

12-1-2014

## After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural Transitions, and Nonpolarity

Nerses Kopalyan

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, kopalyan@unlv.nevada.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations>



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#)

---

### Repository Citation

Kopalyan, Nerses, "After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural Transitions, and Nonpolarity" (2014). *UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones*. 2277.  
<https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/2277>

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself.

This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact [digitalscholarship@unlv.edu](mailto:digitalscholarship@unlv.edu).

AFTER POLARITY: WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLAR STRUCTURAL  
TRANSITIONS, AND NONPOLARITY

By

Nerses Kopalyan

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
2006

Master of Arts in Political Science  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
2009

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy – Political Science

Department of Political Science  
College of Liberal Arts  
The Graduate College

University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
December 2014

Copyright by Nerses Kopalyan, 2015  
All Rights Reserved

We recommend the dissertation prepared under our supervision by

**Nerses Kopalyan**

entitled

**After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural Transitions, and Nonpolarity**

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy - Political Science**

Department of Political Science

Jonathan R. Strand, Ph.D., Committee Chair

John P. Tuman, Ph.D., Committee Member

Tiffany Howard, Ph.D., Committee Member

Andrew Bell, Ph.D., Graduate College Representative

Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D., Interim Dean of the Graduate College

December 2014

## ABSTRACT

After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural  
Transitions, and Nonpolarity

By

Nerses Kopalyan

Dr. Jonathan Strand, Examination Committee Chair  
University of Nevada Las Vegas

The research question poses: what are the polar structurations of a system after unipolar transitions, and should a system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this phenomenon be explained? In the study of polarity, two deficiencies are diagnosed that can potentially not only fill a serious gap, but also strengthen the theoretical, conceptual, and systemic tools utilized within the field. The first gap is the absence of any developed treatments of nonpolarity. Categorical taxonomy primarily revolves around uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi- polar structures. The field lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, thus limiting the development of a robust theoretical model that can enrich the study of polar structures and world powers. The second deficiency is the shortage of systematized studies of structural transformations, especially the outcome of polar structural transitions after unipolarity. The objective of this research is to conceptualize, test, and analyze the power configurations and post transitional patterns within world political systems. The intent is to observe what power configuration unipolar systems transition into, gauge probabilistic outcomes, and if the ensuing power configuration is defined by nonpolarity, address whether a discernible pattern may be ascertained vis-à-vis unipolarity giving way to nonpolarity. Finally, the research attempts to consider the following puzzle: what will the global political order look like after American unipolarity?

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The most notable characteristic of an intellectual is perhaps magnanimity. That this concept defines the prolific group of scholars who contributed to this project cannot be understated. I have seen, experienced, and learned much in life, yet I have even more to learn from Dr. Jonathan Strand, whose chairmanship of this project epitomizes the devotion, nobility, and dedication embodied in a model professor. Expressing gratitude cannot suffice: I remain indebted to him. Esteem must also be endowed upon Dr. John Tuman, whose impressive intellect is equally matched with his kind and considerate dedication to his students. He remains a role model that many of us seek to emulate. Dr. Tiffany Howard's patience and thoughtfulness must also be noted: she had the Herculean task of dealing with my overbearing Armenianness for nearly three years. Her attentive and prudent guidance is but a small example of her thoughtfulness. Recognition must also be extended to Dr. David Fott, who through the years has demonstrated the ethics of being a consummate professional. Collectively, I would also like to acknowledge the entire Political Science Department, from our professors to our graduate students: it has been an extraordinary and continuous pleasure to be part of this department.

Loyalty, honor, and a stoic sense of duty are what define Armenian men of status. This is best projected through one's family. Specification of names is not necessary here, for each hold their esteemed value in relation to their proper place. As such, I am defined by my devotion to my family, circle of friend, and my clan. Our motto remains absolute: "Righteousness Takes Only One Form."

## DEDICATION

In honor of Samvel “Malish” Torosyan:

Beloved Godfather, mentor, and icon;

a true connoisseur of power and a Lion amongst men!

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
DEDICATION.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES.....	viii
LIST OF MAPS.....	x
CHAPTER 1 TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTION: AN INTRODUCTION.....	1
Topic and Research Question.....	2
Literature Review.....	6
Composition of this Work.....	11
CHAPTER 2 BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE METHODOLOGICAL: THE OVERARCHING ARGUMENT .....	16
Research Design.....	18
Methodology.....	21
CHAPTER 3 BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE ANALYTICAL: DEFINING AND EXPLAINING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS.....	36
System-Wide Hegemon and Polarity.....	41
Nonpolarity: As Analytical Tool and Conceptual Model.....	49
CHAPTER 4 THE FAR EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	54
CHAPTER 5 THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	94
CHAPTER 6 THE INDIC WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	144
CHAPTER 7 THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	186
CHAPTER 8 THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	244
CHAPTER 9 AFTER POLARITY: FINDINGS AND AFTERMATH.....	288
Results and Analysis.....	294
Implications of the Findings.....	305
Future Direction of Research.....	317
Conclusion.....	323
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	327



VITA.....367

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1	List of World Political Systems.....	34
Figure 4.1	Distribution of Polar Structures in the Far Eastern System.....	89
Figure 4.2	Distribution of Polar Structures in this Dataset.....	89
Figure 4.3	Average Duration of Polar Structures.....	91
Figure 4.4	Post-Unipolar Power Constellations in Far Eastern System.....	92
Figure 5.1	Distribution of Polar Structures in the Near East-Middle Eastern System.....	138
Figure 5.2	Average Duration of Polar Periods.....	140
Figure 5.3	Historical Space of the Near East-Middle Eastern System.....	141
Figure 5.4	Post-Unipolar Power Configurations.....	142
Figure 6.1	Distribution of Polar Structures in Indic System.....	182
Figure 6.2	Average Duration of Polar Structures.....	183
Figure 6.3	Post-Unipolar Power Constellations in Indic System.....	184
Figure 7.1	Distribution of Polar Structures of Mediterranean System.....	239
Figure 7.2	Average Duration of Polar Periods.....	240
Figure 7.3	Historic Space of Mediterranean System.....	241
Figure 7.4	Post-Unipolar Outcomes.....	242
Figure 9.1	Near East-Middle Eastern Political System.....	297
Figure 9.2	Mediterranean Political System.....	297
Figure 9.3	Far Eastern Political System.....	297
Figure 9.4	Indic Political System.....	298
Figure 9.5	Global Political System.....	298
Figure 9.6	Aggregate Distribution of Polar Structures.....	298

Figure 9.7	Percentile Breakdown of Polar Structures.....	300
Figure 9.8	Average Duration of Polar Structures in the Dataset.....	304
Figure 9.9	Historic Space Occupied by Polar Periods.....	305
Figure 10.1	Aggregate Distribution of Post-Unipolar Structures.....	309
Figure 10.2	Probabilistic Outcomes of Post-Unipolar Structures.....	311
Figure 10.3	Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structures.....	316

## LIST OF MAPS

Map 4.1.....	57
Map 4.2.....	58
Map 4.3.....	63
Map 4.4.....	67
Map 4.5.....	77
Map 4.6.....	82
Map 4.7.....	84
Map 5.1.....	99
Map 5.2.....	108
Map 5.3.....	113
Map 5.4.....	117
Map 5.5.....	132
Map 6.1.....	149
Map 6.2.....	152
Map 6.3.....	154
Map 6.4.....	156
Map 6.5.....	174
Map 6.6.....	178

## CHAPTER 1

### TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTION: AN INTRODUCTION...

Robert Jervis (2009) writes, “Academic analyses are influenced both by events in the world and by scholars’ political outlooks and preferences.” There are developing phenomena that will come to shape and influence the global political realm, yet because these “things are not happening,” they remain puzzles that are “ignored.” So he poses the question: “Who until the end of the cold war would have written an article on unipolarity or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?” (p. 189). Similarly, one could ask: “Who until the end of American unipolarity will write a scholarly work on nonpolarity or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?”

Such rhetorical questions concerning the choice for topics and subject matters for research within the field of international relations (IR) presuppose two extremely important developments with respect to the very nature of research and inquiry: 1) the extent to which the study of a subject matter must be justified in order to even consider undertaking research; and 2) the meta-theoretical considerations that define and legitimate the very method and nature of inquiry. Methodology and paradigmatic legitimation, then, have become the structural basis, the scientificity, that is, the justification, for commencing scholarly research. The extent to which International Relations, as a social science discipline, is itself considered a science brings about more questions than answers: is it a continuing attempt to attain scientific credentials for its knowledge-accumulation, or a stubborn march toward scientificity that is, itself, controversial? The broad and intense debate of what science is, and whether IR should or can be a science, has consumed the discipline in gauging such questions as: what is the

nature of theory and concept; what is the nature of inquiry; what is the nature of knowledge-accumulation; what is the nature of explanation; what is the nature of causation; so on and so forth (Bull 1969; Kaplan 1969; Reynolds 1973; Waltz 1979; Ogley 1981; Ferguson and Mansbach 1988; Nicholson 1996; Wendt 1999).

The legitimation for research and inquiry, then, has required IR to justify this very legitimation by relying on philosophy of science. Namely, since it is the scope of its scientificity that legitimates mainstream IR scholarship, adherence to the logic and method of science, itself, must address the concerns of what is science and scientific inquiry in relation to the social science of international relations. Philosophy of science as legitimation (Wight 2002), then, has offered a robust and powerful framework in addressing the two concerns posed above: the nature of undertaking specific topical research and the meta-theoretical justification for undertaking such research. Concomitantly, for the research project at hand, in the relationship between the normative and the empirical, the structural and the historical, the conceptual and the analytical, and more importantly, between the theoretical and the factual, the following serves an axiomatic premise: facts are what matter and theory is simply a better way of collecting them (Gunnell 1975).

### **Topic and Research Question**

Historically, the power configurations of world political systems, structurally, have been defined by four formations: multipolarity, tripolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. The concept of nonpolarity, however, has never been addressed as a possible or a potential structural formulation in the nomenclature of world/global political systems. The reason for this may be as followed. Since considerations of hegemony and

polarity are generally undertaken by proponents of (neo)realism, or world-systems/world system scholars who also rely on the traditional taxonomy of polarity, nonpolarity would create both paradigmatic and conceptual-analytical complications, since the absence of poles indicates absence of hegemon(s), which either negates positional and structural considerations inherent to the above specified paradigmatic approaches, or marginalizes considerations of the balance of power thesis which also necessitates the presence of polar structures. Concomitantly, paradigmatic approaches that account for system-wide hegemony, along with scholarly attention to forms of polarity, are not and will not be able to address and explain the structure of a nonpolar system.

Since the discipline lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, which, in turn, thoroughly limits the development of a robust theoretical model that can contribute to the study of polar structures and world political systems, the general intent of this project is to address this puzzle of nonpolarity. The second deficiency in the discipline is the dearth of scholarly attention to a systematized consideration of structural transformations, including the structural transition of the system after unipolarity. Specifically, the field lacks any research that addresses observable and systematized patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity specifically) within world political systems. As such, no probabilistic assumptions may be presented to gauge the power configurations of a system after unipolar structural transition. The research presented here is primarily concerned with assessing the structural outcomes of systems after a unipolar period. In sum, an important puzzle remains to be addressed in the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide power configurations, and the subsequent outcome within the system after structural (unipolar) transitions.

Specific Research Question: *What is the polar structuration (power configurations) of a system after unipolar transitions? Concomitantly, should a system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this phenomenon be explained and accounted for?*

A practical question, consistent with the justificatory and legitimation discourse presented above, may be asked with respect to this project: does polarity matter? The answer to this is three-fold. First, polarity matters when attempting to formulate, analyze, and gauge the short-term policies of powerful actors within a world/global political system. For example, after the Cold War, the policy of the United States, as the single system-wide hegemon within the existing unipolar structure, was whether to utilize American preponderance and preserve the unipolar epoch, or to engage in revisionist behavior and transition the system into a multipolar structure—such as, for example, the attempt by the U.S. during the bipolar Cold War structure to position China as a third pole and balance it against the USSR. The underlying arguments were based upon the nature and outcome of the different power configurations of the system: if unipolarity is unstable, then the U.S. should formulate policies that allow other actors to become system-wide hegemons in order to form a multipolar system, which may be more stable. If, however, unipolar structures are stable (and relatively peaceful), then U.S. dominance should be preserved as the only system-wide hegemon. This indicates several highly distinct and diverse policy stratagems: concentration of power, utilization of resources, diplomatic endeavors, international obligations, and all other modes of state behavior. Simply put, policies change in accordance to whether the system is bipolar (a primary concentration of resources against a single opposing pole), multipolar (a balance of



resources against or with several poles), unipolar (selective concentration of resources contingent on outcome), or nonpolar (diffusion of power and dispersion of resources against or with numerically high actors, where balancing is untenable). Policy formulation, then, becomes heavily contingent upon the power configurations of the system.

Secondly, polarity matters because it shapes the policies of other states within the system that are regional/sub-system hegemons, or potentially rising powers with ambitions of being system-wide hegemons. For example, European actors such as United Kingdom, France and Germany, or Asian states such as China, South Korea, and Japan, would have to articulate policy that is either consistent with U.S. unipolarity, or hypothetical China-U.S. bipolarity, or a multipolar configuration with the U.S. and few other actors. So if the system was bipolar (China-US), would Europe continue bandwagoning (policy in unipolar structure), engage in polarization (join US as policy in a bipolar structure), attempt to be revisionist (seeking multipolarity), or remain non-aligned? The polar structuration of the system plays a crucial role in answering such questions.

Thirdly, polarity matters because it allows for the formulation of long-term, grand strategies, which may be of profound importance to the future peace and stability of the global system. If system-wide hegemon(s) seeks to preserve or alter/revise given polar structures, what would be the consequence for the rest of the countries involved in the system? If states are able to gauge what the potential consequences are to their interests based on the power configuration that the system might take, how does this affect their positioning and policy formulations? For example, if China is anticipating a bipolar

structure, then its policy would necessitate massive concentration of resources against the opposing pole; but if it is anticipating a multipolar structure, its policies and behavior would have to be multidimensional; while if it is preparing for a nonpolar system, then its preparations and strategic endeavors will once again have to be vastly different. Since the structure of the system is the environment within which a state functions, the conditions (modality) of this environment (polar structure) is fundamental to the security, economic health, and positional status of states. Simply put, even when considering practical, mainstream concerns—not to mention academic theory-building and hypothesis testing—polarity matters.

### **Literature Review**

The extant literature on polarity within the international/global system finds extensive concentration on four modes of polarity—unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity, and multipolarity—along with the analytical utilization of the balance-of-power concept. Kaplan's (1958) formulation of equilibrium and stability within the system is a classic and a comprehensive conceptualization of balance-of-power theory, based upon the works of Liska (1957) and Gulick (1955), and consistent with the traditional realism of Morgenthau (1993), and the research of Claude (1962), and Wolfers (1962). These authors consider relations between powerful states as primarily defined by delicate power balancing in order to sustain the status quo, that is, equilibrium. In his power transition theory, Organski (1958) focuses on the specific modes of wars and international conflicts that are produced between declining hegemony and rising challengers, but still relying, very much like Carr (1951), on status quo satisfaction as crucial for the stability of the system. Treatments of systems stability is also undertaken by Waltz (1964) and

Rosecrance (1966), addressing the characteristics and dynamics of different polar systems, and how given attributes of polarity affect the stability (gauged by war-proneness) and longevity of the system's structure. Deutsch and Singer (1964) demonstrate that "interaction opportunities" and dispersion of resources decrease the probability of conflict as the number of poles increase in the system. As such, multipolarity is deemed more stable and peaceful than bipolarity. Wallerstein's (1974) world-systems approach interjects an important economics dynamic into gauging the global system as a three-tiered structure accounting for the interactions between states within a hierarchy of material power.

Neoliberalism partakes in the discourse by addressing the role of the world economy, and how the distribution of economic power and the rules governing international economic institutions have been vital to the process of international political change with respect to inter-superpower relations (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984). Modelski (1978) offered a cyclical explanation of power transition, a process which includes counterhegemonic coalitions, arms buildup, hegemonic war, and system renewal. Waltz's (1979) structural realism provides a systemic treatment of polar positioning, where the behavior of powerful states is constrained and shaped by the system, thus viewing the multipolar balance-of power structure as the most volatile and recurring in history, since states constantly counterbalance against other powers and position themselves accordingly. Rapkin et al (1979) contribute to the debate by elucidating the conceptual, definitional, and measurement problems related to the concepts of polarity and polarization, introducing empirical tests that gauge polarization, or the formulation of poles, as being developed in degrees (high, moderate, or low

polarization). Gilpin's (1981) work on change in the international system concentrates on revisionist rising power(s) balancing and challenging the system-wide hegemon(s) when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Once this challenge is materialized, the equilibrium in the international system is disturbed, with the resulting change in the system reflecting the new distribution of power and a resolution to the disequilibrium. In sum, the post-WWII/Cold War era approached research on polarity either through multipolar vs. bipolar models, conceptual and measurement controversies, or specific development of systems analysis to account for an international system that has two or more poles.

The end of the Cold War brought about the expansive debate over unipolarity, with the debate revolving around modes of counterbalancing (Levy 2003) against the unipole, ranging from traditional considerations (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993, 2006; Waltz 2000) to soft-balancing (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Ikenberry 2002; Layne 2006), to scholarly disputes over durability/stability (Wohlforth 1999; Waltz 1993; Wohlforth and Brooks 2008), peacefulness (Kupchan 1998; Ikenberry 2011a; Monteiro 2012), and structural coherence (Jervis 2006, 2009) of the new unipolar system (Krauthammer 1991; Ikenberry et al 2011). Layne (1993) contends that the current unipolar system is defined by American preponderance, where rising powers, instead of engaging in revisionist behavior, are persuaded to bandwagon (Schweller 1994). These states, however, engage in "leash-slipping," where they do not fear the superpower and build their own capabilities to conduct their own policies (Layne 2006). Such modes of counterbalancing, along with the differential resource growth of rising power(s) will inevitably give way to a multipolar structure. Nye (2002), Walt (2005) and Ikenberry (2011a) contend that the

preponderance of the unipole is not temporary, that contingent on its international obligations, alliances, and institutional arrangements, system-wide hegemonic status may be preserved. Wohlforth (1999) joins the critique against neorealism's assumption that the unipole engages in "unconstrained" activities (Mastanduno 1997), or that unipolarity is either temporary, unstable, or prone to return to multipolarity (Waltz 1997; Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999), arguing that the lack of counterbalancing, continued international cooperation, and absence of any foreseeable hegemonic rivalry suggests the continued preservation of the unipolar system. The overarching debate, then, has been over skepticism toward the stability of unipolarity (Posen and Ross 1997), along with the contention that a return to multipolarity is inevitable; only to be countered by claims that the unipolar structure generates fewer incentives for hegemonic status competition, conflict, and instability (Wohlforth 2011).

Finnemore (2011) holds that the strength of the unipolar system is not only dependent on material capabilities, but also on the social system that the unipole constructs, where its values and hegemonic status are legitimated. This is somewhat similar to treatment of the contemporary unipolar system as being cosmopolitanized (Held 1996; Cabrera 2004; Appiah 2007), legalistic (Goldstein et al 2001), constitutionalist, and defined by liberal values (Ikenberry 2011a), where the system-wide hegemon engages in strategic restraint as opposed to overt aggression (2001). Schweller and Pu (2011) disagree with these assessments, contending that the unipolar system will soon transform into a modified multipolar structure, where it will not be defined by traditional balancing, but rather by shirking. Jervis (2009) portrays the unipolar system as stable, but not necessarily peaceful (only hegemonic war is absent), indicating that

outcomes are generated not so much by systemic determinants, but by the (revisionist) behavior and values generated by the unipole. Walt (2011) emphasizes the utilization of loose alliances by the unipole to reinforce the system, where balance-of-threat replaces balance-of-power, and the systemic constraint upon the unipole becomes limited. Posen (2011) argues that the unipolar system, due to an “undisciplined” unipole and diffusion of power, is waning, and multipolarity will become the subsequent global structure. Legro (2011) sums up the debate by holding that the very concept of polarity has been “overvalued,” that polarity, itself, is a product of state choice, and while it has some relevance, it is not the “kingmaker of causation” (344).

With the body of research demonstrating a great deal of focus on unipolarity, and multipolarity as the inevitable structural transition, the extant literature displays a dearth of work on nonpolarity. Haass (2008) is the first to initiate a discussion on nonpolarity, contending that the post-unipolar system will not revert to multipolarity, as most claim, but rather to a nonpolar structure, where power will not be concentrated amongst several system-wide hegemonies, but diffused throughout the globe, which may include dozens of centers of power. Schweller and Pu (2011) touch upon nonpolarity as a possible outcome, but prefer multipolarity and shirking. Wilkinson (1987, 1999b) includes nonpolarity as one of possible structures in his taxonomy, yet refrains from conceptualizing a systemic framework (2004). Utilizing the concept of entropy, Schweller (2010) contends that the random and indeterminate nature of the current unipolar system will come to be defined by the system’s process, as opposed to its structure, relying more on specific unit-level characteristics as opposed to structural determinants. Due to the absence of constraint on the unipole, the global system will witness increased randomness and disorder. As the

system attains maximum entropy, power capabilities will be diffused into a multipolar structure, but one where none of the actors will have any incentive to alter their condition. Schweller's conclusion, then, is a modification of multipolarity as a diffused, disordered (non-hierarchic) structure, yet not one which can be classified as nonpolar.

### **Composition of this Work**

The main objectives of this project may be deemed to be three-fold. First, to engage in knowledge-accumulation by undertaking original research through a systematized consideration of structural transformations, especially during unipolar and post-unipolar periods. Second, to discover new findings by observing probabilistic outcomes vis-à-vis the power configurations of a system, and assessing how this can contribute to practical policy formulation or have policy implications. And third, to contribute to the discipline by introducing an original conceptualization of nonpolarity, which, in turn, may contribute to the development of a robust theoretical model that can enrich the political and scientific study of polar structures and world/global political system(s).

As the body of literature suggests scholarly attention on the subject matter at hand remains extremely limited, and the discipline remains absent of the tools necessary to address possible anomalies and puzzles should the existing unipolar epoch come to an end. The originality of this project has both academic implications as well as practical implications. Academically, studies of polarity and power-relations will be introduced to findings that have never been undertaken, thus presenting new data and knowledge-accumulation for the discipline. Practically, considerations of long-term and short-term state policy may be more coherently formulated by hinging such policies upon

probabilistic assessments and possible predictions based on historic evidence and statistical findings.

The composition of this project will begin with an introduction to the underlying logic for undertaking this research, explaining and elucidating the main research question, the relevance of this research to the field of study concerned, and how the anticipated findings will contribute to future debate and research. An extensive literature review is also incorporated within the relevant themes being addressed in their respective chapter, thus providing exposure of how this project fits within the larger picture.

Chapter 2 provides explanations, clarifications, and in-depth analyses of the overarching conceptual models that will be utilized in this work. Definitional considerations of polarity, hegemony, system-wide and sub-system hegemonic actors, and unipolarity are addressed. This is supplemented by a comprehensive treatment of how each conceptual framework fits into the general argument, and how it further strengthens the overarching theoretical model. This chapter also includes a discussion on nonpolarity, defining, explaining, and elaborating on the conceptual models that are being proposed.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodological design of this project, how it fuses qualitative, semi-quantitative (descriptive statistics), and analytical methods in testing and gauging the coherence of this research project. Historic systems analysis, political history, selective process-tracing, and the operationalization of the case studies through descriptive and semi-quantitative analysis will be addressed. This introduces the reader to the original categorization of *world political systems*, explaining what qualifies and constitutes a world system in this work. Furthermore, it explains how potential



controversial or non-obvious observations utilized for specific cases will be resolved in order to refute competing hypotheses, while providing explanatory and conceptual clarity to the interpretations presented. This chapter will then proceed to demonstrate the multi-tiered data gathering process.

Chapter 4 will begin the data collection portion of the research by addressing the cases through historic system's analysis and the historiographical method of macropolitical history. This chapter will cover the Far Eastern World Political System. The power configurations of each polar epoch, within this world political system, will be categorized and assessed, contributing to the collection of data on unipolar and post-unipolar periods. Extensive descriptive statistics will be provided after the conclusion of the case studies for each world political system. This will include bars, charts, diagrams, and other visual tools. The data will then be analyzed, assessing trends, probabilistic patterns, non-obvious facts, and possible new findings.

Similar to the same organizational and structural approach of the previous chapter, Chapter 5 continues the collection of data on polar structures by undertaking a case study of the Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System. Chapter 6 further continues the data collection process by covering the Indic World Political System. This is followed by the Mediterranean World Political System in Chapter 7 and the Global Political System in Chapter 8. The Middle East-Near Eastern System and the Mediterranean System follow each other to allow for the observation of a system's absorption, separation, and re-formulation within a specific geographic region, yet during different and continuous historic periods. Similar to the methodological treatment of other world political systems, the Middle East-Near Eastern System and the

Mediterranean System will be studied through historic system's analysis and the historiographical method of political history, along with selective utilization of process tracing. Extensive descriptive statistics will be provided for each world political system, allowing for the analysis of trends, patterns, and probabilistic considerations.

Chapter 8 concludes the case studies of world political systems by addressing the European System from the 1500's and how its expansion provides for the formation of the Global Political System. These systems are synthesized in this chapter to allow for the observation of absorption and continuity, since it was the expansion of the European powers that gave way to a globalizing world. The formulation of the European System during the early Middle Ages, as the historical and systemic consequence for the establishment of a Global Political System, is not addressed in this work, but rather, the European System of the 1500's is incorporated in the Global Political System. Consistent with the methodological framework of this project, historic system's analysis and political history (and process tracing) is utilized, along with descriptive statistics and analysis of the data.

Chapter 9 concludes this work by displaying all the findings of this research project, specifically the number of unipolar structures that were observed in all the world political systems, the subsequent structure that the system took after transition, and the extent to which nonpolar systems are found. The aggregate descriptive statistics are also displayed, demonstrating the probabilistic outcomes, and the relationship between unipolar structures and the power configuration that the system subsequently formulates. This chapter also offers guidance for future research on the topic, addressing the concepts of interaction opportunities, dispersion of resources, and entropy to

systematically observe how the nonpolar systems functions, what the specific structural attributes are, and how well will the applied concepts hold when faced with the empirical facts from the historical evidence. This chapter will then conclude by probabilistically suggesting what the post-US unipolar system might look like, what the attributes and characteristics of the system may be, and what policy implications this may have for the United States as it prepares for a world *after polarity*.

## CHAPTER 2

### BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE METHODOLOGICAL: THE OVERARCHING ARGUMENT

As the literature review in the previous chapter suggests, the vast body of research on structural, systemic, and even reductionist (intra-polar) studies of polarity, hegemony, superpowers/world powers, or any other conceptualization of system-wide dominant actors, primarily revolves around four distinct modes of analysis. The first mode of analysis relies on the tenets of neorealism, addressing state behavior in relation to the system and how the structure of the system shapes and predicts behavior, thus attributing structural consequences to the very characteristics of the structure. Examples of this mode of analysis include considerations of how states behave in bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar structures in relation to positioning, balancing, and distribution of resources (material capabilities). The second mode of analysis, contemporary in nature, addresses the post-Cold War unipolar structure, either suggesting the coherence and durability of this system, or its inevitable instability and decay. It includes much attention on strategies of resistance or insulation with respect to the unipole's overwhelming power, alliances and alignments, and the use of international institutions. The third mode of analysis reconceptualizes the Global Political System as evolved and distinct from the previous systems, thus deeming American unipolarity as liberal, constitutionalist, and therefore, consistent with peace and longevity. The fourth mode of analysis is primarily reductionist, addressing not so much inter-polar and structural considerations, but rather the internal dynamics and characteristics of the given system-wide hegemon. This approach is broadly incorporated into systemic, cyclical, and transitional treatments of the structure and modalities of polarity. In sum, the majority of scholarly treatments of

polarity, hegemony, or world power(s)—this project uses the term *system-wide hegemon*—are primarily concerned with either the behavior of actors within a structure, the attributes of the system under different structures, and more recently, the nature, scope, and structuration of unipolarity.

Concomitantly, two deficiencies are diagnosed within the study of this field that can potentially not only fill a serious gap, but also strengthen the theoretical, conceptual, and systemic analytical tools utilized in the study of polar structures. The first gap in scholarly research is the absence of any developed treatments of nonpolarity as a structural mode within a system. Categorical taxonomy primarily revolves around the obvious structures of uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi- polar considerations. The field lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, which thoroughly limits the development of a robust theoretical model that can enrich the study of polar structures and world political systems. The second deficiency is the shortage of scholarly attention to a systematized consideration of structural transformations, especially the outcome of what the structure of the system transitions into after unipolarity. Specifically, previous studies have not examined patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity specifically) within world/global political systems. As such, no probabilistic assumptions can be presented that gauges the power configurations of a system after unipolar structural transition. Some research, for example, explains why great powers rise and fall, how the structure shapes and restrains this process, how stable, peaceful, or durable a given polar structure is, and what the characteristics, dynamics, and attributes are of given structural systems. There is no research, however, that observes and attempts to explain historical patterns in such structural transitions, what the likely structural

outcome may be after a unipolar period, or the number of unipolar periods that all the world political systems in history have formed and what the consequent systemic structure has transitioned into after the unipolar period.

Lacking any research on the above-posed questions, there is a serious gap in evaluating and determining transitional patterns and probabilistic outcomes. Related to this is the absence of a theoretical framework that explains, assesses, and methodically conceptualizes the structure of nonpolarity. As such, there are no conceptualizations of any periods within world political systems that have had nonpolar epochs. Furthermore, one cannot assess after which structural mode of polarity the nonpolar system forms, and what the characteristics and dynamics are of a nonpolar structure. While the research question here is primarily concerned with what the Global Political System looks like after a unipolar period, the scholarly realm, however, remains analytically inept and limited should the systemic consequences be of nonpolarity. To this end, important puzzles remain to be addressed in the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide power configurations, and the subsequent outcome within the system after structural (unipolar) transitions. In short, what happens to international systems after polarity?

### **Research Design**

The research interest of this dissertation is to conceptualize, test, and analyze the power configurations or systemic political structures of the given world political systems, specifically selecting moments within such systems where unipolarity was formed and the subsequent power configurations and systemic structures that were formulated after the end of the unipolar period. The objective is to observe what power configuration the end of the unipolar system transitioned into—unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity,

multipolarity, or nonpolarity—and if the ensuing political power constellation is defined by nonpolarity, whether a discernible pattern may be ascertained through the observed historic epochs where unipolarity gave way to nonpolarity.

### Case Selections

The criteria for case selections will be two-fold, as the discussion below will provide further elaboration on the methodological approach. First, the over-arching case study will be a specific world political system within a given historic epoch (the period from the system's inception to its end). Since the intent is to include all world political systems throughout history for which data exists, the selection of these overarching case studies will be expansive and robust, mitigating concerns of selection bias. Second, within the overarching case studies, the primary concentration will be on historic epochs/periods within world political systems where the power configurations of the system were defined by unipolarity. In this sense, case selection will be determined by the unipolar structuration of the given world political system. Epochs during which the system is defined by bipolarity, tripolarity, or multipolarity will also be included, but with limited attention with respect to in-depth analysis, since the objective is to observe the consequences and the developments within world political systems at the end of the unipolar structure. Fundamentally, since this project is concerned with finding patterns of polar structures after the end of unipolar periods, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar systems will be considered only to the extent to which such factors contribute to the scope and interest of the research question at hand.

This criteria-orientation for case selection naturally brings forth the ubiquitous meta-theoretical concern of the agent-structure *problematique*. To alleviate the

*problematique*, a three-tiered explanatory framework is proposed. First, the conceptualization of system is designated to the given world/global political system under consideration. In this sense, the explanatory framework presupposes the system as being any of the given world/global political systems being studied. Second, the structure remains the given configuration that takes place within the system, that is, its power constellation/polar configuration. The formulation of the set power configurations constitutes the structure within the system under consideration. Third, the agent, then, within the proposed framework, is the political unit/actor under consideration, that is, the system-wide (rising sub-system) hegemon(s) whose behavior gives way to the formulation of the structure itself. The agent-structure *problematique*, then, is addressed through the power configuration (structure) of the political system which, as stated, is shaped and formed by system-wide hegemon(s) (agent). Contributing to this explanatory framework is the infusion of temporal and chronological observations through the notion of polar epochs. Polar periods, in this context, are the power constellations (structure) of the system during a given time-period in the history of the given world/global political system. To this end, the two-tiered criteria for case selection relies on the proposed explanatory framework to account for the system (the world/global political system as the over-arching case study), the power constellations/configurations as the structure (case study within the system), the system-wide, or rising sub-system, hegemon(s) as the agent, and the polar epochs/periods as the chronological historic phases where the agent shapes/alters/defines the structure within the given system.



## Methodology

A four-tiered methodological approach is utilized in this project. Each method will lexically follow the other, for the coherence and tenability of the second approach is based on the first, and the operationalization of the third approach is based on the first and second methods.

- Historic political systems analysis
- Political history method within-cases
- Descriptive statistical analysis of polarity structuration, formation of unipolar systems, and subsequent nonpolar structures.
- Probabilistic calculations of the findings.

### *Historical Systems Analysis.*

Loosely noting the works of Wilkinson (1987,1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2004), with attention to Chase-Dunn et al (2000), Cioffi-Revilla and Landman (1999), and Thompson (2002), along with much appreciation for Wallerstein (1989, 1992) and Frank and Gills (1996), historic systems analysis will be utilized to provide criteria and analytical space in categorizing world political systems and the historic epochs that the system goes through, with specific concentration on the unipolar epoch and the subsequent structure of the given world political system during and after unipolarity. While these authors use comparative-historical systems analysis, which is consistent with both world system and world-systems approach, the approach presented in this project refrains from basing its research project on such foundations. Namely, the unit of analysis is the structure of the system, third level imagery. The approach, however, does not follow the systemic approach of either world system or world-systems analysis. The

criterion of what constitutes a system fundamentally differs, as does the categorization of world political systems and historic epochs. This is why this project uses the term *world political system(s)*. This given approach, however, does draw insights from their concentration on historical case studies and the presence of distinct historic systems (although it offers distinct categorizations as this project will demonstrate).

Paradigmatically, “world-systems,” “world system,” and “world political systems” are conceptual terms that categorize spatial-territorial dimensions of human history within specified and criteria-oriented designation of geo-political, geo-economic, and civilizational structurations. The “world system” approach, for example, conceives the entire history of socio-economic interactions between politico-economic units as a single world system, and as such, it conceptualizes a single *world system* in the history of humanity. By virtue of concentrating on economic interaction, trade, and accumulation, regardless of magnitude or the existence of political attributes, categorization of a system, as a world system, is confined into a single, continuous world system throughout the history of organized human activity. Within this paradigmatic approach, there are no world systems (that is, several world systems in history), or world-systems, but rather, a single *world system* throughout the entire history of organized human economic activity (Gills and Frank 1996; Frank and Gills 1996).

Operationally, this world system approach is limited and incompatible with the conceptual framework of this project for three reasons. First, by virtue of gauging criteria-orientation on material and economic attributes (primarily trade), thus minimalizing the political, treatments of power configurations become fundamentally marginalized. Second, by presupposing a singular world system, analytical space for

categorizing geo-political and civilizational developments of non-connected parts of the world remains inapplicable. Third, by virtue of the first two limitations, it becomes impossible to analyze the formulation of world political systems and the power constellations of such systems, since analytical reductionism becomes confined to a single world system and its inchoate, yet marginally connected, economic activities. Contrary to this uni-dimensional approach, the research at hand conceptualizes different world political systems contingent on the spatial-territorial dimensions of the geo-political and inter/intra-civilizational structures of each system. Furthermore, to offer more robustness to the criteria at hand, mere economic/trade connectedness between systems is expanded by analysis of the absorption of one system by another, thus providing a more coherent and inclusive model for system's analysis. The notion of a single world system, however, is not rejected. The counter-argument presented here is that a single world system, termed as the Global Political System, came into being after all the world political systems interacted and became absorbed into a single Global Political System. Not, as the world system approach holds, that a single world/global system existed from the very outset. In this sense, the world system approach presupposes a single Global Political System throughout human history, while this work rejects that assessment, contending that multitude of world political systems existed throughout history, and a single Global Political System came into being only when all the world political systems were continuously absorbed into a single global structure.

The *world-systems* approach, on the other hand, is distinct from the *world system* approach, and while its designation criteria is somewhat similar to the *world political systems* approach presented here, the criteria-orientation and analytical categorization of

what constitutes a world-system sharply differs from world political systems. The distinction between the world system and world-systems approach is articulated by Wallerstein (1996):

They speak of a “world system.” I speak of “world-system.” I use a hyphen; they do not. I use the plural; they do not. They use the singular because, for them, there is and has been one world system through all of historic time and space. For me there have been very many world-systems...My “world system” is not a system “in the world” or “of a world.” It is a system “that is a world.” Hence the hyphen, since “world” is not an attribute of the system. Rather the two words together constitute a single concept. Frank and Gill’s system is a world system in an attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time to cover the whole world. They cannot conceive of multiple “world systems” coexisting on the planet (294-295).

The categorical stipulation of several systems having existed in the world as opposed to a single continuous system remains a consistent theme between *world-systems* and *world political systems*. The distinction between these two approaches, however, is four-fold. First, *world-systems* theorists, when speaking of world-systems, are in essence speaking of world *economic* systems. The criteria-orientation of what constitutes a system is fundamentally hinged on the economic structure (division of labor, etc.) of the formulated system at hand. Second, consistent with the Marxist tradition, world-systems reduces treatments of system’s analysis to an economic genesis, and as such, the conceptualization of the system presupposes the political as an extension of the economical, as opposed to vice versa. Third, designation of what constitutes a system is framed within the framework of material trans-civilizational exchanges, where division of labor incorporates peoples and societies into the world-system. This ignores the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the given system.

Namely, competition is over economic power, not political power. Fourthly, whereas the world political systems approach presupposes the fusion of political and economic attributes as a singular *power* framework that accounts for the hegemonic actor(s)' rationale for dominance, the world-systems approach gauges structural hierarchy within a center-periphery complex. This latter approach, also consistent with the *world system* approach, presupposes economic hierarchy over political hierarchy, as opposed to conceiving a dialectical synthesis between the two: attainment of power (and not just a myopic consideration of economic power). In sum, great distinction lies in the economic-sociological approach of world-systems analysis, where analytical depth is provided toward conceptualizing the division of labor at the systemic level, as opposed to power configurations in relation to political hierarchies. As such, whereas a system, within world-systems analysis, refers to a socioeconomic system; this project, categorically, considers the political, or macro-political, structures of a system, and thus defines a system within the context of political and system-wide hegemonic dynamics within a synthesized conceptualization of power.

Until the 1600's, a coherent conceptualization of a single world/global system does not exist, for interaction between civilizations, world political systems, and different system-wide hegemons was either rare or almost non-existent. For example, the Mediterranean World Political System, historically, does not define the known world, it is not the only world/global system, and as such, structural treatments of the consequences of a system after unipolarity cannot be limited to Eurocentric historicism. Specifically, prior to the formulation of a Global Political System, where all the powerful countries of the world had knowledge and political, diplomatic, economic, and even

military interaction with one another, world political systems existed with its set of civilizations, political actors, and power configurations. This system delimited their conceptualization of the world (this was their political world); as the Mediterranean civilizations conceptualized Europe, and then the Near East-Middle Eastern System, after its absorption, to be their known world (Chapter 5). The objective is to categorize world political systems that were isolated or had limited interaction with other world political systems, where each system had its own specific inter-civilizational interactions, system of independent political entities (states, kingships, empires, etc.), and power configurations, where which given political entities within the system served as units seeking to restructure the existing system by positioning themselves as system-wide hegemony.

As an example, the Middle East-Near Eastern World Political System may be considered, with its historic epoch from 2600-300 B.C. This world political system did not define the known world, yet it was a coherent world political system in and of itself, separate from, for example, the Indic World Political System in South Asia, or the rising Mediterranean World Political System of the Greece-Balkan-Asia Minor region. Historic systems analysis allows for the categorization of different world political systems during different historic epochs, separately observing and diagnosing the structural transitions and modes of polarity for each given world political system. Thus, during this historic epoch, the Mediterranean System was in its infantile stages of forming a world political system of independent political actors and structural power configurations, while the Middle East-Near Eastern System already had system-wide hegemony in the forms of Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Hittites, etc., with its system's structure shifting from

multipolarity, to bipolarity, to unipolarity, and as analysis will demonstrate, to nonpolarity. Thus, to limit the analytical scope to the Mediterranean World Political System, for example, as the only world system, would be inherently myopic and historically blind, while to view the Middle Eastern-Near Eastern System as the only world/global system for this given historic epoch (ignoring, for example, Indic and Far Eastern world systems) is equally problematic. To this end, a concerted effort will be made to analyze all the world political systems for which historic data exist, categorizing each system within the historic epochs that it existed, and observing the formulation of poles as structural political configurations within each system, with specific concentration on the periods of unipolarity and the structural consequences for the system after the end of unipolarity. In this sense, since formulations of polarity are structural developments within a system, to coherently gauge what the consequences are for a given system after the end of unipolarity, research cannot be limited to a single world political system, but must rather consider the entire historical context. The analytical scope, however, will revert to a systems analysis that encompasses the entire globe after the 1500's, where the different world political systems had come to interact with one another, thus creating a single Global Political System.

A system primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that the given world political system encompasses. This fundamentally presupposes a group of political units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous with one another. Spatial-territorially, a system covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and

territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system. System's classification, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemonies that function within the region that the given system encompasses. The following example will provide more clarity.

The Indic System World Political System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region of the Indian subcontinent, or the region of South Asia. Its regional boundaries tend to be flexible, as political entities on the periphery or external to the system may encroach into the system, thus creating temporary contact (political contact as it pertains to power relations) between world political systems. For example, Afghanistan tends to be on the periphery, yet it is part of the Indic System, while Persia, bordered on the periphery, is considered to be part of the Middle East-Near Eastern System. In cases where the Persian Empire encroaches into the Indic System and becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, it is then considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, from time to time, encroachment by external actors into the system is anticipated. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one system into another. The case of Alexander the Great's conquest of Bactria (modern Afghanistan and Pakistan) is a case in point. This was a temporary infringement by the Macedonians, and did not lead to the



incorporation of the Indic System into any other world political system. As such, for the sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain's colonization of India and the absorption of the Indic System into the Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the given world political system and remain part of it as one of its poles (Mughal system-wide hegemonic status and its absorption into the Indic System). To this end, systems analysis utilized in this project considers the temporal, spatial, and conceptual formulation of what constitutes a system, fundamentally relying on macro-political developments, power configurations, and the structural transition that the system undergoes.

*The Methodology of Political History and Selective Utilization of Process-Tracing*

Political history is a historiographical method that refers to the study of political events based on narrative, critical analysis, evaluation, and empirical examination of historic facts, developments, and outcomes. The objective is to articulate an objective and logically-consistent narrative that accounts for and explains historical developments and outcomes of specific political phenomena in given historic periods (Elton 1967, 1970; Pocock 2005; Fielding 2007). The specific concentration of this historiographical approach is on the political dimensions of history (Trevelyan 1978), for political history, among other things, is the study of the organization and operation of power (Burke 1985). Since the purpose of this project is to observe centers of power, system-wide hegemons within given world political systems, the historiographical method of political history will serve as a method in describing, explaining, and accounting for the modes of polar

structures within given systems. As such, for the purpose of this project, specific attention will be applied to macro-political developments and outcomes. In this sense, the political historic approach will be elevated to third level imagery. This approach is consistent with the qualitative method of “thick analysis:” interpretive and descriptive work that places great reliance on detailed knowledge of cases (Collier et al 2010). Concomitantly, the scope of this project anticipates a large-N, since perhaps hundreds of observations will be formulated based on qualitative/narrative analysis. This is consistent with the works of Tilly (1993) and Collier (1999).

Process-tracing will be utilized as a supplemental approach for specific periods within given world political systems where controversial or alternative explanatory hypotheses exist. Process-tracing is “the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence, commonly evaluated in a specific temporal sequence, with the goal of supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses” (Collier et al 2010, 201). Process tracing inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation where the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are adequately described and accounted for (Collier 2011). Since many of the historic epochs and the power configurations within the given world political systems will not present non-obvious, controversial, or alternative hypothesis or interpretations, process-tracing will not be utilized as a supplemental approach to the political history method. Only during cases where such concerns of controversy are present will process-tracing be implemented to account for the formulation of unipolarity (or nonpolarity): relying on causal-inferences (Bennett 2010) and sequences (Mahoney 2010) within the tracing process to account for the subsequent outcome of the world political system’s structure upon the end of the unipolar epoch.

Thus, for example, the selected historic epoch and world political system is the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C. Mediterranean World Political System, where the historiographical method of political history, elevated to the macro level, will be utilized to account for the formulation of Macedonia as a system-wide hegemon, explaining the systemic structure, inter-subsystem and system-wide hegemonic conflict, and the ultimate positioning of Macedonia as a superpower. This will, in turn, lead to consideration of the bipolar system dominated by Macedonia and the Persian Empire, after which Macedonia, through a series of wars, establishes itself as the system-wide hegemon, hence altering the systemic structure into a unipolar system. Subsequently, the systemic consequences of Macedonia's decline as the system-wide hegemon and the transition from the end of unipolarity to the new power configurations of the system presents controversy and competing hypotheses. To gauge the tenability and robustness of the process-tracing method being implemented, *counterfactuals* (King et al 1994) will be utilized to test the conclusions and assumptions reached in the case study. Continuing with the above-example, does process-tracing and counterfactual analysis reject Macedonian status as system-wide hegemon, or does the political history analysis hold against counterfactuals? Namely, does the contention, that the post-Macedonian unipolar system gave way to nonpolarity, hold, or do competing assessments deem the post-unipolar system as multipolar? Essentially, was the Wars of the Diadochi a case of inter-hegemonic conflict, or, as the nonpolar interpretation suggests, that neither of the units in the conflict were system-wide hegemons? Simply put, in cases where controversy and competing hypotheses/explanations are present, the analytical and causal inferences presented

through process-tracing will be tested against counterfactuals to gauge the tenability and explanatory strength of the conclusions reached in the analysis.

#### *Semi-Quantitative Descriptive Analysis and Probabilistic Assessments*

Semi-quantitative methods will be utilized, along with the qualitative tools specified above, in attempting to observe the formulation of potential structural patterns in world political systems vis-à-vis unipolar systems and the subsequent structure of the system after unipolarity. The structural power configurations of world political systems will be employed to generate feasible modalities of coding. Since the objective is to observe unipolar periods in world political systems (overarching unit of analysis), each unipolar period will serve as the unit of analysis during this phase of the research design. The initial intent, then, will be to observe the number of unipolar periods that each world political system has had throughout its existence. Thus, for example, if observing the Mediterranean World Political System, with its historic epoch lasting from 2300 BC – 400 AD, it may tentatively be suggested that there were approximately 3-5 periods where the structure of the system was unipolar (examples: Mycenae, Macedonia, Rome). This, of course, would already be determined and substantiated through the second methodological approach. This same data gathering method will be utilized for each world political system within the dataset. The underlying aim is to collect the number of unipolar periods for each system, and then aggregate this into the total number of unipolar periods in the history of the world.

Data will be collected on the subsequent polar structures following unipolar periods. Thus, after having data on the total number of unipolar periods in history, the dataset will also have data on the different modes of polarity that were formulated after

the unipolar structure. This will, finally, allow for the coding of the data and the observation of patterns and structural developments with respect to post-unipolar transitions.

#### Sample Coding for Modes of Polarity:

- Unipolar structure: single system-wide hegemon/superpower
- Bipolar: two system-wide hegemon/superpowers
- Tripolar: three system-wide hegemon/superpowers
- Multipolar: four to six system-wide hegemon
- Nonpolar: no system-wide hegemon, constellation of sub-system hegemon (more than seven actors in the system)<sup>1</sup>

In relation to the methodological approach and research design presented above, the analytical operationalization of the data will allow this research to answer some important questions that can potentially solve the puzzle being addressed.

1. After each unipolar period, what power configuration did the structure of the system take?
2. Did the system become bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar?
3. Which polar structure has numerical advantage of becoming formed after unipolarity?
4. What are the probabilistic relations between each possible mode of polarity after unipolar periods?
5. Can consistent patterns be observed that produce non-obvious facts and observations into the historic process of polar structuration after unipolarity?
6. Based on the potential quantified results, can it be predicted, even probabilistically, what the post-unipolar American global system will look like?
7. Consistent with the standards of philosophy of science, can this project generate knowledge-accumulation, and can the produced knowledge be adequately evaluated through hypothesis-corroboration?

#### *Data Collection*

Historical systems analysis will provide the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical basis of categorizing and qualifying what constitutes a world political system, the spatial-territorial location of the system, and the historical period within which the system

---

<sup>1</sup> For a thorough discussion on the attributes of nonpolarity, especially on the numerical considerations of poles, see pp. 45-49.

endured. Concomitantly, the process of compiling the various world political systems throughout human history has led to the designation of five systems. Since world political systems ceased to exist after the 1800s, where a single Global Political System encompassed all the world political systems, this project is interested in categorizing the time period that a given system existed in, whether it was absorbed into a neighboring system, or whether it was thoroughly conquered and ceased to exist. The categorization of world/global political systems and the time periods that measure their existence are provided in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 LIST OF WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEMS

<b>World Political System</b>	<b>Beginning Year</b>	<b>Ending Year</b>	<b>Historical Event/Reason</b>
<b>Middle East-Near Eastern System</b>	2600 BC	300 BC	Roman Expansion, Absorption into Mediterranean System
<b>Mediterranean System</b>	2000 BC	400 AD	Collapse of Roman Empire
<b>Far Eastern System</b>	1000 BC	1850 AD	European/American Intrusion, Absorption into Global System
<b>Indic System</b>	500 BC	1800 AD	British Colonialism, Absorption into Global System
<b>Global System</b>	1500 AD	Present	

Upon formulating a dataset based on world political systems, the intent will be to compile data on the number of unipolar structures each system formed. The number of unipolar periods for each world political system will be combined with the number of unipolar periods for all of the systems in the dataset. This will provide, based on the criteria set forth, the total number of unipolar periods in the history of the world. The primary objective is to gather data on the total number of unipolar periods, which will

then be utilized to observe what a system transitions into after each unipolar structure. Namely, for each unipolar period, further data will be compiled on the subsequent structure of the world political system. The objective is to collect data on post-unipolar periods. This will provide information as to whether the post-unipolar periods transition into bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar structures. As such, data will be gathered for different modalities of polarity following unipolar periods.

### *Selection of Sources*

The accumulation of the data for the polar configurations fundamentally rely on the historic evidence, culled from the vast body of historical research undertaken by scholars that have established mainstream consensus in relation to the substance and accuracy of the information provided. Scholarly consensus, then, remains the criteria for selecting historical works as sources when formulating evidence in support of data compilation. Since the attainment of historical evidence can never be absolute or presuppose unquestioned certainty, the overarching assumption concedes that some degree of bias is inevitable when relying on secondary sources for historiographical research. This bias remains an inherent truism even when accessing primary sources: historic documents defy objectiveness, for they must, by their very existence, support some culture, society, leader, or power structure. To this end, the approach at hand remains vigilant in gauging historic developments at the macropolitical level, and thus refraining from making controversial or unsubstantiated claims based on secondary interpretations as sufficient evidence. What constitutes historic knowledge, then, is qualified by virtue of the existing evidence in support of general claims, as opposed to minute or specific claims that remain outside the data collection scope of this project.

### CHAPTER 3

#### BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE ANALYTICAL: DEFINING AND EXPLAINING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

“We give different labels to the same structural phenomena because we lack a consensus on how the structural phenomena should be conceptualized” (Rapkin et al 1979, 262). As such, some definitional and conceptual clarifications will be necessary to both alleviate confusion and bypass much scholarly controversy over given concepts and assumptions. This will include some specific considerations of paradigm-building and theory development to formulate robust, logically consistent, and analytically coherent conceptual models. First, however, it must be noted that the vast literature on polarity demonstrates not only lack of consensus on how to define, measure and operationalize polarity, but also contradictory findings (Singer 1981), along with different research designs and different attempts at measuring the independent and dependent variables and quantifying modes of polarity (Vasquez 1987). For example, different scholars utilize different criteria to define and conceptualize hegemony (Wilkinson 1999b), hegemon (Gilpin 1981), polarity (Waltz 1979), unipolarity (Layne 1993; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2011; Jervis 2009), polarization (Rapkin et al 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1978), and the distribution of power as distinct from polarization (Wayman 1985).

The problem of measurement is further compounded by the use of vastly different variables, criteria, and even proxies. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth (2011) argue, for example, definitional treatments of polarity (specifically unipolarity) must be based on distribution and concentration of material resources. They separate hegemony and empire from unipolarity because their conceptualization of unipolarity is primarily reduced to the distribution of material capabilities. Wilkinson (1999b) argues



that a dominant state may be a unipole, but this need not suggest that hegemony is present, thus formulating the concept of unipolarity without hegemony. Gilpin (1981) utilizes hegemony within the context of a dominant state in the international system, thus referring to powerful states, or poles, as hegemonic actors. Waltz's (1979) conceptualization of polarity fundamentally relies on distribution of resources, yet it also discusses sheer dominance, might, competence, and even population size. Rapkin et al (1979) provide distinct analytical models to polarity and polarization: the former is the system's distribution of power (the number of roughly equal major actors in the system), while the latter is the tendency of actors to cluster around the most powerful states in the system. Wallace (1973) provides no distinction between polarity and polarization, measuring and operationalizing the concepts as a single phenomenon. Bueno de Mesquita (1978) looks at entire blocs or clusters (for example, NATO as a single pole) and finds a relationship between increased polarization and war, and decreased polarization and absence of war. This is supplemented by his analysis of increasing number of poles in the system contributing to uncertainty and instability. Wayman (1985) measures polarity based on both distribution of power and polarization, showing that wars in multipolar structures are at a much higher magnitude than in bipolar structures. This, however, creates controversy with respect to Rapkin et al's warning of not conflating polarity with polarization. Ikenberry (2011b) relies on distributive considerations of resources to define polarity, but introduces the concept of "hubs," similar to clusters and to Rapkin et al's notion of polarization, to account for the organizational and functional capabilities of the given pole(s). Posen (2011) illuminates the conceptual limitations of operationalizing polarity: what constitutes resource, capability, power, or modes of distribution?

Furthermore, how is dominance gauged, when measurements are not always consistent with the reality of power relations between states? Buzon (2004) offers the best explanation of the vagueness and flexibility of polarity:

Polarity can be used to move forward into realist assumption about conflict of interest, balance of power, and war, but it can just as easily fit with international political economy concerns with leadership and the provision of collective goods, Gramscian ones about hegemony, globalist ones about a dominant core, world system ones about world empires and world economies, and English school ones about great power management and international society. (32)

To avoid controversy, and not fall into the *measurement trap*,<sup>2</sup> this project's conceptualization of hegemony, hegemonic states, and modes of polarity will rely on the concept of system-wide hegemon, which will hopefully avoid criticisms of having narrow or arbitrary criteria. By providing a broad and inclusive definition of these concepts, the depth and scope of the analysis will be far more extensive, as opposed to providing a minimalist definition for the sake of theory conformity. Furthermore, measuring polarity is necessary if engaging in intra-polar research, such as polarization, durability, stability, conflict severity, and so on. The objective of this work, however, is to merely diagnose and observe what the power configurations of the system are, as opposed to disqualifying analytical depth by virtue of measurement criteria that remains inapplicable when formulating the nomenclature for polarity. For example, of the various measures utilized by different scholars (with different and contradictory results), one may hypothetically apply one of the more parsimonious formulas. GDP and military spending is the simplest formula used to measure resource/capability, and as such, the concentration of power

---

<sup>2</sup> The term *measurement trap* is utilized to sum up the extensive debate and lack of consensus on how to measure polarity, or the attributes of polarity, and how this problem creates inconclusive and controversial results, thus illustrating the limitation, or the trap, of utilizing measurements that create more questions as opposed to offering answers to the puzzle at hand.

within a system, hence qualifying status of being a pole based on the operationalization and quantification of such measurements. The distribution of capabilities/resources, as measured through the criteria of concentration, determines the mode of polarity that the system takes (Mansfield 1993). In this overly simplified example, power configuration is categorized and defined by measured and quantifiable variables. The problem with this approach, however, is quite obvious: it is not consistent with the reality of the power configurations of the given world political system. Three historical examples can demonstrate this point.

When considering the power configurations of the Mediterranean System leading up to and during the Peloponnesian War, from approximately 460 BC to 400 BC, the operationalization of the above-mentioned measurements would suggest a unipolar system. Based on GDP and military spending (while specific data does not exist, there's overwhelming historical evidence on Athenian wealth in relation to Sparta), Athens would measure much higher than Sparta, thus demonstrating a unipolar concentration of power. Athens at this point was an empire, with new silver mines, extensive trade and commerce, developed colonies, and military spending (especially on its navy) that was unmatched within the Greek world. Sparta, on the other hand, lacked coherent trade or commerce, had an underdeveloped monetary system, and was relatively, and fundamentally, a poor society. Based on quantified measurements of capability and resource distribution, Sparta would not qualify as a pole. The reality, however, is quite different. Not only was the power configuration of the system bipolar, but Sparta ended up defeating the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. Even if other variables are included in the measurement of polarity (population size, innovation, technology, etc.),

Athens will still demonstrate numerical superiority in magnitude. This creates an anomaly, a misrepresentation of reality.

The case of the Global Political System in the eighteenth century is also quite telling, demonstrating that crude determinism based on measurements of economics, GDP and military spending create a severe disconnect from the reality of macropolitical developments. The United Provinces, for example, were the richest and one of the more developed political units in the system, while Russia was one of the poorest and least developed. However, the Dutch failed to attain system-wide status, which the measured indicators would suggest otherwise, considering Dutch capabilities. Russia, on the other hand, which measured indicators would reject as a power, rose to system-wide presence. This aporia present within the measurement trap creates more analytical problems than solutions, thus limiting the capacity for knowledge-accumulation and the probability of attaining non-obvious facts in order to solve the given puzzle at hand.

A very similar problem presents itself when attempting to categorize the structure of polarity during the Cold War. Based on concentration of power/resource/capability measured and defined by GDP and military spending, the distribution of resources, and as such, relative capability between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or if viewed through the lens of polarization, NATO countries and the Warsaw pact, would be so disproportionate, that the power configuration of the global system will have to be defined as unipolar. This, however, was not the political reality of the Cold War. To deny the presence of a bipolar structure based on given criteria and measurements is fundamentally problematic. For these reasons, this project refrains from utilizing different modes of measurements for polarity when categorizing and defining the power configuration of given systems.

Reliance is rather placed on the conceptualization of system-wide hegemon(s) as a more applicable analytical tool when operationalizing polarity and gauging polar structures. As Vasquez (1987) so accurately articulates, “the classification of periods as unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar is based on historical judgment rather than on precise and replicable measures” (131).

### **System-Wide Hegemon and Polarity**

To bypass the exhausting debate in the international relations literature on hegemony (Higgot 1991), the concept of hegemon, in this work, is conceptualized in two-tiers: sub-system hegemon and system-wide hegemon. The former is generally a regional actor, while the latter is a world/global actor. A system-wide hegemon is generally a “superpower,” or a dominant actor within the system, for the scope of its political, economic, and military power surpasses sub-systemic structures and positions itself at the system-wide level. Sub-system hegemony maintains status and power in relations to their neighbors, but lack the scope and capability to influence, dominate, and coerce actors at a system-wide level. Given regions/sub-systems may have more than one hegemon, and regional inter-hegemonic behavior does not presuppose conflict, tension, or competition. To this end, hegemon is defined as a dominant actor in relation to other actors, and this is further qualified as a powerful actor within a sub-system setting, or a powerful, dominant, hegemonic actor at the system-wide level. Concomitantly, a sub-system hegemon cannot be a pole, for it does not have the structural positioning at the system-wide level, and as such, pole structuration is only undertaken by system-wide hegemony.<sup>3</sup> Sub-system

---

<sup>3</sup> While some literature exists on sub-system polarity (Ross 1999), this concept is disqualified as problematic and analytically conflicting.

hegemons, however, as secondary states, may position themselves as aligned to a given pole, or if capable, maintain status of non-alignment.

Traditionally, hegemony is primarily conceptualized within the confines of political and military power, rather than economic power. Concomitantly, systemic treatment of hegemonic actors has either been transitional or successive (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987; Toynbee 1946; and Wight 1978). As such, robust understanding of great powers seeking status within given systems has required scholarly attention on hierarchies of power, the endeavor to attain such power, and the positioning of given actors within the hierarchy itself. These structural considerations, however, remain analytically limited in their explanatory capacity as long as the rationale for state behavior is presented in a uni-dimensional fashion. In this sense, hegemony cannot only be about military power, especially naval power (Modelski and Thompson 1988), or economic processes (Wallerstein 1974, 1980; Frank 1978), or ideational norms (Cox 1981, 1983; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 2011). An overarching treatment of a power-framework that cogently synthesizes all these attributes remains the more preferable criteria of analyzing hegemony. Namely, since economic, ideological, military, and political considerations always intertwine and interact, the mere act of separating, or suggesting that one variable is a preferable unit of analysis, or a preferable explanatory variable, obfuscates the empirical reality of hegemonic actors. Kennedy's (1987) work on the interdependent relationship between military power, political power, and economic power in the rise and fall of great powers excels in demonstrating this point.

Concurrently, system-wide dominance, whether this dominance is economic, military, political, ideational, territorial, or, realistically, an orchestrated fusion of all

these variables, is, in essence, the rational drive of every rising sub-system actor seeking system-wide hegemonic status. Similarly, preservation of system-wide hegemonic status remains the rationale for the continued safeguarding of the existing power configurations of the system. Thematically, then, the underlying framework that clusters all these variable into a singular explanatory variable is the notion of power, that is, the system-wide hegemon's capacity to control and dominate the system by virtue of exercising, or seeking to exercise, military, territorial, economic, political, and ideational preponderance. Consequently, configurations of power, that is, the hegemonic actor's drive for power as a mechanism of survival in the system, remain the most important variable in gauging the rationale of system-wide hegemonic dominance.

It is crucial to specify the difference between hegemon and hegemony. For a hegemon to establish hegemony, it must not only be relationally the most powerful actor within the given system, but must also dominate, either through direct control or sphere of influence, a preponderance of the system. In defining these concepts, then, hegemon is understood as a dominant actor in relation to other actors in a system, while hegemony is the complete dominance of the system itself. A system-wide hegemon may have hegemony over an entire sub-system (such as Soviet dominance of the East European/Eurasian region), which distinguishes it from a sub-system hegemon, but in order for there to be hegemony, the system-wide hegemon must dominate the macropolitical system itself. Thus, Brazil may be deemed a sub-system hegemon, but it has not established hegemony through South America (for if it did, it would potentially rise to the level of system-wide hegemon). Similarly, the United States is a system-wide hegemon, but it has not established global hegemony. Neither hegemon, in their

respective levels, have established dominance over the system or subsystem in which they engage in. As such, the concept of system-wide hegemony will generally not be utilized in the proposed theoretical model, since it is conceded that in the existing Global Political System, the concept is not applicable; while in previous systems, qualifying system-wide, world hegemony is controversial and problematic.

The concept of sub-system hegemon will be utilized in the analysis to demonstrate two things: how powerful regional actors differ from the system-wide power actors, and to serve as a mechanism in the historiographical analysis of accounting how a state becomes a system-wide hegemon. Specifically, in order for an actor to become a system-wide hegemon, it must not only be, initially, a sub-system hegemon, but must also establish some form of hegemony over the given sub-system.<sup>4</sup> While this is not an absolute prerequisite for system-wide hegemonic status, it does provide an important analytical demarcation between the regional and system-wide spheres. Hegemonic dominance of a sub-system elevates an actor from a sub-system, regional hegemon, to a system-wide, world/global hegemon. In addition, in order for a sub-system hegemon to qualify as a system-wide hegemon, it must be able to counter-balance or display relative strength in relation to other system-wide hegemon(s). In this context, China, for example, while at this current stage a sub-system hegemon, might potentially usurp Japan and establish sub-system hegemony. However, unless it is able to counter-balance, or challenge, the other system-wide hegemon(s) (in this case there is only the unipolar U.S.), it cannot be qualified as a system-wide hegemon, and remains a sub-system power

---

<sup>4</sup> Macedonian hegemony of the Greek sub-system, within the wider Mediterranean World Political System, is an example.



until it is able to elevate itself in relation to the other system-wide hegemon in the global structure.

With respect to this analytical and conceptual approach, in order to avoid the same problems that Rapkin et al (1979) address, this project will use the concept of system-wide hegemon interchangeably with the term pole or polarity when referring to structure(s) (poles) within the system which the system-wide hegemon(s) forms. However, when this process is formulated through the alignment of members, the term polarization will be used. Within this context, there can be multitude of powerful hegemonic states that position themselves structurally as poles within the system, yet polarization does not take place. Specifically, then, pole formulation may take two forms: through the system-wide hegemon(s) positioning as a pole within the system, or through polarization, where secondary states position themselves within a pole led by a given system-wide hegemon. Measuring the magnitudes of polarity (high to low) is bypassed, since gauging the degree of polarization is secondary and outside of the scope of this project. Degrees of polarization are not vital to the conceptualization of the structure of the world/global political system. The primary concern is with systemic observations of inter-polar relations and structural outcomes, as opposed to intra-polar variables and characteristics. Thus, for example, if there is a bipolar system, two assumptions are made: one, that two poles are structured within the system by two system-wide hegemons, and two, given the context, polarization either occurred or did not contingent on the formulation of a bloc with aligned members. As such, the level to which the aligned members are polarized is not relevant to the analysis. The same holds for a multipolar system: the intent is to substantiate whether more than three poles have been structured in

the system, and whether the poles are polarized through bloc formation and member alignment, or polarization did not take place and a system-wide hegemon singularly occupies the pole. To this end, measurement of polarization, as an intra-polar unit of analysis, is outside the explanatory and conceptual purpose of this model.

It is suggested that polarization is one method of pole formulation within the system, while the positioning of the system-wide hegemon(s) is the other. A pole, then, is defined as a structure within a given world/global political system, where a system-wide hegemon, via polarization, is the center of a coalition (secondary actors within this system are obliged to position/align themselves in relation to a given pole/bloc), or absent polarization, is the singular actor, that is, it is the pole itself. Variables such as distribution of resources, relative power capabilities, counter-balancing, positioning, norms, and other system-wide factors are presupposed as being inherent to the analysis of polarity. This consideration, however, stops short of measuring these variables, for as the above-discussion of the problems of *measurement trap* demonstrate, any attempt to provide consistent measurements to all such variables either become arbitrary, or inconsistent with the reality of the political system. Namely, to limit polarity as being only defined and measured by distribution of material capability is to limit the scope and depth of the concept with respect to systems analysis (not to mention the fact that quantifiable data, prior to 1815, is very scarce). A broader, more inclusive definition of polarity, such as the conceptualization of a system-wide hegemon, is more robust and analytically applicable to the proposed systematized analysis of world political systems throughout history.

The overarching analysis assumes conflict behavior as concentrated between the poles and cooperative behavior as concentrated within the poles. States with the capability to abstain from having to position themselves with a given pole remain non-aligned. This process of alignment is deemed to be the polarization process, where a system-wide hegemon orchestrates a coalition in opposition to the polarization undertaken by another system-wide hegemon. Polarity, then, is a reference to these formed coalitions (poles), while polarization is a reference to the alignment process. Since poles tend to be defined in relation to the system-wide hegemon that dominates it, it is preferable to use the terms interchangeably. Thus, in the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union were poles as well as system-wide hegemons. Regardless of polarization, both system-wide hegemons will still have been positioned, structured, and categorized as poles.

The concept of polarization is somewhat disregarded when observing the unipolar structure, for in this system, polarization is a moot point, since no opposing poles exist, and the polarization process, if it had taken place, occurred either during a previous bipolar or multipolar system. In this case, the remaining unipole sustains its status, and the aligned members either leave the bloc (since the system-wide hegemon's position in the pole does not necessitate the positioning of secondary states), or they bandwagon. Within this context, alignment or coalition characteristics within a unipolar system serve marginal analytical relevance: opposing polarization is absent. To this end, because the intent is not to study the polarization process, but rather after polarization has taken place and the pole(s) is formed (thus functioning at the macro, systemic level), the givenness of

the pole is taken as it exists. Analyzing and gauging the internal process of polarization is outside the scope of this study.<sup>5</sup>

With respect to unipolarity, it is defined as a structure in which one state's/actor's capabilities are unmatched and too great to be challenged or counterbalanced, thus preserving the system-wide dominance of the given hegemon. Capabilities include all resources that reinforce and preserve the given actor's power and structural position: economic, military, technological, geopolitical, ideational, and institutional. To avoid controversy over growth differential, measurement of resources, quantification of capabilities, assessments of relative strength, or other measurement criteria that may be deemed subjective,<sup>6</sup> it is preferable to assess whether observable and verifiable patterns exist with respect to potential/possible rising poles within the system, and how the determination of the systemic structure, that is, the mode of polarity, is defined in relation to the challenges and balancing acts undertaken by such revisionist actors. In this sense, the unmatched capabilities of a given state do not suffice to qualify the system as unipolar, since system-wide hegemonic status has not been attained. Qualification for unipolarity must be verified by the absence of challenges and counter-balancing against the system-wide hegemon. As the previous examples demonstrate, if gauged primarily on relative capability, U.S. capability was far superior, perhaps even unmatched, by the Soviets in the mid-1980's. Yet to classify this period as unipolar simply based on the

---

<sup>5</sup> The rationale for excluding analysis of polarization is two-fold. First, cases of polarization do not present much affect upon a system-wide hegemon, since a system-wide hegemon dominates a given pole, and the aligning members remain reliant upon the dominant actor within the pole. Second, since the objective of this project is to observe the power configurations of world political systems, the intra-polar characteristics are not relevant to the analysis at hand. Namely, the intent is to observe the polar structure and the system-wide hegemon that dominates the pole. How the pole is formed, and which secondary states are part of that given pole offer no analytical depth or substantive value to the research process at hand.

<sup>6</sup> For example, traditional calculation of state capability utilized GDP and military spending, only to be modified by the addition or subtraction of other variables, ranging from population size to technological advancement, thus creating much controversy over how to measure polar characteristics (Posen 2011).

differential in capabilities undermines characteristics within the system. The fact that the Soviet Union, at the systemic level, was able to challenge and counter-balance the United States (even if inferior in absolute capability), demonstrates structural positioning within the global system that is consistent with bipolarity. To this end, in a unipolar system, aside from dominance in capabilities, a given pole must have no challengers or counter-balancers at the structural systemic level: “A unipolar system is one in which a counterbalance is impossible. When a counterbalance becomes possible, the system is not unipolar” (Wohlforth 1999, 29).

### **Nonpolarity: As Analytical Tool and Conceptual Model**

The lack of a well-developed conceptual model for a nonpolar system in the literature necessitates the formulation of a robust framework that can be consistently applied when assessing the world/global political system in the absence of polar structures. The intent of such a model is not to suggest or predict how states behave in a nonpolar system, or what the characteristics of the system are in relation to the multitude of actors interacting in the global structure. The objective, rather, is to explain what the structural attributes of a nonpolar system are, as opposed to the causal consequences of the system upon state behavior (these are possible issues for future research). For this reason, the conceptual model for nonpolarity that is presented here primarily explains what a nonpolar system looks like, what its structural characteristics are, and how it differs from the other forms of polarity. Since the objective of this project is to observe nonpolar periods in world political systems throughout history, the intention is to construct an identifiable structure that can be classified as nonpolar. To this end, the task at hand is to articulate what a nonpolar system is, how a system may be identified as

being such, what its attributes are, and how it can be differentiated, for categorical and analytical purposes, from the other modes of polar structures.

*Nonpolarity vs. Multipolarity*

The attributes of a nonpolar system may be best expressed by contrasting how it differs from a multipolar structure. Whereas unipolar, bipolar, and tripolar systems have system-wide hegemon in accordance to a numerically described structure, multipolar systems have up to 6 system-wide hegemon (Concert of Europe presented the most number of poles that a multipolar system has, which fluctuated between 5 to 6 actors), as polarization and alliances shrink the number of poles, while the breakdown of alliances increases the poles. A multipolar structure has never witnessed more than 6 system-wide hegemon, for the increased number of so many poles make balancing, counter-balancing, and considerations of distribution and concentration of capabilities both incoherent and substantively meaningless. With such diffusion of power, it becomes analytically problematic to classify and gauge how 10 system-wide hegemon, for example, counter-balance and position within a system. Furthermore, the increased number of actors conflates system-wide and sub-system variables, since the systemic structure ends up having a constellation of various mid-level world powers. The multitude of such powers, numerically, are so high that it will be unintelligible to assume a multipolar system, and the dynamics of this numerically high world/global political system of various mid-level, sub-system hegemonic powers will make the concept of balance of power untenable.

Since one of the most important attributes that defines nonpolarity is the diffusion of power, this analytical framework is consistent with considerations of concentrations of

power: the extent to which power is concentrated or diffused. This exercise will further demonstrate the difference between multipolarity and nonpolarity. Using Ray and Singer's (1973) index (the same concentration of power formula utilized by the Correlates of War), Mansfield (1993) calculates power concentration in relation to the number of poles/great powers in the system:

$$\text{Concentration}_t = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_t} (S_{it})^2 - \frac{1}{N_t}}{1 - \frac{1}{N_t}}}$$

S represents the proportion of power possessed by an actor (system-wide hegemon);  $S_{it}$  is the proportion of the aggregate capabilities/power controlled by actor i in year/time t;  $N_t$  is the number of actors in year/time t; and  $\text{Concentration}_t$  is a continuous index that takes on values ranging from 1 to 0 (111). Interpreting Mansfield's analysis, the closer the value of concentration is to 1, the more concentrated power is within the system. This presupposes concentration, or absolute concentration, within a single system-wide hegemon. The closer the value of concentration is to 0 the more evenly divided, diffused power is among all of the actors in the world/global political system. Values between .275 and .4 indicates a bipolar system, between .4 to .5 a unipolar system, and between .2 to .275 a multipolar system (113). The logical continuation of the formula is to presuppose that as actors increase in the system, the more diffused, or less concentrated power becomes. This is quite obvious, because if an actor presents such disparity in power, then it will not be in the system as a system-wide hegemon. Simply put, those in the system have some concentration of power, and as the number of actors increase in a system, so does the diffusion of power. With multipolarity ranging from .2 to .275, it may be inferred that nonpolarity would range from .05 to .175. In the same way a value of 1 is

unrealistic with respect to unipolarity (no state can possess all the resources in the world/system), a 0, similarly, is deemed unrealistic when gauging the value of nonpolarity (there cannot be an absolute diffusion of equal power to such a high number of actors in the system). As Mansfield's hypothetical example demonstrates, concentration or diffusion of power in the system does not surpass 5 actors. To suppose a system of 9 actors, for example, the concentration value will be exceedingly low and consistent with our considerations of nonpolarity.

In this sense, it is one thing to observe the balancing behavior of 5 actors, measure each actor's capabilities, gauge relative distribution of resources and power concentration, consider hierarchy and structural positioning, and thus provide a coherent analysis of a numerically-high multipolar system. These same analytical considerations, however, fail to provide accountability and explanatory strength when the number of actors may range in the dozens.

Continuing with the example, one may consider possible sub-system hegemons within the Global Political System: Israel, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Japan, China and South Korea in the Far East; India and Pakistan in South Asia; Australia (possibly Indonesia) in Oceania; Russia and Turkey in Eurasia; Germany, France and United Kingdom in Europe; Brazil (possibly Argentina or Chile) in Latin America; Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa in Africa; U.S. and Canada in North America. It becomes completely untenable to conceptualize and assess such a system with the traditional tools utilized when observing multipolar structures. With power diffusion among some 19 states (power distribution is obviously not equal, yet at the same time, its level of concentration is much lower than in other modes of polarity), a new conceptual



model is necessary to account for such a system. It is analytically futile to attempt to classify such a system as multipolar: the concentration value will be extremely low, perhaps less than .1, while any considerations of balancing and counter-balancing will provide neither explanatory powers nor knowledge-accumulation. The nonpolar system, then, is defined as a structure that lacks system-wide hegemony, where more than seven actors possess and exercise various kinds of power, as the diffusion of power creates different centers of power with a constellation of mid-level, sub-system hegemony.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE FAR EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Far Eastern System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the wider region of the Far East. Territorially, the Far Eastern World Political System includes the global region historically occupied by China, Tibet, Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, and Japan, thus combining, for the sake of analytical coherence and historical continuity, the sub-regions of East Asia and Southeast Asia into a single Far Eastern System. However, similar to other world political systems, to specifically set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system obscures the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system.<sup>7</sup> System's classification of the Far Eastern World Political System, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering

---

<sup>7</sup> For example, actors in the periphery that are part of the Far Eastern System at times exited the system by way of seeking conquests to the north or west, whether by infringing on the Indic System or the Near East-Middle Eastern System. The examples of the Huns in Europe, the Hunas and other Chinese infringements in the Indic System, and the conquest of the Mongols into Eurasia are cases in point. The steppes of Central Asia, which include the current countries of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan remain at the extreme periphery of the system, and have primarily served as pathways toward western expansion by given actors from the Far Eastern System. Concomitantly, in cases where actors from either the periphery or other world political systems encroach onto the Far Eastern World Political System, this infringement will be noted when the given actor becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, and is thus considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, similar to other world political system covered in this work, it is anticipated, from time to time, the encroachment of external actors into the system. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one system into another. As such, for the sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain's colonization of China, along with the colonizing presence of other European powers in the Far East System, thus leading to this system's absorption into the Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the system and remain part of it as one of the given poles (such as the Turkish Kaghannate).

the political interactions and power configurations of system-wide hegemonies that function within the region of the Far East.

The chronological treatment of the system's political history will begin analysis of polar periods from approximately 1000 BC. Archeological evidence and scholarly consensus holds the various regional centers in the Yellow River basin and its expansion and fusion with the proto-civilizations in the Yangtze River valley, from 3000 BC to 2000 BC (Gernet 1968, 46-48; Pearson 1983, 119-124), as the foundational period of what would become the Far Eastern System. From 2000 BC to 1000 BC, three dynasties, the Hsia, Shang, and Chou (Zhou in pinyin), dominated the Far Eastern System, with Chou beginning its system-wide hegemonic preponderance from approximately 1000 BC (Loewe and Shaughnessy 1999, 11-130).<sup>8</sup> The problem with including the periods before 1000 BC as data points for polar epochs is three-fold. First, the line between legend and historical facts are rather blurry when gauging system's configuration during the Hsia dynasty, as the Hsia period has not been fully dated by historians (Chang 1983, 511-515; Murphy 1996, 33; Penkala 1966, 8-10). Second, the historical evidence for the Shang period is equally problematic, as it is unclear whether it followed the Hsia era, succeeded the Hsia, or existed as a separate political unit during Hsia presence (Chang 1980, 350-354; Keightley 1983, 537-541; Hsu and Linduff 1988, 19-22). Third, while the historical

---


<sup>8</sup> Pinyin is the official phonetic system in transcribing Chinese characters in China, Taiwan and Singapore. In 1982 it became the international standard for foreign publications. Prior to 1982, the primary Romanization system was the Wade-Giles transliteration system, being the most common system of transcription among English speakers. As such, much of the historical scholarly work done on the Far East in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially on China, used the Wade-Giles transliteration system. The Wade-Giles system and pinyin are used interchangeably in many English language publications. To avoid any confusions, this author has selected to use the Wade-Giles system for two main reasons. First, since many historical and scholarly works that are utilized in this project use the Wade-Giles system, it remains outside of this scholarly endeavor to undertake the task of adapting the pinyin system. Second, since the two modes of transliteration are used interchangeably in the English-speaking world, relying on the traditional system is both preferable and easier for the task at hand.

evidence substantiates Chou unipolarity after 1000 BC, Chou's rise prior to this period, and its attainment of system-wide hegemonic status prior to 1000 BC remains controversial (Ebrey 1996, 22-31; Blunden and Elvin 1983, 54-57; Huang 1988, 12-19; Hsu and Linduff 1988, 41-47). For these reasons, the historical data necessitates the beginning point of coding power configurations in the Far Eastern System to begin from 1000 BC.

#### *1000 BC – 780 BC Unipolar Structure*

Chou attained system-wide hegemonic status throughout much of the Yellow River basin (Shaughnessy 1999, 307-313), initially subjugating the vast number of tribal statelets (Eberhard 1967, 21-24), establishing strongholds in the south in the Han and Huai valleys, and forming defensive barriers to the north against nomadic incursions (Hsue and Linduff 1988, 129-137). For over 160 years Chou unipolarity remained rather stable, only to be internally disturbed by a coup in 841 BC, followed by nomadic incursions by the Jung in the north. Its preoccupation with the Jung weakened Chou's control over its southern vassals, with the Jung finally managing to conquer the Chou capital in 771 BC and end the unipolar period (Shaughnessy 1999, 342-351; Hsue and Linduff 1988, 258-268). The unipolar structure during this period was primarily sustained by two factors: absence of any challenges in the system by rising sub-system hegemon, and Chou's ability to sustain vassalage of peripheral states. Internal decay, coupled with external incursions (Hirth 1969, 155-170), however, brought about a transformation of the power configurations of the Far Eastern System by the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> century BC.

Map 4.1



*780 BC – 680 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The post-Chou period gave way to intense disintegration (Huang 1988, 17), with vast number of small political units, ranging in the hundreds (Hsu 1999, 547-562; Blunden and Elvin 1983, 61-62; Maspero 1978, 170-173), restructuring the system into a nonpolar power constellation. During this nonpolar period, however, approximately eleven sub-system hegemons, many of them former Chou vassals, began the process of consolidating regional power: Chi ( Ji or Zhi in pinyin), Ch'en, Cheng (Zheng in pinyin), Ch'i (Qi in pinyin), Chou, Chu, Lu, Sung (Song in pinyin), Ts'ai (Cai in pinyin), Ts'ao (Cao in pinyin), and Wey (Wei in pinyin) (Chang 1980, 348-355; Hsu 1999, 547-548). The consolidation process and the attempt at attaining system-wide hegemonic status further contributed to the diffusion of power in the system during this period, as Ch'u in

the southern Yangtze basin counter-balanced the ambitions of the northern sub-system actors, primarily Chang and Chou, while Ch'i and Sung undertook irredentist policies of expansion, only to witness Lu, Ts'ao and Ts'ai consistently engaging in coalitions and counter-coalitions (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 220-226; Legge 1972, 12-37; Maspero 1978, 172-180; Walker 1953, 38-55), similar to all the other actors in the system, as the highly-complex process of balancing, counter-balancing, and alliance-shifting reified the nonpolar structure of this period.

Map 4.2



*680 BC – 580 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure*

The consolidation of power at the regional level allowed several sub-system hegemon to attain system-wide status, thus transitioning the nonpolar structure into a multipolar power configuration. Ch'u sought to transition the multipolar system into a

unipolar one by challenging other system-wide hegemon, including Cheng, Sung, and Ch'i. Ch'i sought to counter-balance Ch'u aspirations by forming an alliance and coming to the assistance of Cheng as it was being invaded by Ch'u (Legge 1972, 62-117; Maspero 1978, 180-192; Walker 1953, 29-34). The containment of Ch'u's attempt at restructuring the Far Eastern System into a unipolar structure was achieved by Ch'i, along with the other, albeit relatively weaker, poles in the system, Cheng and Sung, thus counter-balancing and sustaining the multipolar power constellation. Concomitantly, Chin (Jin in pinyin, not to be confused with Ch'in, which is Qin in pinyin), a small regional actor in the north of the Yellow River, attained sub-system hegemony, while the western state of Ch'in attained sub-system hegemonic status through its dominance of the Wei valley (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 190-194; Maspero 1978, 170-179). By 640 BC Ch'i weakened as a system-wide hegemon, allowing Ch'u to reassert its aggressive policies, only to be temporarily counter-balanced by Sung. Sung challenge to Ch'u remained unsuccessful, as Ch'u forced dominance over Cheng, Ch'en, Ts'ai, Lu, and Sung itself. The rising system-wide hegemon, Chin, preserved the multipolar system by coming to the aid of both Ch'i and Sung, thus assuming leadership of the Yellow River alliance and managing to defeat Ch'u and coerce peace. Chin was soon challenged by Ch'in, another sub-system hegemon that had elevated itself to system-wide status, opening the way for Ch'u to reassert its lost prestige against Chin (Hirth 1969, 208-216; Legge 1972, 172-218; Maspero 1978, 188-203). This process of inter-polar conflict continued, as Ch'u and Chin remained the more powerful system-wide hegemon, while Ch'i and Cheng the relatively weaker poles. Chin and Ch'u temporarily stopped fighting, having reached an impasse, while Chin, suffering from internal crisis, was attacked by Ch'in, thus to the

advantage of Ch'i and Ch'u (Hsu 1999, 551-562; Legge 1972, 245-340). This cycle remained, as each pole temporarily weakened, then revived to either counter-balance another pole, or to reassert itself.

*580 BC – 540 BC Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

Ch'u continued with its ambitious expansionism, conquering Cheng, subjugating Sung, and neutralizing Ch'i. Chin was beaten in a great battle by Ch'u, thus temporarily weakening Chin. Attempting to capitalize on a weakened Chin and a Ch'u undergoing a succession crisis, Ch'i undertook expansionist endeavors, only to be thoroughly defeated by a revived Chin. With Cheng and Ch'i having been reduced to sub-system actors, the system transitioned into a bipolar structure, dominated by Chin and Ch'u (Hsu 1999, 562-563). Chin-Ch'u bipolarity continued through proxy wars, polarization (Ch'u pole included Ts'ai, Hsu, and Ch'en, while the Chin pole included Chu, Cheng, Chou, Chi, Ts'ao, Lu, Hsueh, and Wey), and direct conflict between the system-wide hegemon (Hsu 1965, 55-59; Walker 1953, 55-58). The bipolar power constellation of this epoch, then, included two system-wide hegemon, and several sub-system hegemon, ranging from Ch'in and Ch'i in the north, to Yeuh and Wu in the southeast and south of the Yangtze basin.

*540 BC – 275 BC Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure*

Ch'u proceeded to conquer Ch'en and Ts'ai, only to be counter-balanced by Wu, thus raising Wu to system-wide status. Chin maintained its status as a pole, demonstrating preponderance in the north, while Ch'in allied with Ch'u and Yeuh to counter-balance Wu ambitions (Legge 1972, 547-630, 724-769). System-wide hegemon, during this epoch, proceeded to both eliminate sub-system actors and limit the number of




poles in the multipolar structure. Capitalizing on the internal strife within Chin, Wu sought to dominate the northern league, thus challenging both Chin and Ch'i, while also threatening its southern neighbor, Yeuh. Yeuh would proceed to defeat and annex Wu (Hirth 1969, 261-262), thus removing one pole from the system. Similarly, Ch'u proceeded to destroy Ch'en, thus removing another potential system-wide actor (Ssu-ma 1994, 77-109). By 450 BC Chin disintegrated into three, albeit powerful, units: Hann (Han in pinyin), Chao (Zhao in pinyin), and Wei (Hirth 1969, 264-266; Maspero 1978, 235-250). While relatively weaker than Ch'in, Ch'i, Ch'u, and Yeuh, Hann, Chao, and Wei were not merely regional players, but had system-wide status (Hsu 1999, 594-606). Wei sought to re-establish the Chin dynasty by subjugating Hann and Chao, while at the same time repulsing an attempt by Ch'i at interference. Wei continued its ascendancy by dominating Sung, Lu, and Wey, and even defeating Ch'u in battle (617). Wei ascendancy was counter-balanced by the collective interference of Ch'in, Ch'i, and Ch'u, hence preserving the balance of power in the multipolar system. By 300 BC, Ch'in had become the most powerful system-wide hegemon, overtaking Wei, and facing a combined coalition of Ch'i and Ch'u, along with Chao and Hann. Unable to defeat Ch'in, a second coalition was formed in 296 BC, with Ch'i, Hann, Chao, Sung, and Wei (Ch'ien 1994, 108-117). The balance of power was maintained, but Ch'in still remained the more powerful pole, as the other system-wide hegemon turned against each other: Ch'i annexed Sung, overwhelmed Lu, and sought to conquer Chao, Hann, and Wei, only to face a counter-alliance from the other system-wide actors, thus thoroughly being defeated (Hsu 1999, 632-638) and reduced to sub-system status. With Ch'i removed, Hann, Wei, and Chao being reduced to sub-system status by Ch'u, the only other system-wide

hegemon able to counter-balance Ch'in remained Ch'u. In 278 BC Ch'in thoroughly defeated Ch'u (Maspero 1978, 258-264), removing the only remaining challenger to its power in the system, and thus transitioning the 260 year multipolar period into a unipolar structure.

#### *275 BC – 210 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

Ch'in unipolarity was primarily defined by its irredentist policies, consistently attacking sub-system actors Wei, Chao, and Hann (Lewis 2007, 30-47; Ch'ien 1994, 118-120), seeking not only territorial expansion, but also control of economic resources and trade (Blunden and Elvin 1983, 67-74). An attempt at a bipolar system was made by states opposed to Ch'in's overly-aggressive endeavors, as five states sought polarization under the leadership of Wei, seeking to establish an opposing pole. In 247 BC the five-state coalition managed to defeat Ch'in and hold off the unipole's expansionism (Hirth 1969, 327-328), but immediately dissolved after victory, thus negating any considerations of bipolarity. The unipolar structure was reified by Ch'in resurgence in a matter of few years, supplemented by the system-wide hegemon's continuous policy of expansion. A similar attempt at polarization was once again undertaken to counter-balance Ch'in, a proto-pole including Ch'u, Chao, Hann, and Wei. This attempt at counter-balancing via polarization was an ephemeral one and proved to be unsuccessful as Ch'in remained victorious and continued to exercise unchallenged preponderance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 86-88; Ch'ien 1994, 121-134). Around 210 BC, due to both overextension and internal chaos (Qian 1993, 218-226), Ch'in disintegrated, only to restructure itself as Han. During this restructuration process, however, the unipolar epoch ended, transitioning from unipolarity to nonpolarity.

Map 4.3



*210 BC – 195 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The fall of Ch'in and the establishing of Han as a successor state (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 90-92) was supplemented by the expansion of the Far Eastern System itself, which came to include multitude of sub-system actors in the periphery (Penkala 1966, 7-9). In the southeast coast of the system, Nan-yeuh (Nam-Viet), in current northern Vietnam, began consolidating regional power (Ch'ien 1994, 140-146), while in the southwest mountains, the rise of Tibeto-Burman was noted, along with the sub-

system hegemonic aspirations of Tai. In the northeast of the system, the proto-Koreans, as Ko-Choson (Lee 1984, 11-18; Han 1970, 11-17) under the dominion of the sub-system hegemon Yen from Manchuria (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 196-200), sought positioning as sub-system hegemon when the state of Wiman Joseon was formed through its seizing of Ko-Choson and expanding both east and south (Nelson 1993, 167-189). In the northwest, Kashgaria had risen to sub-system status, further compounding the diffusion of power during this period. The northern periphery of the system, however, displayed the largest number of rising sub-system actors, as the nomadic people of the Steppe started forming more coherent political units. These included the Alans, Mongols, Avars, Sienabi, the Yueh-chih, Turks, and the powerful Huns (McGovern 1939, 118-135; Barfield 1989, 30-35; Grousset 1970, 26-32). Without the presence of any system-wide hegemon, primarily due to the fact that Ch'in had attenuated any potential actors, while Han was still in the process of regional consolidation (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 93-94), the power constellations of the system remained inchoate and quite diffused. Two major developments during this nonpolar period allowed for the transition of the system from a nonpolar structure to a unipolar one. As noted, the reestablishment of Han slowly brought about the restructuring of the system; but this was further augmented by the elevation of the Huns from regional, peripheral actors to system-wide hegemon.

#### *195 BC – 165 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

By 209 BC the Huns had attained sub-system hegemonic status out of their base in Inner Mongolia (Kwanten 1979, 12), only to proceed in subjugating eastern Mongolia and western Manchuria after the fall of Ch'in (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 95). Around 200 BC the Huns reduced to vassalage most of the city-states of Kashgaria

(Ishjamts 1994, 152-158), only to face a massive invasion by the new Han state. The defeat of Han elevated the Huns to the status of unchallenged system-wide hegemon (Grousset 1970, 34), thus restructuring the Far Eastern System from nonpolar to a unipolar structure. Hun preponderance of the system was reinforced by its defeat of the Alans and the complete subjugation of Kashgaria, while having reduced Han to tributary status (McGovern 1939, 119-128; Barfield 1989, 36-55). While militarily dominant, the Huns remained economically reliant on the tributes extracted from Han, and as such, Han slowly reestablished its military might, while sustaining its economic capabilities, while the Huns remained stagnant, and even began falling under the Sino cultural influence.

#### *165 BC – 120 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 165 BC the Hans had repositioned as system-wide hegemon, challenging and counter-balancing Hun dominance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 97-98) and creating a bipolar power configuration. Han expansion, fused with Hun dependency on Han tributes, not only created a co-dependent bipolar system, but methodically shifted the relative power of both actors. Han continued to amass both political strength and undertake territorial expansion. Concomitantly, this bipolar epoch had two system-wide hegemon, with growing differentiation in power capabilities, along with three independent states acting as sub-system hegemon: Wiman Joseon in the Korean peninsula and northeast China, Nan-yeuh in northern regions of Vietnam, and the Dian Kingdom, covering much of the Yunnan region (Yao and Zhilong, 2012, 353-357).

#### *120 BC – 160 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

Han directly challenged the Huns for system-wide hegemonic status, severely defeating them in Outer Mongolia, and succeeding in reducing the Huns to vassal status

by 100 BC (McGovern 1939, 140-154; Grousset 1970, 36-37). By subjugating the Huns, Han became the single pole in the Far Eastern System, facilitating the transition to unipolarity. To display its preponderance, Han undertook the following conquests: Wiman Joseon (Choson) (Lee 1984, 14-18; Nelson 1993, 165-171), removing a sub-system actor from the system and assuming dominance of Korea (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 101); Kashgaria, setting up vassal states and tributaries (Yong and Yutang 1994, 228; McGovern 1939, 170-178); northern Vietnam, subjugating Southern and Eastern Yeuh; Yunnan region, making Dian a vassal state, and thus removing another sub-system hegemon from the picture (Ebrey 1996, 8-11). Han dominance of the Far Eastern System seemed absolute by 25 AD, as most of the sub-system hegemons, from the Huns, to Korea, to Kashgaria, to Nan-yeuh, had accepted either vassal status or had become tributary protectorates (Bielenstein 1967). During this period, three new sub-system hegemons rose to power, and while unable to challenge Han unipolarity, these actors nonetheless maintained political independence: Koguryo in southeastern Manchuria (Henthorn 1971, 25-30), Yarkard, a former Han vassal who was able to establish independent regional dominance in Kashgaria, and the Northern Huns, who soon replaced Yarkard (McGovern 1939, 222-240). By 150 AD, overextension, internal rebellion, and succession problems brought about the disintegration of the Han Empire, which soon came to be challenged by a rising regional power that attained system-wide status: the resurgent Sienbi (Hsien-pi) of the Steppe (Grousset 1970, 54).

Map 4.4



*160 AD – 180 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 150 AD Sienbi had attained sub-system hegemony through much of the northwestern region of the Far Eastern System, seeking system-wide status by subjugating the Puyo of Manchuria, reducing to vassalage tribes of Siberia, and managing to thoroughly defeat both the Northern and Southern Huns (Grousset 1970, 55). By 160 AD Sienbi had begun challenging and counter-balancing Han, thus transitioning the system into a bipolar power constellation (Kyzlasov 1996, 317-321). During this bipolar epoch, Han's relative power as a system-wide hegemon continued to decline, as Han vassals revolted and established independence, thus increasing the number of political units in the system. This process of deconsolidation was supplemented by the decay and collapse of Sienbi around 180 AD.

### *180 AD – 225 AD Transition from Bipolar to Nonpolar*

With the disintegration of Sienbi and the fall of the Han Empire into various political units and sub-units controlled by warlords and generals as ephemeral statelets, the system transitioned from a bipolar structure into a nonpolar one. Similar to most nonpolar epochs, a methodical process of regional power consolidation began to take place, as ambitious sub-system actors sought regional hegemony to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of any system-wide hegemon. The Far Eastern System underwent an extensive diffusion of power, as the increased number of independent political units in the system negated any attempts at cogently formulating a power hierarchy, hence making the power configurations of the system inchoate. Koguryo moved from Manchuria to the Korean peninsula (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 404-406), only to witness the presence of post-Han statelets, while Manchuria itself had Koguryo presence and Puyo (Nelson 1993, 189-222). The Steppes of the periphery saw the decay of Sienbi, the disintegration of the Huns into various tribal units, and the presence of several independent city-states in Kashgaria (McGovern 1939, 310-319). The southwest region of the system also experienced the same process of power diffusion, as Tonkin and Champa (Majumdar 1985), in northern and southern Vietnam, established independence, while Funan, in the regions of Cambodia (Hall 1981, 27-30), became another presence in the system. The diffused nature of the nonpolar structure necessitated the concentration of power at the regional level, as sub-system actors sought consolidation and the transition of the system into some form of a configuration with a clear power hierarchy. Thus, by 225 AD, the Three Kingdoms period had been established, restructuring the nonpolar epoch into a tripolar power configuration.



### *225 AD – 265 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Tripolar Structure*

The consolidation process during the nonpolar period gave birth to three system-wide hegemonies: Shu Han based out of Szechwan in the Yangtze River basin, Wu based out of Nanking in the eastern Yangtze territory, and Wei based out of Luoyang in the Yellow River Basin (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 126-128). Of the three poles, Wei was perhaps the more powerful, subjugating much of Manchuria and the Korean peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 27-31), and thus reducing Koguryo to sub-system status and accepting satellite status from Puyo, while at the same time assuming dominance over Kashgaria in the periphery (Yong and Yutang 1994, 229-335). Shu Han preserved the balance of power in the tripolar structure, reducing former sub-system hegemon Dian in the Yunnan to vassalage, and directly challenging Wei. Wu sought system-wide supremacy by controlling most of southeastern China, reducing Funan to tributary status, and counter-balancing Wei ambitions. This tripolar epoch was primarily defined by cyclical warfare, with Wu and Shu Han resisting Wei irredentism, while at the same time neutralizing and dominating sub-system actors within each pole's respective sphere of influence (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 130).

### *265 AD – 300 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure*

By the mid-260's Wei managed to annex Shu Han, eliminating one pole from the equation. With Shu Han removed, Wu remained incapable of counter-balancing Wei by itself. At the same time, Wei underwent a leadership change via military coup, assuming the new name of Chin (Jin in pinyin), specifically designated as Western Chin, with its capital in Luoyang. In 280 Western Chin subjugated Wu, completely solidifying its unipolar status within the system. This was followed by a repulsion of Sienbi invaders

against Puyo (Lee 1984, 21-24), who had accepted Western Chin suzerainty, followed by the submission of Funan and Champa (Majumdar 1985, 25-29). Western Chin unipolarity was supplemented by: the presence of sub-system hegemon Koguryo in Korea, who was balanced by Western Chin supported Paekche (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 408), another sub-system hegemon; suzerainty over Tonkin, Yunnan, and much of Cambodia; and the presence of rising sub-system actors in the periphery of the Steppe and the north that remained outside of the unipole's sphere of dominance.

*300 AD – 425 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

For the first decade of the 4<sup>th</sup> century, Western Chin underwent severe internal crisis, losing control over its territorial holdings and vassal states. The first to react were the Southern Huns, who not only revolted, but managed to conquer Louyang, the capital. The Chins fled south, reorganizing itself as Eastern Chin with its capital in Nanking (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 132). The north of the Far Eastern System fell into disarray, as the collapse of Western Chin left a power vacuum that was temporarily filled by the Southern Huns, who also separated into two political units: Western Chao and Eastern Chao. Competing at the same time for Chin leftovers in the Yellow River basin were the Sixteen Kingdoms, a collection of numerous independent political units seeking regional hegemonic status (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 149-150). Several of these kingdoms claimed loyalty to Chin, while a large number of them sought sub-system hegemonic status, with potential aspirations of re-establishing the system-wide power structure of Western Chin (McGovern 1939, 321-366). In Korea and Manchuria the system was also shocked by the diffusion of power, as the Sienbi reclaimed parts of Manchuria, thus marginalizing Puyo, while three Korean states, Koguryo, Paekche, and

rising Silla, competed for regional dominance (Han 1970, 23-45; Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 405-416). In the far south of the system, Champa, Tonkin, and Nam Viet temporarily attained independence, thus contributing to the number of actors in the system (Majumdar 1985, 23-29). From 350 the nonpolar structure included approximately fifteen sub-system hegemonic actors: Eastern Chin, Eastern and Western Chao, Koguryo, Puyo, Paekche, Liang, Nam Viet, Sienbi, Champa, Tibet, Yamato from Japan (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 468-469; Henthorn 1971, 33-37) (during this period Japan's interaction with Korea, and its subjugation of Korean city-states, especially the Kayla league, incorporated Japan into the Far Eastern System), and several statelets from the Sixteen Kingdoms. By 400 relative consolidation of power had been taking place, as given sub-system hegemons had established regional preponderance, setting the stage for a transition of the system's polar structuration. Eastern Chin had become established in the Yangtze basin; Northern Wei having somewhat tempered the chaos of the Sixteen Kingdoms in the Yellow River territories (Kwanten 1979, 15-16); Yamato practiced dominance in southern Japan and parts of Korea; Western Ch'in attained stability and status in the northwest of the system, based out of Kansu (Gansu in pinyin); the Tabgach of the Steppe began positioning in the north (Grousset 1970, 60-61); while the Avar (Juan-juan, Hephtalites) confederacy began building its central Asian empire in the periphery (Kwanten 1979, 20-23).

#### *425 AD – 555AD Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure*

By 425 the Far Eastern System had transitioned into a multipolar structure, as given regional powers had not only solidified sub-system hegemony, but had also expanded beyond its regional spheres. Eastern Chin had been replaced by the Sung

dynasty, with the Sung solidifying its system-wide hegemonic status in the Yangtze basin (Holcomb 1994, 29-36). Northern Wei (the Tabgach after becoming Sinified) consolidated power over the north, subjugating and absorbing the remnants from the post-Chin nonpolar period, thus assuming its system-wide status out of the Yellow River basin (Grousset 1970, 60-64). The Avar confederacy in the periphery of the system presented the third pole, having attained dominance over Mongolia and much of the steppe peoples of the surrounding regions. Yamato sustained itself as a system-wide actor, albeit relatively weaker than the other poles, yet nonetheless a pole in its own right, demonstrating dominance not only in its own region, but expanding into the Korean peninsula. Koguryo shifted between system-wide and sub-system status, at times challenging and counter-balancing other poles, and at other times accepting tributary status and thus limiting itself as a sub-system hegemon. Northern Wei proved to be the more aggressive pole during this early period, both subjugating Kashgaria (Mole 1970, 17-19) and Togon, a former Western Ch'in vassal and a rising sub-system actor, while carrying out raids against the Avars to challenge and counter-balance their relative strength in the periphery (Grousset 1970, 58-66). Sung established dominance over much of the eastern and southern portions of the system, accepting vassalage from Tonkin, Champa, and Funan. By the end of the century the Sung dynasty was replaced by the Southern Ch'i dynasty, with no alterations to the balance of power structure. During this period Koguryo expanded into a system-wide hegemon, overrunning much of the Korean peninsula and further succeeding in its absorption of Puyo by conquering Manchuria (Han 1970, 21-51). Internecine war between the poles continued throughout this period, with the balance of power continuing to preserve the status quo. Internal problems,

however, by the early 500's, slowly brought about a restructuring of the system. Southern Chi was supplanted by Southern Liang, weakening and bringing about the slow disintegration of this once-powerful Yangtze political unit. Northern Wei split into Western and Eastern Wei, and proceeded to weaken each other (Wright 1978, 31-44), with Western Wei soon becoming dominated by Northern Chou, and Eastern Wei by Northern Ch'i (Ebrey 1996). Koguryo underwent a civil war, losing much of its power to the other sub-system hegemon in the region, Silla and Paekche (Lee 1984, 42-47). The other remaining sub-system hegemon, the Avars, faced a growing threat from its subjects, especially the Turks (Kwanten 1979, 24-26).

#### *555 AD – 675 AD Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The Gokturks, a Turkish tribe of the Steppe, rebelled against the Avar empire, bringing about the latter's destruction and supplanting it with the First Turkish Khaganate (empire), through which they proceeded to subjugated the Huns and the Kyrgyz at the extreme periphery of the system, thus dominating the entire northeast of the Far Eastern System (30-37). The loose multipolar structure became replaced with Turkish unipolarity, as the Khaganate incorporated northern China into its sphere of influence, both protecting and collecting tribute from the previous system-wide hegemon Northern Chou and Northern Ch'i (Grousset 1970, 66-84; Kyzlasov 1996, 320-323). Around 582, after a civil war, the First Turk Khaganate split into two: Eastern and Western Turkish Khaganate. Capitalizing on this development, Sui overthrew Northern Chou and assumed system-wide hegemonic status, solidifying power in the Yellow River basin and then expanding into south to the Yangtze territory, conquering Southern Ch'en and taking Nanking (Wright 1978, 138-161). Sui assumption of unipolarity allowed for the continuation of

the system's power configuration, as one system-wide hegemon replaced the previous system-wide hegemon, thus maintaining the unipolar structure. Sui influence expanded into the Korean peninsula, antagonizing sub-system hegemon Koguryo and accepting submission from Silla as Sui satellite in the region (Lee 1984, 42-47). Sui's influence also spread to the southeast of the system, incorporating Yunnan, Tonkin and Champa into its sphere of influence (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 154-155). At this stage, the power constellations of the system included Sui as the single pole along with the presence of several sub-system hegemons: Koguryo in Korea, a rising Tibet in the south-west (Beckwith 1987, 14-23), a reviving Togon, the Eastern and Western Turkish Khaganates in the north and western periphery, and Tang, perhaps the most powerful of the sub-system hegemons based out of its capital Ch'ang-an in north-central China.

Overextension, failed incursions into Korea, and several revolts disintegrated the Sui empire into various statelets (Wright 1997, 73-113), positioning the Far Eastern System for a possible transition into a post-unipolar structure. The emergence of Tang, however, maintained the system's unipolar structure, which otherwise would have transitioned into a possible multipolar power configuration. As the most powerful sub-system hegemon, Tang quickly assumed polar status after the fall of Sui (Wechsler 1997, 153-166): establishing dominance over Yunnan, Tonkin, Champa, Funan, and Cambodia (Hall 1981, 30-36; Majumdar 1985, 37-39) in the south, accepting tributary status from Koguryo (albeit temporarily) and Silla in the Korean Peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 46-51), and repelling an Eastern Turkish invasion and managing to subjugate the Khaganate (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 155), while accepting vassalage from the powerful Uighurs (Grousset 1970, 87-93). While several independent sub-system hegemons

remained present, with potential system-wide hegemonic aspirations, Tang unipolarity remained unchallenged during this period, as neither of the sub-system actors was powerful enough to either challenge or counter-balance Tang. By the 670's, however, internal problems, fused with failed expedition into Korea and Kashgaria, relatively weakened Tang (Adshead 2004, 40-48), thus allowing rising sub-system actors to challenge Tang and restructure the power configurations of the system.

*675 AD – 840 AD Transition from Unipolar to Tripolar Structure*

Tibet was the first sub-system hegemon to challenge Tang and thus attain system-wide status. Tibet had already managed to destroy the Togon state, while subsequently submitting much of the Western Turkish Kaghanate (Beckwith 1987, 35-43) and then directly challenging Tang over Kansu and Kashgaria (Richardson 1962, 30-33). The Eastern Turks formed the Second Turkish Kaghanate after revolting against Tang, subjugating the Tang vassal Uighurs, and carrying out raids against Tang (Sinor and Klyashtorny 1996, 327-335). Tibet twice defeated Tang incursions into Kashgaria, while Yunnan rebelled against Tang, only to be followed by a resurgent Tang reconquering Kashgaria and pacifying Yunnan within a 20 year period. Tang counter-balanced the expansion of the Kaghanate by temporarily allying with Tibet to preserve the balance of power (Grousset 1970, 105-115), while at the same time preserving the power parity between itself and Tibet through internecine warfare. Due to internal conflict and succession problem, the Second Turkish Kaghanate collapsed, leaving a power vacuum in the Steppe that was quickly filled by the Uighurs, who, although allied with Tang, nonetheless presented a separate pole in the system (Mackerras 1972), thus preserving the tripolar structure. A rising sub-system hegemon, Nanchao, based out of Yunnan, broke

away from Tang, expanded into Burma, and allied (submitted) itself with Tibet (Backus 1981, 68-80), thus threatening the balance of power. Uighurs responded by attacking Tibet, through Tang help, to counter-balance Tibet, while Tang succeeded in winning over Nanchao, thus weakening Tibet, and managing to establish a three-way peace treaty among the poles (Beckwith 1987, 156-167).

#### *840 AD – 880 AD Transition from Tripolar to Bipolar Structure*

Two major developments around 840 altered the tripolar system: the Uighurs collapsed due to internal revolts (primarily due to Kyrgyz and Turkish tribes) (Grousset 1970, 124-127), and the Tibetan empire disintegrated due to factionalism and civil war (Richardson 1962, 28-34; Beckwith 1987, 171-172). A weakened Tang, having survived several internal revolts, maintained its system-wide hegemonic status, only to be joined by Nanchao as a new opposing pole, who had managed to conquer Tonkin, establish dominance over much of the southeast of the system, and proceed to invade Szechwan (Backus 1981, 144-161). Tang-Nanchao animosity characterized much of this bipolar period, while the rest of the Far Eastern System underwent intense power diffusion, from the Korean peninsula, to the Steppes, to the southeast of the system.

#### *880 AD – 970 AD Transition from Bipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

By the end of the century Tang was in serious decay, as increased rebellions, warlords, and sub-units within the empire disintegrated Tang (Somers 1997, 682-689). The fall of Tang initiated the transition of the Far Eastern System into a nonpolar structure, as the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms began: Later Liang, Later Tang, Later Chin (Jin), Later Han, and Later Chou (Zhou) succeeded one after another in ten year intervals during this inchoate period in the north (Standen 2009, 38-59; Gungwu



1967, 130-188). In the south, Wu, Wuyue, Northern Han, Southern Han, Southern Tang, Jingnan (Nanping), Later Shu, Chu, and Min (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 195-196; Clark 2011, 52-66) all struggled for power, intermittently, seeking regional consolidation and sub-system dominance (Clark 2009, 188-204).

In Korea, nearly seven political units struggled for regional hegemony with Silla, Later Paekche, and Koryo (successors to Koguryo) being the main actors (Lee 1984, 90-99), while in Manchuria Parhae struggled with both Korean political units, actors from the north, and the incursion of nomadic Mongols. In Japan the Fujiwara period introduced relative stability, as sub-system hegemon Kyoto remained content with

Map 4.5



regional dominance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960; 502-505). Nanchao's power thoroughly declined in the Yunnan, with Tonkin, Champa, Tali, Cambodia, and a new Dai Viet all seeking sub-system status. The situation in the Steppes was just as

chaotic, as the decline of Tibet and Uighur had created a power vacuum with numerous competing political units: Turks, Kyrgyz tribes, Tibetans, and Mongols, especially the Khitans (Grousset 1970, 125-131). The inchoate power structure began changing by around 960, as the diffusion of power became absorbed through regional consolidation (Lorge 2011, 225-231), taking approximately 90 years to formulate a power hierarchy in the system and thus allow for a transition from the nonpolar structure.

*970 AD – 1020 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 970 the Khitan Mongols had attained sub-system hegemony and expanded south into China, conquering Parhae, establishing a sphere of influence over the Yellow River territory, and forming the state of Liao as a system-wide hegemon (Mote 1999, 32-60; Grousset 1970, 125-130). During the previous nonpolar epoch, Sung undertook a process of power consolidation similar to Liao, overthrowing Later Chao in 960, absorbing Southern Han, Southern Tang, and various other northern states by 980 (Nap-Yin and K'uan-chung 2009, 206-239), and directly challenging Liao for system-wide dominance (Mote 1999, 68-71; Twitchett and Tietze 1994, 84-86), thus positioning the Far Eastern System in a bipolar configuration. Sung's excessive size was matched against Liao's superior military, only to be supplemented by the presence of sub-system actor Tangut (Dunnell 1994, 155-175), a powerful state established by Tibetan Tanguts, as Liao ally (vassal?) contributing to the balancing act against Sung (Mote 1999, 171-190). In the rest of the system, sub-system actors fought for regional hegemony both in the south (Champa against Dai Viet), and in the periphery (Karakhanid Turks against Uighur), while Korea became a battle ground for proxy conflict between the satellites of each pole,

only to fall under Liao's sphere of influence, in the same fashion as Champa and Dai Viet in the south fell under Sung's sphere of influence.

*1020 AD – 1115 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure*

During this period Tangut and Karakhanid initially succeeded in attaining system-wide status, thus joining Sung and Liao in a new multipolar power constellation. While the latter two remained, relatively, the more powerful poles, Tangut successfully challenged and counter-balanced Sung, while Liao continued with its consolidation of Manchuria and extended Korea into its sphere of influence (Mote 1999, 60-68). The Karakhanids managed to dominate the western periphery by subjugating Dzungaria and Kashgaria (at least the west of it) (Grousset 1970, 133-147). Sub-system actors either struggled with one another for regional hegemony, or became vassals to one of the poles: Koryo and Manchuria vassalage to Liao; Champa vassalage to Sung; Cambodia-Burma (Pagan) struggle; Dai Viet-Champa-Cambodia struggle, etc. Tangut and Liao challenges to Sung reduced the latter to accepting unfavorable terms of peace (vassalage?), but the inter-polar conflict did not alter the polar structure of the system. The system transitioned, however, when Liao was overthrown around 1114 (Chan 1984, 52-60).

*1115 AD – 1205 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

In 1115 the Jurchen, a Tungusic people from Manchuria (Chan 1984, 51-54) overthrew Liao (Mote 1999, 199-205), establishing the state of Chin (Jin), also known as the Jurchen dynasty,<sup>9</sup> submitting Koryo (Han 1970, 152-160), reducing Tangut to vassalage (Mote 1999, 249-256), and directly challenging Sung for system-wide hegemony (Grousset 1970, 135-138), thus transitioning the system into a bipolar

---

<sup>9</sup> To alleviate any confusion between this Chin dynasty (Later Chin) and the previous Chin dynasty, Jurchen dynasty will be utilized to refer to Later Chin.

structure. Jurchen proceeded to attack Sung, conquering much of the Yellow River territory, seizing Sung's capital, and forcing the latter to flee the Yangtze River basin, yet failing to overtake Sung in the south (Franke 1994, 226-234), thus preserving Sung's ability to counter-balance and maintain system-wide hegemonic status. Much of the north, then, remained under Jurchen suzerainty, while Sung exercised dominance, via vassal states, throughout the south of the system (Franke and Chan 1997, 58-82). Jurchen's drive for unipolar status was hampered by the rise of the Mongol confederation in the north, which as former Jurchen vassals had broken loose and positioned to potentially challenge Jurchen's system-wide status (Grousset 1970, 192-197). After moving their capital to Beijing, Jurchen once again attacked Sung, only to be repelled by the latter, hence agreeing to terms of peace and continuing with the status quo.


#### *1205 AD – 1235 AD Transition from Bipolar to Tripolar Structure*

By the late 1200's the Mongol confederation declared a Mongol empire of the steppe under Genghis Khan, proceeding to thoroughly conquer Tangut (Dunnell 1994, 205-209), subjugate Manchuria and Korea, and threaten Jurchen (Grousset 1970, 229-233), while Jurchen and Sung continued the inter-polar struggle into a stalemate (Chan 1984, 100-116). The Mongols continued their solidification of the periphery by conquering Kashgaria and Dzungaria, overrunning the various tribal political units, and heading south to accept the submission of Tibet (Richardson 1962, 30-33; Grousset 1970, 165-171). The inter-hegemonic conflict between Jurchen and Sung played to the benefit of the Mongols, and while Jurchen still exercised preponderance over the north-center of the system, as Sung did the same through the south, the drive of the Mongols for unipolar status brought about the restructuring of the system.

*1235 AD – 1355 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure*

Shortly before 1235 the Mongols destroyed the Jurchen dynasty (Mote 1999, 243-248; Kwanten 1979, 117), with Sung supporting the effort with the hope of alleviating their archenemy (Grousset 1970, 244-251; Kwanten 1979, 133) and creating a bipolar power constellation. Sung policy proved to be miscalculated, as the Mongols immediately turned against Sung, unleashing devastating defeats against the latter. The Jurchen remnants settled in southern Manchuria, accepting tributary status to the Mongols, while the latter proceeded south-east from Manchuria and accepted the submission of Koryo in the Korean peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 115-119). This was followed by the subjugation of Kashgaria, Tibet, and the complete conquest of Sung in 1276 (Grousset 1970, 282-288). Its consolidation of unipolar dominance was complemented by the Mongol's adopting a new dynastic name for their state: Yuan (Langlois 1981, 3-5). Yuan headed south and conquered the Yunnan province, submitting or accepting vassalage-tributary status from Champa, Tali, Dai Viet, Burma, and Cambodia (Hall 1981, 169-171; Grousset 1970, 289-291), while at the same time encouraging the migration of Thai populations into the south to serve as its satellite (Wyatt 1984, 44-48). Yuan's capacity to exercise preponderance over the entire Far Eastern System—from mainland China, to the very south of the system, to the entire periphery in the north and west, and to the entire north-east from Manchuria to Korea—remained neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any actor. Yuan absolute hegemony was only inhibited by its consistent failed invasions of Japan (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 539-540), which remained a sub-system hegemon seeking neither expansion

Map 4.6



nor challenging Yuan's system-wide hegemonic status. Around 1350 several mass uprisings by the Chinese against their Mongol overlord crippled Yuan, and by 1355 Yuan disintegrated into several regional statelets under given warlords (Dardess 1994, 580-586; Mote 1999, 517-540; Kwanten 1979, 239-244). This was supplemented by an intense civil war among the Mongols themselves, leading to two major developments: 1) the Mongols retreating back into Mongolia, thus ending Yuan (Dardess 1973, 115-152); and 2) the birth of the Ming state, as one of the regional statelets that quickly rose to power (Mote 1988, 11-38), defeated all challenging regional warlords, established itself in Nanking, and attained suzerainty over southern China, while also sweeping north and pushing Mongol remnants into the northern periphery (Grousset 1970, 321-329).

### *1355 AD – 1620 AD Continuation of Unipolar Structure*

The stunning rise of Ming in replacing Yuan unipolarity not only allowed for the continuation of the unipolar epoch, but also prevented the Far Eastern System from transitioning into a nonpolar structure, for as the historic precedent demonstrates, nonpolarity tends to be the system's power configuration after long periods of unipolarity, as the process of disintegration and re-consolidation characterizes nonpolar periods. Ming's capacity to quickly consolidate power and assume the mantle of singular system-wide superpower after Yuan (Dreyer 1988, 72-105) allowed for the Far Eastern System to preserve the unipolar structure, albeit under a different system-wide hegemon. Ming's near 350 year singular dominance of the Far Eastern System was initially characterized by the following developments: establishment of tributary status for Champa, Dai Viet, Thai state of Laos, Burma, and Cambodia in the south (Mote 1999, 607-612); reducing to vassalage Koryo (and renaming it Choson) (Han 1970, 180-225; Clark 1998, 272-287), as well as subjugating the Jurchen in Manchuria, thus establishing sphere of influence in the north-east of the system. In the Steppe and the periphery, Ming either neutralized Mongol tribes or engaging in the game of *divide et impera* through diplomacy (Mote 1999, 608-611), such as playing the Oirat Mongols (a sub-system hegemon acting as Ming satellite) against the Alans and other Steppe actors, while in the process managing to impede the rise of Moghulistan as a possible system-wide actor (Grousset 1970, 493-510). Between 1500 to 1600 the system continued to preserve a similar power structure (Geiss 1988, 466-478; Gungwu 1998, 301-328), with Ming as the unchallenged unipole, and the rest of the Far East encompassing either states under the unipole's sphere of influence, or sub-system hegemons being independent of, but neither

challenging nor counter-balancing, the unipole: the newly formed Siam and Vietnam, along with resurgent Burma, exercising independence, while struggling for sub-system hegemony; Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, and rest of the periphery displaying sub-system actors seeking regional consolidation, either independently or through Ming assistance, yet neither seeking system-wide status; while mainland China, Manchuria, and Korea remained under Ming dominance, with Japan (dominated by the Tokugawa Shogunate) remaining an independent/isolated sub-system hegemon (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 590-601).

Map 4.7





By 1620, however, famine, internal unrest, and factional alignments (Mote 1999, 779-180) profoundly weakened Ming, as the system verged on the disintegration of the unipole and a transition to nonpolarity.

*1620 AD – 1660 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

The disintegration of Ming was halted by the presence of powerful princes seeking to preserve the unipolar structure. This endeavor, however, proved unsuccessful, as the Jurchens of Manchuria, establishing the Manchu state, consolidated regional power and rose to challenge Ming at the system-wide level (Roth 1979, 7-30), bringing the Koreans (Lee 1984, pp. 210-217) and tribes of eastern Mongols into its sphere of influence, while expelling Ming out of Peking (Grousset 1970, 514-525), and ushering in a short bipolar period. The Manchu state adapted the name of Ch'ing (Qing in pinyin) (Crossley 1997, 78-79), expelling Ming from the north, then heading south and subduing Ming resistance in the Yunnan (Hall 1981, 400-407), thus proving to be the more powerful system-wide hegemon, and seeking to transition the Far Eastern System back to a unipolar power configuration.

*1660 AD – 1850 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

Ch'ing success over the Ming propelled the former to the status of unchallenged system-wide hegemon, as Ch'ing managed to suppress several large revolts by Ming loyalists, powerful tribes from Inner Mongolia, the Jungars of Dzungaria (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, pp. 356-362) the sub-system actors in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand (Wyatt 1984, 115-122), and pretty much the rest of Southeast Asia. Ch'ing exercised preponderance over the entire Far Eastern System with the exception of the western periphery, as Turco-Mongol political units, from the Oirat to the Kokonors, established

sub-system hegemonic status, successfully maintaining the periphery as their power base against Ch'ing incursions (Grousset 1970, 525-536), while refraining from challenging Ch'ing hegemonic status at the system-wide level. Meanwhile, around the late 1680's the first presence of European powers, in the form of France and England, began incursions into the Far Eastern System by way of Siam and Formosa (Hall 1981, 380-410), initiating what would eventually become the absorption of the Far Eastern System into the Global Political System. Ch'ing system-wide hegemony, however, remained indifferent to such developments, as the unipole finally succeeded in conquering Kashgaria, invading Tibet (even reaching Nepal), submitting Mongolia into vassalage (Mote 1999, 936-940), and thus solidifying its preponderance over the north and western periphery. While Ch'ing system-wide hegemony continued in the Far East, the days of the Far Eastern System, itself, remained numbered, which, in turn, meant the unipolarity of Ch'ing as well.

*Absorption of the Far Eastern World Political System into the Global Political System*

While European interactions with the Far Eastern System became intensified in the late 1600's, direct presence took place with trade and diplomatic relations around the 1790's, with France establishing a presence in the south of the system (what would become Indochina), and Britain seeking ports and trade routes around Formosa (Taiwan), Hong Kong, and pretty much the south-eastern seaboard of mainland China. This was complemented by European attempts at establishing trading ports in Japan from the 1600's, only to be actualized in the mid-1800's by virtue of American forcefulness. The absorption of the Far Eastern System, that is, the end of its existence as a solitary (quasi-insulated) systemic structure, into the Global Political System, primarily came about with the First Opium War between China/Ch'ing Dynasty and Britain, which resulted in the

defeat of the latter, the end of the Canton System (which had limited European presence to Macau and had thus allowed Ch'ing to control European trade in China and much of the Far East), the cessation of Hong Kong, and the opening of five additional trade posts. Complications with these arrangements would bring about the Second Opium War in 1856 (which also included French involvement along with U.S. and Russian interests), also resulting in the defeat of China/Ch'ing, and the complete opening of the Far Eastern System to the rest of the world, that is, its absorption into the Global Political System.

### Analysis

The dataset for the Far Eastern World Political System, as coded utilizing the taxonomical categories for the different modes of polarity, provide for a total of 27 observation points. Consistent with the analytical structure of other world political systems in the dataset, the compilation of the 27 data observations allow for four methods of analysis: 1) distribution of polar structures; 2) assessment of transitional patters after unipolar periods; 3) gauging the duration and longevity of polar periods; and 4) calculating probabilistic outcomes of polar structures after unipolar transitions. The analytical considerations provide two general conclusions: unipolar transitions tend to give way to nonpolar epochs in the Far Eastern System, and multipolar epochs never characterize the post-unipolar structural transitions.

The most common polar structure in the Far Eastern System is the unipolar power constellation, with 8 polar periods being coded as unipolar. While unipolarity, in relation to other modes of polarity, is the most occurring polar structure, it is not the norm in the system, for the distribution of the polar periods suggests a coherent balance. This is best

demonstrated by the presence of 7 bipolar periods, making bipolarity the second most common polar structure in the system. The third most common power configuration in the system is nonpolarity, with 5 periods, followed by multipolarity with 4 polar epochs, and tripolarity with 3 polar periods. Observationally, in the near 2800 years of the Far Eastern System covered in this study, unipolarity is the polar structure approximately 30% of the time, followed by bipolarity (25%), nonpolarity (19%), multipolarity (15%), and tripolarity (11%).

As the figures below demonstrate, the distribution of the polar structures indicate the system's tendency to either transition into a unipolar or bipolar structure for more than 50% of the time, suggesting the Far Eastern System's predisposition to gravitate toward structures where the concentration of power is within limited number of system-wide hegemon. Multipolarity and tripolarity remain the least occurring power constellations in the dataset. If the coding, however, fused tripolarity with multipolarity, presupposing that any power configuration with more than two system-wide hegemon is a multipolar structure, then multipolarity will be tied with bipolarity as the second most occurring polar period in the system. For taxonomical and analytical reasons, however, the distinction between the two modes remains a necessity: the diffusion or concentration of power cannot ignore the difference between three poles and the dynamics involved with four, five, or six poles.

FIGURE 4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE FAR EASTERN SYSTEM





FIGURE 4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THIS DATASET




The longevity of a polar period is indicative of the system’s structural stability, with stability pertaining to the maintenance of a single power configuration for a given duration, as opposed to treatments of stability being gauged by conflict and war. In this sense, the longer a polar structure, on average, demonstrates longevity, the more stable

that given structure, vis-à-vis system's maintenance, remains. On average, the most durable power configuration in the Far Eastern System is unipolarity, with duration of approximately 170 years. The second most durable polar structure is multipolarity, averaging 147 years of longevity, followed by tripolarity with 78 years, nonpolarity with 75 years, and bipolarity with 46 years. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, by virtue of its durability, unipolarity remains the most stable structure at the system's level, since it takes approximately 170 years in order for structural transition to take place. The longevity of the multipolar system is also quite telling: whereas it was initially assumed that the Far Eastern System demonstrates a tendency to gravitate toward structures that concentrate power within one or two polar formations, the system's stability of multipolarity pits the duration of a structure against the number of occurrences for a given polar modality. This is made obvious by the short lifespan of bipolar epochs with an average of 46 years, against the multipolar structure's average of 147 years. As such, while bipolarity occurs 7 times in the system against the presence of multipolarity of only 4 epochs, multipolarity occupied the system for nearly 590 years, while bipolarity only occupied the system with 325 years.

Further contributing to this assessment is the durability of tripolarity with 78 years, almost twice the durability of bipolarity, thus potentially negating the claim that the Far Eastern System strictly shifts towards the centralization of power. The aggregate occurrence of unipolarity and bipolarity, with 15 data observations, is double that of the aggregate of multipolarity and tripolarity with 7 data observations. With respect to durability, however, the aggregate average of the centralized polar structures is 216 years, while the aggregate average of the relatively diffused polar configurations is 225 years.

On average then, the period of time in which the Far Eastern System had a multi, or tri-polar structure is similar to the system's stability observed during unipolar and bipolar periods. The latter, however, still remains the least stable polar structure in the system.

FIGURE 4.3 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES




Consistent with this analysis, the durability of nonpolar periods, with an average of 75 years, is indicative of the system's tendency to fluctuate between the centralization/concentration of power and its subsequent decentralization of power. As the dataset demonstrates, all five of the nonpolar periods came after unipolar or bipolar epochs. In this sense, the concentration of power within the system, either confined to a single pole, or two relatively equal poles, transitions to a diffused nonpolar structure approximately 33% of the time (of the 15 combined polar periods of unipolarity and bipolarity, the system transitioned into a nonpolar structure 5 times). The longevity of the nonpolar epoch is consistent with the historical data: nonpolar periods undergo the time consuming process of regional consolidation, inter-regional sub-system conflict, the

positioning of rising sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level, and then the restructuring of the system into a post-nonpolar configuration.

The transition of the system's structure after unipolarity allows for probabilistic considerations of post-unipolar periods. With unipolarity presenting 8 polar periods, the data provides for similar number of post-unipolar transitions (since the final unipolar period transitioned the Far East System into its absorption by the Global Political System, only 7 post-unipolar data observations are applicable). Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of polar structures after the system's transition from unipolarity: 3 periods of nonpolarity, 3 periods of bipolarity, and 1 period of tripolarity. Gauging the data probabilistically, the unipolar structure in the Far Eastern System had a 43% chance of transitioning into a diffused nonpolar structure, 43% chance of a more centralized bipolar structure, and 14% chance of a tripolar structure.

FIGURE 4.4 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONSTELLATIONS IN FAR EASTERN SYSTEM



The analytical considerations of this distribution are three-fold. First, 43% of the time the system transitions into an inchoate, diffused structure, thus transitioning from a



centralized/concentrated structuration of power to a non-hierarchical power configuration. Second, 43% of the time the post-unipolar system transitions into the least stable structure, thus presupposing that the continuation of power concentration in the system will last, on average, an additional 46 years with bipolarity. Third, the post-unipolar system never transitions into a multipolar structure, indicating two possible explanations: the concentration of power in the system during unipolarity is quite rigid, with the unipole thoroughly suppressing the rise of sub-system hegemony, thus the result being a diffused system after unipolarity. After which, the preponderance of the unipole is so severe that only the most powerful sub-system hegemony is able to rise to system-wide status and provide a challenge, hence the tenability of bipolarity as opposed to multipolarity in the post-unipolar structure. To this end, either the unipole completely collapses, in which the system transitions to nonpolarity, and with most regional actors being subdued, multipolarity becomes impossible; or, one or two actors manage to consolidate enough sub-system power to stop the system from transitioning to nonpolarity and thus challenge the unipole in a new bipolar system. In either case, the unipolar structure in the Far Eastern System remains inhospitable to the development of strong sub-system actors, which, in turn, thoroughly limits the post-unipolar period transitioning into a multipolar one. The result, then, is a temporary continuation of bipolar power concentration, or a complete diffusion of power and a transition to a nonpolar configuration. Concomitantly, with 5 nonpolar periods in the Far Eastern System's 2800 year history, three of the five nonpolar epochs came after unipolar periods.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that this given world political system encompasses. This fundamentally presupposes a group of political units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous with one another. Spatial-territorially, the Near East-Middle Eastern System covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system. System's classification, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemonies that function within the region that the given system encompasses.

The terms "Near East" and "Middle East"<sup>10</sup> cover geographic areas that at times overlap and at times remain mutually exclusive. To avoid any controversy, or specify geographic designations that may not pertain specifically to one or either of the terms used for geographic designation, both terms will be used as a singular reference to a

---

<sup>10</sup> To avoid accusations of Eurocentrism, the term "Western Asia" is sometimes used to refer to the regions designated as the "Middle East" or the "Near East." Since this work relies on historical sources, the usage of terms "Near East" and "Middle East" are used to be consistent and conterminous with the historical sources. The usage of these geographic terms, then, presents no political reference to contemporary geographic and geo-political terminology. The usage is purely historical and consistent with the historic scholarly sources.

geographic portion of the world that functioned as a world political system. The Near East-Middle Eastern System, territorially, includes the global region that covers the following areas: from its eastern periphery it ranges from western Iran in the south and up north through the Zagros Mountains and into the Armenian Highlands of south Transcaucasia; heading westward, it covers all of Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and extends to the Mediterranean coast of Syro-Palestine; to the north it covers the entirety of Anatolia/Asia Minor all the way to the Aegean; and further south and south west, it encompasses Egypt, with the rest of northern Africa, from Libya to Numidia, serving as its south-western most periphery. In this sense, the term “Middle East,” for example, covers much of the territory within the designated world political system, but fails to include parts of Transcaucasia and North Africa west of Egypt, while including Afghanistan that is not part of the designated world political system. Similarly, the term “Wider Near East,” historically, covers the regions primarily associated with the Ottoman Empire, thus including all of the Balkans and various coasts of the Black Sea, which are not part of the designated world political system, while failing to include much of the Arabian Peninsula that is, in fact, part of the designated world political system. Consequently, the limited designation of the term “Near East,” as opposed to “Wider Near East,” specifically covers Anatolia, northern Syria, and upper and central Mesopotamia: territories that make up only part of the designated world political system. For these reason, the geographic designations “Middle East” and “Near East” are connected together by a hyphen and used as a single designation to conceptualize the region of the world that makes up the Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System.

Data collection for polar periods within the Near East-Middle Eastern System begins around 2600 BC, where basic city-states have begun forming in parts of Mesopotamia, Syro-Palestine (Mediterranean Coast) and southern Anatolia. Egypt, by this time, has a highly-developed civilization, but Egypt's interaction with the rest of the system remains almost non-existent until the 1600's BC, and as such, Egypt remains classified as a sub-system hegemon at the periphery. Considerations of polar structures prior to this period present obvious complications: historical evidence is rather limited; formation of political units that function at the system-wide or sub-system level are quite unclear; and inter political interactions between newly-forming political units are structurally so underdeveloped that it makes no analytical sense to classify such developments through the criteria of polar structuration. For these reasons, the coding of polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern system begins from 2600 BC.

#### *2600 BC – 2330 BC Nonpolar Structure*

Southern Mesopotamia, during this period, was comprised of approximately thirty five city states, "more or less evenly divided over the region" (Van de Mieroop 2004, 43). The agrarian economic structure of the region, primarily in Babylonia, gave way to inter-city competition over agricultural land, reifying the nonpolar power configurations of this period by virtue of the excessive diffusion of power within the system. The irredentist aspirations of city-states to expand their sphere, or zone, of influence contributed to the inchoateness and the absence of any power hierarchies in the Near East-Middle Eastern System, which, in turn, provided the opportunity for rising sub-system hegemons to seek to consolidate regional power and thus provide some form of possible hierarchy to the system. Political units such as Lagash, Umma, Ur, Eridu, Adab, Isin, Kish, Shuruppak,

Larsa, Nippur, and various other prominent city-states methodically began positioning to fill the vacuum (Hall 1960, 182-190, 210-211). Uruk, for example, sought expansion around 2400 BC, conquering Ur, only to be soon challenged by Umma, as the latter not only conquered Uruk, but also Lagash, Ur, and the entire south of Babylon. Such conquests, however, were ephemeral, since coalitions and counter-coalitions among city-states either challenged or undid the attempt of centralizing and concentrating power by given rising actors. The cases of Kish, Lagash, Umma, Sumer, and Uruk are cases in point (Langdon 1923, 373-401).

Outside of Southern Mesopotamia, rising city-states in the Levant and Northern Mesopotamia began establishing minor centers of power in the region, while expanding the Near East-Middle Eastern System into Anatolia, thus creating a link between the north and south of the system primarily through trade and diplomacy. Some of these states included Nagar, Shehna, Urkesh, Mari, Ebla, Ugarit, Assur, Carchemis, and Byblos. To the east, Susa, Ansham, and Elam began economic interactions with the Babylonian/South Mesopotamian city-states, thus establishing inter-civilizational relations between the periphery of the system at edges of modern-day Iran and the core of the system along the Euphrates (Podany 2010, 20-29). Diplomatic and economic relations also extended into the Persian Gulf region, especially to eastern Arabia and Oman. The south west of the system, during this period, remained excluded, as interactions between the sub-system hegemon Egypt and the rest of the political actors in Northern and Southern Mesopotamia were either nonexistent, or the historical evidence has not yet substantiated it. In totality, then, extensive diffusion of power throughout the entire system, with a large number of centers of power remaining unable to consolidate power

within their regional settings, contributed to the nonpolar structure of the system during this period by virtue of failing to establish any system-wide hegemonic actors.

#### *2330 BC – 2150 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

The diffused power structure of the previous epoch witnessed a rapid consolidation, especially in Babylonia, as the Akkad dynasty, previously ruling the city-states of Sumer and Akkad, undertook a precipitous process of political centralization, temporarily ending the system of city-states and establishing a large presence throughout much of Mesopotamia. Initial conquest of Kish and solidification of power in northern Babylon led to expansion into the south, where much resistance was provided by rising sub-system actors Uruk and Umma. Akkad's conquest of these actors was followed by dominance of Adab and Lagash (Langdon 1923b, 403-421). Consequently, Akkad re-altered the formerly independent city-states by integrating them "within a larger structure in every respect, politically, economically, and ideologically" (Van de Mieroop 2004, 60). Attention was then applied to the political units in western Iran, conquering and exercising dominance over Simmurum, Prahshum, Susa, and Elam (Langdon 1923b, 418-420). This was followed by expeditions into northern Syria and the upper Euphrates, overwhelming Tuttul, Dagan, Nagar, Urkesh, Shehna, and the most prominent political centers in the region, Ebla and Mari (Podany 2010, 58-59). Expansion into the Persian Gulf was undertaken for economic reasons, as selective raids were utilized to monopolize crucial trade routes, offering Akkad important commerce from such diverse regions as Bahrain, Oman, and the Indus valley (Podany 2010, 35-51).

Map 5.1



After approximately 180 years of unipolarity, the Near East-Middle Eastern System witnessed the collapse of the Akkadian empire, as the system-wide hegemon remained unable to curb the intense political fragmentation that soon followed. Several explanations are suggested for the disintegration of Akkad, and the underlying reason, it appears, is a clustering of all presumed factors. The irredentism of the unipole, coupled with incessant campaigning and consistent expansionism, slowly emboldened local actors to seek defensive measures against Akkadian preponderance, thus laying the groundwork for potential secessionism or independence. Economic decline, famine, demographic shifts, and environmental degradation also had a devastating effect on Akkad's capacity to preserve its system-wide status: increasing aridity, supplemented by low rainfall and drought, skyrocketed grain prices and led to severe scarcity, thus contributing to famine and rapid demographic shifts. These explanatory factors played a crucial role in shaping the subsequent outcome that ended the unipolar epoch: the Gutians, nomadic barbarians

from the Zagros Mountains of Iran, poured into Mesopotamia, conquering Babylonia and ending Akkadian unipolarity (Langdon 1923b, 422-426).

*2150 BC – 2110 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The decline of the system-wide hegemon presented the system without any coherent structures or hierarchies of power, as Akkadian preponderance had not only alleviated possible challengers for system-wide status, but had also formulated a political and economic system of dependence upon the unipole. For this reason, the collapse of Akkad immediately resulted in rapid diffusion of power, as no sub-system hegemons were initially present to assume some system-wide positioning, while rising regional actors seeking sub-system status lacked sufficient power and resources to fill in the vacuum. The singular concentration of power, from the initial nonpolar period to the subsequent unipolar structure, saw a return to a new nonpolar structure, since the capacity of actors to consolidate and engage in some concentration of power, even at the local and regional level, remained absent after the fall of the single system-wide hegemon. While economic trade and forms of commerce were sustained within the new structure of city-states or groupings of political units, albeit in a much decreased form, political interactions remained somewhat unclear or inchoate. In this forty year period, then, the fragmentation of power, and the dispersion of previously centralized political units, allowed for a power constellation within the Near East-Middle Eastern System that was one of nonpolarity.

*2110 BC – 2010 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

During the previous nonpolar period, regional actors proceeded to consolidate power, which brought about inter sub-system hegemonic conflict, as these rising political



units sought to restructure the system within a new form of power hierarchy. While the Gutians, after the fall of Akkad, sought to concentrate power in north Babylonia, Uruk, in southern Babylonia, had already positioned itself as a sub-system hegemon. The outcome was a bipolar conflict between rising sub-system actors for system-wide positioning, resulting in the victory of Uruk and the expulsion of the Gutians from much of Mesopotamia. The dynasty at Uruk proceeded to impose dominance over all of Babylonia and greater part of southern Mesopotamia, while switching its capital from Uruk to Ur (Langdon 1923c, 435-436), and seeking to reestablish a unipolar structure similar to Akkad. Ur expansion proceeded east, into western Iran, reclaiming Susa and taking Awan, while campaigning the Tigris River and the Zagros Mountains, and establishing full control over the area from Susa in the south to the Mosul plains in the north (438-440).

Ur's preponderance of the system was quite different from Akkad, for Ur was geographically more restricted vis-à-vis size, yet it had more internal centralization of power. For this reason, while the previous unipolar structure did not allow the presence of any rising sub-system actors, Ur's modality of preponderance was rather different: areas under direct Ur rule were highly centralized, regions to the east between Tigris and Zagros were militarily controlled, but the rest of the Near East was dealt with either diplomatically or through economic interactions. While some of these economic interactions presupposed military raids, much of the trade, however, involved the exporting of wool and textiles from Babylonia in exchange for copper and stones, and in this sense, "Ur's contacts with the east and south were thus for the purpose of obtaining mineral resources, through trade, diplomacy, and military raids" (Van de Mieroop 2004,

75). By virtue of such developments, Ur unipolarity was not as dominant as Akkad's, which, in turn, allowed regional actors in much of northern Mesopotamia, the Levant, and in the east to consolidate power as sub-system actors. Two rising sub-system hegemonies, the Amorites from the west (primarily from northern Syria) and Elamites from the east, would challenge and end Ur unipolarity (Langdon 1923c, 456-460). Similar to what the Gutians did to Akkad, the Amorites poured into Babylonia, thus greatly weakening Ur's capacity to exercise preponderance as the only system-wide hegemon. This was supplemented by an invasion from Elam, formerly a subject of Ur and a rising regional power. Elam's conquest of Ur, and much of western Iran that was under Ur military dominance, ended the unipolar structure.

#### *2010 BC – 1980 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

The transformation of the power configurations from unipolarity did not give way to extensive diffusion of power, since the existing sub-system hegemonies filled the structural power hierarchy of the system by positioning at the system-wide level. The formation of Isin, from the remnants of Ur, as a system-wide hegemon, became substantiated as it immediately challenged and expelled the Elamite invaders from Babylonia (Thompson 1923, 470-473), thus presuming system-wide status by virtue of exercising sub-system hegemony. While the Elamites were expelled from Babylonia, Elam, itself, became a system-wide hegemon by both establishing regional dominance and counter-balancing other system-wide actors (Podany 2010, 67-68). In northern Mesopotamia, Assur established itself as one of the powerful actors in the region (Kuhrt 1995, 81-88), only to elevate itself to system-wide hegemonic status by both exercising preponderance over the region and countering any system-wide challenges to its status. In

central Mesopotamia, east of the Tigris, Eshnunna also positioned itself as a system-wide hegemon, exercising extensive regional dominance (Yuhong 1994), while also acting at the system-wide level. While Egypt remained in the periphery, and its interactions with the rest of the system, similar to previous epochs, was rather lacking, its preponderance over the entire Nile Valley and up north into the Mediterranean is noted. During this thirty year period, then, the multipolar structure of the system was sustained by the regional actors that had managed to consolidate and exercise some power under the previous unipolar epoch. Consequently, their rise to system-wide status was a transitional byproduct of reifying the power configurations of the system.

#### *1980 BC – 1890 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The previous multipolar structure transitioned into a unipolar power constellation by virtue of three general developments. First, since the presence of several system-wide hegemonies was a byproduct of the decline of the previous unipole, each of the hegemonic actors were presuming system-wide status as an extension of their existing regional power base. Second, once this reality set in, the transformation of the system allowed for the more powerful system-wide hegemon to presume unipolar status without being challenged by the other actors in the system. And third, since the previous system-wide hegemonies became such through default, their demotion to sub-system hegemonic status was not inherently problematic, unstable, or violent as it would be expected. Simply put, by the end of the thirty year multipolar period, it had become evident that Isin, in fact, was the most powerful system-wide actor, and since all of the previous system-wide actors either lacked the ability or the will to challenge and counter-balance Isin, they accepted a return to sub-system status and thus recognized the positioning of Isin as the

single system-wide hegemon. Isin proceeded to establish dominance through the entire region of Babylonia and southern Mesopotamia, assuming control over Ur, Uruk, and Lagash in the south, while solidifying power to the north through Babylon, Kish, and Nippur (Van de Mieroop 2004, 85-88). The absence of any challenges to Isin's unipolar status provided the Near Eastern-Middle Eastern System with nearly a century of peace, as the sub-system hegemons remained content or unwilling to engage in revisionism, while the system-wide hegemon sought neither irredentist policies nor an overexpansion of power. The power configurations of the system, then, were defined by a single system-wide hegemon and a set of several sub-system hegemons, which included Elam, Eshnunna, Assur, and, by around 1930, the rising power of Larsa.

#### *1890 BC – 1800 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By nineteenth century BC, the polar structuration of the system had not only transitioned, but had also developed into a complex hierarchy of competing powers, both at the system-wide and at the sub-system level. Around the 1890's Larsa, a rising sub-system hegemon in southern Babylonia, challenged Isin unipolarity (Thompson 1923, 480-482), thus transitioning the system into a bipolar structure, which, in turn, gave way to a more diffused concentration of power throughout this world political system. Elam, Eshnunna, Mari, along with a rising Babylon, and a very powerful Yamkhad from northern Syria (southern Anatolia) (Langdon 1923c, 444-449), began engaging in sub-system hegemonic conflict, as each actor sought to solidify regional dominance and expansion into the spheres of influence of other sub-system actors. Within this context, the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict allowed Isin and Larsa to play out their bipolar struggle without any of the regional actors having the capacity to rise up as an additional

pole in the system. Larsa managed to attain full control of the regions in the south (all the way to the Persian Gulf) and east (until Nippur) of Babylonia, thus containing Isin to primarily central Babylonia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 87), which, in turn, allowed peripheral states under Isin's sphere of influence to reject the former unipole's suzerainty. Larsa's threat to the balance of power gave way to an alliance between Isin, Babylon and Uruk. But Larsa's defeat of the coalition, followed by the destruction of Uruk sustained the former's position as one of the reigning poles in the system.

The ephemeral polarization under the given system-wide hegemon allowed for the preservation of the bipolar system, but at the same time contributed to the internecine conflict between sub-system actors. Eshnunna's rising power, for example, and its expansion into Mari territory, gave way to Elam, Mari, and Babylon forming an alliance, with Larsa's approval, and offering Eshnunna a devastating defeat. Elam's expansion in its region, which included Susa and the Zagros highlands around Anshan, along with Elam's role as an important player in the macropolitics of the system, gave way to an alliance between Eshnunna and rising Babylon, which would soon extend pressure on Elam's role as a regional powerhouse (Potts 1999, 189-207). The pole formed by Larsa would in turn seek expansion into Elamite territories, which, consequently, led Elam to join the pole led by Isin, which included Uruk and other local Babylonian actors. By the end of the century, the growing strength of Larsa had reduced Isin's capacity as a system-wide actor, hence the latter's consistent need to rely on its sub-system allies. Concomitantly, the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict reduced the number of powerful sub-system hegemon in the system, as the cases of Eshnunna and Elam demonstrate. Within this developing structure, the bipolar system transitioned into a tripolar system, as

Larsa maintained its system-wide status, but was soon challenged by Hammurabi's Babylon, and a new actor in the north of Babylonia, known as the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia.

*1800 BC – 1760 BC Transition from Bipolar to Tripolar Structure*

Of the three poles within the system, Larsa remained the weakest and in decline, with the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia being perhaps the most powerful, while Babylon sustained a middle ground, assuaging the balance of power. What became the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia initially began with the city-state of Assur, only to expand into northern Syria, the Habur valley, followed by a conquest of the powerful sub-system hegemon Mari. By the 1800's, the entire region north of Babylonia, from the Tigris in the east to Balikh in the west, came to form the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 101). Babylon found itself bordered by the relatively more powerful Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia to the north, and Larsa to the south, while still having to balance the alliance formations and inter-regional conflict between many of the sub-system hegemonies (especially Eshnunna and Elam). Babylon's position as system-wide hegemon was rather unique: it selectively and strategically "bandwagoned" or "shirked" with the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia, but at the same time remained a power player in the sub-system hegemonic conflicts, while continuously positioning itself as a counter-balance and a potential challenge to its neighbor to the north. In this sense, as Larsa continued to methodically decline, while the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia sought overexpansion, Babylon chose to engage in resource maximization and bid for time (103-104). Consequently, the slightest weakening in the structural positions of either of the poles immediately gave way to Babylonian


revisionism, hence transitioning the system, in merely 5 years, from a tripolar structure to a unipolar one.

*1760 BC – 1710 BC Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure*

By the 1770's, the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia's overexpansion brought it into severe conflict with regional actors, especially the sub-system hegemons Yamkhad and Enshnunna (Kupper 1973, 14-18). The result was a devastating defeated levelled upon the former, which gave way to its disintegration as a political unit, and the reification of local powers and collection of small independent states. The ability of Yamkhad or Enshunna to fill this vacuum and assume system-wide status was immediately curtailed by the speed with which Babylon assumed unipolar preponderance.

Babylon immediately assumed dominance over southern Mesopotamia by defeating Larsa, along with all given actors that were under Larsa's sphere of influence (Ur, Uruk, Lagash, Eridu) and thus absorbing the entire southern region (Kupper 1973, 24-27). Upon removing the remaining system-wide hegemon, Babylon proceeded to subjugate Elam to the East, Eshnunna in central Mesopotamia, and Mari to the northwest. This was followed by a protracted conflict in the north against a rising Assyria, which gave Babylonian ascendancy by virtue of Assyria's acceptance of tributary status (Thompson 1923, 487-493). Thus, from the Persian Gulf in the south, to the Zagros Mountains to the east, the Middle Euphrates and Nippur in the center, Mari in upper west Mesopotamia, and Assur in the north, Babylon exercised unchallenged preponderance.

Map 5.2



The structure of this unipolar hierarchy, then, included Babylon as the single system-wide hegemon, with a weakened Elam as a sub-system hegemon subject to the unipole, Yamkhad as a powerful sub-system hegemon in the north that remained outside the reach of Babylon (Kupper 1973, 35-34), and Egypt in the periphery that, while not being incorporated in the Near East-Middle Eastern System yet, had limited interactions with other actors in the region through selective trade and commerce. Concomitantly, no actor in the system presented the capacity or the ability to either challenge or counter-balance Babylon, for its preponderance and extraordinary concentration of power over the system had either thoroughly weakened potential regional actors, or, as in the case of Yamkhad, had necessitated the latter, by virtue of severe power disparity, to avoid confrontation and seek preservation through geographic distance. Due to the level of power concentration within this specific unipolar structure, the system underwent severe



power diffusion after the disintegration of Babylon. Series of rebellions in the south gave way to Babylon's loss of control of southern Mesopotamia, which, in turn, thoroughly ended its sphere of influence in the east (Elamite territories), the north west (Euphrates and Syria), and upper Mesopotamia. Reduced to northern Babylonia, it sustained itself only as a regional actor, thus losing its system-wide status and ending the unipolar period.

#### *1710 BC – 1550 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The decline of Babylon as the only system-wide hegemon introduced great deal of inchoateness in the Near East-Middle Eastern System, for the power configurations of the system had been structured to accommodate a unipolar system with a set of sub-system actors sustaining regional coherence. Three general developments explain the transition from the previous unipolar period to a nonpolar structure. First, the diffusion of power did not give way to regional disintegration, and as such, sub-system actors still exercised a great deal of power. At the same time, since they had been constrained and limited to primarily function at the regional level, no subsystem actor had the relative capabilities or the revisionist aspirations to attain system-wide status. Two, since power diffusion was intense at the system-wide level, it remained rather concentrated at the regional level, which allowed for a large number of centers of power to be established throughout the system, hence reifying the nonpolar structure. Third, the introduction of the Indo-European people, primarily in the form of the Hurrians and the Hittites, as political units that had established regional relevance in western Asia Minor/Anatolia (both terms are used interchangeably, but due to the use of Anatolia by historic sources, this is the term that will be used in this work), further contributed to the dispersion of power at the system-wide level, yet consolidation of power at the regional level (Kupper 1973, 36-41).

The outcome, then, was intermittent inter-regional conflict, with existing sub-system hegemony primarily seeking to preserve their regional status, while the new Indo-European actors consistently infringed upon their neighbors in the south, primarily in the Levant and Upper and Lower Mesopotamia, only to retreat back to their original territories. The absence of any single actor, at the system-wide level, is the primary explanatory variable that designates the power structure of this period as nonpolar.

The Hittite expansion from central Anatolia into the Levant brought it into conflict with Yamkhad, with this inter-sub-system hegemonic conflict leading to the weakening of the latter, but not resulting in its destruction, since the former failed to occupy Aleppo or other centers of Yamkhad power (Gurney 1973, 240-245). The result, however, was diffusion of power within this specific region, as the weakening of Yamkhad gave way to the rise of local actors seeking regional recognition. Similarly, the Hittite conquest of Babylon was not followed by consolidation of power, which, in turn, resulted in more political confusion and disintegration within the region.

The political disintegration in the Levant and Mesopotamia, and the absence of any powers filling the void in the structural hierarchy, further contributed to the nonpolarity of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. Concomitantly, internal complications within the Hittites (Old Hittite Kingdom) thoroughly limited its consolidation of power beyond its Anatolian base. During these developments, southern Levant, or the Syro-Palestinian region, saw the development of robust city-states, which, while interacting with the rest of the system, also opened up important interactions with Egypt in the periphery (Kenyon 1973, 77-85). In this sense, Egypt was slowly becoming

absorbed as an important actor in the system, as opposed to remaining limited to its sub-system functions in the periphery.

In totality, then, during this approximate 160 years of nonpolarity, the Near East-Middle Eastern System had no system-wide actors, but rather a high number of centers of power: a rising Assyria and powerful Mitanni (Hurrian kingdom) in upper Mesopotamia; declining and then resurgent Babylon, under the Kassites, in lower Mesopotamia; Sealand dynasty in Sumaria; Yamkhad and Qatna in north Syria (upper Levant); Elam in the east (Hinz 1973b, 267-271); the Old Hittite Kingdom in Anatolia; rising Kizzuwatna in southern Anatolian; Hatti (a new Hittite kingdom) in central Anatolia; Egypt in the south-western periphery of the system in the Nile Valley of north Africa; and several mid-sized regional powers in the form of city-states primarily in Syro-Palestine (Arzawa in the western periphery of Anatolia, Alashiya in Cyprus, Amurru in northwest Syria, Byblos in central Levant, Kadesh in northern Levant, and Damascus) (Liverani 2000, 6-9).


#### *1550 BC – 1450 BC Transformation from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure*

By mid-16<sup>th</sup> century BC, the Near East-Middle Eastern System had reached its fullest integration, with the previous nonpolar period giving way to the development of what became known as the Great Power's Club. A general term used by historians, this is primarily a reference to the establishment of powerful system-wide hegemons that managed to consolidate power during the nonpolar epoch and transition the system into a multipolar structure that was fundamentally defined by a balance of power. Mitanni, centered in north Syria, between Euphrates and the Tigris, would expand its power to the south coast of Anatolia and further reach the borders of Babylonia (Grimal 1992, 213;

Hallo and Simpson, 1998, 107-109; Van de Mieroop 2004, 141-144). The Hittite state of Hatti dominated all of central Anatolia, parts of southern Anatolia, and extended west to the bordering states on the coast of the Aegean (Bryce 1998, 110-112). Hatti's eventual expansion will methodically encroach east and south upon Kizzuwatna's and Mitanni's territory (Hogarth 1924, 262-264), but initially, Hatti was consumed with deterring sub-system hegemonies in northern Anatolia and western Asia Minor, while also dealing with internal problems (Gurney 1973b, 677-680). Kizzuwatna was perhaps the weakest of the five system-wide hegemonies, based out of southern Anatolia, circling the Taurus Mountains, and primarily covering the region that would become Cilicia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 146-148).

Serving as a power player in the balancing act between the relatively more powerful Mitanni, Hatti, and Egypt, Kizzuwatna maintained its system-wide status by initially allying with Mitanni, then shifting allegiances to Hatti, while at the same time preserving its position within the system. Babylon had slowly re-emerged from its initial decay under the new leadership of the Kassites (Drower 1973, 437-439), managing to absorb the southern kingdom of Sealand, and re-establish Babylonian regional dominance over southern Mesopotamia, while also having ambitious claims over Assyria in the north (Van de Mieroop 2004, 164). The least revisionist of the reigning poles in the system, Babylon primarily sought to preserve the status quo through diplomacy and trade. Egypt's expansion from the Nile Valley into Nubia in the south (Bryan 2000, 223-234), and into Syro-Palestine to the north (Hornung 1999, 80), introduced Egypt as one of the more active and irredentist system-wide hegemonies during this period.

Map 5.3



Since southern and central Mesopotamia remained stable under Babylon's non-revisionist policies, while Hatti initially dealt with internal problems and then solidified its dominance over the large geographical region of Anatolia (Bryce 1998, 120-123), much of the inter-hegemonic conflict took place in Syro-Palestine between Egypt and Mitanni, with Kizzuwatna initially succeeding as a powerbroker, but eventually being absorbed by Mitanni (Drower 1973, 457-464). Egypt's expansion into Palestine immediately brought it into conflict with Mitanni, as Egypt overwhelmed Mitanni vassals in the region, reaching the important states of Ugarit and Kadesh (Van de Mieroop 2004,

154). Mittani, in the meanwhile, taking advantage of Hatti's temporary indifference to system-wide developments due to its internal complications, had pushed westward, exercising preponderance over the strategic city-states of Aleppo and Alalakh, while subjugating Kizzuwatna and reducing it to a sub-system actor around the 1470's (Bryce 1998, 125-130). Around 1457 Mitanni orchestrated a coalition of north Syrian states, prominently including Kadesh, in a direct challenge against Egypt, only to be defeated by the latter and thus having to retreat from southern Syro-Palestine (Hornung 1999, 87-9; Sicker 200, 30-32). Ten years later Egypt's expedition reached the Euphrates, and crossing the river, Egypt dealt a severe defeat upon Mitanni, proceeding to conquer Kadesh and establish control over much of Syro-Palestine (Grimal 1992, 215-216; Bryan 2000, 244-251).

The power configurations of the system, then, during this period, was defined by five system-wide hegemonies, with two of the more active actors (Egypt and Mitanni) confronting each other for dominance over Syro-Palestine, a third actor (Kizzuwatna) attempting to preserve its system-wide status in relation to the relatively more powerful actors, and Hatti and Babylon maintaining regional hegemony while also holding system-wide status by virtue of diplomacy and equal recognition from the other system-wide hegemonies in the system. Concomitantly, the initial 5 poles (being reduced to 4 at end of the period) were supplemented by a set of sub-system hegemonies: Arzawa and Ahhiyawa in western Anatolia; Amurru and Kadesh in north Syria; a rising Assyria in north Mesopotamia; and a nascent Elam in the east.

### *1450 BC – 1345 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

Egypt's defeat of Mitanni transitioned the multipolar structure into a unipolar one, for Egypt's dominance of the system, during this period, remained neither matched nor counter-balanced by any other actor. By incorporating the entire coastal strip of Syro-Palestine, Egypt's preponderance of the system spread from the southern peripheries of Nubia and up north into Sinai, Canaan, Amurru, Upe, Carchemish, and the coastal areas of all of northern Syria and parts of southern Anatolia. Unable to match or challenge Egyptian unipolarity, previous system-wide hegemon accepted positioning at the sub-system level, as the Hittites, Babylonians, and the rising Assyrian's sent tribute in recognition of Egypt's unchallenged dominance of the system (Grimal 1992, 215-216; Bryan 2000, 245-248).

Egypt's dominance of the entire Levant also made Egypt the economic might of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, as its control over seaports and trade routes, coupled with extensive collection of tributes from its vassals in Syro-Palestine, not to mention access to vast amounts of gold from Nubia, allowed for Egypt's reification of its unipolar status. The power hierarchy during Egypt's unipolarity, in this sense, did not undergo serious concentration of power, since many of the sub-system hegemon remained relatively powerful in their own rights within their own regions. The unipolar structure, then, was fundamentally a byproduct of these powerful sub-system hegemon not being powerful enough to either challenge or counter-balance Egypt, thus either bandwagoning (Babylon) or shirking (Hatti).

A temporary resurgence by Mitanni, after an uprising by Kadesh against Egypt, proved to be fruitless (Hall 1960, 345-353). This was followed by Mitanni turning its

attention east, undertaking an inter sub-hegemonic conflict with Assyria, defeating the latter, and inciting rebellion against Egypt through Carchemish and other vassals in Syro-Palestine (Grimal 1992, 216-219). Egypt's excessive economic might, robust diplomacy, and well-placed garrisons throughout Syro-Palestine proved Mitanni incapable of seriously challenging Egyptian unipolarity (Cook 1924, 299-301). This was more thoroughly confirmed by Mitanni's acceptance of an alliance with Egypt (Van de Mieroop 2004, 147), thus assuming sub-system positioning, through which Egypt allowed parts of northern Syria to Mitanni, while maintaining control over strategic cities and ports (Bryce 1998, 155-159; Grimal 1992, 219). Mitanni's reversal from being a revisionist state to one that supported the status quo may also be attributed to the threat it received from Hatti, since the latter demonstrated possible system-wide aspirations, and a potential challenge to Egyptian unipolarity, by overwhelming Anatolian sub-system hegemons Arzawa and Assuwa, while also heading south and dominating Kizzuwatna, Aleppo, and posing a direct threat to Mitanni (Bryan 2000, 250-255; Bryce 1998, 135-148).

The possible transition of the system, in the 1390's, from unipolarity to Hatti-Egypt bipolarity was hindered by the former's inability to thoroughly consolidate power in Anatolia, as attacks from a revived Arzawa and the nomadic Kaska from the north forced Hatti to stop its system-wide ambitions and return to regional consolidation. By the 1350's, Egyptian unipolarity was supplemented by the presence of several, albeit bandwagoning, powerful sub-system hegemons: Mitanni (tributary); Babylon (tributary); Assyria (had broken off from Mitanni suzerainty and become a tributary to Egypt); Elam (non-aligned in eastern periphery); and a resurgent Hatti (revisionist).



Map 5.4



*1345 BC – 1290 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

Hatti's direct challenge to Egyptian unipolarity structurally altered the Near East-Middle Eastern System, as powerful sub-system hegemon, capitalizing on the relative weakening of Egypt, sought positioning at the system-wide level, and curtailed tributary or bandwagoning behavior. Hatti's invasion of Mitanni, Egypt's close ally and tributary in the region, was followed by absorption of Kizzuwatna, conquest of Aleppo and Kadesh, and the establishment of vassal relations with Ugarit, Byblos, and Amurru (Bryce 1998, 170-190; Van de Mieroop 2004, 147-148). Hatti's complete dominance of

northern Syria was solidified as Carchemish and Amki were removed from the Egyptian camp and placed under the former's suzerainty. This was followed by the destruction of sub-system hegemon Arzawa in western Anatolia, and subsequent Hatti hegemony over the regions of Anatolia and northern Levant (Hogarth 1924, 263-265). The demotion of Mitanni to Hatti vassal introduced a new system-wide actor into the system: Assyria. A once Mitanni vassal, and sub-system hegemon, Assyria positioned itself at the system-wide level, demanding recognition from Hatti (even temporarily encroaching on its sphere of influence) and Egypt, and challenging Babylon for dominance of upper Mesopotamia (Campbell 1924, 234-237; Gadd 1975, 28-30). Babylon, in turn, assumed system-wide status by forming an alliance with Hatti, while balancing its relationship with Egypt (not as a tributary, but as equals), only to proceed to a protracted war with Assyria to the north (Gadd 1975, 28-33).

In the meantime, Elam attained system-wide status by establishing equal relations with all the other system-wide hegemonies, relying more on its economic and diplomatic successes rather than on military expansionism (Potts 1999, 209-230; Hinz 1973, 112-119). Within these developments, Egypt's inability to placate Hatti ambitions gave way to structural consequences in which powerful sub-system tributaries transitioned from status quo preservation to revisionist behavior, as Babylon, Elam, and Assyria assumed system-wide hegemonic status, joining Hatti and Egypt in a five pole multipolar structure.

#### *1290 BC – 1210 BC Transition from Multipolar to Tripolar Structure*

Two major developments during this period transformed the previous multipolar structure into a tripolar power configuration: Assyria's defeat of Babylon and Elam's

unexplained retreat (Wiseman 1975, 340-346; Labat 1975, 379-384) from the system-wide level (Munn-Rankin 1975, 288-290). Assyria undertook an intense expansionist policy during this period, thoroughly defeating Babylon, thus reducing it to sub-system status, and extending its presence into the northern hills of the Zagros Mountains. Much of former Mitanni territory east of the Euphrates was also annexed by Assyria, along with expansion into northern Syria at the expense of Hatti (Van de Mieroop 2004, 171), only to be followed by Assyrian expansion all the way to the Uruarti-Nairi regions in the Armenian Plateau, thus covering much of middle and upper Mesopotamia, northeastern and east Anatolia, and northern Syria (Munn-Rankin 1975, 280-292).

Egypt attempted to reclaim its lost sphere of influence in north Syria by challenging Hatti's gains during the previous epoch, retrieving Tyre, Byblos, Amurru, and Ugarit back to its sphere of influence (Bryce 1998, 255-263). The result was a massive reaction by Hatti in the famous Battle of Kadesh, as close victory against Egypt symbolically left much of Syria under Hatti sphere of influence, while much of Palestine managed to establish independence from Egypt (Grimal 1992, 251-256). The recognition of Hatti's pyrrhic victory, coupled with the exhaustion of both sides, gave way to what would become a long-lasting peace treaty between the two system-wide hegemon in 1259, as both sides recognized each other's spheres of influence, sought to preserve the status quo, and agreed to mutual assistance in cases of war or internal rebellion (Hornung 1999, 110-112; Bryce 1998, 308-312). By the end of the century, the tripolar structure of a much weakened Egypt, a disintegrating Hatti, and an internally decaying Assyria, was supplemented by much weaker sub-system hegemon in the forms of Babylon and Elam, along with rising number of independent small actors in much of Syro-Palestine.

*1210 BC – 1120 BC Transition from Tripolar to Nonplar Structure*

During this period, the “entire system collapsed” (Van de Mierop 2004, 158), with two general factors explaining these developments: the inflow of the Sea Peoples and the internal decay of previous system-wide actors. The initial collapse begins with Hatti, as it disintegrating into an inchoate constellation of various actors dispersed across much of Anatolia. The causes of the upheavals throughout most of Anatolia remain unclear, but three general explanations prevail: famine, political disintegration, and the migration of the non-sedentary Sea Peoples from the west (primarily from the areas of the Balkans and north east Asia Minor) giving way to much fragmentation and destructive violence (Barnett 1975, 363-366). Concomitantly, the collapse of the Hittite empire reduced a very large portion of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into an indeterminate sub-structure of highly diffused power configurations.

The consequence of such developments upon the rest of the system was profound: the power structure over Syria collapsed, leading to the formation of several independent city-states, many of which, in turn, would also be destroyed by the inflow of the Sea Peoples (Barnett 1975, 366-370). In Assyria, internal revolt greatly weakened and reduced the former system-wide hegemon to a mere regional actor, leading to its defeat, and further contraction, at the hands of a similarly weak Babylon (Wiseman 1975, 444-451). Similarly, Babylon remained a minor regional actor, with its own internal problems, along with much conflict with neighbors Assyria and Elam, the latter which, itself, had been reduced to sub-system status (although the historical evidence remains unclear as to why) (Hornung 1999, 120-126). Egypt also faced extensive internal turmoil, ranging from issues of succession to rebellion, the case of the latter being prevalent in Palestine.

Rising independent actors Israel, Ashkelon, and Gezer, for example, challenged Egyptian hegemony over the region, as did the new Philistines (Hornung 1999, 118-119), while raiding parties out of Libya greatly weakened Egypt's initial capacity for system-wide positioning, only to be supplemented by the incursion of the Sea Peoples on the borders of Egypt (Grimal 1992, 268-271).

Gauged from the macropolitical level, the power constellations of the system during this period may be summed up as followed. First, internal turmoil and regional disintegration forced the previous system-wide hegemon to divert inwardly, thus shirking away from system-wide positioning. Second, the inflow of the Sea Peoples from the west exasperated these complications by reifying the already unstable and weak predisposition of the power actors on the Mediterranean coast, while at the same time leading to the destruction of such important centers of power as Alasiya, Arzawa, Hatti, Cyprus, Ugarit, Tyre, and Amurru (Bryce 1992, 377-381). Third, the consequence of these events transitioned the system into a highly diffused power constellation: Anatolia and northern Syria remained thoroughly disintegrated, as new centers of power were formed by neo-Hittite, Syro-Hittite (Albright 1975, 526-529), and Kaska peoples: Melitene, Gurgum, Hamath, Commagene, Tabal, and Carchemish (Bryce 1998, 382-388); Palestine possessed multitude of disintegrated regional actors and settling Sea Peoples, who, led by the Philistines, established five centers of power: Ashkelon, Ashdod, Edron, Gath, and Gaza (Cook 1924b, 376-380; Barnett 1975, 371-377); southern Syria displayed similarity with Palestine, as the new-settling Phoenicians established such centers of power as Tyre-Sidon, Arvad, and Byblos-Berytus (Albright 1975, 511-526); much of Mesopotamia, cut off from the Mediterranean coast, displayed weakened

regional actors barely sustaining territorial integrity, as Assyria, Babylon, and Elam engaged in internecine warfare (Van de Mieroop 2004, 183-185; Wiseman 1975, 454-457); and a struggling Egypt seeking to both sustain its internal structure due to problems of succession, as well as dealing with the incursion of the Libyans and the Sea Peoples. With no coherent structure of hierarchy in the system, and lacking any system-wide actors to gauge relative power or system-wide positioning, the Near East-Middle Eastern System, during this period of the invasion of the Sea Peoples, underwent extensive diffusion of power, both at the sub-system and system-wide level, thus designating the polar structure of this period as one of nonpolarity.

#### *1120 BC – 1050 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

The ascendancy of Assyria to system-wide hegemonic status transitioned the nonpolar structure of the previous epoch to a unipolar power constellation. Two major events offer explanatory strength to this development. First, the inter-regional conflict between Babylon and Elam led to the disintegration of both actors, which was, in turn, coupled by the presence of the Arameans (from north Syria, possibly of the Sea Peoples) moving into Babylonia (Albright 1975, 31-33). Thus, the collapse of Kassite Babylon, due to Assyrian, but especially Elam pressure, resulted in temporary revival of local Babylonian leaders, who, in turn, sacked and destroyed Elam itself as a regional power (Wiseman 1975, 443-446). In this context, mutual destruction between the two regional actors opened up much of lower Mesopotamia and western Iran to Assyria (Van de Mieroop 2004, 176-177). Second, the remaining power structuration of the system, specifically at the sub-system levels, remained largely unchanged from the previous nonpolar period. Syro-Palestine, with its multitude of independent city-states, functioned

specifically at the sub-system level, primarily engaging in trade and commerce. The situation remained similar in Anatolia as well, with its multitude of independent centers of power politically operating primarily at the regional level, with no single actor, or set of actors, seeking regional consolidation or positioning at the system-wide level. The developments in Egypt indicated its continued decline, as internal instability, raids by external tribes, and loss of its sphere of influence in Palestine (even in the Sinai) reduced Egypt to the level of a weak sub-system actor (Grimal 1992, 288-312), soon to be followed by the splitting of Egypt into Lower and Upper. In totality, then, during the previous nonpolar period, the extensive diffusion of power continued to sustain itself, regionally, unto the subsequent unipolar period, as evident within Syro-Palestine and Anatolia, and complemented by a chronically weak Egypt, thus leaving the system ripe for a unipolar dominance by Assyria.

Soon after 1120 BC, Assyria revived its irredentist aspirations, undertaking unprecedented conquest of the entire central and eastern portion of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, beginning up north from the Nairi-Urartu Tigris regions around Lake Van to Babylon and Elam in the south east, and all the way to the Mediterranean coast in the west, battling such newcomers as the Arameans and the Mushku/I (Barnett 1975b, 420-426). Concurrently, expansion into Lebanon led the acceptance of Arvad, Byblos, and Sidon as vassals (Hornung 1999, 122-127). The extensive trade and commercial wealth of the Phoenician states remained important sources of income for Assyria's tributary relations with the coastal city-states. This was juxtaposed by Assyria's policy of plunder and massacre up north, primarily against the Nairi-Urartu cities. Expansion into

southern Mesopotamia was also one of pillage and destruction, forcing Babylon to accept Assyrian suzerainty, especially in the face of continued Aramean incursions.

Structurally, then, the power configuration of the system during this period is defined by a single system-wide hegemon, with the bottom of the power hierarchy made up of important regional actors and rising sub-system hegemons functioning within a relatively diffused power structure: Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Babylon (under local dynasties), Philistine Confederation in Palestine, Carchemish Confederation in north Syria, Tyre-Sidon in central Levant, the Nairi Confederation around Lake Van, and powerful political units in the Cappadocia region of Anatolia (Mushku/i, Hurrians, Kaska, Luwians, etc.).

#### *1050 BC – 940 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

Around 1055 BC Assyria experienced a civil war that reduced its system-wide behavior to the sub-system level, fragmenting the extensive gains it had made during the previous epoch, and thus re-altering the Near East-Middle Eastern System into a nonpolar structure (Wiseman 1975, pp. 466-469). The Assyrian empire was reduced to its heartland, having lost control of most of northern Syria and large parts of Mesopotamia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 172). Consequently, the power configurations of the system assumed the diffused power structure as having been present prior to Assyrian unipolar ascendancy. Namely, most of the sub-system actors and aspiring regional hegemons had not fully consolidated power, and as such, there remained no system-wide actor(s) after Assyria's decay, but rather a continuation of multitude of centers of power for almost every region in the system. Much of Anatolia maintained a diffused power structure with the Neo-Hittite city-states in eastern and southern Anatolia, along with the quasi-nomadic



Mushku/i, Kaska, and Arameans operating in western and central Anatolia, with the Arameans pouring into upper Mesopotamia, and central Anatolia witnessing the presence of the Phrygians (Katzenstein 1973, 74-77).

Northern Syria continued with its set of commerce-rich city states, primarily in the form of Tyre-Sidon, Damascus, and the Carchemish confederation, soon to be dominated by the Arameans (Aubet 2001, 29-35). Palestine witnessed the regional struggle between Philistine and Israel for sub-system hegemony (Ehrlich 1996, 23-25), while further south and west of the Sinai, Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt competed for regional dominance. Assyria sustained itself as the sub-system hegemon in upper Mesopotamia, while having to deal with the Nairi-Urartu confederation up north; and this was complemented by Babylon's positioning as sub-system hegemon in lower Mesopotamia, only having to deal with the presence of the invading Arameans and internal instability (Wiseman 1975, 470-473).

The system during this nonpolar period had approximately nine centers of power (Assyria, Babylonia, Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Israel, Philistine, Tyre-Sidon, Neo-Hittite city-states, inchoate Anatolia, and the presence of powerful peoples such as the Kaska, Mushku/i, Phrygians, and the Arameans, who would soon dominate much of northern Syria) with no single actor(s) possessing enough relative power to assume system-wide status. The diffusion of power, then, while not extensive, was nonetheless dispersed through the various regions, with sets of regional actors continuing the process of consolidation. On first consideration, some might suggest that the system during this period be classified as multipolar, since several observable centers of power are present. This assumption is refuted for three reasons. First, categorically, the system continuously

and consistently exceeds the 7-actor threshold in the set criteria of polar designation, thus qualifying the structure of the system as nonpolar. Second, the observable centers of power remained functional primarily at the regional level, and as such, none of the regional power actor(s) functioned at the system-wide level. And third, balancing and counter-balancing, and any possible treatment of relative power capabilities, was fundamentally limited to the sub-system level, making considerations of multipolarity incoherent at the structural, system-wide level. By 950 BC, however, a united Egypt, a powerful Tyre-Sidon, and a resurgent Assyria would restructure the Near East-Middle Eastern System.

*940 BC – 880 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Tripolar Structure*

The unification of Upper and Lower Egypt by 940 BC allowed Egypt to reposition itself as a system-wide hegemon, extending its sphere of influence to Palestine, thus exercising suzerainty over the south-western section of the system (Myśliwiec 2000, 23-45). Tyre-Sidon became the most powerful political actor in the Levant, primarily due to its powerful navy and excessive wealth by virtue of its ever-present dominance of the sea routes in the Red Sea and the Phoenician coast of the Mediterranean (Katzenstein 1973, 116-128). Assyria also reasserted itself as a system-wide hegemon, re-establishing dominance of Mesopotamia, reducing Babylon to the level of sub-system actor, while also turning up north to check the growing power of Urartu (Grayson 1982, 246-251; Brinkman 1982, 301-303). This was further supplemented by a westward expansion, primarily fighting the Arameans (Aram-Damascus) for control of northern Syria. Much of Anatolia remained similar to the previous epoch, as rising regional actors, especially Phrygia, slowly attempted to consolidate power, while Neo-Hittite centers of power such

as Carchemish and Malatiya worked hard to resist Aramean, Assyrian, and Urartu pressure (Van de Mieroop 2004, 206-207). This tripolar power configuration, then, was defined by the presence of Assyria, Tyre-Sidon, and Egypt as system-wide hegemons, with Israel, Babylon, Aram-Damascus, Charchemish, Malatiya, and Urartu as sub-system hegemons.

#### *880 BC – 830 BC Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure*

By 880 BC Assyria once again unleashed its expansionist policies, undertaking an impressive dominance of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, and transforming its structure from tripolarity to unipolarity. An initial incursion south reified Assyria's dominance of lower Mesopotamia, followed by tribute collection and economic-military control of Babylon. An excursion north targeted sub-system hegemon Urartu, subjugating the later into its sphere of influence, and demanding tribute (Smith 1925, 32-34). This was soon followed by an expedition west, conquering much of Lebanon and north Syria, including Carchemish, Tyre-Sidon, Byblos, Arvad, and Bit Adini (Grayson 1982, 254-267). In 853, at the battle of Qarqar, Egypt, Ammom, Byblos, Cilicia, Israel, and Aram-Damascus fought as a coalition against Assyria, temporarily halting the latter's expansion into southern Syro-Palestine (Smith 1925b, 21-23). The coalition, however, soon dissolved, and Assyria devastated Aram-Damascus, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, Cilicia, and Byblos, only to follow up by demanding tributes and reducing much of the Mediterranean coast (with the exception of Damascus and Phoenicia) to vassalage (Grimal 1992, 324-328). In sum, Assyria expanded its preponderance of the system from its northern border with the Urartu Kingdom around the south of Lake Van to all of upper Mesopotamia; down south to Babylonia; north-west all the way to Cilicia, southern Anatolia, and

northern Syria; and westward to large chunks of the Mediterranean coast (Van de Mierop 2004, 226).

Assyria's unmatched dominance of the system transformed the previous tripolar power constellations into a unipolar structure, with a single system-wide hegemon, set of relatively powerful sub-system hegemons in the form of Urartu, Egypt, and Damascus, and multitude of weaker sub-system actors such as Babylon, Sealand, Israel, Cilicia, Carchemish, and Tyre-Sidon. Various other political units were reduced to vassalages. Assyria's economic reliance on tributary states necessitated excessive military concentration to extract and punish actors who at times obstructed the flow of goods into Assyria (such as cloth and dye from Phoenicia, or horses from the Zagros Mountains, etc.), while its awareness of possible revisionist sub-system hegemons led Assyria to constantly attack and limit such actors within its regional scope, hence making certain that its unipolar status would remain unchallenged.

#### *830 BC – 745 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

Precipitous expansion does not merely give way to overextension, but also to an inability to organize and institutionalize such gains in a timely fashion. As such, in the face of internal discord, ephemeral and precipitous overextension immediately results in precipitous disintegration. Assyria's nearly 50 years of unipolarity came to end in such a fashion, as a dynastic civil war produced three general outcomes: vassal states stopped paying tributes, local autonomy became reified after the decay of centralized power, and, Assyria went from being the system-wide hegemon to one of many sub-system actors. The diffusion of power during this nonpolar period remains somewhat unique: between

the previous unipole and the set of weaker sub-system vassals, the system also possessed a set up powerful regional sub-system hegemons.

Assyria's decline, however, did not lead to one of the revisionist sub-system hegemons assuming system-wide status. Rather, the result was the opposite: Egypt underwent internal conflict, once again splitting into various political units; Damascus remained one of many active players in northern Syria, but lacking the ability to be a regional powerhouse; and Urartu, while perhaps the most powerful of the sub-system hegemons after the fall of Assyria, failed to expand past its regional boundaries. For these reasons, the possibility of system-wide power concentration sustaining itself within a specific hierarchy was negated through the extensive diffusion of power throughout the entire system. The result was a highly complex development of a very high number of political actors and centers of power, only to be accompanied by the presence of new actors in the east.

In the north of the system, Urartu maintained sub-system hegemonic status, only to have Assyria to its south maintaining, albeit weakly, regional control of upper Mesopotamia (Sayce 1925, 173-177). Southern Mesopotamia was further diffused by retaining three centers of power: Babylon, the Chaldeans, and Sealand. At the eastern periphery of the system, a resurgent Elam rose at the southern tip of the Zagros Mountains, while to the west of the mountains the presence of the Persians was observed, only to be accompanied by the growing power of the Medes in north-central Zagros. North Syria remained as complicated as before, with the fusion of the previous Neo-Hittite city-states being absorbed by the new Aramean city-states, ranging from Aram-Damascus to Bit-Adini to Arpad (Hogarth 1925, 158-164). Anatolia continued its

inchoate power structure, with Cilicia initially falling to Assyria and then to Urartu (Smith 1925, 53-55), while central and western Anatolia remained in the process of power consolidation by Phrygia and soon Lydia.

The power structure of the Levant and Palestine were distributed between Israel, the city-states of Philistine, and Tyre-Sidon (Van de Mierop 2004, 226, 234). The centers of power in Egypt were perhaps the most numerous in its history, as approximately five political units, during this period, defined the power hierarchy of this region: Leontopolis of Lower Egypt, Sais of Lower Egypt, Tanis-Bubastis centered on Thebes, Kingdom of Kush (south of Thebes, modern day Sudan), and Upper Egypt (Grimal 1992, 328-335). Collectively, for nearly 80 years, the diffused nonpolar structure of the system sustained itself, as neither of the sub-system actors managed to position and function at the system-wide level. To the contrary, possible revisionist sub-system actors remained at the regional level, while potential sub-system hegemony further remained at the sub-regional level. The cases of Urartu, Babylon, and Assyria attest to the former, while much of Syro-Palestine and Egypt attest to the latter.


#### *745 BC – 620 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

By the end of the previous nonpolar period, Assyria had laid the groundwork to restructure the system by re-establishing its irredentist aspirations and transitioning the Near East-Middle Eastern System to a unipolar structure. The continued inability of sub-system actors to attain system-wide status played in Assyria's favor, since its ascendancy to unipolar preponderance was absent of any direct challenges or counter-balancing by any other actor in the system. Assyria's first act was to reconquer much of Babylonia, thus incorporating lower Mesopotamia back into its sphere of influence (Hallo and

Simpson 1998, 128-131). Seeking to further solidify suzerainty over the south, Assyria targeted the nascent states in the Zagros Mountains, reducing them to tributary vassals and establishing provinces at the eastern periphery of the system. This would eventually be followed by an invasion of Elam (Smith 1925c, 67-68) and contact with Media, demonstrating a clear desire to dominate the entire eastern periphery of the system.

Having placated the south and the east, Assyria immediately turned its attention north toward aggressive Urartu, which had expanded all the way to northern Syria and might have challenged Assyrian unipolarity if the latter had not so quickly sought to weaken its northern enemy. Assyria defeated Urartu and its ally Arpad, further weakening the former as sub-system hegemon, and thoroughly conquering the latter (Sayce 1925, 179), thus removing it as a sub-system actor and reducing it to an Assyrian province (Barnett 1982, 348-351). This was followed by expansion to the west, reducing most of the powerful Syro-Palestinian actors to tributary status: Cilicia, Carchemish, Hamath, Byblos, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, and Damascus. Philistine city-states, especially Gaza, Gezer, Ashdod, and Ashkelon did not comply, only to be crushed and annexed. This was followed by the annexation of Israel and Damascus as Assyrian provinces (Katzenstein 1973, 210-219). A newly unified Egypt made an attempt at polarization to possibly counter-balance Assyrian expansion, bringing into its camp Hamath, Ekron, Gaza, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, and Judah, only to be thoroughly defeated by the unipole (Thompson 1925, 210-212). Similarly, a few years later, Urartu, Phrygia, and Carchemish formed an alliance to limit Assyria's western expansion, only to be

Map 5.5



crushed, with Carchemish being annexed as an Assyrian province (Barnett 1982, 351-353). This process of temporary and ill-fated revolts, followed by massive Assyrian military response and annexation, along with mass deportations and resettling of conquered people, continued throughout much of this unipolar period (Van de Mieroop 2004, 235-236). Having attacked and thoroughly defeated all possible revisionist subsystem actors, Assyria accounted for the preservation of the unipolar structure by maintaining an aggressive militaristic policy, only to be supplemented through the extraction of material resources via tributaries and vassals. The approximate 130 years of Assyrian preponderance of the system, however, would soon be challenged by the rising power of a new actor from the east, the Medes, and a rejuvenated Babylon.



### *620 BC – 540 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

Around the 620's BC the political confusion in Assyria had allowed Babylon (at times referred to as "Neo-Babylon") to reassert itself as a powerful sub-system hegemon, with designs to challenge Assyrian unipolarity. By 615 BC, Babylon challenged Assyria by attacking vassals of the latter in Mesopotamia, and even directly attacking a much perplexed Assyria (Thompson 1925, 212-214). At the same time, the Medes, covering central Zagros and heading east all the way to Elam (Assyria's destruction of Elam had allowed Media to assume sub-system dominance of the region), had created a rather powerful military state. A joint Babylonian-Median alliance, with assistance from the semi-nomadic Scythians (having recently defeated Phrygia) from the north Caucasus (Minns 1925, 192-195), gave way to a direct invasion of Assyria, the sacking of its capital Nineveh, an extensive destruction of the Assyrian heartland, and the end of Assyria as both system-wide hegemon and political unit (Smith 1925d, 126-131). The entirety of Assyrian lands became split between the two allies, as Media assumed control of the north, dominating Urartu, and heading westward toward Anatolia. The Median state reached all the way to central Anatolia, creating a treaty with the sub-system hegemon Lidya in western Anatolia (Mellink 1991, 649), and exercising preponderance from there to western Iran and the entire eastern periphery to all of northern Mesopotamia and much of the Armenian Highlands of southern Transcaucasia (Young 1988,16-23). Media's expansive growth made its southern neighbor quite uneasy, leading Babylon to build the Median wall from the Tigris to the Euphrates as a barrier to the geo-political boundaries of each pole. Babylon assumed dominion over the remaining territories of Assyria to the south and the west, primarily Syro-Palestine. Initially challenged by Egypt,

since much of Palestine remained the latter's historic sphere of influence, Babylon defeated the Egyptians near Carchemish in 605 BC, annexed Cilicia, followed by Tyre-Sidon, and then headed south to assume control of the entire region, destroying Jerusalem and Judah, and entertaining an invasion of Egypt itself (Thompson 1925, 212-216). The latter objective did not materialize, but Babylonian dominance of the entire Mediterranean coast remained unchallenged, with Babylonian system-wide hegemonic presence ranging from all of Mesopotamia (with exception of northern portions under Median rule) to the entire western coast of Syro-Palestine. At the macro level, during this period, the Near East-Middle Eastern System observed a power configuration of two system-wide hegemons, and several introspective or rising sub-system hegemons (Egypt, Lydia, Scythians, Cimmerians, Persians, etc), with the rest of the political units in the system reduced to vassalage or tributary actors.

*540 BC – 330 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure,*

*Absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System by the Mediterranean System*

The bipolar structure of the previous period was immediately transformed into a unipolar configuration upon the overthrow of the Median state by the Persians, with the latter assuming power in the Median territories, and swiftly challenging Babylon for singular dominance of the system. By 550 BC the Persians had taken over all areas under Median rule (Van de Mieroop 2004, 257), and proceeded further west to conquer Lydia by 547 BC (Gray 1926, 9), assuming dominance of all of Anatolia, even the Ionian Greek city-states on the Aegean coast of. In 539 BC Persia directly invaded Babylon from the Zagros, defeating the latter, overtaking the capital (Thompson 1925, 223-225), and assuming dominance of not only the entirety of the Babylonian empire, but of the Near

East-Middle Eastern System. This was further reified by the conquest of Egypt in 525 BC, extending all the way to Libya and extracting tribute from Nubia in the periphery (Gray 1926, 19-20). From these developments, Persian system-wide hegemony managed to cover the entire system, from the very edges of the eastern periphery (even infringing into the Indic System) to all of Mesopotamia, Transcaucasia, Egypt, Syro-Palestine, and Anatolia. Persia's dominance of the Near East-Middle Eastern System was absolute and unchallenged, with highly weakened sub-system actors functioning at the regional level, and no possible revisionist actors either posing a counter-balance or a threat to Persian unipolarity.

Persian unipolarity, however, would come to an end not from any developments within the Near East-Middle Eastern System, but rather as a result of Persia's endeavor to infringe into the Mediterranean World Political System in its desire to conquer Greece. Around 499 BC the Ionian Greek city-states on the Aegean coast of Anatolia rebelled against Persian suzerainty (Murray 1988, 480-490), not challenging the latter's unipolar status, but merely seeking local independence. Within five years the unipole managed to subdue and repress the rebellion, but the political developments of these events were three-fold. First, inter-system interactions between the Near East-Middle Eastern System and the Mediterranean System became more prevalent, as the Ionian Greeks had clear allegiance to their mother city-states as opposed to Persia. Second, Persia did not only hold the Ionian Greeks responsible for the uprising, but the Greek mainland itself, thus developing plans to infringe into the Mediterranean System. Third, Persian incursion into the Mediterranean System, while ephemeral, allowed for the development of a precedent, which would lead to Persia's destruction at the hands of Macedonia. Within this context,

Persia's incursion into the Mediterranean System did not lead to the absorption of one system by the other, since the Persians were repelled in a set of military confrontations, from Marathon, to Salamis, to Plateau (Munro 1926, 239-251; Hammond 1988, 502-517). As such, this incursion resulted neither in Persia's absorption into the Mediterranean System, nor Persia's dominance of Greece and hence the absorption of the Mediterranean System into the Near East-Middle Eastern System. Due to the temporary nature of the inter-system incursions, inter-system absorption did not take place, and for this reason, a Greece-Persian bipolar system would seem analytically incoherent. Concomitantly, Persia continued its unipolar dominance within the Near East-Middle Eastern System until the invasion of the Macedonian Greeks, which not only ended Persian unipolarity, but also ended the Near East-Middle Eastern System, absorbing it into the wider Mediterranean System.

### Analysis

The cumulative dataset from the polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern System produce 23 observational data points, with the set modalities of polar structures being coded within the criteria set forth. Categorical demarcations between polar structuration and subsequent transitions allow for four general schemes of evaluations: the general distributive nature of polar structure during given periods; transitional patterns for polar structures after unipolar epochs; system's analysis concerning the duration and longevity of polar periods; and a probabilistic treatment of possible structural outcomes after unipolar transitions. Three general remarks may be suggested at the outset: the system demonstrates a consistent tendency in its fluctuation between


unipolar and nonpolar configurations; tripolarity appears to be unfit as a transitional structural outcome after unipolarity; and multipolar periods demonstrate the least stable structures with respect to durability.

The distribution of polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern System shows unipolarity to be the most occurring power configuration, as 9 out of the 23 polar structures in the dataset are coded as unipolar. In relation to other world political system, the Near East-Middle Eastern System lacks a coherent balance between the various modes of polar periods. This is consistently demonstrated by the presence of 6 nonpolar periods as the second most common polar structure in the system, followed by tripolarity and multipolarity, with each structure, respectively, having three polar periods. The least common polar structure remains bipolarity, with only two bipolar periods. Collectively, in the approximate 2300 years of the Near East-Middle Eastern System investigated in this chapter, 39% of the time the system's structure assumed a unipolar configuration, followed by nonpolarity with approximately 26% of the time, tripolarity and multipolarity with 13% each, and bipolarity with only 9% of time.

The analytical considerations are rather unique and quite telling of the Near East-Middle Eastern System: for nearly 65% of the time, the system was either defined by unipolar concentration of power, or, at the very end of the continuum, defined by nonpolar diffusion of power. In this sense, during the vast majority of the system's history, the structure of the system shifted from one extreme to the next, with the remaining power configurations, collectively, only assuming 35% of the system. The system, then, displayed a tendency to either be fit for dominance by a single pole, or the absence of any system-wide poles. In this sense, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar

structures remained somewhat unfit to the structural power hierarchies of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. As Figure 5.1 shows, 15 out of the 23 polar periods were

FIGURE 5.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN SYSTEM




either defined by singular concentration of power, or nonpolar diffusion of power. As such, even if tripolarity and multipolarity are collapsed together into a single category, both collectively merely match the number of nonpolar epochs in the system, thus suggesting that the Near East-Middle Eastern System did not seem fit for power distribution between a set of equal powers: the system experienced either singular or no power hierarchy at all for the majority of its existence

The durability of polar periods allows for important knowledge-accumulation with respect to system's maintenance. Specifically, the longer a polar structure

demonstrates longevity, the better a system demonstrates fittidness vis-à-vis structural power hierarchies with respect to concentration or diffusion. This assessment is also related to considerations of systemic stability: the duration of polar structures suggests the extent to which the conditions of the system are favorable to specific power configurations. The distribution of polar periods, for example, shows the number of polar periods with respect to structural coding. This, however, does not measure the longevity of the given polar structures, but merely the number of occurrences. By gauging duration, numbers of occurrences are better understood in relation to the historic space that the given polar structures occupy.

Within the Near East-Middle Eastern System, the most durable polar structure, on average, is nonpolarity, with duration of approximately 126 years. The second most durable polar period is unipolarity, averaging 109 years, followed by bipolarity with 85 years, multipolarity with 62 years, and tripolarity with 60 years. At the system-wide level, then, the most durable, and systemically stable, power configuration remains nonpolarity, for it takes approximately 126 years for a nonpolar structure to transition. This tentatively suggests that diffused power constellations in the Near East-Middle Eastern System was not an exception or an outlier, but rather part of the norm, since the system, on average, was consumed for longer periods by diffused power structures than by relatively equally concentrated power structures. The almost dialectical relationship between nonpolarity and unipolarity becomes even more interesting when observing the longevity of unipolar periods lasting on average of 109 years.


FIGURE 5.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR PERIODS



As Figure 5.2 suggests, this observation is quite interesting: the system either had long periods of nonpolar structures, on average, or long periods of unipolar structures, on average. In this sense, the system demonstrated longevity either in a highly diffused or highly concentrated structure, and less stability and longevity under relatively equal distribution of powers, such as in bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar structures. In totality, as Figure 5.3 demonstrates, of the 2300 years of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, the system had a unipolar structure for 980 years and nonpolar structure for 755 years. As such, for nearly 75% of the time (1,735 years), the system fluctuated from singular concentration of power to a diffused power configuration.




FIGURE 5.3 HISTORICAL SPACE OF THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN SYSTEM



Post-unipolar patterns of structural formations provide important calculations in gauging probabilistic outcomes with respect to systemic transitions. Of the 23 data points collected in this chapter, 9 of the observations are unipolar periods, of which 8 allow for examinations of post-unipolar transitions (the final unipolar period transitioned the Near East-Middle Eastern System into its absorption by the Mediterranean System, thus excluding it as an applicable data observation with respect to post-unipolar transitions). Figure 5.4 displays the distribution of polar structures after unipolar transitions: 4 periods of nonpolarity, two periods of bipolarity, no period of tripolarity, and two periods of multipolarity. Analyzing the data probabilistically, the unipolar structure in the Near East-Middle Eastern System had a 50% chance of transitioning into a nonpolar structure,

25% probability of a bipolar structure, 25% possibility of a multipolar structure, and no probability of a tripolar structure.

FIGURE 5.4 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONFIGURATIONS



The probabilistic patterns of post-unipolar power configurations appear consistent with much of the results observed in the dataset. Since the system displays a consistent tendency to fluctuate from highly centralized to highly diffused power structures, nonpolarity remains the most probable structural transition after unipolarity in this system. Of the six polar periods that are defined as nonpolar, four of these resulted after unipolar transitions, indicating a systemic connection between concentrated power structures that last for approximately 109 years and subsequent diffused power structures that sustain system's stability for approximately 126 years. The remaining probabilistic

outcomes suggest a relatively more concentrated power structure in the form of a bipolar configuration, or an equally probable outcome of a relatively more diffused power structure in the form of a multipolar configuration.

Possible explanations of these developments are four-fold. First, since the Near East-Middle Eastern System displayed, consistently, high numbers of centers of power, even at regional and sub-regional/local levels, these centers of power were able to re-establish their capabilities after long periods of unipolar dominance. Second, unipolar system-wide hegemon displayed a very conscious effort to immediately confront and weaken possible revisionist states, hence allowing for long periods of unipolarity, while at the same time leaving no actors strong enough to fill in the power vacuum after unipolar epochs. Third, shirking remained an observable reality in the Near East-Middle Eastern System, as many sub-system hegemon, even with the potential capacity to expand and exercise relative power, chose to remain at the regional level, thus refraining from functioning at the system-wide level. And four, since bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar structures have much shorter lifespans, this suggests that many of these arrangements were relatively unstable and difficult to maintain, and as such, the probability of these power configurations forming after unipolarity remained relatively low. That is, the presence of two or more revisionist sub-system hegemon ready to assume system-wide positioning after the decline of a unipole remained a low probability in the Near East-Middle Eastern System. For these general reasons, unipolarity primarily gave way to a diffused power constellation with high numbers of regional and sub-regional centers of power.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE INDIC WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Indic System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region of the Indian subcontinent, or the region of South Asia. Territorially, the Indic World Political System covers much of South Asia, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system obscures the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system.<sup>11</sup> System's classification of the Indic System, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political interactions and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that function within the structural perimeters of this world political system.

The historiographical method of political history will begin analysis of polar periods within the Indic System from 500 BC. Prior to this period, the Indic System is defined by the Verdic Age, with approximately 16 large rising proto-states (Gokhale 1959; Bongard-Levin 1985b) that are in transitional and developmental stages, at times

---

<sup>11</sup> For example, Afghanistan tends to be on the periphery, yet is part of the system, yet Persia, while bordered on the periphery, is considered to be part of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. In cases where the Persian Empire encroaches into the Indic System and becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, it is then considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, we anticipate, from time to time, external actors encroaching into the system. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one system into another. The case of Alexander the Great's conquest of Bactria (modern Afghanistan and Pakistan) is a case in point. This was a temporary infringement by the Macedonians, and did not lead to the incorporation of the Indic System into any other world political system. As such, for the sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain's colonization of India and its absorption into the Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the system and remain part of it as one of the given poles (Mughal system-wide hegemonic status is a case in point).

merging, at times being conquered (Schwartzberg 1992), and as such, not displaying coherent units of political analysis (Bognard-Levin 1985a) with respect to gauging the power configurations of the system. Thus, it is from the period after 500 BC that the political history of the region is substantiated and allows for the coding of polar structures, as historical records of power politics are established (Basu 1969) and coherent political units formed (103), hence allowing for the structuration of polar systems based on the “struggle...for hegemony” (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 56). Each polar epoch will be specified chronologically, indicating the timespan of the polar period and the specific power configurations that define the system. Specific analytical attention will be provided for system’s configurations coded as unipolar periods, and the subsequent system at the end of unipolarity. In the chronological narrative, in order not to have consistent gaps, the polar structures of non-unipolar periods are also coded.

#### *550 BC – 450 BC Unipolar Structure*

In the mid-6<sup>th</sup> century BC much of the northwest of South Asia fell under the dominance of the Achaemenids, beginning with the periphery in the distant western frontiers and expanding to the east with their conquest of Gandhara and Kaisa (north of Kabul), followed by Sogdiana and an extension all the way to the south of the Hindu Kush mountains (Bognard-Levin 1985b, p. 62; Keay 2000, 58). The Achaemenids reinforced their system-wide hegemonic status by annexing Zaranka, Seistan, and Haraubathish, allowing them to further expand west by joining Artakona and Phrada, south by taking Arachotus, east by consuming Gazaca and Kapisi, and north by conquering Bactria (Schwartzberg 1992, 166). In sum, Persian dominion in the system stretched from Herat and Gandhara through the north-western Punjab, along with the whole of Sind and

a large portion of Punjab east of the Indus (Gokhale 1959 30). From 550 BC – 500 BC the Achaemenids remained the single system-wide hegemon in the Indic System, levying taxes on Indian provinces, receiving tributes from neighboring states, and recruiting soldiers for their ever-expanding military (Chattopadhyaya 1950). During this period, Achaemenid unipolarity was neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any other political unit within the Indic System.

During Achaemenid unipolarity, various sub-system hegemonic states were formed in the system, as several of the initial 16 *mahajanapadas* (large developing states) from the Vedic period were beginning to merge or envelop each other within their specific regions, allowing given dominant regional actors to position themselves as sub-system hegemons. Along the Ganga Plain, Kashi had established regional dominance in the center, Kosala in the north, Magadha and Anga in the east, the Vajji confederacy north of Magadha, and the Avanti in the west (Mishra 1962; Singh 1967).

Concomitantly, the Indic System in the entire northwest, and much of the greater northern region was dominated by the Achaemenids, while to the south, in the greater Ganga region of central South Asia, various regional actors were competing for sub-system dominance. Within this context, three general observations are prevalent. First, Achaemenid dominance of the system is unmatched, for its preponderance is reified through both its unmatched strength and the absence of any system-wide challengers. Second, due to the emerging stages that the regional power players are going through, none of the sub-system actors have either attained sub-system hegemony, or the ability to challenge and counter-balance Achaemenid supremacy. Third, for these reasons, the

power configuration of the system is one of unipolarity, with a single system-wide hegemon and numerous rising sub-system hegemons.

By 500/late-400 BC two major developments took place that reshaped the internal power dynamics of the system, but provided no changes to the mode of polarity. First, as the Achaemenids solidified their complete dominance of Iran, their attention shifted West (Olmstead 1948), and away from the Indic System, as the beginning stages of the Greco-Persian conflict removed the Achaemenids as actors in the Indic System, marginalizing them to the periphery of the subcontinent. This was confirmed by the Ionian Revolts in Asia Minor in 499 BC, as the Achaemenids become preoccupied primarily with the Near East-Middle Eastern System and its intrusion into the Mediterranean System, and thus exiting as hegemonic actors from the Indic System. Second, the sub-system hegemons were positioning themselves as potential system-wide actors through warfare and inter-hegemonic competition (Rapson 1922; Ghoshal 1966), and with the exit of the Persians, the vacuum was filled by the ascendancy of sub-system actor(s) to system-wide hegemonic status.

Kosala, Magadha, Kashi, Vasta, Vajji Confederacy, and Avanti were the “major regional powers...in the late 6<sup>th</sup> century BC” (Schwartzberg 1992, 166-167), and under the unipolar system, each not only sought to establish sub-system dominance, but also position itself as a potential system-wide challenger. Within the specific sub-system of the central Ganga Plain, inter-regional hegemonic competition between Kosala and Kashi for sub-system preponderance first led to Kashi’s initial triumph over Kosala, giving way to Kashi expansion all the way to Anga in the south and Magadha in the east. Kashi dominance, however, was short-lived, as Kosala reasserted its power base, re-establishing


lost territories and eventually conquering Kashi itself (Majumdar et al 1967). Kosala's absorption of Kashi not only gave way to Kosala sub-system hegemony, but also elevation to the status of system-wide hegemon by 500 BC, for the only system-wide hegemon, the Achaemenids, exited the Indic System, thus making Kosala, by default, the only system-wide hegemon. Due to these developments, while the system-wide hegemon changed from one political actor to another, the structure of the system did not, for the power configuration of the system still remained unipolar. Kosala unipolarity was supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons, and until these sub-system hegemons rose to the position of system-wide hegemons by way of challenging and counter-balancing Kosala, the Indic System remained unipolar until 450 BC.

During these 50 years of Kosala unipolarity, Magadha established itself as a sub-system hegemon in the east and laid the foundations to challenge Kosala dominance at the system-wide level, while the Avanti undertook similar steps through its establishment of sub-system hegemony in the south. Thus, while Kosala attained unipolar status, the regional hegemonic actors were in the process of consolidating their own drive for system-wide status. Magadha undertook the conquest of Anga, a regional power, allowing for control of its rich forest and mineral resources, as well as trade routes to the sea (Gokhale 1959, 30). Magadha's expansion to the north and west, however, during this period, was barred by the other sub-system hegemon, the Vajji Confederacy (Trautmann 2010, 55). As such, Magadha's drive for system-wide status was at this point hampered through the counter-balancing capabilities of the Vajji Confederacy at the sub-system level. The Avanti, on the other hand, had demonstrated dominance over the southern region by proceeding to absorb Vasta, one of the other major regional powers



(Raychaudhuri 1972, 180), and thus practice hegemony over the entire Malwa Plateau. Concomitantly, Avanti had positioned itself with the Vajji Confederacy to counter-balance Magadha's expansionist endeavors (Raychaudhuri 1972, 213.), and as such, a three-way sub-system inter-hegemonic balance of power was playing out within the wider context of attaining system-wide hegemonic status. As a result of this sub-system hegemonic competition, Kosala's unipolar status remained unchallenged, since none of the sub-system actors, at this stage, had established the necessary ability to become system-wide actors.

Map 6.1



### *450 BC – 400 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 450 BC Kosala's status as unipole was challenged by Magadha, having risen to the status of system-wide hegemon. Magadha's system-wide hegemonic status was confirmed after its eventual conquest of Vajji, the main sub-system hegemon that had managed to previously counter-balance Magadha's aspirations for expansion and complete domination of the entire eastern region. This was augmented by Magadha's defeat of Malla, another regional actor and ally of Vajji. After attaining dominance of the eastern region, Magadha challenged Kosala for system-wide dominance (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 58-59), seeking to expand north and establish hegemony over the entire north-east. In the pursuing system-wide hegemonic struggle, Magadha defeated Kosala (Keay 2000, 65-67), thus establishing itself as a pole in the structure of the Indic System. Magadha's hegemony over the north-east was countered by the rise of Avanti as a system-wide hegemon with its preponderance of the southwest, and expansion into the northwest (Bognard-Levin 1985a, 104-105).

After having consolidated power over the Malwa Plateau, along with its conquest of Vasta, Avanti had expanded north by challenging Gandhara and gaining control over the material resources of the western seaboard and the Southern Route. The polar structure of the system, then, had transitioned from Kosala unipolarity to the bipolarity of Magadha and Avanti. As system-wide hegemon, Magadha controlled the entire eastern and north-eastern region of the system, while Avanti, as the other system hegemon, controlled the entire southern and western region, and large portions of the north-western region. The subsequent power configurations within this epoch demonstrate structural transition from unipolarity to bipolarity, with two new system-wide hegemons formulating


the mode of polarity, while the previous system-wide hegemon being conquered and absorbed.

*400 BC – 180 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The bipolar system proved to be unstable by the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, as Avanti's system-wide hegemonic status, through its dominance of the southwest and the northwest, brought about hegemonic war with the other system-wide hegemon, Magadha. The confrontation between the two poles was predicated on two factors. First, economically, both sought control over the Ganges river system, which was a crucial trade route (Bognard-Levin 1985a, 104-105). Second, politically, while each sought to restructure the system into a unipolar one, there was also the underlying issue of Avanti's consistent threat to Magadha by allying itself with Magadha's enemies as a method of counter-balancing (Schwartzberg 1992). In the ensuing conflict, after a set of prolonged wars, Magadha managed to defeat and conquer Avanti (Iyer and Chawla 1983), thus altering the previous bipolar system into a unipolar one. It established itself "into a leading force in the whole of North India and had become the centre of a unified Indian state" (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 60). From around 400 BC, upon its victory over Avanti, Magadha maintained its system-wide hegemonic status over the Indic System, only to be disturbed from 327-325 BC by the conquest/intrusion of Macedonia, under Alexander the Great (Snyder 1966), into the Indic System.

Magadha's positioning as the single pole is best expressed through three developments. First, due to the fact that it had initially established sub-system hegemony prior to becoming a system-wide hegemon, it had absolutely no challengers within its

Map 6.2



sphere of influence. Second, since Avanti had done the same, the southwest and the northwest also did not present any regional challengers to the given poles. And thirdly, since polarization does not seem to have been present during this bipolar system, Magadha's dominance became complete, since neither alliance obligations nor the allies of its defeated foe served to constrain Magadha's behavior as the single system-wide hegemon. In this sense, unlike the unipolar structure under the Achaemenids, or the Kosalans, the power constellation under Magadha's initial 70 years of unipolarity was one of a single system-wide hegemon with no sub-system hegemons or rising (revisionist) actors.


Alexander the Great's incursion into the Indic System produced two general results. First, by destroying the Persian Empire, the Achaemenids were completely

removed from the periphery (Bury 1963, 798-313), and replaced with what would become in the future Indo-Greek political units (Prakash 1964). Second, it temporarily shook the unipolar structure, as it posed a severe threat to the existing system-wide hegemon. The exit of the Greeks, however, allowed for the strengthening and continuation of the unipolar system, as Magadha, under the Mauryan Dynasty, became the Mauryan Empire (Bognard-Levin 1985b; Dikshitar 1953), and reified the power constellation of the system. The Greek invasion contributed to Mauryan system-wide hegemonic preponderance by destroying all potential sub-system actors in the entire north and northwest, hence alleviating any challenges to the unipolar structure (Schwartzberg 1992, 169). At the same time, Mauryan system-wide dominance allowed it to deal with Alexander's successor in the north-western periphery, the Seleucids, on equal terms. Portions of the north-west, including Gedrosia, Arachosia, Paropamisadae, and Aria (most of modern-day Afghanistan), were conceded by the Seleucids to the Mauryans (Rostovtsev 1959; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987), along with accepting non-involvement (Grainger 1990) in the Indic System (hence remaining in the periphery and operating primarily in the Near East-Middle Eastern System). This was reciprocated by Mauryan allocation of military assistance (primarily war elephants) to the Seleucids and solidification of amicable terms (Trautmann 2010, 56-58). The result was the continuous absence of the Seleucids in the political affairs of the Indic System, with Mauryan friendly recognition of Seleucid presence in the periphery.

Having solidified its dominance in north India, with its western boundaries all the way to the Indus River in the west, and parts of Punjab to the north (as part of its peace treaty with the Seleucids), the Mauryans turned to the south of the subcontinent,

conquering Andhra and after a vicious war, taking Kalinga around 260 BC (Eggermont 1956; Raychaudhuri 1972). As such, with the exception of the lands at the very south of the subcontinent, and the lands north-west of the Punjab region (the periphery ruled by the Seleucids), the Mauryans of Magadha dominated the unipolar structure as the unchallenged system-wide hegemon of the Indic System.

Map 6.3



*180 BC – 140 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*


Around 255 BC the Indo-Greek state of Bactria revolted against the Seleucids, breaking off and formulating its own military-imperialist state (Sidky 2000, 135-147). This signaled the decline of the Seleucids and the birth of separate Indo-Greek political units with aspirations of becoming major actors (Schwartzberg 1992, 172-173) in the

Indic System. By 200 BC the Indo-Greek Bactrians had become sub-system hegemon, with aspirations of challenging the Mauryans for system-wide hegemonic status. The power constellations of the system were beginning to change. This was complemented by the incremental decay of Mauryan unipolarity, primarily contributed to the rise of regionalism and secessionist behavior within Maurya's sphere of influence (Raychaudhuri 1972, 346-351). Bactrian aggression gave way to Indo-Greek conquest of Mauryan territory west of the Indus River around 180 BC (Bongard-Levin 1985a, 137-139), along with dominance in most of the northwest, including the Punjab region (Keay 2000, 104-108). This paved the way for Bactrian ascendance as system-wide hegemon, for not only had they established sub-system hegemony, but had also begun to counter-balance and directly challenge Mauryan system-wide dominance.

A bipolar system was formulated as Bactrian system-wide hegemonic status was supplemented by the overthrow of the Mauryan dynasty by the Sunga dynasty of Magadha. As Magadha continuously lost territories to new independent political units formed out of the old Mauryan Empire, the Indo-Greeks managed to conquer Paropamisadae and Gandhara by 190 BC (Tarn 1951). Magadha, thus, faced a two-front war: one against rebelling provinces, and one against the Indo-Greeks (Pusalker et al 2001). The potential for Indo-Greek unipolarity, however, was hampered by the split within Bactria itself, for in 170 BC the Indo-Greek kingdom was split into two: the eastern Indo-Greek kingdom based out of Gandhara, and the western Indo-Greek kingdom based out of Bactria (Trautmann 2010, 63-34; Sidky 2000, 189-227). While both Indo-Greek kingdoms kept gaining at the expense of the declining unipole, especially Gandhara's expansion south of the Hindu Kush by 155 BC, Gandhara, as a

rising sub-system hegemon, began to counter-balance Bactria, which not only ended Indo-Greek unity, but allowed Magadha some breathing room. The power configurations of this period, then, are defined by two system-wide hegemons, and a rising sub-system hegemon.

Map 6.4





### *140 BC – 120BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The inter-hegemonic conflict between the two system-wide hegemonies in the bipolar structure, Bactria and Gandhara (Tarn 1951), thoroughly weakened both actors to such an extent that by 130 BC, exhaustion, coupled with Gandhara's inability to defeat a weakened Bactria, ended the Indo-Greek dominion in the Indic System (Narain 1957). The decline of both actors from system-wide status to sub-system actors allowed Magadha, under the Sunga dynasty, to reassert its system-wide hegemonic status. Structurally, then, the system transitioned from a bipolar constellation to a unipolar one, with a single system-wide hegemon and two sub-system hegemonies in the northwest.

### *120 BC – 60 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

As Magadha's system-wide hegemonic status declined, multitude of regional, sub-system actors overwhelmed the system. This was supplemented by the invasion and settling of new political units from the north. The Tukharians, Northern Sakas, and Scythians/Sakai (Shrava 1981), as a byproduct of the tribal upheavals in central Asia, migrate into the Indic System, with the Scythians overwhelming Sogdiana and its surrounding areas, the Northern Sakas conquering Gandhara and driving south, while the Tukharians engulfed and settled in Bactria (Chaudhuri 1955). The northwest was also presented with the presence of the Parthians (Isidorus 1914). The Indo-Greek sub-system hegemonies were replaced with a multitude of rising sub-system actors, ending the loose sub-system bipolarity of the north with a nonpolar structure of various Indo-Parthian political units. In the north-central region, west of the Ganga Plain, several independent republics, such as Yaudheyas and Arjunayas, were expansionist powers with irredentist objectives (Schwartzberg 1992, 174). In the Ganga Plain, with the decay of Magadhan

power, Mathura, Pancala, Kosala, and Kausambi (Sharma 1969) established themselves as independent powers, while in the southeast Kalinga established itself as a sub-system hegemon with system-wide aspirations, only to be challenged by a rising system-wide actor, the Satavahanas of Mulaka (Yazdani 1960). As such, the system, during this period, was quite chaotic and in a state of flux, without any system-wide hegemon, and a very high number of sub-system actors and minor actors trying to become sub-system actors. Each region witnessed a process of consolidation, where each rising sub-system hegemon sought to solidify power in relation to other rising regional actors. Concomitantly, this period saw a process of regional consolidation of power, with no actors being able to attain system-wide dominance, rather only driving to achieve sub-system hegemonic status.

#### *60 BC – 30 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

The continuous consolidation process during the nonpolar epoch continued in much of the region, except for the northwest, as the various political units of the Scythians, Sakas, and Parthians intermingled to form the Indo-Parthian dynasty, proceeding to conquer Arachosia, Kandahar, and Paropamisadae (Colledge 1968). While many of the other sub-system actors in the system had ambitions of system-wide status, most were still in the process of either consolidation or simply solidifying regional hegemony. As such, only the Indo-Parthians were able to elevate themselves to the status of system-wide hegemon, qualifying this given period as unipolar. By virtue of all the other actors being weak or in the process of developing, the Indo-Parthians displayed system-wide preponderance, not only dominating the Indus and the west, but also having ambitions of expanding to the Ganges region.

### 30 BC – 40 AD *Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

Indo-Parthian unipolarity was quickly challenged and thoroughly counterbalanced by the rising sub-system actors who had attained system-wide hegemonic status. This development gave way to the formulation of a multipolar system, with four sub-system hegemonies solidifying regional power and positioning themselves at the system-wide level. Seeking to display their system-wide hegemonic position, the Indo-Parthians sought expansion to the east, seeking to dominate the Ganges region. This advance, however, was blocked and counterbalanced by the Sakas of Mathura (Chattopadhyaya 1967), who had consolidated regional power and elevated themselves to system-wide status.

The ability of Mathura to challenge the Indo-Parthians, as indicative of the end of the unipolar epoch, was further reinforced by the rise of Kalinga and Mulaka. To the southeast, Kalinga had also consolidated regional power and had become a system-wide hegemon, even penetrating all the way to the northwest (Majumdar 1996). In the center-west of the subcontinent, the Satavahana of Mulaka had attained system-wide hegemonic status, not only displaying regional hegemony, but expanding all the way south and controlling vast regions of the southern portion of the subcontinent (Sircar 1939). While the Indo-Parthians were perhaps the strongest of the four system-wide hegemonies, they nonetheless failed to construct a unipolar system by virtue of their inability to demonstrate preponderance. Namely, the ability of the other powers, especially of Mathura, to counterbalance and challenge the Indo-Parthians, clearly indicates a multipolar structure.

#### *40 AD – 90 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

The Indo-Parthian dominance of the northwest was challenged by rising sub-system actor Kushanas, which not only sought to overthrow the Indo-Parthian dominance of the northern sub-system, but also conquer Indo-Parthia and attain system-wide hegemonic status. The Kushanas, who were the Tukharians of Bactria, reduced the Indo-Parthians to vassalage in the northwest (Banerji 1908), conquered Mathura in the north center, and thus rose to the status of system-wide hegemon, “ranking among the major contemporary Eurasian empires” (Szhwartzberg 1992, 174). Kushanas would soon proceed to envelop Gandhara, making Gandhara the center of their realm. Kushanas’ system-wide status was balanced by the other system-wide hegemon in the system operating in the south, the Satavahanas of Mulaka. To this end, the Indic System during this epoch was structurally bipolar, with the more powerful Gandhara being counterbalanced by the relatively less powerful, yet nonetheless a system-wide hegemon, Mulaka. Western Sakas, in the Deccan, was in the process of conquering Avanti (Sen 1999, 185-189), hence solidifying power as a sub-system hegemon with aspirations of challenging Mulaka.

#### *90 AD – 150 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The Kushanas of Gandhara extended their empire from Central Asia all the way to northeast India (Trautmann 2010, 65), demonstrating preponderance of the system that was neither matched nor challenged by any other actor. Mulaka was reduced to sub-system status as it became challenged by Western Sakas (Basham 1953), engaging in continuous conflict that weakened both actors and alleviated their ability to position themselves as system-wide hegemon in relation to Gandhara. In this sense, the decline

of Mulaka from system-wide to sub-system actor, and the inability of Western Sakas to overwhelm Mulaka and position at the system-wide level, left Gandhara as the only system-wide hegemon in the Indic System, hence qualifying this period as unipolar.

*150 AD – 200 AD Transition from Unipolar to Tripolar Structure*

After reasserting themselves in Surashtra (Narain and Prasad, 1998), Western Sakas not only established sub-system hegemony, but also rose to the status of system-wide hegemon by reconquering lost territories to Mulaka and proceeding even to challenge and overtake parts of the southern territories held by Gandhara. Similarly, Mulaka had also attained system-wide hegemonic status by serving as a bulwark against Kushana penetration to the south (Puri 1965), thus counter-balancing Gandhara at the system-wide level. These developments clearly indicate the relative decline of Gandhara and the rise of Mulaka and Surashtra, thus transitioning the power configurations from a unipolar structure dominated by Gandhara to a tripolar structure that includes Mulaka and Surashtra.

*200 AD – 310 AD Transition from Tripolar to Nonpolar Structure*

By the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century Kushana power was in serious decline, as the Indo-Scythian Murundas in the northeast, the Kuninda republic in the northwest, the Maghas in the lower Ganga, and the Yaudheyas republic all broke away from Kushanas and proclaimed independence (Sen 1999, 201-202). Mathura was lost to the Nagas by mid-century, while the rising power of the Guptas destroyed all Kushana power in the Ganga Plain (Fleet 1888). The Mulaka empire of the Satavahanas also underwent a similar disintegration (175), with various newly-formed republics dominating the Rajasthan region, while multitude of kingdoms sprang up on the Ganga Plain, only to be

complimented by Satavahana feudatories proclaiming independence in the south. With this continuous disintegration, the mode of polarity in the Indic System underwent a massive transition, as centers of political power were dispersed to a wide-ranging number of units and actors. Sub-system actors during this period were numerous within every region of the system, thus eliminating any considerations of rising sub-system hegemonies at this point. The entire system underwent a methodical process of re-consolidation, as rising regional actors slowly developed sub-system status, only to attain sub-system hegemony toward the end of the century, and thus seek system-wide hegemonic status at the start of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century. In this sense, with approximately 10-15 centers of power throughout the system during this period, the structure had transitioned to one of nonpolarity.

#### *310 AD – 350 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Bipolar Structure*

More than hundred years of nonpolarity in the Indic World Political System allowed for the formulation of new regional actors that by the start of the 4<sup>th</sup> century had consolidated sub-system hegemony, with two political units managing to establish system-wide hegemonic status: the Vakatakas and the Guptas (Altekar 1946). This bipolar structure was augmented by the presence of several sub-system actors: the Hunas in the northwest, the Naga in the north, the Sakas in the Deccan, and the Pallavas, after the disintegration of the Satavahanas, in the south. The Vakatakas attained system-wide hegemonic status by conquering Kalinga in the central-eastern coast of the subcontinent and stretching all the way to the Deccan region (Banarjea 1957, 280-286), overwhelming the sub-system hegemonies the Sakas of Avanti and the Western Sakas of Surastra (Keay 2000, 130-131). Vakatakas' system-wide status was counter-balanced by the rise of the

Guptas. As system-wide hegemon that dominated the Ganga Plain, Gupta suzerainty stretched all the way from Kosala in the west to Kajangala in the east, and virtually assumed the territorial size of the first Magadha empire (Banjeri 1933). The inter-hegemonic conflict between Vakatakas and Gupta brought about the polarization of allies into the two distinct bipolar structures: Vakatakas incorporated the sub-system Nagas and several other allies into its pole, while Gupta brought Vaisali and Pataliputra into its camp. The post-nonpolar structure, thus, observed the formation of a bipolar system that was characterized by a process of polarization.

#### *350 AD – 460 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The Guptas restructured the Indic System into a unipolar power configuration, establishing system-wide hegemony that was neither challenged nor counter-balanced for over a century. Guptas initially conquered northern India, including Vakatakas ally the Nagas, proceeding to overtake Malwa, Mathura, and reach all the way to Kalinga. Heading south, the Guptas established suzerainty over Kosala and Kanci, the Pallava capital. In the Ganga Plain, the long-standing republics, beginning with Madrakas and ending with the powerful Yaudheyas, were brought under Gupta control. In the north, the Kushanas were overwhelmed, while in the Deccan, the Saka kingdoms of Avanti and Surastra were conquered (Agrawal 1989, 103-132). Gupta's conquest of much of the Indian sub-continent, complete with the strategic subjugation of Vakatakas allies, along with reducing Vakataka as "virtual appendage of the Guptas" (Schwartzerg 1992, 179), solidified the unipolar structuration of this specific epoch. Gupta system-wide hegemony was defined by satellite rulers and tributaries that obeyed imperial edicts, and the concession of all political units within Gupta sphere of influence of its hegemonic status.

Sub-system hegemonies that remained outside of Gupta dominance, but were unable to counterbalance the only superpower, were the Hunas in the northwest, elements of the Sassanians of Persia on the periphery (around Gandhara), and the Pallava in the very south of the subcontinent.

*460 AD – 510 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By mid-5<sup>th</sup> century, Gupta power declined, primarily due to internal revolts, the rise of sub-systems hegemonies seeking system-wide status, and the reassertion of Vakatakas as a challenger counter-balancing Gupta at the system-wide level. While dealing with internal instability, the Guptas faced a direct challenge from the Hunas, the sub-system hegemon in the north. Gupta's ability to repel Hunas' ascendance reaffirmed Gupta system-wide hegemonic status and temporarily blocked the Hunas from attaining system-wide positioning (Sharma 1989, 195-196). But these developments allowed for Vakatakas to reestablish itself as a system-wide counterbalance to the Guptas (Majumdar and Altekar 1986), hence restructuring the power constellations of the system to one of bipolarity by establishing control in the west and coastal northeast of the subcontinent (from Avanti all the way to Kosala and Kalinga).

*510 AD – 540 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

While the previous period was bipolar, both system-wide hegemonies were in severe decline, allowing Hunas to elevate itself from sub-system hegemon to the most dominant power in the system. The Hunas were a Central Asian people that migrated from the north and became absorbed by the Indic System. The Hunas had split into two distinct political units after being initially repelled by the Guptas: the Hephthalites in the northern most part of the system, and the Southern Hunas, who drove south to absorb



Kushana and finally defeat Gupta (Biswar 1971). The defeat of Gupta, and the disintegration of Vakatakas by 510 AD, made Southern Hunas the only system-wide hegemon in the system. Southern Hunas suzerainty stretched from the vast areas of Aghanistan to Gandhara, Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and central India, while keeping the defeated Gupta as tributaries (Banjeri 1962, 57-62). The disintegration of both the Gutpas and Vakatakas, however, would produce a very high number of independent, ambitious political units that the temporary superpower, the Southern Hunas, will have difficulty exercising preponderance over.

#### *540 AD – 580 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The disintegration of both Gupta and Vakataka allowed for the temporary rise of Southern Hunas unipolarity in the previous epoch, yet the consequences of the previous political fragmentations had begun to restructure the power hierarchy of the system. Within this framework, intense, multipartite struggles both at the regional and system-wide level, as consequence of the numerously new independent political actors that had broken away from Gupta and Vakataka dominance, sprung up, forming scores of centers of inchoate power through the Indic System. These developments were accompanied by the disintegration of Hunas system-wide positioning as a result of defeats handed down by Iranian Sassanid and Central Asian Turkish incursions into the northwest of the system. The outcome was a plethora of regional actors seeking consolidation, sub-system dominance, and potential system-wide aspirations. Both the Hephthalite Hunas and the Southern Hunas were reduced to regional actors, while Sind, along with the Gonandas in Kashmir, offered regional challenge to both Huna states. Maukharis began its slow rise in the north-central region (Pires 1934), only to be challenged by Magadha (Sinha 1977,

110-115), another rising sub-system actor. Pushyabhuti, a rising sub-system actor in the north-center began positioning itself for regional dominance (Singh 2008, 562-563), while Karnata in the west, Kadambas in the south (Mishra 1979), and Kamarupa in the northeast began consolidating regional hegemony. The very south of the system saw continuous conflicts for regional preponderance, as Pallavas and Pandyas counterbalanced the ambitions of Kongu, while a little west, Kadambas was consistently pressured by the rise of Karnata (Schwartzberg 1992, 179-181). In this sense, with the absence of any system-wide hegemon, the previous regions under hegemonic control first began the consolidation process of formulating sub-system hegemon, thus primarily acting at the regional level. Consequently, the mode of polarity transitioned to a nonpolar configuration, as several actors, within every sub-system itself, sought regional dominance, while at the larger system-wide level, no hegemon were present.

#### *580 AD – 650 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure*

The consolidation of sub-systems by regional powers brought about the transition from a nonpolar structure to a multipolar one, as given sub-system hegemon sought expansion and system-wide status. Maukharis, based out of Kanyakubja, attained mastery of the entire Gangetic Plain, overwhelming Magdha, Kosala, and reaching far east into Gauda (Sinha 1977, 112-118). Pusyabhuti, having defeated the Hunas of Punjab, along with the rulers of Gandhara, Sindhu, the Gurjaras of Rajasthan, and the kings of Malava and Lata, allied itself with Maukharis, but once Maukharis fell (Maukharis system-wide presence was relatively short, as Sasanka, one of its feudatories, rebelled and thoroughly weakened Maukharis, hence its need for alliance with the rising Pusyabhuti), Pusyabhuti, moving into Kanyakubja, became the most powerful system-wide hegemon in the

multipolar structure (Devahuti 1998; Goyal 2006). In the Deccan region, Kalacuris, based out of Anupa, attained system-wide hegemonic status by conquering Maharashtra, Lata, the Malwa Plateau, and the Maitrakas, while counter-balancing and serving as a buffer against Puryabhuti incursion into central India. To the south the Calukyas, based out of Karnata, established sub-system hegemony over the entire south of the sub-continent and proceeded northwest, overtaking much of the lower Deccan and “rivaling the dominant Puryabhutis of the North” (Schwartzberg 1992, 181). Calukyan dominance in the south, however, was challenged by Pallavas, a sub-system actor that had positioned itself at the system-wide level, counter-balancing Calukya in the south while Calukya sought expansion in the north (Gopalan 1928, xxxii). This multipolar structure, then, saw a balance of power between Puryabhuti in the north; Kalacuris in the upper Deccan and central India; Calukyan ascendancy from the south and its challenge to Kalacuris over central India; Pallavas challenge to Calukyan power in the south; and Calukyan and Kalacuris counter-balance to Puryabhuti aspirations south of the Gangetic Plain.

#### *650 AD – 700 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 650 AD the Puryabhuti empire had disintegrated, Kalacuris was reduced to a sub-system actor by Calukyas, while the Calukyas itself had been reduced to sub-system status by its defeat at the hands of Pallavas. Inter-hegemonic rivalry had either destroyed previous system-wide hegemonies, or reduced surviving ones to regional actors. The outcome was a structural transition from multipolarity to bipolarity: Pallavas attained system-wide hegemonic status by virtue of its defeat of Calukyas and its dominance over the south and southwest of the system (Sen 1988, 446-449), while Cacas, based out of

Sind, attained dominance of the northwest, defeating the rising sub-system hegemon Karkotas out of Kashmir and overtaking remnants of the Pusyabhutis.

*700 AD – 740 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

Arab incursion into the periphery of the Indic System had a detrimental effect on powerful actors in the northwest, especially Cacas, as the Caliphate's continuous attacks on Sind greatly weakened Cacas, forcing Cacas to reposition as a sub-system hegemon (346-352). The other system-wide hegemon in the previous epoch, Pallavas, was consistently challenged by rising sub-system actors in the south, only to be defeated by a new system-wide hegemon: the revived Calukyans of Karnata (359-363). Calukyans ascendance to unipolar preponderance was a direct byproduct of the geopolitical consequences of the Arab incursions, including Calukyans' ability to repel the Arabs, along with the inter-regional conflicts in the south that reduced the only existing system-wide hegemon from the previous period to sub-system status. As such, with the northwest in disarray (including the Ganga Plain) and the south destabilized, the Calukyans consolidated power throughout much of south-central India, stretching from the western coast of the subcontinent all the way to the eastern coast. This unipolar structure was supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemonies: Cacas, Karkotas, Kalacuris, Magadha, and Pallavas.

*740 AD – 780 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The inability of the Arabs to consolidate power in the Indic System was followed by the rise of several new sub-system actors seeking to fill the power vacuum in the given sub-systems. The decay of Calukyans further contributed to this development, bringing about a nonpolar structure, as the system remained absent of any political units that

exercised power system-wide, only having a high number of regional actors seeking to solidify local hegemony, hence suggesting a very high number of power centers throughout the system. The Varmans of Kanyakubja were challenged by the rising sub-system hegemon Karkotas for dominance of the northwest; the Calukyas, who had been slowly weakened by the rise of sub-system hegemons, especially Rastrakutas, were reduced to sub-system status; from the Bengal region, Pala established itself as a sub-system hegemon, only to be challenged by Gurjara-Pratiharas, another regional power; and in the south, the conflict between Andhra, Pallavas, and Pandya continued and intensified. These constellations of mid-ranged powers were supplemented by the presence of Kalacuris, Magadha, Kamarupa, and Maitrakas. In sum, following the unipolar system, the power structure during this epoch became inchoate and highly diffused, thus indicating a nonpolar structure.

*780 AD – 880 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

Rastrakutas establishes itself as the singular system-wide hegemon during this period, conquering the entire Deccan region, proceeding south and submitting Pallavas, and then turning north and defeating Gurjara-Pratiharas. While Rastrakutas' military victories up north did not translate into sustained political gain, all of southern and central India, from its western to eastern coast remains under Rastrakutas dominance (Altekar 1967). Only the north of the Indic System did not fall under Rastrakutas dominance, where two sub-system wide hegemons, the Gurjara-Pratiharas and Pala, remained in constant struggle over regional hegemony. Thus, Rastrakutas dominated approximately 60% of the Indic System, while the remaining 40%, which comprised the Ganga Plain of the north and the territories to the northwest, where the battle ground of the two powerful

sub-system actors. If it was not for the inter-sub-system hegemonic conflict between Gurjara-Pratiharas and Pala, where each political unit may have attained its own sphere of influence and cease weakening each other, in relation to Rastrakutas, this period may have been designated as tripolar. However, the consistent utilization of resources at the regional level, as opposed to counter-balancing Rastrakutas at the system-wide level, along with Rastrakutas initial defeat of Gurjara-Pratiharas and Palas' continued reliance on Rastrakutas (412-417), suggests the unipolar structure of this period. Namely, while both sub-system hegemonies had the potential to counterbalance the much more powerful Rastrakutas, and thus suggest a tripolar structure, this potential was marginalized by Rastrakutas' ability to intervene intermittently in the conflict, further destabilizing the northern region, and thus further reifying its system-wide hegemonic status.

#### *880 AD – 920 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

Rastrakutas unipolarity came to end when Gurjara-Pratiharas finally conquered Palas in 883 AD, thus transitioning the Indic System into a bipolar structure. Rastrakutas maintained its status as the most powerful political actor in the system, but the elevation of Gurjara-Pratiharas from regional actor to system-wide hegemon brought about a counter-balance to Rastrakutas preponderance. Gurjara-Pratiharas' domain extended from coast to coast, from the Eastern to the Western Sea, and from the Himalayas to the Vindhyas, thus establishing domination from the upper-Deccan and throughout the Ganga Plain (Puri 1986). Gurjara-Pratiharas consistently succeeded in deterring Rastrakuta ambitions of conquest to the north (Allan et al 1943, 132-136), but Rastrakuta power allowed for its continued dominance of Southern Gujarat and Kalachuris, much to the

dismay of Gurjara-Pratiharas. The bipolar system was best illustrated by the number of times Avanti changed hands, as each actor used this strategic city to counter-balance and demarcate the limits of each polar power. A state of perhaps equal power was Hindu Sahis, based out of Gandhara in the northwest after the Arab conquests (Mishra 1972). However, since Hindu Sahis, regardless of its power, remained a regional actor, thus refraining from involvement at the system-wide level, it primarily positioned itself as a sub-system hegemon.

*920 AD – 970 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The Rastrakutas re-transitioned the Indic System into its previous unipolar structure by embarking on several major expansions: Gurjara-Pratiharas was invaded, thus being thoroughly weakened, while expansion to the south reaffirmed Rastrakuta hegemony in its defeat of Cola, Pandya, and Simhala. Rastrakutas hegemonic status was neither balanced nor seriously challenged by any actors at the system-wide level, thus creating a unipolar structure. The decline of Gurjara-Pratiharas, however, created important developments that soon brought about the end of Rastrakuta preponderance. The Candellas of Bundelkhand, the Paramaras, the Calyukas, and the Palas all re-established themselves as independent, regional actors and rising sub-system hegemons (Sen 1988, 307-321). In the northwest the Hindu Sahis came into regional conflict with Ghazni, another Arabic kingdom absorbed into the periphery of the Indic System.

*970 AD – 1120 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

By 970 AD, Rastrakuta faced severe challenges by the given sub-system hegemons seeking system-wide status, and this was reified in the defeat of Rastrakuta by the Paramaras of Malwa (Bhatia 1970). Paramaras thus established itself as a system-

wide hegemon, seeking suzerainty over Kalacuris, Cahamanas, Caulukyias, and Guhilas (Seth 1978, 47-66). Hindu Sahis became a system-wide hegemon upon entering in conflict with Ghazni, as both system-wide actors sought control of the northwest and expansion in the Indic System. Ghazni remained the most powerful hegemon in the system, conquering lands from the Kabul region, to Punjab, to all the way across central India (Bosworth 1963). Paramaras and Hindu Sahis stubbornly sought to counter-balance Ghazni growth, thus limiting Ghazni from altering the system into a unipolar structure. By 1021 Ghazni achieved its destruction of Hindu Sahi, thus removing a hegemonic actor from the system, only to be confronted by the elevation of Candellas to system-wide status, which not only staved off Ghazni encroachment into the Ganga Plain, but expanded the former's dominance of the region as well (Dikshit 1977, 55-65). In the south the rise of Cola added a fourth actor to the multipolar system, as the new system-wide hegemon subjugated Ganga, conquered Simhala, and pressed gains in Bengal at the expense of Palas. In a matter of a decade, Kalacuris overwhelmed Candellas and replaced it as one of the poles in the system (101), while the Calukyias of Karnata established system-wide hegemonic status by proceeding to challenge and thoroughly weaken Cola, Palas, Candellas, and Paramaras (Schwartzberg 1992, 188-90). In this sense, at any given time during this period, between four and five system-wide hegemons challenged and counter-balanced each other, while rising sub-system hegemons overwhelmed the declining ones, and thus reinforcing the continuous multipolar system.

#### *1120 AD – 1175 AD Transition from Multipolar to Tripolar Structure*

Around 1120, due to Seljuk ascendancy in Central Asia and Middle East, Ghazni was overwhelmed and thus removed as hegemonic actor from the Indic System. The



structure thus transitioned into a tripolar configuration through the rise of Caulukyas from Gujarat (not to be confused with Calukyas of Karnata), the Cahamanas based out of Rajputana (Singh 1964), and the Gahadavalas of Kashi (Niyogi 1959). Caulukyas proceeded to annex Paramaras and counter-balance and even weaken Cahamanas, while establishing supremacy in western India, including much of Rajasthan. Cahamanas had established dominance in parts of the Ganga Plain and in the Punjab, while constantly at conflict with Caulukyas, initially Candellas, and then Gahadavalas (Dikshit 1977, 129-138). Gahadavalas became system-wide hegemon by weakening Palas, annexing Magadha, and counter-balancing the ambitions of Cahamanas.


*1175 AD – 1220 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure*

The decline of Ghazni, along with the inflow of Muslims into the Indic System's periphery, gave way to the incursion of Turkish dynasties into the system. The most powerful political unit to replace the Ghazni in the north were the Ghurids, who conquered southern Punjab, Sind, Ghaznavid, the Cahamanas, Kashi, parts of Bengal, and Malwa, thus extending their power from the periphery in the northwest all the way across the Gangetic Plain (Nizami 1998, 180-186). In a period of 15 years, the Ghurid established itself as the most powerful system-wide hegemon in the Indic System by defeating the previous system-wide hegemon, or reducing them to sub-system status, thus alleviating any challenges or counter-balance to its preponderance. The power constellation during this period is thus coded as unipolarity, with a single unchallenged hegemon, and various sub-system actors, including the rising sub-system hegemon Yadavas (Schwartzberg 1992, 196-197).

*1220 AD – 1295 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

The Ghurids, seeking consolidation of power into the Middle East, exited the Indic System, yet conferred on the Mamluks political autonomy to control the conquered domains (Jackson 1999, 3-21), thus creating the Sultanate of Delhi (the Ghurid dynasty, however, soon collapsed, with the northwestern states gaining independence, but this had no effect on Delhi's system-wide status) (Chaurasia 2002; Aziz 1987; Habib and Nizami 1970). Delhi's position, however, was soon challenged by the rise of Yadavas, a new system-wide hegemon based out of Maharashtra, who managed to expand both east and south, dominating the Deccan and central India (Altekar 1960). The system had thus transitioned into a bipolar structure, with the usual motley crew of sub-system actors: Candellas, Caulakyas, Orissa, Gujarat, Paramaras, and Pandya.

Map 6.5



### *1295 AD – 1400 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

In 1290 the Mamluks were replaced by the Khalji dynasty (Day 1963), yet the Sultanate of Delhi remained a single political unit, only this time it managed to defeat the only other system-wide hegemon, Yadavas (Jackson 1999, 171-176), thus transitioning the Indic System into a unipolar structure. While Mongol groups had moved into the northern periphery of the system, and proceeded to undertake raids on Delhi territories from time to time, a coherent Mongol political unit was not formed, thus removing any systemic challenge to Delhi unipolarity. In 1320 the Tughluq dynasty replaced the Khaljis, undertaking a massive expansion that engulfed almost the entire Indic System. Ghazni, Qandahar, and Kabul were raided in the northwest to deter any future Mongol incursions, while Peshwar, Gujarat, Telingana, Malwa, Rajputana, Pandya, Maharastra, Bengal, and even the Himalayas, were all conquered (Chaurasia 2002, 47-66). With the exception of tribal areas in the northwest periphery, Kashmir, small parts of the eastern sea coast, and parts of Rajputana, the Delhi Sultanate controlled the entire Indic System. Delhi's system-wide hegemonic status remained unchallenged until the end of the century, and while its expansive size gradually limited the Sultanate's capacity to control all of its realms, as vassal states slowly broke off during Delhi's decline, no system-wide hegemon, however, rose to challenge or alter the unipolar structure.

### *1400 AD – 1550 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The incursion of Tamerlane (Amir Timur) into the Indic System, albeit temporarily, threw the power constellation of the system into inchoateness for nearly 150 years, as endless conflict between sub-system actors, rising regional hegemons, and aspiring system-wide actors transitioned the power configurations from the Delhi

Sultanate's unipolar structure to a nonpolar one. In 1398 Tamerlane launched his invasion of India, conquering most of the northwest and the Ganga Plain, thus ending the Delhi Sultanate (Ashrafyan 1998). Tamerlane's incursion, however, did not translate into any consolidations or annexations, as Tamerlane proceeded west to conquer Persia, Eurasia, and much of the Middle East, while solidifying his empire in Central Asia (Mukminova 1998). His incursion, however, left the Indic System in a state of chaos, as the decay of the unipole brought about multitude of new political actors in the northwest and north-center, while in the periphery new political units started forming that would continue incursions into the sub-content, thus contributing to its continuous nonpolarity. Kashmir, Sind, Rajputana and Punjab established themselves as competing sub-system hegemons in the northwest, soon to welcome the rising Mughals (Tamerlane's Turkic-Mongol descendents) in the periphery; Jaunpur and soon Malwa (under the new Ghurids), then a resurgent Delhi, positioned as regional powers in the north-center; Bengal, Assam, and Orissa establish sub-system hegemonic status in the northeast; while Bidar, soon to be challenged by Gujarat, then Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, competed in the West; and in the South, Vijayanagar, Andhra, and Ceylon intensely struggling for regional dominance (Schwartzberg 1992, 199-204).


Inter-regional conflict, along with cross-regional conflict between aspiring sub-system hegemons continued until 1550 AD, with no single political unit being able to attain system-wide hegemonic status. From time to time given actors temporarily succeeded in attaining sub-system hegemonic status, but this was soon challenged by new rising sub-system actors, thus limiting the capacity of such regional powers to attain system-wide positioning. Concomitantly, a continuous cycle presented itself, as new

independent actors popped up in the system, while older ones declined; conquests became ephemeral, with limited longevity of five or ten years at the most, thus reinforcing the nonpolarity of the system by virtue of intense dispersion of power, with centers of power in the system ranging from a minimum of 10 actors to a maximum of 16 actors.

*1550 AD – 1725 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

By 1525 the Mughals had established itself as sub-system hegemony in the northwest, seeking system-wide positioning by attempting to make headway into the Ganga Plain, and finally attaining after 30 years by conquering and solidifying their base of power in Delhi (Akbar 1948; Richards 2001, 9-15). The Mughals proceeded to absorb Awadh, Rajputana, Bihar, Sind, and Malwa in the north-center (Chaurasia 2002, 181-205), then turning north and subjugating Kabul, Kandahar and Kashmir (Mattoo 1988), followed by heading northeast to absorb Bengal and northern Orissa (Ray and Raya 1981), to then conquer Ahmadnagar to the west (Shyam 1966, 297-312), and finally overwhelm Bidar and Golkonda in the south (Chaurasia 2002, 275-277), reaching all the way to Arkat at the southeastern tip of the subcontinent. Mughal suzerainty, thus, extended all the way from Kabul and Kandahar in the periphery of the Northwest, all the way across the Ganga Plain in the North-center to the eastern seacoast, the entire Deccan and all of central India, and much of the southern tip of the sub-continent. Mughal system-wide hegemony remained neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any political units in the system until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, classifying this epoch as fundamentally unipolar. While incursions by Persia into the northwest periphery especially into

Map 6.6



Kandahar, created military problems for Mughal, Persia was neither an actor in the Indic System (since these incursions were inherently ephemeral), nor did they pose any threat or challenge to Mughal unipolarity. Similarly, Maratha resistance to Mughal expansion (Dighe 1944), for example, does not suggest a capacity for counter-balancing or Maratha status as system-wide challengers to Mughal hegemony (Mughal would proceed to conquer Maratha as a final outcome). To this end, the polar structure of the Indic System remained unipolar for nearly two centuries.

### *1725 AD – 1820 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

By 1725 the Mughal Empire had disintegrated, as various political units, either by breaking away from Mughal dominance, Mughal governors declaring independence, or outside powers infringing into the system, resurrected their respective states as system-wide actors. Hyderabad, Marathas, the Durranis of Afghanistan, and the British Empire became the system-wide hegemonic actors in the new multipolar structure of the Indic System. British selective incursion, through the British East India Company, had begun from 1740's, only to be supplemented by methodical British expansion and complete dominance, colonization, of the sub-continent by 1819.

During this period, however, Marathas became a system-wide hegemon by controlling Bundelkhand, Gujarat, and Malwa, raiding Rajput territories, (Gordon 1993, 132-149; Chhabra 2005, 15-27) and directly challenging and counter-balancing one of the other system-wide hegemons, Hyderabad. Hyderabad established its dominance throughout the Deccan, thus directly confronting Marathas to its north, both militarily and diplomatically (Bawa 1986). In the northwest, Afghanistan established system-wide hegemonic status by seizing Punjab and Kashmir, only to meet a challenge from Marathas over Punjab and offer Marathas a severe defeat (Schwartzberg 1992, 211-212). Afghanistan's ability to deter and weaken Marathas further balanced power through the system, as Hyderabad did not face an overly-powerful Marathas by itself. The inter-hegemonic conflict between the indigenous powers, while relatively balancing their strengths, also, relatively, weakened their capabilities in relation to the British. As such, Marathas, Hyderabad, and Afghanistan, by early 19<sup>th</sup> century, slowly began to cede

territory to the British, either through treaties or conquest, only to be enveloped by British power (Chaurasia 2004, 94-127; Chhabra 2005, 131-144).

*1820 AD – 1858 AD Transition from Indic System to Global System*

During this period, British dominance of the Indic System not only included territorial conquest and consolidation, but also administrative and political solidification of British power. In 1757 British victory at the Battle of Plassey over Bengal and its French allies had paved the way for what would become British domination of the Indian subcontinent. This dominance, however, was not immediate as took Britain some time to consolidate its economic and territorial interests. This process, at the same time, was primarily led by the British East India Company, as it both administered and controlled the given territories and trading posts under the auspices of London. Disenchantment with British East Indian Company's rule, however, gave way to the Indian Rebellion of 1857, with regions from Delhi, Maratha, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar joining the uprising, while Bengal, Madras, Punjab, and Bombay did not.

In 1858 the rebellion was suppressed, but the outcome was two-fold: the British East Indian Company was dissolved, hence ending its administrative rule; at the same time, however, the entire country and much of the sub-continent became directly administered by Britain, hence replacing the political units of the Indic System with British Raj. As such, the territories, political units, and the socio-cultural and economic structures that comprised the Indic System officially became part of the British Empire. Forthwith, this period witnessed the colonization by Britain of the Indic System, and the absorption of the Indic World Political System into the Global Political System.




## Analysis

A total of 32 data observations are collected as polar periods where the power constellations of the system are categorized according to the coding for modalities of polarity. The collected data allow for four types of analytical considerations: distribution of polar structures, transitional patterns after unipolar periods, duration of polar periods, and probabilistic considerations of polar structures after unipolar transitions. In the Indic World Political System, the most common power configuration is unipolarity, with 13 unipolar periods being observed. In relation to other modes of polarity, unipolarity tends to be the norm, as the system consistently transitions to a unipolar structure after, on average, two different polar systems. This is indicative of the Indic System's tendency to transition into configurations that display high concentrations of power.

Bipolarity remains the second most common polar structure in the system, with 8 periods, followed by nonpolarity with 5 periods, multipolarity with 4 periods, and tripolarity with 2 periods. Concomitantly, in the 2200 years of the Indic System covered in this study, unipolarity was the polar system 40 percent of the time, followed by bipolarity (25 percent), nonpolarity (15 percent), multipolarity (12 percent), and tripolarity (6 percent). Figure 6.1 charts the distribution of the polar structures, demonstrating the system's tendency to consistently transition to a unipolar structure. Multipolarity and tripolarity remain the least occurring modes of power configurations, and even if the two were combined, presupposing, for the sake of argument, that any system over two system-wide hegemonies is a multipolar system, its occurrence remains at six, lower than bipolar periods and not even half of unipolar structures.


FIGURE 6.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN INDIC SYSTEM



On average, the most durable power constellation is nonpolarity, its average duration lasting approximately 80 years. As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, unipolarity remains the second most durable polar structure, averaging 75 year of longevity, followed by multipolarity with 71 years, tripolarity with 52 years, and bipolarity with 49 years. By virtue of its durability, nonpolarity remains the most stable structure at the system's level, since it takes nearly 80 years in order for structural transition to take place. This appears to be consistent with the historical data: nonpolar periods witness the time consuming process of regional consolidation, inter-regional sub-system conflict, and then the positioning of rising sub-system hegemon at the system-wide level. In this sense, nonpolarity is structurally stable vis-à-vis system's maintenance, not in relation to conflict and war. Similarly, unipolar longevity suggests the predisposition of the Indic System as favorable to system-wide hegemonic actors, since the removal of a pole either revolves around new challenging actors, or the disintegration of the hegemon by virtue of

internal weakening or overextension. In either case, the unipolar structures average 75 years of preponderance. An interesting observation is the system's stability of a multipolar modality in comparison to bipolar structures. While bipolar configurations appear to be far more common, they at the same time are the least durable, while multipolar systems, while relatively less common, are almost as durable as unipolar periods. Systemically, then, bipolarity remains the most unstable power configuration in the Indic System.


FIGURE 6.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES



The distribution of polar structures after unipolar periods offers insight into the probabilistic nature of post-unipolar system's formation. 13 data observations allow for analytical consideration of trends after unipolarity, which suggests an almost equal distribution of polar structurations. As Figure 6.3 shows, of the 13 unipolar periods, the

system transitioned into a bipolar structure 5 times, a nonpolar structure 4 times, multipolar structure 3 times, and tripolar structure only once.

FIGURE 6.3 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONSTELLATIONS IN INDIC SYSTEM



Probabilistically, then, the unipolar structure in the Indic System had a 38% chance of transitioning into a bipolar configuration, 30% chance of diffused nonpolar structure, 23% chance of multipolar constellation, and 7% chance at tripolarity. The analytical conclusion of these observations is two-fold: 38% of the time the post-unipolar system transitions into the least stable structure, while 30% of the time the system transitions into the most stable structure. The explanations for these developments are consistent with the historical data. In instances where system-wide hegemony disintegrates internally or due to overextension, the system generally transitions into a nonpolar structure, where its longevity is sustained through the long climb that regional

actors must take in seeking to fill the vacuum left by the disintegrated, post-unipolar structure. In instances where the unipolar structure transitions into a bipolar one, this is generally the byproduct of rising or new system-wide hegemon counter-balancing and challenging the existing hegemon, in which case a sustained bipolar structure remains untenable, as either one of the poles succeed in dominating the other, or they manage to weaken each other to such an extent that new actors rise to the system-wide level, thus restructuring the power configurations.

The data allows for the rejection of any general hypotheses that contend multipolar or bipolar systems as the norm, rather suggesting the opposite: unipolarity is the most occurring polar structure in this given world political system. Likewise, the traditional disregard of scholars for considerations of nonpolar systems is also questioned by the data produced in this chapter. In the Indic System, nonpolarity was present 15% within its historic sequence, more prevalent than multipolarity or tripolarity. Interestingly, the durability of nonpolar configurations, especially after unipolar transitions, is very telling: in 5 polar periods, nonpolarity accounted for 400 years of system's maintenance, while multipolarity, with 4 polar periods, accounted for a total of 285 years of system's maintenance. The long-term presence of diffused, inchoate power constellations in a system are very important findings that have implications for our assessment of the overarching structurations of polar periods. To this end, should a post-unipolar system transition into a nonpolar structure, this period will not be a temporary epoch, but would last for a fairly long period of time without any system-wide hegemon or superpowers.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Mediterranean World Political System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that the given world political system encompasses. This fundamentally presupposes a group of political units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous with one another. Spatial-territorially, the Mediterranean System covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system. System's classification, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the ebb and flow of powerful political actors, primarily the political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that function within the region that the given system encompasses.

The Mediterranean System, territorially, includes the global region that covers the following areas. The western periphery begins with the Atlantic Coast of the Iberian Peninsula, along the Sea of Gibraltar, heading south to the northern coast of modern-day Morocco, and proceeding eastward along the North African coast all the way to Cyrene (modern day Libya), with the Egyptian periphery of Numidia serving as the eastern-most periphery of the Mediterranean System. Heading north, the system covers much of the Mediterranean all the way to Cyprus, with Cyprus serving as its easternmost periphery,

heading northwest to the island of Rhodes and the entire eastern coast of Asia Minor/Anatolia (Ionian Asia Minor) serving as the central-eastern periphery of the system. Heading westward from Ionian Asia Minor, the system covers all of the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, the mainland of Greece along with all of the accompanying islands in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea, the Italian Peninsula (with the accompanying islands of Sicily and Sardinia), and the entire south of the European continent all the way to the Iberian Peninsula.

The collection of data for polar periods within the Mediterranean System begins around approximately 2000 BC, with Aegean Greece providing the first case of unitary political actors, chronologically speaking, within the system. Evidence of political actors during the Neolithic Period within the Mediterranean System remains fundamentally limited, and for this reason, historical evidence is primarily extrapolated from the Late Bronze Period, with the Minoan Civilization serving as the initial subject of observation. In this sense, the scope of data collection undertaken in this work sharply differs from much of the scholarship undertaken by political scientists that have covered the political interactions and power configurations of ancient Mediterranean, especially of Greece: scope of research has primarily concentrated on the Archaic and Classical Periods, with extensive attention to interstate relations between city-states and the Peloponnesian War (Bederman 2001; Adcock and Mosley 1975; Kozak 2001; Kauppi 1991; Eckstein 2003; Gilpin 1981, 1988; Evera 1999; Doyle 1991; Lebow and Strauss 1991; Finley 1991; Waltz 1979; Wight 1978; and Rostovtzeff 1922). As such, the research at hand greatly expands the scope of data collection by observing the historical and archeological evidence prior to these periods, presenting findings of macropolitical developments for

approximately 1200 years of history that has been generally ignored by political scientists.

While the Mediterranean System covers the entire world region specified above, at its inception, however, it primarily covered four sub-regional civilizations of Aegean Greece: Crete, the Cycladic Islands, Helladic Civilization (Peloponnese and southern, mainland Greece), and Thessalonian Civilization (north-eastern Greece) (Wace 1923a, 174) . Until the expansion of the system into Macedonia, Thrace, eastern (Ionian) Asia Minor, Italy, southern France, and the Mediterranean coast of Spain, for approximately 900 years (2000BC–1100BC), the Mediterranean System remained limited to these four sub-regions. However, interactions with other world political systems, primarily the Middle East-Near East System, did take place primarily through trade with Egypt and the Syro-Palestinian Levant. Political interactions, however, remained almost non-existent, as system-wide actors within the Mediterranean System applied all of their attention to the Aegean, while system-wide actors in the Middle East-Near East System limited their reach to Cyprus, or, in the case of Anatolian system-wide actors, to the periphery of Ionian Asia Minor. Interstate relations between system-wide hegemonic actors of each of the respective systems did not come into political, high-level diplomatic, or military contact until the incursions of the Persian Empire into the Mediterranean System. Within this context, the two systems existed separately until the temporary incursion of the Persians during the Greco-Persian Wars, and the final absorption of the Middle East-Near East System into the Mediterranean System after Macedonia's conquest of the Persian Empire and the formation of a single world political system.



### *2000 BC – 1700 BC Bipolar Structure*

The classification of power configurations within the Mediterranean System begins around 2000 BC with the island of Crete, as the Minoan Civilization of the island represented the most politically and economically developed culture of the Aegean. Evidence of developed political entities in the system remain absent until the spread of Minoan Civilization to the Cycladic, Helladic, and Thessalonian sub-regions during the next 300 years. Within this period, then, the power configuration of the Mediterranean System is defined by the two power centers within Crete: Cnossus in the north and Phaestus in the south. While the historical evidence remains obscure as to whether these system-wide hegemonies were rivals or separate seats of power, there is conclusive evidence that the two were the “great centers of power in Crete.” No archeological evidence exists to demonstrate any challenges to the dominance of Cnossus in the north and Phaestus in the south, leading to the possible assessment that the two “may have been the Athens and Sparta of the time; and the other towns of Crete may, like most states of fifth-century Hellas, have been divided between two political alliances” (Wace 1923b, 593). The naval powers of these Cretan states also gave way to two developments: extensive trade relations with political units on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean (primarily Egypt), and the complete dominance of trade in the Aegean. Much of Aegean Greece, then, became enveloped with the culture, trade, and civilizational developments of the Minoans (Freeman 2004, 123-124).

### *1700 BC – 1550 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The complete decline of Phaestus is noted during this period, with the overthrow and destruction of much of the city, yet with no clear historical evidence as to why.

Concomitantly, the decline of Phaestus “ended with the transference of the seat of power elsewhere, probably to Cnossus in the north,” thus transitioning the polar structure of the system from a bipolar constellations to a unipolar one. Within this context, a unipolar Crete came to dominate much of the system, with a “far stronger and wider Cretan suzerainty over south-eastern Greece and the adjacent islands,” that is, the Cyclades, where the “influence of Crete seems to have been practically supreme in the islands;” while in the Peloponnese and central Greece, it “is possible that Cretan colonies were established at some sites, Mycenae, Tiryns, Corinth, Orchomenus, Thebes; or we might believe that the influence was exercised, not by colonization or conquest, but by peaceful penetration, trade, settlement” (Wace 1923b, 597-608). While the colonization theory remains controversial and unsubstantiated, Cretan dominance, however, remains unquestioned. For no political actor had an “interest in disputing the position of Crete, and the Aegean world from which she had emerged was as yet no match for her” (Matz 1973, 557). Within this context, toward the end of the Cretan unipolar period, the system had three possible sub-system hegemonies in the form of Orchomenus, Thebes, and Mycenae, with a single unipole whose “domination of her neighbors was a foregone conclusion” (Wace 1923b, 614-615). The rise of Mycenae, however, will lead to a re-alteration of the Mediterranean System, as a dominant actor from mainland Greece will proceed to counter-balance Crete’s system-wide hegemonic status.

#### *1550 BC – 1400 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

Around 1600 BC, Mycenae of mainland Greece, in the Achaean-Argolis region, began its rise as a sub-system hegemon by challenging regional hegemon Thebes for local power, proceeding to sack the latter and begin solidifying Mycenaean power in

north-east Peloponnese (Stubblings 1975a, 169-171). While Mycenae remained the cultural center from which the Mycenaean civilization spread, as a political unit, however, Mycenae, at this point, observed the presence of two other sub-system hegemonies: Elis in the north-west and Pylos in the south-west of the Peloponnese (Stubblings 1973, 651). Rising Tiryns and a nascent Athens, while active politically, did not present positioning at the sub-system level, while Mycenae, Elis, and Pylos displayed a rather peaceful balance of power, with Mycenae as not only the relatively stronger actor (Freeman 2004, 127), but also the revisionist actor with aspirations of system-wide hegemonic status. Mycenae's interactions with Crete were both frequent and extensive, since Crete had exercised suzerainty over much of the southern Peloponnese for the previous few hundred years. At the same time, while archeological evidence demonstrates Cretan dominance over Athens, southern Peloponnese, and the Cycladic islands, Cretan preponderance over Mycenae has never been established. Within this context, a rising Mycenae not only viewed Crete as its equal, but also a challenge to system-wide preponderance. Mycenaean expansion into the Cycladic island, as evidenced in Melos, into Asia Minor as evident in Melitus, establishment of settlements on Rhodes (a traditional Cretan sphere of influence), and extensive trade with not only Egypt, southern Palestine, and Syria in the east (Stubblings 1973, 644-645), but Sardinia, the Italian Peninsula, and Malta to the west, clearly represent the rise of Mycenae as system-wide hegemon challenging and counter-balancing Crete's system-wide hegemonic status (Matz 1973, 577). By around 1550, the Mediterranean System had transitioned into a bipolar structure, with Mycenae dominating mainland Greece, while also expanding into

the Aegean, and Crete dominating the southern Aegean and attempting to preserve its system-wide status.

*1400 BC – 1100 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The increased wealth and expansion of Mycenae was coupled with its growing military power: unlike Crete, the Mycenaeans were “outward looking and often aggressive” (Freeman 2004, 125), with a warrior-aristocratic culture that was more violent and war-prone than the Cretans (Levi 1966, 32-36). As Mycenae became the “metropolis of Greece” and the “first major efflorescence of civilization in Hellas” (Stubbings 1973, 629), Crete underwent much decline, reasons for which possibly range from natural disasters, internal decay, and external Mycenaean pressure. As such, while the specifics as to why Crete fell cannot be substantiated through the archeological evidence, one fact remains undisputed: by 1400 BC Crete was dominated by Mycenaean Greeks, perhaps having “been conquered by Mycenaean Greeks,” due “to Mycenaean arms” (655-657). Mycenae’s unipolarity was perhaps unique, in that usage of the term Mycenae and Mycenaean might lead to some confusion with regard to analysis of power configurations: Mycenae refers to the political unit, existing in the form of a city-kingdom, while Mycenaean refers to the culture and civilization that dominated the Greek world after the fall of Cretan Minoan Civilization. Within this context, Mycenae was the most powerful political unit in the system, with the following sub-system hegemons: Pylos (who were also Mycenaean, but a separate, independent political unit), Elis, Mycenaean Crete (dominated by Mycenaean Greeks, but perhaps politically independent from Mycenae), Tiryns, and possibly Athens and Sparta. The interesting feature of Mycenae’s unipolarity, however, is that none of the sub-system hegemons were

revisionist, but rather, they engaged in bandwagoning or shirking. In this sense, relative strength remained somewhat moot, for almost all of the sub-system hegemon displayed complementary, reciprocal, or neutral relations with the unipole.

As the archeological evidence suggests, only the Peloponnese, Crete, Cyclades, and eastern Asia Minor, within the Mediterranean System, were developed civilizations during this period with functional political units. As such, Mycenae's domination of Peloponnese, Crete and the Cyclades led to an expansionist attention toward the east, primarily Cyprus (where Mycenaean settlements were observed) and Asia Minor. These eastward expansions led to tense relations with the Hittites, only to be diffused by the disintegration of the latter, while Mycenae's interest in Asia Minor gave way to the Trojan War. While the historical evidence is rather murky, two general assumptions have been substantiated: Troy was destroyed and the endeavor was undertaken by a joint Greek contingent led by Mycenae (Stubblings 1975b, 342-350). The general outcome, then, until the 12<sup>th</sup> century BC, appears Mycenaean Greece's domination of the eastern Mediterranean, with Mycenae as the leading system-wide hegemon.

#### *1100 BC – 850 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

By 1100 BC, the Mycenaean Civilization had pretty much been eradicated, with Mycenae, along with Pylos, Tiryns, regions of Argolid, Messenia, Achaea, Corinthia, Phocis, and Boeotia being destroyed, great portions of their population migrating, and new patterns of settlements taking place by non-Mycenaean culture (Desborough 1975, 659-660; Stubblings 1975b, 352-354). This was soon followed by the desertion and destruction of the Cycladic centers of trade, such as Melos, Naxos, and Rhodes, while Miletus, on the coast of Asia Minor, was also destroyed (Desborough 1975, 666-667).

The reasons for these developments remain rather obscure. Historical evidence unquestionably proves that these developments did in fact take place: the problem, however, is lack of archeological evidence to explain these developments. Three general theories have been suggested: over-exhaustion of military resources in a war in Asia Minor (possibly the Trojan War); over-population growth, resource scarcity, drought, and internal instability; and the invasion of people from the north unto rest of Greece (the presumed Dorian invasion) (Hammond 1975, 681-701). Regardless of the reasons for the collapse of Mycenae's system-wide dominance, one outcome remains rather clear: "the break-up of the central political power" and the "flight from affected areas" by the Mycenaean Greeks. The outcome, then, was the complete disintegration of the Mycenaean system, with the Mediterranean System restructuring into a nonpolar configuration, as no coherent or system-wide political units seemed to appear, with much of the dominant city-kingdoms being destroyed, along with mass desertion and migrating, and a general conception of chaos prevailing within the macropolitical structuration of the system. The diffusion of power during this period appears to have been extensive, as the collapse of an entire civilization gave way to the destruction of the existing centers of power, with the outcome being some 300 years of nonpolarity: there remained no centers of power, but rather, secluded concentrations of pockets of small political units.

During this nonpolar period, three important developments took place that came to shape much of the future Greek world. First, migrations into Attica and Euboea provided the population basis for the future resurgence of this region, especially Athenian Attica (Thomas and Gognat 1999, 61-66); while migrations into the Aegean islands, and further east to Cyprus, provided the initial basis of Greek colonization on the eastern

periphery of the system. Second, while the ethno-racial identity of the northern invaders remains controversial, their settlement in the south of the Peloponnese remains undisputed. And third, toward the end of this nonpolar period, consolidation of power slowly began to take form regionally, especially in the formation of the four *ethnē* with their distinct dialects: Aeolian (Thessaly, Magnesia, Boeotia, Thebes), Achaean (Arcadians, Cyproits); Ionian (Athenians, Euboeans, Milesians), and Dorian (Sparta, Macedonia, Crete, Rhodes, Epirotes, Aetolians, Locrians). Within this context, much of the Greek settlements in the eastern Aegean and Asia Minor became defined by the colonizing group's *ethnē*: Aeolic settlements in the Aegean north-east and Asia Minor, Ionian settlements in much of the eastern coast of Asia Minor and Cyclades, and Dorian settlements in south-east of the Aegean and Asia Minor (Cook 1975, 776-796). Concomitantly, *ethnē* relations gave way to two general phenomena: the tendency of nascent city-states with the same *ethnē* and dialect to ally together (Thomas and Gognat 1999, 83-84), and the consolidation of regional power based on such structurations.

#### *850 BC – 750 BC Continuation of Nonpolar Structure*

While the Mediterranean System continued its nonpolar epoch, important regional consolidations, or sub-system hegemonic conflict for regional hegemony, took place in many parts of the Greek world. This, in turn, was supplemented by the continued colonization of rising sub-system actors seeking system-wide status. Within this context, three general developments gave way to increased concentration of power within the system: nascent city-states began establishing both regional and system-wide presence; Greek colonization, initially eastward, now turned west, primarily to the Italian Peninsula and the Western Mediterranean, thus expanding the Mediterranean System; and, the

Phoenicians displayed their presence in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa by establishing trading posts and nascent cities, thus further expanding the Mediterranean System (Freeman 2004, 147-156). Concomitantly, relative consolidation during this period created observable centers of power that were non-existent during the initial nonpolar epoch: however, since the centers of power remain numerically high, the structure of the system continues to be defined as nonpolar, since multipolar structural attributes remain absent. The centers of power during this period constituted the following sub-system actors: Argos and Sparta in the Peloponnese; Elis west of Arcadia; Corinth and Megara on the land-bridge connecting the Peloponnese to central Greece; Athens in Attica; Orchomenus and Thebes in Boeotia; Phocis north of Boeotia; Thessaly in northern Greece; Eretria and Chalcis in Euboea; and Miletus in Asia Minor (Sealey 1976, 15-18).

#### *750 BC – 690 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure*

The consolidation of regional spheres of influence during the latter stages of the previous nonpolar period gave way to the development of sub-system hegemon competing for system-wide dominance. Two general events reify this process: the First Messenian War and the Lelantine War. The First Messenian War between Sparta (with allies Elis and Corinth) and Messenia (with allies Argos and Arcadia), was part of Sparta's endeavor to attain system-wide status, as expansion to the west and north solidified Sparta's dominance of much of Peloponnese. This, in turn, gave way to the weakening of Argos as potential system-wide actor, along with the attainment of Spartan suzerainty over the region (Coldstream 2003, 142-143). The Lelantine War was between the two power states of Euboea, Eretria and Chalcis, with Corinth, Samos, and Pharsalos



(Thessaly) siding with the latter, while Megara and Miletus sided with the former (Freeman 2004, 156-158). The outcome was an unclear victory for Chalcis, but nonetheless, both actors were exhausted and severely weakened by the war. Consequently, the allies of the given sides attained further relative power in relation to such developments (Coldstream 2003, 181-182). The power configurations of the system, then, appeared to be as followed: Spartan dominance of southern Greece; Corinthian dominance of central Greece, along with the presence of Megara; Chalcis and Erteria as weakened yet centers of power in Euboea; and Thessaly in northern Greece. Chalcis and Erteria after the war may be reduced to sub-system hegemony, joining Elis, Argos, Athens, and Thebes in the mainland, along with various powerful sub-system commercial island-states such as Aegina.

#### *690 BC – 650 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The Second Messenian War altered the Mediterranean System from a multipolar configuration to unipolarity, as the Peloponnese became engulfed in a war that temporarily weakened all parties involved, while much of mainland Greece lost relative strength to Corinth, which managed to position itself as the singular system-wide hegemon. The Messenian revolt against Spartan suzerainty was coupled by revisionist Argos, which sought to re-establish itself as a system-wide actor, thus challenging both Sparta and Corinth by supporting the latter's enemy Megara. Thus, the Messenian pole (Argos, Sicyon, Arcadia, and Elis) clashed with Sparta (who received assistance from Corinth), giving way to a twenty year conflict that resulted in Spartan victory, yet a much weakened Peloponnese. Concomitantly, Corinthian dominance over central Greece became a reality, as Megara was reduced to sub-system status, while much of Attica,

Boeotia, and Thessaly remained incapable of challenging or counter-balancing Corinthian unipolarity. In this context, the Lelantine War made Corinth the “leading city of Greece” (Freeman 2004, 156), and while the Second Messenian War reduced previous system-wide hegemonies to sub-system status, Corinth had “become the foremost commercial power in Greece” (Coldstream 2003, 147), hence re-structuring the Mediterranean System into a unipolar configuration (Sealey 1976, 43-44). Corinthian unipolarity, however, was supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemonies, one of which expanded the Mediterranean System into north Italy. Sparta and Argos remained competitive regionally, with Sparta eventually gaining the upper hand; Megara, Athens, Thebes, Thessaly, and the usual mainland players remained at the sub-system level; colonies in Ionian Asia Minor and Euboean Balkans preserved the status quo; while Spartan Tarentum, Achaean Croton, Corinthian Syracuse, and Euboean settlements in Italy came into contact with the two new sub-system hegemonies of the region: the Etruscans of North Italy (Ridgeway 1988, 667-675) and the Carthaginians of North Africa.

#### *650 BC – 490 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

The resurgence of Sparta, after the Second Messenian War, as the most powerful system-wide hegemon, altered the Mediterranean System into a multipolar power constellation, as Corinth also maintained its system-wide status, along with an aggressive Argos, a rising Athens, and a powerful Carthage that had not only recently established suzerainty over Phoenician settlements, but also had established its system-wide hegemonic status by dominating North Africa, much of the Western Mediterranean, the Mediterranean coast of the Iberian peninsula, and the islands of Sardinia and, for a limited time, Sicily. This multipolar period, then, may be best organized into five

overarching themes. First, the balancing, counter-balancing, and inter-hegemonic competition in the Greek mainland over system-wide positioning had important implications. Second, process of polarization and alliance formation that took place between system-wide hegemon and sub-system hegemon, thus contributing to much instability. Third, the developing conflict between Carthage and Greek colonies in the West Mediterranean proved to have important consequences upon both the structure of the system and its unitary actors. Fourth, rise of Rome as sub-system challenger to a declining Etruria for sub-system hegemony in Italy magnified the importance of this sub-system. And fifth, the incursion of the Persian Empire into the Mediterranean System via conquest of Ionian Asia Minor laid the groundwork and the potential incentive for the Mediterranean System to absorb the Near East-Middle Eastern System.

The conquest of Messenia gave Sparta control of all the southern part of the Peloponnese and most of the territories up north not controlled by Elis, Arcadia, and Argos (Sealey 1976, 61). By 590 BC, however, Sparta turned its attention north, seeking to conquer Arcadia and subdue Argos. The Tegean War lasted until 560 BC, which pretty much brought the entire Peloponnese under Spartan control (with the exception of Argos), but this control was not so much based on conquest, but rather through alliance and loose polarization: the Peloponnesian League. Headed by Sparta, the League included all of the sub-system hegemon of Peloponnese (Elis included), with the exception of Argos and Achaia. Corinth, Sicyon, Tegea, and eventually Megara would also join the League, thus making this the most powerful alliance in the system, with Sparta recognized as leader, *hegemon*. The League itself, however, was not a tight pole, but rather, a loose pole dominated by Sparta, and within this sense, it cannot be

categorized as a single pole. In-fighting between the allies, for example, did occur, since the alliance revolved around loyalty to Sparta, not each other (Jeffery 1988, 352-353). Furthermore, Corinth, for example, was the most important and perhaps powerful member after Sparta, yet it was, itself, a system-wide hegemon, and while recognition of Spartan superiority in the alliance was noted, Corinth still remained powerful in its own right, as it openly voiced its disagreement with Sparta by counter-balancing and checking Spartan policies if it deemed necessary (e.g., refusing to attack Athens in 507, rejecting Sparta's proposal to invade Athens in 504; serving as arbitrator for Athens-Megara conflict, as well as the Thebes-Athens disputes) (Sealey 1976, 148; Jeffery 1988, 360).

Athens' rise to system-wide hegemon began with a methodical domination of Attica, with a continuous attempt at extending its sphere of influence north to Boeotia, west to Megara, and the surrounding islands of Salamis, Aegina, and the wealthy Cycladic island-states of Naxos and Samos. This, in turn, brought Athens into consecutive conflicts with Megara over Salamis (which Corinth arbitrated in favor of Athens), Thebes over Plataea (over which it defeated a Theban attack), and a naval war with Aegina (which it was able to win with Corinthian assistance) (Jeffrey 1988, 360-366). In the meantime, Sparta sought to establish a sphere of influence over Attica and central Greece as well, as it invaded Athenian ally Samos (unsuccessfully) for undertaking a regime change, overthrew Naxos (another Athenian ally), wrestled Megara from Athens' sphere of influence, and even intervened in the internal politics of Athens itself. The attempt at installing a puppet tyrant in Athens, however, failed, and Sparta led the Peloponnesian League, along with Boeotia and Chalcis, to invade Athens. Corinth's refusal to commit withheld the invasion by the League, which allowed Athens to soundly

defeat Boeotia and Chalcis (Sealey 1976,147-150; Jeffrey 1988, 361-362; Freeman 2003, 177-181).

In the Western Mediterranean, especially in Sicily, Carthage came into serious conflict with two of the more powerful Greek colonies, Gela and then Syracuse. From approximately 650 BC to 510 BC, Carthage had established complete dominance of Sicily, and while it had initially tolerated Greek colonization, it defeated several Greek expeditions in 580 BC, 540 BC and 510 BC. The rise of Gela as a sub-system challenger to Carthaginian hegemony, followed by transfer of Greek power to Syracuse, brought about the Greco-Punic Wars. Within this context, Carthage's system-wide hegemonic status was not necessarily challenged, but rather, its dominance of Sicily was only challenged by rising sub-system actors Gela and Syracuse. While Gela and Syracuse were Doric states, their expansive growth threatened Rhegion and Himera, Ionian states who joined Carthage to counter-balance the Doric threat (Asheri 1988, 748-775). As such, Carthage attained system-wide status by sustaining a commercial and naval empire that stretched the entire Western Mediterranean, but at the same time, it had to deal with rising sub-system hegemonies that threatened its strategic interests in Sicily.

In the eastern periphery of the system, the Persian Empire made an incursion into the Mediterranean System by conquering much of northern Thrace and Anatolia/Asia Minor, thus reaching the coasts of the Black Sea and of the Aegean, hence assuming suzerainty over Ionian Asia Minor around 540 BC. In 499 BC, however, the Ionian Greek cities revolted against Persian rule, hence opening a clash between the system-wide hegemon of the Near East-Middle Eastern System and the various system-wide and sub-system actors of the Mediterranean System. Athens, Miletus, Erteria, and other Ionian

Greek city-states sent assistance to the revolt, hence creating a venue for a much larger conflict (Gray and Cary 1926, 214-225). By 493 BC, however, the Persians had crushed the Ionian Revolt: but the clash between the two world political systems was about to get more severe, as Persia sought to expand its empire and absorb the Mediterranean System into the Near East-Middle Eastern System (Murray 1988, 465-490).

In sum, the polar structure of the Mediterranean System during this period may be classified as followed: Spartan system-wide hegemony and leadership of the Peloponnesian League; Corinthian system-wide hegemony through allying and also counter-balancing Sparta, thus preserving the balance of power within the Greek mainland; Athenian system-wide hegemony in its dominance of Attica and expansion of its sphere of influence into Euboea and the Cycladic islands; Theban system-wide hegemony in Boeotia and the north; Carthaginian system-wide hegemony in the Western Mediterranean; and Persian system-wide presence in the eastern periphery. This, in turn, is supplemented by the presence of a high number of sub-system hegemonies, ranging from Argos to Elis to Chalcis in the mainland, to Aegina, Miletus, Samos and Naxos in the Cyclades, to Syracuse and Gela in Sicily, to finally Rome and the Etruscans in central and north Italy.

#### *490 BC – 465 BC Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 493 BC Persia had suppressed the Ionian Revolt, which was soon followed by an invasion of European Greece, as the Persians crossed the Bosphorus, overwhelmed much of Thrace, subjugated Macedonia, and would soon bring Thessaly and, more importantly, Thebes, under its control (Hammond 1988a, 493-496). Subsequently, the Greek world united under the leadership of Sparta, thus created a bipolar power

constellation in the system, with the Persians and their Greek allies as one pole and the united Greek opposition, soon to be formed as the Hellenic League of 481, as the other. Persia's initial attempt at attacking mainland Greece began in 490 BC with its naval conquest of several Cycladic islands, southern Euboea, and Eretria. This initial success, however, was met with a devastating defeat at hands of the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon (Munro 1926a, 229-254; Hammond 1988a, 502-517). This initial repulsion gave way to a much larger expedition by the Persians, which, in turn, led the Greek cities to form the Hellenic League in 481 (Sealey 1976, 195-196). As the leading power in the Mediterranean System, Sparta also became the leading state in the Hellenic League, followed by the system-wide hegemon Athens and Corinth. Polarization, then, took the form of Sparta and the entire Peloponnesian League, Athens, Plataea, Thespia, Euboea, Aegina, Megara, Locria, Pharsalus, and the various dependencies and colonies of the system-wide hegemon of the League (Sealey 1976, 205-207). The League also invited Syracuse, Gelon, and Crete to join in the effort against Persia, but conflict with Carthage limited Syracuse and Gela to Sicily, while Crete chose neutrality. The only Peloponnesian city-state to not join the League was Argos, whose animosity with Sparta drove it into alliance with the Persians.

In 481 BC Persia began its second, and much larger, invasion of mainland Greece, with the first main battle taking place at Thermopylae, as the Hellenic League sent a force headed by Sparta to stop the Persian advance. The naval forces of the League engaged the Persian fleet at the Battle of Artemisium (Munro 1926b, 284-301). While Persia overran the Greek contingent at Thermopylae, its losses were severe, only to be supplemented by an indecisive outcome at Artemisium. Central Greece remained open for advance, as the

Persians headed to Attica and destroyed an evacuated Athens (Hammond 1988b, 546-591). The evacuation of Athens was a collective success of the Hellenic League, as the population was temporarily settled in Aegina and Salamis, while the navy of the League offered Persia an unexpected and decisive defeat at the Battle of Salamis (Munro 1926b, 303-314). The naval defeats of Persia, and its pyrrhic victory at Thermopylae, forced the Persians to retreat back to their base in the north, while its entire naval force, heavily damaged, retreated to Asia Minor. In 479 BC, the remaining Persian forces unleashed another massive attack against the Hellenic League from the north, only to be crushed in the Battle of Plataea (Munro 1926c, 331-340), hence ending Persia's incursion into European Greece. The League pushed across the Aegean, with powerful island-cities of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos joining the alliance (Sealey 1976, 226-227). At Mycale the Persian forces in Asia Minor faced off against the League, to be, once again, defeated, with the Ionian states also joining against Persia (Munro 1926c, 341-344). The outcome, then, was the expulsion of Persia from the Mediterranean System, which, in turn, gave way to two developments: the rise of Athens as a superpower in the system, and the dissolution of the Hellenic League, with Sparta returning to its leadership of the Peloponnesian League, while Athens forming its own pole: the Delian League.

#### *460 BC – 405 BC Continuation of Bipolar Structure*

In the Hellenic League Sparta had command, while Athens was one of the members within the pole; but this relationship, once the Persians were repelled, no longer reflected the actual balance of power. In 478 BC, Athenian naval power had positioned the city-state as a system-wide hegemon, and to continue Greek activities against the Persian Empire, the Delian League was formed under Athenian leadership. Sparta



considered this development consistent with its policy, since the Persian threat had been alleviated and the Delian League would serve as a buffer between Persia and mainland Greece. Within this context, the bipolar system was complementary and mutually reinforcing: the Peloponnesian League, under Spartan suzerainty, dominated the mainland, while the Delian League, under Athenian suzerainty, dominated the Aegean, the Cyclades, the coast of Asia Minor, and cities on the coast of Thrace (Walker 1927, 40-45; Sealey 1976, 248-252). The structure of these two alliances were rather distinct: the Peloponnesian League revolved around a congress, where member states would assemble and vote, and while Sparta was the recognized leader, members of the pole had the authority to question, debate, and propose courses of action; the Delian League, however, became more autocratic, as Athenian dominance was absolute, with tributes stipulated upon all members, and Athenians reserving the right to interfere in the internal affairs of member states who questioned, challenged, or sought to leave the League. Analogously, then, the Peloponnesian League resembled Cold War NATO, while the Delian League the Warsaw Pact.

In the Peloponnese, sub-system hegemon Argos, in its defiance of Sparta, sought regional expansion against Spartan allies Tiryns and Mycenae, while founding an alliance with the newly-formed Arcadian League. Sparta's capacity to suppress this challenge proved fruitful, but it also demonstrated the revisionist tendencies of regional actors. In 460 BC the Messenian Revolt broke out, as the entire sub-region, traditionally under complete Spartan dominance, revolted (possibly through Argive-Arcadian assistance). Sparta appealed to its Peloponnesian allies, with Aegina, Mantinea, Plataea, and other core members quickly responding. Demonstrative of the complementary nature of this

bipolar structure, Sparta also appealed to Athens, who, complying with the precepts of the Hellenic League, also agreed to help (Walker 1927b, 69-72). Sparta's refusal of this initially requested assistance, however, deeply offended Athens, thus altering the relations of the system-wide hegemony into one of hostility. Athens abrogated its obligations under the Hellenic League and formed an alliance with Argos (along with Thessaly and Megara), thus placing itself in a state of war with Sparta: the First Peloponnesian War was underway (Sealey 1976, 258-263).

Athenian naval success is noted at the beginning, as Corinth and Aegina, the two biggest naval powers in the Peloponnesian League, were no match for Athens. Sparta reacted by displaying its superiority on land, as it invaded central Greece, confronting Athens, Boeotia, Argos, and Thessaly at the Battle of Tanagra, only to come out victorious (Walker 1927b, 78-83). Around 451 BC the Five Years' Treaty was made between the warring parties, reasons for which are two-fold: relative Spartan exhaustion, and dissent within the Delian League (Sealey 1976, 272). Miletus, Erythrae, Chalcis, Erterria, Histiaea, Styra, Cythnos, Siphnos, Tenos, Paros, and Naxos (all important and strategic Aegean island-states) sought to secede from the Delian League. The Athenian response was swift, as given states that did not meet Athens' ultimatum were sieged, overcome, and placed directly under Athenian control, with confiscations of territory and wealth being coupled with the settlement of Athenian citizens and the installation of satellite governments (Walker 1927b, 86-88; Sealey 1976, 277). In this sense, the Delian League had pretty much become the Athenian Empire.

Around 447 BC the Five Years' Treaty was broken, as conflict in Boeotia, along with Euboea's and Megara's rebellion against Athens, gave way to Corinth's

involvement in the conflict. Thus, the Peloponnesian League was once again at war with Athens, with the former invading Attica and devastating much of the western region. The robust show of strength by the Spartans, along with Athens' chronic problems in the Delian League, gave way to the Thirty Year Peace between the parties, hence ending the first stage of the Peloponnesian War (Walker 1927b, 88-93). The terms of the treaty preserved the relative power of both system-wide actors, as Sparta maintained dominance of mainland Greece while Athens retained the Delian League (Sealey 1976, 291-292).

In 430 BC conflict between Corinth and its former colony Corcyra culminated in the former's defeat at the Battle of Leucimne: Corinth's refusal to concede drove Corcyra to an alliance with Athens, thus setting the stage for renewal of hostilities between the Peloponnesian League and the Delian League. Athenian-Corinthian animosities were also projected in a conflict over Poteidaea, a former Corinthian colony: Athens had given Poteidaea an ultimatum for submission, yet Poteidaea refused, appealed to Corinth, who, in turn, appealed to Sparta: the Peloponnesian League prepared for war (Adcock 1927, 171-193). The Second Peloponnesian War thus began, with the first period of this conflict being designated as the Archimadian War. The struggle between the two poles resembled the same pattern from the first Peloponnesian War: Spartan dominance on land, Athenian dominance on sea. Two important developments, however, are to be noted. First, Thebes became a powerful player during this stage, allying with Sparta and positioning itself as a sub-system power with system-wide aspiration. Second, Sicily became part of the conflict, as Syracuse remained a staunch supporter of Sparta, while Athens meddled into the sub-system by allying with Leontini and Rhegium (Syracuse's enemies) (Sealey 1976, 328-331; Adcock 1927b, 193-248). Around 421 BC,

however, both parties sought cessation of hostilities with the Peace of Nicias, a one year armistice, hence bringing an end to the Archimadian War.

The Peace of Nicias was clearly made to be broken, as Sparta established an alliance with Boeotia (presumed Athenian sphere of influence), while Athens concluded an alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis (presumed Spartan sphere of influence), what came to be known as the Quadruple Alliance. These arrangements gave way to three important outcomes: 1) alliances were no longer about polarization, but rather relatively equal and mutual assistance; 2) both system-wide hegemonies sought positioning at the doorstep of the other, hence suggesting the intensification of conflict; and 3) sub-system hegemonies became important actors, thus creating the structural basis for a potential multipolar configuration. The Quadruple Alliance invaded Arcadia, with Sparta responding to this invasion in the renowned Battle of Mantinea: the result was a devastating defeat of the Quadruple Alliance and its dissolution (Ferguson 1927, 261-275). This appears to have been the initial turning point in the war. In response, Athenian strategy resorted to the sea, demonstrated in the famous destruction of Melos in 416 BC followed by the failed expedition to Sicily. Athens had demonstrated initial plans to conquer Sicily, and a conflict in 416 BC between Selinus, a Syracusean ally, and Egesta, an Athenian ally, provided the opening. Athenian forces in 415 BC began their attack of Syracuse, the regional hegemon, while the Syracusans received assistance from Corinth, Boeotia, Sicyon, and Sparta. The outcome changed the course of the Peloponnesian War: the entire Athenian expeditionary force was destroyed (Sealey 1976, 353-355; Ferguson 1927b, 285-311). Sparta capitalized on these developments by invading Argos and devastating the Athenian ally, only to be followed by an invasion of Attica itself.

Concomitantly, the weakening of Athens gave way to a large number of Aegean island-states, along with subject Ionian city-states in Asia Minor, to rebel against the Delian League.

Athens' loss of influence in the Aegean offered Sparta the opportunity to move in and establish satellite governments among former Delian League members. This was coupled by the Peloponnesian League advancing to the doorsteps of Athens, thus blockading Athens by land and sea. The Athenians sued for peace and the Peloponnesian War was over. The terms of peace ended the Athenian Empire, as Athens gave up claims over its Aegean and overseas possessions, surrendered its fleet to Sparta, and recognized Sparta's preponderance over the system. In return, Athens was permitted to keep its territories in Attica, thus being reduced to its former size (Ferguson 1927c, 359-365).

Elsewhere in the Mediterranean System, two regional structural changes are observed. First, Carthage's defeat by Syracuse in 480 BC had reduced the former system-wide hegemon to sub-system status, as it exited from Sicily as a power player, and remained to its regional sphere of influence in North Africa and its commercial interests west of Sicily (Miles 2011, 115-117). As such, the most powerful actor in Sicily became Syracuse, whose status as sub-system hegemon remained unquestioned for much of the century (Hackforth 1927, 162-164). Second, the macropolitical developments on the Italian Peninsula remained specific to that region, as Rome sought expansion northward at the expense of Etruria, thus solidifying its status as sub-system hegemon. At the system-wide level, however, Rome remained a non-actor, for it lacked influence even in the south of the Peninsula, as Syracuse's sphere of influence checked nascent Rome to its central and northern borders.

### *405 BC – 385 BC Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure*

Spartan positioning after achieving victory in the Peloponnesian War was not an attempt at unipolar preponderance, but rather, a multipolar balance of power with relatively weaker system-wide hegemon. The rationale for this appears to be three-fold. First, considering the revisionist tendencies of sub-system hegemon in the Mediterranean System, the preservation of a unipolar structure would be extremely difficult. Second, should unipolar preponderance be the objective, Sparta would have to subjugate all relevant sub-system hegemon, thus, undertake continuous warfare until it remains unmatched and unchallenged. Third, the structure of the Mediterranean System presents a more diffused system with respect to power, and in this sense, concentration of power was utilized via alliances, for no single actor possessed the resources to singularly concentrate sufficient power to position itself as unchallenged system-wide hegemon that cannot be counter-balanced. For these reasons, Sparta's system-wide positioning created a multipolar system that would balance itself out, and as such, preserve Sparta's system-wide status.

This is best observed during the formation of the peace treaty with Athens. Allies Corinth and Thebes staunchly demanded the destruction of Athens, for they viewed Athens as a potential challenge even after having been defeated. Sparta's refusal is quite telling: since Athens was no longer a rival, Sparta had to position itself in relation to its powerful allies, and in this sense, Athens must be preserved as a check to Corinthian and Theban system-wide ascendance. Strategically, Sparta remained the most powerful actor in Greece with its Peloponnesian League, and in order for this position to remain safe, a multipolar system was instituted to balance out revisionist system-wide actors. This was

played out in the Corinthian War, were former Spartan allies turned against their once recognized hegemon.

Conflict between Phocis and Locris led to Theban involvement on the Locrian side, which, in turn, led Phocis to appeal to Sparta. Sparta gathered the Peloponnesian League and sought to humble revisionist Thebes, while Thebes turned to Athens (the same Athens whose destruction it had sought few years back) and formed an alliance. The outcome was an initial defeat leveled against Sparta, followed by inconclusive engagements (Cary 1927a, 44-48). Presumed Spartan unipolarity, then, appears to never have had a chance. This was followed by a quadruple alliance between Boeotia (led by Thebes), Athens, Argos, and Corinth (who had left the Peloponnesian League). The objective was to confine Sparta to the Peloponnese and thus counter-balance its system-wide presence (Sealey 1976, 388-391). Chalcidice, Euboea, and Acarnania also switched to the newly-formed quadruple alliance. Sparta, in turn, showed up with its contingent of allies: Mantinea, Tegea, Elis, Achea, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Halieis, and parts of Arcadia. The engagement occurred in two confrontations, Battles of Nemea and Coroneia, out of which Sparta emerged victorious. Inconclusive and intermittent fighting, however, continued in the Corinthian War and at sea for several more years. The balance of power struggle reinforced the impasse.

Fearing possible Spartan envelopment of the Mediterranean System, Persia once again interfered, hoping to preserve the Ionian coast of Asia Minor as buffer against presumed Spartan/Greek incursions. A joint Persian-Athenian naval expedition defeated the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean, thus removing Sparta's initial dominance of the Aegean that it had wrestled from Athens. This, in turn, provided Athens the opportunity

to re-establish its loss of sphere of influence in the Aegean, and as such, the multipolar structure became shaped as followed: Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Persia. Persia, in turn, wanted the multipolar structure in the Mediterranean System to be preserved, for a balance of power struggle between system-wide hegemon would divert attention from any Greek incursions into the Near East-Middle Eastern System. For this reason, Persia switched sides and sought peace with Sparta, fearing a weakened Sparta would give way to a resurgent Athens. Collectively, then, the multipolar struggle continued until the Peace of Antalcidas was reached in 386 BC (Cary 1927a, 52-54), thus seeking to preserve the status quo, as Corinth was forced to return to the Peloponnesian League and Persia retired from the Mediterranean System.

#### *385 BC – 360 BC Continuation of Multipolar Structure*

The outcome from the previous epoch was the restructuring of the power players in the multipolar power configuration, with Sparta, Athens, Theban Boeotian Federation, and Syracuse as system-wide hegemon. As the stronger of the system-wide hegemon, Sparta sought to reassert itself, targeting several of its allies and forcing them to harsh terms in service to Sparta. In 382 BC it decided to become involved in the complications of the Chalcidian federation in the east of Macedonia, and on its march north, Sparta also managed to occupy Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes. This act of hubris greatly shook the peace terms under which the balance of power was sustained. However, Spartan forces continued north, defeated and subdued much of Chalcidice, bringing it into an alliance that recognized Spartan preponderance (Sealey 1976, 405-407). In 379 BC Thebes attacked the Spartan garrison at Cadmea, with Sparta responding by sending an expedition against Thebes. Athens remained neutral, thus preserving the status quo, while



Thebes managed to wrest Cadmea away from three years of Spartan occupation. Diplomatic relations between Athens and Sparta, however, had turned sore, and when Sparta sent another expedition against Thebes in 378 BC, the Athenians sent forces in support of the latter. The Spartan forces were soundly defeated, and Thebes reasserted itself in Boeotia, thus counter-balancing Spartan irredentism (Cary 1927b, 55-69). To placate further Spartan aggression, however, Thebes sent an embassy to Sparta asking for terms.

This led the Athenians to fear isolation, and so in order to counter-balance Sparta on its own, it formed the Second Athenian Sea League, consisting of Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Mytilene, Chalcis, Erterria, and other island-states (Sealy 1976, 410). But it soon managed to also bring Thebes into the alliance, to both neutralize Thebes as an unmatched center of power in Boeotia, as well as to strengthen a counter-balance against Sparta. Sparta responded by sending several expeditions against Thebes, and a united Theban-Athenian presence induced Sparta to extend the conflict into the sea, only to be defeated by Athens at the Battle of Naxos. The next year the Athenian Sea League convinced Corcyra, on the coast of the Peloponnese, to join the League, inciting another naval battle with Sparta, with the latter being defeated again (Cary 1927b, 64-78). By this point, Sparta's relative strength was weakened, while Athens had established superiority over the seas surrounding the Greek Peninsula, while Thebes, after destroying Plataea and absorbing Thespieae in 372 BC, had become a powerful system-wide hegemon by forming the Boeotian Federations. The growing power of Thebes greatly alarmed Athens and by 371 BC Sparta and Athens were ready to make peace. But Theban conflict with sub-system hegemon Phocis (allies of both Sparta and Athens), brought the Spartan army

into battle against the Theban led federation, resulting in the famous Battle of Leuctra, where Sparta was thoroughly defeated and its system-wide hegemonic status reduced (Cary 1927c, 80-84).

During this period, Syracuse had also positioned itself as a system-wide hegemon, for after having reducing Carthage to a sub-system actor, it had previously repulsed and destroyed the Athenian expedition to Sicily, while having also expanded from Sicily to southern Italy, hence dominating both the island of Sicily and the entire region of the Italian Peninsula south of Tarentum. In the mainland of Greece, it allied itself with Athens after the fall of Sparta, while having good relations with Epirus and much of northern Greece (Bury 1927, 108-132). In this sense, Syracusean influence was extensive at the system-wide level, as was its military and economic power.

#### *360 BC – 345 BC Transition from Multipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

The “collapse of Athenian and Spartan hegemony left a world of small scattered Greek communities,” as years of warfare had sapped the resources of the Greek world, while many cities experienced civil unrest (Freeman 2004, 305-306), along with extensive warfare between sub-system hegemons failing to attain system-wide status. Within this context, the centers of power in the Mediterranean System were numerically high, with concentration of power quickly shifting from one alliance to the next, while no single or set of actors were capable of attaining positioning at the system-wide level.

Leuctra put an end to Spartan system-wide hegemony, reducing it to sub-system status, as Sparta became embroiled in conflict with other sub-system hegemons of the Peloponnese: the Arcadian League, Argos, and Elis. A Theban contingent, with Phocian, Locrian, Euboean, Acarnanian, and Thessalonian allies marched into Peloponnese to aid

the anti-Spartan forces, and not only did they defeat Sparta, but also freed Messenia from Spartan control and established it as an independent city. Sparta was now relegated to a weak sub-system actor: the Peloponnesian League was disbanded, and many of its member concluded separate peace (Cary 1927c, 87-95). Presumed Theban ascendancy realigned the power configurations of the system by drawing the Athenians to the Spartan cause in an attempt to counter-balance Thebes as sub-system hegemon limited to Boeotia (Sealey 1976, 424-426). In this sense, conflicts primarily consisted of sub-system powers struggling for regional hegemony, which, in turn, led to shifting alliances with other sub-system hegemon, hence creating a diffused power structure in the system, where centers of power remained dispersed and, generally, inchoate.

In 362 BC, conflict in the Arcadian League led to a split between Tegea and Mantinea, as the former allied with Thebes, while the latter aligned with Athens and Sparta. The Boeotian Federation under Thebes brought its allies Argos, Messenia, and Megalopolis to face off against Mantinea, Elis, Achaia, Sparta, and Athens. The outcome was indecisive, and the two coalitions dispersed (Cary 1927c, 97-102), as the power constellations of the system remained unchanged: no single state was able to dominate, and as such, dominant sub-system hegemon, like Thebes and Athens, failed to attain system-wide positioning. At the same time, Macedonia entered the picture by established suzerainty over much of northern Greece by invading Illyria, expanding to Thrace by winning the Olynthian War, wresting Ampipolis from Athens (Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 200-212), and thus consolidating regional power and positioning itself as sub-system hegemon.

In 357 BC the Second Athenian Sea League disintegrated, as Athens' loss of system-wide positioning led Chios, Rhodes, Cos, Byzantium, Euboea, and other important allies to succeed. Athens' attempt to overcome this disintegration led to the so-called Social War, where the Athenian fleet was consecutively defeated in two major battles. Athens recognized its loss of system-wide influence through set of treaties that ended the Social War (Cary 1927c, 103-107), hence assuming sub-system status within its regional sphere of influence. The Third Sacred War further elucidated the inchoate power structure of this nonpolar period, as what was initially a religious conflict decreed by the Amphictyonic League<sup>12</sup> led to a wider war between several sub-system hegemon over influence in central Greece. Phocis, the condemned state, refused the ruling of the League, which led the Locrians, Thessalonians, and Thebes to declare war. Concomitantly, Athens, Sparta and several Peloponnesian states offered support to Phocis. While initially being defeated in battle, the Phocians refused submission and continued their defiance, while the ephemeral alliances shifted or disintegrated. At the same time, internal conflict in Thessaly led to one party appealing to Phocis for assistance, while the other party appealed to Macedonia, thus adding another center of power to an oversaturated sub-system struggle. While Macedonia initially proved successful, it was soon defeated in two consecutive battles, thus retreating back to the north. Phocis then turned against Thebes and defeated the sub-system hegemon at Coroneia, only to face a returning Macedonia, which decisively defeated Phocis (Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 213-220). Within this larger framework, three general attributes of this nonpolar epoch stand out: 1) well-organized, hegemon-led Leagues became replaced with

---

<sup>12</sup> Pan-Greek religious council comprised of member states that determined and shaped policies pertaining to religious shrines, sanctuaries, and sacred land, with the power to sanction punishments against states for violations

ephemeral, shifting alliances; 2) sub-system hegemon primarily remained active within their regional theatres, thus demonstrating continued need to solidify regional power in relation to other sub-system challenges; and 3) no actor remained relatively powerful enough to sustain dominance for a given period of time, as the ebb and flow of victory and defeat, ephemeral expansion and immediate retreat, and the overall inability of any single actor to elevate beyond regional dominance to the system-wide level attests to degree of power diffusion and inchoateness characterizing the Mediterranean System.

#### *345 BC – 320 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure*

By 346 BC Macedonia's ascendancy is noted, for after having attained sub-system hegemony in the north, it proceeded south to challenge Thebes and Athens, assumed control over strategic Thermopylae, and arbitrated the end of the Third Sacred War (233-243). Macedonia next proceeded west, establishing spheres of influence in Epirus and Ambracia, only to head east toward the Aegean coast of Thrace and all the way to the border of Chersonese. Developments in Euboea provided Macedon with another opportunity for expansion of its sphere of influence, as Eretria requested assistance, which led to the installment of pro-Macedonian governments in Eretria and Oreus. Macedonia's positioning as system-wide hegemon greatly concerned Athens, especially the former's infiltration of Euboea, followed by aggression toward Perinthus and Byzantium (Pickard-Cambridge 1927b, 244-255). Unable to counter-balance Macedonia, Athens opened negotiations with Persia, since the sub-system hegemon also recognized Persia's ambivalence toward the idea of the Mediterranean System being unipolar. During this time Macedonia, for all practical purposes, had assumed dominance of the Amphictyonic League, which allowed it to declare sacred war as a pretext for

expansion. Athens and Thebes, the only sub-system hegemon in central Greece capable of mustering an alliance to stop the Macedonians, brought together Boeotia, Euboea, Achaea, Corinth, Megara, Leucas, and Corcyra (Sealey 1976, 490). At the battle of Chaeronea, Macedonia's victory was absolute: it subsequently forced the disbanding of the Boeotian Confederacy, installment of Macedonian troops in the Cadmea, and the disbanding of the Athenian Sea League. Having secured northern and central Greece, Macedonia proceeded south into the Peloponnese, taking territories from Sparta and distributing them among Tegea, Messene, Megalopolis, and Argos (Pickard-Cambridge 1927b, 256-267). Macedonia's dominance of the Mediterranean System had become absolute, and this was cemented with the League of Corinth: an alliance of Greek states south of Macedon (except for Sparta), headed and dominated by Macedonia, allowing the system-wide hegemon to not only control Greece, but also to draw on Greek manpower for military purposes (Sealy 1976, 491).

Macedonia quickly turned north to placate the Balkans and much of Illyria, which provided Thebes the opportunity to engage in revisionist behavior: attaining assistance from Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Sparta, and Aetolia, Thebes sought to challenge Macedonian suzerainty of central Greece. The outcome was a complete destruction of Thebes and the reification of Macedonian unipolar preponderance, as "every Greek state hastened to submit" (Tarn 1927a, 355-356). In 334 BC Macedonia crossed the Aegean into Anatolia, taking the first step of what would lead to two major developments: the destruction of the Persian Empire and the absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into the Mediterranean System.

Macedonia secured much of Aegean Asia Minor after the Battle of Granicus, managing to move into central Turkey, and assume dominance of Cappadocia and down south to Cilicia (Dodge 1890, 234-284). The Persian Empire sought to placate the Macedonian advance at the Battle of Issus, resulting in the severe defeat of the former and the continued expansion of the latter. This was followed by Macedonia's seizing of much of Syro-Palestine, the destruction of Tyre, and the absorption of Egypt (Tarn 1927a, 361-383; Dodge 1890, 295-353). Macedonia's preponderance now stretched from mainland Greece, across the entire eastern Mediterranean, and included almost every political unit west of Babylonia. The Battle of Gaugamela marked the end of the Persian Empire, as Macedonia's victory gave way to its absorption of Babylonia, Susa, Persepolis, and all the way to the periphery of the Near East-Middle Eastern System: Bactria and Sogdiana. Macedonia's incursion into the Indic System was ephemeral, for after its seizure of Bactria, Sogdiana, and various Indian kingdoms of the Hindu Kush, the unipole retreated and exited the Indic System (Tarn 1927b, 390-417; Dodge 1890, 387-591). The absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into the Mediterranean System, however, was now complete, with Bactria and Sogdiana serving as the peripheral buffer between the newly expanded Mediterranean System and the Indic System. Concomitantly, Macedonia's hegemony over the Mediterranean System covered the entire system with the exception of sub-system actors in the regions west of Greece: Italian Peninsula, North Africa, Sicily, and Iberian Peninsula.

#### *320 BC – 270 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure*

Macedonia's unipolar preponderance of the Mediterranean System swiftly disintegrated after the death of Alexander the Great, as the concentration of power in the

system was thoroughly diffused to numerous centers of power due to the so-called Partition of Babylon, with sets of military-political leaders struggling for dominance over these centers of power, thus re-structuring the system from a unipolar configuration to a nonpolar structure. The centers of power were as followed: Macedon (much of mainland Greece and Illyria), Thrace (along with Chersonese), Greater Phrygia (much of central Anatolia, including Lycia and Pamphylia), Hellespontine Phrygia, Cappadocia (including Paphlagonia), Lydia, Cilicia, Caria, Syria (including Phoenicia and south Mesopotamia), Babylonia, North Mesopotamia, Parthia, and Persia (Tarn 1927d, 464-504; Will 1984, 23-61; Will 1984b, 101-117). These would also be supplemented by the following centers of power west of mainland Greece: Epirus, Sicily, Rome, and Carthage. The extensive dispersion of power reified the nonpolar configuration of the Mediterranean System by virtue of four specific aspects: 1) the system was defined by an inchoate power structure, as the multitude of centers of power engaged in nearly 50 years of warfare in order to consolidate some form of system-wide positioning; 2) no single actor managed to attain system-side positioning, as the high number of sub-system actors consistently switched alliances and re-altered the probability of a single actor attaining system-wide status; 3) consistent fusion of various centers of power and then the disintegration of this attempted consolidation further contributed to the inchoate diffused structure; and 4) the chronic revisionist policies of almost every political actor within this Hellenistic world, which had come to define the Mediterranean System, made system-wide positioning impossible.

This systemic diffusion of power initially led to the disintegration of the League of Corinth, as Athens immediately broke off and orchestrated a counter league, the Hellenic League, with sub-system actors Thessaly and Aetolia. The direct challenge was



against Macedon's sub-system dominance of Greece, giving way to the Lamian War. While Macedon managed to defeat the revisionist aspirations of the Hellenic League, it, nonetheless, relied on other sub-system hegemonies that the new nonpolar structure had created (Tarn 1927c, 454-460). In this sense, even powerful sub-system actors remained limited in their capacity to solidify regional hegemony. This became indicative of the internecine warfare that engulfed the entire Mediterranean System, which came to be known as the War of the Diadochi. From 322 BC to approximately 275 BC, endless warfare defined the power struggle between the various centers of power that had formed after the disintegration of Macedonian unipolarity, as sub-system hegemonies sought consolidation of their respected regions, only to come into consistent and destructive conflict with neighboring sub-system hegemonies. The overly complex nature of this inchoate system may be reduced to four general theaters of conflict for the sake of simplification: much of Mainland Greece, Thrace, and the Hellespont; Aegean Coast of Asia Minor and Central Anatolia; eastern Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia; and, Egypt, Syro-Palestine, and Cyprus (eastern Mediterranean) (Tarn 1928, 75-107). In each of these theatres of conflict, complex internecine warfare, alliances and counter-alliances, and shifting victories and losses slowly gave way to some form of regional consolidation. By 270 BC, the outcome from the War of the Diadochi had given way to relative concentration of power, with the former Macedonian Empire being replaced by 3 system-wide hegemonies and a powerful sub-system hegemon: Egypt under the Ptolemies (Rostovtzeff 1928, 109-129; Turner 1984, 119-123); Macedonia under the Antigonids (Tarn 1928b, 197-223); the Seleucid Empire covering much of Mesopotamia, Persia,

Syria, Cilicia, and Cappadocia (Rostovtzeff 1928b, 155-196); and western Asia Minor under sub-system hegemon the Kingdom of Pergamum.

Elsewhere in the system, four sub-system hegemons further compounded the diffused power structure of this nonpolar epoch. Rome had established itself as a sub-system hegemon by 340 BC, having expanded its sphere of influence from the Tiber to the bay of Naples. Its sub-system hegemonic status was regionally challenged by an alliance of the Samnites, Etruscans, Celts, and Umbrians, which Rome managed to defeat and subdue by 295 BC (Adcock 1928, 581-616; Cornell 1989, 351-377). Having solidified its sphere of influence over central and northern Italy, Rome turned south toward the Greek cities, most powerful of which was Tarentum. Tarentum appealed to Epirus, sub-system hegemon across the Adriatic Sea in north-western Greece. The inter-sub-system hegemonic conflict between Rome and Epirus resulted in consecutive defeats leveled against the former: but the result was a pyrrhic victory for the latter (Franke 1989, 456-472). In 275 BC Epirus withdrew from the Italian Peninsula, and by 272 BC Rome had conquered Tarentum and assumed complete dominance of the Italian Peninsula, thus assuming positioning as system-wide hegemon (Frank 1928, 638-657). Epirus, on the other hand, had demonstrated its sub-system dominance by not only consolidating regional power, but also assuming an important role in the quagmire that was the War of the Diadochi: Epirus served as temporary ally of Macedon, during one point its King Pyrrhus even assumed lordship, only to be soon driven out and once again embroiled in inter-sub-hegemonic conflict (Walbank 1984, 221-231). This was further supplemented by Epirus' involvement in Sicily prior to its conflict with Rome: seeking suzerainty over Sicily, it had invaded and challenged Carthage for sub-system dominance. While initially

successful, it nonetheless had to abandon Sicily and thus content itself as a sub-system actor (Franke 1989, 479-485). Epirus' conflict with Carthage also brought to light the latter's positioning as powerful sub-system hegemon: it had absorbed much of northern Africa, maintained a foothold in Sicily, extended into the Iberian Peninsula, and functioned as a thalassocracy in much of the western Mediterranean (Schulten 1928, 769-784). Sicily, during this nonpolar period, also attained sub-system status under Syracusean dominance, and until 289 BC, it had acted as a regional power that consistently clashed and limited Carthaginian influence within its sphere (Cary 1928, 617-637; Meister 1984, 384-411). Within this context, between the dispersion of power and the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict that defined much of the Hellenistic world, and the multitude of rising sub-system actors west of the Hellenistic world, the Mediterranean System during this period witnessed an extraordinarily high number of sub-system actors, with no single actors possessing the resources and the capability to assume system-wide status, thus classifying the power configurations of this period as nonpolar.

#### *270 BC – 170 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure*

The newly expanded Mediterranean System had now transitioned from a nonpolar structure to a multipolar power constellation, with three theatres of conflict primarily defined through counter-balancing, balance of power, and expansionism. The first theater was mainland Greece, with Macedonian system-wide hegemony being challenged by revisionist sub-system actors in a set of proxy conflicts supported by Egypt. The second theater was in Asia Minor, the entire eastern Mediterranean, Syro-Palestine (hereafter referred to as Coele-Syria), and Egypt: a balance of power struggle was initiated between

system-wide hegemony Egypt and Seleucid, with Macedonia selectively siding with the latter (primarily due to Egypt's infringement against Macedonian interests in the first theater of conflict). The third theater of conflict was in the western Mediterranean, as system-wide hegemony Rome and Carthage came to clash over Sicily and suzerainty over the western half of the entire system. The system-wide hegemony during this multipolar period are as followed (with each theater that the given superpowers operated also having several sets of sub-system actors): Macedonia, Seleucia, Egypt, Rome, and Carthage.

Of the three theaters, the situation in the Greek mainland was perhaps the most complex: Macedonia's system-wide status remained absolute within its sphere of influence, yet this sphere consistently shifted due to the aspirations of revisionist sub-system hegemony, along with Egypt's endeavor of counter-balancing Macedon through diplomacy, proxy wars, and continuous support for anti-Macedonian sub-system actors. In 267 BC Egypt incited an anti-Macedonian alliance of Greek city-states headed by sub-system actors Athens and Sparta, who sought to limit the hegemon's presence to the north, and thus establish regional autonomy in what came to be known as the Chremonidean War. The outcome reinforced Macedonia's system-wide positioning: Athens was reduced to a dependency, Sparta thoroughly humbled, and Egyptian objectives repulsed (Tarn 1928b, 218-220; Walbank 1984, 236-242). During this period two powerful sub-system hegemony had consolidated power: the Aetolian League in central Greece and the Achaean League in the northern Peloponnese.

In 245 BC inter sub-system hegemonic conflict between the two became a reality, as Aetolia allied with Macedon while Achaean received Egyptian assistance: the latter reigned victories. This was followed by Achaean's revisionist endeavor of directly

challenging Macedonia by taking Corinth, a crucial interest of the system-wide hegemon, and incorporating it into its League. Egypt's objective of creating a weaker Macedon through sub-system buffers was beginning to prove fruitful, especially when Aetolia and Achaea formed an alliance to check Macedonian suzerainty of central and southern Greece in 238 BC. By 233 BC Macedonia managed to humble the revisionist actors, thus limiting their positioning at the sub-system level and demonstrating their inability to counter-balance Macedonian hegemony (Tarn 1928c, 733-746; Walbank 1984, 243-256). Around 229 BC semi-barbarian tribes from the north made incursions into Macedonia, occupying the hegemon's attention, which in turn allowed Aetolia to capitalize by taking Thessaly and thus dominating central Greece, while Achaea also took advantage and assumed dominance of the Peloponnese. Achaea's sub-system status was soon challenged by a resurgent Sparta, who managed to defeat and reduce Achaea's regional status. Achaea appealed to Macedonia, and the system-wide hegemon responded, while Aetolia remained neutral due to its agreement with Macedonia. The outcome was the defeat of Sparta, reification of Macedonian system-wide hegemony, and the imposition of limits on the revisionist aspirations of the sub-system actors. In 219 BC a relatively powerful Aetolia attempted to challenge this status quo, in what came to be known as the Social War, with Sparta and Elis joining Aetolia: the latter was once again humbled, and Macedonian system-wide status preserved (Tarn 1928c, 747-768). Macedonia's system-wide positioning, however, would soon bring about a conflict with the rising system-wide hegemon to its west: Rome. In a set of conflict, the so-called Macedonian Wars, Rome would succeed in reducing Macedonia to a sub-system hegemon subject to Roman policy, that is, an ally of Rome, but on unequal terms.

In the second theater, four general observations may be made. First, Egypt's ambitions as system-wide hegemon brought about a conflict with both Seleucia and Macedonia, as the former sought to preserve dominance of the Aegean against Macedonia, while establishing suzerainty over Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, and the coast of Asia Minor against Seleucid. Second, while Macedonian presence was selective, much of the hegemonic conflict was between Egypt and Seleucid, taking over 100 years in six sets of conflicts known as the Syrian Wars. Third, while the system-wide struggle was primarily defined by the given hegemons, rising sub-system hegemons also played a crucial role in this multipolar structure. Fourth, the continued inter-Hellenistic conflict led to the weakening of both system-wide hegemons, thus providing Rome the opportunity to eventually transition the Mediterranean System into a unipolar structure.

The First Syrian War began in 274 BC between Egypt and the Seleucids over parts of Syria and western Asia Minor, with the outcome being a success for Egypt, who managed to conquer much of Asia Minor, the Aegean, parts of Syria, and all of Phoenicia (Tarn 1928d, 702-704). In 263 BC, Egypt helped Pergamum establish its independence from Seleucid in the so-called War of Eumenes, thus creating a powerful sub-system actor and ally (709-710). In 260 BC Seleucid and Macedonia initiated conflict with Egypt, beginning the Second Syrian War, with the objective of counter-balancing continued Egyptian gains. The result was favorable to the aggressors, as Egyptian naval power was thoroughly weakened in the Battle of Cos, thus strengthening Macedonia, while the Seleucids managed to take Cilicia, Pamphylia, and much of Ionia (Heinen 1984, 418-420; Tarn 1928d, 710-715). The Third Syrian War (also known as the Laodicean War) began in 246 BC, with extensive success for the Egyptians, as Seleucid

power was thoroughly weakened both in Anatolia and Syria. This, however, was supplemented by Macedonia's continued involvement against Egyptian naval presence in the Aegean: in the Battle of Andros Macedonia seized the Cyclades from the Egyptians (Heinen 1984, 420-421; Tarn 1928d, 715-719). While the tripartite system-wide hegemonic conflict continued in this theater, it is crucial to note the presence of several important sub-system hegemonies that helped shape the system: Galatia in northern Phrygia (the Celts had invaded into Thracio-Macedonia, crossed the Hellenic Sea, and established themselves in central Anatolia, selectively serving as important military ally to given system-wide actors); Bithynia in the north coast of Asia Minor (consistently allied with Egypt against Seleucid due to its fears of the latter's western expansion); Pontus (Seleucid ally that counter-balanced sub-system actors Bithynia and Pergamum); Pergamum (the more powerful of the sub-system actors, Egyptian ally, and regional challenger to Seleucid) (Rostovtzeff 1930a, 590-612); Cappadocia (traditional Seleucid ally, important strategic player); Rhodes (economically powerful with one of the more powerful navies in the Aegean, it was respected by the system-wide hegemonies for its neutrality and important role in trade) (Rostovtzeff 1930b, 619-641; Heinen 1984, 421-432); and Parthia (expelled Seleucid presence from its region and positioned as the most powerful sub-system actor in the east).

The Fourth Syrian War broke out in 219 BC, as a rejuvenated Seleucid sought to reclaim Syria from a relatively weakened Egypt, capturing much of Phoenicia, including Tyre. At the Battle of Raphia, however, Egypt emerged victorious, thus preserving its control over Coele-Syria: but Seleucid kept much of its previous gains. The status quo was reified (Heinen 1984, 433-440; Tarn 1928d, 728-731). The Fifth and Sixth Syrian

Wars are primarily defined by one variable: Rome's influence in the east of the system. In 202 BC, internal decay in Egypt provided Seleucid another opportunity to reduce Egypt to sub-system status, with Macedonia joining along to share the spoils. The joint endeavor proved rather successful, as Egypt was handed a crippling defeat at the Battle of Panium, thus leaving the entire kingdom open for invasion. Roman diplomatic intervention, however, stopped this development: Rome was fundamentally reliant on Egyptian grain, and any disruption would create severe complications, and as such, both Macedonia and Seleucid were warned not to invade Egypt. The two system-wide actors complied, but Seleucid had already assumed control of Coele-Syria, along with Caria and Cilicia: Egypt was no longer a system-wide hegemon, but rather, a sub-system actor.

The third theater, initially defined by the Roman-Punic hegemonic conflict, would soon give way to Roman intrusion into both the first and second theaters, thus explaining Rome's restructuring of the Mediterranean System into a unipolar configuration. In 265 BC, conflict over the city of Messana in Sicily offered room for Roman intervention, which was immediately challenged by Carthage and sub-system hegemon Syracuse. The First Punic War was underway, and lasting until 241 BC. Carthage's system-wide presence stretched from parts of Sicily to Sardinia to the rest of the western Mediterranean, reaching the Iberian Peninsula, while North Africa remained its base. Its primary interest was the preservation of its commercial empire. In 260 BC and 256 BC Rome shocked Carthaginian naval power with two victories, followed by landing of troops in Africa. The latter endeavor proves fruitless, and in 249 BC Rome is handed a serious defeat at the Battle of Drepana. By 242 BC, however, the First Punic War had become a war of attrition, with both system-wide hegemons reaching exhaustion. In a



final sea battle, around 241 BC, Rome destroys much of the Carthaginian navy, thus ending the first Punic War (Scullard 1989a, 539-565). Sicily became an independent ally of Rome, thus entering Rome's sphere of influence: in few more years, Sardinia and Corsica will also follow the same path (Frank 1928b, 804-805). After the First Punic War relations between the two system-wide hegemon became rather cordial: Carthage turned its attention away from maritime commercial expansion (the primary cause of its continued conflict with both the Greeks and Rome) and instituted a new policy of acquiring a land empire in Africa and Spain. The imposition of this policy, and the reconquest of resource-rich Spain, preserved Carthage's status as system-wide hegemon (Frank 1928b, 786-789; Scullard 1989b, 17-31).

Two developments in the 220's BC allowed Carthage to reposition its policy against Rome: the Gallic invasions from the north preoccupied Rome, and, Rome's absorption of Illyria into its sphere of influence. These two developments allowed Carthage, under Hannibal, to undertake the conquest of Rome. By 230 BC Illyria had established itself as sub-system hegemon by proceeding south, subjugating Epirus, and counter-balancing Aetolia and Achaëa. Concomitantly, it had also begun to infringe upon Rome's sphere of influence in the Adriatic. In the First Illyrian War, Rome took action, thus submitting Illyria and assuming control of the Adriatic coast of the Balkans. Rome's foothold on the Greek Peninsula also set the stage for a new conflict: Macedonia suspected a threat to its traditional sphere of influence. Seeking to diplomatically counter-balance Rome, Macedonia formed an alliance with Illyria, and 10 years after the first conflict, Illyria, once again bolstered, became a concern for Rome. In the Second Illyrian War in 219 BC Rome quickly and methodically defeated the Illyrians (Holleaux 1928,

831-851). The Illyrian Wars, however, in reality, had become more of a proxy conflict between Rome and Macedonia (Errington 1989a, 85-106). But Rome had to turn its attention west, for Carthage had attacked Rome's ally Seguntum in Spain, and by 218 BC, the Second Punic War was under way (Briscoe 1989, 44-61). The Carthaginians approached Rome from the north, heading in from northern Spain, crossing southern France, and entering the Italian Peninsula. Rome, in turn, sent forces into Spain to counter-balance Carthaginian ambitions. Initially, Carthage handed Rome three severe defeats: Battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae (Hallward 1930a, 36-56). Carthage, however, was not able to capitalize, as Rome methodically turned the tide of war, and by 212 BC Carthage was on the defensive. A large Carthaginian relief force marching from Spain was met and defeated at the Battle of Metaurus in 207 BC. At the same time, Rome also opened a theater of war in Spain: from 209 BC to 206 BC, Rome removed Carthaginian suzerainty from Spain. In 204 BC Rome opened a third theater of war by directly invading Africa. Carthaginian forces evacuated Italy to meet the Roman threat: at the Battle of Zama in 202 BC Rome crushed Carthage, and the Second Punic War was over (Hallward 1930b, 83-106). Also over was Carthage's position as system-wide hegemon: it had now been reduced to sub-system status. By 200 BC, Roman power extended from the Italian Peninsula all the way to Spain, dominating the western Mediterranean.

While the inter-hegemonic conflict of the Second Punic War was playing out, Macedonia, seeking to capitalize on an overwhelmed Rome, formed an alliance with Carthage in 215 BC, thus siding the two system-wide hegemonies against Rome and initiating the First Macedonian War. Rome, in turn, allied itself with sub-system

hegemon Aetolia to counter-balance the Macedonia threat from the east (Holleaux 1930a, 116-126). Further, Rome formed an alliance with Pergamum and Rhodes, two powerful sub-system hegemonies who were leveraged against Macedonia, while Macedonia maintained its alliance with the Achaean League. Within this context, Rome was fighting a hegemonic war with Carthage on one hand, and another hegemonic war with Macedonia, yet also utilizing its sub-system allies on the other hand. While the outcome of the conflict was indecisive, it served the Roman objective of curbing Macedonian assistance to Carthage. Upon its defeat of Carthage, Roman system-wide dominance sought out Macedonia, whose aggression toward Roman allies Pergamum and Rhodes were cause for concern.

The Second Macedonian War broke out in 205 BC, resulting in a crushing defeat for the Macedonians at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC (Holleaux 1930b, 155-178; Errington 1989b, 244-273), with the result being two-fold: Macedonia was no longer a system-wide hegemon, but reduced to a regional actor in northern Greece; and, with Macedonia, Egypt, and Carthage, by this time, being reduced to sub-system status, Seleucid remained the only system-wide hegemon standing in the way of Roman unipolar preponderance. Roman intrusion and terms of ultimatum during the Fifth Syrian War had created much discomfort among Seleucid, and with the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War, a cold war of sorts had developed between the two remaining system-wide actors. Seleucid expansion westward, after having reduced Egypt, had made the system-wide hegemon an extensive power, covering territories from Thrace, across Asia Minor, and the entire east of the system up to Parthia. In this sense, Rome controlled the

entire west of the Mediterranean System, while Seleucid dominated the east, with wide array of sub-system actors strategically contributing to this balance.

The Aetolian League's break from Rome offered Seleucid the presumed opportunity to upset the balance, as the former invaded Greece in alliance with Aetolia, hoping to bring Macedonia and the Achaean League to its side. The two sub-system hegemons refused, while Rome sent an invasion force against Seleucid: the so-called Roman-Syrian War had begun. A defeat at the Battle of Thermopylae forced the Seleucids to retreat from Greece, only to be followed by Rome across the Aegean, where at the Battle of Magnesia Seleucid was soundly defeated. Seleucid lost all of its territory west of the Taurus Mountains, that is, most of Anatolia, thus being limited to Syria and Mesopotamia: it too had been reduced to sub-system status (Holleaux 1930c, 1999-233). Pergamum and Rhodes assumed much of the Seleucids' territory, thus serving as powerful buffers and reliable allies of Rome. By 170 BC Roman unipolar dominance of the Mediterranean System had been established: Macedonia was reduced to a Roman province after the Third Macedonian War (Benecke 1930a, 259-275), while Seleucid and Egypt conceded Roman dominance by abiding Rome's demands during the Sixth Syrian War. The Mediterranean System, then, was defined by a single unipole that was neither challenged nor counter-balanced, with several powerful sub-system actors that were either allied with the unipole, thus bandwagoning, or conceded the unipole's suzerainty.

#### *170 BC - 395 Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The macropolitical attributes of the Mediterranean System during the initial period of Roman unipolarity were primarily defined by Rome's direct control over Spain, western Mediterranean, and the Italian Peninsula. Much of North Africa, the Greek

world, Asia Minor, Seleucid east, and Egypt, while not under direct Roman control, nonetheless recognized Roman suzerainty. While sets of powerful sub-system hegemons remained in the system, none possessed the relative capabilities to either challenge or counter-balance Roman preponderance: these actors were either allied with Rome or assumed neutral, non-aligned policies. In instances where sub-system hegemons engaged in revisionist behavior, Roman response was severe: Roman unipolarity did not tolerate any challenges to its singular dominance of the Mediterranean System. This was evident in 146 BC, when a challenge by the Achaean League led to its swift defeat and the complete destruction of Corinth; while a perceived threat from Carthage led to the Third Punic War and the complete destruction of Carthage as well (Derow 1989, 303-323; Benecke 1930b, 296-305; Hallward and Charlesworth 1930, 479-484).

In 133 BC Rome inherited Pergamum, thus expanding its direct control into Asia Minor after having done the same a decade before in Greece. From 111 BC to 104 BC Rome pacified North Africa after defeating revisionist Numidia whose sub-system positioning had attempted to challenge Roman dominance of the region. By 90 BC Pontus had become the most powerful sub-system hegemon in Anatolia, and its aspirations of system-wide status led to the Three Mithridatic Wars, which Rome soundly won by 63 BC, thus ending Pontus as sub-system actor. This expansion eastward also resulted in absorbing the already decaying Seleucid state, while at the same time forming an alliance (vassalage?) with Armenia (Freeman 2004, 405-415). Rome's preponderance of the system had reached new heights: it extended from the Iberian Peninsula all the way to Mesopotamia, with sub-system hegemon Parthia at its eastern-most periphery. It exercised dominance over the entire Mediterranean civilization, North Africa, Egypt,

Anatolia, Syria, and the Levant: Rome had absorbed the Hellenic Kingdoms. From 59 BC to 50 BC much of Gaul was also conquered and absorbed, thus expanding Roman dominance up north all the way to the British Island.

Rome's internal conflicts, ranging from the Social Wars, to the Civil Wars (Charlesworth 1952a, 13-30; Tarn 1952, 43-65), to the ending of the republic (Tarn and Charlesworth 1952, 90-111) and the formation of the empire (Jones 1952, 127-158), are excluded from analysis, for these developments did not affect systemic outcomes at the macro level: Roman system-wide hegemony remained unchallenged. For the next 450 years, no single sub-system actor managed to position itself at the system-wide level and challenge Roman unipolarity. This is primarily due to two general factors: Rome's policy of aggressive expansion, and, Rome's intolerance of any challenges to its perceived spheres of influence, which, in essence, included the entire Mediterranean System with the exception of Persia.

Within this context, Rome came into conflict with Germanic political units to the north due to its expansionist policies (Syme 1952, 358-368), or, it came into conflict with Parthia due to its irredentist aspirations. As such, neither of these actors sought to challenge Roman system-wide dominance, but rather, especially for Parthia, to preserve its own regional positioning. This is best attested by Rome's continuous conflict with Parthia over Armenia, which Parthia considered to be in its sphere of influence as neighbor, while Rome sought to control Armenia as a client kingdom (Anderson 1952a, 254-278; Anderson 1952b, 747-772). For nearly 400 years, Rome consistently infringed upon Parthia's sphere, usually getting the upper hand in battle, but stopping short of absorbing the sub-system actor, but rather, keeping it just that. Concomitantly, Parthia,

and then Sassanid Persia, never sought system-wide dominance or expansion beyond their regional sphere: the objective appears to merely curtail Roman infringement. In this sense, the Roman-Parthian/Persian Wars were not system-wide conflicts, but rather, a struggle over a regional sphere of influence between an expansionist system-wide hegemon and a defensive sub-system hegemon.

By 60 AD Rome had continued its expansion by annexing Thrace, Noricum (modern-day Austria), Pamphylia, Lycia, Judea, and Mauretania (modern-day Morocco) (Charlesworth 1952b, 674-679). This was topped off by the conquest of Britain (Syme and Collingwood 1952, 794-802). The next several decades were defined by revolts, suppression of such revolts, conflicts over succession, and re-solidification of imperial policies (Stevenson and Momigliano 1952, 842-865). Within this context, Rome was preoccupied with preserving its direct control and expansive sphere of influence, as opposed to expanding or facing challenges at the system-wide level. Macropolitically, the Mediterranean System remained stagnant.

By 100 AD, Rome sought expansion into Dacia (Syme 1954, 168-177), conquering much of modern-day Eastern Europe. By 116 it had expanded into Parthia, taking Babylon, Susa, and the capital of Ctesiphon, followed by the absorption of Mesopotamia as a Roman province (Longden 1954, 226-252). The Roman Empire had reached its maximum peak, extending from Britain all the way to the Persian Gulf. By 160 Rome had returned to its previous boundaries in the east, returning much of Mesopotamia back to Parthia and thus sustaining the sub-system hegemon's sphere of influence. Between this period and 180 Rome fought the Marcomannic Wars against invading German tribes from the north: similar to setting the eastern periphery at the

border with Parthia, Rome had also set its north eastern periphery in Europe at the Danube River (Weber 1954, 349-364). The outcome was Rome's successful defense of this border and an acceptance of the limitations of its expansion.

The greatest threat to Roman unipolarity came around 260, but this was not due to external invasions, but rather, to internal decay: the Empire was temporarily divided into three, in what became known as the Crisis of the Third Century. In the north the Gallic Empire was formed, which included the provinces of Britain, Gaul, and for a brief period, Hispania. In the East the Palmyrene Empire was formed, which primarily included eastern Anatolia, Syro-Palestine, and Egypt (Alfoldi 1961, 169-192.). With the exception of these breakaway regions, the rest of the Empire remained centered on Rome. By 275, however, the breakaway empires had been subdued and reincorporated into Rome (Mattingly 1961, 297-308), and as such, the ephemeral period during which these developments occurred do not constitute a restructuring of the power configurations of the system. Between this period and the mid-400s, Roman unipolarity was under serious decline.

Multitude of factors, ranging from overexpansion, internal decay, splitting of the empire (East and West), wars of succession, conflict with Persia, and endless incursions from the north by Germanic tribes, were incrementally decaying the only system-wide hegemon. In 395 the Roman Empire was officially partitioned into two centers of power, Rome and Constantinople, with the outcome being the decline and fall of Western Rome by 476, while the Eastern Empire continued on in history as the Byzantine Empire. Within this framework, Rome ceased to exist as the unipole after 395, for the development of two centers of power introduced two sub-system actors, which, in turn,



was supplemented by the presence of a high number of sub-system actors that would give way to the end of Roman unipolarity and the end of the Mediterranean System. A new period of nonpolarity was in the horizon.


### Analysis

The collection of data for the Mediterranean World Political System produces a sequence of 15 codings that provide configuration observations of polar structures. The collected data offer non-obvious information on the transitional attributes of polar structures and the formulation of modes of polarity. Consistent with the study of previous world political systems provided in this work, four schemes of evaluation are provided: 1) distribution of polar structures; 2) transitional patterns after unipolar periods; 3) durability of polar epochs; and 4) probabilistic outcomes of power constellations after unipolar transitions. Five assumptions may be culled from the collected data at the outset. First, the traditional conception prominent in Western-centric scholarship that multipolarity is the system's norm is refuted. Second, unipolarity is not only more prevalent, but also displays longevity and sustained durability, thus limiting the multipolarity-versus-bipolarity-stability-debate common among International Relations scholars (see Chapters 1 and 2). Third, tripolarity appears to be unfit for the Mediterranean System, as the system displayed tendencies of unipolar bandwagoning, bipolar polarization, or multipolar diffusion and balance. Fourth, nonpolar power configurations are not only common in this system, but they also tend to form after transitions from unipolar periods. And fifth, multipolarity is the least stable polar structure with respect to system's durability.

In relation to other world political systems, the Mediterranean System has a relatively equal distribution, as the system displays a balanced development between the modalities of polar structures. As Figure 7.1 displays, the distribution of the 15 observation points demonstrate unipolarity as the most occurring polar structure, as 5 out of the 15 polar periods in the dataset are coded as unipolar. Multipolarity is the second most occurring power configuration, being the system's structure 4 out of 15 data points. Bipolarity and nonpolarity, respectively, defined the polar periods of the system 3 times each, while tripolarity never became a system's structure. Cumulatively, for the 2,395 years that the Mediterranean System existed, 33 percent of the time the system's structure assumed a unipolar power constellations, followed by multipolarity with 27 percent of the time, bipolarity with 20 percent, and nonpolarity defining the polar epochs with 20 percent of the time.


The relatively equal distribution of the polar periods is quite telling: concentration of power in the Mediterranean System was relatively weaker in relation to other world political systems, since 47 percent of the time (multipolar and nonpolar periods combined) the concentration of power in the system was quite diffused, while in the bipolar periods (20 percent of the time), power was relatively more concentrated, yet reliant on polarization and alliances/leagues. Concomitantly, in instances of unipolar preponderance, the system still possessed a consistently high number of sub-system hegemony, which may perhaps explain the absence of complete system-wide hegemony (with the exception of Rome for a given period of time).

FIGURE 7.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES OF MEDITERRANEAN SYSTEM




The longevity and durability of polar periods demonstrate the coherence of fitfulness as it pertains to structural power hierarchies within a system: the longer a power configuration lasts in a system, on average, the more stable the system's structure remains. Within this context, while the distribution of occurrence offers interesting insight into polar structures, just as important is the measurement of longevity for such polar occurrences. Due to the extraordinarily long period of Roman unipolarity (565), unipolarity, on average, remains the most durable polar structure with 216 years. The second most durable structure is bipolarity, averaging 177 years, followed by nonpolarity with an average of 138 years. The least durable polar structure is multipolarity, which averages 91 years. Within this context, as Figure 7.2 shows, at the macro level, the systemically most stable power configuration is unipolarity, for it takes approximately 216 years for a structural transition to take place.

FIGURE 7.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR PERIODS




The relative instability of the multipolar structure is also quite telling, for its average lifespan of 91 years suggests weak longevity in relation to a relatively more concentrated structure found in bipolarity (lasting 177 years), or in relation to a relatively more diffused power structure found in nonpolarity (lasting 138 years). For this reason, multipolarity is not only refuted as the distributive norm within the Mediterranean System, but also, the least durable: of the 2,395 years of this world political system, multipolarity existed for only 365 years, that is, only 15% of the historic space. This is quite limited in relation to unipolarity with 1,080 years (45% of historic space), bipolarity with 530 years (22% of historic space), and nonpolarity with 415 years (18%).

FIGURE 7.3 HISTORIC SPACE OF MEDITERRANEAN SYSTEM



The structural transformations following unipolar periods offer important observational patterns in forming probabilistic assessments with respect to outcome. Since the dataset coded 5 unipolar periods, this allows for similar number of post-unipolar structural transitions. After unipolarity, as Figure 7.4 demonstrates, the distribution is as followed: one period of bipolarity, one period of multipolarity, and three periods of nonpolarity. Interpreting the post-unipolar data probabilistically, the Mediterranean system displayed a 20% chance of transitioning to a bipolar structure after unipolar periods, a 20% chance of transitioning to a multipolar structure, and a 60% probability of transitioning to a nonpolar configuration after unipolarity.

FIGURE 7.4 POST-UNIPOLAR OUTCOMES



The post-unipolar transitions may be better situated through two analytical frameworks: in cases where the concentration of power within the system was relatively limited with respect to the system-wide hegemon's preponderance, the system transitioned into either bipolar or multipolar configurations; while in cases where the concentration of power within the system was relatively extensive with respect to the system-wide hegemon's preponderance, the system transitioned into a diffused nonpolar configuration. The cases of the former are rather obvious: Cretan system-wide hegemonic status was not as concentrated, allowing revisionist Mycenae to restructure the system into a bipolar constellations; similarly, Corinthian unipolarity (650 BC-690 BC) was supplemented by the presence of several powerful sub-system hegemons, and within this

context, concentration of power within the unipole was limited, thus giving way to a multipolar structure after Corinthian unipolarity. With respect to the second analytical framework, the relationship between power concentration and subsequent diffusion has the inverse effect. During Mycenaean system-wide hegemonic preponderance, concentration of power was quite extensive, and as such, the transition after Mycenaean unipolarity gave way to a highly diffused, nonpolar structure. The pattern appears to be the same with both Macedonian unipolarity, after absorbing the Near East-Middle Eastern System, and Roman unipolarity. In both instances, the concentration of power was rather extensive with both system-wide hegemonies, thus creating a severe vacuum after the unipolar period, which gave way to a diffused, nonpolar configuration.

## CHAPTER 8

### THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Global Political System encompasses the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors throughout the globe. The conceptualization of the Global Political System is better explained through three developments. First, as the world political systems absorbed or fused into one another, a more integrated, globalizing political system defined the macropolitical landscape. Second, the Global Political System is the byproduct and the outcome of the growth and expansion of the European System, as this world political system expanded and absorbed much of the known world, thus allowing for the fusion and integration of political actors within a single, global system. Third, data collection and analytic legitimations for criteria-designation begin around the 1500's, as the European Age of Exploration and immediate colonization provides the historical demarcation point where a world political system expands into other world political systems and brings about the integration of separate world political systems into a single global system. The European "discovery" and colonization of the Western Hemisphere, expansion into the African continent, establishment of sustained and non-ephemeral relations with political actors of the civilizations of Asia (for the inclusion of the Indic System and Far East System into the Global Political System, see chapters 5 and 6), and extension into Oceania and South East Asia (East Indies) gave way to an international political system that integrated and encompassed the entire globe. As such, power configurations of polar periods no longer remained confined, generally speaking, to specific, relatively isolated world political systems, since system-wide



hegemony started functioning at the wider global level, thus altering the macropolitical composition of the entire globe.

Four general attributes also appear quite unique to the Global Political System. First, whereas in the specific world political systems of the previous historic space economic considerations were extremely important in the expansion and positioning of system-wide actors, economic attributes, however, remained secondary to military might. Nonetheless, this attribute underwent a form of evolutionary development in the Global Political System, as economic power came to serve as an important mechanism in challenging and counter-balancing other system-wide actors. Simply put, relative to previous historic periods, due to the interactions, interdependence, and the globalization of the world economy, economic power came to matter even more in the new global system: this relevance, however, did not usurp the role of military power, but rather, complemented and reinforced it (example of Venice of the 16<sup>th</sup> century is a case in point: perhaps the richest of European states, yet militarily limited, it failed to attain sub-system hegemony). Second, military power no longer became defined so much by size, but rather, through the intense technological advancements that allowed smaller, better-trained, efficient, and well-equipped armies to defeat or challenge much larger, yet technologically deficient armies. Third, this being the case, designations of system-wide hegemonic status, in the Global Political System, does not seem much concerned with physical control of territories, but rather, with spheres of influence, where relatively smaller territorial states, with powerful economic and military attributes, can exercise extensive influence through their spheres: the success of the Dutch and the British, for example, in relation to Russia or the Ottomans. And fourth, diplomacy became a source

of power in and of itself, as the quality and strength of state policy and diplomacy played a crucial role in observing the behavior and distinction between system-wide and sub-system actors: Austrian perseverance, for example, in comparison to Russian stagnation and eventual decline. Collectively, then, the new Global Political System gave birth to a evolved form of system-wide hegemonic behavior, where dominance and preponderance was not merely about controlling vast territories, peoples, and their economies, but also, about regulating a world order that served and reinforced the interests of the said system-wide hegemon(s). In this sense, technological advancement, robust economic growth, and well-refined diplomacy became extraordinarily important to the ability of actors to attain positioning at the system-wide level, or, for revisionist states, to challenge and counter-balance the existing system-wide hegemon(s), that is, the existing regulated world order.

#### *1500 AD – 1590 AD Unipolar Structure*

The Global Political System during this unipolar period may be defined as followed: a single system-wide actor, and a set of relatively powerful sub-system actors that were in the process of consolidating power. France and Britain had recently concluded a near century of internecine warfare over regional preponderance, and as such, their sub-system conflict had equally weakened both actors, and by the 1500's, both were recovering from exhaustion. At the system-wide level, then, both actors remained absent, as Britain was in the nascent stages of establishing a maritime presence and recuperating, while France, after having secured its northern borders against Britain, was preparing to counter-balance an ambitious Spain. The Ottomans, in the east, were in the process of consolidating sub-system status, as their regional conflict with Safavid Persia over Mesopotamia limited its capacity to attain positioning at the system-wide level. At

the same time, it remained limited to the eastern Mediterranean after having been repulsed by Venice, while attempting to conquer Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula in the Near East. Spain remained the more ambitious of the sub-system hegemon, a revisionist actor that had begun its colonial expansion into the Americas, while on the European continent, jockeying with a recovering France over influence in northern Italy. Due to these developments, the unchallenged system-wide actor remained Portugal, who had initiated the European Age of Exploration and had established an impressive reach across much of the globe. Thus, while the sub-system hegemon were seeking regional positioning, Portugal had attained system-wide status as a global actor.

By the 1500's Portugal had established a presence on the Indian subcontinent, thus assuming dominance of the Indian Ocean and making inroads into the Red Sea. From Calcutta to Goa to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to Macau, Portuguese preponderance was established. This was followed by controlling the entire coast of the Arabian Peninsula, from modern-day Yemen to Oman to Bahrain. The African coast was also fortified, from Mozambique to Mombasa: Portuguese system-wide dominance was unmatched. In 1509 the Ottomans attempted to challenge the system-wide hegemon's position in the Indian Ocean, resulting in the latter's defeat. The Ottoman-Portuguese Naval Wars resumed intermittently, with the latter consistently preserving its spheres of influence (Padfield 1979, 48-51). Portugal continued its expansion into Southeast Asia, establishing presence in Malaysia, Indonesia, Timor, and New Guinea (Boxer 1969). This was supplemented by its colonization in South America, with Brazil becoming an important source of wealth for the system-wide hegemon. Portuguese system-wide hegemony, then, may be attributed to several factors: expansive reach throughout the globe, from South America

all the way to Southeast Asia; its dominance of the Indian Ocean, along with its presence in Africa, India, China, and the Arabian Peninsula; accumulation of immense economic might by dominating the spice trade, along with the strategic routes connecting trade between the East and Europe; and, its South American colonies (Diffie and Winius, 1977).

By 1530, however, revisionist Spain had assumed status of system-wide hegemon, thus eclipsing Portugal and reducing the latter to sub-system status: while Spain came to control vast territories both on the European Continent and throughout its overseas colonies, Portugal remained limited to its overseas colonies, displaying no relevance with respect to the power politics in Europe. Thus, as the sub-system hegemons during Portugal's unipolar period consolidated power and came to potentially act at the system-wide level, Portugal lacked the resources to exercise system-wide preponderance, nor did it seek to curtail the behavior of revisionist states. As such, it found itself reduced to sub-system status. Spain stood out as the preeminent power in Europe, and by extension, in the global system, as it controlled, by 1530, primarily through dynastic inheritance, Austria, Burgundy, Netherlands, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, and of course, much of the Americas (Kennedy 1987, 33-35). It possessed a formidable army and navy, along with a growing mercantilist wealth flowing from its colonies. During this early period of Spanish unipolarity Britain remained in the same position as it had during Portuguese unipolarity: developing a maritime presence and consolidating its sub-system hegemonic status (Wernham 1968, 209-233). France, on the other hand, had grown both suspicious and uncomfortable with Spain's rise to system-wide dominance, and fearing its encirclement, with Spain dominant to its west and to its east, it sought to preserve its

sphere of influence in Northern Italy (primarily over Burgundy and Milan), thus bringing about war with the unipole. Lacking the capability to singularly challenge Spain, France allied with the Ottoman Empire, but to no avail. In 1559, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis brought the Franco-Spanish conflict to an end (Braudel 1995, 945-948), as France remained content as sub-system hegemon, while Spain granted Austria independence (but the two remained extremely close allies) (Mamatey 1978, 8-12), in order to turn its attention against the Ottomans. In the conflicts over Djerba (1560), Malta (1565), Lepanto (1571), and Tunis (1574), Ottomans were kept limited to their eastern and North African spheres, hence failing to dislodge Spain's preponderance over the western Mediterranean (Braudel 1995, 973-1103), nor present a challenge at the system-wide level. The containment of Ottoman Turkey, from that point, became the responsibility of Austria, as continuous victories by the latter methodically weakened the Ottoman's capacity to attain system-wide status (Parry 1968, 360-363). In 1580, in the so-called Iberian Union, Spain assumed dynastic control of Portugal, thus annexing all of Portugal's overseas territories: Spain had reached the apogee of its system-wide dominance.

Spain's decline from system-wide hegemonic status came about with the revolt of the Netherlands, as the Dutch sought independence from Spanish control. A presumed local conflict, it now assumed international dynamics, especially as Britain came to the aid of the rebels. This was coupled by Spain's involvement in France's religious civil wars, which had further weakened France and limited its capacity for system-wide positioning. In 1588 and 1590, Spain unsuccessfully attempted the invasion of England itself, resulting in the former's defeat: Spain's unipolar system-wide preponderance was

over (Koenigsberger 1968, 234-318). Britain had elevated itself to system-wide status by both expanding its colonies as well as being an important actor in the power politics of Europe: it had successfully counter-balanced Spain and was now its equal at the system-wide level. France's recovery after the civil wars also elevated France to system-wide status, as it also sought colonization overseas, while attaining Spain's recognition of its new importance in Europe in the Treaty of Vervins (Braudel 1995, 1204-1221). The success of the Dutch against Spain would soon bring about the United Provinces of Netherlands, an economic and naval power that would also become one of the more powerful system-wide hegemon. Austria, in the meantime, would remain a sub-system actor, as it merely sought domination of the German states, while closely allying itself with Spain, thus allocating system-wide policies to the Spanish (Ramsay 1968, 326-334). Ottoman Turkey's potential for system-wide status was also curtailed, for its defeat by the Spanish and Austrians was compounded by the sub-system challenges brought forth by Safavid Persian (Parry 1968, 357-360), forcing Turkey to turn its resources from system-wide positioning to consolidating regional dominance. Within this context, by 1590, the Global Political System had transitioned to a multipolar configuration.

#### *1590 AD – 1660 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure*

The considerations of this multipolar period are three-fold. First, the system witnessed four system-wide hegemon and a high number of relatively powerful sub-system hegemon. Second, a sub-system hegemonic conflict, The Thirty Year's War, turned into an international system-wide conflict, with potential consequences to the structure of the system. Third, the outcome of The Thirty Year's War would give way to a potential restructuring of the Global Political System, as France would capitalize on the

relative weakness of the other system-wide actors brought about by the conflict, thus reducing these actors to sub-system status and assuming unipolar preponderance.

By 1605 a set of peace treaties had established a balanced, multipolar structure in the Global System: Spain, United Provinces, England, and France serving as system-wide hegemony, with the Ottoman Empire (embroiled in regional conflicts), Austria (seeking regional consolidation of the German states), Russia (rising and expanding), the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (covering the Baltics and north east-central Europe, while countering Russia to the east) and Sweden (dominating Scandinavia and displaying revisionist tendencies) functioning as sub-system hegemony. Spain remained a formidable power, both on the continent and at the global scale, and while other system-wide actors were now able to counter-balance and check Spanish aspirations, it nonetheless remained one of the more powerful global actors (Trevor-Roper 1970, 265-282). Britain had assumed system-wide positioning by establishing one of the more powerful navies in the globe, as well as successfully challenging Spanish unipolarity, while at the same time beginning the process of establishing a massive colonial empire. France's entrance into the club of superpowers is also quite telling: possessing perhaps the biggest army, it competently counter-balanced any threat to its system-wide position, while at the same time formulating its own colonial empire throughout the globe. By 1610 the United Provinces of Netherlands had pretty much established their independence from Spain, and in the process, had grown into a global power. Its most unique attribute was that the basis of its strength was primarily hinged on trade (its overseas expansion ranged from South America to the East Indies), industry (it established factories and trading posts throughout the Indian Ocean), and finance (it

served as the center of international finance, functioning as Europe's leading shipper, exchanger, and commodity dealer): it was an economic powerhouse. At the same, it had perhaps the most powerful navy in the world, one which eclipsed the British during this earlier period (Kennedy 1987, 66-69; Wilson 1968, 26-35).

In 1618 the estates of Bohemia revolted against Austrian sub-system dominance, ushering in The Thirty Years War (Tapie 1970, 513-523), as Spain came to the aid of its ally Austria, while the Dutch, Danes, and Sweden came to challenge Austria's dominance of Germany (Beller 1970, 306-356). France interjected itself into the conflict as well, finding the opportunity to further weaken Spain, as the Dutch and the Danes invaded Germany from the north, only to be followed by the powerful Swedish army in 1630, with France offering financial and diplomatic support (Wedgwood 1938, 269-330). This was followed by a direct French invasion in 1635: Swedish and German troops were pressing Austria from the north, while the Dutch and French were confronting the Spanish presence (335-461). This was supplemented by the Dutch attacking Spanish colonies overseas, especially in Brazil, Angola, and Ceylon (Parker 1979, 54-73). Over-exhaustion, depletion of resources, and a general impasse gave way to secret negotiations to a final peace settlement: The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Economically, the situation had become dire: Germany had been destroyed, Austria and Spain were at the verge of bankruptcy, with the Dutch also suffering severe restraints on their enormous economy, while sub-system hegemony such as Sweden were in an even worse situation. System-wide hegemony was quickly learning that prolonged warfare was inherently incompatible with the growing nature of globalized economics: some form of a balance was necessary. By virtue of such developments and the Treaty of Westphalia, Spain fully



recognized the independence of the Dutch, while the Austrians accepted the regional status quo and thus brought tranquility to Germany (Wedgwood 1938, 505-528). While The Thirty Years War had come to an end, the conflict between the French and the Spanish, however, continued: with a weakened Dutch ally, an absentee Britain going through civil conflict, an exhausted Austria, along with much weakened sub-system actors who had partaken in the war, France sought the opportunity to further press and weaken Spain. Concomitantly, in 1640, the Portuguese revolted against Spanish suzerainty, thus beginning the War of Portuguese Independence (1640-1688) (Elliott 1970, 468-472), which further weakened an already over-stretched Spain (Stoye 2000, 74-86).

Two further developments in the 1650s set the stage for French ascendancy. First, from 1652 to 1654, the First Anglo-Dutch War broke out, as the two most powerful maritime powers undertook a commercial war (Wilson 1978, 61-126). The outcome was mutual exhaustion, with Britain failing to overtake the Dutch as the preeminent maritime power with respect to trade and commerce. Second, France's continued war with Spain led to a Franco-British alliance, which severely beat the Spaniards, forcing the latter to sue for peace, with the conflict being resolved in the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659 (Kennedy 1987, 40-41; Stoye 2000, 88-91). Spain recognized all of French gains from the Treaty of Westphalia, thus expanding French influence throughout the continent, while cutting off Spain at the Pyrenees; France agreed to stop aiding the Portuguese War of Independence, which France indirectly continued, thus making France a powerful arbiter of continental politics (Livet 1970, 412-434). In sum, the Thirty Years War and its consequences thoroughly exhausted and weakened all of the parties involved, with the

exception of France, which walked out of that period as the most powerful country on the globe.

*1660 AD – 1715 AD Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The restructuring of the power constellations from multipolar to a unipolar configuration may be attributed to one specific factor: the previous system-wide hegemon, by virtue of collective weakness and relative decay, found themselves reduced to sub-system status, while France, which had grown relatively more powerful, positioned itself as the only system-wide hegemon. Austria's capacity to possibly rise up to system-wide status was thoroughly curtailed by the devastation it underwent through the Thirty Years War, which was soon, in turn, augmented by intermittent warfare against a decaying Ottoman Turkey: from 1663-1791, inter sub-system hegemonic conflict over Hungary, Croatia, and the Balkans continued between the two actors (Betts 1961, 487-499; Kurat 1961, 508-516). Spain found itself profoundly exhausted and weakened, as it lost its possession of Portugal, remained weak in relation to France on both the European continent and in global affairs, and thoroughly struggled to rebuild an economy that became even more reliant on exploitation of resources from its colonies (Coleman 1961, 26-27): Spain had been reduced to a sub-system hegemon (Regla 1961, 369-382). Britain's position was also quite limited with respect to the macropolitics of this period: having recovered from its civil wars, it competed with the Dutch for dominance of the global sea trade (losing the Second War of 1665-1667, and starting the Third War 1672-1674 to assist France, but only to disappoint), failing to attain maritime dominance, thus undertaking a process of consolidation and growth, while choosing a position of neutrality toward the unipole, as opposed to seeking positioning at the system-wide level

(Ogg 1961, 306-329). The Anglo-Dutch Wars, although giving way to Dutch success, nonetheless had a detrimental effect on its capacity to position at the system-wide level (Kossmann 1961, 281-300), that is, to challenge and counter-balance France. Primarily a maritime power, the Dutch lacked the capability to challenge France's unipolar positioning, but rather, only assumed a defensive posture, as sub-system hegemon, against French infringements upon its territory (McKay and Scott 1983). As Paul Kennedy (1987) summarizes:

To the south, Spain was still exhausting itself in the futile attempt to recover Portugal. Across the Channel, a restored monarchy under Charles II was trying to find its feet, and in English commercial circles great jealousy of the Dutch existed. In the north, a recent war had left both Denmark and Sweden weakened. In Germany, the Protestant princes watched suspiciously for any fresh Habsburg attempt to improve its position, but the imperial government in Vienna had problems enough in Hungary and Transylvania, and slightly later with a revival of Ottoman power. Poland was already wilting under the effort of fending off Swedish and Muscovite predators. Thus, French diplomacy...could easily take advantage of these circumstances, playing off the Portuguese against Spain, the Magyars, Turks, and German princes against Austria, and English against the Dutch—while buttressing France's own geographic position" (100-101).

In 1667 France invaded southern Netherlands, reifying its system-wide hegemonic status through irredentism. Fearing France's new position, England and the Dutch quickly made peace, joining Spain and Sweden to check French expansionism. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668 temporarily stopped the hostilities, which France used to further entrench its unipolar status: it diplomatically brought Britain back to its

camp, secured Swedish neutrality, and appeased Austria and the German states (Zeller 1963, 210-213). Within this context, France's power remained unmatched, and only a collection of a multitude of sub-system hegemony remained able to undertake defensive posturing against French aggression: but no single actor possessed the capability to either challenge or counter-balance France. In 1672 hostilities were re-initiated, with now-allied England attacking the United Provinces, only to be defeated and hence exit the war: its sub-system limitations became exposed. Unable to meet the French challenge by itself, the United Provinces utilize their economic might, via subsidies, to desperately form a coalition against France: the German principalities, Austria, Spain, and Denmark joined the anti-French coalition (214-218). This "coalition of states," however, "was not strong enough to overwhelm France," but rather, merely to stop France's expansionist endeavors (Kennedy 1987, 102). France further displayed its global power by not only having the largest and most powerful land force, but also a navy that fully challenged the Dutch: the French navy had established control of the Mediterranean, with the Dutch and Danish navies holding the Baltics, while neither side was able to prevail in the West Indies. The maritime theater of the war greatly harmed the commerce and trade of both France and the Dutch, which, indirectly, would come to serve the benefits of Britain. In 1679 the set of Nymegen peace treaties brought the open fighting to an end, but France continued as the "arbiter of Europe," neither being challenged nor confronted by Germany, Netherlands, Spain, or England (McKay and Scott 1983, 32-34; Kennedy 1987, 101-102).

In 1688 France invaded Germany, which, once again, brought together a defensive anti-French coalition of all the sub-system hegemony in Europe: A Grand Alliance of England, United Provinces, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Savoy, and the

German states. The land battles created, as previously, an impasse, as the coalition of sub-system hegemons limited France's objectives, while the battle at sea turned into a mutually ruinous war against trade: France sought to raid and harm the commerce of the opponent states, while the Anglo-Dutch navy sought to weaken the French economy by instituting a commercial blockade. By 1697 both sides agreed to end the conflict, bringing about the Treaty of Ryswick, which allowed France to keep some of its gains, but generally maintain the initial geopolitical structure (Clark 1970, 225-253).

In 1700, conflict rose anew which would come to be known as the War of the Spanish Succession: France made dynastic claims over Spain, thus assuming exclusive concession from Spain's large overseas empire. Spain, by itself, capitulated, but Britain, the Dutch, Portugal, German principalities, and a resurgent Austria, after having defeated the Ottomans, once again joined the anti-French alliance. Until 1714 the conflict continued both on land and at sea, with the anti-French alliance first making headways, only to be followed by sets of retreats, thus making it a war of attrition (Veenendaal 1970, 410-445). As powerful as France was, it had basically assumed a policy of pretty much fighting the world, that is, with the exception of the sub-system hegemons of the east, almost every actor in Europe. This continuous policy of expansionism and warfare created two conditions that ended French unipolarity: first, it had profoundly harmed France's economy, while diminishing its once unmatched military (Meuvret 1970, 320-325); second, the war had played to the advantage of Britain, for it now found itself in a position to challenge a relatively weaker France at the system-wide level. Thus, the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt proved rather beneficial for Britain: it gained Gibraltar, Minorca, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson Bay, while securing that Spain and

France will remain two separate kingdoms (Pitt 1970, 446-479; McKay and Scott 1983, 63-66). The final outcome of the French unipolar period is as followed: a thoroughly weakened United Provinces lost its maritime dominance to Britain, hence remaining a sub-system actor; Britain rose to the system-wide level, being the unchallenged power of the seas; and Austria positioned itself as a powerful sub-system hegemon, exercising control in northern Italy, Naples, and Sardinia (Stoye 1970, 590-598).

*1715 AD – 1740 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

The power constellations of the Global Political System during this period is one of bipolarity, as a resurgent Britain established itself the most powerful maritime nation in the world, while France had already established itself as a system-wide hegemon. The Anglo-French dominance of the system was augmented by the presence of the usual sub-system hegemons: a declining United Provinces; a rising, yet non-revisionist Austria; a growing Russia that recently defeated Sweden and assumed control of the Baltics (Anderson 1970, 719-739); Spain with its overseas empire, yet too weakened and limited to function at the system-wide level; and a recently defeated Ottoman Turkey that sustained its sphere of influence in the Near East (Kurat 1970, 632-643). A period of relative peace, as the system-wide hegemons undertook a policy of *détente*, the global system remained balanced between Britain's naval power and overseas colonies on one hand, and France's powerful land force (with also a formidable navy) and its own overseas colonies on the other. The first two decades of this period demonstrated a concerted effort by the system-wide hegemons to preserve the status quo, as the two displayed a coherent tendency to cooperate on multitude of policies and issues (Lindsay 1957, 191-204). Further, a consensus appears to have been reached between the two vis-

à-vis spheres of influence: Britain's continued dominance of the sea, while France's dominance of continental politics, with each, respectively, not interfering in the colonial interests of the other. This was best demonstrated by France's aggressive policies within Europe by the 1730's: unlike the previous epoch where anti-French alliances were formed to check its advances, when France attacked Lorraine and Milan, Austrian possessions, and further moved into the Rhineland, Britain remained indifferent and non-reactive. Within this context, the sub-system hegemons recognized the suzerainty of France on the continent: Spain formed an alliance, the Dutch showed deference, and Austria complied (as evident in the Peace of 1738) (Kennedy 1987, 108). France's diplomatic superiority was further recognized when it negotiated an end to the Austro-Russian sub-hegemonic conflict against the Ottomans.

The dynamics of the Franco-British bipolar structure, however, changed as France's expansion in overseas trade became a concern and a perceived challenge to British maritime suzerainty. This, in turn, was further compounded by the conflict between Britain and French ally Spain over colonial possessions, trade, and expansionism in the western hemisphere (Savelle 1974, 124-134). This gave way to the Anglo-Spanish war in 1739, with France choosing to support the efforts of its ally in the colonial struggle. The conflict, however, did not escalate into an inter-hegemonic war, as Britain lacked the capability to conquer the Spanish colonies, while Spain, even with the aid of France, remained far too weak to challenge Britain's system-wide hegemonic status. By 1740, however, the developing dynamics in Europe will come to change the power configurations of the system, as rising sub-system hegemons will attain system-wide status, thus giving way to a multipolar period.

### *1740 AD – 1790 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure*

By 1740, as apparent with Britain's war with Spain, the former's system-wide hegemonic status was not as strong, while on the European continent, with France in the previous epoch succeeding in succumbing such sub-system hegemons as Austria and the Dutch Republic, its preponderance was now challenged and counter-balanced by the positioning of the sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level. Britain and France were joined by the following actors at the system-wide level: a rising Spain, a resurgent Austria, an ambitious Russia, and a revisionist Prussia. In 1740 Prussia seized Silesia from Austria, thus bringing about conflict within the continent, as Britain immediately allied itself with the latter, while France (along with Spain) offered support to the former, only to soon involve formal and direct hostilities between all the parties. The continental war also spread to the colonies of the respective actors, as naval conflicts and commercial clashes were observed from the West Indies to the eastern Mediterranean (Thomson 1957, 416-435). Russia also joined the conflict on the Anglo-Austrian side, as Britain's growing wealth offered immense subsidies to its allies, while the Dutch remained reliant on British assistance against an advancing France (Horn 1957, 446-461). The relative stalemate of the conflict gave way to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which temporarily halted the hostilities and sought to preserve the status quo: Austrian conquests in Italy were given to Spain; France gave its conquests back to the Dutch in return for given colonies taken by the British, while France also returned captured colonies to Britain (especially Madras in India); and Prussia kept Silesia, while the remaining conquests were returned to Austria (Thomson 1957, 437-439).



In 1755 hostilities resumed, in what would become a global conflict between the system-wide hegemon: the so-called Seven Years' War. Theaters of war ranged from North America (French and Indian War) to Central America, India (Third Carnatic War), Philippines, West Africa, and, of course, the European continent (Pomeranian War and Third Silesian War) (Robson 1957, 465-477). After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, both France and Britain had bolstered their armed forces in preparation for prolonged conflict, which was also complemented by similar measures taken by Austria, Prussia, and Russia: each of the actors had built considerably powerful armies, which, in turn, was supplemented by the growing economies of all actors. The global powers were utilizing their resources to basically restructure the Global Political System. The strategic partnerships and alliances had also shifted: Prussia and various German states now aligned with Britain, while Austria sided with France, with Russia also joining the latter (only to switch sides in 1762): Spain and Netherlands initially sought to maintain positions of neutrality, but this would also not hold. The Franco-Austrian alliance proved quite successful at the outset, as advances against the Anglo-German alliance reaffirmed Austria's system-wide positioning, while France's gains overseas against the British presented the possibility of structural shift in the system.

By 1761, however, the tide was turning, as Britain's naval power proved to be too much for the French, giving way to continuous British conquests of French colonies, while Prussia's land forces on the continent systematically defeated the Franco-Prussian forces. The biggest game changer, however, was Russia's switch, as it aligned itself with the Anglo-German group in 1762, bringing much relief to an over-pressed Prussia (479-480). Spain's involvement in the war in that same year did not produce favorable results:

unable to match British naval power, it fell victim to British conquests of its colonies. By 1763 three developments brought the global conflict to an end: Austria was bankrupt and at the verge of collapse; Prussia's successes were matched by its own exhaustion, only to be coupled by Russia switching sides again in 1763; and France, faced with continued British success, sought to limit its losses as Britain itself faced concern with the situation of its continental allies. Similar to the previous continental conflicts, the Treaty of Paris preserved the status quo ante (1713-1714); but the results overseas were not a return to the status quo. While a great deal of conquered territories were returned back and forth, Britain, however, came out of the conflict as the beneficiary. It kept most of what it took from the French in North America, made headways in West Indies and West Africa, eliminated French influence in India, while gaining Florida from Spain. While low-intensity, intermittent conflict between Britain and France will continue over colonial and commercial competition, the status quo would nonetheless be preserved until the French Revolution, after which a resurgent and revisionist France will seek to restructure the system's polar configurations. In sum, the end of this multipolar period may be summarized as follows: Britain's overseas success solidifying its system-wide status, while France, still a hegemon, losing relative strength and influence both overseas and in Europe; exhausted and broke, Prussia, Spain, and Austria were reduced to sub-system status, while Russia, regardless of its ambitions, lacked the capability to sustain a system-wide presence.

### *1790 AD – 1815 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

The structural transition from a multipolar to bipolar power constellation may be attributed to four general explanations. First, a powerful Britain continued its dominance of the seas, while advancing and strengthening its colonial possessions, which, in turn, led to a policy of limited engagement within Europe itself. Second, a France recovering from the Revolution of 1789 proved to be far more revisionist and ambitious than expected, thus creating a serious counter-challenge to British system-wide hegemonic positioning. Third, France's endeavor to alter the polar structure of the system into a unipolar constellation further intensified the bipolar struggle between the two system-wide hegemons. And fourth, due to the developments in the third case, most of the sub-system hegemons sided with Britain to curtail French ambitions. What came to be known as the First Coalition, lasting from 1793 to 1795, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Britain aligned to curtail France's attempt at ascendancy, only to fail in this objective (Kennedy 1987, 121). By 1796 Prussia had sued for peace, leaving much of Germany in a state of vulnerable neutrality that favored France; the Netherlands was conquered; Spain forced to re-align with France in its traditional anti-British posturing; and Piedmont-Sardinia, along with ally Austria, defeated, thus removing Italy from the latter's sphere of influence (Bruun 1969, 254-255). Britain remained incapable of checking France's expansionism, as it was overwhelmed by the subsidies it had to provide its sub-system allies on the continent, while lacking the resources to challenge the new French hegemony in Europe. This bipolar system, then, was caught between two general strategic dilemmas: Britain's dominance's of the seas was not sufficient to defeat or

curtail French hegemony of Europe, while France's unmatched power on land remained incapable of reducing Britain to sub-system status.

A failed invasion of Egypt by the French, and an attempt to remove the Mediterranean and the Levant from British sphere of influence, gave way to a Second Coalition of sub-system hegemony joining Britain to curtail French successes (Markham 1969, 309-311). The outcome, again, was rather unsatisfactory: by 1800 Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia had been forced into an Armed Neutrality League, while Austria had recognized, through suing for peace, France suzerainty (Bruun 1969, 256-260). Britain managed to defeat the French incursion into Egypt, while taking much of French and Dutch possessions in the West Indies. In this sense, French advances on the continent were matched by British advances overseas. Between 1805 to 1808, a resurgent French navy sought to challenge Britain's maritime preponderance, only to be soundly defeated; while Britain's subsidization of massive Austro-Russian armies to challenge France resulted in the complete defeat of the former by the latter (264-269). France's hegemony over all of continental Europe, with the exception of British allies Portugal (Carr 1969, 444-445) at one end and Sweden (Derry 1969, 489-490) on the other, gave way to the Continental System, where a continent-wide embargo was placed against British trade: British economic ties with all of Europe was severed (at least in policy) (Markham 1969, 326-330). Two policy moves by the French would bring about the structural transition of the Global Political System: an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, which would give way to a war of attrition and severe weakening of French resources, and France's failed invasion of Russia, which would bring about the decimation of France's army. By 1815 France would be thoroughly defeated by the continental sub-system hegemony and

Britain, thus bringing about the Treaty of Vienna and the multipolar structure that came to be known as the Concert of Europe (Gulick 1969, 639-667).

*1815 AD – 1840 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure*

The continuous growth and inclusive nature of transcontinental trade provided a hospitable environment for the rise of an integrated global economy, drawing both system-wide and sub-system hegemonies into larger world-wide trading and financial networks. This was further coupled with immense growth in manufacturing, technological innovation, and the general erosion of tariff barriers. Encouraged to formulate a more harmonious global order following the Napoleonic Wars, system-wide hegemonies, supplemented by powerful sub-system actors, sought long-term commercial and industrial relations, thus giving way to a more integrated global economy and the assumption that this will bring about peace and stability, that is, the absence of system-wide wars. The underlying structure which sought to preserve these developments at the macropolitical level was the so-called Concert of Europe, a multipolar power constellation that prioritized the preservation of the status quo over relative power or inter-hegemonic conflict: the collective desire for stability sought to usurp and curtail revisionism at the system-wide level (Crawley 1969, 669-690). At its inception, it included the five Great Powers: Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France. While Britain, in relative terms, was perhaps the more powerful system-wide hegemon, it did not, at this stage, seek system-wide dominance, but rather, reified the multipolar structure. In this sense, Britain's behavior, during this period, was more consistent with being an important pillar of the Concert System, as opposed to utilizing its relative strength to alter the power configurations of the system into a unipolar constellation

(Thomson 1960, 323-349). By 1840, however, its growth into an unmatched global power would change the polar structure of the global system. Until that point, however, Britain endeavored to partake in the Concert of Europe as a mechanism of stability that preserved the new Global Political System.

One of the more defining attributes of this multipolar period was the level of attention applied by the system-wide hegemon to internal issues, and as such, inter-hegemonic relations fundamentally sought to preserve the relative strength of each system-wide hegemon: revisionist behavior remained limited (Craig 1960, 246-266). The spheres of influence for each of the system-wide hegemon, which was strictly preserved through extensive and highly-refined diplomacy, may be gauged as followed: Prussian dominance of Northern Germany and the Rhineland; Russia's preponderance of pretty much everything east of Austria, with Poland and the Balkans under its watch; Austria stretched across east-central Europe, with much of the Italian Peninsula also under its sphere of influence; France maintained its traditional position in the continent (with Spain selectively part of its sphere of influence), with its system-wide status being further reinforced through its extensive colonies; and Britain's positioning remained similar to France, as it extended from the British Isles in Europe (with Portugal consistently in its sphere of influence) and across much of the globe through its growing colonies. By the 1840's, however, social upheavals and growing complications between the continental powers would deem the Concert System obsolete (Pouthas 1960, 389-409; Craig 1960, 269-273). This would give way to a structural transformation: Britain's global power would maintain and elevate its system-wide status, while the former system-wide actors will be reduced to regional preeminence, thus serving as sub-system hegemon. Simply

put, once the preservation of the status quo became incoherent, Britain assumed the mantle of unmatched unipole: the Pax Britannia was under way.

*1840 AD – 1890 AD Transition Multipolar to Unipolar Structure*

As defined in this work, what constitutes the designation of unipole, vis-à-vis a singular system-wide hegemon, is the absence of challenges or a counter-balance to the unipole's positioning at the system-wide level. The extensive balancing mechanisms of the previous multipolar period had limited the capacity of any single actor to remain unchallenged, for the very nature of the Concert System presupposed balancing and counter-balancing. Two developments allowed for the alteration of the Concert System, thus giving way to a unipolar restructuring: 1) previous system-wide hegemons reduced themselves to sub-system status by becoming embroiled in regional conflict, thus neglecting system-wide positioning and hence becoming primarily preoccupied with the European Continent; and 2) this first development allowed Britain to further expand its global reach, thus functioning at the global level, for as the previous powers mainly functioned at the regional, this left British system-wide dominance without a challenge or a counter-balance. Britain's system-wide hegemonic status, then, was a byproduct of both its growing power (especially economic and colonial might) and the fact that inter-sub-system hegemonic conflict hindered the presence of any revisionist actors. As such, neither challenged nor counter-balanced, British unipolarity dominated the Global Political System.

Within this context, British unipolarity may be categorized by the following attributes: naval mastery, financial credit, commercial expertise, successful diplomacy,

and shirking. Its financial, commercial, and economic might is best summed up as followed:

[T]he United Kingdom produced 53 percent of the world's iron and 50 percent of its coal and lignite, and consumed just under half of the raw cotton output of the globe...It's energy consumption from modern sources (coal, lignite, oil) in 1860 was five times that of either the United States or Prussia/Germany, six times that of France, and 155 times that of Russia! It alone was responsible for one-fifth of the world's commerce, but for two-fifths of the trade in manufactured goods. Over one-third of the world's merchant marine flew under the British flag (Kennedy 1987, 151).

Diplomatically, Britain assumed a position that invited shirking: sub-system hegemony neither engaged in revisionist behavior nor did they seek to challenge British unipolarity, but rather, relied on Britain's prolific ability to regulate the global political and economic system. Concomitantly, Britain either played arbiter when sub-system hegemonic conflicts took place, or refrained from any involvement, thus leaving regional powers to appeal for British assistance or diplomatic influence. Three important sub-system wars demonstrate the unipolar structure during this period: Crimean War, War of Italian Unification, and the War of German Unification. In all three of these regional conflicts, Britain's role was both selective and limited, yet the outcome was the same: the weakening of the given sub-system actors and the continued strengthening of British preponderance.

The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a sub-system conflict between Russia and a much weakened Ottoman Empire, with France, Austria, and Britain getting involved to curtail Russian expansionism (Curtiss 1979; Seaton 1977). A Russian victory in the Crimean War, and thus its assumption of extensive Ottoman territories, could have



inevitably elevated Russia to system-wide status, hence challenging British unipolarity. In this sense, Britain's involvement in the Crimean War (with several of its shirking allies) was a pre-emptive check on possible Russian revisionism at the system-wide level. The outcome of the conflict, then, was profoundly consistent with British objectives: a thoroughly weakened Russia and a more balanced distribution of power among the sub-system actors (Ramm 1960, 469-492).

The Wars of Italian Unification (1848, 1859, 1866-1871) were set of complex conflicts that involved the objective of Sardinia-Piedmont to unify the Italian peninsula into a single kingdom, which was, in turn, curtailed by Austria's dominance of the Peninsula, along with continuous French intrusion into Italian affairs (Smith 1960, 552-576; Macartney 1960, 539-540). The struggle of the Italians against Austria's dominance of the region was supplemented by France's assistance to the former, which, in turn, implied one thing: French ambitions over the region. Continued failures by the Italians eventually led, however, to success by 1871. Austria had been entirely weakened through its wars with Prussia, while also being pressed by France, which allowed the Italians to push out much of Austria's influence from the Peninsula. Similarly, French ambitions in the region were curtailed by France's involvement in the Franco-Prussian war, which allowed Sardinia-Piedmont to seize the opportunity and establish a unified Italian state. The outcome of these sub-system wars was three-fold: Austria (became Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867) was undermined and kicked out of Italy, its traditional sphere of influence; France was also weakened and removed from establishing a sphere in Italy; and a new sub-system hegemon was added to the macropolitical structure, as a united Italy became an important actor in European, and eventually, global politics. Within this

context, these sub-system conflicts led to both the weakening of existing regional actors as well as to the increase of an actor, which, in turn, provided Britain further room for diplomatic influence as potential arbiter.

Of the three major regional conflicts addressed in this section, the War of German Unification is perhaps the most important, for the outcome would be a powerful German state that would give way to a restructuring of the system's power constellations. The German Wars of Unification were a set of three wars fought by Prussia against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870), with the result being an unquestioned victory for Prussia and the establishment of the German Empire (Foot 1960, 577-602). While the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War had important impacts on the Italian Wars of Unification, the intertwining nature of regional conflict pretty much came to an end with the establishment of Germany as the most powerful sub-system hegemon in the continent (Taylor 1954). After having lost Italy and its influence among the German states, Austria was reduced to weak sub-system status, soon to accept German suzerainty. While initially a continental powerhouse at the beginning of this polar period, France was also reduced to a much weaker position, as Germany's methodical defeat and even conquest of Paris signified the presence of a new, and regionally unmatched, power (Howard 2001). At the macropolitical level, then, Germany had consolidated regional power by defeating all of the continent's sub-system actors, and hence positioning itself as a potential challenger to British unipolarity.

With the limited exception of the Crimean War, Britain did not intervene directly in the sub-system wars during this epoch, and as such, it did not view Germany, at this stage, as a revisionist actor. The reasons for this are three-fold: 1) after unification,

Germany's policy was one of preserving the status quo; 2) Germany did not display any attempts at challenging or counter-balancing Britain, but rather, assumed a policy of shirking; and 3) Germany's role as honest broker in the Congress of Berlin in 1876 proved its commitment to the status quo and the preservation of stability (Kennedy 1987, 188-191). All of these developments were supplemented by Germany's refusal to challenge Britain, and more explicitly, not to contradict or upset British policies: Germany's possible designs against France in 1875 were immediately stopped by Berlin when London issued a warning. Heeding to London's warning displayed Germany's refusal, at this stage, to challenge British system-wide hegemony. By 1890, however, the dynamics would be quite different, as Germany's military-industrial growth, and its endeavor to question the existing global order, would bring about a bipolar power configuration.

#### *1890 AD – 1915 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure*

By 1890 the power constellations of the Global Political System had transitioned into a bipolar structure, supplemented by the usual set of powerful European sub-system hegemon, along with the presence of two new sub-system hegemon: the United States (establishing sphere of influence in much of the Western Hemisphere and proceeding to push out the Spanish) and Japan (defeating the Chinese and Russia and establishing regional dominance in East Asia and expanding into Southeast Asia) (Davidson 1968, 329-337). Germany's extraordinary growth, coupled with its extensive positioning throughout the globe, elevated the former sub-system power to system-wide status, as it sought to both solidify its global positioning and challenge British suzerainty (Bury 1960, 300-302). Germany's approach at the outset appeared to have been three-fold: its

merchant and naval buildup strategically targeted British weaknesses; its banking and finance both challenged and undercut British endeavors in Asia, Africa, and the Near East; and, German industry, along with scientific and technological advances, threatened Britain's continued global superiority in proliferating its industry and culture (Frederick 1999, 307). By 1900 German naval and territorial expansion threatened British interests in the North Sea, the African Cape, the Mediterranean, and the land routes to India. Globally, Germany expanded to every prosperous market in the commercial sphere where which Britain had dominance, thus directly challenging British commercial interests. The policy of shirking, which had given Britain a piece of mind during Pax Britannia, was now over, as Germany challenged Britain in every aspect: industry, finance, commerce, technology, science, transportation, and military capability. Concomitantly, German advances methodically diminished British relative power, an inherent attack upon the global British system.

In the Far East, Germany made inroads into China and Singapore, traditional British spheres of influence, as it opened ports and entered markets at the expense of British interest. In the Near East-Middle Eastern region, Germany managed to squeeze out British dominance of the Turkish markets, establishing itself as the most prominent European influence in the Ottoman Empire (Bury 1960, 604-306). This German advance was viewed with great suspicion by Russia, France, and Britain, thus setting the stage for anti-German alliance formations. In the African continent, Germany challenged British political and commercial interests in South Africa, further infringing upon traditional British sphere of influence (306-307). Collectively, Germany's rise to system-wide status, and its direct counter-balance to Britain's position, suggests a two-pronged

approach: methodical challenge to the British economic/commercial/trade system throughout the globe, and, an arms race in the form of a naval buildup to establish superiority over the seas.

During this bipolar period three important sub-system hegemonic conflicts took place: the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish-American War, and the Russo-Japanese War. The Boer War, which included Britain's attempt to maintain control over its South African colony (Bury 1968, 118-119), was relevant to the extent that the Germans displayed sympathy with the Boers, thus reifying its continued counter-balance of Britain. The Moroccan Crisis of 1906-1907 further intensified the split between German interests and those of the British (with French interests also being harmed by the Germans) (Bury 1960, 317-327). What all these conflicts led to, in essence, was the development of rigid alliances, possible modes of polarization: the Triple Alliance comprised of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (the Ottomans will also partake in the near future), and the Triple Entente, comprised of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The stage for World War One was set (Vyvyan 1960, 329-354).

#### *1915 AD – 1945 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure*

The outbreak of World War One, and its subsequent outcome, thoroughly altered the polar structure of the Global System, as the German-British bipolar system transitioned into a complex multipolar system, with system-wide hegemons at times being reduced to sub-system status, but soon recuperating and thus altering the dynamics of multipolarity. The Triple Alliance was primarily centralized on Germany's unflinching support for Austria-Hungary, while at the same time obstructing and curtailing the interests of British allies France and Russia of the Triple Entente. While the specific

causes of WWI are not relevant to the analysis at hand, three important factors must be considered.

First, Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia, and Russia's subsequent declaration of war against Austria-Hungary suggested the initial restructuration of the polar system. Second, Germany's recognition of the alliance structure, or the level of polarization between the alliances, led it to immediately unleash war against France, since France's involvement to support its ally Russia was a foregone conclusion, as was Germany's swift involvement in support of Austria-Hungary. Third, British involvement also became inevitable with Germany's invasion of France, since Britain, regardless of alliance obligations, cannot stand by and allow an extraordinarily powerful Germany the chance to dominate the continent (Atkinson 1960, 359-382).

These three developments, in turn, were supplemented by the actions of important sub-system actors: Italy switched its allegiance to the Triple Entente and primarily maintained neutrality; Japan, because of its Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, offered support to the Triple Entente in the Far East (Davidson 1960, 416-419); and the United States, in its rise to system-wide status, joined against the Central Powers in support of Britain and France.

The macropolitical outcome of the war, for approximately the next 20 years, may be gauged as followed: Britain, while relatively weakened due to the exhaustion and attrition of war, maintains its system-wide status; France, victorious with Britain, elevates itself to system-wide status, both enjoying regional and global prominence; United States, similar to the victorious states, assumes system-wide status, regardless of lingering policies of isolationism; Germany, while profoundly weakened, and symbolically reduced to tributary status based on the indemnities it must pay under the Treaty of

Versailles (Butler 1960, 448-455), nonetheless remains a system-wide force to reckon with, possessing not only a powerful army, but also much technological and economic global reach (although Britain, France, and Japan did assume most of its overseas colonies); Russia's military losses and early exit from the war, followed by internal revolution, reduced it to sub-system status (Deutscher 1968, 403-431); the defeat of the Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of its empire reduced Turkey from a relevant sub-system actor to a minor regional player (Kedourie 1968, 269-272); Italy maintained its sub-system status, while possessing revisionist objectives of becoming a system-wide actor; the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed after WWI, ending the Habsburg presence in Europe and relegating Austria to the status of non-factor; and Japan only found itself strengthened as sub-system hegemon in the east, with similar revisionist aspirations, like the Italians, of attaining system-wide positioning.

By the 1930's the multipolar structure of the system had not much altered, with Britain, France, Germany, and the United States as system-wide hegemon, and Japan, Italy, and Russia as sub-system hegemon. The relative power capabilities of the given actors, however, had changed: Germany began a massive rearmament and industrialization process that would allow it to exceed, in both economic and military terms, any other actor on the European continent; the United States had also grown into a global economic behemoth, with a growing military might that was yet to be tested; Japan also had been undertaking extraordinary economic and military progress through industrialization, developing one of the more advanced navies in the world; Italy, while economically semi-developed in relation to other world powers, had nonetheless begun forming a massive army and one of the bigger navies in the Mediterranean, thus seeking

system-wide positioning; Britain, meanwhile, had maintained its economic might, while its military capabilities had remained stagnant, as the British had sought a global policy of preserving the status quo; and France, on the other hand, had generally remained dormant, lacking the level of industrial and economic growth observed in other rising powers. Collectively, then, the macropolitical structure of the Global Political System, until World War Two, remained reified by the existing actors, with the only difference being the continued strengthening of revisionist actors whose potential objective was to alter the polar structure of the system.

Similar to the analysis provided for WWI, the causes and stages of the Second World War are not relevant to the macropolitical assessments at hand. The relevant factors, however, may be gauged in five general developments. First, the formation of the Axis Powers and Japan's rise to system-wide actor altered the dynamics of the multipolar system, while Italy's incompetence and continued reliance on Germany negated its endeavor of being a global power. Second, France's swift capitulation demonstrated its growing weakness during the inter-war period, and France found itself reduced to a sub-system status. Third, the involvement of the Soviet Union in the conflict introduced a new system-wide actor, as the previously weakened Russian state had resurged into a global actor under the new Soviet state. Fourth, hesitant system-wide hegemon America overcame its isolationist tendencies and reasserted itself as one of the more powerful system-wide hegemony. And fifth, Britain reified its position as system-wide hegemon by countering the Axis Powers even when France had been occupied and the United States had not yet entered the war: Britain's extraordinary military and economic might was singularly displayed at its best. In this context, the multipolar structure during the Second



World War possessed five system-wide hegemons: Germany, Japan, Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union. The outcome of WWII, however, ended the multipolar epoch, as the defeated Axis Powers were reduced to sub-system status, while the victorious allies found themselves split into two dominant poles. The United States assumed the leadership of one pole, while the Soviet Union of the other, and while polarization took place in the forms of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Global Political System, in essence, was defined by the counter-balancing behaviors of the United States and the Soviet Union, with respective allied states acting accordingly. The bipolar structure, defined by the Cold War, was under way.

*1945 AD – 1990 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure*

The end of the Second World War restructured the polar configurations of the Global Political System, as the traditional great powers who had maintained system-wide status during the previous multipolar period were reduced to sub-system status, while two relative newcomers to the macropolitics at the system-wide level, historically speaking, reinforced the bipolar structure. Germany was initially reduced to a political non-factor, as the Allies divided the country initially into four occupation zones, and then during the Cold War, into two zones, hence creating two countries. Concomitantly, much of German industry came under Allied control, while stringent regulations were enforced upon its capacity for rearmament. While West Germany would undertake impressive economic growth in the next 30 years, the German state, as a global actor, would not attain relevant sub-system status until its unification at the end of the Cold War. Within this context, (West) German relevance, at the macropolitical level, remained defined by three variables: it was either an extension of the European Community, remained reliant on

US/NATO military protection, or assumed status of prestige second to Britain and France at the sub-system level. Similarly, Japan was stripped of its overseas acquisitions, reduced to control and dominance by the United States, limited in its capacity for armament, and until its impressive economic growth within a 30 year time span, remained a sub-system actor heavily reliant on American military protection.

France initially sought to position itself as a system-wide hegemon, accepting an occupation zone in Germany, receiving permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and reinforcing its dominance of such overseas colonies/protectorates as Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and minor islands in the Pacific (Smith 1981, 85-137). France's grand strategy, however, was untenable: it lacked the economic capabilities of functioning at the system-wide level; it heavily depended not only on American economic aid but as well as military assistance; and finally, its capacity to hold on to its colonies proved to be a failure, as it already had lost its mandates in Syria and Lebanon, while Indochina was not only lost but became a nightmare for the US in the form of the Vietnam War, and not to mention the horrors of the Algerian War which eventually supplemented the losses of Tunisia and Morocco. France had become a sub-system actor with dreams of being a great power, yet it lacked the capability to either challenge or counter-balance the two existing poles, instead choosing to engage in either shirking or bandwagoning with the United States as an important NATO member.

Analytically, the case of Britain remains the most difficult in the initial stages of the Cold War with respect to taxonomical considerations of macropolitical status. In Europe it remained the most powerful country, both economically and militarily, having played a most important role in winning the war and reifying its global status.

Furthermore, its global reach remained immense, since the structure of its empire had sustained itself, and British status was respected by both the United States and the Soviets. The problems, however, were several: it was over-extended and exhausted after having won the war; its gold and dollar reserves were almost diminished, while its domestic economic situation was immensely dire; it continued to rely upon American assistance both during and after the war (e.g., Marshall Plan); and, it realized its empire was no longer maintainable, as it slowly withdrew from India and the Middle East. Within this context, Britain became a sub-system hegemon, but perhaps the most powerful of the sub-system actors, becoming both dependent on the United States for security and yet also serving as its most useful ally (Kennedy 1987, 387-388). In this sense, British policy selected shirking and bandwagoning at the sub-system level instead of challenging and counter-balancing at the system-wide level: that is, while it had the capabilities to possibly function at the system-wide level, it nonetheless made the decision to bandwagon as a NATO member, thus placing much of the burden on the United States.

That the European age had been eclipsed in terms of economic and military power was not open to debate. By 1950 the total gross national product of the United States was \$381 billion, while the Soviet Union's was \$126 billion: each thoroughly surpassed the \$71 billion of Britain, the \$50 billion of France, and \$48 billion of Germany. Militarily the numbers were also telling: United States spent \$14.5 billion with 1.38 million military personnel, the USSR with \$15.5 billion for whopping 4.23 million military personnel, while Britain (\$2.3 billion for 680,000 military personnel) and France (\$1.4 billion for 590,000 military personnel), respectively, remained far behind (Kennedy 1987, 369). By

1970, in terms of military spending, it is quite obvious that the European states had truly assumed a position of bandwagoning: US defense expenditure was \$77.8 billion, USSR's was \$72 billion, while France, West Germany, and Britain, respectively, only spent \$5.9 billion, \$6.1 billion, and \$5.8 billion (384).

Important to note during the bipolar balance of power was the possible consideration of China as a third pole, suggested through three general developments: Sino-Russian tensions and border disputes; policy of *détente* and US attempt to introduce China at the system-wide level as an extra counter-balance to the Soviets; and, China's growing military expenditure (\$23.7 billion by 1970), military size, and perceived potential. These considerations, however, were countered by four important limitations. First, economically, China was not only underdeveloped, but trailed much of the developed world, and as such, its capability to function at the system-wide level was not tenable; second, militarily, while it had size and potential, it lacked the technology and the ability to coherently challenge either of the poles in the system; third, considerations of Chinese system-wide hegemonic status appears to have been inherently premature, since China had not even established regional sub-system hegemony; and fourth, China's own policy never sought system-wide positioning, and as such, its position was one of neutrality and shirking, refusing to either bandwagon or engage in revisionism.

The development and continuation of the Cold War not only further polarized the Global Political System, but also created a complex web of counter-balancing between the two poles, ranging from arms race, to ideological expansionism, to proxy wars. America's endeavors in the Korean War and the Vietnam War proved to be relatively fruitless and quite damaging to its capabilities, yet it neither weakened nor limited

America's positioning as system-wide hegemon. Meanwhile, with the exception of the Afghanistan invasion in the 1980's, the Soviets did not embroil themselves in external wars like the Americans; but, rather, had to deal with internal turmoil: the Hungarian uprising in 1956, Prague Spring in 1968, and the Velvet Revolutions of the 1980's. By 1980 America's gross national product doubled that of the USSR, while Japan and West Germany nearly matched the latter. Militarily, US spending had also thoroughly eclipsed Soviet spending, yet the Soviet bloc remained more than capable to counter-balance and preserve the bipolar structure. The attributes giving way to the collapse of the USSR is beyond the scope of this work, but the outcome remains unchallenged and singular: US unipolarity. Thus, by 1990 the Soviet Union existed in all but name, as the Warsaw Pact collapsed with the Velvet Revolutions and the attainment of political independence for the Eastern and Central European countries, while the 16 republics within the Soviet Union itself had also begun the process of succeeding. The Cold War, along with the bipolar epoch, had come to an end.

*1990 AD – Present Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure*

The transition of the Global Political System into a unipolar structure brought about three unique outcomes. First, the United States, as the unipole, was not only unmatched nor challenged, but also attained friendly relations with all the political units that had opposed the American pole during the Cold War. Second, as a consequence, all Warsaw Pact satellite states formed alliances with the unipole (joined NATO), while former Soviet states, Russia included, either assumed a position of friendly neutrality, or sought closer relations. Third, with previous challengers to American system-wide hegemony now on friendly terms, the Global Political System remained absent of any

revisionist actors that sought to either challenge or counter-balance the United States. Concomitantly, the only actors during this early period capable of engaging in such behavior were in fact the unipole's close allies: the Europeans (primarily Britain, France, and Germany). To this end, American suzerainty was not a subject of debate.

The current unipolar system may be defined by American preponderance (Layne 1993), where potentially rising powers, instead of engaging in revisionist behavior, are persuaded to bandwagon (Schweller 1994). Many of these states, however, at the same time engage in "leash-slipping," where they do not fear the superpower and build their own capabilities to conduct their own policies (Layne 2006). The policies of France, Germany, China, Russia, and Brazil are examples among many. Within this context, none of these states seek system-wide positioning nor do they pose a counter-balance to the unipole, but rather, they selectively refrain from bandwagoning, and in cases of China and Russia, seek regional, sub-system consolidation. This assumption is consistent with the claims of Nye (2002), Walt (2005) and Ikenberry (2011a), who contend that the preponderance of the unipole is not temporary, that contingent on its international obligations, alliances, and institutional arrangements, its system-wide hegemonic status may be preserved. As such, the lack of counterbalancing, continued international cooperation, and absence of any foreseeable hegemonic rivalry suggests the reification of the American unipolar system (Wohlforth 1999).

Furthermore, the strength of American unipolarity is not only dependent on material capabilities, but also on the social system that the unipole constructs, where its values and hegemonic status are legitimated (Finnemore 2011). This is somewhat consistent with the treatment of the contemporary unipolar system as being

cosmopolitanized (Held 1996; Cabrera 2004; Appiah 2007), legalistic (Goldstein et al 2001), constitutionalist, and defined by liberal values (Ikenberry 2011a), where the system-wide hegemon engages in strategic restraint as opposed to overt aggression (2001). This strategic restraint, however, assumes that revisionist actors are absent from the system, and as such, powerful sub-system actors either shirk, as is the case with China or Russia, or bandwagon, as is the case with European and Asian actors, such as South Korea and Japan. Concomitantly, opposition to the policies of the unipole does not constitute a challenge or a counter-balance, since no sub-system actor has managed to challenge the United States at the global level.

Whether considering Russia's current complications with Ukraine, Iran's positioning in the Middle East, China's behavior in the Far East, or leash-slipping in Latin America: none of these are challenges or acts of counter-balance against American system-wide positioning, but rather, the endeavors of regional actors seeking consolidation as sub-system hegemons. To this end, until powerful sub-system hegemons refrain from shirking and/or bandwagoning and seek to challenge the United States at the system-wide level, the current Global Political System is likely to maintain its unipolar structure. The more interesting question, of course, is what will happen if the existing system-wide hegemon's decline is not initiated by any challengers, but rather, of its own making? What would be the structural consequences for the Global Political System after the end of American unipolarity?

## Analysis

The Global Political System provides 12 observation points of polar periods within a timespan of approximately 500 years of world history. The collected data provide sufficient information for gauging four general analytical considerations: the distribution of polar structures, assessment of the formation of polar structures after transitions from unipolarity, calculating the duration and longevity of the polar periods within the data, and computing the probabilistic outcomes of polar structures after unipolar periods. Five general comments may be made with respect to the data at hand. First, tripolarity remains absent from the Global Political System, as the power configurations of the system either assumed bipolar configurations or multipolar configurations, with the system failing to observe the presence of three system-wide hegemon. Second, none of the polar periods are designated as nonpolar, with the number of actors in multipolar structures never surpassing 5, hence the system consistently observing the presence of one, two, four, or five system-wide hegemon during their respective polar periods. Three, there is an equal distribution between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar periods, indicating that the Global Political System, regardless of structural transitions, consistently observed the presence of several and continuously active system-wide actors. Fourth, unipolar preponderance within the Global Political System never demonstrates extensive concentration of power as observed in previous world political systems, that is, even in cases of unipolarity, powerful sub-system hegemon always remained present in the system, hence the tendency of the system to assume post-unipolar structures that are either bipolar or multipolar. And fifth, the absence of nonpolarity may be attributed to this factor, for the Global Political System



never observed extreme concentration of power within a single actor, or an extensive diffusion of power without any system-wide actors. Within this context, periods of nonpolarity, primarily after unipolar periods in other world political systems, usually formed when extraordinarily powerful unipoles, with extensive concentration of power, collapsed, hence leading to a similar extensive diffusion of power with no sub-system actors having sufficient power to assume system-wide positioning. To this end, since the distribution of power, vis-à-vis concentration, remained within several European actors, with shifts in relative power reducing or raising an actor from sub-system to system-wide positioning, the system never underwent extensive concentration or diffusion of power. The equal distribution of polar structures between unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity is consistent with such observations.

The distribution of polar structures within the Global Political System is as followed: four periods of unipolarity, four periods of bipolarity, and four periods of multipolarity. As such, unlike other world political systems, the Global Political System presents a unique phenomenon of exact and equal distribution of polar periods. Within this context, of the 500 years that the system consumed historic space, each of the three polar structures defined the system 33% of the time, respectively.

Considering the system's structural stability, the longevity of the polar period is quite telling. Stability, however, pertains to the maintenance of a single power configuration for a given duration, as opposed to treatments of stability and instability being gauged by conflict and war. On average, the most durable polar structure within the Global Political System is unipolarity, lasting approximately 56 years. The second most durable polar structure is multipolarity, with an average longevity of 42.5 years. The least

endurable of the three configurations is bipolarity, with an average lifespan of 30 years. Unipolarity, then, remains the most stable polar structure within the system, with a total lifespan of 225 years between 4 polar epochs, followed by multipolarity with 170 years for 4 polar epochs, and bipolarity with 120 years for 4 polar epochs. The analytical considerations here are quite obvious: bipolar periods simply do not last for a very long time, as a 30 year average within a 500 year timespan is quite short, while unipolarity is quite stable with an average lifespan of 56 years, clearly suggesting that bipolar and multipolar structures transition far quicker than unipolar structures. The relative longevity of unipolarity is quite interesting, considering the fact that power concentration within the Global Political System remains rather limited, yet the unipole succeeds in having a longer presence as a singular actor as opposed to being a system-wide hegemon sharing the macropolitical scene with other actors.

The transitional patterns of the system after unipolar transitions remain analytically limited, since the number of observations is quite low at 4, with the final unipolar period being in its current form, hence lacking data on what its post-polar structure would be. As such, 3 observations are left from the dataset, with the system transitioning to a bipolar system after unipolarity twice, and transitioning to a multipolar system once. Probabilistically speaking, then, after unipolar periods in the World Political System, there is a 50 percent chance that the system will assume a bipolar configuration, while a 25% chance of multipolarity, with the remaining 25 percent still to be seen. With a limited time span of only 500 years, as opposed to the 2800 years of the Far Eastern System, or the 2400 years of the Mediterranean System, for example, the existing data remains relatively limited when attempting to gauge the post-unipolar probabilities. To

this end, it becomes rather imperative to rely on the cumulative data and patterns ascertained from the other world political systems to be able to cogently engage in calculative predictions and analysis of the structural form that the post-American unipolar period might possibly take.

## CHAPTER 9

### After Polarity: Findings and Aftermath

If modesty was a scholarly virtue, complacency would usurp innovative ideas, original constructs, and unprecedented challenges to the stagnation and repetitiousness that defines the field of International Relations as it pertains to the study of great powers, hegemonic behavior, and polar structures. The endeavor at hand, then, is not a homage to modesty, but rather, is an attempt, at its most basic level, to neutralize two general and severe deficiencies within the field: chronic ahistoricism and the givenness of Eurocentrism (Teschke 1998; Buzan and Little 2000; Zhang 2001). Within this framework, the study of hegemonic states and polar formations cannot be limited to the post-Westphalia system or the myopic historical space of the Greco-Roman world. By formulating and applying the concept of world political systems, the project at hand has attempted to broaden and advance the study of great powers and polarity, offering novel theorization coupled with empirical data collection that allows for hypothesis testing, probabilistic predictions, and knowledge-accumulation through the unearthing of non-obvious facts.

Each of the world political systems, as presented in their respective chapters, demonstrates the following features: an anarchic system comprised of hegemonic actors (or absence of hegemonic actors), that is, a system encompassing autonomous, territorially-based political units that interact and seek positioning within the power structure of the system; a spatial and territorial designation of the system's parameters; explanatory considerations of the shifts, transitions, and the formations of polar structures; and, accountability for the behavior of system-wide hegemonic or sub-system

hegemonic actors in shaping and transforming the power constellations of the system. The aggregate data of the findings suggest potential breakthroughs in gauging systemic transitions, post-transitional predictions, accountability for structural shifts, hegemonic behavior vis-à-vis unipolar configurations, structural longevity vis-à-vis system's maintenance, and an analytical and probabilistic treatment of nonpolarity as a polar configuration.

The scientific study of polarity began with the hope and assumed promise that the accumulation of data and historical evidence and its systemic analysis would give way to a more robust and conclusive understanding of the overarching factors associated with hegemonic state behavior, polarity formation, and observable transitional patterns. Having utilized, collectively, some 10,200 years of political history, this project seeks to present perhaps the most complete treatment of designating, classifying, and qualifying the criteria of historical time and space in assessing and analyzing the formation of polar structures and transitions. What is of greater significance is the consideration that the critical mass of evidence procured may constitute and provide the basis for a conceivable paradigmatic shift in how polarity is conceptualized, spatial-temporally categorized, and systemically analyzed. Since the great body of research on polarity has been fixated on the post-Westphalian European system, observational data points have been inherently limited and simply confined to a 500 year history, offering very little data collection and documented information with respect to polar periods and transitional patterns. Concomitantly, power configurations have been confined to either considerations of bipolarity or multipolarity, since the limited data of the post-Westphalian European system offers no other alternatives or body of evidence to suggest otherwise (until

American unipolarity). By broadening the breath and scope of polarity research to the wider historical process through the inclusion of several world political systems, the myopism of Eurocentrism and the problem of data limitation have been attenuated.

The research at hand is not simply preoccupied with data collection, where which data analysis has been delayed or marginalized; rather, the methodological approach has been mutually complimentary, as data analysis has proceeded in close association with data collection. To this end, this project has concentrated on conducting empirical research as opposed to merely formulating a data set for polarity studies. While the case of the latter is nonetheless true, the objective is much greater than that, for the given data has been collected to address specific research questions and puzzles that International Relations scholars have not attempted to answer in the study on polarity. This, in turn, brings about another objective of this project: the marriage of the theoretical with the empirical. Propositions and research questions must have well-developed, robust theoretical and explanatory foundations before they are tested, otherwise the results will primarily be a mass of disconnected findings that are deficient in theoretical quality and explanatory strength. Thus, accumulating data, formulating research questions, and testing these questions with the goal of solving important puzzles remains a uni-dimensional and insufficient approach. This is most prevalent in the measurement and quantification of state behavior within intra-polar research, as discussed in Chapter 3. Namely, the findings produce quantified results, but very little explanatory capabilities, thus contributing to more confusion and controversy: knowledge-accumulation remains stagnant. At the same time, robust theoretical models and concise propositions, attained through deduction and dense analysis, also do not suffice. That is, regardless of how

powerful and appealing a theory is, or how thought-provoking its propositions may be, they remain just that: untested propositions. The objective, then, necessitates the marriage of the two approaches: a robust theory with explanatory powers, and empirical research that produces data and evidence which allow for the testing and analysis of the given theory and its propositions. As such, if the scientific study of polarity is to be vindicated, and thus escape the controversy and stagnation that surrounds it, a set of empirical generalizations must be produced that are verifiable and corroborated, which, in turn, may be justified by the explanatory strength of its underlying theoretical model.

At the outset of this work, the following sets of research questions were posed. After each unipolar period, what power configuration does the structure of a system take? Does the system become bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar? Which polar structure has numerical advantage of becoming formed after unipolarity? What are the probabilistic relations between each possible mode of polarity after unipolar periods? Can consistent patterns be observed that produce non-obvious facts and observations into the historic process of polar structuration after unipolarity? Based on the potential quantified results, can it be predicted, even probabilistically, how long US unipolarity will last, or, what the post-American global system will look like? Prior to the research at hand, these questions could not have been answered because the body of evidence and the necessary data that may allow for the investigation of such questions remained absent. As such, the field of International Relations lacked both the necessary data and the theoretical models to even address such questions and propositions. Simply put, the knowledge was lacking, and for this reason, the puzzle remained unanswered.

That this project proposes to answer such questions suggests three things. First, by expanding the universe of observations, and thus engaging in extensive data collection, a body of evidence is produced that allows for important probabilistic and analytical conclusions. Second, the scope and depth of such an expansion necessitated a well-refined theoretical model, for criteria, designation, and conceptual categorizations must first be legitimated before the endeavor may be undertaken. Third, by formulating such a theoretical model and utilizing paradigm-building, not only is an explanatory theory developed, but also the necessary paradigmatic tools are formulated to help acquire the empirical data in order to substantiate the theory. As such, the introduction of the concept of world political systems, for example, allowed for the expansion of the universe of observations, since scholarship was no longer limited to the stagnant treatments of polarity that strictly have been confined to the post-Westphalia European system.

In this sense, by covering the macropolitical developments of various systems throughout world history, a more inclusive and robust body of data was ascertained. This, in turn, was supplemented by the utilization of such conceptual tools as system-wide and sub-system hegemon, along with the designation of polar structures defined and legitimated by the theoretical model at hand, including, of course, the application of nonpolarity. To this end, whereas traditional studies of polarity rely on approximately 12 observation points (polar periods from the 1600's to the present), with inconclusive, controversial results that defy consensus (see chapter 3 for a discussion of the measurement trap and the contradictions and general lack of consensus in the study of polarity), the project at hand presents 109 observation points, with clearly developed and defined criteria of what constitutes the mode of polarity, system-wide hegemon, sub-



system hegemon, and world political system. This perhaps explains why the scientific study of polarity has primarily been restricted to intra-polar studies: the stability of bipolarity in relation to multipolarity, the magnitude of war in relation to alliance formation and polarization, and in general, state behavior in relation to systemic characteristics and outcomes. With such a limited universe of observations, traditional scholars have concentrated on the intra-polar developments, since patterns, shifts, and transitions of polar structures cannot be coherently studied, observed, analyzed, or tested with so few observations. Simply put, limited to intra-polar considerations, and constrained by merely a dozen observations, the existing paradigmatic tools utilized by scholars of polarity restricts their ability to address the above posed questions: what do we know about observational patterns and probabilistic assessments of polar transitions and structural shifts?

That hegemonic actors seek to advance their interests and thus engage in behavior at the systemic, macropolitical level to reify such aspirations should be accepted as axiomatic. In relation to other actors in the system, powerful actors with system-wide aspirations seek positioning that either solidifies their relative power or insulates and protects their interests from relatively equal powers. The tactics of *realpolitik* appears to be the pervasive norm among system-wide hegemons, as preservation and advancement of interest necessitates behavior that is consistent with military build-up, economic expansion, alliance formations, establishment of spheres of influence, and the attempt to curtail revisionist actors that seek to challenge the established and perceived interests of the given hegemon(s). These considerations, however, are not claims that possibly suggest whether tactics of *realpolitik* lead to war or peace, stability or instability, success

or failure: these considerations, rather, are empirical observations into the behavior of states that seek system-wide preponderance. Within this context, it should not be presupposed that the project at hand argues that power politics offers sufficient explanations for state behavior. Rather, it is contended that power politics is a type of state behavior, and the extent to which given system or sub-system hegemons utilize power politics at the macro level is contingent upon the set interests and policies of such actors.

### **Results and Analysis**

The produced data set contains a total of 109 observation points that generate findings which pose important and serious challenges to generally held assumptions, hypotheses, and propositions presented by traditional studies of polarity. First, contrary to the research espoused by structural realists, along with the quantitative findings of behavioralists, neither bipolarity nor multipolarity is the norm in the formation of polar structures. Rather, as the evidence suggests, unipolarity is the model power constellation in world history, and as such, assumptions that state behavior, shaped by systemic attributes, inevitably give way to either bipolar or multipolar structurations is unfounded. Unipolarity, it appears, is a perfectly normal and persistent structure for the system to assume.

Second, while the concepts of balancing and counter-balancing are crucial in observing, gauging, and understanding state behavior at the system-wide level, the assumption that the balance-of-power doctrine is a truism is inherently challenged by the findings of this research. Namely, whereas states challenge, counter, and aspire to

balance the relative power or the perceived threat from other actors; they engage in such behavior as extensions of policy that reifies their endeavor to preserve their interests at the system-wide level. In this sense, states selectively engage in such behavior, as opposed to such balancing behavior being an inevitable outcome, a perceived necessity, or a deterministic byproduct of the structure of the system itself. This is better explained by the fact that since unipolarity is the norm, and not bipolarity or multipolarity, the concept of balance-of-power remains a form of state behavior, and not a given.

Third, as the first proposition suggests, not only is unipolarity the norm, but it is also far more stable, as far as longevity is concerned, than any other power constellation. As such, the assumption that American unipolarity is temporary and that the system must, inevitably, assume a bipolar or multipolar constellation, is both challenged and repudiated. Fourth, not only is the polar structure of nonpolarity empirically substantiated as a historical occurrence, but it is also found that nonpolarity is far more common than previously assumed. That is, whereas nonpolarity, traditionally, has been considered a form of designation for the off-hand chance that it may, conceivably, assume a polar structure, it has been generally dismissed as either non-occurring, or should it occur, a rare-event and an outlier. And fifth, gauged probabilistically from the data at hand, the post-American unipolar system will be neither bipolar nor multipolar, but rather, statistically speaking, has a much higher chance of becoming a nonpolar system.


The aggregated data from the five world political systems offers a total of 109 observation points, with 23 polar periods being observed in the Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System (Figure 9.1), 15 in the Mediterranean World Political System (Figure 9.2), 27 in the Far Eastern World Political System (Figure 9.3), 32 in the Indic

World Political System (Figure 9.4), and 12 in the Global Political System (Figure 9.5). These data allow for several sets of evaluations that address the research questions posed in this project. Within this framework, categorical demarcations between polar structuration and subsequent transitions provide for the four general modes of analysis that has been recurrent in this project: the aggregate distribution of polar structures within the entire data set; system's analysis vis-à-vis durability and longevity with respect to polar periods; transitional patterns of power configurations after unipolar periods; and the probabilistic calculations of the possible structural outcomes after unipolar transitions.

The distribution of polar periods within the data set demonstrates unipolarity to be the most occurring structure, as 39 out of the 109 codings for the power polarity configurations are unipolar. This far exceeds any other mode of polarity within the data set, suggesting consistency with the initially proposed contention that unipolarity is not the exception, but rather, the norm and the most occurring form of polar structuration. This is further illuminated by considering the second most common polar structure in the data set, which is bipolarity (n=24). The fact that unipolar configurations occurred 15 times more than bipolar configurations reifies the initial assessment. The third most common modes of polarity are nonpolarity and multipolarity, with 19 codings each, suggesting that the persistence of nonpolar structures throughout history has been far more common than IR scholarship has considered. Further, the fact that periods of nonpolarity are just as common as periods of multipolarity poses severe problems to contemporary studies of polarity. Multipolarity remains in the third tier of most occurring power constellation. The fact that multipolar codings are barely half the codings for unipolarity indicates important implications of polar norms and patterns of persistence.


The least common polar structure is tripolarity (n=8), which demonstrates much consistency with its distribution within the specific world political systems in the data set.

**Figure 9.1 Near East-Middle Eastern Political System**




1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity

**Figure 9.2 Mediterranean Political System**




1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity

**Figure 9.3 Far Eastern Political System**



1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity

**Figure 9.4 Indic Political System**




1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity

**Figure 9.5 Global Political System**



1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity


**Figure 9.6 AGGREGATE DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES**



As Figure 9.7 shows, the data set breaks down as followed: 35.8 percent unipolarity, 22 percent bipolarity, 17.4 percent nonpolarity, 17.4 percent multipolarity, and 7.3 percent tripolarity. These findings are consistent with the challenges proposed to the propositions held by general studies of polarity, that is, our findings indicate that neither bipolarity nor multipolarity is the norm in the formation of polar structures. As the evidence suggests, unipolarity is the most occurring power constellation in world history, for it occurs approximately 13 percent more than bipolarity and some 18 percent more than multipolarity.

This, in turn, bring under question the underlying assumption that state behavior, shaped by systemic attributes, inevitably gives way to either bipolar or multipolar structurations. The findings in this research repudiate such claims as unsubstantiated. In this sense, unipolarity is a *more* normal and persistent structure for the system to assume than bipolarity or multipolarity. Concomitantly, gauged within the context of contemporary American unipolarity, it may be coherently argued that this given unipolar period is neither ephemeral, a fluke of history, nor a transition period where which the system will inevitably assume a bipolar or multipolar configuration. Thus, at the systemic, macropolitical level, the continuation of American unipolarity is both normal and compatible with system's analysis. With unipolar structures having 15 more codings than bipolarity and 20 codings more than multipolarity, it becomes rather difficult, in the face of such evidence, to argue for the *normalness* of bipolar and multipolar configurations in relation to unipolarity. Accordingly, relative concentration of power within a single state cannot be deemed *unnatural*, that is, the current American unipolar structure should neither be considered unanticipated nor historically rare.

**Figure 9.7 PERCENTILE BREAKDOWN OF POLAR STRUCTURES**



The numerical superiority of unipolar configuration observations also challenges the presumed givenness of the balance-of-power doctrine: both the behavior of state actors and systemic outcomes reject the underlying balance-of-power hypothesis that balancing behavior inhibits the development of unipolarity. To the contrary, as demonstrated above, singular system-wide hegemonic preponderance is far more sustained and prevalent at the macro level than balancing behavior by two or more system-wide actors. The evidence seriously undercuts the mainstream paradigmatic assumption that balancing is either axiomatic or universal law. The data repudiates this by providing the following observations points: 58 codings of polar periods where balancing is impossible (39 unipolar structures and 19 nonpolar structures) and 51 codings of polar periods where balancing behavior is the norm (24 bipolar structures, 8



tripolar structures, and 19 multipolar structures). Gauged statistically, balancing behavior is prevalent within systems for approximately 47 percent of occurrences, while in 53 percent of occurrences, balancing is absent or untenable as form of state behavior within the system. These findings are inherently problematic for the balance-of-power doctrine, since balancing is neither the norm nor an inevitable outcome, but rather, it only occurs 47 percent of the time, that is, for 53 percent of the polar structures in which state(s) function, balancing behavior is nonexistent.

The argument presented here by the evidence is not a complete rejection of the balance-of-power doctrine, but rather, a rejection of the widespread belief that balancing is universally valid behavior that all states engage in, and as such, macro political systems must inevitably assume multi-state structures, as opposed to uni-state structures or structures without any dominant states (nonpolar). By virtue of this analysis, two modifications are suggested to the balance-of-power doctrine. First, balancing behavior is neither universal nor inevitable, but rather, it is the norm in only three specific modes of structures: bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar. As such, if the doctrine is modified to specifications of polar modalities, as opposed to universalistic claims for all modes of polarity, the assessments of the doctrine may still preserve its tenability.

Second, claims presupposed on deterministic fallacy must be modified in favor of propositions made on specific polar structures with applicable and verifiable forms of state behavior. Namely, state behavior cannot be gauged by structural determinism or claims of inevitability by virtue of the given polar modality. It becomes evident, then, that structure does not shape state behavior, and for this reason, balancing, as an inevitable and determined mode of state behavior is not substantiated. Rather, balancing

is a byproduct of behavior in which the state determines to engage in by virtue of its policies, as opposed to behavior in which a state engages in by virtue of the system's structure. If balancing, then, is proposed as a form of state behavior, as opposed to a structural outcome, then the tenability of the doctrine remains intact: states selectively engage in balancing behavior in specific polar structures to reify their objective of preserving their interests at the system-wide level.

The observable evidence also rejects the hypothesis that balancing behavior inhibits the rise of a single system-wide hegemon, that is, unipolar preponderance. As the data demonstrate, of the 39 unipolar epochs, the previous polar structure from which unipolarity transitioned into are bipolar (n=13), multipolar (n=8), and tripolar (n=4). As such, the 25 previous polar structures that gave way to the formation of a unipolar configuration are modes of polarity where which balancing is the norm. This being the case, the contentions that balance-of-power, as a structural attribute, shapes state behavior that prevents the formation or the transition into a unipolar configuration is undermined. Simply put, unipolarity is the transitional byproduct, probabilistically speaking, more of balancing behavior than of any other form of state behavior. Consequently, there is a 64 percent probability that a unipolar structure came into being by transitioning from a previous structure where which balance-of-power was the perceived norm. The contention, then, that balancing prohibits the formation of a system where a single actor dominates is rejected: balancing neither inhibits nor does it demonstrate inevitable outcomes contrary to unipolar configurations.

The concept of stability is used interchangeably with the concept of durability within this project, as specified several times in previous chapters, and within this

context, the durability of polar structures allows for important findings that give way to knowledge-accumulation with respect to system's maintenance. Particularly, the longer a polar structure demonstrates longevity, the better a system demonstrates fitfulness vis-à-vis structural power configurations as it pertains to concentration or diffusion. Thus, when engaging in treatments of systemic stability, the following logic is utilized: the duration of polar structures indicates the extent to which the macropolitical conditions of the system are favorable to specific modes of polarity. In this sense, the more historic space that a given polar structure occupies, on average, the more durable and systemically stable it is in relation to other polar structures.

Of the nearly 10,200 years of historic space covered in this research, with respect to all of the world political systems, the aggregate years for each mode of polarity breaks down as followed: tripolarity with 470 years, bipolarity with 1,595 years, multipolarity with 1,570 years, nonpolarity with 1,905 years, and unipolarity with 4,675 years. Analyzing these findings based on their respective occurrence vis-à-vis codings, average durations are gauged for each polar configuration, suggesting the relative instability of tripolarity and bipolarity, while verifying the relative stability of nonpolarity and unipolarity. On average, the least durable polar structure is tripolarity, lasting approximately 59 years. This is followed by bipolarity, with an average duration of 64 years, hence making bipolarity the least stable power configuration among the most common polar structures. Multipolarity remains the third most durable mode with an average of approximately 83 years of longevity. The second most durable configuration is nonpolarity, lasting, on average, nearly 100 years. In relation to the remaining modes of polarity in the dataset, unipolarity remains the most stable and durable structure with

respect to system's maintenance, displaying an average longevity of approximately 119 years. Within this context, the second most occurring structure, bipolarity, is also the second least durable structure; while the most occurring structure, unipolarity, is also the most durable and stable structure. Multipolarity and nonpolarity, on the other hand, have the equal number of codings at 19, yet the average duration of nonpolar periods outlast multipolar periods by roughly 17 years, demonstrating the latter's relative systemic stability.

Figure 9.8 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE DATASET





Figure 9.9 HISTORIC SPACE OCCUPIED BY POLAR PERIODS



### Implications of the Findings

These findings tentatively suggest four important conclusions. First, the stability and durability of unipolarity rejects the prevailing wisdom that unipolar periods are ephemeral, rather indicating that unipolar periods normally last for much longer periods than any of the other modes of polarity. Second, not only is nonpolarity more common than previously perceived, but it is also quite durable, suggesting that periods where power is extensively diffused suggests just as much fit with respect to the system's structural configurations as periods where power is relatively far more concentrated. Thus, extensively diffused periods last approximately 100 years, while the relatively

more concentrated structure lasts on average for 119 years. This clearly indicates that the durability of both unipolar and nonpolar structures cannot be ignored nor deemed outliers and historical accidents. Third, the relative instability of bipolar and multipolar structures demonstrates that these two modes of polarity have less fittidness than the two more stable configurations, nonpolarity and unipolarity. As such, the contention that bipolarity and multipolarity are *more* normal, inevitable, or consistent with macropolitical systems is refuted. Rather, it appears to be the opposite: bipolar and multipolar epochs are not the norm, but rather, are relatively unfit within macropolitical systems, for they last for much shorter periods and thus give way to transitions much quicker. And fourth, the following arguments pertaining to American unipolarity may, to some extent, be answered by the findings: whether American unipolarity is temporary or not, natural or unnatural, consistent with system's analysis or inconsistent, stable or unstable, durable or inevitably short-lived?

As the research demonstrates, American unipolarity is neither ephemeral nor unnatural, but rather, it is consistent with system's maintenance and quite durable, hence negating propositions that the American unipolar epoch will be short-lived, and due to its unfittidness, quickly transition to what have been traditionally deemed *more* fit structures: bipolarity and multipolarity. The argument, rather, may be turned upside-down on its head and proposed in a different fashion: that American unipolarity is not only a norm, but also, that the transition from the bipolarity of the Cold War to a unipolar structure was the most probable outcome, since unipolarity demonstrates far more fittidness than any other mode of polarity. Consequently, it is argued here that bipolar and multipolar structures are, in fact, short-lived and ephemeral, while unipolar structures are


far more stable and durable. As far as system's analysis is concerned, the evidence implies that American unipolarity is here to stay, and gauged probabilistically with respect to the average duration of unipolar periods, we may suggest, based on the historic data, that American unipolarity may well last until the end of this century. Considering that the American unipolar period began in 1990, and with unipolar structures lasting, on average, 119 years, it may be projected that this unipolar period has a very strong possibility of lasting for nearly a century.

This probabilistic assessment, of course, must be further argued by presenting two important qualifiers. First, while American unipolarity will continue to exist until the end of the century, this does not suggest that American concentration of power will increase or sustain itself. Rather, it is argue that even as America's concentration of power decreases, and even as the single system-wide hegemon declines, its relative power will still continue to be disproportionate to such an extent that it will neither see system-wide challenges nor counter-balancing. Second, since American unipolarity has been defined far more by shirking and bandwagoning—with respect to sub-system hegemons and other potential revisionist actors—as opposed to expansionism and conquest, America's preservation of the existing global system remains preferable for many potential system-wide challengers. To this end, the stability of the American unipolar epoch, and the assessment of its longevity, based on the historic findings, is supplemented by the consideration that shirking best explains the behavior of potential revisionist actors, while bandwagoning explains the behavior of powerful allies. Within this context, it may be predicted based on our findings that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be defined by the preponderance of a single system-wide hegemon.

One of the more central proposals posed by this project concerns the ability to probabilistically answer the following question: what power configuration does the structure of the system take after unipolar transitions, and, based on such calculations, can it be predicted what polar structure the post-unipolar American system will assume? Simply put, based on the dataset at hand and the findings produced, what happens after American unipolarity? To address these questions, the aggregate distribution of post-unipolar structural transitions is produced below to allow for probabilistic and predictive assessments. Of the 39 unipolar codings in the data set, 35 data points offer empirical evidence for post-unipolar transitional patterns (four unipolar structures transitioned into absorption by another system, hence being disqualified from probabilistic assessments). Based on these observable patterns, probabilistic outcomes are gauged with respect to post-transitional structural formations. Figure 10.1 displays the aggregate distribution of polar structures after unipolar transitions. After unipolar periods, the structure of the system transitioned into the following polar structures: bipolarity with 12 codings, tripartite with 2 codings, multipolarity with 7, and nonpolarity assuming the post-unipolar structure 14 times. The considerations here are two-fold. First, after unipolar transitions, either the system undergoes intense diffusion of power, or, the system undergoes relatively minor diffusion of power. Second, multipolarity, with 7 codings, and tripartite, with 2 codings, demonstrate that post-unipolar structures have a far less chance of transitioning to a multi-hegemonic system, thus decreasing the probability that the post-American unipolar system will assume a tripolar or multipolar power configuration.



**Figure 10.1 AGGREGATE DISTRIBUTION OF POST-UNIPOLAR STRUCTURES**




Analyzing these data probabilistically, the results are quite surprising, offering serious challenges to widely-held propositions and hypothesis that predominates the study of polarity within International Relations. Figure 10.2 displays the probabilistic outcomes of post-unipolar structures. The post-unipolar transitional patterns support the following findings: unipolar structures have a 40 percent chance of transitioning into a nonpolar structure, 34 percent probability transitioning into a bipolar configuration, 20 percent likelihood of assuming multipolarity, and 6 percent possibility of formulating into a tripolar mode of polarity. Contingent on this data and the historical evidence accumulated, it appears that nonpolarity is the most probable post-unipolar structure,

allowing for the prediction that there is a 40 percent likelihood that the post-American global system will be nonpolar. Following nonpolarity, bipolarity also presents a rather high probability, for there is also a 34 percent chance that the post-American global system will find two system-wide hegemon exercising preponderance. Thus, analytically, it can be expected that the post-American unipolar structure would either be a highly diffused system or a relatively highly concentrated system, for there is a 74 percent probability that the structure of the system would either transition to one or the other, but only a 26 percent probability, collectively speaking, of the structure transitioning into a multi-hegemonic configuration, whether tripolar or multipolar.

The considerations here are four-fold and quite troubling for scholars of polarity that expect the post-unipolar structure to either be bipolar or multipolar, that is, the most probabilistically tenable polar structure remains unaccounted for. First, the post-American unipolar structure has the highest probability of transitioning into a nonpolar configuration because the contemporary unipolar period has consistently displayed a high number of centers of power, even at the regional and sub-regional/local levels. As such, these centers of power would have a relatively easy time sustaining their capabilities even after the structural removal of the single system-wide hegemon. Consequently, whether multitude of centers of power are being considered in North America (U.S., possibly Canada), South America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile), Africa (Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya), Middle-East and North Africa (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Egypt), Europe (United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia), or the entirety of Asia and Oceania (Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia), the inchoateness and level of diffusion of power within the system remains difficult to deny.

**Figure 10.2 PROBABILISTIC OUTCOMES OF POST-UNIPOLAR STRUCTURES**



Second, while bipolarity presents the second highest probability of what the post-American structure will look like, the only tenable treatment of a bipolar structure would have to presuppose China assuming a system-wide position, and as such, counterbalancing the US. While such a development has a 34% probability, three-factors must be considered: Chinese policy prefers shirking over system-wide positioning; China prefers regional preponderance as sub-system hegemon as opposed to accepting the responsibilities of a global power; and, the remaining powers in the world, especially in Europe, cannot be expected to assume sub-system positioning if the configurations of the world order undergoes such transitions. As such, whereas powerful sub-system hegemons in Europe and Asia have chosen shirking and bandwagoning by virtue of their relationship with the unipole, this mode of behavior cannot be expected to continue if

unipolarity ends. The multitude of centers of power from the various continents, specified in the initial analysis, will only be reified once American unipolarity comes to an end.

Third, the importance of shirking, as a mode of behavior by sub-system actors, cannot be analytically underestimated. Meaning, shirking has been an important reality in the American unipolar structure, and the fact that states with the potential capability of engaging in revisionism have refused to do so suggests that aspirations of seeking system-wide positioning remains marginal to the existing centers of power within the various regions in the global system. This reluctance by economically powerful countries, such as Germany and Japan, or militarily powerful countries, such as United Kingdom and Russia, or highly populated countries such as India and China, is indicative of the fact that sub-system actors, even with the capacity to expand and exercise relative power, have refrained from engaging in such behavior, that is, they are refraining from functioning at the system-wide level. Important to note here, for example, is that Russia's current conflict with Ukraine (as of 2014) does not suggest Russian positioning at the system-wide level, nor does it indicate Russia acting in a revisionist fashion. Rather, this is an attempt by Russia to maintain its sub-system status as regional hegemon, and to this end, it is only seeking to preserve what it considers to be its regional sphere of influence. Russia's lack of global reach, and both its inability and lack of desire to function globally, demonstrates this point. Simply put, Russia is primarily concerned with its "backyard" and neighbors, that is, the infringement of what it considers inhospitable forces upon its regional interests.

Fourth, in relation to three of the assessments made above, the probabilistic outcomes of the post-American structure must also be considered within the conceptual

premise of fitness, applied in a modified fashion and primarily borrowed from evolutionary theory of world politics (Modelski 1990; Thompson 2001). The evolutionary theory of world politics observes world political systems, or in the case of contemporary research, the Global Political System, as an evolving organism, a vast structure that develops, grows, and adjusts in relation to the development of its parts (state actors, institutions, structural shifts and developments, etc.). Thus, for example, whereas in ancient Greece the world political structure was defined by city-states, this structure evolved to empires, which, in turn, evolved to the nation-state of the post-Westphalia global system. The underlying argument is that city-states lacked “fitness” in the developing world system, and so the city-state had to evolve into an empire to coherently function and survive in the absorption and expansion of world political systems. As such, through the evolutionary historic process, empires became incompatible with the evolving world political systems, and as the Global Political System came into being, so did its systemic evolution, deeming certain modes of behavior, state formations, or structural characteristics no longer “fit” to survive in the new Global Political System. In this sense, nation-states, for example, were formulated in order to “fit,” as an evolutionary byproduct, of the new global macropolitical structure. So a system learns, innovates, and adapts by creating new forms/orders to supplement, alter, or replace an existing order or system that is not fit. This assessment is also consistent with considerations of unipolarity: for example, whereas system-wide hegemonies like ancient Rome, medieval Mongols, Renaissance Spain and France, and post 16<sup>th</sup> century England each behaved in highly warlike, zero-sum policies of colonization or conquest, the US (existing system-wide hegemon) cannot do the same

things that these hegemons did, for the process of historical evolution altered or created new “forms” or orders in the structure of the Global Political System that has placed severe limitations upon the system-wide hegemon.

Utilizing this overarching theoretical model, it is argued here that whereas in the past the Global Political System was compatible with considerations of multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity, the current macropolitical structure, however, has evolved to such a new system where considerations of polarity, hegemonic struggle, and balance of power no longer “fit” the Global Political System. Namely, the post-American unipolar structure will have to be an outcome that finds fit within the existing global system which has come into being through a methodical, historical, and evolutionary process. Within this framework, as globalization, economic integration, institutional restraint, and intense interstate cooperation have become institutionalized and embedded in the existing global system, the system itself has evolved in such a fashion where traditional considerations of hegemonic power, modalities of polarity, and balance of power lack “fittedness” and are no longer coherent analytical units in the developing/evolving Global Political System. Consistent with this assessment, and hinged on the probabilistic considerations presented earlier, it may be contended that nonpolarity is more fit for the existing Global Political System as it undergoes a structural transition after American unipolarity. As argued in the first assessment above, the extraordinary high numbers of centers of power in the world are byproducts of a systemic evolutionary process where which state actors are either shirking, or seeking regional positioning. Within this perceived evolutionary development, none of the powerful sub-system hegemons are demonstrating behavior that suggests objectives of irredentism, expansionism, or system-

wide positioning where preponderance may be exercised. The most telling factor, and the one that thoroughly challenges traditional studies of hegemony and polarity, is that even states with the potential capability to seek system-wide positioning or engage in revisionist endeavors are refraining from doing so. Consequently, it may perhaps be contended that being a system-wide hegemon does not fit the evolving Global Political System, and as a byproduct of this evolutionary process, states are refraining from engaging in such behavior, that is, they are engaging in behavior that reifies their fittidness. This being the case, nonpolarity, then, appears to be the polar structure that is more fitted to the evolving Global Political System than any of the other modes of polarity.

The relationship between unipolar periods and subsequent transitions to nonpolar structures may be better observed and understood by displaying the set of case studies culled from the body of historic evidence provided in this research. Figure 10.3 does this by presenting the data of unipolar periods that transitioned into nonpolar periods, where the system-wide hegemon's decline was defined by increased diffusion of power to various centers of power throughout the system. Collectively, the findings demonstrate consistency with the probabilistic relationship between the polar structures and the analytical conclusion generated by this research. Important to consider, perhaps for future research, is the magnitude of power concentration for unipolar periods that transitioned into nonpolar structures and unipolar periods that transitioned into structures other than nonpolarity. A very general observation tentatively suggests that the level of power concentration was quite higher with unipolar structures that transitioned into nonpolarity, that is, intense concentration displays a tendency to give way to intense diffusion.

Figure 10.3 TRANSITIONS FROM UNIPOLAR TO NONPOLAR STRUCTURES

UNIPOLAR STRUCTURE	NONPOLAR TRANSITION	MACROPOLITICAL SYSTEM	TRANSITION DATE
CRETE		MEDITERRANEAN	1550 BC
MYCENAE	X	MEDITERRANEAN	1100 BC
CORINTH		MEDITERRANEAN	650 BC
MACEDONIA	X	MEDITERRANEAN	320 BC
ROME	X	MEDITERRANEAN	395 BC
ACHAEMENID / KOSALA		INDIC	400 BC
MAGADHA		INDIC	180 BC
MAGADHA	X	INDIC	120 BC
INDO-PARTHANS		INDIC	30 BC
GANDHARA		INDIC	150 AD
GUPTA		INDIC	460 AD
HUNAS	X	INDIC	540 AD
CALUKYAS	X	INDIC	740 AD
RASTRAKUTAS		INDIC	880 AD
RASTRAKUTAS		INDIC	970 AD
GHURID		INDIC	1220 AD
DELHI	X	INDIC	1400 AD
MUGHAL		INDIC	1725 AD
CHOU	X	FAR EASTERN	780 BC
CH'IN	X	FAR EASTERN	210 BC
HUNS		FAR EASTERN	165 BC
HAN		FAR EASTERN	160 AD
WESTERN CHIN	X	FAR EASTERN	300 AD
FIRST KHAGANATE		FAR EASTERN	675 AD
YUAN		FAR EASTERN	1355 AD
MING / CH'ING		FAR EASTERN	1850 AD
AKKAD	X	NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	2150 BC
URUK		NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	2010 BC
ISIN		NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	1800 BC
BABYLON	X	NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	1710 BC
EGYPT		NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	1345 BC
ASSYRIA	X	NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	1050 BC
ASSYRIA	X	NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	830 BC
ASSYRIA		NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	620 BC
PERSIA		NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN	330 BC
PORTUGAL / SPAIN		GLOBAL	1590 AD
FRANCE		GLOBAL	1715 AD
GREAT BRITAIN		GLOBAL	1890 AD
UNITED STATES		GLOBAL	CURRENT



Cursory assessments of system-wide hegemonies such as Mycenae, Macedonia, Rome, Magadha, Ch'in, Babylon, and Assyria, for example, suggest consistency with such assessments. But at the same time, power concentration was also quite high with Gupta, Mughal, Yuan, Ming, Egyptian, and Persian unipolar periods, yet the system did not transition to a nonpolar structure. The ability to accurately operationalize and apply this dynamic might provide very important explanatory results that may be applied to both previous polar periods as well as for the post-unipolar transitions within the current Global Political System.

### **Future Direction of Research**

Utilization of econometrics to attain more robust, quantifiable findings may rely on inferential statistics to primarily substantiate conceptual models that attempt to gauge the magnitude of power dispersion in the Global Political System as formed after the overarching absorption of all of the world political systems into a single global structure. The Correlates of War index (Ray and Singer 1973), as suggested by Mansfield (1993), offers the most robust formula in calculating power concentration in relation to the number of system-wide hegemonies in the system. Available statistical data for the subject matter at hand may also be attained from the Correlates of War database, which offers data from 1814 to the present. A time-series cross-sectional model will allow for the tracing of the diffusion of power, among global system-wide hegemonic actors, from 1814 to the present. This will potentially allow for the establishment of much quantified, empirically support, attained through methods of econometrics, in addressing questions pertaining to the level of power diffusion after unipolar periods (such as comparing level of power concentration during British unipolarity in relation to level of power

concentration during American unipolarity), and whether an observable pattern of power diffusion is diagnosable where which the evolution of the Global Political System may be analyzed through.

There also remains great deal of room for research concerning the need to provide more specific observations on the structural characteristics and attributes of nonpolarity. This approach may be two-fold, the first relying on the work of Deutsch and Singer (1964), and the second on the work of Schweller (2010). Replicating the two models used by Deutsch and Singer (1964), an attempt can be made to observe if a nonpolar system is more stable and peaceful than other modes of polar structures. Quickly, in the first model, authors assert that the most obvious effect of an increase in the number of actors in a system is an increase in the number of possible pairs or dyads in the total system. A reduction in the number of possible dyadic relations produces, both for any actor and for the totality of those in the system, a corresponding diminution in the number of opportunities for interaction with other actors (393). As stimuli in one particular direction increases, the system exhibits a decreasing response to those stimuli, and increasingly exhibits tendencies that counteract them. Thus, in any given bilateral relationship, a rather limited range of possible interactions is obtained, even if the relationship is highly symbiotic. But as additional actors are brought into the system, the range of possible interactions available to each actor increases, hence increasing the total possible interactions in the system. The objective, then, is to observe the degree to which each single increment or decrement affects the number of possible dyads, interaction opportunities, in the system. Thus, “in a purely bipolar system, only one dyad or pair is possible,” while a tripolar structure “produces three pairs, four actors produce six pairs,

five produce ten possible pairings, and so on” (394). Systemically, as new actors in the system increase, possibility/opportunity of interactive behavior between new actors and existing actors increases, thus potentially decreasing instability in the polar structure/system. Simply put, more interaction leads to increased stability. As actors in the system increase, so do interaction opportunities, and more than 5 actors/poles is the level where the stability-enhancing increment begins to rapidly grow (395).

While the authors limit their analysis to the relationship between bipolar and multipolar systems, this method may be applied to a nonpolar structure: as the number of actors increase in the Global Political System, so does the number of interactions between the actors. This increase in interaction is directly correlated with stability enhancement. So the more independent actors a system has, the more interactions it has, and as such, the more stable it is. With the nonpolar system requiring more than seven actors (above the 5 actor threshold), the stability-enhancing increment will exponentially increase. Hypothetically, for predictive purposes, if one presumes an increase of a minimum of 6 global actors, as the post-US unipolar system would very likely have, the assumption is a nonpolar global system with numerically high sub-system hegemons/actors and numerically high interactions, with no single actor or actors dominating, and as such, decreasing instability and having high rate of interaction opportunities between states. Continuing with this hypothetical, in the contemporary globalizing world, with the declining unipolar system allowing for increased interactions among rising independent actors, the stability-enhancing capabilities of the potential nonpolar system is increased.

The second model, which may be labeled as the dispersion of resources framework, is conceptualized as followed. In a bipolar system, one actor applies its

attention (resource) to its opposing pole/other actor. Yet as actors increase in the system, the existing actor must divert attention/resources to this new actor(s) (assumption is that same level of resource/attention will not be diverted, yet nonetheless, there will be some diversion). As actors increase in the Global Political System, so do the diversion and diffusion of resources/attention of the actors within the system. Thus, whereas two actors applied attention to one another, now all actors must apply attention/resources to each other, although in different degrees (396-398). This relative dispersion of resources decreases the probability of conflict, for it is one thing to concentrate all resources toward one, two, or three actors, as opposed to having to concentrating resources, in complicated stratagem, to seven or more actors. Quantified results show that three power centers in the system sharply decrease probability of conflict, while five centers greatly decrease probability of instability. One may begin to presume how low the probability of instability would be with seven or more centers of power in a nonpolar system. In the absence of system-wide hegemony, the high numbers of actors apply their resources interchangeably to other actors in the global system. Whereas US-Soviet resource allocation was uni-dimensional, a hypothetical multipolar US-EU-China-Russia-India resource allocation structure will be multidimensional, while a nonpolar US-EU-China-Russia-Brazil-Canada-India-Iran-Japan-etc resource allocation structure will be extremely diverse, with the distribution of resources that a state allocates to its relationship with other actors being very diffused and complex. This is consistent with Deutsch and Singer's contention of attention dispersion contributing to systemic stability enhancement. Coupled with the above-assessed notion of "interaction opportunities," it

may tentatively be hypothesized and tested whether a nonpolar global system is more stable than bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or unipolar structures.

Utilizing Schweller's (2010) treatment of entropy with respect to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, a different approach may be taken to assess how power diffusion can take place in a nonpolar system, and how the structure of the system will reinforce itself without the presence of system-wide hegemon/poles. The Second Law of Thermodynamics asserts that a system's total energy consists of two separate parts: energy that is available for work (useful or free energy) and energy that is unavailable for work (useless or bound energy). Entropy measures the disorganization in a system. The extra resources that a pole/system-wide hegemon possesses are akin to what is called "useless energy" that is associated with entropy. The total entropy of any isolated thermodynamic system cannot decrease; it may only remain the same or increase; and so, by implication, the entropy of the universe tends to increase. Entropy is often associated with disorder and chaos because random configurations have larger probability of occurring than more ordered ones. Entropy measures change in the degree of systemic constraints on the units: as entropy increases, constraints weaken. When systemic constraints are high, the system will operate in a fairly predictable manner; when systemic constraints are low or nonexistent, the system will behave in a random and chaotic manner. This occurs because, as entropy increases, the macrostate is composed of more and more specific configurations, and so the former reveals less and less information about the latter. The logic is straightforward and mere commonsense: events of higher frequency appear more often than those of lower frequency. According to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, once the system attains maximum entropy, final

equilibrium, entropy cannot decrease, thus, the system remains as it is. Concomitantly, Schweller holds that once the Global Political System reaches maximum entropy, power capabilities will be diffused to other actors and none will have any incentive to move from this condition (147-150). In this sense, randomness can be found in virtually unlimited combinations of specific configurations (such as in a nonpolar system), whereas order implies a specific combination of a relatively small number of configurations (uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi polar systems). When maximum entropy is attained, order is replaced with randomness, disorder, and indeterminateness.

The absence of specific structural order in a nonpolar system presupposes randomness and inchoateness, hence being consistent with considerations of entropy in the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Disorder does not refer to incoherent and violent behavior among actors, but rather the structure of the system itself: there are no modes of order/polarity, no positional structure to demonstrate hierarchy or organization of power configurations. The unitary relationship of each actor to the overarching global structure is one of randomness and disorder, that is, there is the absence of polarity. Accordingly, entropy may provide much explanation and characteristic attributes with respect to a potential nonpolar Global Political System. For analytical purposes, then, entropy is applicable in gauging disorder and inchoateness with respect to units and their relation to the structure of the system. This unit-structure relationship provides important explanations with respect to the nonpolar system, that is, the nonpolar system is structurally disordered: it has no single order, or hierarchy, of powerful states.

Collectively, then, the application of these three overarching approaches would provide both the opportunity to pose more questions concerning the study of polarity,

while at the same time testing given questions and propositions. Concomitantly, employing such methodological concepts as interaction opportunities and dispersion of resources, considerations of stability, vis-à-vis state behavior, may be better observed and tested, thus providing potential answers to questions pertaining to the attributes of nonpolar structures and state actors. Finally, the application of entropy to system's analysis will allow for a transition from using the conceptual tools of the social sciences to perhaps utilizing the conceptual tools of the hard sciences, through which systemic outcomes of nonpolar attributes may better be gauged and understood.

With respect to continuous future research, the finding and propositions produced in this work may perhaps offer important lessons to IR theory. Specifically, future scholarly work may utilize the following considerations: 1) application of the alleviation of the agent-structure *problematique* to theory development and paradigm-building; 2) criteria for evaluating and qualifying system-wide actors or superpowers in the study of global politics; 3) employing multi-tiered analysis that escapes theory incommensurability and allows for the formulation of theoretical and conceptual frameworks that coherently fluctuate between second and third level imagery; and 4) composing a methodological approach that confidently relies on an eclectic utilization of diverse paradigmatic tools, as opposed to being limited to paradigmatic myopism. In totality, then, future scholarly endeavors may rely on a more multifaceted and refined approach to IR theory-building.

### **Conclusion**

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985) eloquently argued that the scientific understanding of international relations requires explicit theorizing, grounded in

axiomatic logic, from which hypotheses with empirical referents may be extracted, “followed by rigorous empirical analysis (whether quantitative or not) in which assumptions and procedures are explicitly stated.” Furthermore, such research must manage to specify whether the “hypotheses stipulate necessary, sufficient, necessary and sufficient, or probabilistic relations among variables” (121). The research endeavor at hand undertook a concerted effort to abide by such scholarly considerations. Explicit theorizing is provided with respect to the formulation of the various conceptual and analytical tools utilized in this research, which, in turn, are grounded in axiomatic logic. Thus, the concepts of world political systems, system-wide hegemony, modes of polarity, and structural shifts and transitions remain the byproducts of explicit theorizing that is hinged on deductive and axiomatic logic. Consequently, the formulated hypotheses, which pertain to polar structures and post-unipolar transitions, inherently presuppose empirical referents, that follow a three-tiered methodological approach through which rigorous empirical analysis has been utilized. Subsequently, the research design specifies that the propositions and puzzles being addressed by this project stipulate probabilistic relations among the variables being studied. In its totality, then, the theoretical model, conceptual tools, analytical frameworks, methodological approach, and the findings of this research project rest on strong foundations and demonstrate robust adherence to the general standards of philosophy of science.

Among the various observations and findings produced by this project, two overarching ones stand out, where which non-obvious facts were procured and knowledge-accumulations substantiated. First, nonpolarity has been demonstrated to be both an empirical reality and reified through an explicit theoretical framework allowing



for a coherent and applicable assessment of this mode of polarity. That 19 periods in the history of world political systems had nonpolar epochs is quite telling of the persistence and tendency of the macropolitical system to assume such a mode of polarity. The introduction and empirical validation of nonpolarity as both a tenable and verifiable polar structure offers the discipline new analytical tools and data that may be operationalized to develop better understanding of both polar structurations and state behavior vis-à-vis structural shifts and formations within the macropolitical system. Second, body of data has been procured through the historic evidence that has not been produced or qualified by previous research, that is, the criteria-oriented methodology of accumulating data for polar periods offers an expansion in both our knowledge and approach in studying polarity and the behavior of powerful, system-wide actors. As a result, non-obvious and original assessments have been produced with respect to polar transitions and probabilistic predictions of post-unipolar structures. That this research may offer calculated predictions of what the post-American unipolar structure would transition into, for example, and what the world may look like, that is, what the expected affect may be upon both systemic and unitary/state attributes in the Global Political System, is demonstrative of some degree of knowledge-accumulation.

For some 50 years of research undertaken in the scientific study of polarity, we have learned a lot, only to come to realize that, in fact, we have not learned much. Tautology, indeed, is a very dangerous trap: but not inescapable. The circular trap that scholars have confined themselves in, going from bipolarity to multipolarity, from arguing over stability and instability, determinism and non-determinism, causality and correlation, and of course, disputing whether any knowledge-accumulation has been

attained, smacks of an overarching trap of tautology that has overwhelmed the discipline: everyone says a lot, but in the end, no one is really saying anything. That one's nothing is another's something cannot be a tenable approach to the study of International Relations. The problem, then, as suggested earlier, appears to be one of scope: how much can a group of people study the *same* 500 year history (post-Westphalia system); how much can the *same* 200 hundred years of data be quantified and re-quantified, analyzed and re-analyzed, with conflicting results and conclusions; and how long can controversy and disagreement define the inability to establish consensus in the fight over measurements, selection of variables, and research methodology? By becoming trapped in the ahistoricism and Eurocentrism that has come to define the study of power politics and polarity, scholars of International Relations have become academic cannibals: they keep fighting over the *same* meal, and when this does not work, they turn on each other. By broadening the scope, extending the universe of data and empirical referents to a much larger area of inquiry, and introducing methods of research, analytics, and scholarship that supplement and reify this expansion, perhaps paradigmatic and methodological myopism may be escaped. That is, perhaps *more* meals may be provided for the field of study, so that instead of engaging in academic cannibalism, scholars may perhaps actually engage in knowledge-accumulation. That Vasquez (1987) channels Kenneth Waltz's lamentation should not be a surprise: "nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism" (pg. 113).

## Bibliography

- Adcock, F.E. 1927a. "The Breakdown of the Thirty Years Peace, 445-431 B.C." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 165-192.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927b. "The Archidamian War, 431-421 B.C." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 193-253.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928. "The Conquest of Central Italy." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 581-616.
- Adcock, F. E., and D. M. Mosley. 1975. *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece.* London.
- Adshead, S.A.M. 2004. *T'ang China: The Rise of the East in World History.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Agrawal, Ashvini. 1989. *Rise and Fall of the Imperial Guptas.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Akbar, Muhammad. 1948. *The Punjab Under the Mughals.* Lahore: Ripon Print Press.
- Albright, W.F. 1975. "Syria, the Philistines, and Phoenicia." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 507-536.
- Allan, John, Sir Wolseley Haig, and H.H. Dodwell. 1943. *The Cambridge Shorter History of India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alfoldi, A. 1961. "The Crisis of the Empire (A.D. 249-270)." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, M.P. Charlesworth, and N.H. Baynes (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XII: The Imperial Crisis and Recovery, A.D. 193-324.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 165-231.
- Altekar, Anant S. 1946. *The Gupta-Vataka Age.* Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1960. "The Yadavas of Seunadesa." *The Early History of the Deccan* (ed.) G. Yazadani (Vol. 2), pp. 513-75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1967. *The Rashtrakutas and Their Times.* Oriental Book Agency (University of California Digitized Books).

- Anderson, J.G.C. 1952a. "The Eastern Frontier Under Augustus." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 239-283.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1952b. "The Eastern Frontier from Tiberius to Nero." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 743-780.
- Anderson, M.S. 1970. "Russia Under Peter the Great and the Changed Relations of East and West." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 716-740.
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2007. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Asheri, David. "Carthaginians and Greeks." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 739-790.
- Ashrafyan, K.Z. 1998. "Central Asia Under Timur from 1370 to the Early Fifteenth Century," *History of Civilization of Central Asia: The Age of Achievement, A.D. 750 to the End of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century*, (ed.) M.S. Asimov and E.E. Bosworth). Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Pp. 319-346.
- Atkinson, C.T. 1960. "The War of 1914-1918." In David Thomson (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12: The Era of Violence 1898-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 359-385.
- Aubet, Maria E. 2001. *The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies and Trade*. (trans.) Mary Turton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Aziz, Ahmad Muhammad. 1987. *Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, 1206-1290*. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan.
- Backus, Charles. 1981. *The Nan-chao Kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern Frontier*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Banerjea, J.N. 1957. "The Satraps of Northern and Western India." (ed.) K.A. Nilakantha Sastri, *A Comprehensive History of India, Volume 2*.
- Banjeri, Adris. 1962. "Hunas in Mewar," *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*. 4:3, pp. 57-62.

- Banerji, Rakhal D. 1908. "The Scythian Period in Indian History." *Indian Antiquary* (37), pp. 25-75.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1933. *The Age of the Imperial Guptas*. Banjeri, Sukumer: Benares Hindu University.
- Barfield, Thomas. J. 1989. *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China*. New York: Basil Blackwell.
- Barnett, R. D. 1982. "Urartu." In John Boardman, I.E.S. Edwards, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Volume III, Part 1. The Prehistory of the Balkans, and the Middle East and the Aegean world, tenth to eight centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 314-371.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. "The Sea Peoples." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 359-378.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975b. "Phrygia and the Peoples of Anatolia in the Iron Age." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 417-438.
- Basham, Arthur L. 1953. "A New Study of the Saka-Kusana period." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, (vol 15), pp. 80-97.
- Basu, Jogiraj. 1969. *India in the Age of the Brahmanas: Ancient Indian Culture and Civilization, as Revealed in the Brahmanas*. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Bawa, Vasant K. 1986. *The Nizam Between Mughals and British: Hyderabad Under Salar Jan I*. Chand Publishers. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Beckwith, Christopher I. 1987. *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power Among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bederman, E. 2001. *International Law in Antiquity*. Oxford.
- Beller, W.A. 1970. "The Thirty Years War." In J.P. Cooper (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 4: The Decline of Spain and The Thirty Years War 1609-48/59*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 306-358.

- Benecke, P.V.M. 1930a. "The Fall of the Macedonian Monarchy." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 241-278.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930b. "Rome and the Hellenistic States." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 279-305.
- Bennett, Andrew. 2010. "Process Tracing and Causal Inference." In Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds). *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 207-219.
- Betts, R.R. 1961. "The Habsburg Lands." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 474-499.
- Bhatia, Pratipal. 1970. *The Paramaras: 800-1305 A.D.* New Dehli: Munshiram Manoharlal.
- Bielenstein, Hans. 1967. *The Restoration of the Han Dynasty.* Stockholm: Far Eastern Antiquities.
- Biswas, Atreyi. 1971. *The Political History of Hunas in India.* Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Blunden, Caroline and Mark Elvin. 1983. *Cultural Atlas of China.* New York: Fact on File Publishing.
- Boardman, John, I.E.S. Edwards, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). 1982. *The Cambridge Ancient History. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Volume III, Part 1. The Prehistory of the Balkans, and the Middle East and the Aegean world, tenth to eight centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bognard-Levin, G.M. 1985a. *Ancient Indian Civilization.* New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985b. *Mauryan India.* New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.
- Boxer, C.R. 1969. *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825.* London: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bosworth, Clifford E. 1963. *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

- Braudel, Fernand. 1995. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, Vol. 2*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Brinkman, J.A. 1982. "Babylonia c. 1000-748 B.C." In John Boardman, I.E.S. Edwards, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Volume III, Part 1. The Prehistory of the Balkans, and the Middle East and the Aegean world, tenth to eight centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 282-313.
- Briscoe, John. 1989. "The Second Punic War." In S.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 44-79.
- Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2008. *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Bruun, Geoffrey. 1969. "The Balance of Power During the Wars, 1793-1814." In C.W. Crawley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 250-274.
- Bryan, Betsy M. 2000. "The 18<sup>th</sup> Dynasty Before the Amarna Period (c. 1550-1352 B.C.)." In Ian Shaw (ed). *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 218-271.
- Bryce, Trevor. 1998. *The Kingdom of the Hittites*. Oxford: Claredon Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1978. "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (June), pp. 241-67.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View." *International Studies Quarterly* 29:2 (June). Pp. 121-136.
- Bull, Hedley. 1969. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." In James Rosenau (ed). *Contending Approaches to International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. 20-38.
- Burke, Kathleen. 1985. "What is Political History?" *History Today* 35:1. Accessed <http://www.historytoday.com/kathleen-burk/what-political-history>.
- Bury, John Bagnell. 1963. *History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great*. 3<sup>rd</sup> (ed.). London: Macmillan and Co. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).

- Bury, J.B. S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). 1923. *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I. Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927. "Dionysius of Syracuse." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 108-136.
- Bury, J.P.T. 1960. "International Relations, 1900-12." In David Thomson (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12: The Era of Violence 1898-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 300-328.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1968. "Diplomatic History 1900-1912." In C.L. Mowat (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12 (Second Edition): The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 112-139.
- Butler, Rohan. 1960. "The Peace Settlement of Versailles, 1918-1933." In David Thomson (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12: The Era of Violence 1898-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 443-474.
- Buzan, Barry. 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Richard Little. 2000. *International Systems in World History—Remaking the Study of International Relations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cabrera, Luis. 2004. *Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State.* (London: Routledge).
- Carr, E. H. 1951. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations.* London: Macmillan.
- Carr, Raymond. 1969. "Spain and Portugal, 1793 to c. 1840." In C.W. Crawley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 439-461.
- Cary, M. 1927a. "The Ascendancy of Sparta." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 25-54
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927b. "The Second Athenian League." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 55-79.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927c. "Thebes." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The*



*Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 80-107.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1928. "Agathocles." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 617-637.

Chattopadhyaya, Sudhakar. 1950. *The Achaemenids in India.* Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1967. *The Sakas in India.* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). University of Michigan Digitized Books.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1968. *Early History of North India: From the Fall of the Mauryas to the Death of Harsa, 200 B.C.-A.D.65.* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed). Calcutta: Academic Publishers.

Chang, K.C. 1983. "Sandai Archaeology and the Formation of States in Ancient China: Process(ual) Aspects of the Origins of Chinese Civilization." In *The Origins of Chinese Civilizations.* (ed) David N. Keightley. Berkley: University of California Press. Pp. 495-521.

Chang, Kwang-chih. 1980. *Shang Civilization.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Charlesworth, M.A. 1952a. "The Avenging of Caesar." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-30.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1952b. "Gaius and Claudius." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 653-701.

Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Susan Manning, and Thomas D. Hall. 2000. "Rise and Fall: East-West Synchronicity and Indic Exceptionalism Reexamined." *Social Science History* 24, pp. 727-754.

Chaudhuri, Sashi Bhusan. 1955. *Ethnic Settlements in Ancient India.* Michigan: General Printers and Publishers. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).

Chaurasia, Radhey S. 2002. *History of Medieval India: From 1000 A.D. to 1707 A.D.* New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers.

\_\_\_\_\_. 2004. *History of the Marathas.* New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers.

- Chhabra, G. S, 2005. *Advanced Study in the History of Modern India, Volume 1: 1707-1803*. New Delhi: Lotus Press.
- Chi'en, Ssu-ma. 1994. *The Grand Scribes Records, Volume I: The Basics Annals of Pre-Han China*. (ed) William F. Nienhauser Jr. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, and Todd Landman. 1999. "Evolution of Maya Polities in the Ancient Mesoamerican System." *International Studies Quarterly* 43, pp. 559-598.
- Clark, Donald N. 1998. "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2. Volume 8*. (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 272-300.
- Clark, George. 1970. "The Nine Years War, 1688-1697." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 223-253.
- Clark, Hugu R. 2011. "Scoundrels, Rogues, and Refugees: The Founders of the Ten Kingdoms in Late Ninth Century." In *Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms*. (ed) Peter Lorge. Hong Kong: China University Press. Pp. 47-99.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2009. "The Southern Kingdoms Between Sung and T'ang." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Sung Dynasty and its Predecessors, 907-1279, part one. Volume 5*. (ed) Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 133-205.
- Coldstream, J.N. 2003. *Geometric Greece: 900-700 BC*. London: Routledge.
- Coleman, D.C. 1961. "Economic Problems and Policies." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 19-46.
- Colledge, Malcom A.R. 1968. "The Parthians." *Ancient Peoples and Places*. Vol. 59. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44:4, pp. 823-30.
- Collier, David, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright. 2010. "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology." In (ed) Henry E. Brady and David Collier. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 161-200.

- Collier, Ruth Berins. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cook, J.M. 1975. "Greek Settlement in the Eastern Aegean and Asia Minor." In In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J.Gadd, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part 2: History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 773-804.
- Cook, Stanley A. 1924. "Syria and Palestine in the Light of External Evidence." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, The Egyptian and Hittite Empires to c. 1000 BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 296-351.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1924b. "The Rise of Israel." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, The Egyptian and Hittite Empires to c. 1000 BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 352-406.
- Cornell, T.J. 1989. "The Conquest of Italy." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie, and A. Drummond (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History Volume VII, Part 2: The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 351-455.
- Cox, Robert W. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2, pp. 126-155.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2, pp. 162-175.
- Claude, Inis. 1962. *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.
- Craig, Gordon. 1960. "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 246-273.
- Crawley, C.W. 1969. "International Relations, 1815-1830." In C.W. Crawley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 668-590.
- Crossley, Pamela K. 1997. *The Manchus*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Curtiss, J.S. 1979. *Russia's Crimean War*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- Davidson, J.W. 1960. "The Pacific in the First World War and in the Settlement." In David Thomson (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12: The Era of Violence 1898-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 416-442.

- Day, Upendar Nath. 1963. "The North-West Frontier Under the Khalji Sultans of Delhi." *Indian Historical Quarterly*. 39:1-2, pp. 98-108.
- Derow, P.S. 1989. "Rome, the Fall of Macedon and the Sack of Corinth." In S.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 290-323.
- Desborough, V.R.d'A. 1975. "The end of Mycenaean Civilization and the Dark Age." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J.Gadd, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part 2: History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 658-677.
- Deutsch, K.W. and J.D. Singer. 1964. "Multipolar Power-Systems and International Stability," *World Politics* 16:3, pp. 390-406.
- Deutscher, Isaac. 1968. "The Russian Revolution." In C.L. Mowat (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12 (Second Edition): The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 403-432.
- Derry, T.K. 1969. "Scandinavia." (Chapter 9, "The Low Countries and Scandinavia"). In C.W. Crawley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 480-494.
- Devahuti, D. 1998. *Harsha: A Political Study* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dickshitar, V.R.R. 1953. *The Mauryan Polity*. Madras: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
- Dikshit, R.K. 1977. *The Candellas of Jejakhukti*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.
- Diffie, B.W. and C.D. Winius. 1977. *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire 1415-1580.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dighe, V. G. 1944. *Peshaw Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion*. Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Dodge, Ayrault Theodore. 1890. *Alexander*. Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press.
- Dreyer, Edward L. 1988. "Military Origins of Ming China." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1. Volume 7.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 58-106.
- Drower, Margaret. 1973. "Syria, 1550-1400 B.C." In I.E.S Edwards, C.J. Gadd,

- H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 1. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Regions c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 417-525.
- Dunnell, Ruth. 1994. "The Hsia Hsia." In *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368. Volume 6.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 154-214.
- Ebrey, Patricia B. 1996. *The Cambridge Illustrated History of China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eckstein, Arthur M. 2003. "Thucydides, the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the Foundation of International Systems Theory." *Int. Hist. Rev.* 23: 757– 74.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2007. *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome.* Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California Press, 2007.
- Edwards, I.E.S. C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). 1973. *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 1. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Regions c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elliott, J.H. 1970. "The Spanish Peninsula 1598-1648." In J.P. Cooper (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 4: The Decline of Spain and The Thirty Years War 1609-48/59.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 435-473.
- Elton, G.R. 1967. *The Practice of History.* London: Wiley.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. *Political History: Principles and Practice.* London: Penguin Press.
- Errington, R.M. 1989. "Rome and Greece to 205 B.C." In S.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 81-106.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989b. "Rome Against Philip and Antiochus." In S.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 244-289.
- Evera, van S. 1999. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict.* Ithaca.

- Ferguson, W.S. 1927a. "Sparta and the Peloponnese." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 254-281.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927b. "The Athenian Expedition to Sicily." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 282-311.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927c. "The Fall of the Athenian Empire." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 348-375.
- Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. 1988. *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Fielding, Steven. 2007. "Review Article: Looking for the 'New Political History.'" *Journal of Contemporary History* 42:3, pp. 515–24.
- Finley, M.I. 1991. *Politics in the Ancient World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Finnemore, Martha. 2011. "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up To Be." In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds). *International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-98.
- Fleet, J.R. 1888. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum: Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings and their Successors*, Volume 3. Calcutta: Government of India.
- Foot, Michael. 1960. "The Origins of the Franco-Prussian War and the Remaking of Germany." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 577-602.
- Frank, Andre Gunder, and Barry K. Gills. (eds). 1996. *The World System: Five Hundred years or Five Thousand?* London: Routledge.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. "Rejoinder and Conclusions." In Andre Frank Gunder and Barry K. Gills. (eds). *The World System: Five Hundred years or Five Thousand?* London: Routledge. Pp. 297-307.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1978. *World Accumulation 1492-1789*. London: Macmillan.
- Franke, Herbert, and Hok-lam Chan. 1997. *Studies on the Jurchens and the Chin Dynasty*. Norfolk: Ashgate Variorum.

- Franke, Herbert. 1994. "The Chin Dynasty." In *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368. Volume 6.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 215-320.
- Frank, Tenney. 1928. "Pyrrhus." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charelsworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 638-664.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928b. "Rome and Carthage: The First Punic War." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charelsworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 665-698.
- Franke, P.R. 1989. "Pyrrhus." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie, and A. Drummond (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History Volume VII, Part 2: The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 546-485.
- Frederick, Suzanne Y. 1999. "The Anglo-German Rivalry, 1890-1914." In *Great Power Rivalries.* (Ed) William R. Thompson. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. Pp. 306-336.
- Freeman, Charles. 2004. *Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gadd, C.J. 1975 "Assyria and Babylon, c. 1370-1300 B.C." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 21-48.
- Geiss, James. 1988. "The Chia-ching Reign, 1522-1566." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1. Volume 7.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 440-510.
- Gernet, Jacques. 1968. *Ancient China: From the Beginnings to the Empire.* Berkley: University of Berkley Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988. "Theory of Hegemonic War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History.* Vol 18. Pp. 591– 613.
- Gills, Barry K. and Andre Gunder Frank. 1996. "World System Cycles, Crises, and Hegemonic Shifts, 1700 BC to 1700 AD." In Andre Frank Gunder and Barry K.

- Gills. (eds). *The World System: Five Hundred years or Five Thousand?* London: Routledge. Pp. 143-199.
- Ghoshal, P.C. 1966. *A History of Indian Political Ideas: The Ancient Period and the Period of Transition to the Middle Ages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gokhale, B.G. 1959. *Ancient India: History and Culture*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
- Goldstein, Judith L., Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds). 2001. *Legalization and World Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Gopalan, R. 1928. *History of the Pallavas of Kanchi*. Madras: University of Madras (University of California Digitized Books).
- Gordon, Stewart. 1993. *The Marathas: 1600-1818, Volume 2: The New Cambridge History of India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goyal, Shankar. *Harsha: A Multidisciplinary Study*. Kusumanjali Book World. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Grainger, John D. 1990. *Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom*. London: Routledge.
- Gray, Buchanan G. 1926. "The Foundation and Extension of the Persian Empire." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV, The Persian Empire and the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-25.
- Gray, G.B. and M. Cary. 1926. "The Reign of Darius." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: The Persian Empire and the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 173-228.
- Grayson, A.K. 1982. "Assyria: Ashur-danII to Ashur-Nirari V (934-735 B.C.)." In John Boardman, I.E.S. Edwards, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Volume III, Part 1. The Prehistory of the Balkans, and the Middle East and the Aegean world, tenth to eight centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 238-281.
- Grimal, Nicolas. 1992. *A History of Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Grousset, Rene. 1970. *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia*. (trans) Naomi Walford. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Gulick, Edward V. 1955. *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*. Ithaca: Norton and Co.



- \_\_\_\_\_. 1969. "The Final Coalition and the Congress of Vienna, 1813-1815." In C.W. Crawley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 639-667.
- Gungwu, Wang. 1998. "Ming Foreign Relations: Southeast Asia." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2. Volume 8*. (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 301-332.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1967. *The Structure of Power in North China During the Five Dynasties*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gunnell, John G. 1975. *Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- Gurney, O.R. 1973. "Anatolia c. 1750-1600 BC." In I.E.S Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 1. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Regions c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.228-255.
- Haass, Richard N. 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87:3 (May/June), pp. 44–56.
- Habib, Mohammad and K.A. Nizami. 1970. *The Delhi Sultanate, A.D. 1206-1526*. Delhi.
- Hackforth, R. 1927. "Sicily." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 145-164.
- Hall, D.G.E. 1981. *A History of South-East Asia*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hallo, William W. and William K. Simpson. 1998. *The Ancient Near East: A History*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Hallward, B.L. and M.P. Charlesworth. 1930. "The Fall of Carthage." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 466-494.
- Hallward, B.L. 1930a. "Hannibal's Invasion of Italy." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 25-56.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930b. "Scipio and Victory." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the*

- Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 83-115.
- Hammond, N.G.L. 1975. "The Literary Tradition of the Migrations." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part 2: History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 678-712.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988a. "The Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 491-517.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988b. "The Expedition of Xerxes." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 518-622.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988c. "The Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV, Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 491-505.
- Han, Woo-keun. 1970. *The History of Korea.* (trans) Lee Kyung-shik. (ed) Grafton K. Mintz. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Held, David. 1996. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Henthorn, William F. 1971. *A History of Korea.* New York: Free Press.
- Higgot, Richard. 1991. "Toward a Nonhegemonic IPE: An Antipodean Perspective." In Graig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds). *The New International Political Economy.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Pp. 97-128.
- Hirth, Friedrich. *The Ancient History of China: To the End of the Chou Dynasty.* New York: Books for Libraries Press.
- Hinz, Walther. 1973. *The Lost World of Elam.* New York: New York University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1973b. "Persia c. 1800-1550 BC." In I.E.S Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part I. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Regions c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 256-288.

- Hogarth, D.G. 1924. "The Hittites of Asia Minor." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, The Egyptian and Hittite Empires to c. 1000 BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 252-274.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1925. "Hittite Civilization." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 148-168.
- Holleaux, M. 1928. "The Romans in Illyria." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 822-858.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930a. "Rome and Macedon: Philip Against the Romans." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 116-137.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930b. "Rome and Macedon: The Romans Against Philip." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 138-198.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930c. "Rome and Antiochus." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 199-240.
- Holocomb, Charles. 1994. *In the Shadow of the Han*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Horn, D.B. "The Diplomatic Revolution." *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 7: The Old Regime 1713-1763*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 440-464.
- Hornung, Erik. 1990. *History of Ancient Egypt: An Introduction*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Howard, Michael. 2001. *The Franco-Prussian War*. New York: Routledge
- Hsu, Cho-yun. 1999. "The Spring and Autumn Period." In *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.* (ed) Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 545-586.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1965. *Ancient China in Transition*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hsu, Cho-yun, and Katheryn M. Linduff. 1988. *Western Chou Civilization*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huang, Ray. 1988. *China: A Macro History*. London: M.E. Sharpe
- Ikenberry, John G., Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. 2011. "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences." In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds). *International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-32.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002. *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2011a. *American Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2011b. "The Liberal Sources of American Unipolarity." In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds). *International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 216-251.
- Ishjamts, N. 1994. "Nomads in Eastern Central Asia." In *History of Civilization in Central Asia, Volume II: The Development of Sedentary and Nomadic Civilizations, 700 B.C. to A.D. 250*. (ed) Janos Harmatta, B.N. Puri, and G.F. Etemadi. Paris: UNESCO. Pp. 151-169.
- Isidorus Characenus. 1914. *Parthian Stations of Isidore of Charax: An Account of the Overland Trade route Between the Levant and India in the First Century B.C.* (ed.). Wilfred H. Schoff. Philadelphia: The Commercial Museum.
- Iyer, Janaki and Veena Chawla. 1983. *Early Indian Political History: From Ancient Times to the Mughals*. Bombay: Orient Longman.
- Jackson, Peter. 1999. *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jeffery, L.H. 1988. "Greece Before the Persian Invasion." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History*,

*Volume IV: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C.*  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 347-367.

Jervis, Robert. 2006. "The Remaking of the Unipolar World." *The Washington Quarterly* 29:3, pp. 7-19.

----- 2009. "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective." *World Politics* 61:1, Pp. 188-213.

Jones, Sir Henry Stuart. 1952. "The Princeps." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 127-158.

Kaplan, Morton A. 1957. *System and Process in International Relations.* New York: Wiley.

----- 1969. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations." In James Rosenau (ed). *Contending Approaches to International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. 39-61.

Katzenstein, H. Jacob. 1973. *The History of Tyre.* Jerusalem: Schocken Institute for Jewish Research.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Kauppi, M. V. 1991. "Contemporary International Relations Theory and the Peloponnesian War." In Lebow, R. N., and B. S. Strauss (eds). 1991. *Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age.* Boulder. Pp. 91– 124.

Kedourie, E. 1968. "The Middle East 1900-1945." In C.L. Mowat (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12 (Second Edition): The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 269-296.

Keightley, David N. 1983. "The Late Shang State: When, Where, and What?" In *The Origins of Chinese Civilizations.* (ed) David N. Keightley. Berkley: University of California Press. Pp. 523-564.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic and Military Change From 1500-2000.* New York: Random House.

Kenyon, Kathleen M. 1973. "Palestine in the Middle Bronze Age." In I.E.S Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 1. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Regions c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 77-116.

- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Koenigsberger, H.G. 1968. "Western Europe and the Power of Spain." In R.B. Werhnam (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 3: The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 234-318.
- Kokaz, N. 2001. "Between Anarchy and Tyranny: Excellence and the Pursuit of Power and Peace in Ancient Greece." *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 27. Pp. 91–118.
- Kossmann, E.H. 1961. "The Dutch Republic." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 275-300.
- Krauthammer, Charles. 1991. "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70:1 (Winter), pp. 23-33.
- Kuhrt, Amelie. 1995. *The Ancient Near East c. 3000-330 BC, Volume One*. London: Routledge.
- Kuhrt, Ameli and Susan Sherwin-White. 1987. *Hellenism in the East: Interaction of Greek and non-Greek Civilizations After Alexander's Conquest*. (ed). Berkley: University of California Press.
- Kupchan, Charles A. 1998. "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall), pp. 40-79.
- Kupper, J.R. 1973. "Northern Mesopotamia and Syria." In I.E.S Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 1. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Regions c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-41.
- Kurat, A.N. 1961. "The Ottoman Empire Under Mehmed IV." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 500-518.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. "The Retreat of the Turks, 1683-1730." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 608-647.
- Kwanten, Luc. 1979. *Imperial Nomad: A History of Central Asia, 500-1500*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kyzlasov, L.R. 1996. "Northern Nomads." In *History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Volume III: The Crossroads of Civilization, A.D. 250 to 750*. (ed) B.A. Litvinsky, Zhang Guang- da, and R. Shabani Samghabadi. Paris: UNESCO. Pp. 315-325.
- Labat, Rene. 1975. "Elam c. 1600-1200." .” In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 379-416.
- Langdon, Stephen H. 1923. "Early Babylon and Its Cities." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I, Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 356-402.
- 1923b. "The Dynasties of Akkad and Lagash." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I, Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 402-434.
- 1923c. "The Sumerian Revival: the Empire of Ur." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I, Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 435-463.
- Langlois, John D. 1981. "Introduction." In *China Under Mongol Rule*. (ed). John D. Langlois. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. 3-22.
- Layne, Christopher. 1993. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise." *International Security* 17:4 (Spring), pp. 5-51.
- 2006. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: the Coming end of the United States' Unipolar Moment." *International Security* 31:2, pp. 7-41.
- Lebow, R. N., and B. S. Strauss. 1991. *Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age*. Boulder: University of Colorado Press.
- Lee, Ki-baik. 1984. *A New History of Korea*. (trans) Edward Wagner and Edward J. Shutz. Cambridge: University of Harvard Press.
- Legge, James. 1972. *The Chinese Classics, Volume 5: The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen*. Taipei: Wen-shi-zhe Chubanshe.

- Legro, Jeffrey W. 2011. "Sell Unipolarity? The Future of an Overvalued Concept." In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds). *International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 342-366.
- Levy, Jack S. 2003. "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions and Research Design." In John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (eds). *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*. Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 128-153.
- Lewis, Mark Edward. 2007. *The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
- Lindsay, J.O. 1957. "International Relations." In J.O. Lindsay (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 7: The Old Regime 1713-1763*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 191-213.
- Liska, George. 1957. *International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Liverani, Mario. 2000. "The Great Power's Club." In Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook (eds). *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Pp. 15-27.
- Livet, G. 1970. "International Relations and the Role of France 1648-60." In J.P. Cooper (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 4: The Decline of Spain and The Thirty Years War 1609-48/59*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 411-434.
- Loewe, Michael, and Edward L. Shaughnessy. 1999. "Introduction." In *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.* (ed) Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-18.
- Longden, R.P. 1954. "The Wars of Trajan." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XI: The Imperial Peace, A.D. 70-192*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 223-252.
- Lorge, Peter. 2011. "The End of the five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms." In *Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms*. (ed) Peter Lorge. Hong Kong: China University Press. Pp. 223-242.
- Macartney, C.A. 1960. "The Austrian Empire and Its Problems, 1848-1867." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 522-551.



- Mackerras, Colin. 1972. *The Uighur Empire According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories: A Study in the Sino-Uighur Relations, 744-840*. Columbia: University of Southern Carolina Press.
- Mahoney, James. 2010. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 62 (1): 120–47.
- Majumdar, R.C. 1985. *Champa: History and Culture of an Indian Colonial Kingdom in the Far East, 2<sup>nd</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> Centuries AD*. Delhi: Gian Publishing House.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. *Outline of the History of Kalinga*. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services.
- Majumdar, R.C. and A.S. Altekar. 1986. *The Vakataka-Gupta Age*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
- Majumdar, R. C., H.C. Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta. 1967. *An Advanced History of India*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- Mansfield, Edward D. 1993. "Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power." *International Studies Quarterly* 37:1 (March), pp. 105-128.
- Markham, Felix. 1969. "The Napoleonic Adventure." In C.W. Crawley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 307-336.
- Masperio, Henri. 1978. *China in Antiquity*. (trans) Frank A. Kierman Jr. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Mastanduno, Michael. 1997. "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring), pp. 44-98.
- Mastanduno, Michael and Ethan B. Kapstein. 1999. "Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War." In Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds). *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mattingly, H. 1961. "The Imperial Recovery." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, M.P. Charlesworth, and N.H. Baynes (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XII: The Imperial Crisis and Recovery, A.D. 193-324*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 297-351.
- Mattoo, A. Majid. 1988. *Kashmir Under the Mughals, 1586-1752*. Jammu: Golden Herde Enterprises.

- McGovern, William M. 1939. *The Early Empires of Central Asia*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Matz, F. 1973. "The Zenith of Minoan Civilization." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part I: History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 557-581.
- McKay, Derek. and H.M. Scott. 1983. *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815*. London: Routledge.
- Mearsheimer, John. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer), pp. 5-56.
- Meister, K. 1984. "Agathocles." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII, Part I: The Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 384-411.
- Mellink, M. 1991. "The Native Kingdoms of Anatolia." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part 3, The Assyrian and Babylonian Empires and other States of the Near East, from the Eighth to the Sixth Centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 619-655.
- Meuvret, Jean. 1970. "The Condition of France, 1688-1715." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 316-342.
- Minns, E.H. 1925. "The Scythians and Northern Nomads." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 187-205.
- Mishra, Phanikanta. 1979. *The Kadambas*. Delhi: Mithila Prakasana. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Mishra, Yogendra. 1962. *An Early History of Vaisali: From the Earliest times to the Fall of the Vajjian Republic, circa 484 B.C.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Modelski, George. 1978. "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 20: 2 (April), pp. 214-235.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. "Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?" *International Organization* 44:1. Pp. 1-24.

- Modelski, George, and William R. Thompson. 1988. *Seapower in Global Politics 1494-1993*. Basingstroke: Macmillan.
- Mole, Gabriella. 1970. *The T'u-yu-hun from the Northern Wei to the Times of the Five Dynasties*. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
- Monteiro, Nuno P. 2012. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful." *International Security* 36:3 (Winter), pp. 9-40.
- Morgenthau, Hans. 1993. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. (New York: McGraw-Hill).
- Mote, F.W. 1999. *Imperial China: 900-1800*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988. "The Rise of the Ming Dynasty, 1330-1367." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1. Volume 7*. (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 11-57.
- Mukminova, R.G. 1998. "The Timurid States in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," *History of Civilization of Central Asia: The Age of Achievement, A.D. 750 to the End of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century*, (ed.) M.S. Asimov and E.E. Bosworth). Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Pp. 347-364.
- Munn-Ranking, J.M. 1975. "Assyrian Military Power 1300-1200 B.C." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 274-306.
- Munro, J.A.R. 1926. "Marathon." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV, The Persian Empire and the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 229-267.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1926a. "The Reconquest of Persian Europe." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: The Persian Empire and the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 229-268.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1926b. "Xerxes's Invasion of Greece." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: The Persian Empire and the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 268-316.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1926c. "The Deliverance of Greece." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: The Persian Empire and the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 317-346.
- Murray, Oswyn. 1988. "The Ionian Revolt." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond,

- D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 461-490.
- Murphy, Rhoads. 1997. *East Asia: A New History*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Murray, Oswyn. 1988. "The Ionian Revolt." In .” In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV, Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.461-490.
- Mysliwiec, Karol. 2000. *The Twilight of Ancient Egypt*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Nap-Yin, Lau and Huang K’uan-chung. 2009. "Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty Under T’ai-tsu (960-976), T’ai-tsung (976-997), and Chen-tsung (997-1022)." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Sung Dynasty and its Predecessors, 907-1279, part one. Volume 5.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakob Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 206-278.
- Narain, A.K. 1957. *The Indo-Greeks*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (University of California Digitized Books).
- Narain, A.K., and Kashi Prasad. 1998. Jayashwal Research Institute. (University of Michigan Digitalized Books).
- Nelson, Sarah M. 1993. *The Archaeology of Korea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nicholson, Michael. 1996. "The Continued Significance of Postivism?" In Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds). *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 128-157.
- Niyogi, Roma. 1959. *The History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*. Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency.
- Nizami, K.A. 1998. "The Ghurids," *History of Civilization of Central Asia: The Age of Achievement, A.D. 750 to the End of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century*, (ed.) M.S. Asimov and E.E. Bosworth). Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Pp. 177-190.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2002. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ogley, Roderick C. 1981. "International Relations: Poetry, Prescription or Science?" *Millenium - Journal of International Studies* 10 (June), pp. 170-186.

- Ogg, David. 1961. "Britain After the Restoration." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 301-329.
- Oldmstead, Albert T. E. 1948. *The History of the Persian Empire: Achaemenid Period*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Organski, A.F.K. 1958. *World Politics*. (New York: Alfred Knopf).
- Paul, T.V. 2005. "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," *International Security* 30:1 (Summer), pp. 46-71.
- Padfield, Peter. 1979. *Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West, Vol. 1, 1481-1654*. London: Routledge.
- Parker, Geoffrey. 1979. *Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659*. London: Fontana.
- Parry, V.J. 1968. "The Ottoman Empire 1566-1617." In R.B. Werhnam (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 3: The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 347-376.
- Pearson, Richard. 1983. "The Ch'ing-lien-kang Culture and the Chinese Neolithic." In *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*. (ed) David N. Keightley. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Penkala, Maria. 1966. *A Correlated History of the Far East: China, Korea, Japan*. The Hague: Mouton and Company.
- Picard-Cambridge, A.W. 1927a. "The Rise of Macedonia." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 200-243.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927b. "Macedonian Supremacy in Greece." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 244-271.
- Pitt, H.G. 1970. "The Pacification of Utrecht." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 446-479.
- Pires, Edward Aloysius. 1934. *The Maukharis*. Issue 10 of Studies in Indian History of the Indian Historical Research Institute. Ramanand Vidya Bhawan Publishers (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Pocock, J.G.A. 2005. "The Politics of Historiography." *Historical Research* 78:1999, pp. 1-14.

- Podany, Amanda H. 2010. *Brotherhood of Kings: How International Relations Shaped the Ancient Near East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. 1997. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21:2 (Winter), pp. 5-54.
- Posen, Barry R. 2011. "From Unipolarity to Multipolarity: Transition in Sight?" In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds). *International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 317-341.
- Potts, D.T. 1999. *The Archaeology of Elam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pouthas, Charles. 1960. "The Revolutions of 1848." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 389-415.
- Prakash, Buddha. 1964. *Political and Social Movements in Ancient Panjab*. Delhi: Orient Book Distributors.
- Puri, Baij.N. 1965. *India Under the Kushanas*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1986. *The History of Gurjara-Pratiharas*. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Pusalker, A.D, A.K. Majumdar, K.M. Munshi, and R.C. Majumdar. 2001. *The Age of Imperial Unity from 600 B.C. to 320 A.D*. Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.
- Qian, Sima. 1993. *Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty*. (trans.) Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press Books.
- Ramm, Agatha. 1960. "The Crimean War." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830- 1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 468-492.
- Ramsay, G.D. 1968. "The Austrian Habsburgs and the Empire." In R.B. Werhnam (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 3: The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 319-246.
- Rapkin, David P., et al. (1979) "Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Validation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23. Pp. 261-295.
- Rapson, Edward J. 1922. *Ancient India. Vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of India*. (ed).

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Ray, B.C. and Bhabani C. Raya. 1981. *Orissa Under the Moguls: From Akbar to Alivardi, a Fascinating Study of the Socio-economic and Cultural History of Orissa*. Kolkata: Punthi Pustak Books.
- Ray, J. L., and J. D. Singer. 1973. "Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System." *Sociological Methods and Research* 1, pp. 403-437.
- Raychaudhuri, H.C. 1972. *Political History of Ancient India: From the Accession of Parikshit to the Extinction of the Gupta Dynasty* Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
- Regla, Juan. 1961. "Spain and Her Empire." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 369-383.
- Reischauer, Edwin O. and John K. Fairbank. 1960. *East Asia: The Great Tradition. A History of East Asian Civilization, Volume 1*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Reynolds, Charles. 1973. *Theory and Explanation in International Politics*. London: M. Robertson.
- Richards, John F. 2001. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Richardson, Hugh E. 1962. *Tibet and its History*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Ridgway, David. "The Etruscans." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 634-675.
- Robson, Eric. 1957. "The Seven Years War." *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 7: The Old Regime 1713-1763*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 465-486.
- Rosencrance, Richard N. 1966. "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10 (September), pp. 314-327.
- Ross, Robert. 1999. "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty First Century." *International Security* 23:4 (Spring), pp. 81-117.
- Rostovtsev, Mikhail Ivanovich. 1959. *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*. 3 (vols.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Rostovtzeff, M. I. 1922. "International Relations in the Ancient World." In E. Walsh (ed). *The History and Nature of International Relations*. London. Pp. 33– 50.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928a. "Ptolemaic Egypt." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charelsworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 109-154.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928b. "Syria and the East." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charelsworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 155-196.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930a. "Pergamum." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 590-618.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1930b. "Rhodes, Delos and Hellenistic Commerce." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean, 218-133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 619-667.
- Roth, Gertrude. 1979. "The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618-1636." In *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*. (ed) Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. 1-38.
- Savelle, Max. 1974. *Empires to Nations: Expansion in America, 1713-1824*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sayce, A.H. 1925. "The Kingdom of Van (Urartu)." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 169-186.
- Shaw, Ian (ed). 2000. *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schulten, A. 1928. "The Carthaginians in Spain." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charelsworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 769-792.
- Schwartzberg, Joseph E. 1992. *A Historical Atlas of South Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



- Schweller, Randall L, and Xiaoyu Pu. 2011. "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline." *International Security* 36:1 (Summer), pp. 41-72.
- Schweller, Randall L. 1994. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security* 19 (Summer), pp. 72-107.
- , 2010. "Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less Meaningful." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23:1 (March), pp. 145-163.
- Scullard, H. H. 1989a. "Carthage and Rome." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie, and A. Drummond (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History Volume VII, Part 2: The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 486-569.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989b. "The Carthaginians in Spain." In S.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 17-43.
- Seaton, Albert. 1977. *The Crimean War: A Russian Chronicle*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sen, Sailendra Nath. 1999. *Ancient Indian History and Civilization*. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers.
- Seth, Krishna N. 1978. *The Growth of Paramara Power in Malwa*. Progress Publishers. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Sharma, Govardham R. 1969. "Excavations at Kausambi, 1949-1950." *Memoirs of the Archeological Survey of India*, (Issue 74) Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India.
- Sharma Tej. R. 1989. *A Political History of the Imperial Guptas: From Gupta to Skandagupta*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.
- Shaughnessy, Edward L. 1999. "Western Zhou History." In *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.* (ed) Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 292-351.
- Shrava, Satya. 1981. *The Sakas in India*. Lahore: Pranava Prakashan. (University of Michigan Digitized Books).
- Shyam, Radhey. 1966. *The Kingdom of Ahmadnagar*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

- Sicar, D.C. 1939. *Successors of the Satavahanas*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
- Sidky, H. 2000. *The Greek Kingdom of Bactria: From Alexander to Eurcratides the Great*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Singer, David J. 1981. "Accounting for International War: The State of the Discipline," *Journal of Peace Research* 18:1, pp. 1-18.
- Singh, Madan M. 1967. *Life in North-Eastern India in pre-Mauryan Times with Special Reference to 600 B.C.-325 B.C.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (Accessed: Google Books).
- Singh, Rama B. 1964. *History of the Cahamanas*. Delhi: Varanasi.
- Singh, Upinder (2008). *A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India: From the Stone Age to the 12<sup>th</sup> Century*. Delhi: Pearson Education.
- Sinha, Bindeshwari Prasad. 1977. *Dynastic History of Magadha*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.
- Smith, D. Mack. 1960. "Italy." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 552-576.
- Smith, Sidney. 1925. "The Supremacy of Assyria." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 32-60.
- . 1925b. "The Foundation of the Assyrian Empire." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-31.
- . 1925c. "Sennacherib and Esarhaddon." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 61-88.
- . 1925d. "Ashurbanipal and the Fall of Assyria." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.113-131.
- Smith, Tony. 1981. *The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late-Industrializing World Since 1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snyder, J. W.1966. *Alexander the Great*. New York.

- Somers, Robert M. 1997. "The End of T'ang." In *The Cambridge History of China: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906, Part 1. Vol. 3.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 682-789.
- Standen, Naomi. 2011. "The Five Dynasties." In *The Cambridge History of China: The Sung Dynasty and its Predecessors, 907-1279, part one. Volume 5.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 38-132.
- Stevenson, G.H. and A. Momigliano. 1952. "Rebellion Within the Empire." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 840-865.
- Stoye, John. 2000. *Europe Unfolding, 1648-1688.* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. "The Austrian Habsburgs." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 572-607.
- Stubblings, Frank H. 1973. "The Rise of Mycenaean Civilization." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J.Gadd, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part I: History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1800-1380 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 627-658.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. "The Recession of Mycenaean Civilization." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J.Gadd, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, Part 2: History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 338-358.
- Syme, Ronald. 1952. "The Northern Frontier Under Augustus." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 340-381.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1954. "Flavian Wars and Frontiers." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XI: The Imperial Peace, A.D. 70-192.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 131-187.
- Syme, Ronald and R.G. Collingwood. 1952. "The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 781-807.
- Tapie, V.L. 1970. "The Habsburg Lands 1618-57." In J.P. Cooper (ed). *The New*

*Cambridge Modern History, Volume 4: The Decline of Spain and The Thirty Years War 1609-48/59.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 503-530.

- Tarn, W.W. 1927a. "Alexander: The Conquest of Persia." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 352-386.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927b. "Alexander: The Conquest of the Far East." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 387-437.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927c. "Greece: 335 to 321 B.C." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 438-460.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927d. "The Heritage of Alexander." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI: Macedon, 401-301 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 461-504.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928a. "The New Hellenistic Kingdoms." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 75-108.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928b. "Macedonia and Greece." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 197-223.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928c. "The Greek Leagues and Macedonia." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 732-768.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1928d. "The Struggle of Egypt Against Syria and Macedonia." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII: The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 699-731.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1952. "The Triumvirs." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 31-65.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1951. *The Greeks in Bactria and India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Tarn, W.W. and M.P. Charlesworth. 1952. "The War of the East Against the West." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C. – A.D. 70*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 66-111.
- Taylor, A.J.P. 1954. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Teschke, Benno. 1998. "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory." *International Organization*, 52:2. Pp. 325-358.
- Tilly, Charles. 1993. *European Revolutions, 1492-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Thomas, Carol G. and Craig Conant. 1999. *Citadel to City-State: The Transformation of Greece, 1200-700 B.C.E.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Thomson, David. 1960. "The United Kingdom and Its World-Wide Interests." In J.P.T. Bury (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 331-356.
- Thomson, Mark A. 1957. "The War of the Austrian Succession." *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 7: The Old Regime 1713-1763*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 416-439.
- Thompson, R. Campbell. 1923. "Isin, Larsa, and Babylon." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I, Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 464-493.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1924. "Assyria." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume II, The Egyptian and Hittite Empires to c. 1000 BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 227-251.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1925. "The New Babylonian Empire." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, The Assyrian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 206-225.
- Thompson, William R. 2002. "Testing an Instability Theory in the Ancient Near East." *Comparative Civilizations Review* 46 (Spring), pp. 34-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001. *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Toynbee, Arnold. 1946. *A Study of History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Trautmann, Thomas R. 2010. *India: Brief History of a Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Trevelyan, G.M. 1978. *English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries*. London: Longman Group.
- Trevor-Roper, H.R. 1970. "Spain and Europe 1598-1621." In J.P. Cooper (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 4: The Decline of Spain and The Thirty Years War 1609-48/59*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 260-282.
- Turner, Sir Eric. 1984. "Ptolemaic Egypt." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII, Part I: The Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 118-174.
- Twitchett, Denis and Klaus-Peter Tietze. 1994. "The Liao." In *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368. Volume 6*. (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 43-153.
- Vasquez, John A. 1987. "The Steps to War: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings." *World Politics* 40:1 (October), pp. 108-145.
- Veenendall, A.J. 1970. "The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe." In J.S. Bromley (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 410-445.
- Vyvyan, J.M.K. 1960. "The Approach of the War of 1914." In David Thomson (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12: The Era of Violence 1898-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 329-358.
- Wace, A.J.B. 1923a. "Prehistoric Greece." In J.B Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I: Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 173-180.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1923b. "Early Aegean Civilization." In J.B Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I: Egypt and Babylonia to 1580 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 589-598.
- Walbank, F.W. 1984. "Macedonia and Greece." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII, Part I: The Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 221-256.

- Walker, E.M. 1927a. "The Confederacy of Delos." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 33-67
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1927b. "Athens and the Greek Powers, 462-445 B.C." In J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 68-97.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1973. "Alliance Polarization, Cross-cutting, and International war, 1815-1964: A Measurement Procedure and Some Preliminary Evidence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17:4, 575-604.
- Walker, Richard L. 1953. *The Multi-State System in Ancient China*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. *The Modern World System—Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. *The Modern World-System, vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the World-Economy, 1600-1750*. New York: Academic Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989. *The Modern World-System, vol. 3: The Second Great Expansion of the Capitalist Economy, 1730-1870's*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1992. "The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System," *Review* 15:4 (Fall), pp. 561-619.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. "World System versus World-Systems." In Andre Frank Gunder and Barry K. Gills. (eds). *The World System: Five Hundred years or Five Thousand?* London: Routledge. Pp. 292-296.
- Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2011. "Alliances in a Unipolar World." In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds). *International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 99-139.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1964. "The Stability of a Bipolar World." *Daedalus* 93 (Summer), pp. 881-909.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *A Theory of International Relations*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44–79.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1997. "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review* 91:4 (December), pp. 915-916.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2000. "Structural Realism After the Cold War." *International Security* 24:1 (Summer), pp. 5-41.
- Wayman, Frank Whelon. 1985. "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Threat of War." In Alan Ned Sabrosky (ed). *Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 115-144.
- Weber, Wilhelm. 1954. "The Antonines." In S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XI: The Imperial Peace, A.D. 70-192*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 325-392.
- Wechsler, Howard J. 1997. "The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty: Kao-tsu." In *The Cambridge History of China: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906, Part 1. Vol 3.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 150-187.
- Wedgwood, C.V. 1938. *The Thirty Years War*. New York: Random House.
- Wend, Alexander. 1999. *Social theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wernham, R.B. 1968. "The British Question 1559-69." In R.B. Werhnam (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 3: The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 209-233.
- Wight, Martin. 1978. *Power Politics*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Will, Edouard. 1984. "The Succession to Alexander." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII, Part I: The Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 23-61.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984b. "The Formation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms." In F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VII, Part I: The Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 101-117.
- Wilson, Charles. 1968. *The Dutch Republic and the Civilization of the Seventeenth Century*. London: Littlehampton.



- \_\_\_\_\_. 1978. *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars*. London: Martinus Nijhoff .
- Wiseman, D.J. 1975. "Assyria and Babylon c. 1200-1000 B.C." In I.E.S. Edwards, C.J. Gadd, H.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Volume II, Part 2. History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region c. 1380-1000 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 443-481.
- Wolf, J.B. 1951. *The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Wright, Arthur F. 1997. "The Sui Dynasty." In *The Cambridge History of China: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906, Part 1. Vol. 3.* (ed) Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 48-149.
- Wight, Colin. 2002. "Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds). *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage Publications.
- Wight, Martin. 1978. *Power Politics*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Wilkinson, David. 1987. "Central Civilization." *Comparative Civilizations Review* 17 (Fall), pp. 31-59.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. "Decline Phases in Civilizations, Regions and Oikumenes." *Comparative Civilizations Review* 33 (Fall), pp. 33-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. "Configurations of the Indic States System." *Comparative Civilizations Review* 34 (Spring), pp. 63-119.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999a. "Structural Sequences in the Far Eastern World System/Civilization." *Journal for the Comparative Study of Civilizations* 4:21-62.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999b. "Unipolarity Without Hegemony." *International Studies Review* 1:2 (Summer), pp. 141-172.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2004. "The Power Configuration Sequence of the Central World System, 1500-700 BC." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 10:3 (Fall), pp. 655-720.
- Wohlforth, William C. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24:1 (Summer), pp. 5-41.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2011. "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War." In G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds).

*International Relations Theory and the Consequence of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33-66.

Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. *Discord and Collaboration*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.

Wyatt, David K. 1984. *Thailand: A Short History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Yao A., and Zhilong J. 2012. "Rediscovering the Settlement System of the 'Dian' Kingdom In Bronze Age Southern China." *Antiquity* 86(332):353-367.

Yazdani, Ghulam. 1960. *The Early History of the Deccan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yong, Ma and Sun Yutang. 1994. "The Western Regions Under the Hsiung-nu and the Han." In *History of Civilization in Central Asia, Volume II: The Development of Sedentary and Nomadic Civilizations, 700 B.C. to A.D. 250*. (ed) Janos Harmatta, B.N. Puri, and G.F. Etemadi. Paris: UNESCO. Pp. 227-246.

Young, Cuyler T. 1988. "The Early History of the Medes and the Persians and the Achaemenid Empire to the Death of Cambyses." In John Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV, Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean c. 525 to 479 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-52.

Yuhong, Wu. 1994. *A Political History of Eshnunna, Mari and Assyria During the Early Old Babylonian Period: From the End of Ur III to the Death of Samsi-Adad*. Inst. of History of Ancient Civilizations. Northeast Normal University.

Zeller, G. 1961. "French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Their European Setting." In F.L. Carsten (ed). *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 5: The Ascendancy of France 1648-88*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 198-221.

Zhang, Yongjin. 2001. "System, Empire and Sate in Chinese International Relations." In Michael Cox, Tim Dunne, and Ken Booth (eds). *Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformation in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 43-63.

VITA

Graduate College  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Nerses Kopalyan

Degrees:

Bachelor of Arts, Political Science 2006  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Master of Arts, Political Science 2009  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Dissertation Title: After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural Transitions,  
and Nonpolarity

Dissertation Examination Committee:

Chairperson, Jonathan R. Strand, Ph.D.  
Committee Member, John P. Tuman, Ph.D.  
Committee Member, Tiffiany Howard, Ph.D.  
Graduate Faculty Representative, Andrew Bell, Ph.D.