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Case Study: Armenian and Cuban Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy

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CASE STUDY: ARMENIAN AND CUBAN ETHNIC INTEREST GROUPS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

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ABSTRACT

A Historical Case Study: Armenian and Cuban Ethnic Interest Groups in American
Foreign Policy

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Current academic research has moved away from comparative models as a mechanism by which to assess and understand socio-political as well as historical phenomena. In addition, comparative analysis when it comes to addressing ethnic lobbies is almost nonexistent within contemporary research. This work implements a comparative framework and as a result has unlocked a new approach when addressing ethnic advocacy organizations. The purpose of this research is to assess and document the history and impact of both Armenian and Cuban ethnic interest groups within the United States. Specifically, focusing upon the Armenian National Committee of America and the Cuban American National Foundation. The work centers upon two case studies that embody the relative successes and achievements of both institutions. The first being Section 907 of the Freedom and Support Act of 1992 that banned direct US aid to the Republic of Azerbaijan. The second case study is the passage of The Radio Broadcasting To Cuba Act of 1983 that resulted in what became known as Radio Marti. This work attempts to illustrate the degree to which these Armenian and Cuban ethnic interest groups influenced

legislation and by so doing, legitimized their status within their ethnic communities. The passage of these foreign policy initiatives portrayed these diasporan advocacy groups as crucial to the long-term viability of their communities. The comparative model used within this work illustrates that the ethnic interest groups listed above shaped and altered their host nation; the processes they utilized can best be described by four key factors. The relative success and long-term viability of both the legislative acts and the ethnic organizations themselves would be driven by the realization and attainment of these four factors. The comparative model provides a platform by which these four factors are realized, allowing for a broader context by which to understand the impact ethnic interest groups have on US foreign policy development. The corresponding success of these two ethnic interest groups can be directly associated with their ability to advance within as well as successfully employ these four factors.

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Before this project, my understanding of ethnic interest group influence upon host nations was severely limited. In fact, as an Armenian American, I rarely, if ever, considered the ethnic organizations which I participated within as having any significant level of influence outside my Diaspora community. It was not until, 2014, when I was asked to compare Armenian ethnic organizations with those of other ethnic communities residing in the United States, did I finally consider the question seriously. Only when working closely with community members and academics, did It finally dawn on me that the associations between diasporan advocacy organizations and their host nation were complex and difficult to interpret. Thus, the impetus of the project began.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. My supporting wife of over eight years, who suffered from my absence due to the countless hours I spent cultivating and developing this research project. My parents, who never relented on their moral support in this endeavor. And to my brother and his wife who gave me the foresight in pursuing an academic career. Thank you again, Dr. Maria Raquel Casas, for your encouragement, and time in helping me through the Master's program. I always appreciated and enjoyed your knowledge of history and your insight regarding the plight immigrants faced when moving to a new home. I gained a new appreciation and understanding of ethnic interest groups in the US. Thus, my thesis is framed within a comparative model allowing for a more pragmatic assessment of diasporan communities. Furthermore, I would like to thank all those faculty members at UNLV who assisted me through this program. Without those mentioned above, this work would not have been completed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....iii

Acknowledgements.....v

Table of Contents.....vii

Introduction.....1

Chapter 1: The Armenian Diaspora.....17

 The Waves of Armenian Immigration to the US.....21

 A New Armenian Diasporal Identity.....30

Chapter 2: The Cuban Diaspora34

 The Waves of Cuban Immigration to the US.....39

 A New Cuban Diasporal Identity.....54

Chapter 3: Armenian American Political Groups.....58

 The Armenian National Committee of America.....63

Chapter 4: Case Study: Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992.....65

 ANCA and the Marshalling of Resources.....70

 Historical Grievance as a Contributing Factor75

 Ideological Compatibility in Passing Section 907.....80

 Armenian Inter-Ethnic Interest Group Rivalry84

Chapter 5: Cuban American Political Groups.....95

 Cuban American National Foundation.....99

Chapter 6:Case Study: The Radio Broadcasting To Cuba Act of 1983 (Radio Marti).....107

 CANF and the Marshalling of Resources.....113

Historical Grievance as a Contributing Factor	123
Ideological Compatibility in Establishing Radio Marti	130
Cuban Inter-Ethnic Interest Group Rivalry	134
Conclusion.....	142
Bibliography.....	157
Curriculum Vitae.....	172

INTRODUCTION

Various ethnic groups who have immigrated to the United States have attempted to influence domestic and international policy to suit their own ethno-national purposes. The vast majority of immigration to the US has been conducted by those seeking economic betterment, an opportunity to raise the quality of life for themselves and their children. Yet, historically, Armenian and Cuban immigrants, especially those during the earlier periods of their exodus, have made the US their home due to political factors. Although economic factors contributed in various degrees to immigration, specifically during the last few decades, the primary cause for both ethnic groups were initially political in nature. As a result, the political disposition of certain immigrant communities and ethnic groups has for many decades been a bone of contention among historians.

This study does not solely center on the immigrant experience, but rather on how these groups of diaspora fostered certain political sensibilities and strategies that is rarely, if ever, examined. This work attempts to underline the occurrence, significance, and success of certain "ethnic politics," which have been largely driven by what is termed in contemporary times as ethnic interest groups or lobbies. Just as Benedict Anderson states in his seminal 1991 book, immigrant communities and diasporas are "imagined communities," and their members, in terms of their ethnic identity, draw upon both the similar background of the country they left and the host nation to which they immigrated.¹ This dual form of national identification is portrayed through self-referencing notions and terms such as "Italian-American" and produces notions of sympathy that center on a homeland and culture other than the host nation. Thus, attempting to

¹ Henriette M. Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban-American Story of Success and Failure* (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), 17.

highlight and document the relative successes and failures of these groups in terms of creating ethnic politics is the very backbone of this work.

The growing influence of ethnic interest groups and their political goals during the last century is one of the central themes of this thesis. These politically motivated ethnic groups engage as an activist force for their ancestral homeland within the civic structure of the host nation. Providing one of the most unified definitions, in his 2012 work, Matt Grossman refers to these groups as those institutions seeking to promote certain issues on the bases of one or more shared attitudes which are relevant and advantageous for a given group of people.² Thus, this work will center on ethnic interest groups who gather and attempt to marshal support under a notion of a shared ethnic identity. Basically, there continues to re-emerge, a sense in public discourse that political subsidiaries and extensions of ethnic communities in the US who are engrossed in influencing various political agendas through lobbying efforts. The word "lobbying," for the purposes of this study, represents the objectives and aims implemented to achieve and exert political influence on a given political structure. This work will attempt to draw upon the categorization and narrow definition by John R. Wrights, who surmises that lobbying is the influence as well as transfer of communication and pressure of individuals upon a nation.³ Those individuals organizing themselves into political groups attempt to put forward issues important to their communities. Wright maintains that these political organizations are highly competitive in nature and constantly attempt to diminish the efforts of opponents who seek to undermine their efforts. Ethnic lobbies are a relevant topic of study for academics

² Grossmann, Matt, *The Not-So-Special Interests: Interest Groups, Public Representation and American Governance* (Stanford University Press, 2012), 12-14.

³ Wright, John R, *Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions and Influence* (New Topics In Politics, 1996), 11.

focused upon foreign policy development and how these groups tap into transnational networks to further their own political objectives.

Since the late 19th century, the US political and civic structure has become more habitable and supportive toward interest groups influence. Diasporan ethnic special interest groups have seen varying levels of success, despite similar advantages and a uniform political structure within the US. In addition, various factors, when extended over a period of time, have led to differing outcomes for different ethnic interest groups. While the vast majority of analysis regarding ethnic interest groups in the US has centered on the pro-Israel lobby taking the form of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), those of other ethnic political groups are far less thoroughly examined.⁴ For instance, while having a similar overall population in the US, it is commonly held that Jewish-American organizations are far more influential than those of the Greek-American community.⁵ Interestingly, the lack of formal examination when discussing Cuban- and Armenian-American political interest groups has left many academics questioning the overall effectiveness of ethnic interest groups and, more importantly, what factors contributed to the success of these organizations. For many years, being personally involved in Armenian ethnic groups, questions have arisen such as why are some ethnic interest groups more effective than others? This inexplicable and perplexing disparity within similar circumstances offered by the US political environment, and the genuine gains made by certain diapsoran activist groups, fuels the underlying impetus for this research. Thus, the primary question of the work focuses upon what underlying circumstances and factors have traditionally

⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁵ Smith, Tony, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Harvard University Press, 2005), 9-12.

assisted both the Armenian- and Cuban-American ethnic special interest groups when attempting to attain their objectives in guiding and affecting US foreign policy.

Certain questions arise when assessing the development and success of both the Armenian and Cuban diasporan communities in the US. Primarily, what commonalities and differences are held between Armenian-American and Cuban-American communities? Secondly, how did successive and various waves of immigration for both ethnic groups alter the nature of these diasporan communities and the ability of ethnic interest groups to influence US foreign policy? The relative success and failures of these two organizations will be addressed, in the hope of explaining the unique circumstances and factors which are necessary for a given lobby to achieve its policy goals.

Cuban- and Armenian-American ethnic interest groups were chosen for this thesis due to their relative similarities. Both immigrant groups migrated during the early- to mid-20th century as well as possessing a comparatively high socio-economic status. Both activist communities and are seen as successful ethnic interest groups by academics. Furthermore, both communities have been impacted by the geo-political realities of the Cold War, and the resulting collapse of the Soviet Union. For these reasons, a constructive comparison between the two ethnic interest groups will assist academics hoping to expand insight regarding lobbying influence on U.S foreign policy. This thesis attempts to examine Cuban and Armenian ethnic interest groups and the factors by which these groups altered the political policies within the US to suit their own community needs. The traditionally held viewpoint that all ethnic enclaves in the US uniformly influence American political, economic, and cultural life is unsubstantiated. Rather, the various ethnic groups who have immigrated to the US have had, in fact, differing levels of success in

influencing US domestic and international policy. This work attempts to challenge previously held notions and endeavors to add substance to the already chaotic historiography of the field.

Previous research on ethnic lobbies encompasses a wide spectrum of ideas. One of the first scholars to discuss ethnic interest groups is Lawrence H. Fuchs in his 1959 text titled, *Minority Groups and Foreign Policy*. Fuchs claims, "Despite general awareness of the mutual impact of foreign affairs and the claims of minority groups, there has been surprisingly little systematic examination of the results of this process."⁶ The "process" to which Fuchs refers to is a positive one. Claiming that ethnic interest groups give greater depth and understanding to global concerns, which would be otherwise forgotten within public discourse; yet, Fuchs fails to address the conflicting or negative impact some ethnic interest groups might have upon the host nation. In addition, Fuchs fails to mention the various avenues by which ethnic interest groups embark upon when attempting to influence policymaking. More than six decades later, many historians are still attempting to fill in the gap once identified by Fuchs. Despite the gains made in academic circles during the last few decades, an incomplete form of scholarship when debating the scope and nature of diasporan influence upon US foreign policy development continues to persist. Two schools of thought have developed since the 1960s regarding this issue: one argues that ethnic minority interest groups do impact US foreign policy development, while the other faction sees only negligible influence.⁷ In his 2000 book titled, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*, Tony Smith asserts that minority groups directly influence American foreign policy, and that, in fact, these groups have the freedom and the right to exercise this power. Within the Smith camp, scholars have

⁶ Fuchs, Lawrence, *Minority Groups and Foreign Policy* (Political Science Quarterly, 1959), 161.

⁷ H.Rytz. *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban American Story of Success and Failure* (Springer, 2013), 7-9.

attempted to identify the corresponding elements that have allowed various ethnic groups to influence a host nation.⁸ For instance, in his influential 1987 book titled, *Ethnic Groups and US Foreign Policy*, Mohammed E. Ahrari maintains that specific characteristics, organizational models, and political environmental factors enable ethnic groups to successfully influence foreign policy. Ahrari claims that successful ethnic interest groups such as the pro-Israeli lobby do one thing better than anything else—they have the ability to drastically restrict the influence of their opponents. For Ahrari, the success of an ethnic interest group is gauged by the relative success it has over opponents within the host nation. Furthermore, the use of media and organizational advantages have a direct impact upon the achievement of their goals. In addition, Ahrari asserts that the congruence of ethnic interest group objectives with that of US strategic goals—whether they be economic, political, or military—is the main determinant in forwarding these objectives.⁹ For many academics who reside within this camp, ethnic interest organizations are a natural result of a democratic civic structure which permits minority groups avenues to influence decision makers.

In contrast, academics in the opposing camp argue that ethnic diasporan influence is minimal, and that the various diasporan communities within the US are severely constrained in influencing the host nation's policymaking ability. Both academics and historians who adhere to this opinion maintain that the US political structure is far too complex, specifically in economic, socio-political and cultural spheres. In addition, the international order varies to such an extent that ethnic influence is negligible. For instance, in his 1978 book, *Eastern European Ethnic*

⁸ Smith, Tony, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Harvard University Press, 2005), 130.

⁹ Ahrari, Mohammed E. *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy: (Contributions in Political Science)*, Bibliographies and Indexes in Afro-American and African Studies book 186. 1987.p.37-42.

Groups and American Foreign Policy, Stephen A. Garrett claims that, during the Cold War period, US foreign policy and strategic interests barred many ethnic groups from influencing US policymaking. Furthermore, in his 2002 book titled, *Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy*, Will H. Moore asserts that not only did ethnic minority groups have no real tangible impact upon US foreign decisions, but they also did not influence domestic policy toward these diasporan communities.¹⁰ Regardless of the multi-disciplinary approach which has broadened numerous sub-fields in history over the last few decades, a systematic study of ethnic minority influence on US foreign policy development remains elusive and highly fragmented. This work attempts to employ a comparative case study by looking at legislative efforts and attempts to cultivate policy by both Cuban- and Armenian-American ethnic interest groups. More specifically, this endeavor will note the employed strategies, institutional frameworks, and organizational structures of both these ethnic interest groups that ultimately resulted in varying outcomes. This work bids to piece together multiple case studies. It will offer the reader a deeper level of insight regarding the formation of diasporan communities and the strategies these two ethnic organizations employed when attempting to achieve their goals. Thus, this work specifically focuses upon the legislative policy gains made by certain ethnic organizations within these diasporan communities.

This thesis charts both a theoretical and an empirical structure in attempting to interpret and resolve this inquiry. It attempts to illustrate and understand the degree to which ethnic interest groups were key in passing certain legislative acts that deeply influenced either US-Armenian or US-Cuban relations. Focusing upon the most successful and well known lobbying organizations for each ethnic group, the work will attempt to determine the dynamic relationship these institutions had with the US political structure and the differing tactics they employed in

¹⁰ Moore, Will H. *Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy*. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*. Volume 23, No 2 Summer-Fall 2003. 78-81

order to reach their goals. In terms of Cuban-American interest groups, this work will focus upon the Cuban American National Foundation. In terms of Armenian-American lobbying organizations, this study will center its examination on the Armenian National Committee of America. The thesis will attempt to examine the decisive role played by these two organizations in furthering and influencing the passage of legislation, and ultimately, how their efforts were seen within the communities they represented. This study contends that the ethnic interest groups listed above shaped and altered their host nation; the processes they utilized can best be explained as well as assessed by examining four key factors.

First, diasporan ethnic groups are similar when compared to other organized institutions—such as multi-national corporations, organized labor unions, or even environmental organizations—with respect to the *marshalling of resources*. These diasporan interest groups, in order to succeed in their objectives within a highly competitive atmosphere against other foreign policy actors, must display adaptive characteristics and possess the proficiency to tap vast financial resources.¹¹ The degree in which they utilize these resources, in organizing these institutions and welcoming key personnel who possess innovative strategies within their walls, ultimately separates successful ethnic interest groups from ineffective ones. Successful ethnic interest groups realized fairly early on that their ability to finance, allocate, and structurally organize themselves would allow them an advantage over competitors seeking to influence US foreign and domestic policy. In turn, this aligning and mobilization of resources, specifically, the access to monetary sources from the diasporan community, would be crucial in achieving their political objectives. The degree to which these two ethnic interest groups could marshal financial resources would correspond directly to the higher levels of income and commercial

¹¹ H.Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban American Story of Success and Failure* (Springer, 2013), 15-17.

influence the members of their communities would possess. This influence can be calculated in a qualitative manner in many ways by examining the level and amount of financial resources that both ethnic groups can access. Gauging the effectiveness of both Cuban- and Armenian-American ethnic lobbying organizations in this manner will bring greater insight into the achievements and failures of each.¹²

Second, those successful ethnic interest groups center their collectivism and ability to organize on notions of *historical grievances*. Diasporan ethnic groups epitomize immigrant communities, whose representatives and comrades are united collectively by not only ethnic and cultural identity, but also by a common historical event or series of crises. The more substantial and all-encompassing the *historical grievance*, the more the members of an immigrant community are united by a collective ethnic identity. Thus, the level of ethnic identity of a given immigrant community is directly determined by the traumatic events that have shaped its community. The more horrendous the historical event, the more cohesive the community, and the more motivation and clout an ethnic interest group may draw from it. For the most part, the greater the impact of a historical event upon the community, the more substantial this ethnic character is, and the more its identity power can be identified. In addition, the more catastrophic and widespread the historical injustice, the more pronounced a sense of camaraderie exists. The notion of a *historical grievance* brings about the idea of an external threat within a given diasporan group, which reinforces the inner-ethnic bonds within the community.¹³ Ultimately, it is these inner bonds formed by historical events that allow these organizations the right to speak on the community's behalf. For many ethnic groups, the shared *historical grievance*, as well as a

¹² Aghanian, Denise, *The Armenian Diaspora: Cohesion and Fracture* (Lanham University Press America, 2007), 29-30.

¹³ Smith, Tony, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Harvard University Press, 2005), 63.

political goal to rectify historical injustices, is what drives their political objectives. Those within the Armenian- and Cuban-American communities are no different—these interest groups have solely focused upon influencing US domestic and foreign policy in order to rectify historical issues. The injustices that have galvanized both communities have allowed them to exert influence upon their host nation’s political environment. But more importantly the effectiveness and degree to which ethnic interest groups connect historical injustices with contemporary concerns will become an increasingly important element in the overall success of such ethnic lobbying organizations. By documenting the opinions of many within these ethnic organizations regarding the injustices their communities have endured, this study will illustrate the relevance and degree to which *historical grievances* played a role in the development of these two ethnic political interest groups.¹⁴

The third factor, *ideological compatibility*, is one of the most pronounced and profound factors when assessing the effectiveness of these two interest groups. The US, much like other nations, seeks to achieve and maintain certain "national interests." Whether they be economic, cultural, or diplomatic, these "national interests" drive domestic and foreign policy formation.¹⁵ The concept of commonality and the pursuit of a distinct foreign policy are also recurring themes for special interest groups. Especially within pluralistic democratic civil societies, academics assessing the political environment notice quite clearly that ethnic interest groups whose efforts and goals concur with their host nations achieve greater clout when compared to their counterparts. The aligning of their objectives with those of the host nation is crucial for ethnic interest group success. Therefore, gauging the relative achievements of diasporan ethnic interest

¹⁴ H. Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban American Story of Success and Failure* (Springer, 2013), 21.

¹⁵ Bard, Mitchell Geoffrey, *The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to Domestic Influence on United States Middle East Policy*. (Routledge, 1st Edition 1991) 7-13

groups in the US more or less centers on *ideological compatibility*. Successful ethnic interest groups who understand the constantly changing circumstances of international relations and manage to align their goals with those of the host nation achieve their policy objectives, while ethnic interest groups who find themselves in opposition to the host nation's foreign policy ambitions will find themselves becoming marginalized.¹⁶

Inter-ethnic interest group rivalry is the fourth and final factor when assessing the relative successes or failures of both the Armenian American National Committee and the Cuban American National Foundation. The pressure and, at times, direct challenge by opposing ethnic organizations within a given community often lead to the fracturing and limiting of the predominant ethnic interest group's ability to maneuver within the power corridors of Washington. For the most part, ethnic interest group rivalry centers around competition for influence over a given diasporan community. Whether the difference is based upon political, generational, cultural or even economic factors, challenging organizations within both the Armenian and Cuban communities altered the degree in which the ANCA and the CANF could pursue distinct political objectives. Occasionally, this competitive nature within a given ethnic community presented as a contradictory perception amongst outsiders. More specifically, the general American public would find itself confused due to the increasingly complex and conflicting differences within these ethnic communities. This competitive atmosphere was both a product of marginalized elements within a given community as well as of individuals seeking to become the mouthpiece of a community outside their homeland. By assessing the relationship between rival ethnic organizations within the Armenian- and Cuban-American communities, one

¹⁶ H. Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban American Story of Success and Failure* (Springer, 2013), 36-39.

can better track the successes and failures of their most prominent interest groups when attempting to forward their political objectives.

This project's main aim is to understand how the four factors addressed above play a role in determining the success or failure of Cuban- and Armenian-American ethnic lobbying organizations in US foreign policymaking. By assessing the four factors listed above, this study will be able to identify the conditions under which these groups exert influence and succeed in their objectives while others fail. This work centers around two distinct case studies. One study focuses on the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and its direct role in furthering the debate over the establishment in 1985 of Radio Martí, a radio station broadcasting US-composed programming into Cuba with the hope of informing Cubans living on the island about the transgressions of the Castro leadership. The success of such legislation allowed for additional political inroads to be made in the early 1990s.¹⁷ This win in turn allowed the CANF to accumulate even more community resources when it opportunely lobbied for the ratification of the Cuban Democracy Act, a law that further toughened the already-established embargo while simultaneously restricting overseas-created subsidiaries of US firms from conducting commerce, travel, and sending remittances to Cuba. Ultimately, the failures the CANF experienced in the 2000s would throw the organization into an identity crisis.¹⁸ Pressured from within the diaspora by organizations like the Cuban Liberty Council and a growing voice of more ideologically left leaning elements, forced the CANF to alter its tactics.

The other case study will examine the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the development and passage of the Freedom Support Act of 1992, or more

¹⁷ Susan Eckstein, *The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the U.S. and their Homeland* (Routledge, 2009), 199-202.

¹⁸ Judith Radtke, *The Untied States' Rapprochement with Cuba: Reasons, Reactions and Repercussions* (Plaza y Valdes Editores, 2017), 76-81.

specifically, Section 907 of this bill, which prohibits Azerbaijan from participation within the program and from receiving U.S aid.¹⁹ In addition, the case study will explore the relative success the ANCA has achieved during the last few decades of the 20th century. Furthermore, the work will attempt to shed light upon the relationship the ANCA had with various other Armenian lobbying organizations and how these associations furthered policy objectives such as the passage of Armenian Genocide Resolutions. In advocating and promoting various Armenian-American concerns, the ANCA has also endeavored to assist the Republic of Armenia, whether through lobbying lawmakers on behalf of Armenia's foreign policy objectives or by cultivating federal financial assistance for the newly created nation. By examining these two distinct case studies within the framework of the four characteristics listed above, readers will better understand the uniqueness and relative effectiveness of ethnic interest groups within US socio-political society.

The purpose of this thesis is to improve the awareness and understanding of the roles of Cuban and Armenian diasporan ethnic interest groups in the US foreign policy making. By establishing and measuring a theory-centered structure of analysis, this study attempts to classify the circumstances under which ethnic immigrant institutions apply and wield influence. The analytical framework employed in this work is derived by evaluating and judging the current body of empirical data on the issue and by incorporating the results by analytical means, moving this discussion in a more conceptual and generalized direction. The adequacy and feasibility of the analytical framework are then tested by applying as well as utilizing a compare-and-contrast empirical case study. The layout and pattern of this research project thus connects an inductive method with a deductive approach. Assessing each case study in this manner within a broader

¹⁹ Denise Aghanian, *The Armenian Diaspora: Cohesion and Fracture* (Lanham University Press America, 2007), 49-52.

context will permit both scholars and students of immigration and diplomatic history a unique perspective regarding US foreign policy development.

The traditionally held viewpoint that ethnic enclaves in the United States uniformly influenced American politics, economics, and culture is one difference of opinion being challenged in this study. This work will attempt to utilize a whole host of tools, both mythological and conceptual models, to shed light upon the unique attributes, nature, activism, and collectivism of Cuban and Armenian ethnic communities in the US. The study relies on a series of primary and secondary sources in order to implement both a compare-and-contrast model as well as a trans-national approach in determining the degree of success both Cuban and Armenian communities experienced when pursuing their goals. The primary sources collected at the University of Minnesota have allowed me to formulate the rise of institutional development of Armenian-Americans. The Henry Madden Library's special collection regarding Armenian-Americans at Fresno State University also assisted in discovering the unique experiences of Armenian-Americans prior to and during World War II. Primary sources regarding the Cuban-American community could be found in the Cuban Heritage Collection at the University of Miami as well as within the special collections archive at Florida International University. For both ethnic groups, the primary sources consisted of government documents, oral testimony, and economic statistics, which allows for a comprehensive illustration of the development of these ethnic lobbies. The secondary sources used in this work center on various historical research projects, scholarly books, and articles. The reason for utilizing secondary sources like Eileen Oliver's *Cuban Immigration and the Cuban-American Experience* as well as Susan Eckstein's *Immigration, Remittances, and Trans-National Social Capital Formation: A Cuban Case Study* is due to the wide-reaching and qualitative nature of their books. By combining both primary and

secondary sources, this work permits a greater appreciation of and an opportunity to assess the larger political identity of Cuban- and Armenian-American communities who consistently portray their immigration to the US as only one step in a long process in re-capturing their lost economic and political status. Secondary sources regarding the Armenian-American community, such as Matthew A Jendian's *Becoming American, Remaining Ethnic: The Case of Armenian Americans in Central California* as well as Anny Bakalian's *Armenian Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian*, ground this thesis in recent scholarship by emphasizing the undercurrents of ethnic ties these immigrant groups held when seeing their place in American society. The secondary sources used in this study incorporate new perspectives and ideas when determining the level to which these ethnic interest groups were able to organize and cultivate their communities. More importantly, both the primary and secondary sources illustrate the nature of these ethnic communities who reinforced and categorized their ethnic identity in terms of political activism.

This thesis is organized by a simple chronological and topical framework, beginning with an overall summary and background for both diasporan communities. The first and second chapter will identify the waves of immigration for both ethnic communities and the origins of each ethnic interest group. The next two sections of the thesis will present the case studies and examine each ethnic interest group by ascertaining their ability to follow the aforementioned four key factors. The final chapter will compare the two ethnic interest groups and demonstrate that an ethnic interest group may indeed influence foreign policymaking within the US, but only under certain conditions and circumstances. The framework of this thesis mirrors the design of the initial research question while also connecting this examination method chronologically. Within the theoretical portions, the study will begin by applying an inductive path by identifying

and assuming the circumstances of influence and the degree of identity power each group presents. This method is followed by a deductive approach that organizes the political environment in which ethnic interest groups operate by employing the four distinct elements of a successful diaspora immigrant political organization. Ultimately, the study permits a complex depiction of activism, political ideology, and historical underpinnings which at times separate these two ethnic groups from each other. The hope is that the findings of this study will help settle the ongoing debate over ethnic interest groups and the relevance they play in US policy development.

CHAPTER 1: THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA

Diaspora is a situation commonly experienced by both Armenian- and Cuban-Americans. The scattering of both these ethnic groups has been the result of destabilizing circumstances that have impacted their historic homelands since the nineteenth century. These elements have ranged from political instability, persecution, and discrimination to massacres, deportation, and, for the Armenians, full-fledged genocide. Every nation has its immigrants and foreigners, and each country, much like the US, is a hybrid of these varied communities. Despite the trials of immigration, the Armenian and Cuban communities within the US have earned their success stories, achieving much in what can be considered a relatively brief period of time.

The countless waves of Armenian migration from their homeland, during the more than four thousand years of Armenian history, are difficult to discuss and examine in a comprehensive manner. For our purposes, we will limit the focus of Armenian immigration to the US, centering upon the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In order to comprehend the significance of Armenian migration to the US during this period, one must examine the origins and contributing causes which led to these massive waves of migration.²⁰ By examining the ideological, economic, and cultural characteristics of these migrants, the work will better illustrate the relative makeup of Armenian-American ethnic interest groups.

Migration has been an ongoing experience throughout human history, induced by commercial opportunities, political and religious oppression, and, more recently, the possibility for economic advancement. Historically, the Armenian people have been an ethnic group prone to migration. Since antiquity, foreign oppression and curbed economic opportunities have compelled them to leave their homeland in search of freedom to thrive. Armenian migrants

²⁰ Muriel Mirak-Weissbach, *Through the Wall of Fire: Armenia, Iraq, Palestine: From Wrath to Reconciliation* (Frankfurt Edition Fischer, 2009), 213.

reached Jerusalem and created a community there prior to the time of Christ, one which still remains to this day. Prior to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these immigrants were motivated by the hope of commercial gain, or were simply in search of adventure. The vast majority of those who left intended to return, but many immigrants instead created, and thereby laid the foundation for, additional diasporal Armenian communities in their host countries.²¹

There are numerous multi-faceted aspects to the waves of Armenian immigration to the US, varying from involuntary separation to economics. Current Armenian studies concedes that Armenians immigrated to the US in three distinct waves: the initial wave of Armenian immigration to the US; the second wave, which represents the pivotal symbol and composition of current Armenian-American communities and their interest groups; and finally, the current wave, from which we have just emerged. The first wave represents mid- to late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century migration patterns to the US and was primarily composed of immigrants seeking sanctuary who were fleeing violence or whose lives were at risk. The second wave of immigration took place from the 1960s through the late 1980s, consisting mostly of Armenians dissatisfied with socioeconomic conditions within Middle Eastern diaspora communities, joined by a small number who were able to leave Soviet Armenia. Finally, the newest and most current influx of immigration from Armenia occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are dramatic differences in the perceptions of each group involved in all three waves of migration to the US.²² Each subsequent wave would simultaneously revitalize yet cause conflict within the pre-existing community.

²¹ David Marshall Lang, *Armenian Cradle of Civilization* (George Allen & Unwin, 1970), 265-271.

²² Denise Aghanian, *The Armenian Diaspora: Cohesion and Fracture*, (University Press of America, 2007), 78-81.

Armenian immigration to North America can be traced back to the Virginia Colony. According to the Virginia Company of London records, a merchant and tobacco cultivator was contracted to apply his experience on behalf of England. He was known as Martin the Armenian, but most likely his name has been modified and compressed by English colonists from Martorosian. Although records are limited, he was known to be a member of the colony at Jamestown as early as 1618. Records also state that, in 1653, in order to maintain and keep silk production in the colonies from failing, two Armenians were brought to impart their expertise of this industry. Their names were not actually recorded, but records document that "George the Armenian" had received four thousand pounds as an incentive to stay and not migrate back to the Ottoman Empire. It is unclear whether any of the initial Armenians remained in the Virginia Colony, but Martin the Armenian, the first to arrive, did leave for England to sell his cultivated tobacco in 1624.²³ These were the first documented examples of Armenians migrating to the new world.

Khachig Oskanian is the next documented Armenian immigrant to the US in 1834. Oskanian received a degree from the City College of New York and then became a journalist and editor for *The New York Herald*. He also served as president of the New York Press Club, and then, for a short period of time, as Turkish Consul in New York. By 1875, there were only seventy-five Armenians living in the US, mostly within cities along the Atlantic coast. By 1882, a thousand Armenian migrants had made their way to the US. Thousands would begin emigrating each year, and following the Adana massacres of 1909, immigration reached an all-time high of 9,353 by 1913. From 1920 to 1924, an approximate total of 30,771 Armenian refugees fled to the US. The First World War curtailed immigration, and restrictions

²³ Dennis Papazian, "Armenians in America," *Journal of Eastern Christian Studies*, (University of Michigan-Dearborn) 52, no. 3-4 (2012): 311-315.

implemented after 1924 further reduced the stream of migration. From 1925 to 1949, fewer than 9,000 Armenians arrived.²⁴ During the first half of the 20th century, the Armenian American community was relatively small when compared to various other ethnic European groups.

The majority of the initial Armenian migrants arrived with little money. In unsafe and difficult conditions, many labored in manufacturing factories in Massachusetts. Most early immigrants arrived with a background in skilled labor, although they were forced into unskilled occupations. One early migrant, Moses Momulkian, was quoted as saying that factory labor was “*eshoo kordz*,” meaning it was work only appropriate for jackasses. Ultimately, many would leave factory labor and improve their economic circumstances. Like their compatriots in Boston, New York, Niagara Falls, and Waukegan, Illinois, they did what they had to in order to survive.²⁵ A 1903 examination of Armenian immigrants in Fresno uncovered that thirty-one out of sixty-seven Armenian males had worked in the East or Midwest for approximately six years before moving west. This figure illustrates the humble beginnings of the Armenian American community and their motivation for a better life.²⁶

²⁴ Arra S. Avakian. *The Armenians in America*. (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications, 1977), 71-73.

²⁵ Berge Bulbulian. *The Fresno Armenians: History of a Diaspora Community* (The Press at California State University Fresno, 2000), 41-44.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 77-78.

Waves of Armenian Immigration to US

Generally, the first mass wave of Armenian immigration to the US began in the late nineteenth century and lasted until the mid 1920s. The Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896, which resulted in over two hundred thousand deaths, initiated this first wave. These horrific acts of extermination resulted in large numbers of refugees entering the US, bringing with them horrible tales of murdered of innocent women and children. The Armenian Genocide, committed by the Ottoman Empire during 1915-1919, is undoubtedly the key element underlining modern Armenian identity within the diaspora.²⁷ These two predominant historical events utterly redefined the spectrum through which ethnic identity, national political ideologies, and cultural notions were defined and forged by the Armenian American community.

Though I can hardly do this horrific event justice, either in terms of a comprehensive analysis or the magnitude of the extermination, within this text, certain factors require examination. The Armenian Genocide, which occurred almost a century ago amid the turmoil of the First World War, is significant for multiple reasons.²⁸ This genocide caused the extermination of nearly one and a half million Armenians, roughly seventy-five percent of the total Armenian population.²⁹ According to Armenian primary sources, an estimated 2.1 million Armenians lived within the Ottoman empire prior to World War One.³⁰ Those who survived formed refugee settlements in the Middle East, France, Greece, and eventually, throughout the

²⁷ Edward A. Alexander, *A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice* (The Free Press, 1991), 34-39.

²⁸ Edmond Y. Azadian, *History on the Move: Views, Interviews and Essays on Armenian Issues*. (University of New York Press, 1999), 18-21.

²⁹ Jay Winter, *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*. (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 51-53. During a period of a quarter century between 1890 and the onset of World War I, Armenian-Americans engaged themselves in financial and political struggle against their people's oppressors in Turkey and Russia. This harassment, murder, and plundering of the Armenian Christian populations in Turkey awakened notions among Armenians of their rights and the lack of freedom in Turkey.

³⁰ Micheal J. Arlen, *Passage to Ararat* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1975), 88-91.

world. These survivors came to represent the first migrant generation and the impetus of Armenian American organizations like that of the ANCA.³¹

Multiple factors and underlying elements converged to form a post-genocide Armenian-American identity. First, the Armenian Genocide was the great "equalizer" in the formation of the Armenian identity. Being Armenian came to represent being a survivor and a member of a community of victims. This mindset of suffering and victimhood, which had been an integral part of the Armenian character for centuries due to discrimination and repeated massacres, would play a key role in the nature of Armenian ethnic organizations and their ability to initiate these communities.³² This diaspora had always been connected with exile and difficulties, but after the genocide these images were redefined. Instead of a population consisting of merchants, intellectuals, and political exiles, it now represented a group of refugees, starving survivors and a profoundly scarred community. Those individuals who represented this first wave of immigration to the US would lay the foundation for the ethnic interest groups that would arise in future decades. A sense of immediacy and urgency, which can still be noted within the Armenian American community, initially derived from the sense of loss that these genocide survivors experienced. As discussed below, the stories, both Cuban exiles and Armenian genocide survivors told their descendants formed the structural impetus of these ethnic interest groups in the US. Their hope mainly was focused upon rebuilding and curtailing any future threat to their communities.³³ Nevertheless, the initial efforts of Armenian-American communities, and by extension, their ethnic interest groups, focused on developing institutions within the host nation

³¹ Jay Winter, *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71-74.

³² Razmik Panossian. *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (Columbia University Press, 2006), 172-173.

³³ Robert Mirak. *Torn Between Two Lands: Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I*, (Harvard University Press, 1983), 78-83.

that could serve a multi-faceted role. On the one hand, these Armenian American communities constructed churches and schools in order to maintain their cultural identity. In an attempt to maintain their religion and language, the first major wave of Armenian migrants to the US aimed at holding on to their ancient way of life in a new world. On the other hand, they also laid the framework for proceeding generations of Armenian-Americans to become politically active.

Those Armenian-Americans who comprised the first wave during the nineteenth and early twentieth century laid the cornerstone of Armenian-American ethnic interest group goals for future generations. Primarily their attempt in rectifying the injustice which occurred by asserting territorial claims against the modern Turkish state. Ultimately, these post-Genocide Armenian diaspora communities would galvanize their local populations by associating their lost lands with the desire to regain it.³⁴ In order to achieve their goal, these communities, and by extension, their lobbies, have focused their efforts on recognition of the genocide by governments around the world, strategizing that recognition of the Armenian genocide would pressure Turkey to admit its horrible past. For instance, since 1975 and every year thereafter, the ANCA has attempted to pass a genocide resolution in Congress. To the present day excluding non-binding resolutions, the Armenian genocide has failed to be officially recognized by the US federal government. Armenian communities throughout the world insist on using the word *genocide* instead of the less forceful term *massacre*, which fails to illustrate the systematic targeting or intent to eliminate an entire people.³⁵ This century-long struggle has come to represent the political complexity of genocide recognition and how it has influenced not only the

³⁴ Ara Baliozian, *The Armenians: Their History and Culture a Short Introduction* (Kar Publishing House-Toronto, 1975), 162-165.

³⁵ Pierre, Vidal-Naquet, *A Crime of Silence: The Armenian Genocide: The Permanent Peoples Tribunal* (Cambridge Mass, 1985), 212-214.

Armenian political identity within these communities in the US, but also played a key role in shaping political underpinnings within the Republic of Armenia.

The second wave of Armenian immigration encapsulated two stages and started in the late 1940s. The initial stage comprised of representing Soviet-Armenian prisoners during the second World War. The *Displaced Persons Act of 1948*, which authorized over 200,000 individuals to enter the United States, also allowed many Armenian prisoners of war released from Germany to immigrate.³⁶ Despite this, less than 5,000 Armenians entered the country between 1944 and 1952.³⁷ The second stage of Armenian immigration during the 1970s and 1980s included people from established Armenian communities in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as a small number of political refugees from Armenia. With the dissolution of the *US Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965* quotas, Armenians from diasporal communities in the Soviet Union, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iran flooded into the US. Many immigrated due to the political chaos of their host nation, such as the fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon started in 1975 and the Iranian revolution of 1979.³⁸ These Armenian diasporal communities, which formed as a result of the Armenian Genocide, became unstable and fearing persecution due to their Christian religious background, saw immigration as an increasingly favorable practical choice. The instability occurring in many Middle Eastern nations contributed to large numbers of Armenians migrating into the US and Europe during this period.³⁹

³⁶ Carruthers, Susan L, *Between Camps: Eastern Bloc "Escapees" and Cold War Borderlands*.(American Quarterly Volume 57, Number 3, Sept 2005),922-934

³⁷ Ibid., 89-90.

³⁸ Shelia E. Henry, *Cultural Persistence and Socio Economic Mobility: A Comparative Study of Assimilation Among Armenians and Japanese in Los Angeles* (San Francisco Publishers, 1980), 32-36.

³⁹ Ibid 32-36.

The majority of those residing within these nations developed multilingual and multicultural characteristics, allowing them to have higher standards of living and better economic status compared to their neighbors. However, they also retained aspects of their traditional Armenian culture, providing a clear difference between them and local peoples. The influx of these newcomers reinvigorated the original Armenian-American communities they were drawn to, especially in Los Angeles and New York. These second-wave migrants would come to dominate their respective communities in terms of the economic and political leadership once controlled by first-wave Armenian immigrants. Estimates suggest that between 234,000 and 400,000 Armenians were residing in the US by 1990.⁴⁰ This integration into an existing American-Armenian community that arrived decades earlier laid the foundation with which the ANCA frame themselves during the success they experienced in the 1990s.

This second wave of Armenian migrants was characterized by having higher levels of education, occupational skills adaptable to an industrial economy, and some financial resources. In addition, they were more likely to be proficient in English. As mentioned above, the newcomers had an easier process of integration into American society, a point that became a cause of much animosity and conflict between the older and subsequent waves of Armenian migration. Furthermore, the earlier two waves of Armenian immigration to the US also differed in their psychological makeup and worldview. Those who migrated in the earlier period were made to feel subordinate when compared to their hosts.⁴¹ Those who made up this first wave wielded little resources and were initially unable to lessen the gap, both financially and socially, which existed with their Anglo-American neighbors. Prior to the late 1960s and 1970s, with the

⁴⁰ Amy Bakalian. *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (Transaction Publishers, 1993), 87-90.

⁴¹ Warner, W.L., & Strole, L. *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1945), 26-28.

rise and pride of ethnicity, calling someone an “ethnic” had a derogatory overtone. Standing in stark contrast, to the post-World War II Armenian migrants who were far more self-assured when it came to their culture and ethnic identity, specifically those Armenian immigrants who had resided in the Middle East. Many of these Armenians had grown up with a sense of predominance when compared to their Arab hosts. These notions would linger for many when establishing themselves in the United States.

When comparing the first wave with those involved in the second major wave of Armenian migration to the US, one finds that a lack of an already-established Armenian-American community hindered "first-wave" participants. The second wave used the previous waves' inroads and established communal structure to soften the impact of immigration and advanced a more complete integration process. By the early 1970s, the mixing of these two groups of Armenians allowed for the development of community centers, which provided cultural and legal assistance for the community.⁴² Financed through community and federal funds, these centers provided a variety of benefits, such as finding housing, employment, and schools for its members. For instance, one project orchestrated by the Armenian Relief Society that took shape in Los Angeles employed a staff of twenty-nine employees in five satellite branches throughout the valley. It cultivated an annual budget of 1.5 million.⁴³ The Armenian Evangelical Social and Cultural Center, founded in Hollywood in 1977, documented 15,000

⁴² For instance, the AGBU developed community-wide social initiatives in New York City and Los Angeles in the mid-1970s to help newcomers find jobs, housing, legal protection, and other financial assistance programs. Federal assistance in the form of English as second language classes was provided free of charge. The federal plan helped hundreds of Armenian migrants who had fled the chaos in the Middle East and the communist-controlled nations of Romania, Bulgaria, and Soviet Armenia. See Bakalian, *Community Needs Assessment Report, August 1998* and *AGBU Social Services Program*.

⁴³ Information provided by Sarkis Ghazarian, Director of Operations Armenian Relief Society Western Division, August 2002.

Armenians using their services between 1989-1995 and was acknowledged by a community leader as being "one of the most successful of its kind in America."⁴⁴ The countless community centers which were opened up by the two initial waves of Armenian immigrants, allowed subsequent Armenians a means by which to integrate sooner than earlier Armenian Americans could.

The third and current wave of Armenian immigration to the US mainly consisted of those immigrants who migrated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The overwhelming majority, who came from ex-Soviet nation-states such as Armenia, saw the dismantling of the Soviet system as an opportunity to migrate based on political and economic reasons. Environmental calamities and the outbreak of warfare aided this migration as well. The devastating 1988 Armenian earthquake and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh caused an estimated 700,000 Armenians to leave the newly established Armenian Republic, since 1990. Many would relocate to established Armenian communities in Russia, Europe, and the already well-founded Armenian diasporal communities in the US.⁴⁵

Currently, approximately 5,000 Armenians from Armenia annually emigrate to the US. The *American Community Survey in 2011*, assessed that there were 85,150 Armenians born in the US. Documentation and statistics from the US embassy in Yerevan illustrate that 41,543 citizens have changed their country of residence from Armenia to the US between 1995 and 2012.⁴⁶ Demographic census data compiled in 2010 shows the number of US citizens claiming

⁴⁴ The Armenian Evangelical Social and Cultural Center: Ministry Report; Minister: Rev. Haroutune Selimian, Feb 2017. 12-14

⁴⁵ Aram, Akopian. *Armenians and the World: Yesterday and Today* (Noyan Tapan, 2001), 161-168.

⁴⁶ <https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0052.pdf> (U.S Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012).
<https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk>

Armenian ancestry was approximately 585,101 with about half speaking Armenian in their households. Since the data does not take into account those Armenian-Americans who did not claim Armenian ancestry or who did not take the census, it is difficult to gauge the exact number of Armenian-Americans in the US. What we can determine is that this third wave of immigration drastically enlarged Armenian communities throughout the United States.⁴⁷

This newest wave of immigration has complicated an already-diverse ethnic community. Dr. Anny Bakalian, one of the foremost experts on Armenian-American demographic statistics, argues that multiple factors, such as nation of birth, childhood socialization, generational gaps, and even political and religious differences separate people of Armenian descent. The main subgroups within the US are broken up into three categories: *Hayastantsis* (Armenians from Soviet Armenia), *Parskahyes* (Armenians from Iran), and *Beirutsis* (Armenians from Lebanon). The influx of Armenians who have experienced Soviet cultural norms and traits has already caused political, cultural, and social fracturing within these long-established Armenian communities. Currently, the third wave of immigration is declining in number, and the impact and influence of this pattern will be the focus of historians and academics in the coming decades.⁴⁸ Only the future can tell if these newly arriving immigrants will be key to the revitalization of these ethnic communities. However, this third wave of Armenian immigration, which surprisingly has dropped off during the last ten years, still continues to produce tension. Those associating themselves with the first two waves of immigration see the thousands of Armenian newcomers from the former Soviet Union as a nuisance. Many claimed that these new Armenians brought with them a *jarbig* (crafty) attitude that helped foster attitudes of

⁴⁷ Elliott Robert Barkan. *Immigrants in American History: Arrival, Adaptation, and Integration*(ABC-CLIO 2013),727-729.

⁴⁸ Amy Bakalian. *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (Transaction Publishers, 1993), 210-212.

embarrassment and resentment from older Armenian-Armenians as well as prejudice from *odars* (non-Armenians). Ironically, during the last decade, children of the last wave of Armenian immigration have become politically active themselves and have attempted to join the ranks of Armenian ethnic organizations. Yet, those from the first two waves who are more politically active within Armenian ethnic organizations such as the ANCA have heavily criticized the influx of Armenian immigration to the US. Maintaining that since the break up of the Soviet Union an estimated 700,000 citizens have left the Republic of Armenia. The ANCA has taken the position of pressuring the government in Yerevan, the current capital Republic of Armenia, regarding the increasingly dangerous demographic problem which Armenia currently faces.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ *ANCA Disappointed with Obama's Letter on Armenia's Independence: Published September 24, 2016* ARMENEWS: Published

A New Armenian Diasporal Identity

The stagnation of the Armenian diasporal communities during the late 1970s, coupled with socio-cultural alterations such as the threat of assimilation and the merging of their cultural identity with western societies, instilled much fear in hard-line nationalists. For over four decades, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and other politically active organizations throughout the diaspora have cultivated a new meaning of "Armenianness" by engaging in activities and programs with massive amounts of propaganda meant to espouse and impose nationalism and socialism upon a younger generation. As we will see later in this work, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, as the parent organization of the ANCA, has undergone many political changes. These efforts were seen as a stopgap measure in order to maintain a cohesive cultural association within the community on behalf of the homeland they had lost. During the 1960s, many felt that these communities were on their last legs as notions of homeland and repatriation to Armenia were no longer central to being Armenian. With the arrival of the second and third wave of Armenian migrants to the US, the fear of losing ones Armenian identity was temporarily stalled.⁵⁰

The Armenian-American diaspora is continually evolving, developing into a community with notions and themes centered not solely on elements such as language and traditional cultural characteristics, but more simply on being Armenian and being different. These feelings are based largely upon notions of victimization and struggle that fourth and fifth generation Armenians, decedents from the first initial wave of immigration to the US, still possess.⁵¹ It is this idea of

⁵⁰ Amy Bakalian. *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (Transaction Publishers, 1993),187-191

⁵¹ Morrison, Patt. *Richard Hovannisian on Armenians and Genocide's Burden*. (Los Angeles Times: April 21, 2015)

victimization and of being different which has allowed organizations like the ANCA to become successful in furthering Armenian-related issues.

Armenian ethnic interest groups like the ANCA have been successful in mobilizing members of their community due to transnational connections with diasporan communities throughout the world. The ability to mobilize diasporal communities not just within the US and Armenia, but throughout the world, illustrates a form of trans-national networking that represents a core strength for the ANCA, allowing it to speak on behalf of Armenian communities in other countries. For instance, the recent crisis in Syria has motivated many Armenians, Armenian-Americans and those Armenians residing in Europe to fund programs aimed at assisting their compatriots. Armenia has already accepted 12,000 Syrians who are ethnically Armenian into the country.⁵² Interestingly, the Republic of Armenia has taken great care to welcome these refugees. They do not see these people as refugees but as Armenians from the diaspora who are entitled to protection and full citizenship if they desire. Armenian authorities have established a settlement for them outside the capital, permitting many to flee war-ravaged Syria. They are given access to healthcare and educational opportunities as well as monetary aid from Armenian communities all over the world. Both in Armenia as well as in the United States, massive fundraisers have taken place in attempt to relocate and protect the Armenian community in Syria. A mass-media blitz and fundraising program was initiated over the tragic destruction of the border town of Kessab, located between Syria and Turkey, which is considered one of the oldest Armenian cities in the Middle East. Various ethnic groups, Non-governmental organizations and foreign governments

⁵² <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/armenians-flee-syria-rebels-seize-historic-area-article-1.1738031> (The Associated Press) March 28, 2014.

have set forth programs to assist these newly displaced refugees.⁵³ During the last decade, the ANCA has used global crises like the conflict in the Middle East to strengthen its role and position within the Armenian diaspora. In effect, ANCA has claimed a new leadership role when debate centers around issues of ethnic minorities in the Middle East.⁵⁴

Trans-national elements within the Armenian-American community have revitalized the diaspora in the West, rekindling the emotional ties, commercial and social network links with the homeland as well as with the diaspora throughout the world. These associations within the Armenian diaspora have manifested themselves in different ways. From simple interest in cultural events, political issues, to family bonds and organizational ties. These links have been further crystallized over the last two decades, presenting a new, larger collective notion of urgency and need for financial assistance for the Republic of Armenia. For instance, Armenian-American remittances in 2013 totaled 291 million of the total 1.382 billion in overall remittances entering the small nation.⁵⁵ Both Armenian-American interest groups have implemented a mechanism in which the Armenian nation may allocate resources, apply political pressure, and cultivate international sympathy. As Khachig Tololyan argues, "Armenia's Diaspora is never merely an accident of birth."⁵⁶ Alluding to the idea that the Republic of Armenia encourages emigration in order to increase GDP growth and stabilize the fragile economy within the country.

⁵³ Loveday Morris. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/until-last-month-this-ancestral-home-of-syrian-armenians-had-been-insulated-from-war/2014/04/02/84a97180-5224-40fc-bcdf-6920aae3a7ab_story.html. (April 2nd, 2014)

⁵⁴ Davtyan, Erik. *Armenia Supports Its Diaspora Community in War-Torn Syria*. (The Jamestown Foundation: Global Research & Analysis) October, 14th 2016.

⁵⁵ International Monetary Fund. *Republic of Armenia: 2014 Article IV Consultation and First Review Under the Extended Arrangement-Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and Press Release*. (March 2015)5-12

⁵⁶ Khachig Tololyan, *Rethinking Diaspora: Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment* (University of Toronto Press, 1996), 10-11,27-29

Ultimately, both diasporas which will be assessed within this work have a common cause to pursue. They inherently see their ethnic or communal dilemmas and objectives as being connected to the politics of the host country. Whether in regard to their circumstances in the host nation, historical issues, or an association with the homeland, the "cause" becomes a struggle which unites the members of these ethnic communities. The Armenian community may mobilize around these causes in varying ways, but the commonality of political, historical, and socio-cultural underpinnings reinforces these notions.

As we will see, the Cuban-American community maintains many of the same notions, themes, and perceptions as those of Armenian Americans. A relatively newer community compared to the Armenian, the Cuban community, to a large degree, displays many forms of commonality. The "cause" for Cubans and the development of a diasporal community in the US, with its ability to exert and advance political issues important for them and their homeland, parallels that of the Armenian community. Although differing historical origins and factors led to Cuban immigration to the US, the underlying similarities are difficult to ignore.

CHAPTER 2: THE CUBAN DIASPORA

Cuban-American immigration, like that of its Armenian counterpart, has challenged many academics and researchers attempting to explain and illustrate the success of these émigrés. These refugees and their offspring have established their own enclave, a commercially vibrant community that represents distinct contradictions and cultural notions drawn from their exile identity. Four distinct waves of immigration have impacted and influenced the development of the Cuban-American community. Regardless of the tension inherent in resisting assimilation, successive waves of politically motivated migrants have been able to maintain their identity mainly through the commonality of being political exiles. This conviction, theme, and notion within their socio-political identity has been the cement which interconnects Cuban émigrés to one another and over the four distinct waves of immigration. Despite the difficulties in overcoming a foreign land, language, and customs, the Cuban-American community has cultivated an image of a successful ethnic minority. Interestingly, even those not strictly considered political exiles who arrived in subsequent waves would, in fact, come to embrace the political identity of their forerunners.

Primarily due to Cuba's proximity (only ninety miles separates the Florida Keys from Cuba), the US has played a key role in modern Cuban history. Cuba's geopolitical importance explains the high level of consideration and scrutiny the US has accorded this island neighbor since the nineteenth century.⁵⁷ During the 1868 uprising, when Cubans first sought to overthrow Spanish colonial rule, the US meticulously pursued events on the island. As Cuban historian Andres Rivero Aguero once argued, "In Cuba the influence was Black and Spanish, but there also was a North American influence that cannot be disputed. The third one has been

⁵⁷ Louis A Perez, Jr., *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (The University of Georgia Press Athens and London, 1990), 51-55.

misinterpreted, because it is believed the Cuban people have been submissive to the United States."⁵⁸ Regardless of the exact nature of Anglo influence upon the island, Cubans have been immigrating to the US since the nineteenth century.

As the nineteenth century closed and Cubans agitated for independence, the political and economic events of the island repeatedly made headlines in American newspapers, capturing the attention of many American politicians. During the early 1890s, José Martí, an essayist, journalist, and revolutionary philosopher for Cuban independence, sought to gather and organize thousands of Cuban exiles residing in New York and Florida in support for Cuba's war for independence from Spain. Following the insurrection in February, 1895 and a US Congressional resolution supporting the Cuban cause in 1896, America slowly but surely broadened its scope of involvement with Cuba.⁵⁹

Cuba's independence was facilitated by both William McKinley's election in 1898 and with the US warship *Maine*'s destruction in Havana Harbor. Within two months of the *Maine* incident, American military forces arrived on the island, joining Cuban patriots to take Santiago de Cuba, the island's second largest urban center, in only one month. Because Spanish troops had become fatigued and exhausted fighting the Cuban insurgents for decades, the entry of the US was the last straw for Spanish imperial aspirations on this island nation. Ironically, history refers to this conflict as the Spanish-American War, infuriating many Cubans who see the name as making their participation and struggle for independence inconsequential.⁶⁰ What followed the

⁵⁸ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban-Americans* (The Greenwood Press, 1998), 21-25.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

⁶⁰ Jose M. Hernandez, *Cuba and the Coming American Revolution* (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1993), 11-16. The US occupation of Cuba was a complex period of transition during which many Cubans worried that their struggle for independence would be curtailed by imperialistic designs. Anti-American sentiment arose during this period. The socio-political

war was a succession of corrupt, incompetent, and brutal authoritarian regimes and dictatorships which devastated the nation both socio-politically and economically. From 1902 until 1959, the republic became consumed by the need to define its political and commercial relationship with the US, neglecting the needs of its own population.⁶¹ As a result, what would come to be seen as Castro's Revolution can best be attributed to the instability and inability of Cuban political elites during this period to deal with the socioeconomic dilemmas which were experienced by everyday inhabitants.

As the Armenian Genocide was a catalyst for the first major wave of Armenian immigration to the US, so was the rise of Fidel Castro the starting point for Cuban immigration to the US. As an aspiring politician who obtained notoriety as a hooligan during his university years in Havana, Castro's ability for improvisation and political rhetoric propel him and the Cuban people into a realm of estrangement, creating what we have come to see as the Cuban-American diaspora. Castro himself came to symbolize, for many exiled Cuban-Americans, the sole reason for their departure. Yet, despite his death, Fidel Castro's political apparatus continues to uphold many of the political policies left behind by the recently deceased dictator. In particular, the Cuban state's antagonistic approach toward exiled Cuban-Americans is still very much in full force.

The first wave of Cuban immigration to the US began with Fidel's journey to power. On July 26, 1953 he and his armed group of one hundred young rebels unsuccessfully attacked the military headquarters in Santiago but his failed assault, and the subsequent atrocities committed by the police and the military in the hunt for the assailants quickly, exacerbated an already tense

upheaval brought about by the implementation of the Platt Amendment further reinforced Cuban antagonism toward the US.

⁶¹ Ibid., 109-114.

situation.⁶² By 1958, the government's hold was slipping. Popular sentiment favored the bold resistance and aggression of Fidel Castro, and the inability and unwillingness of the army to fight his rebels sealed the fate of Batista's regime. Batista left Havana with a small group of supporters on December 31, 1958.⁶³ It was unforeseeable that this would spark the first and most significant migration of Cubans to the US. This wave laid the groundwork for future patterns of migration from Cuba and in turn establish the foundation of the Cuban-American community and its subsequent ethnic lobby.⁶⁴

The atrocities resulting from Castro's rise were all-encompassing. Fidel monopolized power after the fall of Batista, controlling not only the seat of government, but also becoming the undisputed leader of the nation. His speeches incited the public to follow his policies. He promised to reapply the Constitution of 1940 and extend social justice to all who had been denied it by corrupt politicians. The cruelty and horrific losses during this transition were far reaching. A ruthless dictator, he targeted Batista partisans and elements loyal to the old regime within the army, then focused on the large corporations who had ties to the US. Land owners, the wealthy entrepreneurial classes, the Catholic Church, the free press--any and all who dared to

⁶² Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 121-129. The evacuation of General Batista astonished both Cuba and the US. Despite the quickly deteriorating sociopolitical environment in Cuba, few truly expected the Batista regime to collapse. Oppositional elements who were not connected with Castro's revolution attempted to seize control of the nation's capital, while the guerrilla rebel leader remained in the province of Oriente, approximately a thousand kilometers away. Despite the slack nature of Castro and his rebels in entering and seizing control of Havana, the enthusiastic outpouring of support for the rebel leader proved who really controlled the island.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 145-150.

⁶⁴ Lester D. Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc New York, 1968), 54-58.

question or oppose him--were targeted.⁶⁵ Even those communists within the government who opposed or criticized Castro's actions were labeled counter-revolutionaries and executed, jailed, or exiled. Countless died and thousands were persecuted and imprisoned. An estimated 2,253 executions by firing squad took place in the first five years of Castro's reign. Forced labor camps and religious repression were common, Cubans' travel was severely restricted and for all intents and purposes, the island became a prison. The estimated two million who left by 1992 were faced with a reality that they would probably never return. Although no exact figures are known regarding the total number of deaths and casualties at the hands of the Cuban government, the brutal legacy left in its wake has marked the Cuban-American community to this day.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Julies R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of the Liberty in an Age of National Liberation* (Princeton University Press, 1990), 210-216.

⁶⁶ Thomas G. Patterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 168-172.

Waves of Cuban Immigration to the US

When addressing Cuban immigration to the US, one finds that the Cuban diaspora has been shaped by three distinctive waves. The first period spanned from 1900 to 1958. The second wave encompassed the years directly after the Cuban Revolution. This second wave, from 1959 to 1989, was not a unified or consistent process of constant migration. This second wave involved those Cubans who were cast out as undesirables by the new communist regime in Cuba. Those who arrived during this pivotal second wave went through a gradual evolutionary process when attempting to rebuild their lives and communities. First, they experienced an initial survival period, then an adjustment stage, but by the late 1980s, the community had achieved an economically advanced stage that saw these Cuban immigrants and their decedents prospering in a new country. This second wave of Cuban migration, as a result of Castro's rise and later dictatorship, came to represent and heavily influence the development of Cuban-American political activism. The third and final wave of Cuban migration to the US began in 1990 and extends into to the present. This current wave of migration has seen dramatic changes in the demographics and the sociopolitical background of new Cuban migrants to the US. These three overarching periods of Cuban immigration to the US have cultivated an ethnic diaspora which has interesting been categorized as one that has given rise to a model minority. The Cuban-American community, both in its ability to create internal communal institutions as well as in its capacity to organize politically, has contributed to this diaporal group's success. The three waves of Cuban migration influenced not only the Cuban-American community, but also impacted bilateral relations between Cuba and the US.

The first major wave of Cuban migration to the US during modern times occurred between 1900 and 1958. During this period thousands of Cuban migrants left their island nation

and made their way to places like Tampa, Miami, and New York. Prior to this first mass wave, the Cuban-American community had, by the mid nineteenth century, already established several economic hubs in the US. Cigar export and import companies throughout Tampa were established by Cuban immigrants attempting to extricate themselves from the heavy-handed Spanish colonial rule that hindered economic opportunities. They also had a thriving cigar-manufacturing operation in southern Florida, which laid the groundwork for a Cuban-American community and culture that Cuban émigrés headed to the US could integrate into and then expand upon.

Overall, the pre-Castro revolutionary period of Cuban migration to the US was considerable. Predating the first major wave of migration by Cubans to the US, from 1868 to 1900, nearly 33,000 Cuban immigrants were allowed entry into the US. In the 1870s, 12,000 were allowed admittance, the vast majority of who were unskilled laborers in the tobacco industry. Prior to Cuba's independence in 1902, the Cuban-American population totaled somewhere above 58,000.⁶⁷ Cuban immigration into the US, Cubans centered in New York, New Jersey, and Florida as places to settle and begin their communities. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, an economic downturn in the international markets, specifically in the industries of sugar and tobacco, found thousands of Cuban laborers without employment. During the 1930s, the number of Cuban immigrants did decline to 9,571 individuals from the previous decade, which had seen 15,901 Cuban immigrants move to the US. This decrease was largely due to the Great Depression, which hampered any hopes of economic improvement for Cuban émigrés to the US. However, for the most part, emigration in the 1920's and 1930's was predominately of Cuban males who migrated due to economic factors. They represented

⁶⁷ Durany, Jorge. *Cuban Communities in the United States: Migration Waves, Settlement Patterns and Socio-Economic Diversity* (Pouvoirs dans la Caraïbe, 1999), 69-103.

unskilled or semi-skilled workers in search of employment as these young men saw no avenue of economic or social improvement in their homeland.

During the last two decades of this first wave of Cuban migration, a total of 26,313 Cubans entered the US, creating an increase of over 150 percent. This increase was mainly due to the growing political tension within the island nation. Many of these immigrants, who were driven by the chance for economic improvement, were also politically disenfranchised. Some of these refugees were artists but most were anti-Batista supporters who were either forced into exile or who chose to leave due to their political stance and, who either voluntarily or involuntarily found the nation to the north an increasingly appealing alternative to the dictatorial rule of Batista. Even though the US had favorable relations with the Batista regime, many who left the island nation for political reasons felt that their ability to criticize the Cuban authorities was largely limited. Those who made their way during the 1950s consisted of Cuban families who could financially afford to make the relocation. Many of these immigrants with financial resources saw the 1952 Batista coup as a signal that further political and economic chaos would envelop Cuba.

By 1958, the Cuban population of the US totaled no more than 125,000. This number also included descendants of Cuban immigrants who had made their way to the US prior to 1900. In addition, when assessing the close to one million Cuban migrants who had registered with the US federal government, nearly 28 percent, almost 268,494 Cuban-Americans had arrived prior to 1960. Interestingly, the Cuban-American diaspora has had almost a century-long presence prior to the eve of Castro's coup in 1959.⁶⁸ By the time second wave Cuban migrants reached US

⁶⁸ Jeanne Batalova & Jie Zong. *Cuban Immigrants in the United States*. (Migration Information Source: The Online Journal, November 9, 2017)

shores, they had compatriots with established ethnic enclaves to help assist the new arrivals during this transition period.

The second wave of Cuban migration to the US occurred from 1959 to 1989, and was a result of the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista's regime by the armed forces led by a charismatic, leftist-leaning Cuban guerrilla partisan named Fidel Castro. This period was marked by two distinct stages. The initial stage of this wave was the period between 1959 and 1973, which constituted, for many new arrivals, a survival and adjustment period. As Miguel Gonzalez-Pando argues, during this stage newly arriving Cubans focused upon furthering the Cuban-American community which had, to that point, already developed some roots in the US. This first stage during the second wave can be considered an acclimation period whereby the newly arriving refugees could build upon the ethnic communal network previously established by those in the first wave. The last half of this second wave of Cuban-American migration embodied a period of economic advancement and a growing element of political activism. Although the second wave of Cuban immigration to the US could be distinguished by two separate stages of ethnic community development, there was a noticeably shared element or connection between various Cuban immigrants tying the community together. The second wave illustrated a shift in the internal characteristics of the exiled Cuban-American community and the resulting political platform of the CANF.⁶⁹

The second wave consisted of followers of Batista, partisans who were associated with the overthrown regime. They represented members of the highly educated and mostly white elite class. Many fled shortly after Castro's rise to power, while others left during the spread of the revolutionary fervor which gripped the country's masses. They were wealthy landowners, sugar

⁶⁹ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban-Americans* (Greenwood Press, 1998), 41-43.

barons, industrialists, entrepreneurs, skilled professionals, merchants, and associates of Cuba's US-owned commercial interests. Because the vast majority came from the upper echelons of the Cuba's socioeconomic hierarchy, their departure left a void in the economic viability of the nation.⁷⁰

Making one's way to the US entailed multiple avenues of access. Those who were fortunate enough to gain immigration status through student or tourist visas made their way to the US relatively quickly. Those who were not as lucky arrived via transit from countries from which they were able to apply for US visas. Many Cuban parents, fearing indoctrination by the Cuban government, permitted approximately 14,000 unaccompanied minors to make their way to America between 1960 to 1962 by means of the covert *Operacion Pedro Pan*, the largest exodus of unaccompanied minors in the history of the Western Hemisphere. After 1961, those leaving were only permitted to take the equivalent of five dollars with them and were forced to forfeit all their property to the Cuban government.⁷¹ These political victims would leave a lasting political image in the minds of many Americans, an image of terrified men, women and children seeking a safe haven from an uncertain and violent communist revolution.

The timing of this migration also corresponded with the growing intensity of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. Because Cuban exiles were leaving a communist government, they saw themselves as being caught in the middle of an international conflict. Many within the US political establishment categorized these exiles as freedom fighters leaving a persecuting Cuba, seeing the migrants as ammunition in their effort to detach support from Castro.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 62-63.

⁷¹ Ibid., 68-70.

The middle and upper classes constituted the vast majority of Cubans in the second wave, but due to the political underpinnings they were fleeing from, most immigrants were destitute upon entering the US. However, they were familiar with American culture, for many had visited and associated with Americans prior to the exodus. They may have previously come to the US for business or for vacations with family. Some had friends as well as personal and business contacts throughout the country, allowing them easy access to lodging and employment when they first arrived. Cuban culture had been exposed to and influenced by American culture, so many of these first wave immigrants were accustomed to American cultural nuances. The demographic portrait of these migrants from 1959 through 1962 illustrates other characteristics: though lacking financial capital, they did have human capital. The group included many college-educated, English-speaking professionals, allowing them access to top positions in American society. Furthermore, these migrants were much older compared to other immigrants arriving in America.⁷²

These second wave exiles settled primarily in and around Miami, hoping for a quick return to Cuba. As more and more Cubans arrived, they gravitated to the southwest areas around Miami, which were lower in rent. The newly arriving Cubans were clannish and many combined their resources to rent small apartments until each family was able to leave and live on their own. But by the mid-1960s, this first wave of Cuban immigrants began to lose hope of returning to

⁷² Louis A Perez Jr., *Cuba: In the American Imagination Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos* (Place: University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill, 2008), 101-108. Subsequently, after the Camarioca boatlift, the Johnson administration responded to the illegal stream of Cuban exiles into Florida with a statement he made at the Statue of Liberty in October 1965. Johnson proclaimed that the US would honor previous commitments and continue to welcome Cubans seeking freedom from oppression. A month later, the executive branch announced it had established an agreement termed the "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Cuban communist regime, by which family and friends of Cuban Americans could emigrate into the country.

Cuba. For many, permanent exile was a hard reality to accept. The Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco and the Soviet Union's further influence and support of the Castro regime reinforced the fact that these Cuban refugees were now facing permanent residence in the US.⁷³

The second wave of Cuban immigration between the period of 1965 to 1973 was prompted by an announcement made by Castro himself. His government would permit Cubans with family residing in the US to leave through the port located at Camaricoa, approximately one hundred miles from Florida. Castro also allowed exiles living in the US to come and gather their friends and family who were left behind in Cuba because regular flights between the two nations had been halted after 1962. Many historians have questioned this action by Castro. The majority of scholars contend that the Castro regime was most likely attempting to purge the island of agitators and dissidents who had any connection to the Cuban exiles residing in America. By opening this demographic wave of Cuban immigration, Castro was signaling to the US that he controlled certain aspects of US immigration policy. Exceedingly successful for Castro's regime, this proposition initiated a hysteria among exiles who wished to reconnect with family they had left. Thousands of exiles took the initiative by sending boats to ferry their relatives to Florida. Within three weeks, approximately 5,000 Cubans made the journey to freedom before US officials stopped the boatlift. While most who fled Cuba during this period represented a predominantly white middle class that, for a short period of time, had supported Castro, this group did in fact include many peasants and blue-collar workers. Men of military age were prevented from coming in large numbers, and therefore females and the elderly were vastly overrepresented in the second wave.⁷⁴

⁷³ Jose Lanes, *Cuban-Americans Masters of Survival* (Cambridge Press, 1947), 45-49.

⁷⁴ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban-Americans* (The Greenwood Press, 1998), 88-91.

President Johnson's authorization of the Cuban Adjustment Act permitted Cuban exiles to alter their legal status to become American naturalized citizens without enduring the lengthy process experienced by refugees from other countries. For eight years, the wave of Cuban immigration continued with short flights from Varadero to Miami transporting thousands seeking a new life. By the time the freedom flights were halted in 1973, 300,000 Cubans had made their way to the US. Assessing the migration from a socioeconomic perspective, the initial period of the second wave had a third of the exiles derived from the professional and managerial classes.⁷⁵ However, by the latter stages, only a fifth would represent this category.

The second wave also initiated a consolidation and unification of various anti-Castro elements within the Cuban-American community. The first Cuban political organizations began to appear at this time. Anti-Castro organizations within the community became united in 1964 when Bacardí Rum owner Pepin Bosch underwrote a massive referendum. Over 75,000 exiles participated in the poll, and as a result, representatives were selected for a new organization, Representacion Cubana del Exilio (RECE.) Under the leadership of Jorge Mas Conosa, this group of exiles raised funds for propaganda campaigns, initiating paramilitary operations which funneled commando resources against Castro's regime. RECE could be seen as the precursor to the development of the Cuban American National Foundation. Like other organizations at the time, it was ultimately subverted and infiltrated by the FBI, and by 1973, its authority and unifying appeal had diminished considerably.⁷⁶

Younger émigrés, the offspring of first and second generation Cuban immigrants, aimed to preserve the essence of the anti-Castro movement. They did so by engaging in civil protests

⁷⁵ Maria Cristina Garcia, *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban-Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994* (University of California Press, 1996), 58-64.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 76-79.

focused on gathering attention to the Cuban issue. The Federation of Cuban Students (FEC), an association that rapidly founded branches in the US, Puerto Rico, and Costa Rica, circulated a monthly periodical, *Antorcha*, and in the process, organized two student congresses. A sister organization, Abdala, was founded in New York in 1971. It attracted attention with a symbolic civil act of protest when its members handcuffed themselves to fixtures in the United Nations building. Radicalism spread throughout the second wave community as students became increasingly bolder in their tactics. By 1972, these organizations began to include nonstudents, allowing a new notion of militancy to rise throughout the Cuban community. Terrorist methods were adopted by activist members, terming the struggle “*le guerra por los caminos del mundo*,” which translates to “*the war through the roads of the world*.”⁷⁷ The political and civil activism of the 1970s, both within the Cuban American community and as a whole throughout American society, laid the foundations for the success the CANF achieved in the next decade.

Terrorism was not a new element of Cuban identity. During the 1960s, these exiles had attempted to assassinate Che Guevara during his United Nations meetings in 1964, and there were other attempts targeting communist officials in Canada and the US during that same decade. During the 1970s, radical elements within the Cuban-American community began to form secret organizations such as the Frente de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Front), the Omega Siete (Omega Seven), Gobierno Cubano Secreto (Secret Cuban Government), and Joven Cuba (Young Cuba), as well as others that attempted to revitalize violence as a means of achieving their political gains. Although illegal, these terrorist operations were supported by the anti-Castro community in the US.⁷⁸ While many throughout the Cuban-American community

⁷⁷ Ibid., 82-86.

⁷⁸ James S. Olson and Judith E. Olson, *Cuban-Americans: From Trauma to Triumph* (Twanye Publishers, 1995), 47-51.

discouraged and opposed these actions, certain elements within the community not only secretly supported these acts but also assisted in raising funds for these operations. The violence conducted by these organizations reached its height in 1974 as radicals began to target pro-Castro exiles such as Jose Elias. From 1973 to 1976, more than 100 bombs were detonated in South Florida. In 1976, anti-Castro forces assassinated Orlando Letelier, a former official of Chile who had ties to Castro's regime. The most tragic and bloody terrorist attack occurred in this same year when Cuban exiles brought down a Cubana de Aviacion airplane off the coast of Barbados, killing seventy-three people.⁷⁹

Despite the publicity gained from these violent, unlawful actions, popular opinion throughout the Cuban-American community began to waver by the early 1980s. Many community leaders and elites within Cuban-American organizations began to believe that terrorism had tarnished the image of the exile and, as a result, had actually strengthened Castro's regime. The Cuban exile community, especially the diaspora concentrated within Southern Florida, also began to experience a new prosperity during the two decades between 1973 and 1993 as the unification and consolidation of Miami's communities ultimately became an economic, social, and political reality.⁸⁰

During this second wave of migration, Cuban immigration to the US was also shaped by an unprecedented move by the Cuban regime who invited a group of seventy-five leading exiles from the US in 1978 to Havana for meetings. The original meeting was set to discuss humanitarian issues, but quickly moved on to a political agenda where it was agreed upon to release political prisoners, establish a preliminary form of communication between Cuban exiles

⁷⁹ Esteban Morales Dominguez and Gary Prevost. *The United States-Cuban relations: A Critical History* (Lexington Books, 2008), 67-73.

⁸⁰ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban-Americans* (The Greenwood Press, 1998), 101-107.

and Cuba, and creating the *Dialogoi* period, which allowed exiles access to Cuba for those wishing to visit. During the process, a dialogue was initiated that eventually set the cornerstone for a mass migration of 125,000 refugees from Cuba's port of Mariel, who came to be termed “*Marielitos*.” Their entry caused dissension and division within the Cuban-American community, challenging the monolithic image of the community. After returning to the US, the seventy-five participants were condemned by their fellow exiles. They were marked as traitors by the majority of Cuban-Americans, who saw these agreements and compromises as reinforcing Castro's legitimacy and as a betrayal of what the Cuban Community had long fought for.⁸¹

In May 1980, the first ships entered Mariel to gather Cuban immigrants. Five months later, approximately 125,000 Cubans arrived on the shores of the US. As a result of this massive influx of new migrants, the Cuban-American community become stigmatized and criticized. The Mariel boatlift cast a long and prevailing darkness over the Cuban-American exile community. Demographically and politically, the new migrants were drastically different compared to the Cubans who had initially arrived. The *Marielitos* consisted of younger immigrants coming from mixed racial backgrounds. Because of the socialist influence in which they had been indoctrinated, these new refugees were deficient in the commercial and professional skills their predecessors possessed. Besides these obvious differences in racial backgrounds and

⁸¹ Susan Eva Eckstein, *The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban-Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland* (Routledge, 2009), 76-80. Affected by the widespread frustration and disapproval with conditions on the island, many Cubans undertook to leave by whatever means possible. During one such incident, a bus crashed through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, which ultimately killed one Cuban guard. As a result, the Peruvian government filed an official protest, and in turn, Castro retaliated by relieving the security forces surrounding the embassy. Within a few days, over 10,000 Cubans crowded the embassy, seeking asylum.

professional training, an inherent division along the lines of political ideologies and shared experiences arose between the newcomers and old guard Cuban Americans.⁸²

In a period of just a few weeks, the negative impact of the boatlift signaled a serious crisis. This massive migration caused severe problems, creating a rigid housing shortage, high unemployment, and a persistent crime wave that exacerbated an already struggling South Florida economy. The newcomers caused so many difficulties initially that President Jimmy Carter declared a state of emergency and distributed funds to assist local and state government agencies in directing and dealing with this problem. Even though many ordinary law-abiding Cubans made their way to the US during this period, the historical record does show that Castro released many prisoners, emptying his jails and sending those convicts, along with many immigrants with mental disabilities, to the US. A temporary encampment was set up in Miami but homeless migrants walked the streets, and violent criminal activity consumed Miami and its surrounding areas. So many criminals were arrested they had to be confined to prisons throughout the country. A large number remained incarcerated even after completing their sentences. The problem was the ambiguous immigration status of these new immigrants. Many Americans wanted to send them back to Cuba, however Castro refused them return entry.⁸³

The third and current wave of immigration impacting the Cuban-American community began during the early 1990s and coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Due in large part to the breakdown and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the economic aid that had promoted and maintained Cuba since the 1960s was withdrawn. With subsidization of Cuba's economy halted, the Cuban economy began to deteriorate. Instability within Cuba began to be seen by many across the Florida straits as the proverbial "nail in the coffin" of Castro's regime,

⁸² Ibid., 89-94.

⁸³ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban-Americans* (The Greenwood Press, 1998), 122-127.

and many throughout the Cuban diaspora recommitted themselves to their "cause." With this revitalization of anti-Castro zeal throughout the Cuban-American community, many began to draw plans and create a strategy that would reconstruct Cuba in their own image. From the viewpoint of many Cuban-Americans, the exodus of Cuban refugees during this period implied that the Castro regime was on its last legs and that Cuba was ripe for a revolution.⁸⁴ The economic situation in Cuba became severe. Economic activity within the nation had dropped by over forty percent since the Soviet Union crumbled, a situation which forced Castro's regime to implement drastic and oppressive policies that frustrated public opinion throughout the island. It was no surprise that by the mid- to late-1990s, human rights and dissident organizations spread throughout all levels of Cuban society, forging ties between working alliances and exile political groups. Although these associations were not formal links, they did represent a tactical threat to the communist regime in Cuba. As Cuba experienced an ever more difficult and precarious economic situation, Castro, always known for creative and sometimes desperate ploys to maintain power, agreed to another open door policy.⁸⁵

This demographic release, or escape, depending on which view one espoused, took the form of rafts and small homemade boats and vessels which disembarked from Cuba in the thousands. Castro's scheme again worked flawlessly. By mid-1994, as thousands upon thousands of *balseros* (rafters) made their way to the US, the Clinton administration transacted a compromise with Cuba to halt or curtail this new wave of refugees. This new agreement curtailed and dismantled the advantageous status, previous immigrant Cubans had held by suspending the open-arms policy. However, the concealment and covertness of US officials when conducting these agreements with Cuba fueled fears and protests by exiles who saw the

⁸⁴ Ibid., 197-199

⁸⁵ Ibid., 97-99.

reconstruction of formal relations between the two nations as once again reinforcing Castro's position within the island.⁸⁶

For the most part, third wave immigrants were not motivated by political issues within Cuba but left the island nation because of economic problems instead. The vast majority had been born and raised under the Castro regime and knew very little about their fellow countrymen residing in the US. The Clinton administration altered immigration policy further in 1995, agreeing that the US would only admit those refugees who reached mainland America. Those who were caught at sea en route to the US would be subsequently returned to Cuba. This policy would come to be known as the “wet foot, dry foot” policy. The US also initiated a lottery system that accepted limited numbers of qualifying Cuban immigrants to the US within two-year intervals. Those accepted by the lottery system would be given a temporary visa, and after a medical examination, participants would be allowed entry to the US.⁸⁷

For ten years, Cuba and the US conducted no formal discussions or meetings regarding immigration policy. In 2010, a meeting took place in which immigration policy was discussed, focusing on procedures, legal stipulations, and safety policies for Cuban migration to the US. Since then, the third wave of Cuban immigration has not diminished or ended by any means. In 2013, 13,664 Cuban immigrants legally entered the US, the highest number to enter the country yet. This influx marked an increase over the 8,273 Cuban immigrants entering in 2012 and in 2011, when only 5,973 entered.⁸⁸ Many see the increase as a result of Cuba's new immigration reforms which revamped restrictions on citizens and allowed a much more friendly, open-door

⁸⁶ Ibid., 205-211

⁸⁷ Susan Eva Eckstein, *The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban-Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland* (Routledge, 2009), 91-95.

⁸⁸ Henriette M. Rytz. *Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban-American Story of Success and Failure* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 178-183.

policy for those seeking to leave. This reform also assisted in awarding what are termed "white cards," which are exit visas or travel visas issued to thousands of Cubans. The vast majority of these migrants now enter the US not through Florida, but from the Mexican-US border. Sixty-eight percent of these immigrants are under the age of forty. In spite of these reforms, illegal immigration from the island has not been deterred. During 2012, 1,300 Cubans were detained by the US Coast Guard when attempting to enter the country illegally.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Ibid., 201-204.

A New Cuban Diasporal Identity

The transnational connection between Cuban exiles in America and Cubans living in the homeland has seen a dramatic shift during the last few decades. This shift has been embodied by the new Cuban-American generation, which sees a stronger link between themselves and their compatriots back on the island. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic catastrophes of the 2000s, the communist regime in Cuba has seen the benefit of its Cold War rival on the other side of the straits. Focusing on remittances from the American side of the straits, the Cuban government has come to not only tolerate but also to understand and encourage transnational income transfers. According to Cuba's National Statistics and Information Bureau (ONE), in 2012 the total of remittances entering Cuba figured 2.6 billion in US dollars. In 2013, the figure jumped to 3.1 billion remittance dollars entering the country.⁹⁰ The influx of the fourth wave of migration has shown that these new Cuban immigrants felt it imperative to help the relatives they left behind. In addition, although politically marginalized within the Cuban-American community due to their income-sharing capabilities and willingness to forge transnational connections with the homeland, these new Cuban migrants have proven to be a far more potent force in changing Cuba than previous exiles could have ever imagined. For instance, 70 percent of Cuba's mobile phone market, over 1.6 million cell phone users, is financed through Cuban émigrés' income transfers back home. Furthermore, and especially for a communist country that for so long closed its doors to technology and the outside world, the Cuban government has recently opened 118 cybercafés offering public internet access points to

⁹⁰ Emilio, Morales. "Cuba: 2.6 Billion in Remittances in 2012," (*Havana Times.*, Miami, Florida) June 11, 2013. , In this news article , Morales claims Cuban-American remittances are increasing from just under a billion dollars a year in 2000 to 2.6 billion in 2012. In addition, new governmental policies have been implemented by the Cuban government over the last five years that have encouraged the sending of funds, but more importantly, this interconnection has spawned the funding of new business within Cuba, particularly the rental and sale of real estate.

facilitate a more efficient method to foster and access Cuban-American remittances.⁹¹ Even though current investment restrictions curtail Cuban-American investment in Cuba, the Cuban diaspora is by far the most crucial element driving the island country's economy, and one that might become a greater force when new liberalization is allowed and exiles are permitted to participate in the economy in a more direct and productive manner.

Anticipating institutional changes in Cuba due to Castro's demise seems a safer operation than forecasting what this process might entail for the CANF. Similar to the Armenian-American community, the once commonplace assumption that a collapse of the communist regime would generate an immense influx of exiles back to the homeland no longer seems realistic. Overall, estimates and projections signify that the result of such an event will instead usher in a new wave of refugees from Cuba, in spite of America's policy position to not let this happen. Despite the death of Castro, a new Cuban-American identity has arisen, no longer considering itself an exile community.⁹² More so than ever, during the last decade, Cuban-Americans have strengthened their homeland connections in the forming a new notion of what being Cuban-American means.

Five hundred thousand Cubans entered the US in the first 15 years after the Cuban Revolution, and according to the 2010 US Census, approximately 1.8 million people of Cuban descent now reside in the US. The demographic realities of this community, regardless of legal status or place of birth, display dramatic differences and shifts during the last few decades.⁹³ For

⁹¹ Emilio Morales and Joseph L Scarpaci, *Remittances Drive the Cuban Economy*, (The Havana Consulting Group)

⁹² Santiago, Fabiola. *Curb Your Ethusiasm. Cuba Isnt Truly 'Opening Up' to Cuban-American Travel*. (Miami Herald November, 2017)

⁹³ Jesus Arboleya, *Cuban-Americans in relation to Cuban and U.S. Societies*. (Progresoweekly Oct, 30 2013). In this article , Arboleya focuses on US society and Cuban-Americans and how Cuban culture has changed, although most Cuban-Americans reject the claim that they and their

example, the demographic changes within the Cuban-American community have altered the ideological stance of one of its most prominent ethnic interest groups, that of the CANF. As of 2013, twenty-one percent of the Cuban-American population was eighteen years old or younger, and twenty-eight percent fit between the age group of nineteen and forty. These numbers show that almost half of the Cuban-American population represents young individuals who are likely to interpret their role and place in the community within a different mode compared to their elders. This younger generation, and the connections they have with Cuba, are more diffuse than those of their parents and grandparents, allowing for a new transnational context in which to reassert their Cuban-American character. In a poll conducted in 2011 by the Cuban Research Institute (CRI), fifty-seven percent of Cuban-Americans supported the policy of open and free travel for Americans to Cuba without any restrictions. In addition, sixty-one percent of Cuban-Americans opposed any prohibitory legislative action aimed at curtailing this travel ability.⁹⁴ With a median rate of seventy-two percent supporting open access to Cuba, it is not surprising that this most recent wave of Cuban immigration has changed the degree of influence and margin of maneuverability for the CANF when it comes to Cuban issues. In result, it is plausible to argue that amongst Cuban-Americans between 19 and 40 years of age, the cultural needs related to the very identity of being Cuban-American have shifted. No longer is the isolation of Cuba fundamental in linking their Cuban identity in America. Although the majority of Cuban-Americans still wish for a day in which they may return to Cuba without the presence of a Castro's regime, it is no longer a crucial element of their socio-cultural existence. As of 2013,

compatriots in Cuba possess different cultural traits. The evidence within the last few decades shows a new generation of Cuban-Americans casting their own way and identifying themselves within a North American society with ties to Cubans, not only in Cuba but also in Cuban communities throughout North and South America.

⁹⁴ 2014 FIU CubaPoll: How Cuban Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba. (FIU Cuban Research Institute, 2014), 7-13

four hundred thousand US travelers visited Cuba, the vast majority Cuban-Americans, and this number is expected to grow in the next few years as this new Cuban-American generation sees their homeland as a place to revitalize and connect with their "Cubanness."⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Anna Brown and Eileen Patten, *Hispanics of Cuban Origin in the United States*, (PewResearch Hispanic Trends Project, June 19, 2013)

CHAPTER 3: ARMENIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL GROUPS

The modern political struggles of the Armenians dates back over a century and a half. The inroads and missteps made by these Armenian political organizations, who had their roots in the final period of the Ottoman Empire, laid the cornerstone for the nature of the political goals and objectives Armenian ethnic interest groups would present within the US. The first noticeable Armenian political party, which presented a distinct political platform, a central organizational body, and a formal newspaper, was the Armenakan party. Founded in the city of Van during the last few months of 1885, the organization came to represent the first steps in a distinct Armenian political group. The leading personality and guiding founder was Mkrtich Portukalian. The eldest son of a wealthy Constantinople banker, Portukalian's travels and formal academic training throughout nineteenth-century Europe had opened his mind to the possibility of resolving the systematic discrimination many indigenous Armenians were experiencing during this period. Yet, due to factional strife among the Armenians and the fear of radicalism from Ottoman authorities, Portukslian was forced into exile. Portukslian subsequently founded the Armenakan party in 1885 in Marseilles.⁹⁶ With a published journal and the beginnings of a political network, Portukslian began to disseminate the main points of his political philosophy, one that argued Armenians throughout the diaspora should assist their compatriots in their native land, both financially and by telling the world about their oppressed condition. Regardless of Portukslian's absence in the Ottoman empire, the political networks he developed in the 1870s and 1880s influenced many leading Armenians throughout the region to take up his cause. The failures and unorganized exploits of this first Armenian political group in the late 1880s and early 1890s,

⁹⁶ Jenny Phillips, *Symbol, Myth and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American Population* (New York: AMS Press, 1989), 43-45.

both in terms of inciting violence and political action in eastern Anatolia, brought about deep schisms within the organization's members. Many of the ideas Portukalian and his disciples put forth were lost in the relentless cycle of inter-ethnic killing throughout the region.⁹⁷

Against this backdrop of increasing draconian policies against Ottoman-Armenians, two major ethno-political organizations were being created. First developed in 1887 in Geneva, the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party was founded upon Marxist principles. Its initial members were predominately Russian-Armenians who had incorporated many of the ideas of Portukalian and merged those notions with a more violent political activism of the Cacusian revolutionary ideology, which had taken root during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The party, which would come to be known as "Hunchak," translating as "clarion" or "bell," derived its name from its official newsletter. The founding seven members of this ethnic political party educated in the universities of Western Europe and had their political ideas heavily shaped by democratic ideologies. Corresponding with Frederick Engles, Georgi Plekhanov, and Vladimir Lenin their main purpose and political objective were the furthering of political freedom and revolutionary goals in Turkish Armenia, their motto being, "Those who cannot attain freedom through revolutionary armed struggle are unworthy of it."⁹⁸ With the death of the first Armenian Republic in 1920 and the establishment of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921, all political parties other than the official Armenian communist party were outlawed. Those political organizations who opposed communist ideological notions found a safe haven throughout the vast Armenian diaspora. The distinguishing element within the Hunchak party was its support and further development of the Armenian SSR--the main opposition to Hunchak influence would

⁹⁷ Ibid., 108

⁹⁸ Chalabian, Antranig. *General Andranik and the Armenian Revolutionary Movement*. (Southfeild, Michigan. Antranig Chalabian, 1988)p.58-59.

derive from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) during the majority of the twentieth century.

Connected with the Hunchak party, the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADL), also known as the Ramgavar party, established in 1921 in Constantinople would be one of the two main organizations in support of a Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia. Both the Ramgavar and Hunchak organizations came to represent a counterpoint and were the main opponents of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and consequently, rivals of the ANCA. The mid-20th century saw inter-ethnic tension and conflict between both these left-leaning groups, such as the Ramgavar's and Hunchakan groups, with those affiliated with the ARF throughout the diaspora. This fight over the ideological soul of the Armenian-American community, as of the 21st century, has been completely absent.⁹⁹ The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and its political ethnic interest group known as the ANCA, was by far the most domineering force. Although, other Armenian lobbying organizations, such as the Armenian Assembly of America would represent those politically minded members of the Armenian American community who opposed the ANCA, the Armenian National Committee of America has predominated in the nation's capital.

The parent organization of the Armenian National Committee of America, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, has become the main ethnic interest group for the Armenian-American community. Unlike the Armenian Assembly of America, the ARF was founded much earlier. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), also known as “Dashnaktsutyun,” or in short

⁹⁹ Harutyunyan, Arus. *Contesting National Identities in an Ethnically Homogeneous State: The Case of Armenian Democratization* (Michigan: Western Michigan University), 81-83. The ARF centers its efforts and focuses solely on the Armenian cause. One key aspect of this organization is its efforts in regaining their lost homeland in what they term as "Western Armenia." The party has stated on multiple times that historical justice will only be achieved once this aim has been accomplished.

form, "Dashnak," was established in 1890 in Tiflis, Georgia by Christopher Mikaelian, Stephan Zorian, and Simon Zavarian.¹⁰⁰ Ideologically speaking, the ARF was originally influenced by democratic socialism. However, during the midst of the Cold War, many of its leadership had taken upon themselves to move their political ideological leanings closer to the center right. By far the ARF has the largest membership when compared to other ethnic Armenian political organizations, establishing affiliates and satellite branches in more than twenty-two countries.¹⁰¹ Set side by side with other Armenian parties, which tend to mainly focus upon education and humanitarian efforts, the ARF is solely politically oriented. The ARF has traditionally been a staunch proponent of Armenian nationalism and within the US has been campaigning for the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide, the right of reparations, the establishment of an Independent Nargono Karabach, as well as the realization of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920.¹⁰² This political organization was key in the creation and formation of the Frist Republic of Armenia in 1918. Many of its founding leadership were exiled by the communists after the establishment of the 1921 Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic but in exile the leadership of the ARF established itself throughout the diaspora, laying the foundation for the Armenian diaspora communités throughout the world. Those who found their way to the US laid the cornerstone for the Armenian National Committe of America.¹⁰³ The party currently has members both in the Armenian national assembly and within the Parliament of Lebanon.

¹⁰⁰ Bakalian, Amy. *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling American* (Routledge, 2011), 93.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 78-81.

¹⁰² Burdett, Anita L.P. *Armenia: Political and Ethnic Boundaries, 1878-1948*. (Archive Editions, 1998) , p.1067.

¹⁰³ Federal Research, Division (2004). *Lebanon a Country Study*. (Kessinger Publishing 2004) p.185-188

As mentioned earlier, the Armenian National Committee of America, a branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, is the most influential Armenian lobbying association in the US. Its affiliate organizations worldwide publish 11 newspapers: 4 daily and 7 weekly publications. In addition, the ARF and its political subsidiaries have established two television channels, plus one online streaming portal and two radio stations that air content every day. The ANCA was originally founded in 1918 and was first designated the American Committee for Independence of Armenia (ACIA). It came together after World War I and was founded by Vahan Cardashian. Ironically, Cardashian was the former Consul of the Ottoman Empire in Washington, DC.¹⁰⁴ Noteworthy participants and proponents of the ACIA were James W. Gerard, a US Ambassador to Germany; Senator Henry Cabot Lodge; and Charles Evans Hughes. The main purpose of the ACIA was the independence of Armenia under the guidelines introduced by Woodrow Wilson. Termed “Wilsonian Armenia,” it attempted to establish the first Armenian Republic with the Treaty of Sevres. The ACIA established its headquarters in New York City and by 1940, had already formed 23 regional offices in 13 states. The ACIA, in partnership with the Wilson administration, raised over 117 million dollars, the equivalent of 1.5 billion in today’s US dollars, in an effort to help the Armenians. In 1941, the ACIA re-branded and were renamed the Armenian National Committee of America.¹⁰⁵ It operates under this title to this day.

¹⁰⁴ Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Routledge, 2010), 487.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 118-121.

The Armenian National Committee of America

The Armenian National Committee of America has been described by many American statesmen as realistically the "largest, most vocal, best-organized, and most well-funded" Armenian-American ethnic interest group.¹⁰⁶ The true beginnings of political activism for the ANCA began during the late 1930s with the onset of European conflict and the gradual US political stance against fascism. The fierce ideological divisions which shaped the Armenian-American community later in the century began to appear during this period. A number of resonating dilemmas appeared during the war and post-war period that forced many Armenian-Americans to identify with their ancestral homeland and engage in political activism. As World War II closed and the Cold War began, the ANCA, due to their anti-Soviet stance, began to exert more influence upon domestic and foreign policy initiatives within the US. During the last two decades, these ethnic Armenian interest groups have garnered considerable resources and political gains from Congress. For instance, one such success was financial aid, which, on average, can be assessed on an annual basis to the amount of 88 million in US aid to the Republic of Armenia. Yet, for our purposes when assessing the ANCA, the focus will center upon Section 907 of the Freedom of Support Act in the 1990s, which achieved many of the goals set forth by the ANCA. And it was under Section 907 that dealt a major blow to Azerbaijan in receiving arms and financial or political support from the US.¹⁰⁷ Azerbaijan, an ethnic Turkish nation-state to the east of present day Armenia, has been engaged in a territorial dispute with the

¹⁰⁶ Embassy Yerevan. "Armenia's Opponents to Protocols Ratchet Up Their Rhetoric." https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09YEREVAN687_a.html . (Sept 30th, 2009)

¹⁰⁷ Atabaki, Touraj, *Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora* (Transnational Democracy 1st Edition, Book17, 2009), 238.

Republic of Armenia since the early 1990s. Furthermore, the ANCA has gathered support for official US recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

The level of US assistance and relief for Armenia and Armenian-related concerns are shocking at times. Approximately 1 million Armenians reside within the borders of the US, with the majority living in California and Massachusetts, and their numerical electoral impact is relatively minimal when compared to other ethnic groups in the US. Additionally, the region of Transcaucasia has traditionally not been a bone of contention or of relative importance to the US foreign policy objectives. Ironically, Armenia is relatively lacking in natural resources when compared to Azerbaijan, with which Armenia has an active land and border dispute and should in turn exert less influence upon US foreign policy aims than it currently does.¹⁰⁸ However, Armenia receives considerable US support both in terms monetary as well as material assistances from the US. Despite some undemocratic practices, such as excluding certain political parties and the censorship of the media, there is relatively little mention of Armenia in US media outlets. The question arises, what accounts for this degree of US support on Armenian issues? The intensive efforts of organizations such as the ANCA, and at certain moments the AAA, clearly explain the cause of this support.

¹⁰⁸ Dennis Papazian, "Armenians in America," *Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* (2007): 38-41.

CHAPTER 4 - CASE STUDY: THE ANCA AND THE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 1992

The Freedom Support Act of October 1992 ushered in a transitional period for the nature of US assistance to the former Soviet Union. It moved away from an impromptu form of aid which constituted agricultural credit guarantees, food stuff and medical assistance, toward a more protracted and strategic long-term development plan. It would embody an effort to assist former Soviet states in technical fields as well as expanding a variety of US private sector investment opportunities.¹⁰⁹ The main purpose of the Freedom Support Act was to fill in the vacancy of knowledge and support now missing due to Russia's weakened position. The act attempted to continue the required commercial and political reforms which began in the early 1990s. Approximately fifty percent of the 2.26 billion dollars?, which were set aside from 1992 through 2000, were allocated for projects and programs within Russia. One hundred eighty-seven million dollars of US funds were devoted to program development and modernization efforts in Armenia.¹¹⁰ Yet, during a 16-year period of direct US relations with Armenia, assistance to the young Republic has been estimated at over 2 billion dollars in funds. Many consider Armenia the highest per-capita US aid recipient among newly independent states and humanitarian aid accounts for appoxamilty 80 percent of this total.¹¹¹ Much of the US monetary aid directed toward these newly established nations was due in large part to the economic paralysis caused by the strategic and organized blockades of Armenia's borders by Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, during the last decade, much has changed within Armenia—the economic situation has stabilized

¹⁰⁹ Carcelli, Shannon. *The 1992 FREEDOM Support Act and the Roots of Fragmentation*. (Sept 2017).,31-34

¹¹⁰ United States. Department of State. Bureau of European and Eurassian Affairs. (U.S Bilateral Realtions Fact Sheet- U.S Relations with Armenia Oct, 2017) <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5275.htm>

¹¹¹ United States Embassy in Armenia. *United States and Armenia SIgn Trade and Investment Framework Agreement*.(<https://am.usembassy.gov/united-states-armenia-sign-trade-investment-framework-agreement/>), U.S Mission Armenia, 7 May, 2015.

due to increased energy production and the relaunch of Armenia's Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant.¹¹² Also, Armenian ethnic lobbying organizations such as the ANCA have continued their efforts in increasing funds to the Republic of Armenia..

The objective of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 was in essence to assist and further develop the newly independent Soviet Socialist Republics by laying the groundwork for bilateral economic relations and economic assistance in 13 specific sectors. In Armenia, US monetary and technical expertise took the form of humanitarian needs, educational assistance, the administration of justice, and civilian nuclear reactor safety.¹¹³ Especially in terms of the Republic of Armenia, Congress outlined that the main goal was to have technical and managerial support, which would be implemented on a long-term, on-site basis, whereby diagnostic assessments of institutional agencies and their operational capacity were advised. The foreign policy initiatives also encouraged monetary and personnel resources be sent through nongovernmental organizations and enterprise private agencies. Since the 1992 bill was enacted, the US State Department aimed at achieving three main goals for Armenia. First, they aimed to further the rise of a competitive and efficient market-oriented economy, based upon the US model, which would allow individuals to acquire economic resources and manage decision-making power over the newly privatized industries on an individual basis. Second, the legislation also attempted to structure a transparent and accountable federal government, whereby the citizens of the Republic of Armenia would use democratic mechanisms to participate and gauge

¹¹² Robin S. Bhatti, *Tough Choices: Observations on the Political Economy of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*. (Mimeo, prepared for the World Bank, Dec 2002) p.10-13

¹¹³ Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, & Michael McFaul. *Domestic and International Influences on the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and Russia's Initial Transition to Democracy (1993)*. (Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, March 2009)p.9-11

domestic government policy.¹¹⁴ The final aim was to reformulate private sector roles in key sectors of civil society such as in the health, social services, and transportation sectors of the newly freed Soviet Socialist Republics.

Bill H.R 4547, known as the Freedom Support Act of 1992, was initially sponsored and introduced by Florida Representative Dante Fascell in the House foreign affairs committee on March 24, 1992. It passed the House on August 6, 1992 without any objections and passed the US Senate on October 1, 1992 with 154 Democrats and 78 Republican senators voting in the affirmative. The nays were respectively 86 from the Democratic party and 77 from the other side of the aisle. There was one nay vote from an independent, leaving the final vote at 232 in favor and 164 in opposition. Congressional abstentions were recorded as 36. George H.W. Bush would sign the law into effect on October 24, 1992.¹¹⁵ Section 907 of this bill was the focal point and main contribution of the ANCA. Specifically the ANCA attempted to cut Azerbaijan from any US assistance, due to the ongoing conflict in Nagorno Karabach. The provision, which would become the single most successful achievement for the ANCA, read as follows: "The United States assistance under this or any other Act may not be provided to the government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh."¹¹⁶The ANCA had finally achieved one of its policy goals it had pursued since the outbreak of the conflict.

¹¹⁴ King, David & Miles Pomper, *The U.S Congress and the Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from U.S Policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan*. (The Journal of Armenian Studies, Dec 2002)p.12

¹¹⁵ Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Freedom Support Act of 1992: A Foreign Aid Program for the Former Soviet Union*. (Vol 5. 1992)

¹¹⁶ Baser, Bahar & Ashok Swain. *Diaspora Design Versus Homeland Realities: Case Study of Armenian Diaspora*. (Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3.1 2009) p42-44

The passage and continual maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act is without a doubt the cornerstone for Armenian ethnic interest groups. The legislation was ratified in 1992 to provide US financial and technical resources to former Soviet states after the fracture of the Soviet Union. Section 907 was added to the bill as an addendum referred to as the Freedom Support Act; it specifically restricts Azerbaijan from receiving US aid as long as Azerbaijan continues the conflict with Armenia and furthers the blockade of Armenia. What would be known as Section 907 (a) "rider" to the overall legislation of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 was formulated in the late stages and was nudged into both the House and Senate through the direct support of specific lawmakers like John Porter, Bob Dole, and Ted Kennedy. As ANCA internal documentation and comments show, the lobbying efforts of the ANCA were instrumental in attaching this clause to the overall bill.¹¹⁷

Between the period of 1990 to 2010, the ANCA became the most effective and successful lobbying organization within the Armenian-American community. In a fund-raising event in 2000, Hirair Hovanian, the former Chairman of the Board of Trustees for the ANCA, underscored the following three achievements, which have culminated in over 5 decades of ethnic lobbying efforts within the US. Hovanian states, " First, with the help of our friends in Congress, we secured an \$85 million earmark in US assistance for Armenia in 1996... we achieved \$95 million in 1998." He maintained that, "We achieved our second legislative goal with the passage of the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act...prohibiting American foreign aid to any country that blocks the delivery of US humanitarian assistance to a third country, which is now

¹¹⁷ Tarnoff, Curt. *U.S Assistance to the Former Soviet Union 1991-2001: A History of Administration and Congressional Action.*(Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 2002).p.28

the law of the land."¹¹⁸ Later in his speech he mentioned the development and implementation of a "Transcaucasus Enterprise Fund, which would allocate 15 million in furthering peaceful economic cooperation and dialogue." By 2010, Armenia had become the single largest beneficiary of US aid per capita in the world after Israel. In addition, Hovnanian stated in regards to the Corridor Act that, "US aid to Turkey should also be terminated," due to the ongoing blockade conducted by Turkey and Azerbaijan.¹¹⁹ The concrete success the ANCA experienced during this period would allow the organization to further justify its importance and clout within the Armenian-American community.

¹¹⁸ United States District Court For the District of Columbia: *The Armenian Assembly of America, Inc vs Gerard L Cafesjian*: (Memorandum Opinion. January 26, 2011).,7-11

¹¹⁹ Gorgulu, Aybars, *Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle* (Foreign Policy Analyses. Tesev, May 2008. p43-45

The ANCA and the Marshalling of Resources

One of the ways in which to assess the success and effectiveness of ethnic interest groups in the US is by measuring their ability to marshal resources. The ability to tap into both community and private financial resources is the main element in determining whether a given ethnic interest group can meet the goals it has set forth. The ability of the ANCA to access community resources, both financial and social, in order to further their objectives has been widely reported upon. Yet, an in-depth assessment of the means and actual monetary levels of this assistance has been continually glossed over. The first challenge in assessing the level of and ability to marshal resources is determining the number of Armenians residing in the US. Accurate numbers are difficult to gather due to many reasons. First, as a thirty-five-year-old third-generation Armenian-American post-graduate from UCLA's mathematics department, Abraham Yenijikian, mentioned to me regarding the approximate numbers of self-identifying Armenians in the US, "Although I have never been active in the Armenian-American community, I do first and foremost identify as an Armenian." When asked if he claims his Armenian ethnicity when giving census data or on government paperwork, he responds, "No, I claim white. I try not to give census data, because of discrimination." He continued, "I think a feeling of fear still persists as being identified as Armenian. I feel it to this day, never stepping foot in Armenia."¹²⁰ Conversely, when asked the same questions, Abraham Yenijikian replied, "I've never attended Armenian requiem at an Armenian church nor have I ever been to an Armenian Genocide recognition event, but I still send my donations to non-profit Armenian organizations every year." When asked why, Yenijikian claimed, "It was the least I can do to

¹²⁰ Gournasyan, Michael, Personal Interview: 19 February 2016

maintain my ‘Armenianness’.”¹²¹ Calculating the numbers is at best difficult, but from minimal estimates, approximately 468,000 American citizens claim at least one parent of Armenian ancestry. Approximately 66 percent speak two languages, one being Armenian. Despite the margin of error set at +/-10.5 percent, many scholars have argued that census data regarding ethnic groups such as the Armenians who attempt to blend into the host nation are difficult to gauge.¹²² As Anny Bakalian argues, estimates range for the number of Armenian-Americans in the US from 500,000 to almost a million. Another recent 2015 study set the number at 1.1 million. Whatever the case, the per-capita income for Armenians recorded in US census data illustrates the relative socioeconomic status of Armenian American families at \$69,878 for the 2010 fiscal year. The average US family household income is \$40,103.¹²³

The marshalling of resources for organizations such as the ANCA resulted in relative success due to the higher base incomes of Armenian-American households. During the last twenty-seven years, the ANCA has raised an estimated \$200 million from the Armenian-American community. Although some estimates claim a much larger amount, closer to 400 million, the ANCA has nevertheless successfully tapped the financial capabilities of the Armenian diaspora in the US to further its goals.¹²⁴ In addition, the ANCA has undertaken numerous fundraising events to secure this monetary assistance. Prior to the passage of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, the ANCA had raised, in a span of 8 months, just over 11 million dollars

¹²¹ Yenijikian, Abraham, Personal Interview: (Student In Math Department UCLA) 19 February, 2016

¹²² United States Census Bureau. *American FactFinder: People Reporting Ancestry, B04006*. (<https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk>) 2016

¹²³ Anny Bakalian, , *Armenian Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (Routledge, 2011), 76-81.

¹²⁴ Jaffe, Maayan, “Armenian-American Lobby is Powerful, Despite Overt Support of Iran, Russia and Opposition to Isreal, Azerbaijan,” *The Times of Isreal* Jerelesum, Israel Oct. 24, 2014.

for lobbying efforts.¹²⁵ Armenian leaders who played a direct role in advancing Armenian-American issues in the mid- to late-1990s claimed that "raising money was not difficult in the Armenian community."¹²⁶ According to Internal Revenue Service, the Armenian community as a whole raised \$34 million in non-taxable funds for charities in 2015 alone. For instance, when compared with a total population of 500,000 Armenian-Americans, this result averaged \$680 per person in donations to ethnic and cultural Armenian-American organizations.¹²⁷ The funds that the ANCA have gathered have allowed them to further certain policy recommendations through the Armenian Caucus in Congress. The effective means by which these ethnic interest groups collected monetary resources from their ethnic community helped organize effective lobbying structures. These funds allowed the ANCA to disseminate information to members of Congress and the American media. As Congressman Chris Smith from New Jersey once mentioned, "The Armenian-American organizations through financial backing from their community are professional, speedy, and relevant." They constantly send monthly talking points and Q&A documents refuting Turkish and Azeri official state department claims.¹²⁸ These efforts are only maintained through the ANCA's ability to marshal financial resources from the Armenian-American community.

Since the Freedom Support Act of 1992 was passed, a total of 2.1 billion in US monetary aid has been sent to the Republic of Armenia, an astonishing amount for those who know very

¹²⁵ Daniel S. Parker, *Diaspora Influence Impacting United States Policy in the Caspian Littoral* (University of Nebraska Omaha, 2002), 60-61.

¹²⁶ Nicole Itano, "Armenia's Diaspora Funds a Religious Revival," *The Christian Science Monitor* (April 2007).

¹²⁷ United States Embassy of Armenia. (Internal Revenue Service, April 2016)
<https://am.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/internal-revenue-service-u-s-taxes/>

¹²⁸ Sagnip, Jeff. *Congressman Smith Joins Commemoration of 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide*.(U.S Congressman Chris Smith Representing New Jersey's 4th District, April, 2015)

little about Armenian lobbying efforts. Public opinion has, in many ways, contributed to the relative success in collecting monetary resources for the ANCA. The issues and concerns for the ANCA, and to a great extent the Armenian-American community as a whole, have very little presence in the minds of average Americans. Thus, in terms of average public opinion among Americans, the lobbying efforts of Armenian-Americans are mostly unheard of and the issues about which Armenian-Americans are concerned lay relatively under the radar for most people.¹²⁹ Yet another advantage for the Armenian-American community, which author Thomas Ambrosio mentions, is the lack of public knowledge to form an opinion regarding Armenian issues, allowing lawmakers to vote on Armenian concerns without the threat of serious public discourse.¹³⁰ In addition, the ANCA was able to marshal both political and monetary resources more effectively by tapping into philanthropic projects, for instance, the Armenia Fund, which has for the last sixteen years collected an approximate 280 million for the purpose of building infrastructure in the Republic of Armenia. This fund has a close affiliation with the ANCA. Furthermore, it's been suggested that, in the presidential election of 2008, Armenian-Americans donated through ethnic interest groups 7 million dollars and these funds were then directed to both political campaigns.¹³¹ As a result of the Armenian-American ethnic interest group's ability to marshal resources, there has been a significant increase in the number of positive votes for the Armenian Genocide resolutions in Congress. Finally, the monetary gains during the last three

¹²⁹ United States Department of State: Diplomacy in Action.(*U.S Relations With Armenia*).
<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5275.htm>

¹³⁰ Thomas Ambrosio, *Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, (Praeger Publishers, 2001), 43.

¹³¹ Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 72-74.

decades have allowed the ANCA to further its influence through the congressional caucus on Armenia, which has doubled its size from 2001 to 2011, reaching 154 law-makers.¹³²

Measuring the amount of US foreign aid allows scholars and academics the ability to gauge the relative success of an ethnic interest group. When assessing the period of 1990-1999, of all the 151 nations that had been allocated foreign aid by the US, Azerbaijan ranked last, where Armenia falls in the 18th spot. More surprising is the fact that Armenia was not allocated US foreign assistance during the first two years of the 1990s and only started receiving aid in 1992. The ANCA's lobbying efforts had a direct and concrete impact upon the newly formed Republic. For example, in 1999, Armenia accepted 74.3 million in US assistance and by 2005, that number had reached over 200 million, which included 85 million of direct US foreign aid and another 118 million from the US Agency for International Development. Interestingly, when assessed on an individual basis, Armenia received \$67.07 US dollars per every man, woman, and child. When compared to Azerbaijan for the 2010 fiscal year, it received \$6.25 U.S dollars for every citizen. When aggregated over the total Armenian-American population, it results to the amount of \$259.03 per person.¹³³ Meanwhile, with a strong support from petrol-interest groups in Washington, Azerbaijan could only get a fraction of that allocation. Although Armenia ranked fairly high when compared with Caspian and former Soviet Socialist Republics, in the year of 2013, it also was ranked in the top ten of all nations receiving US foreign aid.¹³⁴

¹³² Phillips, David L. *Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols*. (Institute for the Study of Human Rights March 2012) p.40-41.

¹³³ Tarnoff, Curt. Congressional Research Service. *CRS Report For Congress, U.S Assistance to the Former Soviet Union*. (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, March 2007).p.67

¹³⁴ United States Agency for International Development. *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2013*.p.157.

Historical Grievances as a Contributing Factor in Section 907

Historical grievances are another aspect to the relative success of Armenian-American ethnic interest groups. Two key events have shaped the dialogue of Armenian-American issues, the first being the Armenian Genocide of 1915, which, for the most part, still remains a focal point for Armenian-American activism. The genocide is the underlying element for unifying Armenian ethnic communities throughout the diaspora. The vast majority of Armenians have been directly impacted by this historical event and as a result, the genocide has shaped their “Armenianness,” as well as the means by which ethnic interest groups such as the ANCA and AAA mobilize their efforts. Genocide scholars in Armenia contend that approximately 85 percent of the world Armenian population was either directly or indirectly impacted by the first genocide of the 20th century. Regardless of sociopolitical and economic status, Armenians throughout the diaspora as well as within the current Republic of Armenia have connected this notion of Armenianness with the struggle for recognition of the Armenian Genocide, thus, allowing a key avenue through which ethnic Armenian interest groups are able to galvanize community support for their objectives. The Armenian people have long been seen as victims--the discussions revolving around the Armenian Genocide have entrenched this notion of Armenia as a victimized community constantly being harassed by its neighbors. The passage of Section 907 would seem to reinforce this gesture. Thus, when the passage of this sub-section within the Freedom of Support Act of 1992 was up for debate, the vast majority of congressmen in Washington agreed with the ANCA, that policy support for Armenian issues was in some small way a means of giving justice to the victims of the genocide. For instance, Senator Spencer Abraham, Republican from Michigan, once addressed Section 907: This is not the only time in this century that the people of Armenia have been victims of actions by military forces beyond

their control. The treatment is simply unacceptable. I am not saying there are not arguments of sympathy toward all parties in this region, but the US government made the right step when we instituted Section 907, that we expressed an appropriate level of sympathy, as well as support, and appropriately so, for the people of Armenia.... It would be a tragic mistake for us today to reverse course and to set in motion what, in effect, would be a repeal of Section 907.¹³⁵

The Senator's remarks were not completely unexpected, as his state has the fourth largest community of Armenian-Americans in the country.

Furthermore, the ANCA did its best to present Section 907 as embodying a form of recompense and fairness for a group of people who haven't received justice for historical atrocities. For instance, a member of the Armenian Caucus, Congressman Michael Capuano, who took office in January 1999, was invited by the ANCA to visit Armenia in the summer of 2000. Upon returning, Congressman Capuano spearheaded House Resolution 398, which attempted to commemorate the victims of the Armenian Genocide. During congressional debate, he strongly criticized Turkey, which he argued still "denies the crimes committed against the Armenian people and continues to block the flow of humanitarian aid and commerce to Armenia."¹³⁶ The genocide was a universal topic which brought about various demographic and socioeconomic elements both within the Armenian community and throughout the host nation. The genocide allowed the ANCA, and in turn the AAA, to frame Armenian issues early on as human rights issues, which was key in passing Section 907. Consequently, it has also allowed Section 907 to be a thorn in the side of pro-Turkish and Azeri proponents for decades.

¹³⁵ United States Congressional Record. *106th Congress, 1st Session Issue: Vol. 145, No. 95-Daily Edition.*(Amendment No. 1118.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 734

The second element of historical grievance pertaining to Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 was the issue of Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The decades of lobbying conducted by the ANCA in Washington helped cultivate a belief of grief and remorse over the fate of Armenians. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Armenian-Americans were well positioned to create a narrative of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict that ultimately influenced US foreign policy during the 1990s. As mentioned above, under Section 907, Congress prohibited US foreign assistance to the government of Azerbaijan, which would be lifted only when the government of Azerbaijan took demonstrable steps to cease its blockade and offensive against Armenia. When a cease-fire came into effect on February, 18th of 1994 the ANCA continued to portray Armenians during the late 1990s and early 2000s as the victims; due to the limited knowledge of the region by congressional lawmakers, the ANCA kept opponents of Section 907 at bay.¹³⁷ For a decade, the ANCA used Section 907 to further the international position of Nagorno Karabakh, yet as discussed below, due to pressure from Turkey and elements within large multi-national energy companies, the modification and eventual repeal of Section 907 in its original form would turn a key success of Armenian-American ethnic interest groups into a failure.

One cannot understand the impact of Section 907 without understanding the importance the Nagorno Karabakh issue has for the Armenian Diaspora. For both Armenians in the Republic of Armenia, and for those in the US, the atrocities committed in the early 20th century were connected with the struggle for Nagorno Karabakh. This is a central cornerstone for Armenian ethnic interest groups when attempting to influence policymaking decisions. When, in early

¹³⁷ Argam DerHartunian, "Negotiation and Settlement in Nagorno-Karabk: Maintaining Territorial Integrity or Promoting Self-Determination," *Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal* 7, no. 2 (2007): 22.

1988, Armenians took to the streets protesting environmental issues, no one would have imagined that this act of civil defiance would culminate in demands for the unification of Nagorno Karabakh--a majority Armenian-inhabited region to the east, located within the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nagorno Karabakh, a province populated by 90 percent Armenians at the turn of the last century, was ceded to Azerbaijan by Stalin in 1921. Since that moment, Armenian nationalist organizations throughout the diaspora had pursued unification for over seven decades. Both Armenian ethnic organizations, the ANCA and the AAA, have, since the passage of Section 907, sought recognition of Nagorno Karabakh as an independent nation and have worked extensively with congressional authorities to increase aid for the enclave.¹³⁸ The ANCA has proven to be the most invested in the Karabakh issue.

The gains made by the ANCA in pursuing the recognition of Karabakh would never have occurred if it were not for the inroads made due to Section 907. As a result, eight US states, most recently the state of Michigan, have formally recognized the status of Nagorno Karabakh. The hope of Armenian ethnic interest groups in the US is that once a majority of states recognize the independent status of the enclave, it would be a short step to US national acceptance. Sharistan Ardhalckian clarified the stance of the ANCA regarding the status of Karabakh in US mediation: "Any power that would deny the Armenians in Karabakh their right to self-determination, anyone who would like to see Karabakh remain a part of Azerbaijan cannot be a honest broker...."¹³⁹ The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, as the main political wing of the ANCA, has invested vast amounts of resources, both monetarily and politically, in supporting the Armenian-backed government of Karabakh. The region itself, during the early period of the

¹³⁸ Thomas De Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*, (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 47-51.

¹³⁹ Gunter, Michael M. *Pursuing The Just Cause Of Their People: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terroism*. (Contributions In Political Science 1986).p.21

1990s, was a hotbed of support for the ARF, and after the failure of the ARF to gain political relevance in the Republic of Armenia during the nation's first few elections, Karabakh played and would continue to play an increasing role in diaspora objectives.

In terms of assessing the effectiveness of the ANCA's lobbying efforts, the notion of historical grievances plays a key role in not only the development of Section 907, but also allows for future legislative inroads by the Armenian-American community to take place. Karabakh is a contemporary issue and for the most part carries a more serious connotation among Armenians, regardless whether they live within the boundaries of the Republic of Armenia or throughout the worldwide diaspora. The ANCA's, and more importantly, the ARF's aim at forwarding the issue of independence for Karabakh has been built upon the passage of Section 907. The ARF's, and by extension, the ANCA's ability to allocate significant levels of manpower and material to assist in the development of Karabakh could have only been realized through the passage of Section 907. The passage of this act allowed Armenian interest groups to further lobby Congress for support regarding Armenian issues.

Ideological Compatibility in Passing Section 907

While both the marshalling of resources and historical grievances are important factors to the success of a given ethnic interest group, ideological compatibility has both hindered and furthered the objectives of the ANCA. During the Cold War period, and for a decade after, the ANCA had relative success in aligning its own political aims with those of the US's own foreign objectives. The initial success of Section 907 in the early 1990s can clearly be attributed to the aligning of US and Armenian-American objectives for the region. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the predominance of the Armenian-American community brought about the idea that the diaspora could act as an initial step in bringing the newly formed Republic into the Western sphere. The ability of the ANCA to back the furthering of Section 907 was in many ways a result of the geopolitical realities of the early 1990s. The atmosphere brought about by the break-up of the Soviet Union initially increased Armenian-American efforts throughout Washington, presenting the newly established Republic of Armenia as a potential ally in a region that had been heavily influenced by Russia. Members of the ANCA lost no opportunity to present Armenia as a newly flourishing Singapore or Hong Kong, a democratic society with undertones of capitalist attitudes that aligned perfectly with those of the West.¹⁴⁰

The ANCA's most significant success as mentioned above wasn't solely the passage of Section 907 by Congress, but its efforts in stopping any effort to diminish or derail this legislation. The policy passed under the Freedom Support Act in 1992 was a significant win for Armenian-Americans and the Republic of Armenia during the 90s. The act prevented Azerbaijan from receiving any assistance, whether monetary or in military aid, from the US. The act helped the ANCA spotlight Azeri hostilities toward Armenia, thus presenting the fledgling nation as a

¹⁴⁰ Julien Zarifian, "The Armenian-American Lobby and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy," (*Society* 51, no. 5 (2014): 503-12

victim to its more resource-rich neighbors. The strong efforts made by the Armenian-American community in passing this legislative act are best explained by Yossi Shain: “By and large, matters concerning the integrity and sovereignty of ancestral homeland or the safety of the scattered nation are likely to galvanize a more intense diaspora involvement than matters concerning the homelands' domestic political struggles.”¹⁴¹ Even though efforts under the Bush administration attempted to curtail the overall impact of Section 907, the true success of the ANCA wasn't only the passage of the bill but also the efforts made by the Armenian-American community in preserving the foundation of this legislation.

The ANCA has never shied away from their objectives, and been very vocal and boastful of their achievements. Close examination of the congressional record shows that Section 907 of the full bill was proposed and attached in a Senate conference by Congressman Wayne Owens of Utah, who was jointly supported by then senator John Kerry. Although a minority of congressmen opposed the "rider," these oppositions would initially melt away during the 2000 presidential election due to the need to appease the large electoral base of Armenian-Americans residing in California.¹⁴² Opposition to Section 907 came from "pro-oil" elements within Congress. Republican Greg Laughlin from Texas during the early 2000s, had close relations with Heydar Aliyev, the former President of Azerbaijan and father of the current President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. Both would unite in opposing these restrictions upon US aid to Azerbaijan. With the passage of the Freedom Support Act and Section 907, the ANCA had proven to their ethnic community that their efforts had indeed borne fruit. Although attempts to

¹⁴¹ Avetisyan, Suren. *The Role of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S.A.: The Challenge of Connection and Inclusion*. (American University of Armenia. School of Political Science and International Affairs, December 2013).p.25.

¹⁴² NORA Chairwoman Melanie Kerneklian. *November 11, 2000*. (<http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/7498/>)

alter and minimize Section 907 would occur in the mid-1990's with minimal results, the changing geopolitical climate of the mid 2000s due to the US's War on Terror would slowly erode much of the success and effect of this bill.¹⁴³

Without a doubt, the geopolitical realities and the importance of the Middle East in US foreign policy has made it increasingly difficult for the ANCA to align its policy objectives with those of the US. Many scholars argue that Section 907 has not been fully lifted, even with constant pressure and lobbying efforts by 14 of the top oil companies. The Turkish-American Caucus and the pro-Israel interest groups, along with Armenian-American ethnic interest groups, have held strong and resisted the full erasure of this piece of legislation. The key objective by these opponents of Section 907 was the implementation of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which would propel Azerbaijan and a number of Central Asian states in furthering their economies at the expense of isolating Armenia. Section 907 was the key roadblock in achieving the Silk Road Strategy. Due to the realities in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the Bush administration attempted to switch its foreign-policy objectives, aiming to balance the growing influence of Iran, Russia, and China throughout the region as well as address the difficulties in stamping out Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁴⁴ Although the Bush administration did pull back aspects of Section 907, the ANCA, however, continue its efforts in minimizing the rollback of Section 907. Political scientist and writer Tabib Huseynov states: "Conflict with Armenia has had a deep impact on the US -Azerbaijan relations and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole history of the bilateral relations between the two countries has been obfuscated by the activity of the ethnic Armenian lobby in the USA, which became an influential force in US domestic

¹⁴³ "President Bush Waives Section 907," *Armenian National Committee of America Website*, www.anca.org, (July 9th 2002)

¹⁴⁴ Rose, Suzanne. *The Silk Road Strategy Act: Brownback's Bill is a Geopolitical Hoax*. (Executive Intelligence Review Vol 26, Number 51 Dec 1999).p.32-33.

politics by the 1990s.”¹⁴⁵ However, what Husynov fails to address is that the Armenian lobby had begun its efforts in swaying Washington decades earlier.

Due to Section 907, Azerbaijan was the only government of the former Soviet Union that was deprived of annual U.S financial assistance. It was the only former Soviet Socialist Republic sanctioned in this manner. Yet, for the ANCA, the main objective of this legislative act wasn't to deter financial assistance to Azerbaijan but to present Azerbaijan as an aggressor, as a dictatorship reminiscent of that of the Soviet Union. While some ground has been lost in terms of the impact of Section 907, one must still consider the achievements of the Armenian-American ethnic groups. It is important to consider that during the 2000s, although the Bush administration poked holes in Section 907, it did increase aid both in military and financial assistance to Armenia. Armenia's per capita assistance ranks in the top ten of all nations as of 2004.¹⁴⁶ Yet, despite the move away from Section 907 during the Bush Administration overall aid to the new Republic was increased. This changed during the Obama administration where aid to Armenia and the clout of the ANCA was drastically reduced to just over \$22 million dollars annually for the period from 2013 to 2015. The decrease in material and financial assistance, which the ANCA has been instrumental in garnering for Republic of Armenia, despite the importance of Turkey as a key NATO ally in the War on Terror has sharply minimized much of the gains the ANCA had achieved with Section 907.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Avetisyan, Suren. *The Role of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S.A: The Challenge of Connection and Inclusion*. (American University of Armenia School of Political Science and International Affairs.,26-29

¹⁴⁶ David King and Miles Promper. “The US Congress and the Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from US Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan, (*Journal of Armenian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2004): 8.

¹⁴⁷ Obama Budget Calls for Record Low Level of AId to Armenia. (The Armenian Weekly. Feburary 2, 2015)

Armenian Inter-Ethnic Interest Group Rivalry

The fourth and final factor that impacts the success of a given ethnic interest group is the presence and influence of its rivals within a given diaspora. This last factor is crucial in determining whether the ANCA's rivals succeed where it has failed, and more importantly, to what extent the presence of these rival organizations alters the inner workings and perceptions of the ANCA when dealing with its own community. The Armenian Assembly of America is considered by many the only real rival within the Armenian-American community that has the resources and organizational structure to fill in and/or replace the ANCA. For instance, when assessing the success of Resolution 106, the AAA organized its 15,000 members to hit the phones in a concentrated effort to spread the word. This 2007 legislative attempt, titled "Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide," was the most recent push by the Armenian-American community to have the atrocities of the 1915 designated genocide by the US.¹⁴⁸ Total revenue for the AAA, as of 2015, is approximately 3 million with almost 2 million of those funds being derived from contributions, gifts, and grants. A look into the AAA's finances reveal that it claims approximately 24 million in net assets and with a membership base of 15,000 individuals--the organization's ability to marshal not only monetary resources but also presence within the community is impressive. The organization redirects 2.3 million annually into programs like internships that allow Armenian-American students in law and medicine to foster their skills in their new fields. For instance, the Birthright Program, which was introduced by the AAA in 2003, aims to provide college-aged students an opportunity to practice and study their field in Armenia. Similar to those of the ANCA, the programs in education funded by the

¹⁴⁸ United States Congress. *H.Res.106- Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Gnocide Resolution.* (110th Congress 2007-2008), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/106>

AAA in Washington help to inform lawmakers and their staffers to the important issues of the Armenian-American community.¹⁴⁹ The push for genocide recognition by the AAA in 2007 forced the organization to allocate vast amounts of its financial resources to the passing of the bill. Its failure in doing so in turn forced this ethnic interest group to readjust its approach.

During the last three decades or more of its existence, the AAA has attempted to present itself as an effective alternative to the ANCA. It has positioned itself as an effective voice for Armenian-Americans throughout the community who were disappointed with the heavily influenced ARF ideological notions of the ANCA. Despite the failure of House Resolution 106 in 2007, the AAA has diversified its efforts and has achieved success in other areas. Due in large part to its location in Washington DC, the organization was able to tap into sources of funding other Armenian ethnic political organizations like the ANCA were not privy to. For instance, the AAA was able to obtain millions of dollars of US military aid for Armenia in 2008.¹⁵⁰ Despite the failure the year before, the AAA was able to garner 3.5 million in military aid for the Republic of Armenia and 10 million in additional funding for Nargorno Karabakh, something the ANCA, in terms of designated military US aid, has failed to do on countless occasions. Not surprising that the failure of House Resolution 106, although a concentrated effort by numerous Armenian-American ethnic organizations, has been unfairly portrayed as a failure by the AAA. Mainly due to its headquarter's location in Washington, many throughout the community, as well as those rank and file members of the ANCA, have pinned the failure, at times unjustly, to the AAA.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Charity Navigator: Your Guide to Intelligent Giving:
<https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=5445>

¹⁵⁰ Armenian Assembly of America: Our Mission, 2007 Annual Report.,4-7

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*,6-13

The failure to pass House Resolution 106 can be directly associated with US concern over national security issues. Preceding the floor vote and the subsequent retraction of the resolution vote, many congressmen were unaware of the political and strategic threat a vote in the affirmative would have caused for American foreign policy. The failure to pass the genocide resolution in 2007 was not so much a failure of the AAA or the Armenian-American community as a whole, but rather the Bush administration's success in convincing key congressional members such as Nancy Pelosi to “play fair” with a key ally and that it was more important for the nation to advance foreign policy objectives than politicizing a historical tragedy that occurred almost a century before.¹⁵² Interestingly, within a week of passing the sub-committee vote, ten congressmen would retract their sponsorship of the bill. By late October, the AAA was losing traction in Washington when it became evident that the White House's lobbying efforts against the bill had gained steam. Unlike the passage of Section 907, the AAA could not make up ground against the influence of the White House, whose sole focus during its second term was the war effort and US forces in the Middle East. Turkey was a linchpin in these efforts, and any legislation passed through the senate regarding recognition of the Armenian Genocide would severely hinder these efforts. As a result, support for AAA declined. The number of supporters of this piece of legislation declined from a high of 232 to 215 by the end of October, 2007. In January of 2008, Lu Ann Ohanian, the co-chair of the AAA, commented on the failure of the genocide resolution, stating, “We wanted to make sure we had the votes before introducing the bill and we didn’t have the votes at the end.” Claiming that the AAA faced harsh opposition and

¹⁵² Dombey, Daniel. *Pelosi Backtracks on Armenia 'Genocide' Bill*. (Financial Times, October 17, 2007)

had to give way to national security concerns. Ohanian ended by mentioning that the resolution hasn't died, but was just delayed.¹⁵³

More so than the ANCA, the AAA has used world events to suit its policy goals and distinct narrative. The assassination of Hrant Dink, an ethnic Armenian journalist and one of the most well-known human rights defenders in Turkey in January of 2007, came to symbolize for many throughout the Armenian diaspora that their historical grievances were more important than ever. Dink, due to his position as an outspoken proponent of recognition between Turks and Armenians, had been prosecuted three times for allegedly "insulting Turkishness" under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. These charges presented Dink as a likely target for nationalist and extremist violence. Receiving more than 26,000 death threats during his career as a journalist of the Turkish-Armenian newspaper *Agos*, his murder was a social earthquake in Turkey which redefined the "Armenian Issue" once again. Dink's death allowed organizations like the AAA to release a statement claiming that "the Assembly remains deeply troubled by Ankara's refusal to heed international calls to abolish Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which stifles freedom of speech and criminalizes public discussion of the Armenian Genocide." This event put the Turkish government, both domestically and internationally, on the defensive. Dink's funeral service was held on January 23, 2007, and the ceremony developed into an outright demonstration by some 150,000 citizens of Istanbul marching to commemorate the killing. Many shouted slogans such as, "We are all Hrant, we are all Armenians." Afterward, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current President of the Republic of Turkey, stated that the "attack was a shock and an insult to the Turkish nation and a dark day for not only

¹⁵³ Armenian Community of Florida (FLA). *Armenian Assembly of America Holds Annual Members Weekend in South Florida on Eve of Genocide Centennial.* (<https://flarmenians.com/2015/04/04/armenian-assembly-of-america-holds-annual-members-weekend-in-south-florida-on-eve-of-genocide-centennial/>)

for Dink family, but also for all of Turkey."¹⁵⁴ Unlike the ANCA, the AAA made these events in Turkey a key point in their discussion with lawmakers. They attempted to capitalize on the massive waves of public sympathy throughout the world to forward Armenian-related issues. Despite the momentum created by this horrific event, and the correlation of historical injustice the AAA made with this event, it failed to result in any concrete success. The weakening position of Turkish officials during the mid-2000s was not enough for the AAA to further its goals for genocide recognition. Consequently, many throughout the Armenian-American community saw this inability as a failure of the organization.

Yet, despite this failure and negative portrayal of the AAA in the mid-2000s, in the last two decades, this ethnic interest group has filled roles which were previously minimized by the ANCA. Despite the changing geopolitical environment during this period, the AAA has centered its objectives to align with US strategic goals in the region. The AAA has allowed Armenia to engage in regional projects and associations with the US. One of AAA's most under-rated achievements was its ability to coordinate Armenia as a key US partner in its efforts to further the development of the South Caucasus region, in addition to the growing economic ties between the two nations. One of the main achievements was reached on March 27, 2006, when both the US and Armenia signed the Millennium Challenge Compact. This agreement, which was put into effect in September of the same year, made clear that if the Armenian government took progressive steps in fighting corruption, ensuring the freedom of the press and religion and to allocate appropriate funding for its people, the US would agree to provide the nation with 235 million over a five-year period to help reduce rural poverty through the implementation of

¹⁵⁴ CNN International. *Turks Grieve Over Journalist's Killing*. (<http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/01/19/turkey.dink/index.html>, January 19 2007)

infrastructure building projects.¹⁵⁵ Another major success of the AAA was illustrated by its efforts to work closely with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to assist Armenia in moving toward a free-market, capitalistic economic system. And as a result, Armenia has experienced a double-digit GDP growth from 2002 to 2008. Furthermore, bilateral economic relations have been one of the most successful avenues in which both nations have dramatically improved interaction. Achievements and success in the economic sphere for the AAA, similar to that of the ANCA, were more substantial when compared to political policy efforts. With AAA assistance, protocols such as the Investment Incentive Agreement as well as the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which was the cornerstone for economic interaction between the two nations, were signed. In the last decade, US investment in Armenia has included energy, information technology, hotels, manufacturing, jewelry, and mining. In addition, Armenia has been designated as a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which allows Armenia to export products to the US under a duty-free program.¹⁵⁶

The AAA, unlike the ANCA, has taken a different approach when lobbying on behalf of the Armenian-American community. It has attempted to portray the organization as a more practical alternative to the ANCA. They have centered on three main goals during the last few years. The first and most sensitive concern, not only for the AAA but also for all Armenian ethnic interest groups throughout the diaspora, is the removal of the terrestrial blockade against Armenia from both Turkey and Azerbaijan. Secondly, the AAA seeks the inclusion of the Republic of Armenia into large scale regional economic efforts, specifically in terms of joining

¹⁵⁵ United States Department of State. Millennium Challenge Corporation:United States, Armenia Compact. <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/armenia>

¹⁵⁶ Armenia Bilateral Investment Treaty.*Investment Treaty with the Republic of Armenia. 103D Congress Treaty Doc, 1st Session 103-11.*
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43477.pdf>

economic programs that include its regional neighbors. Finally, the AAA has moved toward objectives in securing and advancing Armenia's energy sector. This includes both the renovation and modernization of its Mestamor Nuclear Power Plant and the effort in pushing for Armenia's inclusion in regional energy transportation projects which currently exclude Armenia.¹⁵⁷ Currently, as relations between the US and Russia deteriorate, the priority for the US to help Armenia and Turkey normalize relations and open this common border has become increasingly important.¹⁵⁸ For Armenian-American organizations such as the AAA, efforts toward regional cooperation and integration have always been categorized as highly crucial to Armenia's overall national security.

The ANCA, as a result of the inroads and, at times, failures of the AAA, has altered its position and attitude when interacting with its own community. The AAA, sought to move away from a more grassroots structure of the ANCA to a more top-down model, whereby the AAA would strictly market their message to a more educated and professional group within its community and focus their efforts directly on the federal level. The ANCA had built an extensive network of locally based affiliates who focused their efforts both on a local and federal level.¹⁵⁹ This strategy allowed the ANCA to pursue a more multifaceted political agenda. However, during the last decade or so, the ANCA has seen the effectiveness of the AAA's more Washington-based model and has changed gears to become more inclusive of the different socio-political variations within its community. Yet, unlike what will be illustrated below regarding the Cuban-American community, the differences between these two ethnic interest groups, the ANCA and the AAA, is minimal. Both groups have similar policy objectives regarding

¹⁵⁷ Armenian Assembly of America. <https://armenian-assembly.org/>

¹⁵⁸ Fiona Hill, Kemal Kirisci, & Andrew Moffatt. "Armenia and Turkey: From Normalization to Reconciliation," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, (2015): 121.

¹⁵⁹ Sedrakyan, Artyom. *The Armenian Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. p.53-55

Armenian-related issues, and on a general base, have colluded on lobbying efforts. Categorizing either the ANCA as solely responsible for the success of Section 907 or the AAA as the main reason for the failure of House Resolution 106 is incorrect.¹⁶⁰ The ANCA, as the largest and most prominent ethnic interest group in the Armenian-American community, was able to promote a narrative that minimized criticism over its failures from the late-90s to the mid-2000's as weakness of its rivals, regardless of whether the ANCA had actually allocated similar levels of time and resources in the effort to achieve their goals.¹⁶¹ Incorrectly, but not surprisingly, many within the Armenian-American community, especially those affiliated, either directly or indirectly with the ARF, have attributed the community's failures to smaller organizations such as the AAA and their unwillingness to unify under a common banner.

Yet, when looking at both organizations, they have remarkably similar strategies when attempting to influence US foreign and financial policy. Both ethnic interest groups give testimonies and educational documentation to lawmakers and their staffers. They also both participate in debates within the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and attempt to garner bipartisan support for their proposals. During the last decade or so, both organizations aligned their efforts to secure US monetary aid to Armenia at 78 million in 2005 and 41 million in 2008, the AAA and the ANCA were able to have the US Congress allocate 93 million in financial support, with an additional 11 million in humanitarian and infrastructure development projects for Nagorno Karabagh.¹⁶² Yet, while both ethnic interest groups focus efforts at the federal level, the AAA has taken their efforts one step further by lobbying for

¹⁶⁰ Armenian Assembly of America. *Armenian Assembly Urges Support for Armenian Caucus Letter Outlining Key Priorities for FY 2019*. (Capital Hill Reception Welcoming Armenian Parliamentary Delegation Slated for this Evening, March 7th 2018)

¹⁶¹ Sassounian, Harut. *IS the CEO of Turkey's Newest U.S. PR Firm Really Armenian*. The Armenian Weekly, November 15, 2017)

¹⁶² [www,https://foreignassistance.gov/#/search](https://foreignassistance.gov/#/search). (Armenia Millennium Challenge Corporation)

additional federal funding through various other political mechanisms and institutions. In addition, in terms of US military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan, both lobby lawmakers to maintain parity in funding and material between the two nations.¹⁶³ The ANCA claims that “the US should maintain parity in all US military aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and prohibit any sales or transfers to Azerbaijan of US equipment, training or technology that could be used against Nagorno Karabagh.”¹⁶⁴ Yet, the AAA also has taken an active role in gaining assistance for Nagorno Karabagh in the form of 4.3 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and 1 million in International Military Education Training (IMET) assistance to Armenia. Also, the AAA, takes it one step further by pressuring Washington to monitor military assistance given to Azerbaijan through other programs such as the Caspian Guard initiative.¹⁶⁵ All in all, both organizations attempt to further important Armenian concerns, but form avenues sometimes different from one another.

In spite of the fact that Armenian ethnic interest groups within the US spend a substantial amount of time and monetary resources on the issue of the Armenian Genocide, both ethnic organizations’ primary goals focus upon improving conditions for Armenia. In terms of policy objectives, the ANCA has shifted its focus during the last decade on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh more so than any other topic. The ANCA has attempted to force the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's self determination within the halls of Congress. The AAA, on the other hand, presents itself, when compared to the ANCA, as the foremost organization with unique ties with

¹⁶³ ANCA FY 2018 Foreign Aid Priorities: <https://anca.org/issue/armenian-americans-us-foreign-aid-policy/>

¹⁶⁴ Chouldjian, Elizabeth S. Armenian National Committee of America: Position Paper For Journalists. <https://anca.org/for-journalists/>.

¹⁶⁵ Alyson JK Bailes,, Hagelin Bjorn, & Zdzislaw Lachowski. *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and the Central Asia*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2003).p.10-12.

the United Nations, claiming that it possesses "the highest non-governmental organization status of any Armenian organizations."¹⁶⁶ From its inception, the AAA attempted to focus upon centers of power and move away from the ANCA's more grassroots approach. For instance, in 1997, the AAA's main NGO training and Resource Center put forth a new endeavor with its counterparts at the United Nation Refugee Agency to establish the ability of NGO's to solve refugee concerns through grants that would further technical and training programs. Furthermore, the AAA was designated with a special consultative status and role within the United Nations Economic and Social Council.¹⁶⁷

The ANCA, due to its well-established infrastructure throughout the US, taking the form of community centers, churches and newspaper and media outlets, in communities from Los Angeles to Boston, has allowed the organization the flexibility to withstand setbacks. The ANCA at its core has been well-suited to mobilize at a more grassroots level, allowing the organization mobility and variance in pushing Armenian-related concerns. Yet, the presence and success of the AAA have altered the ANCA's approach in many ways, by making the organization more supportive and willing to work in alliance with Kurdish and Greek organizations in the US. This alliance of convenience has allowed the ANCA to block on numerous occasions US proposals for arms deals with Turkey.¹⁶⁸ The ANCA has claimed the continual illegal blockade of Armenia's Western border with Turkey is violating international law, and by denying large scale arms deals to Turkey, it would reconsider its policy towards Armenia. In recent years, the ANCA has taken upon itself to be a voice and advocate for the Republic of Armenia in terms of

¹⁶⁶ Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations 2017.

http://csonet.org/content/documents/Information%20Note_18%20May%202017.pdf

¹⁶⁷ Leokadia Drobizheva and Rose Gottemoeller, *Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis*, (Routledge, 1998), 253.

¹⁶⁸ Gregg, Heather S. *Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States*. (August 2002., 11-13

international projects.¹⁶⁹ It has worked extensively to call for the inclusion of Armenia into the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. The failure to include Armenia has led the ANCA to boycott and oppose US involvement in the project. The organization, in the wake of the exclusion of Armenia, has attempted to propose other feasible and alternative routes for the pipeline that would include Armenia.¹⁷⁰ Yet, despite the growing influence of rival ethnic organizations within the Armenian American community, the ANCA is still, without a doubt, the most influential.

¹⁶⁹ Economopoulos, Chrysoula. *Armenian, Kurdish and Greek American Organizations Jointly Oppose Jewish American Organizations Letter to President Bush Urging Additional Support For Turkey*. (Advocates for the Rule of Law, February 22, 2002)

¹⁷⁰ Cornell, Svante E and Fariz Ismailzade. *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Azerbaijan.*, 62-65

CHAPTER 5: CUBAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL GROUPS

As discussed above, academics and scholars alike during the last half of the 20th century have paid relatively little attention to the role, activities, and increasing influence of ethnic interest groups on US foreign policymaking. Early on, academic analysis regarding ethnic interest group influence showed very little connection to actual US foreign policy development. During the Cold War, an understanding formed which contributed US foreign policy development solely with the executive branch. It was believed that the President was the key driving force in the development of a unique foreign policy regardless of approach. Yet, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the US as the sole world superpower, many within academic circles have begun to pay closer attention to the activities of these ethnic political organizations and their influence upon foreign and security policy. Similar to Armenian-American ethnic lobbying groups, due to the realities and aftermath of the September 11th attacks and the increasing focus of Washington regarding security issues, many have increasingly concentrated their efforts on uncovering the levels of influence and outright activism of ethnic groups like the Cuban-American community upon US foreign policy development.

While the Armenian-American community was divided extensively early on by ideological differences and various different political organizations, the Cuban-American community suffered from a political schism only in recent decades. During the first two waves of immigration to the US from Cuba, the ideological makeup of immigrants was politically right-leaning and the ethnic community, although newly established, had a single narrative and objective. By the end of the 1960s, the vast majority of Cuban-American exiles had left the war against Castro behind in an attempt to rebuild their lives and communities in the US. At the same

time, they attempted to instill within their communities the ideas of return and struggle. In addition, during the 1960s the main focus of the majority of Cuban-American individuals was economic betterment, the vast proliferation of anti-Castro factions within the new community left a legacy of right-leaning politically focused individuals, who were suspicious of anything resembling communist notions.¹⁷¹ Thus, many have argued that the need to organize politically as a single voice for the Cuban-American diaspora was seen as unnecessary, due to the single-minded nature of the community in rebuilding their lives and the almost universal tendency of presenting an anti-Castro position. The initial unification attempt conducted by Pepin Bosch and the founding of the Representación Cubana del Exilio (RECE) would lay the groundwork for political activism within the Cuban-American community. Bosch was a prominent Cuban American businessman who had run the Bacardi Rum corporation for over three decades. His efforts were the first attempt at organizing a Cuban American political organization which would eventually lay the groundwork for the development of the the CANF. The RECE would formulate a template in which Cuban lobbying groups cultivated funds for propaganda and educational efforts within the US.¹⁷²

Beginning in the 1970s, only a minority of die-hard Cuban-American exiles had remained in the full anti-Castro movement. During this period, internal divisions among various Cuban-American leaders who questioned the extremist military tactics of their compatriots, exposed divisions within this ethnic community. The last outburst of old-guard anti-Castro elements within the community was led by José Elías de la Torriente. His “Plan Torriente”

¹⁷¹ Sung-Chang Chun and Jonathan Kwon.” Anti-Castro Political Ideology Among Cuban Americans in the Miami Area: Cohort and Generational Differences,” *Latino Research ND 2*, (2004): 2.

¹⁷² Tom Gjelten, *Bacardi and the Long Fight for Cuba: The Biography of a Cause*. (Penguin Books, 2008), 158.

attempted to symbolically endorse and support anti-Castro organizations throughout the community by raising funds. In February of 1970 supporters of Plan Torriente held a major rally with 40,000 Miami Cuban attendees during which debate over a violent policy towards Castro's Cuba took place. The failure and negative perceptions of Plan Torriente were the culmination and the nail in the coffin of militant Cuban exiles and these types of activities.¹⁷³ Ultimately, by the mid-1970s, the violent era of the Cuban-American diaspora ended. From this point forward, the Cuban-American community galvanized around exerting their influence upon Washington DC in hopes of achieving success through policy.¹⁷⁴ As Ninoshka Perez, spokeswoman for the CANF mentioned during an interview, "I think from the 1970s on, exiles started a new phase in which their objectives were to stage actions in the United States that called attention to the crimes committed by Fidel Castro's Communist Regime." Two factors contributed to this shift: first, the heating up of the Cold War illustrated to many elite Cuban-Americans throughout the community that they had an opportunity to take advantage of the geopolitical environment to achieve their political goals. Second, by the 1980s, the Cuban-American community were blessed with a supportive presidential administration, which opened doors to further influencing Cuban-American, anti-Castro notions.¹⁷⁵ For the most part, the CANF arose during this favorable political environment in which Cuban-American issues came to the forefront.

The success of the CANF, as well as other Cuban- American organizations like the Cuban Liberty Council, coincided with a major shift in US foreign policy strategy between 1980 to 2000. From the beginning of the Reagan administration, the role of Cuba and Central America

¹⁷³ Arboleya, Jesus. *The Cuban Counterrevolution (Ohio University Press 2000).*,149-156.

¹⁷⁴ Arboleya, Jesus. *The Cuban Counter Revolution.* (Ohio RIS Latin America Series, Ohio University Press, 2000).p.145-147

¹⁷⁵ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban Americans: The New Americans*, (Greenwood, 1998), 58-61.

became an increasingly important aspect of the executive branch's foreign policy objectives. For the most part, a coalition between the US State Department, the Reagan Administration, and the island's exiles, who themselves had developed a community in the US, centered their focus upon retribution against the Castro regime. Both the ethnic Cuban-American lobby and the Reagan administration pursued a hostile policy towards the Castro regime in Cuba. The objective of cultivating a new public perception of Cuba as well as the notion of regime change fell in line with both the Reagan administration and the CANF's overall aim. Interestingly, the shift had occurred years before Reagan took the oath of office; later declassified documents in the State Department illustrated attempts by federal employees to marginalize moderate leaders in the Cuban-American community and support a more anti-Castro and pro-American stance.¹⁷⁶ The attempted shift in public opinion and more positive view of Cuban-Americans started early in the 1970s and largely came about from attempts made by US government officials in serving a new geopolitical objective during the Cold War. By the time Reagan became President, a new view of Cuban-Americans emerged--one of economic success, portraying the ethnic group as a model minority, an image that many academics and historians have attributed to the federal government.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Henn, Margaret Katherine. *The Cuban American National Foundation and its Role as an Ethnic Interest Group* (Boston College, 2008), 6-11.

¹⁷⁷ Mayer, William G. *Trends: American Attitudes Toward Cuba*. (JSTOR 65, 2001): 585-605

Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)

One cannot discuss the Cuban-American diasporan community without an assessment of its most potent political organization, the Cuban American National Foundation or CANF, established in Florida in 1981 by Jorge Mass Canosa, founder of MasTec, a publicly traded engineering and construction corporation; and Raul Masvidal, a Cuban-American banker and real estate developer. Although founded six decades after the Armenian Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA), the forerunner of the ANCA, the CANF achieved much in this relatively short period. The very origins of the CANF can be traced to the change in Cuban-American relations during the Carter administration.¹⁷⁸ During the Carter presidency, a number of treaties and agreements were signed, such as the Fishing and Maritime Boundary Agreement. Furthermore, a number of travel restrictions, which had been signed in the wake of Castro's rise, were not renewed. More importantly, both nations reestablished diplomatic relations by setting up "Interest Sections" in both Washington and Havana, where the two nations could agree on similar objectives.¹⁷⁹ Yet, despite the inroads made, the situation began to deteriorate over the next decade. The discovery of Cuban troops in Angola in 1975, the uncovering of a Soviet military brigade in Cuba in 1979, and finally, the lasting impact of the Mariel boatlift in 1980 forced US-Cuban relations back toward a footing held prior to the Carter administration. While the Carter administration was dealing with foreign policy challenges both in Latin America and around the world, conservative forces in Washington attempted to formulate a new foreign policy strategy while at the same time criticizing liberal efforts in opposing communism.

¹⁷⁸ Haney, Patrick J and Walt Vanderbush. *The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups In U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation*. (International Studies Quarterly 2nd Series. 43, 1999): 341-361

¹⁷⁹ Haney, Patrick J. and Walt Vanderbush. *The Cuban Embargo: Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy*. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005).p. 55-62

Republican Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan found the perceived mistakes of President Carter on Cuba an issue with which he could distinguish himself.¹⁸⁰ As a result, Regan did exceedingly well among Cuban Americans during the 1980 presidential election, garnering 80 percent of their vote.¹⁸¹

Approval for a more hard-line US foreign policy, especially when dealing with Central America, came from a variety of conservative organizations, the most outspoken being the Committee of Santa Fe, whose 1980 assessment heavily criticized the Carter administration for ignoring the inroads made by the Soviets and Cuban regime in both Central and Southern America. The report made a number of suggestions in restructuring foreign policy objectives for the US. In terms of Cuban-American relations, the report recommended more punitive and assertive measures. It suggested that Cuban officials and diplomats stationed in Washington should be forced to leave, that the US should resume aerial reconnaissance over Cuba, that the hindrance of foreign tourist dollars to the island nation should be sought, and that the repeal of the 1977 fishing agreement should be enacted.¹⁸² Most importantly, for our purposes, for the first time the suggestion of establishing a Radio Free Cuba as part of a larger strategy in undermining the Cuban regime by providing news directly to the Cuban people. If this propaganda efforts failed, the organization suggested an invasion to liberate the island from Castro's grip. Avoided within the report was clearly the Soviet military and financial assistance provided to Cuba, and that such a military action would bring about retaliation. Regardless of the foreign policy

¹⁸⁰ Hudson, Rex A. *Cuba A Country Study*. (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, April 2001).p.78-82

¹⁸¹ Abrajano, Marisa. *Campaigning to the New American Electorate: Advertising to Latino Voters*. (Stanford University Press, 2010).,61-64

¹⁸² Dennis Small, "Reagan Advisers Outline Inter-American Strategy," *EIR National* 7, (1980): 53.

suggestions by conservatives during the Carter administration, the Free Radio Cuba initiative became the most widely known aspect of these efforts.¹⁸³

Links between insurgent communist uprisings and revolutionary incursions in Central America from Havana and Moscow were made by Jeane Kirkpatrick, the future U.N. Ambassador; the Committee of Santa Fe, and then Presidential Candidate Ronald Reagan. The growing concern to "push back" the perceived increasing influence of communism resulted in the rise of a counter-ideological view within the US. This conservative outlook fomented an environment in which the Cuban-American community could achieve many of its political aims. It is important to note that within the first 2 years of Reagan's administration, the entire foreign policy paradigm of US politics shifted toward the ideological right. The 1980s came to represent a pivotal period in Cuban-American history, allowing a new avenue in which Cuban-Americans could challenge the Castro regime. Very much like the Armenian-American community during the 1990s, the Cuban diaspora in the US found the 1980s to be a perfect period to push forward their concerns and achieve significant gains.¹⁸⁴

For the most part, this exiled group, prior to the 1980s had only been seen politically active in southern Florida, where a militaristic type of action against the island was encouraged and organized by localized politicking. Prior to the 1970s in Miami, the exiled ideological right of the community was generally viewed as fragmented, completely lacking any perceivable coherent political organizational structure. The Cuban-American voice in Washington was almost non-existent, as Enrique Ros stated, "There was simply no organized Cuban voice at the

¹⁸³ Patrick Jude Haney, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy*, (University of Pittsburgh Press 2005), 55-58.

¹⁸⁴ Ilan Wurman, *Jeane Kirkpatrick and the End of the Cold War: Dictatorship, Democracy, and Human Rights*, (Claremont Colleges, 2009), 105-107.

federal level."¹⁸⁵ This was especially true during the Ford and Carter years, when many Cuban Americans felt their concerns and issues were left on the back burner. More importantly, among the general citizenry during the 1970s, the Cuban community had suffered from a negative perception that viewed a portion of the Cuban-American exiles as participants in covert activities. This perception, combined with the "Mariel boatlift" that began in late 1980, helped portray the Cuban-American community negatively. In the wake of this low level in public opinion when it came to Cuban-American issues, a conscious move toward more political achievements for the community began during the early 1980s.¹⁸⁶ Jorge Mas Conosa, one of the key founding members and the longtime director of the CANF, commented on the situation in a *Miami Herald* interview conducted in 1986 that, "We had to take the fight out of Calle Ocho and Miami Stadium and into the center of power. To achieve this Cuban Americans had to stop commando raids and concentrate on influencing public opinion and the government."¹⁸⁷ This notion would become the cornerstone and one of the guiding principles for the CANF.

Numerous, and at times contradictory, versions of the founding of the CANF seem to persist. These various narratives can be illustrated as coming together in late 1980. Jorge Mas Canosa contended in interviews conducted in the early-1990s that the impetus for the CANF came about through a few elite Cuban-Americans who completely acted on their own. They began to organize and came to the understanding that a strong political organization was needed to push for Cuban-American issues in Washington, DC. He claimed, multiple times, that it was

¹⁸⁵ Domingo Amuchastegui, "Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis: Intelligence and National Security" 13, no. 3, 88-119): 92.

¹⁸⁶ McHugh, Kevin E, Ines M. Miyares and Emily H Skop. *The Magnetism Of Miami: Segmented Paths in Cuban Migration*. (Geographical Review, Volume 87, Issue 4 October 1997, Pages 447-584).p.479-482

¹⁸⁷ Maria Cristina Garcia, *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994*, (University of California Press, 1997), 147.

not assisted or encouraged to formulate this ethnic interest group by any outside elements or by Reagan insiders: “It was my idea that I discussed with a few friends and we decided to carry it out.”¹⁸⁸ Mas maintains that elite Cuban Americans like Pepe Hernandez, Raul Masvidal, and Carols Salmon took part in the early meetings of the organization and came to develop the framework in which the CANF would pursue its goals in later decades. Coincidentally, the media portrayed this organization, founded by “three Miami businessmen,” as an organic, grass-roots ethnic interest group that arose the exact month in which President Reagan came to office. Countering this narrative, Masvidal, who resigned from the organization due to personal and technical disputes regarding the organization's role, came forward and argued that the CANF's formation was first suggested by Richard Allen, one of Reagan's first National Security Advisors.¹⁸⁹ Interestingly, Masvidal stated that Allen had suggested the organization mimic the structure and organizational capabilities of the successful American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Furthermore, Masvidal claims that Allen had mentioned to him that, with the election of Reagan, a new opportunity for Cuban-Americans would arise.¹⁹⁰ Regardless of the initial reasons behind the organization's founding, from its inception, the CANF would become a major interest group for the Cuban American community.

In recent years, Richard Allen has corroborated Masvidal's account regarding the formation of the CANF. Allen recalls multiple discussions with Mas and Masvidal during the early 1980s in which the newly formed CANF could become more efficient in achieving goals the vast majority of Cuban-Americans desired. Ultimately, he claims that he asked Mas to study

¹⁸⁸ Patrick Jude Haney, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy*, (University Of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 35-38.

¹⁸⁹ Margaret Katherine Henn, *The Cuban American National Foundation and Its Role as an Ethnic Interest Group*, (Boston College University Libraries, 2008), 8-9.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

closely the Isreal and Taiwan ethnic interest groups' models, and for the new CANF, to copy their strategies in effectively lobbying both sides of the political aisle. The CANF, facing a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, key Republicans, as well as the Reagan administration, welcomed any assistance that the Cuban-American community could give in swaying Democrats in Washington DC for a new approach to the Castro regime.¹⁹¹

Regardless of how the organization came about and the controversy the CANF garnered during the early period of its inception, the Reagan administration's approach against global communism coincided and aligned with the political objectives of the CANF. The main objectives of the CANF early on were twofold. First, the organization attempted to counter the propaganda coming out of Castro's Cuba regarding the achievements of the regime for the Cuban people. Second, the CANF attempted to challenge or bring to light efforts of the Cuban government to support proponents of communism throughout Central America and Africa. During the late 1970s, the Castro regime sent Cuban troops to their allies all across the globe in support of leftists. The key goal for the CANF was to counter the spread of Castro's influence by reporting on and correcting the destructive policies and objectives of the dictatorship. Both Central America and Africa became key theaters for the Reagan administration, which was interested in curtailing the gains made by the communist bloc.¹⁹² The CANF's activities and early success in disseminating information about Castro and communist failures assisted US State Department goals in uprooting leftist sympathies in these locations.

When assessing the structure and organizational framework of the CANF, one can't move away from the similarities at heart between this Cuban-American ethnic interest group and

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 28-30.

¹⁹² Barberia, Lorena., and Susan Eckstein. *Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: Cuban Americans and Their Transnational Ties.*(Center for Migration Studies of New York, IMR Volume 36. Number 3 Fall 2002).p.812-815

AIPAC. Early on, the CANF, much like AIPAC, divided its organization into multiple entities and satellite branches in which the lobby was able to legally separate itself, allowing them to divide their material resources between tax exempt educational projects and distinct lobbying efforts. Similar in many ways to the ANCA's grass-roots approach, the CANF attempted to create local chapters in numerous states that could directly influence and create ties with individual lawmakers on the hill. The connection between the American Israel Public Affairs Committee also known as AIPAC and the CANF is best illustrated by AIPAC's own report in 1990. The AIPAC organization took great effort in training CANF staffers in new strategies and tactics for transforming a foreign policy issue into a domestic one and, at the same time, restructuring their own organizational goals to align with those of congressional lawmakers.¹⁹³ In addition, Bernard Barnett, an experienced AIPAC lawyer, mentioned in previous accounts that he personally had helped Mas create the core principles of the CANF in very much the same way he had assisted directors at AIPAC. Furthermore, the CANF was structured in many ways like AIPAC, as the latter ethnic interest group had separated its research, lobbying, and funding divisions into different branches, thus creating a tiered hierarchy allowing the organization flexibility when dealing with multiple issues and political objectives. The tiered structure of this interest group was threefold: 1) monetary resources were contributed through the Free Cuba political action committee, 2) all lobbying efforts were conducted by the Cuban American Foundation, and 3) research and educational programs were done under the authority of the CANF. While the management and directors of these three satellite branches presented an interconnected relationship, the separation allowed the CANF, very much like the AIPAC, to

¹⁹³ Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush. "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no 2 (1999): 252-253.

receive government funds and maintain their tax-exempt status.¹⁹⁴ Tracing back through the CANF's efforts, both the successes and failures over the last three decades can best be attributed to the early structural mechanisms put in place during the first years of its formation.

¹⁹⁴ Jude Patrick Haney, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy*, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 142-148.

Chapter 6- Case Study: The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983 (RBCA)

Radio Martí, which arose out of the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983, was not the earliest undertaking by Washington to transmit broadcasts to the island. Ever since the US severed diplomatic relations with the island nation in the 1960s, the US has on multiple occasions produced radio programs for the Cubans. For instance, President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct covert radio program transmissions in the hope of disseminating information to Cuba as early as 1960. The most well-documented case prior to the RBCA was the Radio Swan Project, rebranded in later years as “Radio Americas,” which attempted to transmit US propaganda into Cuba until the late 1960s.¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, by the mid- to late-1970s, attempts to broadcast US news and information into Cuba had become increasingly difficult. In 1979, the Castro leadership in Cuba started a project to introduce radio frequency transmitters that blocked US radio broadcasts to the island. By the late-1970s and early-1980s, as mentioned above, the geopolitical winds had changed course and discussion for a new outlet to disseminate Western news and ideas was brought back into the spotlight.¹⁹⁶ Regardless of whether the CANF initiated the debate about Radio Martí is less important than the fact that the ethnic interest group was able to attach itself to this effort successfully.

The members of the CANF during the 1980s, both within public and private discourse, illustrate clearly the cooperation between the Reagan administration and the political apparatus of the CANF. By far the most successful achievement and mechanism by which any ethnic interest in the US has had in spreading its views was the development of Radio/TV Martí. By

¹⁹⁵ Progler, Joseph. *American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV Martí*. (Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Vol.10, 2011).p.161-164

¹⁹⁶ Henriette M. Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban-American Story of Success and Failure*, (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), 54-59.

accessing monetary resources from the National Endowment for Democracy and influencing the centers of power in Washington, the CANF would be able to exert considerable private control over some public entities. This allowed the ethnic interest group to present its policy concerns directly to the public, and more specifically, to the Cuban-American community.¹⁹⁷ But most interestingly, as will be mentioned below, the CANF is unique in many ways when compared to various other ethnic interest groups, including the two Armenian-American organizations examined above.

The final passage of Bill S.602, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, was made in small steps and encountered surprisingly strong opposition until its full passage. In 1983, the House introduced two similar measures that copied the H.R. 5427 proposal, which had failed the year before. The Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in late April 1983 passed and restructured the identical bill, which was proposed the year before, designating it H.R. 2453.¹⁹⁸ Opponents of a Free Radio Cuba claimed that by sponsoring and funding a federally subsidized radio project, it would in turn contribute to a radio war with Cuba. Many in Congress remained opposed to such funding and those like Kenneth Skoug, a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State claimed that many were "worried about what Cuba might do in retaliation. The leadership within the CANF knew this, and they were playing it for all it was worth."¹⁹⁹ Regardless of the opposition, the hard-liners, both within the Reagan administration aligned with the CANF and State Department officials, were determined to realize the Radio Martí project.

¹⁹⁷ Carothers, Thomas. *The NED at 10*. (Foreign Policy 95 Summer 1994).p.125-127

¹⁹⁸ Progler, Joseph. *American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV Martí*. (Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Vol.10, 2011).p.166-168

¹⁹⁹ Jon Elliston, *Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda*, (Ocean Press, 2002), 102-105.

In an effort to curtail opposition to Radio Free Cuban legislation, both the officials in the White House and the leadership of the CANF attempted to reform Cuban-related issues in terms of a more specific threat to the US. In May 1983, President Reagan stated that “we have strong evidence that high level Cuban government officials have been involved in smuggling drugs into the United States.” As a result of this statement, the CANF quickly agreed with the President's assertion. The ethnic interest group subsequently published two assessments on the subject regarding drug trafficking, which was then reinforced by the President's own position.²⁰⁰ Later that same year, the President accepted an invitation from the CANF to address the local Cuban-American community in Florida. During his speech, Reagan again restated his support for Radio Martí and announced the nomination of CANF member Jose Sorzano as acting US Deputy Representative to the United Nations.²⁰¹

Both the Reagan administration and the CANF were met with stiff resistance to the passage of Radio Free Cuba legislation in any form. The countervailing opposition came from the National Radio Broadcasters Association and their affiliates. In order to bring opponents of the legislation on board, the Reagan administration attempted to add an amendment to the bill, which would ultimately provide 5 million dollars in funding to compensate the domestic broadcasters who would be impacted by Cuban jamming efforts as a result of the program. This ultimately split the opposition to Radio Free Cuba into two distinct camps. The Broadcasters who adamantly opposed the Radio Martí bill due to the possibility of losing its audience now saw compensation and began to move toward a more moderate position. Yet, the second camp, who

²⁰⁰ United Press International. *President Reagan Friday Implicated 'higher level Cuban officials' in Drug Trafficking* . (<https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/05/06/President-Reagan-Friday-implicated-higher-level-Cuban-officials-in/9474421041600/>,1983)

²⁰¹ Nomination of Jose S. Sorzano To Be Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations.(May 20, 1983) The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41356>

had been the most critical of President Reagan's foreign policy objectives in Central America and the Caribbean, remained opposed to any attempt at forming a Radio Free Cuba program in the US.²⁰²

According to many members, and later analysis of CANF's records, the lobbying efforts conducted in the early 1980s were the key factor in the passage of the RBCA. The foundation's ability to find a compromise helped win over opponents in Congress who had been extremely skeptical about the passage of such legislation. Both Senators Grassley and Zorinsky, who had been opponents of CANF efforts in furthering this bill, began to move toward a more conciliatory position.²⁰³ The final breakthrough for Radio Martí occurred in August 1983, when Senator Hawkins from Florida, with the help of the CANF, allowed for a compromise to be worked out.²⁰⁴ The compromise entailed the placing of Radio Martí under the supervision and direction of the Voice of America, which had been established originally in the early 1940s. Mas Canosa, who had originally wanted Radio Martí to be an independent entity, had given way to this notion of creating a new project in order for the legislation to get passed. Mas's surprising reversal and willingness to compromise (he had up to that point wanted Radio Martí to be placed under the Board of International Broadcasting), showed many in Washington as well as those in the State Department that the CANF was on-board with support for the bill. As Koug mentioned in an interview in 2002, "Jorge Mas Canosa decided that that was the best he was going to get,

²⁰²Progler, Joseph. *American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV Marti*. (Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Vol.10, 2011).p.170-172

²⁰³Rytz, Henriette M. *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: Cuban American Influence on US Cuba Policy*. (Palgrave Macmillian, 1 Edition 2013).,69-73

²⁰⁴Howard H. Frederick, *Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications*, (Ablex Pub. Corp, 1986), 28-31.

and it would work."²⁰⁵ But more on terms with the realities of politics in Washington, the Reagan administration was also pressuring Mas Canosa to get the Radio Martí project underway and authorized by Congress. Ultimately, Mas Canosa's assurance to the State Department that the CANF approved of this compromise allowed for congressional approval of the final bill.

On October 4 of that same year, President Reagan signed the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Showing the importance the administration held in the law as a foreign-policy achievement, President Reagan relinquished the signing ceremony in order to accelerate the funding appropriation process. Only two weeks later did Reagan formally announce the signing of the bill, which he claimed was conducted only through bipartisan support in Congress. As a result, the Castro regime cancelled the bilateral radio interference talks in late October.²⁰⁶

It would appear that the favorable political environment of the Cold War during the 1980s, with the encouragement of the Reagan administration, allowed for the engagement and growth of this ethnic interest group. It presented the CANF as a smart political choice for its diasporan community, as the strongest voice for Cuban-American concerns. Yet, the most striking element when assessing the CANF is not solely the rise of the group, but interestingly, the patterns and factors to the group's growth when it came to its organizational capabilities. As mentioned above, the first element by which to assess the success of the CANF is gauging the level and ability of this interest group to marshal resources from both federal government agencies and the community as a whole. It took another year to finally put Radio Martí on the air and on May 20, 1985 the new broadcasting platform went on the air. Whether on purpose or

²⁰⁵ H. Rytz. *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban American Story of Success and Failure*, (Springer, 2013), 89-93.

²⁰⁶ Treaster, Joseph B. *Radio Marti Goes On Air and Cuba retaliates by Ending Pact*. (The New York Times, Published May 21, 1985) <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/21/world/radio-marti-goes-on-air-and-cuba-retaliates-by-ending-pact.html>

coincidental, the broadcasting agency went on air on Cuban Independence Day, the anniversary of US military forces defeating the Spanish during the Spanish-American War. At 5:30 a.m., Radio Martí went on the air with the following opening statement: "*Buenos dias, Cuba. Este es Radio Martí.*" From this point on, the Cuban-American radio station transmitted news, cultural programs, and pro-Western ideas to the communist-run island.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Proglor, Joseph. *American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV Martí.* (Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Vol.10, 2011).p.166

The CANF and the Marshalling of Resources:

Similar to other ethnic interest groups in the US, the CANF could not have achieved its objectives without the means to allocate and concentrate monetary resources into specific projects. Yet, unlike various other ethnic interest groups, such as the Armenian-American organizations listed above, Cuban-American organizations like the CANF had considerable assistance from the US federal government in funding many of their programs. When attempting to assess the strategies and tactics employed by the CANF in marshaling resources, academics alike have noticed the correlation between the relative success of this model minority in reestablishing their socioeconomic status, which had been erased during the exodus, and the level of monetary funding the organization could collect. Gauging the CANF's capacity and effectiveness in tapping into the financial capacity, its own ethnic diaspora is one of the main factors of its success. Especially early on, the lobby's ability to cultivate funds depended largely upon the association it held with the community it represented. Similar in many ways to the ANCA, the CANF constantly attempted to publicize itself during communal gatherings, reminding its diaspora that it was a crucial element in the community's success. Interestingly, the brisk pace at which the Cuban-American community rose in socioeconomic status prior to the establishment of Radio Martí, allowed a small number of elites whose views completely rejected the Castro regime to lead the public debate. Tapping into this accumulation of wealth and the integration of socio-political networks allowed the CANF to advance their political objectives while at the same time controlling the internal debate within this ethnic community regarding its priorities.

Cubans had migrated and traveled to the US since the mid-nineteenth century, and the numbers increased significantly by 1959. Approximately 131,000 Cuban immigrants had made

their way to the US during the five decades prior to Castro's takeover. Because of the Cuban Revolution, by 1983, that number had increased to 800,000. As of 2016, there are 2.2 million American citizens with Cuban ancestry, approximately .673 of one percent of the US total population. The states with the largest reported numbers of Cuban-Americans are Florida, California, Texas, New Jersey and then finally, New York, with just over 70,000. With a population double that of the ArmenianAmerican community, the CANF had a large pool of Cuban-Americans to access when looking for financial assistance.²⁰⁸ In order to understand the complexity and overall success of the CANF in marshalling resources, one must first address the relative wealth and development of "Little Havana." Only a decade after the first wave of migrants reached the US, this influx of hard-working, upwardly mobile immigrants with experience in business and industry transformed Miami into a center for foreign investment. By the end of the 1970s, Miami became a center for international trade, banking, and tourism as a result of the exiles' influence.²⁰⁹ Three main factors led the US to be an accepted and preferred destination for migration of Cubans. First, the geographic proximity of Cuba to the US allowed for an easy avenue in which migration could take place. Second, the well-established ties between the two people also gave cultural familiarity that allowed for easy migration. Finally, the already well-documented and -established Cuban-American community who had arrived between the late nineteenth to the first half of the twentieth century allowed the newly arriving Cuban exiles to integrate in an easier manner, especially when compared to other ethnic diaspora groups. As a result of the factors listed above, an economic domino effect began to

²⁰⁸ Krogstad, Jens Manuel. *Surge in Cuban Immigration to the U.S. Continued through 2016*. (Pew Research Center, January 2017) <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-relations-warm/>

²⁰⁹ Sack, Kevin. *Politics: Florida; with a Major Primary Nearing, Little Havana is Beginning to Look a Lot Like a Giant*. (New York Times.com. 9 March 1996)

occur within the Cuban-American community.²¹⁰ The ability of the Cuban-American community to integrate socially and economically in a quicker manner allowed organizations such as the CANF to tap into sources of aid that helped their political objectives in Washington.

The US government attempted to disperse the newly arriving Cuban immigrants throughout the nation through the implementation of the 1961 Cuban Refugee Program. The program attempted to provide federal assistance to the newly arriving Cuban refugees, which by the early 1960s had reached 14,000 in number per week. Yet, the plurality of the Cuban-American population made their new homes in and around the Miami metropolitan area by 1980. It was almost 8 times larger than its second largest diaspora settlement in and around New York City.²¹¹ Due to the concentration and high numbers of Cuban-Americans in Miami, assessing their financial power in southern Florida is most illustrative. The urban center of Miami became the embodiment and catalyst for the well-known axiom, "The Great Cuban Miracle." The first wave of migrants fleeing the newly established Castro regime made their home in Miami, which prior to the mid-twentieth century, had been seen largely as a winter resort and retirement haven for those living in the colder northern regions of the US. The resulting influx of Cubans into Florida had by the 1970s transformed this largely recreational town into a dynamic commercial center.²¹²

The relative economic advances of the Cuban-American community can best be underscored by the socio-economic environment which arose due to Miami's Cuban-American diaspora. Prior to 1985, the community's income averaged \$50,150, which was 13 percent higher

²¹⁰ Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, *The Cuban Americans*, (The New Americans: Greenwood Press, 1998), 54-57.

²¹¹ Maret, Susan & Lea Aschkenas. *Operation Pedro Pan: The Hidden History of 14,000 Cuban Children*. (Research In Social Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19, 171-184. p.172-173

²¹² Tulchin, Joseph S. *Changes in Cuban Society Since The Nineties*. (Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 2005). p.161-168

when compared to the US average household income.²¹³ Many have attributed these socioeconomic gains to federal programs that attempted to ease the transition for these newcomers in terms of their living environment and economic integration. The aid that the US government provided these Cuban migrants did impact the first arrivals, however, by 1973 when the program ended, the later arrivals saw far fewer avenues for assistance. Rendering the data collected by Sheila Croucher, we see that the vast majority of the Cuban-American community during the 1970s could be identified as working-class and not solely business owners. Croucher argues that approximately one-fifth of the Cuban-Americans in Florida lived in relatively lower income areas. In addition, she claims that the image of Cuban American success and the universal assumptions of a model minority is not grounded in empirical reality. The Cuban American population in fact encompasses a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds.²¹⁴

What this work discovers is that the Cuban-American economic miracle didn't occur solely as a result of independent Cuban-American commercial gains. The entrepreneurial efforts by the newly arriving Cubans were largely influenced and supported by considerable federal aid, such as low interest-bearing loans from the Small Business Administration.²¹⁵ Interestingly, the influx of cheap labor from the new migrants enticed many corporations to move their business to South Florida. However, what Croucher fails to take into account is that the rapid commercial rise in Southern Florida and the resulting high employment rate (relative to the overall US employment rate) allowed for opportunities for the exiled Cubans. This commercial activity in

²¹³ Pew Hispanic Center: Cubans in the United States. August 25, 2006 (<http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/23.pdf>).p,4-5

²¹⁴ Sheila Croucher, "Ethnic Inventions: Constructing and Deconstructing Miami's Culture Clash," (*Pacific Historical Review* 68, no. 2(1999): 243-245.

²¹⁵ Henriette M. Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban-American Story of Success and Failure*, (Palgrava Macmillan US, 2013), 64-67.

Southern Florida during the late 1970s and 1980s allowed the easing of economic integration for these new arrivals. What many researchers fail to mention is that the geographic concentration of Cuban-Americans and those Cuban-American businessmen in Miami allowed for the creation of tight socio-economic connections that permitted start-up Cuban-American businesses to succeed.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the traditional "rags to riches" image of the Cuban-American community, upon closer investigation, can only be seen in a small number of the commercial elite. Yet, the vast majority of Cuban-Americans, especially those originating from the first two waves of migration, obtained economic advancement.

A closer look at recent statistics collected by the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey in 2012 illustrates perfectly the statistical profile of Cuban-Americans who identify themselves as Cuban-Americans or those who trace their family ancestry to Cuba. With an estimated population in the US of 2 million, the Cuban-American community is the fourth largest population of Hispanics living in the US and currently account for 3.9 percent of the overall Hispanic population in the US. When compared to the overall Hispanic ethnic community in the US, Cuban-Americans have high levels of education relative to the other Hispanic groups in the US.²¹⁷ Yet, this level is somewhat lower than the US overall population. Roughly 30 percent of Cuban-Americans 25 years and older have higher education degrees. The median annual income for Cuban-American individuals of \$25,000 is higher than the median overall US Hispanic individual income at \$20,250 but lower on average when compared to the

²¹⁶ An Overview of the Socio-Economic Condition of Miami-Dade County. (Miami Dade County, Social and Economic Development Council, Miami-Dade County Department of Planning and Zoning , Planning Research Section, May 2007).p.4-8

²¹⁷ Lopez, Gustavo. *Hispanics of Cuban Origin in the United States*.(Pew Research Center: Hispanic Trends, 2015).p.3-5

median income levels of the overall US population at \$30,000.²¹⁸ Although the data listed above illustrate the economic success of the Cuban-Americans, it fails to explain the ability of the CANF to marshal financial resources in their effort to achieve their political goals. So, how can we explain the relative success of the CANF in obtaining funding?

In terms of the operability of the CANF and its financial strength, there is a clear discrepancy, both in terms of its ability to marshal financial resources from the community it represents and aid received from governmental agencies. The CANF's founding saw affluent Cuban elites attempting to translate their own personal commercial successes into political victories. Their hope was to establish an ethnic interest group that inherently utilized the already-developed commercial networks in place by Cuban-American elites in Miami. The interconnected relationships between Cuban-American business leaders and the CANF are clear. This elite exodus class who departed Cuba was relatively the wealthiest among the Cuban population and had invested in American banks and corporations prior to leaving. The Cuban Miami businessmen and millionaires, like Jorge Mas Canosa, used their executive leadership and history with federal politics to start the organization. By its founding year, the CANF had a budget of approximately \$200,000 a year and it would grow as the years passed.²¹⁹

The CANF, with an approximate membership base of 50,000 individuals, became the largest Cuban-American ethnic interest group in the US. The political action committee associated with the CANF donates anywhere from \$100,000 to \$250,000 to congressional candidates and members of Congress in a given election cycle. By 1997, Chairman Mas had reorganized the structure in which the lobby would cultivate funds, creating a two-pronged

²¹⁸ Ibid., 11-13.

²¹⁹ Smith, Christine M. & Polly J. Diven. *Minority Influence and Political Interest Groups.* (The Social Psychology of Politics, 2002) pp 178-181.

approach. The first avenue was from those within its community and the second derived from government agencies.²²⁰ As a result, this position increased both the clout and monetary resources of the organization. For instance, Radio Martí's annual budget by the late 1990s had reached \$15 million annually. Surprisingly, the CANF allocated no funds for the program, and 100 percent of Radio Martí's funding came from US taxpayers. As an example of the CANF's power and success during the 1990s, TV Martí was also developed in conjunction and within the similar funding framework of Radio Martí. TV Martí would also receive an additional \$16 million annually in federal funds in order to operate.²²¹ Unsurprising, Mas suggested TV Martí only 3 years after the establishment of the broadcasting platform. In conjunction with Senators Lawton Chiles (D-FL) and Ernest Hollings (D-SC), Mas initially got approval for a three-month trial period in which it was funded \$7.5 million without any committee or congressional hearing.²²² Despite these efforts, however, the Castro regime jammed TV broadcasts successfully, and few if any Cubans on the island had access to TV Martí.²²³ By 1990, the CANF touted a membership list of 50,000, which would increase to 55,000 by 2001. By the mid-2000s the CANF had 170 directors, trustees, and associates who were reported to contribute \$1,000 to \$10,000 to the interest group. The CANF has always portrayed its members as being the elite and most influential members of the Cuban-American community. Furthermore, in illustrating the ability of the organization to cultivate funds from the very community it represents, the Free

²²⁰ Indira Rampersad, "Down with the Embargo: Social Movements, Contentious Politics and U.S. Cuba Policy (1960-2006)," (dissertation, University of Florida, 2007) , p.207-209.

²²¹ Progler, Joseph. *American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV Martí*. (Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Vol.10, 2011).p.169-171

²²² Cuban Information Archives: Broadcasting To Cuba: Radio Marti &CANF Part 2 1991-1994 (Document 0146b) http://cuban-exile.com/doc_126-150/doc0146b.html

²²³ Progler, Joseph. *American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV Martí*. (Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Vol.10, 2011).p.170-172

Cuba Political Action Committee collected in contributions from 1985 to 2000 for a total of 2.7 million dollars and made political donations in the amount of \$1.3 million throughout that same period.²²⁴

One of the major sources of funding for the CANF was the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), first established in 1983 as a non-profit organization centered upon furthering democratic ideals throughout the world. Although the NED is fully funded by the federal government, the financial resources it allocates are solely given to private organizations.

²²⁵ Currently, over sixty organizations are associated with the NED, the CANF being one of them. Because these organizations gather funds from the federal government, they must align their actions with government policy. Interestingly, many critics of the NED claim that the influence purchased by Washington allows them to achieve many of their foreign policy goals in a subversive manner. Recently in 2015, a controversy over alleged corruption has halted an annual appropriation of 16.5 million to the CANF, which had been planned for that year; ultimately the amount was reduced to only 7 million.²²⁶

Similar to Armenian-American ethnic organizations, the CANF modeled themselves in many cases as a tax-deductible organization, allowing individuals to contribute monetarily to these ethnic interest groups. Despite their enthusiasm regarding advocacy activities, these ethnic interest groups are prohibited by federal law from conducting or funding lobbying campaigns

²²⁴ Whitefield, Mimi. *PACs For and Against Cuba Embargo Bring in Big Money*. (The Miami Herald, January 2016)

²²⁵ Henn, Margaret Katherine. *The Cuban American National Foundation and its Role as an Ethnic Interest Group*. (Boston College University, 2008), 23-27

²²⁶ Henn, Margaret Katherine Henn, . *The Cuban American National Foundation and Its Role as an Ethnic Interest Group*. , (Boston College University Libraries, 2008).p., 21-26.

and more importantly, they are restricted from participating in election campaigns.²²⁷ As a result, they dedicate much of their resources to education by collecting and dispersing information, news and cultural ideas to lawmakers and the public as a whole. This information is crucial in the beginning stages of the policy-development and decision-making process for many legislators. Thus, the CANF conducted communication efforts, connecting with lawmakers and their staff.

²²⁸ Despite the setbacks experienced by Cuban-American ethnic interest groups in recent years, the Cuban-American conservative core within Washington remains a key player in furthering Cuban-related issues.

With the inability to directly contribute to political campaigns, political action committees (PACs) have become an increasingly important aspect of the effectiveness of ethnic interest groups. By having a PAC that furthers the diasporan community's concerns, Cuban-American lobbies have been relatively successful overall. The Cuban Democracy is the PAC associated with the CANF. This Cuban American PAC has donated significantly to political campaigns in the hope of reversing the failures this ethnic community has experienced in the last decade and a half. As a result, It has increased its funding. For instance, in 2004, it contributed \$214,000 and in 2006 its donations totaled of \$569,624. From 2008 to 2014, it contributed a total of 1.8 million to office-seeking candidates in both political parties. Although there was a drop when comparing pre-2008 political contributions with those of recent years, it only represents a small fraction of its overall financial ability. This can best be explained by the emergence of a new political action committee, such as the New Cuba PAC, which opposed sanctions on Cuba.

²²⁷ Holman, Craig and Jeremy Weissman. *Restrictions on Government Entities Lobbying the Federal Government*. (Public Citizen, www.citizen.org , 2010)p.1-4

²²⁸ Kiger, Patrick J. *Squeeze Play: The United States, Cuba and the Helms Burton Act*.(Center for Public Integrity 1997) .p.29-32

Finally, the pro-embargo lobbying has lost favor with many academics and lawmakers who see the inevitability of open diplomacy and trade with Cuba as a step forward.²²⁹

Yet, despite the changes in both the foreign and the domestic political sphere, which will be addressed below, the CANF was instrumental in attracting funds not only for the founding and continual operation of Radio/TV Martí, but also played a key role in advancing other programs. While collecting funds from their community was an essential element of their success, the funds from government agencies were far more effective for the lobby. What came to be known as “Operation Exodus” during the Reagan years was the first instance in US history in which the refugee acceptance process was privatized. The CANF was given authority to process the entrance of thousands of Cuban exiles. According to Mas himself, the CANF had processed and given entrance to 10,000 exiles during the period in which the CANF was in control. In addition, during the early-1990s success, the CANF was able to get \$588 in federal funding for each immigrant entering the US, in the hopes of assisting in the transition process.²³⁰ Furthermore, that same year, the Department of Health and Human Services allocated over 1.5 million in aid for 2,000 Cubans under the auspices of the Cuban Exodus Relief Program, which was also supported by the CANF. Many Cuban-Americans, even those who were not associated with the CANF, found that they could bring in family members trapped in third-party countries to the US more easily if they were on good footing with the organization.²³¹ As seen below, the achievements of the CANF are multi-faceted and a result of multiple factors.

²²⁹ OpenSecrets.org.(Center for Responsive Politics, US-Cuba Democracy PAC).

<https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00387720>

²³⁰ Franklin, Jane. *Cuba and the U.S Empire: A Chronological History*. (Monthly Review Press, 3rd Edition, 2016) .p.242-244

²³¹ Robin Cohen, *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 450-451.

Historical Grievances as a Factor of Influence for the CANF

The second factor when assessing the level of success and failures the CANF experienced is by understanding the degree to which this ethnic organization used historical grievances to organize and formulate a narrative for the ethnic community it represents. Since the 1959 communist revolution, there have been countless systematic human rights violations. The first major wave of immigration to the US brought with it stories of victims who had been murdered, imprisoned, tortured, and arrested. These events fostered with it high levels of public sympathy within the US. The wrongs suffered by these first exiles and ultimately, by succeeding Cubans who arrived in the US, established a distinct narrative, presenting themselves as victims who were persecuted due to their preference for freedom.

The CANF would use this notion and frame the debate around claims that their opponents were against "freedom." In truth, the exact number of victims is impossible to calculate, largely due to the secretive nature of the Cuban government. However, there have been countless accounts over the last two decades of human rights violations. For instance, British historian Hugh Thomas maintained that it would be impossible to know precisely how many deaths were a result of Castro but estimated that by early 1961, approximately 2,000 Cubans had been murdered, and by 1970, some 5,000 Cubans had lost their lives.²³² Interestingly, Thomas does not make clear whether these executions occurred after the trials but only claims that "political" crimes were severely punished with no application of the rule of law. In 1965, Fidel Castro himself admitted in a speech that the Cuban government had up to that point arrested some 20,000 "political prisoners."²³³ Mainly due to the unwillingness to provide restitution to the

²³² Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom*, (Harper & Row, 1971), 451-1458.

²³³ Sacha, Matthew. *Fidel Castro's Legacy: Cuba as a Class Society*. (Workers' Liberty, 2012) <http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2012/02/29/cuba-class-society>

victims or family members of these historical injustices, the Cuban-American diaspora has taken up the cause of pushing for such compensation. The CANF has become one of the key organizations in the Cuban-American community to strive for some kind of resolution to the Cuban question.

Cuban-Americans, in many ways similar to other ethnic diaspora groups, have been shaped culturally, socially, politically, and to a large extent economically by their past. The political gains in which the CANF claim victory must be viewed through the lenses of both the pre- and post-immigration experience by both exiles and the new Cuban arrivals. The common currency for diasporan communities is a shared sense of memory. For the CANF, this collective memory of the difficulties they experienced not only in their escape from Cuba, but also in their ability to survive in a new country, became a mechanism by which the organization collectivized their community. In the case of the development of Radio Martí, almost from the very beginning, the CANF used this platform to further their narrative and reinforce historical grievances held by the Cuban-American community. Despite the jamming efforts by the Castro regime and the minimal number of listeners in Cuba, Radio Martí evolved into a platform for the CANF to reach its own community by shaping the changing dialogue during the mid-1990s. The CANF either willingly or as a matter of accident transformed both the Radio and TV Martí platform into a voice for the organization, allowing it to disseminate and shape its message to its own diaspora. This is not surprising if one looks back at the historical character of the first two waves of exiles from Cuba. These better-off exiles had cultivated, prior to their migration, a tradition of civic engagement in Cuba, and under the US political structure and framework, they transferred this tradition successfully into their new host nation. Thus, as in the post-Soviet era, the CANF continued centering and tightening the economic restrictions imposed upon Castro's Cuba in the

hopes of facilitating the downfall of this regime. Interestingly, the pre-migration background of these first few waves of exiles who comprised the core of the CANF held a hard-line view when compromising on issues regarding the removal of sanctions. For instance, as David Rieff contends in his work, *From Exiles to Immigrants, the Cuban American National Foundation*, the CANF maintained a constant policy approach for three decades. The CANF took a position, arguing that the sanctions against Cuba could only be lifted when the necessary democratic reforms were initiated within the island nation. Continuing in this line of thought, the CANF, as one of the most prominent institutions for this ethnic community, has been steadfast in this opinion. Ultimately, the historical grievances the CANF uses to galvanize its support base has eroded in the last decade. Despite the internal debates that have arisen during the last decade or so, many of the more conservative elements, not only within the CANF but also throughout the ethnic Cuban-American community, have correlated the democratizing of Cuba with their eventual return to their homeland.²³⁴

In many ways, it was not surprising that the foundation would experience success during the 1980s and 1990s. The geographic proximity of Cuba became a relative strength for the CANF to keep their objectives alive within the community. From the period between 1959 to 1979, almost no Cuban exiles were permitted any opportunities to return to communist Cuba, even for leisure travel. Thus, the geographic position of "Little Havana" in terms of its proximity to Cuba kept alive the notion that at a moment's notice these exiles could return to their homeland, and justice for what they experienced at the hands of Castro, became a factor by which the CANF could stiffen any resistance against its own political objectives. The idea that Cuban exiles could return to their homeland, although for many far-fetched, allowed for a sense

²³⁴ David Rieff, *From Exiles to Immigrants, the Cuban American National Foundation*, (Simon and Schuster, 2013), 73-76.

of uniformity. One of the true successes of the CANF that is never examined within academic works was the capacity of the organization to maneuver within the various camps in their community. Despite the hard-line elements within the CANF, especially during the 1990s, these same forces by the late 2000s began to prompt a more liberal approach to Cuba. At the same time, Cuba was in the midst of economic troubles, forcing the regime to open up and implement more democratic initiatives. Although the CANF continues to remain predominantly in the control of exiles and their descendants, a growing awareness and increasing irrelevance of past historical injustices committed during the Castro takeover is taking place.²³⁵ This presents the CANF with a surprising new opportunity to present itself as an alternative form of leadership not only within the Cuban diaspora but also increasingly within the island.

Ironically, hard-line Cuban exiles and their descendants, some of whom are three or four generations removed from these historical injustices, continue to sustain the idea and support for the economic and political embargo of Castro's Cuba. Despite Fidel's death, the growing realization that the Castro family will continue to remain in power has transformed the CANF's approach to and relationship with both Washington and the island nation. It has placed the CANF in a more contradictory position, opening the ethnic lobby to criticism from both within the Cuban-American community and from lawmakers. Unlike both Israeli- and Armenian-American ethnic organizations, the CANF has played a masterful role in presenting the advocacy of an isolationist policy toward Cuba and claiming victory in these endeavors, but also, at the same time, attempting to reestablish a relationship with the communist regime. For instance, the CANF has portrayed the success and passage of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, which was sponsored by Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), as the final blow to the Castro

²³⁵ H. Rytz, *Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban American Story of Success and Failure*, (Springer, 2013), 121-128.

regime.²³⁶ The act contained numerous measures that on the surface looked anti-Castro in nature, but it also attempted to reintroduce a connection between the Cuban-American diaspora and the island nation. While at the same time restricting foreign entities from conducting business with Cuba, it also funded a program that upgraded telephone communication between the US and Cuba. Prior to the implementation of the CDA, Cuban-Americans attempting to call the island were forced to conduct these calls through third-country affiliates such as Canada.²³⁷ For many of the descendants of exiles, a psychological reconnection with the island has presented a profound and complicated division in Cuban-American ethnic interest groups. The last decade of political activism within the diasporan community, more specifically within those organizations outside the influence of the CANF, has challenged the predominance of this ethnic lobby.²³⁸

In the Cuban-American community, specifically with the CANF as the main instrument for Cuban-American political activism at a formal level, the shift away from an embargo to a more liberal approach when dealing with Cuba has become more evident. Historical grievances as a tool by which the CANF prioritized its policy objectives were exceedingly successful between the 1980s to the 1990s. Yet, at the turn of the new century, with the growing relevance of new Cuban exiles in public discourse, the traditional image of a unified Cuban American stance began to erode. In addition, many of these new arrivals didn't view the Castro regime in absolutes. These newer arrivals, by taking advantage of citizenship rights and voting, began to

²³⁶ Brenner, Philip. *Cuba Libre: A 500 Year Quest for Independence*. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017),.233-235

²³⁷ Bell, Jason S. *Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S. Policy: An Analysis of the Cuban Democracy Act*. (University of Miami Law School, 1993),.78-79

²³⁸ The United States Code: Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse. Chapter 69. (*Cuban Democracy Act ("CDA") Section 6001.*). <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/cda.pdf>

present a counterpoint to the CANF. Many saw the CANF as counterproductive in correcting the ills of Cuban civil society, due to their antagonistic approach.²³⁹

The death of Fidel Castro, along with the many formal diplomatic meetings between the US and Cuban governments that occurred during the last years of the Obama administration, helped propell the CANF into the public debate regarding the "Cuban Question." When asked about the number of political prisoners in Cuba, current Cuban President Raul Castro stated, "Give me a list of the political prisoners and I will release them immediately."²⁴⁰ In rebuttal to these statements, the CANF released a list of some 47 verified political prisoners currently being held in Cuba. Despite this historical meeting and at times awkward moments between the two leaders during this meeting, the gradual thawing of relations between the two nations has continued. Despite the public and sometimes outspoken rhetoric of the CANF and its leaders, the presidential trip and Obama's normalization efforts in 2016 was surprisingly encouraged. As Omar Lopez Montenegro, the current director of the CANF's human rights branch, mentioned, "What Obama is pushing for is economic changes, but it doesn't change the politics." Montenegro also claimed: "It's killing me to still see the Castro family still in power, but we need to move forward."²⁴¹ This statement personifies the backdoor US-Cuba policy of the CANF, and as many prominent members see it, by attempting to introduce capitalism or economic benefits to the Cuban people can be a means by which to dissolve this authoritarian one-party system. But more striking is the fact that the mechanisms which the CANF employed, both the Radio and TV Marti programs allowed the CANF to present itself as the most successful Cuban American

²³⁹ Guillermo J. Grenier and Lisandro Perez. *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States*, (Boston: Florida International University, 2003), p.53-55.

²⁴⁰ Maselli, Giovanna. *CANF Releases List of Political Prisoners in Cuba*.(CBS Miami, March 21, 2016)

²⁴¹ Malloy, Allie. *Raul Castro Skirts Question On Political Prisoners*. (Cnn Politics March 2016) <https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/21/politics/raul-castro-political-prisoners/index.html>

ethnic interest group within its community; yet, by the turn of the century, its influence began to waver. A growing number of Cuban-Americans, regardless of whether they were descendants of the original exiles or new migrants, realized that the old tactics employed by the CANF were obsolete and a more interactive relationship needed to be forged in order to achieve and resolve community goals.

Ideological Compatibility in Establishing Radio Marti

The Cuban-American community, for our purposes, has two main positions when it comes to Castro's Cuba. The hard-liner's position, which the CANF puts forth, argues that only by taking a defiant and hostile stance toward Cuba will the regime collapse. These hard-liners suggest the implementation and maintenance of economic sanctions and the limitation of formal diplomatic relations in order to further the ouster of Castro and his family from Cuban leadership. Only by imposing such tactics would, in the minds of these hard-liners, a conquest of the political sphere of the island occur. In addition, they maintain that only by putting pressure on the communist regime in Cuba would exiles retrieve their lost property. Yet, the opposing camp within the Cuban-American community argues that a more moderate and adaptive position be implemented. This camp suggests that removing economic sanctions and establishing political ties with Castro's Cuba would ultimately bring about a more democratic environment within the island. They argue that provoking the Cuban leadership fosters a more totalitarian position for the Castro regime. Similar to the relationship between opposing factions and ideas found within the Armenian-American community, the Cuban-American community, despite the conflicting ideological perspectives, saw concerns regarding the Cuban-American diaspora and the island of Cuba as paramount. Thus, the host nation's attitudes and formal diplomatic status toward the island nation are the driving force and element behind ideological compatibility.²⁴²

The perception that a given ethnic interest group is more effective in furthering its objectives when these issues align with the policy inclinations of Congress and the executive branch are not far-fetched. Underlining the extent and degree in which the CANF succeeded in the 1980s and the gradual loss in effectiveness in subsequent decades illustrates this point

²⁴² Leogrande, William M. *Normalizing US-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past*. (International Affairs, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 2015) .p.466-479

clearly. The success the CANF achieved by pushing for Radio Martí shows the impact an ethnic interest achieves when its policy preferences are widely shared both within the public sphere and in the halls of Congress. But even more interesting is the ability of ethnic interest groups to capitalize on the weakness and divisions of their opponents. For instance, this can best be illustrated in the success of the CANF in the 1980s and mid-1990s. However, by the turn of the new century, the CANF would encounter stiff resistance to its legislative recommendations, and more so than any other period in the history of this organization. During the early years of the CANF, its opponents were ineffective in limiting the policy suggestions towards Cuba. This left the playing field of Cuban-related issues and concerns solely in the hands of the CANF, more than any other organized group within the community. As Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State during the Reagan administration, mentioned in a 1997 interview, the CANF was early on “light years” ahead of any other group within the Cuban-American community in terms of monetary resources, electoral placement, and lobbying connections.²⁴³ As this section attempts to underline, this role the CANF played in furthering the case for Radio and TV Martí can be clearly traced back to the larger presence it had during the Reagan administration. It altered perceptions of Central America and the Caribbean in ways Congress and most of the US public had not seen prior. It presented the region as a place of contention between Western ideals and the rising influence of communist-style governments.²⁴⁴

The factor of ideological compatibility in terms of the CANF illustrates the means by which this ethnic lobby used in pushing forward policy objectives which aligned with the larger predispositions of Washington. Attempting to understand the means by which the CANF aligned

²⁴³ Galliano, Ralph J. *U.S. Cuba Policy Report*. (Institute for U.S. Cuba Relations Washington, DC., Vol 4 Number 1, 1997),p,5-7

²⁴⁴ Franklin, Jane.*The Cuba Obsession*.(The Progressive, July 1993)

its policy objectives with the US federal governments and the level of compatibility with US foreign policy goals this ethnic lobby attempted to mimic, specifically when addressing Project Radio and TV Martí is at times problematic. Unlike other ethnic interest groups who seem to have a mono-directional avenue when influencing policy-making in the US, the CANF is the exception. The unique relationship the CANF had when working in concert with presidential administrations (more specifically the Reagan administration) when pursuing common ideas is more complex than many are lead to believe. Jorge Mass Canosa has made countless statements in addressing the role the CANF and its main role in furthering Radio Martí. It is difficult to ignore the connections between this ethnic interest group and US lawmakers. The most striking element of this association is the means by which the federal government influenced the creation and growth of an ethnic interest group that mixed its own foreign policy objectives with the organization's own machinery.

The case study around the establishment of Radio and TV Martí and more specifically the CANF as a whole shows how the US federal apparatus influenced the CANF and in turn used the organization to further its own foreign-policy objectives. Basically, the relationship between these two forces, especially during the early years of the CANF's founding, was instrumental in developing US foreign policy toward Cuba. CANF strategies and activities in line with the West's anti-communist ideals during the height of the Cold War were the cornerstone of this association. As Richard Allen claims, "You won't find this in the textbooks," noting that the CANF- and US-Cuba polices were a result of the fusing of politics and policy.²⁴⁵ When the Reagan administration sought backing for its impromptu and unique foreign policy, it required a

²⁴⁵ Eckstein, Susan and Lorena Barberia. *Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: Cuban Americans and Their Transnational Ties*. (Center for Migration Studies of New York, 2002) p,811-813

well-organized Cuban organization like the CANF to pressure lawmakers on the other side of the aisle and in public discourse. This work suggests that the key to explaining the success of the CANF throughout the 1980s is understanding the mutual relationship and influence it shared with the US government and most importantly, the close ties it had with the executive branch. There is nothing sinister in this association--rather it was a legal and politically astute alignment..²⁴⁶ If in fact the goals of the Reagan administration were to use an ethnic interest group like the CANF in furthering its aims on the hill, they were exceedingly successful. Ultimately, the Reagan-CANF association assisted in altering US foreign policy not only toward the island, but the whole region, influencing a more ideologically right position. Washington would use this influence to dictate and counter the communist-leaning notions already taking hold during the 1980s in this part of the world. Ironically, in politics, it is said that success is relatively short-lived, and in this case, the successes achieved by the CANF and conservative forces in the US were, in fact, short-term. As long as the CANF's policy goals aligned themselves with those of the US State Department, the independence the CANF exercised was advantageous.²⁴⁷ Yet, the harmony of interests between these groups would begin to shift in subsequent decades.

²⁴⁶ Cobas, Michelle M. *Mass Media Ethnics vs Ethnicity: The Cuban American National Foundation's Battle With the Miami Herald*, 22-27

²⁴⁷ Leogrande, William M. *Normalizing US- Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past*. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2005).p.480-484

Cuban Inter-Ethnic Interest Group Rivalry:

The fourth factor, that of inter-ethnic interest group rivalry, unlike the Armenian American community, played a significant role in the changing strategies of the CANF. By the turn of the twenty-first century, Cuban-related issues started to gain traction within mainstream public discourse, altering and, at times, challenging the CANF's decisions. The third factor to the success of ethnic interest groups, that of ideological compatibility, began to weaken in the late 1990's. Thus, cracks began to appear during the Elian Gonzalez case in 1999, where the CANF's all-encompassing clout within its own community began to be challenged. The controversy that encircled this young boy, who lost his mother to drowning in November 1999 while attempting to escape the island of Cuba, became a focal point of the CANF. What would become a heated international custody and immigration dilemma would in turn illustrate the fragile status of the CANF almost two decades after its inception. Early on, the US Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) would place Gonzalez with paternal relatives, mainly under the care of Lazaro Gonzales, a paternal great uncle, who himself was a Cuban exile living in Miami. The decision ultimately made by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reasserted the fact that only Gonzalez's father could petition for asylum on the boy's behalf, and not extended relatives. The failure of the CANF to win the custody and asylum cases demonstrated to many that the CANF was an outdated ethnic lobbying group for the community.²⁴⁸ The CANF, as one of the most vocal proponents of Gonzalez's asylum rights, was seen during the 2000s as an ineffective lobby. The resulting failure allowed various other ethnic organizations within the Cuban-American community to begin the process of challenging the CANF's position on the "Cuba Question."

²⁴⁸ Vulliamy, Ed. *Elian Gonzalez and the Cuban Crisis: Fallout From A Big Row Over a Little Boy*. (The Guardian, Feb, 2010)

The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, also known as the “wet foot, dry foot” policy signed by President Lyndon Johnson, asserted that any Cuban who had been physically present for one year in the US could apply for permanent residency. More interestingly, the law also gave amnesty to Cuban émigrés who stepped foot on US soil. This long-held policy of accepting immigration from the Cuban island would be the main driving force of the Gonzalez case. Although the 1966 Act was in no way connected to the CANF, the CANF had taken the position to fight on behalf of the Gonzalez paternal relatives in order to keep the young boy in the US.²⁴⁹ Under the leadership of Mas Canosa's son, also named Jorge, the organization undertook a public relations push on behalf of Elian Gonzalez's asylum case. For instance, only a few hours after the boy was rescued by the Coast Guard, this ethnic interest group would portray Elian as a poster child of Fidel Castro's victimizations.²⁵⁰ The seven-month-long ordeal for Elian had two dimensions, one which explained the entire debate around Elian as having been orchestrated by the CANF. The other was the lack of formal relations between the US and Cuba, which allowed the CANF, the leading spokesman regarding Cuban-American concerns in the US, to establish a public narrative regarding the issue. For instance, CANF lobbying efforts went into full gear publicizing and attacking the Castro regime. The CANF distributed thousands of leaflets about Elian at the World Trade Organization meeting, which was held in Seattle that same year. Under the headline, "Another Child Victim of Fidel Castro," the CANF leaflets were an attempt to sum up anti-Castro sentiment on the international stage.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Arteaga, Javier. *The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: More than Forty Years Later a Proposal For the Future*. (FIU L: Rev 2008), 534-538

²⁵⁰ Susan Eckstein, *The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the U.S. and their Homeland*. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 62-64.

²⁵¹ Elizabeth F. Cohen, *Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics. The Paradox of Discretion and the Case of Elian Gonzalez*, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 12-18.

Despite the delay tactics brought forth by the CANF and the public media blitz the organization undertook by presenting themselves as Cuban-rights defenders, it failed in its efforts. The ultimate failure of the CANF in achieving success in the Elian case had disastrous consequences for the organization. Coupled with the loss of CANF founder Jorge Mas Canosa in 1997, this failure generated a schism within the Cuban-American community. The Elian Gonzalez case exposed many underlining tensions of the community. It exposed the differing opinions and interest the community held when it came to US-Cuban relations, which up to that point had been nullified due to the relative success of the CANF. These two events severely disrupted the clout the CANF enjoyed within the Cuban-American community, damaging the reputation of the organization and causing a sharp division that allowed more moderate liberal wings of the community to express their opinions.²⁵² It was when the CANF was perhaps the most vulnerable in the year 2000 that the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) was signed. The act of Congress authorized the exportation of some agricultural, medical and educational products from the US to Cuba.²⁵³ Despite the attempts of the CANF to oppose or weaken this piece of legislation, various other recently established Cuban-American lobbying groups and organizations supported the signing of the bill by President Bill Clinton.²⁵⁴ Ever since the failures of the CANF between 1990-2000, other Cuban-American organizations began to emerge within the community. Yet, no other ethnic interest group could fully replace the CANF in order to represent all or even the majority of those within the Cuban-American

²⁵² Gutierrez-Boronat, Orlando. *Cuban Exile Nationalism*. (University of Miami, June 2005) 114-116

²⁵³ Sullivan, Mark P. *Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances* (Congressional Research Service, August 2014), 1-7

²⁵⁴ Canberk Kocak, "Interest Groups and U.S Foreign Policy Towards Cuba. The Restoration of Capitalism in Cuba and the Changing Interest Group Politics," *Class, Race and Corporate Power* 4, no. 2 (2016): 6-8.

community. This was not only due to the lack of organizational capacity but more importantly because of the ideological differences within the community. Due to the ineffectiveness of the CANF, rival ethnic interest groups began to garner increasing levels of support within the Cuban-American community.

With the new waves of Cuban migration to the United States, a surprising influx moderate, or even, ideologically left leaning individuals began to enter the ranks of the CANF. In 2001, another ethnic organization arose within this community that attempted to take up the mantle left behind by the changing and more moderate CANF. The Cuban Liberty Council, founded by hard-liners from within the CANF, attempted to create an organization that could maintain the isolationist advocating policy toward Cuba, which the CANF had promoted since its establishment. With the death of CANF's founder in mid-1997, tension between newer and older members within the organization began to emerge. Two dozen executive board members of the CANF would leave the organization by 2000 to form the Cuban Liberty Council (CLC). This ethnic lobby would come to symbolize the old order, attempting to hinder any accommodation between the US government and Cuba. The CLC and its new PAC began to raise funds in order to influence policymaking decisions in Washington, and as a result, the CANF's financial capabilities began to decrease. The loss of financial resources for the CANF during the mid-2000s forced the organization to downsize its staff and close its Washington office. It also had an impact on Radio Martí, reducing its on-air presence. Yet, despite its rise, the CLC has not reached the levels of influence the CANF experienced during the 1980s and 1990s. The CLC portrays itself as the continuation of the old-guard CANF and constantly brags that its members

were key to the passage of Radio and TV Martí, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and the Helms-Burton Act passed a few years later.²⁵⁵

During the last decade and a half, due to the rise of various Cuban-American ethnic lobbies, the CANF has embarked on reestablishing its overarching influence throughout its own ethnic community. Under the direction of Jorge Mas Santos, the son of the founder Jorge Mas Canosa, in the mid-2000's the organization adopted an ever-more moderate approach when attempting to seek influence in the decision-making process toward US and Cuban relations. Yet, conservative elements in Washington still are influenced by hard-liners within the Cuban-American community. The US-Cuba Democracy PAC has been essential in maintaining this conservative isolationist policy among policy-makers in Congress. For instance, this Cuban-American PAC has contributed an estimated 2.6 million dollars in a period of ten years, from 2004 to 2014, to political candidates from both parties.²⁵⁶ Interestingly, the data clearly illustrate a significant reduction in donations from conservative elements within the Cuban-American community since 2008. For instance, from 2008 to 2016, total donations to the PAC fell from 879,689 dollars to 714,521 during this period, a reduction of approximately 18 percent. However, it should be noted that donations to ethnic PACs across the board fell during this same period. For example, the pro-Israel PACs during this eight-year period also saw a significant drop in funds, and by some estimates a reduction of 6 percent.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ Lana Wyle, *Perceptions of Cuba: Canadian and American Policies in Comparative Perspective*, (University of Toronto Press, 2010), 22-27.

²⁵⁶ Sugden, John. *New Cuba Policy Strikes Blow to Anti-Castro Lobby*. (OpenSecrets.org: Center for Responsive Politics, December 2014) <https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/12/new-cuba-policy-strikes-blow-to-anti-castro-lobby/>

²⁵⁷ OpenSecrets.org (Center For Responsive Politics)
<https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot.php?cmte=C00387720&cycle=2016>

The capacity to affect the lawmaking process by ethnic lobbies--including those of the Cuban-American lobby through campaign finance--has noticeable constraints. During the two terms of President Barack Obama's administration, the pro-embargo policy which had been so long advocated by the CANF began to weaken. Due in large part to more moderate elements within the CANF and proponents in the agribusiness lobby, a move away from a more isolationist policy regarding US-Cuban relations began to appear. Furthermore, the hard-line stance regarding US foreign policy toward Cuba was further weakened by a growing voice of academics who saw the US sanctions on Cuba as futile and harmful. In December of 2014, President Obama put forth a new foreign policy shift by declaring the restoration of full diplomatic relations with Cuba and the opening of an embassy in Havana.²⁵⁸ This move was the first in over a half a century by the US to normalize relations with the island country. Culminating in an 18-month long process of secret talks between the two country's leaderships, which included a prisoner swap that had been facilitated by Pope Francis and a private phone conversation between President Obama and President Raul Castro.²⁵⁹ The policy shift brought about a backlash from hard-liners, those who supported the isolationist policy long-advocated by the CANF. As Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, the son of a Cuban immigrant himself stated, "This entire policy shift announced today is based on an illusion, on a lie, the lie and the illusion that more commerce and access to money and goods will translate to political freedom for the Cuban people." This notion was reinforced by not only conservative forces in Congress but

²⁵⁸ Katel, Peter. *Restoring Ties With Cuba: Can Easing Sanctions Spur Democracy?* <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2015061200> (Library. CQ Researcher Press 2016)

²⁵⁹ Chandler, Adam. *How the Pope Helped Bring the United States and Cuba Together.* (The Atlantic: December 2014)

among CLC hard-liners as well.²⁶⁰ But most importantly, the move away from a sanction-led foreign policy toward Cuba has illustrated the sharp divides within the Cuban-American community and the sometimes precarious nature of the CANF as a key representative for its members.

Yet, the election of President Trump has again shifted the balance of power back into the hands of the hard-liners, both within the CANF and CLC. The policy pledges once made during his campaign to conservative elements within the Cuban-American community have given many of the old guard cause for hope. At a event in Miami in early August 2017, President Trump said, "America will expose the crimes of the Castro regime and stand with the Cuban people in their struggle for freedom," He continued by stating that "effective immediately, I am canceling the last administration's completely one-sided deal with Cuba." During the Obama administration's last two years, the US and Cuba signed a total of 23 bilateral agreements on a variety of shared interests.²⁶¹ It can be assumed that Trump, who received 54 percent of the Cuban-American vote, owed a political debt to conservative Cuban-Americans who had supported him during his run for President.²⁶² Trump's goal has been stated as conducting foreign policy in order to pressure the Cuban government to fix many of its human rights violations. For example, President Trump has set forth a policy initiative which halted the removal of US financial sanctions on the island country, insisting. "We will not lift sanctions on the Cuban regime until all political prisoners are freed, freedoms of assembly and expression are respected, all political

²⁶⁰ Jonathan D. Rosen, *U.S.-Cuba Relations: Charting a New Path (Security in the Americas the Twenty-First Century)*, (Lexington Books, 2016), xiv-xvii.

²⁶¹ Remarks by President Trump on the Policy of the United States Towards Cuba. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba/> (June, 2017)

²⁶² Leogrande, William M. *Trump Has Set U.S.-Cuba Relations Back Decades.* (<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/22/trump-has-set-u-s-cuba-relations-back-decades/>, June 2017)

parties are legalized, and free and international supervised elections are scheduled."²⁶³ As of yet, it is far too early to assess the impact of a newly elected US presidential administration without following it to its end. But as was the case during the Reagan administration, the conservative elements within the Cuban-American community have come to see the rise of Trump as a successful achievement that could overcome the many failures of the past decade. The resulting reversal, back and forth from conservative to moderate power centers within the Cuban community, has shown the fragile nature of the Cuban-American community and the lack of solidarity among Cuban-Americans currently. Only time can tell whether organizations like the CANF and CLC will achieve their goals in the current domestic and international political environment.

²⁶³ Remarks by President Trump on the Policy of the United States Towards Cuba. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba/> (June, 2017)

CONCLUSION

The chapters above have attempted to illustrate the complex nature of ethnic interest groups in the United States. Identifying the four factors of the relative success or failure of a distinct ethnic interest group has allowed this work to challenge previously held notions regarding lobbying efforts in Washington, DC. These four factors, marshalling resources, historical grievance, ideological compatibility and inter-ethnic rivalry allow for a deeper insight into the relative success of ethnic lobbies. Both Armenian- and Cuban-American political interest groups express many common experiences that link the two organizations within the framework of the four factors listed above. Yet, degrees of difference separate both diasporan groups when they are assessed within each factor. Both ethnic groups have experienced their share of successes and failures, and the changing dynamics in the geopolitical and domestic spheres have brought about new dilemmas for these communities. Although the Armenian-American community and its tradition of political activism started early in the twentieth century, the political associations which they established allowed for a more diverse and stable infrastructure throughout the nation. The Cuban-American community, though largely centralized within a few urban centers, has also allowed it to exercise more political influence in specific regions. However, overall, the varying levels of success and failure that both organizations experienced display the importance of the four factors in pursuing policy goals.

As illustrated above, in terms of comparing the CANF and the ANCA, the ANCA's methodological approach is dramatically different when juxtaposed with the tactics of the CANF. The ANCA has largely positioned itself as a grassroots group, using a localized approach by galvanizing its members in order to change policy at a regional or state level. The aim of this approach was to influence the lower rungs of power in the hope of changing federal policy. Due

to an opposing policy approach by the US State Department during the Cold War, leaders within the ANCA knew early on that the only means by which to impact policy would be found at the grassroots level. In the pursuit of its own goals, the CANF attempted to establish itself within the halls of power in Washington. The CANF represents a completely opposite strategy when compared with the ANCA. The CANF moved away from a localized approach and attempted to associate its inner political workings with those associated with the federal government. Thus, the CANF and its executives aimed to connect on both a personal and professional level with those who have a direct or even indirect influence upon US foreign-policy development. This is not to say that the ANCA or various other Armenian-American organizations lack networking capabilities in Washington. Yet, the CANF itself was initially influenced by individuals who were themselves part of the US foreign-policy apparatus. Although not a requirement, the organizational framework of each ethnic interest group is key to implementing the four evaluative factors listed above. The structural approach of a given lobby group is a determining factor of their success during certain periods of their existence.

When using the four factors delineated above to attempt to gauge the effectiveness of both the CANF and ANCA, we see that the more successful a lobby group is in aligning these factors with its own objectives, the more rewarding the results. When addressing the factor of marshaling resources, we see a significant difference between the two interest groups. When looking at the ANCA, we see that due in large part to its long-running history, the Armenian ethnic interest group has established entrenched links with many Armenian-American elites for funding. The vast majority of the organization's funds were derived from its own community--through fundraising efforts, membership dues, and direct donations, the ANCA has garnered considerable resources. These internal funds have allowed the organization to expand sponsored

programs and educational efforts. As mentioned above, during the last decade or so, the ANCA has gathered an estimated \$200 million directly from the Armenian-American community in order to support not only the operational costs of the organization but also its policy objectives. When examining the average member donation of the Armenian-American community, we see an average of \$680 per person toward Armenian fundraising and cultural charity event contributions. Yet, unlike the CANF, the ANCA was left without the avenue of direct US federal funding to help supplement their funds. With higher average incomes per median family among Armenian-Americans, the ANCA has been able to access communal events in order to raise funds for the organization. It is almost impossible to document and calculate the total funds this organization has collected during its entire existence, but to give a small picture of its monetary strength, the organization by 1920 had collected \$117 million, or about \$1.3 billion dollars given modern rates of inflation as of 2018.²⁶⁴ Yet, when addressing the ability of the ANCA to marshal resources, the work does not solely focus upon the organization's finances but also refers to aid they secured and sent to the Republic of Armenia. Since the Freedom Support Act of 1992, an estimated \$1.6 billion in US funding has been sent to the small country.²⁶⁵ From 1992 to 2000 Armenia had been given \$730 million in aid.²⁶⁶ Although these funds did not enter into the coffers of the ANCA, monetary resources were sent directly to the Armenian Government, it did illustrate to its own community the effectiveness of its strategies. Propelled by political activism in Washington as well as at the local level, the ANCA, with the passage of the Freedom Support Act, provided crucial support during the troubled years of the 1990s for the landlocked country.

²⁶⁴ Adalian, Rouben Paul. *Near East Relief and the Armenian Genocide*. (Armenian National Institute, 1998)

²⁶⁵ Mainville, Michael. *Second-Largest Recipients of U.S Aid, Armenians Fight To Get Ahead*. (The New York Sun, Aug, 2005)

²⁶⁶ Balayev, Bahruz. *The Right to Self Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context*. (Lexington Books, 2013)p81-82

On the other hand, when assessing the ability of the CANF to marshal resources, we see a different approach by which the Cuban-American lobby would pursue its policy and program goals. Organized and developed by Cuban-American elites in Miami, the Cuban American National Foundation was initially funded solely by personal donations from prosperous Cuban-Americans. Although Cuban Americans had a lower median family income when compared to various other ethnic groups in the United States, it was able to harness financial support from elites within the community. The organization was able to supplement financial resources from various avenues. During the first few years, the CANF collected on average over \$200,000 annually. With its membership base of over 50,000 individuals, the organization was able to garner financial resources from its own community, permitting it to influence clout over US foreign policy toward the island nation. In terms of the Radio and TV Martí program initiatives, the funding, which accounted for \$31 million dollars annually, was in fact, 100 percent allocated from the US federal government. In addition, the CANF, through its association with the Free Cuba Political Action Committee, contributed over \$1.3 million in a 15-year period from 1985 to 2000 to political campaigns. Nevertheless, the vast majority of financial resources the organization collected were derived from both government and communal sources. Unlike the ANCA, who succeeded in achieving monetary aid for the Republic of Armenia as well as undertaking educational programs for lawmakers, the CANF, due to its policy objectives, never assisted its home country with aid. In terms of the CANF, the mix of private and federal funds to achieve its political objectives was solely fixated upon its own organizational needs and the community it represents. Although much of the federal funding for the CANF has evaporated in recent years, the organization still attempts to collect monetary and material resources from its ethnic community. When assessing whether the ANCA or the CANF was more successful in its

ability to gain financial resources, one is forced to look toward the future. Both ethnic lobbies have been relatively successful in these endeavors. Yet, the recent reduction of funding to the CANF by the federal government has limited its effectiveness. Meanwhile, the ANCA enjoys a steady stream of contributions collected from its community. The CANF's reliance on federal funds has placed it in a weakened position during the last five years. It has left its future questionable due to the constantly shifting approaches by various executive branches when dealing with foreign-policy issues. Regardless, both ethnic lobbies have used successful methods to gather financial resources to support their organizations

The second factor, ideological compatibility, which refers to the alignment of political goals with that of the host nation's domestic and foreign policy positions, is the most interesting, and at times most difficult, to analyze. Yet, as deduced from the material presented above, the CANF during most of its existence has clearly experienced success in connecting its objectives with U.S foreign policy goals. The Cold War paradigm that developed after World War II led the US to see those nations turning to Moscow during the last half of the twentieth century as in direct opposition to the very ideals the West championed. The rise and development of the CANF in the early 1980s coincided perfectly--many might claim too perfectly--with the height of Cold War tension. This dual paradigm during the second half of the twentieth century allowed the ethnic lobby to exercise greater influence in Washington, permitting the lobby to access financial resources and political support from those who saw Communist Cuba as a threat to US foreign policy objectives in Central America and the Caribbean. The passing of Radio and later TV Martí illustrates perfectly the alignment of the most prominent Cuban-American ethnic interest group with that of the US State Department and Reagan Administration to push for a regime change in Cuba. The information and ideas presented by these two platforms, which

initially intended to be disseminated to the island country, mimicked in many ways the complaints of consecutive US administrations regarding Cuba. Unlike various other ethnic interest groups that operate within political and social spheres, the CANF had the distinct advantage of being encouraged by both the executive and legislative branches in forwarding its suggestions. In addition, the adherence to more conservative elements within the political sphere also paralleled the political leanings of the vast majority of CANF members. Although, the success by aligning the CANF's own political stance with those of US foreign-policy objectives has wavered considerably during the last decade, with many on the ideological left questioning the isolationist attempts of the US toward Cuba. During his campaign efforts in Florida, Trump reiterated his support for further pressuring the island nation. In his first ninety days, President Trump set forth a policy that would further restrict US business and travel to Cuba, and he also attempted to tighten the Cuban embargo that had been loosened during the Obama administration. Many political analysts have suggested that the move by President Trump toward a more restrictive policy on Cuba is an attempt to appease many old-guard Cuban-Americans who still see the communist regime in Cuba as the main threat to their community. Only time will tell if hard-line elements within the Cuban-American community will see another opportunity to align their policy objectives with that of the US State Departments.

When attempting to assess the ANCA's ability to align its own objectives with those of the US, we see a greater degree of difficulty when compared to that of Cuban-American lobbying groups. Due to Turkey's relative importance as a key NATO ally and strategic partner in the region for the US, many objectives, such as the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the ANCA, have failed to make headway in Washington. The fear of many in the State Department to upset a key ally, especially during the Cold War, minimized the margins of

maneuverability for Armenian-American lobbies in pushing forth their goals. However, by the early 1990s, the headway done in coalition-building and networking, especially in less-than-favorable circumstances, bore fruit during this time, allowing the ANCA to capitalize politically from the fall of the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, the chaos and power vacuum created by the fall of the Iron Curtain presented the ANCA with an opportunity to aid the newly established Armenian Republic. The passing of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act and the successful annual allocation of financial and material aid to Armenia was all possible due to the void left behind by the USSR and the convergence of US foreign-policy aspirations in the Trans-Caucasus. The ANCA presented themselves as brokers between the newly established nation and the US. In this capacity, the ANCA was not only a lobbying organization for the Armenian-American community, but also did work on behalf of the new nation. The role of the organization changed throughout the 90s, increasing the level of influence and clout the ethnic organization had in Washington. The recent events in the Middle East, specifically Syria, have strained relations between NATO, most specifically the US. and Turkey. Thus, during the last few months, the ANCA has supported legislative action in Congress to increase funding to Armenia. Regardless, when comparing the CANF and ANCA in terms of ideological compatibility with the US, the CANF has traditionally experienced much more positive returns on their efforts.

Historical grievance and inter-ethnic interest group rivalry are the two other factors that can gauge the effectiveness of both the Cuban- and Armenian-American lobbies. Both lobbies use historical grievances to draw upon distinct affective dispositions within their communities to garner support for their organizations. The effectiveness of doing so, and their ability to hold on to past injustices with their aptitude in coordinating with other organizations within that

community, would determine their long-term validity to speak on behalf of the diaspora. For Armenians, the overarching theme of genocide recognition has allowed the community to focus their efforts on singular issues that the vast majority of not only its members but also the community as a whole agrees upon. Thus, they connected the historical injustice of the past, which had occurred almost a century prior to the passage of Section 907, with contemporary injustices not only for the diasporan community in the US but also for those living in modern-day Armenia. In addition, the challenges the CANF would experience within their community were, for the most part, absent for the ANCA. The ANCA had almost identical policy platforms as their rivals held within the diaspora. As a result, inter-ethnic interest group pressure was minimal, thus allowing the ANCA to dictate both the narrative and overall policy goals of the community in general due to the organization's experience and financial resources. Nevertheless, Armenian lobbying organizations such as the Armenian Assembly of America never directly challenged the clout of the ANCA, but presented themselves as an alternative for many Armenian-Americans who saw a different approach necessary to achieve their stated goals. Yet, when comparing the impact of historical atrocities upon a given ethnic community, the genocide of the Armenians affects almost the entire Armenian-American population on one or multiple levels. Almost the entire community speaks in unison regarding the issue of genocide recognition. This is not completely the case, especially during the last two decades, for the Cuban-American community.

In truth, the Cuban communist revolution in the 1960s shook the very foundation of socio-political and economic life for the island nation. However, during the last few decades, with newer waves of Cuban immigration to the US, this narrative of the atrocities of Fidel's regime has been minimized. For members of the CANF as well as Cuban-Americans as a whole,

the years after the Cuban revolution brought forth a collective memory of difficulties experienced due to their expulsion. The hardships and obstacles these new waves of Cuban immigrants faced became a key aspect of their historical grievance. Many who had experienced a relatively high socioeconomic status in Cuba saw their losses at the hands of the communists as a point of contention that united the Diaspora community. Yet, by the late 1980s, the influx of economic refugees from the island nation began to change the ideological make-up the diasporan community. These new Cuban-Americans began to minimize and complicate the already-established collective notions of historical injustice that bonded the ethnic diaspora. Although, the more conservative elements within the community would prevail in setting political objectives that would linger until the turn of the twenty-first century. Those originating from newer waves of immigration to the US became the voice of contention within the ethnic community toward the isolationist policy of the CANF. Many felt that only by minimizing the harsh foreign-policy directives of the US government could reform take place on the island nation. The CANF's failures in the late 1990s and early 2000s, specifically in regard to the Elian Gonzalez case, resulted in a subsequent schism within the Cuban-American community. The split between left- and right- leaning Cuban-Americans weakened the CANF's overarching influence. Although historical grievance still impacts the Cuban-American community, rivalry from within the community toward the CANF has forced the organization to change its focus. Inter-ethnic interest group rivalry has played a much more significant role in minimizing the influence of the CANF during the last decade. Like the Armenian Genocide for Armenians, the communist revolution utterly changed the identity of Cubans, but various political and ideological inclinations have diminished the tragedy the first Cuban-Americans experienced at the hands of communist rebels. Radio and TV Martí presented historical grievance to a wide

audience, but as time passed, the return-on-investment for this program began to be questioned. Also, comparing the success of negating inter-ethnic interest group rivalry was less effective when assessed within the Cuban-American community.

The more effectively an ethnic interest group was in encompassing these four factors, the more fortunate the lobbying organization was in pursuing its goals. The relative success of either the ANCA or the CANF within these four factors, when it came to both the passage of Section 907 and Radio Martí, often depended on the geopolitical realities the US faced during distinct periods of the twentieth century. Success within these four factors was rarely consistent, and during different periods of these two organizations' histories, was never quite steady. Both organizations, through their legislative successes in pursuing and implementing their policy achievements, became cornerstones for furthering their influence throughout their ethnic communities. The achievements of Section 907 and Radio Martí are still touted by both ethnic lobbies. Opponents of both organizations have, on the other hand, seen those successes as road blocks and examples of the capabilities of these lobbies. Despite the achievements for both ethnic lobbies during the turn of the twentieth century, both organizations have attempted to reframe their goals. Mainly in response to the minimization of Section 907 and Radio Martí as effective programs, both organizations have sought new avenues in which to stay relevant. Future research by scholars will examine these ethnic interest groups in the context of an ever-changing geopolitical environment where US foreign-policy influence is being seen in ever-increasingly negative ways. Thus, the loss of the geopolitical clout of the US will present new challenges and opportunities for these organizations.

However, a few questions are left unanswered when addressing and comparing these two ethnic interest groups. The first being, what does this kind of ethnic lobbying mean for both US

foreign policy efforts and the democratic process in general? In terms of both the Armenian and Cuban lobbies examined above, the primary concern for each ethnic lobby was the method and approach of US foreign policy regarding their ancestral homeland. The democratic process allowed a means by which these interest groups could achieve their stated objectives by navigating the complex environment of democracy which represents various competing concerns. Their ability to concentrate into specific regional enclaves within the United States allowed them the opportunity to portray their diaspora communities as large and vocal constituencies, forming a substantial voter block in state politics. Giving both ethnic groups greater political influence and significance at the local level, when compared to their overall numbers within the US. For instance, states like California and Florida with high concentrations of Armenians and Cubans respectively, have greater clout over their elected officials regarding issues dealing with their ancestral homeland than do Armenians and Cubans living outside those states. This doesn't mean that Armenians and Cubans residing outside those two states have no political agency when dealing with similar concerns, but it does give greater importance to the ANCA and CANF in those two states. Those elected officials with high concentrations of Armenian and Cuban constituencies are particularly more sensitive to the concerns of their ethnic interest groups. For example, the Congressional Caucus on Armenian issues, which was first established in 1995, claims 122 members, 35 of which derive from the state of California. In terms of the Congressional Cuba Democracy Caucus, which holds only 11 members, 4 hail from the state of Florida. Taking it at face value, it seems that these communities and by extension their ethnic interest groups have used the democratic process to carve out a certain level of influence on the political process. The nature of the democratic process ultimately forces and encourages groups of citizens to unify into voter blocks in order for their concerns to be

addressed. These ethnic communities have taken this basic principle and used it to further their collective goals.

The questions which beg to be answered is whether this form of ethnic lobbying is a positive or a negative culmination of democracy? And more importantly, what does this mean for foreign policy in a democracy where ethnic and national interest groups are able to push particular agendas? In order to answer these questions, one must step back and consider the relevance of time and place. As the four factors have illustrated within this work, ethnic interest groups and the foreign policy goals of the host nation as well as the realities of the Diaspora communities themselves are constantly changing. They are not static, the effectiveness of one ethnic interest group during a given period is not representative of the relative overall success of that lobby. As the two case studies have both shown, the more effective a given interest group is in achieving and furthering the four factors listed above, the more successful they are navigating the chaotic waters of democratic politics. In his 1997 essay, titled *The Erosion of American National Interests*, Samuel P Huntington, claimed that ethnic lobbies are entities that seek to promote goals outside the national interest of the United States. Thus, they are a threat to the will of the people, ultimately negating the foreign policy goals of the United States. Although, in some cases there might be some truth behind this claim. Yet, the author fails to define exactly what the national interests of the United States are. This perspective is similar to many who are critical of lobbying influence upon policy development. Asserting that these organizations somehow have ulterior motives or seek to gain advantage to the detriment of the nation as a whole. However, as we illustrated above, that influence doesn't go in one particular direction. That is from ethnic lobbies to lawmakers and federal agencies. Where as this is predominately the case for the ANCA and its relationship with US foreign policy development. Specifically the

issue of achieving recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The CANF is a perfect example of how those within the US State Department and throughout the halls of Congress influenced to a large degree the CANF. The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act was directly fostered by elements both within the US State Department and those lawmakers in Washington. In many ways the CANF was encouraged by US foreign policy objectives during the Cold War. Again, as this work points out on multiple occasions, ethnic interest groups can also be used by the host nation to further its own foreign policy goals. The national interest of the United States is not static, they are constantly changing due to both internal and external stimuli.

Whether ethnic interest groups are a positive or negative element in the democratic process of the US is relative. The most concrete response might be that when policymakers interests coincide with those of the ethnic lobbying organizations, things get done. Whether these actions are positive or negative, are in the eye of the beholder. When opportunities arise for a given nation to exert influence on the global stage, ethnic interest groups could be used as mechanisms to further these objectives. Such was the case with the ANCA and the fall of the iron curtain, or with the CANF during the height of the Cold War. Ethnic interest groups are center stage when international events occur. This is when actions speak louder than words, when ideological compatibility, the ability to marshal resources, the pronouncement of historical grievances and the domination or collision with inner ethnic interest group rivals becomes vital in achieving the goals laid out by these ethnic organizations. After conducting this research it is self evident that ethnic interest group influence upon US foreign policy developments is not a one way street but a culmination of factors.

The upcoming decade will become increasingly difficult for ethnic lobbying groups, and especially so for Armenian- and Cuban-American ethnic organizations, because the Trump

administration has altered the traditional points of contact through which ethnic lobbies could influence policy development. During the 2016 presidential elections, Trump promised very little to the Armenian-American community, and once in office, President Trump has given numerous signals to reduce monetary aid to Armenia, claiming that Armenia's close relationships with Russia and Iran are a direct threat to US presence in the region. Surprisingly, the ANCA has stated that they anticipate very little in terms of support both financially and materially for Armenia from the new administration.²⁶⁷ On the other hand, Cuban-American hardliners throughout the community have been encouraged by the Trump administration, seeing a possible return to a more hostile and isolationist policy toward the island nation. During the Obama presidency, the executive branch took it upon themselves to roll back many economic restrictions and allowed US businesses to have dealings with Cuba. How far Trump will retract these associations is hard to determine, but if Trump's rhetoric is any indication of his policy position, Cuban-American hardliners will be rather pleased.²⁶⁸ Trump had made considerable headway among Cuban-American voters during the 2016 election season. During the elections, Cubans in Florida were twice as likely to vote for Trump, at 54 percent, when compared to 35 percent of Latino-Americans who cast their vote for Trump in 2016.²⁶⁹ The geopolitical realities of the US have changed considerably with the election of President Trump. The new ideological paradigm the executive branch wants to embark upon will drastically alter the ability of ethnic organizations to align themselves with the new administration. The ability of the both the ANCA

²⁶⁷ Armenian National Committee of America: Armenian Caucus Members Seek Reversal of Proposed Trump Administration Cut in Aid to Armenia. <https://anca.org/armenian-caucus-members-seek-reversal-of-proposed-trump-administration-cut-in-aid-to-armenia/>

²⁶⁸ Seein, Carmen. *Cuban Americans Eager to Know Trump's Changes to U.S.-Cuba Policy*. (NBC News, Jun 15 2017) <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/cuban-americans-eager-know-trump-s-changes-u-s-cuba-n772871>

²⁶⁹ Krogstad, Jens Manuel and Antonio Flores. *Unlike other Latinos, about half of Cuban Voters in Florida Backed Trump*. (Pew Research Center: November, 2016)

and the CANF to adapt to this change will be the determining factor to their success in the foreseeable future.

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