a disease that spreads infection to others as well as those giving to the nation.

Ahmad: Incredible, but wouldn't love of the nation cause grave damage to humanity?

Teacher: There is no damage when loving the nation like this because it serves thousands upon thousands of people in it.

Ahmad: It appears sir from your words that love of the nation is a duty for humanity and those who fall short of loving the nation are worse than traitors and criminals; how could you commit this great evil and be guilty of being disobedient to a great mother that raises her native sons? How do people serve the nation as a very trustful servant?

Teacher: For most, their duty is to step up as its servant in times of insecurity with honesty and seek to establish knowledge and proper upbringing and refinement between the community (*al-umma*) and the defenders of the nation as much as you can. For the young it is necessary to learn that wise saying: Love your school, love your people, love your nation.

After justifying why Ahmad must love his school and nation, the teacher stresses that education represented a necessary component of service to the nation, while conserving cultural heritage and identity through proficiency in Arabic maintained a sense of Egyptian unity.

Ahmad: So, you love your school?

Teacher: Yes.

Ahmad: How do you do this?

Teacher: By being devoted to and determined in your studies and being obedient and compliant to your leaders and teachers.

Ahmad: Why?

Teacher: Because when one does this it serves the nation, the most of which is in obtaining knowledge and learning in the young.

Ahmad: Is devotion, determination, and obedience (in school) a part of loving the nation?

Teacher: Yes, all of these show a love of virtue and truth as well as achieving perfection in knowing the honorable Arabic language.

Ahmad: What is the meaning of loving virtue and truth?

Teacher: This means that the pure human self is far from being highly honorable in regards to truthfulness so it is necessary to take into account all this literature.

Student: So it is necessary to perfect knowledge of Arabic well and what if you don't do this?

Teacher: Yes, it is necessary to perfect this well because it is your honorable language that is found in the Quran and practiced in the country (*al-balad*).

Student: And if you gain this proficiency, is it necessary to speak it all the time?

Teacher: Why not?

Student: How can this be done when most of the people speak colloquial Egyptian Arabic?

Teacher: If people speak colloquial Egyptian Arabic this doesn't mean that you and your friends should not speak true Arabic (that of the Quran).

Student: But if you speak *Fusha* in public perhaps people will not understand it.

Teacher: Why do you say this when you know that in the Egyptian nation (*al-balad*) newspapers and journals are mostly published in *Fusha* Arabic and yet most of the individuals that read them every day understand them very well.⁷⁷

It is important to note that Kamil's focus on students' proficiency in Arabic spoke as much to his concern for preserving Egypt's cultural heritage as it did to denounce the pro-English language policies implemented by the British from the 1890s. Kamil's feelings on the matter were no different from other nationalists at the time who perceived Cromer's decision to nearly eliminate

⁷⁷ *al-Madrasa*, March 19, 1893, in Kamil, *'Awraq* vol I, 22-25.

French as a language of instruction in schools and replace it with English as an act rooted in anti-Arabic and anti-Egyptian sentiment.⁷⁸

Complimenting his dialogues, Kamil reiterated similar themes in multiple articles, but over time he intensified the characterization of the heroic youth as an active participant in the nationalist struggle. Kamil creatively introduced the component of active participation in his patriotic anthems beginning in the sixth edition of *al-Madrassa* in September 1893.

It has become one of the things taken for granted among intellectuals that education goes hand in hand with good manners but in reality, intellectuals solely emphasize education when it comes to reform. However, history is the greatest witness that if the world did not possess good manners/refinement then the damage is great on the nation as a whole whose individuals are running the administration. Wise rulers and philosophers have agreed the damage caused by one well-mannered ignorant person is smaller than the damage done by an unrefined intellectual. Therefore, the main goal for us should be to provide good manners to our youth which is why we have provided in every issue of our journal one or two anthems about obedience and refinement. In about five or six months we hope to combine them into one book that will include important and useful guidance and conversations that could be used as the base for the refinement of our sons and I do not deny that this work will help the intellectuals, literati, and poets.

So to our readers here is an anthem that will initiate the chain of this work:

Rise the sons of this land, let's bring back our glory and the pride of Egypt
Rise up to do the country justice, we have forgotten it so it got lost because of our neglect
Rise and achieve greatness so that our country will achieve glory and pride
Rise and leave the disloyal among you, be loyal yourselves for this is better
It is a dishonor to abandon greatness only to follow other lands and their products
We are its men and we are its happiness and all that is good in it
We have forgotten devotion to cherished accomplishments and we thought by doing so
we would be doing good
It is a shame to mistake this humiliation for glory and it is a shame to mistake the bad
path for the good one
It is a shame to live without glory while envisioning the sky and the moon
It is a shame to exist while others bask in our victory and glory
So rise and demand glory and don't settle for humiliation

⁷⁸ For instance, in 1895 Kamil stated in a speech to French notables in Toulouse that the goal of the policy was, "to extinguish all patriotic feeling and make our youth...pro-English." See Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais* (Paris: Perrin, 1906), 31-32. This quote and a more thorough discussion of the nationalist displeasure at the English language policy can be found in Salmoni, "Pedagogies of Patriotism," 192-94.

March toward your goal until you can call together for the glory of Egypt.⁷⁹

It is worth pointing out that while *al-Madrasa* was thoroughly nationalistic, it was not anti-authoritarian. The second patriotic anthem included in the seventh edition of the journal published in July 1893 repeated Kamil's call for youth mobilization in the contemporary nationalist movement but identified the authority and benevolence of the young Khedive `Abbas Hilmi, a model, patron, and "protector" of the nation. As others have noted, Kamil and Abbas enjoyed a close relationship at this time, the khedive supporting many of Kamil's nationalistic efforts which included funding the publication of *al-Madrasa*.⁸⁰ So it not so surprising that while Kamil seemed to challenge adult domination in some regards, his sentiment toward the khedive remained appreciative until their falling out early in the twentieth century. The second anthem proceeded:

Patriotic people of good heart, rise up and improve our nation
Bring back the glory that has been buried and achieve complete triumph
Rise through hard work and devotion to seek and achieve this goal
Rise and don't resist for the time has come and we only have each other
You are the sons of the happy Nile, of glory, and lasting good fortune
Protect it with your numerous bodies for it relies on you
You are its sons, do not rebuild what has been destroyed
Our dear Egypt is in front of you and Abbas is your stable fort
This prince with his determination and love for his country
Has achieved all his goals and he will remain the protector of Egypt
So look up to him, follow his footsteps, to produce the spirit of our land
So that we will all be cloaked in glory
For the free man refuses to live where there is oppression
And the prideful refuse humiliation, glory is for the dedicated
Take Egypt to great heights in order to achieve what is ours
We will govern ourselves amongst all people and win ultimate glory.⁸¹

⁷⁹ *al-Madrasa*, September 12, 1893, in Kamil, `Awraq Vol. 1, 53-54.

⁸⁰ Abbas Hilmi II, *The Last Khedive of Egypt*, 136.

⁸¹ *al-Madrasa*, October 11, 1893, in Kamil, `Awraq vol. I, 61.

Similar to Linda Herrera's characterization of articles in *al-Ustadh* serving as "virtual schools for Egyptian Muslim youth," Kamil intended *al-Madrasa* to provide a learning experience for young people with the aim of inculcating patriotic sentiment, collectivizing political opinion, and stirring action among students for the nationalist cause. Moreover, the journal functioned as the original medium where Kamil's figure of the heroic youth was honed and disseminated. Although *al-Madrasa*'s run of publication ended in December 1893, it served as a launching point for Kamil who would go on to define and symbolize the Egyptian nationalist movement as well as represent and institutionalize his model of youth in the nationalist discourse until his death.

Kamil's Propaganda Campaign to Egypt's Youth, 1895-1904

In June 1893, Kamil traveled to Paris to sit for his first year test at the College of Law. Following his successful completion, he continued his studies at the University of Toulouse where he obtained his law license in November 1894. During his time in France, Kamil wrote articles on his experiences in Europe as well as commented on politics, society, and modernity for the Egyptian newspaper, *al-Ahram*.⁸² In December of that same year, he journeyed back to Egypt dedicated to politics and never practiced law.

Kamil returned to Europe every summer from 1895 to 1907, spending most of his time in France, where he publicized Egypt's predicament by appealing to European sympathizers. In June 1895, he traveled to Paris to deliver a petition to the French Chamber of Deputies protesting the creation of special courts in Egypt and requesting French assistance toward the evacuation of

⁸² See Kamil, *'Awraq* vol. I, 100-28.



Figure 11. Kamil's poster. Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 53.

the British from the country.⁸³ Accompanying the petition, Kamil presented a poster to the Chamber titled, *Appel au secours du Peuple égyptien a la France, libératrice des nations* (Appeal for Help from the Egyptian People to France, Liberator of Nations)(Figure 11). The poster depicted Kamil offering a request to Marianne, symbolizing the French nation, to support Egypt's independence as Egyptian men wearing fezzes and turbans watch in the background.⁸⁴ In the foreground of the picture, Egypt was portrayed as a woman guarded by the British lion and

⁸³ Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919," 313.

⁸⁴ Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 53.

a bare-chested soldier whose foot is placed in the Nile. Kamil printed and distributed thousands of copies of this poster to major European and American newspapers as well as circulated some in Egypt where they were published in the Egyptian press.⁸⁵ While the gender implications of this poster have been analyzed elsewhere, the self-representation of the young Kamil leading the Egyptian procession rendered a unique nationalist image.⁸⁶ The positioning of the Egyptian subjects challenged the age-based conventional hierarchy of patriarchal authority. If the symbolism of Egypt's heroic youth was simply rooted in the hope for the nation's future, then Kamil, who was only twenty-one years old at the time, should have been positioned elsewhere. Thus, my reading of the poster contends that Kamil meant to convey an additional political message: the nation's heroic youth were both Egypt's hope for the future and its most qualified leaders in the present.

Following his presentation to the Chamber of Deputies, Kamil sought support for his political efforts from the renowned French author and editor Juliette Adam. In the first letter Kamil mailed to Adam in September 1895, he reiterated his own self-image as a model youth as well his belief in the characteristic of youthfulness as an essential component of Egypt's rejuvenation:

I am still young, but I have high ambitions. I want to awaken, in old Egypt, her youth. My nation (*patrie*), in a way, doesn't exist. But she lives, Madame; I feel her living inside me with a love that dominates all others and I want to dedicate my youth, my strength, and my life to her. I am twenty-one years old... I want to write, talk, spread the enthusiasm and dedication that I feel within for my country (*mon pays*). Let me repeat that I want to try the impossible. The impossible tempts me indeed.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Ali Fahmy Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil*, vol. 3, 70; Rafi`i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 62.

⁸⁶ See Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, 62-63.

⁸⁷ Letter from Kamil to Adam written on September 12, 1895. Mustafa Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Françaises: Adressées a Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908* (Cairo: The Mustafa Kamil School, 1909), 2-4.

Following this letter, Adam agreed to meet Kamil and took a fond liking to him. Up to the time of his death, she assisted Kamil by publishing his articles in her journal, *La Nouvelle Revue*, as well as introduced the young man to prominent French journalists, editors, and political figures such as Pierre Loti, General Marchand, Edouard Drumont, Ernest Judet, and Henri Rochefort. Ziad Fahmy contended in his examination of Kamil's political activities in Europe that these connections coupled with his educational background and natural abilities facilitated Kamil's access to a European audience whereby he was able to influence public opinion regarding the ills of the occupation and the need for Egypt's independence.⁸⁸

Kamil journeyed back to Egypt in January 1896 where he focused on winning broader Egyptian support for the nationalist movement. Over the next several years, he issued inciting articles in the Egyptian newspaper, *al-Mu`ayyad*, and delivered rousing public speeches in Alexandria and Cairo that attacked the British and called for their evacuation from Egypt.⁸⁹ Through these activities, he was able to generate energy among Egyptians for the nationalist movement and collectivize political sentiment against the occupation. While Kamil frequently referenced the collective identity of Egyptians as children of the nation, he consistently depicted the figure of the heroic youth as an active agent in the nation's rejuvenation and repossession. To

⁸⁸ Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European Public Opinion, 1885-1910: The Case of Mustafa Kamil and Ya`qub Sannu'," in *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 28, no. 1 (2008): 170-83.

⁸⁹ All of Kamil's articles in *al-Mu`ayyad* have been compiled and published in Kamil, *`Awraq Mustafa Kamil: al-Maqallat* vol. I and vol. 2.



Moustafa Kamil — à l'âge de 23 ans

مصطفى كامل
في الثالثة والعشرين من عمره

Figure 12. Mustafa Kamil at 23 years old. Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Françaises*, 31.

this end, he repeated themes in his articles and speeches originally espoused in *al-Madrassa* that formulated the characteristics of the figure of heroic youth measured as proper upbringing, modern education, patriotic sentiment, and service to the nation. He called on adults to establish national schools and institutions whereby Egypt's young people could be shaped and developed in the image of the heroic youth to assure the nation's prospects. He signified his belief in this process in an 1897 speech when he declared, "Young people are the hope of today and the promise of tomorrow. Thanks to them, Egypt will rise and resume its place in the world."⁹⁰ In no small measure, Kamil correlated the figure of the heroic youth to the nation's present and its

⁹⁰ This is taken from Kamil's speech delivered in Alexandria June 7, 1897. Translated from Arabic to French in Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 168.

future. In addition, his frequent reference to this representation of youth in Egypt's mass media entrenched it in the nationalist discourse.

We can easily trace the development of Kamil's conception of the heroic youth in his speeches through the era. Even as he continued to frequently publish in Egypt's press, it was in his speeches where he truly captured the attention and aroused the emotions of Egyptians young and old alike.⁹¹ Once Kamil arrived back in Egypt in 1896, he soon thereafter addressed two meetings in Alexandria, the first primarily attended by Egyptians and the other by European residents of the port city.⁹² At both occasions, Kamil called for the evacuation of British troops from Egypt as well as utilized the metaphor of the child to emphasize the collective identity of his audience as children of Egypt. In his speech in March 1896 he exclaimed, "Thanks to God, Egypt now knows her rights and her children are aware of their duty. Therefore, remain assembled around the banner of patriotism carried by our beloved sovereign Abbas Hilmi... We are the free children of a free Egypt!!"⁹³

A year later in Alexandria, Kamil elaborated on the centrality of youth to the nationalist movement, championed young Egyptians' dedication to the nation, and called for local oversight of Egypt's educational system to ensure proper development of the country's young people who as he explained directly impacted the nation's advancement.

Yes, gentlemen, you affirm today by this meeting, the patriotism of Egyptians and you soften the pain of dear Egypt. Any patriotic meeting, or talk about Egypt, of her rights, or her children fosters their inviolable attachment to the motherland (*patrie*), and this will only heal her wounds and cure her of these evil days...

⁹¹ On the appeal of Kamil to Egypt's young people, Salama Musa stated in his memoir, "Mustafa Kamil knew how to conquer the hearts of young men. Whenever it was announced that he was to give a speech, they flocked to hear him by the thousands. His youthful enthusiasm appealed to the young people very strongly." Salama Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 34.

⁹² Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919," 315.

⁹³ Speech delivered in Alexandria March 3, 1896. Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 81-99.

I find it very sweet to see that Egyptian youth know their duties to the motherland and they work passionately to achieve the goal that to them is the most precious of all. Young people are the hope of today and the certainty of tomorrow. Thanks to them, Egypt will rise and will resume its place in the world...

All Egyptians believe in the future; nothing will change their convictions and the world will soon learn that the Egyptian motherland has dedicated children, she is the magnet of all their forces, they are ready to compete by all their means to confer rights to her despite the occupation and its forces, they are ready to undertake the most beautiful struggles for the deliverance of our native soil...

I want to speak today especially on the duty to contribute to the education of the people. Having this is the most important of all. Government schools are run in a way that is contrary to the national spirit. The country needs national schools that shed light on the true interest of its sons and teach them their rights and duties.⁹⁴

Concentrating on the need for educating Egypt's youth and expanding public instruction, Kamil praised how Egyptian parents went to great lengths to enroll their children in national schools during a speech in Cairo in December 1898. Aside from simply advocating schooling in order to prepare for a career, he attached significant importance to education and schools in shaping Egypt's young people who even as adults would continue to foster the nation's revitalization.

The people have great fondness for the instruction and education of their children, is this not the most decisive proof of the provision in which Egyptians will progress? Those who deny this provision need to browse the schools, at the beginning of the school year, to see the willingness of fathers to beg school directors to accept their sons or how parents break through these refusals for reasons of space.

The nation feels the need for the education of her children; it is a noble sentiment which is, in the eyes of philosophers and leaders of the nation, the basis of progress and even the sign of life.

I hope that they (the schools) will lead the youth to commerce, industry and purely liberal careers in order to make the country rich by the effort of its children as well as for each of us to live a truly national life...

I draw your attention to two issues: 1. the need for education of daughters so that they will become mothers and homemakers, they play a great role in the formation of the spirit of children and in everything related to our existence; 2. whereas it is not necessary to

⁹⁴ Speech delivered in Alexandria June 7, 1897. Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 157-84.

persuade you of this truth, the statement is not enough on its own, but our sons will become men and useful citizens and our girls become women and admirable mothers with the education of their souls: this is love of the motherland possessed in hearts, self-denial, and sacrifice so that the law will be extended for all. Schools must therefore be the source of national vitality.⁹⁵

Kamil intensified his focus on national schools to prepare young people to take on their national duties as not just leaders of the nation, but also its defenders. On the lunar centenary of the Egyptian people choosing Muhammad `Ali as governor of Egypt in May 1902, Kamil professed:

Patience! O beloved motherland, patience! Now your children gather to remember the missing times, the magnificent past, it will be born again by work, struggle and unity!

We have to dip into the life of Muhammed `Ali, which may be useful to the country in the present and the future. We have to give to youth an example of the past, so that they know Egypt had strength and power and this will be again if her sons agree, tighten their ranks, and walk forward with all their energy and all their will.

Gentlemen, teach your children true patriotism, tell them that it is the only moral food which Egypt has now great need. Imprint this feeling in all their souls and in their hearts so that Egypt does not fall into forfeiture a second time by the treachery of a criminal who only seeks to satisfy his physical appetites.⁹⁶

Kamil reiterated these crucial themes in June 1904:

The people who have the best schools are the first; If they are not today, they will be tomorrow.

The founders and directors of our national schools know this, they know that only they hold in their hands the future of the country and that the little children who come out of active homes will turn out to be scholars, administrators, diplomats, and the great leaders of the people if they are raised in the noble principles of patriotism. If children learn in childhood that knowledge and morality are the only real distinction in men, then money is a useful force only if it is in the service of reason and intelligence.

Instruct youth, o masters of schools, that nations can recover by their character and moral qualities. This is the only remedy to sick people and suffering empires.

⁹⁵ Speech delivered in Cairo December 18, 1898. Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 185-228.

⁹⁶ Speech delivered in Alexandria May 2, 1902. Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 249-85.

Sow in the hearts of children the love of virtue, noble character, courage, dignity and the hatred of the easement. Cast out these blessed seeds, and as God is my witness, you will provide for the motherland the strong men who will not fear to loudly speak the truth and who will know how to defend their country.⁹⁷

At the end of the twentieth century, the nationalist movement appeared to be Palace-centered, with its views articulated in *al-Mu`ayyad*. However, as Kamil's popularity grew as both a writer and an orator, his ties to Abbas Hilmi and Shaykh `Ali Yusuf, the publisher of *al-Mu`ayyad*, weakened. In addition, following the Fashoda Affair in 1898, Kamil became increasingly convinced that his appeals in Europe would not lead to European powers risking conflict with Britain over its position in Egypt. As the khedive and `Ali Yusuf became more aware of Kamil's popular support in Egypt, they moved to restrict his publications in *al-Mu`ayyad* and distance themselves from the young man. Taking these changing circumstances into consideration, Kamil decided to publish his own newspaper, *al-Liwa`*, in 1900. Once established, the newspaper soon replaced *al-Mu`ayyad* as the main voice of nationalist opinion.⁹⁸ Occurring around the same time, Kamil and his brother, `Ali Fahmy, took control of a private school in Cairo where together they developed it into a flourishing institution. According to Goldschmidt, the school and *al-Liwa`* facilitated Kamil's ability to disseminate his nationalist ideas to Egypt's growing body of students as well as to the country's urban middle class.⁹⁹

The establishment of Kamil's school provided him an opportunity to translate his rhetoric on shaping the nation's young people toward the reality of developing Egyptian students toward

⁹⁷ Speech delivered in Alexandria June 8, 1904. Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 299-328.

⁹⁸ All of Kamil's articles in *al-Liwa`* have been compiled and published in Kamil, *`Awraq Mustafa Kamil: al-Maqallat* vol. 2 and vol. 3.

⁹⁹ Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919," 317-18.




Figure 13. The Mustafa Kamil School. Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Françaises*, 49.

the political subjectivity represented by the figure of the heroic youth. Wilson Jacob aptly referred to this process as an example of Kamil's success institutionalizing "youthful energy."¹⁰⁰ Kamil made no secret on his plans at the school. In a letter to Juliette Adam dated from December 1899 he stated, "My school now has 265 students, they are all pure and intelligent Egyptians. We will raise them in the most patriotic sentiment; I hope to make them into great patriots."¹⁰¹ Kamil's faith in schools to shape the nation's future men and leaders is evident in a speech he gave in February 1904 at his school's annual awards ceremony. But equally noteworthy from this occasion is Kamil's emphasis to his students on the importance to understand and accept the responsibility of bearing the nation's burdens, both in the present and

¹⁰⁰ Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 85.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Kamil to Adam written on December 24, 1899. Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Françaises*, 48.

the future. This was, of course, the duty of the heroic youth as the only political subjects with the strength, the energy, and the potential to rejuvenate and repossess Egypt. In the speech he stated:

From schools, you will know if the men of tomorrow will possess heads full of knowledge or empty brains. From them, you will learn if the youth of today understand their mission for tomorrow and be able to bear the heavy burden we wish to load on their shoulders.

Schools shape the men who become powerful arms for the nation (*la patrie*). By showing more interest in these schools, you are giving to the nation more power and more energy, and you are preparing for her better days.

We are at the beginning of our national life; we are the first generation that has seen the reawakening of the nation by the will of its children. Our Egypt has become accustomed to not fight, nor conquer, nor grow by the genius of a great man. As soon as this man lacks, his voice weakens, his strength decreases and his body fatigues.

Egypt was the sharp weapon in the hand of its hero; she aims now, by the movement for popular education, to become both the hero and the weapon, that is to say in strength and appearance, the life and sign in the world.

It is the sacred duty of those who found free schools and those that lead this movement to unify popular education, so that the men of the future are soldiers of the same army, with the same courage and the same heart.

Gentlemen, this school was not founded for the purpose of giving the country its officials and diplomats. It aims at men who can live with their head high, their hearts full of noble sentiments, energy of iron in their souls, and can recognize their value. We arm to wage war on ignorance, despair, defect, and give virtue to new conquests. The struggle for life is fiercer than ever among peoples. Success is for those who have courage, patience, and patriotism.¹⁰²

Conclusion

In discussing Egyptian nationalists' representations of children, childishness, youth, and youthfulness, I have argued that from the last quarter of the nineteenth century into the first decade of the twentieth, nationalists introduced unique images of children and youth into the

¹⁰² Speech delivered at the Mustafa Kamil School in Cairo February 19, 1904. Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 287-98.

political discourse as part of their struggle for hegemony in Egypt. During the period of the `Urabi Revolt, Yaquub Sannu` adopted and adapted Western tropes associated with Egypt's childishness and youthfulness to promote the legitimate patriarchal authority of nationalist leaders whom he depicted as adult-like, heroic, and fatherly figures. Following the defeat of `Urabi in 1882 and the imposition of the British occupation a new, young generation of nationalists came of age and modified these earlier images by representing the figure of the heroic youth as the symbol and vanguard of Egypt's rejuvenation and repossession. The growth of Egypt's mass media during this era provided nationalists with an accessible, wide-reaching medium to disseminate their representations of children and youth to Egyptian society which in turn helped galvanize collective sentiment and generate energy for the nationalist movement.

As the representation of the heroic youth took hold within the nationalist discourse after the turn-of-the twentieth century as a result of the efforts of Mustafa Kamil, students and young professionals, members of the young *effendi* class, gained a dominant symbolism and voice as a political subjectivity in the struggle for Egypt. These young Egyptians revealed real power on numerous occasions in the first two decades of this century in the form of strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations as well as violence against the British and a number of Egyptians deemed as conspirators with the country's occupiers.¹⁰³ As a result of these actions, representations of Egypt's young people in the political and popular discourse ranged from images of youth as heroes to villains.¹⁰⁴ From the spring of 1919 through early 1922 as Egyptians from all classes of

¹⁰³ On these particular activities see Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 190-98; and Malak Badrawi's, *Political Violence in Egypt 1910-1924: Secret Societies, Plots and Assassinations* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000).

¹⁰⁴ This is a period of modern Egyptian history that deserves more in-depth study especially in regards to the representations of Egyptian youth in the political and popular discourse as well as their involvement in politics.

society appeared to unite and endeavor for Egypt's independence, representations of the nation's children and youth were frequently included in the rhetoric and iconography of this revolutionary period. Thus, the following chapter turns to examine these depictions in order to scrutinize their diverse meanings as a part of the family politics symbolizing the nation's unity and informing its justifications for an end of the British occupation.

6. A Revolt of Egypt's Youth: Students, School Strikes, and the 1919 Revolution

On March 9, 1919, Egypt erupted in revolution after the British arrested and exiled the nationalist leader Sa`d Zaghlul along with three members of what would become the *Wafd* (Delegation) Party. Having learned of the arrests, students of Cairo's higher schools and the Islamic University of al-Azhar left their classrooms to march in the streets demanding Zaghlul's release, an end to the British occupation, and Egypt's complete independence. The next day, all of the capital's students were on strike. Over the next several months, thousands of Egyptians from all walks of life joined the students in demonstrations, strikes, and general disruptiveness across the country.

The arrest of Zaghlul and his colleagues provided the convenient spark needed to ignite the rage of Egypt's masses after decades of frustration and humiliation at British manipulation of the country's political, economic, and social institutions. At the outbreak of World War One in 1914, Britain formalized its place in Egypt by declaring the country a protectorate state. The British further cemented their authority through the application of martial law, repressive censorship of the indigenous press, the imposition of new economic burdens, and the dismissal of local forms of self-government. Over time, these actions heightened Egyptian resentment toward the British presence in Egypt and helped foster a collective sense of injustice and oppression across class lines and the urban-rural divide.

In the course of the revolution, student political activism contributed a significant force to the mass movement against the British presence in Egypt and in demanding the nation's independence.¹ The emergence of young Egyptians in the national struggle during this period

¹ For a general treatment of student participation in the revolution, see `Asim Mahrus `Abd al-Mutallib, *Dawr al-Talaba fi Thawra 1919* (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-`Amma lil-Kitab, 1990).

was no coincidence given their politicization over the previous two and a half decades. However, the temporary suspension of traditional authority during the revolution provided them a relatively unconstrained space to engage in unprecedented acts of dissent and resistance. Moreover, as others have noted, the *Wafd* relied heavily on members of the young *effendiyya*, students and professionals alike, to rally the support of the masses behind Zaghlul and the party. As one British intelligence report noted, young Egyptians were the “the backbone of the Extremist party.”²

But like all other segments of Egyptian society who participated in the revolutionary events, Egypt’s youth had unique grievances against the colonial authority that blended into the national struggle. Of course, students were not the only Egyptians who demonstrated, went on strike, gave speeches in public spaces, or waged acts of political violence during the revolutionary era. However, their nearly continuous absence from school grounds and unruliness when in class made it more difficult for the British to contain Egypt’s unrest. Thus, this chapter focuses generally on young Egyptians’ participation in the revolutionary events of 1919 and British responses to their involvement. I scrutinize student boycotts and its associated activities as emblematic of young Egyptians’ contribution to the revolutionary movement. Aside from drawing British attention to the politics behind youth participation, young Egyptians forced them to take a sobering look at Egypt’s education system and admit the shortcomings of their policies.

Egypt from World War One to the Outbreak of the Revolution

Egypt’s status as an Ottoman territory under the informal British occupation changed dramatically when the Ottomans joined Germany in declaring war on Britain. The British reacted

² FO 371/3714/75208, “Cairo-Situation Report,” April 25, 1919.

by pronouncing Egypt as a protectorate state on December 18, 1914 and thus formalized their presence in the country. On the morning of the next day, they deposed Khedive `Abbas Hilmi and placed his uncle Husayn Kamil (r. 1914-17) on the throne, changing his title to sultan to denote Egypt's separation from the Ottoman Empire. The British quickly moved to pacify resistance in Egypt by applying martial law that included abolishing Egyptians' freedom of assembly and ordering repressive censorship of the indigenous press. The Egyptian government under Prime Minister Husayn Rushi Pasha and the new sultan were left essentially powerless once the British moved thousands of troops into Egypt to protect their interests in northeastern Africa and western Asia.

During the war, Egypt swiftly became an essential supplier to the British war effort. In September 1914, the British mandated the increased production of foodstuffs and cereals while limiting the growth of cotton in the Delta to one-third of each landowner's holdings. As a result, the value of cotton decreased by fifty percent, infuriating Egypt's peasants and members of the large-landholding elite whom relied on the export of the cash crop as a primary source of their income.³ From 1914 to 1919 Egyptians experienced shortages in basic life essentials as these were diverted to supply the British armies. In addition, the British confiscated animals, buildings, and food such as barley and wheat. Adding insult to injury, they recruited one and a half million Egyptian peasants between the age of seventeen and thirty-five, nearly one-third of all Egyptian men, to work in labor gangs. These developments resulted in economic hardships across rural class lines. Even while some large-landowners benefited from the restructuring of the Egyptian

³ Reinhard Schulze, "Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Rebellion in 1919," in *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, eds. Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 184.

economy during this period, many members of this class were enraged by their lack of voice and agency in determining new agricultural policies.⁴

The war dramatically impacted Egypt's urban dwellers as well. The price of food and other goods exponentially rose due to war-related shortages coupled with rising demand as peasants increasingly moved to cities. At the same time the British stationed their soldiers in and around major urban areas. The growth of Egypt's urban populations along with a scarcity of building materials left the poor without housing or facing unreasonably high rents.⁵ Although in some cases the working class benefited from the production of domestic substitutes for previously imported goods, their resentment toward the British grew as urban living conditions deteriorated. The urban middle classes also became more embittered during the war as a result of these circumstances. These hardships added to their already standing grievances toward British education policies and the growing number of foreign bureaucrats employed in government offices.⁶

Once hostilities in Europe ended in 1918, anger had cumulated across Egyptian society at the conditions imposed by the British. Nevertheless, Egyptians held out hope Britain would grant Egypt nominal independence for their sacrifices during the war. When this seemed

⁴ Schulze, "Colonization," 185.

⁵ A British official report noted that between 1914 and 1919, monthly expenses for Cairo's poorest inhabitants tripled as wages decreased. FO 371/186/325, cited in Benin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 85; and cited in Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 170.

⁶ For in depth discussions on the impact of the war in Egypt, see al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat 1919: Tarikh Misr min sanat 1914 ila sanat 1921*, 4th ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Mar`arif, 1987); `Abd al-`Aziz Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya min sanat 1918 ila sanat 1936* (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-`Araby, 1968); Benin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*; John D. McIntyre Jr., *The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985).

unforthcoming, Sa`d Zaghlul, `Ali Sha`rawi, and `Abd al-`Aziz Fahmy met with British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, on November 13, 1918. At the meeting, these three prominent members of the suspended Legislative Assembly pressed Wingate for permission to travel as a delegation (*wafd*) to Paris in order to present their case for Egypt's independence at the peace talks.

After Wingate refused this request, Zaghlul and members of the now inaugurated *Wafd* Party took immediate steps to enhance their legitimacy, consolidate the party's core membership, and gain popular support.⁷ Zaghlul set off on a nation-wide campaign to present the *Wafd's* demands for immediate British withdrawal from Egypt. His speeches were immediately printed and distributed along with pamphlets advertising nationalist goals. The *Wafd* also collected thousands of signatures in a petition campaign, the *tawkilat*, to prove to the British that Egypt's masses and recognized organizations endorsed Zaghlul and his party as the deputies or representatives of the nation in all negotiations with the European powers.⁸ The *Wafd's* activities in the months preceding the outbreak of the revolution in 1919 aroused political consciousness among the masses and rallied them around the demand for Egypt's complete independence. Moreover, as Maurius Deeb characterized in his study on the *Wafd*, it provided "unwittingly, a silent rehearsal for the 1919 popular uprising."⁹

By early March 1919, the Foreign Office recalled Wingate to London to discuss how to deal with the *Wafd*. On March 6, Zaghlul and members of the *Wafd* were informed that their activities could potentially be punished under the sanctions of martial law. Two days later, Sir

⁷ See Deeb's in-depth description of this process, *Party Politics in Egypt: the Wafd and its Rivals, 1919-1939* (London: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Centre St. Anthony's College, 1979), 39-44.

⁸ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 40.

⁹ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 43.

Milne Cheetham, acting in Wingate's stead, ordered the arrest of Zaghlul, Isma`il Sidqi Pasha, Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, and Hamad Basil Pasha, and their exile to the island of Malta. These actions by the British sparked unrest across the country throughout March as Egyptians demanded an end of the protectorate and complete independence. On March 9, students from Cairo's faculty of law and al-Azhar left their classrooms and were joined by students of other higher schools in the streets resulting in 310 arrests.¹⁰ The next day, tram workers went on strike and marched with students toward central Cairo. In Alexandria, demonstrations intensified as students and "riff-raff of the town" broke out in riots.¹¹ The uprising in Cairo and Alexandria soon spread to other cities and rural districts in the Delta. On March 12, British soldiers fired on demonstrators in Tanta killing eleven and wounding fifty-two.¹² Over the next several days conditions worsened in the Delta. Cheetham described the situation to his superiors in London on March 15 stating: "Reports from the provinces show trouble at Damietta and demonstrations at Mansura and attempts are being made to interrupt communications. Telegraph lines have been cut in several places, apparently with the view to isolating Cairo and railway lines from Tanta to Menouf."¹³ Soon thereafter, Egyptians in Upper Egypt also broke out in demonstrations, destroyed crops, pulled up railroad tracks, and cut telegraph wires.¹⁴

During the early days of the revolution, the British responded harshly to demonstrators and saboteurs alike. In addition to soldiers firing at demonstrators or beating them with canes, the British used their military aircraft to bomb targets engaged in destroying the railroads. They also utilized collective punishment such as burning villages in close proximity to the damaged

¹⁰ FO 371/3714/40278, "Deportation of Egyptian Independence Leaders," March 10, 1919.

¹¹ FO 371/3714/40278, "Deportation of Egyptian Independence Leaders," March 10, 1919.

¹² Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 178.

¹³ FO 371/3714/41569, "Military Report," March 15, 1919.

¹⁴ FO 371/3714/41615, Sir Milne Cheetham, "Egyptian Unrest," March 15, 1919.

railway. As a result of British reprisals, by March 16 an estimated three thousand Egyptians had been killed and one hundred villages destroyed while sixty-three railway stations were burned and railway lines were damaged in two hundred places.¹⁵

Despite severe British interventions intended to quell the uprising, demonstrations continued almost daily and unrest spread around Egypt through the end of the month. On March 16 and 20, elite Egyptian women staged their own demonstrations carrying small flags and placards reading, “We protest the shedding of the blood of the innocent and the unarmed” and “We demand complete independence.” They also shouted slogans similar to their banners, “Long Live Freedom and Independence” and “Down with the Protectorate.” Throughout this period, elite women continued to play a significant role in the political arena, later becoming a potent symbol of the revolution.¹⁶

With the country in open revolt, the British sent General Edmund Allenby to Egypt in late March with instructions to quickly reestablish order by any means necessary. Allenby soon realized that a hard-line military approach would further aggravate the situation in Egypt and thus he decided to reverse course. On April 7, 1919 he released Zaghlul and his colleagues and allowed them to travel with other members of the *Wafd* to Paris to argue their case for Egypt’s independence. Once news of the release of Zaghlul leaked out in Egypt it triggered an outburst of celebration throughout the country.¹⁷

¹⁵ Schulze, “Colonization and Resistance,” 88-89.

¹⁶ On the “Ladies” demonstrations and the collective memory of these events, see Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, 107-34. Also on Egyptian women and the politics of the period, see Margot Badran’s fourth chapter, “Egypt for which Egyptians,” in *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 74-88.

¹⁷ On the celebrations following Zaghlul’s release see Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 140-41.

However, over the course of April the *Wafd* failed to gain attention and concessions from participants at Peace Conference as the British succeeded in isolating Egypt's delegation. Moreover, French and American delegates essentially ignored Zaghlul and his colleagues. Consequently, in May conference participants ratified the continuation of the protectorate. This development reignited Egyptian demonstrations, strikes, and general unruliness against the British and thus began what Muhammad Anis characterized as the second revolution.¹⁸ From this point, unrest continued sporadically until February 1922 at which time the British announced their willingness to recognize Egypt as an independent state.

Egypt's Young People in the Revolutionary Milieu

Most historians agree that the revolution began spontaneously as a result of circumstances imposed upon Egyptians during World War One and the British refusal to negotiate on Egypt's future status at the Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, there is little disagreement regarding the role of the young *effendiyya*, students and professionals alike, in conveying and executing the directives of the *Wafd* leadership in Egypt during the revolution. As prominent members of the *Wafd* remained outside Egypt for much of the period, the party's backers at home shouldered the burden for nurturing mass support and involvement for the nationalist cause.

Prior to Zaghlul's arrest and the eruption of the revolution, students exhibited strong sympathies to the *Wafd*, coordinated their efforts with the party's leadership, and applied pressure on other student groups to join *Wafdist* student committees. In December 1918, a group of students sought out Zaghlul to convey their support and inform him that they intended to stage

¹⁸ Muhammad Anis, *Dirasaat fi Watha'iq Thawrat 1919* Vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1964), 13; cited in Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 175.

a protest against the Protectorate. Zaghlul advised them not to, rather suggesting the students should strike for a fixed amount of time.¹⁹

In the early months of 1919, university and secondary students engaged in incendiary speech-making at the prominent Cairo mosques of al-Azhar and Sayyida Zaynab. There, students affiliated with al-Azhar, the *Watani* (Nationalist) Party, and the *Wafd* occupied distinct corners of the mosques to exchange opinions and give speeches. The *Wafd* students, following orders from their leadership, called for all three groups to join together with representatives of the Higher Schools Committee in the speech-making. Following this, the *Wafdist* and Azhar students appropriated each other's platforms and coordinated efforts. As a result, the ranks of the *Wafd* youths swelled with the addition of the Azharis. Perhaps more importantly, the alliance between the students strengthened the *Wafd's* ability to disseminate its message and consolidate its support in the provinces following the outbreak of the revolution in March.²⁰

In April 1919 the *Wafd* created a Central Committee in Egypt to maintain communication with their colleagues abroad, raise funds for the party, and generate support among the rural and urban masses.²¹ The urban-based *effendiyya* and al-Azhar students proved to be a vital component in spreading the spirit and ideals of the revolution back in their home provinces and rallying urban inhabitants behind the *Wafd*. The British reported in October 1919 that, "a large measure of the work of agitation is entrusted by the Central Committee to the students."²² This included creating and distributing pamphlets and circulars, participating in demonstrations, and contributing to the media campaign that advocated the revolution and the *Wafd* as the natural

¹⁹ `Abd al-Khaliq Lashin, *Sa`d Zaghlul wa Dawruh fi al-siyasah al-Misriyya hatta sanat 1914* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1975), 200, cited in Malak Badrawi, *Political Violence in Egypt*, 135.

²⁰ Badrawi, *Political Violence*, 136.

²¹ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 42-44.

²² FO 407/185 No. 217, Cheetham to Curzon, October 2, 1919.

heads of the nationalist movement.²³ In this effort, *effendi* nationalists effectively employed familial, domestic imagery to portray Egypt as a national “family” with particular members and supporters of the *Wafd* depicted as fathers, mothers, and children of the nation. As Pollard pointed out, although “complete” independence was not attained, the rhetoric and iconography of the revolution proved successful in shaping political consciousness and mobilizing mass support for the nationalist movement led by the *Wafd*.²⁴ Insomuch that all these efforts represented an essential aspect of the *Wafd*'s activities, `Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Secretary of the Central Committee, remarked in a circular, “it is upon you, students, that your nation and the *Wafd* depend.”²⁵

In spite of the recognized role students played advancing the *Wafd*'s agenda in Egypt, Marius Deeb asserts the party did not define a formal relationship to the body of students until 1923 at the creation of the *Wafdist* Student Electioneering Committee.²⁶ Ahmed Abdalla in his study on student political activism in Egypt notes the Higher Schools Club, founded in 1906, provided at least a measure of organization for student political activity during the revolution. Abdalla also mentions that students represented a majority of cell members of the *Wafd*'s Secret Apparatus.²⁷ Noting the above discussion on student political activities immediately prior to March 1919 as well as my arguments in the previous chapter, students by the revolution had assumed a large measure of political influence, organization, and mobilization in Egypt.

²³ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 52-53 and 63-65.

²⁴ See Pollard's chapter, “Reform on Display: The Family Politics of the 1919 Revolution,” in *Nurturing the Nation*, 166-204.

²⁵ FO 407/185, Circular No. 75 in Enclosure No. 206. Cited in Deeb, *Party Politics*, 64 and Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt* (London: al-Saqi, 1985), 43.

²⁶ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 64-65.

²⁷ Abdalla, *The Student Movement*, 43.

Members of the former and current generation of students contributed to the country's intellectual sphere as well as participated in the formation of various political parties, organizations, and movements in the years prior to the revolution. From the 1890s to his premature death, Mustafa Kamil inspired and collectivized student political sentiments as well as mobilized Egypt's young people toward participation in the nationalist movement. He was instrumental in the founding of the Higher Schools Club which grew to become the leading student organization in Egypt by World War One. During the war, students participated in secret activities in Egypt as well as in Europe promoting the nationalist cause and protesting the British establishment of its protectorate. Thus, by the time the revolution erupted in 1919, students were well prepared to organize and contribute to the revolutionary movement.²⁸ Moreover, if the 1919 Revolution created a carnivalesque space whereby normally marginalized Egyptians gained extraordinary power, then young Egyptians on strike, demonstrating in the streets, meeting in cafés, or delivering revolutionary speeches in public spaces posed a very significant challenge to the traditional power structure in Egypt.²⁹ Consequently, expressions of dissent by students and other young Egyptians at the focal points of the revolution represented not just a quantitative challenge to British hegemony, but a direct threat to the imagined gendered and aged hierarchy informing the politics of colonialism.

Prior to the outburst of the revolution, Egyptian youth would often call on Zaghlul at his house, the future *Bayt al-Umma*, to inquire on the latest political news. On March 9, three students on their way to the School of Law dropped by to confirm the news that Zaghlul had

²⁸ For more in-depth background and discussion on student political activities and their secret societies prior to and during World War one see Malak Badrawi's, *Political Violence*.

²⁹ For a treatment of the revolution analyzed through Mikhail Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque, see Fahmy's last chapter, "The Egyptian Street: Carnival, Popular Culture, and the 1919 Revolution," in *Ordinary Egyptians*, 134-66.




Figure 1. “Students from Secondary Schools, al-Azhar, and the School of Medicine in 1919.” *al-Lata`if al-Musawwara*, June 7, 1920.

been arrested. Upon learning as much, the students rushed to the Law School and made speeches to their colleagues, a majority of which supported an immediate protest. The students approached their director who suggested they refer to the school’s judicial advisor on the matter. He recommended the students ask their parents or guardians before taking any action. Upon hearing this, a law student yelled, “You have deported them, and we do not wish to study law in a country where the law is trampled upon!”³⁰ The crowd rushed out and headed toward the School of Engineering to gather students before heading to the School of Agriculture, the *Sa`idiyya* Secondary School, and the School of Medicine. Once arriving at the medical school the director tried to use force to prevent his students from joining the procession. As a result, he was assaulted and beaten by some students. The young demonstrators joined with students of al-Azhar and marched toward the district of Sayyida Zaynab where a force of mounted policemen

³⁰ *Ruz al-Yusuf* no. 2814 (May 17, 1982), 36. Cited in Badrawi, *Political Violence*, 137.

stopped them. After dispersing, the students that escaped arrest decided to print revolutionary circulars.³¹ In the months that followed, students continued these activities in Cairo, but also ventured all over Egypt encouraging mass support for the revolutionary movement and distributing their publications.

As demonstrations spread throughout Cairo and the provinces in the days that followed, the youthful participants grew to include students and pupils from other higher schools and colleges as well as civil servants, workers, and Egypt's upper class women. Notwithstanding the recognized spontaneity of the students' actions, the British press interpreted the unrest as a sign of youthful unruliness and naivety. A correspondent of *The Times* (London) discussing the events of March 9 described Egyptians students as, "ever the ablest material in the hands of political agitators, as the history of Egypt during the past decade proves."³² Several days later, *The Times* conveyed a similar message stating:

The students are still absent from the colleges, but there are signs that they are realizing the folly and futility of their action and the serious results which may ensure to them and to their country by their intervention, which has only resulted in the excitement of the rabble to excesses.³³

Even as demonstrations continued into April, *The Times* maintained student motivations were relatively baseless and their actions disruptive and unoriginal:

The students of the colleges have joined, as usual, partly from the love of participation in all such matters, partly at the instigation of the Extremists. Together with the Azharites they have been prominent in fomenting the insurrection and encouraging the excesses in the provinces. Some of the most violent attacks have been led by students and Azharites. It would be interesting to know to what extent foreign, possibly German, influence and money still prevail at al-Azhar, for it is well known that the Germans long before the war intrigued deeply with the Bedouin and the Azharites, the groundwork being done by the notorious Baron von Oppenheim and the German plan for disorganizing Egypt during the

³¹ *Ruz al-Yusuf* no. 2814 (May 17, 1982), 37, cited in Badrawi, *Political Violence*, 137.

³² Correspondent, "Fatal Shots at Cairo," *Times* (London), March 17, 1919. The *Times* correspondent filed the original report on March 10 but its publication was obviously delayed.

³³ Correspondent, "Spread of Egyptian Disorders," *Times* (London), March 20, 1919.

war included the active participation not only of the Bedouin but also of al-Azhar where they had many emissaries.³⁴

British official reports and correspondences regarding the causes and motivations behind young Egyptians' political activism provided a more nuanced explanation. By the end of March, officials frequently expressed that students were not mere puppets simply under the direction of their older leaders, but rather had real grievances related to education and job prospects in Egypt. Of course, some official explanations ridiculed the "moral training" of children in the home and the lack of mothers with proper educations; reproducing the orientalist generalization regarding the conditions of women in the Muslim world. However, an April 7 letter from A.H. Hooker, Norwegian Consul in Cairo, and a "very old resident in Egypt," to General Allenby provided a more thoughtful explanation to the reasons behind student unrest:

I consider that too much stress cannot be laid on the faulty system of education adopted by the Government, to which much of the trouble amongst the students is to be traced.

The system is based on European requirements, where the students when educated, pass into the various professions and callings which their country opens up to them... In Egypt, those who have passed through the schools restrict themselves to the Civil Service, the Army, Law, Medicine, Engineering and Agriculture.

The result is that certain professions are overcrowded. There are limits to the number of men who can be employed in the Government service, and the candidates for employment always far exceed the vacancies.

Law and Medicine offer the greatest attractions. The legal profession is consequently greatly overcrowded, with the result that in its ranks are to be found the great majority of malcontents and agitator.³⁵

General Allenby relayed a similar perspective in a June 1919 report on the situation in Egypt:

³⁴ Correspondent, "Egypt Unrest: Causes and Results," *Times* (London), April 21, 1919. In a letter to the editor published on April 19, the writer, who had lived in Egypt, stated, "They (the students) are a windy, discontented lot, half-educated and wholly conceited..." R.F. Fleming, "Letter to the Editor," *Times* (London), April 19, 1919.

³⁵ FO 371/3714/65052, A.H. Hooker to Allenby, April 7, 1919.

The students and Azharists are the one section of the community who continue to furnish real enthusiasts for the cause. They are still active in propaganda. They find little in the course of events, either inside or outside Egypt to encourage them, though they have a vague hope that the delays in the conclusion of peace, and the general unrest and unsettlement throughout the world, will somehow provide them with a way out of what appears to be a blind alley.³⁶

Allenby's comments imply that young Egyptians were far from passive, inferior objects of adult intrigue. Rather, he suggests students were active agents of change with real grievances.

Egyptian Youth Off School Grounds in 1919

By the time Allenby had crafted his statement in June, students had staged a nearly two month boycott on school attendance. British and Egyptian officials found themselves in a bind as to what to do with the nation's rebellious youth as well as other unruly segments of Egyptian society. During the revolution, schools represented a symbolic point of revolutionary activity *and* inactivity. Student disorderliness toward authority on school grounds *and* their refusal to abide by government orders to return to class, represented a potent political weapon against the traditional gender-age relations that structured notions of colonial and patriarchal authority.

Following the arrest of Zaghlul in March 1919, students helped organize and joined secret societies across Egypt. These included The Black Hand (*al-Yadd al-Sawda`*), The Torch (*al-Shu`lah*), The Urgent Committee (*al-Lajnah al-Musta`jalah*), The Higher Schools (*al-Madaris al`Ulya*), The Free Egyptian (*al-Misri al-Hurr*), The Committee for the Defense of the Homeland (*Lajnat al-Difa` al-Watani*), The Society of the Five Thousand (*Jam`iyyat al-Khamsat Alaf*), The Assembly of Ten (*Majlis al-`Ashrah*), and The Cannon (*al-Madfa`*), among others.³⁷ The students also organized two groups of marshals known as the *Jam`iyyat al-Bolise al-Watani*

³⁶ FO 371/3714/95833, Allenby to Curzon, June 15, 1919.

³⁷ Badrawi, *Political Violence*, 155.

and *al-Shurta al-Wataniyya*, identified by red armbands, whose responsibilities included policing and maintaining order at demonstrations and meetings.³⁸

One of the primary duties of these organizations included printing and distributing circulars and pamphlets across Egypt in order to maintain mass support for the revolutionary movement and collectivize sentiment as much as possible. As the British authorities applied heavy censorship on officially recognized newspapers and other forms of print media during the revolutionary period illicit periodicals, circulars, and pamphlets provided current information and disinformation to the consuming Egyptian public. Private presses and sometimes established newspaper presses secretly printed these materials. Accordingly, they were then taken to cafés and clubs for distribution. Titles included: The Sphinx (*ʿAbu al-Hul*), The Egyptian Thunder (*al-Raʿd al-Misri*), The Nighingales (*al-Balabil*), The Free Egyptian (*al-Misri al-Hurr*), The Obelisk (*al-Masala*), The Impalement Stake (*al-Khazuq*) and Complete Independence (*al-ʿIstiqlal al-Tam*). As Fahmy points out, in addition to the unlicensed periodicals circulating at the time, hundreds, if not thousands, of revolutionary pamphlets were passed around the Egyptian streets. This form of media functioned to call for revolutionary action, provide news, issue libelous attacks on the British and Egyptian “collaborators,” and offer songs or poems to be read aloud which effectively propagated revolutionary messages to a wide audience.³⁹ With the speed in which they could address the everyday realities of the revolutionary street and evade censorship, pamphlets and circulars were the perfect vehicles for delivering crucial, timely information. In fact, the first call for an extensive boycott on school attendance appeared in a pamphlet printed

³⁸ ʿAbd al-Muttalib, *Dawr al-Talabah*, 91; and al-Rafiʿi, *Thawra 1919*, 235-36. ʿAbd al-Muttalib includes a short description of most of the student groups as well, 89-92.

³⁹ More discussion on “illicit” media and pamphlets during the revolution can be found in Fahmy’s, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 151-56.

by the group, “Students of the Higher Schools,” in mid-March 1919. The pamphlet was distributed around Cairo and explained the rationale and demands behind the call for the school strike:

To the Egyptian Free Students and to the peaceful Egyptian Nation, a number of the Students of the Higher Schools appeal in their capacity as working for their welfare by the peaceful lawful ways, begging of them to have constantly before their eyes the following:

Students should stop work in all lecture rooms and schools until the nation obtains its demands of setting free the president of the Egyptian Delegation and his three colleagues, and the permit be given them to proceed to the Peace Conference to demand independence, and the setting free of our colleagues the students who have been unjustly and with enmity arrested, and this in order to appease the excited minds prevailing now.⁴⁰

Another circular dated from March 16 issued by the “Cadets of the Egyptian Schools and Universities” appealed to the continued student abstention from school attendance as:

Nations praise your noble attitude and your excellent feelings towards the present position of our dear country...It is known that you sacrificed lives and personal interests for the sake of saving the dear country from destruction, and you do so encouraged by the enemy and the rough tyrant who despises obligations and lives for the sake of his coveted object...The student who returns to his school or university accepts what Mr Brunyate said in his speech, “ I know the Egyptians better than God knows them; they are like a flame which can be put out by a spit...” We beg you for the sake of your poor country and your menaced independence and your inured rights and your plundered freedom to continue your non-attendance until the country and nation reach their legitimate desires, praying that God may grant us our requests, while we keep quiet and steady.⁴¹

We may assume the messages found in these pamphlets succeeded in helping deter student attendance because in the months that followed, officials in the Ministry of Education debated at length over what to do regarding the student strikes and boycotts on schools. In April 1919, H.J. Boyd-Carpenter of the Ministry of Education issued a memorandum discussing tactics for dealing with the recalcitrant youth. In his note, he debated two particular viewpoints: one, to

⁴⁰ FO 371/3714/70952 No. 1. “Political Crisis in Egypt,” April 25, 1919.

⁴¹ FO 371/3714/70952 No. 2. “Political Crisis in Egypt,” April 25, 1919. Brunyate was a prominent official at the British Residency in Cairo according to the summary report.

regard the actions of students as subversive and in need of punishment; and two, to regard the actions of students as only a natural consequence of the general unrest and to include them in any measure of general pacification and not punish them. After a lengthy debate on the subject, he did not reach a verdict on proper strategy claiming:

I am not afraid of the criticism of “A” (the first option); for any man in the street will understand that school boys and students who have organized a strike and remained absent for nearly a month from their schools deserve a punishment in his school quite apart from any punishment he may have received for acts of violence or disorder. As a matter of policy it may be thought prudent not to punish, but none could question that punishment had been merited.⁴²

Facing empty Egyptian schools, Allenby issued a Ministerial Order on May 3, 1919 stating that students had until May 7 to return to their educational institutions. Additionally, any student that did not return by that date would not be admitted to any annual examination.⁴³

Despite Allenby’s proclamation and the harsh measures included, students responded by maintaining their boycott. *The Times* claimed that while there was slightly better attendance at the secondary schools, “no one was present in the higher colleges.”⁴⁴ An official report on that day recorded that out of 1200 registered students at Cairo’s secondary schools, 200 attended. The higher schools could only count 3 students present.⁴⁵ In a summary of opinion toward Allenby’s announcement, intelligence officers reported students on May 5 in Cairo cafés exhibiting, “great excitement on account of the Proclamation among the Students...The general tone was that in comparison with their great task of ensuring the complete independence of Egypt, examinations

⁴² FO 141/781/8915/9001, Ministry of Education Memorandum, April 3, 1919.

⁴³ Correspondent, “Egyptian Students’ Boycott,” *Times* (London), May 7, 1919. Original report filed May 4.

⁴⁴ Correspondent, “Cairo Higher Colleges Closed,” *Times* (London), May 12, 1919. Original report filed May 7.

⁴⁵ FO 371/3714/78460, “Summary of Events of the week 4th May to 10th May inclusive,” May 24, 1919.

mattered nothing.”⁴⁶ Even more to the point, according to police report students believed, “the success of the movement now largely depends upon them.”⁴⁷

Following the continuation of the school boycott, *The Times* responded by calling the students, “rebellious,” and then proceeded in what was becoming common fashion for them was to depict the students in a severely patronizing tone:

The students, most of them be it noted grown men, are far more developed morally than students of their own age in Western Countries, yet the behavior of the majority of the young generation throughout has been childish in the extreme. Their conduct has constituted a public danger by setting a bad example to the lower classes. All of them have shown irresponsibility and a lack of sense of proportion, which are deplorable when one remembers that it is from them that the governing elements of tomorrow have to be recruited.⁴⁸

An anonymous letter to the editor of *The Times* a few days later used even more disparagingly words, “The students have no real enlightenment. They are conceited windbags, who think that a knowledge of quadratic equations is a sufficient qualification for the duties of financial adviser.”⁴⁹ Apparently, the school boycotts touched a nerve.

Student strikes on school attendance proved successful in riling the British and provided students a powerful weapon in their challenge to colonial authorities as they sought to advance the revolutionary movement. The students continued this strategy beyond the extended summer break in 1919. In mid-May the British government announced that Alfred Milner would travel to Egypt as head of a special commission to inquire into the causes of the revolution and report on the existing situation. Students responded to this news by publishing and distributing circulars

⁴⁶ FO 371/3714/78460, “Summary of Events of the week 4th May to 10th May inclusive,” May 24, 1919.

⁴⁷ FO 141/781/8915, “Police Report,” April 29, 1919.

⁴⁸ Correspondent, “Leniency to Cairo Officials,” *Times* (London), May 6, 1919. Delayed from May 3.

⁴⁹ Anonymous, “Letter to the Editor,” *Times* London, May 10, 1919.

calling on Egypt's young people to continue the school boycott after the beginning of the fall semester in protest of Milner's mission. The illicit periodical, *The Free Egyptian (al-Misri al-Hur)*, claiming to be the "organ of the students," published direct orders to continue the school boycotts as the arrival of Lord Milner approached. The letter was signed by the Students of the Higher Schools and in it the authors declared:

The Youth of Egypt beg to offer you their compliments and respects for all the you have done at the beginning of the movement in defence of the interests of the fatherland (*watan*).

Now as the Commission of Lord Milner is about to arrive here and as the object of that Commission is to put an end to the applications of Egypt after complete independence, we deem it our sacred duty, before our conscience and God to unite by word and deed that we may entirely obstruct the way of any colonizing germs into this country.⁵⁰

Following this, the circular proceeded to lay out reasons justifying the obstruction of Milner's commission and offered seven schemes to hinder the commission's investigation. One particular tactic involved sending telegrams to Milner and the British Residency in Cairo protesting the commission and refusing to cooperate with the investigation. Students from Egypt's secondary and higher schools followed suit, sending "the good portion" of the 1,131 telegrams received by Milner before and during his stay in Cairo from December 1919 to March 1920.⁵¹ One telegram from Cairo's Agricultural School relayed the common message, "Egyptians draw your (Milner) attention to their delegates in Paris who give you full information about our national patriotic movement. This will save you the trouble of the distance to Egypt. Egyptians are determined to avoid the commission acting under the Protectorate and oppression of martial laws."⁵² Another

⁵⁰ FO 141/781/10311, "The Free Egyptian," October 25, 1919.

⁵¹ FO 848/12, "Records of the Milner Mission," May 20, 1920. The summary states that the average number of signatures to each telegram was between 15 and 20. Some telegrams had over 100 signatures.

⁵² FO 141/781/10311, "Copy of Telegram from Agricultural Students," October 9, 1919.

circular titled, “Lord Milner’s Commission and the School Boys who honour God in the Country,” called for the young to ostracize the commission by refusing evidence, waging school strikes, and demonstrating in order to defend the country “like soldiers.” The circular continued to proclaim:

Boycott the Commission and revenge yourselves upon all who hold converse with them with terrible revenge... You, pupils, are the heroes, and upon you the Nation and the Delegation depends. Aid both in this as servants of the country, to obtain complete independence.⁵³

Another circular calling for a boycott of the Milner commission also characterized students as the nation’s soldiers: “Students! You are the Army which the nation has mustered and prepared for attack, not for retreat; for advance and not for recoil. You are its active pillars, its loyal children.”⁵⁴ For anyone who broke the boycott, students were instructed to, “wreak terrible vengeance on everyone who negotiates with it (Milner’s Commission)... O, brave students, the nation and the nation’s delegation depend on you.”⁵⁵

With the school grounds suddenly closed, Cairo’s public spaces such as cafés and coffee shops provided an essential social space for young people to discuss politics, digest news, give speeches, sing songs, or just revel in the revolutionary milieu. Ziad Fahmy emphasizes that cafés and coffee shops were crucial hubs for revolutionary activity. The British too were well aware of “seditious” acts taking place in there. As a result, their spies frequented cafés and coffee shops to gather information, confiscate illicit circulars, or arrest “troublemakers.”⁵⁶ The cafés particularly favored by youth Egyptians included Groppi’s, *Sault’s* in Heliopolis, *al-Jindi’s* Café, and *al-*

⁵³ FO 141/781/8013, “Intelligence Report on the Situation in Egypt,” September 20, 1919.

⁵⁴ FO 141/781/8013, “Intelligence Report on the Situation in Egypt,” November 27, 1919.

⁵⁵ FO 141/781/8013, “Intelligence Report on the Situation in Egypt,” September 20, 1919.

⁵⁶ Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 145-47.

Shishah Café.⁵⁷ These scenes afforded young Egyptians opportunities to obviously meet up and converse but they also served as spaces where young people could coerce or shame individuals who defied student-issued directives. An intelligence report from May 9 noted that students hatched a plan in a café to harass their classmates that accepted Allenby's order to return to school:

The students were said to have appointed among themselves "Secret Police." These note down the names of those who attend school; the names are reported to the students who are on strike, and then those who have attended school are assaulted if the opportunity offers on their way home.⁵⁸

In another instance of student harassment, a report described a school principle sitting in a café who having seen a number of students there declared that they should end their strike and return to school. Upon stating this, he was "spat on and called a 'traitor in the pay of the British.'"⁵⁹

Overall, cafés served as space for students to revel in the events of the day. A May 6, 1919 Intelligence Report detailed an evening at Groppi's, the popular middle-class café in downtown Cairo. The events in the report summarized the scene as well as students' celebratory reactions following Allenby's proclamation closing schools:

The bars and restaurants, establishments where the Extremists always feel secure in giving vent to their feelings, have never been so crowded as they were last night. It was probably the result of the proclamation issued earlier in the morning, and students especially gathered together in excited groups and discussed it in a manner that can easily be imagined.

Groppi's, last night in particular, has never been so crowded and it was almost impossible to get a seat. Speeches were frequently made, and everyone was in a great state of excitement. . . Both circulars and speeches dealt with one subject-viz: the Protectorate. They were all in the same strain, and can be summarized as follows:

⁵⁷ Badrawi, *Political Violence*, 138.

⁵⁸ FO 371/3714/78460, "Summary of Events of the week 4th May to 10th May inclusive," May 24, 1919.

⁵⁹ FO 141/781/8915, "Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation," May 3, 1919.

“Instruction is most essential for Independence, but not when it is given to us by our enemies.”

“We must not resume our classes as we shall be like animals in a zoo, and not students in a school, if we have to be taught by English professors who are tyrants and despots.”

“The General, in his Proclamation, wants to treat students under Martial Law, and on that point he will find he has made an error. The High Commissioner stipulates that a certain number of students must return to their classes: we do not know what number suffices him, but we can see that he wants to divide us- but that he will never do.”

“General Allenby pretends that there will be an examination, but this is only another of his intrigues which students will not swallow. The fact of our not having examinations this year will not hinder our great task which is to ensure complete Independence for Egypt. Even should we lose one year in our country’s cause, it will be better than everlasting years of bondage.”

Their excitement was even evident in the streets, as small groups were walking about arm in arm shouting “Long Live Independence,” but there were no signs of an organised demonstration.⁶⁰

The Empire Strikes Back at Egypt’s Youth

The stubbornness of Egypt’s young people to Allenby’s orders in May 1919 as well as the continued general unrest across the country inspired British officials to launch new efforts to combat the revolutionary movement and quiet the country. Owing to the fact that the British knew they were losing the battle for Egyptians hearts and minds, they decided in April 1919 to establish an organization for creating and disseminating British propaganda across Egypt. Meeting for the first time in Cairo on April 26, officials discussed the general situation in Egypt, methods of inquiry, subjects of propaganda, and the channels for its distribution.⁶¹ It was decided that the immediate target of the effort would focus on Egypt’s rural masses, the *fellaheen*. In early May, the British published and distributed a pamphlet titled, “How Long will

⁶⁰ FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation,” May 6, 1919.

⁶¹ FO 141/781/8915/9177, “Report of a Meeting to discuss Propagandist Work in Egypt,” April 26, 1919.

they be Patient?,” explaining that the British are the “most patient people in the world. But they will always exact justice and they are never beaten.”⁶² Around the same time, the British released a pamphlet titled, “Whither are they Leading You?” It began by questioning the *fellaheen*’s understanding of the intentions and political activities of the “young men of Cairo” in the rural provinces. The pamphlet pleaded:

O Fellaheen, you have been told by young men and agitators from Cairo that the Germans and the Turks have won the war and have conquered the English. If this is true ask the young men where are the Germans and the Turks, why have they not come to turn the English out of Egypt!

...What do the young men of Cairo and the agitators care for the fair fields-they do not own them although they wish to do so. They are pouring evil lies into your ears that they may first make the fellaheen work by taking from him all the profit of his toil. Beware O Fellaheen, lest when you are weak the young men and the agitators seek to take your lands also. O Fellaheen, the young men from Cairo and the agitators have told you that it is a beautiful thing to die for your country, how can it profit your children that you go to Paradise if the young men and agitators inherit your land.⁶³

On May 23, 1919 the British published 100,000 copies in Arabic and 5,000 copies in English of a circular titled, “To the Wise Men of Egypt,” warning the *fellaheen* of the deceitful “young men.”⁶⁴ Here, the author discussed the British victory in World War One and the conditions imposed on Germany at the end of the war. Additionally, Quranic text was included and a warning to Egypt’s peasants:

Take heed o Fellaheen who are the true Egypt and listen to the voice of the Government and of reason.

Listen not to the lying voices of young men who have misled you and who are bringing on your heads punishment that should fall on their own, who are bringing on you and on the beautiful fields of Egypt sufferings that they themselves will not suffer. The young men have told you to destroy the Railway! What a calamity have they brought on the Fellaheen who have obeyed their deceitful voice!⁶⁵

⁶² FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report” May 1, 1919.

⁶³ FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report” May 1, 1919.

⁶⁴ FO 141/781/19887, “Intelligence Memo,” May 23, 1919.

⁶⁵ FO 141/781/19887, “To the Wise Men of Egypt,” May 23, 1919.

If the gendered and aged language of British propaganda denouncing Egypt's youth was not evident enough in the two examples above, a circular issued in August 1919 titled, "The Wisdom of the Young!," did not shy away from denouncing youth as infantile and indolent. The author clearly meant to implant the notion of a conflict between generations by comparing the representation of rural fathers caring for and building the nation against their sons' engagement in revolutionary activities equated to tearing Egypt apart. Furthermore, the depiction of unruly youth challenging the traditional structure of patriarchal authority in the provinces perhaps spoke as much to young Egyptians disrupting the gendered politics that justified and legitimized Britain's colonial presence in Egypt. The circular read:

O *Fellaheen* to whom God has given the fruitful fields of Egypt that you might be prosperous and free, to whom God has given children that they might bring you happiness amidst your toil, and support and maintenance in your old age, behold the work of the Devil who has entered like a sore sickness into the hearts of our children, so that they turn against their fathers and instead of happiness and help are bringing ruin and destruction upon them. Is it you the fathers that have paid the taxes, that have built the Railway or is it your sons? Why do your sons applaud the counsels of evil men who have destroyed their parents? Is it an advantage to you that you can get no petroleum for your pumps, and is it for your good that it should be difficult to travel and to send the produce of your fields to the market? Is it you or your sons that have paid the taxes to build the schools? Did you build the schools that your sons might spend their time in making speeches and waving flags and in eating sweet-meats and talking about Patriotism? What is this Patriotism which brings misery to the parents? If the Patriotism of the school boys and the agitators have brought sadness to the homes of the parents, how can it bring prosperity and happiness to the fields of Egypt?

O parents weighed down by the oppression of your sons! How long will you suffer the oppression of school boys, whose voices are like the voice of a cackling hen when she has laid an egg, but whose wisdom is less than that of a hen-for the hen at least earns her food and brings you profit, whereas the school boys waste their time in idle and foolish talk, which already has brought much harm to you and to all the *fellaheen*! Was it you for this that you paid their school fees that while you are working they should keep away from school and spend their time preaching in the mosques disorder and resistance to the government? Was it for this that your fathers built the mosques, that the House of God which your fathers built for prayer and for the worship of God should become the meeting place for agitators and school boys to preach the ruin of their fathers and the destruction of their country?

Can your sons acquire the wisdom and experience of their fathers by living in idleness and by associating with evil men? Can your sons acquire the wisdom and experience of their fathers by putting on a tarbooch and wearing a pair of trousers? Have you not seen how the evil talk of one hour-talk that was brought by school boys and agitators from Cairo-has brought you weeks and months of unhappiness?

Beware O old men and fathers of the wisdom of the young and the misery that it is bringing upon you!⁶⁶

The New Academic Year and the Arrival of the Milner Commission, 1919-20

In the summer of 1919, Egypt's young people continued their unruly behavior against the British in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria. The *Wafd's* Central Committee and its affiliated groups organized public disturbances as the news of Milner's Commission continued to incite the passions of Egyptians. In August, workers' strikes erupted beginning a wave of labor activity and unrest that would last for the next two months. During this time, tramway employees, omnibus drivers, railway workers, cigarette factories, the Abu Qirgas sugar mill, the Hawamiyya refinery, waiters and kitchen workers in major cafés, restaurant and patisseries of Cairo and Alexandria, shop and bank employees, bakery workers, the Ma`assara quarrymen, the Candid engineering works, Bonded stores warehouses, and the Spathis soda factory refused to work, went on strike, and demonstrated. A wave of unionization followed this wave of strikes. In August, the British moved swiftly against demonstrators and labor organizers but by September reversed course and did not intervene directly to break up the strikes. Lockman contends this indicated the revolution had weakened the British grip on Egypt. In October, tram workers struck a deal with the newly formed Labor Conciliation Board and soon thereafter other working class groups followed suit. These developments signaled an end of the labor upsurge in 1919.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ FO 141/781, Intelligence File, "The Wisdom of the Young!" August 19, 1919.

⁶⁷ Lockman and Benin, *Workers on the Nile*, 110-15.

The weakening of the British grip on Egypt as a result of the events and developments of the revolution perhaps precipitated *The Times* to reevaluate its position on the causes of unrest in Egypt. In a series of articles in July 1919, the newspaper suggested that changes were required in British governance there. Intriguingly, the paper's correspondent began by discussing the uneven distribution of wealth in Egypt and the failure of the country's educational system to properly prepare graduates for the work force. He wrote:

The uneven distribution of wealth in Egypt and the last 10 years' output of dissatisfied students resulting from our experiments in education, form two of the largest factors in the recent upheaval. Education was to give these young men a big share in the government of Egypt. Unfortunately, these promises have not been kept, and instead they find themselves unemployed either in the Civil Service or in commerce.⁶⁸

Again in September, *The Times* addressed education in Egypt and noted that students aspiring for careers in government service found their paths blocked or deflected by Englishmen. If graduates pursued other careers they found that government regulations similarly obstructed advancement or prosperity. The author of the article argued that these challenges reinforced the dislike of the British amongst Egyptian students and young professionals.⁶⁹ Unfortunately for Egypt's colonizers, they would not have time to implement educational reform as suggested by *The Times*. Moreover, if they had tried, one must wonder how successful the British would have been considering young Egyptians' political sentiments toward Egypt's colonial masters. Needless to say, many of them had not even returned to their schools after the summer break.

Schools officially reopened after summer vacation but were unable to start at the appointed time owing to the refusal of the students and pupils to return. The British blamed this course of action on "certain" schoolmasters, government officials, young lawyers, and members

⁶⁸ Correspondent, "Egypt Unrest: Changes Required," July 17, 1919.

⁶⁹ Correspondent, "Egypt Unrest: The Snare of Education," *Times* (London), September 4, 1919.

of local committees among others. A situation report from August 1919 stated that these instigators hoped the student boycott would convince the Milner Commission of the existence of an independence movement in Egypt.⁷⁰ By early October, students at the higher schools and al-Azhar agreed that they would recommence their studies but continue their work of agitation against the government.⁷¹ Apparently, this decision was not met with full agreement by all young people as an intelligence report noted on October 17 that, “ordinary students are arguing among themselves and are discontented with the Azharians and the students of the Cadi’s School because the latter do not show any inclination to go on strike.”⁷² A few days later, striking students of al-Azhar attacked non-striking students of the Islamic university. Both groups threw stones at each other before being dispersed.⁷³

The sporadic attendance of students at their schools prompted the Ministry of Education to get involved in late October 1919. The Minister of Education at the time, Ahmed Talaat, issued a letter addressed to “my sons the students” advising them to proceed with their studies, respect their teachers, improve their general conduct, and not be absent from school through the end of November. Talaat threatened that if these conditions were not met, he would be forced to take strong measures.⁷⁴ However, the *Wafd* decreed that November 13 would be a day of celebration of Egypt’s “Independence.” As a result, practically all schools were closed on account of insufficient attendance. In accordance with a decision made by the Ministry, schools closed for an additional eight days and General Allenby issued a proclamation stating that

⁷⁰ FO 141/781/8915, “The Situation,” August 2, 1919.

⁷¹ FO 141/781/8915, “Situation Report,” October 8, 1919.

⁷² FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report,” October 17, 1919.

⁷³ FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report,” October 21, 1919.

⁷⁴ FO 141/781/8915, “Letter from Ahmed Talaat to Students,” October 28, 1919.

schools would reopen on November 22. Furthermore, any students that failed to return on that day would lose the right of taking any examinations held in January 1920.⁷⁵

Hardly daunted by the government's threats, about one-sixth of the students at the higher and secondary schools and one-third of the students of the commercial and technical schools returned to class after "Independence" day. Valentine Chirol, writing for *The Times*, reported that those that did return were, "parading the playgrounds, cheering and waving flags and refusing to go into the class rooms. The majority of the higher school students declare they have no intention of returning until the Milner Commission has left Egypt."⁷⁶ Attendance reports accumulated by the Ministry of Education through the end of December supported Chirol's figures.⁷⁷ The Ministry concluded that the drop in attendance was a result of organized efforts by revolutionaries to bring all education work to an end following the arrival of Milner and his commission to Egypt on December 8, 1919.⁷⁸

Milner and his coterie set up their headquarters at the Samiramis Hotel and were provided with strong protection. The news of his arrival prompted hostile demonstrations throughout the country by students, lawyers, professionals, and workers. Merchants closed their shops in Cairo and in some of the provincial towns. Students wrote circulars and revolutionary directives attacking the mission and calling for Egyptians' disobedience and noncooperation. The *Wafd* Central Committee urged the populace not to have any contact with Milner or members of the mission. The committee sent groups of students from the higher schools to keep watch around

⁷⁵ FO 141/781/8915, "Memorandum on the Unrest in Egyptian Schools, 1919," November 23, 1919.

⁷⁶ Valentine Chirol, "The Egyptian Peril: Breakdown of the Machine," *Times* (London), December 1, 1919.

⁷⁷ FO 141/781/8915, "Attendance in Government Schools," December 15-26, 1919.

⁷⁸ FO 141/781/9007/28, "Report on Attendance in Government Schools as from the Arrival of the Milner Commission," December 23, 1919.

the hotel to prevent anyone from calling. The students were instructed to report to `Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, the Secretary of the Central Committee, the names of those who met with the mission. Additionally, the Committee sent emissaries into the provinces to interrogate notables who met with mission members. Accounts from the interrogations were then published in the press.⁷⁹ The success of these efforts can be seen in the limited range of testimonies and interviews recorded by the mission. Most of the people that Milner met with were English or other European residents of Egypt.⁸⁰ Despite Milner claiming in a statement on December 29 that he was dedicated to “listening” to Egyptian requests, the boycott continued.⁸¹

Conclusion

Milner left Egypt in March 1920. Almost immediately, Egypt resumed a level of calm. In June, `Adly Yeghen traveled to London to participate in talks with Milner and representatives of the *Wafd* concerning Egypt’s future status. As negotiations progressed through November, students in Egypt were busy ensuring the continued support for Zaghlul among the masses. They journeyed into the provinces and arranged for telegrams to be sent to Cairo demanding Zaghlul alone should conduct negotiations with Milner. Zaghlul himself showed his appreciation to the students in April, referring to them as “his army.”⁸²

During the course of the negotiations, a split occurred in the *Wafd* as Zaghlul would not settle on an agreement with Milner until a, yet to be formed, Egyptian national assembly could vote on it. Deeb characterizes these negotiations as very significant in regards to the

⁷⁹ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 47.

⁸⁰ One can view the entirety of the Mission report at the British Archives, FO 848. Wilson Jacob originally made the point regarding the success of the boycott in *Working Out Egypt*, 96.

⁸¹ Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, 176.

⁸² Correspondent, “New Crisis in Egypt: Zaghlul’s Move,” *Times* (London), April 27, 1920.

development of Egypt's nationalist movement as differences and discord among members of the *Wafd* became more evident.⁸³ Nevertheless, in February 1921 Milner's Report was published on current conditions in Egypt and the causes behind the uprising. Milner suggested in the report that maintaining the protectorate was no longer reasonable for the British nor satisfactory to the Egyptians. Thus, Allenby requested Egypt's Sultan Fu`ad to appoint a government. The Sultan turned to `Adly Yeghen to form a ministry and Allenby promised his support. Zaghlul and the *Wafd* were left with a guarantee from `Adly to be included in future negotiations with the British.

Following Zaghlul's return to Egypt in April 1921, students were once again called upon to act as the shock troops and chief propagandists for the *Wafd*. In the spring, they published and distributed circulars that ridiculed `Adly and his cabinet. Young supporters of the party traveled throughout Egypt encouraging mass support for Zaghlul. A British report from April 30 stated that, "emissaries of Saad-students and Azharites-are in every village."⁸⁴ The continued popularity of Zaghlul in relation to `Adly, contributed to the premier stepping down in December 1921. As a result, Zaghlul was deported a second time. These actions reignited demonstrations across Egypt and further student boycotts. In February 1922 Britain announced its intention to recognize Egypt as an independent state. This became a reality on March 15, 1922. But even as structures of authority were reestablished, the relationship of young Egyptians to the political realm would not be quite the same. In fact, as Egyptian politicians soon found out, the young could be a mighty weapon or conversely an insurmountable obstacle in the struggle for control of the nation during the interwar period.

⁸³ Deeb, *Party Politics*, 48-49.

⁸⁴ FO 407/189 No. 72, Allenby to Curzon, April 30, 1921.

7. Conclusion

The enormous parade began to move. Successive waves rolled forward chanting patriotic slogans. Egypt appeared to be one great demonstration... united in one person and a single chant. The columns of the different groups stretched out for such a long distance that Fahmy imagined the vanguard would be approaching Abdin Palace before he and his group had budged from their position in front of the railroad station. It was the first demonstration that machine guns had not interrupted. No longer would bullets come from one side and stones from the other.

Fahmy smiled. He saw that the group in front of him was starting to move. He turned on his heels to direct his own personal demonstration. He raised his hands and the lines moved in anticipation and with enthusiasm. Walking backward, he chanted at the top of his lungs. He continued his twin tasks of directly and chanting until the beginning of Nubar Street. Then he turned the chanting over to one of the young men surrounding him, who had been waiting for their chance with anxious, excited voices, as though they had labor pains that would only be relieved by being allowed to lead the chants. He turned around once again to walk facing forward. He craned his neck to look at the procession. He could no longer see the front of it. He looked on either side to see how crowded the sidewalks, windows, balconies, and roofs were with all the spectators who had begun to repeat the chants. The sight of thousands of people concentrated together filled him with such limitless power and assurance it was like armor protecting him, clinging tightly to him so that bullets could not penetrate.¹

By the time Naguib Mahfouz published *Palace Walk* in 1956, young Egyptians' participation in the 1919 Revolution had long been ingrained in collective national memory. Indeed, the novel's climatic scene cited above captured the mythology surrounding their involvement. *Al-Shabab* (youth) at the forefront of demonstrations against oppressive colonialism, leading patriotic chants, and sacrificing their lives for the nation became prominent symbols of the revolution.

Youthful political actors certainly proved their worth to the national cause in 1919 but in the liberal era their political activism revealed nuanced and at times contradictory meanings and symbolism. Following the establishment of Egypt's nominal independence, the contentious

¹ Naguib Mahfouz, *Palace Walk*, translated by William Maynard Hutchins and Olive E. Kenny (London: Doubleday, 1990), 490-91.

course of constitutional life and low levels of economic development led young Egyptians to again challenge the structure of traditional authority. The nationalist discourse continued to champion youth as symbols of Egypt's strength and promise. However, young people were also depicted as precarious and threatening to national politics and popular culture.

The initial euphoria of Egypt's declaration of independence in 1923 and the *Wafd's* election to power the following year quickly faded owing to Sa`d Zaghlul's attempts to quell political dissent and the seemingly never-ending struggle between the *Wafd*, the palace, and the British. The assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of the Sudan and the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, in November 1924 quickly marginalized Zaghlul and eroded the powerful symbolism Sa`d, his wife Safiyya, and the *Wafd* gained during and immediately after the revolution. The British capitalized on Stack's murder by dictating to Egypt new terms in relation to their foreign policy in the Nile Valley.² Under intense domestic and foreign pressure, Zaghlul resigned his office after only eleven months as prime minister. Following this, the *Wafd* split into rival parties and thus created the conditions whereby Sa`d's "sons" challenged the party and its father figure up to his death on August 23, 1927.³

By the early 1930s, the image of a youthful vanguard instructing their failed elders on national honor emerged in Egypt's popular discourse. This depiction reproduced the notion that

² Jane Gifford, "Extracting the Best Deal for Britain: The Assassination of Sir Lee Stack in November 1924 and the Revision of Britain's Nile Valley Policy," in the *Canadian Journal of History* 48, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2013): 87-114.

³ Lisa Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores: Marital-Political Anxieties in the 'House of Egypt,' 1919-48," in *Gender and History* Vol. 21 no. 3 (November 2009): 647-69.




Figure 1. “The Meaning of Honor.” *Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 21, 1932.

young people were the hope for Egypt’s brighter future. At this time, according to Wilson Jacob, the younger *effendiyya* began to view national leaders and the generation of 1919 as having forgotten their political goals as the March 1932 caricature from *Ruz al-Yusuf* demonstrated above (Figure 1). The association of student politics with national honor in the image reversed traditional authority and normal pedagogic roles and thus meant to challenge the old guard elite.⁴ Speaking further on this tension between generations, Lucie Ryzova contends the emergence of urban youth, the “new *effendiyya*,” in the interwar period contested British and palace interests as well as their older cohort. New, young *effendis* constructed a generational identity against the

⁴ Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 102-04; and *Ruz al-Yusuf*, March 21, 1932. The Arabic word on the board is “honor.” The caption indicates the young student lectured his audience stating, “True, you are professors of medicine, law, and philosophy...but honor is something else. So all of you listen up for the first lesson.”

older *effendi* generation of 1919 who came to be viewed as traditional, backward, and passive. In response, the older generation regarded the younger *effendiyya* as troublesome revolutionaries. Thus, the category of the *effendiyya* became an increasingly disputed identity and ambiguous social state divided along generational lines.⁵

Shortly thereafter, the reemergence of the student movement as a distinctive force in Egyptian politics led to a recasting of young Egyptians as, “a problem in need of regulation and control and hence as a necessary object of study.”⁶ Omnia el-Shakry suggests as often as youth were touted as bearing the promise of Egypt’s future at the time, they were also seen as precarious and in a state of crisis.⁷ These sentiments foreshadowed the emergence of a discourse of adolescent psychology in Egypt by the mid-1940s at which time “adolescence” was transformed into a category of analysis and characterized as a psychological stage of social adjustment, sexual repression, and existential anomie. To address these concerns, Egyptian social scientists and psychologists constructed a normative psychological and social adolescent subject which involved the production of ideal gendered, heterosexual, and ethical models. Inasmuch that the broader the political and social context triggered interest in adolescent and youth development, many feared that the limitless energy of youth could be misdirected toward sexual deviance or projected onto the field of political activity.⁸ Thus, the impulse to redefine youth and produce new modes of knowledge addressed multiple concerns, all of which exposed older

⁵ Lucie Ryzova, “Egyptianizing Modernity” 147-49. Also see her book, *The Age of the Efendiya*, for a more extended treatment.

⁶ Omnia el-Shakry, “Youth as Peril and Promise: The Emergence of Adolescent Psychology in Postwar Egypt,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 43, no. 4 (November 2011): 595.

⁷ el-Shakry, “Youth as Peril and Promise,” 593.

⁸ el-Shakry, “Youth as Peril and Promise,” 600.

Egyptians' ambivalence toward the power of youth, as a symbol and mobilized force, in the political and social arena.

This ambivalence is clearly evident in the period surrounding the student uprisings of 1935-36. Student mobilization preceding the unrest revealed young Egyptians' disenchantment with Egypt's politicians and political structure, against which they attempted to exercise independence in thought and action. Many students broke away from the traditional structure of parliamentary politics to form new social and political organizations such as Young Egypt and the Young Men's Muslim Association.⁹ The new student organizations, along with the preexisting ones, played a crucial role in the creation of the United Front which forced the palace in December 1935 to restore Egypt's 1923 Constitution and paved the way for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. These successes marked the emergence of the student movement as a "distinctive force in Egyptian politics."¹⁰

Suddenly, the political and popular discourse symbolized youth again as the promise of Egypt's benevolent future and the sociopolitical force responsible for delivering it. Accordingly, a trend emerged whereby Egyptian youth were depicted as the best representation of an idealized national subject, a symbol of Egypt's promise. James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni called this phenomenon the "myth of youth" as the younger generation of Egyptians were depicted as possessing the energy and promise to deliver independence and modernity to the nation.¹¹ The

⁹ On Young Egypt see James Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels: "Young Egypt," 1933-1952* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975). Young Egypt was founded in 1933 but the Young Men's Muslim Association was founded in 1927 as an educational society by Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz Jawish. It later turned more political and militant.

¹⁰ Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement*, 42; but see Abdalla's entire section on the student uprising, 39-43.

¹¹ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20-22.

clearest indication of this came in the April 1936 issue of *al-Hilal*, Egypt's leading cultural magazine, when it devoted its entire monthly issue to the youth (*al-shabab*) stating in its introduction that, "at the present time youth have an influence in both the political and social spheres; on *their* shoulders now rests the responsibilities for new revivals in the East and West."¹²

In addition to *al-Hilal's* assessment, `Abd al-Rahman Rafi`i enshrined the uprisings of 1935-36 in collective national memory as, "a glorious page in the history of youth...It was a mini revolution, an epitome of the 1919 Revolution." Nevertheless, succeeding the unrest student organizational efforts increasingly became more polarized as young Egyptians' fractured along factional and ideological lines. The ensuing struggle between the Wafdist students, Muslim Brothers, Communists, and Young Egypt's anti-Wafdist paramilitary Green Shirts contributed to the notion that youth were a problem in need of regulation and control as well as a necessary object of study as discussed above.¹³ This particular perspective of young people continued through the violent street clashes of 1937 between student supporters and opponents of the Wafd. Despite the British imposing harsh conditions upon Egypt during World War Two, students continued their political activities and staged demonstrations against the Wafd and British in 1942-44.¹⁴ The second significant student uprising of 1946 initiated a gradual intensification of young Egyptians' opposition to the British presence in Egypt and the country's political structure. As Ahmed Abdalla points out, the student movement over this period directly

¹² See the entirety of *al-Hilal* no. 6 (April 1, 1936); Especially noteworthy are the articles by Muhammad Ali `Aluba, "*Kalimat ila al-Shabab*" and Tal`at Harb, "*Mas`uliyat al-Shabab*."

¹³ On the Muslim Brotherhood's student organizations and its Rover Scouts see, Abdalla, *The Student Movement*, 46-49; and Richard Mitchell's, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

¹⁴ Abdalla, *The Student Movement*, 56-57.

influenced the Free Officers who seized power in July 1952. In no small measure, the links between Egyptian students and the officers were crucial to the success of the 1952 Revolution.¹⁵ As a result, the symbolism of Egypt's young people regained its prominence in the political and popular discourse and thus provides evidence that there may be one consistent characteristic of the representation of youth: fluidity.

¹⁵ Abdalla, *The Student Movement*, 78-79.

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