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Is that Disappointment or Contempt I Feel for Humanity? Actual/Ideal (AI) and Actual/Ought (AO) Discrepancy Beliefs in Humanity Might Have Unique Emotional and Behavioral Consequences

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Is that Disappointment or Contempt I Feel for Humanity? Actual/Ideal (AI) and
Actual/Ought (AO) Discrepancy Beliefs in Humanity Might Have Unique Emotional and
Behavioral Consequences

by

Phillip D. Getty

A Dissertation

Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee

of Lehigh University

in Candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

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Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Phillip D. Getty

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Abstract

Disappointment and contempt are important moral emotions that have the potential to influence social behavior. However, these emotions and their behavioral consequences have yet to be explored in the context of evaluative beliefs about humanity. One purpose of this dissertation was to begin filling this gap in the literature by examining the psychological mechanisms that give rise to feelings of *disappointment in* and *contempt for* humanity, and the social behavior they influence. Disappointment was hypothesized to be associated with AI-discrepancy beliefs (e.g., humanity is not compassionate enough), as they imply the absence of a desired outcome or expectation. Contempt was hypothesized to be associated with AO-discrepancy beliefs (e.g., humanity is cruel), as they imply humanity fails to meet minimal moral standards. Causal attributions (Weiner, 2006), identification with all of humanity (IWAH; McFarland et al., 2012), and implicit theories of personality (IT; Dweck, Chu, & Hong, 1995) were predicted to moderate these relationships. Finally, disappointment was predicted to promote *prosocial behavior*, while contempt was predicted to promote *social avoidance*. These predictions were tested in a series of four studies. Proposed models of disappointment and contempt were tested in Study 1. Studies 2-4 tested the effects of discrepancies and proposed moderators experimentally. The results were mixed. The models of disappointment and contempt were not supported. Evidence was found suggesting AO-discrepancies can evoke both feelings of disappointment (Studies 2 and 3) and contempt for humanity (Studies 2, 3 and 4), while AI-discrepancies appear only to evoke feelings of disappointment (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4). At times, IWAH might

moderate the effects of discrepancies on disappointment (Studies 1 and 2) and contempt (Studies 2 and 3). The proposed moderating effects of causal attributions and IT were largely unsupported. Finally, evidence was found suggesting disappointment and contempt might have unique effects on prosocial behavior and social avoidance, such that contempt seems to promote social avoidance, which might be influenced by IWAH, while disappointment is less likely to influence social behavior. The results of this work contribute to the literature and our understanding of beliefs about humanity, group identity, social emotions, causal attributions, and discrepancy theory.

Is that Disappointment or Contempt I Feel for Humanity? Actual/Ideal (AI) and Actual/Ought (AO) Discrepancy Beliefs in Humanity Might Have Unique Emotional and Behavioral Consequences

What is the nature of humanity? Philosophers have battled over this question for centuries. More recently, psychologists have begun to study how everyday people answer this same question and how different answers might have unique consequences for the individual. Many aspects of people's everyday lives are influenced by their beliefs about humanity. Beliefs about humanity influence political behavior (Rosenberg, 1956), trust in others (Sharma & Dubey, 1986), ethical research practices (Antes et al., 2007), intergroup dynamics (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; Luke & Maio, 2009; Morton & Postmes, 2011), and prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep; Wrightsman, 1992). Beliefs about humanity have even contributed to some of the most appalling acts imaginable. Consider the example of Pekka-Eric Auvinen, a Finnish teenager, who began a "one-man war against humanity" by killing eight of his high school classmates before turning the gun on himself. According to his manifesto, his actions were motivated by feelings of alienation and contempt for humanity (see <http://www.captaincynic.com/thread/76302/the-pekkaeric-auvinen-manifesto.htm>). Clearly, beliefs about humanity can have important and, at times, devastating consequences.

Beliefs about humanity might be as diverse as the individuals who possess them. People form elaborate "philosophies" about humanity based on observed human interaction (Wrightsman, 1992). People differentiate what they believe are humanity's essential characteristics, like warmth and responsiveness, from what they believe are

humanity's unique characteristics, like civility and morality (Haslam, 2006). In short, beliefs about humanity represent a multifaceted network of schemata about humanity's essential and unique characteristics.

Still, some scholars argue that research has neglected emotional responses to humanity and the evaluative beliefs these responses represent (Luke & Maio, 2009). The few studies that have examined evaluative beliefs focused on general positive responses compared to negative responses, which inadequately represents the spectrum of social emotions (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Izzard, 1971; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). This lack of understanding represents a significant gap in the literature on beliefs about humanity.

One purpose of this dissertation was to begin filling that gap by examining the psychological mechanisms that give rise to feelings of *disappointment in* humanity and *contempt for* humanity, both of which are important social emotions with implications for moral judgment and social behavior (De Cremer, 2006; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Lelieveld, van Dijk, van Beest, Steinel, & van Kleef, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; van Doorn, Heerdink, & van Kleef, 2012; Wubben, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2009). To date, we have found no work examining the elicitors of these particular emotions as affective evaluations of humanity. These elicitors and also the behavioral consequences of each emotion will be examined here.

With insight from Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005) and moral psychology (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009), in this dissertation it is argued that perceived discrepancies between the way

humanity *actually* behaves and the way perceivers would *ideally* like humanity to behave and the ways perceivers believe humanity *ought* to behave will elicit feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity, respectively. The reason is that, in moral terms, discrepancies between humanity's actual and ideal behavior (AI-discrepancies) likely constitute prescriptive moral violations, or the failure to activate prosocial behavior, while discrepancies between humanity's actual and ought behavior likely constitute proscriptive moral violations, or the failure to inhibit immoral behavior (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).

Perceiving that humanity displays significant AI-discrepancies (e.g., not being compassionate enough) is hypothesized to create feelings of disappointment in humanity because it “signals the absence of a desired outcome” or behavior (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005, p. 1628), the primary determinant of feelings of disappointment (Higgins, 1987; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). On the other hand, perceiving that humanity displays significant AO-discrepancies is hypothesized to create feelings of contempt for humanity, because AO-discrepancies signal that humanity fails to meet minimal standards of morality (proscriptive moral violation; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).

I suspect that the effects of a given discrepancy on a given emotional response might depend on the cause to which one attributes to the discrepancy (Costarelli, 2012; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Weiner, 2006). In this case, the extent to which one attributes the cause of a given discrepancy to uncontrollable/stable characteristics (i.e., human nature), feelings of contempt might follow (Roseman et al., 1996), although this is more likely in instances of AO-discrepancies, as AO-discrepancies represent the failure to meet

minimum moral standards. In contrast, attributing discrepancies to controllable/unstable traits or characteristics (e.g., a lack of effort), feelings of disappointment might follow because such explanations imply that the discrepancy might be overcome in the future. Of course, this is more likely to occur in instance of AI-discrepancies, because such discrepancies imply high potential to obtain the desired outcome in the future (Covington & Omelich, 1981; Costarelli, 2012).

Other important psychological mechanisms might also moderate the relationship between a given discrepancy and the subsequent emotional response, but they might do so by influencing the type of causes to which one attributes the discrepancy. Specifically, *identification with all of humanity* (IWAH) (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) and *implicit theories of moral characteristics* (i.e., *entity* or *incremental* theory) (IT) are hypothesized to do just that (Costarelli, 2012; Chu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hewstone, 1990; Lau & Russell, 1980; Pettigrew, 1979). In light of negative information about humanity's behavior, strong-identifiers should be *motivated* to attribute that negative information to causes that minimize identity threat, like external causes or unstable characteristics of the group, like effort (Covington & Omelich, 1981; Costarelli, 2012; Hewstone, 1990). In the absence of an external cause, strong-identifiers might be forced to concede responsibility for the lack of positive behavior (in the case of AI-discrepancies) or the failure to meet minimum moral standards of behavior (in the case of AO-discrepancies) to humanity. When they do, strong-identifiers must attribute the discrepancies to aspect that do less damage to humanity's—and their own—positive image. The literature suggests that attributing negative outcomes to unstable/controllable characteristics like effort, function to protect

positive identity (Costarelli, 2012), because they preserve positive potential (Covington & Omelich, 1981). If that is the case, attributing discrepant behavior to controllable causes might be appealing to strong-identifiers.

Implicit theories of moral characteristics (Dweck, 2008; Dweck, et al., 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) are also hypothesized to moderate the relationship between a given discrepancy and the subsequent emotional response by influencing the causes one attributes to the discrepancy. The reason is that one's implicit theory influences how he or she will interpret the cause of a given moral discrepancy (Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Specifically, implicit theories influence the extent to which one attributes the cause of a given discrepancy to uncontrollable/stable characteristics versus controllable/unstable characteristics (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

Entity-theorists generally attribute moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to uncontrollable/stable characteristics, while *incremental-theorists* generally attribute moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to more controllable/unstable characteristics. In other words, entity-theorists are thought to attribute discrepant behavior to underlying characteristics (i.e., a flawed nature), while incremental-theorists focus on the potential to develop the preferred ideal or ought behavior in the future. In this sense, incremental-theorists should have a tendency to attribute discrepant behavior to controllable/unstable characteristics. Thus, incremental-theorists are hypothesized to attribute controllable/unstable causes (i.e., lack of effort) to discrepant behavior, especially in light of AI-discrepancies. On the other hand, entity-theorists are hypothesized to attribute uncontrollable/stable causes (i.e., flawed human nature) to discrepant behavior, especially in light of AO-discrepancies.

In sum, a “core” model is proposed in which perceived moral discrepancies in humanity lead to negative feelings for humanity. The extent to which perceived moral discrepancies lead to negative feelings towards humanity will depend on the extent to which one identifies with all humanity, and implicit theories, because of the causes these characteristics lead one to attribute to the discrepant behavior. In other words, the moderating effects of both identification with humanity and implicit theories of moral characteristics should be mediated by causal attributions. See Figure 1.

Thus, a model of feelings of disappointment in humanity is proposed in which perceived AI-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is not compassionate enough) evoke feelings of disappointment in humanity. However, identification with all of humanity and implicit theories should moderate the effect of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment, respectively, because these characteristics might lead observers to attribute the perceived AI-discrepancies to humanity’s controllable/unstable characteristics. See Figure 2.

In contrast, a model of feelings of contempt for humanity is proposed in which perceived AO-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is immoral) evoke feelings of contempt for humanity. However, identification with all of humanity and implicit theories should moderate the effect of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt, respectively, because these characteristics might lead observers to attribute the perceived AO-discrepancies to humanity’s uncontrollable/stable characteristics (i.e., human nature). Identifying with all of humanity in particular will motivate one to maintain a favorable impression of humanity, so he/she will not attribute AO-discrepancies to

uncontrollable/stable characteristics. An entity theory will attribute the discrepancies to uncontrollable/stable characteristics, because they are theory-consistent. See Figure 3.

To position these proposed models within the pertinent literature, a review of the literature on lay beliefs about humanity will be presented. Then, research on disappointment and contempt will be discussed in order to argue for their distinction. Further, research on self-discrepancy theory and moral psychology will be discussed in order to provide additional insight for examining potential predictors of these emotions in a group context. Next, attribution theory will be discussed in order to explain how different causal attributions might change the meaning of a given discrepancy, thereby changing the emotional response. Several psychological mechanisms hypothesized to moderate the relationship between discrepant beliefs and disappointment in and contempt for humanity by altering the cause to which one attributes to a perceived discrepancy will be introduced. Finally, a series of studies designed to test these proposed relationships is presented.

Human Traits and Feelings about Humanity: Two Frameworks for Examining Lay Attitudes toward Humanity

As attitudes reflect both cognitive and affective information (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Zajonc, 1968; Zanna & Rempel, 1988), it is little surprise that the scientific study of lay beliefs about humanity has arguably developed within two similar frameworks, one based on cognitive information and one based on affective information. Research within the framework based on cognitive information focuses on the traits that lay perceivers believe constitute human nature or “humanness” more broadly (i.e., beliefs about human aggressiveness, conformity, morality, and civility; Gill & Getty, in prep; Haslam, 2006;

Haslam et al., 2005; Kanter & Mirvis, 1989; Rosenberg, 1956; Wrightsman, 1992). The framework based on affective information focuses on lay perceivers' feelings toward humanity, or the extent to which people express positive versus negative emotions towards humanity (Gill & Getty, 2010; Getty, 2012; Luke & Maio, 2009). Research within each framework has illuminated many important facets of everyday life, including political beliefs (Rosenburg, 1956), group dynamics (Luke & Maio, 2009; Morton & Postmes, 2011), de- and infra-humanization (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007), and prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep).

The human traits framework. The human traits framework examines people's answers to the question "what are humanity's characteristics?" In other words, this framework focuses on the trait content of people's schemata about humanity and the effects holding different beliefs might have on social thoughts and behavior. Work within this framework is directly descended from classic epistemology, which asked: "what is human nature." Plato (1987), Confucius (as cited in Stevens & Haberman, 2004), Hobbes (1651/1988), and Rousseau (1761/1913/2010) presented various arguments about human aggression. Their respective answers to this question, they suggested, were necessary to determining a proper form of government, one that would either suppress humanity's natural aggressive tendencies, or promote humanity's natural cooperative tendencies.

To summarize, Plato and Hobbes argued that either in part (Plato) or in whole (Hobbes), human nature is essentially aggressive and dominance-seeking, motivated by selfish needs (Hobbes 1651/1988, Stevens & Haberman, 2004). In their view, a complementary government should consist of "philosopher kings" with knowledge of the "good" in order to guide the masses (Plato) or heavy-handed rulers in order to control a

naturally aggressive populace (Hobbes). In contrast, Confucius and Rousseau each held optimistic views of human nature, arguing that humanity has a natural tendency to seek mutually beneficial relationships, with each other and nature (Stevens & Haberman, 2004), and, therefore, government and philosophy should help people reach harmony and peace.

While these great thinkers provide learned insight, they do not profess what everyday people believe are the fundamental characteristics of humanity. Therefore, some scientists shifted the discussion away from the great thinkers' ideas about human nature to what everyday people believe about human nature, because understanding these everyday beliefs could ultimately illuminate how such beliefs affect people's everyday lives.

Like early philosophers, the scientific study of lay beliefs about humanity examined the links between beliefs about the characteristics of humanity and political attitudes and behavior (Rosenberg, 1956). Morris Rosenberg (1956) was the first modern scientist to address this relationship. He proposed that people, because of diverse life histories, develop different beliefs about humanity; and that understanding the nature of these differences might explain the diversity of political thought. Rosenberg's theory was based on the idea that attitudes about people, or humanity more generally, were strong predictors of "attitudes towards the principles, practices and policies of a political system" (p. 690). For example, he suggested that if a voter believed that humanity is fundamentally bad (i.e., having a misanthropic belief about human nature), that voter would likely support political initiatives to curtail laziness (oppose welfare). On the other hand, if the voter believed that people are fundamentally good, that voter would likely

support political initiatives to help folks get back on their feet during hard times (support welfare).

Rosenberg (1956) developed the *Faith in People Scale* (FPS). The FPS is thought to measure general misanthropic beliefs about humanity, or the extent to which one believes humanity is generally untrustworthy, unhelpful, selfish, uncooperative, and/or indifferent to the needs of others. When Rosenberg examined the relationship between FPS responses and questions about political ideology, he found that misanthropic beliefs about humanity did indeed predict political beliefs and behavior. He found that misanthropists were likely to dehumanize politicians by likening them to puppets controlled by special interests, motivating misanthropists to support strong restrictions on candidates for public office. He also found that, regardless of political affiliation, misanthropists supported strong governmental control over labor, reflecting their belief that government is an “instrument of power designed to suppress” (p. 693).

Rosenberg’s seminal work has been a guiding force in the study of political ideology across many disciplines. Studies addressing confidence in public institutions, for example, have been strongly influenced by Rosenberg (Pharr & Putman, 2000; Newton & Norris, 2000), as have studies addressing the decline of political capital (Paxton, 1999), beliefs about political legitimacy (Weatherford, 1992) and political alienation (Seeman, 1975). The consensus among these scholars is that gauging misanthropy is an important indicator of people’s political beliefs and behavior.

Lawrence Wrightsman (1966, 1974, 1992) is another key contributor to this framework. Wrightsman suggested that via a long process of socialization, people develop lay “philosophies” of human nature. He suggested that these “philosophies” were

a special case of “implicit personality theory” comprised of implicit attitudes based on the way people perceive human interaction.

Wrightsmann (1964, 1974, 1992) conceptualized lay beliefs about human nature as varying along six dimensions: (1) *Trustworthiness versus untrustworthiness* (2) *Strength of Will and Rationality versus External Control and Irrationality*, (3) *Independence versus Conformity to Group Pressure*, (4) *Altruism versus Selfishness*, (5) *Complexity versus Simplicity*, and (6) *Variability versus Similarity*.

The culmination of Wrightsmann’s theory was the *Philosophies of Human Nature Scale* (PHN). The PHN has been adopted in several research programs illustrating the diversity of beliefs about human nature by both undergraduates and graduate students from institutions around the United States (Bayless, 1971; Wilkinson & Hood, 1973; Wrightsmann, 1992), social workers (Dretz & Dretz, 1969, as cited by Wrightsmann, 1992), and racial groups (Johnson, 1969, as cited by Wrightsmann, 1992).

Beyond documenting the diversity of beliefs about humanity that people hold, Wrightsmann’s theory has been instrumental in several areas of social psychological research. Trustworthiness, Wrightsmann’s most pervasive and influential dimension, has contributed to scientific research in a number of areas, including cross-cultural studies of trust (Sharma & Dubey, 1986) and economic exchange among Chilean, Colombian, Mexican and Swedish populations (Ahmed & Salas, 2009). Antes et al.’s (2007) work presented an intriguing set of studies on ethical decision-making among graduate students. They found a relationship between beliefs about trustworthiness and unethical decision-making. Their findings suggested that young researchers who believe that

people are naïve, trusting, and generally act in good faith are more likely to act unethically, perhaps due to heightened confidence that they will not get caught.

It might seem that these six dimensions represent distinct categories of trait beliefs. However, a factor analysis of the PHN discovered only two factors (Wrightsmann, 1974). The first of those factors tapped positive beliefs about human nature, labeled “Beliefs that People are Conventionally Good.” The second tapped negative beliefs about humanity, labeled “Cynicism.” However, these factors imply that cynicism and admiration are orthogonal, which is inconsistent with previous work suggesting that these beliefs represent a single dimension (Rosenberg, 1956).

Wrightsmann’s (1992) view that selfishness and altruism are polar opposites on a single dimension is also questionable. Classically, Comte (1851/1875; see Batson & Shaw, 1991, for a review) considered the two to be “distinct motives within the individual” (Batson & Shaw, 1991, p. 108). Gill and Getty (in preparation) have similarly argued that beliefs about human *prosociality* (i.e., altruism) and *selfishness* are independently represented in lay beliefs about human traits and separating the two better serves the study of lay beliefs about human nature because it more accurately represents the reality of people’s beliefs. That is, people have a tendency to believe that humanity has a natural inclination to act compassionately, while simultaneously possessing an equal and natural tendency to act selfishly. People do not conceive of these dimensions in “either/or” terms, and thus presumably think of human behavior as governed by competing motives of selfishness and compassion, either one of which might dominate in a particular context. Indeed, Gill and Getty’s work has confirmed that beliefs about

selfishness, compassion, and aggressiveness represent orthogonal dimensions of lay beliefs about human nature.

Haslam and colleagues (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006) provide a unique perspective on lay beliefs about humanity. Haslam and colleagues did not examine individual differences in beliefs, but rather focused on what “people generally believe.” In their view, people distinguish between *essential* human traits (what Haslam and colleagues call “human nature”) and traits associated with human *uniqueness*. Traits associated with human uniqueness, arguably, set humans apart from other animals (i.e., secondary emotions, morality, civility, refinement, etc.); they are acquired characteristics that vary in content and degree from one society to another, or from one individual to another without any particular valence (Demoulin et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2005). Human nature, in contrast, is comprised of essential characteristics (i.e., emotional responsiveness, warmth, cognitive openness, depth, individuality, agency) that everyone possesses “deep down, despite superficial variation,” which set human beings apart from cold, unfeeling and unthinking machinery (Haslam, 2006, p. 256).

In three studies, Haslam et al. (2005) set out to support this theoretical distinction of humanness beliefs. In each study, participants rated several personality traits as either unique to humans (operationally defined as “not found in other species”), or as a characteristic of human nature (as described above). In all three studies, the same pattern emerged: traits associated with one category of humanness were either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the other. Furthermore, characteristics marked as essential to human nature were associated with affective traits, such as emotional responsiveness, warmth, openness, agency, independence and depth, mapping on to Wrightsman’s six

dimensions. Characteristics of human uniqueness were associated with traits linked to cognitive complexity: civility, morality, rationality and refinement. Moreover, participants rated the traits associated with human nature as inherent, developing early, universal, highly prevalent and acting as causal forces of behavior. Uniquely human characteristics were not perceived as inherent. Unique human characteristics were seen as less prevalent, less universal and developing later than essential characteristics. In sum, Haslam and colleagues provide evidence that lay beliefs about humanness are multifaceted, consisting of beliefs about both essential and unique characteristics.

The motivation for Haslam and colleagues to formally develop the two-dimensional model of humanness was to address questions pertaining to de- and infra-humanization (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006). Dehumanization is the denial of humanness to others, manifesting in many ways. Some of dehumanization's blatant manifestations are the objectification of women (Fredrick & Roberts, 1997; LeMonchek, 1985; MacKinnon, 1987) and describing others as akin to animals or vermin (Chalk & Johansson, 1990; Haslam, 2006; O'Brien, 2003). A more subtle form of dehumanization, however, is infra-humanization (Leyens et al., 2001; Leyens et al., 2003): an intergroup phenomenon involving denying some but not all humanness to outgroups.

Historically, infra-humanization has been characterized as the denial of unique human emotions (e.g., love, affection, suffering, etc.) to outgroup members, while strongly associating these same emotions with one's ingroup (Gaunt, Leyens & Demoulin, 2002; Haslam, 2006; Paladino et al., 2002). Outgroups are seen as possessing the capacity for basic, primary emotions (e.g., joy, fear, anger, sadness), emotions shared

with other animals (Cahajic, Brown & Gonzalez, 2009), but not “higher” feelings and emotions.

A unique contribution of Haslam’s (2006) model is that it provides for characterizing infra-humanization (or dehumanization more broadly) in ways that go beyond the denial of unique human qualities. The denial of unique human qualities is just one type of dehumanization, “animalistic dehumanization”(p. 255), the target of which can be outgroups and also individuals within a group. Animalistic dehumanization can be as extreme as describing a group as vile, debased, inept *creatures*, uncouth, with little intelligence, higher-emotional experience or moral fiber. On the other hand, de- and infra-humanization via the denial of essential human qualities, or “mechanistic dehumanization” (Haslam, 2006, p. 255) could also be extreme, for example, characterizing someone as a cold, calculating machines with little will or desire to seek new experiences.

Beyond de- and infra-humanization studies, Haslam and colleagues’ two-dimensional model of humanness has been influential in several other lines of research including value importance as a function of human nature (Bain, Kashima & Haslam, 2006; Bastian et al., 2010), bioethics (Wilson & Haslam, 2009), self-enhancement (Haslam & Bain, 2007), economic inequality as a function of biased self-perception (Loughnan et al., 2011), social emotions such as guilt and guiltlessness (Xu, Begue & Shankland, 2011), moral decision-making (Cikara, Farnsworth, & Fisk, 2010), and judgments of moral status (Bastain et al., 2010).

In sum, research within the human traits framework has concerned itself with people’s answer to the question “What are humanity’s characteristics?” Because of

diverse learning histories, people develop varying beliefs about the key traits that humanity possesses. People distinguish between the specific traits they consider essential to humanity, those that might be shared with other species, and those they consider unique to humanity, like morality, civility and refinement. This work has broadened our understanding of how beliefs about humanity's traits influence political beliefs and action (Rosenberg, 1956), trust in others (Sharma & Dubey, 1986), ethical research practices (Antes et al., 2007), prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep), and de- and infra-humanization (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Finally, this work has provided preliminary insight about how trait beliefs might influence the feelings we express towards humanity.

The feelings toward humanity framework. Clearly there has been extensive research examining the cognitive components of lay beliefs about humanity. However, until recently, very little work has examined emotional responses to humanity. Indeed, Luke and Maio (2009) have argued that the theorists reviewed above examined only beliefs about a “specific quality of humanity,” while neglecting the importance of emotional response to humanity and the evaluative beliefs they represent (Luke & Maio, 2009, p. 598). Their solution was to develop the Humanity Esteem Scale (HES; based on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) to measure more encompassing positive versus negative attitudes about humanity, or the extent to which people express like versus dislike for humanity as a whole. Humanity esteem has been linked to differences in discrimination, such that people with low humanity esteem might be more likely to show ingroup favoritism in hiring practices than those with high humanity esteem (Luke & Maio, 2009, Study 2). The authors also demonstrated that humanity esteem is malleable,

and could be increased by exposing participants to media images that promote social values and decreased by exposing participants to media images that threaten societal values, like terrorist activities (Study 3a & 3b).

In sum, research within the feelings framework has thus far studied non-specific positive versus negative attitudes towards humanity. Some evidence within this framework suggests that perceived incongruence between social values and the extent to which people act on those values influence feelings towards humanity (Luke & Maio, 2009). As compelling as these findings might be, research on feelings towards humanity has failed to consider the possibility that people experience a spectrum of emotions (e.g., love, hate, fear, contempt, anxiety) each with its own elicitors and behavioral consequences (i.e., approach/avoidance; prosocial/antisocial behavior; revenge versus forgiveness, etc. (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988, Haidt, 2003; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; Smith, 1993, 1999; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). The pertinent question, then, is whether there is reason to believe that people might express unique emotions towards humanity.

The examination of this question has a parallel in the literature on intergroup attitudes. While in the past it has been customary to conceptualize such attitudes in terms of global negativity versus positivity (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Dijker, 1987; Dijker et al., 1996; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Mackie & Smith, 1998), Elliot Smith and colleagues have presented a theory of intergroup emotions that suggests people in fact express a wide range of intergroup emotions (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 1998a, 1998b;

Schneider, 1996; Smith, 1993, 1999). For example some outgroups “attract” feelings of contempt, which is associated with segregation and social avoidance, while other outgroups attract feelings of anger, associated with a tendency to “move against” the outgroup (Mackie et al., 2000, p. 602).

While many people might express a wide range of emotions towards humanity, just as they might do toward outgroups, feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity are of particular interest. Both emotions, while on the negative side of the spectrum of potential emotions, could have far different patterns of associated behavioral and social outcomes. Expressions of disappointment in humanity might be associated with fostering prosocial consequences, as disappointment in other has been linked to signaling the potential for establishing cooperation (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; van Doorn et al., 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). Contempt for humanity might be associated with fostering antisocial consequences like social avoidance, as it has been linked to segregation and groups moving away from each other (Mackie et al., 2000).

Both disappointment and contempt are important emotions with important implications for moral judgment and behavior (De Cremer, 2006; Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Matsumoto, 2005; Matsumoto & Smith, 2004; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; van Doorn et al., 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). However, the unique elicitors and behavioral consequences of disappointment and contempt have not been directly compared in this literature, nor has work examined the elicitors of these particular emotions as affective evaluations of humanity. This lack of understanding represents a significant gap in the literature on beliefs about humanity. Thus, this

dissertation is the first to directly examine and compare the elicitors of disappointment and contempt in the context of emotional evaluations of humanity.

Disappointment and Contempt: Unique Negative Emotions?

Do disappointment and contempt represent unique negative emotions? In order to answer that question, we must consider whether unique emotions exist at all, and, if they do, how they might be distinguished. Ortony and Turner have argued that emotions are fundamentally the same, only varying by degree of valence, arousal, and pleasantness (see Ekman, 1992b for a review; also see Dijker, 1987; Dijker et al., 1996; Ortony & Turner, 1990). However, the majority view advocates for the existence of unique emotions that reside within categories of “basic” emotions (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988, Haidt, 2003; Izard, 1977; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). In this sense, each basic emotion, like anger, happiness, sadness, fear, and disgust represent “linguistic exemplars of emotion ‘families’” (Matsumo & Ekman, 2004, p. 529) in which family members share “common characteristics” (Ekman, 1992a, p. 172), including similar “appraisals, antecedent events, probable behavioral responses,” and of course, facial expressions (Ekman, 1992a, p. 170; Izard, 1971).

Disappointment. Disappointment resides within the sadness family of emotions, and is associated with feelings of emptiness and dashed hopes (Levine, 1996; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; van Kleef et al., 2010; van Doorn et al., 2012). Disappointment is associated with a facial expression similar to sadness, characterized by drooping eyes with the inner corners of the eyebrows drawn to the center of the forehead and the corners of the mouth turned down (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001;

van Doorn et al., 2012). The key determinant of disappointment is the disconfirmation of a positive expectation or outcome (Carroll et al., 2007; De Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009).

Researchers have identified three different “senses” or kinds of disappointment: (1) Disappointment when a positive expectation for the self is not met, such as when one expects to earn an “A” on an exam but instead earns a “D” (Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002); (2) Disappointment *for* others when they fail to meet positive expectations for themselves, such as when your friend expects a “B” and earns an “F” on the same exam (Carroll et al., 2007; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005); and, finally, (3) Disappointment *in* others when they fail to meet a positive expectation held by the one feeling disappointment, such as when parents express disappointment in their child after he/she is expelled from school for cheating (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). It is this last form of disappointment that is the focus of this examination.

While there is surprisingly little work that directly examines feeling of disappointment in others, the results are very interesting. Disappointment seems to be associated with attributions of causal instability (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). That is, when people express disappointment in others, they usually attribute the eliciting, disappointing event to unstable characteristics of the target. Furthermore, disappointment in others has been associated with a wide range of behavioral tendencies, including inaction, as well as an approach orientation of recuperative responding, like disciplinary action (i.e., disciplinary action so as to correct behavior). Inaction is often associated with

expressions of disappointment in others in the moment of the event (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). That is, when we feel disappointment in someone, we might be unsure how to respond, so we do not respond. While in the context of disappointment in one's ingroup, or in parent-child dyads, this initial inaction is often followed by a delayed recuperative response (De Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).

Contempt. While Haidt (2003) suggest that contempt belongs in the family of anger-related emotions—which would distinguish it from disappointment—Paul Ekman and colleagues, and others, suggest that contempt is the exemplar of its own family of associated emotions—a basic emotion—with its own unique facial expression, appraisals, antecedent events, and behavioral consequences (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Izard, 1977; Matsumoto, 2005; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004). Indeed, tight, unilaterally raised lips characterize the contempt expression, and this expression, Matsumoto (2005, p. 92) noted, has been recognized as contempt by “individuals from Estonia, Greece, Hong, Kong, Japan, Turkey, the United States, West Germany, Sumatra, Italy, Vietnam, Poland, Hungary, Great Britain (including Scotland), and India (Biehl et al., 1997; Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto, 1992; Ricci-Bitti, Brighetti, Garotti, & Boggi-Cavallo, 1989; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995; Wagner, 2000).”

Contempt is also associated with its own unique pattern of appraisal determinants that differentiate it from disappointment and its stepbrothers, anger and disgust (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). Contempt is associated with feelings of moral or intellectual superiority over others who are perceived as failing to meet a minimum standard of morality or intelligence (Ekman, 1994a. 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003).

Contempt is often expressed towards individuals who interfere with our own desired outcomes (Ekman, 1994a, 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003), as when a an individual in another car is too busy texting to pay attention to traffic, impeding one's own ability to merge. Contempt has also been shown to have devastating effects on romantic relationships (Gottman, 1993). Other work also suggests that contempt is often expressed towards others who have no immediate implications for the self, like when a target is seen as incompetent or unintelligent (Hutcherson & Gross, 2001). While some researchers have argued that contempt has no clear behavioral tendency (see Haidt, 2003), Gottman (1993), Roseman et al. (1996), and Mackie et al. (2000) clearly demonstrated that contempt involves an avoidance orientation, characterized by avoiding romantic partners, individuals, and outgroups for whom one feels contempt.

While there is clear evidence suggesting that disappointment and contempt are unique emotions, it is unclear when humanity will be the target of their expression. The literatures on Self-Discrepancy Theory and moral psychology might provide further insight about when most people might express disappointment in versus contempt for humanity.

Self-Discrepancy Theory: Actual-Ought and Actual-Ideal Discrepancies are a Primary Cause of Negative Emotional Responses to Self and Ingroup

When will people experience disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity? It was proposed that both emotions begin with perceived discrepancies between what humans are *actually doing* and what one would *ideally like them to be doing* or what one thinks they *ought to be doing* or *ought not to be doing*. Once perceived, these discrepancies constitute evidence from which humanity is judged, which lead to moral

emotions (disappointment and contempt). The literatures on Self-Discrepancy Theory (Higgins, 1987) and the psychology of proscriptive and prescriptive moral violations (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) might provide theoretical support for these proposed relationships.

Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987). SDT posits that two basic evaluative representations of the self and of groups exist, the *ought* and the *ideal* representations, and people are thought to compare the perceived *actual* self or *actual* group against those representations (SDT; Higgins, 1987). Any resulting discrepancies give rise to unique negative emotions.

The *ought* self is the representation in which the self meets the “normative” or minimum standard of “attributes that someone (yourself or another) believes you should or *ought* to possess (i.e., a representation of someone’s [or your own] sense of your duty, obligations, or responsibilities)” (Higgins, 1987, p. 321). For example, if a person’s behavior does not infringe on the rights of others, that person might infer that he/she is meeting their own minimum obligation, or standard, as an upstanding citizen of their community.

The *ideal* self is the representation of the self in which the self possesses the attributes he or she (or others) would ideally like to possess (i.e., desires, aspirations, hopes, dreams) but which are not considered mandatory or required. That is, one might wish to possess highly compassionate characteristics or to be an altruistic “hero,” even though failing to do these things is generally considered acceptable.

Higgins (1987, 1989) suggested that different types of discrepancies arouse different negative emotions. When one perceives an actual-ought (AO) discrepancy, SDT

suggests that he or she will experience agitation-related emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and/or nervousness as a signal of potential negative consequences. In contrast, when one perceives a significant actual-ideal (AI) discrepancy, SDT predicts that he or she will experience dejection-related emotions, such as sadness, hopelessness, and/or disappointment, because such discrepancies signal the absence of a desired, positive outcome or expectation (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005). Higgins seems to suggest that the negative emotions aroused by these discrepancies are not due to the discrepancy per se, but to the perceived consequences of those discrepancies. Findings from several studies support this pattern of emotional responding to AO and AI self-discrepancies (Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Strauman & Higgins, 1987, 1988; Strauman, 1989, 1992).

Of specific interest to the question at hand are the findings of Bizman, Yinon, and Krotman (2001) who examined SDT in the context of group-based emotions. They examined the emotional experiences of Israeli participants whose beliefs about their nation were highly discrepant from their ought and ideal representations of their nation. Indeed, as SDT would predict, they found that AO-discrepancies predicted group-based agitation-related emotions, while AI-discrepancies predicted group-based dejection related emotions.

As it stands, given the findings in the literature on SDT, are important moral emotions. To further substantiate the claim that AO and AI-discrepancies give rise to these moral emotions, we must consider evidence from the morality literature that one could reasonably argue that feelings of disappointment in humanity and feelings of contempt for humanity could stem from perceiving that humanity is falling short of some

ideal (AI-discrepancy) or minimum standard (AO-discrepancy), respectively. However, disappointment and contempt might suggest these discrepancy beliefs do in fact represent moral judgments. Work on proscriptive and prescriptive morality might provide that evidence.

Proscriptive and prescriptive morality. Janoff-Bulman and colleagues' (2009) work on proscriptive and prescriptive morality is particularly relevant to understanding when people might express feelings of disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity as a function of AI and AO-discrepancies. These authors suggest that lay perceivers conceive of morality as rules, norms, and intuitions that motivate the avoidance of negative outcomes while encouraging positive outcomes. In this way, morality comes in two forms: (1) *proscriptive* morality, which discourages bad behavior (i.e., “*should not*s,” like *lying, stealing, intentionally harming*, etc.) and (2) *prescriptive* morality, which encourages prosocial behavior (i.e., “*should*s,” like *being caring/compassionate, considerate, honest, hard working*, etc.). In this sense, moral principles such as “I must not lie” and “I must tell the truth,” which appear the same, are actually perceived quite differently.

Lay perceivers acknowledge the importance of both proscriptive and prescriptive moral behavior, and perceive violations of the two as equally serious, or morally “weighty.” However, there is a negative bias, such that people are more attuned to proscriptive morality than prescriptive morality, responding with greater disapproval to proscriptive violations than prescriptive violations (Study 1, Study 5). Furthermore, adherence to proscriptive morality is seen as dutiful, while prescriptive morality is more a matter of choice, although at times it, too, can be dutiful (e.g., parental childcare

obligations). However, they also find that people give more “moral credit” to others who perform prescriptive moral acts than those who refrain from proscriptive violations, whether the prescriptive act was performed out of a sense of duty or desire. They conclude then, that to be perceived as a moral person, one must refrain from proscriptive violations. However, to be seen as a highly moral person, one must also strive to perform positive moral acts.

Tying this work back to SDT, Janoff-Bulman and colleagues’ describe proscriptive and prescriptive morality as intimately related to Higgins’ (1987) conception of the *ought* and *ideal* representations of the self, others, and groups. Consider first the apparent overlap between lay perceptions of proscriptive morality and the *ought* representation. Both involve meeting minimum standards of conduct and the avoidance of negative consequences (Higgins, 1987; Janoff-Bulman et al, 2009; Studies 3 & 4). Now, consider the apparent overlap between lay perceptions of prescriptive morality and the *ideal* representations. Both describe fulfilling one’s potential by going beyond the minimal standard in order to activate positive outcomes. Thus, proscriptive morality appears to be the driving force behind the *ought* representation, while prescriptive morality appears to be the driving force behind the *ideal* representation. Therefore, AO-discrepancies are likely akin to proscriptive moral violations, while AI-discrepancies are likely akin to prescriptive moral violations.

When will people express disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity? Given the literature reviewed above, it seems that disappointment in humanity might be a direct result of perceiving that humanity, in general, falls short of prescriptive moral

ideals, while contempt for humanity might be a direct result of perceiving that humanity, in general, fails to inhibit proscriptive moral violations.

Attributions Might Change the Meaning of Discrepancies

The findings discussed above are compelling, yet some researchers question the consistency with which AO- and AI-discrepancies are associated with the emotions predicted by SDT (Bruch, Rivet & Laurenti, 2000; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Szymanski & Cash, 1995). For example, Bruch, Rivet and Laurenti (2000) found a relationship between AI-discrepancies and emotions related to depression, but were unable to find a relationship between AO-discrepancies and anxiety, as SDT would predict. Szymanski and Cash (2005), in the context of women's body image, found no relationship between AO-discrepancies and agitation-related emotions, nor could they find the hypothesized relationship between AI-discrepancies and dejection-related emotions. Clearly, there are inconsistencies here. An important question to ask, then, is this: When discrepancies are unrelated to the specific emotions posited by SDT, is it possible that there is a moderating variable in play that changes the meaning of the discrepancy thereby changing the emotional response?

Research within the domain of Attribution Theory provides evidence that might help to answer this important question. Bernard Weiner (1985; also see Weiner, 2006 for a complete review) proposed a theory acknowledging a number of mediating variables between an observed behavior and the responses elicited in an observer. Specifically, Weiner suggested that the cause to which one attributes to an observed behavior—discrepant behavior in this case—influences the nature of the emotion felt by the observer (Weiner, 2006). Once an observer scrutinizes the properties of the chosen cause of the

observed behavior—especially suffering and controllability implications (see Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013)—these properties bring about a unique emotional response (i.e., anger, sympathy). Finally, after an emotion is elicited, the explainer responds behaviorally (i.e., approach, avoid, etc.). Weiner generalized this sequence as one of thinking → feeling → action.

There are several causes that one might use to explain an observed behavior, each of which might carry with it a unique emotional consequence. The most notable characteristic that differentiates families of explanations is the *internal-external* causal distinction (Andreychik & Gill, 2009; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985; 2006; Gill & Andreychik, 2010; Gill, Andreychik, Getty, 2013). For example, an observer might infer that a discrepant behavior was actually caused by *external* forces working against the actor, as when person A acts violently and his violent behavior is caused by a history of abuse suffered at the hands of person B. Person B’s abuse is therefore the ultimate “external” cause of person A’s transgressions. In cases like this, observers often respond to person A with compassion and with less blame and anger than when the cause to which one attributes is *internal* to person A; that is, when the cause resides solely within person A (Andreychik & Gill, 2009; Gill & Andreychik, 2010; Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013; Weiner, 2006; Zucker & Weiner, 1993).

Within the internal family of explanations, causes might vary along several dimensions, including the global-specificity dimension (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990, as cited by Gill & Andreychik, 2010), mental-state inferences of desires, beliefs, and valuings (Malle, 1999, 2004), and the linked dimensions of controllability and stability. Controllability in particular has been a guiding topic of much research and is often

framed as the most important mediator of people's emotional reactions to the acts and outcomes of others (see Weiner, 2006; also see Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013, and Mullen & Skitka, 2009, for competing views).

Weiner and Kukla (1970) presented early evidence highlighting the important implications of both controllability and stability. Participants were placed in the role of an educator and asked to react to the performance of a fictitious student who failed to achieve academically. The participants were informed that the student either (a) had low intelligence (uncontrollable/stable) or (b) did not exert effort (controllable/unstable). The authors found that participants experienced more anger and responded more punitively in the low effort condition than in the low intelligence condition. The authors concluded that the key difference between the two conditions was that the student-target in the low effort condition had more *control* over his academic outcome than the student-target with low intelligence. Indeed, additional studies by a number of researchers have concluded that in response to a negative outcome, the degree to which an actor *could have done otherwise* is directly related to the extent to which an explainer will respond with anger and punishment (see also Meyer & Mulherin, 1980; Reisenzein, 1986; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).

Given insight from Attribution Theory, one could infer that emotional responses to moral discrepancies might differ depending on whether they are attributed to external versus internal causes, or within the internal distinction, controllable/unstable versus uncontrollable/stable causes. With this insight, Petrocelli and Smith (2005) suggested that AO and AI-discrepancies take on different meaning in the context of different causal attributions; that is, different emotions are elicited depending on the cause of the

perceived discrepancy. They suggested that when one attributes the AO or AI-discrepancy to internal causes (“choices, lack of motivation, attitudes”), the pattern of emotional responding is consistent with SDT. Thus, they predicted that one would experience agitation-related or dejection-related emotions to the extent that the AO or AI-discrepancy was caused by one’s own (or the ingroup’s) actions, characteristics, or nature.

When one attributes a discrepancy to external causes (“bad luck, unfair situations, other people”), Petrocelli and Smith posited a different pattern of emotional responding. For example, they proposed that externally caused AO-discrepancies would elicit anger-related emotions, because an external force blocked one’s (or the ingroup’s) ability to meet the minimum standard or obligation. In this case, it’s not the effect of the perceived discrepancy (i.e., a negative outcome) per se that elicits the emotion, but the perception that the discrepancy is foisted on the self/ingroup from without. In contrast, externally-caused AI-discrepancies are posited to elicit “emotions of discontent” (i.e., dissatisfaction), because the lack of a positive outcome/event is due to external situations (p. 1630).

Indeed, Petrocelli and Smith (Study 1) found evidence supporting the pattern of relationships just described. Furthermore, in Study 2, they sought to extend these findings to the group level, examining the emotional consequences of AI and AO-discrepancies regarding the ingroup (Americans). They found for the most part, the same pattern of relationships noted above; however, this pattern was most strongly evident among participants who strongly identified with the group.

Petrocelli and Smith did not examine whether controllability/stability implications of internal causes also influence emotional responses to discrepancies. Applying their insights to the question of emotional responses towards humanity, one could predict that perceived AI-discrepancies in humanity could evoke feelings of disappointment in humanity (a dejection-related emotion) to the extent that the cause of the discrepancy is perceived internal to humanity, and this might be especially true among participants who strongly identify with humanity on a group level.

However, given insight from research in the Social Identity domain, strong-identifiers should respond differently to distinct internal causes (Costarelli, 2012). That is, strong-identifiers should be far more likely to accept explanations suggesting a discrepancy is due to controllable/unstable characteristics, not because they relieve the group from responsibility (as would be the case with external causes: the preferred explanations for strong-identifiers), but because (a) uncontrollable/stable causes might suggest that there is something inherently wrong with the group, which strong-identifiers are unlikely to accept, and (b) controllable/stable causes suggest that the behavior is malleable, and therefore the group might overcome the discrepancy in the future: There is the potential for the group (or an individual) to rectify the pattern of behavior (Covington & Omelich, 1981).

Finally, because Petrocelli and Smith did not examine feelings of contempt, we can only speculate as to how their finding might apply to feelings of contempt for humanity. We can imagine that AO-discrepancies could potentially evoke feelings of contempt for humanity among weak-identifiers, because weak-identifiers will likely attribute the cause of those discrepancies to internal, uncontrollable/stable characteristics

of humanity, a key determinant of contempt. One thing to note about these presumptions is that they appear counter to Weiner and Kukla's (1970) findings that suggest observers respond with less negativity (i.e., less anger and blame) to uncontrollable/stable causes. However, Weiner and Kukla did not examine contempt.

Given the research reviewed above, contempt and anger, while similar, represent distinct emotions with their own unique facial expressions, "appraisals, antecedent events, [and especially] probable behavioral responses" (Ekman, 1992a, p. 170; Izard, 1971; Mackie et al., 2000). Beyond specific facial expressions, contempt is associated with inferring stable characteristics in an offending party (i.e., the target's core nature), while anger is associated with the personal implications of the specific offense (Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996). Further, contempt is associated with avoiding or otherwise distancing the self from an offending party, while anger is associated with approaching the offending party with the desire to punish. Thus, the suggestion that contempt might be elicited from AO-discrepancies caused by uncontrollable/stable characteristics (especially among weak-identifiers) is not incongruent with Weiner and Kukla, it is presented in addition to their insight. It might be that discrepancies attributed to uncontrollable/stable causes have several potential emotional consequences: they might lead us to forgo blame and punishment, but express contempt in their place.

Armed with Attribution Theory, Petrocelli and Smith provide evidence suggesting that causal attributions shape the meaning of perceived discrepancies and the subsequent emotional response. However that might be, they did not examine the role of controllability/stability implications of internal explanations. Petrocelli and Smith do, however, provide room for speculation about those implications as well as suggest at

least one psychological mechanism that might lead to these specific attributions (ingroup identification). Nevertheless, they did not specifically test for psychological mechanisms that might determine when a specific cause will be attributed. Therefore, to build on this work, two potential mechanisms (*identification with all of humanity, implicit theories of personality*) that might determine when humanity's moral discrepancies will be attributed to specific causes will be examined.

Identification with Humanity and Implicit Theories: Motivational and Cognitive Determinants of Attributions for Discrepancies

Attributions shape the meaning of discrepancies, thereby modulating their relation to emotional responses. The question now is what are the factors that influence the attributions people make for humanity's AO- and AI-discrepancies. It was predicted that two factors would be important: (1) *Identification with all of humanity* (IWAH or, *feeling a part of, love toward, and concern for all humans everywhere*; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012), and (2) *Implicit theories of personality* (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). These predictions will be elaborated on below.

Identification with all of humanity. Do people identify with all of humanity? If so, is there evidence suggesting that those who strongly identify with humanity might respond to discrepancy beliefs about humanity in a similar manner as strong-identifying Americans did in the study by Petrocelli and Smith (2005)? Potentially.

Identifying with all of humanity suggests an emotional and personal connection to one's species, just as strong-identifying Americans might feel an emotional and personal connection to their nation. In fact, McFarland, Webb, and Brown (2012) found that

identification with all of humanity is distinct from universalism, characterized by a sense of human self-categorization while showing concern for others on a global scale.

Identification with all of humanity is positively associated with knowledge of global concerns, voluntary exposure to humanitarian concerns, and support for international charities. In contrast, identification with all of humanity is negatively associated with authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) ethnocentrism (Pratto & Glasford, 2008) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) (Study 7).

How might identification with all of humanity moderate the relationship between perceived discrepancies and feelings of disappointment in humanity and/or contempt for humanity? Insight from Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Taylor, 1979) suggests that there might be motivational factors driving the moderating force behind identification with all of humanity. SIT suggests that people have a strong need or desire to affiliate with a valued group, and when they do so, that group affiliation becomes a part of their positive self-image. Thus, strong-identifying group members should be motivated to attribute discrepant behavior to causes that minimize the potential threat to their positive self-identity (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, identification with all of humanity might moderate the effect of discrepancies on a given emotional response through the clever use of causal attributions.

Human identity might moderate the relationship between discrepancy beliefs and a social emotion via causal attributions. First, the hypothesized relationship between AO-discrepancies and contempt for humanity should be evident when identification with humanity is low, because strong-identifiers should be motivated to attribute those discrepancies to unstable characteristics or even external causes, as they work to protect

one's positive self-identity in the face of negative information about one's ingroup (Costarelli, 2012). Second, the hypothesized relationship between AI-discrepancies and disappointment in humanity should be evident when identification is high, because strong-identifiers might have greater positive expectation of humanity, despite attributing the discrepancies to unstable characteristics. In other words, compared to people who only weakly identify with humanity, people who strongly identify with humanity will want humanity to "be all it can be," to reach its potential, its ideal desirable state, which is beneficial for the group—Learning that humanity is falling short of that goal should be met with greater feelings of disappointment. Furthermore, the moderating effects of human identity on this relationship might be partially or completely mediated by causal attributions. Thus, when strong-identifiers are given information that humanity is not "being all it can be," they should be highly motivated to attribute those discrepancies to controllable/unstable causes, signaling hope for change in a positive direction.

Implicit theories of personality. Carol Dweck and colleagues suggest that people have domain specific implicit theories that influence how they interpret domain relevant behavior, which influence their causal attributions (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For example, in the moral domain, they suggest that these theories influence the extent to which people believe morally relevant behavior is related to malleable personal characteristics (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). *Entity-theorists* emphasize traits, attributing moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to stable characteristics, while *incremental-theorists* focus on mediating factors, attributing moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to more malleable characteristics (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). It stands to reason, then, that one's implicit theory will

influence how he or she will interpret the cause of a given discrepancy (Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Specifically, incremental-theorists are hypothesized to attribute discrepancies to controllable causes (i.e., lack of effort). On the other hand, entity-theorists are hypothesized to attribute discrepancies to uncontrollable causes (i.e., flawed human nature).

The Current Proposal

The work reviewed above provides theoretical support for the argument that when humanity is perceived as not behaving compassionately enough (i.e., AI-discrepancies/prescriptive moral violation), because of unstable, controllable characteristics, feelings of disappointment in humanity might emerge. It also supports the argument that when humanity is perceived as failing to meet minimal levels of moral behavior (AO-discrepancies/proscriptive moral violation), because of stable characteristics (i.e., humanity has a flawed, “evil” nature), feeling of contempt might emerge. Furthermore, this work supports the proposed moderators (*identification with all of humanity, implicit theories of personality*) of the effect of a given discrepancy on its associated negative emotion.

Specifically, *identification with all of humanity* (IWAH; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) is predicted to moderate the effects of both AI and AO-discrepancies. While strong-identifiers might favor external explanations (Gill & Andreychik, 2010), external explanations might not always be available or reasonable. In these cases, strong-identifiers should be motivated to rely on those internal explanations that preserve one’s positive self-image. The most obvious choice, then, is to attribute the discrepancies to unstable causes, as they are known to provide an “identity-protecting function”

(Costarelli, 2012, p. 47). Of course, this pattern of responding is most likely to occur when the discrepancies in question are AI-discrepancies, as they imply the absence of desired behavior or outcome, the primary determinant of feelings of disappointment (De Cremer, 2006; Higgins, 1987; Petrocelli & Smith; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009;)¹.

A similar pattern of responding as those described for strong-identifiers might emerge for perceivers who have an *implicit incremental* theory as compared to those who have an *implicit entity* theory (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Entity-theorists attribute morally relevant behavior to stable/uncontrollable characteristics, while incremental-theorists attribute morally relevant behavior to unstable/controllable characteristics. Thus, entity-theorists should attribute discrepant behavior to underlying characteristics (i.e., a flawed nature), while incremental-theorists should focus on the potential to cultivate appropriate behavior. In this sense, incremental-theorists should have a tendency to attribute discrepant behavior to unstable, controllable characteristics.

A series of studies designed to test these hypotheses is presented below. First, the results of a pilot study are reported, which was conducted in order to construct measures of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. Study 1 tested the proposed models of disappointment and contempt via regression techniques in which all relevant variables noted above were measured and subjected to—for lack of a better term—*quasi-mediated moderation* analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).

Studies 2 through 4 employed experimental manipulations in which manipulated discrepancies were paired with a single manipulated moderator and two measured moderators in order to better establish causal relationships between variables of interest. In Study 2, causal attributions were manipulated. In Study 3, common humanity was manipulated (as a manipulation of IWAH; McFarland et al., 2012). Finally, in Study 4, implicit theories were manipulated (Dweck, Chu, & Hong, 1995). Every study examined whether the discrepancies manipulation affected feelings of contempt and disappointment and tested whether these effects were moderated by identification with all of humanity, implicit theories, and causal attributions, regardless of whether the moderators were manipulated and/or measured. It was expected that participants in the AO-discrepancies condition would report significantly stronger feelings of contempt than participants in the AI-discrepancies and Control conditions. This effect was predicted to be pronounced among (a) weak-identifiers, (b) entity-theorists, and/or (c) when AO-discrepancies were attributed to human nature. In contrast, it was expected that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition would report significantly greater feelings of disappointment in humanity than participants in the other two conditions, especially among (a) strong-identifiers, (b) incremental-theorists, and/or (c) when AI-discrepancies were attributed to controllable causes.

Further, Studies 2 through 4 included behavioral measures to test for the effects of disappointment in and contempt for humanity on social behavior. In Studies 2 and 3, participants were given the opportunity to write a response to the discrepancy information. In Study 4, participants were given the opportunity to donate a sum of money to UNICEF. For both measures, it was predicted that disappointment in humanity

would be associated with prosocial behavior (greater word-count in defense of humanity, more dollars donated) as a means of *recouping* moral credit for humanity, while contempt would be associated with *social avoidance* (low word-count/no defense of humanity, few dollars donated) in order to maintain distance between the self and humanity.

Pilot Study: Measure Development

The purpose of this pilot study was to develop independent measures of feelings of disappointment and contempt for humanity.

Method

Participants. Ninety-seven Lehigh University students (48 females) ($M_{\text{age}} = 19.24$ years old) participated in exchange for partial course credit in an introductory psychology course.

Procedure. Twenty-four negative emotion adjectives were sourced from www.merriam-webster.com and www.thefreedictionary.com, including *disappointment* and *contempt*. Some adjectives were selected based on their suggested similarity to disappointment (i.e., dispirited, frustration, irritation, dissatisfaction) or *contempt* (i.e., aggravation, scorn, disgust, loathing). The remaining adjectives were expected to be unrelated to disappointment or contempt, but were included for exploratory purposes and to provide further evidence that disappointment and contempt are separate from other negative emotions.

The measure included the following instruction: “*Please circle a number that best describes the frequency you feel the following emotions towards people as a whole.*” Participants then rated their experience of each emotion adjective on a 1-5 scale, anchored on “*Never*” and “*Very Often.*” See Appendix A.

Results

Exploratory factor analysis with maximum likelihood (ML) extraction and promax rotation was used to examine the structure and relationship of these adjectives. Examination of the scree plot (see Figure 4) suggested a six-factor solution with eigenvalues greater than one (11.31, 2.36, 1.83, 1.34, 1.29, 1.05), which explained 68.4% of the variance in the data (factor 1: 40.41%, factor 2: 8.34%, factor 3: 6.52%, factor 4: 4.80%, factor 5: 4.6%, factor 6: 3.75%). A change in chi-squared test confirmed that the six-factor solution was more appropriate than the five-factor solution ($\Delta X^2(23) = 50.89, p < .01$).

Examination of the pattern and structure matrices made it clear that contempt and disappointment loaded on independent factors (disappointment on factor 1 and contempt on factor 2).² However, as seen in Table 1, several of the adjectives loaded strongly on multiple factors. For example, “anger,” “displeasure,” and “upset” loaded strongly on factors 1 and 2, while “let down” loaded strongly on factors 1 and 6; “loathing” loaded on factors 2 and 3. Because “anger,” “upset” and “displeasure” loaded strongly on factors associated with both disappointment and contempt, they were removed from further consideration. “Let down” was considered and ultimately retained in the measure of disappointment. In previous research, disappointment has been described as a member of the family of “sadness emotions,” with which feeling let down is clearly associated (Levine, 1996; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; van Kleef et al., 2010; van Doorn et al., 2012). Similarly, as both loathing and contempt are associated with an intense aversion toward a target, it, too, was retained in the factor associated with contempt. Finally, as the goal was to develop measures of disappointment and contempt, items loading on factors 3

through 6 were removed from the final measurement tools, as the EFA results suggested these items were less likely to uniquely capture feelings associated with disappointment and/or contempt.

The final result of the analysis was two, five-item measures of disappointment in humanity (disappointment, frustration, irritation, let down, and dissatisfaction; $\alpha = .85$; $M = 2.51$, $SD = .79$) and contempt for humanity (contempt, scorn, aggravation, loathing, and disgust;³ $\alpha = .84$; $M = 3.35$, $SD = .79$; factor 2), which together explained 54.26% of the variance associated with the 10 items that made it into the final emotion scales (factor 1: 44.81%; factor 2: 9.45%). Given their shared negativity, the measures of contempt and disappointment were related ($r = .58$, $p < .0001$).

Discussion

The objective of this pilot study was to create independent measures of contempt for and disappointment in humanity. The results suggest that feelings of disappointment and contempt can be viewed as discrete negative emotions, although they do share significant negativity. Indeed, several emotion adjectives were associated with both disappointment and contempt. These adjectives were removed from further consideration in hopes of controlling for some of that shared negativity. Nevertheless, the measures remained correlated. Further control will need to be incorporated in subsequent analyses. Shared negativity will be controlled for in two ways: (1) contempt and disappointment items will be presented separately and counterbalanced; (2) by including both emotions in all regression equations.

Limitations. One significant limitation was the relatively small sample size used to conduct the EFA. Indeed, Costello and Osborne (2005) suggest that EFA is a “large

sample” analysis and that a participant to item ratio of 20:1 is preferred. Here the participant-to-item ratio was only 4:1. While low, this ratio is not outside of the norm of published studies that used EFA. Indeed, in their review of the literature, Costello and Osborne (2005) found that 62.9% of published analysis over a two-year period had a ratio of 10:1 or less and that nearly 17% used a ratio of 2:1. Nevertheless, the small sample size in this study might result in difficulty replicating these exact results.

Study 1: A Test of Two Models

The purpose of Study1 was to provide initial empirical support for the proposed models of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. See Figures 2 and 3. Insight from Baron and Kenny (1986), Aiken and West (1991), Kraemer, Wilson, Fauiburn, and Agras (2002), and Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005) guided analysis of these data. The techniques were “guided” and not replications of their techniques, because the proposed models do not exactly fit with the types of mediated moderation or moderated mediation models these authors describe. Their techniques simply informed the plan for analysis. These authors describe models in which the effect of X on Y occurs because of some mediating variable (Me), which is induced by X, and the extent to which X induces Me, or Me affects Y, is moderated by an additional variable (Mo), which is uncorrelated with X (Kraemer et al., 2002; Muller et al., 2005). The reason X and Mo should be uncorrelated is that there is an assumption that the moderating variable comes before the “treatment” variable X. That is, Mo represents a situation, context, or some relatively stable characteristic that was present prior to X affecting Y (Kraemer et al., 2002; Muller et al., 2005). If X and Mo covary, then the proposed moderation cannot take place. Finally, according to Muller et al. (2005), both moderated mediation and mediated

moderation take this same form; the only difference is a matter of emphasis: if the researcher is ultimately interested in moderation, it is a mediated moderation model. If the researcher is ultimately interested in mediation, it is a moderated mediation model.

The most important distinction between this form and the one proposed is that it does not identify an intervening “mediator” (Me) between discrepancies (X) and the emotional response (Y). Rather, it proposes that two variables (identification with all of humanity, implicit theories) moderate the effect of discrepancies on the emotional response, and the moderating effects of these two variables are carried (mediated) via an additional moderator (causal attributions). Thus, because moderation is proposed to take place via a mediating moderator, for lack of a better term, the proposed model is described as a “*quasi-mediated moderation*” model. The core model can be represented with four equations:

$$ER1 = B_{10} + B_{11}(D) + B_{13}(IWAH) + B_{14}(IT) + B_{15}(A) + B_{16}(D*IWAH) + B_{17}(D*IT) + B_{18}(ER2) + \varepsilon_1 \quad (1)$$

$$A = B_{20} + B_{21}(IWAH) + B_{23}(IT) + \varepsilon_2 \quad (2)$$

$$ER1 = B_{30} + B_{31}(D) + B_{32}(IWAH) + B_{34}(IT) + B_{34}(A) + B_{35}(D*IWAH) + B_{36}(D*IT) + B_{37}(D*A) + B_{38}(ER2) + \varepsilon_3 \quad (3)$$

$$BR = B_{40} + B_{41}(ER1) + B_{42}(ER2) + \varepsilon_4 \quad (4)$$

Emotional responses are the outcome variables in Equations 1 and 3. In this example, the emotional response (ER1) is contempt. Equation 1 includes five standardized predictor variables, including perceived discrepancies (D), identification with all of humanity (IWAH), implicit theory (IT), and causal attributions (A). In Equation 1, the first four variables were used to create several interaction terms,

including perceived moral discrepancies by identification with all of humanity (D*IWAH), and perceived moral discrepancies by implicit theories interaction (D*IT). Equation 2 includes the same standardized IWAH and IT terms, but here they predicted causal attributions. Equation 1 also included a term for controlling for shared negativity between contempt and disappointment (ER2). In this example, “ER2” is disappointment.

Equation 2 was included to demonstrate that IWAH and IT predict the expected mediating moderator (i.e., causal attributions (A)). In addition to all the previously described standardized terms and interaction, the perceived discrepancy by causal attributions interaction term (D*A) was included in Equation 3 to predict ER1. Equation 3 will be critical for demonstrating causal attribution’s (A) potential *quasi-mediating* effects of both IWAH’s and IT’s moderating effects. Finally, behavioral response (BR) is the outcome variable in Equations 4. Equation 4 includes two standardized predictor variables, representing the two types of emotional responses of interest, disappointment (ER1) and contempt (ER2). Similarly, as one’s identification with humanity is significantly related to one’s identification with his or her community and country, as per the instructions of McFarland and colleagues (2012), the effects of identification with community and country will be controlled for by using a standardized residual of identification with humanity regressed on identification with community and country, so as to isolate identification with humanity, which is intertwined with community and national identities.

Now, we can apply these equations to the predicted core model. Recall the proposed core model (Figure 1): perceived moral discrepancies in humanity (D) lead to negative feelings expressed toward humanity (ER). The extent to which perceived moral

discrepancies lead to negative feelings towards humanity will depend on the extent to which one identifies with all humanity ($D \cdot IWAH$), and one's implicit theory ($D \cdot IT$), because both identification with humanity ($IWAH$) and implicit theories (IT) are expected to influence the types of causes one attributes (A) to perceived discrepancies (D). Thus, the moderating effects of both identification with humanity (i.e., $D \cdot IWAH$) and implicit theories ($D \cdot IT$) will be carried (mediated) by causal attributions ($D \cdot A$). Finally, the specific negative emotions (i.e., contempt [ER1] and disappointment [ER2]) are expected to lead to unique behavioral responses (BR). Note that only the key pathways of the models are depicted in Figures 1-3. Additional pathways (e.g., the paths from $IWAH$ and IT to ER) are omitted for clarity.

Thus, a model of feelings for disappointment should demonstrate that perceived AI-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is not compassionate enough) evoke feelings of disappointment in humanity; however, AI-discrepancies might only do so if the perceived cause of the discrepancy were controllable/unstable characteristics. The relationship between AI-discrepancies and feelings of disappointment in humanity might also depend on the extent to which one identifies with all of humanity or the extent to which one is an incremental theorist, because both are likely to lead to the perception that controllable/unstable characteristics are, indeed, the cause of AI-discrepancies.

In contrast, a model of feelings of contempt for humanity should demonstrate that perceived AO-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is immoral) evoke feelings of contempt in humanity; however, AO-discrepancies might only do so if the perceived cause of discrepancies were uncontrollable/stable characteristics (i.e., human nature). Again, the relationship between AO-discrepancies and feelings of contempt might also

depend on identification with humanity and one's implicit theory. Strong-identifiers should be motivated to maintain a favorable impression of humanity. They might do so by refusing to attribute AO-discrepancies to uncontrollable/stable characteristics, as these attributions question humanity's—one's own—positive self-image. On the other hand, an entity theorist will likely attribute AO-discrepancies to uncontrollable/stable characteristics, because such explanations are theory-consistent.

Finally, feelings of disappointment in humanity are expected to motivate prosocial behavior, as a form of recuperative response, while feelings of contempt for humanity are expected to motivate social avoidance.

Method

Participants. Three hundred participants were recruited on-line, via the Mechanical Turk interface created by Amazon and paid \$.50 for their participation. Twenty-three participants were excluded from the analysis after failing the attention check question (described below), leaving 277 participants (146 females). All participants were American citizens over 18 years old ($M = 39.66$, $SD = 14.21$), and the majority of participants were well educated (i.e., 64% held a bachelor's degree or higher) and Caucasian (80.8%). All participants provided informed consent prior to their participation.

Procedure. Participants were first introduced to a study of “social beliefs and judgments.” After participants provided informed consent, they were presented with an “attention check” question in which they were instructed NOT to answer the question and skip forward, to demonstrate that they read the instructions carefully. Twenty-three

participants failed to read the instructions and answered the question. These participants were excluded from the following analyses.

So as to confirm the proposed relationship between AI-discrepancy beliefs and prescriptive moral violations, and between AO-discrepancy beliefs and proscriptive moral violations, like Petrocelli and Smith (2005), the session began by explaining to participants the characteristics of ought and ideal beliefs. Participants were given the same brief statements used by Petrocelli and Smith, but modified to represent beliefs about humanity rather than the self. For ought beliefs, participants read:

“Your ought representation of humanity is the representation of humanity in which all people fulfill their duties and obligations. It’s defined by people behaving in the ways you believe people should or ought to behave. It’s not necessary that people actually behave this way now, only that you believe people ought to behave this way.”

For ideal beliefs, participants read:

“Your ideal representation of humanity is the representation in which all people behave in a way you’d really like them to behave. It’s defined by the way you would ideally like people to behave. It’s not necessary that people actually behave this way now, only that you want people to behave this way.”

With each description, participants were given several examples of moral proscriptions (e.g., *lying, stealing, intentionally harming*, etc.; see Appendix F) and moral prescription/AI-discrepancy (e.g., *being caring/compassionate, considerate, honest, hard working*, etc.; see Appendix G) used by Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009). Participants then rated the extent to which they believed humanity “should not” participate in each proscriptive behavior and the extent to which they believe participate “should” participate

in each prescriptive behavior on a 1-7 scale.

The assumption of the measure was that if participants believed that proscriptive moral violations were behaviors that humanity “should not” do and prescriptive moral violations were behaviors humanity “should” do, then if humanity behavior is seen in violation of those beliefs, then humanity is in a discrepant state between the actual and ought and/or actual and ideal. It was reasoned, then, that if one commits a prescriptive violation, his or her actual self is discrepant from his or her ideal self. If one commits a proscriptive moral violation, then his or her actual self is discrepant from his or her ought self. Thus, responses to the “should not” behaviors were averaged to form a composite score representing ought beliefs ($M = 4.34$, $SD = .48$), while responses to the “should” behaviors were averaged to form a composite score representing ideal beliefs ($M = 4.37$, $SD = .46$). As mean should/should not beliefs were well above the midpoint of the scale, the pattern of means suggests that participants strongly believed behaviors associated with moral proscriptions (e.g., lying, cheating, stealing, etc.) should be avoided while behaviors associated with moral prescriptions (e.g., being compassionate, caring, being kind, etc.) should be enacted.

Next, participants’ discrepancy beliefs were measured for each ought and ideal behavior. Participants rated the extent to which they believe people in general fail to meet their moral obligations (AO-discrepancies) or fail to enact highly moral behavior (AI-discrepancies). For example, in response to *dishonest behavior*, participants responded to a 1-7 scale anchored with “*People completely meet the obligation to avoid dishonest behavior*” and “*People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid dishonest behavior.*” In response to *compassionate behavior*, participants respond to a 1-7 scale

anchored with “*People always act compassionately*” and “*People often fail to act compassionately.*” See Appendix H. The 13 actual/ought discrepancy-belief items were averaged to create a score representing AO-discrepancy beliefs ($M = 4.60$, $SD = 1.06$, $\alpha = .93$). Similarly, the 12 actual/ideal discrepancy belief items were averaged to create a score representing AI-discrepancy beliefs ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.08$, $\alpha = .93$). Mean responses indicated that, on average, participants believe humanity often fails to meet moral obligations and often fails to activate ideal, moral behaviors.

Next, participants rated the extent to which they agreed with some of potential causes of the different discrepancies on 1-7 scales with appropriate anchors (see Appendix H). They rated whether human nature was to blame for AO-discrepancies ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.97$, $\alpha = .97$) and AI-discrepancies ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 1.92$, $\alpha = .93$); whether people have control over their AO-discrepancies ($M = 6.01$, $SD = .78$, $\alpha = .93$) and AI-discrepancies ($M = 5.95$, $SD = .75$, $\alpha = .92$); whether people choose to make AO-discrepancies ($M = 6.02$, $SD = .78$, $\alpha = .93$) or AI-discrepancies ($M = 6.02$, $SD = .78$, $\alpha = .95$); or whether external factors are the cause of AO-discrepancies ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 1.26$, $\alpha = .93$) and AI-discrepancies ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 1.23$, $\alpha = .94$).

These responses were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis with ML extraction and promax rotation. The scree plot (see Figure 5) suggested that a three-factor solution with eigenvalues greater than one (3.45, 1.75, and 1.69) explained 99.97% of the variance in the data. Factor 1 included choice and control items for both AO and AI-discrepancies (factor loadings were .911 and higher). Factor 2 included external items for both AO and AI-discrepancies (.912, .916). Factor 3 included human nature items for both AO and AI-discrepancies (.887, .896). Thus, items loading on each factor were

combined to create composite scores reflecting the belief that (1) people have Control/Choice over their discrepant behavior (Factor 1; $M = 6.00$, $SD = .73$), (2) Human Nature is a cause of discrepant behavior (Factor 2; $M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.28$), and that (3) External forces cause discrepant behavior (Factor 3; $M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.21$), respectively. It is important to note that only one causal attribution term was listed in the previously proposed model equations. Previously, attributions of human nature and controllability were thought to be opposite ends of the same type of attribution; that was not the case here. While questions pertaining to human nature and questions pertaining to control/choice were negatively correlated ($r = -.18$, $p = .003$), the correlation was too weak to warrant collapsing them into one term. Thus, model Equations 1, 2, and 3 were modified to include both attributions of human nature (A_{HN}) and attribution of control/choice (A_{CC}):⁴

$$ER1 = B_{10} + B_{11}(D) + B_{13}(IWAH) + B_{14}(IT) + B_{15}(A_{HN}) + B_{16}(A_{CC}) + B_{17}(D*IWAH) + B_{18}(D*IT) + B_{40}(ER2) + \epsilon_1 \quad (1_m)$$

$$A_{HN} A_{CC} = B_{20} + B_{21}(IWAH) + B_{23}(IT) + \epsilon_2 \quad (2_m)$$

$$ER1 = B_{30} + B_{31}(D) + B_{32}(IWAH) + B_{33}(IT) + B_{34}(A_{HN}) + B_{35}(A_{CC}) + B_{36}(D*IWAH) + B_{37}(D*IT) + B_{38}(D*A_{CC}) + B_{39}(D*A_{HN}) + B_{40}(ER2) + \epsilon_3 \quad (3_m)$$

Next, participants rated their feeling of disappointment in humanity ($M = 3.21$, $SD = .82$, $\alpha = .93$) and contempt for humanity ($M = 2.5$, $SD = .79$, $\alpha = .83$; four-item measure) using the same measures described in the pilot study.⁵ While disappointment and contempt items consistently loaded on unique factors, disappointment and contempt

remain significantly correlated ($r = .69, p < .001$). Therefore, their shared negativity was controlled for in subsequent analyses.

Next, the remaining hypothesized moderators were measured. Identification with all of humanity was measured using the Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I). The IWAH is purported to provide a relatively reliable gauge of the extent to which people resonate with their community ($M = 2.89, SD = .81, \alpha = .91$), country (America; $M = 3.08, SD = .73, \alpha = .88$), and humanity ($M = 3.83, SD = .83, \alpha = .91$). The IWAH consists of 9 items for each group, including “*How often do you use the word ‘we’ to refer to people in your community, Americans, people all around the world?*” and “*How close do you feel to people in your community, Americans, people all around the world?*” Per the suggestion of McFarland and colleagues, the standardized residual of identification with humanity (IWAHr) regressed on community identity and American identity was used as the measure of human identity, so as to control for the effects of community and American identities.

Implicit Theory (IT) was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of Personality Scale (e.g., *Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much they can really do to change that*), an 8-item measure developed by Levy and Dweck (unpublished measure; see Appendix J) and used by Gill and Andreychik (in press) who found it had good internal consistency ($\alpha = .93$). After appropriate reverse coding, the measure is structured such that high scores indicate an *entity theory*, while low scores indicate an *incremental theory*. The measure had good reliability ($M = 3.47, SD = 1.41, \alpha = .95$).

Finally, because it was expected that disappointment and contempt would be related to differences in social behavior, specific questions about participants' social lives were included. Specifically, participants were asked about their approach (helping others, active socializing) and avoidance behaviors (not seeking socialization, ignoring requests for socialization, avoiding opportunities to help, etc.) (See Appendix K). After appropriate reverse coding, the measure had acceptable reliability ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.13$, $\alpha = .75$). On average, participants were quite social.

Results

Relationships among variables. Initial data analysis began by examining the simple relationships among the variables of interest. As seen in Table 2, contempt and disappointment and AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs were highly correlated; therefore, they were controlled for in subsequent analyses. Also of note, age turned out to be an important correlate of many of the constructs of interest. Indeed, older adults expressed less contempt for humanity ($r = -.20$, $p = .001$), they were less likely to be entity-theorists ($r = -.13$, $p = .04$), less likely to attribute moral discrepancies to human nature ($r = -.20$, $p = .0009$), and somewhat less likely to believe that people typically fail to meet moral standards ($r = -.11$, $p = .07$). Because age was significantly related to feelings of contempt and contempt-relevant constructs, it was included as a covariate.

Contrary to predictions, both feelings of disappointment in humanity and feelings of contempt for humanity were associated with social avoidance. It could be that disappointment only leads to positive social behavior among strong-identifiers, those who might be motivated to recoup humanity's moral credit. To test this, IWAHr and the interactions between IWAHr and the two emotions were added to model Equation 4:

$$BR = B_{40} + B_{41}(ER1) + B_{42}(ER2) + B_{43}(IWAH) + B_{44}(ER1*IWAH) + B_{42}(ER2*ID_H) + \varepsilon_4 \quad (4_m)$$

Finally, the relationship among the proposed moderating variables (i.e., IWAHr, implicit theory, causal attributions) was examined. Several of these variables were correlated, violating Muller et al.'s suggestion that predictor variables should not be correlated with moderating variables. The strength of these correlations was modest at best, so it was appropriate to continue with the analysis while monitoring potential multicollinearity via VIF tests.

Testing Equation 2. Causal attributions (controllability and human nature, respectively) were first regressed on standardized versions of IWAHr and implicit theory. The model of attributions of controllability was significant, accounting for 4.5% of the variance ($R^2 = .045$, $F(2, 274) = 6.48$, $p = .002$). Examination of the coefficients suggested that implicit theory alone predicted attributions of controllability ($B = -.16$, $t(274) = -3.57$, $p = .0004$). Finally, the overall model of attributions of human nature was not significant ($R^2 = .015$, $F(2, 274) = 2.19$, $p = .12$). However, further examination of the coefficients suggested that implicit theory was the lone significant predictor of attributions of human nature ($B = .16$, $t(274) = 2.08$, $p = .04$). IWAHr did not significantly predict either type of attribution ($ts < 1$, $ps = .99$). In all, the test of Equation 2 suggested that entity-theorists often explain moral discrepancies in terms of stable characteristics (i.e., a flawed nature), and less a matter of choice, which is consistent with Dweck and colleagues' work (Dweck, 2008; Dweck et al., 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck & Molden, 2008). These results partially support the prediction that entity-theorists are likely to perceive that moral discrepancies result from uncontrollable/stable

characteristics. Unfortunately, these results do not support the predicted relationship between attributions and identification.⁶

Testing the two models.^{7, 8}

Disappointment. See Figure 6. Testing began by examining feelings of disappointment in humanity using hierarchical regression analysis with standardized versions of the variables of interest: AI-discrepancy beliefs, IWAHr, implicit theory, attributions of human nature, and attributions of controllability while controlling for feelings of contempt and AO-discrepancy beliefs. Step 0 involved regressing disappointment on AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs, controlling for contempt. The analysis was highly significant, predicting 51% of the variance in disappointment ($R^2 = .51$, $F(3, 271) = 93.76$, $p < .0001$). However, contempt accounted for the “lion’s share” of the variance ($B = .54$, $t(271) = 14.97$, $p < .0001$). After contempt, only AO-discrepancy beliefs predicted changes in disappointment ($B = .10$, $t(271) = 2.00$, $p = .054$). Contrary to predictions, AI-discrepancy beliefs failed to predict feelings of disappointment ($B = .07$, $t(274) = 1.29$, $p = .20$). Step 1 involved regressing disappointment on all the main effects. This model was significant, predicting 51% of the variance in disappointment ($R^2 = .51$; $F(7, 267) = 40.02$, $p < .0001$). Examination of the regression coefficients revealed that AI-discrepancy beliefs did not predict feelings of disappointment ($B = .07$, $t(267) = 1.21$, $p = .23$). Similarly, implicit theory ($B = -.04$, $t(267) < -1.19$, $p = .23$), IWAHr ($B = -.02$, $t(267) < -1$, $p = .54$), and attributions of human nature ($B = .04$, $t(267) = 1.16$, $p = .25$) and controllability ($B = .01$, $t(267) < 1$, $p = .76$) failed to significantly predict feelings of disappointment in humanity. However, AO-discrepancy beliefs were a marginal predictor of disappointment ($B = .1$, $t(267) = 1.18$, $p = .07$). Note:

VIF was less than 2 for all predictors; thus, it was not likely that multicollinearity was contributing to the poor results.

Step 2 involved testing the remainder of Equation 1 noted above, which meant adding the A-I discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory interactions to the regression equation. Adding these two-way interactions marginally contributed to the model ($\Delta R^2 = .01$, $\Delta F(2, 265) = 2.75$, $p = .08$), predicting 52% of the variance in disappointment ($R^2 = .52$, $F(9, 265) = 31.87$, $p < .001$).

Examination of the regression coefficients revealed that the AI-discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr was significant ($B = .09$, $t(265) = 2.04$, $p = .04$; see Figure 7), while the AI-discrepancy beliefs by Implicit Theory was not ($B = .03$, $t(265) = .76$, $p = .45$).

The effects of AI-discrepancy beliefs were then examined at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of IWAHr, via simple slope analysis. When IWAHr was low, AI-discrepancy beliefs were a poor predictor of disappointment in humanity ($B = -.02$, $t(265) < 1$, $p = .8$). However, when IWAHr was high, AI-discrepancy beliefs were a significant predictor of disappointment in humanity ($B = .17$, $t(265) = 2.22$, $p = .03$). Thus, as predicted, people who feel a strong connection to all of humanity also feel a strong sense of disappointment when they believe humanity often fails to act prosocially.

Finally, Equation 3 was tested by adding the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of human nature and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attribution of controllability interactions. If these interactions were significant, it would suggest that the effect of AI-discrepancy beliefs on disappointment was moderated by causal attributions. Further, if causal attributions mediated the moderating effects of both IWAHr and implicit theory (had both interactions been significant), then the AI-discrepancy beliefs

by IWAHr and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory interactions should be significantly reduced after adding the AI-discrepancy by attributions interactions.

Adding the attribution interactions marginally contributed to the model ($\Delta R^2 = .01$, $\Delta F(2, 263) = 2.79$, $p = .06$), predicting 53% of the variance in disappointment in humanity ($R^2 = .53$, $F(11, 263) = 27.31$, $p < .001$). Examination of the regression coefficients revealed that the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of controllability interaction was significant ($B = -.13$, $t(263) = -2.67$, $p = .008$; see Figure 8); however, the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of human nature was not ($B = -.04$, $t(263) = -1.05$, $p = .3$).

Again, using simple slope analysis, the effects of AI-discrepancy beliefs were examined at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of attributions of controllability. Contrary to predictions, when attributions of controllability were low, AI-discrepancy beliefs significantly predicted feelings of disappointment in humanity ($B = .23$, $t(263) = 2.77$, $p = .006$) but failed to do so when attributions of controllability were high ($B = -.02$, $t(263) = -.31$, $p = .76$). These findings are difficult to interpret, but an attempt to do so will be presented in the discussion section.

Finally, if causal attributions mediate the moderating effects of identification with humanity and implicit theory, then adding the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions interactions should result in the AI-discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr interaction and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by IT interaction to drop in significance. This, however, was not the case. The AI-discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr interaction became slightly more significant, while the AI-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory interaction was statistically

unaffected. These results, thus, failed to support the predicted quasi-mediating relationship with regards to feelings of disappointment.

Contempt. See Figure 9. Testing the model of contempt for humanity began in the same way as the model of disappointment, by using hierarchical regression with standardized versions of the variables of interest: A-O discrepancy beliefs, IWAHr, implicit theory, attributions of human nature, and attributions of lack of effort, while controlling for feelings of disappointment and AI-discrepancy beliefs. Step 0 involved regressing contempt on AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs, controlling for disappointment and age. The analysis was significant, predicting 50% of the variance in contempt ($R^2 = .50$, $F(4, 270) = 68.10$, $p < .0001$). However, like contempt, disappointment accounted for the “lion’s share” of the variance ($B = .54$, $t(270) = 14.94$, $p < .0001$). Age was also a significant predictor of contempt ($B = -.11$, $t(270) = -3.13$, $p = .002$).⁹ Contrary to predictions, AO-discrepancy beliefs failed to predict feelings of contempt ($t(270) < 1$, $p = .78$). Step 1 involved regressing contempt on only the main effects. This model was significant, predicting 51% of the variance in contempt ($R^2 = .51$; $F(8, 266) = 34.97$, $p < .0001$). Examination of the regression coefficients revealed that, beyond disappointment and age, only implicit theory marginally predicted contempt ($B = .07$, $t(266) = 1.68$, $p = .09$). AO-discrepancy beliefs ($B = .01$, $t(267) < .1$, $p = .96$), AI-discrepancy beliefs ($B = -.01$, $t(267) < .1$, $p = .8$), IWAHr ($B = .06$, $t(267) = 1.41$, $p = .16$), attributions of human nature ($B = .07$, $t(267) = 1.57$, $p = .11$) and controllability ($B = .04$, $t(267) = 1.41$, $p = .16$), respectively, failed to significantly predict feelings of contempt for humanity. Note: VIF was less than 2 for all predictors, thus multicollinearity might not have had a contributing factor.

The second step in testing the model of contempt involved adding the two-way interaction noted in Equation 1 above. Adding these two-way interactions did not significantly contribute to the model ($\Delta R^2 = .0$). Indeed, neither the AO-discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr nor the AO-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory was significant ($B = -.03, t(264) < 1, p = .56; B = -.06, t(264) = 1.35, p = .14$).

The final step in testing the model of contempt consisted of including the AO-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of human nature and AO-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of controllability interactions (Equation 3). If these interactions were significant, it would suggest that the effect of AO-discrepancies on contempt is moderated by causal attributions. Furthermore, if causal attributions mediate the proposed moderating effects of both IWAHr and implicit theory, then the latter should be significantly reduced. Unfortunately, the additional attribution interactions had no effect on the model ($Bs < .04, ts(262) < 1, ps > .60$); nor did their inclusion effect the significance of the IWAHr and IT interactions. In all, the results do not favor the proposed model. The results failed to support the prediction that causal attributions of human nature and/or controllability moderate the effects of AO-discrepancy beliefs on contempt for humanity. Finally, the results failed to support the predicted mediating effect of causal attributions.

Social avoidance and prosocial behavior. It was proposed that feelings of disappointment in humanity and feelings of contempt for humanity should have different associated behavioral tendencies. Specifically, it was proposed that disappointment in humanity should be associated with prosocial behavior, while contempt for humanity should be associated with social avoidance. However, given that both emotions turned

out to be associated with social avoidance, it was further hypothesized that identification with humanity might moderate these associations. That is, strong-identifiers might be motivated to behave prosocially when they feel disappointment in humanity, as a form of recuperative response. In contrast, weak-identifiers might be especially likely to avoid social behavior when they experience feelings of contempt. Thus, Social Behavior was regressed on disappointment, contempt, IWAHr, and the appropriate two-way interactions. While the model significantly predicted 11.3% of the variance in Social Behavior ($R^2 = .113$, $F(5, 271) = 6.94$, $p < .0001$), contrary to predictions, in this model, contempt failed to uniquely predict Social Behavior ($B = -.09$, $t(271) = -.95$, $p = .32$), while feelings of disappointment did predict a decrease in Social Behavior ($B = -.27$, $t(271) = -2.95$, $p = .003$). In contrast, IWAHr predicted an increase in Social Behavior ($B = .14$, $t(271) = 2.10$, $p = .04$). The IWAHr by disappointment was not significant ($B = -.14$, $t(271) = -1.52$, $p = .13$), but the IWAHr by contempt was marginal $B = .17$, $t(271) = 1.74$, $p = .08$). For exploratory purposes, the nature of this interaction was examined by looking at the effects of contempt at high (+1SD) and low (-1SD) levels of IWAHr via simple slope analysis. The test revealed that among weak-identifiers, contempt significantly predicted a decrease in prosocial behavior ($B = -.25$, $t(271) = -1.97$, $p < .05$). However, contempt was no longer significant among strong-identifiers ($B = .08$, $t(271) < 1$, $p = .6$). See Figures 10.

One additional alternative is that disappointment leads to a recuperative response, but only among participants who perceive discrepancies as controllable. To test this alternative, Social Behavior was regressed on attributions of controllability, disappointment, and their interaction. The analysis suggested that participants who

believe humanity has control over their discrepant behavior were also more socially engaged ($B = .13, t(273) = -2.00, p = .05$), and this effect was moderated by disappointment ($B = -.11, t(273) = -2.02, p = .04$). Follow-up analysis revealed that the effect of controllability on social behavior was only significant when disappointment was low ($B = .23, t(273) = 3.05, p = .003$), contradicting the alternative hypothesis. It seems that the negative effects of disappointment outweigh the positive effect of attributions of controllability on social engagement. See Figure 11.

Discussion

A tale of two models. The purpose of Study 1 was to provide an initial test of the proposed models of feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity and their associated patterns of social behavior.

Disappointment. A quasi-mediated moderation model of disappointment in humanity was proposed. It was hypothesized that AI-discrepancy beliefs would be positively associated with feelings of disappointment in humanity. It was further hypothesized that identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) and implicit theory (IT), respectively, would moderate the nature of this association. Finally, causal explanations that point to controllable causes were hypothesized to mediate the moderating effect of IWAHr and IT. In sum, the proposed model would have predicted that for a strong-identifier or incremental theorist, AI-discrepancy beliefs would be more strongly associated with a general feeling of disappointment, because such traits would lead one to explain these moral discrepancies as due to controllable factors. Finally, the model would have predicted that these general feelings of disappointment would lead one to seek

chances to recoup moral credit for humanity, manifested as a tendency towards social approach and prosocial behavior.

While nearly all of the proposed predictions tested in the model were unsupported by the data, AI-discrepancy beliefs were positively associated with feelings of disappointment among strong-identifiers. This finding is consistent with findings of Petrocelli and Smith (2005, reviewed above). Here, however, we expand on their findings by demonstrating that human identity works in very similar ways as other forms of social identity, including one's national identity.

It was also revealed that the effects of AI-discrepancy beliefs on feelings of disappointment were moderated by attributions of controllability, albeit not in the predicted direction. Indeed, AI-discrepancy beliefs led to feelings of disappointment when AI-discrepancies were believed to be uncontrollable. This is difficult to interpret, especially when attributions of human nature had no effect. It could mean that if one believes that people have little control over being highly compassionate towards each other, and therefore lack the potential to become more compassionate towards each other, he or she might feel disappointment in humanity because humanity is unable to benefit from future prosocial behavior. On the other hand, it could be that participants interpreted the failure to be prosocial as the inability of prosocial behavior to create positive outcomes. In other words, people could be misinterpreting the lack of prosocial behavior as an inability to create positive change in the world, much like when people refuse to donate to charity because they do not believe their donation will go to those who really need it. Thus, their failure is not due to controllable causes, but due to the belief that their

efforts are futile. Perhaps, then, when causal explanations are made explicit (Study 2) rather than rated, the predicted relationship might manifest.

Contempt. A similar quasi-mediated moderation model was proposed for feelings of contempt for humanity. It was hypothesized that AO-discrepancy beliefs would be positively associated with feelings of contempt for humanity. It was further hypothesized that one's identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) and one's implicit theory (IT), respectively, would moderate the nature of this association. Finally, causal explanations that point to human nature as the source of humanity's AO-discrepancies would mediate the moderating effects of IWAHr and IT. In sum, this model predicted that among weak-identifiers and/or entity-theorists, AO-discrepancies would be more strongly associated with feelings of contempt, because such traits would lead one to explain these moral discrepancies as a function of human nature. Finally, this model predicted that feelings of contempt would lead one to avoid positive social engagement.

Did the results of Study 1 support the proposed models of contempt for humanity? Unfortunately, they did not. None of the predictions tested in the model were supported by the data. There could be several explanations for the lack of support, which will be discussed below in the limitations section.

Social avoidance and prosocial behavior. It was originally predicted that contempt and disappointment would have different effects on prosocial behavior. Disappointment was thought to motivate prosocial behavior, as a recuperative response, while contempt was thought to lead to social avoidance. However, in this study, it was disappointment that was directly associated with social avoidance; contempt was not. Indeed, the effect of contempt on social avoidance was moderated by identification with

all of humanity. Strikingly, contempt had no effect among strong-identifiers, but it did predict social avoidance among weak-identifiers. This finding is rather straightforward as contempt is often associated with avoidance of those for whom one feels contempt (Gottman, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000; Roseman et al., 1996). Finally, the association between contempt and a tendency towards social avoidance was influenced by the strength with which one identifies with humanity.

As a revision to the original model, it was proposed that perhaps disappointment would predict prosocial behavior, but only among strong-identifiers. The results did not support this revision. One explanation could be that participants' persistent beliefs, feelings, and behavioral tendencies were being measured. Having a persistent feeling of disappointment in humanity might "eat away" at one's motivation to recoup humanity's moral credit, leading to social avoidance. This could be similar to a sports fan whose team always loses. The persistent belief that one's team is a "losing" team, for example, might be associated with the persistent, albeit mild, feeling of disappointment in his or her team. The persistent feeling might in turn lead him or her to avoid engaging in social activity centered on the team (i.e., watching games with other people).

Perhaps feelings of disappointment lead to prosocial behavior among strong-identifiers when feelings of disappointment are evoked as a response to new, threatening information. Consider the sports fan. If having a long-standing belief that his team performs well and is faced with evidence to the contrary (i.e., the Oregon Ducks lose to the Arizona Wildcats), he might be more motivated to explain away the poor performance (*"There was a solar flare. They didn't put the effort in this time. They'll do better next time!"*). Having done so—after a few days moping—he can once again look

forward to the next game, ready to fully support his team anyway he can, anywhere he can, with whomever he can. Thus, in the case of beliefs about humanity, prosocial behavior might only be a recuperative response among strong-identifiers when the opportunity is presented relatively soon after an unexpected disappointing event or soon after unexpected disappointing information is presented. This possibility will be addressed in Studies 2 through 4.

One final alternative hypothesis was tested: disappointment would motivate a recuperative response among participants who believe humanity's discrepant behavior is highly controllable, and therefore could change. While such beliefs did predict social engagement, feelings of disappointment seemed to interrupt the relationship. Indeed, these participants were less engaged as a function of feelings of disappointment, which, again, contradicts the alternative hypothesis.

Enduring beliefs might also explain these findings. Participants who believe humanity has a high degree of control over its discrepant behavior and reported strong feelings of disappointment might do so because they also believe that humanity has a long history of being morally discrepant when, in Weiner's language, they "could do otherwise," when humanity could be less discrepant. These participants might be less engaged, not because they believe humanity cannot change its behavior, but because they believe humanity apparently refuses to change its behavior. Again, this might be different when participants are reacting to new information rather than reporting enduring beliefs. This possibility will also be addressed in Studies 2 through 4.

Beyond the two models. While the data failed to support many predictions, there was evidence of other potentially interesting relationships. First, older adults seem to

express less contempt for humanity, they are less likely to be entity-theorists, and are less likely to attribute humanity's moral failings to human nature. These findings could suggest that as people grow older and have more experiences, good and bad, they gain an appreciation for the human condition. Perhaps, over time, as folks survive and thrive through trials and tribulations, they gain an appreciation for humanity's ability to adapt. On the other hand, perhaps these relationships do not reflect change over time at all, but some kind of cohort effect. Perhaps older generations simply believe that people have more control over their outcomes, express less contempt for others who fail morally, and less are likely to blame human nature. However it might be, the relationship between age and these phenomena are interesting and potentially worthy of study, but they are beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, as age seems to be an important variable, it will be included as a covariate in subsequent analyses where appropriate.

The general belief that moral discrepancies are caused by human nature was positively associated with both feelings of disappointment and contempt. These findings contribute to the literature on attribution theory, and in particular to the findings of Weiner and Kukla (1970). While Weiner and Kukla found that when negative behavior was attributed to controllable/stable causes (a lack of effort), negative emotional responses like blame and anger increased. This work demonstrates that when negative behavior is attributed to uncontrollable/stable causes, other negative emotions (i.e., disappointment and contempt) might be activated or even increased.

Although unsupported by the literature on disappointment, these findings are consistent with the literatures on both contempt (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996) and implicit personality theory (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu,

Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck & Molden, 2008). Contempt is often associated with uncontrollable/stable causes, which is often one's flawed nature (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996)—entity-theorists by definition make these same causal attributions (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck & Molden, 2008).

It comes as no surprise, then, that IT was directly associated with contempt and directly associated with attributing the cause of moral discrepancies to human nature (averaged across both discrepancy type). Indeed, entity-theorists have been associated with having excessively negative emotional responses to moral violations (Dweck & Molden, 2008). When entity-theorists bring to mind negative aspects of humanity, like moral discrepancies, they might automatically associate those deficiencies to stable characteristics of humanity, its nature. But they might also have an equally automatic tendency towards expressing negative emotions. This could explain why the IT by human nature attributions interaction had no effect: IT was doing it all—IT influenced emotions and explanations.

But why might attributions of human nature be associated with feelings of disappointment? The literature on disappointment does not address this relationship *per se*. Upon reflection, this finding is relatively uninteresting in and of itself. As disappointment is associated with the lack of some positive expectation or outcomes, when one has the enduring belief that some lack of positive expectation or outcome was/is due to human nature, one might be even more disappointed because the desired outcomes or expectations are even less likely to occur in the future, unless one believes that humanity's nature can change or be overcome. Given the strong relationship between

disappointment and contempt, and the fact that both disappointment and contempt were associated with the belief that a flawed human nature is the cause of moral discrepancies, the relationship might only demonstrate that such beliefs predict feeling a general negativity towards humanity.

Limitations. Why did the data fail to support the predicted quasi-mediated moderation models of disappointment in and contempt for humanity? There could be several reasons. First, the “shared negativity” between contempt and disappointment might have made it difficult to detect a strong signal from individual predictors. Unfortunately, there is little one can do to overcome this difficulty beyond continuing to control for the effects of each emotion. One might be able to “boost the signal” of each emotion by presenting participants with discrepant information in an experimental design.

AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs were also highly correlated, making it difficult to isolate their unique emotional consequences. However, this, too, might be overcome by using an experimental design. The subsequent studies adopt such a design.

Correlations between proposed predictors and moderators might have seriously impacted this study. Indeed, many of the predictions were based on the hypotheses that discrepancy beliefs were independent of IWAH, attributions, and IT. This was not exactly the case; these constructs appeared to covary. If two variables vary together, neither one can moderate the other. Of course, this covariance might have been due to the fact that emotions were being measured in the context of enduring discrepancy beliefs, rather than responses to new discrepancy information. The moderating effects of IWAH, attributions, and IT might only be evident when responding to new discrepancy

information. This possibility will be explored in Studies 2 through 4 when discrepancies are manipulated rather than measured.

While there was minimal support for a few of the proposed model components, many components were not supported by the data. Of course, the study design might have been a disadvantage; including similar beliefs and similar emotions in the model might have introduced a lot of statistical noise. Using an experimental design will, hopefully, reduce some of that noise and help isolate the individual effects. Studies 2 through 4 adopted experimental designs.

Study 2: Experimentally Manipulated Moral Discrepancies and Causal Attributions

The primary purpose of Study 2 was to examine the effects of discrepancy beliefs and causal attributions on disappointment and contempt when both are experimentally manipulated. In addition, Study 2 provided another opportunity to test the proposed moderating effects of identification with humanity (IWAHr) and implicit theory (IT). Thus,

Finally, an additional analysis using emotional responses to predict prosocial behavior was conducted. However, in light of the findings of Study 1 that suggested disappointment might lead to social avoidance rather than prosocial behavior, the original hypothesis was modified. Specifically, the prosocial effects of disappointment might be evident only among strong-identifiers, because strong-identifiers should have a vested interest in recouping moral credit on behalf of humanity. Finally, the possibility that controllability perception might moderate the extent to which disappointment relate to prosocial responding was also tested.

Method

Participants. Three hundred participants were recruited on-line, via the Mechanical Turk interface created by Amazon, and paid \$.50 for their participation. Twenty-four participants were excluded from all subsequent analyses after failing the attention check question (described below), leaving 276 participants (151 females). All participants were American citizens over 18 years of age ($M = 36.15$, $SD = 12.96$; Min = 18, Max = 72; range = 54), the majority of whom were well educated (i.e., 58% held a bachelor's degree or higher) and Caucasian (80.36%). All participants provided informed consent prior to their participation.

Procedure. Participants learned that they were taking part in a study investigating “social judgments and feelings” in which they would read about some behaviors and report their impressions and feelings regarding the reading material. The information participants read was adapted from materials used by Andreychik (2009) to manipulate social explanatory styles. Mechanical Turk randomly assigned participants to one of three discrepancy conditions and one of three explanations conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to read an excerpt from an article purporting to document theories about “patterns of human behavior,” based on several scholarly sources. In that passage, participants learned that humanity, in general, fails to meet moral standards (AO-discrepancies condition), fails to live up to moral ideals (AI-discrepancies condition), or general demographic information about humanity (Discrepancies-Control condition). Causal information was also manipulated within each passage. Participants learned that the pattern of behavior was either attributed to human nature (Human Nature condition) or due to explicitly controllable causes (Controllability condition); participants in the

control condition were given no such causal information (Control/neutral condition).

Note that participants in the Discrepancies Control condition were given similar causal information (or no causal information) as those in the AI- and AO-discrepancies conditions, but that information was presented as about behavior in general (see Appendix L). See Table 3 for cell sizes.

After reading their assigned passage, participants provided their emotional responses via the measures of disappointment and contempt that were previously described, but in the context of how they felt “right now” (see Appendices M & N). Presentation of the contempt and disappointment items was counterbalanced. On average, participants reported relatively low levels of both disappointment ($M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.12$, $\alpha = .85$) and contempt ($M = 2.05$, $SD = .88$, $\alpha = .88$). Again, disappointment and contempt were strongly associated ($r = .68$, $p < .0001$).

Next, implicit personality theory (or IT) was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of Personality Scale (ITSPS). After appropriate reverse coding, the measure is structured such that high scores indicate an *entity theory*, while low scores indicate an *incremental theory*. The measure had good reliability ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.36$, $\alpha = .95$), and indicated that, on average, participants were entity leaning.

Participants then completed the Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I) as the relevant measure of social identity. The IWAH provides a relatively reliable gauge of the extent to which people resonate with their community ($M = 2.92$, $SD = .8$, $\alpha = .90$), country (America; $M = 3.00$, $SD = .66$, $\alpha = .85$), and humanity ($M = 2.84$, $SD = .75$, $\alpha = .87$). Standardized residual

scores (IWAHr) were used to isolate human identity from community and American identities.

As a final portion of Study 2, participants were given the opportunity to act prosocially. Prior to debriefing, participants were asked if they were willing to contribute to a collection of written responses to the information they read about. They were told that the collection of responses would be sent to the editor of the periodical in which the target article had been published. They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the information and to identify “possible solutions” to the issues put forth in the article. Participants were free to write at length or not to write at all. Responses were coded for prosociality in three ways: (1) *word-count*, (2) providing a potential *solution* to the problems they read about (binary coding used: providing a solution or not), and, finally, (3) writing “*in defense*” of humanity (coded on a 1 to 5 scale). For example, if a participant agreed with the article and provided no solution (i.g., “*I agree that, on average, the findings of that study are accurate. Most people won't engage in altruistic behavior if a more self-serving option is available*”) their “in defense” response was coded as a 1 (i.e., they did not write in defense of humanity).

If a participant mostly agreed with the article and provided a single vague solution, their response was coded as a 2. For example, statements like “*If given the chance, people will engage in immoral behaviors, especially if they know they won't get caught. To fix this is a hard problem. People often fall into negative patterns of society rather than positive [sic] ones*” were coded as a 2.

If a participant responded with only vague solutions, but did not agree nor disagree with the article, their response was coded as a 3. For example, “*The article had*

a premise that humanity is depraved. However, no consideration is included about the millions of acts of charity, assistance and kindness that occur every day. Is it human nature? Is it our economic construct? There are many variables to consider. The best we could do is raise our children as positive as possible” was coded as 3.

If participants somewhat agreed with the content of the article, but provided a concrete solution, their response was coded as a 4. For example, *“Although I think human nature is inherently flawed in character, I feel that much of the violent crime in the world is exacerbated by the conditions people live in; if we can raise the quality of life people experience, some of this ‘innate’ immoral behavior will go away.”*

If a participant disagreed with article and provided a rebuttal, the response was coded as a 5. For example, *“The article makes it seems [sic] that humans are inherently immoral or bad, but I disagree with this. There are many reasons for someone to not be generous or donate, and not all of those reasons are immoral ones.”*

Two independent raters, blind to conditions and hypothesis, scored the responses using the scale described above. The proposed scale had acceptable inter-rater reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha = .73; Freelon, 2013).

Results

Primary analysis: Attributions and discrepancies. The primary focus of Study 2 was to examine the interaction effects of experimentally manipulated discrepancy information and experimentally manipulated causal attributions on feelings of contempt for and disappointment in humanity. These interactions were tested in a 3(Discrepancies: AI, AO, Control) X 3(Causal Attribution: human nature, controllability, Control/neutral) factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with emotional responses (disappointment in

and contempt for humanity) as the primary dependent variables.¹¹ Each emotion was included as a covariate when the influence of the other was being examined; age was included as an additional covariate.

The test revealed a significant main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on both contempt ($F(2, 265) = 4.30, p = .02$) and disappointment ($F(2, 265) = 4.88, p = .008$). See Table 3 and Figure 12. Planned contrasts revealed that, as predicted, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition reported greater feelings of contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies condition ($t(265) = 2.90, p = .004$) and the control condition ($t(265) = 2.00, p = .05$), which were not significantly different from each other ($t(265) = 1.01, p = .32$). These findings suggest that contempt was a unique response to AO-discrepancies.

Planned contrasts revealed that with respect to disappointment, participants in the AI-discrepancies and AO-discrepancies conditions were statistically indistinguishable ($t(265) = 1.03, p = .30$). However, while participants in the AO-discrepancies condition were marginally more disappointed in humanity than participants in the control condition, $t(265) = 1.87, p = .06$, participants in the AI-discrepancies were significantly more disappointed in humanity than participants in the control condition ($t(265) = 3.08, p = .002$).

Unfortunately, contrary to predictions, these effects were not moderated by causal attributions. Indeed, the test failed to support the predicted two-way interaction between the discrepancies and attributions manipulations ($p = .92$). See Figures 13 and 14.

IWAHr. Next, the extent to which identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) moderated the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt and disappointment,

controlling for the effects of each emotion and age was examined using ANCOVA with IWAHr dummy coded to create two groups, one associated with strong-identifiers ($\geq 1SD$) and one associated with weak-identifiers (See Table 4). The analysis revealed that IWAHr moderated the effect of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt (see Table 4). Indeed, the effect of the discrepancies manipulation was significant among strong-identifiers ($F(2, 66) = 9.42, p = .0003$), but not among weak-identifiers ($F(2, 66) = 2.38, p = .10$). Contrary to predictions, Tukey's post hoc test revealed that strong-identifiers in the AO-discrepancies condition ($M = 2.59, SD = .17$) expressed more contempt for humanity than strong-identifiers in both the control condition ($M = 1.93, SD = .17$) ($p = .007$) and the AI-discrepancies condition ($M = 1.64, SD = .14$) ($p < .001$), while weak-identifiers expressed similarly levels across all three conditions ($ps = .58, .53, .54$). See Figure 15.

There was also a significant effect of IWAHr within the AO-discrepancies condition ($F(1, 268) = 8.66, p = .005$) and within the AI-discrepancies condition ($F(1, 268) = 5.37, p = .02$). See Figure 15. In the AO-discrepancies condition, strong-identifiers reported stronger feelings of contempt than weak-identifiers ($M = 1.91, SD = .16$) ($p = .005$). In the AI-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers ($M = 2.18, SD = .18$) reported stronger feelings of contempt than strong-identifiers ($M = 1.64, SD = .16$) ($p = .02$). The effect of IWAHr on contempt was not significant in the discrepancies control condition ($p = .59$).

The analysis revealed that the effect of discrepancies on disappointment was moderated by IWAHr ($F(2, 66) = 5.57, p = .006$). As predicted, the effect of the discrepancies manipulation was significant among strong-identifiers ($F(2, 66) = 6.28, p =$

.002), but not among weak-identifiers ($F(2, 66) = 1.25, p = .29$). Strong-identifiers in the AI-discrepancies condition ($M = 3.32, SD = .19$) expressed greater disappointment in humanity than strong-identifiers in the control condition ($M = 2.60, SD = .23$) ($p = .01$) and strong-identifiers in the AO-discrepancies condition ($M = 2.26, SD = .25$) ($p = .002$), while weak-identifiers expressed similar levels of disappointment across all three conditions ($ps = .20, .16, .73$). See Figure 16.

Also, there was a significant effect of IWAHr within the AI-discrepancy condition ($F(1, 66) = 7.67, p = .007$) and within the AO-discrepancies condition ($F(1, 66) = 3.90, p = .05$). In the AI-discrepancies condition, strong-identifiers reported stronger feelings of disappointment than weak-identifiers ($M = 2.44, SD = .25$). In the AO-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers ($M = 2.92, SD = .22$) reported stronger feelings of disappointment than strong-identifiers. See Figure 16. No other effect were significant ($ps > .60$).

Implicit Theory (IT). Next, implicit theory of personality (IT) was examined. The effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of contempt and disappointment moderated by IT, while controlling for the effects of each emotion and age, was tested. However, the effect of this interaction was not significant on contempt ($F(2, 268) = .19, p = .82$; see Figure 17), but approached significance on disappointment ($F(2, 268) = 2.38, p = .09$; Figure 18). Because the main effect was not significant, Tukey's HSD adjustment to alpha was used in the follow-up analysis. Taking a closer look at the interaction effect on feelings of disappointment revealed that the only significant difference detected was between entity-theorists (+1 SD) and incremental-theorists (-1 SD) in the control condition ($F(1, 268) = 3.11, p = .02$; see Figure 18), suggesting that incremental-theorists

generally express less disappointment in humanity than entity-theorists, until they are confronted with negative information about humanity. No other effect was significant ($p > .34$).

Prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior was measured by asking participants to provide open-ended responses to the information they read about. They were free to not respond or respond at length. They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the information they read about and to provide ideas for solutions to the problems they read about. Because participants in the neutral condition did not write in a response to any discrepant or “negative” information about humanity, their responses were excluded from the following analyses.

Prosocial behavior was operationally defined in three ways: (1) whether participants provided a solution to the problem they read about (coded as either 0 or 1; 34.32% provided solutions); (2) whether they responded in defense of humanity ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.44$), and (3); the total word-count ($M = 52.14$, $SD = 45.98$). Five outliers had word-counts that exceeded three standard deviations from the mean and were therefore excluded from the analysis, resulting in only minor changes in the descriptive data: Word-count ($M = 47.06$, $SD = 35.6$), in defense ($M = 2.40$, $SD = 1.43$; inter-rater reliability: Krippendorff’s $\alpha = .73$); 33.54% of the remaining participants provided a solution.

Solutions to the problem. Testing began by examining whether participants provided a “solution” to the problem they read about as a function of discrepancies manipulation, feelings of disappointment, contempt, IWAHr, and all two and three-way interactions in a logistic regression analysis. Following the suggestions of Field (2009), -

2LL (i.e., -2 log-likelihood) was the measure of model fit, as its distribution mimics the χ^2 distribution. The -2LL tests the difference between the intercept-only model and the model with the selected indicators. The results of the test suggested that this model fit the data well (-2LL (12) = 18.43, $p = .10$). Unfortunately, the only variable that almost approached significance was IWAHr ($B = .31$, $\chi^2(1) = 2.61$, $p = .11$), suggesting that strong-identifiers might have been more likely to provide solution to the problems they read about. No other effects were significant ($ps > .19$).

One alternative hypothesis that was explored in Study 1 was that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe humanity has control of their discrepant behavior. Here that hypothesis was tested again, but with new discrepant information, rather than enduring beliefs. Thus solution was regressed on discrepancies manipulation, attributions manipulation, and disappointment in an additional logistic regression. Again, the model was a good fit to the data (-2LL $\chi^2(11) = 14.88$, $p = .19$). The attributions manipulation was a significant predictor of providing a solution ($\chi^2(2) = 7.90$, $p = .02$). Participants in the controllability condition were far more likely to provide a solution than participants in the Control/neutral condition ($e^B = 1.73$, $\chi^2(1) = 4.87$, $p = .03$). However, this effect was not moderated by feelings of disappointment ($\chi^2(2) < 1$, $p = .69$). No other was significant ($\chi^2s < 1$, $ps > .33$).

Writing in defense of humanity. Next, “In defense” was regressed on the same combination of variables and interactions as in the analysis of “solution” in a multiple regression analysis. While the overall model provided a poor fit to the data ($R^2 = .11$; $F(15, 152) = 1.32$, $p = .20$), IWAHr significantly predicted defending humanity ($B = .51$, $t(152) = 2.66$, $p = .009$), suggesting that strong-identifiers were more defensive than

weak-identifiers. Furthermore, the effect of IWAHr was moderated by contempt ($B = .55$, $t(152) = 2.01$, $p = .05$). Follow-up simple slope analysis revealed that when contempt was low, IWAHr had no effect on defending humanity ($B = -.04$, $t(152) = -.15$, $p = .88$), but when contempt was high, IWAHr was associated with defending humanity ($B = 1.06$, $t(152) = 2.71$, $p = .007$). As we can see in Figure 19, when contempt was low, strong and weak-identifiers were similarly defensive. However, strong-identifiers were relatively unaffected by strong feelings of contempt, while weak-identifiers become far less defensive. This effect was qualified by the discrepancies manipulation ($B = -.76$, $t(152) = -2.26$, $p = .03$), which suggested that the pattern described was only evident in the AO-discrepancies condition. No other effects were significant ($ps > .16$).

The alternative hypothesis that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe humanity has control of their discrepant behavior was tested again using writing in defense of humanity as the dependent variable. “In defense” was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, the attributions manipulation, disappointment, and all two and three-way interactions in a multiple regression analysis. Unfortunately, these effects were not significant (attributions by disappointment, $F(2, 156) = 2.33$, $p = .12$; all other effects $F_s < 1.45$, $ps > .24$).

Word-count. As a final test of prosocial behavior, participants’ word-count (i.e., the number of words participants contributed to the collective response) was examined with the same combination of variables and interactions described in the previous two analyses, with one addition. Because participants’ responses were not necessarily meant as a prosocial response (by either writing in defense of humanity or by providing a potential solution), but as an opportunity to reaffirm the negative information they read

about, writing in defense of humanity was included as an additional potential moderator in the multiple regression analysis. The model predicted 18.7% of the variance in word-count ($R^2 = .187$, $F(19, 148) = 1.79$, $p = .03$). It turned out that defending humanity was the only significant predictor of word-count ($B = 13.47$, $t(148) = 2.30$, $p = .02$), suggesting that participants motivated to defend humanity used more words to do it. No other effect approached significance ($ps > .13$).

Again, the alternative hypothesis regarding the interaction of attributions and disappointment was tested here. Word-count was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, the attributions manipulation, disappointment, writing in defense, and all two-, three-, and four-way interactions in a multiple regression analysis. The main effect of the attributions manipulation was significant ($F(2, 144) = 6.15$, $p = .003$), and the attributions manipulation by disappointment interaction was marginally significant ($F(2, 144) = 2.84$, $p = .06$). This interaction was explored by examining the effect of attributions manipulation at low (-1SD) and high (+1SD) levels of disappointment (see Figure 20). When, disappointment was low, participants in the controllability condition ($M = 67.83$, $SD = 59.88$) responded with significantly more words than participants in the neutral condition ($M = 44.95$, $SD = 39.11$; $B = .46$, $t(144) = 2.58$, $p = .01$), but statistically indistinguishable from participants in the human nature condition ($M = 45.24$, $SD = 33.34$; $B = .28$, $t(144) = 1.60$, $p = .11$). When disappointment was high, these groups did not significantly differ from each other ($ts < 1.1$, $ps > .27$). As a final test, the effects of disappointment within each attributions condition were examined; however, no significant effect could be detected ($Fs < 2.4$, $ps > .13$).

No other effects in the analysis could be detected $Fs < 2.16$, $ps > .12$).¹²

Discussion

Study 2 had several objectives. The primary objective was to take an experimental approach in order to examine the interaction effect of manipulated discrepancies and causal attributions on feelings of disappointment in humanity and contempt for humanity. The second objective was to further test the potential for identification with all of humanity and implicit theory, respectively, to moderate the effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of disappointment and contempt. The third was to determine whether the moderating effects of causal attributions depend on IWAHr and IT. The fourth and final objective was to further examine the effects of disappointment and contempt on prosocial behavior.

Disappointment. People typically express feelings of disappointment when faced with the disconfirmation of a positive expectation or outcome (Carroll et al., 2007; De Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009). People express disappointment *in* a target when the target fails to meet a positive expectation held by the one expressing disappointment (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). In this case, when the expectation that people are generally good to one another is disconfirmed, observers were expected to express feelings of disappointment in humanity. This hypothesis was confirmed.

Indeed, when participants in the AI-discrepancies condition learned that people often fail to be kind to one another (i.e., rampant prescriptive moral violations, Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009), they expressed elevated feelings of disappointment in humanity, as compared to participants in the control condition who were not given such information.

However, the hypothesis that elevated feelings of disappointment would be unique to AI-discrepancies was not confirmed. It turned out that participants in the AO-discrepancies condition who learned that humanity has a pervasive tendency towards murder, lying, cheating, stealing and all manner of sordid behavior (i.e., rampant proscriptive moral violations, Janoff-Bulman, et al., 2009) also expressed elevated feelings of disappointment, as compared to participants in the control condition, although to a lesser degree. Disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition was only marginally greater than the Control condition, yet statistically indistinguishable from disappointment expressed in the AI-discrepancies condition.

Why might this be? Learning that people often fail to act prosocially is an obvious case of disconfirmation of expected positive outcomes (e.g., the benefits of cooperation). However, failing to meet the most basic moral standards (i.e., refraining from murder, lying, cheating, stealing, and all manner of sordid behavior) might constitute the disconfirmation of an expectation. So what might be happening here is that AI- and AO-discrepancies are touching two sides of the same disappointment coin: outcomes on one side, expectations on the other. These findings seem to build on SDT theory (Higgins, 1987, 1989), which suggests unique discrepancies beget unique emotions. Here we have an example of unique discrepancies evoking the same emotion.

Of course, disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition was less pronounced than disappointment in the AI-discrepancies condition. The reason could be that AO-discrepancies evoke other negative emotions that interfere with the disappointment signal. This possible explanation will be fleshed out further when contempt is discussed.

Attributions. The effect of AI-discrepancies on disappointment was predicted to be moderated by causal attributions, such that the effect would be greatest after learning that persistent prescriptive moral violations were due to controllable causes. Such explanations imply that people possess the potential to behave with highly prosocial intentions but fail to do so. This later prediction, however, was not supported by the data. Nor was the effect of AO-discrepancies on disappointment moderated by causal attributions. While one might be tempted to suggest that these findings contradict those of Petrocelli and Smith (2005), who demonstrated that the effects of discrepancies were affected by causal attributions, it is important to note that they were comparing the effects of internal versus external causal attributions, not different aspects of internal explanations. Nevertheless, the potential reasons for this lack of evidence will be discussed in the limitations section below.

IWAHr. AI-discrepancies were expected to lead to feelings of disappointment among strong-identifiers. This prediction was confirmed. Consistent with Petrocelli and Smith (2005), strong-identifiers in the AI-discrepancies condition reported stronger feelings of disappointment in humanity than strong-identifiers in the Control condition, while weak-identifiers expressed similar levels of disappointment across conditions. Furthermore, strong-identifiers expressed greater disappointment for humanity than weak-identifiers in the AI-discrepancies condition. Explicitly stating that humanity fails to be highly moral is likely more disconcerting to a strong-identifier, because strong-identifiers should have higher positive expectation for humanity. When they learn that humanity is not living up to that high expectation, the difference between humanity's actual state and ideal state is far greater than it would be among weak-identifiers.

Finally, within the AO-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers expressed greater disappointment in humanity than strong-identifiers. This raises the questions as to whether the weak-identifiers were driving this effect. Perhaps rather than weak-identifiers being genuinely more disappointed in humanity, perhaps strong-identifiers were preoccupied by feelings of contempt, evoked by the widespread proscriptive moral violations described in the AO-discrepancies condition. This possible explanation will be discussed further in relation to contempt.

Implicit Theory (IT). The effects of the discrepancies manipulation was expected to be moderated by implicit theory of personality (IT). The AI-discrepancies condition was predicted to evoke stronger feelings of disappointment among incremental-theorists than among entity-theorists. While there was a marginal interaction between IT and the discrepancies manipulation, the nature of the effect was not consistent with predictions. Incremental- and entity-theorists' reported disappointment was only significantly different in the control condition. This finding seems to suggest that incremental-theorists generally express less disappointment in humanity than entity-theorists, until they are exposed to negative information about humanity. When confronted by damning information about humanity, implicit personality theory seems to have little influence on the emotions one will express in response to that information.

Contempt. People typically express contempt when they feel moral or intellectual superiority over those whom they perceive as failing to meet a minimum standard of morality or intelligence (Ekman, 1994a, 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003). In this case, when one perceives that people are morally bankrupt, it was hypothesized that he or she would express feelings of contempt for humanity. This hypothesis was confirmed.

Indeed, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition who learned that humanity is often murderous and otherwise morally broken responded with significantly greater contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies and Control conditions. This is important because it shows that AO-discrepancies uniquely evoke contempt. This finding is also important because it contributes to the SDT literature (Higgins, 1987, 1989), demonstrating that AO-discrepancies evoke emotions beyond those that have thus far been discussed in that literature.

Attributions. It was also predicted that the effect of AO-discrepancies would be exacerbated when participants learned that humanity's moral depravity was due to human nature, implying that humanity is morally flawed and will stay that way. Unfortunately, this prediction was not confirmed. The effects of AO-discrepancies were unaffected by causal attributions. The potential reason will be discussed in the limitations section below.

IWAHr. It was also predicted that the effects of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt would depend on the extent to which one identifies with humanity (IWAHr). This hypothesis was confirmed, although not in the predicted direction. Strong-identifiers were predicted to resist feeling contempt for humanity in light of AO-discrepancies; they actually became quite contemptuous, even more so than weak-identifiers. This finding might be consistent with work suggesting that contempt is at times expressed towards those who interfere with one's desired outcomes (Haidt, 2003). Indeed, strong-identifiers should have the desire to be affiliated with a humanity that is highly moral. Evidence to the contrary might threaten their positive self-image. Thus, when strong-identifiers are

confronted with such information, they might be left with only two options: defend humanity or abandon it. The latter choice seemed to have been preferred in this study.

These findings resemble what Petrocelli and Smith (2005) described as a “reverse causal path,” in which strong-identifiers abandon their group identification upon learning highly negative information about their group. Of course, this finding is only indirect evidence, because IWAHr was measured after participants reported their emotional responses. A pre-test measure might have helped to confirm the reverse causal path; however, one could argue that such effects are only the results of regression towards the mean.

An alternative explanation could be that strong-identifiers might have identified with the victims of murder, rape, etc., rather than construing the information as to suggest that all of humanity is morally bankrupt. In these scenarios, there are a lot of bad people doing terrible things, but there are far more good people who are the victims of those deeds. Thus, contempt among strong-identifiers might have been directed at the perpetrators of the immoral behavior rather than humanity. However, one could argue that if they were feeling contempt for the perpetrators as a subset of humanity, then they should not have responded with contempt for people more generally. As it is, the question was asked about emotions in response to “people as a whole,” not just the perpetrators, so it is difficult to accept this alternative explanation at this time.

A future perspective-taking study might help to clarify which of these alternatives is taking place. Participants could be given an instruction to take the perspective of the victims in these scenarios or given no perspective-taking instruction at all; a third group could be given a manipulation intended to activate a sense of oneness with humanity. All

participants could rate their emotional response to humanity. If participants automatically relate to the victims, we would likely expect that participants in the perspective-taking condition and the no-instructions condition to respond with similar levels of contempt for humanity, while participants in the activated-humanity condition would respond with significantly less contempt for humanity than participants in the other two conditions. A follow-up question could ask participants to rate the extent to which they identified with the victims in the story and with humanity a whole when making their ratings. If participants in the no-perspective-taking-instructions condition rate their identification with the victims at a similar level as participants in the perspective taking condition, and participants with an activated sense of oneness with humanity reject the victim, one might be convinced that participants were indeed identifying more with the victims in these scenarios rather than humanity, unless given specific instruction, which influenced their feelings of contempt for humanity.

Implicit Theory (IT). It was further hypothesized that the effects of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt would be moderated by IT. It was predicted that AO-discrepancies would lead to contempt among entity-theorists. This prediction was not supported by the data. The reason AO-discrepancies did not have an effect on contempt among entity-theorists could be that the discrepancy information was nothing new beyond what entity-theorists perceive of humanity (Dweck & Molden, 2008). In contrast, as we saw with disappointment, incremental theorist responded to discrepancies much in the same manner as entity-theorists; we only found a significant difference between the two in the Control condition. It seems that expressions of contempt are similar between entity-theorists and incremental-theorists. In short, implicit personality theory (IT) did not

moderate the effects of the discrepancies manipulation. Of course, as in the previous study, IT was measured, and the effects of measured IT could be very subtle. In Study 4 we will take a closer look at IT via experimental manipulation to determine if any potential effects might be amplified through priming.

Prosocial behavior. It was predicted that one important distinction between contempt and disappointment would be their unique relationships with prosocial behavior. Consistent with theory, feelings of contempt should be associated with social avoidance and a deficit in prosocial behavior. On the other hand, disappointment could be associated with prosocial behavior—an attempt to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. However, given findings from Study 1 that suggested disappointment was associated with a decrease in prosocial behavior, the hypothesis was modified by incorporating identification. It was reasoned that disappointment might only motivate a recuperative response among strong-identifiers who have something to gain psychologically from their association with a seemingly highly moral humanity. Thus, it was predicted that feelings of disappointment would motivate strong-identifiers to act prosocially if given the opportunity.

To test these hypotheses, participants were asked if they would be willing to write a response to the discrepancy information they read about. Responses were then coded for providing a “solution” to the problem they read about, writing “in defense” of humanity, and, finally, their overall word-count. It turned out that strong-identifiers were somewhat more likely to provide a solution to the problem they read about, but this was not driven by their reported emotions. Furthermore, strong-identifiers were more defensive in their responses overall. In the AO-discrepancies condition, strong-identifiers

unwaveringly defended humanity despite strong feelings of contempt, while weak-identifiers did not. Finally, defending humanity might have contributed to longer word-counts, which is not all that interesting.

These findings have some potential. First, as suspected, identification with humanity was related to prosocial responding in light of negative information about humanity. Indeed, strong-identifiers provided more solutions and were more defensive than weak-identifiers. Furthermore, while it was predicted that identification and disappointment would interact to predict prosocial behavior, it turned out that contempt was the emotion interacting with identification. Specifically, contempt caused weak-identifiers to waver in their defense of humanity, while strong-identifiers remained strong in the face of strong feelings of contempt. The reason could be, as suggested above, strong-identifiers should be motivated to see their group as highly moral and valued—their own positive self-identity might depend on it. Thus, it would make sense that they would try and defend their group/identity when faced with damning information about the group. So in a sense, remaining defensive on behalf of humanity might have been an attempt to reverse the “reverse causal path.”

The final explored alternative hypothesis was that feelings of disappointment and controllability might interact, such that disappointment might only lead to a prosocial response among participants in the attribution of controllability condition. Regardless of the measure of prosocial responding, this hypothesis was not supported. What is interesting, however, is that a similar pattern emerged here, for word-count, as was evident in Study1. Participants in the controllability condition provided more words to the written response than participants in the Control condition, but only when

disappointment was low. When disappointment was high, these groups did not statistically differ from one another. This effect is obviously counter to the prediction that disappointment would lead to a recuperative response among participants who might believe that change is possible. But it might also suggest that people who believe change is possible might act prosocially as long as they do not experience strong feelings of disappointment. Of course, we must be cautious and not put too much stock into this findings. This effect of feelings of disappointment on participants in the controllability condition was isolated to one indicator of prosocial behavior. This effect will need to be tested and replicated in further studies in order to gauge its validity.

Limitations. The primary focus of Study 2 was to examine the effects of manipulated discrepancy information on feelings of disappointment and contempt for humanity, and to further determine if these effects could be moderated by manipulated causal attributions. Unfortunately, Study 2 might have failed in this regard. Indeed, causal attributions had no detectable effect on feelings of disappointment, regardless of IWAHR or IT. One explanation could be that the causal attributions manipulation missed its mark, failing to convince participants. Unfortunately, a manipulation check was not included in the study so this possible explanation is only speculative. Nonetheless, if attributions were at least somewhat convincing, they might have been confounded with IWAHR and IT. Furthermore, while the causal attributions were manipulated, they were always internal. In previous research, in which attributions moderated the effects of discrepancy information, causal attributions were either internal or external (see Petrocelli & Smith, 2005). When participants learned that AI-discrepancies were due to external causes, they expressed greater feelings of disappointment *for* the group than when they were due to

internal causes. Of course, a different sense of disappointment (i.e., disappointment *in* humanity) was targeted here.

The findings of Study 2 were more complicated than expected. On the positive side, Study 2 did demonstrate that when discrepancy information is manipulated, interesting emotional consequences could be tracked. In the context of disappointment in and contempt for humanity, AO-discrepancies evoked both feelings of contempt and disappointment; AI-discrepancies only evoked disappointment. The effects of AI and AO-discrepancies on contempt and disappointment were moderated by identification with humanity directly, with emotional responses being more pronounced among strong-identifiers. Finally, identification and contempt seem to influence recuperative responding in light of damning information about humanity. Specifically, strong-identifiers provide more solutions to the problems they read about, and were quick to defend humanity, even when strong feelings of contempt were present. This is encouraging, although one must be cautious in generalizing these findings.

The sample used in this study was mostly educated, white Americans, who might respond differently to questions about humanity than other individuals from different backgrounds. As Wrightsman (1992) suggested, beliefs about humanity—in this case, beliefs about humanity's moral discrepancies—develop via a long learning history characterized by one interacting with other people and the interactions he or she observes around them. It stands to reason then, that individuals from similar demographic backgrounds likely share similar learning histories, which could influence the extent to which individuals of the same ilk believe humanity is morally discrepant and the extent to which these beliefs correspond to specific emotional responses. It could be that folks with

varying degrees of education, SES, and diverse learning histories also possess a variety of beliefs about humanity and emotional responses. There is, however, still evident suggesting that the phenomena of interest are worthy of further consideration. Study 3 does so by focusing in on the effects of experimentally manipulated identification with all of humanity.

Study 3: Experimentally Manipulated Identification with Humanity

Study 2 found that the effects of discrepancy information on feelings of contempt and disappointment were moderated by identification with all of humanity. Thus, the primary objective of Study 3 was to examine whether similar effects occur when both discrepancy information and identification with all of humanity are experimentally manipulated. The secondary objective was to further examine whether identification and IT related to differences in causal attributions. The tertiary objective was to take another look at the potential moderating effects of IWAHr and IT on causal attributions. The quaternary objective was to reexamine the potential effects of disappointment and contempt on prosocial behavior, moderated by IWAHr and attributions of controllability.

Method

Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-line via the Mechanical Turk interface created by Amazon and paid \$.75 for their participation. Twenty-six participants were excluded from the analysis after failing the attention check question (described below), leaving 174 participants (88 females). All participants were American citizens over 18 years old ($M = 35.90$, $SD = 12.12$), and the majority was well educated (i.e., 59% held a bachelor's degree or higher) and Caucasian (83.90%); thus the findings

might not generalize beyond well educated, White people with access to the Internet. All participants provided informed consent prior to their participation.

Procedure. Participants were first introduced to a study of “aesthetic and social judgments.” After participants provided informed consent, they were presented with an “attention check” question in which they were instructed NOT to answer the question and skip to the next one, so as to demonstrate that they were reading the instructions carefully. Again, twenty-six participants failed to read the instructions and answered the attention-check question. These participants were excluded from the following analyses.

After the attention check, participants were told that the first part of the study would involve providing aesthetic judgments of several images. Actually, participants were placed into different conditions depending on the content of 5 images they received. The images were taken from Moytl et al. (2012) and Oveis et al. (2011), depicting either shared human experiences (Common Humanity condition; $N = 59$), nationality prime images (American Identity condition; $N = 58$), or neutral non-descript images (Neutral condition; $N = 57$). In keeping with the cover story, participants rated the attractiveness ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 1.03$), color contrast ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.15$), and sharpness ($M = 3.6$, $SD = 1.26$) of each image. Ratings of the actual images had no effect on the variables of interest so will not be discussed further. See Appendices P and Q.

After the aesthetics judgments task, the remaining procedures were almost identical to Study 2; however, participants were randomly assigned only to the three discrepancy conditions without causal explanations, as causal attributions were not manipulated (see Appendix L). After reading their assigned passage, participants answered five questions about their causal attributions of the behaviors they read about

(see Appendix R). Specifically, participants were asked whether *human nature* was the root cause of the pattern of behavior they read about, whether people could potentially change the pattern of behavior they read about, and whether people have control over the pattern of behavior they read about. Participants then provided their emotional responses on the same measures of disappointment ($M = 2.75, SD = 1.14, \alpha = .88$) and contempt ($M = 2.02, SD = .86, \alpha = .93$) as described in Study 2. See Appendices M and N.

Implicit theory (IT) was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of Personality Scale (ITSPS; Levy & Dweck, unpublished measure; see Appendix J). The measure had good reliability ($M = 3.45, SD = 1.36, \alpha = .97$). Finally the Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I) was included as a check of the identification manipulation and as an alternative measure of identification. The IWAH provided a relatively reliable gauge of the extent to which people resonate with their community ($M = 3.02, SD = .75, \alpha = .91$), country (America; $M = 3.11, SD = .73, \alpha = .88$), and humanity ($M = 2.91, SD = .80, \alpha = .91$). As in Studies 1 and 2, the standardized residual score of human identity (IWAHr) was used as the continuous measure of identification with humanity.

Measuring causal attributions. After appropriate reverse coding, responses to the five attribution questions (see Appendix R) were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with ML extraction and promax rotation. The scree plot (see Figure 21) suggested that either a two-factor or three-factor solution fit the data well; however, only factors one and two had eigenvalues greater than one (2.58 and 1.03), and together they accounted for 72.25% of the variance in the data: factor 1 accounted for 51.60%; factor 2 accounted for 20.65% of variance in the data. SAS output did not provide factor

loadings for a potential third factor, so the two-factor solution was adopted. Factor 1 included both “control” items and one “change” item (.800 and higher). Factor 2 included only the human nature item (.843). The final reverse-coded “change” item did not load strongly on either factor (.367, -.061), and so it was excluded from further analysis. Thus, items that did load on factor 1 were combined to create a composite score reflecting the belief that people have control over their behavior, and therefore could change their discrepant behavior ($M = 5.2$, $SD = 1.13$, $\alpha = .75$). Finally, one item was left as the sole measure of attributions of human nature ($M = 4.67$, $SD = 1.41$).

In final portion of Study 3, participants were given the same opportunity to act prosocially as described in Study 2. Responses were coded for word-count, having provided a potential “solution” to the problems they read about, and, finally, having written their response “in defense” of humanity, coded on a 1 to 5 scale (see Study 2 above for coding scheme). The same blind raters from Study 2 coded these items. Inter-rater reliability was good (Krippendorff’s $\alpha = .77$; Freelon, 2013).

Results

Identification manipulation check. In order to determine whether the identity manipulation had the intended effect, responses to the Identification With All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland et al., 2012) were examined. Critically, participants in the Common-Humanity condition should report identifying with all of humanity to a greater extent than participants in the Control and American-pride conditions if the manipulation worked. Similarly, if the manipulation worked, participants in the American-pride condition should report identifying with America to a greater extent than participants in the Control and Common-Humanity conditions. To this end, a one-way multivariate

analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. The identification manipulation (Common Humanity, American, Neutral) was the independent variable and the human identity and American identity subscales from the IWAH were the dependent variables. Unfortunately, the test was not significant (Wilks' $\Lambda = .99$, $F(2, 170) = .28$, $p = .75$; see Figure 22), indicating that the identity manipulation did not work. Despite this unfortunate result, the proposed analyses were conducted.

Primary analysis: Common Humanity and discrepancies. Here the hypothesized manipulated discrepancies by manipulated identity interaction was tested in a 3(Discrepancies: AI, AO, Neutral) X 3(Identification: Common Humanity, American identity, neutral) factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with emotional responses (disappointment, contempt) as the dependent variables and covariates. Age was unrelated to feelings of contempt ($r = -.12$, $p = .13$) and feelings of disappointment ($r = -.03$, $p = .62$), and therefore was excluded from these analyses.

The test failed to support the predicted two-way interaction between discrepancies and identification on contempt and disappointment ($F(9, 163) = .73$, $p = .57$), likely because the identification manipulation did not work. However, the test did reveal a significant main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt ($F(2, 163) = 7.76$, $p < .001$), and the effect approached significance on disappointment ($F(2, 163) = 2.3$, $p = .10$). Because this effect was not significant, follow-up tests used Tukey's HSD adjustments to alpha.

Planned contrasts revealed that, as predicted, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 2.35$, $SD_{adj} = .11$) reported greater contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 1.95$, $SD_{adj} = .10$), $t(163) =$

3.85, $p < .001$, and the control group ($M_{adj} = 1.83$, $SD_{adj} = .94$), $t(163) = 2.75$, $p = .006$), effectively replicating the findings in Study 2.

Planned contrasts also revealed that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 2.86$, $SD_{adj} = .08$) reported marginally greater disappointment in humanity than participants in the control group ($M_{adj} = 2.62$, $SD_{adj} = .08$), $t(163) = 2.15$, $p = .08$, but their reported disappointment in humanity was statistically indistinguishable from disappointment reported by participants in the AO-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 2.76$, $SD_{adj} = .08$), $t(163) = 1.35$, $p = .37$), whose disappointment was indistinguishable from the control group ($t(163) = .69$, $p = .77$). See Figure 23.

IWAHr. Because the identification/common-humanity manipulation failed, a multiple regression analysis was conducted, exchanging the identification/common-humanity manipulation with measured identification with all of humanity (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012); all other variables remained the same. Interestingly, for contempt, the analysis revealed that the moderating effect of IWAHr only trended towards significance ($F(2, 165) = 2.11$, $p = .12$). Because this effect was not significant, the follow-up tests used Tukey's HSD adjustments to alpha. Examination of the interaction found that the effect of the discrepancies manipulation was significant only among weak-identifiers ($F(2, 169) = 2.73$, $p = .02$) not among strong-identifiers ($F(2, 165) = 1.59$, $p = .21$). Here, the weak-identifiers (IWAHr -1 SD) in the AO-discrepancies condition expressed more contempt for humanity than weak-identifiers in the control and AI-discrepancies conditions ($B = .89$, $t(165) = 4.45$, $p < .001$; $B = .59$, $t(165) = 2.74$, $p = .007$), while strong-identifiers (IWAHr +1 SD) expressed similar levels across all three conditions ($ts \leq 1.05$, $ps > .36$), essentially reversing the effects found in Study 2, in

which strong-identifiers showed increased contempt in the AO condition. See Figure 24. Next, the effects of IWAHr within each manipulation condition were examined, but these effects were not significant ($ps > .41$). No other effects on contempt or disappointment were significant ($ps > .58$). See Figure 25.

Attributions. Next, the moderating effects of causal attributions on the discrepancies manipulation were tested while continuing to control for the effects of each emotion in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with discrepancies as the between-subject factor and attributions of controllability and human nature as continuous moderating variables. Unfortunately, neither attributions of controllability or human nature moderated the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt or disappointment ($ps > .15$).

Implicit Theory (IT). Next, the potential moderating effects of implicit theories of personality on the discrepancies manipulation were tested while again controlling for each emotion and age. Unfortunately, no moderating effects of IT were detected ($ps > .39$).

Prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior was measured by asking participants to provide open-ended responses to the information they read about; they were free not to write or to write at length. They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the information they read about, and to provide ideas for solutions to the problems they read about. Because participants in the neutral condition did not write in response to any discrepant or “negative” information about humanity, their responses were excluded from analyses.

Prosocial behavior, then, was defined in three ways: (1) whether participants provided a “solution” to the problem they read about (coded as 0 or 1; 48.15% provided solutions); (2) whether they responded in “defense of humanity” ($M = 2.20$, $SD = 1.50$; Krippendorff’s alpha = .77), and (3); total word-count ($M = 35.28$, $SD = 22.70$).

Providing a solution to the problem. Testing began by examining whether participants provided a “solution” to the problem they read about as a function of the discrepancies manipulation, feelings of disappointment, contempt, IWAHr, and all two and three-way interactions in a logistic regression analysis. Again, following the suggestions of Field (2009), -2LL (i.e., -2 log-likelihood) was the measure of model fit. The model fit the data well (-2LL $\chi^2(15) = 21.36$, $p = .13$). Contempt was associated with an decreased probability of providing a solution ($B = -6.29$, $\chi^2(1) = 4.36$, $p = .04$; see Figure 26). There was also a marginal IWAHr by discrepancies manipulation interaction effect ($B = .64$, $\chi^2(1) = 2.99$, $p = .08$; see Figure 27). Further analysis suggested that strong-identifiers were likely to provide a solution regardless of discrepancies condition ($B = -2.18$, $\chi^2(1) = .37$, $p = .57$), while weak-identifiers were more likely to provide a solution in the AO-discrepancies condition than in the AI-discrepancies condition ($B = .63$, $\chi^2(1) = 4.64$, $p = .03$), which is interesting because this is where weak-identifiers experience increased contempt. Furthermore, there was a marginal effect of identification within the AI-discrepancies condition ($B = .58$, $\chi^2(1) = 3.29$, $p = .06$), suggesting that strong-identifiers were more likely to provide a solution to AI-discrepancies than weak-identifiers. No other effects approached significance ($ps > .30$).

One alternative hypothesis that was explored in Studies 1 and 2 was that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe

humanity has control of their discrepant behavior. Here that hypothesis was tested again, but with new discrepant information, rather than enduring beliefs. Once again using logistic regression, solution was regressed on discrepancies manipulation, attributions of controllability, and disappointment in an additional logistic regression. While there was a marginal effect of the discrepancies manipulation $\chi^2(1) = 3.25, p = .08$; unfortunately, none of the main effects or interactions of interest were significant ($\chi^2s < 1, ps > .33$).

Writing in defense of humanity. Next, in a multiple regression analysis, “In defense” was regressed on the same combination of variables and interactions as in the analysis of “solution.” Although, the overall model provided a poor fit to the data ($R^2 = .20; F(15, 91) = 1.58, p = .10$), there was a marginal effect of IWAHr ($B = .55, t(91) = 1.80, p = .07$), suggesting that strong-identifiers might have been more defensive than weak-identifiers, which is similar to the findings in Study 2. However, there was a significant contempt by discrepancies interaction ($B = -.77, t(91) = -2.13, p = .03$). Follow-up analysis suggested that within the AI-discrepancies condition, contempt was associated with decreased defending of humanity ($B = -.80, t(56) = -3.82, p = .0003$). Participants in the AI-discrepancies condition were also far less defensive than participants in the AO-discrepancies condition, but only when contempt was high ($B = -.90, t(91) = -2.05, p = .04$; see Figure 28). No other effects approached significance ($ps > .23$).

The alternative hypothesis, that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participant who believe humanity has control of their discrepant behavior, was tested again using writing “in defense” of humanity as the dependent variable. In a multiple regression analysis, “in defense” was regressed on the discrepancies

manipulation, attributions of controllability, disappointment, and all two- and three-way interactions. Unfortunately, these effects were not significant ($F_s \geq 1.00$, $p_s > .31$).

Word-count. As a final test of prosocial behavior, participants' word-count (i.e., the number of words participants contributed to the collective response) was examined with the same combination of variables and interactions described in the previous two analyses, with the addition of writing "in defense" of humanity.

These data were analyzed in a multiple regression analysis. The model was a poor predictor of word-count ($R^2 = .22$, $F(20, 106) = 1.22$, $p = .26$). The defending humanity by IWAHr interaction was the only significant effect ($B = -9.26$, $t(106) = -2.26$, $p = .03$). Further analysis revealed that defending humanity was only positively associated with word-count when IWAHr was low (-1 SD; $B = 13.93$, $t(106) = 2.30$, $p = .02$, while IWAHr was positively associated with word-count, but only when defending humanity was low (-1 SD, $B = 14.75$, $t(106) = 2.75$, $p = .007$). See Figure 29. No other effect approached significance ($p_s > .19$).

Again, the alternative hypothesis regarding the interaction of attributions and disappointment was tested here. Word-count was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, attributions of controllability, disappointment, writing in defense, and all two-, three-, and four-way interactions. Only the effect of controllability was significant ($B = 15.05$, $F(1, 105) = 9.81$, $p = .002$), partially replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2, suggesting that attributions of controllability can at times predict prosocial responding. No other effect was significant ($F_s \leq 1.17$, $p_s > .28$).

Measuring causal attributions. Finally, IWAHr and IT were tested as possible predictors of causal attributions. Attributions of human nature and controllability were

regressed on IWAHr scores and IT. Unfortunately, the only significant relationship was between attributions of controllability and IT ($B = -.2, t(167) = -2.59, p = .01$) suggesting that entity-theorists were less likely to attribute the cause of discrepancies to controllable factors. No other relationship was significant ($ps > .20$).

Discussion

The primary objective of Study 3 was to take an experimental approach in order to examine the discrepancies by common-humanity interaction effect on feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. The second was to further examine whether identification and IT related to differences in causal attributions. The final objective was to further explore the relationship between negative emotions and prosocial behavior.

Disappointment. It was hypothesized that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition would likely express significant feelings of disappointment in humanity. However, given the findings of Study 2, disappointment might not be unique to AI-discrepancies. Participants in the AO-discrepancies might also express significant feelings of disappointment. This was not exactly the case: the effect of

Common Humanity. Unfortunately, because the manipulation failed, one cannot come to any conclusions about manipulated common humanity. However, non-significant results were found when IWAHr was measured. It could simply be that regardless of identity, participants expressed feelings of disappointment when they learned that people pervasively fail to be kind to one another, even if those feelings were not acute.

Attributions. It was predicted that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition would express greater disappointment in humanity to the extent that they attributed the discrepant behavior to controllable causes. Unfortunately, this prediction was not confirmed. Indeed, these results replicated the (non)findings in Study 2 (see discussion above).

Implicit Theory (IT). It was predicted that AI-discrepancies would lead to feelings of disappointment among incremental-theorists. This prediction was not supported. Indeed, even when examined in relationship to causal attributions, IT failed to moderate the relationship between AI-discrepancies and disappointment.

Contempt. It was hypothesized that participants would likely express feelings of contempt for humanity when they learned that people often fail to meet minimum moral standards of conduct (AO-discrepancies/proscriptive moral violations). This prediction was again confirmed, replicating the findings of Study 2. Indeed, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition responded with significantly more contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies and control condition. Again, these findings suggest that contempt is a unique consequence of AO-discrepancy beliefs, as discussed in Study 2 (see discussion above).

Common Humanity. The identification manipulation was ineffective; therefore, coming to any conclusion about the effects of manipulated Common Humanity is unrealistic. However, using IWAHr, the analyses did suggest that identification with all of humanity moderated the effects of AO-discrepancies on contempt. However, the pattern found in Study 2 essentially reversed in Study 3. Recall that in Study 2, strong-identifiers responded with much more contempt in the AO-discrepancies condition, while

the weak-identifiers maintained across conditions, seemingly unaffected by the discrepancies manipulation. Here in Study 3, strong-identifiers were unaffected by the discrepancies manipulation, maintaining relatively low levels of contempt across conditions, whereas weak-identifiers responded with more contempt in the AO-discrepancies condition. It appears that in Study 3, IWAHr might have blocked the contempt-evoking effects of AO-discrepancies. In a sense, strong-identifiers behaved as they were expected to: rejecting contemptuous feelings for their group. But why did this take place in Study 3 and not Study 2?

One reason could be the content of the identity manipulation. While the Common Humanity condition was predicted to instill a sense of oneness with humanity through pictures of diverse peoples and planet Earth, pictures in the other conditions might have primed positive feelings for humanity as well. In the American Identity condition, participants were exposed to patriotic images, including pictures of fireworks, the American flag, and the Statue of Liberty. For American participants, these images might have been interpreted as depicting humanity at its best. In the Control condition, participants were exposed to images of modern art, depicting humanity's ability to be creative. In hindsight, images in all of these conditions could have primed some positive feelings towards humanity, but to an even greater extent among participants who already strongly identified with humanity. This initial dose of positive humanness might have been enough to motivate strong-identifiers to reject AO-discrepancies and the feelings of contempt associated with them. In concert with the potential "reverse causal path" (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005) detected in Study 2, in which strong-identifiers responded with greater contempt than weak-identifiers, the results thus far suggest a dynamic

relationship between common humanity, AO-discrepancy beliefs, and the negative emotions they influence.

Attributions. Beyond identification, it was predicted that the effect of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt would be moderated by causal attributions of human nature. Unfortunately, this prediction was not confirmed. Indeed, these results replicated the (non)findings in Study 2 using measurement data (see discussion above).

Implicit Theory (IT). It was hypothesized that the effects of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt would be moderated by IT. It was predicted that AO-discrepancies would lead to contempt among entity-theorists. However, given the findings of Study 2, it might actually be that AO-discrepancies lead to feelings of contempt, regardless of one's implicit personality theory, and that any difference in contempt between entity- and incremental-theorists is isolated to the Control condition. The reason is that contempt among entity-theorists was relatively consistent across discrepancy conditions, while incremental-theorists responded like entity-theorists when confronted with highly toxic information about humanity. Here in Study 3, incremental and entity-theorists responded similarly across all conditions. Failure to replicate the IT effect within the Control condition might have been a matter of statistical power; there were far more participants in Study 2 than in Study 3.

Prosocial Behavior. Recall that the literature suggests a potential distinction between contempt and disappointment is their associated behavior (see work reviewed above). Specifically, feelings of contempt for humanity might lead to social avoidance, while disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior. However, it was also suggested

that identification might moderate this relationship, such that feelings of disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior, but only among strong-identifiers.

To test these hypotheses, just as in Study 2, participants were asked to write a response to the discrepancy information they read about. Responses were again coded for providing a “solution” to the problem they read about, writing “in defense” of humanity, and, finally, their overall word-count.

Although only marginally significant, the relationship between contempt and providing a solution was consistent with predictions: the probability of providing a “solution” to humanity’s moral shortcomings decreased as feelings of contempt became more acute. This finding might suggest that contempt not only influences the extent to which one will avoid a target, but also the extent to which he or she will even provide a means for that target to recoup some moral credit. Perhaps with contempt comes the belief that the target of one’s contempt has no hope.

The probability of providing a solution was also marginally influenced by an unexpected IWAHr by discrepancies manipulation interaction. Here, we found that among strong-identifiers, the probability of providing a solution was relatively stable across discrepancy conditions. Weak-identifiers were far less likely to provide a solution in the AI-discrepancies condition than in the AO-discrepancies condition. The reason could be that weak-identifiers are less invested in decreasing AI-discrepancies, because they do not see the benefit. Weak-identifiers might also be less likely to see AI-discrepancies as a problem in need of solution in the first place, for similar reasons. In the AO-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers might have seen the benefit in reducing the rate of murder, rape, theft, etc.

More evidence was found suggesting that strong-identifiers are more defensive in their responses to damning information about humanity, essentially replicating the findings of Study 2. We also found that defending humanity was influenced by contempt, but this effect was dependent on the discrepancies manipulation. Within the AI-discrepancies condition, contempt was negatively associated with defending humanity. This is a rather interesting finding, as AI-discrepancies are generally less contempt-evoking than AO-discrepancies. It suggests that people who might be more prone to contempt also feel less compelled to defend humanity when humanity is at least meeting minimum moral standards. Perhaps, like weak-identifiers who might not see a need to provide a solution to AI-discrepancies, participants prone to contempt might not see the need to defend humanity when humanity is not being highly prosocial—not being bad might be good enough.

Defending humanity and IWAHr interacted to predict word-count. The nature of the interaction was interesting. Defending humanity was only predictive of word-count among weak-identifiers, while IWAHr was only predictive when defending humanity was low. These findings seem to suggest that strong-identifiers will write at length to respond to negative information about humanity, but defending humanity might have no effect among strong-identifiers, because these folks tend to be more defensive already. Weak-identifiers, on the other hand, might only write at length to respond to negative information about humanity when they are motivated to defend humanity. This raises the question: when will weak-identifiers be motivated to defend humanity? It could simply be that weak identification does not necessarily mean one is opposed to the group in question. For example, some Americans might not identify with Palestinians, but they

might still defend their rights to exist with dignity in their own state. The same might be true with identification with humanity: one might not identify with humanity, but still be willing to defend it.

Finally, like in Studies 1 and 2, attributions of controllability were associated with increased prosocial behavior. Participants who strongly believe humanity has control over its discrepant behavior also provided more words to the collective response. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, this effect was not moderated by feelings of disappointment. These findings seem to suggest that people who believe humanity has a high degree of control over its behavior are also more proactive, or at least more engaged.

Predicting causal attributions. While Weiner (2006) suggests that controllable causes are the most blameworthy causes, Costarelli (2012) pointed out that such explanations also imply that a group can change in the future—they have the potential to overcome their discrepancy—which can protect one’s positive identity. Thus, it was predicted that strong-identifiers should be motivated to ignore explanations that imply humanity has a flawed humanity, turning instead to explanations that imply the potential for change via attributing the flaw to controllable causes. It was thought that incremental-theorists might make the same causal attributions as strong-identifiers, not because they are motivated to protect their positive identity, but because such attributions are theory-consistent. Weak-identifiers should be less invested in humanity’s image as it has little connection to their own positive self-image, and so they should be less motivated to resist attributing human nature as the cause of moral discrepancies. Entity-theorists might do so, because such attributions are theory-consistent

Unfortunately, the only significant relationship was between attributions of controllability and IT. Identification had no relationship with causal attributions. These findings are consistent with Study 1; however, in Study 1, IT was related to both attributions of controllability and attributions of human nature. Again, this finding is simply theory-consistent, suggesting entity-theorists are less likely to attribute behavior to controllable causes.

There were several findings in Study 3 that contributed to the overall story about feelings of disappointment and contempt in humanity. Study 3 replicated the effect of discrepancies on disappointment and contempt found in Study 2. Study 3 also found that IWAHr moderated the effects of manipulated discrepancies on contempt, but in the opposite direction as found in Study 2. Identification and contempt influenced prosocial responding in light of damning information about humanity. Contempt decreased the probability of providing a solution to the problems folks read about, and contributed to less defending humanity in the AI-discrepancies condition. Strong-identifiers were quick to defend humanity, and strong-identifiers were more likely to contribute more words to the collective response, but weak-identifiers were willing to contribute more words to the collective response, when they were motivated to defend humanity.

Finally, once again, no evidence of the proposed moderating effects of causal attributions or IT could be found. Study 4 provided one final test to reexamine their potential moderating effects. However, in Study 4, IT was manipulated.

Study 4: Implicit Theories of Personality and Social Avoidance

The primary objective of Study 4 was to examine the interaction effects of experimentally manipulated discrepancies and experimentally manipulated implicit

theory (IT) on feelings of disappointment and contempt. Study 4 also provided an additional test of the proposed moderating effects of causal attribution and identification with all of humanity (IWAHr). Finally, Study 4 provided a novel test of the proposed effects of contempt and disappointment on prosocial behavior, moderated by IWAHr.

Method

Participants. One hundred and seventy-six undergraduate students from Lehigh University participated in order to fulfill the requirements of an introductory psychology course. Participants were mostly in their late teens and early twenties ($M_{age} = 18.97$, $SD_{age} = 1.22$), mostly Caucasian (65.48%), and politically left-leaning ($M = 3.26$, $SD = 1.01$). Data from seven participants were removed prior to analysis, as these participants either voiced suspicion regarding the study manipulations or had provided questionable data (finished the entire study in under 10 minutes, a time in which it would be difficult at best to fully process the study materials). In sum, data from one hundred and sixty-nine participants (90 females) were included in the following analyses.

Procedures. Participants learned that they were participating in a two-part study investigating reading comprehension and social judgments. After providing informed consent, participants read a short excerpt from a “scientific article” about which they would later answer comprehensive questions. However, the short excerpt they read was actually part of a manipulation of implicit theories adapted from Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1997; Study 5; see Appendix S). The authors in that study manipulated whether participants were in either an entity or incremental orientation. Participants in the Entity condition ($N = 54$) were presented information describing human behavior as stemming from fixed characteristics of human nature:

“In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention held at Washington, D.C., in August, Dr. George Medin argued that ‘in most of us, by the age of ten, our character has set like plaster and will never soften again.’ He reported numerous large longitudinal studies which show that people ‘age and develop, but they do so on the foundation of enduring dispositions.’”

Participants in the Incremental condition ($N = 59$) were given information suggesting that human characteristics are changeable and therefore patterns of behavior can change:

“In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention held at Washington, D.C., in August, Dr. George Medin argued that ‘no one’s character is hard like a rock that cannot be changed. Only for some, greater effort and determination are needed to effect changes.’ He reported numerous large longitudinal studies, which show that people can mature and can change their character. He also reported research findings showing that people’s personality characteristics can be changed even in their late sixties.”

For my purposes, participants in the Control condition ($N = 56$) read:

“In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention held at Washington, D.C., in August, Dr. George Medin argued that ‘in most of us, by the age of ten, our limbic system is fully developed.’ He reported numerous studies showing that limbic activation in response to emotional arousing stimuli is nearly the same in 10-year-olds as it is older adults.”

After they completed the IT priming manipulation, participants were given a paper-and-pencil packet that contained the same vignettes and measures as described in

Study 3. Participants read a passage from an excerpt from an article purporting to document theories about “patterns of human behavior,” based on several scholarly sources. In that passage, participants were presented information suggesting that humanity, in general, fails to meet moral standards (A-O discrepancies condition, $N = 54$), fails to live up to moral ideals (A-I discrepancies condition, $N = 58$), or general demographic information about humanity (Control condition, $N = 57$). As in Study 3, no causal information was presented (see Appendix L).

After reading their assigned passage, participants answered five questions about the causal attributions of the behaviors they read about (see Appendix R). Specifically, participants were asked whether *human nature* was the root cause of the pattern of behavior they read about, whether people could or could not potentially change the pattern of behavior they read about, and whether people have control over the pattern of behavior they read about.

After appropriate reverse coding, responses to the five attribution questions (see Appendix R) were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis with ML extraction and promax rotation. The scree plot (Figure 30) suggested that either a two-factor or three-factor solution fit the data well; however, only factors one and two had eigenvalues greater than one (1.90 and 1.04), accounting for 58.75% of the variance in the data: factor 1 accounted for 37.90%; factor 2 accounted for 20.85%. Thus, the two-factor solution was adopted. Factor 1 included both control items and the positively coded change items (.500, .753 and .706). Factor 2 included only the human nature item (.791). The final reverse-coded change item did not load strongly on either factor (.196, -.063), so it was excluded from further analysis. Thus, items that did load on factor 1 were combined to

create composite scores reflecting the belief that people have control over their behavior, and therefore could change their discrepant behavior ($M = 4.50$, $SD = .91$, $\alpha = .69$).

Finally, one item was left as the sole measure of attributions of human nature as the cause of discrepant behavior ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.13$), which unfortunately, could decrease the reliability to measure attributions of human nature.

Next, participants completed the measures of disappointment and contempt previously described, but in the context of how they feel “right now” (see Appendices M & N). On average, participants reported relatively low levels of both disappointment ($M = 2.48$, $SD = .89$, $\alpha = .9$) and contempt ($M = 1.94$, $SD = .75$, $\alpha = .88$). Again, disappointment and contempt were strongly associated ($r = .61$, $p < .0001$).

Next, IT was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of Personality Scale (ITSPS) as a manipulation check. After appropriate reverse coding, the measure is structured such that high scores indicate an *entity theory*, while low scores indicate an *incremental theory*. The measure had good reliability ($M = 3.64$, $SD = 1.13$, $\alpha = .91$).

The Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I) was included. The IWAH measures the extent to which people resonate with their community ($M = 4.07$, $SD = .75$, $\alpha = .58$), country (America; $M = 3.41$, $SD = .67$, $\alpha = .72$), and humanity ($M = 3.04$, $SD = .62$, $\alpha = .82$). Again, the IWAHr (standardized residual score) was measure of humanity identity used in the subsequent analyses.

Prosocial Behavior. In order to measure prosocial behavior, after providing informed consent, participants were told that they would be given \$5 for their participation. After participants finished the paper-and-pencil packet, participants were

asked if they would be willing to donate part or all of their \$5 to UNICEF, an organization that aids needy people around the globe. The amount of money in dollars participants were willing to donate ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.39$) was the measure of prosocial behavior. In all, 84% of participants were willing to donate all of the \$5.

Results

IT manipulation check. If the IT manipulation worked, then participants in the Entity theory condition should have scored high on the ITSPS relative to participants in the Incremental theory condition. To examine this, a one-way analysis of variance was conducted with the IT manipulation (Entity, Incremental, Control) as the independent variable and scores on the ITSPS as the dependent variable; high scores on the ITSPS indicate an entity theory of personality. The analysis revealed a significant effect of the IT manipulation ($F(2, 166) = 5.03$, $p = .008$; see Figure 31). Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the Incremental condition ($M = 3.31$, $SD = .97$) scored significantly lower on the ITSPS than participants in both the Entity condition ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.07$), $t(166) = 1.91$, $p = .05$, and the Neutral condition ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 1.24$), $t(166) = 3.14$, $p = .002$, who did not significantly differ from each other ($t(166) = 1.18$, $p = .24$). While these results confirm that the manipulation had the desired effect on participants in the Incremental condition, it is less certain whether the manipulation primed an Entity theory per se, as participants in this condition were statistically indistinguishable from participants in the control condition. Nevertheless, it is still possible to test the hypothesis that AO-discrepancies should lead to feelings of contempt and AI-discrepancies lead to feelings of disappointment differently among incremental-theorists than among entity-theorists.

Primary analysis: Discrepancies and IT. Testing began by examining the effects of the discrepancies and implicit theory manipulations and their interactions. Data was analyzed in a 3(Discrepancies: AI, AO, Neutral) X 3(Implicit Theory: Entity theory, Incremental theory, neutral) factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with emotional responses (disappointment, contempt) as the dependent variables and standardized covariates.

The test revealed a significant main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of contempt ($F(2, 157) = 9.95, p < .0001$; see Figure 32). Planned contrasts revealed that as predicted, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 2.20, SD_{adj} = .08$) expressed more contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 1.70, SD_{adj} = .07$), $t(157) = 4.46, p < .0001$, and the control condition ($M_{adj} = 1.83, SD_{adj} = .94$), $t(157) = 2.37, p = .02$, who also expressed more contempt than participants in the AI-discrepancies condition, $t(157) = 2.03, p = .05$. However, the effect of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt was not moderated by the implicit theory manipulation ($F(4, 157) = 1.71, p = .15$). No other effect on contempt was significant ($p > .35$).

There was a main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of disappointment ($F(2, 159) = 6.21, p = .003$). Planned contrast revealed that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 2.62, SD_{adj} = .05$) expressed greater disappointment in humanity than participants on both the AO-discrepancies condition ($M_{adj} = 2.35, SD_{adj} = .06$), $t(159) = 3.47, p = .0007$, and the control condition ($M_{adj} = 2.45, SD_{adj} = .94$), $t(159) = 2.21, p = .03$, which did not statistically differ from one another ($t(159) = 1.26, p = .15$). However, this main effect was moderated by the implicit theories

manipulation ($F(4, 159) = 2.52, p = .04$). As shown in Figure 33, the effect of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment was limited to participant in the IT control condition ($F(2, 159) = 9.87, p < .0001$). No other effects were significant ($p > .30$).

Attributions. Next, testing began by examining whether the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of contempt and disappointment were moderated by causal attribution in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the discrepancies manipulation entered as the between-subjects factor and attributions (of control and human nature, respectively) as a continuous moderating variable; emotional responses (disappointment, contempt) were the dependent variables and standardized covariates. The test revealed only the significant effect of attributions of controllability ($B = .16, t(1, 162) = 3.38, p = .0009$; see Figure 34) on disappointment, suggesting that people feel more disappointment (not contempt) when they believe moral discrepancies are controllable. This fits well with classic attribution theory (see Weiner, 2006, for a review), in which targets are more blameworthy when they have control over their bad behavior. Here, it appears that participants were also more likely to feel disappointed in humanity for the same reason. No other effects on disappointment or contempt were significant ($ps > .12$ for controllability; $ps > .67$ for human nature).

IWAHr. Next, testing began by examining whether the effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of contempt and disappointment was moderated by identification with humanity (IWAHr) after controlling for the effect of each emotion and age. Unfortunately, the analysis failed to reveal any significant effects of IWAHr ($ps > .25$).

Prosocial behavior. As a novel measure of prosocial behavior, participants were asked if they would donate all or a portion of the \$5 they were to receive for their participation. Again, the original hypothesis was that feelings of disappointment and contempt would have different effects on prosocial behavior (donating in this case). Specifically, it was predicted that contempt would decrease prosocial behavior while disappointment might motivate prosocial behavior. However, this prediction was later qualified, suggesting that disappointment might only lead to prosocial behavior among participants who strongly identify with humanity.

In a multiple regression analysis, the number of dollars participants were willing to donate was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, contempt, disappointment, IWAHr, and all interaction terms, controlling for age. The model provided a poor fit to the data ($R^2 = .14$, $F(24, 142) = 1.16$, $p = .29$). There was, however, a significant contempt by IWAHr interaction ($F(1, 142) = 5.81$, $p = .02$). As seen in Figure 35, among strong-identifiers contempt was associated with a decrease in donating ($B = -.65$, $t(142) = -1.73$, $p = .08$). However, among weak-identifiers, contempt was associated with an increase in donating ($B = .88$, $t(142) = 2.26$, $p = .03$). No other effect was significant ($ps > .18$).

The alternative hypothesis that was explored in Studies 1, 2, and 3, that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe humanity has control of their discrepant behavior was once again tested here with donations as the dependent variable. Thus, donation was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, attributions of controllability, and disappointment. Unfortunately, none of the effects or interactions were significant ($ps > .30$).

Measuring causal attributions. It has been suggested that identification with humanity and implicit theory of personality should influence the type of causes one attributes to discrepant behavior. Specifically, it was proposed that strong-identifiers should be motivated to make attributions that limit the negative consequences for the group (or themselves), while incremental theorist would do the same, but only because such attributions are theory-consistent. In contrast, entity-theorists and participants who do not identify with all of humanity should be more likely to attribute discrepancies to human nature, because participant who do not strongly identify with humanity should not be motivated to limit negative consequences, and such attributions are consistent with an entity theory.

To examine these predictions, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with Implicit Theory groups (IT) included as a between-subject variable and IWAHR included as a continuous-moderating-variable was conducted. Attributions of human nature and attributions of controllability were the dependent variables. The analysis failed to reveal a significant effect of IWAHR (Wilks' $\Lambda = .99$, $F(2, 162) = 1.00$, $p = .38$). The analysis did, however, reveal a multivariate effect of the IT manipulation (Wilks' $\Lambda = .90$, $p = .002$). Univariate analyses revealed a main effect of the IT manipulation on attributions of human nature ($F(2, 163) = 3.96$, $p = .02$) and controllability ($F(2, 163) = 3.95$, $p = .02$).

As can be seen in Figure 36, participants in the Control condition ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 1.07$) attributed the discrepancies to human nature more so than participants in the Entity condition ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 1.32$), $t(163) = 2.8$, $p = .006$, demonstrating that participants in the control condition were much more entity-driven than participants thought to have

been primed to be. Also, contrary to predictions, participants in the Incremental condition ($M = 3.86, SD = .93$) did not significantly differ from participants in either the Control condition ($t(163) = 1.65, p = .11$) or the Entity condition ($t(163) = 1.2, p = .23$), although the mean of the participants in the Incremental condition was higher. As ratings of attributions of human nature were highest among participants in the Control condition, and statistically indistinguishable between the participants in the Entity and Incremental conditions, it would seem that the IT manipulation did not have the predicted effect on attributions of human nature.

Regarding attributions of controllability, a planned contrasts revealed that participants in the Incremental condition ($M = 4.76, SD = .77$) made more attributions of controllability than both participants in the Control ($M = 4.33, SD = .88$) ($t(168) = 2.78, p = .006$) and Entity conditions ($M = 4.38, SD = 1.03$) ($t(163) = 2.78, p = .007$), suggesting that the IT manipulation did have an effect on causal attributions, but the effect was only as expected when examining attributions of controllability, because theory suggests that incremental-theorists believe more is controllable.

Discussion

The primary objective of Study 4 was to take an experimental approach in order to examine the predicted and so-far-elusive moderating effects of IT. The second objective was to further examine the moderating effects of identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) and the— even-more-elusive—moderating effects of causal attributions. The final objective was to further examine the effects of contempt and disappointment on prosocial behavior, moderated by IWAHr, using a novel measure of prosocial behavior.

Disappointment. It was predicted that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition would likely express stronger feelings of disappointment in humanity than participants in the Control condition. Furthermore, given the findings of Studies 2 and 3, it was also expected that participant in the AO-discrepancies condition would feel more disappointed in humanity than participants in the Control condition, but similar levels of disappointment as participants in the AI-discrepancies condition. This time, however, the pattern was as originally predicted: disappointment was elevated only among participants in the AI-discrepancies condition. Participants in the AO-discrepancies and Control conditions did not statistically differ from one another. What is most interesting here is not that disappointment was strongest among participants in the AI-discrepancies condition, but that it was not elevated among the participants in the AO-discrepancies condition, but even slightly lower than participants in the Control condition.

Looking across Studies 2 through 4, disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition is much lower here in Study 4 than the previous studies, while contempt in this condition is relatively similar. Why did this occur only in Study 4? The age range of the sample of participants might be responsible. In Study 4, the age range was restricted to college-aged participants, while in the previous studies the age range was much wider. College-aged participants in Study 4 reported less disappointment overall than participants in the other studies, especially in the AO-discrepancies condition. College-age participants were much less disappointed in humanity when humanity was described as generally villainous, but expressed just as much contempt for humanity as participants in the other studies. This difference might be tapping into a difference in perspective, or position, from which people express these emotions. For example, contempt is expressed

from the position of perceived moral or intellectual superiority. The potential to think oneself superior, especially intellectually superior, might not be all that uncommon among students at a prestigious private university in Northeastern United States. In contrast, disappointment might be more often expressed from a position of actual moral or intellectual authority rather than perceived superiority, much like when a teacher or parent is disappointed in their student who fails to earn the grade the teacher or parent believed the student was capable of earning. This perspective might only come on strong with age. Of course, this is speculation and would need to be tested.

Implicit theory (IT). In Study 4, we found evidence suggesting that when IT is manipulated, it has the potential to moderate the effects of discrepancy on feelings of disappointment, albeit not in a manner that was predicted, but in a manner that might actually complement the findings in Study 2. Recall that in Study 2, incremental- and entity-theorists did not differ in and across the AI and AO conditions. Where they differed was in the Control condition, with entity-theorists expressing more disappointment in humanity than incremental-theorists, suggesting that incremental-theorists behave like entity-theorists when confronted with damning information about humanity. Here in Study 4, incremental- and entity-theorists responded similarly across all conditions. Indeed, they appeared unmoved by humanity's moral discrepancies. It turned out that elevated disappointment in response to AI-discrepancies was only evident among participants in the IT-control condition. Activated entity and incremental theories seemed to block the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on disappointment. This is a difficult finding to reconcile.

Why was the effect isolated to disappointment in response to AI-discrepancies in the IT-control condition? It could be that the content in the paragraphs caused participants to be less responsive to AI-discrepancies. For example, it could be that Entity and Incremental conditions might have caused people to focus on “individual differences,” which might have reduced the tendency to conceptualize people in a collective sense, while the control condition paragraph might have increased this tendency. Alternatively, in the Entity condition, participants might not have expressed disappointment because the potential for becoming more prosocial is less evident; there might have been less cause to feel disappointed (i.e., there is no disconfirmation of a positive expectation or outcome). On the other hand, in the Incremental condition, it is made explicit that people can mature and change. As such, AI-discrepancies might not signal the disconfirmation of a positive expectation or outcome; rather, the incremental theory paragraph might have implied that the positive outcome *will* come.

Another matter to consider is the fact that disappointment among entity- and incremental-theorists was equivalent in the discrepancies control condition, which was not the case in Study 2. In Study 2, incremental-theorists in the Control condition were far less disappointed in humanity than entity-theorists. Perhaps this was due to the fact that implicit theory was measured in Study 2, not primed. Measured and manipulated implicit theory might not be completely the same. When IT is measured, not only does one learn something about the ways in which people reason about personality, but perhaps a good deal about how and when they more generally experience certain emotions as well (Dweck & Molden, 2008). Thus, our manipulation of IT might not have primed the emotional side of the IT coin. Rather, the manipulation might have only

touched on the cognitive side—the reasoning side—that in turn influenced participants to interpret the discrepancy information in such a way that mitigated the experience of negative emotions. On the other hand, it could simply be that IT has little influence on the way people emotionally responded to humanity’s moral shortcomings. However, it did have an effect on whether participants attributed the moral shortcoming to controllable causes, which in turn influenced feelings of disappointment. It seems that these findings could be distilled into a simple path model (IT → Control/Choice → Disappointment) that resembles the model originally predicted (see Figures 2 and 4).

Attributions. Finally, in Study 4, evidence of the predicted moderating effects of causal attributions with regards to disappointment was found. Indeed, participants in the AI-discrepancy condition reported elevated feelings of disappointment in humanity, but only when they attributed those discrepancies to controllable causes. Thus, when one believes or perceives that people, in general, are far less kind to one another than they should and could be, he or she will respond with disappointment in humanity. This is, of course, consistent with research on disappointment (Carroll et al., 2007; De Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009), SDT Higgins, 1987, 1989; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005). This finding also contributes to the literature on attribution theory and the work by Weiner and colleagues (Weiner, 2006; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). Weiner and Kukla demonstrated that blame and anger increase to the extent that negative behavior is controllable. Here, we found that disappointment increased to the extent that the failure to engage in positive behavior was controllable. These findings build on Weiner’s previous work by demonstrating that, while failing to engage in highly prosocial behavior is not the same as engaging in immoral behavior, explanations

influence emotional responses to those behaviors in much the same way; the only difference is the specific negative emotion activated by the explanation.

Summarizing, in Study 4, IT influenced controllability attributions and controllability attributions, in turn, moderated the effects of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment. More specifically, incremental-theorists attributed discrepancies to controllable causes, and attributing AI-discrepancies to controllable causes increased disappointment. In shape and sound, this pattern resembles the originally predicted paths between these variables (see Figures 2 and 4). There seems to be a glimmer of hope for the model, even if not all of the parts fit snugly.

Finally, no effect of causal attributions of human nature was detected. One potential explanation for this lack of findings could be the fact that one line item was the sole measure of attributions of human nature, which calls into question the reliability of the measure. Future research should consider a more broad measure of attributions of human nature.

IWAHr. Unfortunately, a moderating effect of IWAHr on the discrepancies manipulation with regards to disappointment was not detected. In short, the results of Study 4 were disappointing when it came to IWAHr. This non-significant effect will be considered further in the limitations section.

Contempt. It was predicted that participants would likely express feelings of contempt for humanity when they learned that people often fail to meet minimum moral standards of conduct (AO-discrepancies/proscriptive moral violations). This prediction was again confirmed, replicating the findings of Studies 2 and 3. Indeed, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition who learned that people are often murderous ne'er-do-

wells responded with significantly greater feelings of contempt for humanity than participants who learned that people typically fail to be highly prosocial and participants in the Control condition who were only given basic demographic information about humanity. This finding, again, contributes to the literatures on discrepancy theory and contempt. Indeed, these findings suggest that AO-discrepancies lead to emotions beyond agitation-related emotions (i.e., fear, anxiety, and/or nervousness; Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Higgins, 1987, 1989); indeed, they lead to feelings of contempt.

Unfortunately, the main effect was the only prediction that was confirmed regarding contempt. No evidence was collected to suggest that IT, causal attributions, or IWAHr moderated the effect of AO-discrepancies on contempt. Again, these non-effects might be due to the sample of participants. These non-significant effects will be addressed further in the limitations section below.

Prosocial Behavior. It was predicted that disappointment should motivate strong-identifiers to seek opportunities to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. However, given the potential reverse causal path demonstrated in Study 2, contempt might motivate strong-identifiers to avoid prosocial behavior even more so than weak-identifiers.

To examine these predictions, participants were given the opportunity to donate all or some of \$5 to UNICEF. Unfortunately, no effect of disappointment was detected, regardless of IWAHr. There was, however, a very peculiar contempt by IWAHr interaction effect. Among strong-identifiers, contempt was associated with decreased donating, which is somewhat different than what was found in the previous studies, in which strong-identifiers were unwavering in their prosocial behavior despite feelings of contempt. It could be that when money is brought into the equation, contempt caused

strong-identifiers to become less prosocial. Even more odd was the increased donating among weak-identifiers. If this latter finding does represent reality, then perhaps what appeared to be prosocial behavior was not intentionally prosocial at all, but a stratagem meant to remove one's self from the social situation at hand: To get out of the lab as quickly as possible.

By the end of the study, \$5 might not have been enough to lure weak-identifiers—“non people-persons”—experiencing a heightened sense of contempt for others to stick around. It would have been easier to quickly say “keep it” and run out as quickly as possible. If that were the case, then their “donation” was not intentionally prosocial: They paid to be socially avoidant. Of course, these are merely speculations and would require further testing to confirm or disconfirm.

Limitations. Had Study 4 been more successful, the limited sample of college students would have made one question the extent to which the findings apply to the general population. Nonetheless, the restricted sample of participants might have contributed to the minimal success enjoyed in Study 4. The participants in Studies 1 through 3 were sampled from across the United States and were far more diverse in age and education than the participants in Study 4, all of whom were undergraduate students from Lehigh. Perhaps the phenomenon of interest requires a more diverse sample than what could be drawn from the student population.

Among college students, learning that humanity is chock full of bandits bent on theft, rape, and murder might be enough to get a contemptuous response, which could have been why none of the proposed moderators moderated the effect of AO-discrepancies on contempt. Furthermore, as the sample was first year college students in

an introductory psychology course, their identity as Lehigh students might have been more salient than their human identity, which might explain why IWAHR did not moderate the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on either emotion. It was not until the prosocial behavior portion that IWAHR influenced how participants responded. It could be that asking participants to donate to UNICEF, a global relief organization, activated their own sense of connection—or lack thereof—with humanity.

Finally, a large majority of participants (84%) were willing to donate all of the \$5 to charity. There could be several reasons for this. First, it could be, as suggested previously, that participants might have been motivated to leave the study quickly. Refusing the \$5 might have facilitated this. On the other hand, when participants were assigned to the study, they only knew that they were going to receive partial course credit for participating. Because they were not expecting to receive \$5 in the first place, they might have felt that the \$5 was just an added bonus, painless to relinquish. Or it could simply be that \$5 is “pocket change” for these particular students, and therefore donating a pittance to charity was an easy decision. Unfortunately, the lack of variability in donating might have contributed to the scant findings in this study.

Despite these limitations, Study 4 contributed to the hypothesis about feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. Disappointment was a unique consequence of perceived AI-discrepancies, while contempt was a unique consequence of AO-discrepancies. The relationship between AO-discrepancies and contempt was not moderated by any of the proposed moderators in this study, but that might have been due to the restricted sample of participants. However, the relationship between AI-discrepancies and disappointment was strongest when those discrepancies were attributed

to controllable causes and when one's IT was not activated. Finally, we again found a relationship between contempt and prosocial behavior: contempt seems to restrict strong-identifiers' desire to donate to charity, whereas it might have motivated weak-identifiers to donate as a way to buy their way out of a potentially uncomfortable social situation.

General Discussion

Beliefs about humanity are powerful. What we think and feel about humanity have the potential to influence many aspects of our lives. Psychologists and philosophers alike have considered how our beliefs about humanity shape our politics, our ethics, and our intergroup and interpersonal relationships. At their best, beliefs about humanity can inspire us to act with compassion and kindness towards one another. At their worst, they can move us to violence or to turn away from one another.

The study of beliefs about humanity has been dominated by the study of humanity's traits, also described as the *human traits framework*. The human traits framework examines people's answer to the question "What are humanity's characteristics?" Here the focus is on people's mental representations of humanity and the effects that holding different mental representation might have on thought and behavior. Within this framework, researchers have found that people differentiate humanity's unique characteristics (i.e., traits shared only between individual humans), from humanity's essential qualities (i.e., characteristics that humanity might share with other species) and that variation in these attributed characteristics influences political behavior (Rosenberg, 1956), prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep; Wrightsman, 1992), intergroup behavior (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam,

2007; Morton & Postmes, 2011), trust (Sharma & Dubey, 1986), and even the practice of research (Antes et al., 2007).

There is another approach to the study of beliefs about humanity. This alternative approach focuses on the emotions people expressed towards humanity. The *feelings towards humanity framework* focuses on evaluative beliefs and the emotions people express towards humanity. This approach is fairly new and so has enjoyed less emphasis in the literature. In its infancy, research on emotions towards humanity has focused only on general positive versus negative emotions and the effects these broad categories of emotions have on intergroup dynamics (Luke & Maio, 2009). While this framework is limited, it does suggest something very important: both our thoughts and *feelings* about humanity shape or social behavior. Until now, however, specific emotions and their effects have been neglected in this literature.

The purpose of this work was to move beyond the broad categories of positive and negative emotions by focusing on two specific negative emotions: disappointment and contempt. Here, the potential psychological mechanism responsible for the expression of disappointment in and contempt for humanity, and the potential influence these emotions have on social behavior have been examined. This dissertation represents the first work to examine these specific emotions, their elicitors, and behavioral consequences in the context of beliefs about humanity.

Guided by literature on unique social emotions (De Cremer, 2006; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Lelieveld, van Dijk, van Beest, Steinel, & van Kleef, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; van Doorn, Heerdink, & van Kleef, 2012; Wubben,

De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2009), moral psychology (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009), and Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT; SDT; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005), it was proposed that disappointment and contempt are specific moral emotions and their unique expressions are influenced by the perception that humanity possesses specific moral shortcomings. As contempt is often expressed towards those for whom one believes are morally or intellectually inferior (Ekman, 1994a, 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003), it was been argued here that elevated feelings of contempt for humanity should follow perceived discrepancy between the way humanity *actually* behaves and the way one believes humanity *ought* to behave, because these “AO-discrepancies” represent *proscriptive* moral violation (i.e., the failure to inhibit immoral behavior like murder, rape, theft, etc.), which suggest humanity fail to meet minimal standards of morality. In contrast, as disappointment is often expressed towards those for whom one believes fail to fulfill a desired expectation or outcome (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009), it has further been argued here that elevated feelings of disappointment should follow perceived discrepancies between the way one believes humanity *actually* behaves and the way he or she would *ideally* like humanity to behave. The reason is that in moral terms, “AI-discrepancies” represent *prescriptive* moral violations, or the failure to behave with compassion and care, which communicates a lack of expected positive behavior and a lack of potential positive outcomes.

The relationship between disappointment, contempt, and an eliciting discrepancy was predicted to be moderated by the extent to which one identifies with all of humanity (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) and one’s implicit theory of personality (Costarelli,

2012; Chu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hewstone, 1990; Lau & Russel, 1980; Pettigrew, 1979), because these traits should influence the types of causes one attributes to a given moral discrepancy. Thus models for both feelings of disappointment in humanity and contempt for humanity were proposed. The model of disappointment proposes that identification with all of humanity (IWAH) and implicit personality theory (IT) moderate the effect of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment via the controllable/unstable causes to which one attributes humanity's perceived AI-discrepancies. Similarly, the model of contempt proposes that IWAH and IT moderate the effects of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt, via the uncontrollable/stable causes (i.e., human nature) to which one attributes humanity's perceived AO-discrepancies. In either case, the strength with which one identifies with humanity should motivate a person to explain those discrepancies in such a way as to minimize damage to one's own positive self-image. Theory consistency should be the force behind the relationship between a given IT and the causal attributions. Entity-theorists often attribute behavior and personality to uncontrollable/stable causes, while incremental-theorists often attribute behavior and personality to controllable/stable causes. Thus, incremental-theorists should have resembled strong-identifiers in their causal attributions, while entity-theorists should have resembled weak-identifiers.

Finally, a key difference between disappointment in and contempt for humanity might be their influence on social behavior. Specifically, it has been suggested that contempt should motivate social avoidance, and disappointment might motivate prosocial behavior if one is motivated to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. The body of

work presented here was meant to test the components of both models of disappointment and contempt and their potential for influencing social behavior.

Study 1: Testing the two models

Study 1 was designed to test the models of both contempt and disappointment. Unfortunately, in terms of support for the two complete models, Study 1 was not very successful. However, the ultimate purpose of this work was to learn something new about disappointment and contempt for humanity. In that sense, Study 1 did provide some insight.

As predicted, participants who felt a sense of connection and oneness with humanity were also those participants who reported feeling more disappointed in humanity when they believed that humanity was not as compassionate and kind as they would ideally have liked humanity to be (AI-discrepancies). This is, of course, consistent with the previous work, suggesting that strong-identifiers are more strongly effected by group-level discrepancy (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005), because they have more at stake when their group is found wanting. In this case, strong-identifying folk might have felt doubly disappointed because AI-discrepancies signal that humanity is not doing as well as they would ideally like humanity to do with respect to prosocial behavior, and because humanity is failing to benefit from highly prosocial behavior. This effect was independent of causal attribution of human nature. Indeed, a separate relationship between disappointment and attributions of human nature was revealed, suggesting that people who generally explain moral discrepancies in terms of an effect of human nature, also express more disappointment in humanity, regardless of whether humanity is failing to be highly compassionate or not.

What was also interesting is that the effect of AI-discrepancies on disappointment was independently moderated by causal attributions, but not in the predicted way. In Study 1, we found that AI-discrepancy beliefs were more highly associated with feelings of disappointment when they were believed to be uncontrollable. So when one believes that humanity is not as compassionate as he or she would ideally like humanity be, he or she might express more disappointment when he or she believes humanity has little power to change its general lack of compassion and kindness. Again this was independent of attributions of human nature, which was directly associated with disappointment and contempt. What makes this so odd is that human nature is an uncontrollable cause—people do not have control over their nature. It is what it is. Nevertheless, these findings seem to suggest that people might feel disappointed in humanity when they held the general belief that immorality is due to human nature.

With regards to contempt, Study 1 provided minimal insight. Of the hypothesized predictors of contempt for humanity only implicit theory of personality (IT) and attributions of human nature had any effect. Entity-theorists were more likely to express contempt for humanity, and participants who had a tendency to explain immoral behavior in terms of human nature also expressed more contempt for humanity. What is interesting here is that it had been predicted that these two variables would indeed predict increases in contempt, but not independently. The model suggested that entity-theorists would express feelings of contempt for humanity in response to AO-discrepancies, but that effect would be carried by attributions of human nature. Given insight from Dweck and Molden (2008), the reason attributions failed to mediate the effect of IT on contempt might simply have been that IT directly affects it.

Unexpectedly, age was revealed to be an important predictor of contempt. Specifically, it appeared that older participants expressed less contempt for humanity. Of course, they were also less likely to be entity-theorists and/or attribute moral shortcoming to human nature. These findings might suggest a maturing process, suggesting that through years of experiences dealing with life's difficulties, people learn to "cut humanity some slack." Alternatively, these findings might suggest a cohort effect in which older generations have a tendency to "cut humanity some slack," looking instead to the individual as both the source of moral discrepancies and the source of overcoming those discrepancies. However, the gerontological literature might tell a slightly different tale.

Research suggests that older adults tend to attribute personal shortcoming (failed memory, poor motor skills) to varying causes, depending on the age of the target behaving (Lackman & McArthur, 1986). Older adults tend to attribute personal shortcoming to uncontrollable causes, like a lack of ability, when the target is an older adult (or themselves). However, they attribute the same behavior to controllable causes, like a lack of effort, when the target is young (Lackman & McArthur, 1986). If older adults' heuristic of "people as a whole" is biased towards perceiving humanity as mostly full of young people, it could explain why older adults were incremental leaning in the studies reported here. If that is the case, it stands to reason that older adults experienced less contempt for humanity because they were more likely to believe humanity can put in more effort to change its behavior. On the other hand, it might not necessarily be that older adults fail to experience contempt for humanity; it might be that they were able to down-regulate it. Indeed, research suggests that older adults are often highly efficient

emotion regulators, and this ability to regulate negative emotions has been associated with a heightened sense of optimism (Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009). In sum, a sense of optimism that comes from the ability to regulate negative emotions, coupled with a tendency to believe young people have control over their shortcomings might account for these findings.

Finally, the most compelling findings in Study 1 might have been with regard to the associations between social avoidance and disappointment and contempt, respectively, and how those associations were moderated. Contrary to predictions, both disappointment and contempt were positively associated with social avoidance. Although it had been predicted that contempt would be associated with a general tendency to avoid social interaction and disappointment would motivate strong-identifiers to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity, this was not the case. However, the reason disappointment was positively associated with social avoidance could be because feelings, beliefs, and behavior were being measured as general tendencies, not as discrete reactions to information. Enduring disappointment or an enduring belief that humanity is not prosocial enough might wear on even the most ardent identifier, so much so that they might begin to avoid others. However, if a strong-identifier is confronted with new information that evokes disappointment, he/she might be motivated to combat those feelings by doing something prosocial to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity.

Study 1 did provide some insight about feelings of disappointment and contempt, although there were many unsupported predictions. One of the reasons for this could be that disappointment and contempt might be both reactionary responses and enduring feelings. Study 1 might have been measuring enduring feelings rather than reactionary

responses. Thus, in Studies 2 through 4 moral discrepancies were introduced and paired with experimentally manipulated moderators, so as to measure disappointment and contempt as reactionary emotions.

Experimental manipulations (Study 2 through 4).

Studies 2 through 4 were designed to test the effects of experimentally manipulated discrepancy information on feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. In each of these studies, manipulated discrepancy information was paired with an experimentally manipulated moderator. Causal attributions were manipulated in Study 2, common humanity in Study 3, and implicit theory in Study 4. Those variables that were not manipulated were measured, with the exception of Study 3, which included a measure of IWAH in addition to the common humanity manipulation.

Study 2 found the first evidence suggesting that AO-discrepancies cause participants to express both feelings of contempt and disappointment; AI-discrepancies seem to cause participants to express only feelings of disappointment. These effects were pronounced among strong-identifiers, such that strong-identifiers responded with more disappointment in response to AI-discrepancies than weak-identifiers, and more contempt in response to AO-discrepancies, which might be evidence of a “reverse causal path” (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005), in which strong-identifiers respond to severally negative information by distancing themselves from the group; significant feelings of contempt might be indirect evidence of this effect. Finally, prosocial responding to humanity’s moral discrepancies was affected by identification with all of humanity and contempt. Strong-identifiers consistently defend humanity and provide solutions to humanity’s moral shortcomings, regardless of whether they felt contempt for humanity, which might

have been evidence of an attempt to reverse the reverse causal path. Weak-identifiers who expressed high contempt did not defend humanity.

In sum, the findings of Study 2 were critical in supporting the argument that feelings of disappointment and contempt are connected to humanity's moral shortcomings, although only contempt in humanity leads to social avoidance. The extent to which moral shortcomings lead to disappointment and/or contempt and whether contempt leads to social avoidance was regulated by the extent to which one identified with all of humanity.

Study 3 replicated several of the findings of Study 2: AO-discrepancies caused participants to express feelings of contempt and disappointment, while AI-discrepancies caused participant to only express disappointment. While the common humanity manipulation failed, identification with all of humanity emerged as the sole significant moderator of discrepancies on feelings of contempt. However, the direction of the moderation reversed in Study 3. Here, strong-identifiers responded with less contempt than weak-identifiers and were less influenced by the discrepancies information. Also the moderating effects of identification did not extend to feelings of disappointment in the same way as they did in Study 2. Strong-identifiers expressed no more disappointment than weak-identifiers in response to AI-discrepancies, but the effect of AO-discrepancies was isolated to weak-identifiers. That is, in Study 3 only weak-identifiers reported significant disappointment in response to AO-discrepancies.

Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3, identification and contempt were shown to influence prosocial responding in light of damning information about humanity. Specifically, contempt contributed to less defending of humanity in the AI-discrepancies

condition and reduced the probability of providing a solution to humanity's moral shortcomings. Finally, strong-identifiers were quick to defend humanity and oftentimes contributed significantly more words to the collective response than weak-identifiers. However, when weak-identifiers were actually motivated to defend humanity, they contributed even more words to the collective response than strong-identifiers.

Study 3 provided additional evidence that feelings of disappointment and contempt are indeed dependent on discrepancy beliefs, and contempt has a significant impact on curtailing prosocial behavior. Identification was again revealed to be an important moderator; crucially, Study 3 demonstrated that identification's moderating effects might be quite dynamic.

The findings in Study 4 were somewhat consistent with Studies 2 and 3 in the sense that AI-discrepancies caused participants to experience elevated feelings of disappointment, while AO-discrepancies caused participants to experience elevated feelings of contempt. Unfortunately, the findings in Study 4 were also quite inconsistent with the previous two experiments. First, AO-discrepancies did not cause elevated feelings of disappointment as they did in the previous two studies. Second, IWAH did not moderate any of the effects of the discrepancies manipulation. Third, the effect of AI-discrepancies on disappointment was moderated by causal attributions, such that disappointment was higher among participants who believed humanity could be more caring and compassionate. Fourth, the effects of AI-discrepancies were disrupted by the IT manipulation, such that AI-discrepancies caused elevated disappointment, but only when IT was not activated. It seemed that IT, whether entity or incremental, blocked the effects of AI-discrepancies. Fifth and finally, we again found a relationship between

contempt and prosocial behavior: contempt seemed to restrict strong-identifiers' desire to donate to charity, while it appeared to motivate weak-identifiers to donate; however, weak-identifiers might have had more selfish motives for donating.

In sum, Study 4 provided corroborating evidence that disappointment and contempt are indeed consequences of humanity's moral discrepancies, even in a limited sample of participants. Study 4 once again demonstrated the negative effect of contempt on prosocial behavior, although this time, the effect was isolated to strong-identifiers.

Disappointment and contempt: Unique human emotions.

One purpose of this dissertation was to learn more about two unique negative emotions, disappointment and contempt, the psychological mechanisms that cause people to express disappointment in and contempt for humanity, and about how disappointment in and contempt for humanity influence social behavior.

Disappointment and contempt are distinct negative emotions, with their own facial expressions, determinants, and consequences. Discrepancies between the ways in which one perceives that humanity *actually* behaves, in moral terms, and the ways in which one believes humanity *ought* or *ought not* behave, in moral terms, and/or how one would *ideally* like humanity to behave, in moral terms, greatly influences the extent to which one feels disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity. Individuals might feel elevated disappointment in humanity when they learn that people often fail to be kind and compassionate to one another. However, they might express both disappointment and contempt for humanity when they learn that people are often cruel and murderous. These are very interesting and important findings for three reasons. First, this work is the first to successfully apply SDT to beliefs and feelings about humanity. Second, this work is the

first to document that AO-discrepancies elicit feelings of contempt in addition to agitated related emotions. Third, these findings further contribute to the SDT literature (Higgins, 1987, 1989; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005), by demonstrating that, at times, two unique discrepancy beliefs can give rise to the same emotion. At times, both AI and AO-discrepancies lead to feelings of disappointment. Perhaps what this means is that AO and AI-discrepancies can activate feelings of disappointment via two divergent pathways.

Failing to act with compassion towards one another means that humanity is also failing to benefit from high-level cooperation. In other words, AI-discrepancies result in the failure of a positive outcome. However, the effect of AO-discrepancies, or the failure to meet minimum moral standards by hurting one another, might be considered the disconfirmation of a positive expectation. Separate discrepancies might activate disappointment from two different sources of information: failed outcomes and failed expectations, respectively. Of course, disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition was less pronounced than disappointment in the AI-discrepancies condition, likely due to the fact that AO-discrepancies are also influencing feelings of contempt.

The determinates of contempt align a bit more easily with AO-discrepancies, such that contempt is associated with looking down on a target from a position of moral or intellectual superiority. All else being equal, people not in jail for murder or for rape, etc., probably believe that they at least meet minimal moral standards. So when they learn that a significant portion of people do not meeting this same standard, they might automatically be put in to a position of superiority, which might cause them to feel contempt for humanity.

Of course, not everyone responds to the same discrepancies in the same way (with disappointment and/or contempt), at the same time, or for the same reasons. Indeed, while the findings were somewhat inconsistent, this work suggests that human identity might at times moderate these effects. Either believing or learning that humanity is not as compassionate as it should be can cause strong-identifiers to feel disappointed in humanity. What we cannot tell, however, is whether in these instances strong-identifiers' disappointment stems from the perception that humanity is not living up to their positive expectations, or whether it stems from the perception that humanity is failing to fully benefit from highly prosocial outcomes. A simple solution to tease these perceptions apart might be to simply ask participants why they feel disappointment in humanity.

Human identity's role as a moderator of the effect of AO-discrepancies on contempt was also inconsistent. At times, strong-identifiers responded with more contempt than weak-identifiers (Study 2), while at other times, they responded with less contempt than weak-identifiers (Study 3). When strong-identifiers responded with less contempt, it could be because they rejected the information, deciding instead to rely on their own schema to reaffirm humanity's positive image. When strong-identifiers responded with more contempt, it might have been symptomatic of an underlying emotional break from humanity associated with the "reverse casual path" described by Petrocelli and Smith (2005). This difference might be better understood after a follow-up study that measures contempt and humanity identification, both pre- and post-presentation of the AO-discrepancies. We might find that the strong-identifiers who report greater feelings of contempt for humanity also show a greater decrease in the extent to which they still identify with humanity after they learn the discrepant behavior.

Of course, even when strong-identifiers felt contempt for humanity, they were willing to defend humanity, which might have been an attempt to reverse the reverse causal path. Thus, one could test whether identification remains when participants are given the opportunity to defend humanity and whether identification decreases when they are not given the opportunity. In sum, while human identity might be important in determining if and when people will respond with disappointment and contempt, the reasons why human identity might be important most certainly remains a mystery. Additional research is required.

Implicit personality theory's (IT) role in these studies was even less consistent than the role of human identity. The best we can tell is that entity-theorists have a tendency to feel more contempt (Study 1) and disappointment (Study 2) in humanity than incremental-theorists, which is consistent with previous work (Dweck & Molden, 2008). However, when faced with damning information about humanity, incremental-theorists respond like entity-theorists, with significant disappointment and contempt (Study 2). Finally, when IT is manipulated, it seems to have a tendency to block the effects of AI-discrepancies on disappointment (Study 4).

When we measure IT, not only are we learning something about the way people generally reason about personality and moral behavior, but we are also learning something about their emotional lives, about the emotions entity-theorists and incremental-theorists typically express (Dweck & Molden, 2008). However, when IT is manipulated (Study 4), it seems to operate differently. The reason could be that when IT is primed, it might only activate the reasoning side of the IT coin, leaving the emotional tendencies inactive. If that is the case, manipulated IT might have led participants to

remain objective when reading the rather damning information about humanity, which in turn mitigated the experience of negative emotions. One way to begin examining this might be to compare participants who are primed to make decisions subjectively or objectively versus participants who are primed to think like entity- or incremental-theorists and then measure their emotional responses to discrepancies. If manipulated IT activates reasoning rather than emotional responding, then participants in the entity and incremental theorist conditions should not differ emotionally from each other or from participants in the objective condition.

Causal attributions moderated the effects of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment in Studies 1 and 4; however, the nature of that interaction was different across the two studies. In Study 1, disappointment was greater when AI-discrepancies were uncontrollable. In Study 4, disappointment was greater when AI-discrepancies were highly controllable. The pattern in Study 1 could suggest that if people believe that humanity has no control over being highly prosocial—that is, they believe that people could not become more prosocial with extra effort—disappointment could still be a reasonable response, because people still see benefit in others being highly compassionate. In other words, they are disappointed in humanity because it is not able to benefit from highly prosocial behavior. The pattern in Study 4 would suggest that when humanity has the capability to be highly prosocial, the tendency to feel disappointment is consistent with the failure to meet positive expectations. Taken together, the effects of controllability attributions on AI-discrepancies might be similar to the effect of AO-discrepancies' effect on disappointment: When AI-discrepancies are controllable, disappointment might stem from the disconfirmation of a positive outcome. When AI-

discrepancies are not controllable, disappointment might stem from the disconfirmation of expected behavior. This, of course, is speculative and would require further testing.

An important aspect of the proposed models of disappointment and contempt was that causal attributions were thought to carry the moderating effects of IWAH and IT. This, however, was not the case. There could be several reasons why the quasi-mediation effect of causal attributions was not evident. First, if causal attribution were to carry the effects of IWAH, IWAH would have had to predict causal attributions. This was not the case. The extent to which people identified with humanity was unrelated to the specific types of explanations offered in these studies (i.e., human nature, or controllable causes)—the fact that humanity is not being compassionate enough is enough to cause strong-identifiers to feel disappointment in humanity. Strong-identifiers do not seem to need to reason about why humanity is not being compassionate enough. That being said, had we looked at external explanations, we might have come to a different conclusion.

As external explanations suggest that outside forces have driven a target to a behavior or outcome, the target is less blameworthy and is therefore less likely to take the brunt of negative emotions (Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013). In the context of disappointment in and contempt for humanity, if humanity is seen as not compassionate enough because of external forces—of course, it is hard to imagine what forces are external to humanity that would cause them to be less compassionate, beyond natural disasters—observers would likely respond with less disappointment, especially if they are strong-identifiers. Similarly, if humanity is murderous and vile because of external forces, both strong and weak-identifiers would likely respond with less contempt. However, external explanations were deliberately left out because the purpose of this

work was to uncover when people respond with disappointment *versus* contempt. It makes little sense to think that external explanation would make one respond with one negative emotion versus another for the simple reason that external explanations help decrease negative response.

Causal attributions did not seem to carry the moderating effects of IT, presumably because when IT does moderate the effects of discrepancy beliefs on emotional responses, it does so directly. While the nature of one's IT might be revealed through the types of explanations he or she makes, the influence that one's IT has on his or her emotional responses to others might not depend on the explanation he or she generates.

There is one more alternative to consider with regards to the relationship between causal attributions and feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. Given the highly inconsistent findings, it could very well be that disappointment in and contempt for humanity are indifferent to causal attributions. That is, causal attributions might not moderate the effects of discrepancies on feelings of disappointment and contempt. Consider, first, that the primary determinate of disappointment is the absence of a positive expectation or outcome. Indeed, as Higgins (1987, 1989) points out, it might not be the discrepancy, *per se*, that brings about a certain emotion, but the outcome. In a sense, the fact that nuances between different internal causal attributions had no effect was consistent with Higgins's and Petrocelli and Smith's (2005) findings. When discrepancies are internal, the effect of the discrepancy seems to elicit the emotional response, but when discrepancies are external, the focus shifts to the external cause, which then elicits the emotional response. Thus, in the absence of an external cause, the focus remains on the outcome, or in the case of disappointment, the lack of a desired

outcome or expectation. In short, it might only be the effect that matters when it comes to disappointment, because regardless of whether humanity had control or not, the desired outcome was not present. The reasoning might be the same for contempt. When a target is deemed mentally or morally inferior, the cause of that inferiority might not matter. When it comes to contempt, a target's present state of being might be all that is required for a contempt response.

These possibilities are interesting and speak to how disappointment and contempt might be quite different from anger and blame, the negative emotions that have been the focus of much work in the attribution literature (see discussion above). The attribution literature shows that anger and blame are significantly affected by perceived differences in controllability and the internal/external distinction (see discussion of attribution theory above). Here, it might very well have been demonstrated that disappointment and contempt are not affected by these same causal attributions. If that is true, the (lack of) findings might suggest that there is a limit to the influence of causal attributions on emotional response. Of course, the purpose of this work was never to compare the effects of causal attributions on anger and blame versus disappointment and contempt. However, what this could mean is that one could feel sequential emotions towards humanity. For instance, one could express both anger and disappointment towards humanity if one believes AI-discrepancies stem from controllable causes. He or she might express disappointment because of the lack of a positive outcome or expectation and anger because the responsibility for that lack of the positive outcome or expectation rests with humanity. There might be several combinations of emotions one might respond with when discrepancy information is combined with different causal attributions. These

possibilities could have implications for SDT, which suggests a one-to-one relationship between a specific discrepancy and a specific emotion, only moderated by the internal-external causal distinction. Here we expand on SDT to suggest that a unique discrepancy might evoke a number of emotions. Different aspects or details related to the specific discrepancy information being examined might evoke different emotions.

In sum, the relationship between causal attributions and feelings of disappointment and contempt might be a very distant one, or even non-existent. Causal attributions do not seem to carry the moderating effects of IWAH or IT, presumably because emotional responses from strong-identifiers are not necessarily dependent on nuances between different internal explanations, and because causal attributions are already an important aspect of implicit theory. However, this does not mean that attributions of human nature influence the extent to which one expresses contempt for humanity, only that people who have a tendency to explain humanity's immoral behavior as a function of human nature also have a tendency to express contempt. Causal attributions, specifically those that address controllability implications, might moderate the effects of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment, but given the inconsistency in the pattern of findings across studies, the results speak against it. Indeed, what we might ultimately conclude is that the effects of causal attributions are limited to certain emotions, and disappointment and contempt might fall beyond their influence. This is an important possibility because it could contribute to the literature on attribution theory (see Weiner, 2006, for a complete review). Previous work has focused on the fact that when negative behavior is perceived as controllable, people respond with anger and blame towards a target. Here, we have shown that the failure to be compassionate and kind can

lead to feelings of disappointment, whether it is controllable or not. Similarly, the failure to meet minimum moral standards can lead to feelings of contempt, whether other people have control over their behavior or not.

Disappointment, contempt, and social avoidance.

Disappointment and contempt were expected to differ with regards to their effect on social behavior. Disappointment was thought to have the potential to motivate folks (especially strong-identifiers) to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. On the other hand, contempt was thought to motivate social avoidance in order to distance oneself from members of a tainted humanity. It turned out that this was only half right.

Disappointment did not seem to motivate recuperative responding, not even in strong-identifiers. This effect might have been evidence of the “long term” effects of disappointment on social behavior. That this, when one experiences an enduring sense of disappointment in humanity, they might tend to avoid others. However, this tendency was moderated by attributions of controllability, such that participants who have a general sense that humanity’s moral depravity is controllable become less prosocial when they feel disappointment in humanity.

In the remaining studies, in only one instance was disappointment related to social avoidance. In Study 2, strong feelings of disappointment in humanity were associated with a decrease in word-count, but only among participants who strongly believe moral discrepancies are controllable, replicating the finding in Study 1. Nevertheless, it is difficult to take much stock in its validity. Beyond these two instances, disappointment was unrelated to changes in prosocial behavior, whether it was providing a solution to humanity’s moral shortcomings, writing in defense of humanity, contributing words to a

collective work, or donating to a charity. Thus, disappointment as a reactive emotion might be a healthier negative emotion in that it does not seem to cause one to avoid social interaction or prosocial behavior, unless perhaps among people who have a strong sense that moral discrepancies are highly controllable. This might be why the effect of disappointment on social avoidance was strongest in Study 1. When disappointment is enduring, it might have the most acute negative consequences for prosocial behavior.

Contempt, on the other hand, was consistently associated with social avoidance—with the exception of weak-identifiers in Study 4, which has already been addressed. These findings are consistent with previous work suggesting that feelings of contempt are associated with avoiding those for whom one feels contempt (Mackie et al., 2000). In that work, contempt was usually expressed in an interracial context. Here we see that contempt for all of humanity has a more generic effect, which might be even more damaging. But the contempt effect was moderated by identification, such that strong-identifiers were resistant to the negative effects of contempt, at least most of the time. With the exception of Study 4, strong-identifiers remained prosocial regardless of feeling contempt for humanity. Perhaps this partially explains why Haidt (2003) suggested that contempt has no clear behavioral tendency, because the tendency can be moderated by other factors, namely identification with the target of one's contempt.

The take-away here might be that disappointment and contempt have unique behavioral consequences. Contempt often motivates one to avoid social situations or prosocial behavior more generally. In contrast, while disappointment might not activate prosocial behavior, it rarely causes one to be less prosocial. There seems to be far fewer

negative consequences associated with disappointment. In this sense, it might be far better to feel disappointment in humanity than contempt for humanity.

Limitations.

There were several limiting factors that might have influenced the results of these studies. The literature on unique emotions makes a convincing argument for a division between disappointment and contempt. However, measuring disappointment and contempt as unique emotional responses was much more difficult. In every study, contempt and disappointment shared a great deal of negativity. Indeed, in Study 1, when the model of each emotion was tested, neither model was significant, but one emotion was always accounting for the “lion’s share” of the variance in the other. The problem might have been that people often have a difficult time distinguishing their own emotions. Indeed, Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner and Gross (2007) suggest that people vary greatly in their ability to differentiate between different emotions. Some people rely on broad categories (e.g., feeling good versus feeling bad), while others can be quite specific (i.e., feeling disappointed in someone rather than anger). Thus, people who have difficulty differentiating emotions and experience general negative feelings in response to humanity's bad behavior might have scored high on both contempt and disappointment. So there is still convincing evidence in the literature that disappointment and contempt are unique emotions. In future studies of this kind, it might be beneficial to pretest participants for their ability to distinguish between emotions.

There is also the question of whether participants were truly focused on humanity as a whole, both when completing the measure and when performing the task. Of course, there is always the question of whether or not participants are focused on humanity as a

whole or some subset of humanity, both when completing the measure and when performing the task, especially given the types of behaviors examined—very few people would believe that the entirety of humanity is murderous. However, as in previous studies examining cynicism for humanity (Getty, 2012), the availability heuristic might be at work here, and steps were taken in order to bolster the connection between the available information and people in general. For example, participants were always asked to respond to questions about “people in general.” In Study 3, pictures of the Earth were included so that participants would think of people in a more global sense. Finally, global statistics about people were included in the fictitious study conducted on behalf of the United Nations. Beyond these measures, future studies might want to explicitly ask participants to think of humanity both when performing the task and completing the tasks.

The participants in Studies 1 through 3 were diverse in age, but most of them were educated Caucasian Americans (albeit from all over the country) with Internet access. The participants in the pilot study and Study 4 were young-adult undergraduate students from a private university in Northeastern United States. Responses provided by these samples might not reflect the responses of individuals from different educational backgrounds, races, or socio-economic status. Thus, caution must be taken in generalizing these findings to the population at large.

Conclusion

What we think we know about humanity shapes the emotions we express towards humanity, which in turn influences the ways in which we interact with one another. One

focus of this work was to better understand when humanity is the target of disappointment and contempt and how these emotions might influence social behavior.

While the relationships between what we think about humanity and what we feel for humanity are at times dynamic, we might conclude this: when we believe or otherwise learn that humanity is not as prosocial as we think humanity should be, we might express feelings of disappointment. While disappointment might be defined as a negative emotion, it does not seem to drive a wedge between the one who expresses disappointment and other people.

We might also conclude this: when we believe or otherwise learn that humanity is murderous, vile, evil, and overly capable of horrid acts of violence, we respond with disappointment and contempt for humanity. Contempt might drive the wedge deep, cutting us off from one another, that is, unless we have a strong sense of communion with our fellow human beings. This sense of oneness might not always alleviate feelings of contempt, but they might help us to avoid the potential negative consequences of contempt. Of course, if we can avoid contempt altogether and instead opt for disappointment, then perhaps we will not be overly prosocial, but at least we might not go out of our way to avoid one another.

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Footnotes

1. Strong-identifiers might also experience feelings of disappointment in humanity in response to AO-discrepancies, if they attribute those discrepancies to unstable causes, for similar reasons. On the other hand, AO-discrepancies might lead to a reverse causal path (see Petrocelli & Smith, 2005, Study 2) in which the realization of such discrepancies lead to a decreased sense of identification with humanity. If that is true, then, previously strong-identifiers might respond similarly to weak-identifiers: with contempt.
2. Velicer and Fava (1998; as referenced by Costello and Osborne, 2005) suggested that a factor loading .8 and greater can be considered high. However, Costello and Osborne (2005) noted that factor loading above .8 might be less likely to occur in “real data.” They suggest that low to moderate loading between, .4 and .7 might be more likely, and adequate, in research conducted in the social sciences. Because contempt and disappointment share some negativity, low factor loadings might not help to differentiate the two emotions. Again, the goal was to find adjectives that uniquely related to disappointment and contempt; therefore, the threshold for inclusion was adjusted up to .5 and standardized for all exploratory factor analyses.
3. Disgust was dropped from the contempt measure. The removal of disgust from the measure of contempt is in keeping with previous research suggesting that disgust, contempt, and anger represent distinct emotions that are often confused (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman &

Heider, 1988, Haidt, 2003; Izard, 1977; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).

4. Note that the external dimension of causal attributions is not included in the equation. This was done intentionally. The reason is that we wanted to learn more about explanations that might cause people to respond with disappointment versus contempt. Given the exonerating effects of external explanations often demonstrated in the literature (see Weiner, 2006, for a review; also see Gill & Andreychik, 2009; Andreychik & Gill, 2012; Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013), it did not seem likely that external explanation would cause someone to express one negative emotion over another.
5. In a separate study conducted with a majority of Indian subjects, the emotion adjective “displeased” was strongly associated with the disappointment items noted in the pilot study and loaded strongly on the same factor (factor loading was greater than .7) This was taken as good evidence, at the time, for including “displeased” in the measure of disappointment for the remaining studies. What is interesting about this is displeasure was included in the pilot study but was removed because it loaded strongly on both factors. It is difficult to say why “displeased” would load strongly on one factor while “displeasure” loaded on both. It could be that “displeased” is more prominent in daily use than displeasure. That is, people might say “I’m displeased with X” more often than “I’m experiencing displeasure because of X.” Alternatively, cultural differences might explain the change: “Displeased” might be more greatly associated with disappointment in India than in the United States. Finally, the difference might

have been due to statistical power. The pilot study might not have had the necessary number of participants to accurately place displeasure on a single factor.

6. One alternative that was explored was that IWAH only predicts specific causal attributions in light of specific types of discrepancy information. To test this alternative hypothesis, attributions of controllability and human nature were regressed on IWAH, AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs, and the interactions between IWAH and the two types of discrepancy beliefs. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Neither interaction was significant ($ts < 1, ps < .7$). This hypothesis was also tested in Studies 3 and 4, but to no avail ($ts < 1, ps < .4$).
7. Preacher and colleagues suggest that the “classical causal-steps approach” might not be the preferred method for testing indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Instead, they advocate the use of bootstrapping methods in path analysis. Thus, the models of disappointment and contempt illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 were tested two different ways: (1) via the causal steps approach, the procedures and results of which are presented here in detail, and (2) via structural equation modeling (SEM), which applied bootstrapping techniques to test for indirect effects. Unfortunately, the results from the SEM approach were no better than what was reported here using the causal-steps approach. Indeed, neither the model of disappointment (bootstrapping $N = 5000; \chi^2(46) = 536.42, p < .001; CFI = .36, TLI = .21, RMSEA = .15$) or contempt (bootstrapping $N = 5000; \chi^2(46) = 517.82, p < .001; CFI = .37, TLI = .21, RMSEA = .15$) fit the data well.

8. There was concern that human identity might be confounded with political ideology, such that those who identify strongly with humanity might have strong liberal leanings. To answer this question, the correlations between political ideology (measured by a single item with high scores indicating more liberal views) and identification with humanity were examined and then political ideology was included in each model to determine if political ideology impacted the models. While political ideology and identification with all of humanity was correlated (Study 1, $r = .29, p = .02$; Study 2, $r = .17, p = .02$; Study 3, $r = .39, p < .0001$; Study 4, $r = .27, p = .004$), none of the models were impacted. Indeed, even individually, political ideology had no relationship with either contempt or disappointment in humanity ($r_s < .07, p_s > .3$)
9. These analyses were rerun excluding age as a covariate. Removing age did not significantly change the results of the analysis.
10. Again, age was a significant predictor of contempt ($B = -.27, t(66) = 4.66, p < .0001$) and disappointment ($B = .31, t(66) = 3.71, p < .0001$) and therefore was included as an additional covariate.
11. It is important to acknowledge that typically when there is more than one dependent variable, multivariate procedures are preferred. However, these studies presented a special case in which the effect of one dependent variable needed to be strictly controlled when analyzing the other. Specifically, the rise in any single emotion needs to be separated from rise in “overall negativity.” After consulting sources, including Howell (2007), Field (2009), and Stevens (2009), I was not certain that multivariate analyses provided this type of control, which is why I

turned to ANCOVA. It is also important to acknowledge that in a typical situation in which ANCOVA is being used, there is an assumed independence between the independent variables and the covariates, and that the experimental manipulation should not have an effect on the covariates. While this might be true in most cases, here I am trying to isolate the unique effects of each emotion, which requires controlling the influence of the non-target emotion by co-varying it out, which is why I have chosen to use ANCOVA here and in the remaining studies.

12. Because the results of attributions of controllability by disappointment resembled what would be expected from contempt (i.e., withdrawal), I tested the exact same model described here, but replaced disappointment with contempt. None of these alternative analyses approached significance (for Solution, $X^2 = 1$, $p = .30$; for “in defense” and word-count, $F_s < 1.5$, $p_s > .20$).

Tables

Table 1

Factor Analysis of Feelings towards Humanity (Pilot Study 1)

| Item | Factor 1 | Factor2 | Factor3 | Factor 4 | Factor 5 | Factor 6 |
|-----------------|----------|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|
| Frustration | 0.89 | | | | | |
| Irritation | 0.8 | | | | | |
| Disappointment | 0.77 | | | | | |
| Dissatisfaction | 0.6 | | | | | |
| Let down | 0.61 | | | | | 0.58 |
| Anger | 0.61 | 0.63 | | | | |
| Upset | 0.6 | 0.7 | | | | |
| Displeasure | 0.68 | 0.6 | | | | |
| Contempt | | 0.64 | | | | |
| Scorn | | 0.63 | | | | |
| Loathing | | 0.53 | 0.58 | | | |
| Aggravation | | 0.52 | | | | |
| Disgust | | 0.6 | | | | |
| Disrespect | | | 0.89 | | | |
| Hostility | | | 0.75 | | | |
| Dislike | | | 0.61 | | | |
| Detestation | | | 0.58 | | | |
| Hate | | | 0.55 | | | |
| Discouragement | | | | 0.82 | | |
| Disenchantment | | | | 0.77 | | |
| Disheartenment | | | | 0.73 | | |
| Disillusion | | | | | 0.68 | |
| Derision | | | | | 0.66 | |
| Sadness | | | | | | 0.77 |

Table 2

Correlation Table (Study 1)

| Parameter | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|---------|-------|---------|---------|------|--------|------|------|
| 1. AO-Discrepancy Beliefs | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. AI-Discrepancy Beliefs | .64*** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Disappointment | .30*** | .21** | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Contempt | .22** | .28*** | .69*** | | | | | | | | |
| 5. IWAH | -.02 | -.05 | .008 | 0.06 | | | | | | | |
| 6. Implicit Theory | 0.08 | .16** | 0.08 | .14* | -.12* | | | | | | |
| 7. HN Attributions | .2** | .15* | .2*** | .21** | -0.01 | .13* | | | | | |
| 8. Controllability Attributions | 0.1 | .19** | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.03 | -.21** | -.18** | | | | |
| 9. Social Behavior | -.11 | -.14* | -.29*** | -.24*** | .12* | -.25*** | -.2** | 0.11 | | | |
| 10. Age | -.11 | .03 | -.08 | -.19** | -.03 | -.12* | -.20*** | .06 | .02 | | |
| 11. Sex | .04 | .11 | -.05 | .02 | .13* | .03 | -.21*** | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.04 | |
| 12. Education | -.10 | .15* | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.11 | 0 | -0.06 | .00 | -.14** | .06 | 0.05 |

* $p < .05$
 ** $p < .01$
 *** $p < .001$

Table 3

Study 2 ANCOVA, Discrepancies by Attributions

| | Disappointment | | | Contempt | | | n | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------|---------------|---------------|----------|----|-------|--------|---------|
| | Observed Mean | Adjusted Mean | SD | Observed Mean | Adjusted Mean | SD | | | | |
| Control | | | | | | | | | | |
| No Explanation | 2.31 | 2.59 | 0.14 | 1.76 | 2.01 | 0.11 | 36 | | | |
| Human Nature | 2.63 | 2.81 | 0.14 | 1.85 | 1.97 | 0.10 | 35 | | | |
| Controllability | 2.53 | 2.63 | 0.14 | 1.98 | 2.09 | 0.11 | 34 | | | |
| AO-Discrepancies | | | | | | | | | | |
| No Explanation | 3.28 | 2.94 | 0.15 | 2.39 | 2.23 | 0.11 | 31 | | | |
| Human Nature | 3.09 | 2.95 | 0.16 | 2.2 | 2.09 | 0.12 | 27 | | | |
| Controllability | 3.23 | 2.85 | 0.16 | 2.44 | 2.3 | 0.12 | 25 | | | |
| AI-Discrepancies | | | | | | | | | | |
| No Explanation | 3.07 | 3.03 | 0.15 | 2.12 | 1.97 | 0.11 | 30 | | | |
| Human Nature | 3.05 | 3.03 | 0.15 | 2.08 | 1.97 | 0.11 | 30 | | | |
| Controllability | 2.86 | 3.05 | 0.15 | 1.76 | 1.85 | 0.12 | 28 | | | |
| Source | Disappointment | | | | | Contempt | | | | |
| | SS | df | MS | F | p-value | SS | df | MS | F | p-value |
| Discrepancies | 6.26 | 2 | 3.13 | 4.88 | 0.008 | 3.27 | 2 | 1.64 | 4.3 | 0.01 |
| Attributions | 0.37 | 2 | 0.186 | 0.29 | 0.75 | 0.28 | 2 | 0.14 | 0.36 | 0.69 |
| Discrepancies*Attributions | 0.61 | 4 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 4 | 0.22 | 0.58 | 0.68 |
| Covariates | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contempt | 144.92 | 1 | 144.92 | 225.43 | <.0001 | | | | | |
| Disappointment | | | | | | 85.81 | 1 | 85.81 | 225.43 | <.0001 |
| age | 3.66 | 1 | 3.66 | 5.70 | 0.02 | 7.39 | 1 | 7.39 | 19.4 | <.0001 |

Table 4

ANCOVA Results for Study 2, Discrepancies by IWAHr

| Source | Disappointment | | | | | Contempt | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|----|-------|-------|---------|----------|----|-------|-------|---------|
| | SS | df | MS | F | p-value | SS | df | MS | F | p-value |
| Discrepancies | 0.93 | 2 | 0.46 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 1.43 | 2 | 0.72 | 2.43 | 0.09 |
| IWAHr (dummy coded) | 0.12 | 1 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.67 | 0.001 | 1 | 0.186 | 0.01 | 0.94 |
| Discrepancies*IWAHr (Dummy coded) | 5.2 | 2 | 2.6 | 3.93 | 0.02 | 4.26 | 2 | 2.13 | 7.23 | 0.001 |
| Covariates | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contempt | 41.88 | 1 | 41.88 | 63.36 | < .0001 | | | | | |
| Disappointment | | | | | | 26.08 | 1 | 26.08 | 88.45 | < .0001 |
| age | 7.64 | 1 | 7.64 | 13.76 | 0.0004 | 6.4 | 1 | 6.4 | 21.69 | < .0001 |

Figures

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 11




Figure 12




Figure 13




Figure 14




Figure 15




Figure 16




Figure 17




Figure 18




Figure 19




Figure 20




Figure 21




Figure 22




Figure 23




Figure 24




Figure 25




Figure 26




Figure 27




Figure 28




Figure 29




Figure 30




Figure 31




Figure 32




Figure 33




Figure 34




Figure 35





Figure 36



Appendix A: Negative Emotions Towards Humanity

*“Please circle a number that best describes the frequency you feel the following emotions towards **people as a whole.**”*

*Please respond with a **number** from this scale:*

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very
Often

-
-
- | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| ___ disappointment | ___ anger | ___ let down | ___ contempt |
| ___ disdain | ___ irritation | ___ aggravation | ___ dissatisfaction |
| ___ hate | ___ hostility | ___ disgust | ___ upset |
| ___ frustration | ___ disapproval | ___ scorn | ___ loathing |
| ___ detestation | ___ disenchantment | ___ disillusion | ___ derision |
| ___ sadness | ___ discouragement | ___ displeasure | ___ disheartenment |
| ___ disrespect | | | |

Appendix B: Disappointment in Humanity Scale

*Please circle the number that best describes the frequency you feel the following emotions “towards” **People as a whole**.*

1. Disappointment

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

2. Let Down

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

3. Frustration

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

4. Irritation

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

5. Dissatisfaction

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

Appendix C: Contempt for Humanity Scale

*Circle the number that best describes the frequency you feel the following emotions “towards” **People as a whole**.*

1. Contempt

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

2. Disgust

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

3. Scorn

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

4. Aggravation

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

5. Loathing

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

Appendix D: Contempt, anger, and fear items from Mackie et al. (2000)

*Circle the number that best describe the frequency you feel the following emotions “towards” **People as a whole**.*

1. Repelled

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

2. Sick

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

3. Anger

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

4. Displeased

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

5. Furious

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

6. Worry

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

7. Anxiety

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

8. Fear

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

Appendix E: Positive items from the Social Emotions Scale (Created by Dr. Gill)

*Circle the number that best describes the frequency you feel the following emotions “towards” **People as a whole?***

1. Sympathy

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

2. Compassion

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

3. Caring

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

4. Concern

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

5. Love

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often

Appendix F: Ought Behaviors

“Your ought representation of humanity is the representation of humanity in which all people fulfill their duties and obligations. It’s defined by people behaving in ways you believe people should or ought to behave, or feel obligated to behave. It’s not necessary that people actually behaves this way now, only that you believe people ought to behave this way.”

Please rate the extent to which you agree that each of the following acts represent ways in which humanity **should not** behave using the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6

Disagree

Agree

- ____ People should not act dishonestly
- ____ People should not sleep around
- ____ People should not steal
- ____ People should not act selfishly
- ____ People should not intentionally harm each other
- ____ People should not discriminate against each other
- ____ People should not drink to excess
- ____ People should not manipulate each other
- ____ People should not be wasteful
- ____ People should not be cruel
- ____ People should not be aggressive/violent
- ____ People should not act with arrogance
- ____ People should not be lazy

Appendix G: Ideal Behaviors

“Your ideal representation of humanity is the representation in which all people behave in a way you’d really like them to behave. It’s defined by the way you would ideally like people to behave. It’s not necessary that people actually behaves this way now, only that you want people to behave this way.”

Please rate the extent to which you agree that each of the following acts represent ways in which humanity ***should behave*** using the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6

Disagree

Agree

____ People should act with kindness/consideration for each other

____ People should admit their mistakes

____ People should donate to charity

____ People should save money

____ People should behave honestly

____ People should act faithfully

____ People should work hard

____ People should treat each other fairly

____ People should stand up for each other

____ People should act with generosity towards each other

____ People should help others in need

____ People should respond with care/compassion for others

Appendix H: Discrepancies and Attributions questionnaire

For each item below, please rate the extent to which you believe humanity meets its moral obligation regarding the behavior in question. Next, please rate the extent to which you agree with each statement about the potential cause of humanity failing to meet each moral obligation.

Dishonesty

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid dishonestly *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid dishonestly*

Dishonesty is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always act dishonestly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to act less dishonestly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to act dishonestly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People act dishonestly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Sleeping Around

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid sleeping around *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid sleeping around*

Sleeping around is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always sleep around

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice not to sleep around

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they sleep around

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People sleep around because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Stealing

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid stealing *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid stealing*

Stealing is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always steal from each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop stealing

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they steal

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People steal because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Selfishness

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid selfishness *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid selfishness*

Selfishness is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always act selfishly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop acting selfishly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they act selfishly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People act selfishly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Intentional harm

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid intentional harm *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid intentional harm*

Intentional harm is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always cause intentional harm to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop causing intentional harm to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they intentionally harm each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People cause each other intentional harm because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Discrimination

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation avoid Discrimination *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Discrimination*

Discrimination is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always discriminate against each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop discriminating against each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they discriminate against each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People discriminate against each other because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Drinking to excess

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Drinking to excess *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Drinking to excess*

Drinking to excess is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always drink to excess

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop drinking to excess

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to drink to excess

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People drink to excess because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Manipulation

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Manipulating each others *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Manipulating each others*

Manipulating each other is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always manipulate each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop manipulating each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they manipulate each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People manipulate each other because of external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Wastefulness

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Wastefulness *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Wastefulness*

Wastefulness is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always be wasteful

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop being wasteful

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they are wasteful

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People are wasteful because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Cruelty

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Cruelty *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Cruelty*

Cruelty is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always be cruel to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop being cruel to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they are cruel to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People are cruel to each other because of the external circumstances/personal experiences they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Aggression/Violence

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Aggression/Violence *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Aggression/Violence*

Aggression/violence is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always be aggressive/violent to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop being aggressive/violent to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they are aggressive/violent to each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People are aggressive/violent to each other because of external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Arrogance

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Arrogance *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Arrogance*

Arrogance is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always act arrogantly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop acting arrogantly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they act arrogantly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People act arrogantly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Laziness

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People completely meet the obligation to avoid Laziness *People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid Laziness*

Laziness is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will always be lazy

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to stop being lazy

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they are lazy

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People are lazy because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Kindness/Consideration for others

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always act with Kindness/Consideration *People often fail to act with Kindness/Consideration*

Failing to act with Kindness/Consideration is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely act with Kindness/Consideration

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to act with Kindness/Consideration

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they act with Kindness/Consideration

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not act with Kindness/Consideration because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Admit Mistakes

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Admit Mistakes *People often fail to Admit Mistakes*

Failing to Admit Mistakes is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Admit Mistakes

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Admit Mistakes more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they Admit Mistakes

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Admit Mistakes because of the external circumstances/personal experiences they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Donate to Charity

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always *People often*
Donate to Charity *fail to Donate to Charity*

Failing to Donate to Charity is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Donate to Charity

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

People could make the choice to Donate to Charity

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

People can control whether they Donate to Charity

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

People do not Donate to Charity because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

Save Money

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Save Money *People often fail to Save Money*

Failing to Save Money is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Save Money

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Save Money

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Save Money

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Save Money because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Act with Honesty

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Act with Honesty *People often fail to Act with Honesty*

Failing to Act with Honesty is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Act with Honesty

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Act with Honesty more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Act with Honesty

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Act with Honesty because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Act Faithfully

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Act Faithfully *People often fail to Act Faithfully*

Failing to Act Faithfully is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Act Faithfully

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Act Faithfully more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Act Faithfully

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Act Faithfully because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Work Hard

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always fail Work Hard *People often to Work Hard*

Failing to Work Hard is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Work Hard

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Work Hard more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Work Hard

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Work Hard because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Act Fairly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Act Fairly *People often fail to Act Fairly*

Failing to Act Fairly is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Act Fairly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Act Fairly more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Act Fairly

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Act Fairly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Stand up for each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Stand up for each other *People often fail to Stand up for each other*

Failing to Stand up for each other is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Stand up for each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Stand up for each other more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Stand up for each other

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Stand up for each other because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Behave Generously

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Behave Generously *People often fail to Behave Generously*

Failing to Behave Generously is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Behave Generously

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Behave Generously more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether to Behave Generously

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Behave Generously because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Help Others in Need

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always Help others in Need *People often fail to Help others in Need*

Failing to Help others in Need is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Help others in Need

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People could make the choice to Help others in Need more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People can control whether they Help others in Need

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

People do not Help others in Need because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

Act with Care/Compassion

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
People always *People often fail*
Act with Care/Compassion *to Act with Care/Compassion*

Failing to Act with Care/Compassion is caused by human nature

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

Because of human nature, people will rarely Act with Care/Compassion

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

People could make the choice to Act with Care/Compassion more often

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

People can control whether to Act with Care/Compassion

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

People do not Act with Care/Compassion because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly *Strongly*
Disagree *Agree*

Appendix I: Identification With All Humanity Scale (IWAHR)

1. How close do you feel to each of the following groups? Please use the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
not at all not very somewhat pretty very
close close close close close

_____ People in my community

_____ Americans

_____ People all over the world

2. How often do you use the word “we” to refer to the following groups of people? Please use the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
almost never rarely occasionally often very often

_____ People in my community

_____ Americans

_____ People all over the world

3. How much would you say you have in common with the following groups? Please use the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
almost nothing little some quite a bit very much
in common in common in common in common in common

_____ People in my community

_____ Americans

_____ People all over the world

Please answer all remaining questions using the following choices:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
not at all just a little somewhat quite a bit very much

4. Sometimes people think of those who are not a part of their immediate family as “family.” To what degree do you think of the following groups of people as “family”?

_____ People in my community

_____ Americans

_____ All humans everywhere

5. How much do you identify with (that is, feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) each of the following?

_____ People in my community

_____ Americans

_____ All humans everywhere

6. How much would you say you care (feel upset, want to help) when bad things happen to

_____ People in my community

_____ Americans

_____ People anywhere in the world

7. How much do you want to be:

_____ a responsible citizen of my community

_____ a responsible American citizen

_____ a responsible citizen of the world

8. How much do you believe in:

_____being loyal to my community

_____being loyal to America

_____being loyal to all mankind


9. When they are in need, how much do you want to help:

_____People in my community

_____Americans

_____People all over the world

10. Please mark the letter for the pair of circles that best describes your relationship with each group.



_____People in my community

_____Americans

_____People all over the world

Appendix J: Implicit theories about Stability of Personality
(Levy & Dweck, unpublished measure)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the items below using the following scale.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

- _____ (1) The kind of person someone is something basic about him/her, and it cannot be changed very much.
- _____ (2) People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are cannot really be changed.
- _____ (3) Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much they can really do to change that.
- _____ (4) As much as I hate to admit it, you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. People cannot really change their deepest attributes.
- _____ (5) Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change his/her basic characteristics.
- _____ (6) People can substantially change the kind of person they are.
- _____ (7) No matter what kind of person someone is, they can always change very much.
- _____ (8) People can change even their most basic qualities.

Appendix K: Social Behavior Questions

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements using the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6
Disagree Agree

- _____ I live an active social life
- _____ I often help others in need
- _____ I rarely seek out opportunities to socialize
- _____ I often ignore requests to socialize
- _____ I often avoid opportunities to help others

**Appendix L: Discrepancy stimuli with causal attributions manipulated
(adapted from Andreychik, 2009)**

AO-discrepancies, Uncontrollable cause (i.e., human nature)

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 520,000 people are brutally murdered every year, while another 250,000 are violently raped. Approximately 2 in every 10 people admit committing acts of adultery, while another 2 in 10 admit that they would cheat on their spouse if they did not fear being caught and punished. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they have stolen property from family members, businesses, or their employers.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature of immoral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity's rampant moral failings. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the *Journal of Moral Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from Stanford University concluded that, "we have observed repeatedly that human behavior often falls short of the most minimal moral standards of conduct, and these failings are most certainly linked to the nature of human nature." He found that negative behaviors, such as infidelity, stealing, selfishness, discrimination, rape, incest, and even violence and murder can be conceived of largely as a product of human nature. "What people are, how they behave, what type of outcomes they achieve, are all constrained by human nature." He further argued that, "it is clear that people consistently behave immorally throughout their lives, because the causes of behavior we deem immoral are rooted in human nature."

Dr. Paula McCormack, an evolutionary clinical psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association's annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, "immoral action is the product of our shared evolutionary history. Humanity as a species has gained reproductive success by means of the most egregious moral acts. For example, stealing resources from competing bands, infidelity, and murdering potential reproductive competitors have evolutionary value, and in the long run, they have contributed to humanity's evolutionary success." She concludes that "our data indicate that immoral acts are caused by factors rooted in our evolved genome—our human nature—Whether we like it or not, human nature is the cause of immoral behavior."

AO-discrepancies, Controllable cause (i.e., Lack of effort)

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 520,000 people are brutally murdered every year, while another 250,000 are violently raped. Approximately 2 in every 10 people admit committing acts of adultery, while another 2 in 10 admit that they would cheat on their spouse if they did not fear being caught and punished. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they have stolen property from family members, businesses, or their employers.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature of immoral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity's moral failings. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the *Journal of Moral Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from Stanford University reported that, "we have observed repeatedly that human behavior often falls short of minimal moral standards of conduct, and these failings could be significantly decrease if people would harness their inherited ability to adapt and change...humanity can be less immoral if only people put forth the effort needed to do so." He found that immoral acts, such as infidelity, stealing, selfishness, discrimination, rape, incest, and even violence and murder can be conceived of largely as a product of humanity's lack of effort to curtail these activities. "What people are, how they behave, what type of outcomes humanity achieves is in our hands, the species is in control of its fate," he wrote. He argued that, "it is clear that people consistently behave immorally throughout their lives, and that they do so because they choose to." "Moreover," he added, "we have also found that a strong willpower can overcome immoral impulses."

Dr. Paula McCormack, a clinical psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association's annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, "for most of us, immoral action can be eliminated if people are willing to put out the necessary work to eliminate negative impulses." She reported numerous longitudinal studies conducted by her research team, which show that as "people age and develop, their sense of willpower grows, as does their ability to inhibit immoral behavior." She added that, "our data indicate that people's behaviors and outcomes are mostly a function of factors such as effort and perceived control over one's outcomes—only action can break the cycle of immorality."

AO-discrepancies, No explanation

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 520,000 people are brutally murdered every year, while another 250,000 are violently raped. Approximately 2 in every 10 people have admit committing acts of adultery, while another 2 in 10 admit that they would cheat on their spouse if they did not fear being caught and punished. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they have stolen something from family members, businesses, or their employers.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature of immoral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity's moral failing. In an article published in the February 2006, issue of the *Journal of Moral Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from Stanford University reported recent findings. Dr. Peterson concluded that, "we have observed repeatedly that human behavior often falls short of minimal moral standards..." He found that people often report immoral acts, such as infidelity, stealing, selfishness, discrimination, incest, and even violent, criminal acts.

Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association's annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, "for most human beings, immoral behaviors is quite reliable...when presented with an opportunity to cheat, steal, or otherwise act selfishly, people often seize that opportunity." Dr. McCormack's conclusions about human immorality are based on six longitudinal studies published between 1988 and 2002, including two of her own. All six had considerably different samples and rationales, but "were surprisingly unanimous" in their conclusions about the extent of humanity's immorality depravity.

AI-discrepancies, Uncontrollable/stable cause (i.e., human nature)

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 2 in every 10 people admit that they are not very kind to others. Another 2 in 10 believe that people are far less trustworthy than they would like them to be. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they are not as generous (i.e., they do not donate their money, time, etc.) as they would ideally like to be.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature of moral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity's lack of prosociality. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the *Journal of Moral Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from Stanford University concluded that, "we have observed repeatedly that human behavior often falls short of its ideals...these failings are most certainly linked to the nature of human nature" He found that people often report feeling that they often fail to be kind, to be honest, to admit mistakes, to be generous, to donate to charity, to stand up for others, or to help others in need, which can be conceived of largely as a product of human nature "What people are, how they behave, what type of outcomes they achieve, are all importantly constrained by human nature." he wrote. He further argued that, "it is clear that people consistently fail to reach their desired level of prosociality throughout their lives, and that they do so because of human nature."

Dr. Paula McCormack, an evolutionary clinical psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association's annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, "failing to produce ideal moral action is a product of our shared evolutionary history. Humanity as a species has gained reproductive success by not being exceedingly prosocial. For example, refraining from helping others in need or otherwise reserving kind and compassionate has reproductive value, and in the long run, they have contributed to humanity's evolutionary success." She concludes that "our data indicate that the lack of ideal moral behavior found throughout the human species is caused by factors rooted in our evolved genome—our human nature—whether we like it or not, human nature is the cause of humanity's inability to reach moral ideals.

AI-discrepancies, Controllable/unstable cause (i.e., Lack of effort)

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately, 2 in every 10 people admit that they are not very kind to others. Another 2 in 10 believe that people are far less trustworthy than they would like them to be. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they are not as generous (i.e., they do not donate their money, time, etc.) as they would ideally like to be.

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Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association's annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, "for most of us, failing to produce ideal moral action can be eliminated if people are willing to put out the necessary work to eliminate negative impulses." She reported numerous longitudinal studies conducted by her research team, which show that "people age and develop, and as they do, they sometimes lose much of their motivation to become more prosocial." She added that, "our data indicate that people's behaviors and outcomes are mostly a function of factors such as effort and perceived control over one's outcomes—only through our own effort can we break the hold of inertia, and become a more compassionate human race."

AI-discrepancies, No explanation

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average at 65 years. Of this population, approximately, 2 in every 10 people admit that they are not very kind to others. Another 2 in 10 believe that people are far less trustworthy than they would like them to be. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they are not as generous (i.e., they do not donate their money, time, etc.) as they would ideally like to be.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature of moral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity's lack of prosociality. In an article published in the February, 2006 issue of the *Journal of Moral Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Peterson and colleagues reported recent findings. Dr. Peterson concluded that, "we have observed repeatedly that human behavior often falls short of its moral ideals..." He found that people report that they often fail to be kind, to be honest, to admit mistakes, to be generous, to donate to charity, to stand up for others, or to help others in need.

Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association's annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, "for most human beings, moral behaviors is unreliable...when presented with an opportunity to live up to moral ideals of charity and compassion, people rarely seize that opportunity." Dr. McCormack's conclusions about human immorality are based on six longitudinal studies published between 1988 and 2002, including two of her own. All six had considerably different samples and rationales, but "were surprisingly unanimous" in their conclusions on the failure to produce prosocial behavior.

Control Condition, Uncontrollable/stable cause (i.e., human nature)

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, it is estimated that more than 107 billion people have lived on the Earth. As of 2012, the human population was estimated to have reached around 7.077 billion. Approximately, 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to examine the complexities of human behavior. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the *Journal of Social Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues at Stanford University concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that people’s behaviors and outcomes are strongly linked to the nature of human nature.” He found that people’s behaviors and life outcomes could be conceived of largely as a product of human nature. “What an individual can become, how that individual will behave, what type of outcomes she will achieve are all constrained by human nature.”

Dr. Paula McCormack, an evolutionary clinical psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention in Washington, DC in August, 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, “who we become is a product of our shared evolutionary history. Shared human behaviors exist at present because they have helped the species gain reproductive success; their existence is testament to that fact. She concludes, “Our data indicate that human behavior is caused by factors rooted in our evolved genome—our evolved human nature.”

Control Condition, Controllable/unstable cause (i.e., Lack of effort)

According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, it is estimated that more than 107 billion people have lived on the Earth. As of 2012, the human population was estimated to have reached around 7.077 billion. Approximately, 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 years.

Facts like these have motivated many researchers to examine the complexities of human behavior. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the *Journal of Social Behavior* (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Peterson and colleagues reported recent findings. Dr. Peterson concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that people’s behaviors and outcomes are strongly linked to the deliberate choices they make the effort with which they act.” He found that people’s behaviors and life outcomes can be conceived of largely as a product of the effort. “What an individual can become, how that individual will behave, what type of outcomes she will achieve, are all importantly constrained by the intensity of her actions,” he wrote. He argued that, “it is clear that individuals behave inconsistently throughout their lives.”

Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, “for most of us, our patterns of behavior might change over time...our outcomes come down to our choices.” She reported numerous longitudinal studies conducted by her research team, which show that “as people age and develop, their patterns of behavior change.” She added that, “our data indicate that people’s behaviors and outcomes are mostly a function of factors such as effort and perceived control over one’s outcomes—only through our own effort can we break the hold of inertia.”

Appendix O: Prosocial Behavior, Studies 2 & 3

Earlier in the study, you read a passage from a noted periodical describing “patterns of human behavior.” We are compiling responses to that information that will be sent to the editor of that periodical. We would like to include your response in our compilation.

If you are willing, in the space below, please write a response to the information you read about.

Appendix P: Photo manipulations

Example: Common Humanity



Example: Neutral




Examples: American Pride




Appendix Q: “Aesthetic judgments”

Please provide your “aesthetic judgments” of the photo/painting


1. Attractiveness



2. Quality of color contrast



3. Quality of sharpness.



Appendix R: Causal Attribution Questions for Studies 3 and 4

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements using the following scale:

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6
Disagree Agree

_____ Human nature is the root cause of the pattern of behavior I read about

_____ People have no control over the pattern of behavior I read about

_____ People could potentially change the pattern of behavior I read

_____ The pattern of behavior I read about could not possibly change in the future

_____ People have control over the pattern of behavior I read about

Appendix S: Implicit Theories Manipulation & Manipulation check questions

Comprehension paragraph: please carefully read the paragraph below. You will later be tested on how well you remember the concepts this paragraph contains.

Incremental theory prime:

In his talk at the American Psychological Association's annual convention held at New York City in August, Dr. George Medin argued that 'no one's character is hard like a rock that cannot be changed. Only for some, greater effort and determination are needed to effect changes.' He reported numerous large longitudinal studies, which show that people can mature and can change their character. He also reported research findings showing that people's personality characteristics can be changed even in their late sixties.

Entity theory prime:

In his talk at the American Psychological Association's annual convention held at New York City in August, Dr. George Medin argued that 'in most of us, by the age of ten, our character has set like plaster and will never soften again.' He reported numerous large longitudinal studies which show that people 'age and develop, but they do so on the foundation of enduring dispositions.' He also reported research findings showing that people's personality characteristics are fixed and cannot be changed.

Control condition:

In his talk at the American Psychological Association's annual convention held at New York City in August, Dr. George Medin argued that 'in most of us, by the age of ten, our limbic system is fully developed.' He reported numerous studies showing that limbic activation in response to emotional arousing stimuli is nearly the same in 10-year-olds as it is older adults.

Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the paragraph you read at the beginning of this study.

What is the name of the convention mentioned in the article?

Where does it take place? _____

What was the main concept described in the article?

Appendix T: Demographic Information

(1) Your sex: _____ Male _____ Female

(2) Your age: _____

(3) Your predominant ethnicity:

_____ Asian _____ Hispanic _____ Black

_____ White _____ Other (specify: _____)

(4) What is your occupation?

(5) What is your highest level of education? (Circle one)

Some high school

High school

Trade

BA/BS/BFA

MA/MS/MFA

Ph.D./Psy D/MD

(6) Please describe your political beliefs using the following scale

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Very Somewhat Moderate Somewhat Very
Conservative Conservative Liberal Liberal

Vita

Phillip D. Getty

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EDUCATION

2015 (Expected)—Ph.D., Social & Personality Psychology, Lehigh University.
Dissertation: Is that disappointment or contempt I feel for humanity? Actual/Ideal (AI) and Actual/Ought (AO) discrepancy beliefs in humanity might have unique emotional and behavioral consequences

2012—M.S., Psychology, Lehigh University.
Thesis: Splintering the metaphorical rod of blame to save humanity: Testing multiple means of breaking the link between external explanations for transgressions and increased cynicism toward humanity

2009—B.A., Psychology, University of Oregon, Summa Cum Laude, with department honors.
Honors Thesis: “Autistic-like” personality traits in neurotypical adults: Examining possible differences in the ease, speed, and hierarchy of social inference.

1999—Dive Master, Lane Community College.

PUBLICATIONS

Gill, M. J., Andreychik, M. R., & Getty, P. D. (2013). More than a lack of control: External explanations can evoke compassion for outgroups by increasing perceptions of suffering (independent of perceived control). *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(1), p. 73-87.

Getty, P. D. (2009). “Autistic-like” personality traits in neurotypical adults: Examining possible differences in the ease, speed, and hierarchy of social inference. *McNair Scholars Research Journal, University of Oregon*, (1), p. 61-117.

MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS

- Gill, M. J. & Getty, P. D. (*in review*). Compassion for one begets animus for many: Attribution of wrongdoing to an agent's unfortunate history fosters compassion for the agent but animus toward humanity
- Gill, M. J. & Getty, P. D. (*in prep.*). Presenting the beliefs about human nature scale (BAHN): A new measure of lay beliefs about aggression, selfishness and prosociality.

PUBLICATIONS (NON-ACADEMIC)

- Getty, Phillip D. (2007), Web site publication. *Capitellowines.com*.
- Getty, Phillip D. (May 24, 2007). LCC goes global: President Mary Spilde plans internationally. *Eugene Weekly*, p. 13.
- Getty, Phillip D. (April 26, 2007). Chicken tacos and drunken nachos. *Eugene Weekly (Chow addition)*, p. 7.

PRESENTATIONS

- Getty, P. D., & Gill, M. J. (Accepted, May, 2013). Spare the Rod, Damn Humanity: External Explanations Increase Cynicism towards Humanity Even as they Evoke Compassion for Individual Transgressors. Poster Presentation at the 25th annual Association of Psychological Science convention, Washington D.C.
- Getty, P. D., & Gill, M. J. (Accepted, May, 2013). The Dark Side of Social Explanations: Examining the Damning Consequences of External Explanations. Poster Presentation at the Eastern Psychological Association annual meeting, New York NY.
- Getty, P. D., & Gill, M. J. (January, 2013). All this Compassion is making me Cynical: External Explanations Increase Cynicism towards Humanity Even as they Evoke Compassion for Individual Transgressors. Poster Presentation at the 14th annual Society for Personality and Social Psychology conference, New Orleans, LA.
- Getty, P. D. (November, 2008). "Autistic-like" personality traits in neurotypical adults: Examining possible differences in the ease, speed, and hierarchy

of social inference. Poster presented at the 17th annual Ronald E. McNair Scholars Research Conference, Delavan, WI.

RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE:

- 2014-Present—Senior Researcher, Oregon Youth Authority
- 2009-2014—Graduate Research Assistant for Dr. Mike Gill
- Spring 2013—Graduate Teaching Assistant (Statistics) with Dr. Almut Hupbach
- Fall 2012—Graduate Teaching Assistant (Research Methods) with Dr. Susan Barrett
- Summer 2012—Instructor (Introduction to Psychology)
- Spring 2012—Graduate Teaching Assistant (Personality) with Dr. Mike Gill
- Fall 2011—Graduate Teaching Assistant (Statistics) with Dr. Almut Hupbach
- 2010-2011—News Editor for Wiley-Blackwell Publishing at socialpsychologicaeye.com
- Spring 2011—Graduate Teaching Assistant (Social Psychology) with Dr. Gordon Moskowitz
- Fall 2010—Graduate Teaching Assistant (Developmental Psychology) with Dr. Susan Barrett
- 2008-2009—Research Assistant for Dr. Gerard Saucier
- 2007-2009—Research Assistant for Dr. Sara Hodges
- 2007-2009—Research Assistant for Dr. Bertram F. Malle

SERVICE ROLES

- 2014-Present—Oregon Youth Authority Research Committee, Chair
- 2012-2013—Lehigh University Institutional Review Board (IRB) Graduate Student Committee Member
- 2011-2012—Graduate Student Representative for the Psychology Department

HONORS AND AWARDS

2013—Dale S. Strohl Award for Research Excellence in Humanities and Social Sciences Dissertation Support Fellowship (\$25,000.00)

2011—Lehigh University, College of Arts and Sciences Summer Research Fellowship

2009—Lehigh University, McNair Scholars Graduate Fellowship

2008—Ronald E. McNair Scholarship (McNair Scholars Program). Thesis: “Autistic-like” personality traits in neurotypical adults: Examining possible differences in the ease, speed, and hierarchy of social inference.

2008—Non-Traditional Student Award, University of Oregon.

2007—Honorable Mention, League for Innovation’s Annual Essay Contest for Community Colleges. Essay: The Legacy of Constantine.