ABSTRACT

Bill Clinton's 1994 European Tour: Expanding the Democratic Order in the Post-Cold War World

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In 1994, President Bill Clinton made four trips to Europe. In January, he advocated for the expansion of NATO through the Partnership for Peace plan and signed the first nuclear disarmament agreement with former Soviet states. In June, he attended the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Normandy invasion and spoke of the enduring values of the World War II generation. In July, he visited the capitols of three important former Soviet states and spoke about the imperative of reform. Finally, in December, he attended the CSCE summit and gave a capstone speech about democratic expansion. Each trip had a unique set of goals and circumstances, but all served to bolster Clinton's foreign policy goal of democratic expansion. Clinton's speeches demonstrate the unique facets of his beliefs about foreign policy and the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world.

Bill Clinton's 1994 European Tour: Expanding the Democratic Order in the Post-Cold War World

by

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

At the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy was in a state of uncertainty. The collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated that the economic and social systems of the West were more sustainable, but for the past 50 years, American foreign policy had been justified by and crafted around the threat of the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union dissolved, those justifications were no longer valid and policymakers faced a question—how would the shift away from a bipolar system change the United States' credibility and capabilities and how would American foreign policy utilize those tools?

The 1990s were years of transition away from the Cold War model and toward the beginning of a new paradigm and a new set of justifications for foreign policy. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier describe the foundational importance of these years, stating: "Just as history did not end on 11/9, it did not begin on 9/11. The challenges confronting America—combating extremist forces determined to spread terror, responding to the violent breakdown of states, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, managing the economy in an era of dramatic technological revolution, and choosing when to send young American soldiers, sailors, air men, and marines to fight—did not start on 9/ll. They began when the Cold War ended a decade earlier."[1]

Presidential Exemplars

While George H.W. Bush was technically the first President of the post-Cold War era and oversaw the dissolution of the Soviet Union, his political attitudes had been shaped during the Cold War. Bush and his staff were "Cold Warriors"—many of them fought in World War II and worked for years at the CIA, the Defense Department, or State Department fighting Soviet influence.[2] Bush presided over the transition away from the Cold War, but he clearly saw his role as protecting stability rather than engendering change. Because he lost the 1992 election, it is impossible to know if or how he as President would have further defined the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world.

At the time of Bush's presidency, the situation in Eastern Europe was extremely fragile. There was still no guarantee that Soviet nationalism would not rear its head again, as it had done previously in Hungary in 1956, Berlin in 1957, or Prague in 1968. However, unlike those years, the massive unrest in Eastern Europe would this time lead to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ousting of dictators, the first free elections, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and, just weeks before Clinton took office, the emergence of Russia as the Soviet Union's successor. It seemed almost too good to be true.

Bush's rhetorical response to this exigency was two-fold. First, Bush used this moment to promote values rather than policy. Rachel Martin Harlow says that, "Bush dismissed the notion that the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall was the time for policy announcements and proposals. Rather, he used the speech as a generic celebration of democratic values, and he incorporated the Soviet Union into that praise."[3] Second, he sought to advocate the creation of a "New World Order." Roy Joseph

explains: "President Bush conceived the end of the Cold War as a rhetorical opportunity to build a Churchillian vision of a new world in which 'the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.'"[4] Against this backdrop, Bush amplified his vision of the New World Order, one in which the United States "remains an engaged power for positive change."[5] While Bush was criticized for a lack of direct commentary on the events, his rhetorical choices helped push Russia and Eastern Europe toward liberal democratic capitalism. As William Forest Harlow explains, "George Bush's own explanation, given some years later, was that he did not wish to exacerbate a tenuous political situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 'by having the President of the United States posturing on the Berlin Wall'…. [his] legislative silence and ceremonial whisper were the best choices among the available means of persuasion in this last great rhetorical battle of the Cold War."[6]

While Bush's rhetorical silence may have been appropriate for this moment of transition, it did not serve him well in defining the future. Bush had failed to define a policy strategy that would allow the United States to fulfill the ambitions of the new world order. His lack of policy and clear direction allowed the signifier of "new world order" to be filled will all kinds of meanings, most commonly that the NWO was a conspiracy for one world government that sought to destroy national sovereignty and freedom.[7] Given this branding, it is no surprise that the term never really caught on. Chollet and Goldgeier assert that "the Bush team never answered the fundamental questions raised by these two strategies—defining the role, responsibilities, and limits of American power, and managing the required costs and sacrifice. Instead, they left them for Clinton to figure out."[8]

Clinton was the first President in 50 years to begin his presidency without the presence of the Soviet Union and his lack of recent presidential examples was obvious in that "since the end of World War II, the greatest challenge for the United States had been the Soviet Union's strength and influence. Nine presidents, from Harry Truman to Bush, worked to contain the Soviets and, where possible, to roll back their influence. But Clinton's task was exactly the opposite: to ensure that Russia's weakness did not plunge it into a deeper crisis and allow hardline forces to define Russia's power in Cold War terms or spark an outbreak of violence that could destabilize Europe."[9] The change of situation meant that Clinton could not respond to the problem of foreign policy in same way recent presidents had.

Clinton instead sought to draw upon the examples of FDR and Wilson and ensure the continuation of the ideas, relationships, and institutions that had governed most of 20th century American foreign policy. Indeed, many analogies have been made between 1993 and the momentous years of 1945 and 1918. In all three moments, a Democratic president presided over the transition out of war and, as the victor, defined what the new rules of the game would be. Not surprisingly, these three presidents created remarkably similar agendas.

Clinton's First Year in Office

Despite Clinton's opportunity to shape foreign policy, he felt that it was not his strength and that Americans wanted a greater focus on domestic problems. Coming into office, he had little foreign policy experience aside from his bachelor's degree in international relations and his experience as an aid to Senator J. William Fulbright in 1967, where he worked directly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[10] Linda Miller explains, "For an administration committed to domestic goals, coming into office

convinced that foreign affairs were essentially an unwelcome distraction, the difficulties have been magnified."[11]

The major issue of the 1992 election had been the economy and Clinton intended to stay focused on that issue at the beginning of his presidency. Clinton began his presidency with a major focus on Asia and its emerging markets. Jim Hoagland reported "the president and his secretary of state, Warren Christopher, have publicly voiced their complaints about and irritation with the Europeans several times during the past year, emphasizing their sense of European decline and weakness. Christopher especially has made clear his lack of confidence, and perhaps even his lack of interest in Europe, while constantly stressing the growing importance of Asia."[12] In foreign policy, Clinton saw Asia as a critical economic partner that could help boost America's domestic economy.

There were three main problems with Clinton's "Asia first" policy. Politically, the administration found that Asians didn't cooperate with United States on social and political problems but rather limited cooperation to economic issues. Cultural differences over values had led to disputes about what the goals of international governance should be.[13] Symbolically, the relationship with Asia did not have the same kind of history and legacy as the relationship with Europe, especially given that most of Asia had been 'lost' to communism while Europe had not. For many, it was not worth the same kind of effort.[14] Diplomatically, there had been many missteps by the Clinton administration in managing relationships in Asia and tensions were high.[15] This focus on Asia left the Europeans feeling neglected. The safety and freedom of Europe had been a large part of the justification for fighting the Cold War in the first place and the relationship with Europe was a cornerstone of American foreign policy. What had we been fighting for in Europe if it was not for the right to maintain relations and cooperation with them?

Charles Gati contextualizes this situation, explaining: "U.S. administrations missed few opportunities to challenge the communist dictatorships and press for change and human rights, declaring repeatedly that Europe must be 'whole and free' again. The very aim of American foreign policy was to replace the 'evil empire' with democratic states, on the correct assumption that democracy was the best guarantee for lasting peace. If the aim was only to create tension in the bloc and thus put Moscow on the defensive, as the Communists used to charge, how could the people of east-central Europe know? Henry Kissinger put it well: 'It is hardly to the credit of the West that after talking for a generation about freedom for eastern Europe, so little is done to vindicate it.'"[16]

By the end of 1993, three exigencies surfaced that demanded a new focus on Europe. First, the perceived neglect of the relationship created a need for Clinton to personally mend and manage ties with European allies on both symbolic and practical levels. Europeans needed the president because "from the European point of view, the President's role is crucial. Without clear American leadership and commitment, the West can neither redefine relations with Russia and the Eastern European countries the Soviet Union used to dominate, nor redefine the institutions needed to insure lasting stability from the Atlantic to the Urals in the new era."[17] Low-level diplomacy had been mismanaged and "anecdotes abound here concerning foreign dignitaries who have been treated coldly by the Clinton administration. Some European officials attribute the snubs to the administration's reputation for poor management, but others claim something more politically significant is happening."[18] Clinton either needed to prove this was not happening or more fully justify the deprioritization of Europe.

Second, it was becoming clear that Clinton did not have a grand strategy or vision and that attempts to create one had fallen short, yet the need to have such a strategy

remained. Craig Whitney explains "the challenge facing Western leaders is as critical as the one that faced them 50 years ago, but their response has been far more sketchy and tentative than it was then. Five years after the Berlin Wall collapsed, there has been no grand design to cope with the social unrest of remaking the communist economies, the ethnic strains of resurgent nationalism in Eastern Europe or the increasingly competitive pressures of the global economy."[19] As Linda B. Miller noted: "It is the Clinton administration's perceived 'lack of leadership' that is lamented most often on the editorial pages of the elite press in New York and Washington, as well as in London and Bonn. Many analysts are uneasy with the generational shift that has taken place in the White House, although their own calls for 'American leadership' are often as vague in specifics as those of the US policy-makers they criticize"[20] A grand strategy for foreign policy is considered important because it guides foreign policy across all major issues.

Despite the fact that the United States had just won the Cold War, its primacy was immediately questioned.[21] In September 1993, Peter Tarnoff, the third highest-ranking State Department official, made comments suggesting that the United States no longer had the power to affect world affairs and, as Miller explains, "although Tarnoff's realistic comments were immediately denied, they were a sobering reminder that the recently revised category of 'superpower', already shrunken in value, bears little resemblance to the romantic view of America's pre-eminent Cold War status."[22] Even Charles Krauthammer's essay *The Unipolar Moment*, while arguing that the Cold War had validated the United States as the sole superpower and demanded unilateral military action, warned of the risk that the declining economy could pose to American power and cautioned about new threats and enemies.[23]

There were many major questions to be answered about foreign policy and how the United States would orient itself toward the world. Would Clinton succumb to this declinist philosophy or would he choose to reassert American power? What would be the role of NATO? The Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union and abolished internal European border controls, came into force in November 1993 and raised new questions about how the United States would relate to Europe. Kissinger had once complained that there was no 'number for Europe,' but the founding of the European Union meant that this statement was obsolete. In an interview, this is made clear: "SPIEGEL: Thirty years ago, you asked for one phone number that could be used to call Europe. Kissinger: ... and it happened."[24] Europe was at the historical and practical intersection of global power, yet support for the European Union was contentious because some feared that without the common Soviet threat, Europe would rise up to become a counterbalance to United States hegemony.

Third, while Clinton was deliberating on the shape of his foreign policy, the Cold War victory was under threat from three directions. The first threat was a risk of Communists returning—a literal reversal of the Cold War victory. Anne Applebaum explains the situation, saying: "In the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994, Western politicians and journalists were caught off guard by a series of political changes in Central Europe. In Poland, parties led by former communists and their rural allies won a majority of parliamentary seats; in Hungary, the former Communist party won absolute parliamentary power; in Slovakia, former communists calling themselves Social Democrats replaced former communists calling themselves Nationalists."[25] Economic liberalization had also been difficult for Eastern Europe. Noam Chomsky chronicles some of the problems in former communist economies, documenting high levels of

depression and suicide, declining life expectancy, massively increased poverty, and lack of social services.[26] Despite these troubles, "[Clinton's advisors] were determined that [Clinton] convey to the former Communists who have gained in power in Poland that the road to prosperity and security still leads westward."[27]

The second threat was the risk of war in Europe, which had not disappeared at the end of the Cold War. As Chollet and Goldgeier explain, "Some experts foresaw a future in which Europe would devolve into the kind of militarized rivalries and ambitions that had led to the world wars. The scholar John Mearsheimer argued in a much-discussed 1990 *Atlantic* cover story that the United States "would soon miss" the stability granted by the US-Soviet standoff, warning of nuclear proliferation throughout Europe and violent hypernationalism."[28] European stability had been a major goal of the Cold War and Clinton quickly discovered that such a goal was not confined just to the past. War in Europe still presented a serious threat to American economic and political interests and Clinton chose to "cast himself and the United States as forces of stability for an uneasy Europe and a politically divided Russia."[29]

The third threat was the risk of resurgent Russian nationalism. Russia's transition to democratic capitalism was not easy and both Bush and Clinton made a choice to support Boris Yeltsin to avoid empowering the nationalists, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. If Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party was able to take power, many feared it would entail a return to militant authoritarianism, which would not bode well for Russia's integration into the global market. At the time, Clinton had "just elevated his expert on Russia, Strobe Talbott, to deputy secretary of state, the No. 2 position at the department."[30] According to Paul Bedard "Mr. Talbott supports increased economic and political aid to Mr. Yeltsin, but some congressional leaders are warning the White House

not to put all of its support behind the embattled reformer."[31] The question of how to respond to events and the contestation of leadership in Russia was one of the most pressing issues at the end of 1993.

A year into his presidency, Clinton was beginning to realize the extent of this monumental power. Stephan A. Smith describes two instances where Clinton acknowledged this power, writing that "in an interview with Helen Thomas at the end of his first year as president, Clinton said he was surprised at how much 'the words of a president count.' Political columnist David Broder noted that Clinton was now well aware of the rhetorical impact of certain speeches delivered during the first year of his term and said, 'The most encouraging thing about President Clinton . . . is the serious reflection he is doing about the use of the rhetorical powers of his office.'"[32] Clinton was in a position where it was still possible for him to correct his course and use the rhetorical powers of the presidency to his advantage.

It is the mastery of rhetoric, among other things, that allows presidents to pursue a successful foreign policy. Even the best policies can fail if they are poorly presented. One of the most difficult parts of foreign policy is managing the many different audiences. Foreign relations are not conducted in a vacuum and so a message that is intended for one country can send signals to other countries, whether intended or not. Foreign policy is largely about managing these complex relationships and audiences.

The president has a constitutionally mandated role to lead foreign policy. One of the five primary roles of the president is diplomat-in-chief. As the leader of the country, the president conveys the United States' intentions and goals. No matter where the president speaks or what he speaks about, there is always somebody who is interested, whether it is the domestic public, foreign publics, or foreign lawmakers. The president,

as the representative of the United States, speaks on behalf of the American people, so even if he is not speaking *to* Americans, he is speaking *for* them and therefore shaping global opinions and impressions of the United States.

However, the role of the president is also important to domestic audiences because "audiences often learn about various places, issues, and situations from his discourse. Most Americans have little to no knowledge of the issues and threats that the United States faces in the international arena, let alone knowledge of other nation-states. …they count upon the president to offer a semblance of order to the world around us."[33] In fact, as Frank Schimmelfennig explains "it is no coincidence that the administration's NATO policy was first presented, in January 1994, to a domestic audience in Milwaukee, a city of numerous inhabitants with Central and Eastern European roots."[34] States with heavy Central and Eastern European populations had "accounted for more than half of the electoral votes that Clinton received in that year" and as such "were recognized as indispensable for a victory in 1996."[35] While these domestic concerns did not directly drive Clinton's NATO policy, he certainly made no qualms about publicizing a policy that he thought would appeal to that voting constituency. As Gale Mattox explains, "the one nondomestic issue that resonated and was considered a natural outgrowth of the security provision in the Contract with America was NATO expansion. Ethnic constituencies played more than a minor role in this decision, but fears of a resurgent Russia also drew attention to the issue."[36] While the Contract with America was not released until later in 1994, the issues that would affect the 1994 election were already circulating when Clinton made his trip.

Appealing to domestic constituencies was just one of the ways Clinton used these trips to demonstrate his understanding and mastery of rhetoric. These trips gave Clinton

"an opportunity to cast himself as a true statesman who can address the deep concerns of European governments and put the United States behind the right forces at an uncertain time in history."[37] These trips were an initiative to control the perception and practice of American foreign policy toward Europe and an opportunity for Clinton to actively begin directing foreign policy. This campaign gave Clinton an opportunity to demonstrate his diplomatic skills.

The Turn to Europe

At the end of 1993, Clinton responded to these issues and made a pivot in foreign policy away from Asia and toward Europe. He recognized the exigencies and knew that a rhetorical change was necessary to convey his sense of determination to resolve these problems. That this was a turning point is clearly recognized by both journalists and scholars. Jim Hoagland reported that "with the trade negotiations concluded and Bosnia not now a subject of division, the journey Clinton embarks on next week marks a turning point."[38] To actualize this turn, Clinton and his foreign policy team planned a series of trips to Europe for 1994, supported by a public speaking campaign of administration officials all advocating for a strong relationship with Europe. The trips were a sustained diplomatic effort designed to reassure European allies, define the role of the United States and NATO in the post Cold War era, and support moderates and democratic reforms in Eastern Europe and former Soviet states. This was an initiative that "the Clinton administration is calling privately its 'Year of Europe' - although the use of this phrase, which offended Europeans when Henry Kissinger coined it in 1974, is firmly banned."[39]

These tours ought to be studied from a rhetorical perspective for numerous reasons. The rhetorical presidency has been extensively studied in the domestic context, but study of the foreign context is limited. The foreign rhetorical presidency functions

differently than the domestic rhetorical presidency because the president is given different responsibilities and burdens. Scholars have thoroughly studied the deployment and functions of crisis rhetoric, but have not examined as closely presidential policymaking in the international arena or the study of the president as diplomat-in-chief. International legislation is still in its infancy, but as global interaction has become more frequent, the need for direct executive action has become more common. Richard F. Grimmett explains the unique circumstances of foreign policy, saying that "A few international agreements might be called 'sole executive agreements' because the President considers that he has the authority to conclude them under his own powers and does not submit them to the Senate as treaties nor to Congress for approval. Examples are the Yalta Agreement of 1945, the Vietnam Peace Agreement of 1973, the Iranian Hostage Agreement of 1981, and the Afghanistan Settlement Agreement of April 14, 1988."[40] These differing circumstances clearly have implications for what the role of the president in deliberation and policymaking ought to be.[41] In the international arena, the president's audience is expanded to include not just Congress and the domestic public, but also foreign populaces and their leaders. For Clinton, these gave him "an opportunity to cast himself as a true statesman who can address the deep concerns of European governments and put the United States behind the right forces at an uncertain time in history."[42]

Diplomacy is itself a form of communication, a way of conveying needs, intentions, and concerns through positioning, bargaining, and negotiations. Hedley Bull has explained how without communication, diplomacy would be a worthless endeavor, saying: "diplomacy facilitates communication between the political leaders of states and other entities in world politics. Without communication there could be no international

society, nor any international system at all. Thus the most elementary function of diplomatists is to be messengers."[43] He continues on to say, "A second function of diplomacy is the negotiation of agreements. Without the negotiation of agreements, international relations would be possible but they would consist only of fleeting, hostile encounters between one political community and another. Agreements are possible only if the interests of the parties, while they may be different, overlap at some point, and if the parties are able to perceive that they do overlap. The art of the diplomatist is to determine what this area of overlapping interests is, and through reason and persuasion to bring the parties to an awareness of it."[44] Diplomacy revolves around crafting messages and negotiating agreements around those messages. Understanding how those messages were constructed and negotiated can say as much about the diplomat as the policy.

In addition, as well as appealing to the leaders of these countries, Clinton had to appeal to their domestic populaces because "public diplomacy is, at its core, a necessarily suasive endeavor, concerned with the influence of foreign audiences and the modification of their behavior in some way."[45] After all, it was the people who rose up to end communism. Clinton made addresses speaking directly to the people of Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, and other places. One of the main criticisms of the rhetorical presidency is that presidents often appeal to the people over the heads of the legislature. Clinton's addresses on this trip can be seen as a similar strategy because he used the newly developed power of the democratic masses to support his policies.

These trips also served domestic purposes for Clinton, who was under fire for his foreign policy and facing the beginning of what would become a long series of crises, beginning with the 1994 midterm elections and ending with his impeachment in 1998. Bedard explains that, "Presidents often use foreign travel to boost public opinion at

home, and senior Clinton aides said that is a pattern the president wants to copy. Mr. Clinton's symbolic trips to Riga, Latvia, tonight, Poland tomorrow and Germany next week, with a long stop in Naples, later this week to attend the annual economic summit, is a page out of the playbooks that Presidents Reagan and Bush found could revive faltering popularity at home. With his popularity at rock bottom and respect for his handling of foreign affairs at an all-time low, administration officials are anxious to get any boost in the polls from the eight-day trip."[46] John F. Kennedy once said the best advice he could give a future president under domestic fire was to "go to Germany." These trips to Europe would help the American public to better understand his foreign policy and enhance his domestic popularity.

Focus of Thesis

In my thesis, I examine the rhetorical aspects and effects of Clinton's 1994 tours to Europe. As Martin J. Medhurst explains, "the art of rhetoric has encompassed two parallel dimensions: discovery or invention of ideas, and the judgment and decision making that followed from those ideas. These two dimensions found their end in a third—prudential action."[47] I examine the values that were central to Clinton's foreign policy, how he defined them, and how those values were crafted into policy and implemented. I will discuss the persuasive tactics and framing that Clinton used to persuade European nations of sustained American commitment and to persuade Americans that sustained commitment to Europe was in their best interest.

The effects of Clinton's policies demonstrate their persuasive success. Chollet and Goldgeier argue that "amid the cacophony of criticism that exploded over how they handled these crises, Clinton had implemented a strategy, rooted in American ideals and

power, to deal with two of the biggest challenges bequeathed by the end of the Cold War: the future stability of Europe and the U.S. relationship with its former adversary, Russia."[48] Stephan Walt explains, "Clinton's team successfully persuaded Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear arsenals they inherited from the former Soviet Union. It also placed Russia's nuclear materials under more reliable control."[49] Walt also argues Clinton's "foreign policy team masterfully orchestrated NATO's expansion into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The strategic wisdom of this step is arguable, but it was extremely popular in Europe and bolstered support for NATO back home."[50] In addition, "Clinton can take credit for establishing a good relationship with former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and for helping him defeat reactionary challengers in the 1996 election. Yeltsin was hardly an ideal leader—as his vanishing popularity showed - but he was far better than the alternatives that Clinton's policies helped avert."[51]

Literature Review

There is a fair amount of literature on this topic, but none discussing this particular set of texts. Michael Leff and Mary Kahl wrote a short essay about the June trip, where Clinton gave a number of speeches commemorating World War II. I found this to be an excellent piece of criticism and though short, enlightening as to the purpose and effect of these speeches.[52] Jason Edwards's book *Navigating the Post Cold War World: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric* is a good overview of Clinton's foreign policy and rhetorical style, but the discussion of these specific trips is largely excluded to focus on other events. Brian Snee wrote an analysis of a particular Clinton speech when he analyzes Clinton's 1993 Memorial Day Speech at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. In this speech, Clinton's discourse defends his own opposition to the Vietnam

War and tries to deflect the public's attention away from the past and toward the future. This is a form of amnestic rhetoric that helps the public memory to forget something.[53] This article was helpful because it extrapolated how Clinton related to "the greatest generation," an issue especially relevant during his June trip.

There are quite a few articles that compare Clinton to past presidents. Phillip Abbott discusses the parallels between Clinton and Nixon and how they had both been shouldered with the burdens of a past generation and how this caused them to be personally resentful and prideful.[54] As this is more of a discussion of Clinton as a person rather than as a politician, I find it to be largely unhelpful. Lara Brown wrote an excellent article about Clinton's use of presidential exemplars. Clinton is known for citing Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt, but deeper analysis reveals that he also frequently invoked Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and other centrist politicians.[55]

There are a number of books and articles about Clinton as a speaker. Stephen A. Smith edited a volume about Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign and the road to the White House. While campaign speech is of a different genre rather diplomatic speech, Clinton used many of the same tactics in both his campaign and his diplomacy and this book was helpful in pointing out some of Clinton's common tropes.[56] One of Clinton's later speechwriters Michael Waldman wrote a book called *POTUS Speaks*, which chronicles his time in the White House and what he thinks are the important contributions of the Clinton administration.[57] Robert E. Denton, Jr and Rachel L. Holloway edited a volume about Clinton's communication strategies. Many of the chapters were about domestic issues, but I found the chapter by Craig Allen Smith to provide great insight on the nature of Clinton's rhetorical presidency.[58] These insights are developed further in his volume written with Kathy A. Smith.[59] Keith Whittingon argues that Clinton is the

embodiment of the modern rhetorical presidency because he operated in permanent campaign mode, made heavy use of public speaking for persuasion, and was an ardent believer in the value of opinion polling and public opinion, and "flattering the citizenry rather than enlightening it."[60] A book edited by Steven A. Schier has a number of chapters about Clinton's foreign policy. While the book was written from a political science perspective, it clearly has implications for rhetoric and the study of the rhetorical presidency.[61] Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles co-authored a book about the 'hyperreal' image of Bill Clinton, but this ventures into an entirely new area of critical theory that is beyond the scope of this thesis.[62]

Methods and Organization

I use a historical-critical method to investigate these trips. As the trips were a sustained diplomatic effort and there are hundreds of pages of comments, press releases, internal documents, and other such texts, they ought to be studied as a whole, which demands a broad scope of investigation. Examining the development of diplomatic themes requires a wide enough sample from which to determine the most prevalent themes. At the same time, Clinton gave several notable landmark addresses while on these tours that merit closer study. Therefore, I will be studying these texts through a close reading method.

The chapters will be organized chronologically. The second chapter is about Clinton's January trip. On this trip, Bill Clinton unveiled and advocated for the 'Partnership for Peace' plan. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, questions remained about the fate of NATO. Many of the former Soviet and Eastern European states wanted immediate access to membership in NATO, but this idea was

strongly opposed by Russia, who felt that such a move would impede on Russia's traditional sphere of influence. The PfP plan was a compromise: it would allow any non-members to participate in security dialogue with NATO, including Russia, but it would not guarantee full membership or extend the Article V mutual defense obligation to those states. Clinton waged a persuasive campaign to convince the members of NATO, Russia, and Eastern European states that the PfP was the best possible solution. Clinton used the frame of complex interdependence to justify his NATO expansion policy. By showing that the world was already interdependent, he created an imperative to deepen that interdependence through the expansion of institutions like NATO.

The third chapter is about Clinton's June trip. On this trip, he visited Italy, France, and England. He attended services commemorating the 50th anniversary of the D-Day invasions and honoring American and allied deaths in the fight against fascism. The occasion demanded that Clinton give epideictic speeches, but he used those speeches to elevate a certain set of values that supported his policy of democratic enlargement. Clinton used the power of definition to establish that World War II had been the "good war." He then moved on to construct Normandy as a metaphor for the current day and used that to justify and sanctify his foreign policy actions.

In the fourth chapter, I discuss Clinton's July visit to Europe. On this trip, Clinton would visit and pay homage to those who had suffered most during World War II and under the Soviet Union. He sought to reassure those nations that America's relationship with Russia did not spell their demise. Clinton began his trip in Latvia, where he was the first American President ever to visit a Baltic state. This visit signaled that Clinton accepted the Baltic States as free and independent nations, not merely client states of Russia. Clinton's second stop was Warsaw, where he visited numerous memorials and

then gave a speech to the Sejm, the Polish parliament. He then travelled to Bonn and on to Berlin, where he deactivated the Berlin Brigade, a military unit that had been consistently stationed in Europe since World War II, and spoke to the people of Berlin. In this chapter, I will analyze closely the addresses Clinton gave in Riga, Warsaw, and Berlin. These speeches sought to address the fundamental problems associated with the transition to liberal democracy and market capitalism. I argue that Clinton used a series of ideographs to support the ideological transition that needed to accompany the institutional transition.

In the fifth chapter, I talk about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit. The CSCE was created in 1973 as a space for Eastern and Western countries to meet and discuss common security issues. In 1994, the named was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and it became a formalized institution, rather than a committee. Clinton's speech at the summit can be considered a kind of capstone address—it is the culmination of the themes in his earlier trips. Internal memos and documents indicate that this speech had been the goal of all European foreign policy in 1994. Because Clinton gave only one major address, I do a close analysis of how the speech was constructed and how it was made to reflect the Clinton Administration's views and beliefs. This speech went through several drafts and I will argue that those drafts demonstrate the process of creating diplomatic language.

Chapter six contains my concluding remarks and thoughts. Clinton's actions in 1994 laid the basis for much of the rest of his foreign policy. The idea of democratic enlargement is now an integral part of American foreign policy and this was the year that it all began.

Notes

[1] James Goldgeier and Derek Chollet, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), xi.

[2] Bush himself was director of the CIA; Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had been in government since 1969; Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had been in the Foreign Service since 1957, was an advisor to Kissinger, and served as a US advisor to NATO.

[3] William Forrest Harlow, "And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Bush's Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press), 47.

[4] Roy Joseph, "The New World Order: President Bush and the Post-Cold War Era," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press), 81.

[5] Joseph, "The New World Order," 81.

[6] Harlow, "And the Wall Came Tumbling Down," 38-40.

[7] See for instance, Pat Robertson, *New World Order* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1992.)

[8] Goldgeier and Chollet, *America Between the Wars*, 51.

[9] Goldgeier and Chollet, *America Between the Wars*, 120.

[10] Janis F. Kearney, *Conversations: William Jefferson Clinton: From Hope to Harlem* (Chicago: Writing Our World Press, 2006), 209.

[11] Linda B. Miller, "The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy?" *International Affairs* 70 (1994): 621-634.

[12] Jim Hoagland, "Europe: Waiting for Clinton…," *The Washington Post*, January 4, 1994, A17.

[13] See Harries, Owen, "The Next Cold War?," *National Review* 46, no. 14 (August 1994): 28-37.

[14] See Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern, "The Myth of the Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994): 79-93.

[15] Manning and Stern, "The Myth of the Pacific Community," 86.

[16] Charles Gati, "From Sarajevo to Sarajevo," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1992): 75-6.

[17] Craig R. Whitney, "Summit in Naples: The Outlook," *The New York Times*, July 9, 1994, 4.

[18] "Europeans Are Getting the Brush-off from the U.S.," *The Gazette,* December 11, 1993, A15.

[19] Whitney, Summit in Naples," 4.

[20] Miller, “The Clinton Years,” 625.

[21] Also see Edward Luttwack, *The Endangered American Dream* (New York: Simon and Schuester); Harries, Owen, "The Next Cold War?," *National Review* 46, no. 14 (August 1994): 28-37.

[22] Miller, “The Clinton Years,” 626.

[23] Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990/1991): 23-33.

[24] “Europeans Hide Behind the Unpopularity of President Bush,” *Der Spiegel*, February 18, 2008.

[25] Anne Applebaum, “The Fall and Rise of the Communists: Guess Who's Running Central Europe?” *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994): 7.

[26] See Noam Chomsky, *World Orders, Old and New* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 155-156.

[27] Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Going to a Europe Poised 'at Turning Point,'” *The New York Times,* January 9, 1994, 6.

[28] Goldgeier and Chollet, *America Between the Wars*, 116.

[29] Jehl, “Clinton Going,” 6.

[30] Paul Bedard, “Clinton to Push Partnership Plan Despite Fears of NATO, Congress,” *The Washington Times,* December 31, 1993, 1A.

[31] Bedard, “Clinton to Push,” 1A.

[32] Stephen A. Smith, “The Rhetorical Invention of Bill Clinton,” in *Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage: the Rhetorical Road to the White House,* ed. Stephen A. Smith (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994), 2.

[33] Edwards, Navigating the Post-Cold War World, 1-3.

[34] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 239.

[35] Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, 239.

[36] Gale A. Mattox, “The U.S. Role in Europe: The Decision to Enlarge NATO,” *Miller Center Journal* 5 (1998): 120.

[37] Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Going to a Europe Poised 'at Turning Point,'” *New York Times,* January 9, 1994, 6.

[38] Hoagland, “Waiting for Clinton,” A17.

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[40] Richard F. Grimmett, “Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress,” *Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, US Department of State,* June 1, 1999, http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm

[41] See Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Presidency and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 5 (1991): 120-137.

[42] Jehl, "Clinton Going," 6.

[43] Hedley Bull, "The Functions of Diplomacy," in *Classic Readings of International Relations, 2nd ed.,* ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999), 267.

[44] Bull, "The Functions of Diplomacy," 267.

[45] Matthew G. Gerber, "On the Consideration of 'Public Diplomacy' as a Rhetorical Genre," *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate* 29 (2008): 123.

[46] Paul Bedard, "Little boost seen for Clinton in four-nation trip ; Tough battles rage at home," *The Washington Times,* July 5, 1994, 1A.

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[48] Goldgeier and Chollet, *America Between the Wars*, 115.

[49] Stephen M. Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (2000): 71.

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[52] Mary L. Kahl and Michael Leff, "The Rhetoric of War and Remembrance: An Analysis of President Bill Clinton's 1994 D-Day Discourses," *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication* 7 (2006): 15–21.

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[57] Michael Waldman, *POTUS Speaks* (New York: Simon and Schuester, 2000.)

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CHAPTER TWO

January: Achieving Consensus Through the Complex Interdependence Frame

In January 1994, President Bill Clinton went on the first of what would be four trips to Europe in a single year. During this initial trip, Clinton had two practical objectives. First, he would introduce the Partnership for Peace agreement at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit. Second, he would travel to Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to propose a nuclear disarmament agreement. Both of these plans were contentious and required Clinton to actively persuade other parties to sign on to the agreements. These plans made substantial alterations to U.S. foreign policy in Europe and demonstrated a change not only in the theoretical guidelines of foreign policy, but in its practical implementation as well.

This trip dealt with one of the central questions left by the end of the Cold War—what should be done about institutions like NATO whose primary purpose had been to oppose the Soviet bloc? The United States could have made substantially different choices, choosing to continue the strategy of containment through militarized security or choosing to revert to isolationism and withdraw completely from Europe. Instead, Clinton chose to keep the United States engaged in Europe. However, without the threat of the Soviets, the justifications for that engagement had to be reexamined and reconfigured. It had previously been suggested that organizations like NATO *could* be harnessed for purposes other than deterring the Soviets, but the nature of those purposes remained elusive until this trip.

The trip was a specific persuasive campaign designed to convince NATO members, Russia, and Eastern European states that the Partnership for Peace and other

expansive measures were the best possible solutions to the question of NATO's purpose. But it was also a persuasive campaign for the underlying beliefs that governed Clinton's foreign policy orientation. Because Clinton lacked recent Democratic presidential models, he returned to the seminal models of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, who both valued global cooperation and partnerships. John Ruggie explains:

> On close inspection, however, a striking element of continuity can be seen amid this fog of befuddlement: the foreign policy impulses of the United States at cold war's end have evoked the rhetoric and some of the actions of American leaders at the end of World Wars I and II. …Both supported national self-determination. Both expressed an aversion to the bilateral alliances. … preferring instead more comprehensive and institutionalized security arrangements: a League of Nations in 1919 and a universal security system through the United Nations in 1945. And both favored the reduction of state-imposed barriers to the flow of international economic transactions as well as uniform rules to govern trade and monetary relations. Thus, at the end of each global conflagration in the twentieth century –the two world wars and the cold war—American administrations have enunciated and, at least in some measure, have sought to act upon a vision premised on essentially similar ideas.[1]

However, where Roosevelt and Wilson were held back by situational constraints, Clinton was able to seize on a unique historical moment to drive global cooperation farther and deeper. The opportunity for change brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union and the rapid development of technology meant Clinton had a moment where his rhetoric could propel the world toward greater unity.

Clinton used the interdependence frame to support his policy of democratic enlargement, which was developed in late 1993, as he "felt he needed to respond to the critics who accused him of lacking a clear direction in foreign policy and to devise a strategic doctrine if he was to enter the ranks of grater American presidents. Democratic enlargement served these needs. NATO expansion, then, appeared to be a suitable policy to implement the new doctrine."[2] In September 1993, Clinton gave a speech at the United Nations about democratic enlargement written by Anthony Lake with assistance

from Representative Newt Gingrich. As Douglas Brinkley explains "the concept in fact became the president's general framework for dealing with global issues on a day-to-day basis.…That priority first emerged at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels."[3] Andrew Bacevich has further supported this point, saying: "The final triumph of democratic capitalism had become a reasonable prospect. Completing the process of aligning other nations with the United States ideologically—or, as Lake phrased it, securing the "enlargement of the world's community of free nations"—had become the proper goal of U.S. policy."[4] Understanding the original deployment and underlying principles of this framework can help to explicate later policy developments and explain why the United States' Europe policy took the path it did.

In this chapter, I will that Clinton used a frame of interdependence to explain and justify his foreign policy in Europe. I draw from Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane's theory of complex interdependence to argue that this frame is a change in perspective that alters the goals and priorities of American foreign policy. The NATO Partnership for Peace plan was an initiative designed under this framework and is an example of the kind of policy results that are likely to come from this perspective of interdependence. Second, I argue that Clinton's use of the interdependence frame was a centrist rhetorical strategy and that it was a calculated choice based on his skills, experience, and the available rhetorical and political opportunities.

I begin with an overview of the trip and the goals Clinton hoped to accomplish while there. I then define the interdependence paradigm, examine how it shapes international relations, and provide examples from the major speeches on this trip to demonstrate Clinton's use of the interdependence frame. I will show how Clinton used

this framing to gain support for Partnership for Peace. Finally, I will evaluate whether this rhetoric was successful and discuss what the standards for success might be.

Rhetorical Situation

On this first visit, Clinton stopped in six countries. His first stop was in Brussels, Belgium where he attended a NATO summit and officially presented the Partnership for Peace plan. He gave four major speeches in Brussels. He then traveled to Prague, where he met with the leaders of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, known as the Visegrad states, all of whom had had been agitating for NATO membership. He gave a major speech in Prague about the role of the Visegrad states in changing Europe. After departing from Prague, he briefly stopped in Ukraine, a last-minute addition to the itinerary, and then proceeded to Russia, where he, Boris Yeltsin, and Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk signed a trilateral nuclear disarmament agreement. While in Moscow, he gave a speech about Russia's economic and political future. He then traveled to Belarus, which served the dual purposes of symbolically rewarding Belarus for its quick agreement to nuclear disarmament and of bolstering the moderates in power. Clinton gave a major speech in support of reform in Belarus. Finally, he made a stop in Geneva to meet with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

Clinton's trip served both domestic and foreign goals. At the domestic level, it was reported that Clinton "leaves Washington tomorrow for the most important foreign trip of his Presidency so far, believing that much of his domestic agenda depends on his ability to calm and stabilise a Europe that some of his advisers fear is unravelling."[5] Not only would turmoil in Europe cause problems for the United States, but NATO expansion was an issue that was intrinsically tied to domestic affairs.

This issue was also highly contentious and "no issue since the Vietnam War has so divided the foreign-policy establishment."[6] Paul Bedard catalogues the opposition to Clinton's Partnership for Peace program, saying: "Washington think tanks, congressional leaders and NATO members are warning the president to drop his offer to grant Eastern European nations membership in the 44-year-old military alliance."[7] Bedard cites Brent Scowcroft, Bush's National Security Adviser as saying "This 'Partnership for Peace' approach does not meet the security and political challenges we face in Europe. At best, it will provide some time and rhetorical cover while we turn to the difficult work of fashioning an effective post-Cold War security strategy for Europe."[8]

At the international level, Clinton's trip served four goals—"to mollify his European allies; to revitalize NATO; to reassure the worried eastern Europeans; and to chart the West's relations with the problematic new Russia which is emerging."[9] The State Department's historical account went into even further detail, stating that "the transformation of the New Independent States into free-market democracies and their integration into the community of democratic nations, the global economy, and international institution were among the highest foreign policy priorities of the Clinton administration."[10] Clinton needed to create an understanding of the world to resolve these issues because, as Josef Joffe explained in 1992 immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, "Bipolarity was a system of order and unity—either voluntary or coercive. With its demise Europe's nations and nationalities were liberated from past constraints and dependencies. They are now freer to follow their own needs than at any time since 1945. Hence it is not a safe bet that the logic of unity and interdependence will prevail."[11] With that logic of unity and interdependence under threat, Clinton had to rearticulate its necessity for his goals to become reality.

To do this, Clinton adopted a narrative frame of complex interdependence. A frame is a way of seeing the world. Frames help to explain the world by identifying fragmented issues and ideas and bringing them together to form a coherent story. A frame takes certain assumptions as a given and then seeks to make arguments about policies based on those assumptions. Schimmelfennig explains that "in order to formulate a persuasive argument, rhetorical actors frame their claims, grounds, and warrants in a way that they think is most conductive to persuading their audiences and opponents. Powerful arguments depend on compelling frames."[12]

In the area of foreign policy, theories of international relations act like frames. Theories of international relations seek to explain the nature of the world and to predict how people act within the world; they are a lens by which to see and interpret. The choice about how to frame and think about international relations is important because "inappropriate images and ill-conceived perceptions of world politics can lead directly to inappropriate or even disastrous national policies."[13]

Adopting the Complex Interdependence Frame

The narrative frame of complex interdependence is derived from Nye and Keohane's theory of complex interdependence. The theory was originally developed in 1977 as a challenge to the realist paradigm. While realism has much to offer in terms of its analysis of military conflicts, it could not adequately account for social factors and the increasing importance of non-state actors. Nye and Keohane argue, "we can imagine a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy."[14] These become the three characteristics of complex interdependence. First, "multiple channels connect societies."[15] This means that while government-to-government contact is important, other forms of contact between countries are also important, including government-to-public communication and public-to-public

communication, made possible by new technologies and social developments such as globalization. Second, the international agenda does not have a clear hierarchy of values or issues. States have varying goals and while some of them strive for military dominance, other states seek what Nye later calls soft power—power that is derived from attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and threats.[16] As a result, "military security does not consistently dominate the agenda."[17] Third, military force is less important. While military force may still be used, it is often in a multilateral context that enforces the conditions of interdependence rather than seeking to assert an individual state's power. These three characteristics constitute a theory that underlies Clinton's framing of the international system.

The use of interdependence rhetoric serves an important purpose. Nye and Keohane argue, "Political leaders often use interdependence rhetoric to portray interdependence as a natural necessity, as a fact to which policy (and domestic interest groups) must adjust, rather than as a situation partially created by policy itself."[18] This is a powerful tactic because "the president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public."[19] He goes on to note that "the presidential definition is stipulated, offered as if were natural and uncontroversial rather than chosen and contestable."[20] This is precisely what Clinton did during his first trip to Europe.

Clinton used the rhetoric of interdependence to position the current moment as one of necessary transition and change. He was able to use the changing geopolitical circumstances to argue for a corresponding change in thinking about how the international system operated. Upon arriving in Brussels, he announced: "It is a new day for our transatlantic partnership: The Cold War is over, Germany is united, the Soviet

Union is gone, and a constitutional democracy governs Russia. The specter that haunted our citizens for decades of tanks rolling in through Fulda Gap—or nuclear annihilation raining from the sky—that specter, thank God, has largely vanished."[21] In his speech immediately following the NATO summit the next day, Clinton declared, "Now we no longer fear attack from a common enemy. But if our common adversary has vanished, we know our common dangers have not. With the Cold War over, we must confront the destabilizing consequences of the unfreezing of history which the end of the cold war has wrought."[22]

Clinton was then able to make an argument that the moment was unique and one that had to be taken advantage of; that this was a *kairotic* time, a moment of opportunity. This theme is evident throughout his speeches. On January 9th, he stated, "I have come here at this *time* because I believe that it is *time* for us, together, to revitalize our partnership and to define a new security at a *time* of historic change."[23] On the 10th, he explained, "I do not view this as some sort of half-hearted compromise,…it is the right thing to do *at this moment in history*."[24] On the 14th in Moscow, he told the Russian people that "Once every generation or two all great nations must stop and think about where they are in *time*. They must regenerate themselves. They must imagine their future in a new way. Your generation has come of age at *one of those moments*."[25] This was not just the right time, but also a an urgent moment, for as Clinton said, "Like all great opportunities, we must remember that this one could be fleeting."[26]

Once Clinton constructed this as a moment that demanded action and change, he was then able to describe what the nature of that change should be. He began by describing what kind of changes would not be acceptable or tolerated. Throughout American history, calls for isolationism had been constant, from George Washington's

warning of "permanent allies" and Thomas Jefferson's concern about "entangling alliances" all the way to 20th century thinkers, but in reality, the United States has always been engaged in international affairs. This was not something Clinton desired to change. As would be expected for someone advocating for interdependence, Clinton placed great value on international engagement. On the 9th, Clinton condemned those who would move toward isolationism by saying "history will judge us as it judged with scorn those who preached isolation between the world wars, and as it has judged with praise the bold architects of the transatlantic community after World War II."[27] On the 10th, he stated, "our generation's stewardship of this grand alliance, therefore, will be judged most critically by whether we succeed in integrating the nations to our east within the compass of Western security and Western values."[28]

Throughout his major addresses, Clinton articulated what the nature of this necessary change should be. Clinton began with the assumption that interdependence was a valuable end goal and moved his arguments backward from that point. His arguments reflect the three characteristics of complex interdependence theory. These characteristics are true because interdependence already exists, and Clinton attempted to show how the world is interdependent and how our views on policies and organizations ought to change as a result.

The first characteristic of an interdependent world is that states are no longer the only actors in the international realm. A fundamental tenet of realism is the idea that states are the central actors in the international sphere. In an interdependent world, it is no longer one state competing with every other state, but rather all (or most) states working together to solve global problems. States are important because they make space for cooperation, but they are not the primary controllers of power anymore. While

Clinton clearly reserves a role for states, for him it is the people that ought to dictate what states do rather than states controlling people. This idea was especially compelling in the former Soviet states, where all aspects of life had been controlled by the state. On January 9th, Clinton stated, "the Iron Curtain rusted from within and was brought crashing down by the determination of brave men and women to live free…by all those who understand that neither economics nor consciences can be ordered from above."[29] On the 14th, he expressed his belief that "the greatness of nations in the 21st century will be defined not by whether they can dictate to millions and millions of people within and beyond their borders, but instead by whether they can provide their citizens… the opportunity to live up to the fullest of their ability."[30] Later in the same speech, he spoke of a "dramatically changing, highly competitive, increasingly flexible global economy in which all decisions simply cannot be made by a handful of people from the top down and in which no country is immune from the forces without."[31] In Belarus, Clinton observed, "The world does not work very well from the top down anymore. It requires active engagement of all individuals. When voices are silenced by authoritarianism, by closed political systems or, as in the case with too many democracies today, by the apathy of citizens themselves who stay home and stay out of political dialogue; then wisdom is lost, debate becomes more hollow, challenges are avoided instead of being faced, and in the end, tyrants find it easier to grab or to hold on to power. We know where that low road leads; it leads to economic stagnation and social intolerance."[32] With the state's power to control diminished, it was other actors that would be essential to keeping people connected, as Clinton demonstrated in Belarus, saying, "These private associations are important—almost as important as the right to vote in the elections."[33]

The second characteristic of an interdependent world is the absence of a hierarchy of values (driven by the first characteristic that states are not the primary agenda setters), which leads to a redefinition of what constitutes security. Clinton sought to redefine the meaning of security away from traditional notions of strong armies and military capabilities and toward a more humanized form of security that also included economic and societal factors in the calculation. It was not a rejection of military security, for on the first day of the tour in Brussels, he stated, "the first and most important element of the security must be military strength and cooperation. The cold war is over, but war itself is not over."[34] However, the next day he argued for a change in the notion of security, saying, "we have been granted an opportunity without precedent: we really have the chance to recast European security on historic new principles—the pursuit of economic and political freedom."[35]

Clinton emphasized that forming a new understanding of security was one of his central purposes, noting, "I have come to Europe this week to work with our European partners in building a new security for a broader, democratic Europe in the 21st century"[36] and that "all of these steps can advance the larger purpose we share—the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into a broader Europe that is thriving, democratic, and at peace. Ultimately, that is the best source of security for all of us."[37] Clinton defined security as coming from three sources—military power, economic strength, and democracy. On the 9th, he said, "The new security must seek to bind a broader Europe together with a strong fabric woven of military cooperation, prosperous market economies, and vital democracies."[38] On the 10th, he held, "The best strategy against this threat is to integrate the former communist states into our fabric of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation." On the 12th, he asserted,

"The new security must be found in Europe's integration—in the successful expansion of military cooperation, democratic government, and market economies."[39] On the 14th, he said that, "I think we will have to write an entirely new future for all of Europe—a future in which security is based not on old divisions, but on a new integration of nations by means of their shared commitment to democracy, to open economies, and to peaceful military cooperation."[40]

The third characteristic of interdependence was a change in the role of military forces. Because security was no longer solely constituted by the military, there was a need for a change in the role of military forces. The role of NATO was one thing that would undoubtedly change. Jim Hoagland reported "Clinton's predecessors used NATO as the primary instrument of American leadership in European political and economic affairs. When he attends the NATO summit in Brussels on Jan. 10, Clinton should demonstrate how he intends to continue that tradition of leadership beyond the Cold War — or sketch his alternative of lessened American responsibilities and authority in Europe."[41] Clinton responded to this exigency by stating, "this new security challenge requires a range of responses different from those of the past. That is why our administration has broken with previous American administration in going beyond what others have done to support European efforts to advance their own security and interests."[42] The PfP initiative was one way Clinton tried to change the role of NATO.

William Odom explains what this new role of NATO would be, saying, "NATO's primary task in Eastern Europe is not to defend against Russian military forces. It is to provide a roof over domestic developments in those states and to bring them into the community of liberal democratic states of Western Europe. It is to prevent national and ethnic antagonisms from exploding into wars, or being exploited as they have been in

Yugoslavia, by former local communists under nationalist banners and perhaps by Russian intelligence operatives."[43] Rather than deterring interstate wars, NATO would now serve to deter intrastate wars. The expansion of NATO would help this because "a pluralistic security community retains the legal independence of separate states but integrates them to the point that the units entertain 'dependable expectations of peaceful change.' A pluralistic security community develops when its members possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual responsiveness—a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of 'we-ness', or a 'we-feeling' among states."[44] Integration *was* one of the new roles of NATO because integration served a greater purpose than simply cooperation; rather, that cooperation was the foundation of peace after the Cold War.

The Partnership for Peace

Even the title of Clinton's signature policy initiative demonstrated his commitment to the interdependence framework. NATO had historically been a place where the United States decided grand strategy, along with its closest allies. It had been the center of the battle against the Soviet Union that had defined the second half of the twentieth century. The PfP enabled Clinton and the Atlantic security community to further peace through cooperation. Rather than making a decisive break with the past and abandoning NATO altogether, Clinton transformed NATO into a cooperative institution.

Clinton's initiative was influenced by an earlier campaign waged by Eastern European states. Schimmelfennig describes the campaign as one where Eastern European states "referred to the constitutive values and norms of the Western community as a warrant and adduced their European identity, their democratic values and norms, and

their need of interdemocratic solidarity as grounds in order to validate their claim to become NATO members. This argumentative strategy was used publicly in speeches, interviews and articles addressed to NATO, its member states, and their societies."[45] New Eastern European states sought to be a part of something that they saw as providing security.

The concern among Eastern European states about being excluded was not surprising because the memory of Yalta was not far from their minds. Yalta was the summit where, after being liberated from Hitler, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to hand over the East to Stalin, to allow the Soviet Union control over a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. At a press conference while Clinton was in Prague, Czech President Vaclav Havel said, "At one time, the city of Yalta went down in history as a symbol of the division of Europe. I would be happy today if the city of Prague emerged as a symbol of Europe's standing in alliance."[46] This concern about a second Yalta was clearly at the front of Clinton's mind as he made these proposals. On the 9th, he explained that this time was different, saying, "Now we have the chance to realize the full promise of Europe's victories without its great disappointment. Normandy without Yalta, the liberation of the low countries without the Berlin blockade."[47] On the 12th, he reminded the audience in Prague of Vice President Al Gore's speech a week earlier in Milwaukee and said, "As Vice President Gore suggested last week in a meeting with Polish-, Czech-, Slovak-, and Hungarian-Americans, this is not a rerun of Yalta; it is a first-run of democracy."[48]

During this campaign, Clinton used the interdependence frame to align himself with the concerns of these Eastern European states. While NATO expansion still involved states as the major actors, Clinton identified the people as the underlying force that made those states different. Communist states had lacked democratic input; the new

presence of democratic input made the states more trustworthy. The most important value was democracy, which let people choose which values were most important to them, and free economies, which gave people choice over how to value their labor and money. The role of NATO was no longer just to serve as a military forum, but rather an institution with new roles and responsibilities whose central function was not preparing for war, but fostering peace through cooperation.

Schimmelfennig notes, "If it is correct…that president Clinton was moved to endorse and advocate NATO enlargement as a result of his personal encounter with the most prominent representatives of the new Eastern Europe and his exposure to their rhetorical appeals, then an act of persuasion was indeed at the very origin of the change in US enlargement policy and, by extension, of NATO enlargement."[49] It was persuasion that moved Clinton to support these states and he used that same power to convince others that the Eastern European states ought to be included in the Western community and ought to be a part of an emerging global community.

Interdependence Rhetoric as a Centrist Strategy

Clinton's domestic political appeal was due largely to his use of centrist rhetoric—rhetoric that takes arguments and issues from both the left and right to form a third, centrist political position. Clinton used the same centrist strategy at the international level by espousing this theory of interdependence, a theory that essentially seeks to account for the best of liberalism and the best of realism. Nye and Keohane also indirectly assert that their theory is a form of centrism, saying "our task in this book is not to argue either the modernist or traditionalist position…rather, our task is to provide a means of distilling and blending the wisdom in both positions."[50] Interdependence

theory, while still liberal in orientation, adopts the best of realism to make itself more comprehensive.

The use of centrist rhetoric serves specific goals. Antonio de Velasco, while examining Clinton's domestic rhetoric, argues "Clinton used the center as a complex, mostly tacit figure of argument to advance his political goals, define his adversaries, and overcome key political challenges."[51] He tries to answer the question of "how and to what end did Clinton's public address tap into the longing for consensus, which has long characterized the grammar of America's dominant political imaginary."[52] According to de Velasco, Clinton's use of this centrist rhetoric was necessary because "democracies require the ongoing production of abstract and necessarily ambiguous forms of collective identification. For democracies to remain viable in principles, citizens must have, at a minimum, the rhetorical resources to imagine themselves not merely as separate units of a society, but as members of a polity, that is, a collective entity capable of collective self-governance over time."[53] The effect of this rhetoric is that "it cooks up a public address that seeks to particularize the promise of transcendence in such a way as to make it attractive, to stylize specific visions of an imagined consensus, to cut these visions into shapes that are appealing to masses, palatable to dominant ideologies, and appropriate to the unique character of distinct contexts."[54] Clinton was able to use centrist rhetoric to create a unified public and persuade them that his policies were necessary to maintain that unity.

Mark Aspinwall has documented this connection between centrism and integration in a study of European governments and their acceptance of a common monetary system. He found that the desire for integration could be predicted based on whether the ruling party was centrist. Both liberals and conservatives rejected deeper

integration, but centrists almost always supported it. Aspinwall argues "Their ideological position forms the basis of predictions of government positions on European integration, including the EMS. Far left and far right parties tend to oppose integration, while centrist parties tend to favor integration."[55] Later, he notes that "Centrists take economic interdependence as a given and accept the liberal welfare arguments associated with economic openness; they view binding rules within international organizations as a necessary and welcome consequence of interdependence. Centrists within this policy space take a cosmopolitan, cooperative view of integration, seeing it as a useful step to ensuring economic prosperity and peace."[56] The political ideology of centrism results in policies, language, and persuasive tactics that seek to appeal to a diverse audience and compels both the audience and the speaker to emphasize similarities over differences in search of a unified polity. Velasco confirms this prediction, saying "the political actor who embraces the center will construct a vision of potential unity that remains apparent and unfinished in spite of its claim to be real and complete. Such a vision that seemingly includes all, but actually cannot include all, if only because of the inevitabilities of choice in any democracy."[57] The use of centrist rhetoric attempts to further solidify the idea of a global public, of a united group committed to democracy, liberal economics, and military cooperation.

Conclusion

In the short term, Clinton's first trip to Europe that year was a success. Clinton had two immediate goals, which were to gain agreement to the nuclear disarmament treaty and the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative. Both of these agreements were completed while he was in Europe and therefore, his persuasive skills and rhetoric were

strong enough to consider this trip a rhetorical success. Rhetorical success should be measured in part by policy success and in part by characteristics not related to direct legislative success. Clinton was adept at adapting to the moment, which was one of his rhetorical skills, but rhetorical skill is also judged partly by whether and how that style of rhetoric becomes a model for others to follow.

Clinton was able to establish himself as a diplomat because "the president's trip went over well with the public. Clinton looked good and seemed more in command than he sometimes did. It gave him a real life at an important time."[58] The policies were a success on both the foreign and domestic fronts because "the Clinton administration has held NATO together despite growing centrifugal tendencies and intense policy disputes. Clinton has forcefully reiterated the U.S. commitment to Europe, and his foreign policy team masterfully orchestrated NATO's expansion into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The strategic wisdom of this step is arguable, but it was extremely popular in Europe and bolstered support for NATO back home."[59] As Stephen M. Walt notes, "Clinton's team successfully persuaded Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear arsenals they inherited from the former Soviet Union. It also placed Russia's nuclear materials under more reliable control."[60] In the State Department history, it is argued "the 8 years of the Clinton administration were momentous ones for Europe and for the US relationship with Europe. The actions of the Clinton administration ultimately proved to be decisive in achieving the victory of democracy over tyranny in the Balkans and halting the ethnic cleaning in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Department of State modernized and expanded core transatlantic institutions and successfully promoted democracy and stability in parts of Europe where both were under extreme threat."[61] The official history goes on to observe, "in short, the major shift in focus of the European

bureau during the Clinton administration was from a transatlantic relations guided by a cold war outlook to one guided by the new realities and complex challenges of the 21st century. At the end of the Clinton administration, Europe was more prosperous, whole, free, and more peaceful than ever before."[62] This had been the goal of most people following the collapse of the Soviet Union; Clinton had made it a reality.

Despite Clinton's successes in Europe and Russia, his foreign policy still drew criticism. Elizabeth Drew explains, "The policy toward Russia was considered the jewel in the administration's crown. Some officials even spoke of it in those terms. When things were going bad in Somalia and Haiti and Bosnia, officials would demand to know why there was so much interest in these countries, as opposed to their policy toward Russia, which was working so well."[63] Even that victory in Russia was questioned because many moderates quit the Russian government the day after Clinton left the country, which made him look disingenuous.[64] In addition, reform in Belarus came to a crushing halt in July 1994 when Alexander Lukashenko was elected president and Belarus returned to being "Europe's last dictator[ship]."[65]

While there may have been limits to Clinton's rhetorical achievements, his use of the complex interdependence frame was largely successful in promoting positive change in Europe. The success of this rhetoric is based largely on the standards of evaluation used to judge it, but from the standpoint of interdependence theory, this rhetoric was very successful both by creating immediate change through the Partnership for Peace initiative and by inspiring a continuing commitment to the principles of global cooperation and integration. This was due to the implicit theory he adopted, the timing of his rhetoric and his decision to appeal to the center, which made Clinton's policies more appealing. Clinton's rhetoric on this trip set the stage for the future of relations with Europe. The

Partnership for Peace and its attendant rhetoric would shadow the rest of his trips to Europe and color the tone of the relationship for the remainder of his presidency.

Notes

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CHAPTER THREE

June: Celebrating World War II and Expanding the Victory

In June, Clinton made his second trip to Europe as part of a yearlong campaign of diplomatic trips to the continent, but this trip was special because it also marked the 50th anniversary of the Allied invasion of Normandy. On June 6th, 1944, Operation Overlord commenced as American, British, and Canadian military forces, along with free soldiers from Axis-occupied countries, invaded the north side of France in what would begin the collapse of Germany's western front. This event, commonly known as D-Day, occupies an enormous symbolic place in the Western imaginary. It is valorized in movies and books, taught in schools and is a benchmark illustration of U.S. exceptionalism in American public memory.

In this chapter, I explain how Clinton adapted to three exigencies facing him on this trip—the requirements of the ceremonial occasions, the audience gathered for this occasion, and historical constraints associated with it. These exigencies shaped the style of Clinton's speeches and necessitated that he use epideictic speech. Traditional understandings of epideictic speech revolve around the message, rather than the function. If the speech contains praise or blame, or is given in a ceremonial setting by a celebrated rhetor, it is considered to be epideictic speech. Celeste Condit has expanded on this notion, arguing that epideictic speech serves a number of functions besides simple praise and blame. Using Condit's three functions of epideictic, I argue that Clinton used this epideictic rhetoric to build support for democratic enlargement, the defining characteristic of his foreign policy.

Rhetorical Situation

These speeches were a critical test of Clinton's leadership because recent events had taken a toll on his credibility and this was a chance to redeem himself. Past problems with foreign policy had plagued his administration, as Dick Polman reported: "The world's most powerful leader is now accorded scant respect among those who guide or advise foreign affairs in Europe. The events of the last 18 months have taken their toll: tough words and lack of action in Bosnia; the quick retreat in Haiti; the pullout from Somalia; and, most recently, Clinton's agreement to maintain close trade links with the Chinese, after first demanding a cleaner human rights record."[1] If Clinton wanted to exert international leadership, it was crucial that people identify his foreign policy with more positive associations.

In addition to these more general problems, Clinton's lack of military service and his opposition to the war in Vietnam engendered a lack of confidence among military leaders and veterans. As Angie Cannon reported: "The 47-year-old president's relationship with the military remains shaky because he avoided military service during the Vietnam War, organized protests and even once wrote that he "loathed" the military. For many veterans, Clinton's past is a bitter pill."[2] Clinton had previously defended his personal history in a 1993 Memorial Day speech where he employed "amnestic rhetoric" to make people forget about his own personal history and direct their focus toward the general lessons of the conflict, while showing that he had respect for the soldiers and the things they had accomplished. Brian J. Snee explained that the function of this rhetoric was to "discourage public debate and to diminish public memory. Amnestic rhetoric is discourse designed to forestall the communication and commemoration that foster collective contemplation. Ultimately, it is discourse that calls us to silence and to

ignorance."[3] Clinton gained valuable lessons from this earlier speech, namely that it was possible to avoid discussing one's own history as long as the speech was perceived to be appropriate to the occasion.

Given that this was a historic commemoration of one of the most important American military victories in World War II, the government had been planning the events for over two years. The event was so important that "somewhere between 60 and 70 members of Congress have arranged their own travel"[4] in order to be present. There are commemorations of the D-Day event every year, but larger events were planned for special anniversaries, but the interest in this particular anniversary was unanticipated. The British Defense Ministry explained, "When we started planning we just did not know how big it was going to be and what interest it would spark. It has grown much bigger than anyone ever imagined."[5] In England, one of the events was scheduled to have 10 heads of state and four prime ministers,[6] a logistical nightmare. There were more than 1,200 press passes issued for the events in France[7] and more than 1,000 Pentagon officials were sent to prepare.[8] Clinton appointed Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL) to be the special representative in coordinating the ceremonies, a symbolic gesture because Gibbons had been part of the advanced deployment of paratroopers during the original invasion.[9]

Even though the presidential election was more than two years away, this was an event that could help shape Clinton's legacy and improve his reelection chances. Foreign policy is rarely the most important issue in an election, but it can perform a tiebreaker role and contribute to (or detract from) the image of the president.[10] Bob Dole (R-KS), a World War II veteran and potential Republican presidential nominee, attended the ceremonies. When Clinton was delayed because of weather, cheers of "Dole in 96"

broke out at one of the ceremonies.[11] Dole was emblematic of the World War II generation and because Clinton could never fill the shoes of Dole or George H.W. Bush, another World War II veteran, he had to rhetorically create a new role for himself in order to make himself credible to the audience.

Clinton needed to convey that he was patriotic and committed to the national interests of the United States in order to successfully honor the sacrifices that had been made at D-Day. The speech had to be positive in orientation and he had to adapt to the audience of veterans rather than making the audience adapt to him, because "the constraints of the audience's needs, its willingness to call for a speaker and to listen, its demands that the orator speak for all the people and use the people's values and heritage place powerful limits on how far the speaker can take the audience, and how events can be explained."[12] Clinton could not stand up and downplay the events of D-Day; he had to speak positively to gain the respect and trust of the military. In this respect, Clinton's speeches were a success, because, "For veterans, Clinton's trip may have been a learning experience, too. His short, stirring speeches may have mellowed some veterans still angry about his lack of military service. Some feel he reached out to them, forging new respectful bonds with a past generation."[13] Clinton's ability to reach out and connect with veterans was perhaps the most important challenge facing him.

In addition to adapting to the event and the audience, Clinton had to account for historical constraints. On the 40th anniversary of the Normandy landings, Reagan had given a speech at Pointe du Hoc that was described by historian Alan Brinkley as "one of his most stirring speeches."[14] Following one of the "great communicator's" best speeches would be extremely difficult. Adding to the expectations was the fact that "his task will be even more closely followed…because it is the 50th, it is so much bigger…the

whole world is watching."[15] Nobody expected Clinton to surpass Reagan, but he still had to approach what Reagan had done.

Nostalgia for World War II had reached an all time high in the 1990s, but it originated with people like Reagan in the 1980s. According to Douglas Brinkley, Reagan "played a seminal role in launching the great reappreciation of World War II veterans that swept over America in the 1980s and continues today largely unabated. If it hadn't been for Reagan's two elegiac June 6, 1984, homilies written by Peggy Noonan (Pointe du Hoc) and Anthony Dolan (Omaha Beach)—there may never have been Stephen Ambrose's Band of Brothers, Tom Brokaw's The Greatest Generation, Steven Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan, or numerous memorials—like the National D-Day Museum in New Orleans—built to exalt the citizen soldiers who liberated Europe."[16] Clinton capitalized on this nostalgia by authorizing funding for the World War II memorial in Washington DC and by speaking at public events. That nostalgia made people extremely receptive to messages steeped in this understanding of the past and it could be used to gain additional support for his policies, especially his foreign policy. Comparing his goals and policies to the values associated with D-Day lent them the same type of moral purpose World War II had. Clinton posited enlargement as a philosophy built on the values of World War II—that would define his administration in the same way that containment had defined Cold War administrations.

After the ceremonies at Normandy, Clinton gave a speech to the French parliament and was the first president since Woodrow Wilson to do so. This provided a powerful exemplar for Clinton because Wilson is widely regarded as having begun the modern era of the U.S. presidency. As Andrew J. Bacevich explains, "If we judge events by their consequences, the great world revolutionary was Wilson rather than Lenin. The

strategy of openness returns to the revolutionary project that President Woodrow Wilson outlined during and immediately after World War I: bringing the world as a whole into conformity with American principles and American policies."[17] It was from Wilson that Clinton drew many of his ideas about openness, integration, and cooperation. If Clinton's goals were largely the same as Wilson's—cooperation, integration, supremacy of international law backed up by an international police force—he had to avoid the pitfalls that Wilson had stumbled into and gain domestic support for these ideas in a country where isolationism still had an ideological hold. George H.W. Bush had termed his vision of this the "new world order," but that name never stuck. Clinton recognized that this was a continuation of an older foreign policy ideal, not the beginning of a new foreign policy. The fall of the Soviet Union may have changed the world situation, but it did not necessitate an entirely new approach to foreign policy.

Preparing for the Speeches

Clinton had been making speeches with similar themes as his European trip approached. The repetition of these themes demonstrates that Clinton was not wavering on foreign policy, but rather that he had a coherent message about openness, democracy, the free market, and enlarging the community of those committed to those concepts. As Steve Holland reported: "Clinton has been giving a number of speeches in the run-up to his European trip. His theme is to look back at the blood and sweat required to dislodge the Nazis and ahead to post-Cold War challenges."[18] In his Navel Academy commencement address in May, Clinton told the graduates "to heed the lessons of their World War II forebears and honor responsibilities to duty and service. Looking ahead to the 50th anniversary next month of the D-Day invasion of Europe, Mr. Clinton spoke

with admiration of the 'era of sacrifice' that is to be honored. He said the newest class of Navy ensigns and Marine Corps lieutenants would ultimately be judged by whether they could accomplish so much."[19] At the 1994 U.S. Memorial Day ceremonies, Clinton "marked Memorial Day by paying homage to U.S. soldiers who died in action and urging Americans to remain vigilant." During his speech, a heckler shouted, "go back to Oxford" and called him a traitor and draft-dodger. After the remark, Clinton appeared startled and stumbled over the next few lines.[20] It was this kind of public attitude and impression that Clinton had to counter during the Normandy ceremonies.

Clinton was personally involved in the crafting of these speeches. In preparation for these speeches, he studied with a number of scholars about the historical impact and legacy of World War II, demonstrating that he had an eye both to historical accuracy and his own legacy. Burt Solomon reported, "He's invited scads of scholars, including historians, to the White House. The military historians who debated the meaning of D-Day over dinner on May 24 were only the latest. Presidential scholar Richard E. Neustadt and historian Ernest R. May, Harvard University professors who co-authored a 1986 book on using history to make decisions, dined with Clinton."[21] Those scholars could advise him about potential pitfalls and tactics that had worked in the past.

Clinton also read two notable books, *The Longest Day* by Cornelius Ryan and *D-Day: The Climatic Battle of World War II* by Stephen Ambrose. *The Longest Day* was published in 1959 and is probably the most renowned book about D-Day. In 1962, it was made into a movie directed by Darryl Zanuck that cemented Normandy in the American imagination and was nominated for Best Picture. Because footage of the actual invasion is limited, other movies actually copied the aesthetic of *The Longest Day* rather than use authentic footage. Stephen Ambrose's new book was published just before Clinton left

for his trip. Ambrose followed much of the same story as Ryan, focusing on individual stories rather than a grand narrative of the war in the style of Max Hastings (*Operation Overlord*). Ambrose was known for his "affection for the American soldier (and sailor) of 1994."[22] He had served as a consultant on *Saving Private Ryan* (also nominated for Best Picture) and "Spielberg relied heavily on Stephen Ambrose's book, *D-Day*, for the details that appear in the movie's opening twenty- seven minutes. Those memorable scenes of chaos, confusion, and terrible bloodshed are described at length in Ambrose's volume. Even the lead character in the movie is based, to some degree, on a figure described by Ambrose."[23] This movie "showed audiences that some battles were worth fighting, and the men who risked their lives in worthy causes deserved to be honored."[24] Both of these books provide insight into what shaped Clinton's ideas and understandings of D-Day.

On this trip, Clinton visited Italy, Great Britain, and France. In Italy, he met with the Pope, where they had a contentious discussion about abortion and other social issues. He then gave speeches to the US community, seminarians, and the people of Rome. Clinton also met with Silvio Berlusconi, the new Prime Minister of Italy. In Great Britain, he gave a speech to World War II veterans and a radio address to Americans. He met with Prime Minister John Major, where they discussed possible action regarding the Bosnia conflict. He left Great Britain the morning of the 6th on the USS George Washington (the same day as the Normandy invasions), headed for France, where he gave a sunrise speech commemorating the people who died at sea. He gave three more speeches that day at Pointe du Hoc, Utah Beach, and Omaha Beach. On the 7th, he gave a speech to the French National Assembly in Paris and on the 8th, gave his final speech after receiving an honorary degree from Oxford.

While in Normandy, Clinton only visited beaches where the Americans were responsible for victory. At Pointe du Hoc, it was the responsibility of the Army Rangers to scale the beachfront cliffs and locate the guns guarding Omaha and Utah beaches. The Rangers were some of the first troops on the ground and many of them perished on this mission. Utah Beach was the location of the westernmost invasion. The U.S. 4th Infantry Division landed there and there was little resistance. Omaha Beach was the opposite; it was the fiercest battle of the day but was more important because it linked the American western landings at Utah with the British eastern landings at Gold Beach and was the most tenuously held beach. Clinton did not visit Juno Beach (Canadian), Gold Beach (British), or Sword Beach (combined British/Canadian).

Epideictic Rhetoric and Persuasive Power

In Italy, Normandy, and England, Clinton gave speeches that were epideictic in nature, appropriate to the ceremonial occasion. On the surface, these speeches appear to be a rather general celebration of the Normandy landings and victory in the war, but Clinton defined those events in a way that supported his political agenda. This epideictic rhetoric serves the larger purpose of adhering people to values and ideas about that world that can later be used to support policy or legislation. The defining feature of Clinton's foreign policy was democratic enlargement and he used the moral weight of World War II to support ideas and institutions of democratic enlargement.

In Paris, he gave a speech which was decidedly *not* epideictic in nature, discussing legislative goals and military strategy, but that speech was given in the National Assembly where it was appropriate to give a more strictly legislative speech and that speech in particular reveals many of Clinton's overtly political goals. Despite the fact

that this speech is not epideictic in nature, he uses many of the same themes and tropes in this speech, but is more direct about how they apply to his policy goals. This speech illuminates the end goal Clinton was trying to reach with his other speeches.

Epideictic speeches are a good time to broadly sway public opinions and values because when an audience expects epideictic speech, they are not focusing on the more subtle messages or the possibility that the speaker is priming them for later action; they are focused on the immediate occasion at hand. As Denise Botsdorff explains, "Audiences do not typically attend a groundbreaking ceremony or listen to a eulogy with the idea that speakers will attempt to persuade them on a matter of public policy. As a result, listeners' defenses may be down, making them more open to epideictic rhetoric and the deliberative directions that it supports."[25] The audience at these ceremonies was thinking about their personal experiences, how the occasion had affected their loved ones, or how terrible the war had been; not about free trade, military force posture, or governance reform.

To give an epideictic speech about war is especially powerful for presidents because "it puts them in a position of maximum control while relegating the audience to a role of relative passivity. … The subject of war further amplifies this inequality as Americans are prone to defer to their commander-in-chief on issues of war and peace... When presidential rhetors uphold soldiers as exemplary citizens, they encourage listener acquiescence. If the ideal citizen is one who follows orders, even if it means the loss of life or limb, then questioning those orders places the war dissenter in a position of insubordination that disrespects the aesthetics of war and appears to give aid to the enemy."[26] Clinton portrayed the soldiers in the Normandy invasion as unquestioningly devoted to American principles and American leaders. When Clinton later calls on the

audience to extend their victory, he is placing a parallel demand on the audience to trust him and to remain unconditionally committed to those principles. The audience was already extremely devoted to those soldiers and the call to be like them was well received.

Condit has noted that epideictic rhetoric serves three paired functions, which she has termed "definition/understanding, display/entertainment, and shaping/sharing of community."[27] These terms delineate between the function for the speaker and the function for the audience where "the first term in each pair indicates the function the speech serves for the speaker. The second term indicates the corresponding function served for the audience."[28] The traditional understanding of epideictic speech—the idea of praise and blame—is too simple and reductionist because many speeches have content that praises or blames someone, even when the direct function of the speech is legislative or judicial. It is not merely the content that marks a speech as epideictic, but rather how the speech is performed and what functions the speech serves. In this case, given the circumstances, much of the content of Clinton's speech was largely predictable. The remarkable part of his speeches was his ability to direct those speeches toward his political goals. He employed these three functions in doing so.

One of the functions of epideictic speech is entertaining people through display. The celebrations planned in Italy, England, and France were displays of patriotism and historical commemoration. While Clinton and other leaders were certainly a part of that display, the fanfare and the spectacle were as important in creating an atmosphere of both solemn remembrance and celebration. This was a tourist boom, with organized tours, souvenirs, parties, ceremonies, parades, and so on. For many people, seeing important world leaders was part of that entertainment.

These places provided a powerful backdrop for Clinton's speeches because they had been places of great loss and death. It was his job to create speeches that spoke to beauty, truth, and essential human nature amidst those dark times; to remind people that suffering often accompanies great human achievements. In his sunrise ceremony speech, Clinton began by describing the fate of the *USS Corry*, claiming, "these waters are forever sanctified by their sacrifice,"[29] and implying that it was a holy place deserving eternal recognition and preservation. This story and others like it emphasized valor in the face of defeat. Clinton did not conclude on this note of martyrdom, but rather ended on a hopeful note, saying, "after looking down in sorrow at those who paid the ultimate price, let us lift our eyes to the skies in which they flew, the ones they once commanded."[30] Rather than focusing just on the dark side of the war, he chose to focus on the positive messages and stories that provided hope; the kind of stories and endings most people like to hear.

A second function of epideictic is to provide understanding through definition. David Zarefsky has noted the power of the presidential definition, saying, "Because of his prominent political position and his access to the means of communication, the president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public."[31] These definitions provide the audience with an understanding of how the current social world came to be. Clinton did not create entirely new definitions of old events, but rather took old definitions and turned them in such a way that his policies of democratic enlargement were understood as part of the legacy of World War II, lending them additional suasive power.

In these speeches, Clinton built a series of three important definitions. First, he confirmed the already existing definition of Normandy (and World War II generally) as

the "good war" but placed the qualities that made it good in the context of the three aspects of democratic enlargement. Second, he established Normandy as metaphor for the current time. Finally, he defined the proper way to honor those who made these sacrifices as securing and expanding their accomplishments. Because he had already defined what made the war successful, the metaphor of Normandy allowed him to call on people to embody those same traits in the present day. In this way, Clinton attempted to shape present actions and opinions by locating the traits of democratic expansion in a group and time period that people already admired. All of Clinton's speeches repeated these major themes and solidified these ideas in the minds of the audience.

First, Clinton confirmed the already existing narrative of Normandy and World War II. Takis Pouloukas has described the *epanois,* the illumination that comes from epideictic speech, as an inherently temporally bound process, saying, "Almost invariably, the *epainos* was expanded into a historical account of the community's past."[32] History and epideictic rhetoric are inherently bound together. In the American public memory of history, World War II was the ultimate good war, a time of national unity, moral consensus, and clear distinctions between good and evil. World War II was already a model for contemporary action, as Barbara Biesecker has noted: "In the greatest generation, World War II shifts from being an event in the past about which we make sense to become a mode of sense-making in the present.…World War II becomes a shorthand for a retroactive common sense or 'matrix of practical reason' through which we are able to collectively comprehend and negotiate the challenges of modern life, not the least of which is the ideological unity of the U.S. polity itself."[33] Clinton himself called it "the great war,"[34] "a great crusade,"[35] "the greatest crusade,"[36] "a great and worthy cause,"[37] "a great and noble cause,"[38] "that great combat,"[39] and quoted

Eisenhower calling it "a great and noble undertaking,"[40] Despite the many sad stories and horrifying events, the value of the war was never questioned by Clinton.

Within this context there exists a sub-narrative of the meaning of the Normandy invasions. Clinton used the term "D-Day" 25 times in these speeches, yet "the term 'D-Day' was not coined for the Allied invasion. The same moniker was given to the attack date of nearly every offensive during World War II. It was first coined during World War I."[41] While the term is almost universally recognized as referring to the invasions in Normandy, "there were, in fact, many D-Days in World War II: the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Tararawa, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and elsewhere. But Normandy, the biggest, is the only one still known as D-Day, and in a sense it symbolizes the others."[42] Normandy came to be a signifier for the lessons of World War II, despite the fact that "we might even say that for the future of Europe, the battle of Arnhem three months later in September 1944 was more significant."[43] It was not the military importance of Normandy that made it important in the Western mind, but rather what it had come to stand for. That lack of substance meant that the signifier 'Normandy' could be filled with many different meanings as long as they were in line with the dominant narratives about its importance. If World War II was the great war, Normandy was the turning point that made it possible for that greatness to come about. For Clinton, this was certainly the case. Normandy the event became less relevant than Normandy the myth.

Clinton used those existing understandings of the war and Normandy to support democratic enlargement whose defining characteristics were the spread of democracy, the establishment of market economies, and multilateral military forces that acted only defensively. Clinton cast these three terms as both what made victory in the war possible and as the major achievements of the war. He used a variety of terms for these larger

categories, substituting freedom for democracy, prosperity for economy, security for military, and so on, but the three categories remained consistent. None of them were possible without the others and they were all wrapped up in a central theme of cooperation and integration. In the middle of his Rome speech, Clinton began with a paragraph about how our parents sacrificed, then in the next paragraph described what that sacrifice had brought to Italy—a great economy, participation in NATO, and a stance against "Soviet expansionism," (i.e. democracy). In his speech to the National Assembly, he declared: "In the end, no matter what we do with security concerns or what we do with economic concerns, the heart of our mission must be the same as it was on Normandy's beaches a half a century ago. That is democracy. For, after all, democracy is the glue that can cement economic reforms and security cooperation."[44] It was the potent combination of the three together that gave them their power.

Democracy was the most important and most central component of Clinton's speeches. For Clinton, democracy was both a powerful force and a goal to work toward. Clinton described how the "forces of freedom"[45] had come to "stop one of the greatest forces of evil the world has ever known"[46] and to "[fight] for the very survival of democracy."[47] They "unleashed their democratic fury on the Nazi armies"[48] and "stormed this beach for freedom."[49] Clinton constructed an ideal of democracy that was the opposite of evil, implying that it was inherently a force for good, which made its expansion unproblematic, unlike Soviet expansionism, which he described as "a threat."[50] For Clinton, the most important lesson of the war centered around democracy, as he said in Paris: "The Allied victory proved how democracy's faith in the individual saved democracy itself."[51] The war was great because it "[gave] us 50 years of freedom and

strong nationhood."[52] The spread of democracy was one of the most important conditions of the post-war world.

In his speech to veterans, he extended the victory of the war to the current-day establishment of democracies, saying "after D-Day, it took freedom another year to reach the Elbe; it took another 44 years to reach Warsaw and Prague and East Berlin. And now it has reached Kiev and Moscow and even beyond."[53] Likewise, at Omaha, he said, "Germany, Japan and Italy, liberated by our victory, now stand among our closest allies and the staunchest defenders of freedom. Russia, decimated during the war and frozen afterward in communism and Cold War, has been reborn in democracy. And as freedom rings from Prague to Kiev, the liberation of this continent is nearly complete."[54] The major achievement of the war was not necessarily that it defeated the Axis powers, but that it led to the spread of democracy across Europe. In so speaking, Clinton connects the victory of World War II to the victory of the Cold War. If World War II was the birth of the greatest era, a parallel victory at the end of the Cold War could produce another great era. Likewise, Clinton tied the failure to act now to the failures to act after World War I: "Once in this century, as your President so eloquently expressed, following World War I, we failed to meet that imperative."[55] These were parallel moments and making a choice to withdraw or fail to spread democracy would result in the same kind of rising nationalism and conflict that had followed World War I, as opposed to the years of "peace and prosperity"[56] that followed World War II.

Economic mobilization was also an important factor in winning the war. Prior to D-Day, "factories worked only at half capacity."[57] Yet when the war began, people "awakened the slumbering genius and giant of American industry."[58] As Clinton clarified: "In 1940 our Navy had no landing craft. By 1944 there were over 25,000. In

1940 the United States produced fewer than 500 airplanes a month. In 1941 FDR called for 4,000 a month and everyone thought he was a little crazy. But by D-Day Rosie the Riveter and her co-workers were rolling out planes at twice the pace Roosevelt asked for."[59] It was that economic drive that made victory possible. In his departure speech, Clinton emphasized the importance of the individual effort and personal characteristics, honoring

> those here at home during that war and who, themselves, were also heroes. They made a contribution, whether they were women who built aircraft or rolled bandages, farmers who grew food for troops, men who in my state and many others worked as much as 16 hours in coal mines breathing coal dust and wrecking their bodies to keep our engine of production going, or children who collected scrap metal and rubber for our production. Worried about loved ones overseas, the homefront army of democracy kept the faith to build the wartime output that made D-Day and victory possible.

Later, he said, "Human miracles begin with personal choices—millions of them gathered together as one, like the stars of a majestic galaxy"[60] and again, "every person in democracies pitched in…all of them did their part."[61] For a market economy to function well, individuals have to participate and this importance of individual action established a sort of obligation to participate. If people had not participated in the economy during the war, Clinton implied, we would have lost the war.

The end of the war was significant for the economic prosperity it brought to the West. Clinton explained how "that same generation turned their energies to building a new prosperity. They built schools and highways, and a sense of common purpose that put the country back on track, through the GI bill and housing initiatives, and other things that built the strongest middle class in all of human history."[62] On the international level, "we launched the Marshall Plan, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and other engines of economic development." Michael C. Adams clarifies, "The major role the

U.S. armed forces played in overcoming the Axis is an important part of the pride Americans take in World War II, but it is not what ultimately makes that war the best war ever. At the center of the popular view of the war is a picture of a rich, united, and confident America. It is this vision of home front strength and prosperity that makes the era appear as a golden age."[63] World War II was the beginning of American economic dominance and this is part of what makes the memory of World War II so popular.

For Clinton, the two things that set Western militaries apart from others were their defensive postures and their cooperative nature. Clinton repeatedly emphasized that this was a joint affair; we had worked with British and Canadian forces and coordinated with the French Resistance movement. Our military entered World War II because of "the villainy that started this war,"[64] but it was the common "language of democracy… the Allies spoke" that made the victory possible.[65] Because those militaries were democratic, they also had traits that nondemocratic militaries could never match. Clinton described how "most [Allied soldiers] were new to war, but all were armed with the ingenuity of free citizens and the confidence that they fought for a good cause under the gaze of a loving God."[66] The victory was due to "love of freedom and country,"[67] something that Clinton implied was lacking in Axis forces. Hitler was "sure that the Allied soldiers were soft, weakened by liberty and leisure, by the mingling of races and religion. They were sure their totalitarian youth had more discipline and zeal."[68] Clinton countered with iconic American images, implying that Western civic institutions imparted a drive and a sense of personal responsibility needed to win the conflict, saying "They were also driven by the voice of free will and responsibility, nurtured in Sunday schools, town halls and sandlot ball games. The voice that told them to stand up and move forward, saying, "You

can do it. And if you don't, no one else will."[69] This same effort was tied to economic success and that effort was a result of democratic governments and institutions.

Second, having confirmed this current understanding of Normandy as defined in the context of democracy, capitalism, and military security, the president constructed Normandy as a metaphor for the current time. The Normandy invasion functioned as a metaphor for spreading democracy. Normandy had preceded the spread of democracy across Europe, fueled by cooperation and the liberal democratic ideology. The struggle had been long and uncertain, but the end goal made the suffering worth it. Clinton described how "at this hour on June 6th, 1944, victory seemed far from certain…. Indeed, General Eisenhower had already drafted a statement in case the operation did not succeed."[70] Morale suffered because "nothing seemed to go right."[71] In the same way, "democratic expansion" was an invasion that required the same level of effort and faith as the physical invasion.

In two instances, Clinton metaphorically ascribes literal roles from the Normandy invasion to the present. At Omaha Beach, he said, "Fifty years ago, the first Allied soldiers to land here in Normandy came not from the sea, but from the sky. They were called Pathfinders, the first paratroopers to make the jump. Deep in the darkness they descended upon these fields to light beacons for the airborne assaults that would soon follow. Now, near the dawn of a new century, the job of lighting those beacons falls to our hands. To you who brought us here, I promise, we will be the new pathfinders, for we are the children of your sacrifice."[72] Then, at Pointe du Hoc, a strategic location because the Army Rangers had to scale cliffs to take out German defenses in advance of the main invasion, he said, "still there are cliffs to scale. We must work to contain the world's most deadly weapons, to expand the reach of democracy. We must keep ready

arms and strong alliances. We must have strong families and cohesive societies and educated citizens and vibrant, open, economies that promote cooperation, not conflict."[73] By calling the current generation the new pathfinders and the new cliff-scalers, he implies that the same kind of effort and cooperation are required to succeed and that this invasion will also be worth the sacrifice.

Finally, he defines acting as the proper way to honor Normandy. For Clinton, honoring implies an obligation to act, rather than just an obligation to remember. As he said at Oxford: "Our obligations surely go beyond memory. After all, when the soldiers of D-Day broke through at Normandy, when the sons and daughters of democracy carried on their struggle for another half-century—winning the Cold War against the iron grip of totalitarian repression—they fought not for the past, but for the present and the future. And now it falls to us to use that hard-won freedom, to follow through in this time—expanding democracy, security, prosperity, fighting bigotry, terrorism, slaughter and chaos around the world."[74] His language revolves around the dual notion of remembering and acting. Clinton said that he had "come to Europe to *recall* its cruelest war and to help *secure* its lasting peace." He said that we ought to spend the week "in *reflection* and with *resolve.*" He said he was "glad to be about the work of *honoring* what they have done for us by trying to *preserve* the peace and the future."[75] At the end of his speech in Rome, the last five paragraphs established that we must never forget, moved through a historical account of good things that happened after the war, and ended with a quote from Cicero saying: "Merely to possess virtue as you would art is not enough unless you apply it."[76] He does not just call for new action, but presumes that we are already working toward this goal, saying that "all of us are joined in a sense of pride, a

sense of indebtedness, a sense of wonder, and a sense of determination to *carry on that work* and *never forget*."[77]

Because Clinton had already established what made Normandy great—democracy, market economies, and military cooperation—and because he established an obligation to emulate that example, his call to action was not seen as a political move to gain support for democratic enlargement, but rather as a natural outgrowth of the world 'our generation' had inherited. Clinton frequently uses this kind of generational language to reinforce his point, as Michael Leff and Mary L. Kahl have noted, saying:

> All four speeches [in Normandy], but especially the two longer ones, display a similar chronological structure that moves from the present time and place of the ceremony, to a consideration of the events of fifty years past, and then back to the present. Parallel to this temporal movement, Clinton also develops a generational theme as his remarks shift from 'we,' to 'they,' and then to a 'we' identified as the children of the Normandy generation.[78]

This language created an even stronger obligation to emulate their example. To disregard their example or to fail to emulate would let down not just the people who had served at Normandy, but also one's parents, grandparents, and families.

The third function of epideictic is the shaping and sharing of community. Clinton's language shaped a community that was defined by its values; the community ended where democracy ended and any state that valued those things could be part of this community. This led naturally to a call for that community to be extended to other countries in Eastern Europe and throughout the world, including Russia. The shaping of community is an exercise in praise and blame, the traditional definition of epideictic because it praises the qualities and values that people want to be part of society and blames other qualities and values that people do not want to be part of society. Clinton was able to shape the community through that kind of praise and blame.

After shaping what constituted the community, Clinton was able to encourage participation in that community. Clinton told numerous stories about the war, not for the purpose of educating people about the particular stories, but rather "for the sake of the ritualistic need for communal sharing, not as preparation for some other action, and thus it is performative, as Walter Beale indicated: in the hearing of such self identifying discourse, audience members share, live, and display their community."[79] To be part of a community requires participating in shared heritage and a shared identity. Watching these speeches helped people to participate in that community, by inspiring feels of patriotism, honor, and respect.

Conclusion

Clinton used these three functions of epideictic—display/entertainment, definition/understanding, and shaping/sharing of community—to support his foreign policy goal of democratic enlargement. He used these epidemic occasions as a display to entertain the audience; he defined the meaning of Normandy and World War II in a way that provided greater understanding of what made them successful and how those lessons could be applied in the present day; he shaped the community to support the values of democratic enlargement and encouraged people to share in that community by supporting his policies. Clinton did not really have a choice about giving these speeches, but his decision about how to approach them lent substantial support to his policies of democratic enlargement. He established a narrative of Western history that encouraged people in the West to understand that history as an imperative for a particular action in the present day.

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CHAPTER FOUR

July: Supporting the Ideological Expansion of Democracy

Starting on July 6th, Clinton made his third visit to Europe. Clinton began his trip in Latvia, where he was the first American president ever to visit a Baltic state. There, he met with the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and gave a speech at the Freedom Monument in Riga. Clinton continued to Warsaw, where he gave speeches to the Polish parliament and at the Children's Memorial, a monument dedicated to the children who died during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising during World War II. His final stops were Bonn and then Berlin, where he gave speeches deactivating the Berlin Brigade and to the people of Berlin.

Each of Clinton's trips to Europe served a distinct purpose. On the first trip, his goal was to gain support for the expansion of NATO. On the second trip, Clinton went to Europe to attend a number of ceremonies and observances, including one marking the 50th anniversary of the D-Day invasions. On this third trip, Clinton's purpose was less clear. He did not advocate for a particular policy and did not attend any particular ceremonies. Instead, he gave speeches praising the values of democratic and economic reforms and encouraged the people of those countries in their journey of liberalization. The work Clinton had done on his previous trips to expand NATO and solidify World War II as a sacred moment would be irrelevant if those democratic governments did not have the support of the public in Eastern Europe. These speeches sought to increase the ideological hold of liberal democracy through persuasion.

The Rhetorical Situation

Since Truman, every American president had made utopic promises of freedom to the people of Eastern Europe. Soviet domination over Eastern Europe was a central theme in Cold War foreign policy and freedom was presented as the dividing line between East and West. In what would come to be known as the Truman Doctrine, Harry Truman promised support to "free people who are resisting attempted subjugation"[1] and asserted that "one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion."[2] This speech guided American foreign policy and rhetoric for the next 50 years. John F. Kennedy gave his famous speech in Berlin on June 26, 1963, and spoke "to the hopes of tomorrow" for "the advance of freedom everywhere."[3] Richard Nixon spoke at a factory in West Berlin on February 27, 1969, calling West Berlin "an island of freedom and prosperity," and predicted that while "the men of the past thought in terms of blockades and walls; the men of the future will think in terms of open channels."[4] On June 12th, 1987, speaking on the west side of the Wall, Ronald Reagan anticipated that "across Europe, this wall will fall, for it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom."[5] In speaking in Mainz, Germany on May 31, 1989, George H.W. declared, "the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free."[6]

However, the situation was vastly different for Clinton than for these other presidents. The most obvious goal of the Cold War had been accomplished; there was no immediate threat from the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union has dissolved in December 1991. The stark line between East and West was evaporating and the reality of

liberalization, as opposed to the promised ideal, now informed the dominant understandings of the West. As Thomas Friedman explained, "The euphoria of the immediate post-cold-war world is also over—the days when an American president could whip a crowd into a frenzy by describing that land of milk and honey that lay ahead once Europe was free of the communist yoke."[7] Clinton had to reconcile those promises, the predictions other presidents had made about the rosy future of Europe, with the truth of the situation in a way that did not appear to be going back on those promises.

At the time, Eastern Europe was undergoing what Otto Holman calls the "dual transformation" of their governments and their economies, moving from authoritarian governments to democratic governments, and from centrally planned economies to market economies.[8] It was not an easy transition and it was difficult to convince people that broad changes would make things better when the conditions in their lives pointed to the opposite. After the fall of communism, there were high levels of depression and suicide, declining life expectancy, falling wages, inflation, high unemployment, increasing poverty, and a lack of social services in much of Eastern Europe.[9] Many people thought these conditions validated their fears of liberalization and thus supported parties that opposed liberalization. As Robert Duch reported in 1993, "the mass publics in the former communist regimes are registering their growing impatience with the free-market. …The fall 1991 parliamentary elections in Poland registered the mounting popular dissatisfaction with free-market reforms. Even in the former German Democratic Republic, popular support for market reforms dwindled as the hardships mounted."[10] The parties that were gaining in support were not democratic in nature; they were either comprised of old Communists or of virulent nationalists. These electoral results posed a

threat to the western order because if these parties made larger gains in future elections, there might not be any more free elections.

Increasing societal acceptance of these economic reforms was extremely important. Institutional change without popular support or underlying democratic values would quickly dissolve into a corrupt form of government. Without participation, a market economy would have no consumers or producers and a democratic government would be virtually meaningless. Public polling data about the reception of market and democratic reforms at the time "suggests that, at least at this stage of the transition in central and east Europe, these values and attitudes are as, or more, significant in determining attitudes toward political policies than the calculation of private self-interest."[11] For the reforms to have lasting success, there needed to be an ideological change among the people. Most of the people in Eastern Europe, even if they wanted communism to end and supported liberal democratic and market reforms, had been immersed in a Communist society for their entire lives and had not been taught or had not practiced liberal democratic values, especially in the public sphere. Developing a state and society based on liberal democratic norms would be difficult because, even in those states where a democratic movement had once existed, they "face[d] the common problem of re-presenting their national character as civic and democratic, in great part because their national identities were closely bound to oppressive regimes."[12] These states had to find a way to transition their identity away from those Communist ideas toward liberal democratic ideas.

This points toward an important third transformation happening in Eastern Europe and that was the transformation of ideas and ideology. Regardless of whether one was an idealist or a materialist, there was no doubting that "part of the challenge for post-

Communist societies, then, was not just to realize the institutions of a new order, but to construct models of what that social order should be and to endow that social order with meaning."[13] Ideology can change through a variety of ways and while many of the ideas that had sparked the revolutions were already in place, making the transition to an actual liberal democratic society required a new kind of language. When society makes a major change, the ideographs—the "slogans…easily mistaken for the technical terminology of political philosophy" [14] —that define it must be adapted. McGee constitutes ideographs as "definitive of the society we have inherited, they are conditions of the society into which each of us was born, material ideas we must accept to 'belong'."[15] However, when a new society is being built or, in some of these cases, an old society is being rebuilt, there is contestation over the ideas and institutions that characterize that society.

Understanding these changes helps to explain how it is that ideological shifts take place in the public consciousness. In 1994, it was not even assured that the transition would last, as McIntosh et al asked, "Is it possible to build democracy and capitalism simultaneously in societies that have no real history of either system? Will democracy really take root and flourish in societies without an existing market economy? Or will the monumental task of creating a market economy strain these new democratic governments to the limit and ultimately lead to an authoritarian backlash?" These major changes in ideology are rare and studying the moments of successful transitions can help explain how certain ideas and structures came to be dominant. Paul Aligaca and Anthony J. Evans explain the significance of this transition, saying, "in retrospect, the erosion of the Marxist belief system and its gradual replacement with western belief on how the economy and society should be organized seems to be one of the most spectacular developments in the political and intellectual history of the twentieth century."[16] David

Cratis Williams et al. expand on this need for studying this transition, saying "What is not so clear is how the traditions of public argument and political rhetoric develop in societies where no prior tradition exists; the emerging states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provide us an opportunity to discover that process and to test the ties between public communication and democracy."[17]

Clinton took on a role that encouraged further transformation to achieve these values. The United States and the American president had been symbols of freedom and solidarity during the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, "the demise of the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc was hailed by US politicians and dominant media as a victory of the ideals of freedom based in democracy, cultural diversity and free markets over totalitarianism and repression....the US was upheld as a model for multicultural democracy that Eastern Europe might look to during its transitional period."[18] As a result of this, Clinton inherited an enormous amount of rhetorical capital and used it in these speeches to bolster Western ideology in the publics of Eastern Europe. Clinton's place did not allow him to create a new order as policymakers had done after World War II, but rather he tried to extend and enlarge the existing order. Clinton's domestic agenda depended on increasing trade with places like Eastern Europe, and he wanted to ensure that Eastern Europe would complete both its democratic and market transitions in order to become suitable trading partners for the United States. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake gave a speech in September 1993 laying out the foreign policy goals of the Clinton administration, saying, "The successor to the doctrine of containment must be the doctrine of enlargement—enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." Clinton's speeches in Eastern Europe worked to make that doctrine a reality and a successful model for the rest of the world.

This ideological indoctrination served another purpose tied to Clinton's January trip. If NATO was going to further expand, those potential member states had to prove that they were qualified to be part of that community. "from the perspective of the state already organized in the North Atlantic security community, however, new members can be admitted only after the 'applicants' have learned and internalized their norms. For the original members, 'it's not enough to behave like us, you have to be one of us.' The status of 'partnership,' invented by the European Union, the Council of Europe, and NATO, intends to provide a probationary status to states that wish to joint the North Atlantic security community. Besides testing the intentions and institutions of applicant states, this probationary status is intended to enable members of the security community to distinguish whether applicants are making instrumental choices or adopting the shared identity. In addition, their partnership in common economic and security enterprises is meant to play a major role in changing the identities of the applicants to make them 'more like us.'"[19] If Clinton wanted his earlier PfP initiative to succeed, it was vital that these states prove their liberal democratic character.

In this chapter, I will argue that Clinton used a two-part strategy to propagate liberal democratic norms in the public of Eastern Europe. First, Clinton adapted the ideographs that had defined the Cold War era and used their historical connotations to support his policies of democratic enlargement. He then called for a form of action deeply rooted in the liberal democratic tradition, that of civil courage. These strategies helped Clinton further the spread of the liberal democratic ideology. I will analyze four speeches Clinton gave in Riga, Warsaw, and Berlin. I will not be analyzing the G7 summit because Clinton did not address the general public there. The focus of this

chapter is on the public reception of Clinton's speeches given at important historical monuments.

The Rhetorical Defense of Democratic Liberalization

The first strategy that Clinton used was to articulate the language of liberal democracy. A major part of that vocabulary was composed of ideographs, which are "an ordinary term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power…and guides behavior into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable."[20] In other words, ideographs are important because they mean more than the direct thing they signify. The word 'liberty' means more than a political condition; for Americans, it also conjures up images of Patrick Henry and the American Revolution. It stands for a complex of values, including religious freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. These terms are important because "unlike more general conceptions of "Ultimate" or "God" terms, attention is called to the social, rather than rational or ethical, functions of a particular vocabulary."[21] For Clinton, the social function of these ideographs was to linguistically and symbolically integrate people from Eastern Europe into the Western order. As McGee explains, "If a mass consciousness exists at all, it must be empirically 'present,' itself a thing obvious to those who participate in it, or, at least, empirically manifested in the language which communicates it."[22] For the liberal democratic ideology to be cemented in Eastern Europe, there had to be words to express it.

For ideographs to have power, they must have historical precedents. They do not gather intense meaning on their own or because of a singular usage—they gain power

because they are used again and again over time. By doing this, "we establish an analog for the proposed present usage of the term. Earlier usages become precedent, touchstones for judging the propriety of the ideograph in a current circumstance."[23] The past usage of ideographs creates a constraint on the current rhetor because they create expectations and a kind of rhetorical precedent. Joshua Ewalt explains that "if rhetors have diachronically used <liberty> to support free market capitalism by associating it with a linked grammar of <private freedom> and personal <opportunity>, future rhetors will likely encounter difficulty using it to support government intervention in the economic sphere, as it is not consistent with rhetorical culture."[24] Part of the reason we understand terms is because we understand how they have been used in the past.

Clinton was able to draw from a rich tradition of prior rhetors. Even though the situation had changed and the Cold War was over, the United States had not been defeated and Clinton used this moment to expand rather than change the values that were responsible for the success of the United States. The main terms in both Clinton's speeches and previous speeches revolved around freedom, people, and democracy. For previous presidents, these terms had been useful in aiming for the defeat of the Soviet Union. For Clinton, without the previous goal of defeating the Soviet Union, these terms served a different purpose and functioned as a group to support the liberal democratic market ideology.

These three ideographs, <freedom>, <people>, and <democracy>, were intertwined and it is not surprising that levels of support for one are correlated with support for the others. Raymond Duch did a study based on public opinion surveys about ideas surrounding the transition in Eastern Europe. He found that "democratic values and support for free markets are mutually reinforcing, suggesting that support for democracy

makes a very important contribution to support for free-market reform,"[25] and that "a society that has embraced the notions of liberty and the competition of ideas—so integral to democracy—is therefore likely to support the concepts of liberty, freedom, and competition that are critical to free markets. Hence, those who have embraced democratic norms are expected to respond positively to free-market changes."[26] Therefore, these ideographic terms served the important function not only of supporting democratic government, but also of supporting free markets.

Clinton used the term <free> or <freedom> 45 times in these four speeches. He used other terms like <liberty>, <independence>, <sovereignty>, <opportunity>, and <human rights> to qualify what this freedom meant. <Liberty> has a dual meaning as either the positive right to exercise agency or the negative right to be free from interference. Clinton described a "chain of freedom" stretching back through history and including the Baltic peoples, "who took up their cause, stood vigil over the bonfires of liberty and sang the songs of independence."[27] Coupling liberty and independence together puts the focus on the second meaning of liberty, which is freedom from interference. In Berlin, he used a metaphor about the Berlin Wall to describe the revolutions as the people "turn[ing] your dreams of a better life into the chisels of liberty."[28] This suggested that the function of liberty was to tear down restrictions and barriers. Both of these instances of the use of <liberty> are related to the ideas of a free market, lacking interference or restrictions from the state.

Clinton used the term freedom to mean both political freedom and economic freedom. In Poland, he described the situation, saying "Five years ago, your nation seized that opportunity. Discarding dictatorship and a failed command economy that was imposed upon your nation, you stepped into the unknown and started to build a free

market economy....You have ended hyperinflation, stabilized your currency, privatized enterprises that drive growth and doubled your exports. You have proved that free people need not wait for the state to tell them what to do."[29] This last sentence is especially important. After he described their economic achievements, he moved to an idea that had been potent during the revolutions—that the state could not control the people—and turned that observation into a rationale for a free economic system. The economy also needed to be freed. As Clinton said, "you have put tens of thousands of your people to work, created thousands of new enterprises and begun to free your economy."[30] In this instance, "freedom was reimagined as the unrestrained operation of free markets and free enterprise, which was presumed to be productive of civil liberties."[31] If political freedom produced civil liberties and economic freedom was equivalent to political freedom, then it was assumed that economic freedom would produce a parallel set of economic civil liberties.

These civil liberties manifested themselves as tolerance, for "as democracy is equated with the free market in contemporary Western liberal ideology, racial tolerance is a sign of a society that allows for equal competition and is a test that each nation must pass to be considered free."[32] Clinton supported this idea, saying "freedom without tolerance is freedom unfulfilled."[33] He warned of the danger of intolerance, saying "this moment reminds all of us that darkness could always enshroud us again, that fear and tolerance do find new lives of their own"[34] and that "would-be dictators and fiery demagogues live among us in the East and in the West, promoting ethnic and racial hatred, promoting religious divisions and anti-Semitism."[35] He urged people to refuse intolerance, saying that "Here, in Germany, in the United States, and throughout the entire world, we must reject those who would divide us with scalding words about race,

ethnicity, or religion."[36] Intolerance and division were signs that a society was not free and that it did not have the qualities necessary to be part of the free community of nations.

Clinton described freedom in three ways—as a goal, as a condition, and as a force. He pronounced freedom a goal that was worth sacrificing for and dying for, as people had done throughout World War II and the Cold War. He spoke of remembering "those in all generations who gave their very lives for freedom,"[37] <Free> was also a condition of both places and people. Clinton spoke of free people, saying things such as "we as free peoples, Polish and American,"[38] "Citizens of free Berlin,"[39] and "in the name of the free people of the United States of America, I say to the free people of the Baltic Nations."[40] He also declared each place he visited to be free, calling it the "free Baltic soil,"[41] declaring that "Berlin ist frei,"[42] and addressing his speech at the Sejm to the "free peoples of Central and Eastern Europe."[43]

The force of freedom that brought change to Eastern Europe was an inevitable force, one that could never be stopped. He told the Baltics states that "You have proved that freedom never dies when it lives in the hearts of men and women."[44] In Poland, he said "the lesson that we as free peoples, Polish and American, must embrace [is]… The last bastion of our nation is our people's heart, and that bastion will never be conquered."[45] Clinton declared "one force rules in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and that force is freedom."[46] In Berlin, he said that their struggle had "proved that no wall can forever contain the mighty power of freedom."[47] By constructing freedom as a universal force which could not be stopped, Clinton was telling the people that it was pointless to try to stop moves toward freedom and supporting unfree groups such as nationalists and

Communists was a futile struggle. Similarly, since political and economic freedom were equated, it meant it was impossible to contain the spread of the free markets.

Clinton defined freedom as universal, declaring that the United States and Eastern Europe were "united in freedom."[48] He repeatedly refered to the goal of "a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders."[49] Constructing freedom as universal showed our common interest and our solidarity with Eastern European nations. If everyone had the same essential spirit, it meant that the ideas were not foreign but rather the natural way of acting. Freedom was not only universal across cultures, but across time. Freedom was the common cause that united the past and the future. He spoke of being "forever free"[50] and called on the people to "extend the chain of freedom so that it reaches across generations to your children and beyond."[51]

This notion continued in the idea that "everyone is a Berliner" and was particularly salient because of its historical use. In his introduction, Clinton referred to the citizens of Berlin, the citizens of Germany, and "Berliners the world over."[52] Kennedy had called himself a Berliner, saying that to do so was the proudest boast a free person could make. Reagan said in his speech "Every man is a Berliner" and "wherever I go, whatever I do: 'Ich hab noch einen Koffer in Berlin.'" (I still have a suitcase in Berlin). Berlin itself was a symbol of freedom and anyone who had an interest in freedom, anyone who wanted to be free, should care about Berlin. The universalizing of this struggle was significant because, "Liberal hegemony requires dominant powers to present the pursuit of their enlightened self-interest as being in the common interests of civilisation as a whole."[53] For the spread of liberal democratic norms to continue, it had to be universalized.

Kennedy was not the first president to use the phrase "I am a Berliner." In 1954, former President Herbert Hoover visited Berlin and signed the city's guestbook with his name and the phrase "I am a Berliner." Andreas W. Daum explains the significance of this phrase, saying "Hoover erroneously associated the statement 'I am a citizen of this city' with the Athenians when in fact the figure who most powerfully memorialized the line was the Roman politician, writer, and orater Marcus Tullius Cicero."[54] He continues on to say that this citizenship was "understood in Cicero's time to signify membership in a political community that extended beyond the city of Rome itself."[55] This connection to the idea of Roman citizenship was important because Roman citizenship "vastly expanded the number of people who could enjoy certain human rights. With the help of the sophisticated legal system it developed, Rome granted its citizens a dignity and security hitherto unknown, even if the midst of horrific brutality to those outside its protective embrace…. Roman law is one of Rome's most enduring legacies, and a consideration of Roman law is of primary important in any discussion of freedom."[56] In a similar way, democratic expansion spread freedom, dignity, and security to a new group of 'citizens.'

On this trip, Clinton delivered an original copy of the American Constitution to Bonn. This copy of the Constitution had been translated into German for the American citizens who did not speak English at the time. He described the Constitution as a "symbol of our unity and devotion to freedom." The Constitution is the physical manifestation of freedom and democracy for Americans. This reinforced the idea that the United States should be "upheld as a model for multicultural democracy that Eastern Europe might look to during its transitional period."[57] This had ideological importance for "contained in the notion of freedom is a very particular politico-economic ideology

that appropriates unto itself attributes of right(eous)ness. Thus is bolstered America's claim of a high moral ground, as well as the universalization of the values it espouses as normative."[58] Establishing freedom as universal and intrinsically tied to the United States gave Clinton a rhetorical high ground from which to speak.

The second important term was <democracy>. Clinton describes this with a host of other terms to define it, saying that "democracy remains our indispensable ally. For democracy checks the ambitions of would-be tyrants and aggressors. It nurtures civil society and respect for human rights and the habits of simple tolerance."[59] Clinton performs a similar move to tie democracy to free markets, saying "Our course must be guided by three principles—supporting democracy, advancing free markets and meeting new security challenges,"[60] and praising democracy because "it cements economic reforms … and it offers once-captive peoples the opportunity to shape their own future."[61]

The third important term is the word <people>. Soviet ideology emphasized universalism over nationalism—there was a universal struggle and a universal proletariat. There was no reason to have a national identity as that only connected one more closely to the capitalists, the bureaucrats, and the bourgeoisie. The "people" were constituted by their status as the proletariat, as the working class, not by their ethnic or national groupings. Liberal democratic ideology constituted the people as united by their values, but still separated by nationality, ethnicity, etc. Clinton encouraged this nationalism and the development of groupings of people in a nation. Clinton used a series of moves to constitute Eastern Europeans as separate from the Soviet system and as their own distinct people. His description of the "redeeming spirit of freedom"[62] implied that because the people were now free, they had been redeemed from their past. He described the current

problems as an "inherited burden of debt," implying that it was not them, but someone outside of them who had accumulated that debt. That debt was the result of external forces, what Clinton called "occupations"[63] and "foreign tyranny."[64] However, the positive things that happened were the result of their internal fortitude. He attributes the success of democracy in Europe to the people of Poland, saying, "It has been said that if it were not for the people of Poland democracy might have perished on the continent of Europe a half-century ago."[65] He described the spirit of "free people" as common between the United States and Eastern Europe. In Latvia, he described "the songs of freedom,"[66] which was a reference to the national singing traditions of the Baltic States.

One final important thing about Clinton's use of ideographs is that he translates them into the language of the country where he is speaking. He chose to render certain phrases in the native language rather than English and, by doing this, he is literally giving people a way of saying and expressing those ideas in their own language. In Latvia, Clinton declared, "Freedom - no matter what the language, it is the link that unites the peoples of our nation: Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian and American," and ends the speech with "Vabadus! Laisves! Briviba! Freedom!"[67] These are the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian translations of the word freedom. In Poland, he uses two phrases—"Nic o nas bez nas,"[68] which means "nothing about us, without us" and "Rowni z rownymi, wolni z wolnymi,"[69] which means "equal among equals, free with the free." In Berlin, he also uses two phrases—"Amerika steht an ihrer Seite, jetzt und fuer immer," which means "America stands on your side, now and forever," and "Nichts wird uns aufhalten. Alles ist moeglich. Berlin ist frei," which means "nothing will stop us. Everything is possible. Berlin is free." Clinton reinforced the democratic idea that freedom is what makes those other things possible.

The Call to Action

After establishing these ideographs as a powerful motivating force, Clinton called for the action of civil courage, which relied on these ideographic terms. Civil courage was the ideological opposite of communism. Rather than requiring social mobilization, it utilized the power of individual action. Rather than promising equality for all, it promised opportunity for those who tried. It was a good choice to provide a liberal democratic alternative.

Civil courage was a historically important concept. The first modern use of the term was German. In 1864, Otto von Bismarck declared that while many people have courage on the battlefield, few people show that courage in civilian life. He urged his soldiers to show the same kind of courage at home that they showed in battle.[70] It was about bringing the energy that had previously been used for war into civilian life. This was promising as it could turn the energy that had been poured into Cold War production into ordinary economic production. John F. Kennedy was also known for a book he wrote about civil courage and Kennedy was an extremely popular symbol in Eastern Europe because "the salient quality of JFK's memory is his symbolic connection with innovativeness. His youth and vigor represented a new beginning for the nation."[71] While in Berlin, Nixon had also admired individual acts of bravery, saying, "bravery day-by-day—the steady fortitude that resists remorseless pressure and refuses to permit the slow erosion of liberties. That is the remarkable bravery of the Berliner."[72] These historical precedents gave Clinton's call to action more power.

In each speech, there is one distinct paragraph that summarizes this idea of civil courage. Clinton first praises the past history of the city and then calls for its residents to

channel that success into making liberal democratic reforms a success. Here is what he said in Riga, Warsaw, and Berlin:

> We marvel at your strength and your reborn independence. But we know, also, that many of you face hardship and uncertainty in your daily lives, for the path of reform is not always smooth. Yet America calls on you to hold fast to that path, to seize this moment of renewal, to redeem the struggles of your ancestors, to extend the chain of freedom so that it reaches across generations to your children and beyond….We hear the songs of freedom that have echoed across the centuries. We see the flames that lit your way to independence. We feel the courage that will keep the chain of freedom alive.[73]

> In that time, one half of this city lived encircled, and the other half enslaved. But one force endured: your courage. Your courage has taken many forms—the bold courage of June 17th, 1953 when those trapped in the east threw stones at the tanks of tyranny; the quiet courage to lift children above the Wall so that their grandparents on the other side could see those they loved but could not touch; the inner courage to reach for the ideas that make you free; and the civil courage—civile courage—of five years ago when, starting in the strong hearts and candlelit streets of Leipzig, you turned your dreams of a better life into the chisels of liberty. Now, you who found the courage to endure, to resist, to tear down the Wall, must found a new civile courage—the courage to build. The Berlin Wall is gone. Now our generation must decide, what will we build in its place. Standing here today, we can see the answer—a Europe where all nations are independent and democratic; where free markets and prosperity know no borders; where our security is based on building bridges, not walls; where all our citizens can go as far as their God-given abilities will take them and raise their children in peace and hope.[74]

> To the courage that enables men and women to drop behind enemy lines, face down rumbling tanks, or advance freedom's cause underground, we must add a new civil courage—the energy and optimism and patience to move forward through peaceful, but hard and rapidly changing times. Our course must be guided by three principles— supporting democracy, advancing free markets and meeting new security challenges….Sustain the civil courage that has brought you so far so fast, and do not give up or turn back."[75]

This was "a call for a new kind of courage, one that draws it energy from mundane daily acts of individuals."[76] In a market economy, it is the daily acts of individuals that keep the market moving. Liberal economists "see in smallness an opportunity for a more humane and democratic capitalism. Greater worker participation in decision-making affecting the workplace is one sub-theme."[77] The modern liberal economy calls for "a

host of policies that figure and produce citizens as individual entrepreneurs and consumers whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for self-care—their ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions, whether as welfare recipients, medical patients, consumers of pharmaceuticals, university students, or workers in ephemeral occupations."[78] Encouraging this type of individual action and responsibility was important to teach people about how to behave in a market society.

The concept of civil courage can be difficult to pin down precisely. Martin Doery defines it as "risk[ing] economic or social disadvantage in the pursuit of convictions and ideals. A strangely bland definition considering, in any case, what civil courage has achieved during the 20th century."[79] He goes on to list people like Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr., and the individuals who began the 1989 revolutions in Leipzig. It has also been defined as "brave behavior accompanied by anger and indignation which intends to enforce societal and ethical norms without considering one's own social costs."[80] The convictions, ideals, and norms that civil courage embodies are those of liberal democracy—a belief in the value of the individual and in the power of that individual to make change. The idea that one ought to take action without considering the cost of that action to oneself was also an important idea. It made the current situation less important than the promise of a future one and was premised on standing up for principles that were more important than material gains.

Civil courage gave people hope about the future, even if their own social situation was bad. This was important to ensuring the success of the reforms because "central and east Europeans who are optimistic about the future will be more likely than others to support democratic and market policies. These individuals will support the new system even if they are currently 'losers' if they think they (or members of their family) will

eventually be 'winners' in the system."[81] While civil courage can yield positive results, it can also "mean risking alienation, or isolation. There is pain. But there is also hope. The civilly courageous person takes that risk precisely because she cares about her community and believes in its future."[82] Clinton urged the people to maintain their hope, belief, and faith in the liberal democratic system, saying: "In a time like this it is easy to focus on that pain, not on the *promise of reform*,"[83] and "The work of freedom is not easy. It requires discipline, responsibility and a *faith* strong enough to endure failure and criticism."[84] He called on the people to "*believe* you can live in peace with those who are different from you. *Believe* in your own future. *Believe* you can make a difference and summon your own courage to build, and you will,"[85] and "It was here in Poland that all those who *believe* communism could not stand first found their *hopes* fulfilled."[86] This idea of hope and belief gave people a reason to be optimistic about the future and not turn their backs on reform.

An integral part of civil courage is participating in and defending civil society, which is a significant aspect of democracy. Richard Swedberg explains that "civil courage is closely linked to the freedom of expression and also this right is typical of civil society. Other dimensions of civil courage—such as respect for the individual, the right to form associations, toleration, and the like—are similarly linked to the notion of civil society."[87] But it is important to remember that civil society is not the state. It is the private realm of interaction rather than the public realm. It is not sponsored by the government and it encourages people to make their own way, rather than relying on the government. It is the ideological opposite of communism.

Because of this, "civil courage, like civil society, has seemed to be more of an *ideological* construct than a concrete, really existing phenomenon."[88] Clinton did not

provide direct suggestions about how to stop inflation, how to boost employment, or the like. Rather, he encouraged the ideology of acting. Getting people to act was important because "the successful transition to market democracy requires that people be adaptive and open to change, and may rest even more on the ability of publics to take initiative than does the functioning of established market democracies."[89] It was not so much what people did, as long as they were acting in a liberal-democratic fashion.

Conclusion

While Clinton may not have been the only one exhorting the values of economic reform in Eastern Europe, he was certainly an influential figure. Eastern Europe is one of the biggest success stories of liberalization and Clinton's role was likely to set a future precedent for American presidents to be involved in promoting and securing economic ideologies. As James McCormick explains, "If an enduring legacy of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration was for American presidents to assume more responsibility for assisting in managing the American domestic economy, a likely legacy of the Clinton administration will be for future American presidents to assume more responsibility in managing the global economy."[90] Clinton presided over the opening of the era of globalization and a truly international economic era and his model is one that was followed by Bush and Obama, whose international economic management and use of these same ideographs is directly taken from Clinton's strategy of democratic enlargement.

Notes

[1] Harry Truman, "The Truman Doctrine," Washington DC, March 12, 1947, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/harrystrumantrumandoctrine.html.

[2] Truman, "The Truman Doctrine."

[3] John F. Kennedy, "Ich Bin ein Berliner," West Berlin, Germany, June 26, 1963, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3376.

[4] Richard Nixon, "Remarks at the Siemens Factory," West Berlin, Germany, February 27, 1969, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2427#axzz1inpwMZVk

[5] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate," West Berlin, Germany, June 12, 1987, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganbrandenburggate.htm.

[6] George H.W. Bush, "A Whole Europe, a Free Europe," Mainz, Germany, May 31, 1989, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/bush-a-whole-europe-speech-text/.

[7] Thomas Friedman, "Post-Post Cold War," *The New York Times,* July 13, 1994.

[8] Otto Holman, "Integrating Eastern Europe: EU Expansion and the Double Transformation in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary," *International Journal of Political Economy* 28 (1998): 12-43.

[9] Noam Chomsky, *World Orders, Old and New* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 155-156.

[10] Raymond W. Duch, **"**Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," *The American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 591.

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[12] Benjamin Forest, Juliet Johnson, and Karen Till, "Post-Totalitarian National Identity: Public Memory in Germany and Russia," *Social and Cultural Geography* 5 (2004): 357.

[13] Daine Stukuls Eglitis, *Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and Revolution in Latvia* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 7.

[14] Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66 (1980): 5.

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CHAPTER FIVE

December: The Complexities of Multilateral Diplomacy

In December 1994, Clinton made his fourth and final trip to Europe. The main purpose of his visit was to attend the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit meeting in Budapest, Hungary. While this summit meeting was important, "President Clinton almost did not got to the Budapest meeting at all. Despite the fact that the Budapest summit had been on the international calendar for two years, the White House planned a reception for one of the very same days, and then said Clinton could not leave Washington because of a previous engagement."[1] It was fortunate that Clinton decided to attend because while this fourth trip was the shortest—just a single day and one speech—it was perhaps the most significant. It capped a year of largely successful initiatives that sought to expand Western ideals and institutions and further the economic and political transitions in Eastern Europe. The CSCE was the only regional institution that had once counted both the Soviet Union and Western states as members during the Cold War and, for that reason, it was an important site of political neutrality and cooperation. The summit meeting also marked the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II.

In this chapter, I argue that the construction of Clinton's CSCE summit speech indicates how he attempted to convey his larger foreign policy agenda to the public and to other governments. I first survey the history of the CSCE and the challenges it faced going into the Budapest Summit. Then, I analyze the drafts of Clinton's address and how the speech evolved over time in order to demonstrate what ideas and themes Clinton wanted to prioritize. I conclude by examining the outcome of the summit and discuss

why appraisals of success at the time failed to take account of the long-term implication of Clinton's rhetoric and the CSCE's actions.

Rhetorical Situation

This summit was important because it finalized the transition of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[1] The original CSCE was not an institution, but rather a committee that had met only twice between its creation in 1972 and the Budapest Summit in 1994. In 1973, the CSCE convened its first meeting and by 1975, had produced the Helsinki Accords. The Final Act was "a politically—not legally—binding document that sets out principles of conduct in three areas: military-political, economic, and environmental and human rights."[2] The accord was an important step in increasing cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe. While the CSCE was not yet a formal organization, "during the Cold War, the CSCE was a "process" among its participating states.…The lack of structure was well suited to its role in this period: it captured whatever little common ground existed between East and West."[3] It was an institutional arrangement that facilitated detente. Both the West and the Soviet Union claimed the final accord as a victory. The Soviets secured commitments to national sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs, and territorial integrity. This was important to the Soviets because it prevented the West from criticizing the internal policies of Soviet states. At the same time, the Western states secured a commitment to human rights and the self-determination of all peoples. However, because this agreement was non-binding, conflict between the two sets of commitments remained unresolved.

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[1] In this chapter, I will use the acronym CSCE since the name change did not officially go into effect until January 1, 1995.

In 1990, near the end of the Cold War, the CSCE members met again and signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which confirmed that the "era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended"[4] and affirmed a "steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries."[5] It is no coincidence that these commitments closely aligned with Clinton's goals of promoting liberal democracy, personal and economic freedom, and collective security. The Paris Charter also further institutionalized the CSCE as Miraim Sapiro explains: "With the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, the CSCE decided to have regular meetings at different political levels, and to establish a secretariat in Prague for administrative support. It also decided to establish a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw."[6] These new offices helped make the CSCE a permanent organization rather than just a conference. In 1992, the CSCE met once again in Finland where it produced a document entitled "The Challenges of Change," which created the "institutional core" of the CSCE.[7]

By 1994, the CSCE was already far along the path to officially becoming a formal organization and the Budapest Summit finalized that goal. At the summit, an agreement was reached to officially change the name from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The new OSCE would have more power and permanence than the CSCE and the new title reflected that. As Sapiro noted: "The term "organization" also provides a more accurate description of the CSCE because it no longer functions solely as a "conference" of states."[8] This permanence also meant that conflicts between the values of sovereignty and human rights had to be reconciled.

In a document suggesting themes for Clinton's speech, the State Department said the CSCE was the most important institution for stabilizing Europe.[9] While there were many reasons for this, one of the primary reasons was that "the OSCE has taken a different approach. Rather than waiting for 'the other' to change its identity and interests before it can be admitted to the security community building institution, the OSCE has incorporated, from the outset, all states that express a political will to live up to the standards and norms of the security community, hoping to transform their identities and interests. Thus, the OSCE is building security by means of inclusion rather than exclusion or conditional future inclusion."[10] The CSCE was the only organization that always had Soviet states as part of its membership and was therefore perceived as a more cooperative institution than NATO. It was a consensus-based organization and with the adoption of the Paris Charter, "the OSCE aims to shape new transnational identities based on liberal values and serves as a conduit for the transmission of liberal values, norms, and practices to Eastern Europe, thereby helping create new vested interests in a pan-European cognitive space."[11] The CSCE did not have to face with dilemma of integrating new members into an already existing alliance, as NATO did.

The CSCE was different from NATO and other organizations in its origin, functions, and purpose. Edward Kilham has explained the significance of the difference in origin, saying "NATO has naturally emphasized the security dimension of its broad politico-military role, combining deterrence with defense against the threat from the Soviet Union. The CSCE mechanism, in contrast, evolved through joint East-West efforts in Europe to deal with political and economic, as well as security issues, during a specific historical era, namely, the concluding "detente" phase of the Cold War. NATO was constructed as a defensive wall against possible aggression from the wide zone of

control Moscow seized in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. … OSCE, in turn, was a deliberate attempt to build a bridge over the twin walls provided by NATO and the Warsaw Pact."[12] The CSCE also served different purposes than NATO or the European Union as Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic have explained: "Although all three institutions deal with European security, they have a markedly different membership, different capabilities, and perhaps most importantly, different security cultures….NATO has a clear advantage in conducting military operations, the EU in economic and diplomatic responses, and the OSCE mainly deals with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation."[13] Finally, the functions of the organizations were different because while "NATO retains its essential character as a defensive fence against possible military threats… OSCE, on the other hand, is still a bridge, designed to facilitate peaceful intercourse among its numerous members. …Fortunately for the purposes of this study, both fences and bridges provide important components for a stable and secure European and Transatlantic area."[14] While NATO and the OSCE were different, their work could still be complementary.

NATO and the CSCE were connected in important ways. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was open only to CSCE states and becoming a PfP Partner required commitment to CSCE standards and obligations.[15] Both organizations were important to Clinton's goal of democratic expansion because "although NATO and the OSCE had very different origins and were conceived for quite different, in fact, contrary purposes they can be seen most fittingly as different manifestations of the same fundamental ideological trend, the urge for greater cooperation and unity in Europe."[16] The CSCE was an important actor in reaching the goal of a Europe whole and free.

The Paris Charter gave the CSCE new responsibilities, among them peacekeeping and conflict resolution. At the time of the Budapest Summit, there were two major conflicts facing the CSCE. The first conflict was one that most people were familiar with. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, some of the states wanted independence while Serbia, which had been the dominant state in the Tito era, wanted to remain a single entity. After Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence in 1991, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croatian Catholics in Bosnia wanted to declare their independence as well. Bosnian Orthodox Serbs opposed independence and began attacking non-Serbs with the support of the Serbian government, led by Slobodan Milosevic, and the Yugoslav People's Army. At the same time, Croatia, led by Franjo Tudjman, sought to make parts of Bosnia part of its territory.[17] This incredibly complex conflict was driven by questions of identity, ethnicity, religion, and nationalism.

The conflict in Bosnia was the worst armed conflict in Europe since World War II and the inability of the Western nations to stem the violence seriously damaged their credibility. How could Europe truly be whole and free if a major part of the continent was on fire? For some, Bosnia constituted the new Munich—a symbol of appeasement and unwillingness to stand up for liberal democratic values, as William Safire reported: "Bosnia is to the U.N. what Ethiopia was to the League of Nations: the moment of truth at which the world body flinched, inviting greater aggression elsewhere later."[18] The president of Bosnia stated that the failure of the West to stop the violence demonstrated that the ideas of a whole Europe and an integrated Europe were just fantasies.

The second conflict was much lesser known. Starting in 1988, the states of Azerbaijan and Armenia began an armed conflict over an Armenian enclave inside of Azerbaijan known as Nagorno-Karabakh. When the Soviet Union was formed, it was

common to divide ethnic/national groups to prevent uprisings, thus, Nagorno-Karabakh was made part of Azerbaijan, even though most of the people living there were Armenian. Over time, more Azeris moved into Nagorno-Karabakh and eventually comprised 20% of the population.[19] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenians wanted the territory to belong to Armenia while Azerbaijan insisted on retaining it.

This conflict was at the intersection of a number of important geopolitical rivalries. The United States was officially neutral, but in 1992, Congress passed the Freedom Support Act, which favored the Armenians in part because of the large Armenian diaspora in the United States.[20] Russia had been involved in the conflict for many years (previously acting as the Soviet Union) and both sides considered it partial to the other. It was "the subject of deep suspicion and resentment by both sides, even though [the Russians] were needed and courted by everyone."[21] Turkey, which borders the region to the west, had historical conflicts with the Armenians dating back to the 19th century and sided with the Azeris. The majority of Turks and the Azeris were Sunni Muslims. At the same time, there was a minority of Azeris in the south who were Shia Muslims and shared strong cultural and historical connections with Iran, which shares its northern border with Azerbaijan. Russia opposed involvement by Iran or Turkey because it feared encroachment by either on its traditional sphere of influence. In addition to all of this, major oil and gas deposits in the region contributed to the economic value of the territory and economic liberalization meant that international corporations also had an interest in the region.

Until the 1990s, this conflict had been out of the eyes and hands of the West because Armenia and Azerbaijan were Soviet states. The West tolerated this because of the Helsinki principle of noninterference in internal affairs and, regardless, the Soviet

Union would never have allowed Western monitors or peacekeepers, let alone mediators, in the region. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, it became an international rather than a Soviet problem. This conflict was extremely difficult to solve because "the Armenians want separation from Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani government refuses to grant this separation. …The Armenians consider the Karabakh conflict to be a continuation of a people's determination to rid themselves of colonial bondage. Conversely, Azerbaijan considers the Karabakh Armenians to be armed rebels acting on the behest of Armenia to acquire additional territory."[22] Neither side was willing to make the necessary compromises to end the conflict.

Despite these difficulties, the CSCE created the Minsk Group at its 1992 summit to try to resolve the conflict, headed by the United States, France, and Russia. The Minsk Group had never actually convened due to the inability of both sides to reach a durable ceasefire. In 1994, CSCE members "upheld the Minsk process as the sole forum for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Equally important, Decision No. 3 reaffirmed the goal of convening the Minsk Conference to peacefully come to grips with the political status of Karabakh."[23] In May of 1994, the parties signed a ceasefire, and "while there is no total end to the violence, shooting between the parties has generally been limited to occasional long-range artillery and machine-gun exchanges. It is certainly not war, but neither is it peace"[24] and "although a cease-fire has been effective since May 1994, it can be legitimately claimed that the 'relative quiet is an eerie, delicate, deceptive balance,' as the question as to who has the legitimate right to Nagorno-Karabakh remains a deep-rooted and emotional source of suspicion, fear, and potential violence amongst the conflicting parties."[25] The CSCE faced the difficulty of turning this ceasefire into a lasting settlement.

The CSCE was the ideal location for attempting to resolve this problem for two reasons. First, Russia was not a member of NATO and was openly hostile to the PfP and other NATO initiatives. Seeking to resolve this conflict within NATO would mean excluding the only party with previous experience in the region. Second, in NATO, Turkey had a privileged position as one of the seven countries to host US nuclear weapons. If the peacekeeping force had originated in NATO, it would have been perceived as less neutral because of "the persistent Armenian belief that in a tight situation, the West, particularly the US, would tilt toward the interests of their Turkish allies,"[26] meaning Azerbaijan.

Resolving these conflicts would be an important test of the CSCE's new peacekeeping capabilities, as Stephen Blank has described: "Hungary's ambassador to the OSCE told a United States audience that the OSCE's ability to control peacemaking in Georgia and Abkhazia, and implicitly in Transcaucasia were tests of its own viability and of Russia's 'Europeanness' and willingness to support peace in the region. …So the stakes of the OSCE's operation are enormous and clear to all concerned."[27] The new institutional changes also made this a critical test of the OSCE: "From the autumn of 1992 onwards, the OSCE has devoted a considerable part of its political expertise and financial resources to operational activities related to conflict management. For that purpose, it developed two major cross- dimensional instruments with no real counterpart in other security organizations: the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and field missions known as 'Long-Term Missions' (LTMs)."[28] If the OSCE was to be an organization of influence in the 21st century, it would first have to prove its effectiveness.

Speech Construction

Antony Blinken, a Clinton speechwriter, wrote Clinton's speech at the summit but there were numerous drafts and several people involved in the editing process. Clinton and Blinken worked closely with the State Department, as indicated by speech input documents where specific lines are highlighted and later found in Clinton's speeches. Clinton gave his speech on December 5th and Blinken's first draft was completed by December 2nd.[29] There are four drafts plus the final text of the speech. The 12/2 draft contains the basic outline of the speech as Clinton gave it. However, there are many changes that clearly show what Clinton was trying to achieve with this speech and they convey a sense of the message Clinton wanted to express, one that bolstered his overarching goal of democratic expansion. I identify three major changes in the drafts that lent additional support to Clinton's agenda. First, the speech becomes more active in subjects and verbs to encourage particular actions by both the United States and the international community. Second, the way Clinton names enemies and threats changes to become more ambiguous in the final speech. Finally, the language about Russia is softened to try to mollify their opposition to NATO expansion and their opposition to a multilateral peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This speech demonstrates the complexities of multilateral diplomacy. While all of the summit participants could be considered allies of the United States, there was a multiplicity of different interests and values among the many parties. Clinton had to account for all of these interests and provide specific details about U.S. policy while still remaining ambiguous enough so as not to anger important parties and keep up with rapidly changing events. For example, in the seventh paragraph of Clinton's speech, he had originally called for all sides in Bosnia to accept a ceasefire, but in the final speech

that was changed after the government of Bosnia accepted the ceasefire. Bosnian Serbs still refused to accept the ceasefire and Clinton had to craft his language to encourage them to accept it.

The introduction is the section that changes the most over the drafts. It contained the same general idea, but the wording was different and that changes how it is understood. The first line of the speech explained why Clinton was there (his goal) and what it takes to achieve that goal. In the first draft, this is explicit. It said: "I am here because my nation is committed to a strong united Europe."[30] Not until the final speech did Clinton change this to: "The United States is committed to *building* a united, free and secure Europe."[31] The inclusion of the verb "building" indicates that the United States was actively a part of this ongoing process, instead of just a bystander. Rather than just wanting a united Europe, the United States would help contribute to that goal. This line also changed what the United States was committed to—a "strong, united Europe" is rather ambiguous while "united, free, and secure" corresponded with Clinton's agenda of democratic expansion, which was comprised by the three pillars of promoting democracy (a uniting factor), personal and economic freedoms, and collective security.

Clinton then moved on to discuss what was required for the achievement of that goal. In the first and second drafts, he merely described what steps had already been taken and used that past action as proof that the United States was committed to European security. However, in the third draft, this changed to an explicit, bullet-point list of what is still required to achieve that goal—"that NATO adapt to new challenges; that this organization lead efforts to prevent regional crises; that all the nations of Europe work together in harmony to grow together in peace."[32] In the final speech, he says the goal requires "a *determined effort* to continue to reduce the nuclear threat; a strong

NATO adapting to new challenges; a strong CSCE, working among other things to lead *efforts* to head off future Bosnias; and a strong *effort* at cooperating with the United Nations; and an *effort* by all the nations of Europe to work together in harmony on common problems and opportunities."[33] Again, these changes demonstrate that Clinton wanted to emphasize a more active role both for the United States and other nations. By using the word effort repeatedly, he emphasized that this was an ongoing, active process that required determination in the face of obstacles.

Later in the speech, similar patterns occurred and the language was changed to emphasize action. When describing the importance of the CSCE, the first draft said, "It can help nations come together to *bring* prosperity to their people"[34] while in the final speech, Clinton said, "It can help nations come together to *build* prosperity."[35] Prosperity was not something that was delivered once; it was something that had to be worked at continually. When describing the role of the CSCE, the first draft said, "the CSCE has a unique expanding role"[36] compared to the final draft where he said, "the CSCE can play an expanding role."[37] The CSCE would only have a role if it continued to act. In describing how to prevent "future Bosnias," the first draft said, "the steps we are taking at this meeting,"[38] while the final speech said "we are taking important steps at this meeting."[39] This changed the subject of the sentence from 'the steps' to 'we,' which creates a more active role for "us" (meaning the members of the CSCE.) He emphasized the importance of acting with lines like: "If we have learned anything from the agony of Bosnia, it is clearly that we *must act* on its lessons"[40] and "we know the eloquent intentions about democracy and human rights can promote peace when transformed from words into actions."[41] He complemented this need for action by deeming this a *kairotic* time, saying, "The end of the Cold War presents us with the *opportunity* to fulfill the

promise of democracy and freedom and it is our *responsibility* working together to seize it"[42] and "They have left us still with a great *responsibility* and an extraordinary *opportunity*."[43] This was a unique time for action because of the changing world circumstances and 'we' had an obligation to act upon those changes.

These language changes were useful for Clinton's agenda because after the Cold War some had argued that the work of the United States was done; that the United States could end its international commitments. For Clinton, the end of the Cold War did not mean we should retreat from international problems, but rather engage them even more actively. Clinton combined the imperative to act with the importance of the three pillars of democratic expansion. He said that our goal should be to "seek to increase the security of all; to erase the old lines without drawing arbitrary new ones; to bolster emerging democracies; and to integrate the nations of Europe into a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders"[44] and that "NATO, the CSCE, other European and transatlantic institutions, working in close cooperation with the United Nations can support and extend (eastward) the democracy, stability and prosperity that Western Europe and North America have enjoyed for 50 years."[45] Clinton's language emphasized that the work was not done, but was only just beginning.

There were also significant changes made in how enemies and threats were named. This is important because "presidential enemy construction is one of the central components of a president's foreign policy vocabulary, and becomes a primary guide for understanding American foreign policy at large."[46] In the second paragraph of the original draft, it said, "The forces that tore this continent apart—fascism and communism—have receded, but neither peace nor democracy's triumph are assured."[47] In the fourth draft, this is changed to "the old totalitarianisms that tore this continent apart

have receded."[48] In the final speech, Clinton said, "The forces that tore Europe apart have been *defeated*. But neither peace nor democracy's triumph is assured."[49] Clinton omitted mentioning what those forces were, even though it had been explicit in earlier drafts. Similarly, in the last paragraph, the original draft said, "We must ensure that those who fought two world wars and found the courage to end the Cold War did not die and labor in vain."[50] However, in the final speech, Clinton said, "Three times before in this century, our nations have summoned the strength to defeat history's dark forces."[51] In describing the enemies of the past, Clinton sought to be more ambiguous about what and who they were. This served the purpose of allowing Clinton to make more direct comparisons between the threats of the past and the threats of the present.

When describing the ongoing conflict in Bosnia, he said, "ethnic disputes and forces of hatred and despair, demagogues who would take advantage of them threaten to reverse the new wave of freedom that has swept the continent."[52] The term 'forces' is much more ambiguous than identifying a particular ideology or government system as the enemy. This is connected to the final paragraph of the speech where he spoke of "history's dark forces."[53] Even though the enemies of the world wars and the Cold War were of a very different nature than the enemies of the conflict in Bosnia, the use of this word force connected them.

Clinton also made a crucial connection between the existence of threats and the need for action. In the final speech, Clinton said, "We must not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by a veil of indifference. We must not consign new democracies to a gray zone."[54] Immediately following this in the first draft was the line "we must not abandon the newly free to demagogues or aggressors"[55] while the fourth draft replaced this with "we must not abandon newly free nations to the forces of hatred and intolerance."[56]

Neither of these lines made it into the final speech. In the final speech, Clinton simply moved on to his next paragraph without mentioning any particular threats. For Clinton, the enemy was not necessarily a particular person, ideology, or thing, but rather indifference. The failure to explicitly identify these threats helped support Clinton's imperative to act. Even if demagogues, aggressors, and forces of hated and intolerance did not exist, indifference could still engender conflict. Clinton's equation of the Iron Curtain with the "veil of indifference" implied that indifference could cause as many problems as the Iron Curtain had during the Cold War. The "gray zone" was a reference to the Cold War "buffer zone" between East and West comprised of states like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. During the Cold War, the United States did not have the will or the ability to act in those states. However, Clinton argued that during this *kairotic* time following the Cold War, the choice not to act would result in even greater conflicts.

The third and final important thing to notice about the different drafts and the final speech is the way Clinton approached issues to which Russia was sensitive. While Russia had been invited to participate in the PfP, it was strongly opposed to it and did not want other Eastern states to partner with NATO, let alone become permanent members. In the final speech, Clinton said, "Last January NATO opened the door to new members and launched the Partnership for Peace. Since then 23 nations have joined that partnership to train together, conduct joint military exercises and forge closer political links."[57] Notice that there is no mention of "eventual membership" as there was in the first draft, but rather a vague statement that the door was open. The first draft said this door was open to "eastward expansion," but that phrase was eliminated. Clinton also said, "As NATO does expand, so will security for all European states, *for it is not an aggressive, but a defensive organization*. NATO's new members, old members and

nonmembers alike will be more secure."[58] This line about NATO being a defensive organization was not added until the final speech and was meant to mollify Russia's concerns about encroachment. At the same time that Clinton had to avoid angering Russia, he also could not appear to be giving Russia control over what NATO and other institutions did. In the final speech, Clinton said: "Last week we took further steps to prepare for expansion by starting work on the requirements for membership. …NATO will not automatically exclude any nation from joining. At the same time, no country outside will be allowed to veto expansion."[59]

Another important issue for Russia was the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There were two paragraphs about the peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh and they were both changed in every draft. The first paragraph was about the CSCE peacekeeping mandate. In the first draft, it said, "The CSCE's mandate for peacekeeping sets standards to protect hard won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations. This week we reinforced that mandate by adopting clear principles to ensure impartiality."[60] The third draft said: "to better protect the hard-won independence and territorial integrity of nations, we also strengthened and clarified the CSCE's mandate for peacekeeping and conflict prevention."[61] The fourth draft said: "to better protect the hard-won independence and territorial integrity of nations, we must now complete the work started by our ministers in Rome to strengthen and clarify the CSCE's peacekeeping and conflict prevention mandate."[62] The final speech said: "The principles adopted in Rome made clear that any peacekeeping mission must aim for a freely negotiated settlement by the parties themselves, *not a solution imposed from the outside.* And they hold that no country can use a regional conflict, however threatening, to strengthen its security at the expense of others."[63] The words "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity" harkened back

to the Helsinki Accords, which had strengthened the Soviet Union because it prevented outside interference in internal Soviet affairs. The final draft still embraced the idea that states could make decisions for themselves without invoking those particular terms.

The second paragraph was about the application of that peacekeeping mandate in Nagorno-Karabakh. The first draft said: "the United States believes that all members should support peacekeeping operations and the United States appreciates the willingness of many nations to contribute troops and material for the proposed CSCE led mission in Nagorno-Karabakh."[64] Only in the final speech did Clinton say that the United States was "encouraged that with the support and involvement of the Russian Federation we are on the verge of an agreement that the CSCE will lead a multinational peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States appreciates the willingness of many nations to contribute troops and material for this mission." The inclusion of Russia in the final speech was important because it was the party that had the strongest historical connection to the region and the greatest ability to block outside involvement.

Summit Outcomes

Most people at the time thought the summit was a failure because these conflicts were not resolved. One critic described the larger problem in this way: "Clinton has tried to articulate some sort of global vision, calling for the worldwide spread of democracy and free markets. As necessary as that may be, it does not provide an architecture for international relations in the twenty-first century. … despite much well-meaning summitry, the United States has conveyed no clear vision as to what type of partnership it wishes to build with the European Union."[65] The final summit document did not mention Bosnia and did not provide a concrete direction for OSCE policy in Nagorno-Karabakh.

While military force in Bosnia was largely a NATO issue, the CSCE still had some responsibility and "how the world's leaders came to agree to a statement on European security that made no mention of the Bosnian war may puzzle future generations, much as the appeasement of Hitler still puzzles ours. … Serbia and its backer, Russia, did not want the dismemberment of Bosnia to be labeled aggression, and the Western powers did not have the will to resist them. … For the West, the Budapest conference evokes Churchill's words from 56 years ago: a defeat, total and unmitigated."[66] The failure to resolve the conflict at the OSCE led Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegovic, to express "his disdain for a world he said had turned a blind eye to the death of thousands of his people."[67]

However, it was unreasonable to expect a single summit meeting to resolve a crisis as complicated as the one in Bosnia. A year later, the Dayton Accords were signed and "stopped the bloodshed" as they "created the conditions for life to return to normal—at least on the surface. Bosnia has had several sets of municipal and national elections; its three armies have been integrated into a single multiethnic Bosnian army (each of the army's three major brigades is comprised of three ethnically based battalions), whose soldiers even fought alongside multinational forces in Iraq until December 2008. Dayton and the subsequent surge in international attention provided a high level of internal security, facilitated a widespread return of refugees and displaced persons, and created the conditions for a modest level of economic growth."[68] Although not perfect and while other conflicts arose in the former Yugoslavia, those conflicts never escalated to the levels of conflict seen earlier in the 20th century and, today, are largely considered resolved.

Regarding the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, "the reasons for the missed opportunities of Budapest are the familiar ones: lack of high level Western interest and of a high priority for the Karabakh issue, Russian determination to keep outsiders out of what they consider their sphere of interest, and the lack of an immediately available international peacekeeping force, thus permitting the Russians to argue that they are the only ones capable of sending a force to oversee the ceasefire."[69] Russia did not explicitly agree to a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh and "over a half-year later, not a single OSCE peacekeeper has yet been deployed."[70] Unfortunately, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has never been resolved. To this day, while the ceasefire remains in place, violations are regular occurrences and while violence is rare, it still happens.

However, the failure to resolve such a complex conflict is not entirely the fault of Western institutions. As Gregory Flynn and Harry Farrell explain: "If, however, being incapable of preventing a conflict like that in Bosnia or of resolving a situation like Nagorno-Karabakh constitutes a failure, then not only must the CSCE be classified as a failure but also NATO, the EU, and the UN. Casting the issue this way tells us nothing. It focuses on only one of the many objectives associated with intervention."[71] They go on to explain that "Equally important objectives of every intervention have been (1) to control the conflict situation within the border of the affected states, and (2) to buy time, in the hope that neutral mediation may eventually help parties to transform the situation that gave rise to conflict into one that no longer provokes conflict. Measured against these objectives, intervention by the CSCE has a high rate of success."[72] Emanuel Adler confirms this point, noting that "the same practices that offer a means of dealing with specific problems, such as early warning, conflict prevention, and the protection of human rights and minorities, also fulfill the role of 'building a secure and stable CSCE

community, whole and free'….what matters most is not the short-range success of the project, but the construction of a foundation for community practices and behavior."[73] The point was not entirely about solving a particular conflict, but rather an important step in building a security community that deepened the interdependence between the nations involved. It was as important that the CSCE work together toward a goal as it was that they achieved that goal.

The summit also had a notable success for the completion of the nuclear disarmament agreements that began in Clinton's first trip to Europe in 1994. In January, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States signed the Trilateral Agreement, which finalized the consolidation of nuclear weapons in the Russian state. At the Budapest Summit, the five parties to START I (the United States, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus)[74] exchanged instruments of ratification for the START I treaty and it officially entered into force.

In addition, "these CSCE mechanisms, dubbed tools of 'preventative diplomacy,' have proven to be the real workhorses of the international community in its attempts to control substate conflict in post-Cold War Europe. This perspective contrasts sharply with the common view that the CSCE is irrelevant to the important security issues on the continent and that NATO and the EU are the only European security organizations with weight. In reality CSCE mechanisms have been involved in managing far more potential substate conflict situations than either of the other institutions. …nearly all of these missions involved circumstances where it would have been impossible for states to have used either of the other two institutions for collective intervention because neither had been endowed with the instruments to deal with prevailing conditions."[75] While the summit may not have been successful at resolving these conflicts, it was important in

building a security community around a common set of liberal-democratic values and creating future mechanisms to prevent new conflicts.

Clinton and his speechwriters understood that these were complex conflicts that were unlikely to be resolved at a single summit. His speech encouraged ongoing and sustained action to solve these and other future conflicts. His language created an obligation upon the CSCE community to continue working at peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The changes in his speech about the nature of enemies and threats reinforced this demand to act. By being ambiguous about what the threats were, Clinton was able to encourage constant vigilance against both particular threats and indifference. These were small linguistic changes, but they made a significant difference in how his speech was interpreted. Even if the CSCE community was not able to immediately resolve particular conflicts, Clinton's call for preventative action ensured that the organization remained attentive to threats that could endanger the newly found stability of Europe.

Notes

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CHAPTER SIX

Afterward

Clinton's foreign policy rhetoric was defined by the three tenets of democratic expansion—democracy, free market capitalism, and collective security. In each of these speeches and trips, Clinton sought to broaden support for these values. Each of these values was present on each trip, but each trip tended to have a particular focus. On his first trip in January, he sought to expand the NATO's collective security protection by expanding membership gradually to new members in the east. On his second trip in June, he sought to encourage the kind of action that is required for a market economy by paralleling that action with the actions taken during World War II. On his third trip in July, he sought to strengthen liberal democratic norms and spread the ideology of democracy. His final trip included all of these themes in a single speech.

Clinton didn't necessarily begin this idea of democratic enlargement—George H.W. Bush argued for some of the same things, but Clinton had the opportunity to take it farther, both because of the situation and his personal approach to the presidency. As Josef Joffe explains: "Unlike the United States' Cold War presidents, who lived by enduring rules, President Clinton and his helpers were forced to write new scripts. This has made for a surfeit of theorizing that is unusual for policymakers. Even a cursory glance at the rhetorical record reveals a plethora of general statements: this is how the world is ... these are the sources of power that count ... this is the order we ought to shape."[1] Clinton had the unique ability to define how the United States would act in the future.

Clinton's rhetoric on these trips directly contributed to the continuing stability and effectiveness of the U.S.-European relationship. Clinton was able to preserve and strengthen the traditional alliance with Western Europe while bringing Eastern Europe into that fold by bolstering the values that defined the U.S.-Western European relationship during the Cold War and then extending those values to the newly democratic nations of Eastern Europe. Rather than exerting direct power over other states, Clinton chose to expand those values not by using the military or conquering people, but through persuasion. I believe there are two reasons why he was able to do this.

First, Clinton had a clear goal. His goal was to spread democracy, economic and personal freedom, and collective security to "newly freed" states. Throughout these trips, Clinton's speeches consistently emphasized this goal. While this goal was present during the campaign and in his September 1993 speech to the United Nations, the contours of this goal remained fuzzy until he expounded on them in these speeches. This idea of democratic expansion provided a clear role for each of the major components of states. Every state is compromised of a government, an economy, a military, and the people who operate within them. Clinton's rhetoric provided a framework for how governments ought to function, how economies ought to operate, how and when militaries ought to be deployed, and how people ought to act within those frameworks. It was an expansive and broad understanding of how society should operate. Emanuel Adler explains the significance of this, saying:

> Power can also be understood as the ability to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests, and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer, or deny access to good and benefits. Since social reality is a result of imposing meanings and functions on physical objects that do not already

> have those meanings and functions, the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to commit themselves to those rules, because these rules are now part of the self-understandings of the players is, perhaps, the most subtle and most effective form of power.[2]

Clinton's greatest rhetorical power came in his ability to define the rules of the game and his capacity to make other states want to adhere to those rules. The continuing strength of those democratic norms in the international community speaks to Clinton's enduring legacy in the international arena.

Second, Clinton was able to successfully adapt to the rhetorical situation and use it to his advantage. Democratic expansion would not have been possible during the Cold War. While policymakers spoke about the need for democracy and market reforms during the Cold War, direct advocacy of the kind Clinton practiced would have resulted in major clashes with the Soviet Union. Attempting to spread "Western" values to the East would be perceived by the Soviet Union as trying to impede on its sphere of influence. In a hostile bipolar world, attempting to propagandize so strongly would have upset that balance. The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided an opportunity for Clinton to advocate for these reforms. Because it was a moment of transition, Clinton had the ability to steer the direction of that transition. Rather than inventing an entirely new foreign policy for a unipolar world, Clinton adapted the themes and arguments that had served the United States well during the Cold War. That adaptation is its own form of invention and Clinton was able to create a foreign policy rhetoric all his own. He was able to use the rhetoric of the Cold War—language about freedom and capitalism—and direct it toward new purposes.

This is evident in Clinton's ability to transform institutions, especially NATO and the CSCE. William Odom explains how people understood the role of NATO:

> Many Americans believe that dealing with the Soviet threat was NATO's only mission, leaving NATO today as a relic of the cold war. But the Soviet threat was just one of several missions. The alliance also had the task of bringing Italy back into the Western community, of providing an acceptable context for eventual German independence, and generally of removing old security fears among most states in Western Europe.[3]

Clinton was able to seize on this other, less known mission of NATO and make it its primary mission. Many have doubted NATO's ability to endure after the demise of the Soviet Union, yet today, NATO remains one of the strongest institutions in the world. By emphasizing NATO's integration role, Clinton was able to preserve the alliance and preserve it for future military roles, like those it has played in Bosnia and Afghanistan. In addition, the CSCE used to be a forum for competition of values between East and West—the Helsinki Accords process demonstrates this—but is now a forum for spreading western, democratic values and preventing conflicts through peacekeeping.

I believe Clinton's rhetorical strategy also speaks to strategies of a moderate political ideology. Clinton was not a far-left Democrat; he was a left of center Democrat who focused on getting things done rather than ideological purity. Antonio de Velasco explains that the purpose of centrist rhetoric is to create a space of political transcendence: "[Clinton] is using [the center] as an inventional metaphor to give meaning and persuasive force to his argument.…He is using it to give rhetorical presence of a transcendent public space – a center that can potentially include all who are willing to compromise – in which the possibility of 'getting things done' politically always remains in spite of differences of party."[4] Clinton's democratic expansion was centrist in orientation and attempted to create that kind of transcendent international public space.

Regardless of the skirmishes between states and disagreements on what needed to be done, the values of democratic expansion provided a common space of agreement that held the international community together.

George W. Bush and Barack Obama have not moved far from this framing of democratic expansion and this is an area that is rich for future study. Bush used it to justify the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The differences between how Clinton advocated the spread of democracy in Europe and how Bush did it in the Middle East reveals much about their differences in foreign policy orientation, even though they seem rather similar. As Daniel Green explains:

> The democratic expansion theme of the Clinton doctrine and the more assertive regime-change ideas of Tony Blair and George W. Bush administration continue the trend today. Gradual liberal expansion and liberal behavioral regularities have produced the world as we see it today. It is a world without precedent in that war is largely unthinkable within the major-power security community. As Kant predicted 200 years ago, a liberal zone of peace has fully emerged and now includes over 100 countries whose members need not worry about armed conflict with each other….liberal states, having wandered on to a winning formula, could be expected to have such [imperial] tendencies within them. Liberal powers, safe in their zone of peace, might be expected to at times foist their values on to other nonliberal states, particularly if illiberal states and ideologies attacked them.[5]

As the focus of this thesis is on the rhetoric of Clinton, I cannot make definitive statements about how Bush attempted to spread those values to the Middle East, other than to say that the tactics Clinton used relied much more heavily on persuasion, while Bush relied more on military force and power to achieve his goals.

The president of the United States is one of the most powerful people in the world and the way he speaks about people and events has a strong impact on the world. When Bill Clinton became president, he had an opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War to set the United States and the world on a different path. Clinton sought a foreign

policy that attempted to be inclusive rather than exclusive. The origins of his policy of democratic expansion lie on these trips and understanding Clinton's justification of this policy and his deployment of arguments in favor of it explain much about how the post-Cold War world came to be.

Notes

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Timeline of 1994 Presidential Tours in Europe[1]

January (7 days)

- Brussels, Belgium; January 10-11, 1994
  - NATO summit meeting
- Prague, Czech Republic; January 11-12, 1994
  - Met with Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia
- Kiev, Ukraine; January 12, 1994
  - Met with President Kravchuk
- Moscow, Russia; January 12-15, 1994
  - Met with President Yeltsin and signed mutual nuclear disarmament agreement with Ukraine
- Minsk, Belarus; January 15, 1994
  - Met with Chairman Shushkevich
- Geneva, Switzerland; January 15-16, 1994
  - Met with Hafez al-Assad to discuss Golan Heights return

June (6 days)

- Rome, Italy; June 1-4, 1994
  - Met with Prime Minister and President
  - Met with Pope John Paul II
- London, Cambridge, Portsmouth, England; June 4-6, 1994
  - Met with Queen of United Kingdom and leaders of Canada, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Belgium
  - 50^{th} anniversary of D-day ceremonies; Visited US military cemetery
- Colleville-sur-Mer and Paris, France; June 6-8, 1994
  - 4 speeches celebrating 50^{th} anniversary of the D-Day invasion
  - Met with French President Mitterrand and spoke to National Assembly
- Oxford, England; June 8, 1994
  - Received honorary degree

July (6 days)

- Riga, Latvia; July 6, 1994
  - Met with Baltic Presidents
- Warsaw, Poland; July 6-7, 1994
  - Addressed Sejm
-
-

- Naples, Italy; July 7-9, 1994
    - G7 summit
    - Met with President Yeltsin
- Bonn, Germany; July 9-11, 1994
    - Met with Chancellor Kohl
- Berlin, Germany; July 11-12, 1994
    - Deactivated Berlin Brigade
    - Spoke to the people of Berlin

December 5, 1994—Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Summit in Budapest, Hungary

Notes

[1] Schedule of the President, 1994, William J. Clinton Presidential Library Archives, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/potusschedules.html

APPENDIX B

Speech Texts

Defining a new transatlantic security: January 9, 1994; Brussels, Belgium

Thank you very much. Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Mayor, distinguished leaders. I am delighted to be here in this great hall of history with the Prime Minister and with many of Europe's future leaders.

I first came to Brussels as a young man in a very different but difficult time, when the future for us was uncertain. It is fitting that my first trip to Europe as President be about building a better future for the young people of Europe and the United States today, and that it begin here in Belgium. As a great capital and as the headquarters of NATO and the European Union, Brussels and Belgium have long been at the center of Europe's steady progress toward greater security and greater prosperity.

For those of you who know anything about me personally, I also have a great personal debt of nearly 40 years' standing to this country, because it was a Belgian, Adolphe Sax, who invented the saxophone.

I have come here at this time because I believe that it is time for us, together, to revitalize our partnership and to define a new security at a time of historic change. It is a new day for our transatlantic partnership: The Cold War is over, Germany is united, the Soviet Union is gone, and a constitutional democracy governs Russia. The specter that haunted our citizens for decades of tanks rolling in through Fulda Gap--or nuclear annihilation raining from the sky--that specter, thank God, has largely vanished. Your generation is the beneficiary of those miraculous transformations.

In the end, the Iron Curtain rusted from within and was brought crashing down by the determination of brave men and women to live free--by the Poles and the Czechs; by the Russians, the Ukrainians, the people of the Baltics; by all those who understood that neither economics nor consciences can be ordered from above. Equally important, however, their heroic efforts succeeded because our resolve never failed, because the weapons of deterrence never disappeared and the message of democracy never disappeared.

As the East enjoys a new birth of freedom, one of freedom's great victories lives here in Europe's West--the peaceful cleaving together of nations which clashed for centuries. The transformation was wrought by visionary leaders such as Monnet, Schumann, Spaak, and Marshall, who understood that modern nations can enrich their futures more through cooperation than through conquest.

My Administration supports European union and Europe's development of stronger institutions of common purpose and common action. We recognize we will benefit more from a strong and equal partner than from a weak one. The fall of the Soviet empire and Western Europe's integration are the two greatest advances for peace in the last half of the 20th century. All of us are reaping their blessings. In particular, with the Cold War over, and in spite of the present global recession which clouds your future, all our nations now have the opportunity to take long-deferred steps toward economic and social renewal. My own nation has made a beginning in putting our economic house in order reducing our deficits, investing in our people, creating jobs, and sparking an

economic recovery that we hope will help not only the United States, but will also lift all nations.

We are also facing up to some of the social problems in our country that we have ignored for too long--from the challenge to provide universal health care, to reducing crime in our streets, to dealing with the needs of our poor children. We have a truly multicultural society. In one of our counties, there are people from more than 150 different national and ethnic groups. But we are working to build an American community for the 21st century.

With the European Union, we have recently led the world to a new GATT agreement that will create millions of new jobs in all our countries. In many ways, it would be easy to offer you only a message of simple celebration, to trumpet our common heritage, to rejoice that our labors for peace have been rewarded, to cheer on the economic progress that is occurring. But this is not a time for self-congratulation. And certainly we have enough challenges that we should act as true partners--that is, we should share one another's burdens rather than only talking of triumphs. We should speak honestly about what we feel, about where we are, and where we should go.

This is the truth as I see it. We served history well during the Cold War. But, now, history calls on us again to help consolidate freedom's new gains into a larger and a more lasting peace. We must build a new security for Europe; the old security was based on the defense of our bloc against another bloc. The new security must be found in Europe's integration--an integration of security forces, of market economies, and of national democracies. The purpose of my trip to Europe is to help lead the movement to that integration and to assure you that America will be a strong partner in it.

For the people who broke communism's chains, we now see a race between rejuvenation and despair. And the outcome will shape the security of every nation in the transatlantic alliance. Today that race is being played out from the Balkans to Central Asia. In one lane are the heirs of the enlightenment, who seek to consolidate freedom's gains by building free economies, open democracies, and tolerant civic cultures. Pitted against them are the grim pretenders to tyranny's dark throne--the militant nationalists and demagogues who fan suspicions that are ancient, and parade the pain of renewal in order to obscure the promise of reform.

None of us can afford to be bystanders of that race. Too much is at stake. Consider this: The coming months and years may decide whether the Russian people will continue to develop a peaceful market democracy or whether, in frustration, they will elect leaders who incline back toward authoritarianism and empire. This period may determine whether the nations neighboring Russia thrive in freedom and join the ranks of non-nuclear states or founder under the strain of reform and cling to weapons that increase the risk of nuclear accident or diversion. This period may decide whether the states of the former Soviet bloc are woven into the fabric of transatlantic prosperity and security or are simply left hanging in isolation as they face the same daunting changes gripping so many others in Europe.

These pivotal decisions ultimately rest with the people who threw off communism's yoke. They must make their own decisions about their own future. But we in the West can clearly help to shape their choices, and we must summon the political will to do so.

The task requires a steady and patient effort, guided by a strategic star that points us toward the integration of a broader Europe. It also requires a fair amount of humility--

understanding that we cannot control every event in every country on every day. But if we are willing to assume the central challenge, we can revitalize not only the nations of the East, but also our own transatlantic relationship.

Over the past half-century, the transatlantic community only realized half the promise of World War II's triumph over fascism. The other half lay captive behind Europe's walls of division. Now we have the chance to realize the full promise of Europe's victories without its great disappointment--Normandy without Yalta, the liberation of the low countries without the Berlin blockade.

During this past half-century, transatlantic security depended primarily on the deterrents provided by our military forces. Now the immediate threat to our East is not of advancing armies, but of creeping instability. Countering that threat requires not only military security, but also the promotion of democratic and economic renewal. Combined, these forces are the strongest bulwark against Europe's current dangers--ethnic conflict, the abuse of human rights, the destabilizing refugee flows, the rise of aggressive regimes, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The integration of the former communist bloc with the rest of Europe will be gradual and often difficult, as Germany's bold efforts demonstrate. Like all great opportunities, we must remember that this one could be fleeting. We must not now let the Iron Curtain be replaced with a veil of indifference. For history will judge us as it judged with scorn those who preached isolationism between the world wars, and as it has judged with praise the bold architects of the transatlantic community after World War II.

With the Cold War over, some in America with short memories have called for us to pack up and go home. I am asked often: Why do you maintain a presence in Europe? How can you justify the expense when we have so many problems here at home? We tried that, right after World War I. But the American people this year proved their resistance to the siren song of global withdrawal. We did so when the Congress voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement, voted for America to compete in a global economy, not to retreat. We did so when we reached out to Europe and to others and, in working with the European Union, led the world to accept a new GATT agreement on world trade.

I have come here today to declare and to demonstrate that Europe remains central to the interests of the United States and that we will work with our partners in seizing the opportunities before us all.

Without question, Europe is not the only focus of our engagement; we must reach out to Latin America and to Asia--areas that are increasingly important both to the United States and to Europe. Our bonds with Europe will be different than they were in the past, but make no mistake about it--the bonds that tie the United States and Europe are unique. We share a passionate faith that God has endowed us as individuals with inalienable rights, and a belief that the state exists by our consent solely to advance freedom and security and prosperity for all of us as individuals. That is still a radical idea in the world in which we live. Developed by Locke and Montesquieu and put into practice in my country by Jefferson and Madison, it has toppled tyrants and drawn millions to our country's shores.

Over three centuries, the ties of kinship between the United States and Europe have fostered bonds of commerce, and you remain our most valued partner, not just in the cause of democracy and freedom, but also in the economics of trade and investment.

But above all, the core of our security remains with Europe. That is why America's commitment to Europe's safety and stability remains as strong as ever. That is why I urged NATO to convene this week's summit. That is why I am committed to keeping roughly 100,000 American troops stationed in Europe, consistent with the expressed desires of our allies here. It is not habit, but security and partnership that justifies this continuing commitment by the United States.

Security for the 21st Century

Just as we have worked in partnership with Europe on every major security challenge in this century, it is now time for us to join in building the new security for the 21st century--the century in which most of you in this room will live most of your lives. The new security must seek to bind a broader Europe together with a strong fabric woven of military cooperation, prosperous market economies, and vital democracies.

Let me speak briefly about each of these. The first and most important element of the security must be military strength and cooperation. The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over. As we know, it rages today not only in distant lands but right here in Europe and the former Yugoslavia. That murderous conflict reminds us that, even after the Cold War, military forces remain relevant. It also reveals the difficulties of applying military force to conflicts within as well as among states. And it teaches us that it is best to act early to prevent conflicts that later we may not be able to control.

As we work to resolve that tragedy and ease the suffering of its victims, we also need to believe that the 21st century can be the most exciting period that Europe and the United States have ever known and that your future can be the richest and brightest of any generation. But we will have to work to make it so. Thank you very much.

Partnership for Peace: building a new security for the 21st century: January 10, 1994; Brussels, Belgium

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General and distinguished leaders. I am deeply honored to represent my nation at the North Atlantic Council this morning, as eight previous Presidents have done before me.

Each of us came here for the same compelling reason: The security of the North Atlantic region is vital to the security of the United States. The founders of this alliance created the greatest military alliance in history. It was a bold undertaking. I think all of us know that we have come together this week because history calls upon us to be equally bold once again in the aftermath of the Cold War. Now we no longer fear attack from a common enemy. But if our common adversary has vanished, we know our common dangers have not. With the Cold War over, we must confront the destabilizing consequences of the unfreezing of history which the end of the Cold War has wrought.

The threat to us now is not of advancing armies so much as of creeping instability. The best strategy against this threat is to integrate the former communist states into our fabric of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation. For our security in this generation will be shaped by whether reform in these nations succeeds in the face of their own very significant economic frustration, ethnic tensions, and intolerant nationalism.

The size of the reactionary vote in Russia's recent election reminds us again of the strength of democracy's opponents. The ongoing slaughter in Bosnia tallies the price when those opponents prevail. If we do not meet our new challenge, then most assuredly, we will once again--someday down the road face our old challenges again. If democracy in the East falls, then violence and disruption from the East will once again harm us and other democracies.

I believe our generation's stewardship of this grand alliance, therefore, will be judged most critically by whether we succeed in integrating the nations to our east within the compass of Western security and Western values. For we have been granted an opportunity without precedent: We really have the chance to recast European security on historic new principles--the pursuit of economic and political freedom. I would argue to you that we must work hard to succeed now, for this opportunity may not come to us again.

In effect, the world now wonders whether we have the foresight and the courage our predecessors had to act in our long-term interests. I am confident that the steel in this alliance has not rusted. Our nations proved that by joining together in a common effort in the Gulf War. We proved it anew this past year by working together, after seven long years of effort, in a spirit of compromise and harmony to reach a new GATT agreement. And now we must do it once again.

To seize the great opportunity before us, I have proposed that we forge what we have decided to call the Partnership for Peace, open to all the former communist states of the Warsaw Pact, along with other non-NATO states. The membership of the partnership will plan and train and exercise together and work together on missions of common concern. They should be invited to work directly with NATO both here and in the Coordination Cell in Mons.

The partnership will prepare the NATO Alliance to undertake new tasks that the times impose upon us. The Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters we are creating will

let us act both effectively and with dispatch in helping to make and keep the peace and in helping to head off some of the terrible problems we are now trying to solve. We must also ready this alliance to meet new threats, notably from weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.

Building on NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council two years ago, the Partnership for Peace sets in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO. We began this alliance with 12 members; today there are 16--and each one has strengthened the alliance. Indeed, our treaty always looked to the addition of new members who shared the alliance's purposes and who could enlarge its orbit of democratic security. Thus, in leading us toward the addition of these Eastern states, the Partnership for Peace does not change NATO's original vision-it realizes that vision.

So let us say, here, to the people in Europe's east that we share with you a common destiny, and we are committed to your success. The democratic community has grown, and now it is time to begin welcoming these newcomers to our neighborhood.

As President Mitterrand said so eloquently, some of the newcomers want to be members of NATO right away, and some have expressed reservations about this concept of the Partnership for Peace. Some have asked me in my own country, well, is this just the best you can do? Is this sort of splitting the difference between doing nothing and full membership, at least for the Visegrad states? And to that, let me answer--at least for my part--an emphatic no, for many of the same reasons President Mitterrand has already outlined.

Why should we, now, draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we, now, do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all its European neighbors. The best possible future would be a democratic Ukraine--a democratic government in every one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, all committed to market cooperation, to common security, and to democratic ideals. We should not foreclose that possibility.

The Partnership for Peace, I would argue, gives us the best of both worlds. It enables us to prepare for and to work toward the enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities. It enables us to do it in a way that gives us the time to reach out to Russia and to these other nations of the former Soviet Union, which have been almost ignored through this entire debate by people around the world, in a way that leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that breaks totally from the destructive past we have known.

So I say to you: I do not view this as some sort of half-hearted compromise. In substance, this is a good idea. It is the right thing to do at this moment in history. It leaves open the best possible future for Europe and leaves us the means to settle for a future that is not the best but is much better than the past. And I would argue that that is the course we ought to pursue.

I think we have to be clear in doing so about certain assumptions and consequences. First, if we move forward in this manner, we must reaffirm the bonds of our own alliance. America pledges its efforts in that common purpose. I pledge to maintain roughly 100,000 troops in Europe, consistent with the expressed wishes of our allies. The people of Europe can count on America to maintain this commitment.

Second, we have to recognize that this new security challenge requires a range of responses different from those of the past. That is why our Administration has broken

with previous American administrations in going beyond what others have done to support European efforts to advance their own security and interests, All of you have received our support in moving in ways beyond NATO, We supported the Maastricht Treaty, We support the commitment of the European Union to a common foreign and security policy. We support your efforts to refurbish the Western European Union so that it will assume a more vigorous role in keeping Europe secure. Consistent with that goal, we have proposed making NATO assets available to WE U operations in which NATO itself is not involved.

While NATO must remain the linchpin of our security, all these efforts will show our people and our legislatures a renewed purpose in European institutions and a better balance of responsibilities within the transatlantic community.

Finally, in developing the Partnership for Peace, each of us must willingly assume the burdens to make it succeed. This must not be just a gesture--it is not just a forum. This Partnership for Peace is also a military and security initiative, consistent with what NATO was established to achieve. There must be a somber appreciation that expanding our membership will mean extending commitments that must be supported by military strategies and postures. Adding new members entails not only hard decisions but hard resources. Today those resources are not great but, nonetheless, as the Secretary General told me in the meeting this morning, they must be forthcoming in order for this to be taken seriously by our allies and our friends who will immediately subscribe to the partnership.

Let me also say, in response to something that President Mitterrand said and that is on all of our minds--the problem in Bosnia--that when we talk about making hard decisions, we must be prepared to make them. And tonight I have been asked to talk a little bit about the work I have been doing with Russia and what I believe we all should be doing to support democracy and economic reform there. But I would like to make two points about Bosnia.

First, I want to reaffirm that the United States remains ready to help NATO implement a viable settlement in Bosnia voluntarily reached by the parties. We would have to seek, of course, the support of our Congress in this, but let me say I think we can get it--if such an operation would be clearly under NATO command, the means of carrying out the mission would be equivalent to its purposes, and these purposes would be clear in scope and in time.

Second, I welcome the reassertion by the alliance in this declaration of our warning against the strangulation of Sarajevo and the safe areas. But if we are going to reassert this warning it cannot be seen as mere rhetoric. Those who attack Sarajevo must understand that we are serious. If we leave that sentence in the declaration, we have to mean it. Those of us gathered here must understand that, therefore, if the situation does not improve, the alliance must be prepared to act. What is at stake is not just the safety of the people in Sarajevo and any possibility of bringing this terrible conflict to an end but the credibility of the alliance itself. And that--make no mistake about it--will have great ramifications in the future in other contexts.

Therefore, in voting for this language, I expect the North Atlantic Council to take action when necessary. And I think if anyone here does not agree with that, you should not vote for the language. I think it is the appropriate language, but we have to be clear when we put something like this in the declaration.

Let me say finally that I ran across the following quotation by a distinguished and now deceased American political writer, Walter Lippman. Three days after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, Lippman wrote this--prophetically:

The pact will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union, and come what may, will survive it.

Well, this meeting will prove him right. The Soviet Union is gone, but our community of interest endures. And now it is up to us to build a new security for a new future for the Atlantic peoples in the 21st century.

Building peace and security through partnership and cooperation: January 10, 1994; Brussels, Belgium

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I came to Europe to help strengthen European integration--to create a new security for the United States and its Atlantic partners based on the idea that we have a real chance to integrate rather than to divide Europe, both East and West--an integration based on shared democracies, market economies, and defense cooperation. Today, we have taken two giant steps toward greater security for the United States, for Europe, and for the world.

First, this afternoon I joined our NATO allies in signing the documents that create the Partnership for Peace. The United States proposed this partnership to lay the foundation for intensive cooperation among the armed forces of our NATO members, all former Warsaw Pact states, and other non-NATO European states who wish to join the partnership. By providing for the practical integration and cooperation of these diverse military forces, the Partnership for Peace will lead to the enlargement of NATO membership and will support our efforts to integrate Europe.

I am also pleased to announce that, on Friday, the United States will sign with Ukraine and Russia an agreement which commits Ukraine to eliminate nuclear weapons from its territory. These include 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and some 1,500 warheads targeted at the United States. This is a hopeful and historic breakthrough that enhances the security of all three parties and every other nation as well.

When I came into office, I said that one of my highest priorities was combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The issue of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union was the most important non-proliferation challenge facing the world. With the Soviet Union dissolved, four countries were left with nuclear weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. I have sought to ensure that the breakup of the Soviet Union does not result in the birth of new nuclear states, which could raise the chances for nuclear accidents, nuclear terrorism, or nuclear proliferation.

In just one year, after an intensive diplomatic effort by the United States, both Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and join the ranks of non-nuclear nations. Much credit for these actions goes to President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, whom I will be welcoming to Washington in February; Chairman Shushkevich of Belarus, whom I will meet in Minsk later this week; as well as the people and parliaments of those two countries.

My Administration has been working with the Governments of Ukraine and Russia to address Ukraine's security concerns so that it can follow suit. The trilateral accord we will sign will lead to the complete removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. I want to congratulate both President Yeltsin and President Kravchuk for their statesmanship in negotiating this accord with us. I want to commend President Kravchuk and thank him for his leadership. I look forward to consulting with him personally during the brief stop at Borispol Airport in Kiev on Wednesday evening. President Kravchuk will later join President Yeltsin and me in Moscow on Friday to finalize the agreement in a trilateral meeting.

This agreement opens a new era in our relationship with Ukraine, an important country at the center of Europe---a country, I might add, which was mentioned frequently during our meetings today. We expect to expand our cooperation with Ukraine, especially

in the economic area. We look forward to Ukraine playing an important role in efforts to move toward the integration of a broader Europe.

Today, I spent the day at NATO Headquarters, one of the pillars of our security in the post-World War II era. Through that era, our security was defined by the stability of Europe's division. But with the two breakthroughs for peace announced today, we can begin to imagine--as well as to define--a new security for the post-Cold War era, founded not on Europe's division but instead on its integration.

Throughout the 20th century, now drawing to a close, Europe has seen far too much bloodshed based on these divisions. But with strong democracies, strong market economies, strong bonds of defense cooperation, and this strong step to combat nuclear weapons proliferation, we can make the next century far more secure for all of our people by building a united Europe.

President Clinton. Thank you very much. We have just had a very productive meeting, President Delors, Prime Minister Papandreou, and I. As I have said many times in the last few days, I came to Brussels in the hope of working with the leaders of Europe to build a broader and more integrated Europe.

At the heart of this new concept of security is the economic vitality of the relationship between the United States and the European Union. The EU remains America's most valued partner in trade and investment. A strong relationship between us is good for America. It can help to generate more jobs, more growth, more opportunities for workers and businesses at home as well as for those here in Europe.

That is one of the reasons that our Administration strongly supported the Maastricht Treaty. We believe a strong and more unified Europe makes for a more effective economic and political partner. I think we proved that through our combined efforts to lead the world to a new GATT agreement in December.

One key to achieving that accord came last spring when President Delors agreed to join me in focusing on market access at last year's G-7 summit. I am committed to deepening our relationship with the EU through regular meetings at all levels to continue to address other concerns as we address the market access concern and as we work together to get a new GATT agreement.

I have argued in my own country that to advance the global economy and to advance the interests of American workers as well, we must compete, not retreat. Advanced economies can generate more jobs and higher incomes only when they have more people beyond their borders to buy their goods and services. Therefore, we must continue our efforts to expand global growth and world markets. The GATT agreement will help in that regard. I am convinced it will create millions of jobs in the global economy between now and the end of the decade. But we also have responsibilities-the United States, the EU, and others--to continue our own efforts toward open trade and more global growth.

In today's meeting, we discussed four ways in which we can build on the momentum generated by the GATT agreement. First, we stressed the need to finalize and ratify the agreement. The agreement itself was an impressive breakthrough, but there are several areas in which we did not reach full agreement. I emphasized today our strong desire to resolve our outstanding differences.

We also agreed that further market access offers from Japan and from other countries are also needed to meet the ambitious goals on which we agreed. The U.S. and the EU alone cannot create the open markets the world needs. We think it is clearly time for the other great economic power, Japan, to join us in this effort to open markets. Second, we agreed on the importance of putting jobs at the center of our trade and economic agenda. Today, the nations of the European Union are facing high and persistent rates of unemployment and sluggish growth.

In the United States, we have begun to generate more jobs, but our nation still has a long way to go before our unemployment is at an acceptable level and before our workers begin to generate more income when they work harder. The renewal of each of our economies will benefit all of them. We discussed some of the innovative ideas contained in the Delors White Paper. President Delors and Prime Minister Papandreou both made very thoughtful comments about the kinds of things we could do to generate

more job growth both in Europe and the United States. And we look forward to pursuing those ideas at the jobs conference in Washington this spring, and again at the G-7 summit this July.

Third, we agreed to explore the next generation of trade issues. I suggested that the successor agenda to the Uruguay Round should include issues such as the impact of environmental policies on trade, antitrust and other competition policies, and labor standards--something that, frankly, I think we must address.

While we continue to tear down anticompetitive practices and other barriers to trade, we simply have to assure that our economic policies also protect the environment and the well-being of workers. As we bring others into the orbit of global trade--people who can benefit from the investment and trading opportunities we offer--we must ensure that their policies benefit the interest of their workers and our common interest in enhancing environmental protection throughout the globe. That is exactly what we tried to do with the North American Free Trade Agreement. In the coming months I look forward to continuing discussions on these issues with our EU partners.

Finally, we discussed the imperative of helping to integrate the new market democracies of Europe's eastern half into the transatlantic community. Yesterday, NATO took a historic step in this direction with the Partnership for Peace. We must match that effort by helping to ensure that our markets are open to the products of Eastern Europe. Ultimately, the further integration of Europe can be a future source of jobs and prosperity for both the United States and Western Europe as these nations become increasingly productive and, therefore, increasingly able to serve as consumers in the global economy.

We have already begun to open our markets to these new democracies. And I have urged that both the United States and the EU explore additional ways in which we can further open our markets to the nations to our east. Our trade is a source of strength, a source of jobs, a source of prosperity.

I look forward to continuing these discussions in the future. We had a lot of very good specific discussions this morning on the jobs issue in particular. We intend to continue to work together and to make progress together. Thank you very much.

Prime Minister Papandreou. President Clinton, in this very brief presentation, has covered the issues that we discussed today. He has done so in a very complete way, so I will make two or three comments and not more. To begin with, we have the revitalization of transatlantic relations -- relations between Europe, the European Union, and the United States of America.

It is very important for President Clinton that European integration, the great objective of a united Europe, is very important. Now, the other important issue is an opening toward Eastern Europe. The wall separating the East from the West has been dismantled. We do not want any further divisions in Europe. But we should not ignore the dangers that may confront us on this road.

Russia is involved in a very difficult economic, political, and social reform. And we would like to contribute in any way we can so that this road will lead to a modern economy, to a peace policy, and to a just society. We hope that this will be the final outcome of this process.

Now, the third point which is directly linked to what we have mentioned so far is a Partnership for Peace. We have to work together for peace. This is a great concept. We should consider ways of working together in the area of defense in connection with problems arising due to crises, nationalist fanaticism, and conflicts in Europe or at the

periphery. Crisis management is a very important objective. Military cooperation without Eastern European countries being members of NAT0--cooperation between them and NATO--is not a threat for Russia, but rather an invitation to Russia to contribute constructively.

I will not embark on the problem of the European economy. Mr. Delors will speak about this problem. But the truth is that there are three regions in which we have both unemployment and recession---Europe, Japan, and the United States. Now, the United States has started an upswing. We are faced with a very serious problem in connection with employment, and we will have to live with this problem for many years unless we manage to find a radical solution. It is not the fight time to go into the details of these solutions. Now, this is what I wanted to say at the present juncture.

The Visegrad States: Crossroads to Change in the Heart of Europe: January 12, 1994.; Prague, the Czech Republic

I am delighted to be here with the leaders of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. This region has contributed so much to my nation's history. Officers from your lands helped lead our fight for independence, and your sons and daughters helped build our cities and communities. Two of my senior national security advisers were born in this region--my UN Ambassador, Madeleine Albright; and the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili. I asked Vice President Gore to make his first official trip abroad to this region--to Poland, in April. And I asked him to come here again in December to pay my nation's respects to Hungary's great Premier, the late Jozsef Antall.

The Visegrad states hold a special place in modern history. This is where the transformations of our era began--with Poland's elections in June of 1989, the opening of Hungary's frontiers, and the Velvet Revolution in Prague and Bratislava. Just as your states have been at the heart of European civilization for centuries, your courageous bid for freedom inspired the march to freedom for half a continent and hundreds of millions of people.

At that time, many doubted your ability to succeed. They said achieving freedom was one thing; building new democracies and market economies was quite another. Some said it would all come to tears--that carrying through reforms of such magnitude was simply impossible. And there are those who still say that today. But you have confounded such skeptics. Indeed, you have surprised even the optimists. Against great challenges, your people are repairing the devastation of a half-century of communism, building new market economies---and doing all of this by way of democracy. And your success helps persuade other nations that such reforms can work.

I have come to Europe this week to work with our European partners in building a new security for a broader, democratic Europe in the 21st century. For a half-century, the security of the U.S. and Western Europe was based on the defense of half of Europe against the other half. The new security must be found in Europe's integration--in the successful expansion of military cooperation, democratic government, and market economies. The combination of those practices across a broader Europe is the best protection all our nations can build against creeping instability or a return to the old ways and the old, imposed divisions. Now those old days are gone, and we want to make sure they are gone for good. Let me be absolutely clear. The security of your states is important to the security of America.

Two days ago in Brussels, I began laying out my ideas for how all our states can put the Cold War behind us and move from artificial division to integration. But I am mindful of the old Polish saying, "nothing about us without us," and so I have come to share my thoughts directly with you as well. I want to discuss three sets of ideas I have about how to build the new security and advance the integration of a broader Europe. First, I want to talk with you about the NATO summit. Second, I want to discuss how the United States can support your democratic and free market transformations. Third, I want to discuss how our nation can support regional cooperation among your new democracies.

As you know, the NATO summit approved my proposal, the Partnership for Peace, which builds on shared values and a willingness to assume shared responsibilities.

The partnership invites the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, plus others, to join in military cooperation with NATO--military training, exercises, and operations. We hope Poland will host such an exercise this year.

The partnership sets in motion a process that will lead to the enlargement of NATO's membership. I know that many in this region prefer immediate membership. I want to say two things about that. Partnership for Peace is not NATO membership. But neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire dialogue about enlarging NATO's membership. Now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how we will do so.

I also say to all in your countries and mine who would draw a new line in Europe: We should not foreclose the possibility of the best future for Europe--democracy everywhere, market economies everywhere, countries cooperating for mutual security everywhere. We must guard against a lesser outcome, and we have time to do so. But just as others were wrong to assume the failure of your reforms, I urge you not to assume the failure of Russia's reforms. Freedom's boundaries now should be defined by new behavior, not by old history. As Vice President Gore suggested last week in a meeting with Polish-, Czech-, Slovak-, and Hungarian-Americans, this is not a rerun of Yalta; it is a first-run of democracy.

Like any security agreement among nations, the partnership requires a two-way effort. For our part, we have begun ending Cold War restrictions on the sale or transfer of defense articles to some Central and Eastern European countries. We are prepared to help train some of your military units to NATO standards. For your part, we hope you will join the partnership, participate actively, and work with us to make this the road toward NATO enlargement.

Our second goal is to help solidify your democratic and market reforms. Your progress since 1989 shows that deep, thorough-going reforms work. Today, your cities are alive with commerce. But the benefits of reform are unevenly distributed. Those who have had no experience with any system other than a command economy often feel the insecurities of the new economy more than its opportunities. This is a problem that your nations will solve for themselves. But we are determined to do what we can to help. I have ordered that our programs give greater emphasis to helping you tend to reform's human dimension.

Ultimately, the success of your economic reforms will depend less on aid than on trade and investment. In Brussels, I called on the European Union to work with us to help open the world's markets to fair exports from your countries.

Today, I am pleased to announce that the United States will support your states in the process of achieving early membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. I also am pleased to announce a major expansion of programs by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation--OPIC--in Central Europe. And in the first half of this year, the U.S. will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe.

We also are working to help you bolster your new democracies. Today, all of Europe is facing hard questions about economic transition, social change, and ethnic diversity. Those challenges provide a fertile soil for demagogues preaching militant, intolerant nationalism. They say all the problems are caused by "others." They say they will solve everything overnight.

We all have an obligation to foster tolerance, to protect individual human rights, and to denounce those who sow hatred. That is important in my country as well as in yours. But over time, democracy relies on a robust civil society, embedded in a thriving economy. Today, across your cities and towns, your people are fulfilling the promise of 1989 by creating such a civil society--community groups, free trade unions, environmental organizations, and more. To help support this process, this year we are significantly increasing our support for such groups in this region and elsewhere. And today I am announcing a new initiative, "the Democracy Network," to bring new resources to grass-roots and independent groups throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

One of the most important building blocks of democracy is a free media. Over the years, we supported a free flow of information throughout this region and the former Soviet Union through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Since taking office, I have insisted that these important broadcasting services be continued because they still have a role to play. The Czech Government has made a generous offer to help, if we decide to move them to Prague--and we are looking at this option very seriously.

Finally, my Government is eager to foster regional cooperation among your countries. Our belief in regional cooperation flows from our own experience after World War II. One of the central features of the Marshall Plan and the integration of Western Europe was the development of cooperation among those states. It helped turn wary neighbors into staunch allies. We see cooperation among the states of Central and Eastern Europe as an integral part of Europe's broader integration. We are determined to foster that integration in practical ways. We will provide technical assistance to regional or bi-national groups. We will help mobilize international support for regional infrastructure projects, such as highways and communication networks. And we want to support the development of an integrated system of airports and air traffic control for the region.

All of these steps can advance the larger purpose we share--the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into a broader Europe that is thriving, democratic, and at peace. Ultimately, that is the best source of security for all of us.

You and I both understand this work will be neither easy nor instant. But we are not deterred or dismayed. We have been with you in this struggle since the beginning. We pledged in 1989 to stand by you as long as you continued your reforms--and we stand by you today. Together, we can place Central and Eastern Europe at the heart of an integrated Europe--democratic, prosperous, secure, and free.

Strengthening Russia's economic and political future: January 14, 1994; Moscow, Russia

I am deeply honored to be here today at this television station, which has become for all the world a beacon of information and truth. Attacked three months ago by opponents of reform, Ostankino stands as a symbol of the power of free expression and of the brave sacrifices the Russian people have been making to build a great and free future.

I'm so glad there are many young people here and I hope there are many, many more watching us on television, because it is the future of the youth of Russia that I wish to speak about. Once every generation or two all great nations must stop and think about where they are in time. They must regenerate themselves. They must imagine their future in a new way. Your generation has come of age at one of those moments.

Yesterday I walked through Moscow. I stopped at a bakery and bought some bread. I went into another shop and talked to the people there. I talked with an awful lot of people on the street. I went to Kazan Cathedral and lit a candle in memory of my mother. It is a cathedral which, like Russia itself, has been built anew on old foundations.

Over the centuries, the Russian people have shown their greatness in many ways, in the arts and literature, on the battlefield, in the university, and in space. Though the communist system suppressed human rights and human initiative and repressed your neighbors and brought the world the Cold War, still the greatness of the Russian people showed through.

Now, on the brink of the 21st century, your nation is being called upon once again to redefine its greatness in terms that are appropriate to the present day and to the future, in ways that will enable your nation to be strong and free and prosperous and at peace.

We live in a curious time. Modern revolutions are changing life for the better all over the world. Revolutions in information and communications and technology and production--all these things make democracy more likely. They make isolated, state-controlled economies even more dysfunctional. They make opportunities for those able to seize them more numerous and richer than ever before. And yet even in this modern world, the oldest of humanity's demons still plague us: the hatreds of people for one another based solely on their religion or their race, or their ethnic backgrounds, or sometimes simply on the piece of ground they happen to have been born upon.

In the midst of these conflicts between the forces of tomorrow and the forces of yesterday, I believe that the greatness of nations in the 21st century will be defined not by whether they can dictate to millions and millions of people within and beyond their borders, but instead by whether they can provide their citizens, without regard to their race or their gender, the opportunity to live up to the fullest of their ability, to take full advantage of the incredible things that are in the world of today and tomorrow.

Therefore, if we are to realize the greatness of Russia in the 21st century, I believe your nation must be strong democratically and economically. And in this increasingly interconnected world, you must be able to get along together and to get along with and trade with your neighbors close at hand and all around the globe. To do that, I think we will have to write an entirely new future for all of Europe--a future in which security is based not on old divisions, but on a new integration of nations by means of their shared commitment to democracy, to open economies, and to peaceful military cooperation.

I come here as a friend and supporter of the democratic changes going on in this nation. I hope that my nation and I can make a positive contribution in the spirit of

genuine and equal partnership not simply to these large changes but a positive contribution to the everyday lives of ordinary citizens of this great nation.

In the end, you will have to decide your own future. I do not presume to do that. Your future is still yours to make, yours to write, yours to shape. But I do come to say that my nation and its President want very much to be your equal partners and genuine friends.

If I were in your place listening to this speech, I might ask myself: Why is this guy saying this? What is on his mind? Why, really, is he eager to work with us? First of all, I identify with and even sympathize with the difficulty of the changes you face. I ran for President of the United States in 1992 because I was convinced that my nation had to make some very hard and tough changes in order to keep the dream that had inspired Americans for 200 years alive; in order to keep the hopes of our working people alive in a fierce and difficult and ever-changing new global economy. So I understand that.

I have devoted myself at home to making those changes, and I know the changes are difficult, even in an environment in which they are easier than the ones you face. So I come here in genuine sympathy and understanding.

Secondly, I am interested in supporting these changes because my nation stood for so long against a communist system, against its lack of freedom, against its excessive dictates, against its imperial impulses, and I could not bear to think that a majority of your people would ever be sorry to have given it up.

I come here because I believe that, together, we can write a new future for Europe and help the entire world to have a more peaceful and prosperous future. And, frankly, I come here because I believe your success is clearly in the best interests of the United States and of ordinary American citizens. For it is in our interest to be able to spend less on defense and to invest more in our own people--in the education and health and welfare and technology that will help carry us into a better time in the 21st century.

It is in our interest to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate with you in reducing threats to peace all around the world. It is in our interest to develop new trade ties and new customers. And each of these developments is more likely if we have a genuine, equal partnership with a strong and free Russia.

I believe how you define your future will be determined in large measure by how you decide to respond as a people to the three great challenges facing you. First, will you continue to work for a genuine market economy, or will you slow down or turn back? Second, will you continue to strengthen and deepen your commitment to democracy, or will you allow it to be restricted? And third, how will you define your role in the world as a great power? Will you define it in yesterday's terms or tomorrow's?

Let me begin with a challenge that clearly most affects the daily lives of the people of this nation--the economic one. I know that your transition to a market economy has been hard, painful, even emotionally disorienting to millions of people. But if the change seems costly, consider the price of standing still or trying to go back. A rigid, state-run economy simply does not work in the modern world.

To be sure, the system you had produced a very literate society, made some of you the best educated people in the world; developed a high-tech base and developed a strong industrial base tied quite closely to military might. But it is inadequate for a dramatically changing, highly competitive, increasingly flexible global economy in which all decisions simply cannot be made by a handful of people from the top down and in which no country is immune from the forces without.

The old system failed before. That is why you are in the present period of transition. If you attempted to reimpose it, it would fail you again. Let me make it clear that I do not suggest that markets solve all problems. They clearly do not solve all of society's problems. And indeed, they create some problems for every society--problems which must be frankly and forthrightly addressed by people who propose to have a strong community of common interest and common concern within their nation.

Yet it is clear that the surest way to prosperity in the world in which we live is the ability of people to produce and to sell high-quality goods and services both within and beyond their borders. There is no other clear path to prosperity.

Russia clearly has the capacity to do well in this kind of economy. You have enormous technological prowess, a highly educated citizenry that is known and respected around the world. You have immensely valuable natural resources. It is clear that you have the capacity to do well. You have a rapidly growing private sector. Already your nation has privatized nearly one-third of its industry. About 600 businesses a month are privatizing. Tens of millions of your people now own private property and are gaining, daily, experience in market economies. But there remain serious problems--the most profound, of course, is high rates of inflation.

Inflation at high rates destroys wages. It makes people feel that they can't keep up and that no matter how hard they work, they will not be rewarded for their labor. It hurts the ordinary working people, the very people that are the backbone of any society, who have to believe that the future can be better than the present. It undermines that very belief and makes it so difficult to develop and maintain a majority for the changes and the short-term sacrifices that have to be made. So inflation must be tamed. And as everyone knows, that also has its price, for inflation can only be tamed if the government is willing to print less money and, therefore, to spend less.

The next problem you have, it seems to me as an outside observer, is that even though you have a lot of privatization of companies, the systems on which every private economy depends are not as well-developed as they ought to be. There are not enough laws which clarify and protect contracts, which make tax systems clear, which provide, in other words, the framework within which all different kinds of transactions can occur. But that can be rather easily corrected.

There are other problems. I might just mention one other that President Yeltsin has talked about quite a lot lately and that has received a lot of attention all around the world since the last election here in Russia, and that is that your country must develop some sort of social safety net as all other successful market economies have to deal with the fact that some people are always going to have difficulties in a rapidly changing economy.

Most people can be restored to participation in the economy in times of prosperity, but in any market economy there will always be people who are dislocated. So you have to have training systems, refraining systems, systems to make sure that new businesses can always be started when old businesses are stopping, and systems to deal with people who simply are not competitive in difficult times.

Now, you must determine how to do this. No one can determine how to do it for you, or even whether to do it. But as your partner, I can tell you that the United States will do what we can to help to ease your hardships as you move forward on this path, and do what we can to help you make the decisions that you are prepared to make.

Let me say that I think this has been, in some ways, the most difficult period of all for you because you have taken a lot of risks, you have made a lot of changes already, and yet the changes have not been felt tangibly in the lives of most ordinary citizens in the country. And that is very difficult. But I can say that--just as an outside observer--it seems to me that it is likely that you will begin to see those changes.

Let me just give you a couple of examples. I asked Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to work on a program of economic cooperation in the fields of energy, the environment, and space. You have massive energy resources. If we can just get a few more things worked out, it will lead to big flows of money and investment, prosperity, and jobs into this nation.

We have reached an agreement, an unprecedented agreement for cooperation in space. Next month, Russian cosmonauts will serve on our space shuttle. We will share our resources, share our knowledge, share our training. And we will uncover things in space and in our venture which will have direct economic benefits to the people of Russia and the people of the United States. We both have different but very significant environmental problems which require high levels of skill and technology, but which generate enormous economic opportunity and large numbers of jobs. These things will come.

Secondly, last April when I met with President Yeltsin, I pledged $1.6 billion in United States aid. We have now committed all that aid, and 70% of the money has been spent. And I provided a map the other day to show that it had been spent all over the country in all kinds of different ways--mostly to help you develop a private economy. You will begin to see the benefits of that.

Just this week, the G-7 big industrial nations opened an office in this city, led by an American, for the purpose of making sure that we speed up the aid that was promised last summer, but which has been coming too slow. In September, the Congress of the United States approved another $2.5 billion aid package which can now begin to flow again to try to create jobs and opportunities, and to help slow the rate of inflation in this country. So I believe that specific benefits will begin to be felt, and people will come to see that there is a light at the end of this long tunnel.

Just today we announced the signing of a contract for the purchase of highly enriched uranium, a contract which will bring another $12 billion to this nation over the next several years. And we are working hard to get assistance to the nations which buy your energy because so many of them cannot afford to pay for it; to make sure that you can be paid in cash, promptly, as you sell your energy resources. All these things will begin to have an impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. That is something that, as someone who also has to run for election on a periodic basis, I am sensitive to.

In a democracy, if you put people in the driver's seat, they are going to drive. So it is best to give them a good road to drive on, and we are working with that.

The next great challenge Russia faces is the consolidation of democracy, and I want to say just a few words about that. Just like the market, democracy is no cure-all for all economic troubles or social strains. It is always a noisy and messy system. Our common ally in World War II, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said that democracy is the worst possible form of government, except for all of the others. Why did he say that? Because the debate is so wide, the opinions are so different and, sometimes, the differences are so sharp that you wonder if anything will ever be done.

But democracy still offers the best guarantee of good decision-making and the protection of individual and minority rights.

In a society like yours and mine, and throughout the multi-ethnic expanse of Europe, democracy offers the best hope of protecting diversity and of making diversity a source of strength, harnessing it to a world in which diversity is perhaps the overwhelming fact of life.

That is why I would argue to you that each of us, in order to protect your democracy and mine, has a personal responsibility to denounce intolerance and ethnic hatred and anti-Semitism, and anything that undermines the ability of everybody who lives within our national borders to be as productive as possible. Because, keep in mind, in the world in which we live, if you make any decision that deprives anybody who lives in your country of the right to live up to the fullest of their capacity, you have weakened your own ability to be free and prosperous and successful.

I might say it is also why the United States has cautioned other nations to respect the rights of ethnic Russians and other minorities within their borders. In both our nations, the success of democracy depends partly on a formal constitution and partly on regular elections and respecting those elections. But it also depends upon a full array of other free associations that give real life and texture to democracies: independent trade unions, newspapers, and a wide variety of civic and cultural associations.

If, like me, you are in a position of authority, you know that the freedom of speech can sometimes be a painful thing. Even in Roman times the great Emperor Marcus Aurelius said that the freedom of speech for someone in power was something to be endured, not enjoyed. But it is essential to democratic life that people feel free to say what they believe without fear of retaliation.

We are committed to fostering this kind of democratic ferment, and we are prepared to provide whatever kind of technical assistance we can to help it do well here. I say that because some people are concerned by the wide variety of views and the loud expression of those views we have seen in the Duma after the last election. That can be a healthy thing if, but only if, everybody else's views are respected and protected, too. For once democracy becomes an instrument of crushing the views of the minorities, those who disagree, those who don't have the muscle, then democracy itself soon disappears.

The third great challenge you face today is redefining the role of your great nation in this age: What does it mean to be a great power in this 21st century? How will you define it? How will you know Russia is a great nation? If someone asked you to describe it, looking to the future, how would you know? If someone asked you to describe it looking back in the early 1800s, you would say, we are a great nation because we beat Napoleon and ran him out of Russia. Right? Whether you agree or disagree with the communist system you can say you were a great nation in the sense that you loomed large at the height of the Soviet empire with the Warsaw Pact. Great does not always mean good, but at least it is large.

How will you define your greatness? It is a profoundly important question that you must answer. I think there are some different ways to describe it. Russia co-sponsored with the United States in the Middle East peace process. I think it was a very great thing when Israel and the PLO signed their accord on September 13, 1993. I think it is a good thing that we are continuing to work until a comprehensive settlement is reached in that troubled area

I think it was a great thing what we did today with the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia and the United States agreeing to get all the nuclear weapons out of Ukraine and to give fair compensation to that nation for the uranium they are giving up. It makes the world a safer place. It makes your nation and mine less vulnerable to nuclear terrorism or threats. It shows that we can move beyond the nuclear age entirely.

There are still questions, you know, in the world about how you will define your greatness. When I was at the NATO conference and afterward, there were nations that live between Western Europe and the border of Russia who still wonder what the future holds; nations who said, "Put me in NATO, now, just in case. Oh, I believe this President of Russia when he says he respects the territorial borders of other nations, but look at the history of Russia. Think of the national impulse. Draw another line across Europe while you have a chance."

There are people who are in the Baltic nations now who hear some of the debate in your politics, who hear the threats to take them over again. One of your political leaders even suggested you might like to have Alaska back. I don't think I can go along with that.

I say that because all those definitions, I would argue to you, are looking to yesterday. What in the world would you do with an army of occupation to the East? How would you pay for it? And what would it give you? How would you be more powerful than some small nation, one of the industrial tigers of Asia, for example, producing and selling goods and services at such a rate that their people's incomes are going up by 10% a year, and they are giving the people who live there the opportunity to do things that would have been undreamed of by their parents or grandparents? This is a very serious thing.

I believe that the greatness of a nation that lasts for centuries and centuries and centuries, as this nation has, is the ability to redefine itself in every age and time. The young people of Russia especially now have a chance to show that a great power can promote patriotism without expansionism; that a great power can promote national pride without national prejudice. That, I submit, is your challenge.

Today you face no threat from invasion. That was a legitimate concern of Russia for decades and decades, a legitimate reason to want a buffer zone around your borders in former times. It is not there now. I believe the measure of your greatness in the future will be whether Russia the big neighbor can be the good neighbor.

That is why it is so important that as your forces operate beyond your borders, they do so according to international law; why it is important that you continue your planned withdrawal from all the Baltic states; why it is important that your nation work with the United States and the rest of Europe to build the Partnership for Peace called for at the NATO conference this year, so that for the first time in the history of nation-states, we can have a Europe that is united by a shared commitment to democracy, freemarket economies, and mutual respect for borders for the first time in history, instead of the Europe that is divided.

I'm very proud and pleased that President Yeltsin decided to participate in the Partnership for Peace and work for an integrated Europe; that he signed the historic accord with President Kravchuk and with me today to eliminate over 1,800 nuclear warheads. These are hopeful signs, and I believe signs that indicate you can make a future that is different from the past.

Yours is a history of heroism and of persistent hope. The question now is, can we make the economic decisions, the political decisions that foster hope? You will have to decide these things. I'm amused when I come here in the spirit of genuine partnership and respect and some people say, well, the United States is trying to dictate our course. Nothing could be further from the truth. Believe me, my friends, it's all we can do to deal with our own problems. We don't have time to try to dictate your course. But the course you take will affect us and so we want you to make decisions that are best for you.

And I will close as I began: Will you define your future greatness in terms that were relevant to the past or terms that will shape the future? This is a crossroad, and a difficult one. But the younger generations of Russians will look back on this time with either gratitude or regret, depending on how those questions are answered--the economic, the political, the military questions.

I believe you will choose the future. After all, Russia did not get to this point by making all that many wrong decisions in the past. And every nation makes a few mistakes. There are few people anywhere that have more knowledge of history, both positive and negative, that have more reason to hope for the future than you do. I know the present is difficult, but if you make the right decisions, if you choose hope over fear, then the future will reward your courage and your vision. Thank you very much.

Departure for Trip to Europe: June 1, 1994; 1st Division Monument, Washington DC

Thank you so much, Colonel Nechey, for your introduction, for your comments, for your heroic devotion to your country. General Sullivan, General Talbott, Mr. Stanton.

We stand here today in the shadow of Winged Victory, the statute atop the monument to the 1st Infantry Division, the big red 1. The motto says it all, "No mission too difficult, no sacrifice too great, beauty first." The number "1" tells us not only your division's name, but the faith your country has placed in you for quite a long while now.

You have been first in battle for as long as you have existed. The first in Paris in World War I, the first on the Normandy beaches, the first Army division in Vietnam, the first to breach Iraqi defenses in Desert Storm.

In a few moments I will leave to begin this historic trip to Europe to commemorate the 50th anniversary of D-Day, and the other crucial battles of World War II.

I want to take a moment here briefly to thank the Department of Defense and the World War II Commemorative Committee for all their hard work in organizing these observances. In Europe we will be remembering the sacrifices of the generation that fought that great war. They have given us 50 years of freedom and strong nationhood, they have nurtured generations of young Americans, and given us a chance to work with the rest of the world to bring the Cold War to an end and to build toward the 21st century.

Before we leave to honor those who fought and died in the second world war, I think we should also say a word here on American soil about those who were here at home during that war and who, themselves, were also heroes. They made a contribution, whether they were women who built aircraft or rolled bandages, farmers who grew food for troops, men who in my state and many others worked as much as 16 hours in coal mines breathing coal dust and wrecking their bodies to keep our engine of production going, or children who collected scrap metal and rubber for our production. Worried about loved ones overseas, the homefront army of democracy kept the faith to build the wartime output that made D-Day and victory possible.

With the strong leadership of President Roosevelt, they awakened the slumbering genius and giant of American industry. In 1940 our Navy had no landing craft. By 1944 there were over 25,000. In 1940 the United States produced fewer than 500 airplanes a month. In 1941 FDR called for 4,000 a month and everyone thought he was a little crazy. But by D-Day Rosie the Riveter and her co-workers were rolling out planes at twice the pace Roosevelt asked for.

After the war that same generation turned their energies to building a new prosperity. They built schools and highways, and a sense of common purpose that put the country back on track, through the GI bill and housing initiatives, and other things that built the strongest middle class in all of human history.

On D-Day Americans gathered around the radio to join President Roosevelt in prayer. "Success," he said, "may not come with rushing speed. But we shall return again and again. And we know that by Thy grace and by the righteousness of our cause our sons will triumph."

Today we face new challenges at home and abroad. We know, too, as then, our successes will not come with rushing speed. But we must see our battles through to the end. As it was on D-Day, America will be at work next Monday, June 6th. For one

moment on that Monday you might pause and reflect, 50 years ago on this day, at this hour, the men and women of America saved democracy in Europe and changed the course of history for the world.

Wherever you are then, I hope you will have some time to look at the ceremonies. I hope you will think about how we can honor their legacy by carrying it on. That is the greatest honor of all.

One of the greatest privileges I have as President is to represent all of our country in honoring those who won World War II. This week let us all, from the President to every other citizen, do our best to say a simple thank you. Thank you for what you did. Thank you for the years you have given us. Thank you for the example you have set through sacrifice and courage and determination.

It is fitting that we should begin here, in the shadow of this great monument to the 1st Army Division. Let us all, all of us Americans, spend this next week in gratitude, in reflection, and with resolve.

God bless you all, and God bless America.

To the People of Rome: June 2, 1994; Piazza del Campidoglio, Rome, Italy

Mayor Rutelli, Mrs. Rutelli, Prime Minister Berlusconi and Mrs. Berlusconi; to the citizens of Rome. For Hillary and for me, this is an historic moment. At this site of ancient glory, we say to you on behalf of all of the people of the United States, greetings.

It is humbling to stand here. Romulus walked on this ground. Michelangelo designed this magnificent place. Today we celebrate something worthy of their greatness: the towering friendship between the United States and Italy. (Applause.)

Among the Americans I brought here with me today is a distinguished member of my Cabinet, the watchful guardian of our government's budget, and one of America's greatest sons of Italy --my friend, Leon Panetta. (Applause.

Well, I know that Washington is not Rome, that dollars are not lire. But when the budget is made, taxpayers everywhere need someone in the government like Leon Panetta who is paid to say, "basta" -- enough. (Laughter.)

Because Leon Panetta represents the best of the Italian-American partnership, and because he has such a good sense of humor, and because I am deeply in his debt as an American citizen, I have invited him to translate a part of my remarks here today. And when he is through, I want the citizens of Rome to give him a grade on how well he did. (Laughter and applause.) Mr. Panetta.

I am delighted to be in Rome, and I look forward to returning to Italy to visit Naples next month. There is so much of Italy in America -- art, music, philosophy and, most important, the strength and wisdom of so many of your sons and daughters. (Translated by Mr. Panetta.) (Applause.)

That bond of blood and spirit between our people is the heart and soul of our special relationship. America and Italy are more than mere partners. We are now -- and forever will be -- alleati, amici, una famiglia. Translated by Mr. Panetta.) (Applause.)

So, Leon, grazie. Thank you for your friendship and for teaching me a few words of Italian. (Laughter and applause.) Now, all of his ancestors will rest in peace. All of his ancestors will rest in peace.

I have come to Europe to recall its cruelest war, and to help secure its lasting peace. I am honored to begin my travels here in the Eternal City on the anniversary of your republic. A halfcentury ago, my nation joined a great crusade to restore liberty on this continent. But no moment was prouder than 50 years ago this week when we joined with you and others to return Rome to its people, and its people to freedom. (Applause.)

We are still told stories about that great day -- church bells ringing out the song of celebration; children climbing onto the tanks of the liberators. One brave member of the Italian Resistance said, "We cried with happiness, letting ourselves realize for the first time how scared we had been."

To honor, we must remember. Therefore, this week, as the sons and daughters of democracy, we must resolve never to forget such hallowed words as Anzio, Nettuno, Salerno, Normandy. These names speak of the sacrifices of our parents and the freedom of their children and grandchildren. (Applause.)

Now, for 50 years our people have stood together as Italy has worked a modern miracle. You have transformed Italy into one of the world's great economies. You have

helped to build NATO, history's greatest military alliance. And you have stood firm against Soviet expansion. (Applause.)

America is grateful for Italy's vital role in our partnership, in your hosting NATO air operations at Aviano and in the Adriatic, in your working to build the European Union, in your investment in the continent's new democracies.

The end of the Cold War is permitting all of us to do the work of renewal within our nations, to rebuild our economies, to rebuild our sense of community and common purpose, to reform our politics. We must do this. Cicero said, "Merely to possess virtue as you would art is not enough unless you apply it." I believe Italy will pursue its democratic destiny with virtue and grace. (Applause.) And as you pursue that destiny, America will stand with you and with Europe. (Applause.)

For 50 years we have stood together to help build peace and prosperity in Western Europe. Now let us expand those blessings across a broader Europe. (Applause.) So, to all the Italians here present, and to my fellow Americans here present -- (applause) -- to all the citizens of other nations in this hallowed place, let us hope that, 50 years from now, the world will say of us, the children of freedom and democracy were the builders of lasting peace.

Thank you and God bless you. (Applause.)

Thank you very much. Ambassador and Mrs. Bartholomew, Ambassador Flynn, Mr. Secretary, Hillary, ladies and gentlemen. We are delighted to be here. I want to join my wife in saying I'm sure that many of you will be elated when we leave tomorrow because we have caused you so much extra work.

But on behalf of all the American people, I want to thank those of you who work at our embassies in Rome and the Vatican, our mission to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, our consulates, out military personnel here, for all the work you do always, and especially to make this trip a success.

I'll be back in a month for the G-7 meeting in Naples. And the Prime Minister said that they had a little deficit problem here, too, and if kept coming back we'd have to start paying taxes and contribute in Italy -- (laughter) -- to the economic recovery here as well.

I do want to tell you that back at home things are turning around. The economy is picking up. Unemployment is down. We have plain evidence that our country is in a process of renewal. We're treating a lot of problems seriously we've ignored for a long time. Whether it's international trade or the education and training of our work force or the most serious approach on crime in a generation, the American people are beginning to come to grips with the challenges before us.

We still have a lot of work to do. We're trying our best. And I believe we're going to be very successful in our attempt to pass a comprehensive health reform bill this year. Our European friends find it difficult to believe that the United States is the only advanced nation in the world that can't find a way to provide health coverage to all of its people. So we're going to do that this year.

And we're going to deal with a lot of our other challenges. There is a sense of possibility of movement, that those of us in public service are part of a partnership to make America what it ought to be as we move into the 21st century.

But there is also an awareness at the end of the Cold War that we can no longer do what America has so often done in the past, which is to withdraw from the world and to make a clear distinction between our policies abroad and our policies at home. Now we know they are two sides of the same coin and they must be part and parcel of our commitment to renew our country and to move with confidence and success with our friends and neighbors into the 21st century.

I can say that I have been deeply moved by the reception we've received here in Italy. I agree with what Ambassador Flynn said about my meeting with the Holy Father yesterday. And I must say that all the conversations we've had with the officials of the Italian government have been very satisfactory from my point of view.

So I think we've got a lot of good things coming up. I look forward to coming back next month. I can't wait to come back, even if I do become a tax-paying, quasi-citizen of Italy. (Laughter.)

I thank you again for all your enormous effort and work. You have made us very, very proud of the United States by your efforts. Thank you so much. (Applause.)

To Veterans of the Air Campaign of World War II, Their Families, and Their Guests: June 4, 1994; U.S. Cemetery, Cambridge, United Kingdom

10:46 A.M.

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Major; Mr. MacLean; Chaplain; Secretary Bentsen: thank you for your fine remarks. To our British hosts and to all the distinguished Americans who are also here; members of the Congress; the administration; the Armed Forces: we have come here today, all of us, on a journey of remembrance.

For some, like Secretary Bentsen, it was a journey to retrace time, to go back 50 summers and more when they took to airfields like these. For others, it is a journey to honor those who fought and those who died for the world in which we came of age.

In this moment, all of us are joined in a sense of pride, in a sense of indebtedness, a sense of wonder and a sense of determination to carry on that work and never forget.

On these ancient grounds, 3,812 Americans are buried, Airmen, Soldiers and Sailors. More than 5,000 others are remembered on the Wall of the Missing. The names of some we honor echo still in our nation's memory. Names like Joseph Kennedy, Jr., the brother of our late president, a young man for whom a distinguished political career was predicted, who gave his life for our country. Or Glen Miller, whose wonderful Moonlight Serenade soothed a savage world and still makes us tap our feet.

In death, all these people on the Wall and buried behind us were equal. They came from every state in the Union. They were of many races and religions. They had names like Carillo, Kaufman and Wood. They were, all of them, Americans. They fought to defeat a great evil which threatened to destroy our very way of life -- what Winston Churchill called "the great principles of freedom and the rights of man," which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world.

For long months Britain bravely carried that fight on alone. In the Battle of Britain night after frightful night the people of this beseiged island withstood this attack of Nazi bombers. It was their finest hour. Amid the horror the British looked west for help. Then the Yanks came, deepening one of history's profoundest bonds.

Overnight, it seems, tens of thousands of GIs filled the streets and camps across southern England. All these many years later we find the memories of many of them very vivid -- smiling GIs tossing packs of spearmint gum to British schoolboys, new faces and funny accents at corner pubs, Lindy hops in London, kids from Milwaukee invited in for high tea, all in uniforms filling the pews at British churches.

America gave to England an infusion of arms and men and materiel. The British gave our troops the feeling that they were not so far from home after all. The British gave us inspiration; the Americans gave in return hope.

At every level Yanks and Brits worked together like family. American intelligence services built on Britain's brilliant successes which were pure chronicles in breaking the German code. General Eisenhower chose British marshals to be his deputies. Of course, Montgomery and Ramsay and Tedder. Roosevelt and Churchill, even as they led the assault on tyranny and rallied their own people to support the crusade, encouraged each other with personal notes, all shared a sense of friendship that sustained them through the darkest moments of the war.

All shared a faith that our people, nurtured on freedom, would rise to the call of history. Nowhere was our bond more important than in the air war launched from the

green fields like this one. The Royal Air Force and the Army Air Corps joined in countless sorties to cripple the Luftwaffen, to decimate the Nazi war machine, to soften the Atlantic Wall. One British citizen remembered, for a thousand days, the sky was never still.

It was some of the most dangerous work of the war and the pales of valor still amaze us all. Pilots going down with burning flames to give all the rest of the crew just a few more seconds to get out. Of the two crew members who shared the only parachute on board as they jumped together from their burning plane over England. The Marauders, Liberators, Mustangs and Flying Fortresses, the Halifaxes and Mosquitoes. They were all sturdy. But as one American remembered, the flack sometimes seemed so thick you could walk on it. The wild blue yonder above Europe could quickly turn cold and grey and lethal.

In just the two months before D-Day, the Allied forces lost over 2,000 planes and over 12,000 men. Because of their sacrifice, by June 6th of 1944, the Allies owned the air. Under the shield of that air supremacy, our ships crossed the channels, our men crossed the beaches.

A few days after the Normandy landing, General Eisenhower stood on the beaches of France with his young son, John, recently a graduate of West Point, and told him: "If I didn't have the air supremacy, I wouldn't be here." After D- Day, the Air Corps continued to fly toward freedom's horizon, until the entire continent was retained, and a world was set free.

The victory of the generation we honor today came at a high cost. It took many lives and much perseverance. After D-Day, it took freedom another year to reach the Elbas (ph.); it took another 44 years to reach Warsaw and Prague and East Berlin. And now it has reached Kiev and Moscow and even beyond. The mission of this time is to secure and expand its reach further.

The Airmen who flew these skies had a ritual that Secretary Bentsen mentioned -- for signalling to their comrades on the ground at the end of a mission. As they were coming in for landing, if they fired off a red flare it meant that there were casualties aboard. And if they fired off a green flare, it meant some lucky pilot had just completed his last mission before shipping out.

Well, the generation that won the Second World War completed their mission, whether they walk among us or lie among us today. And after looking down in sorrow at those who paid the ultimate price, let us lift our eyes to the skies in which they flew, the ones they once commanded. And let us send to them a signal, a signal of our own, a signal that we do remember, that we do honor, and that we shall always carry on the work of these knights borne on wings. May God bless them and all our peoples. (Applause.)

Remarks Upon Arrival: June 4, 1994; RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom

9:48 A.M.

Mr. Prime Minister, Hillary and I are delighted to be here. I remember well the first time I arrived in the United Kingdom. I am deeply honored to be here today representing my nation.

Fifty years ago, our two nations joined forces on the beaches of Normandy to turn back the Nazi armies that had overrun Europe. This week I have come across the Atlantic to commemorate D-Day and the many other battles of the Second World War and to honor the sacrifices borne by the war generation in all the nations.

Freedom continues to require our sacrifice and persistence. And I would like to say, on behalf of all the American people, how very sorry we are and how we offer our condolences to the loved ones of those who died in the tragic RAF helicopter accident on Thursday.

Freedom continues to require effort. When he visited the United States after World War II, Winston Churchill spoke of our two nations' role in forging the post- war world. He urged the United States and Britain to walk together in majesty and peace. For he said, "It is in the years of peace that wars are prevented and that those foundations are laid upon which the noble structures of the future can be built."

I look forward to working with the Prime Minister and the British people as we work together to meet those challenges. The Prime Minister has already mentioned the many things that we will be discussing today. I am glad to be back in Great Britain, glad to be honoring the sacrifices and the triumphs of the World War II generation, glad to be about the work of honoring what they have done for us by trying to preserve the peace and the future.

Thank you very much.

Radio Address by the President to the Nation: June 4, 1994; Hartwell House, Aylesbury, England

3:06 P.M.

Good morning. Today I am speaking to you from Aylesbury, England, just outside of London. Hillary and I are in the middle of a journey of remembrance and discovery as we honor the sacrifices of the remarkable Americans who helped to liberate Europe in World War II.

The generation of heroes who defeated fascism left a safer world for the generations after them, and we are grateful. Our country led the forces of freedom during the world war, and our economy led the world in the decades that followed.

This morning I want to talk about some very good news that shows how much we can still accomplish together when we as a nation act decisively.

In 1993, I took office determined to renew our economy so that we could pass on prosperity and opportunity to our own children. Remember, our economy had suffered from a decade or more of deficits and drift, slow growth or no growth.

Then we made some tough choices -- to bring down the deficit, to provide more incentives to invest, and to invest more in the education and training of our people on new technologies, and on helping to convert from a defense to a domestic economy.

Well, now we're beginning to see the results. Our economy is back. It's expanding steadily. Most important, it's creating jobs -- millions of good-paying jobs. Yesterday, the government released new statistics showing the success of our efforts. Since this administration took office in January 1993, the United States has created over 3 million jobs, most of them good paying jobs, nearly all of them in the private sector.

We're creating new private sector jobs at seven times the rate that occurred during the previous administration. During the 1992 campaign we said we'd create 8 million jobs in four years. We're running way ahead of schedule now. America is on the way to creating 2 million more in '94.

But mere statistics tend to be abstract. Everywhere all around us, we see signs of steady economic renewal. The Big Three in Detroit are back, adding shifts, and once again making the best cars in the world. New businesses are being incorporated at a record pace. Consumer confidence is up. Inflation is in check. Business failures are down. And core economic conditions, to quote the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, are "the best they've been in two decades."

As I meet with our allies and visit historic places in Europe, I'm constantly reminded our economy is now the strongest in the world. Let's remember how this came about. These 3 million new jobs are the product of the ingenuity, the entrepreneurial energy and the willingness to change of the American people. They are the result of an economic plan that has seen to it that government has been shrinking in the first quarter of this year, while the private sector grows for the first time in a decade.

We've cut the deficit by $500 billion. By 1995, if we stick to this plan, the deficit will have declined for three years in a row for the first time since Harry Truman was in the White House. In fact, our deficit is now smaller as a fraction of our national income than all but one of our major trading partners.

We've made our cuts fairly. We've sought cuts in more than 300 programs in each of the first two years of the budget. We've sought to eliminate over a hundred

government programs. Only the wealthiest 1.2 percent of our people were asked to pay higher income taxes. Working families didn't pay a cent more in income taxes because of higher rates. In fact, for every person who had taxes increase, at least 10 working families had their taxes cut. We are protecting the middle class.

Now we have an obligation to keep going to make sure that every citizen benefits from a changing world. Too many Americans haven't yet been touched by the economic renewal. This year we want to build on our success by taking concrete steps to keep the economy growing and to give our people the tools they need to succeed.

A good start is to increase our exports to other countries. Trade means jobs. Thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement we may soon sell more to Mexico than we do to Japan. This year I'll present to Congress a worldwide trade agreement that will create hundreds of thousands of new jobs and billions of dollars of exports for America. That's good for America. And that's why Congress must and will ratify the World Trade Agreement soon.

When we create these good export jobs, we must make sure our people are ready to fill them. These days, what you earn depends on what you learn. Skills and knowledge are the most important asset of all. That's why we're working on a lifetime learning system to train every citizen from the first day of preschool to the last day before retirement.

Now we have to fix our broken unemployment system to replace it with a reemployment system so that when someone loses a job, he or she can find a good new job as quickly as possible. I am fighting for Congress to pass this reemployment act this year, too.

Finally, our deficit will grow and our expansion will sputter if we don't reform our health care system. Health care costs are going up more and more in more than any other part of our budget, not for new health care, but to pay more for the same health care. As you know, I am fighting hard to guarantee health care for every American in a way that can never be taken away, but that will bring costs in line with inflation.

So there's still a lot more to do. But let's be proud of what Americans have done. America is going back to work. Unemployment is down. Jobs are up. Inflation is down. Growth and new business is up. Our economy is clearly leading the world. We've made this world better by making the tough choices. That's what we've got to keep doing.

Thanks for listening.

Sunrise Ceremony Commemorating Those Lost at Sea in the Normandy Invasion: June 6, 1994; Aboard the USS George Washington

7:21 A.M.

Thank you very much, Mr. Rockwell, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, Captain Sprigg, Chaplains, distinguished leaders of the Congress, the Cabinet, members of the Armed Services, veterans, family and friends. This new and historically accurate dawn reminds us of that dawn 50 years ago that brought a new era, when thousands of warships assembled to begin Europe's liberation. Allied naval guns unleashed a storm of fire on Normandy's beaches as the sky brightened to a cold grey. Legions of young men packed into landing crafts set out to take those beaches.

After more than a year of brilliant planning by General Eisenhower and his Allied staff and those who were here even before, and one agonizing weather-caused delay, D-Day arrived at last, exactly 50 years ago this day. We gather in the calm after sunrise today to remember that fateful morning, the pivot point of the war, perhaps the pivot point of the 20th century.

But we should never forget that at this hour on June 6th, 1944, victory seemed far from certain. The weather was menacing, the seas were churning, the enemy was dug in. Though the plans had been prepared in great detail, chaos of battle can overwhelm the best-laid plans, and for some of our units the plans went awry. Indeed, General Eisenhower had already drafted a statement in case the operation did not succeed.

As H-Hour approached, everyone in the invasion was forced to prepare in his own way. We know now from the records then that some soldiers and sailors wrote to their wives back home, or to children they had never held. Some played dice, hoping for a string of good luck. Others tried to read, and many simply prayed. One Jewish officer, Captain Irving Gray, asked the chaplain on his landing craft to lead a prayer: "To the God in whom we all believe, whether Protestant or Catholic or Jew that our mission might be accomplished and that we may be brought safely home again."

Back home, as news of the invasion reached our fellow Americans, Americans spoke softly to God. In one Brooklyn shipyard, welders knelt down on the decks of their liberty ship and said together The Lord's Prayer. The soldiers who landed on Utah and Omaha needed those prayers, for they entered a scene of terrible carnage. Thousands would never return. For those who did, it was faith in their Maker's mercy and their own ability that helped to carry the day. It was also raw courage and love of freedom and country.

One of the most stirring tales of D-Day is that to which the Secretary of the Navy has already referred -- the tale of the USS Corry. Ripped by mines while blasting enemy positions on Utah Beach, the Corry began to go under. But one man stayed aboard. He climbed the stern, removed the flag, and swam and scrambled to the main mast. There, he ran up the flag. And as he swam off, our flag opened into the breeze. In the Corry's destruction, there was no defeat. Today, the wreckage of that ship lies directly beneath us -- an unseen monument to those who helped to win this great war. Thirteen of the Corry's crew rest there as well, and these waters are forever sanctified by their sacrifice.

Fifty years ago, General Eisenhower concluded his order of the day with these words: "Let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking." As we begin this new day of remembrance, let us also ask God's blessing:

for all those who died for freedom 50 years ago, and for the Americans who carry on their noble work today. May God bless them, and may God bless America. (Applause.)

Pointe du Hoc: June 6, 1994; Normandy, France

8:45 A.M.

General Downing, Mr. Hathaway, honored leaders of our military, distinguished veterans and members of the Armed Services, family and friends, my fellow Americans: We stand on sacred soil. Fifty years ago at this place a miracle of liberation began. On that morning, democracy's forces landed to end the enslavement of Europe.

Around 7:00 a.m., Lt. Colonel James Earl Rudder, 2nd Ranger Battalion, United States Army, led 224 men onto the beaches below and up these unforgiving cliffs. Bullets and grenades came down upon them, but by a few minutes after 7:00 a.m., here, exactly here, the first Ranger stood.

Today, let us ask those American heroes to stand again. (Applause.)

Corporal Ken Bargmann, who sits here to my right, was one of them. He had just celebrated his 20th birthday out in the Channel. A young man like all the rest of them, cold and wet, far from home, preparing for the challenge of his life. Ken Bargmann and the other Rangers of Pointe du Hoc and all the other Americans, British, Canadian and free French who landed, were the tip of a spear the free world had spent sharpening; a spear they began on this morning in 1944 to plunge into the heart of the Nazi empire. Most of them were new to war, but all were armed with the ingenuity of free citizens and the confidence that they fought for a good cause under the gaze of a loving God.

The fortunate ones would go home, changed forever. Thousands would never return. And today we mourn their loss. But on that gray dawn, millions -- literally millions -- of people on this continent awaited their arrival. Young Anne Frank wrote in her diary these words: "It's no exaggeration to say that all Amsterdam, all Holland, yes, the whole west coast of Europe talks about the invasion day and night; debates about it, makes bets about it and hopes. I have the feeling friends are approaching."

The young men who came, fought for the very survival of democracy. Just four years earlier, some thought democracy's day had passed. Hitler was rolling across Europe. In America, factories worked at only half capacity. Our people were badly divided over what to do. The future seemed to belong to the dictators. They sneered at democracy -- its mingling of races and religions; its tolerance of dissent. They were sure we didn't have what it took.

Well, they didn't know James Rudder or Ken Bargmann, or the other men of D-Day. They didn't understand what happens when the free unite behind a great and worthy cause. For human miracles begin with personal choices -- millions of them gathered together as one, like the stars of a majestic galaxy. Here at this place, in Britain, in North America, and among resistance fighters in France and across Europe, all those numberless choices came together. The choices of lion-hearted leaders to rally their people. The choices of people to mobilize for freedom's fight. The choices of their soldiers to carry on that fight into a world worn weary by devastation and despair.

Every person in the democracies pitched in. Every shipbuilder who built a landing craft. Every woman who worked in a factory. Every farmer who grew food for the troops. Every miner who carved coal out of a cavern. Every child who tended a victory garden. All of them did their part. All produced things with their hands and their hearts that went into this battle. And on D-Day, all across the free world, the peoples of democracy prayed that they had done their job right. Well, they had done their job right.

And, here, you, the Army Rangers, did yours. Your mission was to scale these cliffs and destroy the howitzers at the top that threatened every Allied soldier and ship within miles. You fired grappling hooks onto the cliff tops. You waded to shore and you began to climb -- up on ropes slick with sea and sand -- up, as the Germans shot down and tried to cut your lines. Up, sometimes holding to the cliffs with nothing but the knives you had and your own bare hands.

As the battle raged at Juno, Sword and Gold, on Omaha and Utah, you took devastating casualties. But you also took control of these commanding heights. Around 9:00 a.m., two Rangers discovered the big guns hidden inland and disabled them with heat grenades. At that moment, you became the first Americans on D-Day to complete your mission.

We look at this terrain and we marvel at your fight. We look around us and we see what you were fighting for. For, here are the daughters of Colonel Rudder. Here are the son and grandson of Corporal Bargmann. Here are the faces for whom you risked your lives. Here are the generations for whom you won a war. We are the children of your sacrifice. We are the sons and daughters you saved from tyranny's reach. We grew up behind the shield of the strong alliances you forged in blood upon these beaches, on the shores of the Pacific, and in the skies above. We flourished in the nation you came home to build.

The most difficult days of your lives bought us 50 years of freedom. You did you job; now we must do ours. Let us begin by teaching our young people about the villainy that started this war and the valor that ended it. Let us carry on the work you began here. The sparks of freedom you struck on these beaches were never extinguished, even in the darkest days behind the Iron Curtain. Five years ago the miracle of liberation was repeated as the rotting timbers of communism came tumbling down.

Now we stand at the start of a new day. The Soviet Empire is gone. So many people who fought as our partners in this war -- the Russians, the Poles, and others -- now stand again as our partners in peace and democracy. Our work is far from done. Still there are cliffs to scale. We must work to contain the world's most deadly weapons, to expand the reach of democracy. We must keep ready arms and strong alliances. We must have strong families and cohesive societies and educated citizens and vibrant, open, economies that promote cooperation, not conflict.

And if we should ever falter, we need only remember you at his spot 50 years ago, and you, again, at this spot today. The flame of your youth became freedom's lamp, and we see it s light reflected in your faces still, and in the faces of your children and grandchildren.

We commit ourselves, as you did, to keep that lamp burning for those who will follow. You completed your mission here. But the mission of freedom goes on; the battle continues. The "longest day" is not yet over.

God bless you, and God bless America. (Applause.)

Utah Beach Ceremony: June 6, 1994; Normandy, France

11:12 A.M.

Thank you. Thank you very much, General Talbott, Secretary Perry, Secretary Brown. Let me begin by asking all the veterans here present, their families, their friends, the people from France who have been wonderful hosts to us, to acknowledge those who worked so hard to make these D-Day ceremonies a great success -- General Joulwan, the SAC here, and his European command, 2,700 members of Armed Forces who worked to put these events together; and the Secretary of the Army's World War II commemorative committee, General Mick Kicklighter and all of his committee. Let's give them a big hand; they have done a wonderful job. (Applause.)

My fellow Americans, we have gathered to remember those who stormed this beach for freedom who never came home. We pay tribute to what a whole generation of heroes won here. But let us also recall what was lost here. We must never forget that thousands of people gave everything they were, or what they might have become, so that freedom might live. (Applause.)

The loss along this coastline numbs us still. In one U.S. company alone, 197 of 205 men were slaughtered in just 10 minutes. Hundreds of young men died before they could struggle 20 feet into the red-tinged tide. Thousands upon thousands of American, Canadian and British troops were killed or wounded on one brutal day.

But in the face of that mayhem emerged the confident clarity borne of relentless training and the guiding light of a just cause. Here at Utah Beach, with the Army's 4th Division in the lead, the Allies unleashed their democratic fury on the Nazi armies.

So many of them landed in the wrong place, they found their way. When one commanding officer, Russell "Red" Reeder, discovered the error, he said, "It doesn't matter. We know where to go."

Here to help point the way were the fighters of the French resistance. We must never forget how much those who lived under the Nazi fist did to make D-Day possible. For the French, D-Day was the 1,453rd day of their occupation. (Applause.) Throughout all those terrible days, people along this coast kept faith. Whether gathering intelligence, carving out escape routes for Allied soldiers or destroying enemy supply lines, they, too, kept freedom's flame alive with a terrible price.

Thousands were executed. Thousands more died in concentration camps. Oh, the loved ones of all who died, no matter what their nationality, they all feel a loss that cannot be captured in these statistics. Only one number matters -- the husband who can never be replaced, the best friend who never came home, the father who never played with his child again.

One of those fathers who died on D-Day had written a letter home to his wife and their daughter barely a month before the invasion. He said, "I sincerely pray that if you fail to hear from me for a while you will recall the words of the Gospel: 'A little while and you shall not see me, and again a little while, and you shall see me.' But in your thoughts I shall always be, and you in mine." He was right. They must always be in our thoughts. To honor them, we must remember. (Applause.)

The people of this coast understand. Just beyond this beach is the town of St. Mere Eglise. There, brave American paratroopers floated into a tragic ambush on D-Day, and there the survivors rallied to complete their mission. The Mayor's wife, Simone

Renaud, wrote the families of the Americans who had fought and died to free her village. And she kept on writing them every week for the rest of her life until she died just six years ago. Her son, Henri-Jean Renaud carries on her vigil now. And he has vowed never to forget, saying, "I will dedicate myself to the memory of their sacrifice for as long as I live."

We must do no less. We must carry on the work of those who did not return and those who did. We must turn the pain of loss into the power of redemption so that 50 or 100 or 1,000 years from now, those who bought our liberty with their lives will never be forgotten.

To those of you who have survived and come back to this hallowed ground, let me say that the rest of us know that the most difficult days of your life brought us 50 years of freedom. Thank you, and God bless you all. (Applause.)

5:58 P.M.

Mr. Dawson, you did your men proud today. General Shalikashvili, Mr. Cronkite, Chaplain, distinguished leaders of our government, members of Congress, members of the Armed Services, our hosts from France, and, most of all, our veterans, their families and their friends:

In these last days of ceremonies, we have heard wonderful words of tribute. Now we come to this hallowed place that speaks, more than anything else, in silence. Here on this quiet plateau, on this small piece of American soil, we honor those who gave their lives for us 50 crowded years ago.

Today, the beaches of Normandy are calm. If you walk these shores on a summer's day, all you might hear is the laughter of children playing on the sand, or the cry of seagulls overhead, or perhaps the ringing of a distant church bell -- the simple sounds of freedom barely breaking the silence -- peaceful silence, ordinary silence.

But June 6th, 1944 was the least ordinary day of the 20th century. On that chilled dawn, these beaches echoed with the sounds of staccato gunfire, the roar of aircraft, the thunder of bombardment. And through the wind and the waves came the soldiers, out of their landing craft and into the water, away from their youth and toward a savage place many of them would sadly never leave.

They had come to free a continent -- the Americans, the British, the Canadians, the Poles, the French Resistance, the Norwegians and others -- they had all come to stop one of the greatest forces of evil the world has ever known.

As news of the invasion broke back home in America, people held their breath. In Boston, commuters stood reading the news on the electric sign at South Station. In New York, the Statue of Liberty, its torch blacked out since Pearl Harbor, was lit at sunset for 15 minutes.

And in Newcastle, Pennsylvania, a young mother named Pauline Elliot wrote to her husband, Frank, a corporal in the Army, "D-Day has arrived. The first thought of all of us was a prayer."

Below us are the beaches where Corporal Elliot's batallion and so many other Americans landed -- Omaha and Utah, proud names from America's heartland, part of the biggest gamble of the war, the greatest crusade; yes, the "longest day."

During those first hours on bloody Omaha nothing seemed to go right. Landing craft were ripped apart by mines and shells. Tanks sent to protect them had sunk, drowning their crews. Enemy fire raked the invaders as the stepped into chesthigh water and waded past the floating bodies of their comrades. And as the stunned survivors of the first wave huddled behind a seawall, it seemed the invasion might fail.

Hitler and his followers had bet on it. They were sure the Allied soldiers were soft, weakened by liberty and leisure, by the mingling of races and religion. They were sure their totalitarian youth had more discipline and zeal.

But then, something happened. Although many of the American troops found themselves without officers on unfamiliar ground, next to soldiers they didn't know, one by one, they got up. They inched forward and together in groups of threes and fives and tens, the sons of democracy improvised and mounted their own attacks. At that exact moment on these beaches, the forces of freedom turned the tide of the 20th century.

These soldiers knew that staying put meant certain death. But they were also driven by the voice of free will and responsibility, nurtured in Sunday schools, town halls and sandlot ball games. The voice that told them to stand up and move forward, saying, "You can do it. And if you don't, no one else will." And as Captain Joe Dawson led his company up this bluff, and as others followed his lead, they secured a foothold for freedom.

Today, many of them are here among us. Oh, they may walk with a little less spring in their step and their ranks are growing thinner, but let us never forget -- when they were young, these men saved the world. (Applause.)

And so let us now ask them, all the veterans of the Normandy campaign, to stand if they can and be recognized. (Applause.)

The freedom they fought for was no abstract concept, it was the stuff of their daily lives. Listen to what Frank Elliot had written to his wife from the embarkation point in England: "I miss hamburgers a la Coney Island; American beer a la Duquesne; American shows a la Penn Theater; and American girls a la you."

Pauline Elliot wrote back on June 6th, as she and their one-year old daughter listened on the radio, "Little Deronda is the only one not affected by D-Day news. I hope and pray she will never remember any of this, but only the happiness of the hours that will follow her Daddy's homecoming step on the porch."

Well, millions of our GIs did return home from that war to build up our nations and enjoy life's sweet pleasures. But on this field, there are 9,386 who did not -- 33 pairs of brothers; a father and his son; 11 men from tiny Bedford, Virginia; and Corporal Frank Elliot, killed near these bluffs by a German shell on D-Day.

They were the fathers we never knew, the uncles we never met, the friends who never returned, the heroes we can never repay. They gave us our world. And those simple sounds of freedom we hear today are their voices speaking to us across the years.

At this place, let us honor all the Americans who lost their lives in World War II. Let us remember, as well, that over 40 million human beings from every side perished -- soldiers on the field of battle, Jews in the ghettos and death camps, civilians ravaged by shell fire and famine. May God give rest to all their souls.

Fifty years later, what a different world we live in. Germany, Japan and Italy, liberated by our victory, now stand among our closest allies and the staunchest defenders of freedom. Russia, decimated during the war and frozen afterward in communism and Cold War, has been reborn in democracy. And as freedom rings from Prague to Kiev, the liberation of this continent is nearly complete.

Now the question falls to our generation: How will we build upon the sacrifice of D-Day's heroes? Like the soldiers of Omaha Beach, we cannot stand still. We cannot stay safe by doing so. Avoiding today's problems would be our own generation's appeasements. For just as freedom has a price, it also has a purpose, and it's name is progress. Today our mission is to expand freedom's reach forward; to test the full potential of each of our own citizens; to strengthen our families, our faith and our communities; to fight indifference and intolerance; to keep our nation strong; and to light the lives of those still dwelling in the darkness of undemocratic rule. Our parents did that and more; we must do nothing less. They struggled in war so that we might strive in peace.

We know that progress is not inevitable. But neither was victory upon these beaches. Now, as then, the inner voice tells us to stand up and move forward. Now, as then, free people must choose.

Fifty years ago, the first Allied soldiers to land here in Normandy came not from the sea, but from the sky. They were called Pathfinders, the first paratroopers to make the jump. Deep in the darkness they decended upon these fields to light beacons for the airborne assaults that would soon follow. Now, near the dawn of a n ew century, the job of lighting those beacons falls to our hands.

To you who brought us here, I promise, we will be the new pathfinders, for we are the children of your sacrifice.

Thank you and God bless you all. (Applause.)

Address to the National Assembly: June 7, 1994; National Assembly, Paris, France

Mr. President, distinguished deputies, representatives of the people of France.

It is a high honor for me to be invited here, along with my wife and our distinguished Ambassador Pamela Harriman, to share with you this occasion. There is between our two peoples a special kinship. After all, our two republics were born within a few years of each other. Overthrowing the rule of kings, we enthroned in their places common ideals, equality, liberty, community, the rights of man.

For two centuries, our nations have given generously to each other. France gave to our founders the ideas of Montesque and Rousseau. And then Lafayette and Rochambeau helped to forge those ideas into the reality of our own independence. For just as we helped to liberate your country in 1944, you helped to liberate our country two full centuries ago.

Your art and your culture have inspired countless Americans for that entire time, from Benjamin Franklin to John and Jacqueline Kennedy. In turn, we lent to you the revolutionary genius of Thomas Jefferson, the firey spirit of Thomas Paine, and the lives of so many of our young men when Europe's liberty was most endangered.

This week you have given us yet another great gift in the wonderful commemorations of the Allied landings at Normandy. I compliment President Mitterrand and all the French people for your very generous hospitality. I thank especially the thousands of French families who have opened their homes to our veterans.

Yesterday's sights will stay with me for the rest of my life -- the imposing cliffs of Pointe du Hoc, the parade of our Allied forces on Utah Beach, the deadly bluffs at bloody Omaha, the rows upon rows of gravestones at our cemetery at Colleville.

D-Day was the pivot point of the 20th century. It began Europe's liberation. In ways great and small, the Allied victory proved how democracy's faith in the individual saved democracy itself. From the daring of the French Resistance to the inventiveness of the soldiers on Omaha Beach, it proved what free nations can accomplish when they unite behind a great and noble cause.

The remarkable unity among the Allies during World War II -- let us face it -- reflected the life-or-death threat facing freedom. Democracies of free and often unruly people are more likely to rally in the face of that kind of danger. But our challenge now is to unite our people around the opportunities of peace as those who went before us united against the dangers of war.

Once in this century, as your President so eloquently expressed, following World War I, we failed to meet that imperative. After the Armistice, many Americans believed our foreign threats were gone. America increasingly withdrew from the world, opening the way for high tariffs, for trade wars, for the rise to fascism and the return of global war in less than 20 years.

After World War II, America, France, and the other democracies did better. Led by visionary statesmen like Truman and Marshall, De Gaulle, Monet and others. We reached out to rebuild our allies and our former enemies -- Germany, Italy and Japan—and to confront the threat of Soviet expansion and nuclear power. Together, we founded NATO, we launched the Marshall Plan, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and other engines of economic development. And in one of history's great acts of reconciliation, France reached out to forge the Franco-German partnership, the foundation of unity and stability in modern Western Europe.

Indeed, the members of the European Union have performed an act of political alchemy, a magical act that turned rubble into renewal, suspicion into security, enemies into allies.

Now we have arrived at this century's third moment of decision. The Cold War is over. Prague, Warsaw, Kiev, Riga, Moscow and many others stand as democratic capitals, with leaders elected by the people. We are reducing nuclear stockpile, and America and Russia no longer aim their nuclear missiles at each other.

Yet, once again, our work is far from finished. To secure this peace, we must set our sites on a strategic star. Here, where America and our allies fought so hard to save the world, let that star for both of us -- for Americans and for Europeans alike -- be the integration and strengthening of a broader Europe. It is a mighty challenge. It will require resources. It will take years, even decades. It will require us to do what is very difficult for democracies -- to unite our people when they do not feel themselves in imminent peril to confront more distant threats and to seize challenging and exciting opportunities.

Yet, the hallowed gravestones we honored yesterday speak to us clearly. They define the price of failure in peacetime. They affirm the need for action now.

We can already see the grim alternative. Militant nationalism is on the rise, transforming the healthy pride of nations, tribes, religious and ethnic groups into cancerous prejudice, eating away at states and leaving their people addicted to the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery, and blaming their problems on others when they should be dedicated to the hard work of finding real answers to those problems in reconciliation, in power-sharing, in sustainable development.

We see the signs of this disease from the purposeful slaughter in Bosnia to the random violence of skinheads in all our nations. We see it in the incendiary misuses of history, and in the anti- Semitism and irredentism of some former communist states. And beyond Europe, we see the dark future of these trends in mass slaughter, unbridled terrorism, devastating poverty and total environmental and social disintegration.

Our transatlantic alliance clearly stands at a critical point. We must build the bonds among nations necessary for this time, just as we did after World War II. But we must do so at a time when our safety is not directly threatened, just as after World War I.

The question for this generation of leaders is whether we have the will, the vision and, yes, the patience to do it. Let me state clearly where the United States stands. America will remain engaged in Europe. The entire transatlantic alliance benefits when we, Europe and America, are both strong and engaged. America wishes a strong Europe, and Europe should wish a strong America, working together.

To ensure that our own country remains a strong partner, we are working hard at home to create a new spirit of American renewals, to reduce our budget deficits, to revive our economy, to expand trade, to make our streets safer from crime, to restore the pillars of our American strength -- work and family, and community, and to maintain our defense presence in Europe.

We also want Europe to be strong. That is why America supports Europe's own steps so far toward greater unity -- the European Union, the Western European Union, and the development of a European defense identity. We now must pursue a shared strategy -- to secure the peace of a broader Europe and its prosperity. That strategy depends upon integrating the entire continent through three sets of bonds. First, security cooperation; second, market economics; and third, democracy.

To start, we must remain strong and safe in an era that still has many dangers. To do so we must adapt our security institutions to meet new imperatives. America has reduced the size of its military presence in Europe, but we will maintain a strong force here.

The EU, the WEU, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other organizations must all play a larger role. I was pleased that NATO recently approved an American proposal to allow its assets to be used by the WEU. To foster greater security cooperation all across Europe, we also need to adapt NATO to this new era.

At the NATO Summit in January, we agreed to create the Partnership for Peace in order to foster security cooperation among NATO allies and the other states of Europe -- both former Warsaw Pact countries, states of the former Soviet Union and states not involved in NATO for other reasons. And just six months later, this Partnership for Peace is a reality. No less than 19 nations have joined, and more are on the way. Russia has expressed an interest in joining.

The Partnership will conduct its first military exercises this fall. Imagine the transformation -- troops that once faced each other across the Iron Curtain will now work with each other across the plains of Europe.

We understand the historical anxieties of Central and Eastern Europe. The security of those states is important to our own security. And we are committed to NATO's expansion. At the same time, as long as we have the chance -- the chance -- to create security cooperation everywhere in Europe, we should not abandon that possibility anywhere.

There are signs that such an outcome may be possible. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have now committed to eliminate all the nuclear weapons on their soil. And by this August we may well see all Russian troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltics for the first time since the end of World War II.

Do these developments guarantee that we can draw all the former communist states into the bonds of peaceful cooperation? No. But we would fail our own generation and those to come if we did not try.

Do these arrangements mean we can solve all the problems? No, at least not right away. The most challenging European security problem and the most heartbreaking humanitarian problem is, of course, Bosnia. We have not solved that problem, but it is important to recognize what has been done, because France, the United States, Great Britain and others have worked together through the United Nations and through NATO. Look what has been done. First, a determined and so far successful effort has been made to limit that conflict to Bosnia, rather than having it spread into a wider Balkan war. Second, the most massive humanitarian airlift in history has saved thousands of lives; as has the UNPROFOR mission, in which France has been the leading contributor of troops.

We have prevented the war from moving into the air. We have seen an agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats. Progress has been made. What remains to be done? Today, the United Nations has put forward the proposal by Mr. Akashi for a cessation of hostilities for a period of several months. The United States supports this program; France supports this proposal. We must do all we can to get both sides to embrace it.

Then, the Contact Group is working on a map, which can be the basis of a full and final cessation of hostilities there. We must do all we can, once all parties have been heard from, to secure that agreement.

And finally, let us not forget what has happened to make that more likely, and that is that Russia has been brought into the process of attempting to resolve this terrible crisis in what so far has been a very positive way, pointing the way toward a future in which we may all be able to work together to solve problems like this over a period of time. We must be patient. We must understand that we do not have total control of events within every nation. But we have made progress in Bosnia, and we must keep at it, working together -- firmly together -- with patience and firmness, until the job is done. We can do this if we stay together and work together.

The best way to sustain this sort of cooperation is to support the evolution of Europe across the board. We must also have an economic dimension to this. We must support Europe's East in their work to integrate into the thriving market democracies. That brings me to the second element of our strategy of integration. Integration requires the successful transition to strong market economies all across broader Europe.

Today, the former communist states face daunting transitions. Our goal must be to help them succeed -- supporting macroeconomic reforms, providing targeted assistance to privatization, increasing our bonds of trade and investment. That process invariably will proceed slowly and, of course, unevenly. It will depend in part on what happens within those countries. We have seen voters in former communist states cast ballots in a protest against reform and its pain. Yet as long as these states respect democratic processes, we should not react with too much alarm. The work of reform will take years and decades.

Despite many problems the economic reforms in Europe's East have still been impressive. Russia's private sector now employs 40 percent of the work force and 50 million Russians have become shareholders in privatizing companies. In Prague last January, I said the West needed to support such reforms by opening our markets as much as possible to the exports of those nations. For if our new friends are not able to export their goods, they may instead export instability, even against their own will.

We can also support other reforms by stimulating global economic growth. One of the most important advances toward that goal in recent years has been the new GATT Agreement. It will create millions of jobs. France played an absolutely pivotal role in bringing those talks to fruition. I know it was a difficult issue in this country. I know it required statesmanship. I assure you it was not an easy issue in the United States.

We have issues left to resolve. But now that we have opened the door to history's most sweeping trade agreement, let us keep going until it is done. My goal is for the United States Congress to ratify the GATT Agreement this year, and to pursue policies through the G-7 that can energize all our economies.

We have historically agreed among the G-7 nations that we will ask each other the hard questions: What can we do to promote economic growth and job creation? Why kind of trade policies are fair to the working people of our countries? How can we promote economic growth in a way that advances sustainable development in the poorer countries of the world so that they do not squander their resources and, in the end, assure that all these endeavors fail? These are profoundly significant questions. They are being asked in a multilateral forum for the first time in a serious way. And this is of great significance.

In the end, no matter what we do with security concerns or what we do with economic concerns, the heart of our mission must be the same as it was on Normandy's

beaches a half a century ago. That is democracy. For, after all, democracy is the glue that can cement economic reforms and security cooperation. That is why our third goal must be to consolidate Europe's recent democratic gains.

This goal resonates with the fundamental ideals of both of our republics. It is, after all, how we got started. It also serves our most fundamental security interests, for democracy is a powerful deterrent; it checks the dark ambitions of would-be tyrants and aggressors as it respects the bright hopes of free citizens.

Together, our two nations and others have launched a major effort to support democracy in the former communist states. Progress will not come overnight. There will be uneven developments, but already we see encouraging and sometimes breathtaking results. We have seen independent television stations established where once only the state's version of the truth was broadcast. We've seen thousands of people from the former communist world -- students, bankers, political leaders -- come to our nations to learn the ways and the uses of freedom.

We've seen new constitutions written and new states founded around the principles that inspired our own republics at their birth. Ultimately, we need to foster democratic bonds, not only within these former communist states, but also among our states and theirs.

There is a language of democracy spoken among nations. It is expressed in the way we work out our differences, in the way we treat each other's citizens, in the way we honor each other's heritages. It is the language our two republics have spoken with each other for over 200 years. It is the language that the Western Allies spoke during the second world war.

Now we have the opportunity to hear the language of democracy, spoken across this entire continent. And if we can achieve that goal, we will have paid a great and lasting tribute to those from both our countries who fought and died for freedom 50 years ago.

Nearly 25 years after D-Day, an American veteran who had served as a medic in that invasion returned to Normandy. He strolled down Omaha Beach where he had landed in June of 1944, and then walked inland a ways to a nearby village. There, he knocked on a door that seemed familiar.

A Frenchwoman answered the door and then turned suddenly and called to her husband. "He's back. The American doctor is back," she called. After a moment, the husband arrived, carrying a wine bottle covered with dust and cobwebs. "Welcome, Doctor," he cried. "In 1944, we hid this bottle away for the time when you would return. Now, let us celebrate."

Well, this week, that process of joyous rediscovery and solemn remembrance happened all over again. It unfolded in countless reunions, planned and unplanned.

As our people renewed old bonds, let us also join to resume the timeless work that brought us here in the first place and that brought our forebears together 200 years ago -- the work of fortifying freedom's foundation and building a lasting peace for generations to come. I believe we can do it. It is the only ultimate tribute we can learn -- we can give, for the ultimate lesson of World War II and Normandy.

Thank you. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

Upon Receiving Doctorate in Civil Law: June 8, 1994; Sheldonian Theater, Oxford University, Oxford, England

Thank you very much, Chancellor, distinguished members of the university community. I must say that it was quite easy for me to take the Chancellor's gentle ribbing about the presidency, since he is probably the only Chancellor of this great university ever to have written a biography of an American president. I thank you for your biography of President Truman and for your leadership and for honoring me.

You know, as I walked today through the streets of Oxford with my wife and with my classmate, now the Secretary of Labor in our administration, Mr. Reich, who is here, it seemed almost yesterday when I first came here. And I remembered when I walked in this august building today how I always felt a mixture of elation and wariness, bordering on intimidation, in your presence. I thought if there was one place in the world I could come and give a speech in the proper language, it was here, and then I heard the degree ceremony. (Laughter.) And sure enough, once again at Oxford I was another Yank a half step behind. (Laughter.)

This week the world has taken a profound journey of remembrance. Here in Great Britain, in the United States and France and Italy, all around the world we have reflected on a time when the sheer will of freedom's forces changed the course of this century.

Many of you in this room, including my good friend the former warden of Rhodes House, Sir Edgar Williams, who is here with me today, played a major role in that great combat.

It was a great privilege and honor for me to represent the United States in paying tribute to all the good people who fought and won World War II, an experience I have never had the like of and one which has profoundly deepened my own commitment to the work the people of the United States have entrusted to me.

I am also deeply honored by this degree you have bestowed on me, as well as the honorary fellowship I received from my college today. I must say that, as my wife pointed out, I could have gotten neither one of these things on my own. (Laughter.) I had to be elected President to do it -- with her help. (Applause.) Indeed, it was suggested on the way over here that if women had been eligible for the Rhodes Scholarship in 1968, I might be on my way home to Washington tonight at this very moment. (Laughter.)

I am profoundly grateful for this chance to be with you and for this honor, not only because of the wonderful opportunity I had to live and study here a quarter century ago, but because of the traditions, the achievements, the spirit of discovery, and the deep inspiration of this noble university.

Even in a country so steeped in history, there are few institutions as connected to the past as Oxford. Every ritual here, no matter how small, has a purpose, reminding us that we must be part of something larger than ourselves -- heirs to a proud legacy.

Yet Oxford could hardly be called backward-looking. Over the centuries, as a center of inquiry and debate, this great university has been very much involved in the action and passion of its time. Just listen outside here -- (laughter) --everything from disputes over battles to the nature of the Italian government to the character of the word "skinhead" --(laughter) - - is being debated even as we are here.

This university has been very much committed to passing on our legacy to yet another generation. Our first obligation is what I have been doing here this week. It is remembrance -- to know how we came to be what we are. We have all learned again this

week, in reflecting on the uncommon valor and the utter loss that brought us 50 years of freedom.

I know I speak for everyone in this theater when I say again, a profound thank you to the generation which won World War II. We can never forget what was done for us. Our memories of that sacrifice will be forever alive.

But our obligations surely go beyond memory. After all, when the soldiers of D-Day broke through at Normandy, when the sons and daughters of democracy carried on their struggle for another half-century -- winning the Cold War against the iron grip of totalitarian repression -- they fought not for the past, but for the present and the future. And now it falls to us to use that hard-won freedom, to follow through in this time -- expanding democracy, security, prosperity, fighting bigotry, terrorism, slaughter and chaos around the world.

There are -- make no mistake about it -- forces of disintegration at work in the world today, and to some extent even within our own countries, that could rob our children of the bright future for which so many of our parents gave their lives.

There are also, to be sure, forces of humanity in progress which, if they prevail, could bring human history to its highest point of peace and prosperity. At this rare moment, we must be prepared to move forward; for, in the end, the numberless sacrifices of our forbearers brought us to precisely this -- an age in which many threats to our very existence have been brought under control for the moment.

So what shall we do with the moment? Our challenge is to unite our people around the opportunities of peace as those who went before us united against the dangers of war and oppression. The great Oxford don, Sir Isaiah Berlin, once said: "Men do not live only by fighting evils, they live by positive goals, a vast variety of them; seldom predictable, at times incompatible."

History does not always give us grand crusades, but it always gives us opportunities. It is time to bring a spirit of renewal to the work of freedom, to work at home to tap the full potential of our citizens, to strengthen our families and communities, to fight indifference and intolerance. And beyond our borders, to keep our nations strong so that we can create a new security -- here, especially, all across Europe; to reverse the environmental destruction that feeds the civil wars in Africa; to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and terrorism; to light the lives of those still dwelling in the darkness of undemocratic rule.

Our work in this world -- all of it -- will surely take all of our lifetimes and more. But we must keep at it, working together with steadiness and wisdom, with ingenuity and simple faith. To those of you here in this ancient temple of learning and those beyond who are of a younger generation, I urge you to join this work with enthusiasm and high hope.

This week, at the grave sites of the generation that fought and died to make us the children of their sacrifice, I promised that we would be the new pathfinders, lighting the way in a new and still uncertain age, striving in peace as they struggled in war.

There is no greater tribute to give to those who have gone before than to build for those who follow. Surely, that is the timeless mission of freedom and civilization itself. It is what binds together the past, the present and the future. It is our clear duty, and we must do our best to fulfill it.

Thank you very much for this wonderful day. (Applause.)

At Freedom Monument: July 6, 1994; Riga, Latvia

Today we celebrate a moment of renewal. Today we remember your courage. Today we rejoice; for one force rules in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and that force is freedom. (Applause.) Thank you, President Ulmanis, for your gracious words and your warm welcome to this beautiful capital. And my thanks, also, to President Meri and President Brazauskas for your contribution to this historic event.

To the people of these lands, to those gathered in this square, to those listening or watching from afar, to all who have kept the faith, I am deeply honored to stand before you, the first President of the United States to set foot on free Baltic soil. (Applause.)

Today we remember, we remember an August day just five years ago when the peoples of your nation join hands in common cause from Tallinn to Vilnius, a million strong, you reached across the boundaries of fear. And here in this Square, sheltered by the Freedom Monument, that human chain found its center. You showed the peoples of the world the power of the Baltic way.

Now, today, I stand with you here. And on behalf of all Americans, I proudly take a place in that unbroken chain for freedom. (Applause.) The chain stretches back to your grandparents exiled to the wastelands of Siberia, many never to return; back to your fathers, men who took to the forests to resist the occupying troops -- (applause) -- and to you, who took up their cause, stood vigil over the bonfires of liberty and sang the songs of independence. And to those in all generations who gave their very lives for freedom. (President speaks in Latvian.) Freedom. (Applause).

No matter what the language, it is the link that unites the peoples of our nation: Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian and American, no matter the century, no matter the invader. You have proved that freedom never dies when it lives in the hearts of men and women. You have taught us never to give up. You have inspired the world. And America has kept faith with you. For 50 years we refused to recognize the occupation of your nation. (Applause.) Your flag flew in our capital.

Many of your countrymen and women sought refuge on our shores. Now some have returned to serve their homelands, while others remain to keep your spirit alive all across America. The chain that binds our nations in unbreakable. (Applause.) We marvel at your strength and your reborn independence. But we know, also, that many of you face hardship and uncertainty in your daily lives, for the path of reform is not always smooth. Yet America calls on you to hold fast to that path, to seize this moment of renewal, to redeem the struggles of your ancestors, to extend the chain of freedom so that it reaches across generations to your children and beyond.

And as you return to Europe's fold, we will stand with you. We will help you. (Applause.) We will help you to restore your land, to bring new markets to light, to find prosperity for all your people. And we will rejoice with you when the last of the foreign troops vanish from your homelands. (Applause.) We will be partners for peace. Our soldiers, the new Baltic battalion among them, will join together to bring security to a new Europe. We will be partners so that your nation can be forever free. (Applause.)

I come from a nation of people drawn from all around the world. A nation of many, many peoples who once were bitter enemies, but who now live together as friends. In your homeland, as in America, there will always live among you people of different backgrounds. Today I appeal to you to summon what my nation's greatest healer,

Abraham Lincoln, called "the better angels of our nature," to never to deny to others the justice and equality you fought so hard for and earned for yourselves.

For freedom without tolerance is freedom unfulfilled. The shining figure of liberty stands guard here today and the spirit of your peoples fills the air and brings joy to our hearts. We hear the songs of freedom that have echoed across the centuries. We see the flames that lit your way to independence. We feel the courage that will keep the chain of freedom alive. May the memories of this day linger. May the spirit of the Baltic souls soar. May the strong sense of freedom never fade. So, in the name of the free people of the United States of America, I say to the free people of the Baltic Nations: Let freedom ring. Vabadus! Laisves! Briviba! Freedom! (Applause.)

At the Children's Memorial: July 7, 1994; Mali Powstaniec, Warsaw, Poland

3:25 P.M. (L)

Thank you very much, Ryszard Paclawski, Adam Bielaczki, and to Magda Kierszniewska. Didn't she do a good job? Let's give her another hand. (Applause.)

We are gathered at the wall of an old city to honor a people whose love of freedom is forever young. Fifty years ago a heroic chapter of history was written here -- a chapter stained with the blood of war, but brightened by the enduring power of the human spirit.

Next month you will honor that spirit by marking the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising. And I am pleased to say that the Vice President of the United States Al Gore will be here with you in August, just as I am today.

The seeds of rebirth that are now flowering across this wonderful country were planted a half-century ago. When the brave Poles took up arms against Hitler's tyranny in the summer of 1944, Warsaw was on the verge of total destruction. For 63 days, Polish men, women and children struggled against the Nazis. For 63 days they faced the tanks, machine guns and bombers with courage and faith and solidarity. Two hundred thousand of them died. And this beloved city seemed beyond salvation.

I have seen photographs of Warsaw at the end of the war, an exquisite city that took six centuries to build was razed to the ground in two monstrous months. The statue of King Zigmund was toppled from its base, an elegant column literally blown to bits. The majestic arches of St. John's Cathedral were battered until only a skeleton remained. The Old City marketplace was obliterated.

No one sacrificed more than the children. The statue behind me honors the children of the Warsaw Uprising. The terror of war took their innocence. Their childhoods were buried in the rubble. Young girls braved sniper fire to deliver messages for the Resistance, and Szare Szeregi, the Young Scouts, faced the front lines of battle.

Thousands of children witnessed the unimaginable. One boy was eight years old when the bombs began raining down, when the Nazi planes destroyed the building where he lived, when his family courtyard was turned into a graveyard for his neighbors. But that little boy survived. He never forgot Warsaw, and he never gave up trying to give meaning to the tragedy. Today, that little boy is the highest ranking military officer in the United States of America, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has dedicated his life to the fight for peace and freedom. (Applause.)

His life, like the lives of so many other children of Warsaw, teaches us what Poland taught the world: out of the wreckage of oppression can grow the redeeming spirit of freedom.

Some of those other children, now grown, are with us today. Let us thank them all for that profound lesson. (Applause.)

Sometimes in life, we do not realize the good we have done. Fifty years ago, the heroes of Warsaw seemed defeated. Fifty years later, we know the Polish spirit did not die in the ruins. Sometimes what seems to be the final chapter in history is but one sad page of an unfinished and triumphant story.

The Polish people never gave in to the shadow of despair. They found strength through the light cast for the Uprising, and after the war, the survivors returned to the ruins. Brick by brick, with cold and tired hands, they rebuilt this city. Day by day, they

revived a nation, even as a new invader overwhelmed the homeland they loved. For five more decades, as Poles had done for centuries in the face of attack and invasion, they held fast to their dreams; they endured the darkness of domination; they prepared and fought for a new day to come.

Just as the men, women and children of the Uprising won their fight, so you in this generation have won yours. Warsaw is not a city under siege, but a city in peace. Poland is not a nation consigned to the darkness of tyranny, but a nation inspiring the entire world in a season of renewal.

This moment reminds all of us that darkness could always enshroud us again, that fear and tolerance do find new lives of their own. But let us remember the words of the Polish philosopher, Joachim Lelewel, a great Polish thinker who said, "The last bastion of our nation is our people's heart, and that bastion will never be conquered."

That is the lesson of the Warsaw Uprising. That is the lesson of democracy's triumph in Poland today. And that is the lesson that we as free peoples, Polish and American, must embrace.

Today we have no doubt that the children of the Warsaw Uprising won their larger war, for the hearts of the free can never be conquered.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

To the Sejm: July 7, 1994; Parliament Building, Warsaw, Poland

2:35 P.M

Thank you very much. Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Marshal Oleksy, Mr. Speakers, and representatives of the people of Poland: I am honored to stand before you today in this chamber, at the heart of Poland's democracy. I know that you have extended your session in order to hear me today, and I am very grateful for your hospitality.

We gather today to honor a friendship that is as old as my nation. And we honor ties that grow stronger every day. We admire the contributions that Polish Americans, millions of them, have made and are making to our nation's strength. And we celebrate the cultural ties that bind our peoples. But at this moment of decision in history, in this time of renewal for Poland and for the United States, Poland has come to mean something even greater, for your success is crucial to democracy's future in Central and Eastern Europe, and indeed, all across the globe.

It has been said that if it were not for the people of Poland democracy might have perished on the continent of Europe a half-century ago. For it was the Polish mathematicians from the laboratories of Poznan who broke the secrets of the Enigma Code, what Winston Churchill called the most important weapon against Hitler and his armies. It was these code-breakers who made possible the great Allied landings at Normandy, when American, English, French, Canadian and, yes, free Polish forces joined together to liberate this continent -- to destroy one terrible tyranny that darkened our century.

Yet, alone among the great Allied armies who fought in Normandy, the Poles did not return to a liberated land. Your fathers instead returned to a nation that had been laid waste by its invaders. Then one would-be conqueror gave way to another, and an Iron Curtain fell across your borders, a second foreign tyranny gripped your people and your land.

It was here in Poland that all those who believe communism could not stand first found their hopes fulfilled; here that you began to hammer on the Iron Curtain and force the first signs of rust to appear; here that brave men and women, workers and citizens, led by Solidarnosc, understood that neither consciousness nor economics can be ordered from above; here that you showed the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe that with hearts and hands alone, democracy could triumph.

But I come here today not simply to recall the events of 50 years past, or even to rejoice at those of five years ago; for others have done that, and done it very well. Instead, I come to the heart of a new, democratic Central Europe to look ahead; to speak of how we can reverse the legacies of stagnation and oppression, of fear and division; how we can eradicate the artificial lines through Europe's heartland imposed by half a century of division; and how we can help chart a course toward an integrated Europe of sovereign free nations.

The challenges our generation faces are different from those our parents faced. They are problems that in many cases lack pressing drama. They require quiet and careful solutions. They will not yield easily. And if we meet them well, our reward will not be stunning moments of glory, but gradual and real improvement in the lives of our people.

We must find the will to unite around these opportunities of peace as previous generations have united against war's life-or-death threats, and oppression's fatal grip. To

the courage that enables men and women to drop behind enemy lines, face down rumbling tanks, or advance freedom's cause underground, we must add a new civil courage -- the energy and optimism and patience to move forward through peaceful, but hard and rapidly changing times.

Our course must be guided by three principles -- supporting democracy, advancing free markets and meeting new security challenges. Half a century after our fathers beat tyranny into submission, and half a decade after the Soviet empire collapsed, the voices of violence and militant nationalism can once again be heard. Would-be dictators and fiery demagogues live among us in the East and in the West, promoting ethnic and racial hatred, promoting religious divisions and anti-Semitism and aggressive nationalism. To be sure, they are weak imitators of Hitler and Stalin, yet we dare not underestimate the danger they pose. For they feed on fear, despair and confusion. They darken our road and challenge our achievements.

In this fight, democracy remains our indispensable ally. For democracy checks the ambitions of would-be tyrants and aggressors. It nurtures civil society and respect for human rights and the habits of simple tolerance. Its progress is slow and uneven, and as you doubtless know in this chamber, occasionally frustrating. But it cements economic reforms and security cooperation. And it offers once-captive peoples the opportunity to shape their own future.

Five years ago, your nation seized that opportunity. Discarding dictatorship and a failed command economy that was imposed upon your nation, you stepped into the unknown and started to build a free market economy. Doubters said that it couldn't be done, but the Polish people have proved those naysayers wrong. Poland's reforms are working. You are beginning to win the struggle for economic transformation. You have ended hyperinflation, stabilized your currency, privatized enterprises that drive growth and doubled your exports. You have proved that free people need not wait for the state to tell them what to do. You have demonstrated an entrepreneurial talent that generates one of Europe's highest growth rates.

But we must be sober and honest in our judgment. When you began this process the old communist economic system was already collapsing. You knew then your journey would be difficult, at best. And although many Poles are prospering today, many others have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and their hardships abound. In a time like this it is easy to focus on that pain, not on the promise of reform.

My message today to the people of Poland, and to all the people of Central and Eastern Europe, is simple and direct: Free markets and democracy remain the only proven path to prosperity and to peace. You must hold hard to those tracks. Sustain the civil courage that has brought you so far so fast, and do not give up or turn back. You will not be alone.

The United States has stood with you since you began to build a modern economy, and we stand with you now. America is the number one investor in Poland, with $1.2 billion already in place, and much more on the way. The American people are proud to have supported Poland as you have put tens of thousands of your people to work, created thousands of new enterprises and begun to free your economy from its inherited burden of debt.

Today we are announcing new initiatives that will pump hundreds of millions of dollars into the Polish economy. For example, our government, along with some of our nation's largest labor unions, has established a $65-million Polish Partners Fund to

promote new investments in business. We are also working to quicken the speed of privatization, to assist people in finding new jobs and housing, to help protect your citizens from the economic pirates of organized crime.

Taken together, these goals -- hopeful citizens, thriving entrepreneurs, new investments and expanded trade -- are the future pillars of a prosperous, reformed Poland. Economic reform and democracy, though important, however, will only flourish if the free peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are also secure.

In moving to guarantee its own security, Poland has indeed become a model for the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Your decisions to establish good relations with Russia, Ukraine, Germany and Lithuania are shining examples of the potential for peace that the new Europe provides. At this moment, in fact, Poland faces what may fairly be described as its best prospects for peace and security in 350 years.

And yet, as you have taught us, we must not forget the lessons of history. There appears to be no immediate or short-term threat to Polish sovereignty, but history and geography caution us not to take this moment for granted.

When my administration began I stressed that Poland's security and the security of all democratic nations in the region is important to the United States. In January of last year, when I visited Prague and met with the heads of the Visegrad nations, I learned a Polish phrase: Nic o nas bez nas - -- Nothing about us, without us. (Applause.)

That phrase echoes in my mind today as we solidify and search for new security arrangements in Europe. Because the simple fact is that Poland should never again have its fate decided for it by others. No democracy in this region should ever be consigned to a gray area, or a buffer zone. And no country should have the right to veto, compromise or threaten democratic Poland's or any other democracy's integration into Western institutions, including those that ensure security. (Applause.)

I know that these are ambitious goals, but history has given us a rare opportunity: the opportunity to join together and to form a new, integrated Europe of sovereign nations -- a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders, but where nations can rest easy that their own borders will always be secure. This is the vision behind the Partnership for Peace.

Twenty-one nations have now joined that Partnership since we began it, and they are already moving to fulfill the dream of a unified and peaceful Europe. They have sworn not only to pursue democracy, but also to respect each other's sovereignty and borders. They are moving along a course that is both visionary and realistic, working for the best while always preparing for the worst.

Poland, as all of you know, has taken a leading role in the Partnership for Peace, and I am proud and pleased that some two months from now your nation will host the first Partnership exercise on the territory of a former Warsaw Pact state. For the first time since 1945 Polish and American troops - -- troops that once faced each other across the Iron Curtain -- will train together on the plains of Europe.

The United States recognizes that full participation in the Partnership requires resources. And I am pleased to announce today that I will ask our Congress to designate $100 million, effective in the fall of next year, to help America's new democratic partners work with us to advance the Partnership for Peace's goals. (Applause.) In response to your nation's demonstrated commitment to security and democracy, I will ask that fully one-fourth of that money, $25 million, be directed to Poland.

But the Partnership for Peace is only a beginning. Bringing new members into NATO, as I have said many times, is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will not depend upon the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region. We are working with you in the Partnership for Peace in part because the United States believes that when NATO does expand as it will, a democratic Poland will have placed itself among those ready and able to join.

The Partnership for Peace, and planning for NATO's future mean that we will not let the Iron Curtain be replaced with a veil of indifference.

I have learned another Polish phrase which, even in my tortured accent, well describes our goal for a more secure, democratic and prosperous Poland. Rowni z rownymi, wolni z wolnymi: Equal among equals, free with the free. (Applause.) It is time to bring that phrase to life.

Here in the middle of the rebuilt city of Warsaw, we are reminded that the Polish people have always fought for that right. Fifty years ago this month, the Polish home army was planning the greatest urban uprising of this century. On August the 1st, Polish heroes seized much of their city preparing for liberation. The uprising ended in ruin. Some of the heroes perished; others escaped. Yet, amidst the flame and the rubble, a lone radio signal could be heard in the West -- "Immortal is the nation that can muster such universal heroism," came the broadcast from Warsaw, "for those who have died have conquered, and those who live on will fight on, will conquer and again bear witness that Poland lives while the Poles live."

Here in the heart of a free Poland, you can hear the echoes of that broadcast today. So now let us summon the civil courage that will keep your nation forever free.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

Address to the People of Berlin: July 12, 1994; The East Side of the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, Germany

Citizens of free Berlin, citizens of United Germany, Chancellor Kohl, Mayor Dietkin, Berliners the world over, thank you for this wonderful welcome to your magnificent city. (Applause.)

We stand together where Europe's heart was cut in half and we celebrate unity. We stand where crude walls of concrete separated mother from child, and we meet as one family. We stand where those who sought a new life instead found death. And we rejoice in renewal.

Berliners, you have won your long struggle. (Applause.) You have proved that no wall can forever contain the mighty power of freedom. (Applause.)

Within a few years, an American president will visit a Berlin that is again the seat of your government. And I pledge to you today a new American embassy will also stand in Berlin. (Applause.)

Half a century has passed since Berlin was first divided -- 33 years since the Wall went up. In that time, one half of this city lived encircled, and the other half enslaved. But one force endured: your courage. Your courage has taken many forms -- the bold courage of June 17th, 1953 when those trapped in the east threw stones at the tanks of tyranny; the quiet courage to lift children above the Wall so that their grandparents on the other side could see those they loved but could not touch; the inner courage to reach for the ideas that make you free; and the civil courage -- civile courage -- of five years ago when, starting in the strong hearts and candlelit streets of Leipzig, you turned your dreams of a better life into the chisels of liberty. (Applause.)

Now, you who found the courage to endure, to resist, to tear down the Wall, must found a new civile courage -- the courage to build. The Berlin Wall is gone. Now our generation must decide, what will we build in its place. Standing here today, we can see the answer -- a Europe where all nations are independent and democratic; where free markets and prosperity know no borders; where our security is based on building bridges, not walls; where all our citizens can go as far as their God-given abilities will take them and raise their children in peace and hope.

The work of freedom is not easy. It requires discipline, responsibility and a faith strong enough to endure failure and criticism. And it requires vigilance. Here, in Germany, in the United States, and throughout the entire world, we must reject those who would divide us with scalding words about race, ethnicity, or religion. (Applause.)

I appeal especially to the young people of this nation -- believe you can live in peace with those who are different from you. Believe in your own future. Believe you can make a difference and summon your own courage to build, and you will. (Applause.)

There is reason for you to believe. Already, the new future is taking shape in the growing chorus of voices that speak the common language of democracy. In the growing economies of Western Europe, the United States and our partners. In the progress of economic reform, democracy and freedom in lands that were not free. In NATO's Partnership for Peace where 21 nations have joined in military cooperation and pledge to respect each other's borders.

It is to all of you in pursuit of that new future that I say in the name of the pilots whose airlift kept Berlin alive, in the name of the sentries at Checkpoint Charlie who stood face-to-face with enemy tanks, in the name of every American president who has

come to Berlin, in the name of the American forces who will stay in Europe to guard freedom's future -- in all of their names, I say "Amerika steht an ihrer Seite, jetzt und fuer immer." (Applause.)

America is on your side now and forever. Moments ago, with my friend, Chancellor Kohl, I walked where my predecessors could not, through the Brandenburg Gate. For over two centuries in every age, that gate has been a symbol of the time. Sometimes it has been a monument to conquest and a tower of tyranny.

But in our own time, you, courageous Berliners, have again made the Brandenburg what its builders meant it to be -- a gateway. Brandenburg what its builders meant it to be, a gateway. (Applause.) Now, together, we can walk through that gateway to our destiny, to a Europe united, united in peace, united in freedom, united in progress for the first time in history. Nothing will stop us. All things are possible. "Nichts wird uns aufhalten. Alles ist moeglich. Berlin ist frei." (Applause.) Berlin is free. (Applause.)

Plenary Session of the 1994 Summit of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe: December 5, 1994; Budapest Congress Center, Budapest, Hungary

Thank you, President Klestil, President Goncz. I am delighted to be here in this great city in Central Europe at this historic meeting.

The United States is committed to building a united, free and secure Europe. We believe that goal requires a determined effort to continue to reduce the nuclear threat; a strong NATO adapting to new challenges; a strong CSCE, working among other things to lead efforts to head off future Bosnias; and a strong effort at cooperating with the United Nations; and an effort by all the nations of Europe to work together in harmony on common problems and opportunities.

In the 20th century, conflict and distrust have ruled Europe. The steps we are taking today will help to ensure that in the 21st century, peace and prosperity rein.

The forces that tore Europe apart have been defeated. But neither peace nor democracy's triumph is assured. The end of the Cold War presents us with the opportunity to fulfill the promise of democracy and freedom. And it is our responsibility working together to seize it, to build a new security framework for the era ahead. We must not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by a veil of indifference. We must not consign new democracies to a gray zone.

Instead we seek to increase the security of all; to erase the old lines without drawing arbitrary new ones; to bolster emerging democracies; and to integrate the nations of Europe into a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders, but where every nation's border are secure.

We are making progress on the issues that matter for the future. Today, here, five of this organization's member states -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States -- will bring the START I treaty into force and reduce the nuclear threat that has hung over our heads for nearly a half century.

START I will eliminate strategic bombers and missile launchers that carried over 9,000 warheads. And it opens the door to prompt ratification of START II, which will retire another 5,000 warheads. These actions will cut the arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union more than 60 percent from their Cold War peak. The world will be a safer place as a result.

But even as we celebrate this landmark gain for peace, the terrible conflict in Bosnia rages not 300 miles from this city. After three years of conflict, the combatants remain locked in a terrible war no one can win. Now each faces the same choice: They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

The government of Bosnia-Hercegovina has made the right choice by accepting the international peace plan and agreeing to recent calls for a cease-fire. So I say again to the Bosnian Serbs: End the aggression, agree to the cease-fire and renewed negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. Settle your differences at the negotiating table, not the battlefield.

We mustn't let our frustration over that war cause us to give up our efforts to end it. And the United States will not do so. If we have learned anything from the agony of Bosnia, it is clearly that we must act on its lessons. In other parts of Europe, ethnic disputes and forces of hatred and despair, demagogues who would take advantage of them threaten to reverse the new wave of freedom that has swept the continent.

So as we strive to end the war in Bosnia, we must work to prevent future Bosnias. And we must build the structures that will help newly-free nations to complete their transformation successfully to free market democracies and preserve their own freedom.

We know this is not something that will happen overnight, but over time, NATO, the CSCE, other European and transatlantic institutions, working in close cooperation with the United Nations can support and extend the democracy, stability and prosperity that Western Europe and North America have enjoyed for 50 years. That is the future we are working to build.

NATO remains the bedrock of security in Europe, but its role is changing as the continent changes. Last January NATO opened the door to new members and launched the Partnership for Peace. Since then 23 nations have joined that partnership to train together, conduct joint military exercises and forge closer political links.

Last week we took further steps to prepare for expansion by starting work on the requirements for membership. New members will join country by country gradually and openly. Each must be committed to democracy and free markets and be able to contribute to Europe's security. NATO will not automatically exclude any nation from joining. At the same time, no country outside will be allowed a veto expansion -- to veto expansion.

As NATO does expand, so will security for all European states, for it is not an aggressive, but an defensive organization. NATO's new members, old members and nonmembers alike will be more secure.

As NATO continues its mission, other institutions can and should share the security burden and take on special responsibilities. A strong and vibrant Conference on Security and Cooperate in Europe is vital.

For more than a decade the CSCE was the focal point for courageous men and women who at great personal risk confronted tyranny to win the human rights set out in the Helsinki Accords. Now, the CSCE can help to build a new an integrated continent. It has unique tools for this task.

The CSCE is the only regional forum to which nearly every nation in Europe and North America belongs. It has pioneered ways to peacefully resolve conflicts, from shuttle diplomacy to longstanding missions in tense areas. Now that freedom has been won in Europe, the CSCE can play an expanding role in making sure it is never lost again.

Indeed, its proposed new name, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, symbolizes the new and important mission we believe it must undertake. The CSCE should be our first flexible line of defense against ethnic and regional conflicts. Its rules can guard against the assertion of hegemony or spheres of influence. It can help nations come together to build prosperity. And it can promote Europe's integration piece by piece.

By focusing on human rights, conflict prevention, dispute resolution, the CSCE can help prevent future Bosnias. We are taking important steps at this meeting for that crucial goal -- by strengthening the High Commissioner for National Minorities, establishing a code of conduct to provide for democratic civilian control of the military, reinforcing principles to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preparing to send CSCE monitors and peacekeepers to potential trouble spots outside Bosnia. These actions will not make triumph and headlines, but they may help to prevent tragic ones.

The principles adopted in Rome made clear that any peacekeeping mission must aim for a freely negotiated settlement by the parties themselves, not a solution imposed from the outside. And they hold that no country can use a regional conflict, however threatening, to strengthen its security at the expense of others.

I am very encouraged that with the support and involvement of the Russian Federation we are on the verge of an agreement that the CSCE will lead a multinational peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States appreciates the willingness of many nations to contribute troops and material for this mission.

The continuing tragedy in Nagorno-Karabakh demands that we redouble our efforts to promote a lasting cease-fire and a fair settlement. The United States strongly supports this effort and calls upon all CSCE members to contribute toward it.

The CSCE also has an important role to play in promoting economic growth while protecting Europe's resources and environment. We should strengthen its efforts to increase regional and cross-border cooperation. Such efforts can bring people together to build new highways, bridges and communication networks -- the infrastructure of democracy.

Since 1975, when the countries of Europe expressed the desire to form a community founded on common values and founded the CSCE, more progress has occurred than even dreamers might have hoped. We know the change is possible. We know that former enemies can reconcile. We know the eloquent intentions about democracy and human rights can promote peace when transformed from words into actions.

Now, almost 20 years later, our challenge is to help the freedoms we secured spread and endure. The task will require energy and strength. Old regimes have crumbled, but new legacies and mistrust remain. Nations have been liberated, but ethnic hatred threatens peace and tolerance. Democracy and free markets are emerging, but change everywhere is causing fear and insecurity.

Three times before in this century, our nations have summoned the strength to defeat history's dark forces. They have left us still with a great responsibility and an extraordinary opportunity. Our mission now is to build a new world for our children -- a world more democratic, more prosperous and more secure. The CSCE has a vital role to play.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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