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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to present a new analysis of the perception of Libyan policy-makers towards Arab National Security since the 1969 Revolution. Also this study proves a link between Libyan foreign policy towards African and Arab national security. This perception has resulted in creating an in-depth strategy incorporating Africa. The study focuses on the most crucial aspects that Libya has embraced—on both the Arab and African front—to achieve its goals on the diplomatic, military, economic and political fronts.

The principal argument of the study is that Libyan policy embraces a position that Arab National Security can only be preserved through the unification of African states and the comprehensive economic development of continent's countries to enable them to combat the dangers and threats of major external actors.

Thus, Libya relies on historical, cultural, geographic and religious ties that link Arabs and Africans. Libya also relies on the similar circumstances facing African states—be they Arab or non-Arab—from external threats that usually occur from ex-colonialists. Libya believes that most of the external threats to the African continent occur because of the weakness and fragmentation of African states.

The research studies Libya's role in the ten years to 2009 as a crucial regional actor in Africa, Libya's achieved several positive outcomes in the continent, both economically and politically. In addition, it assesses Libya's success in gathering African support to end the Western-backed and UN-imposed sanctions on Libya.

This study also argues that the African success in ending the sanctions on Libya strengthened the Arab support for Libyan efforts to establish the African Union as a strategic depth for the Arab region. This was evident through the fact that most Arab states in Africa joined the CEN-SAD economic community, which Libya established as a step to increase economic cooperation in the face of global alliances. Furthermore, Arab states immediately joined the African Union which Libya called for in 1999.

Libya's political ambitions towards Africa were portrayed in Libya's success in transforming the Organisation of African Union into the African Union, which in turn changed foreign states' perceptions of Libya. Libya became an important player both in Africa and on the global institutional level.

This study examines Libya's ability to be a regional player, it also examines Libya's ability to transform theoretical goals into tangible realities. This study finds this was achieved principally through Africa's ability to end Western hegemony—portrayed through the ending of Libyan sanctions—and establishing the African Union. Libya perceives the Union as the most crucial instrument in preserving African and Arab security.

This study has shown the linkage between Libyan foreign policy and the issue of Arab national security within the framework of African continent, which makes it an original study in the field.

DECLARATION

The author of this thesis declares that this study is his own original work, conducted under the supervision of Prof. Anoush Ehteshami. All sentences or passages quoted in this dissertation from other peoples' work have been specifically acknowledged by clear cross-referencing to author, work and page(s). None of the materials in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree qualification in this or any other university.

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DEDICATION

To my father and love for my mother and my wife and my kids

NOTES ON TRANSLATION

Unless otherwise noted, all translations in the manuscript are mine.

For the convenience of my examiners I have translated the titles of my List of References into English as the original publications were issued by the Libyan Officials and their exact word to word meaning are unique as the Libyan political system is completely different i.e. several ministries and positions do not exist anywhere in the English Speaking World.

Notes and references from all Arabic sources have been translated directly without transliteration of Arabic into Latin script. I have highlighted this by putting brackets to explain this such as (In Arabic).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my adviser, Professor Anoush Ehteshami of the School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA) for his guidance during my doctoral research at Durham University. I am indebted to many others who have indirectly participated in support of this work.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACRF: The African Crisis Response Force
AEC: The African Economic Community
AFESD: The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
African Frontex: African External Border Protection Agency
Alquimia Al Arabiya: Means Arab Nationalism
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union
AU: African Union
AUA: African Union Authority
AUC: African Union Commission
BADEA: The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
CENTO: The Central Treaty Organization
COMESA: Common Market of East and Southern Africa
Dawlah: Means State
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
ERRF: European Rapid Deployment Force
GCC: The Gulf Cooperation Council
IMF: The International Monetary Fund
IRT: International Relations Theory
LAP: Libya Africa Investment Portfolio
Maghrib: West
Mashriq: East
NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
Polisario: The Liberation Army for Western Sahara
Qumeyh: Means Nationalism
RSQ: Rascom Star-QAF it's a Communication Company
SADC: Southern Africa Development Community
SEN-SAD: The Community of Sahel-Saharan States
U.K: United Kingdom
UAE: The United Arab Emirates
UE: European Union
Ummah: Means Nation

US: United States

WB: World Bank

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO: World Trade Organisation

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INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

Arab national security is considered to be amongst the most important issues of concern for both Arab world and Western analysts and politicians, especially in the shadow of an increasing multiplicity of threats and risks at the international level. The Arab world is facing these threats and risks to a disproportionate degree and Libya is one of foremost of the Arab states in addressing that how these threats affect national security mechanisms. In this context Libya has adopted a range of different approaches towards this issue, more so than other Arab world states, by using a range of political, economic and geographical conditions as foundations for its policy towards realising its national security objectives.. This policy has been shaped by a revolutionary outlook and ‘specific’ ideology espoused by the Libyan political system since 1969. Libyan policy-makers believe that Arab national security (internally and externally) can only be protected through a comprehensive Arab unity between all Arab states including those in Africa and Asia. Therefore, Libya has made concerted efforts towards implementing various schemes in order to bring about an Arab unity.

However, this policy has faced many obstacles, including increasing Western pressure on Arab states—particularly those opposed to Western military presence in the region—and the scramble for African resources by external powers. Furthermore, Libya recognises the danger of such threats especially in light of the African and Arab disunity. Therefore, as a result of increasing pressure from the contemporary world order Libya has sought to modernise the Arab unification plan by inviting all Arab countries in Africa and Asia to engage in the project of the African Union. Tripoli believes that this is a natural route through which to achieve the objectives of Arab unity, such as protecting the Arab world from further fragmentation through regional economic associations. Also, Libya seeks to achieve the idea of Arab Nationalism and to protect Arab national security within the framework of African Union.

These factors made Libya aware of the importance of Africa to Arab national security, especially after the failure of unity attempts amongst Arab states. Thus, Libya came up with new policies to strengthen Arab-African relations as a step towards finding a new entity that would be able to protect Arab national security from external

penetration of the region. However, Libya's active role in Africa and the Arab region as well as its opposition to Western military presence in the region led to international sanctions being imposed on it.

Since the 1969 Revolution, Libya has believed that Arab national security can only be achieved through improved Arab world and African relations, either in the form of Arab unity or Arab-African integration through an African Union. Thus, Libya has dedicated significant effort to its African role in the hope of achieving peace and stability both regionally and globally. Libya has provided assistance to African states to improve economic and political ties; Tripoli is currently at the forefront of the international community in providing grants and investment in African states as a way of improving relations. Libya continues to cooperate with all African states and provide assistance that embodies the principals of the Revolution which call for a halt to Western and Israeli presence in Africa.

Since Libya is an African state, it believes its responsibility is to stand with other African states. Furthermore, Libya has realised that Africa can play a crucial global role if the efforts of the component states are united. Thus, Libya realised the need to unite African efforts in a single political entity; Libya is the only state with a ministry dedicated exclusively for African affairs. This reflects the profound nature of Libya's policy towards Africa and its efforts to revive the continent in line with global developments and progress. This was reflected in Libya's efforts to establish the African Union.

These moves emphasise the argument that Africa is one of Libya's main foreign policy priorities, which arises because of various political, geographic and security factors. Geographically Libya is part of Africa with important ports on the Mediterranean, creating the conditions for the historical links between Africa and Europe. Politically Libyan policy-makers believe that political occurrences within Africa impact upon the country since it is bordered by major African states such as Egypt, Sudan, Niger, Chad, Tunisia and Algeria. Libya is influenced by security issues in the continent due to the socio-geographical intertwining of the continent's inhabitants, as well as the size of the Saharan desert which makes security control over area difficult without inter-state cooperation.

Importantly, although Libya's recognised the important of Africa from the Revolution, initially practical steps were slow and only accelerated from the beginning of the 1990s when Libya's role in Africa increased in the military, political and economic fields.

The fulfilment of Arab national security is a priority for Libya; as such it has taken important steps in search for Arab security taking into account global changes and challenges. As a result, Libya's role in Africa increased simultaneously with the growing threats and challenges posed by global actors. Nevertheless, Africa was always present in Libya's foreign policy considerations, even as Libya called for Arab unity, as is shown by its participation in the numerous African multilateral institutions. Libya is one of the biggest donors to Africa and supports African causes. In addition, since the Revolution, Libya has been at the forefront in fighting against imperialism in the continent, including opposing Western military presence in Africa.

This highlights the importance of Africa to Libya in maintaining Arab national security. Libya's role in Africa increased gradually, starting with support for liberation movements, then providing economic assistance and political support to establish the African Union. It is through this vehicle that Libya hopes to establish an African army and a single African economy able to protect the continent's economic, political and socio-cultural resources. Thus, Arab national security occurs in light of African security.

2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

This study aims at exploring and analysing the importance of Africa in giving strategic depth for Arab national security according to Libyan foreign policy since the 1969 Revolution. The study also aims to explore the important policy initiative that Libya has embraced in order to achieve its political, economic and security aims in Africa. The study analyses the success of Libyan policy in its attempt to achieve peace and stability in the continent. Furthermore, the study also aims to examine the desire of the African states to achieve peace and stability through their adherence to Libyan policies, which aim to strengthen the African ability to protect itself against the threats and challenges of the global system.

To fulfil these aims, the following objectives are developed:

- (i) To identify national security in general and Arab and Libyan national security in particular;
- (ii) To examine the Arab perception of national security by emphasising the Arab-centric view;
- (iii) To identify the security dilemma faced and perceived by Libya;
- (vi) To investigate the importance of African security for Arab national security in relation to Libyan foreign policy;
- (vii) To analyse the developments related to Libya's role in the economic regionalisation of Africa within the framework of protecting the security and stability of the continent;
- (viii) To explore Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African relations through regional multilateral organisations;

3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Libyan political discourse since the 1969 Revolution highlights the prime importance of Africa because it is perceived to add natural depth to Arab national security. Therefore, the following questions are posed within the aims and objectives of the study:

To what extent has the Libyan regime succeeded over the past 40 years in achieving its aims in the African continent and realising Arab National Security? And what are the problems and obstacles that face these policies?

What is the Arab national security dilemma according to Libyan policy-makers? And what are the most important policies and steps that Libya has taken in Africa in its attempt to achieve Arab national security?

How does Libya envisage the importance of Africa for Arab national security? And what are the policies that Libya has followed to encourage African efforts towards protecting Arab national security?

To what extent has Libyan policy succeeded in achieving its aim of Arab national security on both the African and Arab level?

The study assumes that the pan-nationalist-African tendency, which appears in Libyan discourse since the 1969 Revolution, is reflected in Libyan foreign policy and its core values. Thus, Arab national security became a central tenet of Libyan foreign policy. The Libyan regime has a specific ideology (The Third Universal Theory or The Green Book as it is often referred to in West) peculiar to it; to what extent has this ideology influenced philosophical and practical basis for Libyan policy towards Africa? Since the 1969 Revolution, the Libyan regime has been subject to rapid changes vis-à-vis foreign policy. Are these changes as a result of domestic, regional or global factors? Or are they attempts to seek Arab National Security in accordance to the socio-cultural and economic requisites imposed by domestic and regional realities?

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1. A General Survey on Libyan Foreign Policy

Decision-making in foreign policy involves the analysis and assessment of past and current data in light of past experiences, and to further identify the need and available options for action in the future and the likely implications of each of these options for the protection and promotion of national interests.

Libyan foreign policy has four dimensions: domestic political; external security-related; economic including commercial; and societal, which has a bearing on the society. There are other secondary factors that are mentioned in Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six. A successful foreign policy protects and advances the national interest and contributes to the preservation and enhancement of state power and status, without being unduly detrimental to the national interest, power and status of other states. It seeks to avoid conflict and, where this is not possible, to minimise the likely damage to the state, national interest, power and status.

The process of decision-making in Libyan foreign policy has become more complex since the 1969 Revolution for several reasons: for example, the hegemony of Gathafi's ideology means that adopting the Arab nationalist dimension becomes the main factor for Libyan foreign policy-making. Moreover, the Gathafi ideology believes that only political actor that can harmonise the social composition is the nation-state. This principle resulted in Libya undertaking a number of largely unsuccessful attempts at Arab unity. The pressures of international change and constraints saw Libya reformulate the idea of Arab unity by inviting Arab states to engage in a project of African unity in order to achieve Arab nationalism within the framework of the African Union.¹

Libyan foreign policy has faced many challenges from the international community as a result of its actions taken to achieve the objective of Arab unity. One of the paramount policies was Libyan support for various liberation movements around the globe. Moreover, Libyan policy was characterised by hostility to the West and imperialist-states which imposed on Libya many restrictions between 1969 and 2003, when Libya reformulated its foreign policy to cooperate and be more open with the West.

4.2. Surveying Libyan Foreign Policy-Making

A survey of literature on Libyan foreign policy reveals that a number of research projects have been undertaken over a long period. Most studies emphasise the nature of the Libyan behaviour in key periods, for example since the 1969 Revolution. The surveys highlight that Libyan foreign policy has been shaped by perceived external threats, particularly from Western forces. Therefore, the majority of the research focused primarily on the issue of security, particularly preventing the return of colonialism or foreign powers in the region. Ronald Bruce St. John (1987) in *Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign policy, 1969-1987* identifies the basic tenets of Libyan foreign policy. The book gives a useful discussion of the background against which foreign policy under Gathafi takes place. It also looks at Gathafi's Third Universal Theory and its place in the history of Arab nationalism. St John critically

¹ Ramahi, Mari Ali. (2009). "The national dimension of the Libyan foreign policy". *Azzahfalkhder Newspaper*. No. 5727. p.3

examines Gathafi's attitudes toward Israel, his relationship with the superpowers, his search for Arab unity, his drive towards positive neutrality, his attempts to influence oil policy, his efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the manner in which foreign policy is formulated in the Libyan state.²

St. John (2002) in *Libya and the United States: Two Countries of Strife* highlights that diplomatic relations between the US and Libya has rarely followed a smooth path. Washington has repeatedly tried and failed to mediate lasting solutions, to prevent recurrent crises, and to secure its own national interests in a region of increasing importance to the United States. The book provides a unique analysis of US-Libyan relations, assessing within the framework of a conventional historical narrative the interaction of the governments and peoples of Libya and the United States over the past two centuries.³ Tim Niblock (2002) in “The Foreign Policy of Libya” shows that Libyan foreign policy is predicated upon three durable factors that are critically important in setting its parameters: the economic base and oil exports; the manner in which culture and geography have interacted in Libya; and Libya’s geographic and strategic location.⁴ St John (2003) in his article “Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility” draws out that Libya opted to improve bi-lateral relations with African states from the early 1970s, a move which allowed for the establishment of a solid platform for better economic and political relations in later periods. Alongside these enhanced African alliances, Libya attempted to improve relations with Western countries, particularly those that did not impede its overall foreign policy direction.⁵ Khalil Matar and Robert Thabit (2004) in *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations* study relations between Libya and the West, in particular the US. They argue that the Lockerbie issue increased the gap between Libya and most Western countries. The period between 1988 and 2003 was one of the worst periods in relations between Libya and the West, after America accused Libya bombing of Pan

² Ronald, Bruce St. John. (1987). *Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign policy, 1969-1987*. London: Publisher Saqi Books.

³ Ronald, Bruce St. John, (2002). *Libya and the United States: Two Countries is Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,

⁴ Raymond, A. Hinnebush and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. (2002). “The Foreign Policy of Libya”, in Tim Niblock (Ed), *the Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (pp.213-234). United Stats: Lynne Rienner Inc

⁵ Ronald, Bruce St John. (2003). “Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility”. *Foreign Policy Research Institute* , 47(3),

Am flight 103.⁶ In this context, Charles Cecil (2008) in “Libya’s Relation with Africa and the West” points out that Libyan-US relation need more clarity to improve cooperation in all areas. Cecil points out that improving Libyan-US relations has become urgent because of the common interests between the two countries. Also this article shows that Libya is interested in improving its relations with the US in order to ensure its foreign policy in Africa.⁷ The speeches of the principle decision-maker in Libya, Muammar Al-Gathafi, (2009) are highlighted in *Statement, Speeches and Talks 1969-2009* These give a fundamental outline of Libyan foreign policy in general.⁸

4.3. Surveying Libyan Perceptions of Africa in Relation to Arab National Security

The research topic is concerned with three inter-related aspects: Arab national security; Libyan policy towards Africa; and Africa’s importance to Arab national security. No previous study has tackled the Libyan perception of Africa as providing strategic depth for Arab national security. Therefore, the research focuses on studies that have dealt with Libya foreign policy towards Africa on all its levels in an attempt to gain as much information and knowledge as possible. In addition, the research also focuses on studies that deal with Arab national security and the concept of national security. This research uses primary sources from Libyan institutions such as annual reports and documents from the Libyan Foreign Ministry and reports and documents from other Libya institutions such as Libyan investment companies in Africa. Moreover, primary sources such as the treaties and agreements from the regional institutions such as the Arab League, the African Union and CEN-SAD Community are also used.

4.4. Literature on Libyan Foreign Policy towards Africa

There are very few studies concerning Libyan foreign policy towards Africa. One such study is Sulaiman Al-Hayali’s (1973) “Libyan Diplomatic Trends in Africa” which assesses the role of Libya’s diplomacy in improving Arab-African relations as

⁶ Khalil, I. Matar. And Robert, W Thabit. (2004). *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations*. Jefferson, USA: McFarland and Company Inc.

⁷ Charles, O. Cecil. (2008). *Libya’s Relation with Africa and the West*. Paper presented at the first conference on the Libyan Affairs and the West, organized by Middle East Institute and the Green Book Researcher Canter on 31st March 2008, Washington: US.

⁸ See Muammar, Al Gathafi. “Statement, Speeches and Talks”, *National Register*, since 1969-2009. Publications of the World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green Book, Tripoli

a prelude to strengthening and restoring diplomatic relations between Arab and African countries as well as between African countries themselves.⁹

Abd al-Maguid Al Kut's (2001) *Libyan Foreign Policy towards Non-Arab Africa after the Cold War* shows the orientation of Libyan policy towards black African countries, and examines relations in the shadow of social and culture interaction between the continent countries.¹⁰ Making particular reference to Africa and Libyan relations, Asteris Huliars' (2001) "Gathafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s" shows the significant change in Libyan foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa after 1989, especially following the breaching of the UN embargo by a number of African leaders.¹¹

In 2003, Kathryn Sturman shows that Libya, as a result of its issue with the western states and with the Arab countries, which did not support Tripoli during the period of the UN sanctions, turned its attention toward building strategic alliances in Africa. In her article "The Rise of Libya as a Regional Player", she addresses the objectives of Libyan foreign policy in Africa and highlights Libyan efforts to improve the African economy as a step towards creating the African Union.¹² In extending the discussion to the flexibility of Libyan foreign policy, St John's (2003) "Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility" focuses on the issues that led Libya to turn towards Africa. Moreover, this study shows that Libya enjoys support in Africa as a state that supported liberation movements and helped end colonialism in Africa.¹³

More recently, Suleiman Mansour (2005) in *Libyan Foreign Policy towards the African Continent 1990-2000* addresses historical relations between Libya and African states and also shows several policies and strategies that Libya used to achieve its objectives in Africa. Furthermore, this study analyses the legal and political nature of African unity projects such as the African Union and CEN-SAD

⁹ Sulaiman, Y. Al-Hayali. (1973). "the Libyan Diplomatic Trends in Africa". *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No. 93, Cairo: (in Arabic)

¹⁰ Al Kut, Abd al-Maguid, k. (2001) *Libyan Foreign Policy towards Non- Arab Africa After the cold War*: MA, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Cairo. (In Arabic)

¹¹ Asteris, Huliars. (2001). "Gathafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s". *African Affairs Journal*, 100(398)

¹² Sturman, Kathryn. (2003). "The Rise of Libya as a Regional Player". *African Security Review*, 12(2)

¹³ Ronald, Bruce St John. (2003). "Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility". *Foreign Policy Research Institute* , 47(3),

community. Moreover, this study evaluates the Libyan foreign policy in Africa and its future aspirations.¹⁴

The various studies provide a reasonable amount of material on Libyan foreign policy in relation to Africa at the political, economic, social and cultural levels. However, they do not attempt to show any linkage between Libyan foreign policy in Africa and Arab national security issue. Therefore, this survey highlights that there is no literature that is directly relevant to the importance of Africa to Arab national security in from the perspective of Libyan foreign policy. This again provides justification for the unique attempt made by this study.

5. SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

It is noticeable that the research on Libyan policy in Africa has focused on political, economic and historical ties, as well as Libyan foreign policy attempts to strengthen political and economic relations with the continent. Therefore, the importance of this research lies in it being the first comprehensive attempt to explore the Libyan perception of the strategic importance of Africa to Arab national security. This has been evident in Libya's opposition to all Western presence in the region and its support for improved Arab-African cooperation in order to protect Arab national security and create peace and stability in Africa.

The importance of the study is due to its attempt to fill the gaps in the literature relating to Libyan policy in Africa, particularly in terms of security, which is the core of the study. This core has become more important due to the repercussions of security on the economic and political realms, as a result of changing domestic and international factors. Therefore, this study highlights the importance for Libyan foreign policy of uniting the African continent in the face of threats provided as a result of international challenges.

This study is considered as the first significant contribution to the issue of protecting Arab national security through the creation of security and stability in Africa. This is

¹⁴ Suleiman, M. Mansour. (2005). *Libyan Foreign Policy towards the African Continent 1990-2000*. Benghazi –Libya: *Dar al-Kotob Al-Wataniya*. (in Arabic)

particularly relevant because of the large number of Arab countries which are located in the African continent and because most of the Arab population lives in Arab-African countries (more than 60%). Moreover about 72.7% of the area of the Arab world is located in the African continent. Therefore the Arab part of Africa is important to the Arab Nation. In addition, the African continent is closest to the Arabs in terms of the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. In line with this, this study provides an examination into Libyan foreign policy towards Africa, particularly in the area of security, which is considered to be the basis for stability and strong global relations.

An additional important contribution of this study is to analyse the Libyan foreign policy towards Africa by focusing on the view of the Libyan regime and the ideology it adopted after 1969. It is due to the ideological positioning of the regime that Libya has expended considerable effort in its policy towards Africa at the economic, political, social and cultural levels. Furthermore, this study contributes to the understanding from the Arab national security perspective within the African framework.

Moreover, the study proves that Libya did not switch the primary focus of its policy from the Arab world to Africa purely as a result of perceived failure of the Arab states to support Tripoli over the Lockerbie issue. However, this was just one of the reasons which resulted in the change of Libyan policy towards Africa as articulated by the current study. This study shows that Libya works with the other Arab countries in Africa to establish and create the stability and security in the framework of continent.

Finally, this study analyses the linkage between Libyan foreign policy and Arab national security issue in the framework of African continent, which makes it a unique study in the field.

6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The process of scientific research is considered to be a complex activity, which aims to increase knowledge and find solutions to the problems facing various institutions. Thus, scientists give utmost importance to finding appropriate frameworks and tools

in order to conduct scientific research; these are termed the research methodology.¹⁵ Gerring mentions that the actual use of research methodology grew over the past few decades.¹⁶ Recently, the use of research methodology has increased to become one of the most important tools used by researchers to conduct scientific research.

Mehmet Asutay defines the term methodology as “how one will go about studying a phenomenon.”¹⁷ In expanding this definition, Murray and Lawrence define research methodology as:

Techniques that are an abstraction of reality and which are used in an orderly manner to reveal the dimensions of reality. The term ‘methodology’ may be taken to be inclusive of research design, theoretical frameworks, the selection and analysis of literature relevant to the nominated topic, and justified preferences for particular types of data gathering activities.¹⁸

In addition, in referring to the framework of research methodology, Remenyi et al. defines the term of methodology as “the procedural framework within which the research is conducted. It describes an approach to a problem that can be put into practice in a research programme or process.”¹⁹ To support this, Walker and Monahan define methodology as:

The generic term used to characterize how social scientists go about answering factual questions. It is the overall strategy or plan of attack for generating and analyzing information. A more refined appreciation of the concept requires considering its two principal components: how information is gathered, and how information, once gathered, is interpreted.²⁰

¹⁵ Pasha, A. F. (1987). *Exploits of Scientific Muslims: Founding the Methodology of Scientific Research*. The Scientific Miracles in Islam. Availabel at: <URL: <http://www.nooran.org/O/2/2O10.pdf>> Access date: 15th May, 2009.

¹⁶ Gerring, J. (2001). *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*, Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

¹⁷ Asutay, M. (2007). *PH.D-Research Support Workshop Programme: Research Methodology*. UK: School Of Government and International Affairs. Durham University.

¹⁸ Murray, L. and Lawrence, B. (2000). *Practitioner-Based Enquiry: Principles for Postgraduate Research*. London: Falmer Press.

¹⁹ Remenyi, D. Williams, B. Money, A. & Swartz, E. (1998). *Doing Research in Business and Management: An Introduction to Process and Method*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

²⁰ Walker, L. and Monahan, J. (1988). “Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent”. *JSTORE*, Vol. 76, pp 877-896.

Collis and Hussey summarise all these definitions by emphasising its functional nature: research methodology is “the overall approach to the research process, from the theoretical understanding to the collection and analysis of the data.”²¹

Based on these definitions of methodology, it can be argued that all writers agree that research methodology is the process followed by researchers to find a solution to the research questions. Accordingly, the term methodology is considered as the systematic steps used by the researchers to complete their research.

According to Collis and Hussey research can also be divided according to the approaches being followed by the researcher in the process of constructing the research or in identifying the problem or the phenomenon to be studied. Asutay therefore, highlights that there are two basic approaches related to the research methodology: quantitative research and qualitative research.²²

According to the nature of this study a quantitative methodology was ruled out as a choice due to the nature of the research that explores the development of state and international relations. Therefore, the study is constructed within a qualitative research methodology through collecting available data, documents, reports, from various Libyan institutions, especially from Libyan Foreign Ministry, and analysing it. In this analysis, the philosophy of the Libyan regime that shapes its foreign policy in relation to the importance of Africa for Arab national security is analysed through discourse and policy analyses. Considering the framework of the research, the qualitative method will yield a more descriptive outcome that will allow greater flexibility to present the analytical outcomes.

Research method-wise a combination of approaches has been used including the use historical analysis. The choice of multiple methods is based on a consideration of the way in which information is maintained and recorded, as well any changes during the research. This justifies the use of multiple methods, as a single method would not

²¹ Collis, J. and Hussey, R. (2003). *Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

²² Asutay, M. op. cit.,

highlight sufficient material for analysis. The lack of written records on this topic from government and other sectors also necessitates the use of multiple methods.

This study is the first of its kind; therefore there are no available studies from which to gather data. Thus, the researcher collected primary data from the documents, agreements and treaties that Libya has signed with African states. In addition, the researcher analysed the output of Libyan policy-makers and institutions relating to the research topic, including speeches, official correspondences and decrees and decisions of the Libyan parliament and government relating to Africa. In addition to these primary sources, secondary sources, including newspapers, magazines, journals and books, were consulted.

The data collected was analysed through textual and interpretative analysis, which enables examination of the material through by way of a social constructivist approach.

7. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Similar to any other study, the researcher experienced a number of obstacles. Research in social sciences is conducted in a controlled manner, which imposes a number of constraints. In addition, conducting research in societies, such as Libya, can impose further constraints due to the under-developed nature of civil society. Therefore, people are reluctant to assist the researcher. Furthermore, gaining permission to conduct research in the form of questionnaire and interviews in societies such as Libya can be challenging. Therefore the researcher could not conduct any interviews to support this study.

Importantly, due to secondary data constraints, particularly with materials that are related to security issues, it is difficult to ascertain the various elements of the research. Taking into account the systemic lack of data in Libya, it was not possible for this study to collect sufficient data for this research. The secondary data would have help contribute to an understanding of the sources of Libyan foreign policy and its direction towards the issue of Arab national security within the framework of Africa. However the lack of primary data resulted in many difficulties.

It was difficult to obtain sufficient information, including documents, because of bureaucratic impediments. In addition, there was paucity of resources in English which led the researcher to translate documents from other languages into English. Moreover, the lack of sufficient resources related to the topic in the university library resulted in the researcher travelling to other libraries and countries.

8. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

In order to answer the research questions (highlighted in section 2), the research is divided into six chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion. The researcher divides the topics and provides a methodological and analytical study in each section.

The introduction gives a historical background to the topic and provides a methodology for the research. Chapter One is a literature review of previous studies relating to the concept of national security. This is broken down into three eras: the Cold War; post-Cold War and post-9/11. The principal thinkers and theories of each era are examined and studied. This chapter also provides definitions of the main concepts of national security. The concept of national interest is also defined and its relationship to national security is assessed. The chapter also highlights the main internal and external factors relating to national interest and national security.

Chapter Two examines the Arab perception of national security through a study of the Arab-centric view of the national security of the state. Furthermore, the concept of regional security as an alternative to Arab national security is examined and the fact that Arab national security is one of the pan-Arab aims. In order to emphasise the importance of this concept, the most crucial factors pertaining to Arab national security are examined, through six dilemmas facing Arab national security.

In Chapter Three the research highlights in three sub-sections the dilemma of Arab national security vis-à-vis Libyan policy. First, the role of the 1969 revolution in formulating a pan-nationalist Libyan policy is examined, particularly in terms of Libya's relations with other Arab states and its calls for Arab unity rather than individual nation-states. Section two highlights Libya's perception of Arab national security and the extent to which it converges and conflicts with Western interests in

the region. This section also highlights the Libyan perception of the fragility of the state-centric concept of national security when confronting Western ambitions in the region. This is constructed upon the idea that Arab national security is a collective and indivisible concept. Section three highlights the main sources of threat to Arab national security according to Libyan policy-makers. The main internal and external challenges are examined as along with the influence of Western and regional states such as Israel, Turkey and Iran.

Chapter Four examines the importance of Africa for Libyan foreign policy. This is done through five aspects. The first aspect is Libya's vision of Africa as a strategic dimension of Arab national security. This perception is constructed on various elements including geography, politics, security, military and socio-culture. The second point examines Libya's incentive to intervene to end inter-African conflicts through using various economic and political policies. The third point deals with the most significant African conflicts and Libya's role—on various levels including economically, politically and militarily—to attempt to end these conflicts. This point also deals with the factors that encouraged Libya to cooperate with African states to bring about the end of the Western presence in the continent. The final section also examines Libya's stance on the Chinese presence in Africa and its opposition to foreign military presence in the continent.

Libya's role in the economic regionalisation of Africa is examined in Chapter Five through two main points. The first is Libya's incentives to call for economic alliances in Africa. Libya considers that it has much to gain through its calls for inter-African unity in confronting global alliances and economic blocs through a single African policy. Economic alliances are no longer a luxury but have become a real necessity. Therefore, Libya recognises the need for African states to develop a regional economic system due to the important role that Africa plays in assisting developing states, preserving security and reducing the pressures from globalisation and global economic powers. The second point deals with Libya's role in supporting and strengthening regional economic alliances in Africa. This point focuses on Libya's role in the most important economic alliances and the Libyan perception of the importance of these alliances for African and Arab national security.

Chapter Six examines Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African relations through regional institutions and organisations. This is done through five main points. First, Libya's role in promoting Arab-African relations on the bilateral level is assessed. This is achieved through portraying Libya's historical role in improving Arab-African relations due to its strategic geographical location and its proximity to European states such as Italy and Malta which resulted in strong relations between Libya and Africa states, particularly the Saharan ones. Second, the improved Arab-African relations through the regional organisations are discussed. It is evident that Arab states have realised the strategic importance of Africa and thus many have moved towards building closer ties, including establishing ministries and departments to deal specifically with African issues. The common feeling between African and Arab states for the need of co-dependence has encouraged both parties to strengthen ties. The third point discussed is Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African relations through the Arab League. This point highlights Libya's role in the League and its efforts to improve ties with Africa through the regional organisation. Fourth, Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African ties through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is analysed. This point deals with the steps taken by Libya to improve ties through this organisation. This point also shows that Libya has always supported regional organisations and highlights the importance of both Libya and the OAU for their mutual development. Fifth, Libya's role in establishing the African Union (AU) and its importance in Libyan foreign policy is discussed. Undoubtedly, since the 1969 Revolution Libya has continually sought to establish a strong entity in Africa in order to confront the consequences of various global challenges on the Arab and African regions. This point highlights the importance of the Libyan role in Arab and African organisations and the significance of the AU for Libyan policy. The last chapter is the conclusion, the main aim of which is to summarise the most important findings and recommendations of study.

Chapter One

TRENDS TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

1.1. INTRODUCTION

National security is a major concept related to the strategic decision-making of political leadership groups and is a primary concern for the issue of sovereignty of nation states. Political leaders invariably attempt to establish a self-defence strategy against threats that challenge the sovereignty of the state. Whilst the perception of external threats provides the basis for foreign policy behaviour, the nation state gives greater priority to territorial and border security as these determine the power and existence of the state. The presence of state power ensures the security of the state in relation to domestic politics and ensures its presence at the forefront of its aspirations over all other considerations. Security concerns also determine the main features of foreign policy behaviour such as self-reliance, regional alignment or collective security. Thus national security defines the vital interests as well as the success of the state in providing its security and dictates the effectiveness of its foreign policy.²³

The end of Second World War changed the global order from one based on multiple centres of power to a bipolar one. The structural change in the international order also marked changes in the development of the study of international relations. Power-based approaches and the use of force became important issues for security and strategic studies. Literature concerning the concept of national security, therefore, is core to the study of international relations.²⁴

From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, reaction to national liberation movements and wars resulted in the meaning of national security being expanded. During the Cold War, the concept of security was expanded to take into a number of aspects, in particular economic factors. For instance, the oil embargo in 1973, which helped

²³ Atta, M. Salh. (1997). *In Arab National Security*. Tripoli: World Centre for Studies and Research of the Green Book. p.12. (In Arabic)

²⁴ Herald, D. Lasswell. (1950). *National Security and Individual Freedom*. New York: McGraw-Hill. p.9 - 40

precipitate the global economic crisis in 1974, put economic security at the heart of national security.

There were many definitions of the concept of national security during the bipolar international system, the important of which focused on economic aspects. For example J. S. Nye, a Harvard academic, defined economic security as “the absence of the threat of severe deprivation of welfare economics.”²⁵

The trend to widen the scope of national security was started by former American Defence Secretary Robert McNamara in his book ‘*The Essence of the Security*’ published in 1964. He defines security in relation to the development of state and society. McNamara believes that security is not merely the accumulation of armaments, military force, or traditional military activity (although these may be part of it) but that security is primarily about development.²⁶ This definition initiated a trend to link national security to economic prosperity and political balance, as well as military capability.

To clarify the issue of national security, this chapter will be divided into four parts. The first section will examine the literature which addresses the historical development of the concept of national security, in three eras: the Cold War, post Cold War to 2001, and post September 2001. The second section will define the concepts of national security and national interest. The third section will discuss the relationship between national security and national interest, and the fourth will highlight the important factors which influence national security and national interest.

1.2. NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATES

The literature on national security has developed according to changes in the international system. Three key stages can be indentified: the Cold War era (1945-1989), post-Cold War (1989-2001) and post-9/11 (since September 2001). To determine the contemporary understanding of the concept of national security it is important to assess previous studies in the context of these three political phases. In

²⁵ J. S. Nye. (1974). “Collective Economic Security”. *International Affairs*, 50(4), pp.584-598

²⁶ McNamara, R. S. (1968). *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office*. New York: Harper & Row. pp.29-60

recognition of McNamara's close connection with Arab Middle East, the author will give greater consideration to his approach to the concept of Arab national security in this chapter.

2.2.1. National Security during the Cold War Era

The concept of national security has been used since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. In International Relations Theory (IRT) this resulted in the emergence of literature that examined how to achieve security and how to avoid war. The concept of balance and deterrence was developed, which led to the establishment of the American Security Council in 1974. Since this date there has been a widespread use of the security concept on the domestic, regional and international levels.²⁷ During the Cold War period the concept of national security was primarily discussed through the realist and neo-realist prisms. It is important to note that the concept of national security went through two periods during the Cold War. The first period was in the 1970s which showed that the security was visualised in the context of conflict and encounter. The second period which started in the mid-1980s played an important role to push the security concept to become as an alternative to the concept of power.²⁸

As its starting point, the realist school theory considers the state to be the primary actor in international relations. In addition, realist theorists consider conflicts and encounters between countries as the norm and the driving imperative of international relations. Therefore realists focus on the military drivers of national security.²⁹ This narrow focus opened the theory to much criticism. The Cold War provided the background that crystallized realist understanding in theorizing national security. The doyens of classical realism such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr argue that the countries, like the human beings, possess an innate desire to control others,

²⁷ Zakaria, Hussein. (2000). *National Security*. Available at: <URL: <http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/mafahem/2000/11/article2.shtml>> Access Date: 15th November 2006. (In Arabic)

²⁸ Buzan, Barry. (1991). *People States and Fear an Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*. USA: Lynne Reinner Publication. p.8

²⁹ Mohamed, S. Abouamod. (Winter, 2002). "Democracy and National Security in Contemporary Reality". *Democracy Journal*, Al Ahram Establishment. No.10, pp.25-36. (In Arabic)

which drives them into conflicts and wars.³⁰ Morgenthau and Niebuhr highlight the virtues of the traditional system of a balance of power through a multi-polar system; as such they consider that a bipolar system, pitting the US and the Soviet Union against each other, carried many risks.

Kenneth Waltz extends the concept of realism through neo-realism. He ignores the role of human nature, and instead focuses on the impact of the international system. According to Waltz, the international system consists of a number of major powers, each one determined to maintain its position on the international stage. This means that the system is anarchic, as there is an absence of a central authority that protects states from each other. In addition, each state is concerned only about its own national interests; however, weak states attempt to use a balance of power, instead of entering into conflict with more powerful adversaries. Therefore, unlike Morgenthau and Niebuhr, Waltz claims that the bipolar system is more stable than the multi-polar system.³¹

One of the important revisions to realism emerged from two trends, known as offensive and defensive capabilities, led by academics such as Robert Jervis, George Quester and Stephen Aivira. They argue that the possibility of conflict between countries can be explained as offensive and defensive positions. If the defence capability becomes greater than the offensive capability, then it is the most important security concern and stops the incentive for expansionist tendencies. The other condition is that if there is a focus on defence, the states will be able to distinguish between the use of defensive and offensive coercion. Thus, states will possess the means of defence without threatening others and therefore reduce anarchy within the international system.³²

The realist school argues that the main defence strategy of small states is seeking to maintain their sovereignty, while the major powers establish their own security and deterrence guarantees by forming a collective security arrangement and through nuclear deterrence. It is not surprising that neo-realism believed that the bipolar

³⁰ Walt, Stephen M. (spring, 1998). "International Relation, One World Many Theories". *Foreign Policy Journal*, No.110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge. pp.29-46

³¹ Ibid.,

³² Ibid., pp.29-46

system provided reliable security for Europe and US during the Cold War.³³ In addition there were fears about the possibility that the United States squandering this safety position through adopting a hostile foreign policy. Thus in the end of the cold war foreign policy moved from the realism pessimism of Morgenthau which derived from an understanding of the human nature to the adoption of a foreign policy which was more optimistic vision.

However, neither realism nor neo-realism can explain the 1+ 4 international system (the US as a superpower plus Russia, China, Europe, India as great powers) but the realist tradition still has strong arguments about security and defence strategies, namely: the priority of security in domestic and international politics is the main cornerstone of inter-state relations; the anarchical structure of international system relies on power competition between great powers; this power-based approach to international politics produces war, alliances, hegemony, and balance of power. The realist school theory suggests that the prime consideration for states is their own interests and sovereignty within determined territorial borders. A state analyses the threats to its interests from the perception of both internal and external threats. Therefore, the targets of its policy are basically the land and the national sovereignty of the state.³⁴ Moreover adherents of the realist trend accept that the best way for the state to maintain its national security is to build a strong military capability to act against both internal and external threats as was highlighted during the Cold War.

However, the end of the Cold War could not be explained by realist and neo-realist theories. The analysis of domestic and regional conflict had to change completely as realism and neo-realism rejected the idea of the collapse or defeat of a superpower. However the experience of political history shows that excessive attention to the military forces can lead to insecurity through the starting of an arms race. Therefore, military force without a definitive view of security in relation to other countries is not sufficient for security.³⁵ This is because the use of military force is considered as a

³³ Ibid., pp.29-46

³⁴ Smith, Steve. Amelia, Hadfield. Timothy, Dunne. (2008). "The Primacy of National Security", in Brian C. Schmidt (Eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (pp.155-170). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³⁵ Mohamed, S. Abouamod, Op. cit., pp.25-36

fundamental option to achieve national security³⁶ which turns into a zero initiative that must have a winner and a loser. In this context, long term international cooperation becomes an illusion that cannot be achieved.

It can be argued that realism justifies war and that peace is impossible. Realists expect a conflict to reach a balancing point as states individually seeking to promote and protect their interests, thus taking a pessimistic outlook towards the prospect of reducing conflicts and wars. However it has given us a simple explanation, relevant at times of war, alliances and imperialism, as well as highlighting obstacles against cooperation and other international phenomenon. In addition, its focus on the competitiveness tendency was apposite in relation to the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. This led to the fact that the link between survival and the characteristics of a great power reflect a weak relationship between states. However, the changes that happen from time to time in the world states does not mean that there is a change in the international system.³⁷

In addition, the period of the Cold War was characterized by an ideological conflict between the Eastern Communist Camp and the Western Capitalist Camp. This is another reason that kept most countries in the world living in a state of concern and in balance. This divide was imposed on most countries, especially the smaller and developing states, which sought the protection of one or other of these camps in order to protect their people in the case of a potential outbreak of war during that period.³⁸

Most academic studies have shown that the realistic perspective of security has become more prevalent in the three and a half centuries since the peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the subsequent emergence of state nationalism. However, the national security concept was re-evaluated by academics and researchers after the Cold War which resulted in the emergence of new concepts. This new concept introduces the bipolar system. On the other hand, the Realism was able to control the conduct of

³⁶ David, P. Fidler. (2002). "Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious Diseases, Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik". US: *The George Washington International Law Review*, vol.35, pp.788-856

³⁷ Waltz, Kenneth. (1978). *Theory of International Politics*. U.S: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. p.163

³⁸ Richard, Saull. (2001). *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power, and Social Revolution*. London: Routledge. pp.104-140

international relations for a long time, although this theory is the most vulnerable and criticised in the history of modern international relations. That is because it was not able to predict the sudden end of the Cold War.³⁹ In addition, during the Cold War there was a gap between the superpowers and the other states, and the competition was clear and the world was clearer in terms of theory and practice.⁴⁰ Moreover the rivalry between the superpower had a deep impact on all states as well as on the external and regional development of policies. Furthermore it affected the understanding of the concept of security throughout the Middle East and other regions in the world.⁴¹

Consequently, according to previous studies done in the phase of the Cold War, the concept of national security was linked with the realist theory, which was based on assumption that security can be achieved by nation-states. This belief can be preventing the conflict between states. However, at the end of the Cold War, many new issues and problems for the concept of national security such as natural disasters, poverty, and political anarchy, rise of non-state actors, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and international intervention were raised in IRT. Thus emergence the 1+4 global systems which introduce the unipolar power US as dominating the international political system.

1.2.2. National Security during the Post-Cold War Era

In the post-Cold war period from 1989 to 2001, there were many forms of security risks; for example, ethnic and religious conflicts, the spread of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and unstable economies. Although no one particular security risk became widespread, the US as the dominant power was forced to respond to domestic and regional conflicts, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in (1990-1991), the Somali crisis in (1991-1992), the Haiti disturbances in (1994), as well as the war in Bosnia in (1995) and the conflict in Kosovo (1999). At the same time, other crises occurred and the US did not intervene in the ethnic genocide occurring in Rwanda (1994) and in

³⁹ Craig, A. Snyder. (1999). "Realism and Security Studies", in Sean M. Lynn Jones (Eds.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (pp.53-76). New York: Routledge.

⁴⁰ Buzan, Barry.& Ole, Woever. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. UK: Cambridge University Press. p.31

⁴¹ Nikolaos, A. Stavrou. (1999). *Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads, A Reader*. US: Duke University press. p.245

Bosnia (1992-1995). Furthermore, the US and other powers did not use their ability for intervention to stop civil wars in Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leon, Zaire, and Darfur, and in other places in the world.⁴²

It can be argued that powerful states, such as the US, can intervene to extinguish conflicts and wars, or can ignite them when their safety and security are threatened. According to the dominant thinking about security during the period 1989-2001, termed the liberal trend, the concept is not just about protection from external military threats. It is extended to any danger that threatens human security. This analysis does not only concentrate on the state, but also on individuals, focusing on economic and ideological threats, or environmental disasters.⁴³ However, there is a dichotomy between proponents of this liberal trend. The first group presumes that security is to protect vital resources, thereby concentrates on developing strategies such as securing energy supplies. The second group argues that economic development is the essence of security, which, as discussed earlier, was addressed by Robert McNamara former Defence Secretary of America who referred to national security as internal economic and political development, as well as the development of all states. From the economic perspective, McNamara concludes that security means development so that there is no security without the development. McNamara believes that the use of military force could help to provide law and order, but this can not be achieved except in a way commensurate with the actual presence of a strong base of law and order in the developing states. The desire to cooperate on the part of the population, law, and order is the basic shield through which development can be achieved, and this is the reality about security.⁴⁴

On the other hand, the intellectual Francis Fukuyama believes that the end of Cold War was a victory for liberal democracy and capitalism, and thereby reflects, the end of history.⁴⁵ He claims that history has entered its final stage, as a result of the victory of the liberal democracy. Therefore, it appears that academics and researchers of

⁴² Patrick, M. Regan. (2002). *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate*. America: University of Michigan Press. pp.37-64

⁴³ Lenore, G. Martin. (2001). *New Horizons in Middle East Security*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.3-24

⁴⁴ McNamara, Robert. Op. Cit., p.28

⁴⁵ Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). *The End of Cold War and the End Man*. London: Penguin Books Ltd. p.6

international relations have to re-examine their viewpoints about the security theories. Stephen Waltz marked this post-Cold War period as the “stage of the Renaissance of Security Studies”.⁴⁶ Realists were easily able to identify the security issue, especially the equation between the security and military. However after the concept of security was moved out of the military domain, it became more difficult to determine and define.⁴⁷

The end of the Cold War created many political and strategic changes at the international level. Furthermore, the traditional threats which came from the competition between US and Soviet Union disappeared, creating a new international relation’s environment that was not easy to analyse. Non-military threats and challenges, which threatened stability, emerged as national security threats, leading states and politicians to review many of these new issues.⁴⁸ Therefore, it could be said that what distinguishes this stage is that the countries continued to achieve their political goals by using power.

It can be argued that the end of Cold War presented a big challenge for the whole world, especially the European states with the independence of Eastern Europe states from the Soviet Union. It would seem that the sudden end of the Cold War led European countries to review economic, social, cultural, and political policies in relation to national security. This reference to the security of the states was more broadly based than only armed forces issues.⁴⁹

This stage produced important points which were to play a significant role in the global security system. It can be argued that this stage changed the equation of the security system at the global level. Another change was the breakup of the Soviet Union into many states, which facilitated the dominate role of the US on the international stage. The other important point was the end of the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism was no longer valid for the global equation.

⁴⁶ Stephen M. Walt. (1999). “The Renaissance of Security Studies”. *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 211-239

⁴⁷ Buzan, Barry. Ole, Woever. Jaap, de Wilde. (2002). *Security a New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Renner, pp.1-20

⁴⁸ Terry, Terriff. Stuart, Croft. Lucy, James. Patrick Morgan. (1999). *Security Studies Today*. Cambridge: polity press, p.115

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.166

Furthermore, during this stage there emerged other ways and other tools which were used in the penetration of third world states. The major post cold war aim of US foreign policy was the containment of communism in Africa.⁵⁰ This stage is considered very important, because it changed the standard and methods of the security system. Also, other new players who were waiting for this opportunity since the end of the Cold War emerged on the picture of international security system.⁵¹ For example, with the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the single remaining superpower.

The post-Cold War era highlight a number of issues, such as the development of democracy, shrinking military influence over new liberal policies, and economic reforms. Also military coups which characterised the Cold War decreased, in addition to the reduction of extremism and an increase in the level of stability.⁵² It could be argued that the post-Cold War era had an important impact on national security and the international security system. Also the concept of national security is complex and poorly defined.

Moreover at the end of the Cold War the security challenges became more complex, particularly the security issues that did not represent a direct threat to national security and the entity of the state. However, these issues undermined state sovereignty and reduced the state's ability to control its border and strained its relations with groups inside the state and/or with other states within the regional and international systems. Most of the variables contributed to the change in the traditional theories of security and accordingly were globalised and internationalised. This phenomenon emerged clearly during the 1990s and linked with theories that were endorsed by the retreat of unlimited state sovereignty for issues, such as humanitarian intervention. The process of globalisation highlighted tensions between two key trends. The first trend emphasised that globalisation did not adhere to national borders, and it could penetrate any society. According to this trend, globalisation represents certain values,

⁵⁰ F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam. (1992). "The United States and Africa after the Cold War". *Africa Today Journal*, 39(4), pp. 19-34

⁵¹ Buzan, Barry & Ole, Woever. (2003). Op. cit., pp.49-70

⁵² Ibid., p.320

such as democracy, liberalism and human rights.⁵³ The second trend focused on the nation-state and called for the shrinking of the state within its border in the fields of economics, politics, society and technology.

In addition, as a result of the globalisation, there emerged new pretexts to interfere in the affairs of states. Globalisation led to a change in the patterns of international relations. Arguably the freedom of the state to choose its political, economic and social systems became restricted and the scope of these choices became too narrow. Small, poor states were exposed to either direct or indirect pressure to accept a set of rules governing their political, economic and social activities. This resulted in a significantly increased restriction on the exercise of the sovereignty of the nation state.⁵⁴

It is important to note that the process of globalisation reduced the scope of sovereignty of the state and increased the power of other entities, including multinational enterprises. For example, deregulation means that corporations have more freedom to enter and exit the nation-state which makes it difficult for the state to retain corporations to support the nation-state economy. In addition, this was clearly reflected in the defence and security of a community. However, it can be argued that the development of globalisation and its activity led to a reduction in the state's role in the field of the defence and security.⁵⁵ For example, globalization is eroding military advantages and reducing its Capabilities. For this reason, the US imposed controls on the technology which maintains the capability gap between its military forces and other competitors.

At the end of the Cold War, the US dominated international policies in the context of globalisation. Since that date the Middle East and Africa became a key element of US national security and interests. The US structured its strategy on the basis of containment policy through the creation of alliances with a number of prominent countries in the region. Hence, these countries became client or satellite states which

⁵³ Helen, Y. Neal. Arthur G. Neal. Jacob Fried. (2008). "Global and Local Culture in the 21st Century". *Journal of American & Comparative Cultures*, 24(3-4), pp.31-36

⁵⁴ Clair, Apodaca. (2001). "Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights after the Cold War". *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(4), pp.587-602

⁵⁵ Jonathan, Kirshner. (2006). *Globalisation and National Security*. USA: CRC Press. pp.1-350

the US used to implement its external policies in the region. Also, these countries are the tools which reflect the threat to the interests of the United States in the region.⁵⁶

By 2000, the international system had migrated towards a multi-polar system. The European Union and the Federal Russian system each sought to adopt foreign policies and security issues independent of an American orientation. This is highlighted by the differences which emerged in the 2000 Millennium Summit regarding international intervention, the amendment of the Charter of the United Nations and changes in the concept of state sovereignty.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the US has played its role as the primary superpower since the end of the Cold War; however, its policies have resulted in many crises in the international and regional systems.⁵⁸

Thus, it was clear that the concept of national security was more open and moved out of the military domain. Liberalism added important factors to national security concept such as human security, vital economic, democratic and capitalist resources. However, during this post cold war period the opportunities of a state to choose its political, economic and social system, was too determined and narrow as a result of the use of a unipolar system. It is clear that a State was not the only player in international relations. Liberals acknowledge there were other elements which supported a state to managing its role among international players. The most prominent of these elements was economic power. Therefore, the concept of security in liberal theory did not depend on the military dimension, but also extends to the economic, cultural and social dimensions.

Despite the fact that liberalism had to consider social and cultural aspects as supplements to the security process, it was not interested in the details of the risk components such as poverty, unemployment, social justice, faith groups and internal affairs. It could be argued that ignoring such details led to the 11 September events, which destabilised the balance of security and questioned its many theories. The next point will address this issue.

⁵⁶ Stephen, Hubbell. (1998). "The Containment Myth: US Middle East Policy in Theory and Practice". *Middle East Research and Information Project: Middle East Report*, No.208, pp.8-11

⁵⁷ United Nations Millennium Declaration at Fifty-Fifth Session. General Assembly Resolution: No. (55/2 of 8). September, 2000. pp.1-9

⁵⁸ Karen, A. Feste. (2003). *Intervention: Shaping the Global order*. United States: Greenwood Publishing Group. pp.177-216

1.2.3. Structural Changes in National Security Trends since 9/11

The post-11 September 2001 era registered a new beginning in the development of American strategic thinking, as well as a new world system. The impacts of the terrorist attacks on that morning are compared to the impact of the Pearl Harbour attacks on 7 December 1941 which led the US into the Second World War. It is evident that the 11 September attacks suddenly changed the international security environment, with the presentation of a new security threat. This resulted in the international system, led by the US, developing a new strategy to face the latest threat to security. Cline and Taylor argue that the phrase “a big strategy” describes ways in which a state uses various means, such as the military, economy, technology, ideology and culture to protect and promote its national security, its values and its national interests.⁵⁹

The events of 11 September were a significant turning point in history and changed many of the balances and theories, in the context of security, economics, politics and society. Arguably these events undermined the usefulness of previous theories; in particular the theories that were forward looking and which underpinned most of global policies.⁶⁰ For example, the intellectuals Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama argued that all wars led by the US post-11 September, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, were contributed to by other powers. Therefore it can be argued that this event led to the re-examination of international policies, especially the policies of national security.

The discrepancy between the realist and the liberal trends, and their failure to determine a definition of security that combines both trends, advanced the emergence of an integrative trend and constructivist approach. The integrative trend argues that national security connotes a state’s ability to face dangers from three angles, namely the world, the community, and the political system. This applies to the national security of the state in relation to the size of its exposure to each of these angles and the ability of the state to face these threats. The event of 11 September has clearly

⁵⁹ Raechelle, Cline and Megan, Taylor. (2002). “A New Era in U.S. Strategic Thinking”, in Robert J. Lobber (Ed.), *September 11: One Year Later* (pp.5-8). US: A Special Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State.

⁶⁰ Smith, Steve and Amitav, Acharya. (2002). “The Concept of Security before and after September 11th”. Singapore: *Institute of defence and strategic Studies*, No.23, pp.1-32

highlighted the appositeness of the integrative trend, which emphasises that all aspects of security must be taken into account. Moreover, it appears that the security of the state lies will be threatened as a result of neglecting any part of security.

The failure of both realism and liberalism in predicting the end of the Cold War boosted the credibility of constructivist theory. Constructivist theory criticises the static assumptions of traditional international relations theory and emphasizes that international relations is a socially constructed reality.

Social constructivism has been described as a challenge to the dominance of neo-liberal and neo-realist schools of international relations theories. These describe international relations theories as being concerned with how ideas define international structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states and how states and non-state actors reproduce this structure.⁶¹

It should be noted that constructivism is a critical theory, ontologically grounded in rationalist theories of international relations. Whereas realism deals mainly with security and material power, and liberalism looks primarily at economic interdependence and domestic-level factors, constructivism is primarily concerned with the role of ideas and social and political actors in shaping the international system.⁶²

In addition, constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of a perceived reality that influences states and non-state actors within the international system. As a result, constructivists believe that these ideational factors can often have far-reaching effects, and that they can trump materialistic power concerns.⁶³

Despite the importance of social constructivism, the integrative trend in the post 9/11 era emerges clearly more than other theories in analysing the case for national security.

⁶¹ Michael, Barnett. (2005). "Social Constructivism" in *The Globalisation of World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.162

⁶² Scott, Burchill. Andrew Linklater. (2005). *Theories of international relations*. USA: Palgrave, Macmillan. p194

⁶³ Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit. (1998). "Dangerous Liaisons: Critical international theory and constructivism". *European Journal of international Relations*, SAGE, 4(3), 259-294

This does not mean that other theories do not have a legitimate role in this, but the integrative trend has shown that the security process needs to be integrated in at all levels of policy.

The events of 11 September 2001 influenced the concept of security, as it brought to the surface a new concept for international security, which led towards new security strategy arrangements. The US tried to impose its own agenda on the concept of security, formulating a new security strategy.⁶⁴ This was based on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, as the perception grew that terrorism and insurgency were a serious global threat to the security of all states and societies. Therefore, the US started to build and lead an international coalition against terrorism, as well as using all tools available, including the military, to improve homeland security. The strategy is based on the right of America to use pre-emptive military strikes against any nation or groups, which Washington believes may be a danger or threat to American's security. This resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in October 2001 and the subsequent ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in April 2003. Furthermore the US has used other means such as restricting financial sources of international terrorism. However, the U.S policy of the preponderance of power has received domestic and international criticism and has resulted in an increase of anti-Americanism globally.

At the forefront of these changes is the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty in order to hunt down terrorist groups and isolate terrorist supporting countries. In contrast, the US placed greater importance on its security interests than on global stability.⁶⁵ In doing so, the US has sought to set out a list of priorities relating to the risks that threaten the states and societies, namely: terrorism, dictatorial regimes (particularly the 'Axis of Evil' states)⁶⁶ the defects in the structures of social and

⁶⁴ "The New National Security Strategy of America: Vision Critical". (Spring, 2003). *Sho'oun Khalijia Journal, Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies*, No.33. pp.170-174. (In Arabic)

⁶⁵ G. John Ikenberry. (September - October 2002). "America's Imperial Ambition". UK: *Foreign Affairs Journal*, 81, (5), pp.49-55

⁶⁶ *Axis of evil states* is a term initially used by the former United States President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 in order to describe governments that he accused of helping terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction. President Bush named Iran, Iraq and North Korea. President Bush's presidency was marked by this notion as a justification for the War on Terror.

political systems in pro-US states, and regional conflicts whose continuation may lead to threats to international security.⁶⁷

Arguably the US has played the main role during this stage. This has opened up a comprehensive, prolonged war through the mobilization of its military, political and economic strength.⁶⁸ The US internationalised security issues through its policy of direct military intervention. This has resulted in an American presence in the key strategic areas in the world in order to serve its national and security interests. The presence of an international military force linked to the policies of the superpower override traditional regional and international arrangements and treaties.⁶⁹

It cannot be denied that events post 9/11 have raised many new security issues, the most important of which is the insertion of non-state actors into the security situation at the regional and international level. Moreover, the emergence of non-state actors has stretched the capability and security parameters for many states. Additionally, there are several studies demonstrate other issues have emerged since 11 September, such as the excessive use of military force and the threats to the national security of many states under the pretext of fighting global terror. For example, Philip H. Gordon argued that the war on terrorism post 9/11 became the new paradigm of international relations.⁷⁰ The violation of international law is one of the critical issues facing western liberal democracy. Following neo-conservative policy⁷¹ the US argued that the current framework against the use of force in the international relations was no longer viable for the current international situation. Therefore, the US has used military force and exceeded the international legal framework in dealing with

⁶⁷ Stephen, Hubbell. Op. cit., pp.8-11

⁶⁸ Ifantis, Kostas. (2002). "Understanding International Politics after the 11 September Terrorist Attacks: A Note on the New Security Pradigm". *Journal of International Affairs*, 11(1), pp.101-106

⁶⁹ Mohammed, Abdulsalam. (2003). "Regional Security Arrangements in the Post-September 11th 2001". *A Series of Brochures Strategy, The Centre for Political and Strategic Studies*, No.127, Egypt: Al- Ahrum Establishment, pp.27-29 (In Arabic)

⁷⁰ Philip, Gordon. (2005). "NATO After 11 September". *Survival*, 43(4), pp. 89 -106

⁷¹ *Neo-conservatism* is a political philosophy that emerged in the United States of America, and which supports using American economic and military power to bring liberalism, democracy, and human rights to other countries.

countries which threaten its security by disregarding limits cited in the charter of the United Nation.⁷²

The US has dealt with the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a threat to international security in a number of different ways. These include conventional means, such as the use of armed force such as in Iraq, the threat of its use as in the case of Iran and the use of political threats as in case of Libya and North Korea. Furthermore, Washington has also adopted non-conventional measures against some countries, such as with Syria and Iran.⁷³ However, the US has ignored the weapons of mass destruction possessed by Israel and India.

In this context, the concept of national security has been an element in various theories throughout the three different periods. This fact indicates that national security as a concept remains complex and identified within specific policy framework despite its the complexity the various important factors that compliment it. However, the military aspect remains central to its conceptual understanding.

With references to the above mentioned it could be argued that the concept of national security became part of the integrated approach post 9/11. This is evidenced by that the fact US invited the world community to integrate its efforts in order to face terrorism as the main world enemy. Since that date, security equation changed and began to be as an integrated security system which did not ignored specific factors that complimented the security process.

The three periods mentioned highlight the evolutionary process of national security strategy at the domestic, regional and systemic levels and how this influenced thinking around the concept of national security. The following section will deal with the concept of national security and its relative importance to the national interest.

⁷² Arend, Anthony Clark. (2003). "International Law and Rogue States: the Failure of Charter Framework". Boston: *New England Law Review*, vol. 36, pp.735-753

⁷³ Mohammed, Abdulsalam. (2004). "Arms Control in the Stage of Post- Iraq War". Egypt: *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.153, pp.108-111. (In Arabic)

1.3. NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL INTEREST: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

The concept of national security has passed through a number of complex political stages. Furthermore, the concept and definition of national security has altered within the framework of the prevailing political situation. For example, realist theory and the arms race dictated policy which influenced the understanding of the concept of national security during the Cold War. Each state sought self-reliance or a collective defence strategy to protect itself and tried to dominate others. However, the end of the Cold War saw the rise of the liberal trend which believed that security was not just protection against external threats but also focused on individual security. Thus, the concept of security reached new horizons in strategic thinking at the end of the 1980s.⁷⁴ Thus Barry Buzan argues that the concept of security is not only military force but includes other dimensions such as the economic, social, political and ecological security.⁷⁵ Since 11 September 2001 an integrative approach to the concept of national security has evolved. This approach argues that security is concerned with the protection of the state from three angles: the land; community; and the governance system. The supporters of the integration approach believe that it comprised the interdependence between the international units. Karl W. Deutsch argued that “the aim of integration is to form a secure society of integrated units where there is no place for potential wars”. This approach can be achieved through adopting measures and mechanisms that can peacefully solve conflicts and enforce cooperation.⁷⁶ Integration in this sense means a relation between units which depend on each other and which aim at acquiring characteristics that are difficult to obtain individually.

The concept of national security is a dynamic phenomenon, which changes with time, and with the policies of security at the regional level, and according to the international situation. There are many forms of internal and external threats to national security, such as political instability, the lack of social integration, civil wars, and the failure of development, poverty, and authoritarian political systems. Hence, the concept of national security surpasses the military power of the state; it is

⁷⁴ Buzan, Barry. Op. cit., p.4

⁷⁵ Smith, Steve and Amitav, Acharya. (2002). op. cit., pp.1-32

⁷⁶ Karl W. Deutsch. (1988). *The Analysis of International Relations: Foundations of Modern Political Science*. US. Prentice-Hall. Pp.200-201

extended to include all political, psychological, humanitarian, ideological, scientific as well as technological aspects and dimensions of the economy.

In addition to this, integrative approaches argue that the concept of national security can be characterized by being definite, inclusiveness, relative, and changing. It is limited in the sense that it is confined to scope of the nation state. Therefore, it finds its practical and applicable field in the framework of the nation state. This concept is comprehensive in the sense that it includes all aspects of security which are linked with the absence risks in all its forms. Through following the international concepts of national security and the methods used to achieve it. It can be deduced that there are two schools of thought, the school of strategic values, and the school of development. This does not necessarily apply to the any real state.⁷⁷

Contemporary political theories provide links between a state and the concept of national security. The existence of the nation-state as a political institution has become justified through discussion on national security. Therefore, the nation-state remains the primary actor associated with national security. Moreover, the nation-state is the systematic embodiment for nationalism and interest group. However, the nation-state is the embodiment of a national group therefore; national security is the essence of the national group security. Thus, national security means the security of any national interest group.

In order to highlight the linkage between national security and national interest, this section next looks at the definition of national security.

1.3.1. The Definition of National Security

The concept of security, at its most basic, is related to the individual. Security is experienced either as a result of the absence of risks which may threaten an individual's existence or as a result of having the tools to confront risks as they appear. Security allows individuals to ensure their survival and satisfy their needs.⁷⁸ The protection of personal property is one of the key aspects of security. Therefore, great

⁷⁷ Ali, Eddin Hilal. (1986). *Challenges of Arab National Security in the Next Decade*. Amman: Arab Thought Forum. p.22. (In Arabic)

⁷⁸ Fouad, Raslan. (1977). "*Concept of National Security*", Cairo: MA Thesis, Unpublished, Faculty of Economic and Political Science, Cairo University. p.11 (In Arabic)

efforts have been made to protect property, such as houses and banks.⁷⁹ It is fair to say that security of individuals and the security of the state have a horizontal correlation with each other. This seems to indicate that the definition of national security provides a link with the threats that face political groups at certain times. These threats can be internal or external. As a result, there must be a secure entity of the state or group of states in relation to the risks that threaten it, internally and externally. A further purpose is to secure its interests and create the conditions needed to achieve its objectives, as well as its national purposes.⁸⁰

However, individuals may also be exposed to threats, when they are part of a group. Therefore, the group takes upon itself to protect its security.⁸¹ Barry Buzan defines national security as the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and communities to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. In addition, he confirms that security is the basis of survival which refers to the ability of the state to maintain its separate identity as well as its unit of physiology.⁸²

Thus, in this case national security refers to the scenario where the nation has its own identity and its national personality, distanced from terrorism or any threats of external force. The nation gains confidence from the lack of danger whether through the absence of any threat or the having the capacity to eliminate threats. From this, it is evident that national security means the freedom from the feeling of danger. Therefore, security implies the absence of factors of fear and anxiety as the state attempts to achieve its objectives. Therefore, it can be asserted with a degree of certainty that security is the feeling of confidence that arises when the scourge of war and the complexities arising from interactions on the international stage can be avoided or absorbed through a sound foreign policy.

⁷⁹ Christian, Bay. (1970). *The Structure of Freedom*. US: Stanford University Press. pp.65-70

⁸⁰ Ali, Eddin Hilal. (September, 1979). "Arab Security and the Strategy Conflict in the Red Sea Area". Beirut: *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, No.9, p.98. (In Arabic)

⁸¹ P.G. Bock and Morton, Berkowitz. (1968). "National Security", in David Sills (Ed.), *The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (pp.3-45). New York: Macmillan & The Free Press.

⁸² Barry, Buzan. (Jul, 1991). "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century". *International Affairs*, Vol. 67(3), pp.431-451

However, it is possible to understand national security in multiple ways. The term can be used to refer to the objective which the foreign policy of a state seeks to achieve, or as the sense of power, or as a framework for a political movement. Also the term is applied to certain institutions within the state.

More broadly, national security as an objective of the government means maintaining the nation's sovereignty and protecting it from domination by external forces, in order to ensure its stability. Moreover, this view highlights that if the state is exposed to aggression, and if this undermines the political leadership, then the state can be susceptible to aggression at any moment. Consequently, national security becomes of the priority of foreign policy. This interpretation of national security suggests that it is a set of actions undertaken by the military to protect the state. Sociologists also highlight that the national security is the ability of the state to protect the internal values from external threats.⁸³

National security can also mean a group of principles that are linked with the protection of the state and represents the minimum needed to ensure the national presence in the international system. Politicians tend to follow this approach to national security and thus it becomes the framework for their policies. It is clear that the concept of national security applies to certain organs of state, such as the security organisation and the National Security Council, which includes government officials and technocrats. The National Security Council is a modern organisation and is linked with political attitudes as well as the speed of policy changes. The security organisation is collecting information on enemies and friends and analyses it so as to make the best political decision.⁸⁴ National security is considered a complex and ambiguous concept, therefore multiple definitions as well as schools have examined it.

It is argued that the over-arching meaning of national security is the extent to which the state has the ability to secure its internal and external economic and military assets and to deal with internal and external threats during peace and war. National security is aimed at ensuring these elements are secured according to planned objectives.

⁸³ P.G. Bock and Morton, Berkowitz. Op. cit., pp.3-45

⁸⁴ Hamed, Rabi. (1979). *The Political Content of the Arab-European Dialogue*. Cairo: the Institute of Arab Research and Studies, p.179. (In Arabic)

There are many definitions of security. In addition, there are some concepts that are generally accepted in security studies, such as national security as a military concept and national security as a social concept. National security is more often than not thought of as a military concept. However the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* defines national security as the state's ability to protect its internal values and interests from external threats.⁸⁵ There are also those who define national security as the protection of vital national values that form part of government policy, which in turn aims to create local and international conditions that are suitable for protecting these values from any threats. It is worth mentioning that the *Britannica Encyclopaedia* defines national security as protecting the nation against the threat of foreign attack. Barry Buzan's definition of national security is the preservation of a way of life. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal supervision and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic, and social values which are essential to the quality of life.⁸⁶ National security is the ability of the state and societies to protect their life and their identity. Several factors can affect national security such as military, environment, political, societal and economic influences.⁸⁷

These definitions refer to the structure of military force which is the essence of national security policy and also focus on the need for the state to be strong militarily to achieve its goals. The idea of security is linked with the sense of deterrence and self-defence through maximisation of military force, as well as the readiness to face external military threats.

On the other hand, the social meaning of national security is comprehensive and more general than within the military context, because it is linked with the social development of states. Therefore, something that can impact negatively on any social force is classified as a threat to national security. According to this definition, multiple sources of threat exist to national security, including insecurity related to politics, economics, food, ideology, materials, internal subversion, external pressure, military coups, illiteracy and underdevelopment. To identify the concept of national security

⁸⁵ P.G. Bock and Morton, Berkowitz. Op. cit., pp.3-45

⁸⁶ Smith, Steve. Amelia, Hadfield and Timothy, Dunne. (2008). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors and Cases*. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 156

⁸⁷ P. R. Kumaraswamy. (2004). *Security beyond Survival: Essays for K. Subrahmanyam*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. pp.15-16

more clearly, three important points must be analysed: the concept of national interest; the relationship between the national interest and national security; and the factors affecting national security and national interest.

1.3.2. The Concept of National Interest

The concept of national interest includes a set of values that reflect the needs and the aspirations of the nation. Although, the concept is contested by political analysts, it has benefited politicians who have used it as a means of gaining popular support. Arguably politicians do not adopt their goals for reasons of the national interest, but argue that these objectives are national interests in themselves. The aim is to gain the necessary support for the implementation of their foreign policy decisions. Thus, the national interest becomes the basis for political action.⁸⁸

The concept of national interest was first defined at the end of the First World War, as politicians and academics, such as Morgenthau, became concerned about the relationship between foreign policy and the national interest. Morgenthau defined this concept as “power” and he stressed that foreign policy goals must be defined by taking the national interest into consideration, because the latter is the basis for political action.⁸⁹

Thus, this draws attention to the integral relationship between national interest and power, as each is regarded as complementary to the other; power is the means to protect states’ national interest, as well being a goal for the national interest. In other words, the over-arching national interest is the consolidation of power of the national state at its most comprehensive. Nevertheless, in reality there is a disparity between power and interest, even for some powerful and wealthy states. In short, the national interest comprises the political, economic, cultural, military, technological and social factors that influence the state in achieving its expectations. National interests are of a flexible nature changing according to different circumstances. These interests are crucial for the political decision-makers.

⁸⁸ P.G. Bock and Morton, Berkowitz. Op. Cit., pp.3-45

⁸⁹ Hans, J. Morgenthau. (1951). *In Defence of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 38-39

While a political decision-maker is initially motivated by the national interest of the country, this is not always related to power. This is because the concept of national interest includes many aspects, which reflect values that are not all related to military force. There are multiple, incremental components of the concept; moreover the weighting of the components are linked with to the background situation which in turn is influenced by political, economic, cultural, and technological changes, as well as the country's historical background. It is important to note that the national interest is the expression of differing conflicting interest groups. However, this means that the state is independent of these national interests, which influence the requirements of national security, in order to protect the nation from any external threats.⁹⁰

This raises questions about the relationship between the concept of national security and national interest—these concepts express one and the same thing. Issues include the extent of the limits of the relationship between them and which is more influential in forming strategic political decisions? To answer these queries, it is important to clarify the relationship between these two concepts and the factors affecting them. In this context, the national interest is the underlying determinant for a state's foreign policy formulation and description of its goals and objectives. The states, therefore, have to adopt elements of power in their policy by which they can protect the nation-state interests.

1.4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Both concepts are linked with the state but are different from each other. The concept of national security refers to the set of principles that aim to protect the state from different threats, while the concept of national interest refers to the set of values that is most relevant for the state. Furthermore, national security is concerned with the safety and stability of the community as set against external threats. However, as the national interest is linked with communal values, it is concerned with achieving societal goals. National security and the national interest are linked by the status quo; however, both revolve around a certain level of state survival. It is possible to conclude that the

⁹⁰ Kissinger, A. Henry. *A Global Order in Flux*. (July 9, 2004). The Washington Post. Available at :< URL: <http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/wp070904.html> > Access Date 12th February, 2007.

national security remains at a certain level, but the national interest aims to develop the community.⁹¹

Despite the fact that both concepts are different, they are linked closely and related in complex and ethereal ways. It is generally accepted that the concept of national security finds its origins in the historical formulation of the concept of national security interest. According to Walter Lippmann, the nation will be able to protect itself by war in the case of challenge and that the national interest becomes included in the national security interest.⁹²

It is generally accepted that the ambiguity of the relationship between nationalism and national security will result in a number of different national interests, whether real or imaginary, that place a burden on national security. For example, US policy is based on national interests linked to the American national security. In the Cold War era the national interest was that no country should become a communist state. This led America to fight wars in Korea and in Vietnam to defend its concept of national interest and national security;⁹³ however, its security was not directly threatened in Korea or Vietnam. Washington believed that by allowing communist proliferation this would have caused a danger to America's national security. Therefore, arguably communism put the US in a position which made it less able to clearly define its national security.

The ambiguity of the relationship between the concepts of national security and national interest are highlighted in managing foreign policy. This is shown in the relationship between America and Israel. US presidents continuously confirm that the US national security lies in ensuring the security of Israel, despite the fact that Israel's security does not contribute to the protection of America's national security. However, the US believes for a variety of reasons that the existence of Israel serves its

⁹¹ Daniel, Lieberfeld. (1999). *Talking with the Enemy: Negotiation and Threat Perception in South Africa and Israel/Palestine*. UK: Greenwood Publishing Group, pp.13-20

⁹² Walter, Lippmann. (1943). *U.S. Foreign Policy*. Boston: Shield of the Republic: little, Brown and company. p.51

⁹³ Gary, Donaldson. (1996). *America at War since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War*. US of America: Praeger Paperback. pp.37-49

interests.⁹⁴ Therefore, it is committed to protect Israel's existence because of the American set of values, despite the adverse effects on the country politically, economically and socially.

Also, this ambiguity can clearly be seen in the relationship between developed states and developing states which export oil. All developed industrial countries are increasingly reliant on developing countries as a source of natural resources such as oil or a market for their industrial output. This dependency encouraged developed countries to further their ambitions beyond just energy. In the period following the October War 1973 the concepts of security and national interest were combined. Both have common characteristics of continuity, rigidity and influence on political decision-making, as well as in the formation of strategy. Moreover, both concepts are characterized by continuity and stability since the variables that govern them are stable. Stability, however, does not mean stagnation but rather avoiding volatility and fluctuation.

It would appear that these variables are very important for states. Britain's national interests and national security are greatly influenced by its unchanging geographical position as an island at the east of the Atlantic. This geography controlled the general nature of its foreign policy, which was secondarily influenced by its colonies. Thus, Britain depended for its survival on the possession of a powerful navy until the First World War.

Arguably the national interest is characterised by a large degree of constancy. Thus, the national interests of any state, when they are determined, acquire the advantage of long-term stability. This explains why in international relations "there are no eternal friends or enemies but there are eternal interests."⁹⁵ For example, American interest in the Middle East has been fixed since the signing of agreements between US oil companies and regional leaders and following the departure of the UK and France left it. It is clear that the means to achieve those interests change in accordance with variables that emerge in the international system—whether those variables are

⁹⁴ Cheryl, A. Rubenberg. (1986). *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*. US of America: University of Illinois Press. pp.1-24

⁹⁵ Otte, Thomas G. al.el. (1997). *Personalities, war and diplomacy: essays in international history*. London: Fran Cass Publishers. pp. 151-152

influenced by changes in the regional balance of power, technology or economic circumstances. However, the means do not change at the same speed.⁹⁶

It would appear that strategic means are more stable than those of tactics. Therefore, the relationship between means and interests appears to be an inverse one. While changes are made to national interests, transforming them into national objectives in a short period of time, the biggest changes are in the strategic and tactical means. This accounts for why the concepts of security and national interest have become important, in terms of the state, and been introduced into a framework by which politicians must abide when making political decisions. The situation is no different when a strategy or a national interest is established, as they form another type of political act. Arguably, the national interest of any state influences the direction of its policies and its strategies according to the requirements of national security.

In addition, there are several internal and external factors that play a key role in influencing the relationship between the two concepts. The most important factors are discussed in the next section.

1.5. FACTORS INFLUENCING NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

As has been discussed national security is affected by many factors that are imposed through political decisions. However, the most influential factors are those which directly affect the relationship with the national interest. This relationship is interdependent as discussing national security means addressing the national interest. This reflects the objective of national security which is to protect the national interest. Academic studies highlight that the national interest is tied to the national security force, including all elements that can affect the building of strategic security which protects the national interests from all internal and external threats. Thus, the absence of one means the absence of the other. This leads to the fact that the national security and national interest are basic building blocks for internal and external state policies. In addition, the success and failure of these policies depend on a group of main factors.

⁹⁶ Saad Eddin, Ibrahim. (1975). *Kissinger and The Middle East Conflict*. Beirut: Dar Italia'a. p.126

The most important of these factors are discussed in depth including: internal factors such as political forces, the hierarchal building of political values and national personality; and external factors which revolve around changes in the international system and its national balance.

1.5.1. Internal Factors

Internal factors play a major role on the concept of national security and national interest of a state. It can be seen that there are many factors that impact on both concepts, whether negatively or positively. These factors are complementary in highlighting this impact. Therefore, it is important to identify these factors.

1.5.1.1. Political forces

Conflicting interests determine the type of national interest and the identification of the factors linked to national security. Arguably in a community where multiple political forces are in play, some of these forces leave their mark on national security and the national interest. This happens as a result of these forces having a prominent influence in shaping and determining the objectives and trends of foreign policy.⁹⁷ This means that the objectives of states differ according to the quality of the governing party. It is generally accepted that the objectives of a state under the authority of religious leadership are not the same as when the power is in the hands of the army. This is because the interests of these two groups differ from each other. This also makes their goals and views on foreign affairs different. Lobby groups are a further example which highlights the different outcomes for the national interest.

1.5.1.2. The value system

A coherent set of values is adopted or evolves by a person, organisation or society as a standard to guide its behaviour and preferences in all situations. Political values are one of the important value systems because it reflects the ideas of social phenomena which are of a lasting significance for the satisfaction of needs of large social groups

⁹⁷ Qasim, Altmah. (1987). "Arab National Security and the National Unity". *Unity magazine*, the National Council of Arab Culture, Rabat: No.28, p.27. (In Arabic)

and society as a whole, and which at the same time marks those ideas as the ideas of the needs of large social groups and society as a whole.⁹⁸

Arguably the hierarchal building of political values in a society can form an integrated value framework for the national group. Therefore, these values affect the national interest and national security. In addition, value systems differ between nations. The origin of political values should be considered as directly connected to the sphere of political practice. Their ultimate source and political content, however, should be sought in the entirety of political interactions.

Therefore, value systems are important for all nations because if it is imbalanced then there is also an imbalance in a society's political, economic and social development. This imbalance could result in a threat to the society and a subsequent lack of stability and security.

1.5.1.3. The national personality

National personality affects both concepts and differs from people to people. For example, the general characteristics of the American personality differ from the general characteristics of the German personality. American people can be described as materialistic, which makes the achievement of the national wealth a goal which subordinates other goals of American foreign policy. Thus, America's national security focuses on ensuring the protection of wealth. On the other hand, Germans are fanatical about their race, military and the glorification of war. These reasons make war the main objective of their foreign policy. Therefore, their national security becomes focused on ensuring the German purity of race and its success.⁹⁹

Furthermore, the Arab personality is different from the European personality. The Islamic religion often influences the Arab personality, which is said to be more prone to authoritarianism than other races. Prothro and Melikian compared Arab students with American students at the American University of Beirut and reported that the Arab students scored higher on a scale of authoritarianism and hostility than did the

⁹⁸ Karwat, Miroslaw. (1982). "Political Values as Ideas of Social Needs". *International Political Science Review*. 3(2). pp. 198-204

⁹⁹ Fouad, Raslan. p.136

corresponding American group.¹⁰⁰ This refers to the problem of harmony between personality and the national interest. Inconsistency and contradiction result in difficulties in achieving balance between national security and the national interest. In turn, this opens the way for increased threats as is the reality facing the Arab nation at the present time.

1.5.2. External Factors

External factors are variables that exist in the international system and relate to the balance of power. These factors influence the position of the state in the international system. This implies that the power of state is defined by the interaction of local political interests within the state. However, it is also linked with the needs and aspirations of the state in the international theatre. In contrast, changes in the international environment and the balance of power impose a change on the national interest. Furthermore, national security is also shaped by these variables. It is linked to changes in power, as well as by its reflection of international relations and the balance of power.

Britain in the last century was a superpower and following the principle of balanced multi-polarity did not hesitate to declare that the national interest was based on the preventing the expansion of other European powers. In relation to its national security, it possessed the largest naval force in the world, which allowed it to rule over the seas. However, this situation changed in the bi-polar era, with British interest focusing on the prevention of the spread of communism to Western Europe. Moreover, its national security since the Second World War has become reliant on NATO.¹⁰¹ Another example is the Netherlands. During the first colonial era it was a major power, and based its national interest on controlling its colonies. Therefore, it competed with other European powers in this era—relying on its power to achieve greater security. However, its concerns changed after the emergence of the US and Soviet Union bipolar system and is now based upon the balance of power in international relations.

¹⁰⁰ Prothr, T. and Melikian L. (1953). "The California Public Opinion Scale in an Authoritarian Culture". *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17(3), pp. 353-362.

¹⁰¹ Humid, Rabbi. (1979). Op. cit., p.272

This external change led the Netherlands to focus on raising the standard of living for the Dutch people.¹⁰²

Similar examples can be found with the US and Soviet Union. The US moved from an isolationist foreign policy to a more outwardly looking one, thus changing the nature of its national interest and national security. American foreign policy is no longer isolated from other forces, but now interest with various forces in order to spread American values. Moreover, America's national security becomes dependent on the powers of the western camp.¹⁰³ The national interest of Tsarist Russia lay in maintaining the status quo in Europe in that period. In contrast, the national interest in the Soviet era was concerned with spreading the ideology of communism. This meant that Soviet national security was linked to the communist camp and its ability to face the western camp.

Arguably the national interests of a state or nation can overrule of any value or ethics. The best proof for this statement is the arms transaction (the Alyamama deal) between Saudi Arabia and Britain. Despite the allegedly corrupt nature of this transaction, the Britain government halted investigations into this issue in the name of the national security and national interests. The British government faced a great deal of criticism from a number of internal and external political actors. However, the government of Britain preferred to maintain the deal in order not to lose billions of pounds which played a major role in boosting the Treasury and supporting its national interest.¹⁰⁴ Thereby, it is argued that the national interest is superior to any consideration that can threaten the national security of the state.

1.6. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, national security, for a long period of time, was centred on ensuring the security of the state and the community. However, after the Second World War, national security became a wider concept that formed multiple frameworks internally

¹⁰² Sabri, Muqalled. (1973). "Europe Political Unity in the Eighties". Egypt: *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.134, p.26. (In Arabic)

¹⁰³ Hanson, W. Baldwin. (1970). *Strategy for Tomorrow*. New York: Harper & Row. pp.342-347

¹⁰⁴ Blair Defends Decision to Call off Fraud Probe as Discontent Grows: *Intervention to Stop SFO Vital to Preserve National Security and Trade*, says PM. (Friday, 8th June, 2007). The Guardian Newspaper, Available at :< URL: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/08/bae5> > Access Date 15th June, 2007.

and externally and not just the military aspect. Thus, the concept of national security has been developed to include aspects such as politics, economics, industry, health, culture, food and water. Moreover, there are many other specific things which concern the states, especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks when national security became a comprehensive and integrative concept. All states have put security to the forefront of their policies and plans owing to this event.

At the academic level, concerns about national security concepts have increased and as a result courses about national security are taught in most of the international universities including those in the Arab world.

It has been shown that three trends which define the national security have emerged. The first regards security as an abstract value and is linked to the issues of independence and sovereignty of strong states by military force. The second trend focuses on economics and links it with development. The third trend focuses on the concept of comprehensive power as the basis towards the achievement of national security.

Thus, while the needs and ambitions of states are infinite, no state has sufficient power to achieve all its needs and ambitions. Therefore each state has to prioritise its interests. The leadership of a state is distinguished from its counterparts by the degree of understanding shown towards its national priorities, by its ability to provide the power to protect itself and by the realisation of harmony between interests and power. This indicates that national security is a complex process, involving many elements which are highly interdependent. National security and the national interest cannot be separated from each other. Consequently, the process of non-separation of the two components necessitates the availability of other elements that are integral parts of the security process, which is founded on the internal conditions of the state and its ability to protect its national security from internal and external threats. The political, economic, social, military and cultural elements are the interests that the state aims to protect and from these elements the state or the nation gains its power in the international community.

As shown in this chapter, national security is the means by which the identity of a nation-state and community is ensured against internal and external threats. It is the

creation of the appropriate economic, social, and political conditions to achieve the objectives which reflects public satisfaction in the society. In this definition, national security includes military force as a tool to protect the nation-state, but never can it be the foundation of national security. This is because the military aspect is just one of the national security tools that together with other tools which can help the state in structuring and developing its economic, political, social, military, and diplomatic capabilities. In another definition, national security is a comprehensive and integrative concept which includes all the components of nation-states and the conditions of stability, whether internal or external. With the absence of any of these conditions the security of the nation-state becomes threatened. This means that national security requires the state to understand and deal with the different sources of threat to the national interest.

To summarise, this chapter has examined the concept of national security within three important periods. This has highlighted the concept of national security within the framework of an integrated approach that is more open and flexible. This approach attempts to illustrate the understanding of the national security from the Libyan foreign policy perspective.

Chapter Two

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY FROM THE ARAB PERSPECTIVE

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Although the role in world politics of each of the Arab countries differs according to the manifestation of force and availability of natural resources, Arab countries have all been faced with a common external threat driven by the hegemonic ambition of great powers. However, since the collapse of Soviet Union, the balance of power has changed and US became the only superpower in the international arena. Nevertheless, external powers still attempt to influence or penetrate domestic politics within the Arab World. The paradigm shift with 9/11 changed the Arab image in the international community which, in turn, has created multi-faceted threat to these countries. These changes increased the complexity of the concept of Arab national security.

Therefore, this chapter will address the national security vision of the Arab nations. This is important because the Arab nations control the 15million km² of territory, around 2.10% of the area of the world.¹⁰⁵ These lands contain around 300 million people, around 6.2% of the world's population.¹⁰⁶ In addition to this, the region's energy sources provide a significant geopolitical role for Arab World. The proven oil reserves in the Arab countries are estimated at around 62.2% of total global reserves.¹⁰⁷ Arab countries produce around 26.3million barrels per day (bpd) of oil which is equivalent to 31.7% of the daily world production. They also produce around 11.4% of world natural gas production and hold around 29.4% of the world's gas reserves. Furthermore, the Arab nation stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf

¹⁰⁵ United Nations. Economic and Social Council. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/NGO/26. 29th July, 2002. pp.1-4

¹⁰⁶ Mohamed A. El-Erian, Susan Fennell International Monetary Fund. Middle Eastern Dept - Business & Economics. (1997). *The economy of the Middle East and North Africa in 1997*. US: International Monetary Fund. p.27

¹⁰⁷ Abdel Hai, Mohamad. (2009). *UAE has 14.6% of proven Arab oil reserves*, Available at: URL<<http://www.gulfbase.com/site/interface/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?cntr=0&n=120864>> Access Date: 2nd January, 2010.

shares common characteristics of history, language, culture, religion, customs and norms.¹⁰⁸ Such characteristics form the basis for Arab political and religious influence in the Islamic World and many African states.

Figure: 2. 1. Global Shares of Oil and Gas Production¹⁰⁹





Figure: 2.2. Global Shares of Oil and Gas Reserves¹¹⁰



The role of energy in Arab geopolitical understanding and the commonalities of the Arab national identity will support our argument in the formulation of strategy and

¹⁰⁸ Qasim, Altma. Op. cit., p.25

¹⁰⁹ Joint Arab Economic Report (2006), *Arab Monetary Fund (AMF)*, Abu Dhabi: Available at: URL<<http://www.amf.org.ae/pages/Page.aspx?Type=8&id=449&forceLanguage=en>> Access Date 15th Jun, 2009.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.,

solidarity of Arab national security in this chapter. Arab solidarity overlaps with security considerations which, in turn, are linked to the issue of economic and societal development and also influences the geopolitical role of Arab nations in the international environment. It is a feature of the international system that having enormous hydrocarbon resources attracts the hegemonic ambitions of the great, thus creating an external threat to Arab national security. The American-led invasion of Iraq is a key example of this intervention. This multi-faceted threat necessitates developing an Arab national security doctrine as well as an Arab national strategy that can deal with the multiple international challenges in order to ensure Arab interests. Therefore, there were several attempts in the Arabic world that attempted to develop an international relations theory focused on Arab identity. The attempts concentrate on developing common political interests for Arab countries. In addition, the focus was on the sources of external and internal threats depending on changes in international environment. In light of the perceptions of threats Arab national security is redefined; however this may be contradictory to the political systems and interests of the individual Arab countries. To understand the Arab national security concept, this chapter explains the contribution of Arab intellectuals in security matters. To this end, the chapter focuses on state-to-state relationships at the regional and domestic level in Arab World.

This chapter discusses the concept of national security from the Arab perspective in the following framework. First, the concept of the Arab national security is defined. Second, regional security as a synonym for Arab national security is discussed. Third, national security is considered as a national prerequisite. Fourth, the constituents and the dilemmas of building Arab national security are highlighted.

2.2. THE ARAB CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

A study of Arab political history has shown that the concept of security dates back as far as the Holy Qoran. It was also studied by Ibn Khaldoun history¹¹¹ and recognised into the Charter of the Arab League in the mid-1940s. At the level of academic studies

¹¹¹ Ibn Khaldūn. (1969). *The Muqaddimah, an introduction to history*. translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal. US: Princeton University Press. pp33-44

in relation to the Arab national security concept, Arab political scientists started to develop an interest in the concept of the Arab national security in the mid-1970s. Since then many Arab intellectuals have researched the subject in specialised scientific institutes and in political studies centres in order to identify what is meant by Arab national security. In this context it is important to refer to the 'Charter of the League of Arab States' that acts as the constitution for the League of Arab States, which was established in March 1945. Importantly, there is no mention of the term security in the document, although in Article VI it does refer to the issue of the 'collective assurance'. This refers to the need for the collective cooperation against internal or external threats against member states. In addition, the 1950 Treaty of Mutual Defence and Economic Cooperation of the League of Arab States referred to the need of cooperation in the field of defence, but did not refer to the concept of security. Furthermore, Article II of the treaty refers again to the collective assurance which urges members to unify their plans and to act collectively against any threats or imminent danger such as wars. For this reason the Common Arab Defence Council was established, which included Arab defence and foreign ministers.¹¹² In 1964 the Permanent Military Committee was established which consisted of the Chiefs of Staff of the Arab armies in a step towards the achievement of the much needed national security.¹¹³ Then, in 1965 the Charter of the Arab Solidarity was established in Casablanca.¹¹⁴ This charter aimed to find a constructive information policy on both the national and humanitarian levels. It also committed to the recommendations of the Permanent Committee of Arab Information at its 30th and 31st sessions that indicated "the necessity of announcing a national Arab Information Charter of Honour" in addition to Arab information agreements.

In the 1970s, the emergence of the national liberation movements in Africa and Arab world was perceived a threat to all external interests in the Arab region, especially those of the Western and Eastern camps of the Cold War. The Arab nationalist movement led the two camps to each adopt a policy of attracting the support of

¹¹² Muffed, Shehab. (1978). *The League of Arab States its Charter and Achievements*. Cairo: The Institute of Arab Studies and Research, pp.15-20. (In Arabic)

¹¹³ Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation. (1950-1952). Alexandria: the League of Arab states.

¹¹⁴ Mufeed, M. Shehab. Op. cit., pp. 250-256.

countries in the region. However, there emerged a number of contradictions between the Arab states according to which camp the state belonged. It could be said that as a result of these conflicts, contradictions, and divisions Israel in the framework of western camp emerged as the largest threat to Arab national security. This step resulted in many Arab states leaning towards the Eastern camp which supported the Arab side in the Palestinian issue and was against the Western camp's policies. Therefore, the League of Arab States attempted to take action to determine the concept of national security and the mechanisms and tools that could protect Arab security, whether at the level of the individual state or at the level of the Arab League.¹¹⁵

However, the Arab league concerns around the Arab national security issue changed and activated after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in the early 1990s. This crisis resulted in all Arab states requiring reconsidering the concept of national security and its mechanisms. Arguably, since that crisis the issue of Arab national security has returned to the forefront of the issues facing the Arab League. In addition, the Arab League was eager to prepare a comprehensive study about Arab national security. As a result of this study Arab national security is defined as:

The ability of Arab nations to defend their security, rights, the protection of their independence and sovereignty over their territory. The security concept also includes the development of Arab capacities and possibilities on all levels and fields of political, economic, culture and social aspects. Based on the diplomatic and military ability and it must take into account diplomatic and military abilities and the national security needs of each state, as well as the available capabilities, internal, regional and international variables that can affect Arab national security.¹¹⁶

It can be said with a degree of certainty that these attempts have not reached the goals of clearly identifying the concept of Arab national security. Moreover, this is because of the shallow understanding of the results reached. The difficulties arise because the concept is complex and there is confusion between the concept on one hand and the procedures on the other. Furthermore, it can be seen that these attempts have shown

¹¹⁵ Adli, Hassan Saeed. (1977). *Egyptian Security and Strategy to Achieve it*. Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organisation. p.37 (In Arabic)

¹¹⁶ Zakaria, Hussein. (2000). *Op. cit.*,

the strategic dimension in determining national action in most fields but it did not specify the terms of reference for implementation and follow up for any of the dimensions.

If it goes back to some official documents such as the treaty of Mutual Defence and Economic Cooperation which was confirmed in June 1951 in Alexandria. As well as the charter of the Arab solidarity this was established in Casablanca in 1965.¹¹⁷ According to such documents it can be seen that the issue of national security is not so far from the Arab intellectuals and mind of Arab elders nevertheless there is not enough practise and seriousness of application. However it is widely believed that the Arab national security concept is still a moving concept in terms of the agreement with its definition and this determines its features. Moreover, relationship between Arab national security and state security is still foggy and unclear.

Despite this emphasis on Arab national security there remain many unanswered questions such as: What is meant by the Arab nation (*ummah*)? What is meant by the nation-state (*dawlah*)? What is the relationship between these ideas? Which leaders, institutions and organisations act as drivers and control aspects of national security whether political, military, economic, social, cultural or scientific? Answering these questions could contribute to establishing what is meant by the concept of national security from the Arab perspective.

It can be argued that the Arab national security as a concept is at the current stage revolving around the set of principles that can guarantee the ability of Arab states to protect the self entity of the Arab nation from any existing or potential threats as well as its ability to achieve the nationalism idea. In addition the Arab national security as a concept is attempting to overcome the current situation such as partition and weakness, towards one that could comply with the needs of the national ambition of the Arab state. This refers to the Arab national security inter within the framework of

¹¹⁷ Mufeed, M. Shehab. Op. cit., pp. 250-256

what it should be. This means the concept of national security should be addressed within the scope of the comprehensive national interests.¹¹⁸

One of the difficulties facing the idea of Arab national security is that the constituent members are individual nation-states. These states have different political systems and laws: some states have adopted a presidential system, while others opt for a monarchical system. In addition, the level of parliamentary involvement in the political systems differs across the countries. These differences make it difficult to achieve a single concept of national security.

During the 1970s and the 1980s the literature about the Arab national security concept did not give a single coherent idea of the concept. In this context Abbas Nasrallah address national security from the military perspective. He argues that national security is linked with a military force that is capable of protecting the state and can achieve its security through two aspects. First, the formation of the military force acts as a deterrent to protect the state from violence by other states (national security as deterrence). Second, the state resorts to the use of its military force as a result of exposure to an invasion or threat or its use to achieve a certain goal.¹¹⁹

Hamed Rabi defines Arab national security as a set of dynamic rules that the state must respect and preserve, also the state must impose on other states with which it deals, in order to secure their security whether internal or external at the regional level.¹²⁰ Thus, Rabi means that security has become a set of national traditions which lead to the policy process looking firmly at regional relations in order to protect the nation-state from potential enemies which can exploit the position of weakness that is imposed by its regional boundaries.¹²¹ Furthermore, this definition portrays national security as a military concept that stems from the defensive characteristics of a state. Therefore, this concept moves from being a theoretical formulation to becoming a set of rules of collective behaviour and leadership with a political connotation.

¹¹⁸ Adli, Hassan Saeed. Op. Cit., p.12

¹¹⁹ Nasrallah, Abbas. (1999). *A Future Vision for Lebanon's Military Strategy*. Damascus: Military Academy. pp.55-56 (In Arabic)

¹²⁰ Hamed, Rabi. (1981). "The Concept of Arab National Security and Definition of its Changes". Tunisia: *Journal of Arab affairs*, No. 2, the league of Arab states. p.306. (In Arabic)

¹²¹ Mohamed, S. Abouamod. (Winter, 2002). Op. cit.,p.13 (In Arabic)

Amin Huwaidi provides a vision for Arab national security based on the concept of comprehensive power. He argues that the old definitions of national security are incompatible with the contemporary world order. He said, although there is a general concept of security that includes peace or the absence of armed clashes it is more comprehensive, by reducing national security to only a military aspect this means narrowing the extent and purpose of the state in relation to its overall security. Therefore national security does not only refer to the military capabilities of the state. Thus although these are important they are not sufficient to achieve security as an integrated concept for all the Arab states.¹²²

Ali Eldin Hilal defines national security as security of the entity of state and society against the threats both internally and externally. In this case the state ensures its interests and creates the appropriate conditions economically and socially to achieve goals and targets that reflect the best for society.¹²³ Ala Taher indicates that national security means the set of measures and theoretical and practical needs for the protection of the state. Also he argues this does not only mean the geo-political scope of the state's territory, but also includes economic wealth and political ideology of the governing regime. Furthermore, national security is influenced by the characteristics of nationalism and culture.¹²⁴ However, Abdul-moneim Almshat defines national security not only as a society's ability to face the events or facts of individual violence, but also to face all aspects that are attached to the acute and complex nature of violence.¹²⁵

At the official Arab level the most important attempt came after the events of September 11th. In April 2007, the Arab summit in Riyadh defined the concept of Arab national security as being a comprehensive concept which contains international challenges, such as terrorism and globalisation, as well as regional challenges, such as peace in the Middle East, and the national challenges such as the education system,

¹²² Amin, Howaidi. (1991). *The Crisis of Arab National Security*. Cairo: Dar Al Shorouk Publishing. pp.5-36. (In Arabic)

¹²³ Ali, Eldin Hilal. (January 1984). "Arab National Security A Study in Surcease". Tunisia: *Journal of Arab Affairs*. No.35, p.7 (In Arabic)

¹²⁴ Mohamed, S. Abu Amoud, op. cit., p.31

¹²⁵ Abdulmoneim, Almshat. (1984). *Contemporary Theory of Arab National Security*. Cairo: Dar Elmawkef Alarabi. p.29. (In Arabic)

infrastructure development, inclusive development and the other issues which concern the Arab community.¹²⁶

Therefore the new concept that was presented at the 2007 Arab summit includes the external dimensions of international and regional security. In addition it reflects the inter-Arab dimensions and local dimensions within each Arab state. This integrated vision reflects a new understanding of the Arab reality and the challenges facing it.

It could be said that this attempt will prove just as fruitless as previous attempts. This is because the summit did not decide the formulae and mechanisms that can be used in achieving this perspective. Consequently it can be said that the Arab national security concept is still a dream for the Arab people. Nevertheless a conceptual understanding and definition of Arab national security has not yet been achieved because of the lack of political will.

It can not be denied that to achieve Arab national security from the strategic perspective the Arab states have to recognise the long-term view. This strategic perspective is related to their abilities to define a clear vision of national strategy that can determine the nature of the land on which they are standing on, as well as to be able to define where they belong and the goals they seek to achieve.

In this context and according to the previously discussed challenges and difficulties of defining the concept of Arab national security from the Arab viewpoint, it is relevant to point out that there are obvious differences amongst Arab researchers about the concept of national security. This is because there are differences in their starting points and trends. These differences can be seen through three trends. The first trend refers to national security at the level of the state (dawlah), ignoring the idea of an Arab national security (ummah). A second trend refers to Arab national security in the context of regional security (al-ummah al-arabiyah). The third trend refers to the term in relation to Arab nationalism. These three trends are discussed in the following sections.

¹²⁶ Mukhtar, Shuaib. (Monday, April, 2007). "The Riyadh Summit and Stage of Post Realised the Challenges: the New Formulation for Challenge Concept and National Security and Face the Anarchy", Cairo: *Al-Ahram newspaper*, No.43946, p.2 (In Arabic)

2.2.1. The National Security of the State (Dawlah) as a Synonym for the National Security of the Arab Nation (Ummah)

The current international, regional and domestic situations mean the beginning of reconciliation between the national security of the state (*dawlah*¹²⁷) and the national security of the Arab nation (*ummah*¹²⁸). The first trend focuses on the security of the individual state and uses the term national security in this context. This trend is apparent in a large number of writings, especially in Egyptian studies.¹²⁹ It is argued that academics in this trend have taken the term national security from western thought, where the concept found its first formulation in the views of writers from differing perspectives. For example, military opinion looks at national security as the military capability to protect and defend the state from any external threat. In contrast politicians define it as the set of principles that condition national integration in view of the changing external environment. Moreover, sociologists believe that the national security of the state is the state's ability to protect its internal values from any external threat. Thus, it has been shown that the concept of national security of the state by this deterrent means it is related only to the state.

To discuss this trend, it is necessary to define the national security of the state (*dawlah*) as a starting point for a general definition of national security of the Arab nation (*ummah*).

2.2.1.1. Definition of national security of the state (Dawlah)

The concept of national security of the state means that the state should be able to defend itself from any direct or indirect threat to its existence. National security of the state might also be achieved by the absence of the threats and when the state is not exposed to any kind of danger.¹³⁰ Furthermore, it may be achieved by the state possessing sufficient power to face any threat and keep the country safe from the effects of something happening. This implies that each Arab state enjoys sovereignty,

¹²⁷ *dawlah* means state or country

¹²⁸ *ummah* means nation, which I use to refer to the Arab nation

¹²⁹ Hassan, Nafaa. (1984). *Egypt and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: From an Inevitable Struggle to an Impossible Settlement*. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. pp.116-117. (In Arabic)

¹³⁰ Wajih, Ziauddin. (Oct, 1974) "The Geopolitical of Sinai and Egyptian National Security". Cairo: *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.30, p.12 (In Arabic)

which reflects political and economic independence and ownership of the sources of power to ensure the continued evolution of society within its political borders. Furthermore, national sovereignty is reflected in the foreign policy of the state in the form of principles which revolve around protecting the entity of the state from any threat.

Therefore, it can be argued that the exposure of the national sovereignty of the state to risk means a test for the validity of the concept of national security of the state. It also shows the degree of strength or fragility of the state's ability in the face of threat or risk. Accordingly, threats to any Arab country highlights the concept of national security of the state, as each state seeks to protect itself and its own interests.¹³¹

It is important to note that there are some very important observations that ought to be highlighted; including each Arab state is established as a part of the Arab people, and part of the Arab land. Therefore every regime in the Arab world, regardless of their political system, stresses in their basic political documents that the Arab people are part of the Arab nation. Furthermore, many Arab states, such Egypt under Nasser and Libya after the revolution, go further in their constitutions which emphasise the need to work to achieve tangible Arab unity.¹³²

Another point refers to the foreign forces, such as Israeli and imperialism, which look to the Arab nation as one identity and look to the Arab world as one regional entity. These results in several important outcomes: first, the security of any Arab states cannot be completely independent which means no Arab state can live apart from the other,¹³³ because any case of national security of the state means to protect the part of total Arab people. Consequently this protection will be limited to the state as a part of the Arab region but not apply to the Arab people; therefore this means that the risk is still a threat to the region and to the Arab people. Second, the exposure of any state to any form of risk affects the safety of other Arab countries or paves the way to

¹³¹ Atta, M. Saleh. (1997). p.122

¹³² "Tripoli Unity Charter" on the (27th December, 1969). This Charter was proposed a Federation of Arab Republics of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan.

¹³³ Sylvia, Haim. ed. (1962). *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*. Berkeley and University of California press. p.233

exposure of similar risks and threats.¹³⁴ It should be noted that with the exception of Saudi Arabia all the Arab states have suffered from the effect of colonial domination over a long period. Moreover, the effects of Israeli control over Palestine have overstepped the Palestinians and did not stop at the neighbouring states of occupied Palestine, but reached other Arab states.¹³⁵

The last point in this framework refers to the notion that certain risks and threats faced by nation-states may be beyond the state's capabilities, such as the case with situations in Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan and Somalia. The Western Sahara dispute between Morocco and the Polisario is still ongoing and the former has been unable to do anything to resolve this issue. The issue of southern Sudan still haunts the successive Sudanese governments and there are not any clear solutions that can guarantee victory and terminate this conflict.¹³⁶ Therefore, these problems still represent a challenge to the political authorities in the Sudan. In this framework there are Arab politicians who are specialists in this field, such as Haytham Alkilani, believe that it is necessary to recognise the link between military matters and economic development.¹³⁷ In their view, it is impossible for poor states to build the military forces necessary to wage a modern war without economic development. Furthermore, the sophistication of the modern weaponry, such as missiles, nuclear weapons, atomic submarines and satellites, make these expensive. Therefore, most Arab armies—if left to enter battle independently—would not be able to fight effectively.

It can be seen that the search for Arab national security has become increasingly difficult in light of the increasing fragmentation in the current Arab ranks. The increasing logic of partition and fragmentation has resulted in each country putting their own interests ahead of Arab national interests. Arguably this leads to the absence of the concept of Arab national security in both the political and military fields.

¹³⁴ Atta, M. Saleh. (1997). Op. cit., p.123

¹³⁵ Salih, Mahdi Mashie. (1970). *The Militarily Unit*. Cairo: Dar Ataleha for Printing and Publishing. p.92 (In Arabic)

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.102

¹³⁷ Haytham, Al Kilani. (1998). *The Concept of National Security Politically and Militarily*. Paris: the Euro-Arab Centre for Studies. pp.53-78 (In Arabic)

There are many commonalities amongst the Arab states; these include the social factors of a common language, culture, civilisation and religion as well as the economic factors of oil wealth, natural resources, agricultural areas and capability of tourism. In addition, common military factors include a large population and an arsenal of conventional arms. However these factors have not contributed to the creation of an Arab system capable of preserving Arab national security. However, these factors do influence the actual practices of all Arab states. Although there have been calls for unity between all Arab states, the result has been the opposite with increased fragmentation and emphasis on the individual state. This is because the Arab state has followed national policies of state (*dawlah*) which contradicts the objectives of Arab nationalism (*qumeyh*) and the national security of the Arab nation (*ummah*) in its most comprehensive sense. There are Arab countries which have shown in their constitutions that the security of the state is the dominant function of the state.¹³⁸ This seems to indicate the affairs of state (*dawlah*) are more important than those of the Arab nation (*ummah*). In addition, there are other Arab states which use the term of nation as meaning state in their constitutions, such as the Kuwaiti Nation (*al-ummah al-kuwaitia*), Egyptian Nation (*al-ummah al-masriyah*), Lebanese Nation (*al-ummah al-lobnaniyah*) and Tunisian Nation (*al-ummah al-tonseyah*). It can not be denied that this use of the term of nation (*ummah*) has significant impact on undermining the idea of Arabism and Arab nationalism (*al-qumeyh al-arabiya*).

Furthermore, the prevalence of inter-Arab conflicts strengthens the idea of a nation-state (*dawlah*) and creates further destabilisation of the Arab system. This was evident in the wake of the Gulf crisis which led some to argue that an Arab 'regime' never existed. It is clear that the various Gulf crisis, such as the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 1990 and the crisis of the U.S. occupation of Iraq since 2003, revealed the weakness of the Arab system and the utopian ideas of Arab Nationalism and Arab national security.¹³⁹ Therefore it can be argued that the division of the Arab states in the framework of the state (*dawlah*) has created the reality which reflects its national security concepts, leaders, arms, institutions and problems.

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp.40-55

¹³⁹ Ahmed, Yusuf. (1994). "Arabs and New Challenges of Middle Eastern". Lebanon: *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, No.179, p.56 (In Arabic)

It is important to note that all the previous reasons and events prompted the Arab official system to wonder, Are we one nation?¹⁴⁰ The formal system of the League of Arab States has stressed that the Arab states are independent of western colonialism, not in one state but in many states which have contradictory policies. This means that each Arab state has a separate identity, independence, and natural wealth which it is not willing to share with other Arab states. In addition, each state has a different political system such as a monarchical or republican based system, which does not concede its authority to others.¹⁴¹ Accordingly it can be argued that these issues were absent from the mind of Arab intellectuals when they formulated the ideas of Arab national security. This was clear through the literature review discussed in this chapter. The utopian ideal of unity and unification backfired and led to negative reactions from certain Arab states. Some Arab states sought to undermine the role of the Arab national institution (the League of Arab States) and reinforced the concept of the state sovereignty. This is reflected in the reluctance of most Arab states to implement decisions of the League that relate to Arab national security; despite these decisions being officially passed by the Council of the League.¹⁴²

Finally, it could be said that in the midst of the war in Iraq, and Western pressure, it is impossible to use the concept of national security of nation (*ummah*) as a synonym for the national security of the state (*dawlah*) which the Arab states use as an excuse for not supporting the Iraq in this conflict. Arab regimes believe that national security prevails over all other functions of the state which resulted in the negative attitude of the Arab states towards the U.S. invasion of Iraq and also the negative attitude of Arab states to Libya during the international embargo.¹⁴³ It is important to note that due to this narrow perspective of Arab national security, all Arab states will be subject to external threats unless this perspective is altered to encourage inter-Arab solidarity.

¹⁴⁰ Shadli, Elkoleibi. (1998). "Are we a Nation". Lebanon: *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, No.179, p.4 (In Arabic)

¹⁴¹ Mohamed, Majdoub. (1998). *International Regulation*. Beirut: *Addar Al Jameaayeh*. p.318 (In Arabic)

¹⁴² Haytham, Al Kilani. Op. cit., p.75

¹⁴³ Matar, Khalil I. and Thabit, Robert W. (2004). *Lockerbie and Libya: a study in international relations*. U.S: McFarland. pp.98-104

Consequently it can be said that the definition of Arab national security of the state (*dawlah*) according to the Arab perspective and practices of the official Arab political system can be understood as measures and actions which are taken by the state to protect its national security (*dawlah*) internally (i.e. from the other Arab states) and externally (i.e. from non-Arab states), which in turn results in a diminution of cooperation with other Arab states. This indicates that the Arab states are still afraid of each other. These concerns increased after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Despite the increasing problems in opting for a co-operative approach, Arab regimes continue to seek a framework through which Arab security can be achieved jointly. The following section looks at the second trend of how the concept of 'regional security' has been applied as an alternative to 'Arab national security'.

2.2.2. Regional Security as a Synonym for Arab National Security

It is generally accepted that the current situation in the Arab world requires the adoption of the concept of regional security for the application of the Arab national security. Therefore, in this context there has emerged a trend in the Arab political thought that links the concept of Arab national security and the mechanisms of the Arab Regional system that is represented in the League of Arab States and its various institutions. In other words, this trend believes it is possible to achieve Arab national security through the existing framework of the League of Arab States. Consequently, Arab national security becomes synonymous with regional security. This trend has more adherents than the previous trend.

The concept of regional security includes linkages between more than one state in a certain geographical area; for example, sub-regional entities such as Arab Maghreb Union in the east of the Arab world and the Gulf Co-operation Council in the west. As previously argued, Arab national security in general means a situation of stability throughout the Arab region without any kind of internal or external threat.¹⁴⁴ the attempts of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries¹⁴⁵ and the Arab Maghreb

¹⁴⁴ Hamed, Rabi. Op. cit., p.220

¹⁴⁵ Members of GCC - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

Union (AMU)¹⁴⁶ to build political institutions to protecting member states from internal or external threats such as Amen Huwaidi who believes that the Arab national security is the set of actions that are applied by the state or a group of states which are included in one collective system in their limited capacity, to protect its entity and interests, without ignoring the international and local variables. Furthermore, they believe that collective security is imperative in order to achieve Arab national security, because it has many benefits in the case of an obligation by the rules and principles of collective action.¹⁴⁷

It can be seen that through understanding of the difference between the concept of national security as defined by western thought and the concept of Arab national security according to the characteristics of the Arab reality. There are Arab thinkers who believe the concept of Arab national security is in essence to secure regional safety, political stability and economic integration between the parts of Arab world. In addition, it reinforces mechanisms and rules of mutual actions including the defensive capability to stop external penetration of the Arab body, as well as the treatment of the relationship between the various states that appears sticky at the present time and the adoption of dialogues and negotiation to end the differences and conflicts between these states.¹⁴⁸

In this context it can be said that this indicates that the first trend (The National Security of the State (*dawlah*) as a Synonym for National Security (*ummah*)) considers the political boundaries of each Arab state to be the necessary level of political development. However, this trend ignores many important aspects in the identity of the Arab world such as national presence and practices which contribute to the distinction between national security of the individual Arab state and comprehensive Arab national security. In addition, it ignores the relationship between the two national securities. Therefore, the supporters of regional security believed that ignoring the national presence means threatening the national security of the state

¹⁴⁶ Members of The Arab Maghreb Union - Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia

¹⁴⁷ Amen, Huwaidi. (1982). *The Political and Security*. Beirut: Arab Development Institute. p.27. (In Arabic)

¹⁴⁸ Mohammed, Massalha. (January, 1984). "The Issue of Arab Security between Concepts, Realty, Texts". Egypt: *Journal of Arab affaires*. No.35, p.27 (In Arabic)

(*dawlah*) in one way or another.¹⁴⁹ Also, the supporters of this trend argue that changes in society in individual Arab states occur simultaneously with the evolution of the Arab society as a whole and not independently of it. In addition any risks threatening any Arab state mean that these risks affect other Arab states whether directly or indirectly, because these risks and threats are directed towards the whole of Arab world. The threat posed the by the presence of Israel in the region is a stark example of this argument.

Also in this context it is not possible to achieve security within the narrow framework embraced by proponents of national security. This is not only because alliances are a necessary part of the international environment, but also because of the interconnectedness of the world, which means that states cannot ignore the impact of other actors when seeking to achieve their objectives and secure their national interests.

The link between Arab national security and regional security means that there is confusion (not only theoretical, but also with regard to the Arab situation) between two different concepts. Importantly, there are many Arab thinkers, such as Hamed Rabi, who argue that the perception of Arab national security as part of regional security is not correct. Rabi argues that it can be seen as an alternative to Arab national security, but not an application of the concept of Arab national security.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, Ali Eddin Hilal says according to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations national security is not just a form of regional security and the right of collective self defence. Accordingly, this vision focuses exclusively on the links of geographical proximity.¹⁵¹

Arab national security is based mainly on the unity of the Arab nation and to the unity of belonging as well as to concepts of one nation and self determination. This indicates that Arab national security is not merely a result of the sum of various Arab states but instead takes into consideration the risks and threats faced by these states.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ *The Report about Six October and National Security*. (October, 1975). Cairo: International Research Unit, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. (In Arabic)

¹⁵⁰ Hamed, Rabi. op. cit., p.186

¹⁵¹ Ali, Eddin Hilal. Op. cit., p.21

¹⁵² Ibid. p.21

Consequently, any formulation of the Arab national security concept or any attempt to achieve it must be subject to many factors in relation to the requirements of the region. The proponents of the regional security focus on four factors which they believe may be used to achieve Arab national security: abidance with Arab covenants; the use of diplomacy to resolve inter-Arab disputes; actions in accordance with the requirements of collective security; and adopt an unified Arab policy.

2.2.2.1. Abidance with Arab covenants

This point refers to the fact that all Arab states must be act within the framework of the Arab covenants such as the Charter of the League of Arab States, the Treaty of Arab Common Defence, the Charter of Arab Solidarity and other charters. All these are very important to ensure Arab national security.¹⁵³

It is generally accepted that the Charter of the League of Arab States was the first official attempt at establishing an official medium of cooperation between the Arab states and governing the relationship among these states. In addition this Charter affirms the need to give priority to Arab affairs over all other affairs. Furthermore, the Charter of Arab Solidarity and the Treaty of Arab Common Defence have stipulated the commitment of Arab leaders to Arab solidarity. It is important to note that historical experience has shown the dangers of acting unilaterally without Arab consensus and giving priority to commitments with the foreign states over Arab commitments.¹⁵⁴ Therefore it can be argued that if the Arab states are committed to these covenants they will achieve a significant amount vis-à-vis Arab national security.

2.2.2.2. The use of diplomacy to resolve inter-Arab disputes

Arab states must not resort to the use or threat of military force against other Arab states as such actions have in the past negatively affected Arab national security. The Fifth article of the Charter of the League of Arab States indicates that Arab states

¹⁵³ Abdulhammed, Almowavi. (June, 1989). "Mutual Commitments among Arab Countries: between the Texts and Actual Practice". Tunisia: *Journal of Arab Affairs*, No.58, p.29 (in Arabic)

¹⁵⁴ Mohamed, Abdulmawla. (1977). *The Great Collapse*. Beirut: Dar Al Massira, p.27 (in Arabic)

must not resort to force to settle conflicts between two or more member states.¹⁵⁵ This means resorting to dialogue and diplomatic tools for the management of inter-Arab crises would go towards achieving a comprehensive Arab national security. Therefore all Arab states must work to find a mechanism that can achieve this in the framework of the Arab system.

2.2.2.3. Actions in accordance with the requirements of collective security

It is generally accepted that Arab regional security requires cooperation between Arab states especially in the military and economic fields. Arab states have realised the importance of this since the establishment of the League of Arab States, particularly in the Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1948. Also Arab regimes realised this during the 1973 oil crisis when the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries initiated an oil embargo 'in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military' during the Yom Kippur war. Both of these examples highlight the importance of Arab national security needs and the necessity to unite their efforts both militarily and economically.¹⁵⁶ The concept of Arab national security interest in relation to the military aspect (as opposed to other aspects) can be seen that through the Charter of the Arab League. The Treaty of Arab Common Defence has in its articles tried to identify aspects of military cooperation and affirm the need for the consultation between all member states on military cooperation in the face any internal or external threats.¹⁵⁷

2.2.2.4. Adopt an unified Arab policy

A unified policy does not necessarily result in a comprehensive political unity which may not be feasible on the short run due to various obstacles including the crucial international variables that are taking place. Rather, a unified policy represents an aspect of a common action which reflects the dynamic homogeneity among the states that are linked regionally or share common problems. It simply organizes these states'

¹⁵⁵ Mohammed, Massalha. Op. cit., p.44

¹⁵⁶ Roberts, Paul. (2004). *The end of oil: on the edge of a perilous new world*. U.S: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. pp. 100-101

¹⁵⁷ Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation. (1950-1952). Op. cit.,

interests ,and internationally acts as one allied power which achieves a kind of internal and external harmony.¹⁵⁸

It could be said that the levels of unified policy are cooperation, coordination and alliances, each reflecting the degree of dynamic homogeneity. This means that movement at this level gradually helps to achieve a unified policy system.

It may be possible to conclude that although there are many manifestations of a unified Arab policy, especially in the fields of politics, economics and the military.¹⁵⁹ This unified Arab policy was in evidence during the 1973 oil crisis politically, economically and militarily. However, this unified policy has not evolved sufficiently to achieve the necessary objectives.

For the reasons mentioned it can be argued that the regional security trend has failed to achieve Arab national security. Nevertheless, despite the failure of this trend, Arab national security still remains necessary as national requirement. Therefore, the next section will address the most important steps which have been taken towards achieving a clear concept of Arab national security from the perspective of Arab Nationalism.

2.2.3. National Security as Arab Nationalism

This section focuses on the third trend that of the idea of Arab nationalism (*qumeyh*), despite the contradictions between the existence of the nation-states and the ideal of an independent Arab state. This trend embraces as a central tenet the notion of a vibrant Arab nationalism. Thus, according to this argument, Arab national security is defined as the ability of the Arab nation (*ummah*) to protect the Arab entity and the historical Arab values, whether materially or morally through as the use of economic, political, and military means. The threats to the Arab nation can be internal, such as underdevelopment and dependence, and external, such as Israel.

¹⁵⁸ Atta, M. Saleh. (1997). Op. cit., p.124

¹⁵⁹ Dawisha, Adeed. (2003). *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century from Triumph to Despair*. UK: Princeton university press. pp.1-13

It is widely believed that these threats are the main reasons for the Arab defeats in war and the weakness of the Arab system. It can be seen that there is a lack of will amongst the Arabs to achieve comprehensive independence as a result of the disruption of the development, as well as emergence of the role of multinational companies. In addition, the Arab systems and thinkers not welcomed the acceptance of the Israel regime and the legitimacy it has been given by a lot of Arab regimes. Consequently it can be argued that these threats are clearly referring to the threat of the security of the Arab countries.¹⁶⁰

Therefore according to this requirement national security becomes reflective of the three requirements that the Arab nation must work to achieve. The first is the idea of necessity which means the right of self-defence and to a strong military force. The second requirement is the will of Arab unity in the face of risks and threats. The third is the right of 'development', in other words the right of self-determination through the comprehensive integration of the different parts of the Arab world. It can be argued that with the realisation of these requirements that they became aware of the strengths and weaknesses facing the Arab entity.¹⁶¹

It is important to note that Arab national security is still missing the common security concept because the starting point of this issue is the Arab national presence, despite the Arab nation being split between more than 20 states. Moreover the risks whether internal or external are threats to the whole of the Arab presence. This means the issue of Arab national security is primarily related to the Arab people. Consequently the issue of Arab national security requires cooperation between the people and political systems to ensure national security by focusing on a set of basic rules that are related to how to protect the state against external aggression. This includes the protection of state borders and the prevention of occupation, such as Palestine, Golan Heights Iskenderun, the Island Ben Omer, Ceuta and Melilla, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. Also, it is necessary to protect the presence of the nation, to prevent the continuation of the occupation of the Arab land and to prevent the humiliation to its

¹⁶⁰ Rifat, Sayyid Aḥmad. (1984). "National Security Post Lebanon War". Tunisia: *Journal of Arab affairs*, No.45, p.82 (In Arabic)

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p.83

people, as well as work hard to prevent the division of the Arab world and overcome the artificial borders.

Furthermore, within the framework of Arab nationalism national security as Arab national requirement needs to work hard to liberate the Arab people from all forms of injustice, tyranny, slavery and ensure the establishment of the democracy system. On the other hand building a strong economy can protect the existence of the nation and can ensure all the needs of the population.¹⁶²

It could be said with some degree of certainty the solution of inter-Arab differences and conflicts within the framework of Arab nationalism which can prevent interference by foreign powers is one of the most important requirements for promoting Arab national security. The support for this requirement is a Treaty of Arab Common Defence. This treaty is a complementary document to the Charter of the League of Arab States. This treaty was signed on 17 July 1950; it has shown in its second article that this treaty is the application of the provisions of sixth article of the Arab League Charter as well as the first article of the United Nations charter.

It can be argued that the sixth article has shown how the Arab League can be used to resolve conflicts between the member states, in the case of aggression or potential aggression between member states. For this reason the sixth article gave the right to the threatened state to request an invitation to the Council of Arab League immediately and the Council must determine the necessary responses to this crisis as soon as possible.¹⁶³ In addition, article 51 of the United Nations Charter has shown that nothing in this charter can impair or decrease the natural right of states to protect themselves individually or collectively if aggressed by any armed force or by any member of the United Nations even if the security council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. It may be possible to conclude that these articles give Arab national security a decisive role to help the Arab political system to achieve its national security.

¹⁶² Naji, Alloush. (Feb, 1987). "Arab and Security Missing". Lebanon: *Al-Wahdah Journal*, No.28, p.15 (In Arabic)

¹⁶³ Mufeed, M. Shehab. Op. cit., p.250 (In Arabic)

The Treaty of Arab Common Defence refers to the need for Arab states to co-operate in the military field. Member states should also work together to construct a joint a response team—with each state participating according to its ability—to resist any attack on any of the member states¹⁶⁴. Nevertheless, this treaty remains inactive. It could be said that this problem also highlights the inability of the Arab League to resolve inter-Arab conflicts and crises. The problem is further extenuated through the absence of a Arab unity in various conflicts, such as the Lebanese civil war, the Iraqi-Iranian war throughout the 1980s, the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, the issue of Arab-Israel conflict, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the Algerian events, the events in Yemen in 1994, the Darfur crisis and in the south of Sudan, the civil war in Somalia and the problem of the Western Sahara.¹⁶⁵ In addition, the Arab silence during the external interference in the region and the occupation of Iraq by foreign troops. The Arab political system at the level of Arab League was unable or unwilling to take any practical measures to resolve these crises.

This failure highlights the Arab weakness and inability to make decisions in the interests of the Arab nation. This emerged clearly in the Arab League Council meeting of March 2003 about the Iraq crisis; the fourth article of the Arab League states that 'Arab states must refrain from participating in any military activity that undermines the sovereignty and security of Iraq.'¹⁶⁶

Finally it may be possible to conclude in the light of the evolution of nation state concept, there emerged a conflict between the ideas of 'regionalism' and 'nationalism' symbolised through the emergence of three different trends in Arab thinking. The first focuses on the national security of the state, (*dawlah*) the second stresses the concept of regional security while the third trend focuses on the concept of Arab national security as (*qumeyh or ummah*) based on the nationalism of Arab society.

¹⁶⁴ Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation. (1950-1952). Op. cit.,

¹⁶⁵ Muhammad, Abdulkarim. (20th Oct, 2000). "Towards Revival the National Security Institutions: The Arab Summit and Restoration of the Arab Reality Troubled". Dubai: *Albayan Newspaper*, p.2 (in Arabic)

¹⁶⁶ *Arab League Council Resolution No.6266* (24th March, 2003). The Meeting (119). This Resolution Was Calls demanding the Immediate and Unconditional Removal of U.S. and British Soldiers from Iraq.

It can be seen that to reconcile the requirements of the current and future situation, it can be argued that the concept of regional security should be understood as the gradual application of the national security concept. Effort ought to be exerted in accordance with the concept of regional security and must comply with the Arab treaties and remain loyal to the idea of nationalism in all its activities.

In addition, the Arab Common Defence Council ought to be revived and the Military General Secretary of the Arab League should be activated as along with the revival of the Unified General Command of Arab armies. All these steps will provide important cooperation for any future military activity in Arab states; however, these moves must occur without any external interference or preconditions.

It is evident that the dilemma of Arab National Security is epitomised by the absence of a unified Arab will and determination. Thus, there has been a failure to provide security as set out by the Charter of the Arab League. Furthermore, the majority of Arab states have proceeded in the opposite direction, favouring the national interest of state (*dawlah*) over the Arab national interests (*ummah*). Consequently, Arab security has become subject to various threats from different sources. In addition, there has been a lack of agreement on the priorities facing the Arab states and there is no single issue receiving equal attention from all Arab states. Thus, the Arabs have not only lost the determination but also the vision to share amongst themselves.¹⁶⁷

The construction of a new civilisation project in the Arab world will only be achieved through the above perception, in particular a unified will and attention. Arab states must be absolutely aware that they need to protect their boundaries and resources if they wish to survive and prolong their existence. The era of boom thanks to the immense oil resources in the Arab world will come to an end, therefore to protect their interests and security the only hope for Arab states is cooperation, embracing gradual and democratic change and constructing the basis for a civilisation project that makes use of the human and natural resources in the region.

¹⁶⁷ Ali, Eldin Hilal. (1988). *The Arab and the World: The Project of Depletion of the Arab World*. Lebanon: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. p.136. (In Arabic)

It can be argued that the Arab national security is more of a populist sentiment rather than a need as seen by the Arab regimes. Therefore, Arab thinkers and leaders believe that they must rely on some important constituents to solve the major dilemmas that are facing the achievement of this requirement. Therefore, the next section of this chapter will highlight the importance of these constituents and dilemmas.

2.3. THE CONSTITUENTS AND THE DILEMMAS OF BUILDING ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY

International variables have played a major role in impeding attempts to achieve Arab national security, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union which has contributed to establishing the current world system. Subsequently, relations at the top of the international system transformed from conflictual to cooperative characterised by interdependence. Since then the major powers have given priority to solving the dilemmas stemming from economic and strategy imbalances between the capitalist states.

Furthermore, the transformation of the Eastern European states into liberal market economies played a role in shaping the global realm in its current form. Moreover it can be seen that there has been a relative neglect of the issues relating to the third world by the new international system. On the other hand it could be said the main source of concern for the major players has been the issues that relate to the prosperity of these states. Accordingly it can be argued that the current international variables have resulted in the reduction of the freedom of regional systems movement including that of the Arab regional system. As a result of these restrictions, Arab thought has tended to give more attention to the subject of Arab national security. Subsequently, there have been many studies and debates tackling the issue of Arab security.¹⁶⁸ These studies have highlighted six dilemmas: determining the enemy's identity and modes of resistance; constructing the necessary capacity to face potential threats; building a military force; building an Arab military doctrine; possessing nuclear capabilities; and the geo-strategic location of Arab world.

¹⁶⁸ Amin, Howaidi. (1975). *The Arab Security in the Facing of the Israel Security*. Beirut: Dar Ataleha. pp.70-85 (In Arabic)

2.3.1. Determining the Enemy's Identity and Modes of Resistance

It is generally accepted that the official Arab political regimes play the main role in the formulation of the Arab national security and determine its elements, principles and priorities. The reality of the divisions within the Arab world results in variations and contradictions in policies, contributing to the first problem of building Arab national security. The multiplicity of Arab policies creates confusion in deciding who is the enemy and the threats which may be posed to the national security in the future.¹⁶⁹

In reality, the presence of various policies ought not always lead to tensions; international alliances usually tend to contain countries embracing different stances on a single issue. However, there is usually agreement on who the enemy is and the steps needed to combat this enemy. This has been evident throughout history, for example, the Western allies and the Soviets both fighting against a common enemy (the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, Japan and Bulgaria) during the Second World War despite their ideological, political and social differences.¹⁷⁰

The contradictory nature of Arab security has been the norm since the middle of the 1950s. This is due to the fact that most of the newly independent Arab states were allied to the Western camp and thus their policies were indirectly linked to those of the Western allies at all levels: economically; politically; and militarily.¹⁷¹

A second major influence on Arab policy was the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1947, whereby the common enemy was identified as Israel, which was seeking to establish a Jewish state in the Arab area known as Palestine. At the time, most Arab states embraced a similar foreign policy with little variation, the common

¹⁶⁹ Haitham, Ayoubi. (1987). "Problematic of Building the Arab National Security". Rabat: *Al-Wahdah Journal*, No.28, p.7 (In Arabic)

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p.8

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.8

enemy was known and most Arab states were allied with the Western camp. Arab states at that time were thus able to construct a common approach to Arab security.¹⁷²

However, such an approach also had negative aspects. For example, the emphasis by Arab states to build up a military arsenal to confront Israel with weapons imported from the West which, in general, supported the Israeli project. Therefore, the Arabs were left no choice but to enter into war with Israel in 1948 and again in 1967 due to the pressures exerted by some Western states that support Israel. The 1973 War was an opportunity for the Arabs to overcome some of the negative aspects of their approach and further reconcile their foreign policies.¹⁷³

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the differences that exist between Arab states vis-à-vis dealing with their common enemy, even though confronting potential threats is a central tenet of Arab regional security.

2.3.2. Constructing the Necessary Capacity to Face Potential Threats

According to Elkoleibi, preparation of the necessary capacity to face the risks is a multifaceted issue interpenetrated by economic, military, political and technological factors. Moreover, determent is the best way to use the force towards the enemy.¹⁷⁴

It is clear that this problem stems from the fact that the Arab states have achieved political independence but have not yet achieved economic independence. Furthermore, they are still following the economic direction of the great states, through the economic policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). Therefore it can be argued that the most important fact which distinguishes this problem is the inability of the Arab states to face the risks that threaten their national security. This is due to several reasons, the most important of which is that Arab states have not given enough attention towards the technological

¹⁷² Atta, M. Saleh. (1986). "National Security and the Joint Arab Action". Lebanon: *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, No.94, pp.16-35 (In Arabic)

¹⁷³ Haitham, Ayoubi. Op. cit., p.8

¹⁷⁴ Shadli, Elkoleibi. (Dec, 1981). "Comprehensive Strategic Development". Tunisia: *Journal of Arab Affairs*. No.10, p.265 (In Arabic)

side, particularly in the development of weapons and military industries, as well as economic development.¹⁷⁵

There have been rare cases that reflect the ability of Arab states to develop their resources to achieve positive results. This was seen in the success that was achieved by Egypt and Syria during the preparations and conflict in the October War in 1973. That means that the Arab states have the opportunity to achieve the Arab national security if they are keen to undergo development of their resources and abilities.

2.3.3. Building a Military Force

The inability of the Arab states to build a military force is one of the gravest problems facing Arab national security. Arab states remain unable to manufacture weapons and only possess a limited military capability, both in terms of quantity and quality. Consequently Arab states have to rely on imported arms. The military capability of the Arabs in the near future will remain subject to external factors. Furthermore, the maintenance and modernisation of these weapons is closely regulated by exporters.¹⁷⁶

2.3.4. Building an Arab Military Doctrine

This issue is concerned with the establishment of an Arab military doctrine that includes the way military force ought to be used when confronting threats. In other words, choosing either a systematic military capability in the form of an army or popular resistance in that is able to prolong a confrontation.

Determining between those two options depends on the nature of the threats and the balance of power. This means if Arab national security was exposed only for the threats of separatist forces that are located in the Arab areas or that Arab national security was exposed to threats of local states which possess traditional armies. At this present time, the Arab state should be concerned with building regular armed forces capable of waging war against the conventional and guerrilla forces. The Arab states have sufficient manpower and economic and military ability to build the armed forces

¹⁷⁵ Haitham, Ayoubi. Op. cit., p.9

¹⁷⁶ George, Elmasri. (1989). *Theory of Contemporary Arab National Security*. Cairo: Dar Elmawkef Alarabi. p.137

necessary to manage the conflicts against guerrillas and can strike their bases in neighbouring states that support them.¹⁷⁷

2.3.5. Possessing Nuclear Capabilities

Arab politicians and intellectuals believed that the protection of Arab national security needs to possess the capabilities of nuclear weapons and because the other states which threaten Arab security, such as Israel, are in possession of the nuclear power. It can be said that, despite the high costs, acquiring nuclear weapons is necessary. However

It is known that nuclear power is an important factor that maintains the balance of power and lowers the risks of the comprehensive destruction through deterrence. Also nuclear power is considered an important factor for domestic reasons to strengthen the regime's political position and gain popular support. This is because nuclear weapons have become a symbol of the powerful and modern state as they are capable of protecting the people and their interests.¹⁷⁸ For these reasons, Arab politicians have often suggested that Arab states need to possess nuclear weapons to protect themselves. Although, the major states do not threaten Arab national security directly by nuclear weapons, Arab national security is exposed to threat of Israel nuclear weapons. It is important that the nuclear situation in the region is unbalanced in the interest of Israel.¹⁷⁹

2.3.6. The Geo-Strategic Location of Arab World

It is important to note that the essence of this problem is that the Arab world covers a large geographical space. This creates strategic and logistical problems for cooperation amongst Arab armies and military institutions in terms of Arab regional security. Furthermore, the lack of an efficient transport infrastructure exacerbates this issue.

¹⁷⁷ Haytham, Al Kilani. (1991). *The Military Strategy of the Arab-Israeli Wars 1948-1988*. Lebanon: the Centre for Arab Unity Studies. p.103 (in Arabic)

¹⁷⁸ Sagan, Scott D. (1997). "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb". *International Security*, 21(3), pp. 54-86.

¹⁷⁹ Alexander, Nikitin. (2009). *Lessons to Be Learned from Non-Proliferation Failures and Successes*. Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp.103-105

These factors are difficult to overcome as long as the Arab states do not have unified policies. Many important steps are required to overcome this strategic issue, most noticeably the urgent need to unify Arab resources and capabilities in order to better serve Arab national security.

In summary, the above issues are the central issues that stand in the way of Arab regional security being achieved. Nevertheless, it ought to be stated that Arab states have also been unable to provide political and ideological remedies to these factors.

2.4. CONCLUSION

Arab thought has always been conscious of the need for a clear understanding of Arab national security, as a result many studies have been published. However, most of these studies are vague and contradictory. This study proves that the field of Arab national security is a relatively new one in an academic sense, and only came to the forefront within social science studies after the end of the Second World War. The official Arab stance on this issue has been expressed through the Arab League; furthermore, this study shows how various Arab thinkers have attempted to express their opinions on this matter. Despite all this, a systematic approach to preserve Arab regional security is yet to come to existence.

The failure of Arab regimes to reach a consensus on the concept of Arab security and the most appropriate methodology to attain and then preserve it does not mean that the concept does not exist. It is argued in this study that the societal progress within an Arab nation-state occurs simultaneously to that of the Arab nation as a whole and not independently of it. Thus, there is a general consensus amongst both regimes and intellectuals that the threats and risks faced by any Arab state is a direct or indirect threat to the entire Arab people, for in reality these threats are targeted at the Arab region as a whole. Consequently, the shared goals, civilisation, ideology, language and fate of the Arab people mean that the Arab populace and regimes are left with no choice but to cooperate against external threats. Thus, the security of the Arab region is in effect the security of each member of that region.

However, certain obstacles and hurdles faced by the Arab regimes have rendered the realisation of a comprehensive Arab security framework unachievable. This study highlights the main hurdles; it also shows that the wish of the Arab populace is different from that of the Arab regimes, particularly in areas relating to the achievement of national ambitions. Thus, this study argues that the Arab people are absent from political progress, and all that has been expressed in the realm of Arab regional security is the desire of the regime and not the citizens.

It is clear that the vagueness of the relationship between ‘nationalism’ and ‘Arabism’ is one of the main reasons behind the complexity of Arab regional security as a concept. Arab regimes hold different perceptions vis-à-vis ‘nationalism’ and ‘Arabism’ on one hand and Arab nationalism and Arab regional security on the other. This discrepancy is clear in the differences that exist between the attempts of Arab intellectuals to implement the concept of national security and the decrees and stances of the Arab League.

Consequently, Arab regimes have failed to reach a unanimous consensus on the conceptual understanding of Arab regional security. One of the reasons behind this is the lack of agreement between Arab regimes on parts of Arab regional security as well as the lack of will and determination to reach a consensus. In conclusion, although Arab national security is an evolving concept that adapts to the changes in the international arena, it remains a vague and contradictory concept due to the reasons highlighted in this chapter.

Chapter Three

THE DILEMMA OF ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY IN LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of national security has been the subject of much attention for governments and political elites at both the domestic and international levels. Arab focus on the concept of Arab national security increased after the emergence of Arab Nationalism in the 1960s. Since then, the dilemma of Arab national security has been central to Arab policy, particularly amongst the revolutionary regimes that were aware of the increased threats—both internally and externally—facing the Arab region.

Since the 1969 Revolution Libya has been one of the countries that has embraced the ideals of Arab Nationalism. Part of these ideals is the call for the resolution of Arab conflicts within the scope of Arab national security which can only be realised through Arab unity. This chapter will examine the extent to which Libya since the Revolution has embraced Arab Nationalism and the importance it has dedicated to Arab national security. This chapter is divided into three main sections: first, the role of the Revolution in shaping the Nationalist approach of Libyan foreign policy since 1969 is analysed. This section examines the changing nature of Libyan foreign policy after the revolution, particularly towards Arab states. This section also highlights the effectiveness of Libyan policy within the Arab realm especially through embracing a Nationalist policy calling for unity.

The second section concerns Libya's perception of Arab national security. This point discusses the tensions between the Libyan view of Arab national security and Western interests in the Arab region. Furthermore, it highlights the fragile nature of the national security of the state (*dawlah*)¹⁸⁰ in the face of the Western threats and challenges in the region. This view is based on the principle that Arab national security is a concept that cannot be divided and that Arab unity is the basis for achieving Arab national security.

¹⁸⁰ Dawlah means State or Country

The third, sections discusses most important sources of threats to Arab national security according to the Libyan perception. This section examines both internal and external threats, as well as the influence of both neighbouring and Western states, including Israel, Turkey and Iran. The position of Libyan policy vis-à-vis these challenges is also be presented.

3.2. THE ROLE OF THE REVOLUTION IN SHAPING THE NATIONALIST APPROACH OF LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1969

During the post-independence period from 1951 to 1969 during which oil production started Libyan foreign policy tended to lean towards the West and ensured that good ties were maintained with Western states.¹⁸¹ During that time, the World Bank classified Libya as one of the most backward states in the world. Its economy was almost entirely reliant on agriculture, despite the fact that water was scarce and there was hardly any land suitable for cultivation. Thus, Libya relied mainly of foreign aid¹⁸² from the US and the UK in exchange for a military presence on Libyan soil.¹⁸³ The Kingdom of Libya government signed an agreement of friendship with the UK on 29 July 1953 making Libyan soil a British military base.¹⁸⁴ A similar agreement was signed with the US on 9 September 1954.¹⁸⁵

In terms of Arab affairs, the Libyan monarchy followed a policy of detachment; Libya joined the United Nations in December 1951 but did not apply to join the Arab League until February 1953 and then only after succumbing to popular pressure.¹⁸⁶ In general the monarchy lacked any sense of Nationalist commitment to the Arab region. Furthermore, the Libyan government of that era adopted policies that were not coherent with the changing nature of the region and the popular appeal of Arab Nationalism, thus leading to negative consequences for Arab national security and a

¹⁸¹ Thomas, M. Leonard. (2006). *Encyclopaedia of the Developing World*. New York: Taylor and Francis Grope Ltd. p.961

¹⁸² Salah-Addin, Hasan Al-Souri. (1985). *Al-Awda' al-Siyasia al-Libbiya* (The Political Situation in Libya) 1954-1969. The Libyan Conference on the Experience of Development in Libya. Paris: pp.2-11

¹⁸³ Little, Douglas. (2003). *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*. London: I. B. Tauris, p.208

¹⁸⁴ As a Result of this Agreement Britain Established the *Adam* Military Base on the Eastern City of Tabraq- Libya close to the Egyptian Border.

¹⁸⁵ As a Result of this Agreement the US Established Five Military Bases Across Libya.

¹⁸⁶ Atta, M. Saleh. Ahmad, Fawzi. (1988). *Contemporary Arab Political Regime*. Benghazi: Qar Younes University. pp.372-373 (in Arabic)

disgruntled Libyan populace.¹⁸⁷ This was part of the general ‘conflict’ that occurred between revolutionary and conservative regimes in the Arab countries; monarchies belonged to the latter category which were less willing to embrace towards the concept of Arab Nationalism, built close ties with the Western states and thus distanced them from their populaces.¹⁸⁸ This was evident in the calls of the masses of the revolutionary regimes to bring to an end Western presence in the region. During the monarchical era, Libya hosted British, US and Italian military bases, despite popular pressure to terminate these agreements.

Such circumstances led to the Libyan Revolution on 1 September 1969,¹⁸⁹ and the new regime was aware of the danger of allowing Western military presence on Libyan soil. Post-Revolution Libya believed that the country’s independence was curtailed by the presence of Western military bases. Consequently, Muammar al-Gathafi, the Leader and Guide of the Revolution, stated that ‘the [Western] military bases that were imposed on the people [of Libya] must depart as soon as possible by any means.’¹⁹⁰

As a result, Libya entered into negotiations with both the US and UK to bring to an end their military presence in Libya; the UK bases were dismantled on 28 March 1970 and US bases followed a similar fate on 11 June 1970.¹⁹¹ The remainder of Italian colonialism were expelled from Libya in October of the same year and thus foreign military economy presence in Libya was brought to an end. The Revolution thus not only brought an end to the policies of the monarchy but also ended Western military presence. The new leadership then embraced an Arab Nationalist approach and dedicated its abilities and resources in the hope of achieving Arab national security. As a result, Libyan foreign policy towards Arab states underwent dramatic changes; Libya became a more active player in the Arab region by embracing a policy of Arab

¹⁸⁷ *Lockerbie Issue and the Future of the International Regime*. (1998). Malta: publications of Centre for Islamic World Studies. p.83 (In Arabic)

¹⁸⁸ Khair el-Din, Haseeb, and Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-Arabīyah. (1991). *The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Options*. London: Routledge. pp.124-132

¹⁸⁹ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1970-1971). “Statements and Speeches and Talks”, *National Register*, Vol (2), Publications of Arab Socialist Union, Libya: p.185 (In Arabic)

¹⁹⁰ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1969-1970). “Statements and Speeches and Talks”, *National Reregister*, Vol (1), Publications of the National Culture Centre, Libya: p.77 (In Arabic)

¹⁹¹ Ronald, Bruce St. John, (2002). *Libya and the United States: Two Countries is Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp.91- 92

Nationalism ending the detached policy of the monarchy.¹⁹² It emphasised that the policy of the Libyan Arab Republic after the Revolution aims to achieve comprehensive Arab unity because the Arabs cannot overcome their problems of backwardness and underdevelopment and confront the various challenges unless they are united.

The importance to the concept of Arab unity was highlighted in official documents of the Republic: Article I of the 1969 Constitution states that the Libyan people are part of the Arab Nation and its principal aim is to achieve comprehensive Arab unity.¹⁹³ In its third chapter—the social section—the *Green Book* emphasises the importance of Arab unity by arguing that it is the sole format compatible with the natural societal composition and that the establishment of any political system that opposes the natural composition of the state is only a temporary affair that is bound to cease to exist.¹⁹⁴

After the Libyan Revolution the new government formulated its foreign policy by analysing the status of the Arab region. It argued that the main reason behind the demise of the Arab world was due to the disunity and fragmentation that is so prevalent amongst its people. Therefore, the Libyan regime attempted to focus linking the two crucial issues: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine.¹⁹⁵

It is important to note that the Revolution contributed to the potential of the Arab world: it supported the concept of Arab unity, embraced Arab Nationalism and brought to an end Western military presence in Libya, a source of threat to the entire region. Thus, it can be argued that post-Revolution Libya was able to strengthen the strategic abilities of the region. It also acted as a link between the Arab East (*Mashriq*) and the Arab West (*Maghrib*); all of which would not have been possible under the

¹⁹² Henry, Habib. (1981). *Libya between the Past and Present*. Tripoli: people's foundation of publishing and distribution. p.291

¹⁹³ Subhi, Ganwus et al. (1999). *Revolutionary Libya in Thirty Years: Political, Economic, Social Transformation 1969 – 1999*. Libya-Masrath: Ad-dar Al-Jamahiriya for Publishing, Distribution and Advertising. pp.210-211(in Arabic)

¹⁹⁴ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1976). *The Green Book*. Part Three. Tripoli: The World Centre for Studies and Researcher of Green Book. pp.141-142 (in Arabic)

¹⁹⁵ Atta, M. Saleh. Ahmad, Fawzi. Op. cit., p.278

monarchy.¹⁹⁶ Partly because Libya under the monarchy did not possess the financial abilities which came about as a result of the oil revenues but more importantly, the monarchy lacked the depth of vision and the ideological embrace of Arab Nationalism.

The Revolutionary government realised that Arab unity is one of the most important steps towards achieving Arab national security. Thus, Tripoli called on the Arab regimes to unite by any means possible and through any desired methods. Libya announced its readiness to unite with any Arab state ready as a first step¹⁹⁷ and continued its efforts to establish a viable Arab alliance that would withstand the challenges of international affairs.¹⁹⁸ Two months after the 1969 Revolution, Libya signed the Tripoli treaty which aimed to establish unity between Libya, Egypt and Sudan.

Since then Libyan aspirations for increased Arab national security through Arab unity attempts have not ceased and the regime has been a continual proponent for the ideals of Arab unity, as basis for the maintenance and protection of Arab national security. Libya embraced the ideology of Arab unity and Arab Nationalism as the mode of protection for the region against foreign threats. Thus, Libya called on all Arab states to support unity in all its forms and began to form multilateral alliances as a step towards comprehensive Arab unity. The Libyan leadership has supported the idea of Arab Nationalism through various means such as education, media and political rhetoric.

Although most Arab regimes support the idea of Arab unity, they all believe that the circumstances are not presently right for unity, arguing that such a move requires gradual change. Gathafi rejects such beliefs and argues that Arab unity is not a utopia but a real goal that must be achieved; he agrees with Arab leaders that change must come gradually but argues that the biggest challenge is the first step.

¹⁹⁶ Jamil, Matter. and Ali Eldin, Hilal. (1982). *The Arab Regional Regime "Study in the Arab Political Relation"*. Beirut: The Centre for Arab Unity Studies. p.110 (In Arabic)

¹⁹⁷ The Report of Unity Minister, (1998). *the Libyan Foreign Policy in Field of Arab Nationalism*. Tripoli: pp.1-10

¹⁹⁸ Ronald, Bruce St. John. (March, 2008). "Redefining the Libya Revolution: the Changing Ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi". *The Journal of North African Studies*. Vol.13, London: Routledge. p.92

The period between 1970 and 2000 witnessed a transformation in Libyan official rhetoric in relation to Arab nationalism. This came about as a result of the ideology of the regime which stems from the “Third Universal Theory”.¹⁹⁹ The regime also established various institutions such as the Ministry of Arab Unity with aim of instilling the concept of Arab Nationalism and unity; such institutions have had far reaching effects both within Libya and abroad. Amal Obeidi notes that the regime has succeeded in establishing a coherent national identity as a medium to achieve Arab unity.²⁰⁰ Undoubtedly the emphasis on Nationalism within the school curriculum aims to establish a political culture that supports the Arab Nationalist approach of Libyan foreign policy.²⁰¹ This is also evident through the various organs of the official media (radio, television, newspapers and cinema), which has since 1969 transmitted material that corresponds with the official rhetoric of the regime.²⁰²

As part of such rhetoric, the Libyan authorities embrace a motto which says that “Libya is the land of all Arabs”. Arabs residing on Libyan soil are not considered as foreigners; furthermore, neither Africans nor Arabs require an entry visa into Libya.²⁰³ Nevertheless, some Arab and African states do not treat Libyan nationals in a reciprocal manner, either through restricting their entry or domicile. This highlights the insistence of Libyan foreign policy to overcome the challenges that face the Arab national security and the various strategic implications they cause.

The new regime was not only revolutionary in domestic affairs but immediately adopted a policy aimed at establishing Arab unity: thus it took on a twin-pronged approach which can be characterised as revolutionary-cum-nationalist. This outlook of Libyan policy is clearly portrayed in the establishment in 1993 of a dedicated ministry to deal with Arab unity, the Secretariat of Arab Unity as it was labelled was to deal with Libya’s relations with Arab states in all fields, be it political, economical or socio-cultural. The ultimate aim of the Secretariat is to work towards achieving

¹⁹⁹ The Third Universal Theory is the work of the Libyan leader Muammar Al Gathafi, exemplified in The Green Book, which was published in 1975, outlining his views on his political philosophy as a solution to the political, economic and social issues and challenges facing humanity.

²⁰⁰ Amal, Obeidi. (2001). *Political Culture in Libya*. Great Britain: Curzon Press. (First Addition). p.4

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp.202-209

²⁰² Katab, Hussein Mohammed. (1995). *Unitary Direction in the Libyan Diplomacy Towards the Arab League, 1994 – 1969*. Master’s thesis, Unpublished, Institute of Arab Research and Studies. Cairo: p.10 (in Arabic).

²⁰³ Ibid., p.99

Arab unity.²⁰⁴ This was followed in 2000 with the upgrading of the African Affairs Department to become the Ministry of African Affairs, which led to the creation of the African Union. Africa has always been a priority for the Revolutionary government's policy, contrary to a number of studies that claim that Libya only became interested in Africa after its efforts for Arab unity failed. Such an argument is untrue as the regime's foreign policy has consistently embraced the motto 'Africa is for the Africans'.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, Libyan policy opted to begin with the Arab sphere as a step towards achieving African unity.

Nationalist tendencies that first appeared during the beginning of the 1960s were crystallised into a tangible foreign policy after the 1969 Revolution. Libya supported Nationalist projects and both the first decree of the Revolution and the Constitution emphasise this.²⁰⁶ Previous literature has proved that the nationalist tendencies of the Libyan regime have bridged the gap between the Arab and African ethos and identity. Tripoli calls for African countries to contribute and join in all unity and political projects being proposed. Also Libya supported and helped in resolving many Arab and African issues. This will be clarified in detail in chapters four, five and six.

Furthermore, the Revolution has played a crucial role in the ideological and socio-cultural connection between Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Libya has become an important centre of knowledge for Arabs and Africans. The Revolutionary regime has also made use of Libya's financial capabilities to spread the Nationalist conscious amongst the Arab and African ex-pats residing on Libyan soil. In addition, Libya has used Islam as a medium to promote the Nationalist cause and improve relations between Africans and Arabs.

Such efforts bore fruit and the first signal of that appeared in 1977 during the Arab–African conference in Cairo.²⁰⁷ The conference initiated several ties and it could be

²⁰⁴ Decree of the Libyan Prime Ministry, No.114, (1993). the Ministry of Unity, Tripoli, Libya.

²⁰⁵ "Historical Milestones for the Revolution", (September, 2007). Tripoli: *Azzahf Alakhder Newspaper*, No.68, p.1 (in Arabic)

²⁰⁶ *Al-Bayan al-Awwal*, (The first Communiqué of the Libyan Revolution in 1/9/1969). Available at: <URL: <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8744/commun1.htm>> Access Date: 15/3/2007

²⁰⁷ Abdelkader, Benamara. and Sam, lfeagwu. (1997). *OPEC Aid and the Challenge of Development*. London: Rutledge publishing, p.53

argued that Libya succeeded in its mission of promoting the Nationalist rhetoric through the various mediums such as education and the media.

3.3. THE LIBYAN PERCEPTION OF ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY

The Libyan regime believes that the weakness and inability of the Arab people is due to the fierce attacks to which it is being subjected. This has appeared in various forms such as artificial boundaries, the creation of Israel in the midst of the Arab region thus causing unrest since 1948, the occupation of Iraq, interference in Darfur and the on-going Western military presence across the Arab region and African continent. This is in addition to the inter-Arab and inter-African conflicts such as the involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The situation is further exacerbated by the Arab states' inability to promote reform and popular participation in policy-making as well as their inability to achieve full sovereignty by joining in with foreign security agreements that ultimately threaten Arab National security. In addition, Gathafi believes that 'Western and American hegemony and their control of the media and education in the region creates disagreements and ethnic conflicts thus isolating the Arabs from positive civilisational participation in global progress.'²⁰⁸

These reasons further emphasise the findings of the literature which states that the Libyan perception of Arab national security is constructed upon the need for comprehensive Arab unity under a single political leadership. The Libyan regime has been calling for such measures for many years and has implemented a number of attempts at unity starting with the Tripoli Charter of 1969 which brought together Libya, Sudan and Egypt with the aim of strengthening strategic military co-operation, improving ties and co-ordinating foreign affairs.²⁰⁹ This charter was signed by Gathafi Ja'far al-Numairi (for Sudan) and Nasser (Egypt), who all believed that the challenges facing the region made such an agreement a necessity. Furthermore, they saw the charter as a revolutionary alliance creating a deep-rooted bond amongst the Arab popular movement in its efforts to overcome the challenges of both imperialism and

²⁰⁸ Al Gathafi Addresses the Students of Oxford University on Africa in the 21st Century. (16th May, 2007). Available at: <URL: <http://www.alGathafi.org/html-english/index.htm>> Access Date: 20/8/2007

²⁰⁹ Michael, Crowder et al., (1984). *The Cambridge History of Africa*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp.502-561

Israel. This was thought to be a first step; thereafter, ultimately, societal change would occur and Arab unity would follow. In 1970, Libya, Egypt and Sudan agreed to a unity plan. The charter later included Syria and thus laid the foundation for the constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics launched in Benghazi, Libya on 17 April 1971 and included Egypt, Syria and Libya.

The announcement of the Federation proclaims that given the political, military and economic capabilities of the Arab states, their unity would be the sole method to challenge imperialism, halt Israel and liberate Arab lands.²¹⁰ Presidents Asad and Sadat alongside Colonel Gathafi agreed to establish the Federation between their three countries with Sudan joining at a later stage. It was hoped that this would be the founding step for a more encompassing Arab Union based upon the principles of socialism. The three leaders agreed that the Federation should work towards achieving Arab unity, creating a Socialist society and supporting both Arab and African national liberation movements. The agreement also stated the principals of foreign policy including war, peace, defence, economy, cultural and national security.

However, differences between members meant that it was unable to move forward and achieve its stated goals; even though some of its institutions were active they were unable to create any tangible results.²¹¹ In 1973 Libya called for complete unity with Egypt. The agreement was initially approved by President Sadat and Colonel Gathafi in Benghazi in 1972 and signed a year later. The main incentive behind this union was the desire to halt Israel attacks on Arab soil. Libya realised that Egypt was the eastern front line of defence against Israel and thus saw this union as a necessity for Arab national security. Nevertheless, as a result of the increased fighting between Egypt and Israel at the time, the union did not succeed.²¹² In 1973 Gathafi led a unitary demonstration which called for a full unity with Egypt.

²¹⁰ Bechtold, Peter K. (1973). "New Attempts at Arab Cooperation: The Federation of Arab Republics, 1971-?". *Middle East Journal*, 27(2), pp. 152-172

²¹¹ Itamar, Rabinovich. Haim, Shaked. (1978). "The Federation of Arab Republics", in Varda Ben-Zvi (Ed.), *From June to October: the Middle East between 1967 and 1973?* (pp.171-183). USA: Transaction Publishers.

²¹² Gil, Feiler. (2003). *Economic Relations between Egypt and the Gulf Oil States, 1967-2000: petro-wealth and patterns of influence*. UK: Sussex Academic Press. pp.178-183

Another Libyan effort for Arab unity was the 1974 Djerba declaration which aimed to establish unity between Libya and Tunisia creating a single state under the title the Arab Islamic Republic.²¹³ The agreement was to be approved after referenda in both countries, but due to the absence of such a precedent in the Tunisian constitution the project was abandoned by the Tunisian side. In spite of this, Libya continued its efforts to achieve Arab unity and signed the Hassi-Messaoud declaration on 28 December 1975. Boumedienne and Gathafi—leaders of Algeria and Libya—signed the agreement as a step towards comprehensive Arab unity.²¹⁴

Based upon the principals of the Libyan Revolution—Arab Nationalism and unity as a means of achieving Arab national security to challenge Israel and re-capture Arab land—the Unity State was announced between Syria and Libya in September 1980. In December of the same year an announcement stated that a single state would be created with a single international identity; the state would aim to achieve political, economic and cultural unity. Furthermore, the state would seek to reduce the fragmentation between Arab states and link their human, economic and military resources to face the various challenges, especially those from Israel.²¹⁵ These moves clearly indicate Libya's commitment to Arab national security, for even though it is not a neighbour of Israel and has never been subject to its attacks. Nevertheless, the Arab Nationalist spirit of Libya encourages it to ally with other Arab states to protect Arab soil.

Libyan efforts for Arab unity again moved from the Eastern part of the region to the West. Libya and Morocco signed the treaty of the Arab-African Union on 13 August 1984 in Oujda, Morocco. The treaty reflected Libya's ambition of expanding the Arab union to include non-Arab states (African states), and it stated that African or Arab states wishing to join the treaty may do so subject to the approval of the two founding members.²¹⁶ Article VIII of the treaty states that the Union aims to strengthen and

²¹³ John, Wright. (1981). *Libya: a Modern History*. UK: Taylor & Francis. pp.165-167

²¹⁴ Ahmed, Aghrout and Keth, Sutton. (1990). "Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28 (1), pp.115-139

²¹⁵ John, F. Devlin. (1983). *Syria: Modern State in an Ancient land*. Oxford: Taylor & Francis, pp.111-112. Also in Arabic see *Diaries and documents of Arab Unity 1989-1993*. Beirut: the Centre for Arab Unity Studies. pp.644-646

²¹⁶ Ronald, Bruce St. John. (1987). *Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign policy, 1969-1987*. London: Publisher Saqi Books. p.66

improve Arab ties as well as preserving peace and security and working towards achieving Arab unity.²¹⁷

In 1988 Libya continued its calls for other Arab states to join the Arab-African Union and abolished its borders with Egypt and Tunisia. A year later on 17 February 1989 Libya, alongside other Maghreb states, signed the Marrakech treaty which established the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which included Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania.


The Libyan leadership considered AMU as an important preliminary step towards greater Arab unity. Article XVII of AMU's treaty calls on the rest of Arab and African states to join the Union and thus achieve gradual integration between all states in the region.²¹⁸ However, inter-Arab conflicts were a great hindrance to the progress of AMU; in particular the Saharan conflict between Algeria and Morocco weakened the Union. Despite all the difficulties and challenges, Although AMU has made little progress; the members continue to revive the moribund organisation.

In 1990, the ambitions of the Libyan leadership went further and put forward a proposal for an Arab Union based on a continuation of other alliances. Gathafi presented this project to the leaders of Arab states during the 1990 Arab League Summit in Algiers. The Arab Union project reflects a realistic perception of the contemporary situation in the Arab world and takes into account various factors especially those which the Arab League failed to achieve. As a result, the Libyan regime proposes an Arab unity in the form of a confederation rather than as one centralised state.²¹⁹ The Union would be effective in assisting the Arab League in transforming into a true alliance.

²¹⁷ The Treaty of the Arab-African Union, see Khouri, Yusuf. (1990), *Attempts of Arab Unity 1913-1982*. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. pp.515-517 (In Arabic)

²¹⁸ Text and Amendments of the Marrakech Treaty signed on February, 17th 1989.

²¹⁹ *The Arab System: Delayed Reform*. The strategic report, 2004-2005. Al- Ahrām Centre, Available at: <URL: <http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/ahram/2001/1/1/RARB81.HTM> > Access Date: 7th September, 2007. pp.60-66. (In Arabic).

Figure: 3.1. Arab Unitary Projects Since 1969²²⁰

Since 1969 Libya has consistently championed Arab unity however other Arab countries have been less supportive of the idea. Thus although the above attempts have not met with exceptional success they were nevertheless beneficial for both the Libyan regime and other Arab states. These experiences were a wake-up call for Arab regimes highlighting the danger of fragmentation and proving that the future of the Arab world must be in its unity and alliance.

Libya was not disheartened by the failure of these attempts; in fact Libya continues to call for Arab unity. Undoubtedly, Libyan calls for unity were directed at the existing Arab regimes and thus the failure indicated the contradictions that occur amongst these regimes especially politically and ideologically. Furthermore, these attempts focused entirely on the official regimes without giving much attention to popular opinion amongst the masses. Despite the lack of success the Libyan regimes has learnt a lot in how to deal with issues of crucial importance to the region. In particular, issues relating to Arab national security in its political, economic and military aspects. The Libyan regime has learnt to appeal to the Arab citizen by deepening the concept of Arab Nationalism through grassroots methods and the revival of pan-Nationalist ideology.

Libyan policy believes that Arab national security will only be achieved through Arab Unity; consequently Libya is calling on all Arabs—both within Asia and Africa—to

²²⁰ This figure is prepared by the researcher based on the information mentioned in this study

join the Arab-African realm and face the challenge of contemporary global affairs.²²¹ Libya also sees the need to strengthen the strategic dimension of Arab national security by securing support from African states. However, the close ties between Arab states and the West has not allowed this to be achieved.²²² Libya believes that the policies of the US and other Western states act against Arab interests, such as the events in Libya during 1980s and 1990s, Sudan and Iraq. Libya also believes that whilst the West deals with the Arabs as an economic and political alliance, Arab states continue to deal individually with the West and thus jeopardise Arab interests, which further emphasises the need for Arab unity.²²³

As a result of these calls Libya was subjected to pressure from large western states that saw a clear contradiction between their own policies and the Libyan aspirations in the region. For this reason, the US and other Western powers have exerted their efforts to ensure that no regional power is established in the Arab region. More precisely, they ensure that no alliance can take place, be it a union between states or a confederation or even strong cooperation between Arab states. However, if this were to occur then the regional balance of power would be in the Arabs' favour and against US policy and its interests.

The US was opposed to Arab unity in principle, and opposed this unity as a national goal, even if it has occurred in some cases.²²⁴ Furthermore, the US clearly states that it works towards giving Israel a clear military advantage in the region. This was clearly indicated by George W. Bush in his May 2008 speech in front of the Israeli Knesset (parliament) where he insisted on the need to halt Iran's nuclear ambition without even referring to Israel's nuclear arsenal which threatens the Arab world. Furthermore, Bush argued that Israel is the foremost of priorities for US Middle East

²²¹ *Al Gathafi Calls on Arab Asia to Join the African Space*. (26th January, 2006). Panapress, Khartoum: Available at: <URL: <http://www.panapress.com/newsara.asp?code=ara1033&dte=26/01/2006>> Access Date: 5th June, 2007. (In Arabic)

²²² Khair el-Din, Haseeb. (8th Aug,2005). *Major Power and Arab Unity*. Available at: <URL: <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1D6FEA68-C53D-4687-9222-49385793B080.htm#L2>> Access Date: 12th May, 2007. (In Arabic)

²²³ Ibrahim, Gharayba. (3rd Oct, 2004). *The State of the Arab Nation*. Aljazeera, available at: <URL: <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/14C7419E-A5AD-4797-AE24-E11B63C2D9D3.htm>> Access Date: 25/6/2008.

²²⁴ Mohammed, Fadhel Al-Jamali. (April, 1981). The Arab Union: Hopes and Dilemmas, *Journal of Arab Thought*, No 7, Beirut: p.41 (In Arabic)

policy in terms of support and assistance.²²⁵ This clearly indicates US bias towards the more powerful side which serves their interest in the region.

It can be argued that implementing the Libyan perception of Arab national security has faced many obstacles because its successful outcome would oppose the imperial ambitions of the major players in the region. Thus, these powers have targeted Libyan interests and have made allegations concerning Libyan actions against Western interests in the Arab world and Africa. Nevertheless, Libya was aware of the crucial need for Arab national security, for in addition to Libya's clear Nationalist stance it also realises the fragility of the Arab nation-state which cannot by itself faces the many challenges and threats in the region.²²⁶ The many wars involving Arab states support this claim.

The post-1969 Libyan perception of Arab national security was unique in the sense that it was based upon ideological beliefs and principles as opposed to other Arab perceptions that were based on national self-interest. Consequently, one of the most important factors of the Libyan perception is that nation-state security must be part of a greater Arab national security. Gathafi stated that 'unless all the victories and achievements of the nation-state are placed within a correct framework they would disappear and the only correct framework is that of Arab unity.'²²⁷ Therefore, unity is not merely a mode of survival for the Arabs but it is also a medium to achieve comprehensive political, economic and socio-cultural development to allow for the full potential of the Arabs.

It is important to note that the Libyan insistence on Arab national security is a characteristic that has existed since the Revolution.²²⁸ Libya continues to re-iterate its belief that Arab nation-states are unable to attain their full potential without Arab unity.

²²⁵ George, W. Bush. (15th May, 2008). Address to Members of the Knesset, Jerusalem, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 37(4), pp.186–188

²²⁶ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1970-1971). "Statements, Speeches and Talks", Op. cit., pp.180-190

²²⁷ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1969-1970) "Statements, Speeches and Talks", Op. cit., p.291

²²⁸ The Annual Report (1998). Libyan Foreign Policy in the Arab Area, Unity Ministry, Tripoli – Libya. pp.1-10

It is clear that the Libyan calls for Arab unity stem from the regime's belief that the Arab world possesses greater potential and characteristics than any other artificial alliance in the modern world such as the US or the EU—which both continue to achieve great results despite the huge wars that occurred amongst its members and the fact that the only unifying factor is economic interests.²²⁹ The Arab world on the other hand possesses a strategic geographic location linking three continents—Africa, Asia and Europe—through various sea lanes that control global shipping transportation. In addition, the Arab world possesses immense natural resources such as oil and agricultural land, as well as large capital. The Arab world is also united through language, religion, civilisation, history and culture as well as the natural bonds between the Arab people.

As part of its envisagement of Arab national security, Libyan policy does not acknowledge the presence of artificial state boundaries between Arab countries which have been—and continue to be—hurdles in the face of Arab unity. Libya has called for the need to remove these boundaries that were an outcome of imperialist states during the era of colonisation. In this context, the leader of the Libyan Revolution states that:

These boundaries are what remain of imperialism; we will work to remove them because this is part of our struggle for freedom. Imperialism cannot disappear whilst its remains are intact, for the remains of imperialism are more dangerous than its actual presence.²³⁰

As a result, Libya withdrew its military presence from the Eastern frontier with Egypt in March 1988 and dismantled the militarised zone in that region. It also removed the border gateway between it and Tunisia in April 1988 and withdrew Libyan military presence on that border. In September of the same year Libya also announced the dismantlement of the artificial boundaries with Algeria.²³¹ Such moves did not continue, even though they can be considered as important steps on the Libyan side to boost Arab unity.

²²⁹ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1990-1991). "Statements, Speeches and Talks", *National Register*, Vol (22), Tripoli: World Centre for Studies and Research of the Green Book. pp.31-33. (In Arabic)

²³⁰ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1985-1986). "National Register, Statements", Speeches and Talks, *National Register*, Vol (17), Tripoli: World Centre for Studies and Research of the Green Book. pp.115-120. (In Arabic)

²³¹ Subhi, Ganwus et al. Op. cit., pp.226

Another characteristic of the Libyan perception of Arab national security is that it does not acknowledge the existence of Israel in the Arab world. Libyan policy emphasises that the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of existence rather than just of borders and land. In other words, the presence of Israel on Palestinian land not only poses a threat to Arab national security but also threatens the actual Arab existence. Libyan foreign policy also believes that Israeli colonisation does not end at the Palestinian borders but it stretches to include the entire Arab realm.²³² It believes that Israel has a strategic goal to capture other parts of the Arab world as is evident in Israel's occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, parts of Lebanon and the continual expansion of settlements in the West Bank.

Furthermore, the Libyan perception of Arab national security rejects Western military presence on Arab soil in all its forms, considering such a presence is a direct threat to the security of the Arab world.²³³ It can be argued that the Libyan regime considers the Western and Israeli presence as the most significant problems facing Arab national security as these pose the most significant threat for the Arab world (as will be explained in 4.4.2.2.1.).

It is important to note that the Libyan regime put an end to British, US and Italian military presence on its soil. Furthermore, Libya has been committed to supporting Liberation movements —both in Africa and Arabia—against Israeli and Imperialist hegemony and colonisation.²³⁴ Libya has also objected to US and Western naval presence in the Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf.²³⁵

The Libyan interest in Arab unity and achieving Arab national security is characterised through its efforts to amend the Charter of the Arab League—which is a dimension of the Arab Union project.²³⁶ This project proposes the establishment of the League of Arab Unity as opposed to the League of Arab States. Article I of the Libyan proposal states that ‘the goals of the League of Arab Unity are to direct the Arab world towards comprehensive Arab unity, to liberate Palestine and all occupied

²³² Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1969-1970). “Statements, Speeches and Talks”, Op. cit., p.15-23

²³³ Henry, Habib. Op. cit., p.277

²³⁴ Henry, Habib. Op. cit., pp. 278-283

²³⁵ The Annual Report (1998). Libyan foreign policy in the Arab Area, Op. cit., 1-10

²³⁶ The Arab System: Delayed Reform. Op. cit.,

Arab lands, to reject Imperialism in all its forms and to stand against external threats.²³⁷

It can be argued that the aims of the proposal—as indicated in Article I—reflect the foundational changes that Libya hopes to introduce to the Arab League by emphasising the issue of Arab unity and the League’s role in achieving such an aim. As such, based on Libyan perceptions of Arab national security, it aims to increase the League’s role and boost its positive input into communal Arab action.²³⁸ The Libyan proposal for the amendment of the Charter of the Arab League came as a result of the realisation of the several hindrances that the present charter contained. Furthermore, it aimed to encourage the League to become a more influential actor in solving the issues of the region and also to increase the activities of the League’s institutions.

As part of its consistent stance towards achieving Arab national security, Libya responded clearly to the League’s proposal in 1993²³⁹ regarding this matter by stating that:

Libya has made clear its willingness to work alongside the League to achieve Arab national security...and believes that this Security will only be achieved through the comprehensive Nationalist vision that was echoed in the League’s founding Charter, and was agreed upon by all of our [Arab League members] agreements and charters, and the time has come for that to be put into practice.²⁴⁰

In truth, the consistent nature of Libyan policy since 1969 had caused it many problems with the Western states, particularly the US which sees Libyan policy as being harmful to US and Western interests in the Arab region. Furthermore, the US believes that Libyan policy is a threat to US national security and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) plans.²⁴¹ As a result, the US and its allies have worked to ensure that Libyan efforts for Arab unity fail and aimed to cause tension between Libya and its Arab and Africa neighbours.

²³⁷ Mustafa, Abdullah Khchim and Mohamed Zahi Mogherbi. (March, 1999). Libyan Perspective for Amend the Charter of the Arab League. Tripoli: *Dirasaat Journal*, No.1, p.106. (In Arabic)

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.108-110.

²³⁹ Libyan Proposal (21st July, 1993). That has distributed to the Members of Arab League about the Issue of Arab National Security, Unpublished, Cairo: (In Arabic).

²⁴⁰ A Letter from the Libyan Minister of Unity to the Secretary-General of the Arab League Regarding the Issue of Arab National Security Dated on the 28/5/1995, Department of Arab Affairs, Ministry of Unity, Tripoli-Libya.

²⁴¹ The Lockerbie Issue and the Future of the International Regime. Op. cit., p.13

In this context, the US has imposed economic sanctions on Libya since 1982,²⁴² and in 1986 carried out an air attack on Tripoli and Benghazi.²⁴³ In 1991, the US accused Libya of being responsible for the 1988 Pan-Am flight crash over Lockerbie.²⁴⁴ This accusation was further exacerbated by the UN—which was under US hegemony—Security Council Resolution number 748 in 1992 imposing an air embargo over Libya.²⁴⁵ This lasted until 2003 when Libya agreed to pay compensation to the Lockerbie crash victims' families and give up its weapons of mass destruction programme. However, Libya did not admit responsibility for the bombing but agreed to compensation only to remove the various international sanctions. Libya continued to follow the case in both the Scottish and international courts and was granted a fresh appeal by the specialist Scottish committee in 2007 allowing a new investigation into this incident.²⁴⁶ However, in 2009 the Scottish parliament released the Libyan defendant in the Lockerbie case based on medical advice. However, Washington was against this decision, clearly reflecting US policy towards the Arab states.

Libya continues to insist that any Western or US intervention into internal Arab affairs is considered a threat to the national security and sovereignty of those states. Similarly, it is apparent that Libya has modified its rhetoric towards Western states in recent years. However, this is not say that Libya has changed its stance towards the West but it has merely become clearer with regards to certain issues. This was highlighted when the Libyan foreign minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam stated during a speech to the Parliament that:

Libya has moved from the period of confrontation to that of dialogue, and that even though Libya might agree with the US and Western states on certain matters—particularly those of an economic nature—Libya remains opposed to crucial US policies such its support for Israel, its stance towards Syria, the invasion of Iraq and interference in Arab internal affairs.²⁴⁷

²⁴² David, P. Currie. (2000). *The Constitution of the United States: A Primer for the People*. United States of America: university of Chicago press. p.41

²⁴³ David, J. Whittaker. (2003) *The Terrorism Reader*. Oxford: Routledge. p.68

²⁴⁴ Sterling, Johanson. (2003). *Peace without Justice: Hegemony Instability or International Criminal Law*. UK: Ashaget Publishing Ltd. p.144

²⁴⁵ Vera, Gowlland. Debbas, Diacoba Liva. (2004). *National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative Study*. Netherland: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p.177

²⁴⁶ *Lockerbie Bomber Appeal in Court*. (Thursday, 20th Dec, 2007). BBC News 24. Available at: <URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7152862.stm>> Access Date: 4th January, 2008.

²⁴⁷ *The Speech of Libyan Forging Minister in the General People Congress (Libyan parliament)* at the Annual Meeting (3rd March, 2008), Available at: <URL: http://foreign.gov.ly/online/news_details.php?id_news=1222> Access Date: 8th April, 2008.

Such statement clearly indicates that Libya still holds on to its principals and considers these issues as threats to Arab national security.

US and Western policy has continued—through a specific strategy—to isolate Libya as a way of halting its consistent Nationalist tendencies. This has occurred through various means including: economic sanctions; air attacks; air embargo; pushing other countries to act against Libya; igniting conflicts in other countries, especially Libya's neighbours; and, finally, the use of media propaganda to portray Libya as a state that sponsors terrorism.

It is clear from what has been previously mentioned that the Libyan perception of Arab national security is constructed upon the realisation of the fragility of national security of state (*dawlah*). It also envisages an Arab national security that incorporates various factors, such as politics, military, economics and socio-culture. Such a comprehensive view portrays—according to the Libyan perception—the sole medium through which Arab self-determination and Arab national security and stability can be achieved in the face of imperialist and Zionist threats and challenges.

According to the Libyan perception of Arab national security there are various sources of threat that may be of concern to Arab stability and security. These sources aim to halt efforts towards Arab unity. The following section highlights the major threats to Arab national security from the Libyan perspective.

3.4. LIBYAN PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY

The Libyan leadership categorises its perceptions of threats to Arab national security into internal and external ones. These threats, which strongly influence Libyan foreign policy, are discussed in detail in this section.

3.4.1. Internal Sources of Threat

The internal sources of threat according to the Libyan perception can be divided into three categories: political; economic; and social and cultural. The literature shows that according to Libyan perceptions the most significant political sources of threat to Arab national security are: the absence of a comprehensive Arab unity; the presence

of Colonialist-inspired boundaries between Arab states; the absence of democracy in the Arab world and terrorism. The economic sources of threat include: food insecurity; the flight of Arab capital; unemployment and poverty; inequality in the distribution of wealth; and succumbing to Western economics ideas and finance. The social and cultural sources of threat include: the low quality of education leading to the inability to protect the Arab identity and ideology; the brain drain; the absence of human rights; the lack of civil society institutions; the marginalisation of women; the presence of ethnic minorities, armed militias and the absence of social equality.

3.4.1.1. Political sources of threat

The most dangerous internal source of threat to Arab national security according to the perceptions of the regime is the state of fragmentation and disunity prevalent amongst Arab states. According to the leadership this source of threat is the result of the paucity of inter-Arab interactions which have, in turn, reduced the strategic significance of the Arab world on the international front. Consequently, this resulted in conflict between Arab states—sometimes expressed violently—leading to catastrophic results. This created an incentive for foreign intervention, which in turn led to regional alliances within the Arab world circumventing pan-Arab institutions and political development in the region, thereby weakening the potential for a unified Arab stance. Weakness and division were widespread amongst the Arabs, often leading to calls for external help thus exacerbating the political and ideological differences between the Arab states.

Second, taking into account the importance of a single pan-Nationalist entity to the realisation of Arab national security, Libya rejects all forms of disunity and fragmentation within the Arab region such as the widespread presence of more than 20 Arab nation-states.²⁴⁸ Libya believes that this disunity is a direct result of Western colonisation of Africa and the Arab world and thus remains the single most important challenge facing Arab national security.²⁴⁹

It is clear that the Libyan leadership realised from early on that although Arab states may have achieved political independence, this has not been used to support

²⁴⁸ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1969-1970). "Statements, speeches and talks", Op. cit., pp.31-33.

²⁴⁹ *Al Gathafi Addresses the Students of Oxford University on Africa in the 21st Century*. Op. cit.,

Nationalist tendencies and to achieve what the Arab people long for, Arab unity. Instead these nation-states have been led into conflicts and increased disunity. Libya—as discussed previously—has therefore exerted considerable efforts to unify the Arab nations. For example, during the latter half of the 1980s Libya removed its boundaries with Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, as a move to encourage other Arab states to take such steps.²⁵⁰

Third, the Libyan regime considers the absence of democracy in the Arab world as a political challenge facing Arab national security. The Libyan regime believes that the Arab citizen is continuously marginalised from decision-making and active participation in both nation-state (*dawlah*) and Nationalism (*qumeyh*)²⁵¹ issues.²⁵² According to the Libyan leadership, the most important aspect the Arab world needs to achieve its unity and its national security is to dedicate attention to the liberty of its citizens and open the door for Arab citizens in all nation-state to participate in achieving the pan-Nationalist ambitions and goals.

Fourth, the spread of terrorism in a number of Arab states is perceived to be a threat to those states and the Arab region in general. This phenomenon has created new barriers between the Arab countries, because of the spread of terrorist groups across borders. As a result more stringent policies aimed at controlling the movement of those groups have been adopted. For example, the development of armed Islamic groups in Algeria caused Libya to change its policy and tighten security measures on the movement of people between the two countries, as well as with Egypt and Sudan.

3.4.1.2. Economic sources of threat

Economics is considered as a source of threat by the regime for various reasons, including: food insecurity in the region; the flight of Arab capital abroad; increased unemployment and poverty; inequality in the distribution of wealth; and succumbing to the ideas of Western economics and finance. In general, the current economic situation of the Arab world does not allow it to develop despite the presence of

²⁵⁰ Subhi, Ganwus et al. Op. cit., PP.225-227

²⁵¹ Qumeyh: means Nationalism

²⁵² A Report on the Contributions of the Libyan Delegation to the 4th Conference on Arab National Security, Contemporary Challenges and Visions for the Future, (16th January, 1996). Department of Arab Affairs, Ministry of Unity, pp.1-8

immense economic potential, which if used properly could direct the region towards self-sustaining economic growth.

Having realised the danger of such situation—particularly succumbing to Western economics—Libyan policy followed steps that would be beneficial to its own country as well the Arab region. This occurred through the Libyan emphasis on the liberation of Arab resources from Western and American hegemony.²⁵³ Since the 1969 Revolution Libya has reiterated the need to integrate Arab resources in order to make the best use of the immense wealth in the region and achieve economic independence and growth. Consequently, Libya constructed industrial platforms with a capacity far beyond the levels of Libyan consumption in order to integrate with other Arab states that may make use of this capacity.²⁵⁴

It is important to note that as part of its 1990 Arab Union proposal Libya has emphasised the need to achieve Arab economic unity.²⁵⁵ The proposal included the establishment of a specialised Economic Council in charge of regulating economic affairs in the Arab region, boosting inter-Arab trade and the creation of a single currency, thus assisting with Arab economic integration.²⁵⁶ Libyan policy perceives economic unity is one of the most important aspects of Arab unity. Thus, Libyan foreign policy has attempted to activate the Arab Common Defence Policy Agreement and achieve economic unity by removing barriers and the free movement of goods, individuals and labour.²⁵⁷

In reality, Libya policy since the Revolution has paid specific attention to strengthening economic cooperation and relations with both Arab and African states in various fields. This has been a priority for Libyan foreign policy due to the

²⁵³ Emad, Yousef. and Arwa al-Sabbagh. (1996). *The Future of International Policy towards the Middle East*. Amman: the Centre of Middle Eastern Studies. p.301 (In Arabic)

²⁵⁴ Rashid, Yousef Athamnah. (1997). *The Economic Factor in Libyan Foreign Policy 1977-1997*, an Unpublished, M.A. Thesis. Tripoli: The Academy of Economic Studies and Research. pp.63-64

²⁵⁵ For more Information See *the Arab Summit Conference*, Unusual, (28th May, 1990). Iraq Affairs, Available at: URL :< http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/search_ar.jsp Access Date: 10/8/2008.

²⁵⁶ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1996-1997). “Statement and Speeches and Talks”, *National Register*, Vol (28), Tripoli: Publications of the World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green Book. pp.234 - 236

²⁵⁷ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1992-1993). “Statement and Speeches and Talks”, *National Register*, Vol (24), Tripoli: Publications of the World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green Book. p.578


realisation of the importance of uniting Arab resources for achieving economic independence.²⁵⁸

Libyan foreign policy considers the global economic alliances as the most dangerous sources of threat for Arab national security. In particular, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) aims to make economics a state-centric factor, as well as the Middle East project and the European Union (EU).²⁵⁹ Libyan foreign policy believes that these alliances and institutions aim to divide the Arabs into separate geographic entities that are engulfed by these alliances. Thus, Libya established the Arab-Libyan Foreign Investment Company as a step towards building an Arab economic alliance to compete with the global alliances which seek to penetrate the Arab world. Realising such danger, Libya invested more than LD25bn²⁶⁰ in various sectors in the Arab world and Africa including petroleum, agriculture, fisheries, transport, telecommunication, tourism and banking (see Map 3.1).

²⁵⁸ A Memo from the Libyan Minister of Unity to the Secretary-General of the Arab League dated (1st August, 1995). Department of Arab Affairs, Ministry of Unity, Tripoli. p.3-4

²⁵⁹ Leith, Al Zubaidi. (2005). "Middle East Project and the Future of Arab National Security". Tripoli: *Dirasaat Journal*, the sixth annual, No.22, p.17 (in Arabic).

²⁶⁰ Badr, Hassan Shafi. (29th Aug, 2001). *Sahel-Saharan: The Libyan Role in Africa*, Islam Online, Political Affairs. Available at: URL :<
<http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/politics/2001/08/article32.shtml>> Access Date: 2nd May, 2008.

Map: 3. 1. Libyan Investments in Arab World²⁶¹

Similarly, Libya raised its concern over the Western and Israel economic projects which are proposed as part of the new international order for the Arab region. This includes the Middle Eastern common market and the European partnership, which Libya perceives as steps towards demolishing the Arab regional system including the Arab Common Market.²⁶²

Libya's stance on these challenges is that there is a need to develop the Arab Common Market (ACM)²⁶³ in order to achieve Arab economic unity and improve Arab-African economic ties which would end Western economic hegemony and achieve Arab economic security and African stability.

²⁶¹ See the Libyan Arab Company for Foreign Investments. Available at: < URL:

<http://www.lafico.ly/about-us.html>> Access Date: 10th January, 2010

²⁶² A Memo of the Libyan Minister of Unity to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, see footnote 74, p.5-6

²⁶³ The Arab Common Market (ACM) was founded in August 1964 on the basis of a resolution passed by the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), an organization that the Economic Council of the Arab League had established in 1957. The ACM is not an independent organization and its implementation was overseen by the CAEU. In 1999 Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Syria, and Yemen belonged to the ACM. The long-term goal of the ACM was to establish a full customs union that would abolish—amongst its members—trade restrictions, trade quotas, and restrictions on residence, employment, labor, and transportation.

3.4.1.3. Social and culture sources of threat

The most important factors in this section are the increased social differences. These include the low quality of education leading to the inability to protect Arab identity and ideology, the brain drain, the absence of human rights, the lack of civil society institutions, the marginalisation of women, the presence of ethnic minorities, armed militias and the absence of social equality, which is highlighted by poverty. Since the 1970s, official Libyan perceptions consider these issues as major social challenges to the region.²⁶⁴

Since the 1980s Libyan policy has focused on armed religious groups in the Arab region which it sees as the major social threat to Arab national security. These groups are perceived as “un-Islamic” and alien to the region; they are believed to aim to harm Islam and Arab Nationalism and are thus a danger to Arab national security.²⁶⁵ Consequently, the Libyan leadership saw the need to confront these groups, because they are perceived to use religion for their own benefit. The Leader of the Libyan Revolution stated that ‘those un-Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb-ut-tahrir, the Takfir and Hijra and Da’wah to Jihad...all must be fought against and destroyed just like imperialism and Zionism are fought against.’²⁶⁶

Libyan policy-makers perceive that these groups are supported by Western and foreign interests with the aim of strengthening them in order to create a threat to Arab national security. This opinion has been expressed by the Libyan Leader on various occasions. For example, he stated that ‘the US supports, finances and protects these [religious political] groups so that it [the US] may succeed in its aim of preventing Arab unity.’²⁶⁷

3.4.2. External Sources of Threat to Arab National Security

According to the Libyan perception the external sources of threat to Arab national security can be divided into two categories: first, the major powers that use their

²⁶⁴ Muammar, Al Gathafi, (1970-1971). “Statement, Speeches and Talks”, Op. cit., pp. 88-89

²⁶⁵ Muammar Al Gathafi, (1992-1993). “Statement, Speeches and Talks”, Op. cit., p.1063

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p.1063

²⁶⁷ Muammar, Al Gathafi, (1982-1983). “Statement, Speeches and Talks”, *National Register*, Vol (14), Libya: Publications of the World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green Book, p.23

military, economic and technological capabilities to acquire hegemony over the globe in general and the Arab world in particular; and second, regional power states such as Iran, Israel and Turkey. Both of these categories—according to the Libyan perception—pose the most dangerous threats to Arab national security. Due to such importance, the following sections examine these aspects in extensive detail.

3.4.2.1. The major powers and the role of the West

It can be argued that all Arab states, including Libya, believe that the global sources of threat have increased amidst the presence of a uni-polar global power structure. The US—with its aggressive foreign policy—poses a greater source of threat to the Arab region. Furthermore, the US is not afraid to use its military capabilities, interfere in internal affairs of other states and erect US military bases in order to seek control over energy sources and strategic locations.

There is abundant evidence showing that the major power states—and particularly the US—aim to seek control over the Arab world and Africa. Reinhold Niebuhr—one of the most significant proponents of Realism—argues that whoever controls the Middle East (i.e. the Arab world) controls Europe.²⁶⁸ Vladimir Lenin also claims that the road to Paris goes through the *Maghreb* (i.e. North Africa).²⁶⁹

According to Michael Klare strategists in the US Ministry of Defence and National Security Council have been influenced by theories that claim that Iraq is the heart of Arab Asia²⁷⁰ and that invading it would mean: controlling oil resources, controlling the strategic transport routes and the Arabian Gulf shores as well as capturing the control over the “fertile crescent”. Thus leading—to what William Hamilton calls—US hegemony over region from Islamabad to Cairo.²⁷¹

Henry Kissinger used to talk of Egypt as the Arab “geographical pivotal point” and its strategic importance to the Arab-Israeli conflict. What he meant was to move Egypt

²⁶⁸ Niebuhr, Reinhold. (1959). “Power and Ideology in National and International Affairs”, in William T. R. Fox (Ed.), *Theoretical Aspects of International relation* (pp. 107-116). America: University of Notre Dame Press.

²⁶⁹ Monde, Moderne. (1975). *Africa and the defence of the West*. Paris: Le Monde. p.110

²⁷⁰ Michael Klare. (July–Augu, 2003). “The New Geopolitics”. *Monthly Review*, 55(3), pp.51-56

²⁷¹ Hamilton, William. (2004). ‘Heartland’ strategy in Iraq: Right idea, if done the right way. Available at: <URL: http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-06-29-opcom_x.htm > Access Date: 13th January, 2010.

away from the Soviet Union and drag it to the western side gradually. The “step-by-step policy” was the first US-Israeli strategy to contain the geographical pivotal point (Egypt) as it was considered to be the largest Arab military power that threatened the Israeli occupation of Palestine.²⁷²

Taking into account the actions of Western states towards the region, and by examining the responses of Libyan policy, it is clear that Western states—according to Libyan policy-makers—are a source of threat to Arab national security. Western states have directly aided in establishing an Israeli state on Palestinian land²⁷³ by providing all forms of support and assistance. Western states have also supported Israeli aggression against Arab states and most recently invaded Iraq.

Furthermore, the Libyan regime regards all Western military alliances as efforts to undermine Arab national security,²⁷⁴ particularly alliances that can carry out military activity on a regional level. Such examples include the calls by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal in November 1995 to establish the European Rapid Deployment Force (ERRF).²⁷⁵ Also the US calls in October 1996 for the establishment of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).²⁷⁶ Such calls for the creation of various security alliances under different names within the Middle East and Africa ultimately aim to bring about change within the region to best serve Western interests.²⁷⁷ It is believed that the Western strategy to establish security alliances in the region has come about as a result of the security void created by the failure of Arab collective security.

²⁷² Ghalib, Hassan Mohamed. (31st Oct, 2007). Threat to Arab National Security, from the Heart to the Centre. *Thawra Newspaper*, Available at: <URL: <http://thawra.alwehda.gov.sy/archive.asp?FileName=99074866620071030203100>> Access Date: 19th September, 2009.

²⁷³ Athena, S. Leoussi, (2001). *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism*. New Jersey: Transaction publisher, p. 47

²⁷⁴ Muammar, Al Gathafi Speaking at the Conference of the 17th Arab Summit in Algeria, (22 March, 2005) Available at: <URL: http://www.rcmlibya.org/AIAI_Gathfi/AIAI_Gathfi_kh_9.htm> Access Date: 23rd May, 2007. (In Arabic)

²⁷⁵ Erik, Denters P.J.M. de Waart Nico Schrijer. (1998). *Reflections International Law from the Low Countries: in honour of Paul*. Netherland: Martinus Nijhoff publishers. p.301

²⁷⁶ Robert, I. Rotberg, Greg Mills. (1998). *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade*. Washington: Brooking Institution Press. p.214

²⁷⁷ *The Idea of Indivisibility of International Security to Regional Sectors is due to Winston Churchill, the notes of Winston Churchill*. (1961). Tantalization, Khairi Hammad. Damascus: Osama publishing House. p.1016

Furthermore, these alliances are attempts to confront the challenges to Western interest in the region and halt the development of any potential regional powers.²⁷⁸

In such a context, Libya perceptions are that Western alliances seek to dismantle and obstruct attempts at reforming the existing pan-Arab institutions, most prominent of which are the Arab League and the African Union. This occurs through Western control over the UN and its institutions, most crucially the Security Council.²⁷⁹

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Western states are striding in the opposite direction of collective security concept and are working to demolish it. Such examples include the Western states' refusal to co-operate with the Gorbachev initiative which called for disarmament, conflict resolution and collective responsibility based on the balance of interest as opposed to the balance of power.²⁸⁰ It can be argued that the refusal by Western states indicates their fear of reviving the concept of collective security as stated by the UN Charter. Furthermore, Western states are afraid that alternative security agreements may lead to the destruction of NATO.

Western states are perceived by the Libyans to be an obstacle to the implementation of Article 42 of the UN Charter.²⁸¹ Thus, it became impossible for the UN to possess armed forces that can be used in line with the Charter's aims.²⁸² Furthermore, the Soviet suggestion of establishing a central war committee to provide a solution to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was turned down.²⁸³ Instead, the US and Britain preferred military action within the context of a Western-led alliance thus allowing them the freedom of movement and decision. They also ignored The Secretary-

²⁷⁸ Thatcher, Margaret. (1994). *The years of Downing Street*. Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Arabia Company for researcher. p.960 (In Arabic)

²⁷⁹ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (8th December, 2007). "Criticized the Security Council during his Speech at Lisbon University". for more Information see *Al-Quds Al-arabi Newspaper*, 19(5761), p.3

²⁸⁰ Olav, Njolstad. (2004). *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict*. Oxford: Rutledge. p.121

²⁸¹ Article 42 of the UN Charter says that, should the Security Council believe that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

²⁸² Jyoti, Khanna. Todd, Sandler. Hirofumi, Shimizu. (April 1998). "Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976 – 1996". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(2), pp.176-195

²⁸³ Robert Owen Freedman. (1993). *The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait*. USA: University Press of Florida. pp. 85-86

General of the United Nations Dr. Ghali's recommendation for a peace initiative which called for the establishment for a permanent international armed force.²⁸⁴

In addition, the Libyan leadership believes that there are various examples of Western states conspiring against Arab collective security. Al-Gathafi claims these states are continuously working to limit UN activity to the Security Council and to ensure the Security Council merely includes the Western alliance and thus subject the entire institution to Western opinion.²⁸⁵ This is evident in the Western state's delay in paying their dues to the UN and thus weakening it, while instead strengthening NATO so it can carry out UN-sanctioned military missions, as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁸⁶ Furthermore, Western states—and particularly the US—have used their right of “veto” on several occasions to prevent Security Council resolutions being issued that condemn Israeli attacks on Lebanon, the Golan and Palestine. The same Western states have also worked together to annul the UN General Assembly resolution number 3379 which considered Zionism as a form of racism.²⁸⁷

Consequently, the Libyan leadership perceives the US as the Western state that poses the largest threat to Arab national security. First, it provides Israel with all forms of support and assistance and considers it as a strategic ally—especially since the signing of the Strategic Alliance memo in 1981.²⁸⁸ Libyan policy also states the US will continue to support Israel in spite of Arab disapproval.²⁸⁹ Second, the US seeks to acquire further hegemony over the Arab world and its resources as well as seeking control of the strategic locations in the region such as the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Sirte, the Bab al-Mandib strait and the strait of Gibraltar.

²⁸⁴ Saad, Salloum. (10th Oct, 2005). A Road Map for Reform the United Nation after Sixty Years since the Established the International Organisation of Peacekeeping and Security, *Civilised dialogue Magazine*, No.1343, Copenhagen: Available at :< URL: <http://www.rezgar.com/debat/show.art.asp?aid=47505#>> Access Date 15th January, 2007. (In Arabic)

²⁸⁵ Muammar, Al Gathafi Criticized the Security Council. Op. cit. p.3

²⁸⁶ Martin, Reichard. (2006). *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*. London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. p.254

²⁸⁷ The Decision of The General Assembly of United Nation No. (86/46) (December, 1991). To more information see Adris, Lakrin, (7th June, 2006). The Palestine issue and International changes, *Civilised Dialogues*, No.1574. Available at :< URL: <http://www.rezgar.com/debat/show.art.asp?aid=66844>> Access Date 12th December, 2007.

²⁸⁸ Haitham, Kilani. (April, 1992). “The Theory of Israel Security between the Wars of 1973-1991”. *Mjlah alfkr Alastratiji Ala'rbi* (Journal of Arab Strategic Thought), No.40, pp.93-110 (in Arabic)

²⁸⁹ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1990-1991). “Statement and Speeches and Talks”, Op. cit., p.32

Thus, Western and US policy have been contradictory to Libyan policy of a Nationalist-cum-revolutionary nature. As a result there has been an inevitable clash between the two vis-à-vis Western and US policies in the Arab region. US policy has achieved many of its aims in the region, especially in the midst of Gulf War II, and this according to Libyan policy is a direct threat to Arab national security. Libyan policy describes the US and Western states as the neo-Colonial alliance which poses a direct threat to Arab national security and aims to demolish any hope of Arab unity.²⁹⁰

In such a context, the Libyan leadership perceives the Euro-Mediterranean alliance proposed by the 1995 Barcelona Conference as the most threatening European policy in the region.²⁹¹ Libya believes that the EU supported this idea because it could be a medium through which the EU can return to its position of authority in Northern Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁹² Thus, Libya officially objected to the proposal, as it believes the alliance seeks to disunite the Arab world, end any hope of Arab unity and put an end to the Arab Common Market.²⁹³

Libya also warned of the EU attempt to establish the European Rapid Deployment Force in 1995²⁹⁴ in the Mediterranean because such an act is seen as another step in acquiring hegemony over the Arab region, as well as being a threat to Arab national security.²⁹⁵

In conclusion, it is clear that Libya's Nationalist vision has realised the dangers posed by Western states to the Arab region and its national security. In fact, Western states are seen as the most decisive source of threat to Arab national security. Libya treats Western states with caution because of their history of colonialism. It is also clear that despite the improved relations between Libya and the US in recent years, Libya still perceives the US as a threat to the Arab world and Africa.

²⁹⁰ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (29th Aug, 1997). *Interview on Arab TV*, Broadcast live on Libyan Television Network in Arabic.

²⁹¹ Olivier, T. Karmusch and Barbara, Hooper. (2004). *Cross-Border Governance in the European Union*. London: Rutledge publishing. p.151

²⁹² A Report (17th Oct, 1995). on the Documents of the Barcelona Conference and the Economics Conferences for the Middle East and North Africa that were Convened in Casablanca and Amman, Department of Arab Affairs, Ministry of Unity, Tripoli. pp.4-5

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp.25-27

²⁹⁴ Alistair, Jones. (2007). *Britain and European Union*. UK: Edinburgh University Press. p.72

²⁹⁵ A memo from the Libyan Minister of Unity to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, dated 2/8/1997, Department of Arab Affairs, Ministry of Unity, Tripoli. p.5

3.4.2.2. Regional power states

It must be stated that the security of any non-Arab state in the region necessitates the absence of Arab nation-state security (*dawlah*) and Arab national security of nation (*ummah*). The Libyan leadership believes regional states have and continue to pose threats to Arab national security. Ignoring this is believed to be dangerous and could lead to catastrophic consequences. Israel is considered as the most dangerous threat to Arab national security, followed by Iran, particularly in light of its nuclear programme, and then Turkey,²⁹⁶ because of its military relations with Israel. The following sections provide a detailed discussion of these points.

3.4.2.2.1. Israeli presence as a threat to Arab national security

The Libyan regime considers Israel to be the most dangerous source of regional threat; it is also the most vicious and aggressive state towards the Arabs, particularly in Palestine, Lebanon and the Golan Heights in Syria. Libya further believes that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is not only an immediate threat to the region but also to global peace and security.²⁹⁷

Libya perceives that the very existence of Israel is the source of most of the Arab region's problems, because ultimately Israel's security perception is essentially different to the Arab one. It also points to the danger of Israel's ideology which states that Palestine is merely the starting point of the Jewish National State.²⁹⁸ Thus, Israel is truly seeking to achieve the Knesset's aim of a Jewish state expanding between the Nile and the Euphrates. Libya perceives this as a direct and dangerous threat to Arab national security.²⁹⁹

In its examination of Israel, Libyan foreign policy relies on the accounts and speeches of Israeli leaderships which have not missed an opportunity to claim that Israel is a state in the process of formulation. This is taken to mean that Israel is not satisfied with Palestine, but is seeking to capture other Arab land. Thus, it is considered that

²⁹⁶ *A Discussion on the Strategy of Arab National Security*, (27-30/5/2007). Damascus: The General-Secretariat of the General People's Congress (*Libyan Parliament*).

²⁹⁷ The General-Secretariat of the Arab Parliament, (4-6 August, 2007). *Results of the Meetings of the Committee of External Affairs, Politics and National Security*, Tripoli. p.4

²⁹⁸ Fouad, Japer. (1974). *Nuclear Weapons and Strategic of Israel*. Beirut: Arab Studies Institution. p.32 (in Arabic)

²⁹⁹ Walter, Laqueur. (2003). *The History of Zionism*. New York: Tauris Parke Paperback. p.45

Israel's sole aim of possessing a nuclear weapon is to use it against the Arabs whenever it wishes. Evidence of this occurred during the 1973 War, when Syrian tanks progressed through the Golan and into the Jalil, Israel informed the US that Israeli would use nuclear weapons.³⁰⁰

Furthermore, David Ben Gurion stated that 'the Jewish state had been established on only a part of Israel.'³⁰¹ Thus, he claimed that one of the aims of the Suez War in 1956 was to liberate the part of Israel that had been invaded. Moshe Dayan said after the June 1967 that, 'now we [Israel] have the military ability and the armies through which we can control the area from the Suez Canal to Jordan and Mt. Harmon, only then will we achieve the goals of Zionism.'³⁰² Furthermore, Menachem Begin called on the Jewish youth to migrate to Israel from all four corners of the world so 'we can build Israel together, for there are millions of spaces for those coming back to Israel.'³⁰³

In addition to occupation of Arab lands, the Israeli state has supported Jewish migration to Palestine³⁰⁴ and prevented Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes. Furthermore, it has initiated various wars with the Arabs and has interfered in Arab internal affairs.

As a result of all the above, Libya considers Israel as the most dangerous threat to Arab national security and perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict as the central issue for Arabs. Thus, Libya has constructed its foreign policy to take account of this, whilst taking into account each country's stance on the conflict. Libya has always called for national resistance, the unification of the Palestinian factions and committing financial aid and support to Arab countries that share frontiers with Israel, as long as

³⁰⁰ Ghassan, Al Imam. (10th May, 2005). "The Arab National Security and the Iranian bomb", *Alsharq Alawsat Newspaper*, No.9660, London. p.5. (in Arabic)

³⁰¹ State of Israel, Government Yearbook, 5713 (1952), Introduction. p.15

³⁰² Arye, Naor. (1999). "The Security Argument in the Territorial Debate in Israel: Rhetoric and Policy". *Israel Studies*, 4(2), pp.150-177

³⁰³ Begin, Menachem. (1977). *Who is Menahem Begin? : a documentary sketch*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. p.67

³⁰⁴ Elias, Shufani. (1977). *Menahem Begin: From Terrorism to Power*. Palestine: Institute for Palestine studies. p.126 (in Arabic)

these frontiers are open for resistance and there are no direct negotiations with Israel.³⁰⁵

Libyan decision-makers consider the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of survival of the Arab world and not a mere battle over borders.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, Libyan policy believes that all attempts at peace and resolution of the conflict are only efforts to sanction Israeli presence in the region.³⁰⁷ It is a given that Libya has always rejected Israel's presence in the region perceiving it as the most dangerous threat to the region. Furthermore, since the 1969 Revolution, Libya has placed the Palestine issue at the centre of its list of priorities and has rejected all Western meddling in the conflict. Libya also rejects the various calls that appear within the peace process, such as 'land for peace', believing that such attempts merely support Israel so as not to alter the balance of power into the Arabs' favour.³⁰⁸

3.4.2.2. Iran as a source of threat to Arab national security

Iran—particularly in light of its nuclear programme—is seen by the regime as the second most dangerous regional threat. The aspects of Iranian policy that constitute a threat include: its support of the sectarian conflict in Iraq; the occupation of three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the erection of a naval and air base on Iran's Gulf shores; and the previous history of Iranian hostility towards the Arab region.³⁰⁹ The Iran-Iraq War is one of the main reasons why Iran is considered as a threat to the Arab region, because according to the Arab Defence Charter, any attack on an Arab state is considered an attack on all Arab states.³¹⁰ The Iranian threat increased after missiles were fired on Baghdad and the use of all forms of weaponry against Iraqi forces on various fronts.

³⁰⁵ The Arab System: Delayed Reform. Op. cit.,

³⁰⁶ The Annual General Report (1980). Libyan foreign Policy on 1980s, Section Two, Libya: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.1-11

³⁰⁷ A Report on Libya's Stance on the Madrid Peace Conference, (1995). Tripoli: Department of Palestine Affairs, Libyan Ministry of Unity. p.2

³⁰⁸ The Arab System: Delayed Reform. Op. cit.,

³⁰⁹ General-Secretariat of the General People's Congress (Libyan Parliament), *a discussion on the strategy of Arab National Security*. op. cit.,

³¹⁰ Yusuf, Makki. (5th June, 2005). *The Causes of Break Down the Arab National Action*, The website of Arab renewal, Available at: <URL:<http://www.arabrenewal.net/index.php?rd=AI&AI0=554>> Access Date: 18th June, 2008. (In Arabic)

Several issues have occurred that have caused tensions in Iranian-Arab relations, particularly with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Jordan and Egypt. It is evident that Iran aims to deal with each Arab state as an individual entity, in particular the GCC states. When any conflict occurs between Iran and an Arab state it aims to ensure that other Arab states remain impartial. Iran's abilities are greater than each of the GCC states; for example, Iran's population is five times that of Saudi Arabia, although its size is only 74% of Saudi Arabia.³¹¹

If compared to any of the GCC states, then Iran holds a unique geo-political position. It controls the Strait of Hurmoz, has shores on both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, because of the huge volumes of oil and trade tankers that pass through these sea lanes. Moreover, it borders ex-Soviet states and is close to Central Asian markets. Iran also possesses military capabilities that enable it to threaten its neighbours.³¹²

The nature and level of the Iranian threat to the Arab region is discussed through the two main aspects that Iran places on in its foreign policy towards the Arab region and thus are a source of concern to the Arabs. These are Iran's military capability and the Islamic movements in Iran.

3.4.2.2.2.1. Iranian military capability

According to most strategic studies,³¹³ Iran's air force, army and navy outdo Arab forces, particularly the GCC forces. The military expenditure in the GCC is considerably more than in Iran. There is a clear Iranian advantage in terms of self-reliance in terms of military production. Iran's advantage is extenuated when compared with Arab military capabilities, particularly when one takes into account the fragility of the GCC states neighbouring Iran. No GCC state can individually confront an Iranian attack, be it through land, air or sea.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Talaat, Muslim. (1998). *Arab Military Cooperation*. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. p.95 (in Arabic)

³¹² Peter, Brookes. (2007). *A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Rogue States*. UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p.199

³¹³ Russell, Richard L. (2005). *Weapons proliferation and war in the greater Middle East: strategic contest*. USA: Routledge. pp. 71-107. Also see Hiro, Dilip. (2005). *The longest war: the Iran-Iraq military conflict*. USA: Routledge. pp. 7-254

³¹⁴ Magdi, A. Attiya. (1986). "Military Effectiveness of the Gulf States and Iranian threat". *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No 85, Cairo. p. 121 (in Arabic)

The following table compares Iran's military capability and expenditure to its GCC neighbours.³¹⁵

Table: 3. 1. Military Expenditure 2000-2005³¹⁶

State	Military Expenses US\$bn	Active forces	Air forces	Navy forces
Iran	3.051	540,500	52,000	38,000
Saudi Arabia	18.747	219,500	34,000	15,500
Oman	3.020	41,000	4,100	4,200
UAE	9.000	50,500	4,000	2,500
Kuwait	0.800	15,500	2,500	2,000
Qatar	2.910	12,400	2,100	2,000
Bahrain	1.100	11,200	1,500	1,200

Despite Iran's possession of technologically advanced weapons that can reach any Arab state, it continues to develop its arsenal. Iran is also developing a nuclear programme and allegedly wishes to develop a nuclear arsenal, in spite of global opposition. Such moves to acquire immense weapons undoubtedly increase the level of Iranian threat to the region.³¹⁷ Furthermore, Iran's amongst Top World Oil and Gas Producers.³¹⁸ Thus, Iranian power threatens the Arab region and Arab national security.

3.4.2.2.2. Iranian Islamic Revolution

Regional states are of great importance to Iranian foreign policy, Iran plays a crucial role in stabilising the price of petrol and preserving peace in the region. Iran's departure from the CENTO³¹⁹ and the relinquishment of its role as the region's

³¹⁵ Anthony, H. Cordesman & Nawaf, E. Obaid. (2005). *National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and challenges*. Westport: Greenwood publishing group. p.15

³¹⁶ This Table Prepared by the Researcher According to Anthony, H. Cordesman & Nawaf, E. Obaid. (2005). *National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and challenges*. Westport: Greenwood publishing group. p.15

³¹⁷ Hossein, Seifzadeh. (2004). *Iranian Nuclear Issue: An Academic of Iran's Official Positions*. paper presented at UCLA Conference, Dead Sea, Jordan, 9-12 September 2004.

³¹⁸ Marschall, Christin. (2003). *Iran's Persian Gulf policy: from Khomeini to Khatami*. USA: Routledge. pp. 59-60

³¹⁹ CENTO is The Central Treaty Organization, the original name was Middle East Treaty Organization or METO, and is also known as the Baghdad Pact. It was adopted in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom and was dissolved in 1979.

policeman after the Islamic Revolution were welcome by its neighbours.³²⁰ However, Iran's policy of "exporting the Revolution" led to accusations of Iranian meddling in its neighbours' internal affairs.

The success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution led Iranian policy-makers to wish to export it to Arab and Muslim states.³²¹ The Islamic Republic made clear its opposition to the US and Israel,³²² which resulted in a global policy considering Iran as a new threat in the region, particularly to the strategic interests of the US and Europe. Leader of the 1979 Islamic Iranian Revolution Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini's attempt to export the Revolution led to fears amongst foreign troops in the region, as well as amongst Iran's neighbours, in particular the GCC and Iraq.³²³ Islamic movements in these states gathered support and leaders emerged who were attempting to follow in Khomeini's footsteps. Evidently, Islamic movements benefited from the Revolution and their demands became greater, thus posing a more dangerous threat to the political regimes in the Arab world.³²⁴

The Iranian leadership used various methods to achieve its aim including: the use of embassies, consulates and attachés in other states; the translation of literature into other languages; and even using the pilgrimage to promote the Revolution's message.³²⁵

Islamic Movements in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were particularly influenced due to the presence of Shia minorities in these countries.³²⁶ The Revolution also influenced other Islamic Movements such as the Jihad Group in Egypt which assassinated President Sadat in 1981.³²⁷ In Lebanon, both Hizbollah and Amal

³²⁰ Kanishkan, Sathasivam. (2005). *Uneasy Neighbours: India, Pakistan, and US Foreign Policy*. London: Ashgate publishing Ltd. p.98

³²¹ Shaul, Shay. (2007). *Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East*. Portland: Sussex Academic press. p.60

³²² Reese, Erlic. (2007). *The Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. policy and the Middle East Crisis*. Sausalito: PoliPoint Press. p.4

³²³ Manouchehr, Ganji. (2002). *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance*. Westport: Greenwood Publisher Group. p.131

³²⁴ Shaul, Shay. (2005). *The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror*. US: Transaction publishers. pp.23-24

³²⁵ Ibid., pp.25-26

³²⁶ Bakinam, Sharqawi. (17th May, 2006). *Iran's Foreign Policy*. Aljazeera, Available at: <URL: <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A3A589ED-901B-428A-B0EC-AA98FFBD6A10.htm>> Access Date: 10th March, 2007. (In Arabic)

³²⁷ Angel, Rabasa. et al., (2004). *The Muslim World after 11/9*. Colophony: Rand Corporation. p.95

Movements embraced the policies of the Islamic Revolution and in Palestine the Revolution influenced both Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

In light of such developments, it was crucial to find an appropriate response to halt the spread of the Revolution's ideals across the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf region. Due its policy of exporting the Revolution, Iran's relationship with Arab and Gulf states suffered a heavy blow, especially after Arab states accused Iran of supporting violent Islamic groups in the region. The crisis reached a peak when Iranian diplomats were expelled from Jordan after their country was linked to a cinema bombing in Amman and the assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Beirut.³²⁸ This led to further accusations by Egypt and Algeria of Iranian meddling in their internal affairs and supporting extremist Islamic groups.

The last ten years has witnessed an increase in the Iranian threat to the Arab region; this is due to the strengthening of extreme Shia groups in various Arab states as a result of the growing number of Shias in Lebanon and Iraq and the increased role of Iran in Palestine. The uncovering of a Hezboullah faction in Egypt made the Arab regimes more aware of the danger of the triangular threat posed by Iran, Hezboullah and Hamas. Such unity aims to challenge Arab sovereignty by supporting and influencing extremist Islamic groups so that they are able to threaten the regimes and cause chaos and instability.

By embracing a policy of promoting chaos in the Arab region, Iran hopes to bring to an end the Arab role in the region so that it may become the principal power in the region.³²⁹ Although, the Iranian leadership has neither confirmed nor denied the attempts to export the Islamic Revolution, according to Howeidi Iranians wish that their Revolution is followed by Muslims across the globe.³³⁰

According to the available information, Libya had a specific position when dealing with Iran as a source of threat to Arab national security. It can be argued that the

³²⁸ Walled. Mahmud. (July, 1994). "Iran towards the Decisiveness and Escalation or Towards the Continuation". Cairo: *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.117, p.25 (In Arabic)

³²⁹ Zakaria, Hussein. (July, 1999). "Foundations Perception of Iran for Gulf security". Cairo: *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.137, p.285 (in Arabic)

³³⁰ Fahmi, Howeidi. (1991). *Iran From Inside*. Cairo: Al-Ahram Translation & Publishing Centre. Fourth Edition. p.204 (In Arabic)

Libyan leadership embraced a policy of closeness, friendship and good relations. Libya thought that the Iran-Iraq war was an international conspiracy to serve Israel. This can be seen by the US policy of supporting both sides. The infamous Iran Contra³³¹ scandal exposed the US' attempts of selling arms to Iran in order to destroy the Iraqi army, which was perceived as a threat to Israel. Nevertheless, Libya believes that it is also a US policy to constrain and crush the Islamic Revolution in Iran because it too is seen as a threat to Israeli and US interests in the region.³³²

Furthermore, there are clear similarities between the aims of both the Islamic and the Libyan Revolutions; these include the opposition to Israeli presence on Muslim soil and opposition to US policies in the Arab region and the Middle East. Such commonalities have brought Libyan and Iranian policies closer together.³³³

However, during the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, Libyan policy-makers faced a major dilemma: how could Libya support Iran when this was clearly contradictory to the principles of Arab national security which Libya has always promoted and worked to achieve? Thus, available sources show that Libyan policy embraced an alternative stance by working to bring an end to the war. Consequently, the Iranian Revolution would be preserved and the people and land of Iraq would also be protected thus preserving the principals of Arab national security.³³⁴ Libya undertook various important steps to end the war and the Libyan leadership announced on various occasions that its alliance with Iran was not aimed against Iraq. Colonel Gathafi reiterated that Libya supported the Iranian Revolution against the US, Imperialism and Israel; Libya also supported Iran's freedom but this was not to say that it was against Iraq or the people of Iraq. He also added that Libya saw the need to

³³¹ Peter, L. Hays et al., (1997). *American Defence Policy*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.189

³³² Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1986-1987). "Statement, Speeches and Talks", *National register*, Vol. (18), Tripoli: Publications of the World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green book. p.115

³³³ Ismail, Mohamed. (14th February, 2007). *Libya-Iran Common Factor in their Relationship is Disagreement with Others*. Aljazeera, Available at: <URL:

<http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5C7528FB-2D70-4EB6-9666-3982520699A9.frameless.htm>

Access Date: 29th May, 2007. (in Arabic)

³³⁴ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1986-1987). "Statement, Speeches and Talks", Op. cit., p.511

bring this war to an end because it is a conspiracy against the Iranian Revolution and the people of Iraq.³³⁵

The Libyan leadership believed that there was a Western desire to destroy both Iraq and Iran; the former because it was perceived to be an important Arab power and the latter because it was no longer a Western ally.³³⁶ Thus, to reduce the threat of this source Libya embraced a specific approach when dealing with Iran that was characterised by closeness and co-operation.

Libyan policy towards Iran has been consistent since the Iranian Revolution, this was evident in Gathafi's speech during the 20th Summit of the Arab League in Damascus 2008 when he called on Arab states not be hostile towards Iran but instead to seek resolutions through the International Court of Justice. He also saw the need for close ties with Iran which he considers to be a close neighbour and from which the Arabs should not be distanced. This proved Iran's importance in Libyan foreign policy and within the context of Arab national security.³³⁷

It is also evident that until now the Libyan leadership has succeeded in containing Iran through a policy of co-operation. Also, there have been shared stances on important issues such as Israel and US Imperialism, such commonality undoubtedly stems from the aims of the Revolutions of both countries.

3.4.2.2.3. Turkey as a source of threat to Arab national security

Despite the historical, geographic and religious ties that link Turkey with the Arab world certain Turkish policies, particularly since the 1990s, are—according to the Libyan leadership—a source of threat to Arab national security, particularly since the signing of several agreements between Turkey and Israel—the Arab world's primary enemy.³³⁸ In light of this, Turkey is considered as the third most dangerous regional threat to Arab national security. Turkey has military co-operation with Israel, there are also some issues with the Arab world that remain unresolved, including Eskandron

³³⁵ Ibid., p.606

³³⁶ Jalal, A. Mouawad. (November, 1998). Turkey - Israel Military Cooperation. Beirut: *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, No.27, p.6

³³⁷ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (30th March, 2008). "Speech at the Twenty of Arab Summit in Damascus", Tripoli: *Al Shames Newspaper*, No.4535, p.1 (In Arabic)

³³⁸ Turkey Was Amongst the First States to Acknowledge Israel's Existence in 1949.

province and the Turkish capture of the waters of the Euphrates water to the detriment of both Iraq and Syria.³³⁹

Turkish-Israeli relations have improved since the 1990 Gulf War; there has been increased co-operation in all fields including politics and economics, but more importantly in the security and military aspects.³⁴⁰ The military and strategic co-operation is deemed by the Libyan leadership as a threat to Arab National security as this alliance occurs between Turkey—an ex-coloniser—and Israel—a country that seeks to acquire hegemony over the Arab region.

Turkey paved the way to announce its strategic alliance with Israel in various ways: it hinted at the “water war” with Iraq and Syria, called for a new security system that serves Western and US interests in the region with regard to threats to Turkey emanating from the Kurdish region in the north of Iraq. It also penetrated Iraqi air space and increased its tensions with Syria.³⁴¹

Turkish PM Tanso Ciller’s visit to Israel in November 1994³⁴² was the first of its kind since Turkish acknowledgement of Israel in 1949.³⁴³ This visit paved the way for a military agreement between the two states which took place in 1996 during Necmettin Erbakan’s premiership.³⁴⁴ This agreement led to various joint military activities and improved diplomatic ties between the two states. In turn, this caused immense concern for Arab leaders on all levels, political, economic, strategic and military. This was due to the fact that the strategic aims of the Turkish-Israeli ties could potentially cause a danger and a threat to Arab national security, especially as Israel does not wish to see a strong unified Arab force.

³³⁹ General-Secretariat of General People's Congress (Libyan Parliament), *a discussion on the strategy of Arab National Security*, Op. cit.,

³⁴⁰ Lenore, G. Martin, Dimitris, Keridis. (2004). *The Future of Turkey Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: MIT press. p.181

³⁴¹ Rashid, Al Zubaidi. (Wenter, 1998-1999). “The historical Roots of the Turkey - Israeli Alliance”. Damascus: *the political thought Journal*, No.4-5, pp. 150-163.

³⁴² Inbar, Efraim, (2001). “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment”, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, (Eds), *Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging Multiregional power*, (pp.115–126). CO: Lynne Rienner. pp.115–126.

³⁴³ Khalid, Fayyad. (July, 1997). “Turkish – Israeli Relations from Ciller to Erbakan”. *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.129, p.183 (in Arabic)

³⁴⁴ Tareq, Y. Ismael. Mustafa, Aydin. (2003). *Turkey's Foreign Policy in The 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*. London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. p.111

It is important to remember that Turkey abandoned the Arabs when Ataturk established the Turkish secular state in 1923³⁴⁵, which is now seeking to acquire an important role in the Middle East in order to revive its regional role and past glories. Thus, Turkey has established new alliances that are a source of threat to Arab national security, particularly to the security of states such as Iraq and Syria.³⁴⁶ It can be argued that Turkey's principal aim in allying itself with Israel is due to the fact that it seeks an important role in the region. In addition, it wishes to gain Israel's support against Iran and anti-Turkish Islamic groups. However, this alliance has led to a military imbalance in the region against the Arabs.³⁴⁷

As a result of the above, Libyan policy played a role in halting the Turkish threat. Libya was amongst the states that realised that Turkey poses a threat to Arab national security, particularly after the end of the Cold War. This was due to the changes that occurred which disadvantaged the Arabs, and also the transformations and challenges within Turkey which led it to use Arab states to export its own internal problems.³⁴⁸

Consequently, the Libyan leadership sees the need to contain Turkey in order to ensure its allegiance to the Arab region. Thus, Libya will have helped in reducing the Turkish threat; also, Libya saw the need to enter into political and economic ties with Turkey. Politically, Libya undertook various steps to reduce the Turkish threat. For example, Libya supported Turkey in the Cyprus issue by exerting efforts to resolve the issue on the basis of uniting the island to ensure its independence.³⁴⁹

As part of the Libyan effort in solving the Cyprus issue, Colonel Gathafi said in his speech during the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Muslim states in Tripoli in 1977 that 'Libya calls for the need for Cyprus' independence and the equality between Muslims and Christians on the island without ignoring the ethnic and

³⁴⁵ Tareq, Y. Ismael et al. (1991). *Politics and Government in Middle East and North Africa*. U.S: University Press of Florida. p.92

³⁴⁶ Jalal, A. Mouawad. (1996). *Turkish – Israeli Relations in the Nineties*. Egypt: Cairo University Center for Political Research and Studies. p.29 (In Arabic)

³⁴⁷ Nabih, Hussami. (19th Oct, 1997). "Peace Exporting Countries", London: *Al Hayat Newspaper*, p.3(In Arabic)

³⁴⁸ Rashida, Ahmed, Morsi. (2002). *Turkey's Regional Role and its Impact on the Arab world*. MA, Unpublished, Tripoli: Academy of Graduate Studies. p.170 (In Arabic)

³⁴⁹ Orhan, Kologlu. (2007). *500 Years in Turkish – Libyan Relations*. Turkey: Center for strategic researcher. p.262-266

religious conflict.³⁵⁰ Libya also stated that the departure of foreign troops from the island is considered as one of the key points in solving the issue.

As part of its efforts to reduce regional sources of threat to Arab national security, Libya continues to maintain strong political ties with Turkey and attempts to avoid the forging of alliances that would be deemed unfavourable to Arab states. Libya believes that good relations with neighbouring states, particularly Iran and Turkey, are crucial to Arab national security. Furthermore, it is evident that Libyan policy places great emphasis on economics as a medium of improving ties with neighbouring states.

On the economic level between Libya and Turkey it is evident that Libyan policy since 1969 Libyan revolution has been to improve these ties. The policy has been more active since 1980s taking into account the crucial importance to Turkey of the economy due to the various financial crises it has gone through. Libya has therefore improved economic ties with Turkey and assisted during the various crises Turkey has experienced. For example, Libya played a role to reduce the high level of Turkish unemployment which reached a staggering 18% in 1975 by opening the doors for Turkish labour to work in Libya. Also, bilateral agreements were signed which called for the establishment of joint economic committees which would meet every six months in either capital.³⁵¹ In order to ease Turkish unemployment, Libya gave the priority to Turkish labour after their expulsion from Germany in the 1980s; Libya hosts the second largest number of Turkish firms and labour in Middle East and North Africa during that time.³⁵²

It can be argued that Libya succeeded in acquiring Turkish support for Arab causes; this was evident in the issuing of a Turkish statement condemning the US attacks on Libya in 1984. Turkey called for self-restraint by both states and not to resort to violence and seek resolutions through direct dialogue. Several high-level visits were conducted by Turkish officials to Libya especially after PM Ciller's visit to Tripoli in 1994.

³⁵⁰ Aribi, Ali Al-Tahir. (1992). *Libya- Turkey Relations since 1969*. Tripoli: Academic of Graduate Studies. p.164 (In Arabic)

³⁵¹ Faraj, Shallouf. (December, 1982). *The Evolution of Economic Relations between Libya and Turkey*. Paper presented at the Second Conference of the Libyan and Turkey Relations, organised by Libyan Foreign Ministry. Tripoli. p.747 (In Arabic)

³⁵² Orhan, Kologlu. Op. cit., p.263

It is clear that Libya continues to maintain strong ties with Turkey and improve economic co-operation between the two states. The Turkish ambassador in Libya, Omer Scholnder, in October 2008 indicated during a press interview with the newspaper *Libya-alyoum* (Libya Today) that annual trade between the two states is around US\$12bn.³⁵³ Such a level of trade reflects Libya's seriousness in improving ties with Turkey as part of its attempt to reduce regional threats to Arab national security.

Nevertheless, despite such strong ties, Gathafi did not hesitate to criticise the military agreement between Turkey and Israel reiterating the danger of this agreement on Arab national security. This occurred in a press conference during which the then Turkish PM Erbakan was present.³⁵⁴ This shows that despite Libya's perception of Turkey as a danger it still works to maintain friendly ties with the state as an attempt of reducing tensions and containing the threat.

In summary, regional states will remain a source of threat to Arab national security when the Arabs are in a state of weakness. Similarly, when the Arabs are strong, regional states will seek to co-operate and compete.

This section has showed that there are internal and external sources of threat which according to Libya perceptions pose dangerous obstacles to achieving Arab national security. It is evident that Libya has exerted immense efforts to confront these challenges; it has dedicated all its capabilities to face these challenges and deployed its policies to achieve tangible results. Libya has aimed to warn Arab states against these threats and the problems they can bring with them. Libyan policy emphasises the need for Arab co-operation to overcome these threats and challenges. However, Tripoli stresses that this co-operation must occur in a way that serves the pan-Nationalist aims of the region.

It is clear that Libya policy favours an approach of co-operation and containment in relation to some of the threats, as is the case with Iran and Turkey. Although Libya

³⁵³ *Interview with Turkish Ambassador in Libya*. (17th November, 2008). Libya: azzahf alakhder, Newspaper. Available at: <URL: <http://www.azzahfalahkder.com/content/view/1357/> > Access Date: 15th December, 2008. (In Arabic)

³⁵⁴ Ahmed, Alnami. (1998). *Turkey and the Arab world*. Tripoli: Academic of Graduate studies. p.183 (In Arabic)

continues to reiterate that Iran and Turkey are sources of threat to Arab national security, Libya has dealt with them in a diplomatic fashion and made use of the religious and historical links with both states against Israel. As mentioned above, Libya has succeeded in numerous occasions to contain these sources of threat and reduce their intensity against Arab national security.

3.5. CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that Arab national security has been a prominent issue for Libyan foreign policy since the 1969 Revolution. Libyan concerns with Arab national security arises for various reasons including historical and political aspects; primarily the history of colonisation and the policy of great powers' self-interest when dealing with developing states. Libya was amongst the states to have been colonised by Britain, France and finally Italy; an era which witnessed various wars being fought on Libyan soil. This history led to a negative perception held by the Libyan political elite vis-à-vis Western presence in the Arab region. Thus, the elite believes that instability in the region is caused by the policies and actions that have come about as a result of colonisation. It is clear that the leadership of the Libyan Revolution has always believed that stability in the Arab region will only occur once it is united and that security in the region will only occur following comprehensive Arab unity.

Thus, the dilemma of Arab national security—according to Libyan perceptions—is due to the weakness and fragmentation of the Arab region, in addition to the absence of a clear and united Arab strategy for human and economic development. It is in this context that Libya has sought to achieve, through various methods, Arab unity. This has occurred in various forms in order to suit the differing characteristics of Arab states in the hope of achieving Arab unity.

Nevertheless, Libya has faced various challenges in its efforts towards Arab unity; the most prominent of which is the tensions between Arab strategies and international circumstances. In addition the fragmentation of the Arab states is a key challenge. This is due to poor Arab relations, which have reduced the strategic impact of the Arab region on global affairs, the weak institutional structure especially in relation to regional organisations such as the Arab League, and the weakness of the political

development in most Arab states which has led to political disunity in the region and resulted in a reliance on external assistance.

Furthermore, the failure of the Arab unity projects which Libya attempted is in part due to social aspects, including the wide social disparities in the Arab region, the poor quality of education and a resultant inability to protect the Arab identity and ideology, the brain drain, the absence of human rights, the shunning of civil society institutions, the marginalisation of women and the absence of social equality. All these factors have been behind the Arab populaces' distance from their governments and thus adding to the inability to achieve unity and security.

Libya perceives that in addition to the internal factors external factors have also hindered the achievement of Arab unity and Arab national security. According to Libyan beliefs these external threats are in the form of the major power and regional states, including Israel, Iran and Turkey. Libya believes that these states aim to undermine security and stability in the Arab region, and any co-operation between Arab states is a threat to the interests of these states. In addition, Western economic hegemony from which many Arab states suffer constrains their abilities to enter into unions and alliances, even within an Arab context. Thus Libya claims that the failure of the attempts of Arab unity and the instability in the region is due to the interference of external states in the internal affairs of Arab states in a continuous attempt to trigger instability and obstruct any attempts to build Arab national security.

It is clear that Libya has its own agenda regarding the Arab national security dilemma. Libya has laid out a set of requirements that need to be achieved in order for Arab national security to be realised. These include comprehensive Arab unity, improved Arab relations with neighbouring states, the resolution of the Palestinian issue, activating the political, economic and socio-cultural Arab institutions, finding a prominent position for the Arab entity within the global environment, ending the political and economic hegemony of Western states and encouraging co-operation and joint defence in order to protect Arab national interests.

From this chapter it can be seen that the concept of Arab national security according to the Libyan perception means the Arab Nation's (*ummah*) ability to protect itself from internal and external threats and to end future threats. This will only be achieved

through comprehensive unity between Arab states. In turn, unity will only be achieved through political, economic and socio-cultural development of the Arab Nation. Without development and comprehensive unity the Arabs will remain subject to these threats.

As a further step in this context, Libya seeks to achieve Arab security through creating stability in Africa as a security belt for Arab national security. The next chapters will show the position of African stability in Libyan foreign policy and how and what Libya has achieved in this context.

Chapter Four

AFRICA AS A PRIORITY OF LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY

4.1. INTRODUCTION

It is important to note that the principles of Libyan foreign policy are constructed upon the political ideology of the 1969 revolution, as elucidated in the “Third Universal Theory”. This forms the central tenet in constructing Libyan policy, both internally and externally. Thus, Libyan foreign policy usually embraces an alternative position to that of most Western countries and in particular the US, particularly in relation to the African and Arab regions.³⁵⁵ This difference of opinion is clearly portrayed in the Libyan stance which argues that the backwardness and destruction in the Southern hemisphere generally and in Africa specifically is a result of the actions of Western imperialists during the periods of colonisation.

Consequently, Libyan foreign policy is heavily shaped by the aforementioned belief vis-à-vis the establishment of security in the African continent. Libya strongly believes that the West is the primary threat to African regional security, and given the importance of Northern Africa within a greater Arab context, Libya perceives an urgent need to reduce Western presence in Africa. In turn, this would reduce the threats emanating from Africa to Arab national security, the priority of Libyan foreign policy.

Furthermore, it is an *a priori* assumption that geo-politics in addition to other factors plays an immense role in shaping the foreign policy of any nation-state. It can also be argued that geo-politics are amongst the most crucial factors in analysing and understanding foreign policy as a concept. Undoubtedly a state’s geographical position and both its advantages and drawbacks significantly influence its foreign policy.³⁵⁶ Therefore, Libyan foreign policy towards Africa is heavily influenced by its

³⁵⁵ Helen, Chapin Mate. (2004). *Libya: A Country Study*. Washington: Kessinger Publisher. pp. 17-19

³⁵⁶ Jakub, J. Grygiel. (2006). *Great Power and Geopolitical Change*. United States of America: The Johns Hopkins University Press. pp.1-13

geographical position and its realisation of the strategic importance of Africa towards its own national security.

The geo-strategic positioning of Africa, a proximity to global shipping routes and abundant natural resources and minerals have made it highly vulnerable to external involvement. Several studies such as Watts³⁵⁷ and Baloubi³⁵⁸ have shown that Western interest in Africa is mainly scrambling concentrated on those states with both a strategic location and a wealth of natural resources; Libya, with its long coastline and huge reserves of oil and gas fulfils both conditions.³⁵⁹ This interest in Africa is long-standing and remains so during the post-Cold War period which has witnessed the involvement of foreign actors such as the US, France and Israel, as well as emerging powers such as India and China. This involvement is not merely motivated by economic interests but also possesses political and strategic dimensions. Furthermore, foreign involvement in Africa has increased in the post 9/11 era, since when the US alongside other major powers have had to re-think their previous ideas regarding national security and geo-politics; the more so within regions, such as Africa, that are perceived to be the source of threats. This is evidenced by the fact that the US and other major powers have become interested in many of the issues that were neglected before 9/11 such as terrorism, democracy and human rights. In addition, and according to the new strategies of the US and other major powers, the presence of hostile forces in strategic locations, especially those which contain natural resources, are seen to pose a threat to such powers.³⁶⁰

American interest has been shaped by two main factors: economic (i.e. hydrocarbons) and security (i.e. terrorism).³⁶¹ Africa's geographical location as a centre point between Asia, the breeding ground for much of the terrorist activity, and Europe, the US' principal strategic ally, in addition to the presence of terrorist activity within parts

³⁵⁷ M, Watts. (2006.), "Empire of Oil: Capitalist Dispossession and the Scramble for Africa", *Monthly Review*, 58(4), pp. 1-15.

³⁵⁸ Baloubi, Desire. (1999). "Scrambling for Africa Again". *Journal of Black Studies*, 29(5), pp.610-618.

³⁵⁹ Dino, Mahtani. (28th January, 2008). *The New Scramble for Africa's Sources*. Financial Times, UK: Available at: URL< <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a6a63200-cad7-11dc-a960-000077b07658.html>> Access Date: 13th May, 2008.

³⁶⁰ Stephen, D. Biddle. (2005). *American Grand Strategy after 9/11: An Assessment*. US: Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College. pp. 1-50

³⁶¹ Stevenson, Jonathan. (2003). "Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance". *Survival, The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 45(4), pp.153-172.

of Africa (for example Somalia and Sudan) have made the continent of key interest for Washington. Furthermore, in order to remain a superpower and eradicate terrorist hotspots requires the US to control of strategic locations around the globe. Thus Africa, as one of the most important of such locations, is crucially important for both the US and the West.

In was in this context, that the leader of the Libyan Revolution realised the potential threats emanating from the African continent as result of the strategic and security vacuum in the region. This motivated the adoption of a Libyan foreign policy with a greater focus on Africa in order to reduce potential threats. Therefore, arguments claiming that Libyan interest in Africa started in the early 1990s as a result of the Lockerbie affair are not true.

Libyan foreign policy towards Africa was clearly different from the major Western actors. The former realised the danger of the latter's presence in the African continent and thus moved swiftly to formulate an effective political strategy that would ensure African stability and therefore help to boost Arab national security. This is apparent in the fact that Africa has played a central role in Libya's political rhetoric and its foreign policy since the Revolution. This is portrayed in the political dogma of the Libyan regime which dedicates great importance to Africa, perceiving it as the natural extension and a strategic depth of the Arab world.³⁶²

This chapter examines the most important factors that place Africa as a priority in Libyan foreign policy. The chapter is divided into five sections: Libya's perception of Africa as a strategic ally to the Arab world; Libya's motives for intervention in African conflict resolution; highlighting Libya's role in resolving or reducing the most important conflicts; Libya's motives to cooperate with African states to purge the continent of Western presence; and Libya's stance towards Western and Chinese presence in Africa.

³⁶² Luis, Martinez. (Winter, 2001). "*The Return of Libya*", African Geopolitics. No.1, Available at URL<http://www.african-geopolitics.org/home_english.htm> Access Date: 1st January 2008.

4.2. LIBYA'S PERCEPTION OF AFRICA AS STRATEGIC DEPTH FOR ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY

As mentioned earlier, Libya perceives Africa as a strategic arena for its own national security and thus for greater Arab security. It can be argued that the perception became clearer and more important from the early 1990s as many African states played an influential role in ending the international embargo on Libya which was imposed as a result of the Lockerbie issue. Libya became aware that African states were now a source of political, military and moral support in the face of external threats. Furthermore, Libya shares the common African positions of rejecting neo-imperialism in all its forms and of refusing to rely on the West to attain prosperity and development instead of building self-reliance to achieve progress.

The Libyan perception of Africa as a strategic actor for Arab security is built upon various determinants, which may vary in importance but nevertheless form the foundations for such perception. These determinants which can be categorised as geographic, political, security, economic and socio-cultural, are discussed below.

4.2.1. Geographic Determinants

Undoubtedly, ability and geography form a cornerstone in shaping and applying the concept of national security, as the lack of ability would inevitably lead to the absence of a clear conceptual understanding and application of national security. Indeed, a lack of ability would have an inverse consequence on security and may, in fact, lead to insecurity. Consequently, the ability derived from geographical characteristics plays an important role in forming the concept of national security in Libyan foreign policy. This is partly because Libya is an African state but also because Africa itself is an important global strategic location.

Africa is the second largest continent forming 30,065,000km² of territory, i.e. 20% of the earth's land surface. It is unique in that it is entirely inter-connected with no significant peninsulas or islands separating its territory. In terms of distance, Africa measures over 8000kms from north to south and approximately the same distance from east to west. Its eastern coast borders the Indian Ocean, the northern coast borders the Mediterranean Sea and the western coast borders the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, Africa possesses many lakes and rivers which form an indispensable form of

transport for goods from across the globe. In addition, it has a significant mineral and natural resources such as oil and gas.³⁶³

Libya is the third largest African state after Sudan and Algeria and has a vast northern coast line on the Mediterranean stretching for over 1900kms. Libya is important in that it connects the eastern and western Arab states, as well as its role as a medium between the East and West. This also indicates that Africa is the important geographical link for Arab and Libyan security; undoubtedly, regarding to geographical factors mentioned above the security and stability in Africa are important to achieve the Arab national security.

Libyan political involvement in Africa is deeply entrenched. Libya acts as a guard for Africa's northern coast. In addition, there are also other geographical factors which have influenced both Libyan and other African states' policies, such as socio-political interconnections, tribal affiliations that transcend national boundaries, common language and religion, as well as the historical links which are based upon geography and nature.³⁶⁴ For example, the period of strongest political relations between Libya and Chad commenced when President Idriss Déby, who belongs to the Zaghawa tribe which is spread between Libya, Chad, Niger and Sudan, came to power in a 1990.³⁶⁵ This highlights the influential role played by tribes in the policies of the region. There are many Arab tribes, such as the Awlad Sulayman, Masaalit and Mahamid, which are spread between Libya and other African countries. It can be said that geography is the main reason that helped such tribes to spread and control some of the centres of power in these countries. Therefore, Libya's political system relies on the influential role that these tribes play in the neighbouring countries such as Darfur region of Sudan. Libya deals with the Arab-African tribal elders to resolve different issues. This can be seen

³⁶³ John, W. Wright. (2007). *The New York Times Guide to Essential Knowledge*. (Second Edition). New York: Macmillan. pp. 583-624.

³⁶⁴ Jamal, Hamdan. (1996). *Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: A Study in Political Geography*. Cairo: Madbouly library. pp.134-295 (In Arabic).

³⁶⁵ I. William Zartman. (1995). *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. United States: Lynne Rinner publisher. pp.17-20

in the various negotiations sponsored by Libya to resolve the conflict between the Arab and African tribes in Darfur³⁶⁶ (see next section).

Therefore, Libya perceives geography as a central factor in determining its foreign policy. Libya perceives itself as a geographical link between Africa and Europe and thus believes it has a duty to construct an active foreign policy towards Africa and the Arab world on the one hand and Europe on the other. As Libya is an Arab-African state it can bridge Arab and African relations in the face the challenges from Europe.

Libyan official rhetoric highlights the important role Tripoli plays in creating a balance in Arab-African relations, for example by supporting the African Union. At the same time, Libyan foreign policy attempts to find a framework for African-European co-operation, in which mutual respect prevails without European interference in the domestic affairs of African countries.³⁶⁷

4.2.2. Political Determinants

On the political front achieving Arab regional security is a principal aim of Libyan foreign policy; moreover, it is one of the central tenets of post-1969 Libyan political ideology. As was discussed in chapter four Libya has initiated many attempts to establish a unified Arab bloc although the efforts have ended in relative failure. As a result of these experiences, Libya has become aware of Western threats to its national security, in particular those arising from within the African continent.

Libya is determined to cooperate with all African states in order to create a common strategic vision and create strong ties. Libya also hopes to establish common aims and priorities that can offset the threats presented by the ever-changing global environment. This would allow Africa to compete with the major nations of the world. Libya believes that a strong unified African bloc will be able to stand up to the major powers and protect the continent and its security. It is a common belief amongst Libyan policy makers that Africa's inability to co-operate on both the strategic and political fronts has lead to its weakness and an inability to respond to external and

³⁶⁶ The Report of Libyan Efforts (2008) in Resolving the Problems and the Internal Conflicts in Several African States: the Libyan Foreign Ministry, the Department of African Affairs. Tripoli.

³⁶⁷ Gathafi's Speech at the Press Conference on the Draft of Union for the Mediterranean: (9th Agu, 2008). Document from Libyan foreign Ministry, Tripoli.

internal challenges. Thus the African states are perceived as easy prey for more powerful external states.³⁶⁸

Therefore, Libya sees a pressing need for political co-operation between all African states, particularly given the common nature of the problems faced by the continent. One way of providing such support is through establishing diplomatic ties between Libya and the other African states. In this respect, Libya has the largest number diplomatic missions in Africa³⁶⁹ (see Table 5.1).

³⁶⁸ Gathafi Calls for one African Country and one African military. (2007). Available at: <URL: <http://www.panapress.com/freenewsara.asp?code=ara023937&dte=28/06/2007>> Access Date: 15 May, 2008.

³⁶⁹ The Libyan Embassies in Africa. The Website of Libyan Foreign Ministry. Available at: < URL: http://foreign.gov.ly/online/africa_bureaus.php> Access Date: 14th May, 2008.

Table: 4.1. Top Five Arab-African Diplomatic Representations in Africa³⁷⁰

No	African countries	Libya	Egypt	Algeria	Morocco	Sudan
1	Algeria	Embassy	Embassy	**	Embassy	Embassy
2	Angola	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
3	Benin	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO
4	Botswana	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
5	Burkina	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
6	Burundi	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
7	Cameroon	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy	NO
8	Cana	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
9	Cape Verde	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
10	Carlyon	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
11	Central Africa	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
12	Chad	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
13	Comoros	Embassy	NO	NO	NO	NO
14	Congo	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
15	Côte d'Ivoire	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
16	Djibouti	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
17	DR Congo	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy	NO
18	Egypt	Embassy	**	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
19	Equatorial Guinea	Embassy	NO	NO	Embassy	NO
20	Eritrea	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	Embassy
21	Ethiopia	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
22	Gabon	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
23	Gambia	Embassy	NO	NO	NO	NO
24	Guinea	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO
25	Guinea - Bissau	Embassy	NO	NO	NO	NO
26	Kenya	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
27	Lesotho	Embassy	NO	NO	NO	NO
28	Liberia	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
29	Libya	**	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
30	Madagascar	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
31	Malawi	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
32	Mali	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
33	Mauritania	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	**
34	Mauritius	NO	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
35	Morocco	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	**	Embassy
36	Mozambique	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO
37	Namibia	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
38	Niger	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO
39	Nigeria	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
40	Rwanda	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
41	SãoTomé & Príncipe	Embassy	NO	NO	NO	NO
42	Senegal	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
43	Seychelles	Embassy	NO	NO	NO	NO
44	Somalia	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO
45	South Africa	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
46	Sudan	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy	NO
47	Swaziland	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
48	Tanzania	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
49	Togo	Embassy	Embassy	NO	NO	NO
50	Tunisia	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy
51	Uganda	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
52	Zambia	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
53	Zimbabwe	Embassy	Embassy	Embassy	NO	Embassy
Total		51	46	29	21	18

³⁷⁰ Source: This data is available from the Websites of Foreign Ministries of these Countries. Libya- <<http://www.foreign.gov.ly/online/index.php>> Egypt- <http://www.mfa.gov.eg/MFA_Portal/en-gb/> Algeria<[http://193.194.78.233/ma ar/stories.php?acceuil=Y](http://193.194.78.233/ma_ar/stories.php?acceuil=Y)>Morocco- <<http://www.maec.gov.ma/EN/default.html>> Sudan- <http://www.mfa.gov.sd/arabic/ar_embassis.php> Access date: 15th October, 2008.

From table 5.1 it can be seen that the Libyan diplomatic presence can be found in 51 of the 53 African countries, with an Egyptian presence in 48 countries, Algeria in 29 countries, Morocco in 21 countries, and Sudan in 18 countries. Thus, the table clearly reflects the importance of the African continent in Libyan foreign policy.

4.2.3. Security Determinants

As previously argued, Libya believes that Arab national security is strongly connected to regional African security, with both being strategically inter-connected, therefore a threat to Sub-Saharan Africa is also a threat to North Africa and other Arab countries. This stems from the fact that the much of the Arab world is part of the African space: around 70% of Arabs people live in Africa and more than 40% of Arab countries are in Africa. Furthermore, there are many important events that highlight the relationship such as the support of African countries for the Palestinian cause at the UN. Moreover, African countries breached the embargo which was imposed by the UN Security Council on Libya in 1999. Furthermore, Arab countries supported African liberation movements in 1970s therefore contributing in the independence of the continent. These factors helped to led to the agreement to form the African Union which aims at protecting the continent from external threats. It is a known fact that Africa is overridden with political, security and military conflicts: from Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire, to the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the more well-known conflicts of Somalia and Darfur, along with the various civil, ethnic and tribal conflicts.

Libya strongly believes that the absence of African co-operation in terms of security is a major cause for the on-going instability and is therefore committed to establishing security and military co-operation. Ultimately, it is believed that there are common interests amongst the African states, and a threat to one state could lead to direct or indirect tension in neighbouring states. For example the crisis of Sudan in Darfur created instability in the neighbour countries of Uganda, Kenya, Libya, Chad, Egypt, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Central Africa Republic.³⁷¹ Furthermore, the absence of African co-operation on security will only encourage foreign intervention in the continent. Therefore, Libya remains committed to building bridges between the

³⁷¹ Francis, David J. (2005). *Civil militia: Africa's intractable security menace*. England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. pp.131-162

different African states and ultimately reaching a common security agreement with a clear strategy of at least reducing foreign threats if not removing them entirely.³⁷²

The Libyan position maintains that lack of a common security strategy is the primary cause for the unrest in Africa, which in turn encourages Western states to intervene in Africa, thus further threatening its stability.³⁷³ On the other hand, this security vacuum also encourages domestic rebel groups to trigger ethnic and sectarian conflicts within the continent.

Given the above, Libya's sees the need to establish an African strategy which is able to achieve economic and social development with a military ability that is able to protect the continent from potential threats. Libya's commitment to this vision is portrayed through its calls for an African military force under the authority of the African Union and which would be responsible for maintaining peace and security.³⁷⁴

The presence of security threats in parts of Africa in the form of civil unrest or conflicts is a source of concern for Libya, as it believes that any unrest has the potential to expand to other states within Africa, including the Arab states and even Libya itself. Therefore, Libya believes that it is the duty of all African states to intervene in internal struggles in order to ensure that a vacuum does not appear and foreign states do not intervene. The historical experience of the African continent at hand of the imperialists is a continuous source of concern for Libya and therefore it believes the West is major source of threats to the region, even if the means vary.

Given Libya's belief about the duty of African states to be active players within Africa, it is continuously attempting to be involved in all security-related issues in the continent. This is evident through Libya's numerous proposals on political, economic and security fronts, either through bi-lateral agreements or through regional African co-operation. A key example of this is Libya's call for the establishment of the United States of Africa as a single political bloc. On the economic front, Libya has

³⁷² The Report of Libyan Efforts (2006) to Resolve the Problems and the Internal Conflicts in Several African States: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of African Affairs. Tripoli.

³⁷³ Bronwen, Manby. (2004). "The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda". The Johns Hopkins University Press: *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26(4), pp.983-1027.

³⁷⁴ Nelson, Alusala. (2004). "African Standby Force, West Africa moves on". *African Security Review*, 13(2), pp.113-121.

encouraged and supported the creation of various trade zones within Africa which would be able to compete with similar zones across the globe, such as the EU. This resulted in the creation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in February 1998 which is one of the cornerstones of the African Union. On the security front, Libya continues to call for the establishment of an African army which would ensure that peace and security prevail in the continent and that foreign intervention is prevented.³⁷⁵

All the above steps prove the importance of African security in Libyan policy, and as a result Libya continues to play an important role in establishing security and stability in the continent by preventing the spread of any potential threats.

4.2.4. Economic Determinants

Libya believes that Africans, not foreign monopolies, should control their natural resources and that an economic framework needs to be set-up to ensure that this happens.³⁷⁶ In addition, Libya believes that the requirements of the African economy are not consistent with the needs of Western economies; therefore an economic framework needs to be created that is free from reliance on foreign capital or on foreign control.³⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Libyan leadership believes that as a result of the present world order which is built on economic blocs the battle over control of Africa's resources will continue to increase.³⁷⁸

What gives credibility to such Libyan beliefs and assumptions is that international changes have occurred in accordance with US-led globalisation. As a result, global and US politics towards Africa now focus on the use of the 'diplomacy of trade' as a

³⁷⁵ Ibid., pp 113–121.

³⁷⁶ Hamdi, Tahiri, (1998) *Africa between Colonialism and Independence*. *Adabbooks Library*. Cairo: p.175 (in Arabic)

³⁷⁷ Asteris, Huliars. (2001). "Gathafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s". *African Affairs Journal*, 100(398), pp.5-25

³⁷⁸ *Speech of Colonel Gathafi at the Meeting of the Interior Ministers of the States of the African union*, (18/6/2008). Panapress official Website, Tripoli, Available at: < URL: <http://www.panapress.com/freenewsara.asp?code=ara1013&dte=18/06/2005> > Access Date: 23 April, 2008. In this meeting Gathafi called for dealing with the African issues within the concept of the African Union. He also called for establishing the African common defence, strong African Economy, One African Market, One African Negotiation Position, and One African political position with the World. In addition, he called for establishing the African union as soon as possible to be equal to other global blocs in the world.

tool for penetration. This policy was epitomised in 1998 when the Clinton administration established the African-American partnership.³⁷⁹

It is through the use of such policies that the US executes 'selectionism', whereby specific states or areas within the continent are selected to propagate US policy in the region. Through this policy the US supports only those countries that are relevant to Washington's interests as in the case of Nigeria and ignores others such as in the case of Somalia and Rwanda.³⁸⁰ Libya believes that there is a contradiction in the US stance between this policy and its calls for integrating Africa into the global economy. It believes this policy is part of a new US attempt to divide the continent in accordance with its own interests through the use of humanitarian intervention (Chomsky labels this the 'new military humanism')³⁸¹ as justification for intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

In addition, Libyan policy is based on the belief that Africa continues to be divided as a result of Western competition for its resources and economic gain; this only becomes possible due to the economic vacuum and the absence of co-operation between the African states.³⁸² Western policy aims to gain control of the natural resources within Africa to an extent that Western states have had to compete against each other, most notably in the US' attempt to capture most of western positions in Africa, especially the French control of parts of African energy reserves. Charles Josselin, the French Secretary for Cooperation stated in 1997 'the US reaps most of the economic benefit whilst France provides most of the assistance to the African countries.'³⁸³

Furthermore, Libya believes that the conditional aid provided by the West to African states causes more harm than good. It has called upon African states not to resort to

³⁷⁹ Rosemary, Foot. S. Neil MacFarlane. Michael, Mastanduno. (2003). *U. S Hegemony and International Organization: The United States and Multilateral Institutions*. New York: Oxford university Press, pp.183-184

³⁸⁰ Gilbert, M. Khadiagala. (Winter-Spring 2001). "The United States and Africa: Beyond the Clinton Administration". *SAIS Review Journal*, 21(1), pp.261-262

³⁸¹ Noam, Chomsky. (1999). *The New Military Humanism: lessons from Kosovo*. London: PLUTO Press. p. 4

³⁸² Muammar, Gathafi (22ndOctober, 2007). Addresses the Faculty and Students of Cambridge University, Available at: <URL: http://algathafi.org/html-english/cat_1_2.htm > Access Date 10th January, 2008.

³⁸³ Asteris, C. Huliaras. (December, 1998). The "Anglosaxon Conspiracy: French Perception of the Great Lakes Crisis". *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 36(4), pp. 593-609

such aid as it is often used as a form of leverage by the donors, thus creating long-term obstacles for African development.³⁸⁴

In order to prevent further foreign intervention in Africa and to ensure that economic threats are eradicated Libya has played an active role in the economic development of the continent. Its vast natural resources have permitted it to be one of the main donors of aid to African states. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed the influx of Libyan investment in African countries as is shown in the next chapter. Libya believes that the future prosperity of Africa is closely linked to achieving economic cooperation and fills the strategic vacuum that may otherwise be captured by non-African states. According to the Libyan perspective, African resources will only benefit Africa once they are under the complete control of African institutions. The next chapter will highlight specifically the Libya role in African economic development.

4.2.5. Socio-Cultural Determinants

Despite the changing nature of global affairs, be it on a state or a regional level, Libyan policy-makers recognise the importance of the socio-cultural element in its relationship with Africa, especially since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of common challenges. Libyan policy is based on the perception that the socio-cultural factors are more than merely those constructed by the Arab-African historical experiences which were in turn built upon centuries of social activism and inter-relations. Furthermore, they believe the socio-cultural factors transcend beyond geographical boundaries and delve into profound cultural, human and civilisational links.

The socio-cultural factor reiterates the strong bond that exists between the African states. This bond was initially motivated by location and mutual gain but then extended to various socio-cultural elements. Such elements include Islam which is perceived as an important medium in strengthening the bond, and the presence of tribes which cut across the present-day boundaries of various African states. Trade caravans that cross the continent were based on these tribal linkages, with Libya being an important part of the trade.

³⁸⁴ Muammar, Gaddafi. (Sunday 29th March, 2008). "Africa Should Say no to Conditional Aid". *North Africa Times Newspaper*. p.8

Since the Revolution, Libyan foreign policy has expanded its circle of involvement in Africa in order to achieve better Arab-African cooperation to face contemporary challenges. Despite the varying degree and nature of involvement in the different regions, socio-cultural factors are a key determinant of Libyan policy towards Africa. Understandably, North African and Saharan countries continue to receive the greatest Libyan attention due to the presence of strong religious, cultural and heritage links; however, this special bond between Libya and Northern Africa has helped in creating stronger links with the rest of Africa.

Libya has continued to exert immense efforts in strengthening these bonds by reviving African cultures and dialects, providing scholarships to African students in Libyan universities and institutes and opening schools and cultural centres across the African continent.³⁸⁵ As a result, 44 schools, over 10 institutes and more than 33 mosques have been built across 16 African nations— Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan and Zimbabwe.³⁸⁶ Furthermore, the Libyan World Islamic Call Society has educated more than 6,620 young Africans in over ten countries.³⁸⁷ In 2007, the Libyan Fund for Aid and Development in Africa was established. It aims to provide humanitarian, development assistance and emergency relief as well as promoting women and child development in Africa.³⁸⁸

These efforts are, in part, motivated by Libya's belief for the need for Africans to grasp on to their cultural heritage and not be affected by Western cultural hegemony.³⁸⁹ In addition, these efforts reflect Libya's belief that the absence of cultural prosperity has been one of the main factors for Africa's demise and backwardness. The lack of human development has not only led to increased civil

³⁸⁵ Suleiman, M. Mansour. (2005). *Libyan Foreign Policy towards the African Continent 1990-2000*. Benghazi –Libya: Dar al-Kotob Al-Wataniya. pp.79-80 (In Arabic)

³⁸⁶ More Information see the website of Libyan World Islamic Call Society. Available at: URL > http://www.islamonline.net/the-wics/Arabic/Society/Relief/Center/article_01.shtml > Access Date: 17th November, 2008.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.,

³⁸⁸ Resolution No. 374 (2008) : Establishing a Libyan Fund for Aid and Development in Africa, the General People's Committee (Libyan prime minister) Tripoli.(In Arabic)

³⁸⁹ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (1st February, 2005). Presents to African Intellectual his Strategic Vision of an African Cultural Revolution to Preserve the African Identity, its Historical Roots and Age-old Culture Heritage. *Al Gathafi Speaks website*, Available at: <URL: http://www.algathafi.org/htmlenglish/cat_02_04.htm> Access Date: 22th May, 2008.

unrest and tribal and ethnic combat but also to Western involvement in the continent. The most recent example of Western usage of the vacuum was during the Rwandan civil war between the Hutus and Tutsis, and also the crisis of Darfur in Sudan which according to the Libyan interpretation represents a battle between Europe countries and the US.

The various determinants through which Africa is perceived as an important strategic actor for greater Arab security have encouraged Libya to be more heavily involved in African conflict resolution as an important step towards creating the stability and economic development in the continent. The following section examines Libya's motives for intervening in African conflict resolution.

4.3. LIBYA'S MOTIVES FOR ASSISTING WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

A common element of foreign policy is to evaluate the potential threats and causes of concern, then formulate a coherent policy to prevent such threats or dangers from occurring. All states have the right to achieve national security and act accordingly if a perceived threat arises. Consequently, Libya's belief that inter-African conflict and unrest is a danger to Arab security has resulted in the development of a suitable foreign policy to minimise such a threat. There have been a number of inter-African conflicts. On occasions these have involved Arab-African states such as Sudan, Mauritania and even Libya itself. These conflicts significantly affected Arab-African relations particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Arab-Arab conflicts have also had negative impacts on African institutions.

The greatest source of concern in Africa remains the issue of contested borders. Conflict over the issue has occurred in various forms: some between two African-Arab states; and others between an African-Arab state and a Sub-Saharan African state. Regardless of the actors involved, these conflicts have left their mark on Arab-African relations. Other sources of civil unrest in the continent include ethnic and sectarian divisions and military coups: Eritrea, Western Sahara and Southern Sudan being the most prominent examples of such conflicts.

Libya realises the danger of these threats and how they are used by Western powers as a tool for intervention in Africa.³⁹⁰ The nature of inter-African relations makes any form of common and mutual understanding rather difficult to achieve. However, two obstacles stand in the way of Libyan attempts at conflict resolution in Africa. First, the resources available to Libyan foreign policy are not sufficient to deal with all problems in African and second, the constraints upon Libya prevent it from forming an entirely satisfactory policy. Therefore, Libya has had to adopt a calm and flexible approach towards many of the conflicts in Africa. It has not always taken an unbiased approach but this is because it is merely attempting to act within its abilities.

Furthermore, Libya's immense interest in proving its presence in the African continent has, on occasions, meant that it has resorted to military intervention in certain cases such as in Uganda 1979 and Chad 1983. This inevitably led to restraints being placed on Libya, especially during the 1980s. In accordance with international developments and the changing nature of global affairs, Libya realised the difficulty of continuing this type of approach: first, because it increased the level of conflict; second, it ruined Libya's image amongst the African states; and third, major powers who opposed Libya's intervention were liable to impose further restraints on Tripoli.

The changing nature of the Libyan approach was clearly evident during the 1983-1987 Chad conflict; the border dispute between Libya and Chad resulted in a costly conflict. Throughout the conflict Libya's aim was to rid Chad of the pro-Western regime and support the liberation movements within the country.³⁹¹ However, after Libya realised that the very existence of this type of conflicts gave a reason for Western presence in Africa it implemented the International Court of Justice's decision of 1994 and withdrew from Chad. Furthermore, it supported the elected Chadian government, and called for national re-conciliation between the various Chadian tribes and for the re-construction of what was destroyed in the war.³⁹²

It can be argued that this change in approach on the part of Libya signifies an understanding of the dangers of a military approach. In addition, adopting a

³⁹⁰ Gathafi. (27/4/2007). "Africa has turned to a paper of an intarenatonal bidding". *Al- Alarab Newspaper*, p. 6. (In Arabic).

³⁹¹ Asteris Huliaras., *Op. Cit.*, p. 5-25

³⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 5-25

conciliatory and peaceful approach has allowed Libya to rebuild many of its relations with its African neighbours. Furthermore, this approach, twinned with cooperative action and the involvement of supra-national African institutions, has allowed Libya to play an influential role in attempting to resolve conflicts across Africa, including between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in Congo, Togo and Sierra Leone and most recently in Somalia.³⁹³ Libya's role in conflict resolution is examined in section 5.4.

Libya has managed to become an influential figure in African conflict resolution and this has allowed Libyan policy-makers to possess an advantage in the form of knowledge and information that would otherwise not be available to them. More importantly, it has paved the way for Libya to achieve its ultimate aim of becoming a central actor in Africa. This progress is highlighted by Libya being invited on several occasions to join UN discussions on Africa's issues. Furthermore, Colonel Gathafi has been hosted in an official capacity by various European leaders who now perceive him as a central figure in African continental politics. Accordingly Gathafi was invited to several European countries such as Belgium in 2004, France and Spain in 2007, Italy in 2009 then at the United Nations in July 2009 as the president of the African Union. In addition, African states and presidents have been calling for Libya's intervention in resolving various conflicts. A good example of this was Idriss Déby's, the Chadian president, letter to Colonel Gathafi in which he professed that 'the Chadian government continues to count on Libya to play a role in the peace process between the Chadian factions within Chad and also between Chad and Sudan.'³⁹⁴

It can be argued that Libya has succeeded in bringing an end to many African conflicts, either as a solitary effort or within a group effort alongside other states and institutions. Libya's role in conflict resolution is examined in the following section by highlighting Libya's role in a number of key conflicts.

³⁹³ Ibid., p. 5-25

³⁹⁴ The Message of Chadian President to Colonel Gathafi the Leader of Libyan Revolution which highlighted the necessity of activating the Libyan role to sponsor and support the peace process between Chadian parties, and between Chad and Sudan. *Libyan Foreign Ministry*, (15th April, 2008) Available at: URL < <http://foreign.gov.ly/online/newsarchive.php> > Access Date: 6th January 2008.

4.4. LIBYA'S ROLE IN REDUCING THE INTENSITY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONFLICTS AND WARS IN AFRICA

Two periods were crucial for the development of the political process in Africa. The first was the Berlin conference which took place in the 1880s and divided Africa according to the needs and desires of the then great powers.³⁹⁵ Ethnic, tribal, cultural, linguistic and religious factors were all ignored to satisfy the wants of certain powers. The second era, the liberation period, occurred in the 1950s as many of the modern African nation-states gained their independence.³⁹⁶ Thus, while the 19th century witnessed the colonisation of Africa and its division according to the imperialists' wants, the 20th century saw the independence of many African states. However, the continent remained heavily divided with many new borders creating political complexities along religious, ethnic and tribal frontiers.³⁹⁷ As a result, Africa has come to be the most divided and politically diverse continent.

Unfortunately, African suffering as a result of Western greed has not ended. The Cold War era saw the continent being used a proxy battlefield by the bi-polar powers thus causing immense destruction.³⁹⁸ Inevitably, the consequences were grave for the entire continent and there was a noticeable decline in human development and production as well as an absence of autonomy, peace and security.

These externally-induced problems are compounded by border issues left from the colonial era and the resultant need for high spending on security. The area of Africa is about thirty million square kilometres and has a seacoast estimated at about longitudinally (41000) kilometres. Moreover, a huge population of about half a billion people creates problems of homogeneity and political cohesion. Thus, Africa has become the scene of successive revolutions, regional conflicts, political coups and multiple wars.

³⁹⁵ Peggy, Martin. (2004). *5Steps to a 5: AP World History*. USA: McGraw-Hill Professional. p.214

³⁹⁶ York, W. Bradshaw. (1996). *Michael Wallace, Global Inequalities*. London: Pine Forge Press. p.61

³⁹⁷ Richard, G. Catoire. (2004). "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan", in Brian Loveman (Ed.), *Strategic for Empire U S Regional Security Policy in the post Cold War Era?* (pp.135-154). UK: SR Books.

³⁹⁸ Kidane, Mengisteab. (1997). *Globalisation and Autocentricity in Africa's Development in the 21st Century*. Eritrea: Africa World Press. p.152

The Libyan official stance is that most inter-African conflicts have their roots in the negative impact of Western imperialism. Colonel Gathafi expressed this sentiment when he said that ‘we have reiterated that Africa is for the Africans and the Africans are able to solve their own problem, they reject any foreign intervention or mandate over their own internal problems.’³⁹⁹ What he is saying is that foreign intervention in African internal affairs is a cause for African instability and unrest. This has been evident on various occasions as in the example of French, British and Belgian intervention to achieve regime change in the likes of Kenya, Tanzania, Chad and Zaire.

Furthermore, there exists another form of indirect Western intervention in Africa, this mainly occurs through the support for pro-Western regimes as is the case in Central African Republic and Uganda.⁴⁰⁰ Other examples include French and American intervention in Burundi and Rwanda and more recently the sudden Western interest in Sudan. In reality, the modern history of Africa is littered with continual foreign intervention; the current post 9/11 global climate has even given Western powers more of a reason to intervene.

Despite the fact that colonialism officially ended decades ago and many states have now been independent for over 50 years, Africa remains overrun with civil strife and unrest⁴⁰¹ as a result of the competition between the great powers such as America and France. Although this problem is continent-wide, it is most heavily focused in the Central and Western regions. Libyan policy continues to state that unless an end is brought to this unrest then the inevitable demise of Africa will occur. As a result of internal unrest, Africa has become an easy prey for Western hegemony and even a battlefield where wars are fought out. This was the case during the Cold War when the US and the USSR did not shy away from bringing the war to Africa.

Even though the international rhetoric since 9/11 has been focused on mutual cooperation between the major actors such as US, EU and China to combat the new

³⁹⁹ Muammar, Gathafi’s Speech at the 30th Session Meeting of the Coordination Committee for the African liberation Movements. 4th February, 1978.

⁴⁰⁰ Leuan, Ll. Griffiths. (1994). *The Atlas Africa of Affairs*. (Second Edition). London: Routledge. p.83

⁴⁰¹ Peter J. Schraeder. (Autumn, 2000). “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa”. *Political Science Quarterly*, 115(3), pp.395-419.

threat of terrorism, when it comes to Africa there still remains the old rivalry for hegemony. The following section will highlight the main types of conflict (military coups, anti-government rebellions and civil wars, ethnic conflict and border issues) in Africa and Libya's role in resolving them.

4.4.1. Military Coups

The international community generally regards military coups as illegal and therefore unacceptable due to the potentially negative consequences in terms of politics, economics and human development. Furthermore, military coups threaten democratic progress and stability.⁴⁰² It can be argued that the origins of military coups and the reasons behind their rise are due to the impact of imperialism.

The principal causes for military coups in Africa are the geopolitical complexities caused by the departing imperialist powers. Military coups have only been occurring in Africa since the 1960s following the departure of the colonising powers. Due to the limitations of space and time, only a selection of coups will be highlighted, in particular those that have occurred since 1994 when in July a military coup in the Gambia that overthrew President Jawara Dawada.⁴⁰³ This was followed in 1995 by an attempted coup in São Tomé and Príncipe: there were further attempts here in 2003⁴⁰⁴ and 2008.

One example of Western involvement in military coup attempts was the French in the Comoros in 1989, 1992, 1995 and 2000; they also interfered in the 1996 elections to support their ally Mohamed Taki who became as president until 1998.⁴⁰⁵ This highlights the intervention of Western forces in the affairs of the continent, especially those regions that contain petroleum or have strategic locations. In addition to the coup which toppled elected President of Niger Mamadou Tanja in 1996, and in 1999 another coup by General Robert Guéï successor to President Henri Konan Bédié in

⁴⁰² Patrick, J. McGowan. (2003). "African Military Coups D'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(3), pp.339-370

⁴⁰³ R. J. Harrison Church. (2003). "The Gambia Physical and Social Geography", in European Publication (Ed.), *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. (pp.455-473). London: Taylor & Francis Group.

⁴⁰⁴ Richard, Auty. and Philippe, Le Billon. (2007). "Managing Revenues from Natural Resources and Aid", in O. Brown et al., (Ed.), *Trade, Aid and Security: An Angola for pace and Development*. (pp.158-189). London: Earthscan.

⁴⁰⁵ Adrian, Karatnycky and the Freedom House Survey Team (2000). *Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey and Civil Liberties 1999-2000*. New York: Freedom House. pp.35-37.

Côte d'Ivoire. In the same year military coups took place in Guinea Bissau. In 2001 repeated coup attempts led to civil war in the Comoros and in the Central African Republic.⁴⁰⁶

The seriousness of these coups cannot be more clearly evident than it was in Sierra Leone in 1997 when rebel militias took power from the democratically elected president causing hunger, unrest and civil war. Eventually, massacres were taking place and more than 200,000 refugees fled to neighbouring countries.⁴⁰⁷ A military coup in Burundi in April 2001 was followed by another in July when the US backed the Hutu majority which formed 85% of the population against the Tutsi (14%).⁴⁰⁸ Côte d'Ivoire also witnessed a coup in 2002 resulting in unrest between the north and south of the country and eventually led to violence that claimed hundreds of lives.⁴⁰⁹ France played a major role in the Côte d'Ivoire coup which lead UN Security Council Resolution no. 1643 of 2005 to 'Requests the French Government to communicate as appropriate to the Security Council, through the Committee, information gathered by the French forces and, when possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, about the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire and about the production and illicit export of diamonds'.⁴¹⁰

Libya has always played an influential role in preventing any form of military coup against the legitimate governments; this was evident in Libya's intervention in the Central African Republic in May 2001 when General Francois Bozize an ex-military leader attempted to seize power from the democratically elected president Ange-Felix Patasse. Libyan forces intervened to prevent the coup from taking place and restored peace and stability to the country.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁶ Richard, Jackson. (2006). "Africa's Wars: Overview, Causes and the Challenge of Conflict Transformation", in Oliver, Furley. Roy May. (Ed.), *Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace*. (pp.15-30). England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

⁴⁰⁷ Jimmy, D. Kande. (Sep, 1998). "Transition Without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996". *Source: African Studies Review*,41(2), pp.91-111

⁴⁰⁸ Gregory, Mthembu-Salter. (April, 2002). *Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile: Burundi*. US: Foreign Policy in Focus. pp.1-4

⁴⁰⁹ Janice, Hamilton. (2004). *Ivory Coast in the Pictures*. US: Lerner Publications. p. 32-33

⁴¹⁰ UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1643* (2005), "on Renewal of the Measures Imposed by Resolution 1572 (2004) on Arms Embargo against Côte d'Ivoire", 15 December 2005, available at: URL<<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44168ba214.html>> Access Date:5th Jun, 2009.

⁴¹¹ Edmund, J. Osmanczyk et al., (2003). *Encyclopaedia of United Nation and International Agreements*. New York: Routledge. p.1322

However, the following year 2001 there was another military coup which caused civil unrest in Central African Republic and neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire.⁴¹² In addition, 2003 witnessed a coup in Liberia where President Charles Taylor lost power after a series of confrontations between the government and rebels. These confrontations spread beyond the Liberian borders to Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Guinea and also killed many civilians.⁴¹³

In September 2003 the military coup in Guinea-Bissau brought to an end the three year reign of President Kumba Yala who was elected in 2002.⁴¹⁴ Two months earlier, in July 2003, there was also another coup which took place in São Tomé and Príncipe against the elected president Fradique Melo de Menezes.⁴¹⁵ There were further coups or attempted coups during 2003 in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania⁴¹⁶ and the Central African Republic. As McGowan explains these highlight the failure of the post-colonial states that were an outcome of imperial plans.⁴¹⁷

May 2008 witnessed another attempted coup in São Tomé and Príncipe, but thanks to Libyan and other African efforts the elected president was restored power.⁴¹⁸ Also in August 2008 a military coup seized power from the Mauritanian democratically elected president Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi who was elected in 2007. The Libyan leader as president of African Union visited Mauritania in March 2009 to find a solution to the phenomenon of coups in Mauritania that date back to 1978.⁴¹⁹

Libyan policy has been continually opposed to coups which it perceives as a source of danger and threat to the continent. Furthermore, Libya has always stated its support for peace and reconciliation, and reiterated its belief in dialogue and the peaceful

⁴¹² Richard Jackson. Op. cit., pp.15-30

⁴¹³ Varney, A. Yengbeh, Jr. (spring, 2006). "Liberia's Security Foreign Policy Dilemma". *African Policy Journal*, Vol.1, pp.57-73.

⁴¹⁴ Barry, Boubacar-Sid et al., (2007). *Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau*. US: The World Bank. p.3

⁴¹⁵ Michael, J. Palmiotto. (2006). *World Policy Encyclopaedia*. New York: Routledge. p.718

⁴¹⁶ Boubacar, N'Diaya, (2006) "Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and Democracy, or Just another Coup". *African Affairs Journals*, 105(420), pp.425-426.

⁴¹⁷ Patrick, J. McGowan. Op. cit., pp.339-370

⁴¹⁸ Osama, Ismail. (19th May, 2007). *The Leader of The Libyan Revolution had intensified efforts to return the stability to Sao Tome and Principe: the Website of the Revolution Committees Movement*. Available at: <URL: <http://www.rcmlibya.org/Analysis22.html>> Access Date: 10th January, 2008. (In Arabic)

⁴¹⁹ Balkassm, Smida. (16th March, 2009). "The Libyan leader of Revolution Calls the Mauritanian People to look towards the Future". *Azzahfalakhder Newspaper*, No.5536, Tripoli, p.3

transfer of power according to the nature and circumstances of the continent and not according to Western interests.⁴²⁰ Undoubtedly, the high number of military coups in Africa proves that the continent is on the verge of collapse, particularly in the western region which appears to have been drowning in a vicious cycle of political unrest.

4.4.2. Anti-Government Rebellions and Civil Wars

The nature of warfare within Africa underwent a radical change at the end of the 20th century. Wars were no longer the exclusive territory of the military; civilians became equally as important. Civilian rebels present one of the most dangerous forms of political activism as it makes it nearly impossible to form any understanding between professional armies and armies of civilians. This was clearly the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where Laurent Kabila led a campaign with help of Tutsi groups and America in the east of the country in 1997. Kabila was finally successful in ending the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.⁴²¹ Other examples of civil rebellions include the one carried out by Charles Taylor in Liberia in 1999 as well as the unrest in Côte d'Ivoire which lasted from 1960-2005. This latter example was catalysed by Western intervention, especially by France, which supported the minority within Côte d'Ivoire against the anti-French majority.⁴²²

Civil wars have been a major source of unrest in much of Africa. The starkest example of an on-going civil war is that of Somalia where tribal confrontations have been causing bloodshed since 1992.⁴²³ However, despite the on-going unrest and immense danger, Libya has been one of the only two African states to maintain diplomatic ties with Somalia. The Libyan embassy still operates in the Somali capital and Libya is working continuously to bring an end to the civil war that has resulted in

⁴²⁰ Muammar, Al Gathafi. (01st February, 2005). *Presents to African Intellectual his Strategic Vision of an African Cultural Revolution to Preserve the African Identity*. Op. cit.,

⁴²¹ Robert, G. White. (2001). "Implications of the Information Revolution for Africa: Cyberimperialism, Cyberhype, or Cyberhope", in B. Louis (Ed.), *Cyberimperialism?: Global Relations in the New Electronic Frontier*. (pp.223-232). United States of America: Greenwood Publisher Group.

⁴²² Bader, Shafie. (September, 2005). "Cote d'Ivoire Crisis and Plight of Muslims". African Readings. Available at: URL< <http://www.albayan-magazine.com/qiraat/02/08.htm>> Access Date: 17th May, 2007 (In Arabic).

⁴²³ Jeffrey, S. Lantis. (2002). *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification*. United States of America: Greenwood Publishing Group. Pp.57-58

Somalia being classified as a failed state.⁴²⁴ This highlights Libya's commitment to its African neighbours and its determination to stand side-by-side with its friends in times of difficulty.⁴²⁵

Another example of an on-going civil war is taking place in southern Sudan. This is a disaster where the confrontations between the central government in Khartoum and rebel movements have had regional and global repercussions. A recent UN report stated that as a result of civil war Sudan is classified amongst the poorest states with very low human development.⁴²⁶ Ironically, Sudan has vast resources, including water, fertile land and mineral resources such as oil and gas. Sudan could be one of the most prosperous states in Africa. However, civil war has made this almost impossible.

Libya believes that the on-going conflict in Sudan has acted as a tool to justify foreign intervention in the country. Furthermore, Sudan's neighbours have also attempted to intervene claiming that they are seeking a solution to the conflict. Many African states including Libya have opposed any form of foreign intervention and have called for a solution to be drawn up within the context of the African Union. Accordingly, Libya has been active in its role by calling for the opposing factions to meet in Tripoli and Sirte.⁴²⁷

Libya's role in combating civil rebellions and wars can be traced back to 1996 where it played an important role in ending the Sierra Leone conflict which lasted for 4 years from 1996 till 2000. Furthermore, Libya provided US\$24m in the form of aid for reconstruction.⁴²⁸ Since 1999, Libya's efforts in Chad were equally important and several peace talks and agreements were brokered between the different factions. In the Central African Republic Libya adopted a more direct approach in 2001 by using

⁴²⁴ *Libyan Diplomats Freed in Somalia*. (2008). Aljazeera English Website, Available at: <URL: <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/56F00717-8507-43B4-A097-DE3FD5500F5A.htm>> Access Date; 23th May, 2008.

⁴²⁵ Suleiman, M. Mansour. Op.cit., P.67

⁴²⁶ *Human Development Report, 2007/2008*, New York: United States Development Program.

⁴²⁷ Kelly, Campbell. (January, 2008). "Negotiating Peace in Darfur". United States Institute of Peace: Available at: URL :< http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.PDF > Access Date: 5th March 2008.

⁴²⁸ The Annual Report (2006). *Libyan Efforts to Resolving many Conflicts and Problems between African States*. Libyan Foreign Ministry, African Affairs Department, Tripoli.

its military to bring to end rebellions against the government,⁴²⁹ peace talks were also brokered between the opposing factions. Furthermore, the UN Security Council commended Libya for its role in the Great Lakes region in 1999 where it was able to stimulate peace and reconciliation between the various factions and bring an end to bloodshed in the region.⁴³⁰

In February 2007 the Libyan presidency brokered the peace process between the government of the Central African Republic and the rebel factions. In October of the same year Libya also played a crucial role in bringing about reconciliation between the Chadian government and rebels in the country.⁴³¹ A year later, in February 2008, Libya brought an end to rebel activity in Chad and attempted further reconciliation between opposing factions.⁴³² Libyan peace efforts were also noticeable in Mali where peace talks were held between the central government and the Tuareg rebels which lead to a ceasefire in April 2008.⁴³³ Finally, Libya was able to intervene and halt rebel attempts to capture power in Anjouan Island (*Comoros*) in March 2008.⁴³⁴

A specific region that has been subject to considerable Libyan interest is the Great Lakes area. The area is a continuous source of concern for many African states, as it is strategically located in the heart of Africa and is the source of the river Nile. Libyan diplomacy was able to trigger a peace process between Congo and Rwanda in 1999.⁴³⁵

In the Congo, Libya called upon all factions in the conflict who participated in Sirte I and II and Tripoli conferences to reach a peace deal. Eventually a deal was brokered

⁴²⁹ David, Hilling. (2003). "The Central African Republic: Physical and Social Geography", in European Publication (Ed.), *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, (pp.199-230). London: Taylor & Francis Group.

⁴³⁰ The Annual Report (2006).Op. cit.

⁴³¹ Charles, O. Cecil. (2008). *Libya's Relation with Africa and the West*. Paper presented at the first conference on the Libyan Affairs and the West, organised by Middle East Institute and the Green Book Researcher Canter on 31st March 2008, Washington: US.

⁴³² *Battle Rages for Chadian capital*. (02nd February, 2008). Aljazeera English News, Available at: URL :< <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2392EF0A-8B23-4CEC-9604-42A404A43C24.htm>> Access Date 10th February 2008.

⁴³³ *Mali's Government and Tuareg Rebels Agreed A Ceasefire*. (3rd Apr, 2008). Reuters AlertNet, Available at: URL< <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03349589.htm>> Access Date: 8th April, 2008.

⁴³⁴ See the Resolutions of the Arab Summit, the 20th Session, Damascus, March 29/30, 2008

⁴³⁵ Herman, Cohen. Ali Richi. Stephen, Morrison. Miloud, Mehadabi. (31st March, 2008). *Libya's Relation with Africa and the West*. Paper presented at the first conference on the Libyan Foreign policy and African Affairs, Organized by Middle East Institute and the Green book Researcher Centre on 31st march , Washington-US.

on 7 September 2002 between the Congolese and Ugandan presidents. As a result the military forces of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia all withdrew from the Congo. Thus, it can be argued that Libyan efforts were in large responsible for bringing to an end one of the worst civil conflicts in the African continent.

In Western Africa, Libyan efforts succeeded in ending the conflict between Guinea and Liberia in 2001.⁴³⁶ As for the Darfur conflict, Libya continues to exert immense efforts in achieving peace. The government has hosted most of the meetings on Darfur, either at an international or regional level. Libya's concern for Darfur is mainly humanitarian, but there is also a security aspect which is exacerbated given the geographical proximity of Sudan to Libya.⁴³⁷

Libya has dedicated immense efforts to bringing to an end all forms of civil wars and unrest and this role has increased noticeably in recent years. Libyan policy insists on the need to end all forms of political and civil unrest, thus Libya stands against civil rebellions and wars. It argues that wars must be avoided and differences ought to be resolved peacefully. Furthermore, Africans should focus on achieving economic prosperity rather than bloodshed and war.⁴³⁸

The security and stability threats caused as a result of civil and political unrest are widely known, therefore, Libyan policy has been consistent in attempting to bring to end such dangerous phenomena. The examples discussed highlight Libya's commitment to ensuring peace and stability in the continent. The Secretary for African Affairs Ali A. Triki in the Libyan Foreign Ministry recently stated that Libya's insistence on halting civil wars and unrest stems from its belief that they are the primary obstacles of development and stability in the continent.⁴³⁹ It is upon such belief that Libyan policy on the matter is constructed.

⁴³⁶ Suleiman, M. Mansour. Op. cit., 69-70

⁴³⁷ The Annual Report (2006). Libyan Efforts to Resolving many Conflicts and Problems between African States. Op. cit.,

⁴³⁸ Muammar, Gathafi. (29th Oct, 2007). "What We Benefited from the Civil Wars in Africa", *AL-Iraq Al-yoom Newspaper*, No.626, p.2. (In Arabic)

⁴³⁹ Ali, Triki. The Libyan Ministry for African Affairs, (2007). The Importance of Peace. Paper presented at the *Arab Conference to Support and Address the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur* Organised by the Arab League and Sudan Government, on 29th October 2007, Khartoum. (In Arabic)

4.4.3. Ethnic Conflict

Africa is a continent of immense diversity and heterogeneity. There are various ways in which Africa can be categorised, the most relevant division of which is between Northern Africa (Arab speaking) and Sub-Saharan Africa, with key culture, social and religious differences existing between these two blocs. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into three main linguistic categories: Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone. Furthermore, Africa contains many languages and dialects as well a vast number of religions and beliefs including the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Consequently, this heterogeneity has had a great influence on the politics and security of the post-colonial African nation-state. Ethnicity has been a catalyst for conflict in much of Africa, examples include the 1967 Biafran conflict in Nigeria,⁴⁴⁰ the civil wars in Sudan, and rebel factions in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Namibia. In fact, there is hardly an African state that has not witnessed ethnic conflict, as ethnic diversity has not been dealt with by the post-independent nation-state. The outcome of these conflicts has been drastic, with millions of lives lost during the 1990s as a result.⁴⁴¹

The cause of these conflicts is contested and may be an amalgamation of factors. Nevertheless the presence of strong ethnic identities in the face of a new national identity is undoubtedly a major factor in most conflicts. Ethnic identity is unique from other forms of social identification in the sense that it is inherited through ancestry and not a conscious human choice. Thus, it denotes an inevitable fate for an individual from birth. In fact, ethnicity as an important political factor is a relatively modern concept that was brought about as a result of imperial confrontations in Africa. The imperial powers used African ethnicities in their policy making, battles over resources and acquiring support of a certain group over another. Inevitably, ethnic conflicts have had a grave outcome on all aspects of life within Africa, whether political, social

⁴⁴⁰Isawa, Elaigwu. (1977). "The Nigerian Civil War and the Angola Civil War: Linkages between Domestic Tensions and International Alignments", in Ali Al'Amin Mazrui (Ed.), *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, (pp.215-235). Netherland: E. J. Brill.

⁴⁴¹Howard, Adelman. (2002). "Refugee Repatriation", in S. Stedman, D. Rothchild, E. Cousens (Ed.), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreement*. (pp. 279-281). USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

or economic. Furthermore, they have drowned Africa in a vicious circle of unrest and have become a cornerstone for inter-African relations.⁴⁴²

Noticeably, one of the main causes for ethnic conflicts in modern Africa is the presence of the modern nation-state. Imperialist cartography often ignored the importance of the ethnic factor when drawing up the map of modern Africa. As a result, several ethnic groups were divided by erratically drawn borders; furthermore, certain ethnic groups with a history of hostility found themselves having to share a state.⁴⁴³

One of the major areas of ethnic tensions in Africa is the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi; the years of bloodshed and unrest have led to massacres and grave consequences, not only for the innocent civilians but for the continent as a whole. Undoubtedly, the main cause for the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is the creation of modern borders that were brought about by imperial powers.⁴⁴⁴

Rwanda and Burundi have a combined population of 13 million of which 85% are Hutu and 14% are Tutsi.⁴⁴⁵ There are also around one million Hutus in neighbouring Tanzania, along the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. In addition, there are tens of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis living in Uganda, along the Burundi border. Inevitably, this widespread ethnic dispersion has resulted in political alliances such as that between President Museveni of Uganda and the Tutsi minority governments in Rwanda and Burundi. On the other hand, the Hutus found support and sympathy from Tanzania, Kenya and Sudan.⁴⁴⁶

Realising the potential danger of ethnic conflict, Libyan policy has dedicated significant attention to this matter in the Great Lakes region and Congo⁴⁴⁷ where there is the greatest ethnic diversity and considerable tension particularly between the

⁴⁴² Okwudiba, Nnoli. (1998). *Ethnic conflict in Africa*. Oxford: African Collective Books. p.377

⁴⁴³ Robert, O. Matthews. Taisier, M. Ali. (1999). *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*. London: McGill-Queen's university press. p.260

⁴⁴⁴ Almamon, Papa-Alamin. (1993). *Kenya, African Issues, the Current Challenge and Future*. Cairo: Al-Tkadaom press. p.25

⁴⁴⁵ Ingrid, A. Lehmann, (1999). *Peacekeeping and public Information: Caught in the Crossfire*. London: Frank Cass Publisher. p.84

⁴⁴⁶ E. Wayne Nafziger. Frances, Stewart. and Raimo, Vayrynen. (2000). *War, Hunger, and Displacement: the Original of Humanitarian Emergency*. Oxford: Oxford university press. pp.21-22

⁴⁴⁷ In Congo there are more than 250 militias, the most important of them are Tutsi and Hutu.

Hutus and Tutsis. Libya played an important role in the reconciliation meetings in Burundi in 2001. Its diplomatic efforts and calls for a solution within an African context resulted in good progress, particularly amongst Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria.

In the Burundian conflict, Libya played a constructive role in the mini summit in Bujumbura where reconciliation was activated and a unity government of both Hutus and Tutsis was formed.⁴⁴⁸ In the Great Lakes region and, in particular, the Congo, Libya exerted immense efforts to bring peace to the region. From as early as 1998 Libya called for summits to be held to establish reconciliation between the different factions. 1999 and 2000 witnessed peace deals in which Libya was commended by the UN Security Council No. 2/833/1999.⁴⁴⁹

Ethnic conflicts are one of the most complex issues that have engulfed the African continent. The causes of the conflict vary from one case to another and the demands of ethnic groups can also vary from realistic equality, power sharing, and a portion of the income from natural resources to more idealistic independence, secession or self-autonomy. Nevertheless, Libya believes that ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved unless there is a common African voice stemming from a single African bloc. Thus Libya argues for the urgent strengthening of the African Union and its institutions and to speed up the establishment of the United States of Africa.⁴⁵⁰

4.4.4. Border Disputes

Contemporary African borders were inherited from imperialist cartography; the Berlin conference in 1884 divided Africa into fifty artificial countries. Therefore it can be argued that the presence of these modern states is one of the major causes of conflict within the continent. African states and the African Union have realised the complexity of the border issue, especially as borders have now acquired a sanctified status within Africa. Furthermore, Libya has always believed that European colonisers

⁴⁴⁸ The Annual Report (2001) of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee (Libyan prime minister) for African Unity: Tripoli.

⁴⁴⁹ The Annual Report (2008). Libyan Efforts to Resolving many Conflicts and Problems between African States. Op. cit.,

⁴⁵⁰ See the *Sirte Declaration*. Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 8-9 September 1999 Sirte, Libya.

were not merely content with creating artificial states in Africa; they even drew borders according to their own imperialist ambitions and wants. Current African borders almost never take into account important factors such as terrain, society and economics, thus their presence continues to be problematic.⁴⁵¹

Moreover, there are certain border disputes that fall beyond the control of the state. For example, the dispute over the Mano River between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea-Conakry; where the actual disputed territory falls beyond the military autonomy of any of the mentioned states. Libyan policy participated strongly in solving the problems of border dispute between Chad and the Central Africa Republic and the Great Lakes region which includes border areas of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Moreover, Libya participated in solving the border dispute between Uganda and Sudan. These issues highlight the severity of division and dissent among African governments. Due to the complex nature of this dispute, Libya has played an important role in ensuring that the matter does not escalate and a resolution is drafted.⁴⁵²

Other examples of border disputes which were subject to Libyan efforts include Egypt and Sudan.⁴⁵³ However, most noticeably of all is the Libyan effort in the Casamance province which has been the source of conflict between the Senegalese government and the Democratic Movement forces that are demanding secession. This conflict has been a source of concern for Senegal's neighbours, mainly Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, however, thanks to Libyan efforts a peace deal was signed in 2000 between the Senegalese government and the rebels and the road is set for a long-lasting era of peace.⁴⁵⁴

In addition to the aforementioned disputes, there are other forms of conflicts that occur within the African state. Due to the fragile nature of the political system there

⁴⁵¹ Timothy, Murithi. (2005). *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peace building and development*. England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. pp.41-44

⁴⁵² Yavis, Alexander. (2005) "African Union and Conflict Management Challenge Settlement of What is Happening Within State and What is Outside the Scope of National", in B. Al-Kot (Ed.), *The African Union* (p.190). Tripoli: World Centre for Studies and Research of the Green Book.

⁴⁵³ The Annual Report (1998). *Libyan Foreign Policy in the Field of Arab Nationalism in: General People's Committee for Arab Unity*, (Arab Unity Ministry). Tripoli. pp.11-12

⁴⁵⁴ The Annual Report (2006) *Libyan Efforts to Resolving many Conflicts and Problems between African States*. Op. cit.,

often occurs armed conflicts between different parties within a state each seeking power and authority. Examples of such conflicts have occurred in Angola, Congo, the Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau. Furthermore, such internal conflicts often transcend beyond state borders and may include more than one state such as the case in the conflict between Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Rwanda and Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Congo, and Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa. Often, such conflicts occur due to a difference in political ideologies and the desire of varying factions to acquire regional hegemony. Undoubtedly, colonisation in its previous form or its contemporary form which is occurring through 'economic cooperation' and 'cultural integration' has played an important role in leading Africa to the unrest it is in now.

Libyan diplomacy has been exerting considerable efforts in Africa to resolve conflicts or, at least, be part of the process of reconciliation. Examples of this are aplenty; Libya, as part of its efforts to improve Arab-African relations, was able to restore diplomatic ties between Sudan and Uganda.⁴⁵⁵ Furthermore, Libyan efforts succeeded in resolving disagreements between Sudan - Eritrea and Ethiopia - Eritrea⁴⁵⁶ as well as Libya's ability to resolve the problems between Sudan and Chad.⁴⁵⁷

There are certain factors that can be highlighted as the causes for the continuous strife in post-colonial Africa. The first is the economic factor and the grave consequences it has had; huge debts, poor economic development, lack of education and absence of human development. The second factor is the absence of the fundamental concept of power sharing and the lack of national political maturity. This can be pinned down to the absence of a strong symbolic leadership and the alliances formed between African regimes and Western powers. It can be argued that the absence of good leadership has

⁴⁵⁵ The Annual Report (2001). The Libyan Secretary General of the People's Committee for African Unity. Op. cit.,

⁴⁵⁶ The Annual Report (1999). Libyan Efforts to Resolve many Conflicts and Problems between African States. Libya's Foreign Ministry, African Affairs Department, Tripoli.

⁴⁵⁷ *African Meeting supporting the Libyan Efforts to Reconcile between Chad and Sudan*, Alchourouk Magazine Online, (13th February, 2008). Available at: URL :<
<http://www.alchourouk.com/detailarticle.asp?IDX=111201&IDXRUB=82>> Access Date: 5th Aug 2008.

been a primary cause for the lack of political maturity in many African states and thus has allowed Western powers to use Africa for their own gain.⁴⁵⁸

The various military coups, civil wars, border disputes and ethnic conflicts that continue to occur have left Africa in an impoverished state. As a result, Libyan policy has focused on promoting peace and stability in the continent which it believes is a strategic choice. Thus, Colonel Gathafi has embraced this aim as a personal mission. Over the years he has given his full support to peace promotion across the continent; Sudan, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa being the most notable areas of Libyan efforts.⁴⁵⁹

Libya believes that in order to prevent foreign powers from regaining access to Africa, it is crucial that conflicts are resolved within the framework of African institutions.⁴⁶⁰ This stance was clearly portrayed in Libya's refusal of UN-sanctioned foreign intervention in the Darfur crisis,⁴⁶¹ as well its efforts to resolve the Chad-Sudan crisis which eventually lead to the peace deal in 2008.⁴⁶²

In summary, it can be said that there were several factors that encouraged Libya to promote inter-African relations and rid the continent of Western presence. Furthermore, promoting Arab-African relations is a way through which political, economic and security goals can be achieved. The following section will discuss the main motives behind Libya's cooperation with African states to rid the continent of Western presence.

⁴⁵⁸ Zahir, Reyad. (1976). *European Colonization of Africa in the Modern Era*. MA Dissertation, Unpublished, Egypt: The College of Economic and Politics, Cairo University. p.102 (In Arabic)

⁴⁵⁹ See the Final Communiqué of the General People's Congress (Libyan parliament). On (January 20-22, 2006), *Article, 1, 2, 3*. That shows the efforts of Libyan foreign policy towards resolving disputes and conflicts among African states.

⁴⁶⁰ Muammar, Gathafi. (Friday, 2/5/2005). "Speech at the Eight Session of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States", *Elakhtar Newspaper*, No.16884, Cairo. (In Arabic)

⁴⁶¹ Alex, J. Bellamy. (June, 2006). "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit". *Ethics and International Affairs*, 20(2), pp.143-169

⁴⁶² "Chad and Sudan Signed an Agreement in Senegal to Stop the Hostilities between them", (15th March, 2008). *Asharq Al-awst Newspaper*, No.10700, (In Arabic)

4.5. LIBYA'S MOTIVES IN COOPERATING WITH AFRICAN STATES TO PURGE THE WEST FROM THE CONTINENT

Although strategic and security interests have been amongst the most important motives for Libyan cooperation with its African neighbours other factors are also relevant. This section discusses the main motives behind Libyan cooperation with other African states. These include: geography; history; socio-cultural; strategic relationships; the need for a regional alliance; support from African states against international changes and global security challenges.

First, the geographic factor given Libya's northern coastline has played a strategic role in establishing a policy of shared and mutual interest between Libya and its neighbours.⁴⁶³ Second, there are historic ties based on Libyan tribes which migrated to countries such as Chad, Mali, Sudan, Niger and Nigeria primarily during the 19th and 20th century.⁴⁶⁴

Third, Libya considers itself as being part of the socio-cultural structure of Africa. In other words, the social and cultural values across Africa are the same ones that exist within Libya. Islam has played an important role in homogenising much of Africa's cultural aspects in terms of art, literature and language. Thus, according to Alljabir it can be argued that since the 7th century a common African culture has been evolving as a result of the presence of Islam within the continent.⁴⁶⁵

The fourth factor that has played a role in strengthening the cooperation between Libya and its African neighbours is the strategic relationships that exist between Libya and other African states, in particular, Northern Africa and Sahel-Saharan states. Libya's politics, economy and society are bound to be affected by the events taking place in these states; furthermore, these effects can reach the entire Arab world. Thus, Libyan political leadership has realised the need for an active and strategic cooperation and integration between it and the rest of Africa. No political

⁴⁶³ Abdulsalam, Mohamed Shalluf et al., (2001). *African Documents from Accra to Lomé*. Misrata-Libya: Ad-Dar Al Jamahiriya for Publishing, Distribution and Advertising. P.574 (In Arabic)

⁴⁶⁴ Wajeh, Omar Mater. (September, 2002). "The Gathafi Initiative Between possible and impossible". *Al refkah Journal*, No. 3, Tripoli, p.19 (In Arabic)

⁴⁶⁵ Ahmed, Alljabir. (1992). *Arab-African Relations*. Tripoli: General Company for Publishing, Advertising and Distribution. pp.11-12

commentator can be so naïve as to ignore the strategic importance of Africa vis-à-vis Libyan policy making. In fact, Libyan political rhetoric has emphasised the importance since the 1969.⁴⁶⁶

The changing nature of modern politics and the creation of regional blocs lead us to the fifth factor. Libya has realised that in an era shaped by supra-international alliances, Africa poses the only credible choice as the framework through which a regional alliance can be constructed.

The sixth factor is based on Libya's appreciation of the African support given to it when a number of countries decided to break the international air embargo placed on it by the UN after the Lockerbie issue. This action encouraged the Libyan belief that if African states could unite and cooperate than they could form a strong bond that is able to face whatever challenges or threats are posed by other states.

The final and most important factor is the belief that Africa can provide the necessary strategic depth to provide greater security for Libya and the pan-Arab world.

The above motivations have left Libya with no choice but strengthen its ties with its African neighbours, despite the presence of various political complexities within the continent. Since the early 1990s Libya has concentrated its efforts in achieving certain political aims in Africa, amongst them is the strengthening of its inter-African relations either bilaterally or multi-laterally in the hope of creating a strategic dimension that would strengthen its own security. Such efforts are evident in Libya's promotion of stronger Arab-African ties.⁴⁶⁷

Libyan foreign policy believes unless unity in Africa is achieved then Arab unity projects are also doomed to failure. This belief can be attributed to the immense African support given to Libya in its stand-off with the West. African states were able to independently end the air embargo on Libya in 1998. This decision was taken during the 34th African summit in Ouagadougou. Thereafter, nine African heads of

⁴⁶⁶ Telegram from the President of the Libyan Revolution Command Council to the Presidents of African States before the African Summit (May. 1973) to more information about this telegram see Muammar, Gathafi. (1973-1976). "Statements and Speeches and Talks", *National register*, Vol. (7). The World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green Book. Tripoli. pp.413-414.

⁴⁶⁷ Muammar, Gathafi. (1982-1983). "Statements and Speeches and Talks", Op. cit., 78

states flew to Libya to join in the celebrations commemorating the Libyan Revolution.⁴⁶⁸

Such a remarkable step was not taken by the Arab states. Thus, Libya realised the importance of Africa and increasingly moved towards greater African cooperation. A new African platform African Union rejecting neo-imperialism in all its forms was created; self-reliance and the use of African resources by the African people were the preferred strategies as opposed to relying on Western aid. Most importantly, the ambition of creating a strong strategic policy within Africa that would be able to face the challenges and threats of external actors was proposed.⁴⁶⁹

Consequently, based on the aforementioned motives, Libya saw the need to remove all obstacles, including the Western presence that could get in the way of strengthening Arab-African relations. Thus, Libya, alongside its African neighbours, worked hard to achieve the desired bond between North African and Sub-Saharan states; a bond that would face the challenges of Western hegemony, as well those presented by contemporary international politics.

It cannot be denied that in adopting an anti-Western approach, Libya faced immense difficulties, the most noticeable of which was US policy towards Libya. In 1998, President Clinton toured several African states in the hope of curtailing the Libyan role in Africa. During his meeting in Uganda, Clinton highlighted the danger of Libyan presence in Africa, in particular the spread of Gathafi's ideology in parts of Central and Western Africa. Moreover, the US offered aid packages worth between US\$100m and US\$120m to several African states in return for severing ties with Libya.⁴⁷⁰ There was a common stance by the US and several other Western states to prevent Libya from becoming an important player in the region.

The following section examines the other side of the importance of Africa in Libyan foreign policy, Libya's stance towards Western and Chinese presence in Africa.

⁴⁶⁸ Khalil, I. Matar. And Robert, W Thabit. (2004). *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations*. Jefferson, USA: McFarland and Company Inc. pp.102-103

⁴⁶⁹ Mohamed, Ashour Mahdi. (2002). *African Space in the mind of the Libyan Leadership and its Policies*. Paper presented at the conference of African Studies: About African and Globalisation, Organised by Politics and Economic Faculty, Cairo University on 12th-14th February 2002, Cairo.

⁴⁷⁰ Abd al-Maguid, k. Al Kut. (2001) *Libyan Foreign Policy towards Non- Arab Africa After the cold War*. MA, Cairo: Institute of Arab Research and Studies. pp.232-235 (In Arabic)

4.6. LIBYA'S STANCE TOWARDS WESTERN AND CHINESE PRESENCE IN AFRICA

It is important to note that since the 1969 revolution Libya has adopted a position that until 1999 was entirely opposed to the Western powers. Libya's political ideology, as well as its economic approach, puts it at odds with the major world powers.⁴⁷¹ This stance is due to the Libyan perception that the West is a hostile power which always seeks to colonise the developing world and take control of its resources.

Libya's stance towards the West is clearly portrayed through its relationship with the US. In 1969, Libya expelled US and foreign military bases from its territory. Four years later, the Libyan regime nationalised the hydrocarbon industry and prohibited US and Western military ships from entering its territorial water. Furthermore, Libya's strong support for liberation and revolutionary movements across the globe and particularly in Africa resulted in being deemed as a 'terrorist' state according to US terminology.⁴⁷² Ties between the US and Libya were severed in 2006.

In 1973, as a response to the Middle East crisis with Israel, Libya participated in the oil embargo, the US responded by placing an embargo on the arms sales to Libya in 1978. The relationship took a serious blow in 1979 when the US embassy in Libya was forced to close its doors, as a result the US expelled Libyan diplomats from its territory in 1981.⁴⁷³ The relationship continued to deteriorate and Libya's insistence on embracing its opposition to western policy lead to economic sanctions in 1986, Libyan accounts in US and Western banks were frozen and the Libyan economy suffered.

The US accused Libya of involvement in the 1986 bombing of a night club in Germany which was popular amongst US ex-pats. In 1986, the US Air Force intruded on Libyan air space leading to a stand-off between the two countries. Later that year, the US carried out an air raid on Tripoli and Benghazi causing the loss of many

⁴⁷¹ Tim Niblock. (2002). *Pariah States and Sanction in the Middle East*. US: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp.19-22

⁴⁷² Richard, Heinberg. (2005). *The Party's Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies*. (Second Edition). Canada: New Society Publisher. pp.74-75

⁴⁷³ *Significant Events in U.S.-Libyan Relations*. (Sept, 2008). US Department of State. Available at: <URL:<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/109054.htm>> Access Date: 2nd December, 2008.

Libyan civilian lives.⁴⁷⁴ In 1991 Libya was accused of involvement in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, in which 270 lives were lost. In 1992, the US, France and the UK supported a UN Security Council Resolution placing an air and military embargo on Libya; economic sanctions followed a year later in 1993.⁴⁷⁵

The standoff between Libya and the West continued and it seemed that no reconciliation was possible. However, 1999 witnessed the beginning of a new era. Libya accepted the trial of two of its citizens accused of the Lockerbie bombing. The trial was to be conducted by a Scottish court under Scottish law but held in the Netherlands.⁴⁷⁶ In 2003, Libya offered compensation to the families of the victims on board Pan Am flight 103 subject to the removal of UN sanctions. The deal went ahead and as a sign of goodwill Libya gave up its nuclear programme.⁴⁷⁷

Undoubtedly, these steps played a significant role in changing the nature of Libya's relationship with the West. Diplomatic ties between Libya and many Western states were restored; offices that had been closed for over 30 years were re-opened and Libyan oil was again being exported to the US. As a result, Libya was removed from the list of 'states sponsor terrorism' in 2006 and the air embargo was lifted.⁴⁷⁸ A year later, in 2007, US Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte paid a visit to Libya which paved the way for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit in September 2008. Later that year, US-Libya diplomatic ties were fully resorted after a turbulent relationship that lasted for more than 30 years.⁴⁷⁹

A close examination of the nature of the relationship between Libya and the West leads us to the fact that it is a relationship built entirely upon self-interest. Undoubtedly, Libya's hardline stance caused it many difficulties and resulted in

⁴⁷⁴ Dirk, J. Vandewalle. (2006). *A History of Modern Libya*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp.152-154

⁴⁷⁵ Robert, Litwak. (2007). *Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*. United States: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp.176-177

⁴⁷⁶ Angus, M. Gunn. (2008). *Encyclopaedia of Disasters: Environmental Catastrophes and Human Tragedies*. United State of America: Greenwood Publishing Group. pp.514

⁴⁷⁷ Sean, D. Murphy. (2006). *United States Practice in International Law: 2002-2004*. United State of America: Cambridge University Press. pp.370-374

⁴⁷⁸ Gordon, Corera. (2006). *Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network*. United Kingdom: C. Hurst and Co. Publisher Ltd. pp.223-240

⁴⁷⁹ Ronald, Bruce, St John. Op. cit., pp.133-148

constraints being placed on it. Realising the uni-polar nature of global affairs, in particular since the start of the Lockerbie trial in 1999,⁴⁸⁰ and more so in the post 9/11 political climate, Libya decided to embrace a more flexible approach in its relationship with the West. The huge constraints placed on Libya, in addition to the imbalance in power and abilities left Libya with no choice but to adopt a reconciliatory approach, in particular in the field of economic and humanitarian affairs.

Nevertheless, despite Libya's reconciliatory approach, its beliefs have remained the same. Libya continues to be wholeheartedly opposed to Western military policies that threaten the stability and national sovereignty of African and Arab states. This is evident in Libya's stance vis-à-vis the competition between major powers to penetrate the African continent, most noticeably the one over natural resources and oil between China and the USA.⁴⁸¹ The increasingly active role of China in Africa continues to be a source of concern for Western states, trade between China and Africa increased by 62% year on year to reach US\$72bn in 2008, and the Chinese government expects it to reach US\$100bn in 2010.⁴⁸² This indicates the African states' willingness to cooperate with China; however, it raises further concerns for Western interests in Africa and thus will lead to further competition between the major powers.

Libya believes that Chinese presence in Africa is constructed upon mutual interest and is to the benefit of both parties.⁴⁸³ Nevertheless, it also argues that this presence can be a source of danger and threat to the region.⁴⁸⁴ Libya believes that China has no political interests in Africa, as opposed to the US and other Western powers which are continually meddling in the internal affairs of African states, as history has proven.

⁴⁸⁰ Raymond, A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. (2002). "The Foreign Policy of Libya", in Tim Niblock (Ed), *the Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (pp.213-234). United States: Lynne Rienner Inc.

⁴⁸¹ Hamdi, A. Hassan. (February, 2007) *African and Chinese Relation: Partnership or Hegemony*, Al-Ahram Centre for Politics and Strategic Studies, Brochures Strategy, No.172, Cairo, Available at URL<<http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/ahram/2001/1/1/SBOK57.HTM>> Access Date: 2nd January, 2008.

⁴⁸² Wen Jiabao Chinese Premier (2006). In the Second Conference of Chinese and African Proposed *China and Africa should fully Tap Cooperation Potential and Strive to bring their Trade Volume to 100 Billion U.S. dollars by 2010*, (November 4 2006). Available at: <URL http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/04/content_4990.htm> Date: 2nd Nov, 2008.

⁴⁸³ Zhaoqv, (1st May, 2006). *President Hu's Arab – Africa Visit Fruitful*, website of Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, Available at: URL< <http://au.chinaembassy.org/eng/xw/t250048.htm>> Access Date: 12th January 2008.

⁴⁸⁴ *Gathafi addresser the Student of Oxford University about Africa in the 21st Century*. Op. cit.,

Furthermore, the Libyan leadership is aware of the increasing trust between China and African states. This trust is primarily due to the fact that China penetrated the continent through trade and commerce with beneficial results in the affected regions as opposed to the negative impact of Western imperialism.⁴⁸⁵ This is in stark contrast to the wary relationship between Africa and Western states, which is usually built upon deceit and the lack of trust.

However, Libyan policy is not built upon absolute confidence in China. Libya is aware of the danger of competition between major powers over African resources notably the one that exists between the US, France and China. Furthermore, Libya is also well aware the common interests that unite these very same competing powers, as is evident in the cooperation of the EU, China, France and the US in attempting to combat terrorism in Africa.⁴⁸⁶ According to Libyan perceptions, such competition between the major powers can lead to drastic consequences as was seen during the first period of colonisation. A more contemporary example of such consequences is the Darfur crisis, which according to Libyan beliefs, is a result of the major powers' competition over natural resources in the region. American, French, Canadian and Chinese corporations all have major interests in Darfur, particularly its oil and natural resources.⁴⁸⁷

In terms of Libya's relationship with the West, recent years have witnessed a surge in ties between the two parties; however, this has not lead to a change in the Libyan perception of the West which sees it as an imperialist entity seeking hegemony over the African continent. Furthermore, Western states even compete against one another for control in Africa. This is portrayed through the increasing tension between the US and France as a result of US intervention in Francophone African states. The US has

⁴⁸⁵ Talat, Romeih, (December 29, 2007). *China to Africa: why?* Arab Renewal Website, Available at: URL<<http://www.arabrenewal.org/articles/10393/1/CaOia-Aai-AYNiPiC-aaCDC/OYIE1.html>> Access Date: 3th January 2008. (in Arabic)

⁴⁸⁶ Norman, Bowen. (2005). "Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foreign Policy Discourse". *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 16(1), pp.94-216.

⁴⁸⁷ Walther. (18th May, 2008). *Darfur. A US-China proxy Battle for Oil?:* Ground report. Available at: URL< <http://www.groundreport.com/US/Darfur-A-US-China-Proxy-Battle-for-Oil>> Access Date: 23rd November, 2008.

attempted to lure the support of these states by offering financial and political aid, a move which has caused concern for France.⁴⁸⁸

The US has been able to penetrate two of the most important Francophone states in Africa, Senegal and Djibouti. This is part of the continuous US effort to reduce the role of any external actors in Africa. Furthermore, US policy is also attempting to ensure that no African states play an important role within the continent, as is seen in the US opposition towards Libyan and other Arab states' efforts which are perceived with great hostility.⁴⁸⁹

A major point of contention between Libya and the West is the former's belief that the US and Western powers seek to ignite sectarian and ethnic conflicts among Arabs and Africans for their own interests. This is portrayed through the West's stance towards the issue of political Islam, which it labels as 'terrorism' and uses as a tool to justify military acts, as was the case with the US bombing of the Shifa' pharmaceutical laboratory in Khartoum in 1998.⁴⁹⁰ Another example can be seen in the US role in the Darfur crisis where its support for the InterGovernmental Authority on Development. (IGAD) initiative as opposed to the Libyan-Egyptian efforts to resolve the conflict is a clear indication of the US' desire to create divisions and conflict amongst the African states.⁴⁹¹

In fact, the entire Darfur crisis is perceived by Libya as a clear form of Western interference in African affairs. The crisis according to the Libyan leadership was created by the West to control the region's natural resources and ignite tension and division between Arabs and Africans in the continent.⁴⁹² The nomadic Arab-Bedouin tribes have been involved in confrontations over water resources with the African settler tribes. The latter rely on agriculture as a source of income, thus the importance

⁴⁸⁸ Peter, J. Schraeder. (December, 1995). "From Berlin 1884 to 1989: Foreign Assistance and French, America and Japanese Competition in Francophone Africa". *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(4), pp.547-548.

⁴⁸⁹ Kamara, Abbas. (Friday, 22February, 2008). "Reflections of the Motives of American Interests in Africa", *Al-Raya Newspaper of Sudanese*, No.3750, p.5. (In Arabic)

⁴⁹⁰ David, Hoile. Farce, Majeure. (2000). *The Clinton Administration's Sudan Policy 1993-2000*. London: The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council. p.7-8

⁴⁹¹ Asteris, Huliars. Op. cit., pp.23-24

⁴⁹² Muammar, Gathafi (2007). *The Great Power States Seeks to Control the Oil of Africa*. Al Gathafi Speaks website, Available at URL :< http://www.algathafi.org/html-english/cat_1_2.htm>Access Date: 15th July, 2008.

of water to their livelihood; furthermore, the arid nature of the region results in increased tension over the scarce water resources.

Libyan policy is based on the belief that such conflicts can only be resolved through traditional, tribal means of which the West is unaware.⁴⁹³ Nevertheless, the West insists on intervening, while both France and the US use Darfur as a battleground to fight out their own differences with an absolute disregard to other factors. Furthermore, Western interest in the Darfur region only came about after the discovery of oil, thus the real intentions of Western powers are made clear.⁴⁹⁴

Libyan political discourse refers to the truth is that Western powers have no interest in the humanitarian conditions of the Sudanese people or of Africans. Western policy aims to secure its own interest in Africa, particularly in the oil-rich regions of the continent. Consequently, it is the belief of Libyan policy that the West intends to return to the period of colonisation to secure its own financial and political interests.⁴⁹⁵ Despite the reconciliatory approach of Libyan policy towards the West, Libya is not naïve enough to forget the history of Western mistreatment, not only towards Libya but towards the entire African continent. Thus, the absence of trust between Libya and West will continue to be a crucial factor in the relationship.

In spite of the new phase in Libya's relationship with the West and the many conferences and meetings held to discuss African affairs and development,⁴⁹⁶ Libya continues to be opposed to Western presence and intervention in the continent, especially a military presence. Abdulrahman Shalqam, Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated this position in January 2008 when he stated that:

We have insisted that the achievement of security, stability and development in Africa is the Africans' own responsibility, and Libya does not accept any foreign military presence on African soil, American or otherwise because this

⁴⁹³ For more information see, *Darfur 'A Quarrel over A Camel*, BBC News 24, (Tuesday Oct23, 2007). Available at: <URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7058671.stm>> Access Date: 30th Apr, 2008.

⁴⁹⁴ Foster, John Bellamy. (June, 2006). "A Warning to Africa: The New U.S. Imperial Grand Strategy". *Monthly Review*, 58, (2), pp.1-12

⁴⁹⁵ UNMIS Media Monitoring Report. (20th November 2006) *United Nation Mission in Sudan*. UN: pp.3-4

⁴⁹⁶ David, Goldwyn. Mahmoud, Gebrel. Youssef, Sawani. David, Hamod. (31st March 2008). *Libya's Relation with Africa and the West. paper presented at the first conference on the Libya's Economy and African Development*, organiSed by Middle East Institute and the Green book researcher canter on 31st march ,2008, Washington- US.

will not help in achieving stability, it will only lead to more tension and conflict.⁴⁹⁷

Furthermore, Libya has been adamantly opposed to participating in any US or foreign military programme in Africa, as is evident in its opposition to the establishment of Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US military command in Africa.⁴⁹⁸ Nevertheless, Libya does support a good relationship with the West in all matters of common interest, but a relationship that is built upon mutual benefit and respect for national autonomy and sovereignty.

Recent years have witnessed various Libyan attempts to strengthen its ties with foreign actors, keeping in mind its own domestic and external aims. Part of these attempts was Colonel Gathafi's European tour in 2008, which was described by the Libyan Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam as an attempt to strengthen Libyan-European and African-European relations.⁴⁹⁹ This policy has allowed Libya to be an important actor in the political and security affairs of the region. Furthermore, Western states are aware of the recent change in Libya's foreign policy and its attempt to cooperate with foreign actors in various fields such as development, economy and technology, yet maintaining a clear position of opposition in terms of military presence.

Furthermore, the West's desire to cooperate with Libya has been evident in recent years, in particular in the field of economic development. This stems from the Western belief that Libya possesses immense experience in African affairs. In addition, the prominent position it enjoys within the African Union, the CEN-SAD Community and the continent in general would allow a better implementation of Western development policy in Africa.

⁴⁹⁷ See the *Tunisian Electronic Newspaper of alchourouk*. (12th January, 2008). Available at: URL:<<http://www.alchourouk.com/detailarticle.asp>> Access Date: 24th November, 2008. (In Arabic)

⁴⁹⁸ Saeed, Shabazz. (July 13, 2007). "Africa Rebukes Bush on Africa Command". News Report, *New America Media*, Available at: <URL: http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=4a2a2e222670a44825c1cc01fff3d91e> Access Date: 17th March, 2009.

⁴⁹⁹ More Information see the *Comments of Libyan Foreign Minister on the Result of Colonel Gathafi European Tour*, Tripoli, 4/3/ 2008, Available at: URL<http://www.foreign.gov.ly/online/news_details.php?id_news=1222> Access Date: 15th October 2008.

4.7. CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that Africa is of great importance in Libyan foreign policy, which is primarily due to Libyan policymakers' perception of Africa. There are various factors that make Africa an important entity for Libya policy; these include geographic, political, economic, security and socio-cultural aspects. Furthermore, due to Libya's geographic position, its economic capabilities and political importance, it is an important actor in the continent. Consequently, Libya realises the need to construct a policy which takes into account the stability and security of the entire African region, including the Arab world, because ultimately both these factors will affect Libyan security.

In addition, because Libya, alongside most other African states, has been subject to a long period of colonisation, it perceives the presence of Western ex-imperialist military powers as a threat to the entire continent. Consequently, Libya has insisted on African cooperation to oppose Western presence, in particular in its military form. This call was received positively amongst many African states. In turn, this accumulated greater support for Libya and allowed it to play an important role in resolving inter-African conflicts without intervention from Western powers, as was the case with the Chad crisis. Libya became an influential actor in Africa and is now able to play a peacemaking role equal in importance supranational and global institutions.

Clearly, Libya has succeeded in bringing to an end various African conflicts, either unilaterally or with the help of other actors. Libyan diplomacy was able to restore peace to the Great Lakes region after years of conflict. As for coups, Libyan forces were able to prevent a coup in Central Africa in 2001 and Libyan efforts helped in restoring power to the president of São Tomé and Príncipe after the military coup of 2008. Libya was also active in calming and bringing an end to civil wars, as was evident in the case of Guinea and Liberia. Ethnic conflicts were also a realm for Libyan efforts as was seen in the crises between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria. And finally, Libya policy helped to bring about reconciliation in border disputes such as the ones between Eritrea and Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sudan and Egypt.

Libya believes that all these conflicts are an indirect result of colonisation and thus it insists on the need for African cooperation to rid the continent of the Western military presence. Furthermore, given the common history, geography, politics and most importantly aspirations and hopes that are shared by African states, cooperation is a highly logical choice. It is also a practical one if one takes into account the current trend in global politics which seeks to establish regional blocs. Libya, having realised that Africa presents the most suitable choice for a regional bloc, is working to establish a common African entity. Furthermore, Libya is conscious of Africa's importance for Arab security and its own security and through Africa Libya can execute an influential foreign policy.

Libya's increasing interest in Africa has led to embrace a hardline stance in opposing all forms of foreign presence in Africa, particularly in a military sense. Libyan policy has continuously reiterated its belief in the negative impacts of foreign presence and the threat it causes to Libyan, African and pan-Arab security. Furthermore, in spite of change in the Libyan relation with the West and the increasing cooperation in various fields such as trade and culture, Libya's opposition to Western military presence in Africa remains adamant. This opposition has affected the nature of the relationship between Libya and the West which continues to lack any form of trust. This is further exacerbated by the fact that Libya has been much more welcoming of Chinese cooperation.

In conclusion, we can see that as a result of the previous tensions between Libya and the West, Libyan foreign policy towards the West in the past ten years has proceeded in parallel to US and Western pressures. Through its activity in Africa Libya hopes to acquire greater international support while sending a message to the West that it can wield immense political influence on Western interests in Africa. On the other hand, Libya also has the ability to be more open and flexible, as opposed to the common Western perception portraying Libya as an extreme state.

Chapter five

LIBYA'S ROLE IN THE ECONOMIC REGIONALISATION OF AFRICA

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Globalisation is currently the most influential phenomenon across the globe. It is not just an economic phenomenon but is a process of integration of the world community into a common economic, social and political system. Globalisation is a phenomenon determined by the practices of large, powerful states who are continuously seeking to increase their resources and wealth. As a result a direct confrontation between large and small states has occurred with the former seeking control over the latter's resources without taking into consideration cultural, geographic, economic and political norms and aspects. The practices of US as a super-power are clear evidence of this issue. Noam Chomsky in *What Uncle Sam Really Wants* gives clear evidence when he highlights the main goals of US foreign policy are weakening competitors, controlling the economies of the world and preserving America as a superpower as well controlling other countries especially small states.⁵⁰⁰

Noticeably, globalisation has been heavily supported and promoted by developed states as a tool for market expansion, particularly in developing, non-producer states. This expansion has resulted in severe challenges for many developing states. The shrinking of local production has lead to high unemployment; furthermore, developing states have been subject to increased intervention and pressures from external actors on several fronts including politics, economics and security.

It can be said that globalisation in its current form acts as a restraint upon developing states in Africa and their economies. Globalisation and development are often at opposite ends of the spectrum especially in developing countries. In this respect it is similar to colonisation during which hardly any long lasting development took place in Africa. Africans do not believe that globalisation will achieve beneficial outcomes for their continent. According to Spoor, most Africans are of the opinion that those

⁵⁰⁰ Noam, Chomsky. (2002). *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*. (first edition). Tuscon: Odonian Press. pp. 5-112

who promote globalisation are the same powers that prevented any development from occurring in Africa during the period of colonisation.⁵⁰¹ Consequently, smaller states must seek the initiative to join or establish economic alliances as a strategic alternative to confront global alliances and cope with globalisation and its challenges. Isolation from the international community is no longer a realistic option, therefore it is important to remain part of the global society.

Taking this into account, Libya has been prominent amongst African states in putting forward proposals to face the challenges of globalisation. Amongst these proposals is Libya's call for the strengthening of political and economic regional blocs and alliances as a medium for better cooperation in the face of contemporary challenges.

This chapter discusses two key issues. The first is Libya's motives to encourage the creation and/or strengthening of African economic alliances and adopting a common policy to deal with global alliances. Regional alliances have become a necessity in this era of globalisation. These alliances play a crucial role in assisting developing states but also confront the challenges of globalisation and thus help maintain African security.

The second issue discussed is Libya's role in supporting and strengthening African economic alliances. This section examines Libya's role in the most important African alliances, the role of each alliance and its importance to Libyan policy. In addition, the importance of these alliances vis-à-vis Arab and African regional security are also examined.

5.2. LIBYA'S MOTIVES FOR AFRICA ECONOMIC ALLIANCES

There are a number of factors especially political and economic which can shape a state's foreign policy towards a certain region or regional organisation. This can equally be applied to Libyan foreign policy-makers in their approach which calls for increased African cooperation, either through the strengthening of existing regional institutions or the establishment of new ones. First, the most prominent of these

⁵⁰¹ Max, Spoor. (2004). "Collateral Damage or Collateral Default? The Millennium Development Goals and the Political of Globalisation", in J. Pronk (Ed.), *Globalization, Poverty and Conflict: A Critical "development" Reader* (pp.9-34). Nederland: Kluwer Academic Publisher.

factors is the nature of the post Cold War global affairs. The establishment of regional alliances has become a global phenomenon that cannot be averted. The second factor is Libya has been further encouraged by its belief in Africa's economic ability to confront contemporary challenges.

The third factor is despite the failure of Libya's previous attempts to increase inter-Arab cooperation, it acquired valuable experience in the political processes required to boost regional cooperation. In fact, the failure of its attempts to improve Arab regional cooperation (discussed in chapter three) forced Libya to seek an alternative more viable framework in Africa. The fourth is Libya's awareness of the increasing political and economic challenges facing Africa encouraged it to use its historic ties with African states to promote regional economic alliances. The fifth factor is the views of the Libyan leadership establishing and strengthening African alliances would allow the continent to face modern challenges as well as ease the international pressure being placed on Libya as a result of its African policy.

Undoubtedly, strong Libyan-African relations already exist in various fields such as politics, economics, arts, science and culture. There is also a strong desire amongst the governments of African states to benefit from Libya's economic abilities, particularly from investment in the upstream and downstream hydrocarbon sectors. Furthermore, there is strong consensus amongst many African states who share the Libyan view for the need to promote development within the continent according to African needs and circumstances and not Western ones.

It is a widely accepted notion that new market policies, constructed upon the ideas of open, liberal markets, freedom of information and new technologies, have placed considerable constraints on small states that may had been adopting isolationist policies. As Chomsky argues, it is now necessary to be part of the changing global system and succumb to its laws and policies.⁵⁰² Libya became aware of the several challenges being posed in the modern era. Furthermore, it realised that economic policies, in particular, can play an immense role and thus can be used to confront the challenges of the new world order.

⁵⁰² Noam, Chomsky. Op. cit., Pp. 5-112

Accordingly, Libya embraced a policy of regional cooperation to confront the challenges of the new world order, which are often posed by global powers in the form of regional alliances. Given Libya's strategic, political, economic and cultural significance in Africa, it was only natural that it would lead the way in establishing African alliances.⁵⁰³ Undoubtedly, Libya's resource wealth is amongst the factors which played an important role in encouraging it to support African economic institutions. Table 6.1 shows Libya's hydrocarbon resources compared to other African states.

Table: 5.1. Top Three African Countries Proven Oil & Gas Reserves, 2007⁵⁰⁴

Type	Nigeria	Libya	Algeria
Gas	181.9	52.7	161.7
Oil	36.2	41.5	12.3

Furthermore, Libya currently produces 2m barrels of oil per day and with production expected to increase by a 100% by 2014, Libya's strong economic role within Africa is bound to increase.⁵⁰⁵ The above table also shows that whilst Libya comes in third place regarding gas reserves with 52.7trn square feet with Nigeria in first place with 181.9bn square feet and Algeria in second place with 161.7trn square feet. Libyan oil reserves of 41.5bn barrels exceed both Nigeria and Algeria with 36.2bn and 12.3bn barrels respectively.⁵⁰⁶

It can be argued that as a result of the significant challenges posed by the increasing number of economic alliances there is an increasing threat to Arab and African security and Libya as an African country. Consequently, Libya has continued its support for African economic alliances which has been further promoted by Libya's wholehearted belief in Africa's economic and political ability to become a major actor in global affairs if its resources are used in an appropriate manner. An important step to promote African unity and rid the continent of the various conflicts is the

⁵⁰³ Waniss, A. Otman, Erling Karlberg. (2007). *The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning*. New York: Springer. pp.271-274.

⁵⁰⁴ *Libya Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal*. (July 2007). Energy Information Administration, *Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government*. Available at: <URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Libya/pdf.pdf>> Access Date: 12th November, 2008.

⁵⁰⁵ Waniss, A. Otman Erling Karlberg. Op. cit., p.326.

⁵⁰⁶ *Libya Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal*. (July, 2007). Energy Information Administration, *Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government*. Op. cit.,

strengthening of economic and trade ties between the various African states, this would not only lead to stability but would also reduce international pressures on Libya and other countries in the region.⁵⁰⁷ For example, the political and economic alliances that Libya supports play important roles economically and politically. In terms of economics, the community of CEN-SAD contributes strongly to the composition of gross domestic product of member states. Politically speaking, the African Union supports the African issues and raises the profile of Africa at the level of international organisations.⁵⁰⁸

Furthermore, there is a common perception shared between Libyan foreign policy and the African states towards the promotion of regional alliances, particularly in this era of globalisation in which small states do not have a powerful voice. In addition, there is a Libyan vision for the establishment of a strategic African alliance that would provide the continent with the necessary political, military and moral support in the face of potential conflicts that may occur amongst the major world actors. Also, Libya believes that Africa ought to benefit from globalisation by creating its own regional alliance, one which would lead to a larger market, better investment and growth, lower inflation and higher level of exports and to a decline in budgetary deficits for most African states. Most importantly, an African alliance would act as a central bloc for a common African voice and thus break away from the continent's dependency on its ex-colonisers.⁵⁰⁹

By promoting the policy of integration and cooperation Libya seeks to achieve various strategic goals. These include the prevention of major powers from once again taking control of Africa and possibly redrawing the map of the continent. Furthermore, it believes that integration will halt the usurpation of Africa's resources for the benefit of external actors.

⁵⁰⁷ Mohammad, Nazim. (21st February, 2009). "Review process to activate summit resolutions", Tripoli: *azzahfalahder Newspaper*, p.3 (in Arabic)

⁵⁰⁸ *Available Features Program of Sahel-Saharan Community*. (2008). Available at: URL <<http://www.cen-sad.org/>> Access Date: 14th October, 2009

⁵⁰⁹ Ibrahim, Aboukhazam. (2008). *Libyan and the West*. Paper presented at the Special Conference on Libya's Relations with Africa and the West, organized by Middle East Institute and World Center for Studies and Research of the Green Book, 31 March – 5th May 2008, Washington-U.S.

Undoubtedly, economics plays a crucial role in the national security of any state. This is particularly apposite in the contemporary understanding of security which posits that the lack of economic development leads to an absence of security and stability. Libyan policy is based on this belief to build the security process in Africa. As a result the leadership stresses the importance of establishing African security.⁵¹⁰ This, alongside the changing nature of global affairs and the era of uni-polarity, has formed the cornerstones for Libyan policymaking.

Thus, Libyan policy has promoted African cooperation, be it on a sub-regional scale in the form of mini-alliances or on a pan-African scale. The Libyan leadership believes that such cooperation is likely to lead to various positive outcomes not only on the African level—in the form of reducing inter-African tensions, promoting conflict resolution and encouraging development and stability—but also on the international level by empowering Africa to face the challenges posed by the major players.

Consequently, Libyan policy has continued to support existing African institutions as well as promoting the establishment of new institutions that would speed up the process of economic cohesion and African self-dependency. It is also believed that these institutions would promote peace and security in the continent as well as confront external threats that may wish to control African resources.

It can be argued that Libya's insistence on greater African cooperation stems from its awareness of the importance of African natural resources. The existence of a strategic void in the continent has encouraged external actors to intervene in Africa and thus seek to control its resources.⁵¹¹ The following section examines Libya's role in supporting, strengthening and establishing various regional institutions.


⁵¹⁰ *Gathafi Addresses the Students of Oxford University on Africa in the 21st Century*. (16th May, 2007). Available at: <URL: <http://www.alAlGathfi.org/html-english/index.htm>> Access Date: 20th August, 2007.

⁵¹¹ Final Communiqué of the General People's Congress (Libyan parliament) Sirte: 3rd March, 2007.

5.3. LIBYA'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING AND STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA

It is a well known fact that Africa possesses an immense potential in terms of resources which if are used appropriately can allow Africa to become an influential actor in global affairs. The African continent makes up a fifth of the entire world's earth mass, at 30,056,000 km² it is the second largest continent with a population of over 877,500,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, Africa is considered as one of the richest regions in natural resources and minerals.⁵¹² For example it holds 97% of the world's chrome reserves, 74% of its manganese reserves, 70% of the world's cocoa, 67% of its gold, 67% of its diamonds, 25% of the uranium, 23% of the world's coffee, 20% of its oil, and 14% of the world's copper reserves.⁵¹³

Figure: 5.1. Africa's Share of Selected Global Natural Resources⁵¹⁴



In addition to the aforementioned resources, there are several water sources within the African continent, biggest of which is the Nile which flows into the Mediterranean. There are also three major rivers which flow into the Atlantic Ocean; Congo; Orange;

⁵¹² Abdulsalam, Albaghdadi. (2001). "The African – Arab contemporary problems". *Strategic Issues Journal*. Arab Centre for Strategic Studies, No.6, p.139 (in Arabic)

⁵¹³ Juma, Fazzani. (2001). *The African Union and the Future of the African continent*. Cairo: African Research Centre of Cairo University. p.29 (in Arabic)

⁵¹⁴ Juma, Fazzani. (2001). *Op. cit.*, p.29

and Gambia and Senegal. Six major rivers flow into the Indian Ocean: Juba; Kagera; Rovuma; Rufiji; Limpopo and Zambezi. In addition, there are many waterways and canals that play a crucial role in the global movement of ships.⁵¹⁵

Given the above factors, Libyan policy-makers are well aware of Africa's strategic, economic and political importance and the need to create stability and security in the continent in order to provide a bulwark for pan-Arab security. Therefore, Libya considers Africa as the most crucial and strategic factor for Arab security; it is the fortress through which the entire region can be secured and stabilised and the threat of neo-colonialism can be halted.⁵¹⁶ Furthermore, Libya has been aware of Western attempts to capture and control African resources under the banner of humanitarianism. It is because of this that Libya has insisted on considering any foreign presence in Africa as a threat to the continent. Thus it has continued to play an important role in ensuring that Africa's resources benefit Africans.⁵¹⁷

The declining level of natural resources twinned with the continuous increase in the world's population are sources of concern for global security, thus major powers are urged to seek and control further areas of natural resources.⁵¹⁸ Africa, being one of the wealthiest regions in the world as well as possessing a huge potential market in the form of its population, has become the source of attention for many major actors across the globe. Having realised the continent's strategic importance we are now witnessing an increase in the scramble of major powers towards Africa. This, in turn, has become a source of concern for Libya and its policymakers who have realised the increasing sources of threats to the African continent. Consequently and taking into account the Libyan perception of Africa as a crucial strategic entity for Arab and Libyan national security in particular,⁵¹⁹ Libya has moved towards a policy of supporting and strengthening most of the regional economic and financial institutions

⁵¹⁵ Matiza, and H. N. Chabwela. (1992). *Wetlands Conservation Conference for Southern Africa: Proceeding of the SADCC Wetlands conference*. Southern Africa: IUCN. p.18

⁵¹⁶ Mohamed, Ashour Mahdi. (2002). *African Space in the mind of the Libyan Leadership and its Policies*. Paper presented at the first conference of Arab African Studies: Africa and Globalisation, Organised by Politics and Economic Faculty, Cairo University on 12th –14th February 2002, Egypt.

⁵¹⁷ Suleiman, M. Mansour. Op. cit., p.269

⁵¹⁸ Kathryn, Strother Ratcliff. (1989). "Contraception control and Choice: International Perspectives". in K. Yanoshik and J. Norsigian (Ed.), *Healing Technology: Feminist Perspectives*, (pp.61-92). America: University of Michigan Press.

⁵¹⁹ *Gathafi Addresses the Faculty and Students of Cambridge University*. (2007). Op. cit.,

within Africa. In particular, those that are seen as a benefit to Africa and can play a role in preventing external ambitions from materialising.

Libyan involvement in regional economic institutions in Africa can be traced back to 1972 when Libya joined the African Development Bank (ADB).⁵²⁰ Interestingly, despite Libya's crucial role within the ADB, it remains to be the only member state not to have resorted to the ADB to finance national projects. This highlights Libya's awareness of the priorities for development within Africa. Furthermore, Libya is considered as a hugely active member of the ADB and has been behind several initiatives to promote development in the region. Libya has also supported African cohesion in the battle against poverty, an epidemic that is widespread throughout the continent.⁵²¹

Libya was also a founding member of the first Arab bank dedicated towards promoting development in Africa. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) was established in Khartoum in 1974, and aims to develop agricultural and industrial resources in the continent. Libya contributed US\$195m as its 17.32% share of the capital.⁵²² Another project which received Libyan support is the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) which Libya helped to establish and is its second largest investor.⁵²³ The Bank has provided assistance to several African states including Gambia, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso.

In 2009, Libya provided capital of US\$998m to help establish the African Investment Bank (AIB), which is based in Tripoli-Libya. The AIB will assist African Union members according to the Union's policies and guidelines.⁵²⁴ However, Libyan efforts have not been restricted to the African continent; it has expanded to promote Arab-African economic institutions either through Arab and African regional entities or through bilateral relations with other African states.

⁵²⁰ Helmi, Sharawi. (Nov, 1979). "The new Reading for the Facts of Relations between the Arab - African National Liberation Movements". *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, 79 (10), Beirut. p.75.

⁵²¹ Chawki, Chahed, (2007). *Cooperation between ADB and Libya*, available at: URL:< <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/cooperation-between-ADB-and-libya-1582/> > Access Date: 8th April, 2008.

⁵²² Helmi, Sharawi. Op. cit., p.77

⁵²³ Rabi, Thani. (May, 2007). *Productivity Growth in IDB Member Countries*. IDB Productivity Report, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Development Bank. pp.2-61

⁵²⁴ Decree of Libyan Prime Minister No.54, (2009). "The Approval on the Protocol of the Constitution act of the African Investment Bank.", Tripoli.

Libya has immense political experience which it gained through its participation in a number of African and Arab regional institutions. Such experience has allowed Libya to follow a step-by-step approach towards achieving African unity. Thus, Libya has supported African economic institutions which it not only perceives as a step in the direction of African unity but also as a necessity for the continent to challenge Western economic presence in the region. The thesis now examines Libya's role in establishing or supporting various economic communities. The focus will be on the CEN-SAD community which Libya established and continues to support because it is perceived by Libyan foreign policy-makers as the cornerstone of the African Union which Libya helped to establish.

5.3.1. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) was established on 4 February, 1998 in Tripoli, Libya as a result of the efforts of Muammar Al-Gathafi. The inauguration summit was attended by the heads of states of Mali, Niger, Sudan, Chad, Burkina Faso and Libya. The charter of the Community left the door open to other African states to join as long as the principles and regulations of the community are observed. Subsequently, in 1999 Eritrea and the Central African Republic joined during the first summit held in Sirte. A year later Senegal, Gambia and Djibouti became CEN-SAD members and in 2001 during the Khartoum summit Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Somalia all joined. Togo and Benin were admitted the following year and in the sixth summit in 2004 Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia became members of the community. The following year Ghana and Sierra Leone joined during the Ouagadougou summit and in 2007 Comoros and Guinea were admitted. Finally, during the tenth summit 2008 in Benin Kenya, Mauritania and São Tomé & Príncipe became the newest members of the CEN-SAD community thus making the total number of member states 28.⁵²⁵ CEN-SAD is the largest community of its kind in Africa and although most of its members are under-developed it represents a crucial strategic step towards the security and stability of the region.

⁵²⁵ The Website of CEN- SAD, *Confrences of Heads of CEN- SAD States* (1998). Available at: <URL: http://www.cen-sad.org/new/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=81&lang=english > Access date: 28 May, 2008.

It can be argued that through CEN-SAD Libya hopes to unite the different African states in a single economic alliance that is able to confront the global challenges. Furthermore, the community is an opportunity for Libya to become more politically influential by providing financial assistance to members.⁵²⁶ It is clear that the common intention behind CEN-SAD, which is shared by all the member states, is to benefit Africa as a whole. This has in effect encouraged more states to join the community and thus expanding its membership to 28 states.

The continuing expansion of CEN-SAD also signifies its political and economic importance within an African context. Furthermore, it is an indication of the success of Libyan foreign policy which has exerted considerable effort in establishing and building the community. CEN-SAD is becoming one of the most important economic alliances in Africa, as highlighted by the fact that more states are joining, even states which are part of other regional alliances, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria which are members of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya as members of Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The main reasons behind the success of CEN-SAD derive from several factors, including the realisation by most African states of the challenges posed by globalisation and the policies of major external states. In addition, the aims of CEN-SAD which include the removal of barriers that can prevent the cooperation between members such as the barriers to the movement of people and goods, the freedom to reside and own property, the right to economic activity and the right to access education in any of the member states. CEN-SAD also aims to promote investment across its community and expand into global markets. Member states ought to also treat CEN-SAD citizens as they would treat their own citizens. Furthermore, CEN-SAD is working towards homogenising the educational and cultural systems across its member states.⁵²⁷ This is reflected in the first article in the CEN-SAD agreement which states that the establishment of a comprehensive economic alliance should

⁵²⁶ Sturman, Kathryn. (2003). "The Rise of Libya as a Regional Player". *African Security Review*, 12 (2), pp.109-112

⁵²⁷ Waniss, A. Otman, Erling Karlberg. Op. cit., p.268

work towards the removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of the member countries.⁵²⁸

Clearly, the objectives of CEN-SAD reflect the nature of Libya's vision towards Africa and its urgent need for such alliances that may contribute to the political and economic development of the continent. It is also evident that CEN-SAD holds an important place in Libya's foreign policy which perceives the community as a crucial strategic link between Sahel and Saharan states. Furthermore, through CEN-SAD Libya has been able to bring together Arab and African states in a single economic alliance. It is important to remember that 75% of Arab territory lies within Africa⁵²⁹ and 70% of all Arabs live within the continent⁵³⁰ not to mention the historical, cultural, economic and political ties that are shared by the Arabs and Africans.


It can be argued that through CEN-SAD Libyan policy has been able to create a geo-strategic entity spreading from the Indian Ocean in the east to the Atlantic in the west and from the heart of Africa to both the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Undoubtedly, this strategic entity was a crucial factor in supporting the Libyan stance in its negotiations with the EU and other Western states.⁵³¹ The following map shows the strategic importance of CEN-SAD for Arab security, it is interesting to note that the community forms a security belt around the Arab states. It has also allowed several African states to benefit from economic cooperation and closer ties with Arab states.

⁵²⁸ The Treaty of Established the Community of Sahel-Saharan states CEN-SAD: That was signed in Tripoli – Libya in 4th February 1998.

⁵²⁹ Mazrui, Ali AlAmin. (2002). *African Redefined*. Eritrea: African World Press. p.109

⁵³⁰ Omran, Abdel R. (1980). *Population in the Arab world: problems & prospects*. Great Britain: Groom Helm Ltd.

⁵³¹ AbdulMalik, Oudh. (Aug, 2001). The Community of Sahel-Saharan states: Geostrategic Vision. *Studt publshed in Egyptian-African Studies*, Cairo University: Economic and Political Faculty, p.6 (In Arabic)

Map: 5.1. Membership of CEN-SAD⁵³²

As the above map shows, the security belt formed around the Arab states deems it more difficult to penetrate them and allows them greater time to confront any potential challenges. The success of CEN-SAD is a source of encouragement for Libyan policy to continue to support such alliances.

CEN-SAD played an important role in ending the sanctions on Libya in 1998 and it continues to support Libyan stances in various global gatherings. Many African states share Libya's refusal to accept neo-imperialism in all its forms and its call for the need to rely on African efforts to develop Africa rather than relying on Western efforts. Furthermore, there is a common shared vision between Libya and other states that realise the need for greater economic alliances in this era of globalisation; therefore, Libyan policy initiated the idea of an African sphere that would confront the economic and political alliances of the major global states. The Libyan parliament has continued to support such idea as shown in various parliamentary decrees.⁵³³

⁵³² The official website of the community of Sahel-Saharan CEN-SAD. Available at; URL:< <http://www.cen-sad.org/new/?lang=english>> Access Date: 15th November, 2009.

⁵³³ Decision No.1. (2005). The General People's Congress (Libyan Parliament)

Libyan policy envisages CEN-SAD as an important alliance to confront Western states and their possible ambition of drawing up a new map of Africa in this era of globalisation. It is also a medium through which external attempts to capture African resources are prevented. To this effect, one can clearly notice the immense political and financial efforts exerted by Libya to ensure the success of the CEN-SAD alliance. Financially, Libya provides heavy investment throughout Africa, particularly in the member states. It has also worked to strengthen its economic relations with CEN-SAD members and other African states by signing over 270 memorandums of understanding and establishing 22 joint committees between Libya and other member states.⁵³⁴

Politically, Libya has worked hard to ensure that any conflicts posing a potential hurdle to the success of CEN-SAD are resolved. Libya even paid off any outstanding commitments owed by the CEN-SAD member states to the Organisation of African Unity to ensure the active participation of all states within the political programmes proposed by CEN-SAD.⁵³⁵ Libya has and continues to encourage other African states to join CEN-SAD community; table 5.2 highlights the importance of a larger community which according to a Libyan vision would form the cornerstone of the African Union.

⁵³⁴ Badr, Hassan Shafie. (2001). *Op. cit.*,

⁵³⁵ Lucy, Dean. (Ed.). and Taylor & Francis Group. (2004). *The Middle East and North Africa 2004*. (50th Editions). London: Taylor & Francis Group. P.792.

Table: 2. 2. Data and Information on CEN-SAD States⁵³⁶

No	State	Area by 1,000,000km ²	Population In Millions 2006	Accession to CEN- SAD	Date of independence	Date of accession to the UN
1	Benin	112,600	9,000,000	2002	1960	1960
2	Burkina Faso	274,000	14,800,000	1998	1960	1960
3	Central Africa	623,000	4,300,000	1999	1960	1960
4	Chad	1,284,000	10,800,000	1998	1960	1960
5	Comoros	1,900	600,000	2007	1958	1975
6	Côte d'Ivoire	322,500	19,300,000	2004	1957	1960
7	Djibouti	23,200	800,000	2000	1977	1977
8	Egypt	1,001,500	75,500,000	2001	1936	1945
9	Eritrea	117,000	4,800,000	1999	1992	1993
10	Gambia	11,300	1,700,000	2000	1956	1956/
11	Ghana	238,500	23,500,000	2005	1957	1957
12	Guinea	245,900	9,400,000	2007	1960	1958
13	Guinea Bissau	36,100	1,700,000	2004	1973	1974
14	Kenya	580,400	37,300,000	2008	1963	1963
15	Liberia	111,400	3,800,000	2004	1947	1945
16	Libya	1,759,500	6,200,000	1998	1955	1955
17	Mali	1,240,200	12,300,000	1998	1960	1960
18	Mauritania	1,030,700	3,100,000	2008	1960	1961
19	Morocco	446,600	30,900,000	2001	1956	1956
20	Niger	1,267,000	14,200,000	1998	1960	1960
21	Nigeria	923,800	148,000,000	2001	1960	1960
22	SãoTomé and Príncipe	946,000	200,000	2008	1975	1975
23	Senegal	196,700	12,400,000	2000	1960	1960
24	Sierra Leone	71,700	5,800,000	2005	1961	1961
25	Somalia	637,700	8,700,000	2001	1960	1960
26	Sudan	2,506,800	38,600,000	1998	1956	1956
27	Togo	56,800	6,600,000	2002	1960	1960
28	Tunisia	163,600	10,200,000	2001	1956	1956
	Total	16,230,400	514,500,000

The above data shows that the CEN-SAD covers 16,230,400km² (over 60% of Africa's landmass) with over 514m inhabitants (over half of Africa's population); as such it is the largest economic community in Africa. Member states possess a high level of natural resources, which if used within the framework of the organisation's agreements can be of immense potential to the development process of Africa. Politically, CEN-SAD forms a crucial strategic alliance with a common aim of peace and good relations. Common factors such as geography, civilisation, culture and history add to the strength of the community. More importantly, most member states

⁵³⁶ Data about the Community of Sahel-Saharan States is drawn from the following websites. Data and Statistic at the World Bank website. Available at <<http://ddpext.worldbank.org>> Access date: 13 May 2008. The CEN-SAD official website. Available at <<http://www.cen-sad.org/new/index.php?lang=english>> Access date: 28 May 2008. The African Union website. Available at: <<http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/memberstates/map.htm>> Access date 28th May, 2008.

support Libyan policy vis-à-vis the African Union, thus allowing Libya to push through its policies both on a regional and international level.

In its efforts to strengthen the CEN-SAD alliance, Libya has participated in the establishment of various agencies and sub-divisions; these include the economic, social and cultural councils as well as CEN-SAD's Bank for Investment and Commerce (BSIC) which is headquartered in Tripoli and in which Libya has a 40% stake.⁵³⁷ During the 10th summit in 2008 Libya granted US\$3bn to the BSIC in order to invest in infrastructure projects throughout the member states, in particular the improvement of roads and bridges which are crucial to the development process of the continent.⁵³⁸

The BSIC aims to attract investment in the region according to the community's conditions and requirements; it also cooperates with other agencies to ensure the execution of CEN-SAD policies and helps in promoting the economies of the member states and their active participation in international financial organisations. This reflects Libya's awareness of the importance of such alliances in highlighting the continent's role in the international arena.⁵³⁹

In order to further promote the continent's international role, CEN-SAD has entered into various agreements with many regional and international bodies and organisations to strengthen ties in the fields of politics, economics and culture. This has given CEN-SAD a political dimension which member states would not have been able to access prior to their accession.

Also agreements have been entered into in relation to food security which is a central tenet of CEN-SAD's founding charter. Libya as a CEN-SAD member has cooperated with the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to sponsor food development programmes in more than 12 African countries, making it the largest food security

⁵³⁷ Abdullah, Adam Khatir. (18th March, 2008). "The CEN-SAD Community: Start or Rebuilding?", *Al-Sahafa Newspaper*, No.5292, pp.2-3. (In Arabic)

⁵³⁸ *Libya Granted three Billion Dollars to the CEN-SAD Bank*. (2008). Available at: <URL: <http://www.alarabonline.org/index.asp?fname=\2008\06\06-18\998c1.htm&dismode=x&ts=>> Access Date: 18th Jun, 2008.

⁵³⁹ Taher, Mohamed Alsnvaz. (January 1999). "Treaty of the Community of CEN-SAD and the Future of Africa". Libyan Ministry of Information: *Arab Culture Journal*, No.1, pp.17-19. (In Arabic)

programme of its kind in the region.⁵⁴⁰ It can thus be seen that the Libyan perception of the CEN-SAD is that of a medium to strengthen inter-African cooperation and consequently allow Africa a greater role in the international arena to ensure security and stability in the continent.

Article II and III of the founding charter states the need for a security framework which ensures regional peace and stability and which is in effect a pre-requisite for the other aims of the Community.⁵⁴¹ Accordingly, thanks to Libyan efforts a security agreement was signed in September 1999 and further aims relating to security, peace-keeping and further cooperation were added to the CEN-SAD's objectives, particularly in the fields of agriculture, industrial and investment. CEN-SAD was also given an observer status at the UN General Council in resolution RES/A/56/92.⁵⁴² The security agreement gave CEN-SAD a role in conflict resolution between member states and to ensure that all the necessary steps are taken for peace and security to prevail throughout Africa.

In its efforts to further promote CEN-SAD Libya worked hard during its presidency of the community in 1999, 2002 and 2006 to ensure that conflicts were resolved and reconciliation was established for ultimately the aim of Libyan policy is to ensure peace and stability throughout the continent.⁵⁴³

Clearly, the establishment of CEN-SAD is considered by Libya as an important step in its efforts to create African unity and thus bring peace and stability to the continent. Furthermore, CEN-SAD is considered by Libyan policy-makers as a necessity to ensure that further economic decline is prevented in member states; it also halted the plans of external actors to usurp African resources.

The vision of this alliance in Libyan policy came about as a means to bring together the advantages of the member states, such as the fertile coasts, natural resources such

⁵⁴⁰ A Report, (2007). About the Progressing of the Community of Sahel-Saharan states CEN-SAD: the Libyan Foreign Ministry. Tripoli, 02/06/2007.

⁵⁴¹ The Treaty of Established the Community of Sahel-Saharan states CEN-SAD: That was signed in Tripoli – Libya in 4th February 1998.

⁵⁴² The UN General Assembly under the Resolution A/RES/56/92. Op. cit.,

⁵⁴³ Ibid.,

as oil, diamonds and gold. The result is better security for both Libya and other states in the region in the hope of achieving stability in Africa.

5.3.2. Economic Community of West African States

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in May 1975 and became effective in 1976. The Community is made up of 16 states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.⁵⁴⁴ The Community aims to strengthen cooperation and integration amongst its members, as well as establish economic and monetary union. The Community also aims to achieve agricultural development. In terms of economic cooperation the focus is on the fields of energy, industry, transport and telecommunication. It also aims to improve commercial relations between member states as part of development in Africa.⁵⁴⁵

Although the primary objective of ECOWAS was to create economic unity, the Community's leaders have realised the important link between economics and politics and security. Due to the absence of stability in the region, the member states have agreed to establish a medium through which all states can achieve peace and stability. Consequently, during the 4th summit held in Dakar in 1979 the heads of states agreed a joint defence policy charter. One year later in May 1980 the charter became effective making it the first regional common security alliance within Africa. The charter also highlights the need for a common stand to defend constitutional regimes by participating in the creation of a joint military force.⁵⁴⁶

As part of Libyan efforts to strengthen all African institutions which it deems as being able to participate in the development of Africa, Libya has shown interest in ECOWAS. On various occasions it has called for the integration of ECOWAS with CEN-SAD based on the fact that most members in the former are also members in the latter. Libya also argues that CEN-SAD is better positioned to be able to play a role in

⁵⁴⁴ Ademola, Adeleke. (1995). "The political and diplomacy of peacekeeping in West Africa: The Operation in Liberia". *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 33(4), pp.569-593.

⁵⁴⁵ Henry, Kyambaleasa. and Mathurin C. (2006). *Economic Integration and Development in Africa*. England: Ashgate Publisher Limited. p.84

⁵⁴⁶ David, J. Francis. (2006). *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. England: Ashgate Publisher Limited. pp.145-146.

promoting development in its member states.⁵⁴⁷ As part of this process, Colonel Gathafi attended the 33rd ECOWAS summit held in Burkina Faso in January 2008,⁵⁴⁸ during which he reiterated the call to integrate ECOWAS with CEN-SAD. Furthermore, Libya has shown support for the ECOWAS in its attempts to resolve Africa's many conflicts and disagreements⁵⁴⁹ (as discussed in chapter four).

Overall, Libya's stance regarding ECOWAS is that it is an organisation which supports efforts to strengthen African unity in order to confront the challenges which are faced by many states within the continent. It also reflects Libya's aim to unite and strengthen regional organisations within Africa. This was evident in the Libyan National Public Congress (parliament) decision in 2007 for the need to establish a method or medium through which the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), ECOWAS and CEN-SAD can be integrated to form a single economic union.⁵⁵⁰ This reflects the seriousness of Libyan policy to unite African efforts in the face of external challenges.

5.3.3. Southern African Development Community

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa towards Economic Liberation. It was initially formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states under the umbrella the Southern African Development Community Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. The founding member states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADCC was transformed into SADC on 17 August 1992 at a summit of heads of state and government in Windhoek, Namibia when the Declaration and Treaty was signed, thereby giving the organisation a legal character. The community now comprises of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of

⁵⁴⁷ Muammar, Gathafi Speech at the opening Meeting of the Eighth Session of CEN-SAD Community; He addressed many Important Issues and Topics about the CEN-SAD and the African Continent in General. Tripoli: Libyan Information Ministry. 3/6/2006.

⁵⁴⁸ Muammar, *Gathafi attend the ECOWAS Summit*. (2008) Available at: <URL: http://www.moheet.com/show_news.aspx?nid=77495&pg=21> Access Date: 2th June 2008.

⁵⁴⁹ Ali, Triki. The Libyan Ministr of African Affairs, (2008). *Libya Supports the Mediation Efforts of the ECOWAS Community in Africa*, Interview. Zana the Zambia News Agency, Available at: URL: <http://www.zana.gov.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=9&id=1038733087>> Access Date: 3rd June, 2008

⁵⁵⁰ Final Communiqué, (2007). of the General People's Congress (Libyan Parliament)

Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.⁵⁵¹ SADC headquarters are located in Gaborone, Botswana. SADC aims to promote development and growth, reduce poverty, improve living standards in its target region,⁵⁵² develop joint institutes and organisations, promote sustainable growth on the principle of cooperation between member states and strengthen historical, social and cultural ties between members.⁵⁵³

Libya participated in the SADC-sponsored peace initiative in October 1998.⁵⁵⁴ The initiative aimed to establish peace between the rebels and regimes in Uganda, Rwanda and Congo. Libyan succeeded in participating actively to bring resolutions to various conflicts within the initiative's framework, Libya also participated in the heads of states SADC Summit on 17 June 1999 which planned to bring an end to the Congo crisis.⁵⁵⁵ Libya has also been involved in attempting to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe, and gave support to Nelson Mandela to bring to end apartheid in South Africa. Libya involvement with SADC has also included strengthening bilateral relations with individual member states, either in the form of improving economic ties.

Libyan policy-makers believe that the 'alliance phenomenon' will end with SADC being the major alliance in the southern part of the continent whilst CEN-SAD will hold the same position in the northern part.⁵⁵⁶ Although Libya was not directly present at SADC's establishment it has always supported the community which it believes is beneficial to the continent on various levels.

⁵⁵¹ Ben, Chingara. (2004). *Land Reform Policy: the Challenge of Human Rights Law*. England: Ashgate Publisher. p.4-5

⁵⁵² Robert, M. Perito. (2007). *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*. Washington: US Institution of Pace Press. p.80-81

⁵⁵³ Mohamed, Ashour Mahdi. (2001). "The Southern Africa Development Community (CADC)". *Afakh Africiya Journal*, 2 (7), p.22-23.

⁵⁵⁴ Christian, P. Scherre. (2002). *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*. US: Greenwood Publisher Group. pp.274-275

⁵⁵⁵ Stefaan, Smis. and Wamu, Oyatambwe. (2002). "Complex Political Emergencies, the International Community and the Congo Conflict". *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 29 (93 & 94), pp.411-430.

⁵⁵⁶ Gaddafi is expected to birth of Two Regional Grouping in African Union. (2007). The 9th Summit of CEN - SAD Community in Libya. *Aljazeera.net*, Available at: <URL: <http://www.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveId=1059788>> Access Date: 5th June, 2008.

5.3.4. Common Market of East and Southern Africa

The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 1981 under the name of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) as an organisation with the aim to promote and develop the economic potential of its members and to achieve economic integration. In 1992 the members of PTA changed the name to COMESA and on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda signed the treaty of establishment, which was ratified a year later in Lilongwe, Malawi on 8 December 1994.⁵⁵⁷ COMESA has 19 member states: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Libya which officially joined the community in 2005.⁵⁵⁸

Despite efforts towards achieving the economic goals, the lack of stability in the region has forced the COMESA to focus its efforts almost entirely on the security aspect. Consequently, during the 4th COMESA summit in Nairobi in 1999, the heads of states decided to make the issues of peace, security and cooperation to resolve conflict their priorities.⁵⁵⁹

Libya played an important role in bridging the gaps between COMESA members even before it officially joined the community highlighting Libya's deep awareness of the importance of peace and stability in Africa. Libya participated in the reconciliation process between Sudan and Uganda in 1995, a hurdle which had always prevented economic progress within the COMESA.⁵⁶⁰ In its efforts to support the community, Libya participated as an observer at the Cairo Summit in 2001.⁵⁶¹ Realising the importance of this common market Libya joined COMESA during the 10th Summit in June 2005 and was given full membership in August 2006.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁷ Christof, Heyns. (2002). *Human Rights Law in Africa 1999*, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. p.354

⁵⁵⁸ Waniss, A. Otman, Erling, Karlberg. Op. cit., P.269-270.

⁵⁵⁹ Jamal, Dilla. (2000). "The legal and Political Framework of The Common Market for East and Southern Africa COMESA". *Afakh Africiya Journal*, 1(1), pp.21-54 (In Arabic)

⁵⁶⁰ Tripoli's Announcement of the Principles and Measures to Restore Confidence between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of Uganda. Libyan Foreign Ministry, Tripoli, April 1995

⁵⁶¹ Jamal, Dilla. Op. cit., pp.21-54

⁵⁶² Waniss, A. Otman, Erling Karlberg. Op. cit., pp.269-270

In November 2007, Libya hosted the 12th Meeting of the COMESA Governors of Central Banks which discussed further economic integration within the Community.⁵⁶³ In recognition of the importance of technology and software in boosting economic development, Libya sponsored the first workshop on the free and open source software in May 2008. The workshop was coordinated between the Libyan Foreign Ministry and the COMESA Administration of Information and Systems.⁵⁶⁴

In the field of bilateral relations between Libya and other COMESA members, in 2008 Libya supported the construction of a new oil pipeline connecting Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda which was part of Libya's efforts to alleviate the consequences of high energy prices and to support investment within the region. Libya also signed a treaty in 2008 with Burundi guaranteeing and protecting investments between the two states.⁵⁶⁵ Furthermore, since its accession to the Community Libya has become one of the largest donors to COMESA's budget.⁵⁶⁶

It can be seen that Libya has seized every opportunity to be an active member within the COMESA either on the institutional level or in the field of bilateral relations. This further reflects Libya's awareness of the importance of such alliances to improve the living standards of the African individuals and strengthen the tools of development as well as establish security and stability within the continent.

5.3.5. The Arab Maghreb Union

The first serious initiative to establish the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) came in the form of the Zeralda Declaration which was a result of the 1988 Arab Summit in Algiers and was signed by the heads of states of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The Declaration called for the establishment of a committee to examine

⁵⁶³ *The Twelfth Meeting of Governors of COMESA Central Banks*. (Nov, 2007). Available at: <URL: http://www.cbl.gov.ly/search/details.php?id=869&cid=75&totalRows_RSSearchAll=29&textfield=%E1%CF%E6%E1> Access Date: 10th June, 2008.

⁵⁶⁴ *Workshop on Free Software of COMESA*. (May 2008). Available at: <URL: <http://www.libyaninvestment.com/pdf-engine/?x877=x0ff8d4&id=7495>> Access Date: 10th June, 2008.

⁵⁶⁵ *Libya Oil Company Signed the Treaty with Burundi Government to Establish the Pipeline Petroleum Products*. (May 2008). Available at: <URL: <http://www.alelam.net/New/economy/details.php?id=2806&kind=E>> Access Date: 10th June, 2008.

⁵⁶⁶ Final Communiqué, (2005) of The Tenth Summit of the COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, "Theme: Deepening Regional Integration Through COMESA Customs Union" Kigali, Rwanda 3rd June, 2005.

the means of uniting the Arab Maghreb. On 17 February 1989 the five heads of states at their meeting in Marrakech announced the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union.⁵⁶⁷

The AMU set out to achieve various goals, the most important of which were to strengthen the ties between the member states both officially and publicly, improve standards of living, participate in peace-making on the principle of justice, create a common policy in various fields and start the gradual process of achieving the free movement of goods and labour. At the time, some analysts expected full unity to be achieved between the AMU states.⁵⁶⁸

AMU's creation at the end of the 1980s came at a time of global transition, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of socialism—an ideology to which many Arab States had ascribed. It was also a time when the US became more interested in acquiring global hegemony and creating a uni-polar world. Many Arab and African states were under the impression that this new era would be one of alliances and blocs, an opinion based on the discussions of Eastern enlargement and a single European currency taking place within the European Community at the time. These changes became the incentive for the creation of the AMU; however, the process did not prove easy with a number of key internal and external challenges.⁵⁶⁹

The most prominent of these challenges related to economic and security issues, including the civil war in Algeria, the issue of Western Sahara and various border disputes.⁵⁷⁰ The crisis in Algeria came about as a result of the 1991 election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the appearance of the military as an important political actor in the country. However, the most crucial conflict was that in the Western Sahara involving the Liberation Army for Western Sahara (Polisario). This conflict caused tension between Algeria and Morocco with the latter accusing the former of using the crisis to stop Morocco from expanding southwards. In 1995,

⁵⁶⁷ Zeralda Declaration. (1988). Available at :< URL:

<http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/uma.cfm> >Access Date: 10th June, 2008.

⁵⁶⁸ Marrakech Treaty of established the Arab Maghreb Union. 17th February, 1989.

⁵⁶⁹ Dickson, Eyoh. (2003). *Encyclopaedia of Twentieth-century African History*. New York: Routledge. pp.36-37

⁵⁷⁰ Yahia, H. Zoubir. (1999). *North Africa in Transition: State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s*. US: University Press of Florida. pp.176-181

Morocco made an official request to halt the AMU's institutes as a sign of protest against Algeria's stance in supporting the Polisario in the Western Sahara conflict.⁵⁷¹ There are also a number of other tensions between the AMU member states; for example, the border disputes between Algeria and Morocco, and Tunisia and Mauritania.

In addition to these bi-lateral security issues, in 2004 Libya refused to hold the Presidency of the AMU as a protest against the other members' participation in the international sanctions against Libya and thus not abiding by the Union's common defence policy.⁵⁷² The normalisation of ties with Israel was a further point of contention, with Libya opposing Mauritania's normalisation of ties with Israel.⁵⁷³ In turn, this resulted in Mauritania accusing Libya of meddling in its internal affairs by supporting coups against the regime in 2003.⁵⁷⁴

Libya was also active both bilaterally and multi-laterally within the Maghreb but outside the AMU. In 1984, Libya and Morocco signed the Treaty of Oujda—the founding cornerstone of the Arab African Union—with the aim of protecting the Arab region against any potential threats. However, this agreement was abandoned by Morocco in 1986.⁵⁷⁵

Despite all the problems facing it, Libya exerted its utmost efforts to make the AMU and its institutions successful. Libya's participates in all of the Union's councils; it hosts the Maghreb Academy of Science and the AMU's headquarters; Libya also participates in the Maghreb Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷¹ Robert, A. Mortim. (1999). "The Arab Maghreb Union: Myth and Reality" in Yahia H. Zoubir (Ed.) *North Africa in Transition State, Society, and Economy Transformation in the 1990s*. (pp.177-194). U.S: University Press of Florida.

⁵⁷² Kennady, Graham. and Tania, Felicic. (2006). *Regional Security and Global Governance: A Study of Interaction between Regional Agencies and UN Security Council with the Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism*. Belgium: VUB Brussels University Press, pp.165-166.

⁵⁷³ Mustafa, Filali. (1990). "Prospects for the Arab Maghreb Union". *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal*, The Arab Future Centre: Issue, No.132, pp.41- 45.

⁵⁷⁴ Hufbauer, Gary. Claire, Brunel. (2008). *Maghreb regional and global integration: a dream to be fulfilled*. United States of America: Peterson Institute. p10

⁵⁷⁵ Suleiman, M. Mansour. Op. cit., p.154

⁵⁷⁶ *The Institutions of Arab Maghreb Union*. (2008). Available at: <URL: <http://www.maghrebarabe.org/ar/institutions.cfm>> Access Date: 10th July, 2008.

In its efforts to reduce the tension between member states, Libya accepted to share part of its continental shelf with Tunisia despite the 1985 International Court of Justice decision in favour of Libya.⁵⁷⁷ This clearly indicates Libya's willingness to bridge any gaps that may exist between member states. As for Libyan relations with Algeria, the two countries have entered into several political, economic and security agreements with the aim of improving bilateral ties within an AMU framework. As a result of the Libyan Prime Minister's decision in 2004, the Libyan-Algerian dispute over the border was ended.⁵⁷⁸

Libyan ties with Morocco have also improved with the former insisting that its support for the people of Western Sahara Polisario is directed against Spanish imperialism and not the sovereignty of Morocco.⁵⁷⁹ Libya abandoned the Saharan cause as soon as the Moroccan authorities took over the management of the Sahara issue and left the issue to be resolved exclusively between the people of Western Sahara and Morocco. Furthermore, Libya has tried to improve relations with Morocco, several visits involving officials from both countries have taken place and a number of agreements have been signed covering a range of areas including politics and economics.⁵⁸⁰

Despite Libya's disapproval of Mauritanian normalisation with Israel and despite the Mauritanian accusations of Libyan involvement in the attempted coups of 2003 and 2004, Libya has attempted to improve its relations with Mauritania in order to strengthen the Union.⁵⁸¹ Libya has rejected all Mauritanian accusations and insisted on improving diplomatic ties requesting that the Mauritanian government present any evidence proving Libyan involvement.⁵⁸² It is important to note that the relationship

⁵⁷⁷ The Judgment of the International Court and Justice, No. 85/21. (10th December 1985). Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February, 1982 in the case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya)

⁵⁷⁸ The Decisions of Libyan Prime Minister No.83/2004, 198/2005, 457/2006, 465/2006, 455/2006, 516/2007, Available at: URL < <http://gpc.gov.ly/online/searchdec.php?decn=%C7%E1%CC%D2%C7%C6%D1> > Access Date: 13th March, 2008.

⁵⁷⁹ Muammar, Gathafi. (1975-1976). "Statement and Speeches and Talks", Op. cit., pp.347-423

⁵⁸⁰ The Decisions of Libyan Prime Minister No.50/2006, this Decision confirms to activation of all agreements with Morocco. Tripoli, Libyan Monastery, 2006.

⁵⁸¹ Daniel, Zisenwin.(2007). "Mauritania's Democratic Transition: A Regional Model for Political Reform?" *The Journal of North Africa Studies*, 12 (4), p. 481- 499.

⁵⁸² *Libya denies Mauritania coup Link*. (2004). London: Available at: < URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3703694.stm> > Access Date: 11th July, 2008.

between the two states has improved since the arrival 2005 of a new regime in Mauritania.

Despite all the aforementioned efforts by Libya, the economic, political and security hurdles have prevented the AMU from progressing. As a result Libya has sought alternative alliances to confront modern challenges, but without entirely abandoning the AMU. Libya justifies this by arguing that the Union and its institutions are still unable to bring about unity and integration, pointing out that even the goals of the Marrakech agreement have yet to be realised. Nevertheless, Libyan policy-makers remain positive about the Union and reiterate the need to activate its institutions in order for it to be able to deal with other regional alliances, with specific reference to the Western Mediterranean region (5+5).⁵⁸³ Libyan policy does not ascribe to the concept of a nation-state *per se* but instead believes that the world ought to be divided into blocs and alliances. Therefore, Libya calls for the integration of the AMU with other African alliances in order to create one single Arab-African alliance capable of confronting the modern challenges posed by the major actors.⁵⁸⁴ This indicates Libya's refusal to abandon the northern part of Africa.

In its efforts to ensure that the Arab states of North Africa do not fall into the traps of Western states, Libya called for a mini summit on 10 June 2008, during which Colonel Gathafi called for the need to be cautious vis-à-vis the European bid to establish a Euro-Mediterranean alliance. The Colonel sees this move as an attempt to split Arabs and Africans on the continent.⁵⁸⁵ We can clearly see that Libya has exerted immense efforts—both on a bilateral and regional level—to make the AMU successful.

⁵⁸³ Decision No.1, Article 5, (2005). The General People's Congress (Libyan Parliament) about the Libyan Foreign Policy, Tripoli- Libya.

⁵⁸⁴ Muammar, Gathafi Speech in (ECOWAS) *Ouagadougou Summit*. (18th January, 2008). Available at: URL< <http://www.rcmlibya.org/News/2008/details.ID019-1.1.08.htm> > Access Date: 23th April, 2008. Also see the Final Communiqué (2007). The General People's Congress (Libyan parliament). Sirte 3 March, 2007.

⁵⁸⁵ Muammar, Gathafi, (12th Jun 2008). Speech at the Tripoli Summit. Mediterranean Union of the States Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, Tripoli: *Azzahfalkhder Newspaper*, p.1.

5.3.6. The African Economic Community

Since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, African states under successive leaders have attempted to establish a strong alliance, not only to overcome internal and external conflicts, but also to achieve economic and social prosperity for its citizens. This ambition has led to the creation of various alliances in the 1970s and 1980s with the aim of achieving integration in the continent. However, this ambition faced significant problems, including ideological differences and the inability to pay the financial commitments that come with joining an alliance. The failure of several alliances led to the rise in new development strategies during the first two decades of African independence thus leading to serious consideration on how to overcome this issue.

During the 16th Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Monrovia in 1979, a specific strategy was agreed upon by the heads of states to adopt a policy of self-reliance in the fields of social and economic development.⁵⁸⁶ A year later in the Lagos Summit, the heads of states reiterated the need to follow the Monrovia strategy. However, internal conflicts within the continent were the main reason behind the delay in its implementation.⁵⁸⁷ As a result of the lack of progress, in 1991 the Abuja Treaty was signed establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).⁵⁸⁸ In its efforts to activate the different African economic alliances, Libya has repeatedly called for the activation of the AEC's institutions. The 2001 Sirte protocol called for the establishment of an African Parliament as a step towards achieving the AEC's goals.⁵⁸⁹

It can generally be said that the AEC started to work effectively as a result of the Sirte protocol which called for the activation of the Abuja Treaty and all the different

⁵⁸⁶ Sadig, Rasheed and Makha, D.N. Sarr. (1991). "From the Lagos Plan of Action to the Thirteenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly", in Adebayo, A. Owodunni, T. and Patrick, B. (Eds.), *The Challenge of African Economic Recovery and Development* (pp.13-36). London: Frank Cass and CO.LTD.

⁵⁸⁷ Claude, Ake. (1996). *Democracy and development in Africa*. Washington: Brookings institution press. p.22

⁵⁸⁸ The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). (1991). Available at: <URL: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/AEC_Treaty_1991.pdf > Access Date: 23th Jun, 2008.

⁵⁸⁹ Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-Africa Parliament. Sirte-Libya, 2nd March, 2001.

institutes it aimed to create. One cannot deny that Libya played a crucial role amongst the different African actors to reach the Sirte protocol which called for the need to establish the AEC's most crucial institutes, namely the Central Bank of Africa, the African Monetary Union and the African Court of Justice. It also called for the strengthening of regional economic alliances as a way of achieving the AEC's economic goals.⁵⁹⁰

According to the Durban Declaration on 10 July 2002, the founding treaty of the AEC aims to establish the various African economic institutes through African Common Market based on regional economic alliances. These alliances have proved to be a central force towards economic integration in the continent as well as creating closer links with international organisations. The AEC Treaty also aims to promote peace by resolving conflicts between member states.⁵⁹¹

It can be said that the Libyan perception of the importance of regional alliances was correct and its dedication to the various alliances has been crucial to the development of many economic institutions. This has occurred through better inter-African and Arab-African cooperation, as well as closer ties with international organisations. Libya was an important actor in all the steps leading to the establishment of the AEC. Since 1969, it has always called for what it believed was best for the continent and has participated in and hosted many of the conferences and meetings concerning the AEC. Such Libyan efforts reflect the deep understanding of the importance of the AEC for the speeding up of economic integration and cooperation between African states.

5.3.7. Libya Africa Investment Portfolio

The Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP) is important because of the significant level of Libyan investment in Africa, which totals US\$35bn. The fact that Libya has placed most of its investments in Africa despite the political instability and lack of security is only part of Libya's efforts towards the continent. As previously discussed, Libya believes that the main reason for the absence of stability in Africa is due to the

⁵⁹⁰ *Sirte Declaration*. Op. cit.,

⁵⁹¹ *Durban Declaration* in Tribute to the Organization of African Unity and on the Launching of the African Union. Assembly of the African Union. First Ordinary Session, (9 -10 July, 2002) Durban-South Africa.

intervention of certain external actors and their imperialist ambitions. Therefore, Africans have no choice but to concentrate their efforts and search for a strong African entity that is able to use the continent's resources for the benefit of its own citizens. Furthermore, this should be done without any foreign intervention and away from the Western dominated globalisation policies.

Undoubtedly, Africa's richness in resources makes it one of the wealthiest continents.⁵⁹² In turn, these resources made it appealing for the ambitions of external actors and thus a concern for Libyan policy. It is evident through the official rhetoric of Libyan policy that it wholeheartedly believes that if Africa's wealth is used in an appropriate manner then it can reap benefits for the citizen of Africa. Libyan policy-makers have also been aware of the foreign hegemony over Africa's resources and that this was a result of the void caused by the absence of effective African institutions able to be promote the well-being of the African people.

Such reasons have urged Libya to seek a way of either confronting those challenges or finding a way to adapt to them, thus it was faced with no choice but to concentrate its economic efforts towards the continent. As a result, the LAP was founded by government decree number 15, 2006 with a capital of over US\$5bn.⁵⁹³ This was in addition to the US\$25bn which Libya was investing as part of the Arab Corporation for African Investments and other mediums. These funds all came under the newly established LAP.⁵⁹⁴ The aim of the LAP is to strengthen Libyan presence within Africa, improve Arab-African relations and confront the challenges of external actors. The Libyan Prime Minister declared that the purpose of this portfolio is to strengthen and unite Libyan investments under one authority to able to deal effectively with other companies and thus compete strongly in international markets. The LAP was also given complete independence of action and all bureaucratic hurdles were removed to allow it to achieve its aims.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹² Nazimudeen, M. Saleem. (2007). *Global Economic and Public Policy Framework*. U.S: Lulu.com. pp.334-338

⁵⁹³ The Decision No.15 (2006). of Libyan Prime Minister For the establishment of a portfolio Libya Africa Investment. Tripoli. 6th February, 2006.

⁵⁹⁴ Badr, hassan Shafi. (29th August, 2001). Op. cit.,

⁵⁹⁵ The Decision of Libyan Prime Minister No.15, (2006). Op. cit.,

The LAP's capital is spread between portfolios, bonds, and investments in firms such as the African Investment Corporation, the Arab Corporation for Foreign Investment, the Libyan External Bank, the Oil Investment Corporation and the Long-term Investment Portfolio.⁵⁹⁶

The LAP aims to centralise Libyan investment, especially in financial investments and global stock markets portfolios and use these profits in direct investment in Africa with an emphasis in improving economic development within the continent.⁵⁹⁷ The LAP also invests in bonds in a number of local and international banks including the CEN-SAD Bank (BSIC) and the Libyan Foreign Bank. One of the aims of the LAP is to provide capital for African investments in various fields such as hospitals, property, forestry, wood, metal, agriculture, fishing, aviation and oil. The LAP also aims to improve output and production in African states.⁵⁹⁸

The LAP also incorporates Oil Libya, a petroleum distribution firm present in 12 African states with the intention of further expansion. Oil Libya is considered as the second largest medium of direct Libyan investment in Africa. The first is BSIC, which is present in 10 African states and in which Libya owns a 45% stake. Libya has also given the bank a US\$3bn grant in order to improve infrastructure in several African states. The LAP, through its investments, plans to expand into all African states.⁵⁹⁹

Libyan policy indicates that one of the aims of establishing Oil Libya is to compete with Western and Chinese firms who are seeking to control the petroleum industry within Africa. Oil Libya has successfully managed the pipeline project between

⁵⁹⁶ Report Press (14th February 2008). "Investment portfolio allows Libyan investments to be centralised in many African countries", *Al- Arab Newspaper*, p.6.

⁵⁹⁷ "AfrAsia Bank Ltd The new bank plans to become a financial bridge between Africa and Asia" *Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series*, (Oct, 2007) 44(9), pp.17559B-17559C.

⁵⁹⁸ "Libya Africa Investment Portfolio: The LAP active in Funding Diverse Projects, Particularly if they add Value to Raw Commodities". *African Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series*, (2007). 44 (9), 17559A-17559B.

⁵⁹⁹ Libya Africa Investment Portfolio is Tool for Integration. (2007). Tripoli-Libya: Available at: <URL: <http://www.panapress.com/newsara.asp?code=ara1012&dte=10/11/2007>> Access Date: 16th Jun, 2008.

Kenya and Uganda,⁶⁰⁰ and despite the cost and complexity of such a project Oil Libya was able to win the contract in the face of Chinese and Western competition.

In an interview with *Jil* electronic newspaper, the chief manager of Oil Libya Ali Al-Shamikh stated that his firm intends to further penetrate the African market. At present it owns over 1027 petrol stations in Africa as well as oil refineries and plane and ship refuelling stations. Al-Shamikh also stated that Oil Libya is seeking to buy shares in foreign-owned oil companies and has bought part of Exxon Mobil in Tunisia, Morocco and other African states.⁶⁰¹ It is clear that Oil Libya derives its aims from Libyan official policy which seeks to minimise the role of foreign and Western enterprises in Africa.

The LAP is also investing in the telecommunication sector through a 60% share in RascomStar-QAF (RSQ) with the aim of spreading telephony, internet and television services to parts of Africa yet to be penetrated. The firm has dramatically spread across Africa and is continually aiming to acquire new markets across the continent.⁶⁰² By investing in this firm, Libya hopes to become an important actor in the telecoms sector and compete with Western companies in this field in Africa.⁶⁰³

The LAP also owns the African Airlines firm which was established as a result of the Libyan government decree number 35, 2006 with the purpose of providing aviation services both domestically and internationally. The airline flies to over 40 destinations including most African states as well as many international destinations including London, the USA, Australia, Japan, Russia and several others which had previously been unreachable by many African airlines.⁶⁰⁴ This initiative further emphasises Libya's eagerness to participate in the development process of Africa and thus

⁶⁰⁰ Bosco, Hitimana. (2008). *Rwanda/Uganda: Oil pipeline to cut down costs*. East African Business Week. Uganda: Available at: <URL: <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/16525.html>> Access Date: 21st April, 2008.

⁶⁰¹ *Libyan oil Buys Exxon Mobil companies*. (2008). Available at: <URL: http://www.jeel-libya.com/show_article.php?id=3508§ion=14> Access Date: 3rd May, 2008.

⁶⁰² International Astronautical Federation. (2006). *Highlights in Space 2005: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law*. United Nation publications. p.17


⁶⁰³ "Libya: Africa Investment Portfolio". Op. cit., pp. 17559A-17559B

⁶⁰⁴ *African Airways* (2003). Tripoli. Available at :< URL: <http://www.afriqiyah.aero/infomain.asp> > Access Date: 16th Jun, 2008.

compete with foreign states and fill the strategic voids that would otherwise be captured by Western states.

As well as the strategic projects managed by the LAP, its affiliate institutions work on establishing other projects that provide direct services to African citizens. These projects improve the standard of living and are a step towards improving African capabilities and reaching integration and cooperation between the continent's states.⁶⁰⁵

Map: 5.2. Type of Investment in Africa by the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio⁶⁰⁶



⁶⁰⁵ The Goals of Libyan Arab African Investment Company. (2003). Tripoli-Libya Available at: <URL: <http://www.laaico.com/home.htm>> Access Date: 3rd January 2008.

⁶⁰⁶ The Report of Libyan Company for African Investments Portfolio, 2009

5.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has highlighted the main Libyan efforts in boosting the various economic alliances throughout Africa. It can be concluded that creating and supporting economic alliances has been one of the main strategic of Libyan foreign policy in Africa. It is used by the leadership as a tool to confront Western presence in the continent, which it perceives as a major source of insecurity. Libyan foreign policy also aims to prevent the break up and re-drawing of Africa amidst the chaos of globalisation. Furthermore, Libyan policy has attempted to invest in Africa's immense natural resources in order to achieve better integration and confront the exploitation of these resources by external actors.⁶⁰⁷

It cannot be denied that Libya has tried to participate in as many economic alliances as possible, sometimes at the expense of its own national interest. This highlights the Libyan belief that its policy aims to create stability and security in Africa, as well as to prevent Western states from usurping African resources and pose threats to African security.

It is thus clear that Libyan policy has deployed various means to confront Western ambitions in Africa that go beyond the economic cooperation; this has included working with its neighbours bilaterally and also through multilateral frameworks. As a result, Libya has participated in almost all African alliances, either directly as a member or indirectly through financial and logistical support. This has been justified because of the Libyan belief that this is only means by which true African progress can be achieved in all fields and to rid Africa of foreign intervention in all its forms. By the ensuring these aspects Libyan policy-makers believe that African security and stability will help to ensure Libyan and Arab national security.

Libyan policy has been applied to encourage African states to form their own political and economic alliances which would be able to compete with the ever-increasing number of regional and global alliances. Libya succeeded in establishing the largest alliance within Africa, CEN-SAD, which within a short period grew to comprise 28 member states strategically spread from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean and

⁶⁰⁷ Badr, hassan Shafi. (29th August, 2001). Op.cit.

from the Sahara to the Mediterranean and Red Seas. CEN-SAD played a crucial role in ending the UN Security Council-imposed international sanctions on Libya, thus allowing Tripoli to re-establish ties with the global community. CEN-SAD also provided political and financial assistance to its member states and was an important bridge between its members and other regional alliances. CEN-SAD was also central to the establishment of the African Union and through it overcame what was considered the impossibility of forming an African-Arab alliance.

Alliances are crucial to Libyan policy. Thus, Libya has supported several alliances and is a member of AEC, AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA and supported the others. Libyan policy has attempted to integrate all these alliances into a single entity and thus create a strong and unified force that is able to compete and deal with other global alliances.

This chapter has also proven that the Libyan leadership is aware that stability and security are necessary to attract investment but conversely without better economic conditions it is difficult to achieve any form of stability. Therefore, Libyan policy has been directed towards to speed up the process of development in Africa and assist African regional institutions. As well as working alongside African organisations, Libya is also carrying out individual efforts to boost conditions in the small impoverished states within Africa. This is evident through Libya's US\$3bn grant to the CEN-SAD's Bank for Investment and Commerce (BSIC) conditional to improving infrastructure in several African states, and also Libya's participation in other financial institutes aiming to support economic development in African states.

The Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP) indicates the importance of Libyan investment for Africa; US\$35bn has been set aside for Libyan investment in the continent. Libyan policy through the LAP hopes to fill the strategic void that may otherwise be captured by foreign actors and used as a tool for intervention in Africa. The LAP has been active in many investment sectors including aviation, petroleum, metal, fishing, agriculture, wood, cattle, tourism and telecommunication, as well as through specialised investment companies with expertise in the global financial markets.

Thus, it is evident that Libyan policy has been aware of the importance of the economic aspect vis-à-vis political and economic development in Africa. Libya's support for the establishment of African alliances came as a result of the experience gained in its confrontations with Western states. Libya became aware of the need to ward off pressure from foreign actors aiming to capture the continent's resources and then monopolise its markets thereby threatening its national security. Thus, Libya is hoping to rescue African states from the trap of Western powers who seek control of the continent through neo-liberal market policies backed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This policy aims to usurp Africa's wealth for the benefit of the major powers. Libya believes that there is a lack of balance or equality between Western economies and the economies of African states where the majority of African citizens live below the poverty line.

It is clear that the economic factor has been very important in Libyan foreign policy; Libya has worked to improve its economic ties with many African states and Libya—through its economic policy—has succeeded in creating peace and stability between many African states, either through individual Libyan efforts or within an institutional framework.

It can be argued that Libya has been able to bring African policy into line with the direction of Libyan foreign policy which ultimately aims to create strong economic and political alliances in an era of globalisation in which less economically powerful states have little voice. Thus, it can be seen that Libyan efforts have focused on the creation of economic institutions and alliances as a real step towards achieving security and stability in Africa, as well as providing protection for both African and Arab national security.

Chapter Six

LIBYA'S ROLE IN PROMOTING ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS THROUGH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The principal axis for Arab-African relations throughout history is Arab and African individuals. The cooperation between them is built upon strong foundations and they have always attempted and continue to confront the common political, economic and socio-cultural challenges that face them. In fact, the basis of this relationship is constructed upon the common challenges that are faced by states on various frontiers such as the ones mentioned above. African states are experiencing common phenomena of backwardness, struggle, challenges and constraints; however, the levels vary from state to state.

Arab-African relations have been engraved in history. The modern era is witnessing new forms and institutions to regulate this relationship and push for greater Arab-African cooperation. Since the middle of the 1970s there has been continuous transformation of this relationship, although on occasions these transformations have not always been positive for various reasons at the global level. Nevertheless, the on-going cooperation is a necessity for the African states given the problems and challenges they are facing in the midst of continuous global change. Despite all the challenges, there are a set of factors that ensure the existence of Arab-African relations. Amongst these factors are history, geography, culture and the desire of both sides to fend off the ambitions of the global powers. The shared sense of African states of the possibility of cooperation with Arabs has encouraged both sides to find mediums and institutions to strengthen their relationship and work towards greater cooperation.

This chapter examines Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African relations through regional institutions. This is achieved through five areas of discussion. The first is Libya's historic role in promoting bilateral Arab-African relations. Libya has traditionally been one of the main centres of trade in Africa and is also a crucial link between Africa and Europe thanks to its long coastline and its proximity to European countries such as Italy and Malta. This has boosted relations between Libya and African states, particularly the Saharan ones. It is in this context that Herodotus states that Arab-African relations are historical links going back to

ancient times, and that Northern Africa—which was known as Libya—had an important role in strengthening this relationship.⁶⁰⁸

The second point to be discussed is the progress of Arab-African relations through the various regional institutions. The Arab focus on Africa is for a number of reasons. As a result, various Arab regimes have given an importance to African-Arab relations across various fields; evident to this is the establishment of councils and ministries that deal solely with African affairs with the aim of promoting joint security, economic and political action.⁶⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Arab League established a section for African affairs in 1974 with the aim of liaising between Arab and Africans on both a bilateral and a multi-lateral level.

Third is Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African relations through the framework of the Arab League. Libya's stance towards the Arab League will be highlighted, as well as Libya's policies towards Africa through the League and its role in improving Arab–African relations through its presence in the Arab League.

Fourth, Libya's role in strengthening Arab-African relations through the framework of the African Union (AU) is discussed. Although all African states are members of the AU and that all Arab states are members of the Arab League, there are varying degrees of cooperation between the states and the two organisations. Some states do not rely on these regional organisations whilst others do, especially in the field of foreign policy. Libya is considered as a state that supports regional institutions, especially the AU. Thus, this section will highlight the importance of Libya's role in the AU and the Union's place in Libya's foreign policy, particularly in the context of promoting Arab-African relations.

The fifth point to be discussed is Libya's role in establishing the AU and its importance in Libyan foreign policy. This point will highlight the importance of Libya's role and the results of these efforts in both Arab and African institutions in establishing the AU.

⁶⁰⁸ J. Talboys Wheeler, F. R. G. S. (1854). *The Geography of Herodotus: Developed, Explained and illustrated from Modern Researches and Discoveries*. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. pp.334-348

⁶⁰⁹ Mohammad, Anis. (1973). *The Modernization Process in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs*. Cairo: Institute of Diplomatic Studies. p.91. (In Arabic)

6.2. LIBYA'S ROLE IN PROMOTING BILATERAL ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS

Since 1969 Libya has adopted a policy of simultaneously strengthening its bilateral relations with African states while increasing its efforts in African and Arab regional organizations. This policy came in the framework of Libya's regional aim of establishing a strong economic entity to unite African and Arab efforts in the face of global challenges. For Libyan policy-makers, the aim of promoting Arab-African unity is crucial for establishing both Arab and African security. In addition, Libya believes that Arab-African cooperation will help to achieve political and economic independence, as well develop the continent and support the struggle of the people of the Third World in confronting new challenges. Arguably, Libya has led strong political action that has achieved Arab openness towards Africa.⁶¹⁰ One example of this action is the increased Libyan diplomatic representation in African countries, thus promoting and strengthening bilateral ties.

As part of these efforts to strengthen Arab-African ties—and as a step towards achieving Arab-African union, one of Libya's principal aims—Libya has taken many important steps since the 1969 revolution. On an institutional level, the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a special African Affairs department to strengthen the progress of Libya's relations with African states. In 1993, the department became the Ministry of African Affairs; its aims were to work towards achieving Arab-African cooperation by promoting ties bilaterally and multi-laterally, as well as working towards achieving comprehensive African unity.⁶¹¹

Libya has ensured the expansion of its bilateral ties with neighbouring African states as part of the general effort to promote Arab-African relations. One example is the Ourgala declaration by Libya, Algeria and Niger in 1976 in which the three states reiterated their commitment to Arab-African cooperation and their intention to exert their efforts in promoting ties between their three states.⁶¹² In 1979, Mali and Chad joined this declaration during the Niamey meeting at which the activation of Arab-African cooperation was agreed, as well as the expansion of efforts amongst the five states within the framework of the Organization for African Unity (now known as the AU).

⁶¹⁰ Sulaiman, Y. Al-Hayali. (1973). "the Libyan Diplomatic Trends in Africa". Cairo: *Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Journal*, No.93, p.40. (in Arabic)

⁶¹¹ Decision, No.6. (1993). The Establishment of a Ministry for African Unity, Libya: The General People's Congress (*Libyan parliament*).

⁶¹² John, Wright. (1981). *Op.cit.*, p. 208. Also see the *Ouargla Statement*, 12th April, 1976, in Algeria, Tripoli: Libya Foreign Ministry.

Libya also attempted to reduce tensions between the two blocs order in to strengthen Arab-African relations. This was clear in Libya's efforts for reconciliation between Egypt and Sudan in 1992, and in reviving diplomatic ties between Eritrea and Sudan in 1998 in which Libya played an important role.⁶¹³ Libya has also consistently intervened to reduce the tension between Sudan and Chad, most notably in 2006 and 2008.⁶¹⁴

Libya's efforts in promoting bilateral relations were not restricted to Sub-Saharan states but included all African states. Libya's success in promoting relations across the continent is indicated in the step taken by many African states to cut relations with Israel and support the Palestinian cause.⁶¹⁵ One example is Libya's relations with Uganda which have been improving since the early 1970s. In fact, the leaders of the Libyan revolution were aware of Uganda's importance to Arab and African security because Uganda was as a theatre for the Arab-Israeli conflict from as early as 1962. Israel, through its relations with Uganda, was attempting to use the African state as a source of leverage on the Arab-African states which rely on the Nile, in particular Egypt and Sudan. As a result of the improved relations between Libya and Uganda, the latter put an end to its relations with Israel in 1972 and expelled all Israeli military experts.⁶¹⁶ Close relations with Libya resulted in Chad and the Congo breaking ties with Israel in 1973 and Mali, Burundi and Niger followed in same year. Consequently, Libya was able to remove a real source of threat to the Arab states. In addition it re-established ties between Egypt, Sudan and Uganda which was no longer posed a threat to the waters of the Nile.

The results of pursuing this policy of better bilateral relations were exemplified in a large number of political, economic, security and cultural agreements that took place between Libya and African states. From the beginning of 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s Libya was able to strengthen its ties with over 30 African states. In this period Libya provided financial assistance totalling US\$288m to African states. The annual reports of the Libyan Foreign Ministry during the period also indicate that Libya's efforts and assistance were

⁶¹³ The Annual Report, (1988). The Arab Unity in the field of Arab Nationalism, Libyan Foreign Ministry, Tripoli: pp.1-11

⁶¹⁴ Tripoli Agreements to Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and Republic of Sudan, The first in 2006 than in 2008. Libyan Foreign Ministry.

⁶¹⁵ Joel, Peters. (1992). *Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship*. America: British Academic Press. pp.34-47

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.33-34

aimed at curbing the ambitions of external actors within Africa, as well as supporting resistance and freedom movements across the continent.⁶¹⁷

The period between 1980 and 1988 was characterised by increased Libyan interest in strengthening its bilateral ties with African states. As a result, 73 new treaties were signed and Libyan assistance to African countries reached US\$558m. The majority of this assistance was aimed at helping African States to rid themselves of threats coming from the imperialist states and Israel.⁶¹⁸

Libyan efforts at strengthening bilateral ties with African states aim to create a strategic dimension for its own national security. This would occur by the removal of the sources of threats amongst the Arab and African states which have been caused by the colonisers. Furthermore, Libya is attempting—through these bilateral ties—to convince all parties of the importance of Arab-African cooperation because of the political and economic benefits. This is assisted by the common geographic, cultural and religious links that tie Arabs and Africans that could help make them a single unit which is able to confront future challenges.

The Libyan policy of improving bilateral relations with African states saw the establishment of a solid platform during the early 1970s on which to establish better economic and political relations. Therefore, Libyan policy allowed for a marked improvement in economic relations between Libya and the African States in the face of the Israeli aggression in the October 1973 War, as well as a common unity against the presence of Western powers in the African continent.⁶¹⁹ Noticeably, post-1973, Libyan policy embraced a position favouring collective diplomatic action through the African organisations. Nevertheless, Libya's bilateral ties were not sacrificed; in fact, the presence of such ties made Libya an important actor in the regional and international organisations within Africa.

The 1990s witnessed increased Libyan policy activity in Africa. This is evident in the increased Libyan diplomatic representation across Africa as is shown in table 4.1. As well as the increased number of Libyan official visits to African states. The most notable of these visits were the ones carried out by the Libyan Revolution leader to Nigeria, Niger and Chad

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 33-34

⁶¹⁸ Suleiman, M. Mansour. Op. cit., pp.265-270

⁶¹⁹ Ronald, Bruce St John. (2003). "Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility". *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 47(3), pp. 463-477

in 1996-97. Gathafi also visited other African states where he reiterated the fact that the people of Niger, Nigeria and other African states are not only Muslim and Africans but they are also Arabs.⁶²⁰ He also said that people inhabiting the Sub-Saharan region are an extension of the Arab People.⁶²¹

This indicates Libya's commitment to Arab-African cooperation towards African issues. Libyan policy efforts to improve bilateral ties with African states led to their breaking of the UN-imposed air embargo on Libya in 1992. This consequently reiterated the importance of the historical links between the Arabs and Africans.⁶²² Furthermore, official African delegations—as part of the process towards better Arab-African relations—carried out visits to Libya, most notably the visit of the then South African President Nelson Mandela in 1997 during which he responded to some Western states opposition to this visit by saying: 'We are establishing relations with those who have supported our war and who refused to establish economic relations with the apartheid system.'⁶²³

Through its bilateral ties with African states Libya was able to shift the Arab-African relationship from a circumstantial nature to one based on institutions. Libya's relations with African states became an integral part of its general foreign policy which moved towards giving an equal importance to both the African and Arab world. This stems from Libya's belief in the historical ties that have linked the Arabs and Africans through migrations, religions, values, trade and the struggle to free themselves from the colonial presence and its greed. On this basis, Libya ensured better relations with Africa and worked to improve Libyan-African relations and thus Arab-African relations.

Libya's success in strengthening its bilateral ties with African states as well as playing a role in improving Arab-African relations allowed it to gain support for its policies in Arab, African and international institutions; this is examined in the next section by highlighting Libya's role in regional institutions.

⁶²⁰ Muammar, Gathafi. (1996-1997). *Statement and Speeches and Talks*, op. cit., p.293.

⁶²¹ Subhi, Ganwus et al. *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

⁶²² Asteris, Huliaras. (Jan 2001). *Op. cit.*, 5-25.

⁶²³ Group of Researchers. (1999). *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

6.3. LIBYA'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS THROUGH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The Arab League was aware of the importance of Arab-African cooperation; this was reflected in the 1953 Decree of the League which called on Arab states to elevate the level of diplomatic representation in African countries. Furthermore, Arab states were encouraged to exchange political delegations with African states, either through the establishment of a League Bureaux in Africa or through organising cooperation between Arab delegations.⁶²⁴ Libya as a member of the Arab League and African Organisation Unity was never absent from the development of Arab-African relations and the development of multi-lateral African institutions since the 1969 Revolution. Libya was always present, both financially and morally to strengthen these relations and offer its full cooperation to African causes.

It is noticeable that Arab-African ties witnessed more active cooperation between both the Arab League and the AU throughout the 1970s. This period witnessed improved economic and political ties between the two organisations and work was under the way to establish an Arab-African front to combat imperialism and cooperate in creating a socio-economic system able to accommodate the continent's circumstances.

With the appearance of the new international policy of détente (or cooperation) between the two superpowers in the early 1970s and its negative consequences on the Third World in general and Arab and African issues specifically, the Arab League and the OAU (the predecessor of the AU) realised the need to strengthen the ties between them. This was particularly important in an era where cooperation between the countries of the 'south' became necessary. On this basis both organisations began taking the required steps to achieve this goal. As a result this led to a search for alternatives to accommodate the changes and challenges of the period during which Arab and African states found no other way but to cooperate because of the similarity of the conditions and challenges facing them.

Undoubtedly the 1970s witnessed immense activity by and the North African Arab states—notably Libya, Algeria and Egypt—to highlight Arab interests in African affairs within the context of the OAU, to the extent that Arab states became important players in dealing with

⁶²⁴ Joel, Peters. *Op. cit.*, pp. 58-112. Also see the Resolution, No.46, (1973). the Sixth Arab Summit Conference, held in Algeria, on 28th November 1973.

African-linked institutions.⁶²⁵ It is important to note that Arab states were the one to initiate cooperation with Africa. This was because the Arab states were aware of the importance of Africa for Arab regional security in the midst of the international scramble towards Africa.

Due to the economic situation of the majority of African states, their Arab counterparts were keen to strengthen their ties with Africa through economic cooperation. In turn, African states were keen to maintain stronger ties in order to receive Arab financial support.⁶²⁶ Libya was among the leading states to support Africa through the Arab League. This is evident in Libya's participation in the establishment of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) in 1972. The Fund is considered as the start of multi-lateral Arab economic efforts which in turn leads to further initiatives such as the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) which was established at the Sixth Arab Summit Conference held in Algeria on 28 November 1973. Libya was one of the largest contributors to the capital of the Bank.⁶²⁷ The Bank symbolises the serious cooperation and the profound nature of Arab-African relations with the aim of better economic ties between the two entities. The Bank was created for the purpose of strengthening economic, financial and technical cooperation between Arab and African countries in order to make Arab-African solidarity a concrete reality and to base this co-operative venture on the foundations of friendship and equality. To this end, the Bank was given a mandate to assist in financing economic development in non-Arab African countries, to stimulate the contribution of Arab capital to African development and to help provide the technical assistance required for the development of Africa. This was followed by the creation of the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African Countries in 1974 with Libya's assistance. The Fund aims to provide technical assistance through the provision of academic scholarships and apprenticeships in the hope of improving the living standard of the African individual.⁶²⁸

During the 1973 oil embargo, Libya was amongst the Arab states which provided subsidised oil to African countries. This in turn increased the African states' confidence in the Arab

⁶²⁵ K. Haseeb. and Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-Arabīyah.(1995). *The Arabs and Africa*. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. pp 223-250

⁶²⁶ Mazrui, Ali A. (July, 1975). "Black Africa and the Arabs". *Foreign Affairs; an American Quarterly Review*, 53(4), pp.725-747

⁶²⁷ The Annual Report, (2007). The Arab Bank for Economic and Development in Africa, Khartoum: p.103.

⁶²⁸ Pierre, van den Boogaerde. (1991). *Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institutions*. USA: International Monetary Fund. pp.18-19

League and thus most African countries supported the Palestinian cause and cut their ties with Israel⁶²⁹ except for South Africa, Malawi, Mauritius, Lesotho and Swaziland.

The mid-1974 saw two important elements added to the relationship between the Arab League and the OAU. First, the OAU became seen as an efficient medium for the Arab states to gain political support for their policies. Second, the African states utilised this to acquire political and economic support needed for development.⁶³⁰ Libya supported the 1974 Arab League decision to establish an Administration for African Affairs which would liaise with the OAU. Similarly, the Council of Ministers of the OAU in its 24th session in 1975 decided to establish an Administration—under the General Secretariat of OAU—to oversee cooperation with the Arab League.

On the economic front, various organisations were established to promote Arab-African economic cooperation. Although Arab-African cooperation has faced a number of challenges the relationship between the two entities has strengthened.⁶³¹ In 1976, Libya played an important role alongside other Arab states to establish the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), which is concerned with providing assistance to African states. A year later in 1977, Libya supported an initiative for Arab-African economic and financial cooperation.⁶³² Undoubtedly, this reflects Libya's active role in promoting Arab-African cooperation through the Arab League as well as the importance of Africa for the Arab League and for Libyan foreign policy.

Although the Arab League and the OAU were established at different times and in different circumstances, both organisations agree on certain aspects—which Libya supports—such as the policy of non-alignment, combating apartheid, and achieving socio-cultural development as a means of undermining the monopoly of industrialised nations. Both organisations have ensured—particularly since the 1970s—a dedication to both Arab and African affairs either bilaterally or multi-laterally. Arab-African collaboration was highlighted in the First Arab-

⁶²⁹ Ibid., pp.15-26

⁶³⁰ Mazrui, Ali A. op. cit., pp.725-747

⁶³¹ Abdul Rahman, I. Al-Salhi. (1986). "A futuristic vision of the Afro-Arab Cooperation". Cairo: *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Issue.47, p.144

⁶³² Dominick, Salvatore. (1989). "Trade Policies and Aid for African Development", in B. Klein and Salvatore (Ed/s), *African Development Prospects: A Policy Modelling Approach*, (pp233-260). New York: Taylor & Francis Inc.

African Conference in March 1977 which put in place a framework to execute cooperation in all fields through the Arab League and the OAU.⁶³³

Since 1977, Arab-African joint activities have witnessed various forms of cooperation, in which Libya has always been present. This started from the first Arab-African summit conference which included all the leaders of members of the Arab League and African Organisation Unity. Then Libya was included in the Arab-African Council of Minister, which consists of the Arab-African Foreign Ministers, and oversees the work of the Permanent Committee for African Cooperation, of which Libya is also a member. Moreover Libya is member of the liaising committee for Arab-African cooperation which is responsible for ensuring the execution of decisions by the African co-operation bodies. In 1985, Libya was amongst the founding members of the Afro-Arab Cultural Institute. This institute has three main aims: first to facilitate and promote mutual knowledge between African and Arab peoples through their respective cultures; second to strengthen cultural co-operation between African and Arab countries so that it may become an essential factor for Afro-Arab co-operation; and third to provide technical and/or financial assistance to needy African and Arab countries for the development of their national culture and the promotion of Afro-Arab cultural exchanges.⁶³⁴

The process of closer Arab-African cooperation has faced a number of hurdles. The end of the Cold War had a huge impact on the relationship between the two organisations. More recently, the effects of globalisation on the national, regional and international frontiers have also been significant. For example, the collapse of the oil prices, civil war in Africa, the Kuwait-Iraq war and the subsequent sanctions imposed on Iraq, Libya and Sudan, Arab-African conflicts and inter-African conflicts, have all hindered Arab-African relations bilaterally and multi-laterally.

Despite these difficulties, Arab-African cooperation continued, evident to that is the establishment of the AU in 2002 alongside other cooperation and economic organisations concerned with strengthening Arab-African cooperation. This indicates the importance of

⁶³³ “Documents and Source Material: Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”. (Spring, 1977). *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 6(3), pp.178-197.

⁶³⁴ The Afro-Arab Cultural Institute. (2010). Available at; URL:< www.afroarab-ci.org > Access Date: 15th February, 2010.

Arab and African regional organisations for Libyan foreign policy, particularly in the face of contemporary challenges.

It ought to be noted that Libyan efforts have been clearly directed towards the strengthening of Arab-African cooperation, either bilaterally or through the regional organisations—particularly ones of economic and political nature. Despite the challenges and threats it faced, Libya's awareness of the importance of Arab-African cooperation ensured its active participation in Arab and African regional organisations. The following two sections highlight Libya's role in both the Arab League and the OAU.

6.4. LIBYA'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE

The Arab League was established in 1945 as a regional organisation comprising of all the independent Arab states. Joining the League was conditional to the state acquiring independence from colonising powers and gaining recognition from the United Nations. Given these conditions, Libya joined the League in March 1953.⁶³⁵ The period between 1953 and 1969 witnessed a lack of active Libyan policy vis-à-vis the Arab League. This can be attributed to Libya's lack of influence at the time and also its weak economic capabilities. Furthermore, the heavy influence of foreign powers on the policies of the Libyan Kingdom at the time did not allow for a strong Libyan stance.⁶³⁶

It is evident that Libya's strong involvement in the League only began after the 1969 Revolution. Thanks to the removal of Western influence and its new found economic wealth, Libya started to play an important role in the region embracing a 'unifying' approach to the Arab region as a step towards African unity. Despite Libya's concerns about the limited ability of the Arab League, it still considered the organisation as an important medium through which greater Arab-African cooperation can be achieved. Libya believed that the League lacked the expertise, not only to achieve inter-Arab cooperation but also to become an important actor in Arab-African relations, let alone global affairs.⁶³⁷ Consequently, Libya was amongst those states which called for a reformation of the League's Charter in 1974,

⁶³⁵ Edmund, J. Osmanczyk. et al., op. cit., pp.1289-1295

⁶³⁶ Tareq Y. Ismael. et al. (1991). *Politics and government in the Middle East and North Africa*. US: University Press of Florida. pp. 487-512

⁶³⁷ Yacoubi, A. Yacoub. (1972). *Fateh Revolution of September and the Contemporary World*. Tripoli: Ministry of Information. p.35 (in Arabic)

particularly when the need arose to develop the League and provide it with the support needed to achieve the hopes of the Arab masses.⁶³⁸

Libya's has supported Arab policy towards Africa on both political and economic fronts in the Arab League, particularly in promoting Arab-African relations and African causes. Libya has played an important role in promoting and strengthening Arab-African cooperation, as was seen in the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the African Unity Organisation which was passed in the 8th session meeting in Addis Ababa in 1973. The Decree called for the establishment of a committee consisting of seven African states⁶³⁹ of which Libya was one and also designated Tripoli as responsible for establishing closer ties with Arab states. These efforts consequently led to the 6th Arab Summit in Algiers in 1973 reiterating the importance of Arab-African relations and strengthening ties through greater diplomatic representation as well as tangible cooperation in the fields of politics, economics and security.⁶⁴⁰

Libya was one of the most fervent supporters of the decisions taken at the 7th Arab Summit in 1974 to call for an Arab-African summit.⁶⁴¹ This was a turning point in the relations between Africa and the Arab states. As a result, the Arab League Council in its 63rd session decided to establish a committee of nine states headed by Libya. The committee was responsible for liaising with a 12-member committee from the OAU to draw up a plan for Arab-African cooperation, including its aims and aspirations. Eventually, in 1975 the committees were successful in reaching agreements on the progress of Arab-African ties.⁶⁴²

Consequently, it can be argued that Libya was amongst the active Arab states which promoted Arab-African cooperation in the first half of the 1970s. Libya's participation occurred through Arab-African ministerial committees within the League and included plans for greater cooperation between Africa and the Arabs in various fields such as politics, economics, security, education, culture, arts and media. Libya was a member of one of the most important ministerial committees, the 'Committee of the 24', which consisted of 12

⁶³⁸ Mustafa, khashim. and Mohamed, Moghrabi. (1999). "The Libyan perspective to amend the Charter of the Arab League". *Journal of Studies*, Cairo: first issue. p.98 (in Arabic)

⁶³⁹ These countries were Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania and Zaire.

⁶⁴⁰ *The Resolutions of the Sixth Arab summit conference*, (1973). Algeria: 26-28 Nov, 1973. Available at: < URL: http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/print_page.jsp?art_id=401 > Access Date: 12th May, 2008

⁶⁴¹ One of these Resolutions Mandated the General Secretary of the Arab League to contact African Countries in order to pave the way for a joint summit.

⁶⁴² Mohamed, G. Dalh. (2002). *Libya's role in supporting the Pan-African Movement*, paper presented at the Conference of African Union, orginyed by The African Association of Political Science, on 9-12 September 2002, Tripoli pp.1-30

Arab Foreign Ministers and 12 African counterparts and studied the process for promoting Arab-African relations.⁶⁴³

In March 1974 the Conference of Arab and African Foreign Ministers met in Cairo with the aim of preparing an agenda for the first Arab-African Summit. During the meeting, the head of the Libyan delegation called for the need for greater Arab-African ties stating that:

Libya regards Arab-African cooperation as a historical strategy. Libya will continue to cooperate with all African states and work with seriousness and commitment to promote and strengthen Arab-African cooperation and provide possible support to the people of the African continent [in order to] develop it.⁶⁴⁴

Libya's ambitions were symbolised in the agenda of the Arab-African Summit which reiterated the need for a timetable for Arab-African cooperation. As a result of Libya's active role in promoting Arab-African cooperation, it was chosen as a member of the Preparatory Committee for the first Arab-African Summit. The committee put in place the agenda and a timetable for Arab-African cooperation within the scope of the plan that was later agreed by Arab and African Foreign Ministers in their Dakar meeting in April 1976 and was later ratified in the first Arab-African Summit in 1977.⁶⁴⁵ This resulted in four important agreements: the political declaration which stressed peaceful coexistence and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; the declaration of the Arab-African cooperation; the declaration of political and economic of Arab-African cooperation; and the identification of areas of cooperation and programmes of action.

It can be argued that Libya played an important role in the preparation for the First Arab-African Summit held in Cairo during the period of 1-9 March 1977 and attended by 60 states. The Summit was formulated on the need to regulate the relationship between the Arab League and the OAU within a collection of principles and values respecting the autonomy of all Arab and African states, their security, unity and political independence. Furthermore, the Summit worked to promote equality between all states, acknowledged the sovereignty of the state over its natural resources and condemned violence and the illegal occupation of territory.

⁶⁴³ Abdelaziz, Khellef. (1987). "Arab African Cooperation", in Abdelkader, Benamara, and Sam, Ifeagwu (Ed/s), *OPEC Aid and the Challenge of Development* (pp.51-70). Vienna: Published for The OPEC Fund for International Development.

⁶⁴⁴ This was the General Message Portrayed by the Speech of the Libya Representative during the Arab Summit in Cairo. (March, 1977)

⁶⁴⁵ The Political Declaration, No. A/32/61. (17th March, 1977). The First Conference of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and the League of Arab States, met at Cairo from 7 to 9 March 1977. General Assembly of United Nation:

The Summit also condemned the interference in others' internal affairs and worked to preserve relationships based on mutual benefit and respect. It also called for the need to resolve conflicts peacefully and reiterated the communal struggle against Western hegemony in all its forms in order to maintain peace and security in the region.⁶⁴⁶

Libya's role in promoting Arab-African ties and its call for African Unity—through the Arab League—became more apparent in the early 1990s. The reason behind this push was primarily due to the increasing global threats and challenges to the region. Furthermore, growing internal challenges led Libya to call for a greater Arab-African Union. Libya believes that a strong Arab League will only be achieved within the scope of an AU and greater Arab-African cooperation. This stems from Libya's belief in the importance of Africa as a strategic and security dimension crucial for the Arab region. This Libyan stance is clear in its 1998 call for integrating the Arab League with the AU as a step to promote cohesion in the face of global challenges. In the 2001 Amman Summit members of the Arab League accepted a Libyan proposal for the establishment of an AU (but not within the framework of the Arab League).⁶⁴⁷

Even after Arab league joined the AU in 2002, Libyan remained committed to calling for reform and restructuring of the Arab League's mechanisms. Libyan discourse on this aspect calls for the need to modernise and face contemporary challenges through the creation of strong Arab-African alliances, both politically and economically. This stance is clearly portrayed in various Arab Summits. In the March 2003 Summit in Sharm al-Shaikh, Libya put forward a proposal to restructure the League's mechanisms in a way that would lead to a strong Arab-African entity capable of confronting contemporary challenges particularly the ones targeting the African continent and its natural resources.⁶⁴⁸

In the 2004 Arab League Summit in Tunis, Libya threatened to withdraw from the League if other members insisted on opposing the development of the League's mechanisms in a way that would allow it to end internal conflicts over political issues and confront potential challenges.⁶⁴⁹ In the 2005 Summit in Algeria, Libya suggested the need for Arab-African

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.,

⁶⁴⁷ Eur, Europa Publications Staff. (2002). "Libya: Physical and Social Geography", in W. B. Fisher (Ed.), *The Middle East and North Africa 2003*, (pp.747-799). London: Published by Routledge.

⁶⁴⁸ Khalid, Haridi. (2004). *The initiatives to develop the Arab League*. BBC Arabic, available at: <URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/arabic/middle_east_news/newsid_3528000/3528701.stm> Access date: 5th Jun, 2008.

⁶⁴⁹ Dirk, J. Vandewalle. Op. cit., p.193

cooperation in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict and confronting globalisation, Libya also called for an 'Arab Stance' towards these issues and the need for Arab relations with other global and regional alliances. In the Khartoum Summit of 2006, Libya supported the League's decision to back the AU's forces in Darfur as a method to remove international forces from Arab and African soil and as a way of solving internal conflicts within the scope of the AU without external interference.

Libya's efforts to strengthen Arab-African ties and achieving regional security is clear in the continuing calls by Libya for Arab League members within the Asian continent to join the AU. Libya made these calls again in the Damascus Summit in 2008 in the light of the increasing threats by global powers and their scramble for control in the region.⁶⁵⁰ Libya believes that amalgamating the Arab League and the AU as a prime opportunity for Arab states to strengthen their economic and political role, especially within the climate of increased global threats and the Arab weakness to overcome the challenges of globalisation. The following section examines Libya's role within the OAU, latterly the AU.

6.5. LIBYA'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS THROUGH THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Libya was one of the founding members of the OAU which was established in May 1963. However, during the period of 1963-69 Libya policy towards Africa was unclear because at that time it was hosted foreign military bases including US, UK and Italy which resulted in Libya coming under the pressure from these powers.⁶⁵¹ The situation changed dramatically after the 1969 Revolution when Africa became the number one issue for post-revolution Libya. In particular, issues relating to security, independence and sovereignty were of particular interest to Libya's ethos of supporting liberation movements and challenging imperialism and the Israeli influence throughout Africa⁶⁵² as mentioned in previous chapters. However, the OAU embraced an alternative stance to Libya vis-à-vis the aforementioned issues, which led to tensions between the organisation and the Libyan regime.

⁶⁵⁰ Muammar, Gathafi, Calls on Asian Arabs to join the African Union at the Arab Summit, 20st Ordinary Session, Damascus: (30-31 March, 2009)., Available at: <URL: <http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/index.jsp>> Access Date: 15th May, 2009.

⁶⁵¹ Tareq Y. Ismael. et al. Op. Cit., pp. 487-512

⁶⁵² Ronald, Bruce St. John. Op. Cit., pp.463-477

The most notable of these tensions was as a result of Libya's attempts at regime change in a number of African countries and its interference in the internal affairs of pro-Western African states. One example was Libya's interference in Chad in the early 1980s and its attempt to change the regime which it perceived as being pro-Western.⁶⁵³ Not only did these instances result in tension between Libya and OAU's members but Libya's anti-Western stance led to certain Western powers to provide support to African states to act against Libyan policies. Nevertheless, despite these disagreements the situation never caused Libya to break from the OAU and it continued to be an active participant in the organisation and its projects.

Eventually in the early 1990s Libya abandoned some of the policies that caused these tensions. This change of policy was dictated by the importance given to Africa in Libyan foreign policy, as shown in Libya's efforts to build strong ties bilateral and multi-lateral ties with African states. This can be seen through Libya's emphasis on developing ties through economic agreements and by its investments in Africa through the OAU.⁶⁵⁴

Libya's policy towards Africa since the 1970s highlights the importance of Africa for Libyan policymakers. It is also noticeable that Libya ensured the empowering of the OAU as a strong regional entity capable of promoting its members' interests. This enabled the OAU to play an important role in promoting the independence of South Africa and Namibia from their colonisers.⁶⁵⁵

Libya's interest in Africa can also be seen through its emphasis on creating institutions to deal specifically with African affairs. The Department of African Affairs (part of the Libyan Foreign Ministry) established an office to deal specifically with the issues of the OAU. Then, in 1993 Ministry of African Unity was established with the aim of dealing with issues relating to Arab-African cooperation and strengthening Arab-African relations. It was also charged with following up on the execution decisions of the OAU especially in relation to Arab-African cooperation, as well as dealing with other issues relating to African issues.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵³ John, L. Wright. (1989). *Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara*. London: C. Hurst & Co. publisher Ltd. pp.120-145

⁶⁵⁴ Mabrouk, M. Younis. (2005). *Libya's relationship to Africa*. Paper presented at the conference on Libya as the public model, organised by the World Center for Studies and Research of the Green Book, on 1st - 2st March 2005, Tripoli.

⁶⁵⁵ A Report on the Progress of Cooperation between Libya and the African States. (June, 1993). Department of Economic Affairs, Libyan Foreign Ministry, Tripoli.

⁶⁵⁶ Decision, No.6. (1993) The General People's Congress (*Libyan parliament*). Op. cit.,

Libya's role in the OAU is highlighted in its support for the continent's states and its effort to ensure economic and political independence. This is evident through Libya's support for liberation movements and continuous calls for African independence from Western hegemony. Libya supported the independence of various states within the OAU such as Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Eritrea.⁶⁵⁷

During the 27th meeting of the OAU's Council of Ministers in Mauritius in June 1976, Libya proposed that the UN should no longer allow the five permanent members of the commission the use of the veto; the OAU supported the Libyan proposal. In addition, Libya reiterated its dedication to the issue refugees in Africa. It also called for the need to establish an African Labour Organisation—similar to the International and Arab Labour Organisations—which would be part of the OAU's structure.⁶⁵⁸ During the First Arab-African Summit in 1977, Libya reiterated the need to improve Arab-African cooperation. It also highlighted the fact that this cooperation is perceived by Libyan policy-makers as an on-going strategy which it would continue to pursue to build ever stronger ties with various states.⁶⁵⁹

In this context, Libya undertook several steps that reflected its policy which sought to establish coherent mechanisms within the OAU to promote the continent's causes. For example, Libya was amongst those who called for the 'revision' of the organisation's charter in 1979 to allow it to be better placed to achieve the hopes and aspirations of the African people. In 1980, Libya supported the Lagos plan which aimed to tackle the organisation's inability to deal with under-development in the continent. In 1982, Libya made an official request to revise the OAU's charter in the light of the global developments of the time. In 1991, Libya signed the Abuja agreement which aimed to expand the scope of the Organisation's activities..⁶⁶⁰

Libya's focus on Africa—particularly through the framework of the OAU—has resulted in various positive outcomes, which include: participating in the removal of the Portuguese colonisers from Mozambique, Angola, Comoros and Cape Verde and the eventual

⁶⁵⁷ Asteris, Huliaras, (2001). Op. cit., pp.5-25

⁶⁵⁸ Libya Exerted Immense Efforts to Establish the African Trade Union Organization during the Conference of African Labour Ministers which met in Kampala, Uganda.

⁶⁵⁹ General Message Portrayed by the Speech of the Libya Representative during the Arab Summit in Cairo. (March, 1977). Op. Cit.,

⁶⁶⁰ The Annual Report of Libyan Foreign Policy, (1995). *Libyan Foreign Policy in Africa*, African Affairs Department, Libyan foreign Ministry, Tripoli.

independence of these states.⁶⁶¹ Libya also ensured—through its policies towards Africa within the OAU—that most African states including Guinea, Uganda, Chad, Congo, Niger, Mali, Burundi, Togo, Congo, Rwanda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Gambia, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Botswana and Mauritius cut their ties with Israel which Libya perceives as a threat to the interests of Africans and Arabs alike. This is evident in the various packages of assistance provided by Libya to most of those states that cut their ties with Israel. For example, Uganda received US\$30m in 1972 and Chad and Senegal who received US\$92m and US\$50m respectively. Such steps highlight Libya's willingness to remove what it considers to be any source of threat to the continent.⁶⁶²

From the previous discussion, it is clear that since 1969 Libya has been attempting to support the OAU and embrace its principles, in the hope that it becomes a medium to propagate African causes for both the Arab and African states. Libya has placed greater emphasis on aspects that it deemed suitable for the advancement of Arab-African relations and has worked closely with the OAU's members in various meetings and conferences to gain support for the desired outcomes such as the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union. The other main example is Libya's championing of Arab-African economic integration as in the case of CEN-SAD community.

The Libyan emphasis on the need to strengthen Arab-African cooperation increased in the 1990s particularly after the historic stance taken by African states—within the context of the OAU—to break the UN Security Council and US imposed sanctions on Libya. This action allowed Libya to further realise the importance of Africa and the potential role of the OAU both politically and in relation to security. Thus, it increased the Libyan desire to play a crucial role in transforming the OAU into the AU.⁶⁶³ This transformation would not have been possible without the logistical and financial support of Libya and the insistence by Libyan diplomacy on the need to speed up the political, economic, military and security integration within the continent, particularly in light of the global transformations and the continuous threats posed by external actors.

⁶⁶¹ *Libya's Role in Africa*, (April, 1976). Published in the Jihad Newspaper, No.88, Tripoli.

⁶⁶² Joel, Peters. Op.cit., pp. 43-62

⁶⁶³ Bronwen, Manby. (2004). "The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda". *Human Rights Quarterly* 26.(4), pp.983-1027.

Libya also worked within the context of the OAU to resolve various inter-African conflicts, (see chapter four). In addition, Libya made calls within the OAU for the need to achieve absolute political, economic, cultural and security independence. Furthermore, Libya emphasised the need to improve Arab-African cooperation which it sees as a requisite to achieve security for the OAU's members and an alternative to fill the strategic and military void in Africa. Libya also reiterated that unless these factors are fulfilled, achieving national security will not be possible, especially in the light of current global challenges. During the Arab Summit in Algiers in 1999, Libya convinced the other Arab states within Africa to join the African Union project, which it perceives as the suitable mechanism for overcoming contemporary challenges.⁶⁶⁴

It can be noticed that Libya's efforts within the OAU throughout the previous decades were a way to preserve and maintain the strong Arab-African ties that had been established in the 1970s. This occurred despite the various transformations and challenges that occurred on the global scene.

In conclusion, it is evident that Libyan foreign policy played an important role within the OAU to strengthen and support Arab-African relations, despite the various challenges imposed on Libyan policy within both organisations. Libyan policy was able to overcome all potential obstacles to help achieve strong Arab-African ties, which it perceives as the sole option for resolving Africa's issues. The next section highlights how Libya was able to use its bilateral Arab and African ties through the OAU and Arab League to realise the creation of the AU in 2002.

6.6. THE LIBYAN ROLE IN ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY

First, it is important to mention that the concept of African Unity is a historic one originating in the 19th century and gaining momentum between 1900 and 1945. Several attempts and meetings took place to unite the efforts of the African continent, amongst the most prominent of such attempts is the 'African League' which first met in London in 1900, in Paris in 1919, and then in 1921. The fourth meeting took place in Lisbon in 1923 and a fifth followed in

⁶⁶⁴ Baimu, Evarist and Sturman, Kathryn. (2003). "Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene: A Shift from Human Security to Regime Security". *African Security Review*, 12 (2), pp.37-45.

New York in 1927. The final African League Conference met in Manchester in 1945. The concept behind the League stemmed from the efforts of Africans living abroad wanting to see an end to racism and calling for the return of Africans to their homelands.⁶⁶⁵

The second period to witness efforts for African Unity occurred between 1958 and 1963. This époque was characterised with struggles for independence and resulted in various alliances aiming to create inter-African unity and even African-Arab unity to end imperialism and racism. During this period three important conferences took place; at each the participants called for independence and an end to the imperial-caused border conflicts. They also called for the need to establish an organisation to unite the people of Africa to concentrate their efforts on independence and overcome the negative effects of imperialism. The outcome of this period led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 which consisted of all the independent African states.⁶⁶⁶

The third period, between 1963 and 2002, witnessed continuous African efforts within the context of the newly established OAU which worked hard to continue the struggle for independence and greater African autonomy. Therefore, it can be said that the idea of African unity was as a source of support for the African struggle, for independence of African states and the end of racism. For such reasons, the request of African Unity has been present amongst African since the 19th century, yet the global circumstances and the intervention of external players came in the way of this dream's realisation.

Furthermore, Arab-African relations go back to hundreds of years and it is a relationship that has gone through various phases; cooperation, trade, conflict and tension. However, there are several factors which have ensured a degree of Arab-African cooperation despite all the challenges that have been discussed previously. Most prominent amongst these factors is religion; Islam has played an immense role in strengthening the relationship between the Arabs and Africans. Consequently, it can be argued that the experience of Arab-African cooperation is amongst the oldest in the region, where the ties transcend beyond geographical proximity to involve factors such as culture and civilisation which have progressed through centuries of mingling between the Arabs and Africans. However, political circumstances

⁶⁶⁵ Kevin, Shillington. (2005). *Encyclopaedia of African History*. New York: Taylor and Francis Group. pp.350-372.

⁶⁶⁶ Godfrey, L. Binaisa. (1977). "Organization of African Unity and Decolonization: Present and Future Trends". *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 432(1), 52-69.

have been an obstacle for Arab-African cooperation, as was the case during the era of imperialism, wars and conflicts which the region has experienced.

Imperialism played a huge role in weakening any attempt for Arab-African cooperation through its colonial policies. It has created divisions that served the self-interest of the great powers and ignores ethnic, racial, economic, political and cultural factors of the Arab and African states. For example, the 1884 Berlin conference saw the division of Africa thus reducing the possibility of cooperation between the continent's inhabitants and facilitating the way for the colonisers to acquire hegemony over it.⁶⁶⁷

Furthermore, Western discourse and literature has divided Africa through other means. For example, artificial divisions are discussed such as White and Black Africa, Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa or Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone Africa.⁶⁶⁸ Such terminologies have attempted to create divisions within Africa and place the Arabs on one side and the 'Africans' on the other by referring to White and Black Africa or Arab and Non-Arab Africa. Furthermore, these divisions are incorrect, as not all Arabs are 'white' such as the case of Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Comoros. In addition, there are many 'black' Arabs living in Arab states. Furthermore, the AU has intentionally overcome this artificial division and placed the Arabs and Africans equally under one organisation.

It is noticeable that imperialist states have continually obstructed any attempt to unite Africa. This has occurred through the usage of certain weaknesses to divide the continent, for example religion, race and culture. Nevertheless, despite the various attempts to weaken Arab-African cooperation, it is evident that both Arab and African states wish to continue to seek ways to strengthen the cooperation amongst them.

Libya has been aware that the political, economic and military conflicts which the Arabs and Africans have been subjected to stem from their own weakness and state of division. Libyan policy-makers reached this conclusion in the wake of the 1969 Revolution based on the risks and threats suffered from Western states as a result of its anti-Western stance in the continent. This also indicates that the claim that Libya only focused its policy towards Africa as a result

⁶⁶⁷ Godfrey, L. Binaisa. *Op. cit.*, pp. 52-69.

⁶⁶⁸ David, J. Francis. *Op. cit.*, pp. 44-37.

of the disappointing stance of the Arab states following the 1988 Lockerbie is not true. As Colonel Gathafi stated:

they think that I embraced a position of heading towards Africa [politically] because the Arabs did not stand with Libya and break the embargo, and they [the Arabs] left the US, Britain, France and the rest of the Western states to target Libya and the Arabs stood watching...no...this is not true.⁶⁶⁹

However, Libyan policy-makers recognised that the support of African states during the Lockerbie crisis reflected the importance of strengthening Arab-African cooperation as a means to break the political isolation from the West was trying to impose on Libya. Undoubtedly, the African stance, which helped to end the sanctions on Libya, strengthened its focus on the creation of the AU as a way to confront Western challenges and achieve stability and security for Libya. This was reiterated by Gathafi during a 2004 meeting with members of the Revolutionary Committees where he claimed that 'Africa is the strongest fortress and nothing compares to it, the Libyan people must resort to it to defend against any potential attacks, and Africa is considered as a safety shore and a secure fortress for the security of Libya.'⁶⁷⁰

This stance is further enhanced by the fact that since the 1969 Libyan revolution the leadership has always embraced a pro-Africa stance through its motto of "Africa for the Africans" and "No alliance for Africa except with itself". This proves the importance of Africa for Libyan policy and the fact that Libya has embraced a stance of pro-African unity since the revolution.

The Libyan revolution has many aspects that show its desire to achieve greater Arab-African cooperation and African unity, as is evident in the various attempts and calls for unity between North Africa and parts of Central and West Africa as well as CEN-SAD. Libya also called on Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal and Gambia to unite, with other eastern and southern African countries to join later. However, there are many internal and external obstacles that have prevented these calls from being realised. Libyan political discourse claims that Libya not only seeks African unity for its own benefit but also for the benefit of the whole of Africa. Furthermore, Libya will further its sovereignty and interests through the unity of Africa and

⁶⁶⁹ Muammar, Gathafi. (1998-1999). Statement, Speeches and Talks, *National register*, Vol. (30). The World Centre for Studies and Researchers of the Green Book, Tripoli. pp.221- 222

⁶⁷⁰ *Gathafi's Speech in the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Movement of Revolutionary Committees*, (2004) Tripoli, Available at: <URL: <http://www.alelam.net/New/policy/details.php?kind=P&id=3262>> Access Date: 23th February, 2008.

the presence of a strong African policy, a single African defence force and a single economy with an African Common Market.⁶⁷¹

It is clear that Libyan policy has always placed special emphasis on strengthening Arab-African relations. This stems from Libya's belief in the importance of Africa as a strategic dimension for the security of the region in general and for the security of Libya specifically. It is also a way to confront the threats and challenges posed by external intervention in the region as well as a medium to overcome the Western attempts to minimise the Arab and Libyan role in the Africa. Libya's position is at odds with the Western one because Libya opposes Western presence in the continent in all its form, as well as the fact that Libya wants a strong entity with strong political and economic links to be created in Africa that can act globally.⁶⁷² In other words, the affairs of African states affect Libya and thus Libya has no choice but to interact with such a situation.

The Libyan regime believes that the steps taken by Africa to bring to an end the international sanctions on it is stark evidence for the need for Arab states to secure themselves through a strong presence in Africa. Libya argues that the threat of a potential embargo of Arab states can begin from the depths of Africa. As a result, Libya has been calling for stronger involvement in Africa and an increase in African security to guarantee Arab security.

Consequently, and in order to achieve greater Arab-African cooperation, Libya has attached an increased importance to the institutions that aim to speed up African unity. Libya directed much of its investment activities towards Africa (see chapter five) and worked to improve Arab-African relations as well as inter-African relations by ensuring the freedom of residence, travel and investment as well as greater economic, political and security cooperation between Africa and the Arabs.⁶⁷³

Libya efforts to improve Arab-African cooperation stem from the original calls for African unity made by the likes of Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Sékou Touré.⁶⁷⁴ The aim of this

⁶⁷¹ Muammar, Gathafi's (30th January, 2008). Speech for Global Media before African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Alshames newspaper *Newspaper*, 30th January, 2008, No.4484, Tripoli.

⁶⁷² Buthaina, Esfahani. (1977). *Arab-African solidarity*. Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies. p.15

⁶⁷³ Decision, No.6. (1993). The General People's Congress (*Libyan parliament*). Op. cit.,

⁶⁷⁴ Kwame Nkrumah was an influential 20th century advocate of Pan-Africanism, and the leader of Ghana and its predecessor state, from 1951 to 1966. Ahmed Sékou Touré was an African political leader and President of Guinea from 1958 to his death in 1984. He was one of the primary Guinean nationalists involved in the liberation of the country from France.

unity, according to its flag bearers, is to serve the African continent in the face of global changes and transformations as well as confront internal and external challenges with increased solidarity and unity.⁶⁷⁵

In continuing with the African dream and request for unity and despite the immense challenges and obstacles, Libyan efforts in Africa increased further at the end of the 20th century. This was evident through the several steps taken by Libya to promote the African unity project, such as the creation of CEN-SAD. This success increased the African confidence in the Libyan project for unity and boosted ties between African leaders and their Libyan counterpart. This resulted in increased activity which took shape in the form of both official and public gatherings, and was epitomised through the support of the leaders Nelson Mandela.

The 1998 African Summit in Burkina Faso produced an affirmation of support for Libyan efforts in promoting Arab-African ties.⁶⁷⁶ The Summit also commended Libya for its consistent stance towards the African continent and its issues. African states were making clear their opposition to the Western stance against Libya and thus convinced the West to place the Lockerbie issue in the hands of the International Court of Justice in order to remove the international sanctions imposed on Libya.⁶⁷⁷ Consequently, UN Security Council Resolution 1192 was passed in August 1998, supported by African states and called for halt of international sanctions on Libya. Since then Libya has been in a position to become a strong proponent of African unity.

The dynamic nature of the Africa project was revealed by Gathafi in September 1998 when he called for the establishment of the AU. This call found widespread support amongst the OAU's members during the 1999 Algiers summit, in particular in relation to issues relating to peace keeping and conflict resolution within the region. As a result of the immense Libyan efforts and the insistence of Libyan policy to achieve unity in Africa, the dream of the great African statesmen was achieved and all Arab and African states were convinced to transform the OAU into the AU on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya. The Sirte Declaration stated:

⁶⁷⁵ Mohamed, G. Dalh. Op. cit., p.1-30

⁶⁷⁶ Dirk, J. Vandewalle. Op. cit., pp.94-96.

⁶⁷⁷ Asteris, Huliaras. (Jan 2001). Op. cit., 5-25.

We, the Heads Of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), met at the fourth Extraordinary Session of our Assembly in Sirte, in the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 8 - 9 September 1999, at the invitation of the Leader of the Al Fatah Revolution, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, and as agreed upon during the Thirty fifth Ordinary Session of our Summit in Algiers, Algeria from 12 - 14 July 1999. In our deliberations, we have been inspired by the important proposals submitted by Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, Leader of the Great Al Fatah Libyan Revolution and particularly, by his vision for a strong and united Africa, capable of meeting global challenges and shouldering its responsibility to harness the human and natural resources of the continent in order to improve the living conditions of its peoples.⁶⁷⁸

The July 2001 Summit in Lusaka was historic as the Sirte Declaration which called for the establishment of the AU dominated the African Council of Ministers' discussion. Also, the issues of the African Summit that related to transition from the OAU to UN were on the meeting's agenda. Libya exerted immense efforts to overcome all the challenges and the AU was officially formed during the 38th Session in Durban in July 2002.⁶⁷⁹

The importance of the Union can be seen through its aims which include a comprehensive continental economic plan with the hope of strengthening the industrial and economic ability of Africa as a means to end Western hegemony. The Union also adopts a military and defence strategy enabling it to confront any challenges on that front, as well as a foreign and diplomatic policy to serve Africa's interests on the global scene. The Union established a series of institutions as highlighted in Articles I and II.

- (i) Establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
- (ii) Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, in particular:
 - (a) Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty,
 - (b) Ensure the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty; such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and in particular, the Pan-African Parliament. We aim to establish that Parliament by the year 2000, to provide a common

⁶⁷⁸ *Sirte Declaration*. Op. cit.,

⁶⁷⁹ Chris, Landsberg. (2004). *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition*. South Africa: Jacana Media. pp.193-195

platform for our peoples and their grass-root organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing our continent.⁶⁸⁰

One of the most important aims is stated in Article IV where it is said that the Union has authority to intervene in any state—without prior permission—in order to preserve peace and security, prevent war and massacres and maintain stability.⁶⁸¹ This aim was not present in the OAU and this suggests that stability and security in Africa is likely to improve.

The AU is of great importance for Libyan foreign policy. Tripoli perceives its creation as a great success for contemporary Libyan diplomacy giving a much needed positive impression of a new Libyan role in Africa. Furthermore, the Union has given great significance to Libyan policy in all fields. The Union has also allowed the Libyan regime greater scope to deal with Western nations, particularly the US, France and Britain, through which to discuss Libya's role in Africa. Noticeably, since the Union's creation, Libya has been able to resolve many issues that have been stalled for several years, including the West's stance towards Libyan policy. Libya has been able to restore its relationship with various states, including Britain in 1999. In 2001, dialogue between the US and Libya commenced and 2003 Libya began restoring ties with several states and EU. In September 2003 the international sanctions on Libya were lifted and in 2004 Libya restored diplomatic ties with the US. In 2006 Libya was removed from the US State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism.⁶⁸²

Such steps have helped Libya to restore economic ties and relationships with the West. Undoubtedly, Libya has been able to protect its national security through its efforts in establishing the AU which in turn helped Libya to return to the international scene after an absence of over 30 years; during these years a period of instability and fear was experienced due to the international pressure on Libya.

It can be argued that the Union changed the Libyan policy and made it more flexible in dealing with regional and global issues. This can be attributed to the fact that Libyan policymakers had a sense of greater security within the newly founded AU as it was a more

⁶⁸⁰ *Sirte Declaration*. Op. cit.,

⁶⁸¹ The Constitutive Act of African Union. Lome -Togo. 11 July 2000.

⁶⁸² Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman. *Significant Events in U.S.-Libyan Relations*, Washington: September 2, 2008, Available at: <URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/109054.htm> >Access Date: 11th October, 2008

powerful entity on the global scene than was the OAU. This is because the AU became more effective and now keeps pace with the political, economic and social developments.

Thus, it can be said that due to the greater ability to penetrate the international scene resulting from membership of the AU, the Union in turn acquired greater importance in Libyan Foreign policy. Through the Union, Libya has been able to achieve its primary goal (African unity) which it has had since the Revolution. Libyan policy-makers believe that Arabs must support the creation of African unity in order to achieve their national security. This was evident in the change of Libya's global role which happened only after the Union's creation and resolved issues that had been on hold for over three decades. Thanks to the Union, Libya has had a greater role in Africa and has been welcomed by international organisations such as the UN which appreciates Libya's role in Africa.

Libya realised that without the AU there was not going to be Arab national security or African stability. Therefore, Libyan policy is still concerned with achieving its objectives by building a strong AU that has stature and prestige among the international community. Libyan diplomacy achieved further success in the 13th AU Summit in Sirte in 2009 which achieved important steps in relation to the institutions of the AU. This summit resolved to transform the African Union Commission (AUC) into the African Union Authority (AUA). The most important components of this authority are the common defence, foreign policy and foreign trade. During this summit, the African Common Defence Council and the African External Border Protection Agency (African Frontex) were also established. This indicates the significance of Africa within the Libya's foreign policy.⁶⁸³ Libya aims to bring Africa into line with other continents which have a strong voice because of their strong regional organisations as well as the right of veto at the United Nations. Libyan policy-makers believe this will protect the African continent from the domination of major powers.

6.7. CONCLUSION

This chapter has made clear that Africa has been a priority for Libyan policy since the 1969 revolution as indicated by the revolutionary slogans such as 'Africa for the Africans' and 'No alliance for Africa except with itself'. It is also clear that since the Revolution Libyan efforts

⁶⁸³ Presse Communiqué No. 90/2009. Transformation of the African Union Commission (AUC) into the African Union Authority (AUA). At the Opening of the 12th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union in Tripoli, Libya. 15-16 April, 2009.

to strengthen Arab-African ties have been continuous. The aim of these ties is to create a security frontier for the Arab world within Africa by ending Western and Israeli presence in the continent. As a result, Libya has exerted immense efforts to promote Arab-African ties, either on bilaterally or multi-laterally through regional organisations such as the Arab League and the OAU.

It is also evident that since the 1970s Libya has focused on African unity, through its participation in all regional organisations, particularly ones of an economic nature and that promote Arab-African cooperation. In this context, Libya played an important role in calling for the strengthening and developing of these organisations, as well as its calls for the updating of charters in order to better serve the African people and their aspirations. In the same way that Libya called for the updating of the Arab League's charter, it also called for the strengthening of the OAU, primarily because Libya believes that nation-state (particularly the less-developed state) is no longer able to function effectively in the midst of global unions and alliances.

One of the most crucial reasons that encouraged Libya to exert more effort in establishing the AU was the African states' stance vis-à-vis the Lockerbie affair and their ability to break the international embargo. African states were able to ease the British and American stance into accepting Libyan conditions regarding the Lockerbie affair. The African heads of states took a decision during the 1998 Ouagadougou Summit to break the international embargo on Libya and thus eased the way for further events.

Libya believed that there was no alternative for Africans to overcome their marginalisation except through uniting their efforts, through their regional organisations in order to achieve an African resurgence on the global scene. Thus, Libyan policy began taking steps in achieving these aims, this started with the creation of the CEN-SAD alliance in 1998. Libya also exerted immense efforts in transforming the OAU into the AU and achieved this during the Sirte meeting on 9th September 1999 which paved the way for the official launch of the AU during the Durban Summit in 2002.

The AU is of great importance for Libyan foreign policy; it is regarded by Libyan policy-makers as one of the most crucial achievements for Libyan policy since the Revolution, and is seen as a step for achieving the Arab regional security. It can be argued that despite the various challenges and obstacles faced by Libyan policy-makers—either bilaterally with Arab

and African states or multi-laterally through the AU and the Arab League—it has managed to achieve its most important foreign policy aims in Africa. This was evident in Libya's ability to gather consensus amongst both African and Arab states to establish the AU. This is perceived to be an important step in achieving greater security and overcoming the challenges of the current global climate. It also fulfils the post-1969 Libyan policy and is a step in achieving the greater goal of a United States of Africa.

Libya's success in establishing the AU has allowed it greater scope to return to the global scene and end the threats against it, especially those from the West. Libya has also become an active player in global affairs; a role it plays through the Union's institutions. The Union has been a much needed entity for both Arabs and Africans, as evident through its success—alongside other global actors—in bringing to an end various conflicts and disagreements within the continent. In addition, the AU is now able to play an important role in the international community.

Chapter Seven

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this study is to explore the importance of Africa as a strategic factor in Arab national security and Libyan foreign policy since the outbreak of the September 1969 Revolution in Libya. Therefore, the study examines the most important policies adopted by Libyan policy makers through integrative approach oriented towards achieving political, economic and security goals throughout the African continent. The study has shown the success of Libyan policies in achieving stability and security within the continent. Furthermore, the study shows the will of many African countries to achieve security through conformity with Libyan Policies, which strengthens the collective power of Africa in protecting itself against the dangers and hazards imposed by changes in global politics.

The results of this study were achieved through a set of questions put forward by the researcher as a means of showing the importance of Africa in Libyan foreign policy, namely: What is the problem of Arab national security within Libyan policies? What are the most important policies and steps practiced by Libya within the African context to achieve Arab national security? How does Libya view the role of Africa in protecting Arab national security? How has Libya implemented these policies? Finally, to what extent has Libya succeeded in achieving its policy of protecting Arab national security on both the Arab and the African levels?

In order to answer the research questions, it is important to refer to the relevant literature and theories relating to national security as a whole to determine the importance of national security within the context of international relations theory and its effect on societies and countries. The integrative and social constructivist approaches are considered to be the most useful theoretical frameworks to explain the Libyan approach to Africa. As Libyan policy is the main focus of this study, it is vital to follow developments within Libyan policies and the treatment of Arab national security, and the important steps adopted by Libya to protect the Arab national security; with special focus on Libyan policies towards Africa and the role Africa plays in Arab national security.

The study follows developments in Libyan foreign policies towards Africa as a strategic partner in achieving Arab national security through observations in Libyan policies and practices since the 1969 Revolution. There seems to be a deep attention given to the African continent as a natural strategic continuation to the Arab world whereby the African continent provides support to Arab national security according to the Libyan foreign policy.

On following the steps of Libyan foreign policy towards Africa as the strategic depth for Arab national security, the study shows it is clear through the political discourse and practices of Libyan foreign policies that the African continent is important as a pillar of Arab national security. However, this study clarifies that Libyan foreign policy has faced many challenges which has obstructed achieving goals with regards to Arab and African fronts. Moreover, this study highlights the extent to which the Libyan regime has succeeded in achieving its ambitions with regards to the African continent and Arab national security since the establishment of the regime after the 1969 Revolution. It also highlights the key problems and challenges which have obstructed Libyan policy from achieving its goals on the Arabic and African fronts. It is obvious from this study that the outlook of Libyan foreign policy does not fall beyond a general understanding of the idea of national security.

The significance of the study is on political, economic, military and cultural levels, and it arises from the increasing profile of national security policy for governing administrations. This will lead to new branches and schools of thought on the definition of national security. Some critics consider national security as an absolute value since they link it to issues of independence and national sovereigns. Some view it as being linked to economical power and development while others determine that it is only through absolute power and development that national security can be achieved. In fact, Libya aims to achieve Arab national security by achieving stability, security and development. While Libyan policy adopts unity and development as the foundations of national security, it has not offered a single definition of national security due to the complexity of factors that affect the understanding of general national security.

The first chapter of this study shows that the issue of national security has been debated on, creating a variation in the exact meaning of the term attributed to the

differences in interests and power on economical, political, social and cultural levels. The issue of national security is not limited to certain aspects as previously thought but is complex. It, involves internal factors such as internal security in areas of poverty, social equality, distribution of resources, corruption in governments, administrative and economic corruption; and external factors which contribute to the attitudes of decision makers, especially when personal interest is linked to national interest, and the inability to mobilize military forces or the misuse of the military. Other factors that can also be included are the greed of some powerful countries and their desire to control less powerful nations and become involved in national affairs, leading to reactions and tension in international relations; and the colonial past of many developed countries in many developing countries.

Therefore, it is evident that the concept of national security is variable in accordance with geographical situation; the military and economic power of the nation in question; political, social and cultural stability; and level of education. Moreover, it is difficult to give an exact and comprehensive definition of national security, although it is possible for individual countries to define the term in accordance with national interest and the need to protect such interest against foreign interventions. An important example of the variation within the definition of national security is one that occurred as a result of the Cold War: before, the view was driven by a realistic balance of power between the Eastern camp and the Western camp; smaller nations would inevitably join one of the two to protect its national assets, which also explains Libya's search for union regardless of whether Arabic or African. However, after the Cold War the concept of national security evolved under liberal views, which constituted national security as more than military protection from foreign interventions to include any factors that threatened the security of not only the nation but the individual inhabitants, and threats faced within and outside of national borders. Another important addition to the concept of national security during this period is the consideration of economic development as a basis for security, without which the protection of national security is difficult even with the presence of a powerful national military force.

The differences in realist and liberal perspectives and the inability of either party to reach a middle definition that satisfies both has led to the emergence of an

integrative trend and constructive approach. This defines national security as the ability of a nation to face dangers from three angles: land, society, and the governing regime. Thus, it is possible to control national security on these three plains and allows for a higher ability to prevent threats. This was confirmed by the 11 September 2001 attacks which changed many views, at the forefront of which were security, economical, political and social balances. In turn, this triggered a global reassessment of policies. The study shows that the 9/11 attacks represented an end to the theories upon which many international policies were built, the most important being Huntington's and Fukayama. Thus, 9/11 was a pivotal point where international relations in general and security relations in particular, were reconsidered. It also showed that security is not dependent on a specific facet, but it changes in accordance with the current affairs of the nation at the time; thus, it is important for the nation to be protected against any possibilities, be they internal or external. These ideas cannot be achieved without unity in preparation—economically, socially and politically; this applies to all nations and countries.

Therefore this study is grounded in the integration and socially constructivist approaches as theoretical frameworks and methods of analysis looking at the issue of national security from a Libyan policy perspective. It is also important to state that social constructivism is an important theoretical framework for this study, as has been discussed in the earlier chapter, Libya's rapprochement towards Africa is also a constructed reality in the sense that Libya was forced to take up such an option. In other words, ideological and social realities have played an important role in this process. However, the reality of being a comparatively small state has forced Libya to find regional alliances in the face of being isolated from the west and in the absence of friendly support from the Arab Gulf states. These all come together to justify social constructivism as an important theoretical framework for this study.

The second chapter shows evidence that Arabic thought did not ignore the security issue by tracking the different stages of development of national security, and by referring to studies on national security especially after Second World War. It is also evident that official Arab regimes held a view on the matter through the Arab league. The study also points out that there are many trials of Arab intellectuals in the context of national security. Although there are a large number of studies on the subject, there

is an absence of a single programme that protects Arab national security as required for protect the nation.

The failure of Arab political regimes to agree on a unified definition of Arab security and on the term national security does not mean that Arab national security is non-existent. It is viewed by many that the mobilization of any one society in an Arab country mirrors a general mobilization within the whole Arab nation; thus, it is not wholly independent. Shared interests and deep historical, social, religious and linguistic links have lead Arab countries to unite in opposition to any global threats. Therefore, the safety of Arab countries has become a collective matter, and has encouraged improvements in individual national security. The reality of an Arab political regime is the primary reason for the hindrance of the realisation of a unified Arab national security system. This study emphasises many of these difficulties and concludes that the will of Arab citizens is different to that of governing political bodies, particularly with regard to achieving national aspirations. Therefore, it is evident that Arab nationals are absent from this political change, meaning that most decision making reflects the aims of political governments rather than those of the Arab citizen.

As chapter 2 makes evident, the lack of a unified and clear definition of national security agreed upon by all Arab countries has a detrimental effect. Difficulties also arise from the absence of will power, ability and mechanisms to achieve Arab national security.

Furthermore, the study highlights the obscurity in the relationship between nationalism and Pan-Arabism, as well as between Arab nationalism and Arab national security. Although Arab national security has seen adaptation and development following global change, it remains an obscure concept to many Arab intellectuals and politicians. This is due to the numerous problems inherent in identifying a single enemy; the ways to face threats; and the inability to provide the required resources in times of threat. This is attributed to the weakness of a collective Arab military force and the inability to build a stronger one, while the enemy is able to develop and strengthen its defence systems and acquire nuclear power. In addition, due to its geo-strategic situation, the Arab world is targeted by many larger countries, making it attractive to enemies due to its strategic importance and an inability to protect national

interest. Therefore, Arab nations must strive to achieve a strategic frame and depth to protect national security.

Libya is one of the Arab-African countries which aims to protect Arab national security. Thus, in chapter 3, this study shows how, according to Libyan foreign policy, the problem of Arab national security, is presented by division and weakness that affects the Arab area. Thereby, it is worth observing that Libya attempted to achieve Arab unity from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf through a number of methods that is personal to each country. However, a number of obstacles faced Libya from achieving its ambition of unity: the most important being the state of division that exists amongst Arab countries. This is a result of the lack of Arab interaction and interrelations; a significant decrease in strategic weight; and the weakness of infrastructure and political development in the majority of Arab nations. This resulted in the internal political division of Arab countries with a tendency to call upon external support for political, ideological or sectarian reasons giving an opportunity for foreign intervention in the region. In addition, economic dependence on the West affects many Arab countries and limits them from entering ventures or unions even within the context of Arab countries. Moreover, the failure of experimental unity schemes proposed by Libya is attributed to political and cultural factors. Other factors that have contributed to the incoherence between Arab nationals and their governing bodies include: the increase in social distinctions; decrease in quality of education and its failure to protect Arab identity; the absence of human rights; the diminishing role of civil establishments; the marginalisation of women; and the lack of social equality. They reflect the inability to achieve stability, security and unity.

This study shows that the Libyan proposals for Arab unity as a means of protecting Arab national security has faced much foreign opposition from large countries, geographically neighbouring countries, and Israel. According to Libya's point of view, these countries aim to obstruct security and stability in the Arab region. Any coherence between Arab countries creates threats to the interests of these countries in the region. Therefore, Libya attributes the failure of experiments of Arab unity and the instability of the area to interventions of western countries in the national affairs of Arabic countries. Such interventions can occur by obstructing any operations with the general outlook for a comprehensive Arab national security.

It is also evident that Libya has its own agenda towards the problem of Arab national security. It maintains that such national security cannot be achieved without comprehensive Arab unity and the strengthening of relations between Arab countries and other neighbouring countries; finding a solution to the Palestinian occupation; mobilising Arab political, economical and cultural institutions; achieving a vital place for Arab countries within the global assembly; ending economical and political dependency on western countries; and activating a common cooperation and joint defence of Arab national interests. Moreover, Libya views the understanding of Arab national security concept from a broad, integrated and comprehensive stance. In other words, Libya believes the concept of national security to be the ability of a nation (*ummah*), not just the ability of a state (*dawlah*), to protect its interests from internal and external threats. Thus, Libya maintains the importance of including the power of its citizens in order to be fully prepared to face changes and development imposed by international policies.

This has clarified in chapter four, which reflects on Libyan policies for development and change of national security and, accordingly, international change. Libyan policies were not absent from following international relations and did not abandon the idea of protecting Arab national security; instead, Libya attempted to reach a new strategic depth in protecting Arab national security. This depth was situated in Africa which enjoys a preference within Libyan foreign policy as a result of a number of important factors such as geographic, political, economical, cultural social and security factors. Libya has an important place on the African continent's composition due to its geographical situation, it also has a significant political role, has strong economic power, and social and cultural integration. Based on these considerations, Libyan foreign policy was drawn towards Africa as an integral component that can affect stability and security of both the Arab and the African area alike as they both in turn affect the security and stability of Libya. Africa remains an important factor affecting Arab national security; the continent as a whole displays a weakness and an increase in conflicts that are fuelled by foreign influences, giving an opportunity for foreign presence within the continent. The African continent is also considered important in the protection of Arab national security in accordance with global direction and global developments that lean towards the formation of economic and political coalitions. Thus, these factors have contributed to the emergence of the

importance of the African continent within Libyan foreign policy. In addition, many African countries suffered as a result of its colonial history; this is shared by Libya who saw that the presence of foreign and colonial powers within the continent created a danger for the collective area. As a result, it was vital to work towards protection from the presence of any western powers, especially in a military form. This decision was welcomed by the majority of African countries, thus leading Libya to continue its political efforts in the continent, strive towards the resolution of conflicts locally without the need for western interventions, and re-establish links with a number of countries including Chad. All the aforementioned policies allowed Libya to become a vital political player in the establishment of peace within Africa alongside other African and international institutions and parties.

The study further demonstrated that Libya's will to create stability and security in the continent has led to solving existing conflicts in many of the African countries either through individual or shared efforts. For example, Libya achieved agreement between conflicting sides over the African Great Lakes. Libya was able to negotiate the reinstatement of the president of São Tomé and Príncipe following the military coup in 2008. The Libyan military was also successful in retaining rebellion in the Republic of Central Africa in 2001. On the topic of civil conflicts, due to Libyan policy, Libya was able to reduce the effects of civil war in the West African countries of Guinea and Liberia.

With regard to ethnic conflicts, Libyan policy has also played a vital role in decreasing the effects of the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in many countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria. Moreover, in the issue of border conflict Libya has succeeded in reaching agreements over conflicts between Eritria and Sudan; Ethiopia and Eritria; and Egypt and Sudan. It may be concluded from this that Libya strives to create stability and end African conflicts, thereby stopping these conflicts from multiplying and reaching the Arab region, as well as preventing involvement of foreign military and foreign policies.

Libya views these conflicts are a result of the colonial past of many of these African countries. Therefore, it was important to aid the countries in eliminating any presence of western powers in the continent. This stems from a common view between Libya and other Africa nations of shared goals as they are connected by geography, history

and social relations. In addition, the international changes which were directed towards the formation of political and economic coalitions meant that it was natural Libya turned to the African sphere as the most suitable to form a coalition. Moreover, Libya was in search for a strategic depth that would allow the country to protect its security; give a broader scope for practicing foreign policies; and allow it to adapt to global political changes as one of Africa's most important countries.

Libya's growing interest in the African continent has resulted in the maintenance of the dangers of larger powers in Africa, especially in term of military force presence. This creates a serious threat to African and Arab national security, and thus to Libyan national security which has been clearly stated in Libyan policy. Although Libya's stand towards the West and larger powers has become less extreme, especially in terms of economic cooperation, commercial and artistic exchange, its view towards the presence of military forces in the continent remains unchanged. This is evident in Libya's stand towards China in comparison to other powers, particularly western powers; Libya tends support China's economic and cooperative presence. Yet, Libya views the West with caution based on its colonial past in the region.

In general, one may conclude that Libyan foreign policy towards the West in the last decade became more parallel with western and American pressures due to the crises between Libya and the West and the US in particular. Particularly in Africa, Libyan policies aim through its activities and efforts to gain more international support for its position, and to send a clear signal that Libya is able to act as an effective political influence against the interests of the West in Africa. On the other hand, it is also open to change its traditionally held view which is stereotyped by the West as an extremist country.

Economic exchange was an important a sector of international relations, particularly after the Cold War. The economic situation in many African nations is exploited by many western countries as a reason for their presence in that continent. Chapter five examines Libya's contribution to supporting the African economy in an attempt to end its economic dependency on western countries and to support it on an autonomous self direction. Libyan policies have contributed to important economic coalitions in Africa while attempting to limit the western presence in Africa as one of the factors that threatens African generally and Arab national security. Libyan foreign

policy in Africa prevented international powers from moulding the African map during a rapidly globalising climate. Libya also invested in the great economic potential of African countries and channelled them towards achieving coherence and integration between continent countries in the face of major powers ambitions in the continent. It is undeniable that Libya has attempted to become involved in the majority of economic African intuitions at times, compromising national interest. This is evidence that Libyan policy aims to both achieve stabilisation and security in Africa and obstruct the exploitation of African resources and threat to national security by western powers.

Thus, it becomes clear that Libya has attempted to face the presence of western power in the African continent which is viewed as a source of threat. The Libyan political system in this framework works in accordance with international changes. Libyan policy cooperates with African countries, offering them financial and moral help thereby allowing them to eliminate foreign intervention. Yet it also protects its security and Arab national security.

Within the context of protection against rapidly forming international coalitions, it can be concluded that Libyan policy has focused efforts on encouraging African countries to form economic and political coalitions, which are able to compete on the international and African circuit. Moreover, Libyan policy was successful in creating the largest economic coalition in Africa CEN-SAD. This included 28 African countries in a short period of time, thereby creating a strategic centre that extends from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, and from the African desert to the Red and Mediterranean Sea. This coalition played a vital role in ending the sanctions imposed on Libya by the UN Security council, giving an opportunity for Libya to re-establish its relationship with the international community. It also provided financial and political support to member countries; became a link between members of the community and other regional communities; and formed the basis of the African Union. Through this policy, Libya proved that it was possible to create compatibility among Africans and Arab-Africans.

Due to the importance of such communities within Libyan policy, Libya has supported the majority of African communities and became a member of AEC, Arab Maghreb Union, COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEN-SAD. Libyan policy attempted to

merge all these communities into a single one in an effort to focus African abilities into a single force that can compete and negotiate with larger international coalitions and face global changes.

This study has shown that Libyan policy had a pre-formed idea that investment in Africa required peace and security and that the continent was required to improve its economic situation. It believed without these aspects, stability and security could not be achieved according to the comprehensive concept of national security which states that with security arises development. Therefore, Libyan policy has contributed individually to the advancement of development in Africa by offering support to African national institutions. It continued to lead the effort without exhausting the capabilities of smaller African nations. This is shown by the sum of US\$3 billion that was contributed to the CEN-SAD fund. It has allowed for the improvement of the infrastructure of many African countries, and has contributed to many other economic projects that aim to support the economy of poorer African countries.

In support of growth and development in African, Libya has established the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio with the amount of US\$ 35 billion to finance economic development. The policy aims through this to focus on strategic economic factors that are seen as an opportunity for foreign intervention. The Libya-Africa fund for investment has focused on many sectors such as aviation; petroleum; fishing, forestry, farming and cattle; hotels and tourism; telecommunication; and financial companies that specialise in financial markets and stock.

From the aforementioned, one may conclude that Libyan policy is aware of the importance of economic and political development within Africa. The support that Libya has given to these economic coalitions has resulted from political experiences with western countries, and a complete understanding for the requirement to eliminate foreign pressures that aim to exploit resources of the African continent and seize control of stock markets, thereby threatening national security. Therefore, Libya attempts to rescue African countries from the policies of powerful countries that aim to control and then implicate these countries in a free market economy. Libya's policies are an attempt to prevent African nations from becoming accountable under the laws of the international monetary fund, and from being exploited for the gain of developed countries due to lack of parity between the Western economy and the

economies of African countries, where most of African countries inhabitants live below the poverty line.

It is evident then that economic factors played a vital role in Libya's foreign policy: as Libya aimed to improve economic relations with other African countries, it became successful in establishing peace and stability amongst many countries, through economic relations, regional institutions or individual efforts.

It would seem that Libya was successful in creating a focus and direction in Africa by encouraging a foreign policy that aims to establish strong political and economical coalitions in an era of globalisation that does not recognise the power of small unions. Therefore, Libyan effort focused on the building of institutions and economical groupings as steps towards achieving African security and protection of its collective national security and Arab national security. Thus, it created a new strategic depth that is able to respond to any threats and block the larger powers from controlling strategic parts of the continent. It is able to channel the resources of the area into its own development as well as stop any foreign forces from exploiting local resources.

This study also highlighted in the sixth chapter that this policy towards Africa is not new in Libyan policy but was put into place since the 1969 Revolution. This is shown in speeches by the Libyan leader and the slogans that were adopted by the Revolution that imply an Africa for Africans; that Africans cannot achieve a better coalition than with other Africans; and that emphasise the role and importance of Africa in the international circuit. It can be observed that Libyan efforts to support African-Arab relations did not stop since the Revolution was established 1969 as it continues to strengthen the link to create a security belt for the Arab region within Africa by blocking the plans for the exploitation of Africa by the west and Israel. On this basis, Libya focused all its resources on creating relations through organisations such as the Arab League and the African Union.

Since the 1970s, Libya has attempted to encourage the union of African and Arab collaboration by contributing to all regional institutions, in particular economic, that contribute to African-Arab relations. In this context, Libya has played an undeniably vital role in calling for the development of regional institutes so that it can face the role that will benefit African nations. As well as this, Libya demanded a

reconsideration of the constitution of the Arab League to create a more powerful league. At the same time, Libya attempted the development of the African Union as Libya views that local government is no longer able to exist and compete in an era of global coalition.

In conclusion, Libya increased the pace of the creation of the African Union after the position taken by African countries regarding the Lockerbie incident where African countries had a vital role in the lifting of sanctions and the change in American and British views who accepted the Libyan requirements. This was achieved through the 1998 summit of the organisation of African Union leaders in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to ignore UN sanctions on Libya, helped by international circumstances, which has witnessed developments and changes during that time which are pushing for the unity of the African continent. Thus, Libyan policy saw an opportunity to face the limitations imposed by globalisation powers through the focus of efforts and independence for the continent; and the support of regional institutions that would lead to the development of African in accordance with global powers. Libya raced towards the creation of African-Arab unity, and on 8 January 1999 the formation of SENCAD was completed as a step towards creating African unity under the primary focus of Libyan policy makers. Libyan efforts also developed the organisation of the African Union. At a summit in Sirte, Libya for African leaders on 9 September, 1999, the declaration of Sirte for the creation of an African Union was made, and it was established officially during the 38th summit in Durban, South Africa in 2002.

The African Union represents the vital role of Libyan foreign policy because it is one of the results of Libyan policy since the start of the Revolution as it reflects a contribution to Arab national security that Libya sought to achieve it. Despite Libyan policy has faced many difficulties with regards to individual relations with African and Arab countries, and its relationship with the Arab League and the African Union. Yet it has managed to achieve its most important foreign policy aspiration in Africa through its power to achieve harmony between Arabs and Africans in the creation of the African Union. This union is viewed as an economic and political coalition that achieves security, can match global changes and threats from larger countries. Such an achievement was the aim since the Libyan Revolution in 1969: the creation of the 'United States of Africa'. Libya's success in the creation of the African Union gave

the country an opportunity to return to the global community and end any threats it may have faced from the West. Alongside other African and Arab countries, Libya has become more involved in global change through the branches of the Union. The success of the Union alongside local institutions must be mentioned in the resolution of many conflicts in the African continent.

At the end of this study it can be said that Arab national security within Libyan foreign policy means the protection of national interests internally and externally, through the security of national resources and its shielding from internal and foreign threats as defined by international change. The security of the Arab region is created through the African Union as prescribed by the international community which acts through political and economical coalitions. As described by Libyan policy, any individual country which is not included in a coalition is destined to vanish; thus giving rise to the importance of the creation of a united Africa that can face all levels of global coalition. The Libyan aide of expanding the role of the African Union hinges on the presence of effective authority, strong agenda and organisation to allow for the following: the views of member nations during international negotiations; the execution of the general African policy of defence and security, and strategic policy; the need to defend the continent; the consideration of all member countries; and the representation of these nations as a coalition internationally.

Finally this study shows that Libya does not ignore Arab nationalism and Arab national security but has sought to modernise the Arab national unification requirement through inviting the Arab countries to engage in the project of the African Union as a method of achieving Arab national state objectives such as protecting the Arab world from fragmentation schemes which are presented to the Arab nation in the form of regional economic projects. Also this study shows that Libya sought to achieve the idea of the Arab national state in the framework of African Union.

7.1. SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The originality of the present study is evident in the depth to which the issue has been investigated and the methodological approach used. The findings of this study contribute to the understanding of Libyan foreign policy towards Africa and the issue

of protecting national security. It also presents an explanation of the evolution of Libyan foreign policy towards Africa. Finally, it paves the way for further studies into the role of the African Union AU, and its ability to protect and create security and stability for the Arab region and other AU member states.

7.2. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the analysis the researcher recommends a number of important issues that would allow for the establishment of a strategic plan for Arab national security and the creation of stability within the continent. These issues may be summarised as follows:

Conflicts between African countries and African-Arab countries are a primary contributor to the weakness of the continent, and thus represent a disadvantage for Arab national security in terms of security and stability. On this basis, the researcher sees that the resolution of all conflicts amongst African-Arab institutions would halt foreign interventions. The researcher believes there are a number of false understandings in the Arab region and within the continent as a whole. For example, the interlocking and variable nature of interests from one country to another is one of the most threatening factors to security and stability in Africa. Thus, the researcher recommends a shared strategy between countries, particularly in the context of the AU, that would allow the definition of any threats to the security of the continent. The researcher recommends that the states of the African continent oppose the notion of weapons of mass destruction, and allow the creation of a single military force that is able to maintain peace and security between countries.

The researcher views that the strategic balance is not only derived from military aspects. Therefore, the researcher recommends the need for an economic revolution that aims to drive African economic coalitions, and support and develop them under the supervision of the AU. These coalitions should broaden economic interactions, trade and development which would bring many of the benefits that are required by the continent. The researcher argues that there is the need for the presence of political will power and the revitalisation of political, economic, social and cultural institutions through pivotal change. This would encourage the institutions to carry out their local role of resolving African issues. Moreover, the researcher sees that these would have

a crucial role in the creation of security and stability in the Arab region and the continent as a whole. This issue is key as it requires the most important issues that should be relied upon by all Arab and African states. The researcher recommends the activation of this co-operation at all levels, but particularly on the economic one.

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