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High Stakes of Media Messages: Decoding Visual Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses

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ABSTRACT

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by

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This research analyzes media coverage of the Iraq War from the perspective of the invading forces, the United States and the United Kingdom. *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* were chosen to represent news from their respective countries because of their high circulation rates and international prestige for journalistic reporting. The study focuses on how the Iraq War was visually represented after the Iraq invasion of 2003, examining periods in 2006 and 2011. There were significant differences in how *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* visually portrayed the war in 2006, especially in terms of Iraqi civilian and Coalition military casualties. However, there were no significant differences in how they represented the war visually in 2011. War is a high-stakes enterprise and how messages are broadcast visually, verbally, and textually influence the audience's perception of the war. With the use of similar and repeated images encouraging support or opposition to military conflict, these messages become more salient for the audience.

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the men and women in the military that risk their lives to maintain the security of the United States and the United Kingdom. I would also like to thank the journalists and photojournalists who put their lives on the line to inform the public about wars and conflicts.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the current information age of minute-by-minute media updates, audiences are inundated with global and local news coverage, which sometimes confuses their understanding of important international events, such as war. The information individuals consume from print, television, and online media play a major part in informing individual perspectives and constructing societal realities about the world around them. Many scholars have studied how various media outlets report and portray war on varying platforms and countries (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Wells, 2007). Recently, much attention has been given to how the Iraq War was covered visually and textually (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; King, & Lester, 2005; Wells, 2007).

The Iraq War lasted more than eight years, resulting in the deaths of 4,500 Americans, and cost somewhere between $800 billion and $3 trillion (Ghosh, 2012). Iraqi casualties have been estimated anywhere from 100,000 to 600,000 people (Ghosh, 2012) with some estimates as high as a million. With continued war efforts in Afghanistan and the U.S. involvement in Libya, Syria, and Egypt, awareness of message frames and critical consumption of media will remain an integral component in keeping the public informed and conscientious about foreign policy issues.

In constructing news, journalists rely on newsgathering practices and credible sources to express large concepts, explain the facts, structure the headlines, and write the storyline (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003). How journalists choose to report and cover events

are influenced by how similar events have been reported and documented in the past. Often conventional news frames are reiterated creating "persistent patterns of selection, emphasis, and exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events" (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 4). How news is presented — particularly military conflict — is influenced by complex relationships between political pressures, government-media negotiations, military censorship, internal media politics, and profit. A number of scholars have discussed the difficulties of collecting and publishing verifiable and meaningful stories under wartime conditions (Jamail, 2011; Fuchs, 2011; Schechter, 2011).

Accordingly, scholars and policy analysts have devoted much attention to studying media messages and their role in reporting the Iraq War, as well as in their portrayal of the war through visual frames and narratives (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). Essentially, during times of war, as scholars have noted, visuals create persuasive messages that develop public support for the actions of the government and military (Fahmy & Wanta, 2007, p. 20). How media outlets reported the Iraq War has been debated and analyzed in several studies (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; King, & Lester, 2005; Wells, 2007).

Within a democratic society, the importance of reputable, independent and balanced news sources are paramount in educating the general populace. This is essential in providing individuals accurate information when evaluating candidates for public office and in deciding what policy issues to support or oppose — including foreign conflict. The democratic process cannot exist without members of the Fourth Estate who

practice independently and critically. In *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Cohen writes, "the media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (Cohen, 1963, p .13). Entman (2007) built upon Cohen's concepts, suggesting scholars need to address the larger implications of media framing. "If the patterns of slant persist across time, message dimensions, and media outlets," he wrote, "it means that the media may be systematically assisting certain entities to induce their preferred behavior in others" (Entman, 2007, p. 166). This is especially important within the context of media's portrayal of war.

Two years into the Iraq invasion, Air Force General Erwin Lessel addressed the importance of aligning public opinion with the government's position for policy makers. General Lessel explained the government focuses on public perceptions and public information within the United States. "That support, that information, is necessary," he wrote. "You can't fight a war; you can't go forth successfully, without popular U.S. support" (McCormick *Tribune*, 2005, p. 109). However, in order to maintain a self-governing democracy, it is imperative that the populace is educated. James Madison made this point early in the nation's formation when he wrote, "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both" (Madison, 1822, p. 103). Geoffrey Stone, professor of law at the University of Chicago, reiterates Madison's sentiment in his explanation for the necessity and importance of the First Amendment and the difficulties of its application in wartime. "In a self-governing democracy, it is fundamental that citizens openly discuss policy and debate freely who their leaders should be," Stone wrote. "And there is no issue more important than whether and how to go to war" (McCormick *Tribune*, 2005, p. 14).

Media messages supporting or opposing the Iraq War have varied significantly between media platforms and countries, with a number of these studies focusing on pictorial representations of key events (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). War is a "high-stakes enterprise" and every war includes competing images and messages to influence public perceptions (Griffin, 2010). While previous studies have completed comparative analyses of news images during the Iraq invasion in 2003, this thesis includes images and messages from the occupation, and the official end of the Iraq War in 2011. A comprehensive analysis of news from the United States and the United Kingdom during this period provides a better understanding of the complex relationships between government, public interest, and the press.

Background

The ability of photographs to capture and bear witness to moments in time have captivated audiences and influenced history. Images published or broadcast with news stories play a major role in affecting media frames and messages (Sontag, 2003; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Wells, 2007). Since photography's inception, the new medium was heralded "the ultimate eyewitness, unhampered by subjectivity, memory lapses, or flights of fancy" (Goldberg, 1991, p. 19). Today, when audiences are aware of the ability to manipulate images, sophisticated observers often tend to believe unconsciously the camera's report (Goldberg, 1991).

The "juxtaposition and integration" of other images and text can further alter visual meanings (Roskill & Carrier, 1983, p. 19). Therefore, awareness of image manipulation and the marketing of messages will help audiences be less susceptible to

coercive visual frames (Messaris, 1994). Sontag (2003) addressed this phenomenon in her analysis of how photographs are not simply transparencies of what happened. They are "the image that someone chose; to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to exclude" (Sontag, 2003, p. 46). War photography initially was intended to "drum up support" for soldiers and their sacrifices (Sontag, 2003, p. 48). The manipulation of photographs and war staging goes back to Civil War photography. Common at the time of Mathew Brady's Civil War photography was the staging of dead bodies for dramatic effect (Borchard, Mullen & Bates, 2013). "To photograph was to compose (with living subjects, to pose), and the desire to arrange elements in the picture did not vanish because the subject was immobilized, or immobile" (Sontag, 2003, p. 53).

Scholars continue to cite Entman's (1993) definition of framing (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Entman (1993) was particularly interested in how framing influences the perceptions and thoughts of audiences (p. 51). To frame, he wrote, "is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text" (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Frames "define problems," "diagnose causes," "make moral judgments," and "suggest remedies" (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Frames call attention to some aspects of reality, but they also obscure others (Entman, 1993, p. 55). Framing plays a significant role in the exertion of power, and "the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power — it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text" (Entman, 1993, p. 55).

However, discussing and applying the terms of frames and framing to visual images can be problematic. In photography, framing can mean how the subject is contained within the physical borders of the image, the choice of subject, and the

intention to represent meaning through the image. In communication studies, the concept of framing can refer to text, images, and rhetoric and it refers to how messages are articulated and received (Entman, 1993). Clearly defining concepts and terms utilized within academic literature is necessary in communicating complex and multifaceted topics.

This study will provide a necessary contribution to the scholarship that has not previously addressed the roles of major newspapers in communicating international events. *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* are among the world's most respected newspapers (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). The Sunday edition of *The New York Times* ranks first in the nation for the largest circulation rates, and the daily newspaper holds the second-largest circulation rates (Haughney, 2013). *The Guardian*'s print and online versions have been utilized by previous researchers studying media coverage of the Iraq war from the United Kingdom (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). Similarly, previous researchers have also used *The New York Times* to analyze and represent media coverage of the Iraq war from the United States (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Moreover, both *The Times* and *The Guardian* have secured their places in research as among the most cited newspaper sources for conducting analyses on international media events.

Thematic Statement

Scholars have documented how photographs that illustrate messages and frame news have influenced audiences. War images have the ability to persuade, provoke, inspire, influence, compel change, and reinforce nationalistic causes. This thesis provides

a comparative analysis of war frames over the course of a conflict, from invasion to official end. To analyze contemporary war reporting, the thesis examines the recent conflict between American forces and the counterinsurgency in Iraq. The thesis analyzes the newspapers of the invading forces, namely *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, two newspapers chosen for their journalistic quality and international prestige. Both papers are politically independent, but considered left leaning in political stance and journalistic viewpoints. *The Times* is among the few family owned and operated major newspapers still publishing in the United States. *The Guardian* Media Group, a trust that exists in part to secure the financial and editorial independence of *The Guardian*, owns the newspaper, which was founded by textile traders and merchants as "an organ of the middle class" (Engels, 1973, p. 109). Given their statuses as independent newspapers, both with important perspectives on international issues, previous scholars have utilized *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* to represent journalistic reporting from the United States and the United Kingdom (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). "Both of these prestigious newspapers fall into the same liberal model … as they tend to hold more liberal viewpoints in comparison with other newspapers in their country" (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 448).

The United States and the United Kingdom are both major powers in the international world and had similar stakes in the Iraq War, and previous studies have found many similarities and some differences between their published war images (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). For this thesis, a content analysis of published Iraq War images from *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* was developed through the examination of images, headlines, and photographic captions. This

thesis compares the same historic events in both publications, which include the occupation period in 2006, and the close of the war in 2011. Additionally, the thesis investigates how the British press and the American press relayed these events in their photographic news coverage. The research examines ongoing or changing war frames/narratives within each publication, as well as how *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*'s coverage compared to each other. In providing a longitudinal study of the Iraq War, this research analyzes complex issues including the purpose of the war, the success/status of the war, and the impact/future implications of the war as relayed through the lens of media.

Significance of the Study

The ways in which messages are broadcast visually, verbally, and textually influence the audience's perception of events. With the use of similar and repeated images juxtaposed with text, these messages become more salient for the audience. Much attention has been given to media messages and their role in supporting or opposing the Iraq War through frames and narratives, which has varied significantly between media platforms and countries (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). After all, foreign policy news is closely related to security issues; therefore, international events are often framed in a matter that is consistent to the host country's government interests.

While previous studies have provided comparative analyses of news images during the Iraq invasion in 2003, this thesis contributes to scholarly research by including images and messages from the occupation, and the official end of the Iraq War in 2011.

The daily newspapers of the U.S.'s *The New York Times* and the U.K.'s *The Guardian* were analyzed for this study. Daily newspapers rather than weekly magazines were chosen for this research in order to get an immediate interpretation of events, one that is more commonly used by consumers of news, as well as media outlets, including websites and broadcasters. By examining disparate media coverage of war, this thesis develops new scholarship on framing analysis.

Literature Review

Several scholars have examined the visual coverage of military conflicts in the Middle East over the last twenty-two years. A few different types of studies have emerged. Some scholars have provided a historical analysis of war reporting within a country (King & Lester, 2005; Griffin, 1995, 2004). Other researchers have focused on war reporting within a single country during an event or short duration of time (Keith, Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2009; Wells, 2007). Finally, other studies have compared the reporting of military conflict between countries (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). Within all these studies, several techniques of visual and textual analysis have been conducted, highlighting varying degrees of success and shortcomings.

King and Lester (2005) conducted a historical content analysis of photographic images from the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. The authors compared the differences in the visual coverage from the media pool system used in 1991 to the use of embedded journalists in 2003. Journalists chosen to make up the military press pool was highly selective at about 100 individuals, with a pool of sixteen reporters covering

every ground unit of over 500,000 troops (King & Lester, 2005). Also, in 1991 all stories and images required military approval and were subject to censorship (King & Lester, 2005). During the 2003 Iraq War, more than 500 embedded journalists were trained by military officials and traveled with coalition combat units (King & Lester, 2005). While the embedded journalists in 2003 were subject to less restrictive practices than the 1991 reporters, many argued because the embedded reporters are so dependent on the soldiers for safety—they would be more likely to identify with them and report stories that are more favorable about the soldiers and the war (King & Lester, 2005).

The first week of the start of the ground war in 1991 and 2003 were compared on microfilm for the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times,* and the *New York Times* (King & Lester, 2005). From the two periods, 1,023 photographs were analyzed, 317 for 1991 and 706 for 2003 (King & Lester, 2005). There were statistically significant differences in content categories between 1991 and 2003. The 2003 conflict contained more fighting scenes, and protestor images. The 1991 war had a larger proportion of battlefield scenes, prisoners, and civilian images and portraits. The ratio of images for deceased soldiers, injured soldiers, and miscellaneous pictures for both wars was similar. Significant differences were also found on page selection, the 1991 war had almost twice as many front-page images than the 2003 conflict. The authors found the combined categories of battle scenes similar for both wars. The authors concluded the embedding program resulted in a much larger frequency of published war images in 2003 over 1991; however, allowing journalists better access to war zones "may not automatically result in more direct war coverage" (King & Lester, 2005).

Griffin (2004) analyzed the U.S. news-magazine photo coverage of the "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan and the Iraq invasion (p. 381). Griffin utilized the same photographic methods of classifying images into frames as his earlier study of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the earlier study of the Gulf War, Griffin and Lee (1995) found little attention was given to actual combat, civilian casualties, or cultural damage. Instead, 57 percent of all pictures published in news magazines consisted of images of the American arsenal (planes, ships, tanks, missiles, and other weapons), troops (not in combat), and pictures of political and military leaders (Griffin & Lee, 1995). The central theme of the pictorial representation promoted the power and superiority of the American military, while neglecting the human cost or cultural contexts of the conflict (Griffin & Lee, 1995).

Then in Griffin's (2004) study, images of the 2003 invasion of Iraq were found to be similar to the (1995) study of the Persian Gulf War. About half of all photographs printed in U.S. news magazines were of the arsenal, unengaged troops, and political leaders (Griffin, 2004). Also, as a result of embedded journalists with U.S. troops, new categories of images occurred that were not available from the previous Persian Gulf War. For example, there were numerous photographs of Iraqis. The majority of these photographs could be categorized as either pictures of Iraqi civilians greeting American armored convoys, images of Kurdish fighters allied with U.S. and British forces, pictures of captured Iraqi soldiers, photographs of Iraqis receiving humanitarian aid, or pictures of crowds cheering U.S. troops (Griffin, 2004). As in 1991, categories of images that were absent included pictures of coalition casualties (U.S. and British), damage of Iraq bombing and war, and pictures of the Iraqi perspective (Griffin, 2004).

The overall narrative of the 2003 invasion was "Rolling to Baghdad," which depicted the unstoppable military machine of the United States and culminated in Iraqi liberation by the toppling of the Saddam regime and the destruction of Saddam's statue (Griffin, 2004). Griffin (2004) discussed how the ongoing conflict following the end of the invasion confused American media's coverage of this war. As a result, Griffin (2004) discussed how published war images had dropped significantly, and argued a new narrative of the conflict had yet to emerge.

Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009) applied Griffin and Lee's (1995) methods and found similar results in their analysis of images from the 2003 Iraq invasion. The authors compared the visual content produced from print, television, and online media coverage during the first five weeks of the 2003 Iraq invasion. In their content analysis of 1,822 war related images of the invasion of Iraq, researchers found little difference between the most prevalent war frames (Keith, et al., 2009). Keith, et al., found 77 percent of the most dominant images collected of the invasion were of the arsenal/war machine. The authors noted finding similar results to Griffin's (2004) news magazine study. The enemy received scant visual coverage among these three platforms, as did Iraqi civilians, scenes of actual combat, or casualties.

Keith, et al., (2009) recognized limitations of their research, stating the data collected only reflected differences during specific times and could not be generalized to overall image selection by television, Internet, or print media. Also, it is important to note the authors started their study with Griffin and Lee's twenty-seven classifications of war images, which they then shrunk into six categories and, in statistical analyses, further

reduced to only three categories. Due to the sample size chosen, Keith, et al., (2009) seemed to have only scratched the surface on analyzing these war images.

Fahmy and Kim (2008) also applied Griffin and Lee's (1995) methods in their visual study of the 2003 Iraq War in the American and British presses. The authors chose to compare *The New York Times* and Britain's *The Guardian* because both of these newspapers tend to be more liberal and are respected worldwide for their journalism (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 448). Fahmy and Kim coded 1,099 photographs from *The New York Times* and 206 photographs from *The Guardian* and found coverage of the Iraq War was extremely narrow, with a focus on images of Allied troops and U.S. and British political leaders in both newspapers. However, there were significant differences between the press coverage. *The New York Times* predominantly printed images of coalition troops (23.9 percent); then loss of civilian life in Iraq (21.2 percent); images of leaders from the United States and Great Britain (6.4 percent); and coalition troops with Iraqi civilians (6.1 percent) (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 451). The majority of *The Guardian*'s images were loss of civilian life in Iraq (20 percent); then Allied troops (11.7 percent); and images of looters, presidential palaces, and artifacts in Iraq (10.3 percent).

The analysis revealed the British newspaper was more concerned with the disturbance of cultural sites in Iraq because of looting and war. Also, *The New York Times* printed fewer images of casualties and destruction (17.3 percent) in comparison to *The Guardian* (35.5 percent) (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Contrary to expectations, both newspapers showed more images of Iraqi civilian casualties in comparison to images of military fatalities.

The British newspaper ran fewer photographs of political leaders from the United States and Great Britain. These papers also provided fewer images of "happy encounters" between troops and Iraqi civilians (than the U.S. media), and they printed more images of looting and cultural artifact loss. Also, unlike *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* printed actual combat images. Fahmy and Kim (2008) discussed how the majority of the British public opposed the war while the American public was largely in favor of it; therefore, the U.S. media may have represented the news in a more patriotic framework to meet the expectations of readers, while British coverage of the invasion was more critical.

The research was organized. It provided adequate discussion of previous research and clearly defined terms/concepts used in the study. However, the ratio of photographs analyzed in the two newspapers should have been more proportional. With thirty-six categories for analysis, 1,099 photographs from *The New York Times* provide an overview for cursory purposes. However, the study's analysis of only 206 photographs from *The Guardian* in these thirty-six categories does not provide significant statistical data.

Other scholars have constructed original frameworks for coding media war images (Wells, 2007; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007), and others have narrowed their focus to study published war images of children (Thorne, 2003; Wells 2007). Thorne (2003) examined photographs published from the 2003 Iraq invasion in U.S. news, European media, and Middle Eastern outlets. The author found photographs of severely wounded children were rare in U.S. news, more prominent in European media, and most prevalent in Middle Eastern media (Thorne, 2003). Thorne (2003) discussed the

power of representing suffering children to "personify injustice" because "children signify vulnerability, dependence, and innocence" (p. 261).

Wells (2007) focused on published photographs of children in British newspapers during the Iraq invasion. The author discussed how images of children are particularly influential when framing motivations and outcomes of war. Wells (2007) argued oppositional visual narratives of the Iraq invasion existed in the *Daily Mirror*, and *The Guardian*. These two narratives were: 1) Anti-war sentiments and expressions about the illegality of the Iraq invasion (the *Daily Mirror*); and, 2) Skepticism of the legality of war with liberation narratives (*The Guardian*).

To justify these different narratives the author displayed four published images, discussed a few images not shown, and presented a sample of headlines. Wells (2007) found *The Guardian*, although opposed to the Iraq war, did anticipate a favorable outcome for the Iraqi people. This was revealed through images selected from *The Guardian*, such as Iraqi children celebrating the fall of Saddam, smiling Iraqi children with a British Marine, and happy Iraqi children on top of an abandoned Iraqi tank.

In contrast, the *Daily Mirror* focused on the illegality of the invasion of Iraq and the suffering of the Iraqi people/children. The author discussed how the *Daily Mirror* printed many of the same images as the Arab press and often included wide-angle shots of damage resulting from the war (Wells, 2007, p. 69). Wells (2007) asserted the images printed by the *Daily Mirror* were intended to expose the actions of the British government and question the legalities of the Iraq invasion (Wells, 2007).

While the research pointed out an important area of inquiry other scholars have not addressed, i.e. images of children; the study lacks methodological rigor. The author

did not qualify the reasons for choosing the *Daily Mirror* and *The Guardian*, or explain the methods used to investigate these photographs. The author failed to provide an explicit period of study, or discuss the sample size. The narratives would be better argued if the author explained how many photographs of children were analyzed, or if the images were classified according to narratives, or if it was explained, how the four photographs published within the study characterize the larger sample.

Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) also constructed an original framework for coding war frames of articles during the Iraq invasion. The authors compared the newspaper coverage of the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States during the Iraq War in 2003. The United States and Sweden were selected because of their differing political systems, media structures, journalistic values, and positions on the Iraq War. Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) conducted a content analysis of the leading newspapers in both countries, the *Dagens Nyheter* and *The New York Times*. The researchers retrieved 172 articles from *Dagen Nyheter* and 1,417 articles from *The New York Times*, and then extracted a sample of the *New York Times* resulting in 236 articles. Therefore, 408 articles were analyzed under several categories. Articles were coded for specific mentions of political leaders, and groups or countries. The types of sources cited were classified under government official, military personnel, individual, journalist, or terrorist group member. The tone of the war coverage was coded for positive, negative or neutral on the U.S. position on the war. The news frames coded were military conflict (military action, troops, equipment, etc.); human interest frame (emphasis on human participants); responsibility frame (party/person responsible for the event); diagnostic frame (what

caused the event); prognostic frame (possible consequences of the event); violence of war frame; anti-war protest, and media self-reference frame (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005).

Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) found several differences between the two newspapers. The tone of *Dagens Nyheter*'s coverage was found to be more negative in tone than *The New York Times*' coverage. There were several statistically significant differences among war frames. The U.S. was much more likely to include military conflict and prognostic war frames, while the Swedish press included more anti-war protest frames and responsibility frames. Also, *The New York Times* relied on more official government and military sources than *Dagens Nyheter*. Finally, the U.S. press focused more heavily on human-interest frames of American participants, while the Swedish press emphasized Iraqi civilians (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). Overall, the authors found the two newspapers covered the Iraq war differently in terms of tone, war framing, and sources. While *The New York Times* coverage was dominated by military conflict developments and battles, the *Dagens Nyheter* was more likely to report on anti-war protests and responsibility issues regarding the Iraq War (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005).

Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) elaborated on the methods used in Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) and applied those to visual images. The authors compared media coverage in Egypt, Qatar, United Kingdom, and the United States. Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) included previous research that suggested the American public was exposed to different news coverage of the Iraq war in print and broadcast media, in comparison to other countries. Specifically, U.S. networks ignored

covering opposition to the war and instead provided a "sanitized picture of the war" (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 157).

Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) downloaded the home pages of *The New York Times* (nytimes.com), *The Guardian* (guardian.co.uk), Al Ahram (ahram.org.eg) the online newspaper in Egypt, and *Al Jazeera* (aljazeera.net) during the invasion from March 20, 2003, to May 1, 2003. All headlines, text, and photos associated with the Iraq War were content analyzed, totaling 112 home pages. Clear differences were found between the Arab and Coalition online media. The most predominant frames in the Arab media were "military conflict" and "violence of war" including heavy depiction of destruction with military and civilian casualties (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 161). The Arab media ignored the "rebuilding of Iraq" frame in contrast to the Coalition media (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 161). Also, the British and American news sites focused more heavily on looting. However, there were individual differences among the four media sites. The tone of *Al Jazeera*'s site was significantly more negative than that of *Al Ahram*, and *The Guardian* used anti-war frames more often than *The New York Times*.

Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) concluded the differences in framing suggest that Arab and Coalition media portrayed "different tales of the same war" in their online news coverage (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 162). While the Arab online audience saw a war with heavy military and civilian casualties represented in online images, the Coalition media emphasized the long-term benefits of a democratic government resulting from war. Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) pointed to public opinion of host countries as the most likely reason for variations of war coverage. The

authors were successful in adding to the few studies that have conducted comparative analyses and included the Arab world. However, within the study they classified western journalistic practices as objective, an arguable assertion. Future research would benefit by consistent methodologies for comparing war coverage.

Hammond (2003) examined the role of media, specifically U.S. and U.K. journalists in representing images that are supportive or critical of the war in Iraq. Hammond (2003) discussed the highly "image-conscious" media and stated that "producing the right image" is just as important as achieving tangible results on the ground (p. 23). Hammond (2003) discussed the role of U.S. media campaigns in filming military soldiers performing "heart-warming duties" including helping injured Iraqi children (p. 26). U.K. media was found to be much more critical, questioning the validity of the war and nature of U.S. media images. One BBC correspondent predicted the Iraq war would be "justified in the lofty rhetoric of human rights," warning his audience: "Get ready for a new generation of heart-wrenching images" (Hammond, 2003, p. 34).

Susan Carruthers (2008) in "No one's looking: the disappearing audience for war" discussed the American public's apathy for the war. Carruthers (2008) discussed how the Iraq war has become largely unpopular in the U.S., but has been unable to stir animation, emotion, or unrest from its citizens. Television airtime for Iraq has dwindled; embedded reporters have become too expensive financially and too dangerous (claiming the lives of 110 journalists).

Efforts by independent filmmakers and some Hollywood efforts to cover the Iraq war have found disinterested American audiences. The insurgency has become old news, despite the large amount of visual images and growing films available online and through

foreign news sources. Carruthers (2008) discussed the debate on Capitol Hill on when and how to "draw down" the troops; however, the disconnected American public has not called for any critical account or inspection of the war efforts and their effects. Carruthers (2008) concludes with a call for future research on these "contemporary peculiarities" of anemic dissent (p. 74).

The results and methods from Griffin and Lee's (1995) Persian Gulf War study influenced later research investigating war reporting. Building upon previous research methods for visual content analyses helps to build a more solid framework for future studies. From the literature, it is evident that disparate media coverage of the Iraq invasion across media platforms and/or countries exists. Griffin's (2004) study identified a change in the framing of the war by American media after the invasion of Iraq, an area ripe for further examination.

How the American and British media continued to cover the Iraq War eight years after President Bush declared mission accomplished needs to be analyzed. Updated research on how the American and British presses continued to cover such a controversial war provides insight to the complex relationships between government, international interests, the public's right to know, and the press.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODS

The literature on tone, framing of war, and war narratives has revealed differential visual coverage during the 2003 Iraq invasion period. This thesis compares the newspapers of the Coalition forces; the United States through *The New York Times* and the United Kingdom through *The Guardian* for two months during the occupation period (selecting 2006), and five weeks leading up to the designated end/closure of the war in 2011. To examine visual differences depicted within the publications, the study will explore the following research questions:

RQ1: How will *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* compare in their frequency of published images, size and placement in 2006 and 2011?

RQ2: How did the *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* compare in their newspaper coverage after the invasion period in 2006 and 2011 in terms of war frames and narratives?

RQ3: Did the war frames, and narratives change over time within each newspaper? If so, how?

Based on the review of literature, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H1: *The New York Times* will publish a higher frequency of images than *The Guardian* in their respective newspapers, but the size and placement of the images will be similar.

H2: *The Guardian* will include more critical coverage of the Iraq War than *The New York Times* in 2006 and 2011.

H3: Both newspapers will include more frames depicting violence, destruction, and societal chaos of war in 2006; and the 2011 coverage will focus on the departing troops and include much less critical and graphic images of the war.

In utilizing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* to represent newspaper coverage from the United States and the United Kingdom, this research is replicating an earlier study by Fahmy and Kim (2008) that analyzed the invasion period. This study chose to analyze images, which often after a conflict becomes iconic historical representations of previous wars. This study chose to examine war periods beyond the initial invasions in order to compare and analyze how news organizations represent and cover long-term conflicts that were initially intended to be short-term excursions. By uncovering how these two newspapers visually represented the Iraq War in 2006 and 2011 new insight can be brought to how these news organizations and countries positioned the war in informing the public of the progress and close of the war.

This study provides a comparative analysis of war images from the American and British presses. A content analysis of published Iraq War images was conducted using *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*. In order to access these images, microform copies of the newspapers were analyzed. This study was not able to utilize digital databases of these newspapers, as the digitized versions often exclude the photographic images printed with the news stories for copyright purposes. This study analyzes Iraq

War images and utilizes headlines and photographic captions as references in coding the American and British presses.

The New York Times and *The Guardian* were chosen for their journalistic quality and international prestige. These newspapers serve as important mouthpieces for the presses for the United States and the United Kingdom. Previous studies have utilized the print or online version of *The New York Times* (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005) and *The Guardian* (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, Fahmy & Kim, 2008) to represent newspaper coverage from their respective countries.

The research focused on images from two distinct periods after the 2003 invasion, in 2006 and 2011(the middle and end of the war respectively). These two periods, drawing from sources in *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, feature moments from the occupation, and the close of the war. The occupation period was chosen for the end of 2006, when the Associated Press reported the largest amount of war casualties. Therefore, the months of November and December in 2006, were determined to be especially newsworthy period during the war. The examination included materials from the month leading up to the official end, between November 18, 2011, and December 21, 2011.

The unit of analysis chosen in this study was the individual news photograph, although surrounding content including captions and articles was taken into account while coding. Every photograph within the two periods that portrays the Iraq War will be analyzed. Images were collected from the main news sections (the first few pages), from the International sections, National news sections, and the Metro sections. The following

sections with images were excluded: Business; Editorial (comment and analysis, and cartoon depictions); special features presented at the back of the newspaper; and published advertisements pertaining to the war.

Also one of the limitations of the study was that *The Guardian* does not publish on Sundays and did not publish on several holidays that *The New York Times* did, which might have affected the frequency of images published. The following were dates that publications occurred for *The New York Times* but were absent for *The Guardian*: 11/5/2006, 11/12/2006, 11/19/2006, 11/26/2006, 12/3/2006, 12/10/2006, 12/17/2006, 12/24/2006, 12/25/2006, 12/26/2006, 12/31/2006, 11/6/2011, 11/13/2011, 11/20/2011, 11/27/2011, 12/4/2011, 12/11/2011, 12/18/2011, and 12/25/2011.

This study merged classification categories from previous literature, including Griffin and Lee (1995); Griffin (2004); Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007); and King and Lester (2005). Also, new classification categories were introduced that have not been previously applied in visual analyses of war to elaborate on previous war frames. Griffin and Lee's (1995) and Griffin's (2004) categories were centered on coding manifest content, items that are more concrete and recognizable. Also, these categories are mutually exclusive; therefore, an image could only be classified under a single category.

Griffin and Lee's (1995) and Griffin's (2004) methods for coding include the following classifications (some categories have been modified to reflect the Iraq War):

arsenal/noncombat (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);

civilian casualties (U.S. and U.K.); (Iraqi);

civilian life (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.);

combat (all nations);

damage and destruction (Iraq);

ecological subjects;

historical photos (All nations);

media;

military casualties (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);

military leaders (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);

oil and energy;

political leaders (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); (Arab world, excluding Iraq); (United Nations, and others, excluding Arab and Coalition leaders);

prisoners of war (POWs) (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);

public demonstrations (Coalition nations, U.S. and U.K.); (Arab);

troops/noncombat (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);

wartime civilian life (Iraq);

and other.

Scholars including, Griffin (2004), Fahmy and Kim (2008), Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009) have utilized Griffin and Lee's (1995) coding as a baseline and have merged or adjusted categories.

Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) coded manifest and latent content, which includes underlying meanings of communications in their study. Their coding includes classifications that are mutually exclusive and others that are not. Classifications for tone were mutually exclusive: items were coded as positive toward the U.S. position on the war; negative toward the U.S. position on the war; or neutral/mixed — i.e., neither

clearly positive nor clearly negative toward the U.S. position on the war. The war frames the authors coded were not mutually exclusive, these categories included:

anti-war protest;

diagnostic frame (reasons for leading to war);

human interest (focus on human participants);

looting frame;

media self-reference (emphasis of the role of journalists);

oil resources frame;

prognostic frame (long-term effects of the war);

rebuilding of Iraq;

responsibility frame (looking for blame);

violence of war (destruction and human cost of war);

and war frames (military conflict, focus on troops and military developments);

Also, the type of sources cited were coded (government official, military personnel, individual journalist, terrorist group member, and other). Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) also coded the use of negative moral terms within their study.

King & Lester's (2005) study analyzed the first week of the start of the ground war in 1991 and 2003. The unit of analysis for the study was the individual photograph, and all the images were classified under one of ten categories: fighting scenes, deceased soldiers, battlefield scenes, prisoners, civilians, home front subjects, protestors, portraits, and miscellaneous. Also, the images were coded for source (staff photographer, pool photographer, miscellaneous); page selection (front page, front section, or second

section); page placement (top, middle, or lower third); photographic perspective; and size of photograph.

In coding for war frames, this study applied a combination of Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007), Griffin and Lee's (1995), and King and Lester's (2005) methods. Originally this study intended to code for tone, positive, negative, or neutral/mixed; however, the images in 2006 included complex messages making the coding process too difficult to delineate between negative and neutral/mixed tone. Also, while positive tone was a category, it was not anticipated that any images would be classified under this category. Some categories from Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007), Griffin and Lee's (1995), and King and Lester's (2005) studies were merged, and some categories were introduced, such as Iraq study group, Saddam's trial, Donald Rumsfeld's exiting as defense secretary, societal chaos of war, and war atrocities.

Within the classifications of war frames, this study will emulate Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) methods — where the category of war frames is not mutually exclusive. Images often include several elements and competing messages; therefore, images within this study can be categorized as being in more than one war frame category. However, this study will mitigate the overlap of categories by the explicitness of the classifications. Also, the use of headlines and captions within the publications will be instrumental in coding the war frames appropriately.

The following categories analyzed within this study are as follows:

Anti-war Protest; or anti-U.S. or anti-U.K. public demonstration (Coalition or Arab countries): These images include an individual or assembly of people either protesting against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces in Iraq.

Atrocities and/or Scandals of War (committed by Coalition military, Saddam's regime, or the Iraqi government): These are clearly defined atrocities or scandals where the headlines or captions define the actions as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary torture. Often as a result, a trial or official investigation is or was underway within the publication.

Coalition Military Troops: This denotes a visual presence of coalition military troops, and these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under wounded coalition soldiers, human cost of war for coalition troops, human-interest stories, or atrocities by coalition soldiers.

Coalition Troop Withdrawal: This category is only represented for events during the year 2011, during the withdrawal of Coalition military. These images include visual representations of packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq.

Diagnostic Frame: Refers to images that are visual representations of the reasons leading to war from the invading forces' perspective. Images of Saddam Hussein, other defined enemies, and/or enemy weapons will be classified under this category.

Donald Rumsfeld's Exiting as Defense Secretary: Rumsfeld lost political support as the Iraq War continued and resigned in late 2006. Images of Rumsfeld's departure were separated from images of political figures because his resignation signaled a change in how the war would be handled.

Human Cost of War (Coalition soldiers or Iraqi casualties): These images represent loss; coffins, gravesites, military photos of the deceased, funeral processions, and visible grieving by family or loved ones. The caption of some images may mention

casualties occurred from bombings or other activities, but unless the images show a visual representation of loss as expressed above they are not classified as *human cost of war*.

Human-Interest Stories (Iraqi civilians, Iraqi military/police, Coalition soldiers, Coalition civilians): These images emphasize the human participants in the event. The captions of these images include the name/s of the people depicted within the images, which is also referenced within the articles that correspond to the images. Images are not double coded as human interest and as Iraqi civilian, Iraqi police, or coalition military troops. However, if there are other people in the background of an image that are not referenced by name then these other categories can be included. Iraqi prisoners were not included as human interest stories, often the prisoners are referenced by name within the captions, but usually in terms of discussing the crime or the context surrounding the imprisonment. Also, human cost of war was not included under human interest story. However, if the image was of a grieving family member and included the name of the family member grieving — it was coded for human cost of war for coalition casualties and human interest story for coalition civilians.

Iraq Study Group: This war frame category was only included during events in the year 2006. The Iraq study group refers to a panel of individuals selected to investigate the progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War, and make recommendations as to the future course of the involvement from the U.S. and U.K.

Iraqi Civilians: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi civilians, these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under *human-interest stories*, *antiwar protest*, or *cheering celebrating an event associated with the war*.

Iraqi Police/Military: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi policy/military; these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under *human-interest stories* of Iraqi military.

Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons (not Saddam): This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi prisoners or prisons

Military Activity: This is Coalition activity and images of Coalition military arsenal and military conflict. In 2006, this may include military patrols and withdrawal or change of military bases in Iraq; however, this does not include the military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

Political Figures: These are images of political figures from Coalition or Arab countries including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, members of congress, high-ranking military officials, and other public officials. These images do not include images of Saddam.

Rebuilding of Iraq: These images show how Coalition forces or Iraqis are involved in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure through roads, bridges, buildings, etc. Also, images depicting democratic progress (through voting, or other areas) would also fall into this category.

Saddam's Trial: In 2006, Saddam's trial was highly publicized, these are images around the trial, but do not include images of Saddam.

Societal Chaos of War, and/or Bombings and Insurgent Activity: The captions of these images mention bombings and/or insurgent activity; they may also refer to negative consequences or aftermath that was a direct result of insurgent activity.

Violence/Destruction of War: These images may include fire, bullets, violence, visible bloodshed, and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. These photographs may show graphic images of slain bodies, however, if the bodies are covered by a sheet, a body bag, or coffin and do not show blood they will be classified under human cost of war.

Wounded Disabled (Coalition soldiers or Iraqis): These photographs may contain images of fresh injuries or fully healed injuries that result in disfigurement or amputations. If the images are fresh and blood is visible, the images are also classified as *violence/destruction of war.*

Other: War frames that cannot be classified under any other category listed above.

After all data were coded, the most predominant frames, as well as underrepresented categories, were further analyzed for the findings section. The most highly represented frames were grouped into representative narratives that discuss the overall tone of the war coverage during these three periods of investigation. The largest obstacle this study faced involves ensuring inter-coder reliability that becomes more difficult when latent content was coded. Also, it was anticipated that coding reliability might become difficult because some photographs may be in more than one war frame; however, with pilot coding training and testing — this study mitigated those problems, as reflected in the following chapter. Chapter Three describes the findings of the methods previously described.

Intercoder Reliability

In order to test for intercoder reliability, 10 percent of the 377-sample size was tested. The researcher coded all of the images, and a graduate student in Journalism and Media Studies coded the first 38 images in the sample size. A Kappa test was run on all of the war frames and categories. Intercoder reliability analysis by Landis and Koch (1977) was utilized for the interpretation of results. The following categories had perfect agreement at the Kappa value of 1: diagnostic frame, political coalition figures, military activity, antiwar protests from Arab countries, human-interest stories of Coalition civilians, and societal chaos of war.

The following categories were mutually agreed upon as not being represented in the 38 sample size: Saddam trial; political Arab figures; Iraqi military; Iraqi prisoners/prisons; rebuilding Iraq frame; anti-war protest from Coalition countries; human interest stories of Iraqi civilians; human interest stories of Iraqi military; atrocities by Saddam's regime; atrocities by Iraqi regime; Iraqi study group; returning Coalition soldiers; and other. The frames that were found to be in substantial agreement (between 0.61-0.80) were: Donald Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary (0.64); Coalition troops (0.72); human cost of war for Coalition casualties (0.80); human cost of war for Iraqi casualties (0.64); and wounded Coalition soldiers (0.64). Photograph size was found to be in moderate agreement at 0.41 (between 0.41-0.60). The following categories were found to be in fair agreement (between 0.21-0.40): Iraqi civilians (0.29); violence/destruction of war (0.31); wounded Iraqis (0.31); celebrating events of war from Coalition countries (0.31); celebrating events of war from Arab countries (0.31); human interest stories of

Coalition soldiers (0.31); and atrocities of Coalition military (0.31). (The complete Kappa tests are located in Appendix I).

CHAPTER THREE

FINDINGS

The study included 377 images were collected from *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* from microfilm. These images were taken from newspapers from November 1, 2006, to December 31, 2006, and from November 18, 2011, to December 21, 2011. The 2006 images were collected over a two-month period that coincided with one of the bloodiest times during the Iraq war, with the largest amount of civilian casualties reported by the Associated Press. On December 15, 2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta declared the Iraq War over, and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011, marking the end of the war. Therefore, November 18, 2011, to December 21, 2011, was selected to collect images corresponding to the end of the conflict.

RQ1: How will *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* compare in their frequency of published images, size, and placement in their newspapers in 2006 and 2011?

In order to answer **RQ1**, frequencies of the published Iraq images were run in both newspapers. The sizes of the published images were compared in both *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*. Finally, images were analyzed according to which page number the image was published within the newspapers.

Frequencies

The study sampled 293 images were collected from *The New York Times*, and 84 images were collected from *The Guardian* during both periods. *The New York Times* published images of the Iraq War much more frequently during both time periods with a total of 77.7 percent compared to 22.3 percent of images published from *The Guardian*. However, the proportion of images both newspapers printed during these periods were very similar, which may reflect consistent editorial styles. For *The New York Times*, 86 percent of their total images were printed in 2006 versus 14 percent in 2011. Comparatively, *The Guardian* printed 82.1 percent of their total images in 2006 versus 17.9 percent in 2011.

TABLE 1: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 and 2011

			Date		
			2006	2011	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	Count	252	41	293
		% within newspaper	86.0%	14.0%	100.0%
		% within Date	78.5%	73.2%	77.7%
		% of Total	66.8%	10.9%	77.7%
	The Guardian	Count	69	15	84
		% within newspaper	82.1%	17.9%	100.0%
		% within Date	21.5%	26.8%	22.3%
		% of Total	18.3%	4.0%	22.3%
Total		Count	321	56	377
		% within newspaper	85.1%	14.9%	100.0%
		% within Date	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	85.1%	14.9%	100.0%

There is not a significant statistical difference in comparing the newspapers and the date of published images; the p value for the Chi Square test is .380. (The complete Chi Square test is found in Table 1 in Appendix I).

Size

The study included the category of size for classification, the larger an image is printed, the more prominent its visual representation on the page. Within the study, large images were defined as one quarter of the page or larger. Medium images were less than a quarter and larger than one-twelfth of the page, and small images were one-twelfth of the page or smaller. Also, images the size of a thumbnail or smaller were excluded from the study. *The Guardian* was much more likely to publish large images over *The New York Times* at 19 percent compared to 3.4 percent. The majority of images in both newspapers were medium or small with medium being the predominant size photograph in both newspapers. 55.3 percent of *The New York Times* images and 42.9 percent of *The Guardian* images were medium. The relationship between the photograph size published and newspaper was found to be statistically significant at the p value of .000, a highly significant difference. (The complete Chi Square test is found in Table 2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 2: Crosstabs *New York Times* and *The Guardian* and Photograph size

			photosize4			
			Large	Medium	Small	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	Count	10	162	121	293
		% within newspaper	3.4%	55.3%	41.3%	100.0 %
		% within photosize4	38.5%	81.8%	79.1%	77.7%
		% of Total	2.7%	43.0%	32.1%	77.7%
	The Guardian	Count	16	36	32	84
		% within newspaper	19.0%	42.9%	38.1%	100.0 %
		% within photosize4	61.5%	18.2%	20.9%	22.3%
		% of Total	4.2%	9.5%	8.5%	22.3%
Total		Count	26	198	153	377
		% within newspaper	6.9%	52.5%	40.6%	100.0 %
		% within photosize4	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %
		% of Total	6.9%	52.5%	40.6%	100.0 %

Placement

Finally, to finish answering **RQ1,** images were analyzed according to which page number the image was published within the newspapers. This uses the premise that the closeness to the front page equates to prominence of the image. For the study, "ppublish3" refers to the page on which the image was published, with the pages the images were printed on ranging from 1 to 47 and were broken down into three categories designated as "1," "2," and "3." The first category, 1, means the image was printed on the front page of the newspaper. The second category, 2, means the image was printed somewhere between pages 2 and 15 — the section directly after the front page. Finally, the third category means the image was printed somewhere from page 16 to 47. All of the images collected were only from the front of the newspaper including the national, international, and metro sections. For both newspapers, once the researcher got to the

finance or business sections of the publications the image collection stopped. Therefore, no images were collected under business/finance or in the remaining sections that included arts and leisure, sports, comment and analysis/editorial, or other later sections.

Through Chi-Square analysis a statistically significant difference between newspaper and page images of the Iraq War were published was not found. (The complete Chi Square test is found in Table 3 in Appendix I). This may help make the argument that both newspapers have made similar editorial decisions on image prominence according to the page number images were published. While a statistically significant difference was not found based on image placement, there were some differences between the two newspapers. First, *The New York Times* was slightly more likely to publish images relating to the Iraq War on the front page of their newspaper with 10.2 percent compared to *The Guardian's* 8.3 percent. Also, the majority of images published in both newspapers were in the second and third sections, which makes sense because the second and third sections range from page 2 to page 47. However, where the majority of images are published for both newspapers is different. While 53.2 percent of images in *The New York Times* are published in the second section, 46.4 percent (the majority) of *The Guardian's* images are published in the third section. Therefore, there is a slight difference in prominence in comparing both newspapers. *The Guardian* is slightly more likely to bury images of the Iraq War in their newspaper as compared to *The New York Times*. Finally, hypothesis one can be revisited and answered.

TABLE 3: Crosstabs *New York Times* and *The Guardian* and Page Published

			ppublish3			
			1.00	2.00	3.00	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	Count	30	156	107	293
		% within newspaper	10.2%	53.2%	36.5%	100.0%
		% within ppublish3	81.1%	80.4%	73.3%	77.7%
		% of Total	8.0%	41.4%	28.4%	77.7%
	The Guardian	Count	7	38	39	84
		% within newspaper	8.3%	45.2%	46.4%	100.0%
		% within ppublish3	18.9%	19.6%	26.7%	22.3%
		% of Total	1.9%	10.1%	10.3%	22.3%
Total		Count	37	194	146	377
		% within newspaper	9.8%	51.5%	38.7%	100.0%
		% within ppublish3	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	9.8%	51.5%	38.7%	100.0%

H1: *The New York Times* will publish a higher frequency of images than *The Guardian* in their respective newspapers, but the size and placement of the images will be similar.

In answering **H1**, *The New York Times* did publish a higher frequency of images than *The Guardian* in their respective newspapers.

This is a logical occurrence since the United States had deployed more troops to Iraq and had arguably a larger stake in its success or failings than the United Kingdom. Also, the image placement or what page the image was published was also found to be similar. However, image size was found to be statistically different based on the two newspapers with *The Guardian* more likely to publish large images over *The New York Times* and give the Iraq War images more prominence according to size. Therefore, based on the evidence **H1** was partially supported.

TABLE 4: Crosstabs Page Published and Photograph Size

			Photosize4			
			Large	Medium	Small	Total
Ppublish3	1.00	Count	0	28	9	37
		% within ppublish3	0.0%	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
		% within photosize4	0.0%	14.1%	5.9%	9.8%
		% of Total	0.0%	7.4%	2.4%	9.8%
	2.00	Count	15	99	80	194
		% within ppublish3	7.7%	51.0%	41.2%	100.0%
		% within photosize4	57.7%	50.0%	52.3%	51.5%
		% of Total	4.0%	26.3%	21.2%	51.5%
	3.00	Count	11	71	64	146
		% within ppublish3	7.5%	48.6%	43.8%	100.0%
		% within photosize4	42.3%	35.9%	41.8%	38.7%
		% of Total	2.9%	18.8%	17.0%	38.7%
Total		Count	26	198	153	377
		% within ppublish3	6.9%	52.5%	40.6%	100.0%
		% within photosize4	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	6.9%	52.5%	40.6%	100.0%

During the compiling of data, a crosstabulation comparing image placement and photograph size was also run to see if a difference exists. This analysis included both newspapers and found a pattern in both publications. There was a statistically significant difference based on photograph placement and size with a p-value of .042. (The complete Chi Square test is found in Table 4 in Appendix I). For both newspapers there were no large images printed on the front page, most likely because images compete for major stories on the front page of newspapers.

The majority of front-page images in both newspapers were in the medium size category. The majority of all images published were of the medium size in both newspapers at 52.5 percent. The largest amount of images in any one section was medium images in the second section of the newspaper located from page 2 to 15, most likely because in 2006 and 2011 the Iraq War had been going on for several years, and

while some stories and images on the war made the front pages of both newspapers on occasion, the majority of the time the images were located in the second section of both newspapers.

Analysis of Frames

RQ2: How did *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* compare in their newspaper coverage after the invasion period in 2006 and 2011 in terms of war frames and narratives?

In order to answer **RQ2**, the image categories and war frames need to be analyzed.

TABLE 5: Newspaper Frames

Newspaper Frame	NY Times (2006)	Guardian (2006)	NY Times (2011)	Guardian (2011)	All Media	Percent of Total
Diagnostic frame (Enemies/Weapons)	16	6	0	1	23/377	6.1%
Saddam Trial (Not Saddam, only in 2006)	6	0	0	0	6/321	1.9% (2006)
Political Coalition Figures	47	16	7	1	71/377	18.8%
Political Arab Figures (Not Saddam)	18	0	3	2	23/377	6.1%
Rumsfeld Exiting as Defense Secretary (2006)	8	4	0	0	12/321	3.7% (2006)
Military Conflict/ Developments	23	4	1	2	30/377	8.0%
Coalition Troops	35	9	15	6	65/377	17.2%
Iraqi Military	12	1	2	1	16/377	4.2%
Iraqi Civilians	59	7	6	2	74/377	19.6%
Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons	8	1	3	2	14/377	3.7%
Rebuilding of Iraq	0	1	1	0	2/377	0.5%
Violence/Destruction of war	25	6	0	1	32/377	8.5%
Human cost of war Coalition casualties	3	13	0	0	16/377	4.2%
Human cost of war Iraqi casualties	31	4	2	1	38/377	10.1%
Wounded Coalition soldiers	7	3	1	0	11/377	2.9%
Wounded Iraqis	4	2	0	0	6/377	1.6%
Protests from Arab countries	5	2	0	0	7/377	1.9%
Protests from Coalition Countries	1	0	0	0	1/377	0.3%
Celebrating from Coalition Countries	1	2	1	2	6/377	1.6%
Celebrating from Arab Countries	2	1	1	0	4/377	1.1%
Human interest stories (Iraq Civilians)	15	0	4	0	19/377	5.0%
Human interest stories (Iraq Military)	1	0	0	0	1/377	0.3%
Human interest stories (Coalition Military)	10	1	3	3	44/377	12.0%
Human interest stories (Coalition Civilians)	9	3	0	0	12/377	3.2%
Societal Chaos of War	38	4	2	0	44/377	11.7%
Atrocities by Coalition Soldiers	4	2	2	3	11/377	2.9%
Atrocities by Saddam's regime	1	0	0	0	1/377	0.3%
Atrocities by Iraqi regime	1	0	1	0	2/377	0.5%
Iraq Study Group (2006 only)	9	1	0	0	10/321	3.1%
Returning Coalition Soldiers (2011 only)	0	0	11	3	14/56	25.0%
Other	10	1	1	0	12/377	3.2%
Total	252	69	41	15	377/377	

Diagnostic Frame: Refers to images that are visual representations of the reasons leading to war from the invading forces' perspective. Images of Saddam Hussein, other defined enemies, and/or enemy weapons will be classified under this category. Of the 377-picture sample, 6.1 percent of images were categorized under the diagnostic frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 6.9 percent of the images were categorized diagnostic with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the diagnostic frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square test is found in Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 6: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Diagnostic Frame

		saddam5		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	16	277	293
	The Guardian	7	77	84
Total		23	354	377

Saddam's Trial: In 2006, Saddam's trial was highly publicized, these are images around the trial, but do not include images of Saddam. Of the 321-sample size of 2006, only 1.9 percent of images were in this category. In comparing the Saddam's trial frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there were no statistical differences for images published between the two newspapers. (The complete Chi-Square test is found in Table 6 in Appendix I).

TABLE 7: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Saddam Trial Frame

		Saddamtrial6		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	6	287	293
	The Guardian	0	84	84
Total		6	371	377

Political Figures: These are images of political figures from Coalition or Arab countries including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, members of congress, high-ranking military officials, and other public officials. Also, these images do not include images of Saddam. Of the 377-picture sample, 18.8 percent of images were categorized under the political Coalition figures frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 19.6 percent of the images were categorized political Coalition figures with 14.3 percent in 2011. In comparing the political Coalition figures frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there were no statistical differences for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 8: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Political Coalition Figures Frame

		polcoalition7		
		Yes	No	Total
newspaper	New York Times	54	239	293
	The Guardian	17	67	84
Total		71	306	377

TABLE 9: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Political Arab Figures Frame

		polarab8		
		Yes	No	Total
newspaper	New York Times	21	272	293
	The Guardian	2	82	84
Total		23	354	377

For the political Arab countries frame 6.1 percent of the 377-picture sample was categorized under this frame. When comparing the political Arab countries frame between the two newspapers there was some variance. If both 2006 and 2011 are included in the comparison, there were no statistical differences between newspapers. However, when just 2006 is isolated, there was a statistically significant difference at the .022 level. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 in Appendix II).

Donald Rumsfeld's Exiting as Defense Secretary: Rumsfeld lost political support as the Iraq War continued and resigned in late 2006. Images of Rumsfeld's departure were separated from images of political figures because his resignation signaled a change in how the war would be handled. Of the 321-sample size for 2006, 3.7 percent of images were categorized under *Donald Rumsfeld's exiting as defense secretary* frame for both

newspapers. In comparing the Donald Rumsfeld exiting frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there were no statistical differences for images published between the two newspapers. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 9 in Appendix II).

TABLE 10: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Donald Rumsfeld Exiting Frame

			rumsfeld9		
			Yes	No	Total
newspaper	New York Times	Count	8	244	252
		% within rumsfeld9	66.7%	79.0%	78.5%
	The Guardian	Count	4	65	69
		% within rumsfeld9	33.3%	21.0%	21.5%
Total		Count	12	309	321
		% within rumsfeld9	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Military Activity: This is Coalition activity and images of Coalition military arsenal and military conflict. In 2006, this may include military patrols and withdrawal or change of military bases in Iraq; however, this does not include the military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. For the military activity frame, 8.0 percent of the 377-picture sample was categorized under this frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 8.4 percent of the images were categorized under military activity with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the military activity frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 11: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Military Conflict Frame

		mconflict10		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	24	269	293
	The Guardian	6	78	84
Total		30	347	377

Coalition Military Troops: This denotes a visual presence of coalition military troops, and these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under *wounded coalition soldiers*, *human cost of war* for coalition troops, *human-interest stories*, or *atrocities* by coalition soldiers. Of the 377-picture sample, 17.2 percent of images were categorized under the Coalition military troops category for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 13.7 percent of the images were categorized Coalition military troops with 37.5 percent in 2011. In comparing the Coalition military troops category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 12: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Coalition Troops Frame

		coaltroops11		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	50	243	293
	The Guardian	15	69	84
Total		65	312	377

Iraqi Police/Military: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi policy/military; these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under *human-interest stories* of Iraqi military. Within the 377-picture sample, 4.2 percent of images were categorized under the *Iraqi police/military* for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 4.0 percent of the images were categorized Iraqi police/military with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi military troops category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 13: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Military Frame

		iraqipolicemil12		
		Yes	No	Total
newspaper	New York Times	14	279	293
	The Guardian	2	82	84
Total		16	361	377

Iraqi Civilians: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi civilians, these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under *human-interest stories*, *antiwar protest*, or *cheering celebrating an event associated with the war*. Of the 377-picture sample, 19.6 percent of images were categorized under the *Iraqi civilians* for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 20.6 percent of the images were categorized *Iraqi civilians* with 14.3 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi civilians category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was a

significant statistical difference at the .020 level in the amount of images published between the two newspapers when comparing both years. When isolating for 2006, the statistical relationship is even higher at the .016 level. However, when comparing only 2011 the difference is no longer significant and is at the .90 level. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 13.1, 13.2, and 13.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 14: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Civilians Frame

		iraqicivil13		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	65	228	293
	The Guardian	9	75	84
Total		74	303	377

Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons (not Saddam): This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi prisoners or prisons. For the 377-picture sample, 3.7 percent of images were categorized under the *Iraqi prisoners/prisons* for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 2.8 percent of the images were categorized *Iraqi prisoners* with 8.9 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi prisoners' category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 14.1, 14.2, and 14.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 15: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Prison Frame

		iraqipprison14		
		Yes	No	Total
newspaper	New York Times	11	282	293
	The Guardian	3	81	84
Total		14	363	377

Rebuilding of Iraq: These images show how Coalition forces or Iraqis are involved in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure through roads, bridges, buildings, etc. (this also includes repurposed buildings). Also, images depicting democratic progress (through voting, or other areas) would also fall into this category. Of the 377-picture sample, 0.5 percent of images were categorized under the *rebuilding of Iraq* frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized *rebuilding of Iraq* 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the *rebuilding of Iraq* frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 15.1, 15.2, and 15.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 16: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Rebuilding Iraq Frame

		rebuiliraq15		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	1	292	293
	The Guardian	1	83	84
Total		2	375	377

Violence/destruction of war – these images may include fire, bullets, violence, visible bloodshed and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. These photographs may show graphic images of slain bodies, however, if the bodies are covered by a sheet, a body bag, or coffin and do not show blood they will be classified under human cost of war. Within the 377-picture sample, 8.5 percent of images were categorized under the *violence/destruction of war* frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 9.7 percent of the images were categorized *violence/destruction of war* 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the *violence/destruction of war* frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 17: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Violence/Destruction Frame

		violdestruc16		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	25	268	293
	The Guardian	7	77	84
Total		32	345	377

Human cost of war (Coalition soldiers or Iraqi casualties) – these images represent loss, this may be visualized by coffins, gravesites, military photos of the deceased, funeral processions, and visible grieving by family or loved ones. The caption of some images may mention casualties occurred from bombings or other activities, but unless the images show a visual representation of loss as expressed above they are not

classified as *human cost of war.* Of the 377 total sample, 4.2 percent of images were categorized under the *human cost of war* for Coalition soldiers frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 5.0 percent of the images were categorized *human cost of war* for Coalition soldiers with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *human cost of war* frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was a significant difference at the .000 level when including both years. When isolating for 2006, the statistical difference is also at the .000 level. However, when comparing only 2011 the difference no longer exists (there were no images of coalition casualties in 2011). (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 17.1 and 17.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 18: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Cost of War for Coalition Casualties Frame

		hcostcoal17		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	3	290	293
	The Guardian	13	71	84
Total		16	361	377

For the 377-picture sample, 10.1 percent of images were categorized under the *human cost of war* for Iraqi casualties frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 10.9 percent of the images were categorized *human cost of war* for Iraqi casualties with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the *human cost of war* for Iraqi casualties category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no

statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 19: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Cost of War for Iraqi Casualties Frame

		hcostiraqi18		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	33	260	293
	The Guardian	5	79	84
Total		38	339	377

Wounded disabled (Coalition soldiers or Iraqis): These photographs may contain images of fresh injuries or fully healed injuries that result in disfigurement or amputations. If the images are fresh and blood is visible, the images are also classified as *violence/destruction of war.* Within the 377-picture sample, 2.9 percent of images were categorized under the *wounded disabled* Coalition soldiers category for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.1 percent of the images were categorized *wounded disabled* Coalition soldiers with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the *wounded disabled* Coalition soldiers category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 19.1, 19.2, and 19.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 20: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Wounded Coalition Soldiers Frame

		woundcoal19		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	8	285	293
	The Guardian	3	81	84
Total		11	366	377

TABLE 21: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Wounded Iraqis Frame

		woundiraq20		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	4	289	293
	The Guardian	2	82	84
Total		6	371	377

Of the 377-picture sample, 1.6 percent of images were categorized under the *wounded/disabled* Iraqis category for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized *wounded/disabled* Iraqis with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *wounded/disabled* Iraqis category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 20.1 and 20.2 in Appendix I).

Anti-War Protest/ or *anti- U.S. or U.K. public demonstration (Coalition or Arab countries)*: These images include an individual or assembly of people either protesting

against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces in Iraq. For the 377 total sample, 1.9 percent of images were categorized under the *anti-war protest* frame from Arab countries for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized anti-war protest from Arab countries with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *anti-war protest* frame from Arab countries category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 21.1 and 21.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 22: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Anti-war Protest from Arab Countries Frame

		protestarab21		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	5	288	293
	The Guardian	2	82	84
Total		7	370	377

Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the *anti-war protest* frame from Coalition countries for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized anti-war protest from Coalition countries with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *anti-war protest* frame from Coalition countries category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two

newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 22.1 and 22.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 23: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Anti-war Protest from Coalition Countries Frame

		protestcoal22		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	1	292	293
	The Guardian	0	84	84
Total		1	376	377

Celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War (Coalition or Arab countries) — these images include an assembly of individuals cheering/celebrating an event associated with the war. Of the 377-picture sample, 1.6 percent of images were categorized under the *celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War* frame from Coalition countries for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.9 percent of the images were categorized celebrating an event associated to the Iraq war from Coalition countries with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the *celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War* frame from Coalition countries category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was a significant statistical difference at the .008 level in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. However, when isolating for 2006 and 2011 this difference was no longer significant. Also, it is important to note how small the

sample size is for this category. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 23.1, 23.2, and 23.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 24: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Celebrating an Event Associated with the War from Coalition Countries

		celebcoal23		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	2	291	293
	The Guardian	4	80	84
Total		6	371	377

For the 377-picture sample, 1.1 percent of images were categorized under the *celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War* frame from Arab countries for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.9 percent of the images were categorized *celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War* frame from Arab countries with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the *celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War* frame from Arab countries category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 24.1, 24.2, and 24.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 25: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Celebrating an Event Associated with the War from Arab Countries

		Celebarab24		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	3	290	293
	The Guardian	1	83	84
Total		4	373	377

Human Interest Stories (Iraqi Civilians, Iraqi Military/Police, Coalition Soldiers, Coalition Civilians): These images emphasize the human participants in the event. The captions of these images include the name/s of the people depicted within the images, which is also referenced within the articles that correspond to the images. Images are not double coded as human interest and as Iraqi civilian, Iraqi police, or coalition military troops. However, if there are other people in the background of an image that are not referenced by name then these other categories can be included. Iraqi prisoners were not included as human interest stories, often the prisoners are referenced by name within the captions, but usually in terms of discussing the crime or the context surrounding the imprisonment. Also, human cost of war was not included under human interest story. However, if the image was of a grieving family member and included the name of the family member grieving—it was coded for human cost of war for coalition casualties and human interest story for coalition civilians.

TABLE 26: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Iraqi Civilians Frame

		Humiraqciv25		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	19	274	293
	The Guardian	0	84	84
Total		19	358	377

Of the 377-picture sample, 5.0 percent of images were categorized under the *human interest stories* for Iraqi civilians frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 4.7 percent of the images were categorized *human-interest stories* for Iraqi civilians with 7.1 percent in 2011. In comparing the *human-interest stories* for Iraqi civilians category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was a statistically significant difference at the .017 level in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. *The New York Times* was much more likely to publish these images over *The Guardian*. When isolating for 2006 this was significant at the .038 level, however, was not longer significant when only looking at 2011. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 25.1, 25.2, and 25.3 in Appendix I).

Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the *human-interest stories* for Iraqi military for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized *human-interest stories* for Iraqi military with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *human-interest stories* for Iraqi military category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case

when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 26.1 and 26.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 27: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Iraqi Military Frame

		Humiraqmil26		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	1	292	293
	The Guardian	0	84	84
Total		1	376	377

Of the 377-picture sample, 12.0 percent of images were categorized under the *human interest stories* for Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized *human-interest stories* for Coalition military with 10.7 percent in 2011. In comparing the *human-interest stories* for Coalition military category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 27.1, 27.2, and 27.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 28: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Coalition Soldiers Frame

		Humcoalsol27		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	13	280	293
	The Guardian	4	80	84
Total		17	360	377

Within the 377-picture sample, 3.2 percent of images were categorized under the *human-interest stories* for Coalition civilians for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.7 percent of the images were categorized *human-interest stories* for Coalition civilians with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *human-interest stories* for Coalition civilians category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 28.1 and 28.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 29: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Coalition Civilians Frame

		Humcoalciv28		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	9	284	293
	The Guardian	3	81	84
Total		12	365	377

Societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity – the captions of these images mention bombings and/or insurgent activity, they may also refer to negative consequences or aftermath that were a direct result of insurgent activity. For the 377-picture sample, 11.7 percent of images were categorized under the *societal chaos of war* for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 13.1 percent of the images were categorized *societal chaos of war* with 3.6 percent in 2011. In comparing the *societal chaos of war* category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was a significant statistical difference at the .025 level in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. When isolating for 2006 the difference was significant at the .043 level. *The New York Times* was much more likely to show images of *societal chaos of war* frame than *The Guardian*. However, when isolating for 2011 the difference was no longer significant. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 29.1, 29.2, and 29.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 30: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Societal Chaos of War Frame

		socichaos29		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	40	253	293
	The Guardian	4	80	84
Total		44	333	377

Atrocities and/or scandals of war (committed by Coalition military, Saddam's regime, or the Iraqi government): These are clearly defined atrocities or scandals where the headlines or captions define the actions as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary

torture. Often as a result, a trial or official investigation is or was underway within the publication. Of the 377-picture sample, 2.9 percent of images were categorized under the *atrocities of war* committed by Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized *atrocities of war* committed by Coalition military with 8.9 percent in 2011. In comparing the *atrocities of war* committed by Coalition military category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 30.1, 30.2, and 30.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 31: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Coalition Soldiers Frame

		Atroccoalm30		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	6	287	293
	The Guardian	5	79	84
Total		11	366	377

Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the *atrocities of war* committed by Saddam's regime for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized *atrocities of war* committed by Saddam's regime with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the *atrocities of war* committed by Saddam's regime category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two

newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 31.1 and 31.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 32: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Saddam's Regime Frame

		Atrocsadd31		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	1	292	293
	The Guardian	0	84	84
Total		1	376	377

Of the 377-picture sample, 0.5 percent of images were categorized under the *atrocities of war* committed by the Iraqi regime for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized *atrocities of war* committed by the Iraqi regime with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the *atrocities of war* committed by the Iraqi regime category between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 32.1, 32.2, and 32.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 33: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Iraqi's Regime Frame

		atrociraq32		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	*New York Times*	2	291	293
	The Guardian	0	84	84
Total		2	375	377

Iraq Study Group: This war frame category was only included during the 2006 period. The Iraq study group refers to a panel of individuals selected to investigate the progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War, and make recommendations as to how the future course of the involvement from the U.S. and U.K. For the 321-sample size for 2006, 3.1 percent of images were categorized under the *Iraq study group* for both newspapers. In comparing the *Iraq Study Group* frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers for 2006. (The 2006 Chi-Square test is found in Table 33 in Appendix I).

TABLE 34: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraq Study Group Frame

			iraqstudy33		
			Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	Count	9	243	252
		% within iraqstudy33	90.0%	78.1%	78.5%
	The Guardian	Count	1	68	69
		% within iraqstudy33	10.0%	21.9%	21.5%
Total		Count	10	311	321
		% within iraqstudy33	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Coalition Troop Withdrawal: This category is only represented during the 2011 period during the troop withdrawal. These images include visual representations of packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq. Within the 56-picture sample size for 2011, 25.0 percent of images were categorized under the *Coalition troop withdrawal* for both newspapers. In comparing the *Coalition troop withdrawal* frame between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers for 2011. (The 2011 Chi-Square test is found in Table 34 in Appendix I).

TABLE 35: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Returning Coalition Soldiers Frame

			Returncoal35		
			Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	Count	11	30	41
		% within returncoal35	78.6%	71.4%	73.2%
	The Guardian	Count	3	12	15
		% within returncoal35	21.4%	28.6%	26.8%
Total		Count	14	42	56
		% within returncoal35	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Other: War frames that cannot be classified under any other category listed above are coded as other. Of the 377-picture sample, 3.2 percent of images were categorized under *other* for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized *other* with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the category *other* between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when

comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 35.1, 35.2, and 35.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 36: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Other Frame

		other34		
		Yes	No	Total
Newspaper	New York Times	11	282	293
	The Guardian	1	83	84
Total		12	365	377

H2: *The Guardian* will include more critical coverage of the Iraq War than *The New York Times* in 2006 and 2011.

In answering **H2**, while the war frames varied on specific categories that can be attributed to critical coverage of the war; i.e. human cost of war, wounded/disabled, societal chaos of war, anti-war protests, violence/destruction of war, and atrocities of war, one newspaper was not clearly more critical of the Iraq War than the other. However, interesting statistical differences did arise in two of these category examples. In 2006, the human cost of war frame for Coalition casualties was highly significant at the .000 level. During this time, *The Guardian* was much more likely to publish images depicting the loss of life of Coalition troops over *The New York Times*. Also, on the societal chaos of war frame *The New York Times* was much more likely to publish images within this frame over *The Guardian* at the .043 level in 2006. Interestingly, when comparing all the 2011 war frames of the two newspapers there were no statistical differences between the

publications. Therefore, the results are mixed in answering **H2**, and one newspaper was not found to be more critical than the other was.

RQ3: Did the war frames, and narratives change over time within each newspaper? If so how?

The graphs below separate the 2006 top war frames from the 2011 data. The top five war frames for 2006 were the following: Iraqi Civilians (20.6 percent); political Coalition figures (19.6 percent); Coalition troops (13.7 percent); societal chaos of war (13.1 percent); and human cost of Iraqi casualties (10.9 percent). The five most representative categories for 2011 were: returning Coalition soldiers (25 percent); Coalition troops (17.2 percent); political Coalition figures (14.3 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.3 percent); and human interest stories of Coalition soldiers (10.7 percent).

CHART 1: Top War Frames for 2006



CHART 2: Top War Frames for 2011



When comparing both newspapers together the war frames changed dramatically from 2006 to 2011. The 2006 coverage was much more critical with a higher frequency of images depicting societal chaos of war, violence/destruction, and the human cost war for Coalition soldiers and Iraqis. When isolating for newspaper, for societal chaos of war, 15.1 percent of *The New York Times'* coverage fit into this category while only 5.8 percent of *The Guardian's* 2006 coverage printed images of this frame (which was a statistical difference at the .043 level). While there was not a statistical difference on human cost of war for Iraqi civilians, this frame was more prominent in *The New York Times'* coverage (with 12.3 percent) than *The Guardian's* coverage (with (5.8 percent). Also, it is important to note, while combined the human cost of war frame for Coalition casualties was 5.0 percent when including both newspapers, it represented 18.8 percent of

all of *The Guardian's* coverage for 2006. Interestingly in 2006 while *The New York Times* focused on the loss of Iraqi civilian life (12.3 percent), *The Guardian* emphasized the loss of Coalition soldiers (18.8 percent).

The majority of the coverage in 2011 in both newspapers revolved around the Coalition troops with some coverage of political Coalition figures and Iraqi civilians. However, none of the top five categories included critical war coverage. Therefore, the prominent message was simply around the Coalition troops returning home.

> **H3:** Both newspapers will include more frames depicting violence, destruction, and societal chaos of war in 2006; and the 2011 coverage will focus on the departing troops and include much less critical and graphic images of the war.

In answering **H3**, both newspapers did include in 2006 a larger number of critical frames of violence, destruction, and the societal chaos from war, and provided a more sanitized or uncritical conclusion of the Iraq war in 2011.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Revisiting the War Frames of Previous Scholarship

This study set out to investigate how war frames changed over a span of eight years. In order to discuss how war frames changed it is important to revisit the findings of previous studies. Previous research of the Iraq invasion period of 2003 has revealed that military conflict was one of the most predominant war frames during the 2003 Iraq invasion. King and Lester (2005) found the top five categories found in U.S. newspapers for the 2003 Iraq invasion included: battlefield scenes, images of the home front, fighting scenes, portraits, and images of civilians. Concluding that over half of the images could be classified as battle images.

Griffin (2004) found about half of all images printed in news magazines were of the arsenal, unengaged troops and political leaders. Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009) analyzed print, television and online media coverage and found 77 percent of all images were of the arsenal/war machine frame. Fahmy and Kim (2008) compared the visual coverage of *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* during the Iraq invasion in 2003. *The New York Times'* top categories included: Coalition troops; Iraqi casualties; Coalition political leaders; and Coalition troops with Iraqi civilians (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). *The Guardian*'s most predominant categories were: Iraqi casualties; allied troops; and images of looting (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) compared the websites of the *New York Times* and *The Guardian* during the 2003 Iraq invasion. The

top five categories for *The New York Times* was: violence of war; military conflict; rebuilding of Iraq; human interest; and prognostic frame (long term effects of war). For *The Guardian* the most predominant frames were: violence of war; military conflict; prognostic frame; rebuilding of Iraq; and anti-war protest (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Both websites had similar war frames but *The Guardian* focused more on anti-war protests than *The New York Times* (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Overall, military activity/conflict was the most dominant frame across the 2003 Iraq invasion coverage. The visual representation of the 2003 Iraq invasion focused on the Coalition troops, the Coalition political leaders, and the Coalition arsenal. The prominent narrative was the progress towards Bagdad, which often erupted in violence and Iraqi casualties.

Frequency, Photograph Size, and Placement, 2006, 2011

The findings from this study revealed *The New York Times* was over three times more likely to publish Iraq war images over *The Guardian* in 2006 and 2011 (77.7 percent compared to 22.3 percent). The United States deployed many more soldiers into Iraq than the United Kingdom and had a larger stake in the Iraq War — therefore that difference is representative in the media coverage for both countries.

Under the category of image size *The Guardian* was much more likely to publish large images over *The New York Times* (19 percent compared to 3.4 percent). The majority of images in both newspapers were medium or small with medium being the predominant size photograph in both newspapers (55.3 percent of *The New York Times* images and 42.9 percent of *The Guardian* images). This may be because the Iraq War had

been going on for several years and therefore received less prominent placement in terms of size compared to other news stories.

For photograph placement (the page the image was printed on in the publication), there were no statistically significant differences on photograph placement. However, *The Guardian* was slightly more likely to bury images of the Iraq War in the third section of their newspaper over *The New York Times*. Again, with the ongoing and long duration of the war, the Iraq War was no longer a new story. Updates of the Iraq War had to compete with turmoil in the Afghanistan war in 2006 and the Arab Spring in the 2011 coverage.

The 2006 War Frames

Three years after the invasion period, Iraq was on the brink of a civil war. A new permanent Iraqi government was in place, but it struggled against growing sectarian violence and anti-coalition attacks. At the same time, the Iraq Study group found the situation in Iraq to be deteriorating with no foreseeable end to the conflict and withdrawal of Coalition forces would further destabilize the region.

The war frames that emerged in 2006 that were the same or similar to the 2003 studies were the following: diagnostic frame, political figures, military conflict/developments, coalition troops, Iraqi military, Iraqi civilians, Iraqi prisoners/prisons, rebuilding of Iraq, violence/destruction of war, human cost of war (Coalition and Iraqi casualties), wounded (Coalition and Iraqis), protests (Coalition and Arab countries), and human interest stories.

The diagnostic frame refers to images that represent the reasons for leading to war, including images of enemies and/or enemy weapons. From Dimitrova and Connolly-

Ahern's (2007) study 1.8 percent of images from both newspapers were labeled diagnostic. Fahmy and Kim (2008) found only 1.2 percent of the images collected from *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* to be images of Saddam. The amount of images in the diagnostic frame for this study in 2006 more than tripled from earlier studies with 6.9 percent of all the images categorized as diagnostic, 6.3 percent from *The New York Times* and 8.7 percent from *The Guardian*. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there were no statistically significant differences of published images between these newspapers. The majority of images in this category were of Saddam Hussein. At the end of 2006, the new Iraqi government found Saddam Hussein guilty of crimes against humanity after a yearlong trial in an Iraqi court. Saddam's trial was highly publicized and the majority of these images were of Saddam during the trial and referencing war crimes that occurred decades before the Iraq invasion. The widely publicized trial is probably why these images increased from 2003 to 2006.

Political figures from Coalition countries and Arab countries were classified for this study, including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, member of congress, high-ranking military officials, and other public officials (but do not include images of Saddam or other individuals clearly defined as enemies). From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study of the Iraq invasion in 2003, 9.1 percent of images were of political and military leaders of Coalition forces from both newspapers. In comparing their study to this research that number doubles in 2006 with 19.6 percent of the images categorized as political Coalition figures. The majority of political Coalition figures were of the U.S. president or the British prime minister for this study. There were no statistical differences in comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* in 2006 on the category of political

Coalition figures. Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study found 0.7 percent of political and military Arab figures represented in 2003. In comparing 2003 to this study for 2006, political Arab figures increased in 2006 to 5.6 percent of the coverage in both newspapers. However, when isolating for publication for this study for 2006, there was a significant difference in the 2006 representation of this category. *The New York Times* was much more likely to publish images of political Arab figures over *The Guardian*, with 7.1 percent of *The New York Times'* coverage was of political Arab figures, whereas *The Guardian* did not publish any images under this category in 2006.

Military activity/developments may include Coalition patrols, withdrawal, or change of military bases as well as military conflict (but does not include the 2011 withdrawal). For Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) study in 2003, 75.4 percent of images collected were of military conflict. In comparing their study to this research, this number dropped dramatically in 2006, with 8.4 percent of the images categorized under military activity/developments. In comparing this frame between the two newspapers for this study in 2006, there were no statistically significant differences between the amounts of images published.

Coalition military troops are a visual presence of Coalition soldiers and are not already classified under wounded Coalition soldiers, human cost of war, or atrocities. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study of 2003, 21.8 percent of images collected were of Coalition troops. In comparing their research the amount of images of Coalition troops decreases in 2006, with 13.7 percent of the images were categorized under Coalition military troops. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* in 2006 for this

study there were no statistical differences for images published between the two newspapers.

Under the category Iraqi police/military this denotes a visual presence of Iraqi police/military that are not already classified as human interest stories. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study Iraqi military and police consisted of 1.4 percent of the images in 2003. In comparing their study to this research, this number increases in 2006, with 4.0 percent of the images classified under this category. In comparing Iraqi police/military between the two newspapers in 2006, there were no statistical differences in their visual representation.

For the category of Iraqi civilians, this includes images of Iraqi civilians not already classified under human-interest stories, anti-war protest, or cheering/celebrating an event associated with the war. Fahmy and Kim's (2008) category of "civilian life" in 2003 was used for comparison with this study's category of Iraqi civilians. In their 2003 study of the Iraq invasion 21.0 percent of the images were of civilian life. This amount was similar to this study for 2006, where 20.6 percent of the images were categorized under Iraqi civilians. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* in 2006 there was a significant statistical difference between the two newspapers. *The New York Times* was over twice as likely to publish images of Iraqi civilians over *The Guardian.* 23.4 percent of *The New York Times'* coverage was of the Iraqi civilians category over 10.1 percent of *The Guardian's* coverage.

The category of Iraqi prisoners/prisons does not include images of Saddam, and is a visual representation of Iraqi prisoners/prisons. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study 2.3 percent of images were of Iraqi prisoners. This is similar to the amount of images

found in 2006, only 2.8 percent of the images were categorized under this Iraqi prisoners/prisons category, and there were no statistical differences between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*.

The rebuilding of Iraq frame shows how Coalition forces or Iraqis are involved in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure through roads, bridges, or other facilities. For Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) study in 2003, 61.4 percent of the images collected were of the rebuilding of Iraq frame. In comparing their study to this study in 2006, this amount dropped considerably to only 0.3 percent of all images being under this category. Only one image in 2006 was included in this category and was printed by *The Guardian*. With the small amount of images, there were no statistical differences between both newspapers for 2006.

For the violence/destruction of war frame, these images may include fire, bullets, violence, visible bloodshed, and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. For Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) study in 2003, 89.5 percent of images were classified as violence of war. In comparing their study, the amount of violent images dropped dramatically in 2006, with 9.7 percent of the images categorized under violence/destruction of war. When comparing both newspapers in 2006 there were no statistical differences between the amounts of images published between the two newspapers.

The human cost of war frame includes images of Coalition soldiers or Iraqis. These images represent loss of life, which may be depicted through coffins, gravesites, military photographs of the deceased thorough portraits, and visible grieving family or loved ones. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study in 2003, 2.0 percent of images were of

Coalition military casualties. In comparing their study to this research in 2006 that amount increased to 5.0 percent of the images classified under human cost of war for Coalition soldiers. There was a statistical significant difference between both newspapers in 2006 for the human cost of war frame for Coalition soldiers. *The Guardian* was much more likely to publish images of the human cost of war frame for Coalition soldiers over *The New York Times*. In 2006, only 1.2 percent of all images for *The New York Times* were included under this category whereas 18.8 percent of *The Guardian's* coverage for 2006 was included in this war frame. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study in 2003, 3.0 percent of images were of Iraqi casualties. In comparing their study to this research in 2006, the amount of images classified as human cost of war for Iraqis tripled to 10.9 percent of images for both newspapers. When comparing the amount of images in both newspapers in 2006 for human cost of war for Iraqis there were no statistical differences between the publications.

The anti-war protest/anti- U.S. or U.K. demonstration (Coalition or Arab countries) includes images of one or more individuals protesting against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study in 2003, 2.4 percent of images were of anti-war protests in Arab/Muslim nations. This amount slightly decreases in this study for 2006 with 1.9 percent of the images categorized as anti-war protest from Arab countries. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* in 2006 there were no statistically significant differences for images published under this category. From Fahmy and Kim's (2008) study in 2003, 2.3 percent of images were of anti-war protests in the U.S. or U.K. This number drops even more in this study of 2006 with 0.3 percent for 2006 of anti-war protests in Coalition

countries. Only one image was printed in 2006 and it was in *The New York Times* newspaper. The sample size for this category was small and there were no statistically significant differences between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* for the anti-war protest war frame.

The category of human-interest stories differentiated between Iraqi civilians, Iraqi military/police, Coalition soldiers, and Coalition civilians. These images emphasize the human participants in the event and include the names of these individuals in the captions or identified within the story and their personal experience is a major part of the newspaper article. From Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) study in 2003, 57.9 percent of images were categorized as human interest, however, whether the human interest story was about Coalition soldiers, Coalition civilians, Iraqi soldiers, or Iraqi civilians was not differentiated within their study. For this study in 2006, the total of human-interest stories of all categories amounts to 12.1 percent of all images. In 2006, 4.7 percent of the images published were of human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians. In comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian,* there was a statistically significant difference in the amounts of images published within this category in 2006. *The New York Times* was six times more likely to publish human-interest story images of Iraqi civilians over *The Guardian*. In 2006, *The New York Times* published 6.0 percent of human-interest stories of Iraqi civilians, while *The Guardian* did not publish any images within this category. For human-interest stories of Iraqi police/military, only 0.3 percent of images were classified under this category. Only one image was printed within this category in 2006 and it was published in *The New York Times*. With such a small sample size for this category, there were no statistically significant differences for human-interest

stories for Iraqi military/police. In 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized as human-interest stories for Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing both newspapers for 2006 there were not statistically significant differences in the amount of human-interest stories published for Coalition military. In 2006, 3.7 percent of the images in both newspapers were of human interest stories for Coalition civilians. In comparing both newspapers there were no statistically significant differences for images published in 2006 under human-interest stories for Coalition civilians. Overall, *The New York Times* was more likely to publish human interest stories for all categories over *The Guardian* in 2006, 13.9 percent of all *The New York Times*' images were of human-interest stories, while only 5.8 percent of *The Guardian*'s coverage was of this category.

The types of frames that emerged in 2006 that were distinctive from 2003 were the following: Saddam's trial, Donald Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary, celebrating an event associated with the war, societal chaos of war, atrocities, and/or scandals of war, wounded/disabled frame, and the Iraqi study group.

In 2006 Saddam's trial was highly publicized, the images in this category include images associated to the trial but do not include images of Saddam. These images often included visuals of the courtroom and the judge. In 2006, only 1.9 percent of the images published were included within this category. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* there were no statistically significant differences for images published.

Also, in 2006 Donald Rumsfeld lost political support as the Iraq War continued and he resigned at the end of 2006, therefore the category of Donald Rumsfeld's exiting as Defense Secretary was added. These images were separated from the images of political Coalition figures because his resignation signaled a change in how the war

would be handled. In 2006, 3.7 percent of images were classified under this category. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* there were no statistically significant differences for images published in this category between the two newspapers.

Celebrating an event associated with the Iraq War (Coalition or Arab countries) include images cheering a development in the war. In 2006, 0.9 percent of images were categorized as celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition Countries. Interestingly, for celebrating an event associated with the Iraq War for Arab countries it is also 0.9 percent in 2006. When isolating for 2006 only, there were no statistically significant differences in the types of images published for celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition or Arab countries. In 2006, the most celebrated event associated with the war was the verdict from Saddam's trial where he was sentenced to death by hanging.

The category of societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity was another new frame that emerged in 2006. In 2006, 13.1 percent of images were classified under the societal chaos of war frame for both newspapers. In comparing the publications, there was a significant statistical difference between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*. *The New York Times* was much more likely to publish images of the societal chaos of war frame over *The Guardian*. In 2006, 15.1 percent of the *New York Times'* images were of this war frame compared to 5.8 percent of *The Guardian's* coverage.

Atrocities and/or scandals of war were separated by Coalition military, Saddam's regime, and the Iraqi government. These were actions defined as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary torture. In 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized as

atrocities of war committed by Coalition soldiers. Only 0.3 percent of images in 2006 were classified under atrocities of war committed by Saddam's regime. Also, in 2006 0.3 percent of images were categorized as atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime. For the atrocities categories, no statistically significant differences for images published by *The New York Times* compared to *The Guardian*.

The wounded/disabled war frame distinguishes between Coalition soldiers and Iraqis, these photographs may contain images of fresh wounds or fully healed injuries that have resulted in disfigurement or amputations. In 2006, 3.1 percent of the images were classified as wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers for both newspapers. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, no statistically significant differences existed between the images represented in this category. For wounded/disabled Iraqis, there were 1.9 percent of images included in this category in 2006. When comparing both newspapers for wounded/disabled Iraqis, there were no statistically significant differences between the amounts of images published.

The Iraq study group frame was also a new category that emerged in 2006, this frame refers to a panel of individuals selected to examine the progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War and to make recommendations on a future course of action. In 2006, 3.1 percent of images were classified under this frame. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, there were no statistically significant differences between the amounts of images published.

The findings for this study discovered the top five war frames for 2006 for both newspapers were the following: Iraqi Civilians (20.6 percent); political Coalition figures (19.6 percent); Coalition troops (13.7 percent); societal chaos of war (13.1 percent); and

human cost of Iraqi casualties (10.9 percent). When isolating for *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* by year, there were some variation in the top war frames. For *The New York Times* in 2006 the top five war frames were: Iraqi civilians (23.4 percent); political Coalition figures (18.7 percent); societal chaos of war (15.1 percent); coalition troops (13.9 percent); and human cost of war for Iraqi casualties (12.3 percent). For *The Guardian* in 2006 the top five categories were: political coalition figures (23.2 percent); human cost of war for Coalition casualties (18.8 percent); Coalition troops (13.0 percent); Iraqi civilians (10.1 percent); and with diagnostic and violence/destruction of war both at 8.7 percent.

While the 2003 invasion period has been described as the unstoppable war machine rolling into Baghdad (Griffin, 2004), the 2006 occupation period lacked a central theme or specific narrative. Instead, with the rising death and wounded rates of Iraqi civilians and Coalition solders along with rise of insurgent activities and bombings the 2006 period can best be described as chaotic and violent. With the exiting of Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary and the emergence of the Iraq study group the future direction of the war is unclear and criticized. How the Iraq War had been handled is largely questioned at this time from U.S. and U.K. media in 2006. This was also reflected in the American public's opinion over the war. By mid-November 2006, only 41 percent of Americans believed going to war in Iraq was the right decision and over 51 percent believing it was the wrong decision (Pew Research Center, 2013). In the U.K. in March 2006, 33 percent of the British people believed going to Iraq was the right decision over 57 percent believing it was the wrong decision (YouGov, 2013). However, amid the large

increase in insurgent activity and casualty rates at the end of 2006 — the only clear message is that the Iraq War is too unstable for the Coalition troops to withdrawal.

The 2011 War Frames

Only one war frame emerged in 2011 that was distinctive from 2006, this was the coalition troop withdraw frame. These images include packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq. In 2011, 25.0 percent of all images in both newspapers were of this frame. When comparing *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* for all of the war frames there were no statistically significant differences for images published between both newspapers. The types of frames that disappeared in the 2011 coverage from the 2006 coverage were the following: Saddam's trial; Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary; human cost of war for Coalition casualties; wounded Iraqis; anti-war protests from Arab countries; anti-war protests from Coalition countries; human-interest stories of Iraq military; human-interest stories of Coalition civilians; and atrocities by Saddam's regime.

Several war frames decreased from 2006 to 2011 as the visual coverage during this time became centralized around the departing Coalition soldiers. These frames included, the diagnostic frame, political coalition figures, military activity/developments, Iraqi civilians, violence/destruction of war, human cost of war for Iraqi casualties, wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers, and the societal chaos of war frame.

For the diagnostic frame in 2011, there was one image of Saddam printed by *The Guardian*. This represented 1.8 percent of the 56-sample size for the images collected in 2011. The diagnostic frame had decreased considerably as compared to 2006 when it was

6.9 percent. In 2011 images of political Coalition figures was still a prominent frame at 14.3 percent of the images from both newspapers. This had decreased a few percentage points from 2006 when the percentage of political Coalition figures was at 19.6 percent. For the military activity/development frame in 2011, 5.4 percent of images published were coded under this frame. The military activity frame decreased a few percentage points from 8.4 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2011. The visual representation of Iraqi civilians declined in 2011, but was still a major war category. In 2006, 20.6 percent of images were classified as Iraqi civilians compared to 14.3 percent in 2011. The violence/destruction of war frame decreased in 2011. In 2006, 9.7 percent of images were classified under violence/destruction of war, compared to only 1.8 percent in 2011.

The human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame decreased in 2011. In 2006, 10.9 percent of images were categorized under human cost of war for Iraqi casualties compared to 5.4 in 2011. The amount of wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers decreased in 2011. In 2006, 3.1 percent of images were categorized as wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. Images classified under societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity frame dropped considerably from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 13.1 percent of images were categorized as societal chaos of war, compared to 3.6 percent in 2011.

While many war frames disappeared or declined from 2006 to 2011, there were some that increased. These included: political Arab figures; Coalition military troops; Iraqi police/military; rebuilding of Iraq frame; celebrating an event associated with the war; human interest stories for Iraqi civilians; human interest stories for Coalition

military; atrocities committed by Coalition soldiers; and atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime.

For political Arab figures in 2011, 8.9 percent of the images were included in this category. The percentage of political Arab figures rose from 2006 with 5.6 percent of the images to 8.9 percent. Also, while in 2006 *The Guardian* did not publish any images in this category, in 2011 it represented 13.3 percent of the images relating to the Iraq War. The Coalition military troops frame more than doubled in 2011. The Coalition military troops frame was a very prominent frame in 2006 at 13.7 percent of images then increased considerably to 37.5 percent of the images collected in 2011. The Iraqi police/military frame rose slightly in 2011, from 4.0 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent. For the category of Iraqi prisoners/prisons this war frame rose in 2011. In 2006, 2.8 percent of images were classified as Iraqi prisoners/prisons and increased to 8.9 percent in 2011. The rebuilding of Iraq frame increased slightly in 2011. In 2006, only 0.3 percent of images were classified under this category compared to 1.8 percent in 2011.

Celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition and Arab countries both rose in 2011. In 2006, 0.9 percent of images were categorized under celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition countries compared to 5.4 percent in 2011. Also, in 2006, 0.9 percent of images were classified as celebrating an event associated with the war from Arab countries compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. In both categories, the event being celebrated was the withdrawal of Coalition soldiers from Iraq.

Under the category of human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians, the percentage of images published rose from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 4.7 percent of images were classified under human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians compared to 7.1 percent in 2011. The

percent of human-interest stories for Coalition military rose from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 3.4 percent of images were classified as human interest stories for Coalition military compared to 10.7 percent in 2011.

For the category of atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by Coalition soldiers the percentage of these images rose in 2011. In 2006, 1.9 percent of images were classified as atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by Coalition soldiers compared to 8.9 percent in 2011. For the category of atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by the Iraqi regime, the percentage of these images rose slightly from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were classified as atrocities and/or scandals of war compared to 1.8 percent in 2011.

The five most representative categories for 2011 for both newspapers were: returning Coalition soldiers (25 percent); Coalition troops (17.2 percent); political Coalition figures (14.3 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.3 percent); and human interest stories of Coalition soldiers (10.7 percent). The top five categories for 2011 for *The New York Times* was: Coalition troops (36.6 percent); returning Coalition soldiers (26.8 percent); political Coalition figures (17.1 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.6 percent); and human interest stories of Iraqi civilians (9.8 percent). For *The Guardian* for 2011 the top categories were: Coalition troops (40.0 percent); human interest stories of Coalition military (20.0 percent); atrocities by Coalition Soldiers (20.0 percent); and returning Coalition soldiers (20.0 percent). Then following categories were all at 13.3 percent for *The Guardian* in 2011: political Arab figures, military conflict/developments, Iraqi civilians, Iraqi prisoners/prisons, and celebrating Coalition countries.

The central narrative around the 2011 coverage was the departure of Coalition soldiers and the long awaited official end to the conflict. The primary focus was of the Coalition troops and their personal stories and preparation in leaving Iraq. During this time, more emphasis was put on the representation of political Arab figures and the Iraqi military/police in maintaining control in Iraq. Also, images of Iraqi civilians transitioning to normal life and celebrating the end of the Iraq war were represented in both publications. During this time both *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* published stories about continued insurgent activity and bombings resulting in death and destruction, however, photographs rarely accompanied these articles.

During the last month leading up to the withdrawal of Coalition troops in Iraq, public approval of the war slightly increased to 48 percent believing it was the right decision, with more than 46 percent believing it was the wrong decision (Pew Research Center, 2013). For the U.K., 2011 public opinion data was not available, however by 2013, only 27 percent of the British public believed going to war was the right decision (YouGov, 2013).

In comparing the war frames, it was expected for the representation of military activity/development to dramatically decrease from 2003 to 2006 and 2011. However, it was surprising that the rebuilding of Iraq frame was much more significant in 2003 over 2006 and 2011. In addition, when the rebuilding of Iraq frame appeared in the research, it was often connected with a misuse of funds and associated with unsuccessful projects in Iraq.

Interesting war frames that emerged in 2006 included the Iraq study group and societal chaos of war. The 2003 narrative that emphasized the progress the Coalition

forces made no longer existed in 2006. The new focus in 2006 was how badly the Iraq War had been handled and the instability of the war at that time. Also, since Iraq was so unstable with widespread insurgent activity, the one clear message was that the Coalition forces could not abandon Iraq during this time. Therefore, while the former actions of the Bush administration were questioned and criticized, the continual presence of the Coalition forces within the country was a necessity.

Discussion

During the invasion period, both *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* focused heavily on the Coalition military activity, the search for weapons, and the successes of securing Iraqi cities including Baghdad. This research investigated how the press visually represented an unpopular and largely controversial war in the U.S. and British presses. While both *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* visually portrayed the end of the 2011 conflict similarly, the tumultuous 2006 period was represented differently in both newspapers. After the Coalition forces did not find weapons of mass destruction, which were believed to pose a threat to the allied nations (and was the primary reason for invading Iraq), media coverage surrounding the military action in Iraq became largely criticized. Three years after the invasion period, Iraq was on the brink of a civil war. The situation in Iraq had largely deteriorated with widespread insurgent activity and Iraqi civilian deaths — the end of the war was nowhere in sight because withdrawal of Coalition forces would further destabilize the region. Eight years after the Iraq War began Coalition forces withdrew from Iraq, while insurgent activity still existed — the new Iraqi government was more secure.

Over a decade after the war in Iraq began, the American and British public is still divided over the decision to use military force in that country. The Pew Research center tracked the American public's opinion over whether using military force in Iraq was the right or wrong decision from 2003 until 2013. At the start of the Iraq War in mid-March, 71 percent of Americans believed using military force was the right decision, by the end of the official invasion period this number had dropped slightly to 69 percent (Pew Research Center, 2013). In the U.K. only 50 percent believed going to war was the right decision in March of 2003, with that slightly increasing to 54 percent by early April of 2003 (YouGov, 2013). A decade after the war began 41 percent of Americans believe going to war with Iraq was the right decision, 44 percent believe it was the wrong decision, and 14 percent responded that they did not know (or refused to answer). By 2013, only 27 percent of the British people believed going to war with Iraq was the right decision over 53 percent believing it was the wrong decision (and 20 percent responded they did not know) (YouGov, 2013). Surprisingly in 2013, more American and British respondents were undecided over whether going to war was the right decision or not over all other years polled (Pew Research Center, 2013; YouGov, 2013). To a large extent this dis-enthrallment with U.S. and U.K. objectives can be attributed to the coverage of the war from the respective nation's media.

Analyzing visual images of recent wars therefore is an important area of study in understanding complex relationships between media, political administrations, and the public's knowledge of war. In the United States, the Persian Gulf War is generally cited as the Pentagon's response to the media coverage of the Vietnam War. Danny Schechter, a U.S. based filmmaker and former TV network producer and journalist has been

outspoken in his criticisms of domestic media to hold U.S. officials accountable for the failures of the Iraq War. Schechter argues that many in the Pentagon believe the media coverage of the Vietnam War ultimately led to the loss of that war (Schechter, 2011). Therefore, as a result, "large amounts of money and manpower" have been invested in influencing the press in order to mitigate negative media coverage of wars after Vietnam (Schechter, 2011, p. 313).

Rachel Maddow, an American television host, political commentator, and author, addressed war censorship and its affects as "insulating the public from not only the cost of war but sometimes even the knowledge that it's happening — war making has become almost an autonomous function of the American state" (Maddow, 2012, pp. 202-203). The Bush administration from 2003 to 2008 "exercised a tight hold on imagery about the cost of the wars" news photographers were banned from the transfer ceremonies for flag-draped caskets and the president and vice president did not attend military funerals (Maddow, 2012, pp. 245). The government actively prevented funeral coverage even when reporters were invited by the families, also by requiring news agencies to get signed consent forms from photographed wounded soldiers — the Pentagon further limited the press (Maddow, 2012). Under President Obama's administration from 2008 to present, Obama has taken a more aggressive stance on preventing whistleblowers since the Nixon administration (McVeigh, 2013). Prosecuting journalists under the Espionage Act has severely hindered the release of information and led to a chilling effect on the press (McVeigh, 2013). Therefore, media coverage of current wars is affected by even more restrictive measures than under the Bush administration.

In addition, with continued media consolidation of news organizations and the corporatization of TV news these changes have made "external manipulation easier" (Schechter, 2011, p. 314). Schechter (2011) has argued that the war was not the product of only one person — "it took powerful institutions — a military-industrial-media complex — to achieve the desired outcome" (Schechter, 2011, p. 314). Fuchs (2011) discusses how the competition for Iraq War coverage in 2003 between major channels as FOX, CNN, ABC, CBS, and MSNBC "did not automatically result in a more democratic and pluralistic type of coverage" but instead resulted in "mass one-dimensional coverage" (Fuchs, 2011, p. 57).

The Iraq invasion has been described as a conflict reduced to "a fight between the evil-doer Saddam Hussein and the forces of civilization" (Schechter, 2011, p. 308). After the invasion of Iraq, American viewers began to seek alternative sources in other countries including the BBC and British newspaper websites (Schechter, 2011). *The Guardian* as well as the *Independent*, and the *Daily Mirror* "offered a counter-narrative no mainstream media outlet did the same" (Schechter, 2011, p. 307). Dahr Jamail a well-known journalist that reported from Iraq discussed how the reporting of the *The New York Times* represented the trend of the entire mainstream media (Jamail, 2011, p. 292). Therefore, analyzing *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* following the Iraq invasion period is an important area of study and comparison.

Another important aspect of the Iraq War was the use of embedded reporters, who first gained notoriety as war correspondents in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While embedded journalists in 2003 were subject to less restrictive practices than those in 1991 were, many scholars have argued because the embedded reporters are so dependent on

the soldiers for safety, they would be more likely to identify with them and report stories that are more favorable about the soldiers and the war (King & Lester, 2005). King and Lester (2005) found similar visual war frames between the 1991 Persian Gulf and 2003 Iraq War.

Scholars have argued that embedded journalism is an "integrative strategy of media self-censorship" which dissolves the distance between reporter and military (Fuchs, 2011, p. 56). During the Iraq War embed program, more than 600 reporters were stationed with British and U.S. troops from the front and had to sign an agreement defining "ground rules," which set strict regulations for coverage (Fuchs, 2011, p. 56). For example, an embedded journalist was fired for posting images of the remains of American soldiers after a suicide bombing (Jamail, 2011).

While a small percentage of all images collected in 2006 and 2011 were of atrocities or scandals by Coalition soldiers (2.9 percent), Jamail (2011) an Iraq War reporter argues this number could have been much larger. Jamail (2011) discussed how there was a misrepresentation of news by journalists during Fallujah, and Abu Hanifa:

> I have found and reported that in order to bring freedom to Fallujah, the "US troops have sprayed chemical and nerve gases on resistance fighters" and that "residents have been further burnt beyond treatment by poisonous gases." I had evidence too since the US had admitted having used napalm, an internationally banned weapon, in Iraq during the initial invasion of the country. I had eyewitness accounts to back my claims. (Jamail, 2011, p. 294)

Jamail (2011) reported that some of these illegal weapons used by the U.S. accidentally killed American soldiers, and argues "a few simple interviews conducted with Iraqis and

some readily available photographs and video can drastically correct the glaring errors in the Western media's representations of the occupation" (p. 300). Within crisis management, there are five most commonly used propaganda tactics, which include: "delay, distract, discredit, spotlight, and scapegoat" which have been largely used by the United States in their media coverage of the Iraq War (Jamail, 2011, p. 300).

There were a number of limitations of the study. First, when utilizing microfilm to analyze images, the image quality is deteriorated from the original form. The images are in black and white instead of color, and several of the microfilm images were dark and fine image details were lost. The largest obstacle this study faced involved ensuring inter-coder reliability that becomes more difficult when latent content is coded. Examples of manifest conflict would be images of Coalition soldiers or Iraqi civilians, while latent content is less explicit like violence/destruction and societal chaos of war. Also, it was anticipated that coding reliability might become difficult because some photographs may be in more than one war frame, and the intercoder may not be as diligent in ensuring that all frames are coded. However, with pilot coding training and testing — this study worked to mitigate those problems.

Initially this study intended to classify images of children in the Iraq War coverage. Often images of children become persuasive messages either supporting or criticizing the war efforts. Thorne (2003) explained the nature of these images and how they "personify injustice" because "children signify vulnerability, dependence and innocence" (p. 261). However, with only a few images collected from both newspapers, this category was not utilized within the study.

After conducting the study, images of the human cost of war would be a ripe area for future research. Within this study, there were several ways how the loss of life of Coalition soldiers and Iraqis were portrayed. The human cost of war for Coalition casualties was most often represented by portrait images of the deceased soldiers, with some flag draped caskets. Conversely, the images of human cost of war for the Iraqis were much more graphic, with the most common representation of bodies covered by a sheet of cloth—and sometimes with an arm or other body part visible.

As we enter a new era of long-standing wars, analyzing ongoing conflict is a very important area for future research. This study found there are major differences between media coverage of invasion periods over continuing conflict. Whether going to war with Iraq was the right decision is still a largely debated topic by the American and British public. This is largely reflective in how the media coverage of *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* evolved over time. However, there were major differences in how these newspapers covered the 2006 occupation period in terms of political Arab figures, Iraqi civilians, human cost of war of Coalition soldiers, and human-interest stories about Iraqi civilians, and societal chaos of war. In comparison to *The Guardian* in 2006, *The New York Times* underrepresented the amount of Coalition military deaths, and instead focused on political Arab figures within the new Iraqi government and the plight of the Iraqi civilians during this period of widespread insurgent activity resulting in massive Iraqi casualties. Over a decade after the Iraq War began, more American and British people are undecided over whether using military force was the right decision. Historically, the public should be more informed about the facts and issues surrounding military conflict and more decisive as further details are revealed over time through

media outlets. This suggests a failure by the U.S. and U.K. media in providing a comprehensive representation of the Iraq War to allow individuals to come to definitive decisions about the actions of their elected officials in dealing with foreign policy. What the Iraq War should have taught us is that a critical investigative press is essential in preventing misrepresented and unnecessary wars. However, with shrinking media budgets for investigative reporting, and stricter government control over what the press can release — this lesson will not be learned in the foreseeable future.

APPENDIX I

Chi-Square Tests

Table 1: Newspapers according to publication year

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.771[a]	1	.380		
Continuity Correction[b]	.495	1	.482		
Likelihood Ratio	.743	1	.389		
Fisher's Exact Test				.387	.237
Linear-by-Linear Association	.769	1	.381		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.48.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 2: Photograph size published and newspaper

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.226[a]	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	20.623	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.394	1	.011
N of Valid Cases	377		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.79.

Table 3: Newspaper and page images of the Iraq War were published

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.710[a]	2	.258
Likelihood Ratio	2.674	2	.263
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.262	1	.133
N of Valid Cases	377		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.24.

Table 4: Photograph placement and size

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.925[a]	4	.042
Likelihood Ratio	12.418	4	.014
Linear-by-Linear Association	.966	1	.326
N of Valid Cases	377		

a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.55.

Table 5.1: Newspaper and diagnostic frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.940[a]	1	.332		
Continuity Correction[b]	.506	1	.477		
Likelihood Ratio	.877	1	.349		
Fisher's Exact Test				.312	.232
Linear-by-Linear Association	.938	1	.333		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.12.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 5.2: Newspaper and diagnostic frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.467[a]	1	.494		
Continuity Correction[b]	.172	1	.678		
Likelihood Ratio	.443	1	.506		
Fisher's Exact Test				.590	.326
Linear-by-Linear Association	.466	1	.495		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 5.3: Diagnostic frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.783[a]	1	.095		
Continuity Correction[b]	.280	1	.597		
Likelihood Ratio	2.685	1	.101		
Fisher's Exact Test				.268	.268
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.733	1	.098		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 6: Saddam trial frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.748[a]	1	.186		
Continuity Correction[b]	.685	1	.408		
Likelihood Ratio	3.053	1	.081		
Fisher's Exact Test				.345	.218
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.743	1	.187		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 7.1: Political coalition category, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.140[a]	1	.709		
Continuity Correction[b]	.046	1	.829		
Likelihood Ratio	.138	1	.710		
Fisher's Exact Test				.752	.408
Linear-by-Linear Association	.139	1	.709		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.82.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 7.2: Political coalition category for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.707[a]	1	.400		
Continuity Correction[b]	.449	1	.503		
Likelihood Ratio	.686	1	.408		
Fisher's Exact Test				.397	.248
Linear-by-Linear Association	.705	1	.401		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.54.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 7.3: Political coalition category for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square	.971[a]	1	.324		
Continuity Correction[b]	.307	1	.579		
Likelihood Ratio	1.107	1	.293		
Fisher's Exact Test				.428	.305
Linear-by-Linear Association	.954	1	.329		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.14.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 8.1: Political Arab category, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.611[a]	1	.106		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.842	1	.175		
Likelihood Ratio	3.160	1	.075		
Fisher's Exact Test				.126	.080
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.604	1	.107		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.12.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 8.2: Political Arab category for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.221[a]	1	.022		
Continuity Correction[b]	3.959	1	.047		
Likelihood Ratio	9.001	1	.003		
Fisher's Exact Test				.017	.011
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.205	1	.023		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.87.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 8.3: Political Arab category for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.489[a]	1	.484		
Continuity Correction[b]	.029	1	.865		
Likelihood Ratio	.454	1	.501		
Fisher's Exact Test				.602	.406
Linear-by-Linear Association	.480	1	.488		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 9: Donald Rumsfeld's exiting as defense secretary in 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.035[a]	1	.309		
Continuity Correction[b]	.435	1	.510		
Likelihood Ratio	.933	1	.334		
Fisher's Exact Test				.295	.244
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.032	1	.310		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.58.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 10.1: Military activity frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.098[a]	1	.754		
Continuity Correction[b]	.007	1	.933		
Likelihood Ratio	.100	1	.752		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.481
Linear-by-Linear Association	.098	1	.755		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.68.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 10.2: Military activity frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.780[a]	1	.377		
Continuity Correction[b]	.407	1	.523		
Likelihood Ratio	.844	1	.358		
Fisher's Exact Test				.470	.270
Linear-by-Linear Association	.777	1	.378		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 10.3: Military activity frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.571[a]	1	.109		
Continuity Correction[b]	.871	1	.351		
Likelihood Ratio	2.214	1	.137		
Fisher's Exact Test				.172	.172
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.525	1	.112		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 11.1: Coalition military troops category, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.029[a]	1	.865		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	.995		
Likelihood Ratio	.029	1	.866		
Fisher's Exact Test				.871	.490
Linear-by-Linear Association	.029	1	.866		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.48.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 11.2: Coalition military troops category for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.033[a]	1	.856		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.033	1	.856		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.518
Linear-by-Linear Association	.033	1	.857		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.46.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 11.3: Coalition military troops category for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.055[a]	1	.815		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.054	1	.816		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.526
Linear-by-Linear Association	.054	1	.817		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.63.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 12.1: Iraqi police/military category, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.923[a]	1	.337		
Continuity Correction[b]	.428	1	.513		
Likelihood Ratio	1.046	1	.306		
Fisher's Exact Test				.540	.268
Linear-by-Linear Association	.921	1	.337		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 12.2: Iraqi police/military category for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.530[a]	1	.216		
Continuity Correction[b]	.796	1	.372		
Likelihood Ratio	1.894	1	.169		
Fisher's Exact Test				.313	.190
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.525	1	.217		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.79.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 12.3: Iraqi police/military category for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.069[a]	1	.792		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.066	1	.797		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.615
Linear-by-Linear Association	.068	1	.794		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 13.1: Iraqi civilians category, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.444[a]	1	.020		
Continuity Correction[b]	4.742	1	.029		
Likelihood Ratio	6.056	1	.014		
Fisher's Exact Test				.019	.012
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.430	1	.020		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.49.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 13.2: Iraqi civilians category for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.838[a]	1	.016		
Continuity Correction[b]	5.054	1	.025		
Likelihood Ratio	6.603	1	.010		
Fisher's Exact Test				.018	.009
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.820	1	.016		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.19.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 13.3: Iraqi civilians category for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.015[a]	1	.902		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.015	1	.901		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.637
Linear-by-Linear Association	.015	1	.903		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.14.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 14.1: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category , 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.006[a]	1	.938		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.006	1	.937		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.619
Linear-by-Linear Association	.006	1	.938		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.12.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 14.2: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.592[a]	1	.442		
Continuity Correction[b]	.128	1	.721		
Likelihood Ratio	.684	1	.408		
Fisher's Exact Test				.690	.389
Linear-by-Linear Association	.590	1	.442		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.93.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 14.3: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.489[a]	1	.484		
Continuity Correction[b]	.029	1	.865		
Likelihood Ratio	.454	1	.501		
Fisher's Exact Test				.602	.406
Linear-by-Linear Association	.480	1	.488		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 15.1: Rebuilding of Iraq frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.892[a]	1	.345		
Continuity Correction[b]	.009	1	.926		
Likelihood Ratio	.739	1	.390		
Fisher's Exact Test				.396	.396
Linear-by-Linear Association	.890	1	.346		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 15.2: Rebuilding of Iraq frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.664[a]	1	.056		
Continuity Correction[b]	.483	1	.487		
Likelihood Ratio	3.086	1	.079		
Fisher's Exact Test				.215	.215
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.652	1	.056		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 15.3: Rebuilding of Iraq frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.373[a]	1	.542		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.732
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 16.1: Violence/destruction of war frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.003[a]	1	.954		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.003	1	.954		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.578
Linear-by-Linear Association	.003	1	.954		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.13.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 16.2: Violence/destruction of war frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.093[a]	1	.760		
Continuity Correction[b]	.006	1	.940		
Likelihood Ratio	.095	1	.758		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.484
Linear-by-Linear Association	.093	1	.761		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.66.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 16.3: Violence/destruction of war frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.783[a]	1	.095		
Continuity Correction[b]	.280	1	.597		
Likelihood Ratio	2.685	1	.101		
Fisher's Exact Test				.268	.268
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.733	1	.098		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 17.1: Human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33.553[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	30.091	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	26.574	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	33.464	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 17.2: Human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.631[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	32.002	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	27.825	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	35.520	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.44.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 18.1: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.031[a]	1	.154		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.488	1	.223		
Likelihood Ratio	2.261	1	.133		
Fisher's Exact Test				.216	.108
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.026	1	.155		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.47.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 18.2: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.359[a]	1	.125		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.737	1	.188		
Likelihood Ratio	2.680	1	.102		
Fisher's Exact Test				.189	.089
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.352	1	.125		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.52.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 18.3: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.069[a]	1	.792		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.066	1	.797		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.615
Linear-by-Linear Association	.068	1	.794		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 19.1: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.373[a]	1	.542		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.732
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 19.2: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.442[a]	1	.506		
Continuity Correction[b]	.075	1	.784		
Likelihood Ratio	.409	1	.523		
Fisher's Exact Test				.453	.367
Linear-by-Linear Association	.441	1	.507		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.15.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 19.3: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.373[a]	1	.542		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.732
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 20.1: Wounded/disabled Iraqis frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.430[a]	1	.512		
Continuity Correction[b]	.026	1	.872		
Likelihood Ratio	.391	1	.532		
Fisher's Exact Test				.619	.401
Linear-by-Linear Association	.429	1	.513		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 20.2: Wounded/disabled Iraqis frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.508[a]	1	.476		
Continuity Correction[b]	.045	1	.833		
Likelihood Ratio	.457	1	.499		
Fisher's Exact Test				.613	.382
Linear-by-Linear Association	.506	1	.477		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 21.1: Anti-war protest frame from Arab countries, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.287[a]	1	.592		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.505	1	.477		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.777
Linear-by-Linear Association	.287	1	.592		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 21.2: Anti-war protest frame from Arab countries for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.212[a]	1	.645		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.198	1	.656		
Fisher's Exact Test				.646	.465
Linear-by-Linear Association	.212	1	.645		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 22.1: Anti-war protest frame from Coalition countries, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.287[a]	1	.592		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.505	1	.477		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.777
Linear-by-Linear Association	.287	1	.592		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 22.2: Anti-war protest frame from Coalition countries for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.275[a]	1	.600		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.485	1	.486		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.785
Linear-by-Linear Association	.274	1	.601		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 23.1: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.936[a]	1	.008		
Continuity Correction[b]	4.576	1	.032		
Likelihood Ratio	5.493	1	.019		
Fisher's Exact Test				.024	.024
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.918	1	.009		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 23.2: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.662[a]	1	.056		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.458	1	.227		
Likelihood Ratio	2.849	1	.091		
Fisher's Exact Test				.118	.118
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.650	1	.056		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 23.3: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.571[a]	1	.109		
Continuity Correction[b]	.871	1	.351		
Likelihood Ratio	2.214	1	.137		
Fisher's Exact Test				.172	.172
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.525	1	.112		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 24.1: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries , 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.017[a]	1	.895		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.017	1	.897		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.637
Linear-by-Linear Association	.017	1	.896		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .89.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 24.2: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.251[a]	1	.616		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.226	1	.635		
Fisher's Exact Test				.517	.517
Linear-by-Linear Association	.251	1	.617		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 24.3: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.373[a]	1	.542		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.732
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 25.1: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.736[a]	1	.017		
Continuity Correction[b]	4.461	1	.035		
Likelihood Ratio	9.864	1	.002		
Fisher's Exact Test				.010	.007
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.721	1	.017		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.23.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 25.2: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.308[a]	1	.038		
Continuity Correction[b]	3.076	1	.079		
Likelihood Ratio	7.459	1	.006		
Fisher's Exact Test				.048	.024
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.295	1	.038		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 25.3: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.576[a]	1	.209		
Continuity Correction[b]	.448	1	.503		
Likelihood Ratio	2.605	1	.107		
Fisher's Exact Test				.565	.276
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.548	1	.213		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.07.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 26.1: Human interest stories for Iraqi military frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.287[a]	1	.592		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.505	1	.477		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.777
Linear-by-Linear Association	.287	1	.592		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 26.2: Human interest stories for Iraqi military frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.275[a]	1	.600		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.485	1	.486		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.785
Linear-by-Linear Association	.274	1	.601		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 27.1: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.016[a]	1	.899		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.016	1	.900		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.548
Linear-by-Linear Association	.016	1	.899		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.79.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 27.2: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.039[a]	1	.308		
Continuity Correction[b]	.417	1	.518		
Likelihood Ratio	1.248	1	.264		
Fisher's Exact Test				.468	.275
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.035	1	.309		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 27.3: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.847[a]	1	.174		
Continuity Correction[b]	.759	1	.384		
Likelihood Ratio	1.659	1	.198		
Fisher's Exact Test				.326	.188
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.814	1	.178		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.61.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 28.1: Human interest stories for Coalition civilians frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.053[a]	1	.818		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.052	1	.820		
Fisher's Exact Test				.734	.523
Linear-by-Linear Association	.053	1	.818		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 28.2: Human interest stories for Coalition civilians frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.091[a]	1	.763		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.088	1	.767		
Fisher's Exact Test				.725	.496
Linear-by-Linear Association	.090	1	.764		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.58.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 29.1: Societal chaos of war frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.005[a]	1	.025		
Continuity Correction[b]	4.180	1	.041		
Likelihood Ratio	5.943	1	.015		
Fisher's Exact Test				.032	.015
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.992	1	.025		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 29.2: Societal chaos of war frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.104[a]	1	.043		
Continuity Correction[b]	3.328	1	.068		
Likelihood Ratio	4.801	1	.028		
Fisher's Exact Test				.045	.028
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.091	1	.043		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.03.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 29.3: Societal chaos of war frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.759[a]	1	.384		
Continuity Correction[b]	.003	1	.954		
Likelihood Ratio	1.274	1	.259		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.532
Linear-by-Linear Association	.745	1	.388		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .54.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 30.1: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.514[a]	1	.061		
Continuity Correction[b]	2.270	1	.132		
Likelihood Ratio	2.984	1	.084		
Fisher's Exact Test				.073	.073
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.504	1	.061		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 30.2: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.508[a]	1	.476		
Continuity Correction[b]	.045	1	.833		
Likelihood Ratio	.457	1	.499		
Fisher's Exact Test				.613	.382
Linear-by-Linear Association	.506	1	.477		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 30.3: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.088[a]	1	.079		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.509	1	.219		
Likelihood Ratio	2.704	1	.100		
Fisher's Exact Test				.113	.113
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.033	1	.082		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 31.1: Atrocities of war committed by Saddam's regime frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.287[a]	1	.592		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.505	1	.477		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.777
Linear-by-Linear Association	.287	1	.592		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 31.2: Atrocities of war committed by Saddam's regime frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.275[a]	1	.600		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.485	1	.486		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.785
Linear-by-Linear Association	.274	1	.601		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 32.1: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.576[a]	1	.448		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	1.011	1	.315		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.604
Linear-by-Linear Association	.575	1	.448		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 32.2: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.275[a]	1	.600		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.485	1	.486		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.785
Linear-by-Linear Association	.274	1	.601		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 32.3: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.373[a]	1	.542		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.732
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 33: Iraq Study group frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.808[a]	1	.369		
Continuity Correction[b]	.258	1	.611		
Likelihood Ratio	.954	1	.329		
Fisher's Exact Test				.696	.328
Linear-by-Linear Association	.806	1	.369		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.15.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 34: Coalition troop withdrawal frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.273[a]	1	.601		
Continuity Correction[b]	.030	1	.862		
Likelihood Ratio	.282	1	.595		
Fisher's Exact Test				.736	.442
Linear-by-Linear Association	.268	1	.604		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.75.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 35.1: Other frame, 2006 and 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.392[a]	1	.238		
Continuity Correction[b]	.685	1	.408		
Likelihood Ratio	1.708	1	.191		
Fisher's Exact Test				.478	.211
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.389	1	.239		
N of Valid Cases	377				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 35.2: Other frame for 2006

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.039[a]	1	.308		
Continuity Correction[b]	.417	1	.518		
Likelihood Ratio	1.248	1	.264		
Fisher's Exact Test				.468	.275
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.035	1	.309		
N of Valid Cases	321				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 35.3: Other frame for 2011

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.373[a]	1	.542		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.630	1	.427		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.732
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545		
N of Valid Cases	56				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

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CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

University of Nevada Las Vegas, Journalism and Media Studies, Master of Arts (2014)

- Thesis: *High Stakes of Media Messages: Decoding Visual Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses*
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Towson University, Towson MD, Bachelor of Science in Anthropology/Sociology, Minors Applied Statistics and Studio Art

PRESENTATIONS

Liese, J. (2013). My Lai: Critical War Coverage of Vietnam Atrocities. Presented at the Graduate and Professional Student Association (GPSA) Research Forum, at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, March 16, 2013.

Liese, J. (2013)**.** Media Organizations and the Manufacturing of News: Decoding the Iraqand Afghanistan Wars through Visual Narratives. Presented at Far West Popular and American Culture Associations (FWPCA/ACA) 25th Annual Conference, in Las Vegas, February 22-24, 2013.

Liese, J. (2012). My Lai: Critical War Coverage of Vietnam Atrocities. Presented at the International Crime, Media & Popular Culture Studies 4th Annual Conference, in Terre Haute, Indiana at Indiana State University, September 17-19, 2012.

Liese, J. (2012)**.** Media Coverage of Military Conflict in the United States: Political Elites, Framing, and Public Misperceptions. Presented at Far West Popular and American Culture Associations (FWPCA/ACA) 24th Annual Conference, in Las Vegas, February 24-26, 2012.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Part-Time Instructor, UNLV: JOUR 202 Electronic Media Production Course, Fall 2013

- Developed weekly lesson plans that parallel course objectives, while training a graduate teaching assistant
- Instructed and graded students on operating field video cameras and basic post-production editing
- Promoted to part-time instructor after maintaining a graduate teaching assistant position for this course during Fall 2012 and Spring 2013

Graduate Teaching Assistant, UNLV: JOUR 332 Media Buying and Selling, Fall 2011

- Formulated lesson plans and learning material for lectures; instructed students on print, broadcast, and online media buying and selling methodologies
- Recruited experts in radio and TV broadcasting for guest lectures from the Nevada Broadcasting Association