ABSTRACT

The Evidential Support Relation

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Evidentialist views in epistemology, like that of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, define epistemic justification at least partially in terms of evidential support. According to these views, a person is justified in believing a proposition p just when her evidence supports p. The subject of this dissertation is the evidential support relation at the heart of these views—viz., the relation which obtains between a person's evidence e and a proposition p just when e supports p in the sense required by these views. I engage three initially tempting accounts of this relation in terms of meta-attitudes, explanatory relations, and probabilistic relations, finding all three accounts wanting. I then propose a fourth, causal account. My thesis is that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman should find this causal account of the evidential support relation more attractive than the other three kinds of account.

The Evidential Support Relation

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to the Evidential Support Relation

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have defended the following evidentialist view concerning propositional justification:

> (EJ) Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for a subject S at t iff D is the attitude toward p which fits the evidence S has at t (Conee and Feldman 1985).

Notice that, according to this thesis, Conee's and Feldman's views concerning propositional justification are heavily dependent upon what we might call the relation of evidential fit—the relation which obtains between a subject's evidence and some attitude D just when that attitude fits her evidence. When it comes to the particular propositional attitude of belief, Conee and Feldman have had more to say about this relation of evidential fit. The attitude of belief toward a proposition p fits a subject's evidence just in case that evidence supports the proposition p, they say. This is clear from their thesis E:

> (E) A subject S is justified in believing proposition p at time t iff the evidence S has at t supports p (Conee and Feldman 2008).

Thus, at least when it comes to the propositional attitude of belief, Conee's and Feldman's views concerning propositional justification rely heavily on what we might call the relation of evidential support (or "the evidential support relation")—the relation which obtains between a subject's evidence and a proposition just when her evidence

supports that proposition.[1] This relation of evidential support central to Conee's and Feldman's work is the subject of my dissertation.

I will argue in favor of one particular account of the evidential support relation. More specifically, I will argue that anyone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views should find this one particular account of the evidential support relation attractive—more attractive than three of its leading rivals. For, this account, when conjoined with at most slightly modified versions of theses central to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views, has more intuitively pleasing results concerning epistemic justification than do these rival accounts when they are conjoined with at most slightly modified versions of these same theses. The account I argue for, which I call the "causal-inclination account," says the following:

> (CIA) A subject S's evidence e supports the proposition p at t iff by virtue of a disposition of which S is aware in the presence of evidence like e to believe p, e causes S to be ultima facie inclined at t to believe p.

The leading alternative accounts I call "attitudinalist" accounts, "explanationist" accounts, and "probabilistic" accounts. Thus, I shall argue that there is a conjunction of CIA with at most slightly modified versions of central evidentialist theses which has implications concerning epistemic justification more intuitively pleasing than the implications of any conjunction of attitudinalist, explanationist, or probabilistic accounts of evidential support with at most slightly modified versions of those same evidentialist

[1] One might suggest that the relation of evidential support is relevant for the justificatory status of other attitudes as well. For example, one might propose a disjunctive account of epistemic justification according to which attitude D is justified for S at t iff D is the attitude of belief and S's evidence at t supports p or D is disbelief in p and S's evidence supports not-p or D is suspension of judgment and S's evidence at t supports neither p nor not-p. In fact, Conee and Feldman discuss just such a definition in the "Afterward" of (2004). Ultimately, they shy away from endorsing such an account, in part, because it eliminates doxastic attitudes other than the attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment.

Nor will I endorse this disjunctive account. Indeed, I think a non-disjunctive account is more attractive, and it will be clear in chapter five that the account of evidential support I favor allows for a non-disjunctive account.

theses. Establishing this claim goes a long way toward recommending CIA as an account of evidential support to anyone attracted to the views of Conee and Feldman and perhaps to internalists more generally.

In the remainder of this Introduction, I will pursue four aims which will assist the reader in better understanding my project in the dissertation. First, I discuss the subject of epistemic justification, seeking to clarify in an intuitive way what epistemic justification is, what propositional justification is, and what philosophers have done to offer an account of each. Second, I present Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views concerning epistemic justification in more detail, explaining exactly what these views are, what the "central evidentialist theses" are, and how these views fit in to the broader spectrum of views about epistemic justification. In section three, I turn to what I hope to contribute to the subject of epistemic justification. As indicated above, I hope to contribute something to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist project. Specifically, I hope to contribute an account of the relation of evidential support central to that project. So, in the third section below, I discuss the specific contents of each of the chapters of my dissertation and explain how these chapters work together to support my thesis that CIA is preferable, for someone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views, to attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts of evidential support. In the final section, I discuss the motivation and significance of the project. I maintain that the project is of great significance for internalist views of justification.

1 Epistemic Justification

In this section my goal is to offer an intuitive, imprecise account of what epistemic justification and propositional justification involve, and to indicate what philosophers

have done to offer precise analyses of each. I will begin with the phenomenon of doxastic attitudes.

That subjects take doxastic attitudes of various sorts toward propositions is a matter of only little controversy.[2] For instance, as I type this paragraph, I take the attitude of belief toward the proposition that I am presently writing the beginnings of a dissertation on the relation of evidential support. I take the attitude of disbelief, or believing *not*, toward the proposition that I will finish a draft of this work within the hour. I take an attitude of suspension of judgment toward the proposition that I will finish a draft of this work two months hence. Though there may be common attitudes toward propositions other than the attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment, many take it that there are at least these attitudes. Such attitudes are typically called "doxastic attitudes," and I will follow that usage here.

Many take it as a datum of common sense that some of these doxastic attitudes are justified and others are unjustified.[3] Perhaps, if I were to believe that I will complete a draft of this dissertation within the hour just because I really want to be done with it, I would have an unjustified belief. If I were to believe that I will complete a draft two months hence because I really want to do so *and* because, so far as I can tell, there are no obstacles to my doing so, I might have a justified belief. In addition to justified and unjustified doxastic attitudes, there may also be doxastic attitudes which are neither

[2] Eliminative materialists, e.g., Paul Churchland, those who deny that there are mental states like beliefs, may furnish an example of a group of philosophers who would dispute this claim. Note, however, that even they will want to find some suitable way of making sense of our talk of justified and unjustified doxastic attitudes. So, even for them, there may be something valuable to an account of epistemic justification. They will just maintain that instead of applying to doxastic attitudes, epistemic justification applies to the appropriate items which serve as proxy for the former in their theory.

[3] It is worth noting, however, that there is some debate over whether the concept of epistemic justification is an ordinary folk concept, or whether the term "justification" as philosophers use it is a term of art used to pick out a concept that the folk do not have.

justified nor unjustified. Perhaps, were I to believe that I will complete a draft of this dissertation within the hour as a result of someone whacking me in the head with a board, I would then have a belief that was neither justified nor unjustified.

In addition to taking it as a datum of common sense that there are justified and unjustified *token* propositional attitudes like those above, many take it as a datum of common sense that there are also justified and unjustified *type* propositional attitudes. It is not only the case that were I to believe that I will finish a draft in the next hour just because I really want to that this token belief of mine would in those hypothetical circumstances be unjustified, it is also the case that the type attitude of believing that I will complete this draft within the hour is in my actual circumstances here and now unjustified. As some have put it, I am not right now justified *in believing* that I will complete a draft within the hour; I am right now unjustified *in believing* that I will complete a draft within the hour, whether or not I in fact token this belief.

Given these data from common sense, many epistemologists have considered the subject of what they call "epistemic justification" a worthy subject of philosophical inquiry. Intuitively, "epistemic justification" denotes some property of token and type doxastic attitudes which is in some important way a good-making property of those attitudes. Or, more carefully, it denotes a valuable property which only token doxastic attitudes can have and a different but related valuable property which type and perhaps token doxastic attitudes have. In light of these different objects which can be said to be justified, epistemologists have offered theories of the epistemic justification that attaches only to token doxastic attitudes attitudes as well as theories of the epistemic justification that attaches to type doxastic attitudes and perhaps token doxastic attitudes. We can call

theories of the former type of epistemic justification theories of "doxastic justification," and theories of the latter type theories of "propositional justification."[4] Most have agreed that doxastic justification can be defined in terms of propositional justification, and many have thought that not only can doxastic justification be defined in terms of propositional justification but that it can be reduced to propositional justification.[5] The proposed definition, or reduction, is as follows: a subject S's token attitude D toward the proposition p is doxastically justified at t iff D is propositionally justified for S at t and S takes D toward p on the basis of something which makes D propositionally justified at t. In short, doxastic justification has been thought to amount to propositional justification plus proper basing.[6] In light of this, the theory of propositional justification has taken center stage for many working on the concept of epistemic justification.

In order to offer accounts of epistemic justification, theorists have focused on offering necessary, sufficient, or necessary and sufficient conditions for an attitude to be propositionally or doxastically justified. In some cases, these conditions are intended to offer analyses of epistemic justification or of concepts related in special ways to epistemic justification. In other cases, they are simply offered as necessary truths which impose constraints on any analysis of epistemic justification. The theses EJ and E

[4] I say here that doxastic justification is the justification that attaches *only* to token attitudes, whereas propositional justification may attach to both type attitudes and token attitudes. I state the distinction this way to be accommodating to some who claim that token attitudes may be propositionally justified. In my own view, this overcomplicates things. All we need to say is that type attitudes which are in a particular instance tokened may be propositionally justified while the token attitudes themselves are neither propositionally justified nor doxastically justified. In any event, I state the distinction here as I do so as to make it consistent with the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification as it is typically drawn in places like, e.g., (Goldman 1979).

[5] See, e.g., Kvanvig (1990).

[6] For endorsement of such a view, see (Kvanvig 2003), (Pollock 1986), (Swain 1979), (Korcz 2000) and (Conee and Feldman 1985). For criticism of these proposals, see (Turri 2010).

discussed above, as well as other central evidentialist theses I will discuss below, are intended as at least the latter.

For now, let this suffice for an introduction to the subject of epistemic justification. In the next section, I will discuss some of the lay of the land in contemporary work in epistemology on this subject, showing in particular how Conee's and Feldman's views on this subject fit into that broader landscape.

2 Epistemic Justification and Evidentialism

One way to situate Conee's and Feldman's views within the broader lay of the land in contemporary work on epistemic justification is to focus on a perennial debate concerning epistemic justification—the debate between internalists and externalists. This debate is a debate over which kinds of facts fix justificatory facts, or facts about epistemic justification.[7]

Internalists tell us that the nature of justification is such that facts concerning epistemic justification are fixed by facts about matters internal to subjects. Thus, in order to determine the justificatory status of some attitude for a subject, we need only look to certain facts about states internal to her. Of course, it is controversial just what counts as a state internal to a subject. And, internalists themselves disagree on precisely which internal states are the relevant ones for determining justificatory status. However, what unites them is their view that justificatory facts are fixed by facts about matters which are in some important way internal to subjects.

[7] The language of "fixing" employed here suggests that internalists and externalists are offering not just necessary truths about justification, but necessary truths which are supposed to be explanatory. I think this is right. The idea is that justificatory facts hold if and only if certain facts about matters internal (on internalism) or external (on externalism) hold, and the former facts hold *because of* the latter.

Externalists deny internalism. That is, they say that there are some facts about matters which are in important ways external to subjects which facts are nonetheless relevant for determining the justificatory status of their attitudes. To determine the justificatory status of some attitude for a subject, we need to look to more than just some facts about matters internal to her—we need to look to at least some facts about matters external to her as well. Again, it is a controversial matter just what makes a fact about some matter a fact about a matter *external* to a subject. And, externalists themselves disagree concerning just which facts about matters external to subjects are relevant for determining the justificatory status of attitudes. But, what unites them is the view that at least some facts about matters external to subjects are relevant for determining the justificatory status of their attitudes.

Typically, evidentialists are internalists. For, typically, evidentialists believe that evidential facts are sufficient to fix justificatory facts, and that evidential facts are facts about matters internal to subjects.[8] Yet, there is wiggle room here. For, there is disagreement concerning the nature of evidence.[9] There are views of evidence which make evidence a more public, less internal affair. And, someone who believes this kind of account of evidence and believes that evidential facts fix justificatory facts would count as an externalist. Perhaps Clifford's famous dictum that "it is wrong always,

[8] See, however, (Lyons 2009), where he takes it as sufficient for one to be an evidentialist that one thinks that epistemic justification is at least *in part* a function of one's evidence.

[9] There is disagreement both about the kinds of things which are evidence as well as disagreement about which specific things of the right kind are evidence in any given case. The main views concerning what kinds of things count as evidence are abstractionist views which count only abstract things like propositions as evidence and psychologist views which count only certain psychological states as evidence. There is logical space for internalist and externalist varieties of each of these views.

everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" was inspired by an externalist variety of evidentialism.[10]

Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views constitute one type of internalist view. They are committed to the claim that justificatory facts are fixed by facts about matters in an important way internal to subjects. For, they are committed to the claims that justificatory facts are fixed by facts about the evidence that subjects have and that facts about the evidence subjects have are facts about matters internal to subjects. That they are committed to the claim that all justificatory facts are fixed by facts about had evidence is clear from their thesis ES:

> (ES) The epistemic justification of anyone's doxastic attitude toward any proposition at any time strongly supervenes on the evidence that the person has at the time (Conee and Feldman 2004).

ES they call "bedrock evidentialism." The language of supervenience in ES is supposed to be roughly equivalent to the language of fixing I have been using. So, according to ES, justificatory facts are fixed by evidential facts. Further, because Conee and Feldman think that all had evidence consists in mental states, they express their internalist views in terms of the following thesis:

> (M) If any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are exactly alike justificationally (Conee and Feldman 2001).

Justificatory facts therefore supervene on or are fixed by internal facts, according to Conee and Feldman. Specifically, they are fixed by mental facts. In this way, Conee and Feldman endorse one variety of internalism.

There are various ways of supporting internalism in contrast to externalism. Though it is not my aim to offer a full defense of the view here, I will mention two of the

[10] See (Clifford 1877).

central lines of motivation for internalist theories. These motivations for internalism will play an important role in some arguments to come later in the dissertation. Both lines of motivation appeal to individual cases which many have taken to indicate that justificatory facts are fixed by facts about matters in an important way internal to agents.

The first line appeals to what is called the "new evil demon problem." Here we are to imagine two individuals, exactly alike mentally, who inhabit very different possible worlds. The first individual, let's say, is you in the world as you suppose it to be. The second individual is very much like you. In fact, she is exactly like you in one important respect. She is exactly like you mentally. However, the world she inhabits is very different from yours. For, her mental life has been induced in her by an evil demon, rather than in the sort of way that your mental life has been induced in you. From her perspective, everything appears just the same as it does to you. But, presumably, you are right about much more than she is. For, like we said, you inhabit a world which is as you suppose it to be. But, this other individual, we have said, does not inhabit such a world. In fact, we are to imagine that the demon ensures that for nearly everything that this individual supposes, she is wrong. Now, consider the following question about this individual. What is she justified in believing? Is she justified in believing the same things as you, or different things? Many have taken it as quite clear that she is justified in believing the same things as you. After all, from your perspective, you might well be her. Yet, if she is justified in believing all and only the same things as you, then there is powerful evidence here in favor of internalism. Justificatory facts are fixed by facts about matters which are in an important way internal to subjects. Indeed, they are fixed by facts about what you might call the mental life of a person. Cases like the new evil

demon case are often thought to support Conee's and Feldman's specific variety of internalism—mentalism. For, it seems that the best explanation for why you and this other individual are justified in believing all of the same things is that you and her are exactly alike mentally.

A second line of motivation for internalism appeals to Laurence Bonjour's (1980) case of Norman the clairvoyant. The case is as follows:

> Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against his belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.

Many have found it intuitive that Norman is not justified in believing that the President is in New York City in this case. *We* might be, knowing that Norman thinks this is where the President is located and knowing of his clairvoyant power. But this is because we, and not Norman, possess the information that Norman possesses the clairvoyant power in question. One argument for thinking that Norman is not justified in believing that the President is in New York here appeals to what is known as the subject's perspective objection (SPO). The idea is that, if a proposition's being true would be an accident from the subject's own perspective, then the subject is not justified in believing that proposition. Here it looks as if the President's being in New York would be an accident from Norman's own perspective and hence Norman is not justified in believing that the President is in New York.

Many have thought that the best explanation for why Norman is not justified here, perhaps despite certain objective confirmation relations holding between his believing

that the President is in New York City and the President's in fact being in New York City, will appeal to internalism. Norman isn't justified because there is nothing internal to him which supports his belief about the President. He believes that the President is in New York, to be sure. But the problem is that there is nothing else internal to him of which he is aware which supports this belief. In particular, there is nothing in his mental profile which supports this belief. We, however, are justified in believing that the President is in New York, given our knowledge of Norman's clairvoyant power, since there is something in our mental profiles which *does* support this belief—namely our knowing that Norman has such a power and that he has reported that the President is in New York. In this way, the Norman case too has been thought to support internalism. For, the best explanation of the case seems to be that justificatory facts are fixed by facts about matters internal to subjects. Perhaps more specifically, justificatory facts are fixed by facts about the mental profiles of agents.

So far we have seen four of the theses I call the "central evidentialist theses." These were M, ES, EJ, and E. M, and likewise ES, is defended by appeals to motivations for internalism like the ones just discussed. EJ Conee and Feldman have always thought to be the natural view, and have sought to defend it from objections.[11] And E is just a way of cashing out what EJ says when it comes to the attitude of belief. It is rather harmless until we begin to say just what evidential support amounts to. Of course, that is what I hope to do in this dissertation.

There is one final thesis I want to include within the central evidentialist theses. It is a thesis concerning epistemic obligations. Conee and Feldman have presented defenses of a specific thesis concerning the relationship between epistemic obligations

[11] See, e.g., their strategy in (Conee and Feldman 1985).

and epistemic justification right alongside their defenses of the other theses mentioned above. For that reason, I take this thesis to be central to their evidentialist views. Any account of epistemic justification which did not accommodate this thesis they would view for that reason as suspicious. The thesis concerning epistemic obligations they defend says the following:

> (EO) S is justified in taking attitude D toward proposition p at t iff S ought to take attitude D toward p at t (Feldman 2000).

Conee and Feldman take EO to constrain any account of epistemic justification. They argue for it by arguing that what fits our evidence fixes our epistemic obligations and that what fits our evidence fixes all facts about what is justified for us. Thus, we are epistemically obliged to have just those attitudes which are justified for us. EJ, E, ES, M, and EO together constitute what I call the central evidentialist theses.[12]

It is noteworthy that all of these theses are theses concerning propositional justification. As we saw earlier, it is natural to begin an account of epistemic justification with an account of propositional justification and build an account of doxastic justification out of that account of propositional justification. And this is exactly what Conee and Feldman do. Their account of doxastic justification says the following:

> (WF) S's doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only if
>
> (i) Having D toward p is justified for S at t; and
> (ii) S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that
>
> a. S has e as evidence at t
> b. Having D toward p fits e; and
> c. There is no more inclusive body of evidence e' had by S at t such that having D toward p does not fit e' (Conee and Feldman 1985).

[12] By labeling these theses in this way, I mean only to suggest that these theses are central to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist project. I don't mean to suggest that they are central to all evidentialists' projects.

Here they use the phrase "well-founded" in the way I have been using the phrase "doxastically justified." The use of "justified" in (i) is meant to express propositional justification.

Now, I don't include WF as one of the central evidentialist theses. But, this isn't because it isn't a key thesis which Conee and Feldman defend. Nor is it because I think CIA doesn't fit as well with it as it does with EJ, E, ES, M and EO. It is just that, in this dissertation, I focus on propositional justification, and these latter theses are the central evidentialist theses relevant to propositional justification. Where I do talk about doxastic justification, I am sure to point out that views of propositional justification based off of CIA are consistent with an at most slightly modified version of WF. And, further, I will employ WF in arguments at various points throughout the dissertation with the assumption that if a view conflicts with WF, this provides the evidentialist strong motivation for denying that view.

Take this to suffice for a presentation of Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views, along with an explanation of where those views fit within the broader literature on epistemic justification. In the next section, my goal is to explain the specific contents of each chapter of my dissertation, and to show how each chapter contributes to establishing my thesis that CIA is an account of the evidential support relation central to Conee's and Feldman's work on epistemic justification which is preferable to attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts of that relation.

3 Summary of My Chapters

I have said that my goal is to argue in favor of one particular account of the evidential support relation over three rival types of account. In this section, I pursue two ends

which will show how I go about making that argument in the dissertation. First, I present in brief outline the three rival accounts which I will argue are inferior to CIA. Second, I briefly outline the contents of the chapters in my dissertation in which I argue that these accounts are inferior to CIA.

I said above that I will call the three rival accounts to CIA the attitudinalist account, the explanationist account, and the probabilistic account. Begin with the attitudinalist account. In fact there are multiple versions of the attitudinalist account. These attitudinalist accounts do not offer necessary and sufficient conditions for a subject S's evidence to support a proposition p, but only necessary conditions. They say that S's evidence e supports p only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p. One example would be an account which says that e supports p only if S grasps the connection between e and p. Accounts along these lines are suggested, though not fully endorsed, at some places in the writings of Conee and Feldman. Further, some have argued that only attitudinalist views or views in their near neighborhood will allow the evidentialist to retain thesis M.[13] Attitudinalist views, then, are worthy of consideration as candidates for the support relation.

The explanationist account is the official view of Conee and Feldman (2008). It says that S's evidence e supports p iff p is part of the best explanation available to S for e. In order for p to be part of the best explanation available to S for e, p need not be true. Rather, something like the following subjunctive conditional needs to be true: were p true, p would explain e. Further, while Conee and Feldman offer no account of what is required for p to be available to S, they do suggest at least that S must sufficiently understand p.

[13] See, e.g., (Goldman 1999).

Third is the probabilistic account. Just as there are multiple versions of attitudinalist accounts, there are multiple versions of probabilistic accounts. I consider two representative types of probabilistic account in chapter three. The first is a Bayesian-inspired account which makes usage of subjective degrees of beliefs along with rules for probabilistic coherence and inference to explain evidential support. The second is an account I call the two-story story. Accounts falling under this type offer one probabilistic view concerning the way in which beliefs support propositions and one probabilistic view concerning the way in which experiences support propositions. The account of evidential support from beliefs says that a belief or group of beliefs b supports a proposition p for S just when b is justified, the probability of p given the contents of b is sufficiently high, and S is aware of this probabilifying relation. Accounts of evidential support from experiences may differ. Some make usage of the contents of experience, while others make usage of the existence of experiences. On the first sort of account, an experience e supports a proposition p for S just when the probability of p given the content of e is sufficiently high. On the second sort of account an experience e supports a proposition p for S just when the probability of p given that S has e is sufficiently high.

With a handle on these rival accounts of evidential support, I will now outline the contents of the chapters which follow. In chapter two I consider attitudinalist accounts of the support relation. I show why it is that Conee and Feldman do say some things in favor of such views, and what advantages such views would offer them in the face of some recent objections raised against their evidentialist program. I also show, however, that attitudinalist views, when conjoined with the central evidentialist theses above, have implications which conflict with intuitive judgments concerning justified doxastic

attitudes. Specifically, attitudinalist views make justification too hard to come by, since they require too much sophisticated reflection on the part of a subject for her to have justified beliefs. CIA, by contrast, does not have this implication. Further, CIA promises nearly the same advantages for the evidentialist with respect to those recent objections raised against her view which the attitudinalist view promises to solve. These considerations, combined with the claim that CIA doesn't also have other implications, when conjoined with versions of the above evidentialist theses, which conflict with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification, lead me to favor CIA over attitudinalist accounts of evidential support. I defend this further claim—the claim that CIA doesn't conflict with *other* intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification—in chapter four.

In chapter three I turn to Conee's and Feldman's official explanationist view. I argue, first, that it is not clear that there is any version of this explanationist view which satisfies two constraints Conee and Feldman wish to place on the correct account of the support relation. I then show that all plausible varieties of explanationism, including those varieties which do seem to satisfy the two aforementioned constraints, face a serious difficulty when it comes to accounting for certain cases of justified beliefs about the future. Notably, CIA satisfies both of the constraints and does not have any trouble accounting for these cases of justified beliefs about the future. These considerations, combined with the claim that CIA doesn't also have other implications, when conjoined with versions of the above evidentialist theses, which conflict with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification, should lead the advocate of the central evidentialist theses to prefer CIA to the explanationist account.

Chapter four treats probabilistic accounts. I discuss two representative accounts, present independent difficulties for each, and then present a difficulty for probabilistic accounts more generally. The first account I consider is the Bayesian-inspired account. The central independent difficulty for this account is that it does not allow experiences to play a role in supporting beliefs—even beliefs about their own existence. The second account, the two-story story view, does allow experiences to play such a role. I present difficulties for the two-story story having to do both with the account of support from beliefs and with the account of support from experiences. The central difficulties facing the account of support from beliefs are that this account fails to allow beliefs with content like <S is having an experience as of an x> to support propositions with content like <there is an x>, and that this account requires that only justified beliefs can support propositions when arguably beliefs which aren't justified can do so as well. I show, in addition, that several difficulties face the most elegant and obvious of the available probabilistic views concerning how experiences support propositions. After presenting these independent difficulties for the Bayesian view and the two-story story, I close the chapter by showing that probabilistic accounts in general fail to allow dispositions to play the role they plausibly do play in epistemic justification. None of the difficulties discussed are difficulties for CIA. Thus, given that CIA does not face independent difficulties, it is preferable to these probabilistic accounts.

In the fifth chapter I focus my attention on CIA itself. I begin with an extended explanatory commentary on CIA. I discuss what is meant in CIA by "evidence," "having evidence," "by virtue of," "disposition," "ultima facie inclined," and "at t." After completing this commentary—an exposition of CIA, if you will—I complete my

argument that CIA is preferable to the accounts of evidential support discussed in chapters two through four. There are three things I must show in detail to complete this argument. First, I must show that CIA is consistent with the central evidentialist theses. Second, I must show in detail that CIA does not face the difficulties faced by the accounts of chapters one through three. Third, I must attempt to make it plausible that CIA does not suffer from other independent difficulties. I consider several of the most prima facie threatening difficulties for CIA—some driven by intuition and some driven by theory—and attempt to show that these difficulties are not fatal.

So, in chapters twp through five I shall argue that there is a conjunction whose conjuncts are CIA and only slightly modified versions of the central evidentialist theses above which is consistent and which has implications concerning epistemic justification which match better our intuitive judgments about justified doxastic attitudes than do the implications of rival conjunctions of only slightly modified versions of those same theses and attitudinalist, explanationist, or probabilistic accounts of evidential support. In this way, I hope to contribute something of significance to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist project and thereby to the theory of epistemic justification as a whole.

Before concluding this section, it will be helpful to note three things here which temper the conclusion that can be drawn from my work. First, it is important to note that I only consider three of the leading rivals to CIA. I am only arguing that CIA is preferable to these three types of account—attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts. This is compatible with there being some other account of evidential support superior to CIA as well as to these other three accounts.

Second, it is important to notice the nature of the accounts considered. I am interested in considering *fully* attitudinalist, *fully* explanationist, and *fully* probabilistic accounts of evidential support. There is possible space for hybrids of these accounts. For instance, someone could advocate an account according to which evidence supports a proposition if either the conditions of attitudinalism are met or the conditions of explanationism are met. And there are other such disjunctive accounts imaginable. Nothing I say in the body of the dissertation shows that CIA is preferable to these hybrid accounts. However, it is noteworthy that these hybrid accounts do give up quite a bit of intuitive appeal by sacrificing their simplicity and elegance.[14]

Third, it may turn out that there is no analysis of the evidential support relation after all. In other words, it may turn out that this relation is *unanalyzable* or basic. My argument in this dissertation is for the conclusion that one proposed analysis of this relation is preferable to others. But this is consistent with there being no correct account of this relation after all. My hope, of course, is that there is such an account and that it is the one I offer. But it is consistent with my work here that there is no such account.[15]

The reader should keep these limitations in mind when considering what conclusions can be drawn from my argument that CIA is preferable to attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts of evidential support.

[14] Perhaps this is part of the reason why Conee (1988) himself prefers a unified account.

[15] Conee has expressed some pessimism about whether there is an analysis of evidential support to me in conversation. His (1988) also suggests such pessimism.

4 The Motivation for and Significance of the Project

Now that I have described in suitable detail the project I will pursue in the following chapters, I want to pause to say a bit about what has attracted me to this project. I'll discuss four motivations which highlight the significance of the project.

First, I was attracted to pursuing this project because the relation of evidential support is a subject of great interest to many working in epistemology, not just Conee and Feldman. Of course, I do focus in the following pages on the relation of evidential support central to *their* views, and it may be that this relation is different from relations other philosophers are interested in. However, much of what I say about the support relation should be acceptable even to some who are not ready to swallow hook, line, and sinker Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist program. For, many of the arguments I make in the following chapters concerning the support relation do not rely on principles unique to their views, but on principles more generally acceptable to internalists. Indeed, in future work in this area I plan to argue that from the perspective of a typical internalist CIA and the account of justification it licenses have much going for them in comparison to other accounts of evidential support and the accounts of justification they license. Thus, much of what I say in this dissertation about the evidential support relation should be of interest to many internalists interested in the evidential support relation. This has been a motivation for me in pursuing this project.

Starting by addressing the support relation in the context of Conee's and Feldman's work is not a bad place to start. Indeed, the quality of their work, their defenses of its central components, and the attention it has received in the recent literature is another motivation for the present project. I have already discussed briefly

how Conee and Feldman have sought to defend the central evidentialist theses discussed above. Though not all have been persuaded by these defenses, the defenses are respectable. Further, interest in their views has surged of late with a great number of articles devoted to their work, a book of their own in 2004, and an edited collection of essays devoted to their work still forthcoming. Beginning a discussion of the evidential support relation by focusing on their work, then, seems duly motivated. By beginning here my project begins with a view wherein the evidential support relation takes center stage which view is both plausible and has received a great deal of recent attention.

A third motivation for my project is that it brings me into contact with what I think of as three contemporary research groups. The first and most obvious is the explanationist research group headed by Conee and Feldman. Not only do Conee and Feldman propose an explanationist account of evidential support in their own work, but some of their students have been working on explanationist views as well. In particular, I am thinking of Kevin McCain's forthcoming dissertation concerning explanationist responses to skepticism. A second research group my project brings me into conversation with is the direct awareness group headed by Richard Fumerton. Direct awareness features prominently in my discussions of explanationist and probabilistic accounts of evidential support, and indeed in CIA itself. Fumerton is not the lone contemporary author working on direct awareness. Some of his students have taken his lead as well. In particular, I am thinking of Sam Taylor's work applying the direct awareness view to Bergman's dilemma for internalism. A third research group is the phenomenal conservatism group headed by Mike Huemer. Not only has Huemer ably defended phenomenal conservatism in numerous publications, but phenomenal

conservatism and views much like it seem to be all the rage. In particular, I am thinking of the attention given to phenomenal conservatism in Chris Tucker's (forthcoming) edited collection devoted to seemings. By interacting with these three contemporary research groups in my dissertation, I hope to gain dialectical partners that will last for some time in my philosophical career. This is a third motivation for my project.

A fourth and final motivation for the project are its numerous implications for the study of epistemic justification more generally. There are some very significant claims concerning the structure of justification, the nature of religious and moral justification, the value of justification, and the viability of internalism which follow if the project is fully successful. For instance, if the project is successful, then all of the traditional accounts of the structure of justification are incorrect. If the project is successful, then there is a plausible way of unifying accounts of religious, moral and perceptual justification. If the project is successful, then an Aristotelian theory of epistemic value deserves significant discussion. And, if the project is successful, then there is a satisfying reply to Bergman's dilemma—an important argument against the viability of internalism. These implications are all intrinsically important for contemporary epistemology.

For these reasons, I believe the project I pursue in the following chapters duly motivated. I invite the reader to follow me along as we begin in the first chapter by considering the first proposed account of evidential support—attitudinalism.

CHAPTER TWO

Attitudinalist Accounts of Evidential Support

The foremost defenders of evidentialism, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, have defined their view in terms of the following thesis:

> (EJ) Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t.

Though the definition is short, the commentary on it is longer. In particular, Conee and Feldman have sought to clarify EJ by discussing such things as the relations of fit and support, what it is to have evidence, and in what evidence itself consists.

Some of Conee's and Feldman's commentary on EJ suggests that they are friendly toward a view of the support relation—the relation which obtains between a person's evidence e and a proposition p just when e supports p—which I call "attitudinalist." By an "attitudinalist" view of the support relation, I mean a view which requires that for S to have evidence e which supports a proposition p, S must take a certain kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p. The specific version of attitudinalism toward which Conee and Feldman have appeared friendly is one according to which S's evidence e supports p only if S regards e as indicative of the truth of p. This attitudinalist view of the support relation obviously does not offer necessary and sufficient conditions for a person S's evidence e to support a proposition p, but it does offer one important necessary condition.

In this chapter, I begin by showing that at various points Conee and Feldman have talked as if they are friendly toward this attitudinalist view of the support relation

(Section 1). I then illustrate why this is important by considering some recent objections to their evidentialist views which they can easily dismiss if they do endorse an attitudinalist view along these lines. These objections come from a forthcoming collection of essays edited by Trent Dougherty in which philosophers Keith DeRose, Duncan Pritchard, and Alvin Goldman present prima facie serious concerns for evidentialism. I will present their critiques in Section 2 and then show in Section 3 that if Conee and Feldman do want to embrace an attitudinalist view of evidential support like the one just mentioned these critiques are just off-target; they aren't addressing Conee's and Feldman's views. I continue discussing the potential benefits of attitudinalist views in Section 4. There I discuss an argument some have endorsed which, if successful, would show that one can only maintain internalist theses about epistemic justification like M if one endorses something in the neighborhood of attitudinalism. Attitudinalist views, then, have a good deal going for them for someone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views.

Nonetheless, despite these potential advantages of attitudinalism, I show in Section 5 that attitudinalism, particularly of the variety discussed in the preceding paragraph, faces at least one very serious difficulty. Attitudinalist views of evidential support, when combined with the central evidentialist theses, have the consequence that doxastic attitudes of some subjects which we intuitively judge justified are in fact not justified. Attitudinalism makes justification too hard to come by. In response to this difficulty for attitudinalist accounts, one might seek to modify attitudinalism. In Section 5, I consider three plausible modifications of the original atttitudinalist proposal. First, I consider modifications of the view which move away from a view which would require

occurrent attitudes toward the relation between one's evidence and the proposition supported by this evidence and toward a view which requires only that the subject have a dispositional attitude toward this relation or that the subject be disposed to take such an attitude. Second, I consider a more significant departure from the original attitudinalist account which suggests that in order for a person S's evidence e to support a proposition p, S needs no occurrent or dispositional attitude, or even a disposition to take an attitude toward the relation between e and p, but S does need to have evidence that e supports p. I argue that the first two modifications of attitudinalism face the same difficulty as the original—they too require too much for subjects to have justified doxastic attitudes. The third modification, I argue, results in vicious regresses. Thus, neither the original attitudinalist proposal nor these modified versions of it can succeed.

I conclude by considering how the causal-inclination account of evidential support (CIA) does in comparison to the attitudinalist views I discuss in this chapter (Section 6). First, I show that CIA affords Conee and Feldman replies to the criticisms of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman which are just as easy as those afforded by attitudinalist views. Second, I offer some reason to think that CIA doesn't have the consequence, when combined with central evidentialist theses, that justification is harder to come by than it is. At least, I show that there is some reason to think that, in the cases discussed where attitudinalist views have consequences which conflict with intuitive judgments concerning the justificatory status of doxastic attitudes, CIA does not have those same unhappy consequences. I say more about this topic in chapter five after further clarifying CIA. Third, I show that one may embrace CIA while retaining internalist theses like M. The argument that one can only retain internalist theses like M if one takes an

attitudinalist view fails. Thus, presuming that CIA doesn't conflict with *other* intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification when combined with suitably modified versions of the central evidentialist theses—a claim I will support in chapter five—I conclude that the conjunction of CIA with the central evidentialist theses is preferable to the conjunction of attitudinalist views of evidential support with at most suitably modified versions of central evidentialist theses. Anyone attracted to evidentialist views like those of Conee and Feldman should find CIA more attractive than attitudinalist views of any kind. For, those views, when conjoined with at most slightly modified versions of central evidentialist theses, conflict with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification; but CIA does not.

1 Conee's and Feldman's Friendliness toward Attitudinalism

In this section, I will discuss those places in the writings of Conee and Feldman where they express some sympathies for attitudinalist views of evidential support.[1] Recall, first, that attitudinalist views of evidential support say that a subject S's evidence e supports a proposition p only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p.[2] Now, presumably, the proposition *S's evidence e supports p* is equivalent to the proposition *the evidence e that S has supports p*. For, to talk of "S's evidence" is just to

[1] There are other epistemologists who have also presented views friendly toward attitudinalism. (Bonjour 1980) seems to be an example, and (Pryor 2000) lists several epistemologists who have been friendly toward attitudinalist views. Attitudinalist views are one example of what (Alston 1986) calls views which have "higher-order requirements."

[2] "e" here can stand for any item or group of items of evidence, including the subject's entire body of evidence. Thus, the attitudinalist offers a constraint for items within an evidence set supporting a proposition. If she wants to offer necessary conditions for a subject's entire body of evidence supporting a proposition, she could use the present account to do so. She could simply say: S's total evidence e supports p only if there is some item or group of items e' in e which are such that S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e' and p. I say more about this issue in chapter five.

talk of the evidence S has.[3] So, if I can show that Conee and Feldman say things which are sympathetic toward the view that S has evidence e which supports p only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p, I will thereby have shown that they have sympathies for attitudinalist accounts of evidential support.[4] And this is just what I will do.

That Conee and Feldman are sympathetic toward the view that S has evidence e which supports p only if S takes a certain kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p is clear from their presentations in "Evidence" (Conee and Feldman 2008) and in "First Things First" (Conee 2004). In each of these places, Conee and Feldman go so far as to claim that where S fails to take the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p, e fails to qualify as evidence about p at all for S and *a fortiori* fails to be evidence S has which supports p. In "First Things First," while discussing the view Seeming Evidentialism, Conee writes,

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[3] The possessive form is used interchangeably with the full "has evidence" phrase at various points, for instance, in (Feldman 2004).

[4] One might object here that, by showing that something e counts as evidence for a proposition p for a subject S only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p I have not shown that something e supports a proposition p for some subject S only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p. For, it might be that something e can support a proposition p for a subject S even though S takes no attitude toward the relation between e and p. For instance, let e just be some proposition q which entails p, but whose relation to p S has never considered. Plausibly, e will then support p. But, in such a case, e will just not be part of the evidence S has. So, showing that Conee and Feldman are friendly toward the view that something e is evidence for S for p only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p is not sufficient for showing that they are friendly toward attitudinalism.

However, this objection misses an important point. It misses the point that the evidential support relation key to the views of Conee and Feldman is a relation which obtains only between *evidence* and that which evidence supports. It doesn't obtain between anything which isn't evidence and something else. And, if something e counts as evidence for a proposition p for S only if S takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p, then *a fortiori* e evidentially supports p only if S takes this attitude toward the relation between e and p.

Now, as I mentioned in the Introduction, it may be that there is an important relation which is worth of the title "support relation" which obtains between things other than evidence and something else. Indeed, the quote from Feldman to follow in the text indicates just this. But, that relation is not the evidential support relation key to the views of Conee and Feldman. And it is the evidential support relation in which I am interested here.

> [S]omeone's evidence about a proposition includes all that *seems to the person to bear on the truth of the proposition*. . . . What seem true are propositions. They seem true in virtue of the fact that we are spontaneously inclined *to regard something of which we are aware as indicative of their truth* (p.15, italics mine).

It is natural to interpret the "all" in the first line of this quotation as an "all and only," since Conee is here telling us what evidence is in the definitional sense of "is." Thus, a subject's evidence includes all *and only* that which seems to the subject to bear on the truth of the proposition supported by the subject's evidence. For Conee, what counts as evidence are certain things of which we are aware. He offers as examples such things as "conscious qualities, memories, and conceptual connections." It is these things of which we are aware which count as evidence for a proposition p only when we regard them as indicative of p or only if it seems to us that they bear on the truth of p. Thus, to take a crude example, a subject S's cup-ish experience is only evidence for the proposition that there is a cup, and hence only supports the proposition that there is a cup, if it seems to S that S's cup-ish experience bears on the truth of the proposition that there is a cup, or, alternatively, if S regards S's cup-ish experience as indicative of the truth of the proposition that there is a cup. Thus, S must take an attitude toward e's relation to p if e is to be evidence which supports p. And this is attitudinalism.

Conee's and Feldman's remarks in "Evidence" (2008) also suggest an attitudinalist view. They distinguish there between "scientific evidence" and the kind of evidence with which evidentialism is concerned. Something E is scientific evidence, they say, just in case "E is publicly available and E reliably indicates the truth of P."[5] Yet, not all scientific evidence for a proposition p, even if shared by a subject S, supports p for S. They write,

[5] Perhaps, as I suggested in the Introduction, it was this sort of view of evidence which was guiding Clifford's (1877) discussion.

> Suppose that some factor, S, is scientific evidence, for some condition, C. One's knowing that S exists does not guarantee that one is to the slightest degree justified in believing that C obtains. . . [For,] one can have scientific evidence without having any reason at all to believe what that scientific evidence supports. A criminal investigator can know the proposition F, that the fingerprints at the scene of a crime have precise characteristics X, Y, and Z. This can be strong, even decisive, scientific evidence for the proposition, L, that Lefty was at the scene of the crime. But, if the investigator does not know, or at least have reason to believe, that F indicates Lefty's presence, then the investigator has no reason at all to believe L and is not (on that basis, at least) at all justified in believing L. To be justified in this case he must in some way grasp the connection between F and L. . . . As we use the word "evidence," in our statement of evidentialism, the investigator who is unaware of any such connection does not have evidence that Lefty was at the scene of the crime (p.84-5).

Thus, not all scientific evidence which supports a proposition p is *evidence* which supports a proposition p, where the italicized "evidence" is the kind of epistemically justifying evidence with which Conee and Feldman are concerned. Indeed, if S doesn't "grasp the connection" between some bit of scientific evidence e and p, then e will not count as evidence of the justifying kind for p, for S, and hence will not count as evidence which supports p. Thus, it would appear that in order for some evidence e of S's to evidentially support p, S must take an attitude toward e's relation to p—S must grasp e's connection to p. And, again, this is attitudinalism.

Now, I say that Conee and Feldman write in ways which are friendly toward attitudinalist views, but I stop short of saying that they endorse an attitudinalist view. This is somewhat surprising, at least initially. For, one would think that from the above claims one could easily build an argument that Conee and Feldman are *committed* to attitudinalist views. For, they do seem to endorse the view, at least in some cases, that if S doesn't take the right kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p, then e is not evidence of S's which supports p. And, by contraposition, attitudinalism follows. Yet, there is some evidence for thinking that Conee and Feldman do not endorse

attitudinalism. Predictably, this evidence comes from *other* things which they say which indicate that they are *not* so friendly toward attitudinalist views. For instance, at a later stage in their paper "Evidence," they criticize a view of the support relation which holds that S's evidence e supports p if and only if S believes that e supports p. Criticizing the left-to-right direction of this conditional, they say that such a view "implies a metalevel requirement that we reject—namely, that justified belief in all cases requires believing that some suitable objective relation holds between one's evidence and the content of one's beliefs (p.95)." Perhaps it is this particular metaleval requirement they reject—the metaleval requirement that S must *believe* something about the *evidential relationship* between e and p for e to support p. Or, alternatively, it might be that they just don't like metalevel requirements at all. If it is the latter, then surely they are not so attracted to attitudinalist views as the evidence above suggests.

Additional evidence that they might not accept an attitudinalist view is perhaps supplied by their own official explanationist view of evidential support—that S's evidence e supports p just in case p is part of the best explanation available to S for e. For, although it isn't clear that this explanationist view *implies* that attitudinalism is false, neither does it obviously imply attitudinalism. If their own official view of evidential support is consistent with the denial of attitudinalism, then perhaps they are not so attracted to attitudinalist views as the evidence above suggests. So, there is at least some reason to be cautious about attributing an attitudinalist view to Conee and Feldman.

Nonetheless, they do talk as if they are friendly toward such a view, and there is a tempting argument that they are indeed committed to such a view. Further, the comments we have just reviewed go some of the way toward explaining just what kind of attitude S

must take toward the relation between e and p for e to count as evidence for p. S must take an attitude wherein she grasps the connection between e and p, wherein she regards e as indicative of p's truth, wherein it seems to her that e bears on the truth of p. There is certainly work left to do in unpacking this idea. Yet, it is clear that however the details are filled in the idea implies attitudinalism of the sort I defined above. Attitudinalist views are worthy of consideration in their own right, and especially worthy of consideration in this context because of the remarks Conee and Feldman make which seem friendly toward such views. They are further worthy of consideration because, as we will see in the next two sections, they offer Conee and Feldman easy replies to objections recently brought against their evidentialist views.

2 DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman vs Evidentialism

In this section I will present three recent criticisms of Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views. I show how attitudinalist views of the support relation would offer Conee and Feldman easy replies to these objections in the next section.

Begin with DeRose's criticism (forthcoming). In his "Questioning Evidentialism," DeRose focuses on a piece of the commentary on EJ which encapsulates the evidentialist's view of epistemic normativity, the thesis O2:

> O2. For any person S, time t, and proposition p, if S has any doxastic attitude at all toward p at t, then S epistemically ought to have the attitude toward p supported by S's evidence at t (Feldman 2000).[6]

DeRose demands that the evidentialist explain why the sense of "ought" captured in O2 has a special claim to be considered *the* epistemic ought, when there seem to be equally good senses of "ought" which are just as epistemic. He motivates this demand by

[6] Compare the central evidentialist thesis EO: S is justified in taking attitude D toward proposition p at t iff S ought to take attitude D toward p at t.

appealing to certain cases in which it seems that there is a perfectly intelligible sense of "ought" in which a subject S ought (or ought not) to take a certain attitude D toward a proposition p, where it is not at all clear that the sense of "ought" involved is non-epistemic, and yet where D is not (or is) the attitude supported by S's evidence at t.

DeRose describes two such cases, though I will focus here only on the first case. DeRose describes that case as follows:

> Suppose that Henry firmly believes that P . . . and has excellent evidence for P. Suppose further that Henry doesn't possess evidence against P, so the attitude toward P that fits all the evidence Henry possesses is the confident belief that P which Henry in fact holds. But suppose that Henry doesn't believe P on the basis of the excellent evidence for it that he possesses. Indeed, Henry hasn't even considered P in the light of this excellent evidence, and the fact that he possesses good evidence for P is no part of the explanation for why Henry believes that P. Rather, Henry believes that P on the basis of some other beliefs of his that he considers to be good evidence for P, but which in fact constitute absolutely lousy evidence for P.

Thus, we imagine that Henry believes p on the basis of some evidence e which is in fact lousy evidence for p. Yet, as it turns out, Henry has some additional evidence e' which is fabulous evidence for p. O2 tells us that, in such a case, Henry has the attitude toward p which he ought to have—namely, the attitude of believing. Yet, there seems to be a perfectly good sense in which Henry *ought not* have this attitude toward p, says DeRose. And, this sense of ought is not at all clearly non-epistemic. So, DeRose challenges Conee and Feldman to explain why it is that their sense of "ought" should be favored over this one. In the next section, however, I will show that this criticism would be simply off-target if Conee and Feldman embraced an attitudinalist account of evidential support.

Next, take Prichard's criticism (forthcoming). In his "Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism," Pritchard argues that Conee and Feldman have made a mistake by tying their evidentialist views to a classical internalism which accepts the following theses:

> (MENT) If S and S* do not differ in their mental states then they will not differ in the degree of epistemic justification that they have for their beliefs.[7]
>
> (ACCESS) If S and S* do not differ in the facts that they are able to know by reflection alone then they will not differ in the degree of epistemic justification that they have for their beliefs.
>
> (DISC) If the experiences had by S and S* are indiscriminable then S and S* will not differ in the degree of epistemic justification that they have for their beliefs.

The polar opposite of this classical internalist position is classical externalism, which denies MENT, ACCESS, and DISC. But, Pritchard observes, there are positions intermediate between classical internalism and classical externalism. In particular, there is the epistemic disjunctivist's position which accepts MENT and ACCESS but denies DISC. Pritchard argues that this disjunctivist position is favorable to the classical internalist position because it provides a better response to skepticism, while overcoming all of the most threatening objections urged against it. Further, the theory is not without theoretical motivation. Interestingly, Pritchard's criticism, too, would be off-target if Conee and Feldman embraced attitudinalism.

Finally, consider Alvin Goldman's criticism. One of Goldman's key arguments against evidentialism runs as follows. Evidentialists, like Conee and Feldman, are committed to the *sufficiency of current experience* (SCE) thesis, which says:

[7] Compare central evidentialist thesis M: If two subjects are exactly alike mentally, then they are exactly alike justificationally.

> (SCE) The experiential portion of an agent S's current body of evidence is sufficient to determine whether the fittingness relation holds or does not hold between any hypothesis and S's evidence.

But, SCE is false. So, evidentialism is in trouble.

Why think that SCE is false? Here Goldman appeals to beliefs formed through the process of what he calls "preservative memory." "Preservative memory does not create or generate justifiedness 'from scratch,'" writes Goldman, "but instead *transmits* a belief's justifiedness from one time to a later time." Preservative memory is thus a process whereby one acquires a justified belief that p at time t_1 on the basis of some experiential evidence e, and then at a later time t_2 continues to justifiedly believe that p, though she has long since forgotten e. One example of such a preservative memory belief Goldman offers is one's belief that one's social security number is such-and-such. This belief, maintained through the process of preservative memory, may contribute something additional to the justificatory status of my beliefs than they receive only through my current experiential evidence. For instance, there may be nothing in my current experiential evidence which supports the belief that my social security number ends with such-and-such four digits. But, my belief that my social security number is such-and-such, maintained and justified through preservative memory, does support this latter belief. As Goldman puts it, preservative memory "explains how the evidential status of a belief held at t can partly derive from earlier experiences without positing event memories, at t, *of* such earlier experiences." I shall in the next section show that this critique, too, would be off-target, were Conee and Feldman to endorse attitudinalism.

3 DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman Off-Target, Given Attitudinalism

Let me now show why it is the case that were Conee and Feldman to endorse attitudinalism, this would imply that the critiques of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman are each off-target. Begin with DeRose. Recall DeRose's stipulations in the first Henry case. There we were to suppose that Henry believes p on the basis of lousy evidence e, yet Henry has alternative evidence e' which is fantastic evidence for p. Now, notice what implications attitudinalism has for this case. If e' is to count as evidence for Henry that p, then Henry must grasp the connection between e' and p. Yet, as DeRose describes the case, we are explicitly directed to suppose that Henry *doesn't* take such an attitude toward the relation between e' and p. DeRose told us that "Henry hasn't even considered P in the light of this excellent evidence." But, then, e' will not count as evidence for p for Henry. And so O2 will not say that Henry ought to believe p.

Further, even if DeRose alters this feature of the case, it will not help. For, imagine that Henry *does* grasp the connections between e' and p and between e and p. Why would Henry then base his belief that p on e rather than e' or rather than the conjunction of e and e'? This sort of happening is in fact quite hard to imagine. When I discuss this sort of case with colleagues, they often respond that such a case just isn't psychologically possible at all. Yet, even supposing that it is, there is an interesting result. It seems that, if Henry grasps the connection between e and p and between e' and p and then bases his belief that p on e alone, this must have involved some kind of willful effort on Henry's part. And, it would seem that if this is the case, it is much more plausible that the sense in which he has not believed as he *ought* is a *moral* sense, rather than an epistemic sense. Henry is blameworthy for believing as he has, but his belief is

nonetheless the right one to have, given his evidence. And this is just what evidentialists would like to say about this case.

Move to Pritchard's critique. Pritchard's critique will go off-target by suggesting that Conee and Feldman endorse MENT, ACCESS, and DISC. For, if we make them attitudinalists, it is clear that they *will not* accept DISC. Recall that DISC says that for any agents S and S*, if the experiences had by S and S* are indiscriminable then S and S* will not differ in the degree of epistemic justification that they have for their beliefs. To show that Conee and Feldman will not accept this, we will need a case where two agents host indistinguishable experiences and yet, given Conee's and Feldman's views, they differ in justificatory facts. This is in fact quite easy to have, if they are attitudinalists. For, imagine that S and S* each have an experience e such that S's experience is indistinguishable from S*'s experience. Now, remember that, for Conee and Feldman, S and S* will differ in justificatory facts if they differ with respect to which propositions are supported by their evidence. But, according to attitudinalism, S and S* may differ in which propositions are supported by their evidence if S, but not S*, takes the right sort of attitude toward the relation between the shared indiscriminable experience e and a proposition p. For S, e may count as evidence for p and may even support p such that S is justified in believing p. But, for S*, whose experience e is indiscriminable from S's experience e, e will not count as evidence for p and *a fortiori* will not support p such that S* is justified in believing p. So, S and S*, though they share indiscriminable experiences, may differ in justificatory facts. In this way, were Conee and Feldman to embrace attitudinalism, it would afford them an easy reply to Pritchard's criticism.

Finally, consider again Goldman's critique. Goldman argued that Conee and Feldman are committed to SCE and that SCE is false. It isn't clear to me that his arguments for the falsity of SCE are persuasive. Yet, I will focus here on his claim that Conee and Feldman endorse SCE. It seems clear to me that, if they were attitudinalists, they *wouldn't* accept SCE for reasons similar to those just deduced to explain why they would deny DISC. Recall that SCE says that the experiential portion of an agent S's current body of evidence is sufficient to determine whether the fittingness relation holds or does not hold between any hypothesis and S's evidence. A case like the one just mentioned, where two subjects S and S* share the same experiences, but take different attitudes toward the relation between those experiences and some proposition p, will furnish a case which shows that Conee and Feldman need not accept SCE. For, if SCE were true, then the attitude of belief would be justified for both S and S* or for neither. But, were Conee and Feldman to embrace attitudinalism, the attitude of belief may be justified for one but not for the other. So, were Conee and Feldman to embrace attitudinalism, they would also have an easy reply to Goldman.[8]

It is clear, then, that DeRose's, Pritchard's, and Goldman's critiques would all be off-target, were Conee and Feldman to embrace attitudinalism. These authors' criticisms simply wouldn't address the view Conee and Feldman hold. Attitudinalism would allow them an easy escape from each of these three critiques. Attitudinalism, then, has this

[8] At least, they would have an easy reply to the argument represented on this page. They might not have an easy reply to Goldman's preservative memory case. For, if it is indeed a case where the subject is justified, and that justification comes from evidence now forgotten, then it is a counterexample to attitudinalism. For, the attitudinalist can't allow the forgotten evidence to play a justifying role, since the subject doesn't take an attitude toward it. However, (Conee and Feldman forthcoming) replies to the case by suggesting that it is other evidence, had at the time of recollection, which justifies the belief—not the evidence which has long since been forgotten.

much going for it for someone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's views. In the next section, I will discuss a further potential benefit of attitudinalism.

4 Attitudinalism and Central Evidentialist Thesis M

I have already discussed two reasons why someone attracted to evidentialist views like those of Conee and Feldman might be attracted to an attitudinalist account of evidential support. One reason is that Conee and Feldman talk as if they are friendly toward such an account themselves. A second is that attitudinalist views offer the defender of evidentialism easy responses to some eminent criticisms. In this section, I will discuss one further motivation for attitudinalism. Some have argued that one can only maintain internalist theses like M if one adopts a view like attitudinalism.[9]

One way to put the argument is as follows. Call something a "justifier" just in case it helps determine, or fix, the justificatory status of beliefs. In order for someone to be an internalist, she must think that all justifiers are internal states of the subject. In the particular case of an internalist whose internalism is encapsulated by thesis M, in order to maintain her internalism this theorist must think that all justifiers are part of persons' mental lives. For, according to M, if two subjects are exactly alike mentally, they are exactly alike justificationally. In other words, all that matters for justification—all that counts as a justifier—are the items which compose the subject's mental life. But, the argument goes, evidentialists say that the evidential support relation is also a justifier. For instance, Conee and Feldman's theses EJ and E commit them to claiming that whether a subject S's evidence e *supports* a proposition p helps determine the justificatory status of p for S. Hence, the support relation itself is a justifier, by

[9] I'm thinking in particular of (Goldman 1999). Cf (Bergman 2006a) and (Matheson and Rogers 2011) for a reply.

definition. Yet, plausibly, the support relation is not an item which is part of S's mental life. So, something other than items which compose the mental life of a subject are justifiers, according to evidentialists. So, evidentialists are not internalists; in particular, Conee and Feldman cannot embrace thesis M.

That is, they cannot do so unless they adopt attitudinalism or something very close to it. For, perhaps, if they adopt attitudinalism, then they *can* escape this argument. For, suppose they adopt an attitudinalist account of evidential support. Thus, whether S's evidence e supports a proposition p depends on *attitudes* of S concerning the relation between e and p. But now the evidential support relation might in fact reduce to facts about S's mental life. So, if Conee and Feldman embrace an attitudinalist view of evidential support or something much like it, they might get to retain M. Thus, we have a third motivation for someone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views to accept attitudinalism. Nonetheless, as we will see in the next section, attitudinalism and modifications of it face very serious difficulties. So, if there is a view which will allow us to retain the benefits of attitudinalism without its detriments and if this view does not itself face independent difficulties, it would be preferable to attitudinalism. I shall argue that there is such a view—CIA.

5 Attitudinalism Requires Too Much for Justification

In this section I begin by discussing what I see as the fatal flaw for attitudinalist views. I consider three ways of modifying attitudinalism in response to this difficulty. I show, however, that all three attempts ultimately fail.

The fatal flaw of attitudinalism is that it requires too much sophistication on the part of the agent for her experiences and beliefs to enter into the evidential support

relation. An objection parallel to the infant/child objection raised against positive reasons requiring views about testimony may be raised against this view as well. Positive reasons requiring views about testimonial knowledge and justification require that for an agent S to know p or to have a justified belief that p on the basis of testimony that p, S must have positive reasons for thinking that the testimony that p indicates that p or something along those lines. The infant/child objection against positive reasons requiring views about testimony says that these views go wrong because they rule out infant/child justification or knowledge through testimony, since infants and children simply do not have, and perhaps cannot have, attitudes toward the relation between their testimonial source and the proposition to which this source is testifying. Whatever the merits of this objection against positive reasons requirements in the case of testimony, there is a similar objection to attitudinalist views regarding the support relation, and this objection is quite powerful.

The objection is just that attitudinalist views require too much sophisticated reflection on the part of subjects for their beliefs and experiences to count as evidence for propositions and hence to evidentially support propositions. Do infants and children take attitudes toward the relation between their experiences or beliefs as of p and the proposition p? Do ordinary adults, for that matter? My guess is that they probably do not, at least in quite many cases. And, if this is so, then neither infants, nor children, nor ordinary adults are justified in believing much of what we take them to be justified in believing, given attitudinalism. Consider simple cases of perceptual belief, for instance. Imagine that Tommy the toddler has an experience as of seeing mommy in the doorway. It is plausible that, on the basis of this experience, Tommy might immediately form the belief that mommy is in the doorway. He might, like the rest of us, be disposed upon

having such an experience to believe that mommy is in the doorway. And, his experience, by virtue of this disposition, might lead to his belief that mommy is there. Now, it is plausible that Tommy could be justified in believing as he does in such a case. Yet, if attitudinalist views are correct, then this is not so. For, Tommy has not formed any attitudes concerning the relation between his experience as of seeing mommy in the doorway and the proposition that she is in the doorway. Rather, he just had the experience, and the experience caused him in a very ordinary way to believe that proposition. Attitudinalist views, then, would say that Tommy was not justified in believing as he did. And this conflicts with intuition. Intuition tells us that Tommy is justified in believing what he does here. But, attitudinalist accounts of evidential support, combined with central evidentialist theses—E in particular—say that Tommy is not justified. So, our original attitudinalist view, when combined with central evidentialist theses, conflicts with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification.

One might think that there is a simple way to fix the original attitudinalist view so that it does not conflict with our intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification in cases like Tommy's. I'll consider here three proposals about how attitudinalism might be modified to avoid this difficulty. The first two suggest that the attitudinalist was wrong to require an occurrent attitude toward the relationship between a subject's evidence e and the proposition p which it supports, but that a dispositional attitude toward this relation or a disposition to take an attitude toward this relation would not be such a problem. The third proposal suggests that instead of requiring an attitude of any kind toward the relation between e and p, we need only require that the subject have evidence which supports this relation's obtaining.

Begin with the proposal that instead of requiring an occurrent attitude toward the relation between e and p, we need only require that a subject S has a dispositional attitude toward the relation between e and p if e is to support p. Specifically, we need only require that S dispositionally believes that e is indicative of p. I want to argue that this first proposal does us no help in cases like the Tommy the toddler case. But, before I can do so, I need to say something more about dispositional beliefs.

Explaining what dispositional beliefs are and how they differ from both occurrent beliefs and dispositions to believe is a quite difficult and controversial task. But, one of the best-received treatments of the distinction belongs to Robert Audi (1994). Considering what Audi has to say concerning occurrent beliefs, dispositional beliefs, and dispositions to believe will be helpful not only for assessing this first proposed modification of attitudinalism, but the second.

Begin with what Audi says concerning the distinction between dispositional and occurrent belief:

> What is dispositionally as opposed to occurrently believed is analogous to what is in a computer's memory but not on its screen: the former need only be brought to the screen by scrolling—a simple retrieval process—in order to be used, whereas the latter is before one's eyes. Compare a dispositionally believed proposition's needing to be "called in," as in answering a request to be reminded of what one said last week, with an occurrently believed proposition's being focally in mind, roughly in the sense that one attends to it, as where one has just formulated it to offer as one's thesis (420).

Accordingly, I might dispositionally believe that my social security number is such-and-such though I don't occurrently believe it, when I am not currently attending to it. This is so because I believe it, and have for some time, yet I am not here and now focally attending to it. Yet, I can have an occurrent belief with the same content as this

dispositional belief if I only go through a simple operation of retrieval—if I only, so to speak, search my memory bank looking for my social security number.

But we should not take this to indicate that everything dispositionally believed was once occurrently believed. Indeed, this is false. Audi goes on:

> The computer analogy has another useful dimension. If propositions are added directly to the memory bank without being typed on the screen, we have an analogue of belief formation without occurrent belief. Such belief formation seems possible where one acquires beliefs in certain perceptual ways without thinking of the propositions thereby believed. While absorbed in conversation, one might come to believe, through hearing a distinctive siren, that an ambulance went by, but without thinking of this proposition or considering the matter. This is the formation of a dispositional belief (420-1).

Thus, dispositional beliefs can be formed even in the absence of past occurrent belief in their contents. I might dispositionally believe that the dog is on the sofa while I type this chapter without having previously occurrently believed this. What dispositional beliefs share in common isn't an origin in having once been occurrently believed. Instead, what they share, according to Audi, is that they are not currently present before the mind, but might easily be present through a simple process of attending to them.

So let us consider afresh the first proposed modification to our original attitudinalist account of evidential support. The original account seemed to require that for the subject S's evidence e to support p, S have an occurrent attitude toward the relation between e and p—specifically, that S occurrently believe that e is indicative of p. This is part of the force of saying that S *takes* an attitude toward the relation between her evidence and the proposition p. S's taking an attitude suggests that the taken attitude is an occurrent one. But we might modify this original view so that it only requires a dispositional attitude toward the relation between e and p. Our modified account, then, would say that S's evidence e supports a proposition p only if S has the right sort of

dispositional attitude toward the relation between e and p—specifically, that S dispositionally believes that e is indicative of p.

One might think that this modification would help with the problem I raised above for attitudinalism. For, after all, it seems to require slightly less intellectual sophistication on the part of the subject for her evidence to support a proposition p. Yet, the modification does not remove the difficulty. It still requires too much for subjects to be justified. It still implies that there will be cases like Tommy's where a subject will not be justified in believing a proposition, though intuitively we think she is justified in believing it.

The reason is that dispositional beliefs are just as conceptual as occurrent beliefs. That is, in order for someone to dispositionally believe a proposition p, she must have as good a grasp on the concepts involved in p as she needs in order to occurrently believe p. I cannot dispositionally believe, for instance, that an ambulance has just gone by without as good a grasp on the concept of ambulance as I need in order to occurrently believe that an ambulance has just gone by. I cannot dispositionally believe that the dog is on the sofa without as good a grasp on the concepts of dog and sofa as I need in order to occurrently believe that the dog is on the sofa. The reason for this is very simple: the content of the dispositional belief and the occurrent belief is the same. Yet, in order to have these occurrent beliefs, I *do* need something of a handle on the concepts involved. I need, at least, to have the concepts. So, to have the dispositional beliefs, I likewise need to have the concepts.

But this is just where the proposed modification of our original attitudinalist account gets into trouble. For, recall that according to this proposal, if S's evidence e is

to support p, then S must have a dispositional belief that e is indicative of p. But, as we have just seen, if S is to have a dispositional belief that e is indicative of p, then S must have a sufficient grasp of the concepts involved in the claim that e indicates p. S must grasp them just as well as she must in order to occurrently believe that e indicates p. But plausibly there are cases of justified belief, and hence cases where a subject has evidence which supports a proposition, where the subject does not have the required grasp of the relation of indication.[10] The concept of a relation between her evidence and the proposition in question is just not one she has yet acquired.

Consider Tommy, for instance. We have already seen that it is implausible that Tommy takes an occurrent attitude toward the relation between his experience as of mommy and the proposition that mommy is there. Part of the reason for our skepticism here is that Tommy's belief is formed rather quickly and there just doesn't seem to be time for such an occurrent attitude of this sort. But that's not all the reason for our skepticism. We are also skeptical of Tommy's forming an occurrent attitude toward the relation between his experience of mommy and the proposition that mommy is there because of the complexity of the content of this proposition itself. The proposition that his experience of mommy is indicative of mommy's being present is itself too conceptually complex for Tommy to have taken an attitude toward it in our case. Yet, if the proposition is too conceptually complex for Tommy to have taken an occurrent attitude toward it, it is likewise too conceptually complex for Tommy to have had a dispositional attitude toward it. For, as we just saw, one must have just as good a grasp of the concepts involved in a proposition if one is to dispositionally believe it as one must

[10] This applies *mutatis mutandis* for other relations, like probabilistic or explanatory ones, between e and p.

have if one is to occurrently believe it. Thus, just as Tommy doesn't have a good enough grasp of the relation of indication for him to occurrently believe that his experience of mommy is indicative of mommy's presence, he doesn't have a good enough grasp of the relation of indication for him to dispositionally believe that his experience of mommy is indicative of her presence. Nonetheless, his experience of mommy does support the proposition that mommy is present. Indeed, his belief that she is present, based on this experience, is justified.

The problem for this first proposal, then, is very simple. It does not remove the sophistication required by the original proposal. For, the original proposal went awry by requiring too much conceptual sophistication. And, this second proposal requires equal conceptual sophistication. We cannot fix attitudinalism by requiring dispositional attitudes rather than occurrent attitudes.

Perhaps, though, we can fix it by requiring neither dispositional attitudes nor occurrent attitudes, but only dispositions to take attitudes. In order to understand this proposal, we must consider the distinction between dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Here again is Audi:

> By contrast with both of these cases of actual belief, propositions we are only disposed to believe are more like those a computer would display only upon doing a calculation, say addition: the raw materials, which often include inferential principles, are present, but the proposition is not yet in the memory bank or on the screen. The suggested difference between a dispositional belief and a disposition to believe is in part that between accessibility of a proposition by a retrieval process that draws on memory and its accessibility only through a belief formation process (421).

One might have a disposition to believe p, then, without it being the case that if she just attends to whether p is true or not, she will occurrently believe p. Whereas dispositional

beliefs are beliefs, dispositions to believe are not beliefs. They are only dispositions to believe.

Following Audi, dispositions are always dispositions from something to something. They are dispositions, in the presence of something—Audi calls them "realization conditions"—to do something or other—Audi calls these the "constitutive manifestations." For instance, I have a disposition to scream "Yes!" and pump my fist. Not just anything is a realization condition for this disposition. Not just anything, as I like to say, triggers or activates this disposition. Watching the Boston Celtics or the Baylor Bears make a great play triggers it. Reading my email usually doesn't. The former conditions are realization conditions; the latter aren't. Thus, if we are to consider a proposed modification of attitudinalism which requires dispositions to take attitudes of a certain sort, we will want to know something about the realization conditions for those dispositions. We'll want to know what is supposed to trigger or activate those dispositions. We'll want to know under what conditions one must be disposed to take an attitude toward the relation between one's evidence and the proposition it supports, if that evidence is indeed to support that proposition.

There are various answers one might propose here. A very natural answer would be to say that if S's evidence e is to support p, then S must be disposed, upon considering whether e is indicative of p, to believe that e is indicative of p. Or, one might prefer that if e supports p, then S must be disposed upon considering the relation between e and p to believe that e is indicative of p. The details here shouldn't matter, however, for what I want to say about this proposal.

The first thing I want to say about this proposal is that it does seem to improve on the previous two proposals, at least when it comes to cases like Tommy the toddler. It is implausible, as we have seen, to think that Tommy takes either an occurrent or a dispositional attitude toward the proposition that his experience indicates his mother's presence. However, it is far more plausible to think that, once Tommy reaches a level of sophistication where he is able to reflect on whether his experience indicates his mother's presence, he will indeed come to believe that it does. Thus, this second proposed modification of attitudinalism has the consequence that Tommy may well be justified in believing that his mother is present on the basis of his experience of her, in accordance with our intuitive judgments.

However, the proposal faces its own difficulties. It too makes justification too hard to come by. It just isn't necessary for justification for believing p that one be disposed to believe that one's evidence indicates p. For, no matter what triggering circumstances we pick for the required disposition, it can be that under *those* circumstances, by some weird occurrences, the agent is *not* disposed to take the required attitude. Yet, when this is how things go concerning the agent's dispositions but nonetheless everything else for her is just like it would be in the normal case, we are strongly inclined to think that these dispositions play no role in determining the justificatory status of her beliefs at all.

Consider a comparison between Tommy and Timmy. Tommy is the Tommy you've already met. He has an experience of mommy and his experience causes him in just the ordinary way to come to believe that mommy is present. His belief is justified. Timmy, Tommy's brother, is slightly different. He too has just the same sort of

experience of mommy and it too leads him in just the normal way to believe that mommy is present. Yet, unbeknownst to him, he has some funky dispositions. His father, a fancy neurophysiologist, has wired Timmy's brain so that whenever he begins to reflect on whether some evidence of his indicates a proposition, he launches into a song about cream puffs and can do nothing else. In particular, he cannot form attitudes toward the relation between his evidence and the propositions in question. His singing prevents it every time.

Now, ask yourself about Timmy. Isn't Timmy justified in believing that mommy is present just as well as Tommy is? Sure, they differ in that Timmy has some weird dispositions that Tommy doesn't. But this seems entirely irrelevant to Timmy's justificatory status. All that seems relevant is just what seems relevant in Tommy's case—the experience and the way in which it has led Timmy to believe that mommy is present. Timmy's funky dispositions neither contribute nor take away from whether Timmy's evidence supports the proposition that mommy is present.

Moving to this second proposed modification of our original attitudinalist proposal, then, will not succeed. For it, too, makes justification too hard to come by. We cannot require that for a subject S's evidence e to support a proposition p, S is disposed under certain triggering circumstances to believe that e indicates p. For, no matter which circumstances we pick, there will be examples where subjects fail to have the relevant dispositions and yet their failing to have them seems not to remove their evidence's support for the propositions in question. We should not require for S's evidence e to

support p, that S have either a dispositional or an occurrent attitude toward e's relation to p, nor that S is disposed, under certain circumstances, to take such attitudes.[11]

There is only one final modification of attitudinalism I wish to consider here. It is a more substantial departure from attitudinalism than the previous two modifications. Instead of requiring any attitudes, or dispositions to take attitudes, toward the relation between e and p, we only require that the subject has evidence which supports the claim that e supports p.[12] Tommy need not take an attitude toward the relation between his experience and the proposition that mommy is present, nor need he even be disposed to take such an attitude under certain triggering circumstances. Instead, in order to be justified in believing that mommy is present, Tommy must have evidence which supports the claim that his experience of mommy supports the claim that mommy is present.

There is a major difficulty for such an account, however. It engenders vicious regresses of having evidence. One sort of regress it engenders is an infinite regress. Suppose that S has evidence e which supports p. Thus, according to this account, S has evidence e' which supports the proposition that e supports p. But then, by this account, S must have evidence e'' which supports the proposition that e' supports the proposition that e supports p, and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinite regress is vicious because it places

[11] One might suggest that instead of requiring that the subject herself has this disposition, we only require that she would under normal circumstances. The problem with this suggestion is that it mitigates against the perspectival character of justification endorsed by internalist views (see, e.g., Kvanvig 2003).

[12] A view like this is discussed approvingly in (Conee and Feldman 2001). They do not say that S must have evidence which *supports* the proposition that e supports p, they only say that S must have evidence that e supports p. But, presumably, the evidence e' which S must have concerning e's relation to p must confirm to some degree, even if coming short of supporting, that there is a supporting connection between e and p. And, then, the question will be whether S must then also have evidence that there is *that* kind of connection between e' and e and p for e' to bear that kind of connection to e and p. Plausibly, the answer will be "yes," and so a regress will still be engendered.

Further, given Conee's and Feldman's view, discussed in (2008), that "all evidence is justifying evidence," it follows that if S has evidence e' for e's supporting p, then e' supports the proposition that e supports p.

too stringent a requirement on subjects for their evidence to support propositions. Justification does not require an infinite regress of evidence possessing.

A second sort of regress engendered by this view is a definitional regress. Presumably, the correct analysis of e's supporting p will on this view include as one of its necessary conditions the condition that the subject has evidence which supports e's supporting p. But, if this is correct, we get an analysis of support in terms of support—and this is no analysis at all! This fourth modification of attitudinalism therefore fails as well.

As we have seen, embracing an attitudinalist view—either the original or one of these proposed modifications—will allow Conee and Feldman a simple reply to the objections of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman. Further, embracing such a view will allow Conee and Feldman to resist the argument discussed in section 4 which purports to show that evidentialists cannot be internalists. However, avoiding these difficulties by embracing an attitudinalist view comes at a high price. Attitudinalist views, when combined with central evidentialist theses, have results concerning epistemic justification which conflict with intuition. In particular, they make justification too hard to come by. Thankfully, however, there is an account of evidential support which has the same benefits of attitudinalism concerning the objections of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman, and which will allow the evidentialist to keep thesis M, but which does not have this cost of attitudinalism. That view is the causal-inclination account (CIA) of evidential support. In the next section, I will explain how CIA has the same benefits as these attitudinalist views, without their detriment.

6 CIA vs Attitudinalism

In this section, I will show that in two respects CIA is just as good as attitudinalist accounts of evidential support and that in one crucial respect it is plausibly better. CIA is just as good as any of the attitudinalist proposals we have considered in that it will allow Conee and Feldman to dismiss the criticisms of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman just as easily as would embracing these attitudinalist accounts and in that CIA will allow Conee and Feldman to retain evidentialist thesis M, despite the argument discussed in section 4. Further, CIA is plausibly better than the attitudinalist proposals we have considered because it plausibly does not have the cost associated with these views highlighted in the previous section. CIA doesn't require too much sophistication for subjects to be justified.

Begin with the respect in which CIA is better than the foregoing attitudinalist proposals. Recall what CIA says concerning the evidential support relation. According to CIA, the support relation is like the causal relation. Suppose that the relata of the causal relation are events. Many think that, whether event e1 causes event e2 is in part a matter of which other events, or which other background conditions, obtain. If certain background conditions B obtain, then e1 does cause e2; if these conditions don't obtain, e1 doesn't cause e2. CIA is like this as well. Whether S's experience or belief e supports the proposition p depends, in part, on other facts about S's mental life. If S's mental profile is a certain way, then e may support p; if S's mental profile is another way, e may not support p.

What kinds of other facts about S's mental life do I have in mind? I will not go into great detail about this question right now—that is for chapter five. Yet, what I will say now is just that the other facts are facts about the evidential profile of S. The other

facts upon which the support relation depends, then, are facts about S's evidence for anything and everything. In order to complete the account of just what these facts are, we'll need to know what counts as evidence, which I will discuss in greater detail in chapter five. Depending upon these evidential facts about S, when S has a certain new experience e, e may result in S's seeing the world in one way or seeing it in another. Put slightly differently, relative to certain other mental facts about S, S's experience e may or may not cause S to be inclined to believe a proposition p. My causal-inclination account (CIA) of the support relation accordingly says this:

> (CIA) S's evidence e supports a proposition p at t if and only if, by virtue of S's disposition of which she is aware in the presence of evidence like e to believe p, e causes S to be ultima facie inclined at t to believe p.

It should be clear that this account does not imply attitudinalism. For, it does not require for something e to count as evidence for a proposition p for S, and hence to support p for S, that S takes an attitude toward the relation between e and p. This might be one way in which S becomes disposed in the presence of e to believe p, but there are other ways. Because CIA doesn't imply attitudinalism, the conjunction of CIA with central evidentialist theses plausibly will not have the problematic implications concerning epistemic justification that the conjunction of attitudinalist views with the central evidentialist theses do.

For instance, take the case of Tommy discussed above. CIA will not have the implication that Tommy isn't justified in believing that mommy is in the doorway. In fact, CIA strongly suggests that Tommy *is* justified in believing this. For, Tommy's evidence—his experience as of seeing mommy in the doorway—seems to have caused him, by virtue of a disposition of which he is aware in the presence of such experiences to

believe that mommy is in the doorway, to be ultima facie inclined to believe that mommy is in the doorway. CIA, then, doesn't force a judgment which conflicts with intuition in cases like Tommy's. So, in this respect, it is better off than attitudinalist views of evidential support.[13]

CIA also does just as well as these attitudinalist proposals in two important respects. First, CIA affords Conee and Feldman just as easy a reply to the criticisms of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman as do attitudinalist accounts. Begin with DeRose's criticism. Given CIA, it is not clear in the original Henry case that Henry's evidence e' supports p. For, in order for e' to support p, it will have to be that e' causes Henry in the appropriate way to be ultima facie inclined to believe p. But, this appears *not* to be what happens in the original case.

If DeRose chooses to modify the case so that e' does cause Henry to be ultima facie inclined to believe p in the right way, then our judgment that Henry *ought* to believe p will increase in strength. For, according to CIA, if e' is to support p, it will have to be the case that e' causes Henry to be ultima facie inclined to believe p. Yet, if e' causes Henry to be ultima facie inclined to believe p, it will be extremely odd for Henry to base his belief that p on e alone. He will either base this belief on e' alone or on the conjunction of e' and e. Just as some have the reaction that it is psychologically impossible for S to believe p on the basis of e alone where S grasps the connections between e and p and between e' and p, it is likely that many will find it psychologically impossible for S to believe p on the basis of e alone when e' causes S to be ultima facie inclined to believe p. If they are correct, then this Henry case just isn't possible. Further,

[13] More needs to be said to defend CIA here. In particular, the reader may question whether Tommy is aware of the disposition I discuss. I say more about this issue in chapter five after discussing awareness at greater length.

just as it seems increasingly plausible to say that Henry is *morally*, rather than epistemically, culpable for his believing p as he does when we add attitudinalism to the story, the same is increasingly plausible when we add CIA to the story. Though Henry is blameworthy for believing p on the basis of e when e' causes Henry to be ultima facie inclined to believe p, Henry nonetheless *epistemically* ought to believe that p. Believing p is the attitude he ought to have, he just gets to it in the wrong way. Thus, CIA handles DeRose's concerns just as well as does attitudinalism.[14]

Second, given CIA, Pritchard's concerns are equally worry-free for Conee and Feldman. For, CIA implies that DISC is false. For, it is possible, given CIA, that S and S* share indiscriminable experiences and yet differ over justificatory facts. For, they may differ in that S's experience e causes S, by virtue of the right sort of disposition, to be ultima facie inclined to believe p whereas S*'s experience e *doesn't* cause her to be ultima facie inclined to believe p in this way. And, in such a case, e will support p for S but not S* and hence S, but not S* will be justified in believing p.

Finally, CIA furnishes Conee and Feldman an equally helpful reply to Goldman. For similar reasons to those just offered as to why one who adopts CIA will deny DISC, one who adopts CIA will deny SCE. Further, the defender of CIA has an additional resource in response to Goldman: she can say that where an item of evidence e at t_1 causes S to be inclined to believe p at t_2, e might support p for S at t_2. And being able to say this may help in cases like Goldman's where it seems that something other than

[14] The idea here is that *if* Conee and Feldman wanted a reply to the Henry case along the lines of the attitudinalist response discussed earlier, then CIA may well afford such a reply. For my part, however, I tend to think that Conee's and Feldman's distinction between propositional justification—embodied in EJ—and doxastic justification—embodied in WF—handles such cases perfectly well. This distinction itself allows for two senses of ought—the sense of ought in which we ought to believe things and the sense of ought in which we ought to believe things in a certain way. In the Henry case, Henry believes *what* he ought (the ought of propositional justification), but not *as* he ought (the ought of doxastic justification).

current experiences or beliefs contributes to the justificatory status of beliefs.[15] CIA, then, affords Conee and Feldman easy responses to the criticisms of DeRose, Pritchard, and Goldman. In this respect it is just as good as the attitudinalist proposals discussed above.

CIA is also just as good as these attitudinalist proposals in that it allows for the evidentialist to retain internalist theses like M, despite the argument of Section 4. Recall the argument of Section 4 that evidentialists must embrace attitudinalist-like views if they are to retain M. This argument relied upon the premises that evidentialists say that whether evidence supports propositions is part of what determines the justificatory status of attitudes, that whether evidence supports propositions is not solely a matter of subjects' mental lives, and that justificatory status must be determined entirely by subjects' mental lives, by M. Only one who embraces an attitudinalist-like account of the support relation could escape this argument, it was suggested, because only these accounts could maintain, contra the arguer, that whether S's evidence e supports a proposition p *is* entirely a matter of S's mental profile. But this claim is false. One who endorses CIA can also contend that whether S's evidence e supports p is entirely a matter of S's mental profile. For, according to CIA, the only things which determine whether a subject's evidence e supports p are mental states of the subject and certain specific *relations* between those mental states—causal or explanatory relations[16] between those states, to be exact. So long as it is fair to count causal or explanatory relations between

[15] I will say more about CIA and whether evidence hosted at times other than t can support propositions at t in chapter five.

[16] See chapter five for why I use the disjunction here.

the subject's mental states as part of the subject's mental profile, one who embraces CIA can resist the above argument in favor of attitudinalist accounts of evidential support.

And, indeed, it is plausible to count the relations between mental states as part of a subject's mental life. In other words, it is plausible to think that two subjects are "exactly alike mentally," as in M, only if both their mental states and the causal and explanatory relations between those mental states are exactly the same. For instance, consider two subjects, S and S*, who both have an experience as of an x and an inclination to believe there is an x at t. If S's experience causes or explains her inclination, but S*'s inclination causes or explains her experience, then it is quite plausible that S and S* are not exactly alike mentally. Mental likeness, as in M, should then plausibly be understood to include causal and explanatory relations between mental states. But, if this is what M requires, then one who embraces CIA can maintain M just fine. For, CIA has it that all that counts as justifiers are those things which count as part of the subject's mental life—her mental states and the relations between them. CIA, then, allows the evidentialist to maintain central evidentialist thesis M.[17] So, CIA has all of the benefits of attitudinalist views which have been discussed without their detriments. And, to that extent, it is preferable to those accounts.

[17] I argued here that CIA provides the evidentialist an alternative to attitudinalism which will allow her to maintain M. This is not to argue that there aren't other alternatives to attitudinalism which also would allow the evidentialist to maintain M. In particular, the following account has the same consequence. Suppose that support relations are necessary. That is, suppose that for all agents S and S', necessarily, if evidence e supports p for S, e supports p for S'. Someone who maintains that support relations are necessary in this way can maintain M without embracing attitudinalism. For, on this view, two agents who are exactly alike mentally will be exactly alike justificationally. And this is so even if whether evidence supports p is determined by matters not involving agent's mental states.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that someone attracted to the evidentialist views of Conee and Feldman should find CIA more attractive than attitudinalist accounts of the evidential support relation. For, the conjunction of any attitudinalist account of evidential support with at most slightly modified central evidentialist theses has implications which conflict with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification, while the conjunction of CIA with the central evidentialist theses does not. More precisely, I have shown that, given central evidentialist theses, attitudinalist accounts of evidential support face some serious difficulties plausibly not faced by CIA. In particular, attitudinalist accounts imply that attitudes of subjects which we intuitively judge justified are not justified—they require too much for justification. But CIA does not obviously imply this, at least not for the same cases. I have also shown that benefits associated with attitudinalist accounts are also benefits of CIA. In particular, CIA affords the evidentialist a ready reply to recent criticisms of evidentialist views and CIA allows the evidentialist to maintain thesis M. The final step needed to complete my argument in favor of CIA over attitudinalist accounts of evidential support is to argue that CIA does not have implications which conflict with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification in cases other than those considered in this chapter. But that argument must wait until chapter five. Until then, I am satisfied with the conditional conclusion that *if* CIA doesn't have these other troubling implications, it is preferable to attitudinalist views. That conclusion has been established.

CHAPTER THREE

Explanationist Accounts of Evidential Support

In chapter two, we saw that there is good reason for someone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views to resist any attitudinalist account of the evidential support relation—any account which requires that for a subject S's evidence e to support a proposition p, S must take an attitude toward the relation between e and p. We also saw that there is good reason for such a person to resist modifications of this attitudinalist account which require dispositional attitudes or dispositions to take attitudes instead of occurrent attitudes toward the relation between e and p. These results will be important to bear in mind in this chapter as we consider a second account of evidential support—the explanationist account.

The explanationist account of evidential support is Conee's and Feldman's own proposal. The account, which they offer in their (2008), says:

> (EXP) A subject S's evidence e supports proposition p just in case p is (part of) the best explanation available to S for (S's having) e.[1]

In this chapter, I will argue that EXP, when combined with central evidentialist theses, leads to conflict with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification. In

[1] This formalized account is extrapolated from their comments in prose. They state the view, which they call their "explanatory coherence view," using the language of justification rather than support. Here is an excerpt from the relevant passage: "We believe that the fundamental epistemic principles are principles of best explanation. Perceptual experiences can contribute toward the justification of propositions about the world when those propositions are part of the best explanation of those experiences that is available to the person. Similarly, the truth of the contents of a memory experience may be part of the best explanation of the experience itself. Thus, the general idea is that a person has a set of experiences, including perceptual experiences, memorial experiences and so on. What is justified for the person includes the propositions that are part of the best explanation f those experiences available to the person (pp.95-6)."

particular, EXP conflicts with intuitive judgments concerning certain cases of justified beliefs about the future.

I begin in section one by looking closely at EXP. At first blush, it appears that EXP conflicts with certain constraints Conee and Feldman believe the correct account of evidential support must not violate. So, I discuss how we must understand EXP if it is not to violate these constraints. I argue that, given our results from chapter two, we must understand EXP rather narrowly if it is not to violate these constraints. Avoiding conflict with these constraints involves taking on significant theoretical commitments which CIA does not involve. In the second section I present my central problem for explanationist accounts. It is a problem for any of the understandings of EXP discussed in section one, including what I take to be the best understanding of the view. The problem, as I have mentioned, is that these explanationist views, when combined with central evidentialist theses, conflict with intuitive judgments concerning certain cases of justified beliefs about the future. There are cases where we intuitively judge subjects to be justified in believing some proposition about the future but where these explanationist accounts, when combined with central evidentialist theses, have it that the subject is not justified. Since CIA, when combined with the central evidentialist theses, does not have these same implications concerning justified beliefs about the future, it is to that extent preferable to explanationist accounts. Further, CIA violates neither of the constraints which Conee and Feldman believe the correct account of evidential support must not violate. So, if CIA does not have other implications which conflict with other intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification, when combined with the central evidentialist theses,

then it is preferable to these explanationist accounts, period. I argue in chapter five that CIA does not have any such implications.

In the final part of section two, I consider whether someone attracted to EXP might move away from talking of best explanations and instead define evidential support in terms of contrastively better explanations. I show that this view faces a serious conflict with intuition as well. There appears to be no ultimately attractive analysis of evidential support in terms of explanatory relations.

1 Objectivist, Reflectivist, and Causal-Inclination Accounts

In this section, I will consider EXP in detail, arguing that we must understand EXP in a certain way if it is to satisfy two constraints which Conee and Feldman believe the correct account of evidential support must satisfy. I will begin by discussing Conee's and Feldman's rejection of two alternative types of account of the evidential support relation—objectivist accounts and reflectivist accounts. By understanding why Conee and Feldman reject these accounts, we can better understand the constraints which they believe the correct account of the evidential support relation must meet. Conee and Feldman think that the correct account of the evidential support relation must be neither too objectivist nor too reflectivist. However, as I will show, we must understand EXP in a certain way if it is to avoid violating these constraints.

Begin with what Conee and Feldman say about objectivist accounts. Objectivist accounts say that a subject S's evidence e supports a proposition p just when the content of that evidence bears the right kind of objective logical or probabilistic relation to p. A particular example would be an account which says that S's evidence e supports p just in case the content of e entails p. Conee and Feldman reject this kind of view because it

makes the support relation too independent of the subject. Objectivist views make evidential support a matter of relations between a subject's evidence and propositions, but they do not require that the subject is at all aware of these relations or that the subject even understands the propositions in question. Concerning objectivist accounts which define evidential support in terms of logical relations, Conee and Feldman write the following:

> We reject this view. We think it ties epistemic relations too closely to logical relations. Specifically, it suggests a kind of logical omniscience that justified believers need not have. A person may know some propositions that logically entail some proposition that the person scarcely understands and surely does not know to follow from the things she does know (2008, p. 94).

Mathematical examples help here. Frequently, people have as evidence certain mathematical axioms and propositions M_1-M_n from which, by some difficult chain of reasoning, a further proposition p follows. Often, these subjects are entirely unaware of the logical connection between M_1-M_n and p. Conee and Feldman resist any view which says that subjects in these cases are justified in believing p. Perhaps one motivation for doing so is that, given the central evidentialist thesis EO that S is justified in taking D toward p just in case S ought to take D toward p, it would follow that the subject in this case *ought* to believe p if she is justified in believing p. And it is clearly not the case that these subjects ought to believe the entailed proposition. Another part of their motivation may be the motivation for evidentialist thesis M which says that if two subjects are exactly alike mentally, they are exactly alike justificationally. Part of the motivation for M, as we saw in the Introduction, is that it seems that it is features of a subject's mental life which make the difference for justification. This being so, Conee and Feldman would probably like to maintain that a subject who does grasp the connections between

M_1-M_n and p may have a different justificatory status concerning p than a subject who doesn't grasp that connection. The additional mental state of grasping contributes to the subject's justificatory status. Unfortunately, objectivist views which define evidential support in terms of logical relations conflict with central theses EO and M on these scores. Thus, Conee and Feldman reject objectivist accounts like this because they make evidential support too independent of the subject—too objectivist, in other words.

The same is true of objectivist views which make evidential support a matter of probabilistic connections between evidence and propositions. After all, in the mathematical example above, objectivist theories which make support a matter of probability will likely say that the probability of p given M_1-M_n is 1. But then the subjects in those examples will be justified in believing p, though they are unaware of the connection between M_1-M_n and p. And this Conee and Feldman want to resist. Objectivist theories, whether couched in logical or probabilistic terms, go wrong in making the evidential support relation too independent of the subject.[2] One constraint, then, which Conee and Feldman place on the correct account of the evidential support relation is that the correct account must not make evidential support a relation which is determined wholly independent of the subject. It cannot be that in order to discern whether a subject's evidence e supports a proposition all we have to do is see whether e is part of S's evidential profile and then the rest of the work is done with no eye on the subject at all. The rest of the subject's evidential profile must be somehow more involved than this in determining the relation of evidential support. In particular, it seems that the subject needs a kind of bridge mental state which bridges the gap between e and

[2] This is not to say that there might not be some type of probabilistic account of evidential support which Conee and Feldman might be friendly toward; it is only to say that they would only be friendly toward such a view if it were *not* objectivist. They hint at the possibility of such a view in their (2001).

p (I will say more about this notion later). Call this constraint the anti-objectivism constraint.[3]

One might think that the natural solution to the difficulties faced by objectivist views is to move to a view which requires that for S's evidence e to support p, S must take the right sort of attitude toward the relation between e and p. Such an attitude would constitute one variety of a bridge mental state connecting e and p. In chapter two, I called views of the supports relation with this requirement attitudinalist views, and I will continue to do so here. One version of attitudinalism says that for S's evidence e to support p, S must *believe* that the right sort of relation—perhaps a logical or probabilistic one—obtains between e and p. Call this view reflectivism. Reflectivism would not face the difficulties faced by the objectivist views just discussed, since the subjects in those cases did not take attitudes toward the relation between their evidence and the propositions logically or probabilistically related to that evidence. Nonetheless, Conee and Feldman reject this kind of view for other reasons. Chiefly, they reject it because it over-intellectualizes the supports relation. It requires too much reflection, too much mental gymnastics, on the part of the subject for her to be justified in taking the attitudes

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[3] In my view, Conee's and Feldman's argument here against objectivist theories goes a bit too fast. For, they presume that all objectivist theories will have it that mental states M_1-M_n will count as evidence regarding some proposition p when M_1-M_n bear the right sort of logical or probabilistic relation to p. But objectivists might not embrace this view of evidence. They might require, for instance, that M_1-M_n count as evidence regarding p only when the connection between M_1-M_n and p is grasped by the subject. If the objectivist takes this view, then in the examples discussed in the text objectivism will not have the consequences there attributed to it. It will not be the case, for instance, that in the mathematical cases the subject is justified in believing p; for, it is not the case that her *evidence* concerning p bears the right sort of connection to p.

Although the objectivist might get out of the problems for her view discussed in the text by making this move, there remain problems for the resulting view. In particular, it just seems to posit a bad view of evidence. When one considers a proposition p and then asks oneself about what one's evidence has to say about p, one may well scan many of one's mental states which one does not think of as bearing any salient relations to p. All of these mental states are included in one's evidence—one's "evidential profile," as I like to call it. But, only some of them are evidence *for*, or evidence which supports, p.

she does. Conee and Feldman write, "There can be knowledge and justified belief in the absence of any such beliefs about evidential relations. Children and unsophisticated believers provide clear examples of this, and even sophisticated believers often lack explicit beliefs about the connections between their evidence and their conclusions (2008, p.95)." Reflectivist views thus go wrong by requiring too much on the part of the believer for justification. A second constraint on the supports relation is that it not require too much sophistication on the part of the subject—that it not be too reflectivist. Call this constraint the anti-reflectivist constraint.

So, here are our two constraints—anti-objectivism and anti-reflectivism. The correct account of evidential support must not make that relation too independent of the subject nor must it require that the subject believe that certain objective relations hold between that subject's evidence and the proposition her evidence supports. The correct account must require some sort of bridge mental state between the subject's evidence and the proposition it supports, but this bridge mental state better not be a belief concerning the relation between that evidence and the proposition it supports. If EXP is to be attractive to someone holding the evidentialist views of Conee and Feldman, it must abide by these two constraints. The question I now want to ask is whether it can. I believe that it can, but if it is to do so it must be understood in a certain way—a way which involves a significant theoretical commitment.

At first blush, it is hard to see how EXP can avoid violating the anti-objectivism and anti-reflectivism constraints. For, EXP makes evidential support a matter of explanatory relations. Explanatory relations seem no less objective than probabilistic relations or logical relations, so one would be inclined to think that EXP faces the same

problems as objectivist accounts. For, the sorts of things typically taken to serve as criteria of adequacy for explanations are all rather objective criteria—e.g., internal and external consistency, fruitfulness, and simplicity. Thus, it would seem that explanationist accounts would make evidential support too independent of the subject, since they seem to make evidential support a matter of these objective relations. Explanationist accounts do not seem to require bridge mental state between S's evidence and the proposition p.

But this is where the availability constraint comes to the rescue. By the "availability constraint," all I mean is the requirement in EXP that the proposition p be not just the best explanation for S's evidence e, but that p be the best *available* explanation for e. It is this requirement, if any, which will ensure that EXP does not violate the anti-objectivism constraint. For, plausibly, requiring that an explanation p of a subject S's evidence e be available to S will ensure that whether S's evidence e supports a proposition p will not be too independent of S's mental states other than e. Indeed, it may be that the availability requirement ensures that the subject has just the right sort of bridge mental state between e and p needed to avoid both the anti-objectivism constraint and the anti-reflectivism constraint. What we need, then, is a way of understanding what it is for p to be available to S which implies that S has just the right sort of bridge mental state between her evidence e and the proposition p. In order to see how we can have this, I must say more about what I have been calling "bridge mental states."

I am pessimistic about whether I can offer a precise account of just what these bridge mental states are. However, I do think that in a rough and intuitive way I can characterize what they are, and that I can offer what seems to me an exhaustive list of the plausible candidates which would make good sense of the availability constraint in EXP.

Let me begin with the rough and intuitive characterization. Roughly and intuitively, for S to have a mental state which is a bridge mental state between her evidence e and a proposition p is for her to have a mental state which takes her from e to p. Such a mental state might have e and p as part of its contents, or it might not. Such a mental state might be occurrent, or it might be dispositional. Whatever its nature on these counts, it is just the sort of thing to move S from her evidence e to believing the proposition p. Multiple kinds of mental states may well be able to serve this function. But, insofar as they do so, they serve roughly the same function. The best I can do, then, to provide an intuitive sense of what these mental states are, is to point to a common function: bridge mental states from e to p are all just the sorts of mental states which move a subject from some bit of evidence e toward believing some proposition p.

I can think of several plausible candidates for such a bridge mental state which would make sense of the availability requirement in EXP. I'll offer a numbered list so that I can refer back to each of the possibilities later. (1) An *occurrent belief* that p is (part of) the best explanation for e would do the job. Occurrently believing that p is part of the best explanation for e is just the sort of mental state to move a subject S from e to believing p. (2) A *dispositional belief* that p is (part of) the best explanation for e would likewise do the job. Also, (3) a *disposition to believe that p is (part of) the best explanation for e* might do the job—at least under the right triggering circumstances for the disposition. Likewise, (4) a *disposition to believe p, in the presence of e* would do the job. This sort of disposition is plausibly a mental state which is just the sort of thing to lead a subject from e to believing p. Of course, it doesn't itself make any mention of explanation. But perhaps that is OK. Finally, (5) a *direct awareness* of p's being (part

of) the best explanation for e would do the job. Here we have a requirement that the subject have a non-conceptual awareness of an explanatory relation between e and p. We might imagine this awareness motivating belief in much the way that my awareness of some fast-moving object on my periphery motivates me to move forward.

As far as I can tell, the foregoing list is an exhaustive list of the plausible candidates for a bridge mental state between e and p which makes good sense of the availability requirement in EXP.[4] What I want to do now is show that the only candidates which when plugged back into EXP yield an account of evidential support which violate neither the anti-objectivism constraint, the anti-reflectivism constraint, nor conflict with any of the considerations governing an account of evidential support discussed in chapter two are proposals (4) and (5), and that (5) has certain advantages over (4) for someone attracted to both EXP and Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views.

To see this, begin with option (1). Option (1) violates the anti-reflectivism constraint. For, it requires that for a subject S to be justified in believing a proposition p,

[4] Well, not quite. There are three more possibilities I can think of. But none is worth adding to the list in the main text.

First, I can imagine someone complaining that I did not include a *seeming as of* p's being part of the best explanation for e or a *seeming that* p is part of the best explanation for e. I discuss seemings in chapter four. The bottom line is that it seems to me that there are no seemings. Seemings are not a *sui generis* type of mental state. So, I don't think they deserve a category of their own here. Roughly, seemings as of p's being part of the best explanation for e can be treated either as mental states of type (1) or (2), and seemings that p is part of the best explanation for e can be treated as mental states of type (1), (2), or (3) or equivalent to the second possibility I am about to discuss.

Second, another genuine possibility, I think, is a *disposition to be* (ultima facie) *inclined to believe p, in the presence of e.* This is different, I think, than option (3), since inclinations and beliefs are not the same. I don't discuss this option in the main text here because it would unnecessarily complicate the discussion. The same points made against option (3) in the text can be made against this proposal as well. Mental states of this sort do not provide a suitable bridge mental state which makes good sense of the availability requirement.

The third suggestion is that S must have evidence which supports p's being part of the best explanation for e. This account, as we saw in chapter one, will be subject to an infinite regress and will make EXP suffer from conceptual circularity. So, I will not bother to include it here.

she must believe that p is (part of) the best explanation for e. But this is just the sort of requirement ruled out by the anti-reflectivism constraint. Options (2) and (3) are ruled out by considerations from the previous chapter. Just as it might be that taking an occurrent attitude toward the explanatory relations between e and p may be too conceptually complex for some justified believers, so might taking a dispositional attitude toward these relations. So, we should not, *pace* option (2), require any dispositional belief concerning these explanatory relations. Nor should we, as option (3) suggests, require a disposition to believe that p is (part of) the best explanation of e. For, as we saw in chapter two, there can be justification in the absence of such dispositions. They seem to play little role at all in fixing justificatory facts.

This leaves options (4) and (5). Only these options avoid conflict with both the anti-reflectivism constraint and the anti-objectivism constraint while not falling prey to the difficulties highlighted for options (2) and (3) in chapter two. I'll briefly illustrate this for both (4) and (5).

Begin with option (4). (4) avoids conflict with the anti-objectivism constraint because it does require a bridge mental state between the subject's evidence and the proposition it supports.[5] It also avoids conflict with the anti-reflectivism constraint because it does not require that the justified believer believe that explanatory relations obtain between her evidence and the proposition supported by her evidence. Nor does (4) require conceptualization of explanatory relations, since unlike options (1) and (2) it doesn't require that the subject have the concept of explanation. Finally, (4) avoids the

[5] At least, on Conee's and Feldman's (forthcoming) views, such dispositions are mental states. I agree with this judgment, though I will not argue for it at length here. One reason for thinking so is that differences in such dispositional states appear to generate differences in intuitive judgments concerning mental likeness between pairs of subjects.

difficulty of option (3) because it doesn't require a disposition to believe things about explanatory relations. Instead, all (4) requires is a disposition to believe the supported proposition. (4), then, avoids conflict with both the anti-reflectivism and anti-objectivism constraints as well as the constraints discussed in chapter two.

Option (5) also fares well with respect to these same constraints. Start with the anti-objectivism constraint. Since option (5) does require a bridge mental state between a subject's evidence e and her believing the proposition p, option (5) does not violate the anti-objectivism constraint. Nor does it violate the anti-reflectivism constraint. It doesn't require that the justified subject believe that her evidence is best explained by the proposition it supports. Nor does option (5) conflict with our considerations from chapter two which tell against options (1) and (2). What gets options (1) and (2) into trouble is that they each require too sophisticated conceptualization on the part of the justified subject. She has to have attitudes toward propositions concerning the explanatory relations between her evidence and the proposition it supports. She can't have these without adequate conceptualization of explanatory relations. So, (1) and (2) require conceptualization of explanatory relations, which might not be had by some justified subjects. Option (5), however, does not require conceptualization like this. It requires only *non*-conceptual awareness of explanatory relations between the subject's evidence and the proposition it supports. One can be aware of something without conceptualizing it in a certain way. For instance, one can be aware of a telephone without being aware of it *as* a telephone. Perhaps likewise, if one can be aware of explanatory relations between her evidence and the proposition it supports, then she can be aware of these relations without being aware of these relations *as* explanatory relations. Since option (5) requires

only the former sort of awareness rather than the latter, option (5) does not conflict with the considerations from chapter two which tell against options (1) and (2).[6] And, finally, since (5) does not require any dispositions of the sort required by option (3), it does not face the difficulties associated with option (3).

Thus, options (4) and (5) both fare well with respect to the anti-reflectivism and anti-objectivism constraints and avoid conflict with the conclusions of chapter two. However, of the two, option (5) has certain advantages over option (4). At least, for someone attracted to both EXP and Conee's and Feldman's evidentialism, (5) fares better than (4). I will discuss three advantages.

First, one might worry that option (4) conflicts with internalist thesis M. For, one might worry that there could be two subjects S and S* such that S and S* are exactly alike mentally, but different objective explanatory relations obtain between S's evidence and some proposition p than obtain between S*'s evidence and p. After all, certain other objective relations are like this—they can obtain between one subject's evidence and a proposition p while not obtaining between another subject's evidence and p, where the subjects share the same evidence. For instance, some probabilistic relations are like this, as we will see in more detail in chapter four. One might think that explanatory relations share this feature of these probabilistic relations. If they do, then, according to EXP as understood in light of option (4), M is false. For, S and S* would then be exactly alike

[6] My discussion of direct awareness as a non-conceptual *de re* awareness follows (Fumerton 1995). There is a noteworthy comparison to be made between Fumerton's discussion of non-conceptual *de re* awareness and what is variously called "implicit consciousness" or "secondary consciousness" in the phenomenological tradition. For discussions of the latter, see (Brentano 1982), (Sartre 1956), and (Janzen 2006). Janzen contrasts this implicit consciousness with introspection as follows: "Acts of introspection are deliberate, moderately effortful, and generally unprotracted, whereas implicit [consciousness] is a constant, effortless, and non-deliberate element of all conscious states." On Janzen's view, all conscious states involve this sort of implicit consciousness of the self.

mentally without being exactly alike justificationally. This would provide a sure reason for rejecting option (4).

By contrast, option (5) does not appear to conflict in this way with thesis M. That (5) looks like it will not conflict with M is clear from the fact that it looks like two subjects S and S* can't be exactly alike mentally if S is aware of an explanatory relation obtaining between her evidence and a proposition p while S* is not. But, in order for there to be a conflict between (5) and M, it needs to be the case that (5) implies that there could be a scenario where two subjects, S and S*, were exactly alike mentally and yet they were not exactly alike justificationally. The reason option (4) conflicted with M was that it looked like it might be possible for different explanatory relations to obtain between subjects' evidence and a proposition p, though the subjects were exactly alike mentally. However, the defender of option (5) might insist that if different explanatory relations obtain between subjects' evidence and a proposition, then those subjects can't be just alike mentally while being different justificationally. For, there are only three options to consider here and none of them offers a counterexample to M. On the first option, both subjects are aware of the relations which obtain. If this is the case, then the subjects will differ mentally. For, they will be aware of different relations obtaining between their evidence and the proposition it supports. On the second option, just one of them is aware of the relevant relation. Here, too, the subjects will not be the same mentally. And, on the third option, neither subject is aware of the relevant relation. Here the subjects will be the same mentally, but they will also be the same justificationally. Neither will be justified in believing the target proposition because neither is aware of the right sort of relation running between her evidence and that proposition. Thus, option

(5), at least at first glance, does not appear to conflict with M in the same way that (4) threatens to do so. To this extent, option (5) is preferable to option (4).

There is a second reason to prefer option (5) to option (4). Option (5) makes the relevant explanatory relations central to EXP in a way that option (4) does not. Both option (5) and option (4) define evidential support in terms of an explanatory relation and a mental state the believer must have—in option (5) it is an awareness and in option (4) it is a disposition to believe the supported proposition. However, option (5) makes the required explanatory relation more central to EXP in the following way. The mental state required by option (5) cannot be had without the existence of the relevant explanatory relation, while the mental state required by option (4) can be had independently of that relation. Thus, option (5) ties together the two requirements in a way that option (4) does not. I think this will lead someone attracted to EXP to favor option (5) over option (4).

A third reason to favor option (5) to option (4) is that option (4) looks like a poor account of availability. Options (1)-(5) were supposed to offer ways of understanding what it is for an explanation to be available to a subject. Option (4) tells us that an explanation is available to a subject when that subject is inclined to believe that explanation. This definition of availability implies that explanations one is not inclined to believe are not available to one. But surely such explanations are sometimes available to one. This is just what happens when we perform an inference to the best available explanation. We compare multiple explanations which are all available to us and we, hopefully for good reason, find ourselves inclined to believe one of them. The one we are inclined to believe wasn't the only one available—there were others. (4), then, is a poor account of what it is for an explanation to be available.

(5) does better here, too. For, (5) does not imply that only those explanations one is inclined to believe are available to one. An explanation will be available when the subject is aware of the explanatory relations running from her evidence to that explanation. This is a far more plausible account of availability. Thus, while options (4) and (5) both fare well with respect to the anti-objectivism and anti-reflectivism constraints, and while neither conflicts with the conclusions of chapter two, option (5) still has a number of advantages over option (4).

Thus, despite initial concern, EXP can be understood in such a way as to avoid violating the anti-objectivism and anti-reflectivism constraints and in such a way as not to conflict with any of our results from chapter two. The best way to understand EXP along these lines is for the explanationist to adopt option (5) for understanding the availability constraint. Understanding EXP in this way does come at a cost, though. For, understanding EXP in accordance with option (5) implies taking on some significant theoretical commitments concerning the viability of direct awareness of explanatory relations. I will not evaluate the viability of this sort of direct awareness here. All I wish to point out here is that the most attractive way of filling in the availability constraint in EXP seems to commit one to the viability of these direct awareness states. EXP can be understood in such a way as to avoid conflict with the anti-objectivism and anti-reflectivism constraints and with the conclusions of chapter two, but this comes at some theoretical cost.

CIA, by contrast, easily abides by both the anti-objectivism constraint, the anti-reflectivism constraint, and also avoids conflict with the conclusions of chapter two. Take the anti-objectivism constraint first. This constraint says that the correct account of

the support relation must not make the support relation too independent of the subject. In order for S's evidence to support p, it must be that S has a bridge mental state connecting e and her believing p. CIA implies this. For, CIA requires that for S's evidence e to support p, e causes S, by virtue of the right sort of disposition, to be ultima facie inclined to believe p. So long as we follow Conee and Feldman in postulating that these dispositions are mental states, CIA will require bridge mental states. So, CIA furnishes no conflict with the anti-objectivism constraint.

CIA also satisfies the anti-reflectivism constraint. For, CIA does not require that for S's evidence e to support p S take any kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p. To be sure, it might be that sometimes when e causes S by virtue of the right sort of disposition to be ultima facie inclined to believe that p, the reason S is disposed as she is is that S takes an attitude toward the relation between e and p—e.g., an attitude of believing that p is likely given e. But this is not required. So, CIA also satisfies the anti-reflectivism constraint imposed on the support relation by Conee and Feldman.

Nor does CIA get into trouble by conflicting with any of the results from chapter two. For, it neither requires the kind of conceptualization required by options (1) and (2) nor the sorts of dispositions required by option (3). So, CIA easily avoids conflict with both the anti-objectivism and anti-reflectivism constraints as well as the conclusions of chapter two. Since this is so, and since the only ways of understanding EXP where it avoids such conflict involve a significant cost which CIA doesn't have, CIA is to that extent preferable to EXP.

2 Explanationism and Justified Beliefs about the Future

In the previous section, I considered how we must understand EXP if it is to have any hope of satisfying Conee's and Feldman's constraints on the support relation. In this section I want to present a serious difficulty for explanationist accounts in general, which will apply just as well to those versions of explanationism which, according to section one, offer the best understandings of EXP.

The problem I want to highlight has to do with justified attitudes about the future. These are commonplace. We make decisions on the basis of beliefs about the future daily. I believe that tomorrow so-and-so will be in the office, that my internet will be working, et cetera. Often, such beliefs are justified. But explanationist accounts struggle to explain how such beliefs could be justified.

Let me pick one particular example. Suppose I'm on the golf course on a sunny, calm day. My putting stroke has been working for me most of the day, and I'm now on the sixteenth green. It's not a long put—just six feet. I'm fairly confident. I rotate my shoulders, pulling the putter back, and then accelerate through the ball. It rolls toward the cup. The speed looks good. The line looks on. Yes, I believe it's going in!

Now, in such cases, I may very often be justified in believing things about the future. Here, I am justified in believing that the ball will in some short time roll into the cup. But explanationist views cannot account for this. To see why, begin with EXP itself and what it would say of such a case. EXP says that the belief that the ball will roll into the cup is justified for me just in case the proposition that the ball will roll into the cup is part of the best available explanation for my current evidence. But this is implausible. Surely the ball's rolling into the cup at some later time doesn't explain why right now I

have the evidence that I do. What explains my current evidence, rather, is a body of current and perhaps past facts. But little, if any, future facts enter into the best explanation for my current evidence. So, according to EXP, I am not justified in this case. And this conflicts strikingly with intuition.

The defender of explanationist views might try to insist that, despite the initial appearance of oddity, the ball's rolling into the cup some short time hence in fact *does* explain why I have the current evidence I do. Or, at least, it is part of the best explanation for why I have this evidence. To begin with, some have found it quite plausible that temporally backward explanations are perfectly ubiquitous.[7] For instance, my tidying my apartment right now may be best explained by my brother's coming over tomorrow. More generally, Jenkins and Nolan have offered the following argument in favor of the ubiquity of backwards explanations:

(1) There are apparently appropriate uses of language which suggest backward explanations.

(2) The only way to explain these linguistic data without allowing for the ubiquity of backwards explanations is to offer a plausible substitute, in each case, for what speakers meant which doesn't involve some future thing explaining a past thing.

(3) It is impossible to offer plausible substitutes, in each case of apparently appropriate linguistic usage which suggests backwards explanations, for what speakers meant which doesn't involve some future thing explaining a past thing.

(4) So, we cannot explain the apparently appropriate uses of language which suggest backward explanations if we do not allow for the ubiquity of backwards explanations.

[7] (Jenkins and Nolan 2008).

Premise (1) is supported by cases like the tidying case above as well as many others. Witness: "The volcano is smoking because it is going to explode;" "The flower closed up because it was going to rain," and so on. Premise (3) Jenkins and Nolan support by arguing that the only plausible substitutes in many cases appeal to explanations of which the speakers are hardly aware. Writing generally about attempts to account for the appropriateness of the foregoing linguistic data without allowing for backwards explanations, they write: "Even if in each case of apparent backwards explanation we were prepared to acknowledge the existence of some explanation of the explanandum event in terms of dispositions, likelihoods, or whatever, we can as yet see no good reason to regard these replacement explanations as 'the real' explanations in the sense of the ones which were really intended. We doubt whether all the everyday examples of apparently backwards explanation are plausibly interpreted as invoking dispositions, intentions, likelihoods, or whatever." Thus, (3) follows—it is not possible to find plausible candidates for what was *really meant* by the speakers in cases like those which support (1) which can be understood in such a way that the speakers are *not* invoking backward explanations. And from (1), (2), and (3), (4) clearly follows.

The glaring problem with this argument, however, is premise (2). For, this premise ignores a completely commonplace method in philosophy of explaining apparently appropriate linguistic usage which conflicts strongly with intuition or with a theory. *One* way to explain such usage is to say that what is *really meant* by the speaker is something consistent with the intuition or theory we wish to preserve. But there is another perfectly ordinary way, too. Often, in order to accommodate certain apparently appropriate linguistic data which conflict strongly with intuition or with a theory we

would like to preserve, the philosopher will suggest that the apparently appropriate linguistic data are all strictly speaking false, but that there is, for each instance, something in the near neighborhood which is true, and hence the linguistic items are innocuously false. This method, too, preserves both the appearance of appropriateness in the linguistic data and the theory or intuition with which it conflicts. And, it seems to be just the right method for the one attracted to the view that backward explanations are not ubiquitous to employ here. The reason that the linguistic data which support (1) seem appropriate despite the fact that there aren't hardly ever backward explanations is not that the speakers of these sentences mean something other than that there is a backward explanation going on—maybe they do; maybe they don't—rather, it's that their sentences, though strictly speaking false, have something in their near neighborhood which is true. Those propositions in their near neighborhood which are true need not even be known to the speakers. But, so long as they are in the near neighborhood and are true, they will do the job. And, as Jenkins and Nolan are perfectly willing to accept, there are, for each of their proposed instances of linguistic data which support (1), propositions in the near neighborhood of what is expressed by these sentences which are true. So, (2) is false and there is no argument from the linguistic data which support (1) to the conclusion that backward explanations are ubiquitous. They aren't.

Of course, in order for my proposed counterexample to challenge EXP, I don't need to defend the claim that backward explanations aren't ubiquitous. The important question is not whether backward explanations can be found, or even whether they are found frequently. The important question here is whether, in the golf ball example and in others similar to it, the best explanation for why I have the evidence I do is one which

runs temporally backward from the future proposition in question. In our example, the question is: Is it the case that the ball's rolling into the cup shortly is part of the best explanation for why I have the current evidence I do? For all the world it seems not. What explains why I have this evidence is a body of current and past facts—facts about the ball's position now and a moment ago and such.

The defender of EXP might, however, press the following point. There is a potential explanation of why I have the current evidence I do which includes the body of current and past facts discussed in the previous paragraph *and* the claim that the ball will roll into the cup shortly which is better than one which includes the current and past facts and the claim that the ball will *not* roll into the cup shortly.[8] Perhaps, for instance, the former explanation is simpler than the latter. For, in order for the latter to be consistent, we will presumably have to posit the occurrence of something which conflicts in some way with the current evidence I have, like a strong wind. So, perhaps it is not so absurd to claim that the ball's rolling into the cup some short time hence best explains why I have the current evidence I do. After all, it seems to better explain it than any body of current and past facts together with the proposition that the ball will *not* roll into the cup some time hence.

But this defense of EXP in the face of the current counterexample faces a serious difficulty, too. For, explanations need not be maximal. That is, it need not be the case that for any explanation E and any proposition p, E includes either p or not-p. So, explanations of my current evidence in the golf ball case need not include either the proposition that the ball will roll into the cup or the proposition that it will not roll into the cup. But, then, there can be a potential explanation of my current evidence in the golf

[8] Though this is not uncontroversial, either.

ball case which says nothing about the future. It will be one which appeals only to the body of current and past facts discussed above. And, rather clearly, this explanation will be simpler than either of the foregoing explanations which does include information about the future. So, by the criterion of simplicity, it will be a better explanation than either of these. Indeed, it will be the best. And, if so, then according to EXP, I am not justified in believing that the ball will roll into the cup in the golf ball case.

The difficulty highlighted here for EXP afflicts each of the most plausible versions of EXP discussed in section two. It afflicts account (4) because account (4) requires that for a subject's evidence e to support a proposition p, p must be part of the best explanation for e. And, it afflicts account (5) because account (5) requires that for S's evidence e to support p, p must be part of the best explanation of which S is aware for e. But in the golf ball case and others like it, it is neither the case that the proposition that the ball will roll into the hole some time hence is part of the best explanation for the subject's evidence or that it is part of the best explanation of which the subject is aware for her evidence. And yet the subject's evidence does support the proposition that the ball will roll into the hole. So, the subject is justified in believing that it will. So, EXP, on either of its most plausible readings, has results which conflict strongly with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification.

I want to consider just one final argument which would attempt to rescue EXP from examples like the golf ball example. The argument runs as follows. The claim that the ball will roll into the hole some time hence is, after all, part of the best explanation available for the subject's current evidence. For, the best explanation available to the subject will *entail* that the ball will soon roll into the hole. For, the best available

explanation will be one which includes both present and past facts and laws of nature which govern the operations of things like golf balls. However, an explanation which includes both these present facts and the laws of nature will be one which entails that the ball will soon roll into the hole. So, it turns out that the best available explanation will be one which entails, and which therefore includes,[9] the proposition that the ball will roll into the hole. So, despite appearances, there is no problem here for EXP.

There are two serious problems for this defense of EXP. First, it is far from clear that the explanation involving the laws of nature in question will be one which is *available* to the subject. Conee and Feldman write as if a minimum requirement for an explanation's being available to the subject is that the subject sufficiently understands the explanation. But, it is plausible that there could be a golf ball type case where the subject does not sufficiently understand the deterministic laws in question. In such a situation, there will not be an explanation available to the subject which entails that the ball will soon roll into the hole.

The second serious problem for this defense is that it relies upon deterministic laws. The laws governing the behavior of the golf ball may well not be deterministic laws. If they aren't, then it will be plausible that the best available explanation for the subject's current evidence in the golf ball example is not one which will entail the ball's rolling into the cup. Of course, one might insist that the laws governing the behavior of the ball are deterministic.

[9] I discuss several difficulties for this approach in the main text. One which I do not discuss is that it isn't clear that if an explanation E entails a proposition p, p is included in E. But this principle appears to be relied upon here. Perhaps the advocate of this principle could make use of some story about relevant entailment.

But if we move to an alternative example it will be less plausible to insist that the laws are deterministic. For instance, suppose we take an example of future free action. Suppose my wife responds to tickling by tickling. That is, suppose that if I tickle her she tickles me back—and does so of her own accord, freely. Now, I might be justified in believing that my wife will soon tickle me, if I am now planning on tickling her and I have no reason to think that I will be impeded or that she will somehow be prevented from responding in the way she normally does. However, it seems that her tickling me sometime hence does not explain why I have the current evidence that I do. It doesn't explain why, for instance, I desire to tickle her—suppose, e.g., that I have no interest at all in her tickling me back. Further, if her action is free, at least according to an incompatibilist conception of freedom, then there will not be any explanation which appeals to current facts and laws which will entail that she freely tickles in the future, either. So, defending EXP in the way suggested faces the severe difficulty that it requires deterministic laws. It would be quite odd if the correct account of evidential support entailed the denial of incompatibilist views of freedom. Defending EXP in this way thus comes at a high cost.

And there is another significant cost to defending EXP in this way. The defender of EXP needs to claim not just that the laws governing the actual world—including free action in the actual world—are deterministic, but that this is necessarily so. She needs to claim that the laws couldn't have been merely statistical. For, if the laws had only implied a .999 probability of the ball's rolling into the hole, I still would have been justified in believing that it will soon roll into the hole. Yet, the best explanation available to me would not have been one which included deterministic laws which

entailed the ball's rolling into the hole. So, according to EXP, my evidence would not have supported the claim that the ball will soon roll in. And this result, given E, conflicts strikingly with intuition.

For the above reasons, then, I think that EXP is in grave trouble. It fails to account for an impressive range of justified beliefs about the future. In these cases, the propositions about the future which the subjects are justified in believing seem not to be part of the best explanation for the subject's current evidence. Further, the most plausible defenses of EXP against this charge fail. For, first, *pace* Jenkins and Nolan, backwards explanations are not ubiquitous. And, even if they were, they don't occur in the cases cited. Second, explanations need not be maximal. So, the fact that some explanation which cites the relevant future propositions might be better than any which cite their negations doesn't imply that an explanation which cites these propositions is best. And, third, the defender of EXP should not appeal to deterministic laws to defend her view of evidential support. Anyone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's account of evidential support should reject EXP.

CIA, by contrast, plausibly does just fine with these examples of justified beliefs about the future. For, in a case like the one described, if I am justified in believing that the ball will roll into the cup, then my evidence, by virtue of my disposition in the presence of such evidence to believe the ball will go in, will have caused me to be ultima facie inclined to believe that the ball will roll into the cup. CIA just says that the reason that my belief that the ball will roll into the cup is justified is precisely because of this—it is precisely because my evidence causes me, by virtue of such a disposition, to be ultima facie inclined to believe that the ball will roll into the cup. Thus, CIA does not appear to

conflict with intuitive judgments concerning justification in such cases in the way that the explanationist views discussed above do. And, to that extent, CIA appears to be superior to those views. A fuller discussion of CIA and how it applies in such cases must wait, though, until chapter five.

I take it as established, then, that the explanationist views discussed above appear to be inferior to CIA in at least this respect, that they handle improperly certain cases concerning justified attitudes about the future. Before concluding, however, I want to consider two proposed modifications of the explanationist views considered here which might seem to better handle justification for beliefs about the future. I will argue that neither modification succeeds.

The first proposal is as follows:

> S's evidence e supports p at t iff at t p is part of the best explanation available to S for e or S is aware of p as a probable consequence of the best explanation available to S for e.[10]

The proposal may indeed help in the golf ball case. For, though the ball's rolling into the cup shortly is not part of the best explanation for my current evidence, it is plausible that I may be aware of the ball's rolling into the cup as a probable consequence of that explanation. But there are at least two problems with this proposal. First, the proposal offers a disjunctive account of evidential support. One learns after some time to view disjunctive accounts in philosophy with suspicion. The main reason is that, once we move to the disjunctive account, the account loses its simplicity and elegance. And, there is some reason to think that the best accounts will be theoretically elegant and simple. The second problem with the proposal is more serious. The problem is that the account *doesn't* handle all examples like the golf ball example above. Although it may be that in

[10] (McCain unpublished).

the golf ball example I am aware of the ball's rolling into the cup as a probable consequence of the best explanation for my current evidence, this is a rather complicated psychological feat. In my view, this proposal conflicts with the results from chapter two which rule out accounts (1) and (2) of EXP above. For, this proposal requires too much sophisticated reflection on the part of epistemic agents for their beliefs about the future to be justified. In particular, it requires too much conceptualization. For, the agent is required to be aware of p *as* a probable consequence of the best explanation for her current evidence.[11] In the golf ball case, I may well not have this kind of sophisticated conceptualization going on despite the fact that I am justified in believing the ball will roll into the hole. This first proposal, then, will not help the explanationist accounts discussed here.[12]

The second proposal moves from a best explanation account to a contrastively better explanation account. It further keeps in step with proposal (5) for understanding EXP by requiring that the subject only be aware of a certain kind of relation—a contrastive explanatory relation. According to this account, no longer does evidence e supports p for S just when p is the best explanation for e. Instead, e supports p for S just when p is (part of) a better available explanation for e than any available explanation which includes not-p. And, what makes an explanation available to S is just that S is non-conceptually aware of it and of the relation it bears to her evidence. Thus, on this

[11] Of course, one might modify the proposal so that it doesn't involve this kind of conceptual awareness. I consider accounts probabilistic accounts of evidential support which do not involve conceptual awareness of probabilistic relations in chapter three.

[12] See further my discussion of disjunctive accounts of support in the Introduction.

view, one's evidence e supports a proposition p just when S is aware of an explanation of e involving p which is better than any explanation of e which includes not-p.

This proposal promises to help with cases like the golf ball case. For, in the golf ball case, although the claim that the ball will shortly roll into the hole is not part of the best explanation for my current evidence, there is an explanation of my current evidence which includes the proposition that the ball will roll into the cup which is better than any explanation of that evidence which includes the proposition that that the ball will *not* roll into the cup. At least, this is plausible. And, it may well be that, although I am not aware of the explanatory relations in this case *as* explanatory relations, I am nonetheless aware of them. So, according to this proposal, I am justified in believing that the ball will roll into the cup.

In my view, this is the best proposed modification of the explanationist accounts discussed here. That is not to say that it is worry-free, however. Some will worry, for instance, about whether it really is the case that there is an explanation of my current evidence in the golf ball example which includes the proposition that the ball will roll into the cup which is better than any explanation which includes the proposition that the ball will not roll in. Others may be concerned that this view allows one's evidence to support propositions when they are included in explanations only slightly better than explanations involving their negations. But I will not pursue these issues here. These problems are problems which this modified version of EXP shares with the original. Presumably, the defender of the original thinks there are responses to these concerns. If so, she won't be bothered by the fact that the same concerns afflict the modified better contrastive explanation view.

There are, however, problems which afflict the better contrastive explanation view which do not afflict EXP itself. The central problem is this. The better contrastive explanation view, when combined with central evidentialist theses, implies that where two competing explanations of my evidence are on par with respect to their explanatory power, and where both include superfluous claims p or not-p, I am justified in believing the simpler of the two explanations just because it is simpler. However, this result conflicts with intuition. Consider again the golf ball case. Suppose that, as I put the ball, I have very little evidence concerning the number of ducks in the world. All I know is that I've seen a handful of them. Now, contrast the following two explanations of my current evidence. Explanation One: What explains my current evidence includes a body of present and past facts concerning the wind, the ball, my having putted well most of the day…. and the claim that there are less than two million ducks in the world. Explanation Two: What explains my current evidence includes a body of present and past facts concerning the wind, the ball, my having putted well most of the day…. and the claim that it is not the case that there are less than two million ducks in the world. Explanation One and Explanation Two are on par concerning their explanatory power. Each equally explains my current evidence. However, Explanation One is better than Explanation Two. For, Explanation One is simpler than Explanation Two. And, by a simple application of Ockham's Razor, where two explanations are on par with respect to their explanatory power, the simpler one is better. But, then, according to the better contrastive explanation view, my evidence supports the claim that there are less than two million ducks in the world. So, by thesis E, I am justified in believing that there are less than two million ducks in the world. But this result clashes with intuition. Intuition tells

us that I am not justified in believing that there are less than two million ducks in the world in this case. If I am justified in taking any attitude toward the proposition that there are less than two million ducks in the world, I am justified in suspending judgment concerning this proposition.

Because of this difficulty for the better contrastive explanation account, one can pose a dilemma for the defender of explanationism. Either explanationism is committed to best explanations as in EXP or explanationism is committed to better contrastive explanations. If explanatinoism is committed to best explanations, then it conflicts with intuitive judgments concerning justified beliefs about the future. If it is committed to better contrastive explanations, then it conflicts with intuitive judgments concerning justified attitudes about propositions which would seem to be superfluous elements of any explanation of one's evidence. The difficulty with using best explanations is that it requires too much. But, the difficulty with using better contrastive explanations is that it requires too little. And there seems to be no way of fixing the explanation view so that it avoids both of these problems.

In this section, I have argued that the most plausible ways of understanding EXP all fail to account for intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification in cases like the golf ball example. They fail, that is, to account for an impressive range of justified attitudes about the future. The best attempts at rescuing EXP from these difficulties are also ultimately unappealing. CIA, however, does not appear to fail on this score. So, in this respect, CIA appears better off than any of the explanationist views here considered. The best option for someone attracted to EXP appears to be to move from EXP to a better contrastive explanation view. I argued that this view, too, faces a serious conflict with

intuition in that it requires too little for justification. CIA, then, appears preferable to the most promising fully explanationist accounts of evidential support, whether these are done in terms of best explanations or whether they are done in terms of better contrastive explanations.

Conclusion

Let me summarize. My goal in this chapter was to argue that Conee and Feldman should consider CIA as a worthy account of the support relation, an account even better than their own explanationist account EXP. I argued for this by showing, first, that CIA satisfies two constraints which Conee and Feldman place on any account of the supports relation. Though it is possible to understand EXP in such a way that it avoids conflict with these constraints as well, I showed that doing so is difficult and involves a significant theoretical commitment. I finally showed that all ways of understanding EXP, including those which avoid conflict with the two aforementioned constraints, face serious difficulties. For, when they are combined with central evidentialist theses, they yield results concerning epistemic justification which conflict with intuitive judgments on these matters. CIA itself does not face these difficulties. For these reasons, I think that CIA deserves attention from anyone attracted to EXP. Further, if CIA doesn't have other implications, when conjoined with central evidentialist theses, which conflict with intuition, then CIA is preferable to EXP. I defend the claim that CIA doesn't have other such implications in chapter five. If my defenses there are sound, then CIA is preferable to EXP. At this point, the theorist attracted to EXP might seek to modify EXP in order to avoid the difficulties it faces with justified beliefs about the future. The best modification would be to move to a better contrastive explanation account which requires non-

conceptual awareness of the explanatory relations running from the subject's evidence to the propositions supported by that evidence. I argued that this account makes justification too easy to come by in certain cases where CIA plausibly does not make justification so easy to come by. Thus, if CIA does not suffer from independent difficulties, then it is preferable to both the best explanationist accounts discussed here and the better contrastive explanation account.

CHAPTER FOUR

Probabilistic Accounts of Evidential Support

My topic is the relation of evidential support so central to the evidentialist views of Conee and Feldman. In the previous two chapters I have examined a view about this relation which says that whether a subject's evidence supports a proposition is a matter of whether that subject takes the right kind of attitude toward the relation between his evidence and that proposition and a view which says that whether a subject's evidence supports a proposition is a matter of whether that proposition bears the right sort of explanatory relations to the subject's evidence. I have argued that each of these views faces serious difficulties. The former view requires too much sophisticated reflection for a subject's evidence to support a proposition, and the latter view either fails to account for evidence which supports propositions about the future or implies that we are justified in believing far more than we are in fact justified in believing.

In this chapter, I will investigate another type of account of the evidential support relation—probabilistic accounts. Generally speaking, a probabilistic account of evidential support will say that S's evidence e supports a proposition p just when the right sort of probabilistic relation obtains between e and p. For the same reasons given in chapter three for supposing that the subject needs to be aware of an explanatory relation between e and p for that explanatory relation to do justifying work, we can also assume here that for the probabilistic relation between e and p to do justifying work, the subject must be aware of it. (In fact, as we saw, the original motivations from Conee and Feldman for requiring this sort of bridge mental state were aimed at probabilistic

accounts, rather than explanationist accounts). Thus, generally speaking, probabilistic accounts worth considering as accounts of evidential support attractive to someone who embraces the central evidentialist theses will be accounts which say that S's evidence e supports p just when e bears the right sort of probabilistic relation to p and when S is aware of this relation.

Here I will investigate two representative types of probabilistic account which fit the above general description. The first is a Bayesian-inspired account. I will save the details of this account for section 1. But, the essence of the account is to apply rules for probabilistic coherence and inference to the subjective degrees of belief of individuals and thereby compute which propositions are supported by the subject's evidence. I discuss one central independent difficulty for this Bayesian proposal as it is typically understood. The central problem for this view is that it fails to account for the unique evidential role of experiences. Someone attracted to the evidentialist views of Conee and Feldman, for whom the unique evidencing role of experiences is quite important, should not find this view attractive.

I move on, in section two, to discuss a second type of probabilistic view which does allow experiences to play a central role in supporting propositions. This second type of account I will call the "two-story story." Examples of the two-story story tell an objective probabilistic story about how beliefs support propositions (evidential support *from beliefs*) and an objective probabilistic story about how experiences support propositions (evidential support *from experiences*). Their accounts of the former will be the same but their accounts of the latter may be different. When a subject S's evidence e consists in a belief or group of beliefs, advocates of the two-story story agree that e

supports p for S just when e is justified, the probability of p given the propositional contents of e is sufficiently high, and S is aware of this probabilistic relation. Where e consists in experiences, advocates of the two-story story view may part company in their accounts of how e can support propositions. According to some advocates of the two-story story, where e consists in experiences, e will support p just when the probability of p given the contents of e is sufficiently high and S is aware of this. According to others, where e consists in experiences, e will support p just when the proposition that S has e makes probable p and S is aware of this. Thus, generally speaking, the two-story story view says that S's evidence e supports p just when either e is a justified belief or group of justified beliefs and the content of e makes probable p and S is aware of this or e is an experience and either the content of e makes probable p or the proposition that S has e makes probable p and S is aware of this.

In section 2.1, I present two objections to the account of how beliefs support propositions advocated by adherents of the two-story story. The objections contend that beliefs can support without being justified and that it is false that in all cases where a belief supports a proposition, the content of that belief makes probable the supported proposition.

It will be helpful, however, to look further than just this account of evidential support from beliefs—the first part of the two-story story. For, the account itself is incomplete. It defines evidential support from beliefs in terms of justification. But, someone committed to central evidentialist theses E and EJ wants to define justification in terms of evidential support. It appears at first, then, as if we have a definitional circularity. More must be said if the two-story story is to avoid such circularity.

Advocates of the two-story story alleviate this concern about circularity by claiming that the "justification" spoken of in the account of evidential support from beliefs is a different kind of justification than the justification which arises where one's beliefs support a proposition. The latter sort of justification is sometimes called inferential justification. The former sort of justification is called non-inferential justification.[1]

It is not the sort of justification which arises from beliefs, but the sort of justification which arises from experiences. Advocates of the two-story story offer probabilistic accounts of this latter sort of justification as well. They do so by offering probabilistic accounts of how experiences, rather than beliefs, support propositions. Thus, advocates of the two-story story provide in the first instance an account of how beliefs support propositions which itself presupposes an account of how experiences support propositions, and then they offer an account of how experiences support propositions.

I will focus in section 2.2 on the accounts of evidential support from experiences which are available to advocates of the two-story story. I survey the most elegant and obvious kinds of probabilistic accounts of evidential support from experience and discuss difficulties faced by each of these kinds of accounts.

After discussing the Bayesian-inspired account in section one and the two-story story view in section two and presenting independent objections to each, I conclude the chapter by offering an objection which will threaten both types of account. The objection is that these probabilistic accounts of evidential support fail to account for the unique evidential role of dispositions. I attempt to show not only that the representative

[1] These are Fumerton's names for these kinds of justification. See (Fumerton 1995; 2006).

probabilistic accounts discussed herein suffer from this difficulty, but that probabilistic accounts more generally will face this problem. Thus, if successful, this chapter will show that there is good reason for someone attracted to the central evidentialist theses to reject the two representative probabilistic accounts of evidential support discussed at length here and that, moreover, there is reason for her to be suspicious of probabilistic accounts generally.

1 Bayesian-inspired Probabilistic Support

I'll begin here with the Bayesian-inspired account. Here I will describe the account and offer one objection specific to this account. In section three I will urge one further difficulty for probabilistic accounts of evidential support which afflicts both the Bayesian-inspired account of this section and the two-story story view presented in the second section.

There are two features of the Bayesian account which make it stand out against the two-story story to be presented in section two. The first feature is that the Bayesian account relies heavily on degrees of belief. It is a subject's degrees of belief in propositions, together with certain principles governing rationality, which tells us what the subject's evidence supports. The second unique feature of the Bayesian account is its proposals for which laws govern synchronic and diachronic probabilistic rationality. These laws mirror proposals for synchronic and diachronic deductive rationality. The most commonly proposed laws for synchronic and diachronic deductive rationality are deductive coherence, in the first place, and conformity to deductive rules of inference in the second. Similarly, Bayesians propose that synchronic rationality be governed by probabilistic coherence and that diachronic rationality be governed by probabilistic rules

of inference. A subject S's synchronic probability assignments are coherent, and hence rational, when and only when S assigns probabilities which conform to the probability calculus. A subject S's diachronic probability assignments are rational when and only when they conform to the probability calculus and the principle of conditionalization.

The principle of conditionalization comes in different versions. The simple version says that if S begins with initial probabilities P_i, and S becomes certain of new evidence E, then S must update her probabilities P_f such that where S is any statement, $P_f(S) = P_i(S/E)$. Many have found the simple rule of conditionalization too restrictive. For, they insist, we ought to update our probabilities not only when we gain new evidence of which we are *certain*, but also when we gain new evidence of which we are less than certain. In order to handle updating in the absence of certainty, Richard Jeffrey (1992) has proposed the following revised principle of conditionalization:

$$P_f(H) = [P_i(H/E) * P_f(E)] + [P_i(H/\sim E) * Pf(\sim E)]$$

Thus, the Bayesian view I will consider accepts that S's degrees of belief are rational only if they conform to the probability calculus and the revised principle of conditionalization.[2]

We are close to seeing what this Bayesian-inspired view will say about evidential support. Generally, the view accepts that S's evidence E supports p at t only if S must have a sufficiently high degree of belief in p at t, given E. It further explains when S must have a sufficiently high degree of belief in p at t in terms of synchronic and diachronic rationality. So, according to the Bayesian view, S's evidence E supports p at t only if, given probability assignments to the propositional objects of E equal to S's

[2] Which principle of conditionalization we choose actually plays almost no role in the discussion which follows. But, I should point out here that there is controversy over Jeffrey's revised principle, since it seems to require *sequential* updating. See Hawthorne (2004).

degrees of belief in those propositions at t, the probability which must be assigned to p in order for the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of E and to p to conform to the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization is sufficiently high.

Two further comments are in order before assessing this view. First, it is important to distinguish Objective Bayesian views from Subjective Bayesian views. These views offer different accounts of what is required for the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of E and p to conform to the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization. Subjective Bayesian views say that the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of E and to p conform to the probability calculus and to the rule of conditionalization iff the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of E and to p conform to the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization, given probability assignments to all other propositions q equal to S's degrees of belief in all other propositions q. Subjective Bayesianism requires, in effect, that all of S's degrees of belief conform to the probability calculus and that his degree of belief in p obeys the rule of conditionalization. Objective Bayesian views say that the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of E and to p conform to the probability calculus and to the rule of conditionalization iff the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of E and to p conform to the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization, given probability assignments to all other propositions q equal to the *rational person's* degrees of belief in all other propositions q. Thus, the difference between Subjective and Objective Bayesian

views is that Subjective views deemphasize constraints on a subject's prior probabilities, while Objective Bayesian views emphasize such constraints.[3]

Due to the perspectival character of justification,[4] the Subjective Bayesian view offers a more promising model of epistemic justification than the Objective Bayesian view. One helpful way of explaining the difference between Subjective and Objective Bayesian views is with the language of perspective. The Subjective view requires that, for S's evidence e to support p, the probability assignment to p which obeys the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization given *S's perspective* is sufficiently high. Objective Bayesian views require that for S's evidence e to support p, the probability assignment to p which obeys the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization given *the rational person's perspective* is sufficiently high. But, then, Objective Bayesian views will make justification dependent upon the perspective of someone other than S where S isn't rational. So, since justification is dependent on the perspective of the epistemic agent, Subjective Bayesian views will be preferable. This is why I pursue a Subjective Bayesian view here.

The second remark is that something else may be required before we can turn the necessary conditions for evidential support proposed two paragraphs back into necessary and sufficient conditions. What may be required is an awareness requirement. The necessary conditions proposed for evidential support two paragraphs back appeal only to probabilistic relations between a subject's evidence and a proposition p. They do not require that the subject have any bridge mental state moving her from her evidence to p.

[3] Talbott (2008) distinguishes the two types of view in this way. For an example of a Subjective Bayesian view, see (Jeffrey 1992). For an example of an Objective Bayesian view, see (Rosenkrantz 1981).

[4] See (Kvanvig 2003).

As we saw in chapter three, the most promising bridge mental state for a view like this Bayesian one is an awareness of the relevant relation. There is some motivation, then, to combine the aforementioned requirement concerning the existence of the relevant probabilistic relation together with the awareness requirement. I should note, however, that this motivation is not decisive, since the conditional probabilities used in the Bayesian view are probabilities of the subject already. Nothing much in my treatment of the view which follows turns on whether or not the awareness requirement is included. The full account, including as optional the awareness requirement, says the following:

> (BES) S's evidence e supports p at t iff, given probability assignments to the propositional objects of e equal to S's degrees of belief in those propositions at t, the probability which must be assigned to p in order for the probabilities assigned to the propositional objects of e and to p to conform to the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization according to subjective Bayesianism is sufficiently high, (and S is aware of this relation between E and p).[5]

I now turn to the assessment of BES.

There is one difficulty I want to propose here as an independent difficulty for BES. The central difficulty I want to suggest as an independent difficulty for BES is that BES fails to account for the unique evidential role of experiences, which plays an important part in Conee's and Feldman's own view and which seems to be supported by intuition.

It is easy to see that BES fails to make room for the unique evidential role of experiences. For, according to BES, the only things relevant for determining whether my evidence supports a proposition p are degrees of belief I have in propositions, the axioms

[5] A view much like this one, minus the awareness requirement, is discussed (though not endorsed) in Hawthorne (2009). According to the view, "Real agents should try to emulate the *ideal agent* of the model (to the best of their abilities) by attempting to assign probabilistically coherent numerical weights to propositions; they should then *believe* just those propositions that fall above some numerical threshold for belief appropriate to the context, and should revise probabilistic weights and beliefs as needed to better approximate the ideal."

of the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization, and (perhaps) my awareness of a probabilifying relation between the propositional objects of my degrees of belief and p. Nowhere are experiences allowed to enter the equation. If, for instance, I had an experience as of a television and a disposition, in the presence of this experience, to believe that there was a television, but had no degree of belief in the proposition that I was experiencing a television or in any other probabilistically relevant proposition, my evidence could not support the claim that there was a television. According to BES, what does the work of evidentially supporting is degrees of belief. Experiences play no role. But this conflicts with both intuition and Conee's and Feldman's views about experiences playing the role of ultimate evidence.

One might attempt to reply to this objection by suggesting that anytime a subject has an experience as of an x she also has a degree of belief in her having had an experience as of an x. Thus, although experiences do not themselves play any evidential supporting role, there at least cannot be cases like the one I just mentioned of justified belief in the existence of a television in the absence of degrees of belief in probabilistically relevant propositions. This reply does not appear to save enough, though. For, at its very best, it conflicts with the phenomenology of doxastically justified beliefs in the existence of external world objects. At least in some cases, we properly base our beliefs in the existence of external world objects on experiences we have. In at least some such cases it seems intuitively plausible that we have doxastically justified beliefs. But, given WF, this can only be so if our experiences support the relevant propositions. Thus, the reply here that experiences entail degrees of belief does not save enough because it conflicts with intuitive judgments about doxastic justification.

But the reply also faces another difficulty. According to all of the familiar conceptions of degrees of belief, the requirement that there is a necessary connection between having an experience as of an x and having a degree of belief that one is having an experience as of an x fails. The familiar accounts of degrees of belief include accounts done in terms of betting behavior (de Finetti 1980) or attitudes about betting behavior (Hajek 2009) or preferences (Savage 1954) or probability assignments. But there does not seem to be any necessary connection between having an experience and being in these other states. So, it seems that it is false that whenever one has an experience as of an x one has a degree of belief that one is having such an experience. And, if this claim is false, then the possibility of cases of justification and evidential support in the absence of probabilistically relevant degrees of belief remains.

Even if the defender of BES is not moved by these considerations concerning the absence of any evidential supporting role for experiences in cases like belief in the existence of televisions, she should be moved by other cases where experiences seem necessary for justification. For instance, it would seem that the experience as of an x is just the sort of thing to evidentially support the belief, or a degree of belief, that one is having an experience as of an x. Indeed, it is difficult to find any good candidate for a degree of belief which could evidentially support this proposition. What proposition is it which is such that if one has a high degree of belief in it, she must, according to the probability calculus and rule of conditionalization, also have a high degree of belief in the proposition that she is having an experience as of an x? There seems to be no good answer. This is because it isn't my degrees of belief in any other propositions which justify me in believing that I am having an experience as of an x, but rather my

experience as of an x does this itself. Of course, the defender of BES might reply by accepting that high degrees of belief in propositions like the proposition that one is having an experience as of an x are justified independent of degrees of belief in anything else. But, then, her view will imply one of three seemingly unacceptable conclusions. On one option her view will imply that there can be justification without evidence. This conflicts with thesis E. On the second it will imply that not all justification comes from probabilistic relations obtaining between the objects of one's degrees of belief. This option, though more plausible, yields an account of evidential support which does not have probabilities all the way down. On the third option, the evidence for the claim that one is having an experience as of an x comes from the proposition that one is having an experience as of an x. In other words, this proposition is self-evident. Since it is unlikely that the evidentialist will find any of these options attractive, this is a major difficulty for BES.

The central independent difficulty, then, that BES faces, is that it fails to account for the unique evidential role of experiences. Experiences can support propositions. They can support propositions affirming their own existence. And, they also seem to support propositions about the existence of external world objects. BES does not account for either of these evidential powers of experiences. The best attempts to rescue BES from this difficulty either conflict with thesis E or imply that evidential support is not to be defined in terms of probabilities all the way down or rely on self-evidencing doxastic states. None of these options is ultimately attractive. BES, then, faces the independent difficulty that it implies that experiences play no role in evidentially supporting propositions. There is a second difficulty I wish to discuss for BES. But, since it is

shared by the two-story story and perhaps other probabilistic accounts of evidential support, I save it for the final section.

2 The Two-story Story

Move then to a second probabilistic account of evidential support which does allow experiences to support propositions—the two-story story. In section 2.1 I will discuss the two-story story's account of evidential support from beliefs, presenting two objections to this view. These objections apply to all versions of the two-story story, since all versions of the two-story story agree in their accounts of how beliefs support propositions. In section 2.2, I discuss the available options for two-story story adherents concerning how experiences support propositions, outlining the challenges facing these views.

2.1 The Two-story Story on Support from Beliefs

The two-story story's account of evidential support from belief, as I construe it, is inspired by Richard Fumerton's account of what he calls inferential justification. For our purposes here, we can understand inferential justification, as we saw above, as that sort of justification which type-attitudes receive from beliefs.

Fumerton's view about inferential justification is motivated by skeptical worries. The skeptic's argument, as Fumerton (1995) understands it, relies on what Fumerton calls the principle of inferential justification. This principle says the following: For any subject S, proposition p, and set of believed propositions b, S is justified in believing p on the basis of b only if (i) S is justified in believing each member of b and (ii) S is justified in believing that b makes probable p. Fumerton responds by building this principle into his original formulation of his account of inferential justification. According to the

Fumerton, the two necessary conditions for justified inferential belief required by the principle of inferential justification provide necessary and sufficient conditions for inferential propositional justification. Thus, Fumerton's account of inferential propositional justification says:

> (FIJ) The attitude of believing p is inferentially justified for a subject S at a time t by a set of believed propositions b iff (i) S is justified in believing each member of the set b and (ii) S is justified in believing that the contents of b make probable p.[6]

FIJ offers a view very much like the two-story story's account of evidential support. The only differences are that, first, FIJ is a view about justification rather than support and, second, FIJ requires not that S be aware of the probabilistic relation between the propositional objects of b and p but that S be justified in believing that such a relation obtains. Importantly, however, Fumerton explains the justification in clause (ii) by appealing to direct awareness of the relevant probabilistic relation. The explanation for why a subject can be justified in believing that the relevant probabilistic relation obtains is that she is directly aware of it. Direct awareness of this relation is both necessary and

[6] I have slightly amended Fumerton's presentation of inferential internalism here to make it more clear that it is indeed intended as an account of propositional justification. Fumerton often presents his account of inferential justification in such a way that it looks like an account of doxastic justification rather than propositional justification. What is particularly misleading is the basing language employed. For instance, in his (1995), the account reads: "To be justified in believing one proposition P on the basis of another proposition E one must be (1) justified in believing E and (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P." Since "justified in believing" is ambiguous between propositional and doxastic justification, one might take the language of basing involved in this account to indicate that it is an account of doxastic justification—only token beliefs are based, after all, it would seem. But, that Fumerton intends this as an account of propositional justification is made clear by his presentation of the same view in his (2006). There the view says, "To have justification for believing P on the basis of E one must not only have (1) justification for believing E, but (2) justification for believing that E makes probable P." Though the basing language remains here, it is clear that Fumerton is talking about propositional justification because he has spent the previous several pages distinguishing between *having justification for a belief* and *having a justified belief*. The former is intended to capture propositional justification while the latter is intended to capture doxastic justification. I avoid using the language of basing in my characterization of the view so as to avoid confusion between propositional and doxastic justification.

sufficient for this justification, according to Fumerton.[7] Thus, clause (ii) of FIJ is equivalent to the claim that S is aware of the probabilifying relation between the contents of b and p.

The only difference, then, between FIJ and the account of evidential support from beliefs offered by the advocate of the two-story story is that FIJ is an account of justification rather than support. But, suppose someone wanted to hang on to central evidentialist theses E and EJ and to FIJ. The conjunction of E, EJ and FIJ implies the following account of evidential support from beliefs:

> (ESB) S's belief or group of beliefs b supports a proposition p at a time t iff (i) S is justified in believing all of the propositional objects of b, (ii) the probability of p given the propositional objects of b is sufficiently high, and (iii) S is aware of the probabilistic relation in (ii).[8]

I call this view ESB to abbreviate "evidential support from beliefs." ESB is just the account of evidential support from beliefs which I have been attributing to the two-story story. And it is easy to see how such an account could be inspired by Fumerton's account of non-inferential justification.

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[7] At least, in some places [e.g., (Fumerton 1995)] Fumerton talks like this. However, there is good reason to think that direct awareness of this probabilistic relation is not sufficient for justification for believing that there is such a relation, even given Fumerton's own views of non-inferential justification. For, Fumerton requires that for the type-attitude of believing p to be non-inferentially justified for S, S must be directly aware of the fact that p, the thought that p, and the relation between these. Thus, for a subject to be non-inferentially justified in believing that the relevant probabilistic relation obtains here, she must have the thought that this relation obtains. But, it seems clear that there are cases of inferentially justified belief where the subject has no such thought. Perhaps in part for this reason, Fumerton in other places backs off of the requirement that there be justification for believing that this probabilistic relation obtains and instead holds only that the subject must be directly aware of it [see, e.g., (Fumerton forthcoming)].

[8] ESB, as stated, offers an account of the conditions under which particular beliefs or groups of beliefs support a proposition p. We might build an account of the conditions under which a subject's entire body of beliefs supports a proposition p by saying that S's entire body of beliefs B supports p just when for some belief or group of beliefs b in B, b is justified, the content of b makes probable p, S is aware of this probabilistic relation, and S has no defeaters for b's supporting p. So long as the no defeaters clause here is ultimately understood in probabilistic terms, there is no threat of circularity in the definition here. See note 17and chapter five for further discussion.

I now turn to assessing ESB as an account of evidential support from beliefs. I will discuss two difficulties for this view.

The first and central difficulty for ESB is that there are cases where a subject's belief supports a proposition p but where the content of her belief plausibly doesn't make p probable. If there are such cases, they will violate clause (ii) of ESB. And, plausibly, there are such cases.

Begin by considering a case where you have an experience as of a computer monitor. On the basis of this experience, you acquire a justified belief that you are having an experience as of a computer monitor. Under such circumstances, in the absence of defeaters, you might infer that there is a computer monitor before you. Very plausibly, in such a case, you could have a doxastically justified belief. Given WF, your belief that there is a computer monitor before you will only be doxastically justified if your belief that you are having an experience as of a computer monitor supports the proposition that there is a computer monitor before you. And, given ESB, for your belief that you are having an experience as of a computer monitor to support the proposition that there is a computer monitor before you it must be that the proposition that you are having an experience as of a computer monitor before you makes probable the proposition that there is a computer monitor before you. I want to argue that it is possible for there to be cases like this one where very plausibly the relevant probabilistic relation does not obtain.

Before arguing for this, however, I want to discuss one feature of the kind of case envisioned. This kind of case may be a rare kind of case. It may be that, typically, when we have doxastically justified beliefs about the external world, we base these beliefs not

on other beliefs about our experiences but on the experiences themselves. Basing one's beliefs on beliefs about one's own experiences may seem a challenging feat. However, it is a possible feat. Further, it would be odd for someone to defend the view that it is possible for one to have doxastically justified beliefs in external world objects based on one's experiences and possible for one to have doxastically justified beliefs in propositions about one's having these experiences but not possible for one to have doxastically justified beliefs in external world objects based on doxastically justified beliefs about one's experiences. This is the sort of commitment which has the danger of implying that as soon as we start trying to be very careful about how we come to believe things, we lose the justification we might have otherwise had. This sort of view suggests that experiences are a *better* candidate for what to base one's external world beliefs on than are beliefs about those experiences. And this comparative claim is far from clear.

Cases, then, where one has a doxastically justified belief in the existence of a computer monitor on the basis of a justified belief that one is having an experience as of a computer monitor are possible. And, as I will now attempt to show, there are such cases where it is very plausible that the contents of one's belief does not make it probable that there is a computer before one, contra ESB.

For instance, consider a subject who is the victim of an evil demon world. She is exactly like you mentally; so, according to evidentialist thesis M she is exactly like you justificationally and thus exactly like you with respect to what her evidence supports. However, her mental life is mostly the product of a deceitful evil demon. And, further, the world she inhabits is very different from the one you inhabit. Although she has all the same evidence as you do concerning the existence of computers and the like, every bit of

it is misleading. She has an experience, like you do, as of a computer monitor. And, she justifiedly believes she is having an experience as of a computer monitor on this basis. From this belief she infers that there is a computer monitor before her. Her belief that she is having an experience as of a computer monitor must then support the claim that there is a computer monitor before her just as much as your belief does, given thesis M.

What does ESB say about this case? ESB tells us that your demon-world counterpart's belief supports the proposition that there is a computer monitor in front of her only if the proposition that she is having an experience as of a computer monitor makes it probable that there is a computer monitor in front of her. However, for all the world, it seems as if the proposition that she is having an experience as of a computer monitor does *not* make it probable that there is a computer before her. More generally, her belief that she is having an experience as of x does not make it probable that there is an x. For, in almost every case where she has an experience as of x, there is no x. So, it seems that there are examples where a subject's belief supports a proposition p but where the content of her belief does not make p probable.

The foregoing argument relies upon our intuition in cases like the new evil demon case concerning whether a probabilifying relation obtains between the claim that a subject is having an experience as of an x and the claim that there is an x. Call the claim that there is such a probabilifying relation PR. The above argument appeals to our intuition that PR is false. But more can be said that this. For, not only is it intuitively appealing that PR is false; but the best-understood accounts of objective probability will not offer any support to the defender of PR. Neither the frequency, nor the classical, nor the logical, nor the propensity, nor the nomological interpretation of probability makes it

clear that PR is true. Indeed, there is good reason to think that on each of these views, PR is false.

We have already begun to see why the frequency interpretation does not confirm PR. There are two versions of the frequency interpretation. On one version, the probability of an outcome o of trial t is equal to the actual frequency of outcomes of type o in trials of type t. On this view, for instance, the probability of my rolling a six when I roll a six-sided die is equal to the actual frequency of sixes I have rolled in my total number of rolls of the die. Applied to the case at hand, the probability that there is an x given that the demon-world believer is having an experience as of an x is equal to the actual frequency of there being an x in the total number of cases where the demon-world believer is having an experience as of an x. By stipulation, this actual frequency is very low. So, given the first version of the frequency interpretation, the probability that there is an x given that the demon-world believer has an experience as of an x is low—not high, as PR requires.

Of course, it is well-known that there are serious difficulties with the actual frequency version of the frequency interpretation. In particular, this view has trouble handling single case probabilities. To use the die example, for instance, if I were to roll the die only once rolling a six and never to roll the die again, the actual frequency view would imply that the probability of my rolling a six was 1. This result is clearly wrong. For this reason, advocates of the frequency interpretation have preferred a different version of the view which appeals to limiting relative frequencies. Typically, limiting relative frequencies are explained in terms of counterfactuals. The limiting relative frequency of an outcome o of a trial t is equal to the limit toward which the ratio of

outcomes of o in an infinite series of trials of type t would approach. The idea is that if I were to roll the die an infinite number of times, the limit toward which the ratio of sixes to the total number of trials would approach would be 1/6.

The limiting relative frequency view does not help PR. For, supposing that our demon is sufficiently good at deceiving, the limit toward which the ratio of trials in which the subject has an experience as of an x and there is an x compared to the total number of trials in which the subject has an experience as of an x would approach is very low. Thus, far from confirming PR, the frequency interpretation of probability in both of its guises appears to disconfirm PR, thereby confirming our intuitive judgment.

The same goes for the classical interpretation. The classical theory of probability began with Laplace (1814/1951). On this view, the unconditional probability of any sentence A can be determined a priori by dividing the number of possibilities in which A is true by the total number of possibilities. According to classical probability, each possibility has an equal share of probability in the absence of evidence or in the presence of counterbalanced evidence. To compute conditional probabilities, we use the theorem that Pr(A/B)=Pr(A&B)/Pr(B) where Pr(B)>0. The probability of A given B is thus equal to the number of possibilities in which A and B divided by the number of possibilities in which B. When we use this interpretation of probability to understand BES, we find that BES requires that for S's evidence e to support a proposition p, it must be that the number of possibilities in which e & p divided by the number of possibilities in which e is sufficiently high. Possibilities here are logical possibilities. Thus, to evaluate whether, according to the classical theory of probability, there is a probabilifying relation between the demon world subject's belief that she is having an experience as of an x and the

proposition that there is an x, we should see whether the ratio of the number of logical possibilities in which she has this evidence and there is an x divided by the number of logical possibilities in which she has this evidence is high. It appears, however, that the ratio will not be high. At face value, the ratio would appear to be ½. For, there are equally as many logical possibilities in which she has the evidence she has and there is an x as there are possibilities in which she has the evidence she has and there is not an x. Thus, it is not at all clear that according to the classical interpretation of probability there is a probabilifying relation running from the demon world subject's evidence to the proposition it supports. Indeed, it seems that on the classical interpretation, PR is false.

One response to this argument on behalf of the logical interpretation would be for the defender of the logical interpretation to offer an account of legitimate ways in which certain logical possibilities can be ignored when computing conditional probabilities. For instance, when we compute the probability of rolling a five when we roll a six-sided die, the classical probability theorist may want us to consider only those logical possibilities in which the die comes up a one, two, three, four, five, or six. She may not want us to consider the infinite number of logical possibilities in which the die explodes or lands on one of its corners. Perhaps, then, she would like to suggest more generally a way in which certain possibilities can be ignored when computing conditional probabilities. And, perhaps the rule for ignoring here would allow us, when considering PR, to ignore demon-world possibilities and their kin.

Though this sort of move may allow the proponent of classical probability to avoid claiming that PR is false, it appears to come at a high cost. First, accounts of nearly anything which require clauses concerning which possibilities can be properly

ignored are notoriously difficult to work out.[9] Second, one worries that this sort of restriction will conflict with inductive learning. Suppose, for instance, that I find out that I am highly unreliable when it comes to detecting green shirts (as in fact I have come to find out). Suppose now that I have an experience as of a green shirt. Should I ignore all that I have learned about my unreliability when I evaluate whether it is probable that there is a green shirt given my present experience just because this parallels what happens in the demon world? Many of us will be inclined to think not. Indeed, Laplace himself appears to have thought not. Because he thought not, he proposed the following addition to his account of probability to help account for inductive learning:

Pr(success on $N+1^{st}$ trial/N consecutive successes) = $N+1/N+2$[10]

However, as soon as we add this to the classical account of probability, we see that that account straightway implies that in the demon world the subject's belief that she has an experience as of an x does not make it probable that there is an x. For, the subject has had numerous consecutive trials where she had such an experience as of an x but there was no x. The greater this number of trials is, the more probable it will be that there is no x given her belief. Thus, the greater this number of trials is, the less probable it will be that there is an x given her belief that she has an experience as of an x. The classical theory of probability, then, does not appear to offer any more help to PR than the frequency theory.

Neither does the logical interpretation of probability offer much hope for PR. The details of the logical interpretation are much harder to work out because the interpretation

[9] See, e.g., (Lewis 1996) and the literature which has cropped up concerning his account of properly ignored possibilities since that time.

[10] This formalization comes from (Hajek 2009). The original formulation from Laplace is available in (Laplace 1814/1951).

appeals to state and structure descriptions and defines probability relative to a language. The interpretation, developed by Carnap (1950), provides a function for assigning non-conditional probabilities to state and structure descriptions of the world and then uses this function to define conditional probabilities. Importantly, the non-conditional probabilities are not assigned equally to each possibility as in the classical interpretation. Rather, the probabilities are assigned equally to structure descriptions and unequally to state descriptions. State descriptions are maximal consistent descriptions of the world in the object language. Structure descriptions are descriptions in the meta-language which say how many of each structural property there are. Structural properties are defined by the possible combinations of predicates in the language. Thus, if we take a very simple language with only two predicates—F and G—and only two objects—named by a and b—there will be 10 state descriptions corresponding to 10 possible combinations of 4 structural properties. The four structural properties are F&G (call this S1 for structural property 1), F&~G (S2), ~F&G (S3), and ~F&~G (S4). The ten possible structure descriptions will be two S1, one S1 and one S2, One S1 and one S3, one S1 and one S4, one S2 and one S3, two S2, one S2 and one S4, one S3 and one S4, two S3, and two S4. The function provided by the logical interpretation assigns equal non-conditional probabilities to each of these structure descriptions and then divides this non-conditional probability assignment to structure descriptions among the state descriptions which fall under each structure description category. Once these non-conditional probabilities are fixed, conditional probability can be defined using them. The conditional probability of p given e will be the sum of the non-conditional probabilities of those state descriptions in

which p and e divided by the sum of the probabilities of those state descriptions in which p.

Thus, in order to determine whether the demon world subject's evidence makes probable that there is an x we must ask what the ratio is between the sum of the non-conditional probabilities in which the subject has an experience as of there being an x and there is an x divided by the sum of those probabilities in which she has an experience as of an x. If this value is to be greater than .5 it will have to be that the sum of the non-conditional probabilities in which the subject has the experience and there is an x is greater than the sum of the non-conditional probabilities in which she has the experience and there is not an x. It is hard to envision a convincing argument that would show that this is so. One problem is that the logical interpretation of probability only gives us a way of computing the conditional probabilities of things having certain properties. It doesn't give us a clear way of computing the conditional probabilities of things existing. One could insist that existence is a property of a thing, but this the history of philosophy has shown is quite a controversial assumption.[11] Another difficulty is that to provide an argument that the content of the demon world subject's belief makes probable that there is an x according to the logical interpretation, we will first have to argue for which language containing which predicates and subjects is the correct language to use to evaluate this claim.[12] The prospects for coming up with an argument that according to the logical interpretation the subject's evidence makes probable that there is an x seem dim indeed. Thus, it is not at all clear that on the logical interpretation PR is true.

[11] See, e.g., the discussion of the ontological argument in (Kant 2000).

[12] (Hajek 2009) discusses this general difficulty for the logical interpretation in further detail.

Further, if we attempt to provide a simple language with predicates and variables in order to apply the logical theory to our case, there is good reason to think the logical theory will imply that PR is false. For, imagine that in order to evaluate the probability that there is an x given S's having an experience as of an x we use a simple language with two predicates and two names. The two predicates are ∃e and ∃x and the names are a and b. The names a and b name situations.[13] ∃e(a) stands for "situation a is such that S has an experience as of an x" and ∃x(b) stands for "situation b is such that there is an x." The four possible combinations of our two properties, our four structural properties, will be ∃e & ∃x (call this structural property E1), ∃e & ~∃x (E2), ~∃e & ∃x (E3), and ~∃e & ~∃x (E4). These combinations allow for ten different structure descriptions in our language which will be awarded equal unconditional probability in the absence of evidence or in the presence of counterbalanced evidence. Several of these structure descriptions are met by multiple state descriptions. Table 1 lists the structure descriptions with their unconditional probability assignments and the state descriptions with their unconditional probability assignments.

With these unconditional probability assignments to each of the state descriptions in our language, we can compute the conditional probability for a situation a that there is an x given that S has an experience as of there being an x relative to this language. That conditional probability will equal the sum of the probability assignments to state descriptions which E1(a) divided by the sum of the probability assignments to state descriptions which include E1(a) or E2(a). In the absence of evidence which would limit

[13] I'm trying to illustrate here how one might apply the logical interpretation to evaluate the case in question. If the reader is squeamish about ontological commitment to situations here, she can find a suitable substitute to work with to follow my presentation.

Table 1: Table for Probabilities

Structure Description	Unconditional Probability of Structure Description	State Descriptions	Unconditional Probability of State Descriptions
Two E1	.10	(1) E1(a) and E1(b)	.10
One E1, One E2	.10	(2) E1(a) and E2(b)	.05
		(3) E2(a) and E1(b)	.05
One E1, One E3	.10	(4) E1(a) and E3(b)	.05
		(5) E3(a) and E1(b)	.05
One E1, one E4	.10	(6) E1(a) and E4(b)	.05
		(7) E4(a) and E1(b)	.05
Two E2	.10	(8) E2(a) and E2(b)	.10
One E2, one E3	.10	(9) E2(a) and E3(b)	.05
		(10) E3(a) and E2(b)	.05
One E2, one E4	.10	(11) E2(a) and E4(b)	.05
		(12) E4(a) and E2(b)	.05
Two E3	.10	(13) E3(a) and E3(b)	.10
One E3, one E4	.10	(14) E3(a) and E4(b)	.05
		(15) E4(a) and E3(b)	.05
Two E4	.10	(16) E4(a) and E4(b)	.10

which structure descriptions we look at or in the presence of counterbalanced evidence, this ratio is clearly .5. For, the state descriptions in which E1(a) are 1,2,4, and 6 and the sum of the probability assignments to these is .25. But, the state descriptions in which either E1(a) or E2(a) are 1-4,6,8, and 9, and 11 and the sum of their probability assignments is .5.

Of course, in the demon world, we might imagine that our evidence is not counterbalanced between the ten structure descriptions. For, we can imagine that we

know that in one situation in the demon world, S has an experience as of an x and there was no x and now in the second situation S is having an experience as of an x but we do not know whether there is an x or not. In such a case, only those structure descriptions which include E2(a) and either E2(b) or E1(b) will be relevant for our evaluation of the probability that there is an x given the content of S's belief that she has an experience as of an x. Thus, the only state descriptions which will be relevant for our evaluation are (3) and (8). Our task is to compute the probability for a situation b that there is an x given that S has an experience as of an x. This will equal the sum of the probabilities in which E2(a) and E1(b) divided by the sum of the probabilities in which either E2(a) and E1(b) or E2(a) and E2(b). Thus, the probability for situation b that there is an x given that S has an experience as of an x is equal to .5/.15 = 1/3. This conditional probability obviously does *not* help PR. For, using the language we have picked here, there is not a probabilifying relation between the demon-world subject's belief and the claim that there is an x, but a *dis*probabilifying relation. Her evidence, given the logical interpretation of probability and the language used here to apply that interpretation, makes it *un*likely that there is an x. There is good reason, then, to think that the logical interpretation offers PR no help.

It could of course be that the language I have used here is not the correct one. But, one difficulty with the logical interpretation is just that it is not at all clear if there is such a thing as the correct language and if so which language that is. I am not asserting here that the language I have picked is the correct one. I only use it to illustrate that in at least some languages, including ones which are not obviously the wrong languages to pick, the logical interpretation implies that PR is false. It is far from clear that there are

any languages where the logical interpretation implies that PR is true and that these languages are better than the language employed here.

Move to the propensity interpretation. There are two versions of this theory to consider. The first version, due to Giere (1973), says that the probability of an outcome e of an experiment R is equal to the propensity of R to produce outcome e. The second, due to Popper (1957), says that the probability of an outcome e of an experiment R is equal to the limiting relative frequency which R has the propensity to produce e. The first thus identifies probabilities with propensities, while the second identifies probabilities with limiting relative frequencies, but explains limiting relative frequencies without reference to hypothetical infinite series of trials or events as we did above.

It is difficult to apply Giere's interpretation to the case at hand because it is defined only for experiments. However, we can supply an awkward suggestion as follows. Applying Giere's interpretation to the case at hand, we find that the probability of there being an x given the content of the demon-world subject's belief that she is having an experience as of an x is equal to the propensity which her having this experience has to produce the existence of an x. The suggestion is indeed awkward. It is awkward, first, to talk of experiences as having propensities at all. And it is even more awkward talking about experiences producing the existence of things other than actions or mental states of the persons who hold them. But, if we get over these concerns, we can ask whether the interpretation provides any reason for thinking that a probabilifying relation obtains between the subject's evidence and the existence of an x. This seems unlikely. Part of what the new evil demon cases illustrate is that one's mental states just

don't have propensities for things to be the way those mental states lead their hosts to believe that things are.

This difficulty equally afflicts any attempt to apply Popper's interpretation here. For, his interpretation requires that in order for the content of the subject's belief to make probable that there is an x her experience must have a propensity for there to be an x with a high limiting relative frequency. If anything, it seems that the subject's belief does not have this propensity. So, according to Popper's view, it will not make it probable that there is an x.

Consider finally Pollock's nomological interpretation of probability. Pollock thinks of probability as analogous to nomic generalizations. What distinguishes nomic generalizations of the form $(x)(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$ from material generalizations of the same form is that the former and not the latter are about more than just the actual Fs. Indeed, the nomic generalization is about all "physically possible F's."[14] The generalization above, read as a nomic generalization, says that all physically possible Fs would be Gs. Following this analogy between nomic probability and nomic generalizations, Pollock proposes that as a useful heuristic we think of the formula $Pr(G/F)=r$ as "telling us that the proportion of physically possible F's that would be G's is r." This is only offered as a heuristic since Pollock is suspicious that probability is unanalyzable. Nevertheless, it is offered as a *useful* heuristic.

Importantly, Pollock's probability function concerns indefinite probabilities, rather than definite ones. The difference is that indefinite probabilities concern properties

[14] (Pollock 1992; 1990; unpublished).

rather than propositions.[15] Our heuristic tells us that a thing's being an F makes it probable that it is a G just when there is a lawful connection between things which are F and things which are G. If we want to know how probable it is that a particular x is G, given that it is F, we must infer this from the indefinite probability Pr(G/F). This inference from an indefinite probability to a definite one Pollock calls a "direct inference." Direct inference works via defeasible reasoning, according to Pollock. Fx together with Pr(G/F)=r will give one a defeasible reason for thinking that the definite probability P(Gx)=r. But this defeasible reason is subject to undercutting defeaters. In particular, if there is some property H which nomically implies the property F, then Pr(G/H)≠Pr(G/F) together with Hx provides an undercutting defeater for the above defeasible reason.

Could the defender of PR use Pollock's account to argue in favor of PR? It seems not. In order to do so, she will first need to show that the indefinite probability of there being an x[16] given that someone is having an experience as of an x is high. She will then need to show that there is an undefeated direct inference from this claim to the claim that it is probable that there is an x in the demon world. Both of these claims are doubtful. First, the indefinite probability of there being an x given that someone is having an experience as of an x is high only if there is a lawful connection between having an experience as of an x and there being an x. But part of the lesson of the new evil demon thought experiment appears to be just that there is no such lawful connection here. Further, given Pollock's useful heuristic, there is such a lawful connection only if the

[15] We saw, above, that classical probability is like this as well.

[16] Again, as with classical probability, we will have to gerrymander properties a bit to apply Pollock's theory to the present case.

proportion of physically possible worlds in which there is an x when someone has an experience as of an x is high. But, this proportion does not appear to be high. Second, even if we grant that the indefinite probability of there being an x given that someone has an experience as of an x is high, it still appears we have a defeater for the direct inference from this claim to the claim that it is probable that there is an x in the demon world. For, there is a property the demon-world believer has which nomically implies the property of having an experience as of an x which is such that the nomic probability of there being an x given this property is not equal to the nomic probability of there being an x given that one is having an experience as of an x. The property I have in mind is the property of being caused by a deceitful evil demon have an experience as of an x. There is certainly no lawful connection between this property and the property of there being an x. Thus, there is a defeater for the direct inference which would save PR. Pollock's nomic theory, like the frequency, classical, logical, and propensity theories does nothing to help the defender of PR.

We have seen, then, that PR seems wrong intuitively and that none of the best understood accounts of objective probability make it clear that despite this intuition, PR is true. These facts provide very good reason for thinking that there is no probabilifying relation between the content of the demon-world subject's belief that she is having an experience as of an x and the proposition that there is an x.

Despite this apparent difficulty for clause (ii) of ESB, some defenders of ESB have insisted that there *is* nonetheless an objective probabilifying relation between the content of the demon-world believer's belief and the proposition that there is an x. In particular, I have in mind Richard Fumerton's suggestion that the probabilifying relation

is a relation of *epistemic* probability. Epistemic probability, for Fumerton, is no less objective for being epistemic. Indeed, Fumerton models the relation on the Keynesian interpretation of probability.

According to Keynesian interpretation of probability, probabilities are necessary and knowable *a priori*. Thus, this view has the consequence that if an experience as of an x makes it probable that there is an x in the actual world, then an experience as of an x makes it probable that there is an x in the demon-world too. Furthermore, Fumerton hopes that the view will not just make these probabilities equivalent, but high—high enough for evidential support. This is about as full a story of epistemic probability as we can have.

The problem for this account is that, given the limited nature of what is said about epistemic probability, it appears that coupling ESB with epistemic probability so defined will not provide a non-trivial probabilistic account of evidential support. The reason is because all that we know about epistemic probability is that e makes epistemically probable p when e supports p. But, if this is all that can be said about epistemic probability, then we will be wasting our time attempting to provide a non-trivial account of evidential support in terms of epistemic probability. The account we will end up will be trivially true, if true at all. It will not deepen and illuminate our understanding of evidential support.

Fumerton, the central defender of the notion of epistemic probability I have in mind here, has recently admitted this triviality. In a paper where he discusses the connection between justification and truth, he writes the following:

> In one perfectly clear sense, P is epistemically probable for S when S is justified in believing P relative to S's epistemic situation. The connection between

> epistemic justification and truth is then defined in terms of epistemic probability. An epistemically justified belief is, by definition, one that is epistemically *likely* to be true. There is therefore a connection between having justified beliefs and having beliefs that are likely (*epistemically* likely) to be true. But, as we noted earlier, this just obfuscates the answer to the question in which we are here interested. We want to know what the connection is between having justified beliefs and having mostly true beliefs. And the fact is that there is *no* plausible account of corrigible epistemic justification on which there will be a conceptual connection between having justified beliefs and having mostly true beliefs. There might be a trivial connection between having justified beliefs and having beliefs that are epistemically likely to be true—but the claim is trivial precisely because talk of justified beliefs and talk of beliefs likely to be true end up being alternative ways of saying the same thing. (forthcoming: p.10)

If there is any sense at all in which the content of the demon world subject's belief that she has an experience as of an x makes it likely that there is an x, it is, as Fumerton admits, a "trivial" sense. We cannot appeal to a concept of probability to illuminate and deepen our understandings of justification and evidential support. We cannot appeal to a concept of probability to analyze justification and evidential support. At best, we can use talk of epistemic likelihood interchangeably with talk of justification and support. The question of whether there is an analysis of any of these remains unanswered.

The first difficulty, and the central difficulty I wish to urge against probabilistic accounts of evidential support, is that in the case of evidential support from beliefs there seem to be cases where a belief supports a proposition but where the content of that belief does not make probable that proposition. At least, there are cases where the only sense in which the content of a belief makes probable the proposition it supports is a trivial sense which does nothing to deepen our understanding of evidential support. Thus, clause (ii) of ESB faces a very serious difficulty.

I want to discuss briefly one further difficulty for ESB before moving on to talk about the various options for accounts of evidential support from experience open to

defenders of the two-story story. The difficulty is more controversial than the first and will not be developed at extended length here. I defend it at greater length in the next chapter when defending CIA. The difficulty targets clause (i) of ESB rather than clause (ii).

The second difficulty is that there appear to be cases where a set of believed propositions b support a proposition p for a subject S but where S isn't justified in believing all of the members of the set b. The easiest way to see this is by considering a modified new evil demon case. Imagine that Sue is the victim of a demon who causes her to believe that all tigers are ferocious and that Sally is a tiger. Imagine, too, that he causes her to erroneously believe that she has had experiences as of reading about the ferocity of tigers and that she has had experiences with Sally herself. Now, it is plausible in this case that Sue is justified in believing that Sally is ferocious. Of course, if she is justified in believing that Sally is ferocious it is plausible that she is justified in believing this because her beliefs that all tigers are ferocious and that Sally is a tiger support this claim. However, if ESB is correct, then these beliefs can only support the claim that Sally is ferocious if Sue is justified in believing them. It is questionable whether Sally is justified in believing that all tigers are ferocious and that Sally is a tiger in this case. However, some will think that she is. Those who think she is will think that she is justified in believing these things because she believes that she has had tiger-research experiences and experiences with Sally, and these beliefs support the beliefs that all tigers are ferocious and that Sally is a tiger. However, again, according to ESB, they can do so only if they are justified. And it is quite plausible that Sue is not justified in believing what she does about her experiences with Sally or about her experiences of reading about

the ferocity of tigers. At least, someone attracted to Conee's and Feldman's evidentialist views should think this plausible. Intuitively, she doesn't have any evidence supporting these beliefs. They were just caused by the demon. And, though they cohere with her other beliefs, very different beliefs than these particular beliefs about particular experiences she has had cohere with her other beliefs as well. We don't want to say that she ought to believe any and all such things. So, we don't want to say that she has evidence which supports these beliefs—including the ones she presently has. Thus, we have an example where a subject's beliefs b support a proposition p but where she isn't justified in believing all of the members of b. This sort of case presents a challenge for clause (i) of ESB.

We have seen, then, two reasons to reject ESB as an account of evidential support from beliefs. There are plausible cases where a subject's beliefs b support a proposition p but where the contents of b don't make p probable non-trivially, and there are plausible cases where a subject's beliefs b support a proposition p but where she isn't justified in believing all the members of that set. Insofar as all two-story story views accept ESB, which they do by definition, all two-story story views face two serious difficulties for their accounts of evidential support from beliefs. There is one further difficulty for such views I wish to discuss. But, I keep it for section three since it threatens both two-story story views and the Bayesian-inspired view of section one. For now, I proceed to discuss the various options available to defenders of the two-story story for evidential support from experiences.

2.2 The Two-story Story on Support from Experiences

As we have seen, the two-story story's account of support from beliefs—ESB—is incomplete without an account of evidential support from experiences. This is because clause (i) of ESB requires that in order for a belief or set of beliefs b to support a proposition, b must be justified. And, given E and EJ, this implies that b must be supported by one's evidence. The defender of ESB will say that the kind of support required by clause (i) reduces to support from experiences. I turn in this section to investigate the most obvious and elegant probabilistic accounts of evidential support from experiences available to advocates of the two-story story. There are four basic types of account, and each type faces difficult challenges.

Accounts of evidential support from experience available to the two-story story will either involve probabilistic relations running from the content of experiences to propositions or they will involve probabilistic relations running from propositions affirming the existence of experiences to propositions.[17] To illustrate the difference, consider a simple case of an experience as of a brown coffee cup. If the account of support is done in terms of contents of experiences, then this experience will support a proposition p just when the probability of p given the content of this experience is sufficiently high. If the account of support from experiences is done in terms of the existence of experiences, then this experience will support a proposition p just when the

[17] These accounts will tell us the conditions under which an experience supports a proposition. If we want to build from them an account of the conditions under which a subject's entire body of evidence supports a proposition, we will have to consider both what ESB says and we will have to, per fn 8, require a no-defeaters clause. The view would say: S's entire body of evidence B supports a proposition p just when either S has a belief b which supports p and no defeater for b's supporting p or an experience e which supports p and no defeater for e's supporting p. In order for the account to avoid circularity, the no-defeaters clauses will have to be understood probabilistically.

probability of p given the existence of S's experience as of a coffee cup is sufficiently high.

I will treat accounts of support from experience done in terms of the existence of experiences as one of the primary types of account available to the defender of the two-story story. The other three types of account are variants of the account from support done in terms of the contents of experiences. They differ from one another by differing about what is said about the content of experiences.

It is noteworthy that all three of the accounts done in terms of the contents of experiences, in order to be available to the defender of the two-story story, will need to be views according to which experiences have propositional contents. For, we can only calculate the probability of a proposition p given the contents of an experience e if the content of e is a proposition. It is, of course, highly controversial whether experiences have propositional contents. On some views, experiences have not propositional but representational contents. On other views, experiences have neither propositional nor representational contents, but only a sort of qualitative feel—if such a thing can be called the experience's content. Thus, all three of the views I will discuss here which make support from experiences a matter of a probabilistic relation between the contents of experiences and a proposition make use of a controversial assumption that experiences in fact do have propositional contents. I will let this assumption stand for now so that we might consider these views in more detail. But, I do argue in chapter five that there is some motivation for someone attracted to central evidentialist thesis M to deny the general claim that experiences support propositions by virtue of their content.

One way of dividing up the possible views according to which experiences do have propositional content is to divide them into views which include a reflexive element having to do with the source of the experience and views which don't.[18] According to views of the former sort, the content of an experience as of a brown coffee cup will include something about the experience itself, who has it, and its source.[19] If it is a visual experience had by me, for instance, then the content of the experience will include this. The latter sort of view will not include this information in the content of the experience. We can call the former sort of views reflexive views and the latter non-reflexive views.

A second way of dividing up the possible views of the contents of experience available to defenders of the two-story story is to divide these views into those views where the content of an experience as of an x implies that there is an x and those views where this experience's content does not imply that there is an x. According to the former sort of views, the content of an experience as of a brown coffee cup will imply that there is a brown coffee cup, while this will not be the case according to the latter sort of views. The former views we can call veridical views, the latter non-veridical views.

It would seem, then, that we have four elegant and obvious views about the contents of experiences available to the defender of the two-story story. There are reflexive veridical views, reflexive non-veridical views, non-reflexive veridical views, and non-reflexive non-veridical views. However, when we begin to fill out what these views will look like, only three of the four are sensible.

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[18] Janzen (2006) employs the language of "reflexivity" like I have here. He also uses the phrase "*de se* content" to refer to those views of the contents of experiences which include the experiencing subject as part of the content of the experience.

[19] (Kriegel 2002) defends the view that experiences should be understood as having reflexive content of this sort.

Start with reflexive veridical views. A reflexive veridical view will say, generally, that the content of S's q-sourced experience as of an x is the proposition that S experiences an x via q, or something along these lines. For example, my visual experience as of a brown coffee cup has on this view the content that I see a brown coffee cup. This proposition offers information about the possessor of the experience and the source of the experience, which makes the view reflexive. It also implies that there is an x. For, if S experiences and x, there is an x. This makes the view veridical.

A reflexive, non-veridical view, by contrast, would say that the content of S's q-sourced experience as of an x is the proposition that S's q-faculties report that there is an x, or something like this.[20] For instance, my visual experience as of a brown coffee cup has on this view the content that my eyes report that there is a brown coffee cup. This account preserves the reflexive elements of the former account. But, the proposition which is offered as the content of the experience here does not imply that there is an x. That my eyes report that there is a brown coffee cup does not imply, for example, that there is a brown coffee cup.

Move to non-reflexive views. A non-reflexive veridical view will say that the content of an experience as of an x will not include reflexive information about the source of the experience or its possessor, but will imply that there is an x. Generally, the content of S's q-sourced experience as of an x, on this view, will be that there is an x. For example, the content of my visual experience as of a brown coffee cup will be that there is a brown coffee cup.

So far, all of these views are sensible. But it is hard to make sense of the idea that an experience could have a propositional content which is both non-reflexive and non-

[20] For a view like this, see (Dougherty manuscript).

veridical. When we moved from reflexive veridical contents to reflexive non-veridical contents, we moved from contents like S experiences x via q to S's q-faculties report that there is an x. But, if we eliminate the reflexive elements from the latter account, we are left with nothing. It seems, then, that there are only three sorts of account available to the defender of the two-story story for the contents of experiences. I'll investigate them one-by-one and then return to the other type of view according to which support from experiences is explained not in terms of the contents of experiences but in terms of propositions affirming the existence of experiences.

Begin with the non-reflexive, veridical account of the contents of experiences. On this view, the content of my visual experience as of brown coffee cup is just that there is a brown coffee cup. This experience, then, can support propositions which the proposition that there is a brown coffee cup makes probable. For instance, the proposition that there is a brown coffee cup makes probable the propositions that there is a brown coffee cup, that there is something brown, and so on. Thus, the visual experience as of a brown coffee cup, on this view, can support the propositions that there is a brown coffee cup, that there is something brown, and so on.

One potential difficulty for this view is that it allows experiences to have just the same contents as beliefs. For instance, the experience as of a brown coffee cup has exactly the same content as a belief that there is a brown coffee cup. Some philosophers find it objectionable that experiences could have the same content as beliefs in this way.

A second and perhaps more serious difficulty for this view is that it does not allow experiences to support propositions affirming their own existence. The proposition that there is a brown coffee cup does not make it probable that *I* am having an experience

as of a brown coffee cup. Thus, my experience as of a brown coffee cup cannot support the proposition that I am having an experience as of a brown coffee cup. This is potentially quite problematic. For, it is tempting to think that when one has an experience as of an x and is aware of this, one may be justified by this experience in believing that one is having such an experience. When the present version of the two-story story is combined with theses E and EJ, however, it will imply that experiences cannot justify beliefs in their own existence like this.

Move then to an option which will allow experiences to justify beliefs in their own existence. Both of the reflexive views will do this. Start with the reflexive, non-veridical view. On this view, the content of my visual experience as of a coffee cup is the proposition that I am having a visual experience as of a coffee cup. Clearly, on this view, experiences will be able to support propositions affirming their own existence. For, the proposition that I am having a visual experience as of a coffee cup makes probable the proposition that I am having a visual experience as of a coffee cup. Indeed, the one entails the other, since they are the same proposition.

The reflexive, non-veridical view, however, will not allow experiences to support propositions about the external world. For, as we saw at length above, the proposition that one is having an experience as of an x does not make probable in any non-trivial sense the proposition that there is an x. The proposition that I am having a visual experience as of a brown coffee cup does not make probable the proposition that there is something brown, that there is a cup, or that there is a brown coffee cup—at least not if I am under the control of a sufficiently talented evil demon. Thus, the reflexive, non-veridical view will not allow for doxastically justified beliefs in external world objects on

the basis of experience. For, given WF, such beliefs will be doxastically justified only if what they are based on—the experiences in this case—support their contents. And as we have just seen it is not the case that the experiences in question support the relevant external world propositions on this view.

The reflexive, veridical view will help on this latter score. According to this view, the content of one's q-sourced experience as of an x is the proposition that one is experiencing an x via q. For instance, the content of my visual experience as of a brown coffee cup is the proposition that I am experiencing a brown coffee cup through my eyes. The proposition that I am experiencing a brown coffee cup through my eyes makes probable the proposition that there is a brown coffee cup. At least, it does so as long as we understand the locution "S experiences x" as factive—as implying that there is an x. And this construal is plausible. Thus, on the reflexive, veridical view one's experiences can support propositions about the external world and hence one can have doxastically justified beliefs in external world propositions based on experience.

Further, as we have already seen, reflexive, veridical views, since they are reflexive views, will support propositions affirming their own existence. The proposition that I am experiencing a brown coffee cup through my eyes makes probable the proposition that I am experiencing a brown coffee cup through my eyes. So, on this view, there can be doxastically justified beliefs in propositions about one's experiences based on those very experiences.

The reflexive, veridical view does seem to have a difficulty with certain kinds of beliefs about one's experiences, however. Though on this view an experience can support belief in its own existence, it is not clear that experiences can support beliefs in

their phenomenal quality. For instance, consider the example of my visual experience as of a brown coffee cup. There is something it is like to have this experience. What it is like is expressed by the phrase "as of a brown coffee cup." It is a visual experience *as of* a brown coffee cup. If my experience is veridical here such that I experience something, I experience that something *as* a brown coffee cup—even if what I in fact experience is not a brown coffee cup. For instance, it could be that what I am in fact experiencing—what my eyes put me into contact with—is a particularly life-like painting of a kitchen with a coffee cup on a table. I experience the painting of a coffee cup here *as* a brown coffee cup. Plausibly, when I have such an experience, it can support the proposition that I am having an experience *as of* a brown coffee cup. This is what I mean by the claim that experiences can support propositions about their own phenomenal quality.

As I say, it is not clear whether the reflexive, veridical view can account for this. In order for my experience as of a brown coffee cup to support the proposition that I am having an experience as of a brown coffee cup, the content of my experience must make it probable that I am having an experience as of a brown coffee cup. There appear to be cases, however, where one's experience as of a brown coffee cup supports the proposition that one is having an experience as of a brown coffee cup but where the content of this experience, given the reflexive, veridical view, does not make it probable that one is having an experience as of a brown coffee cup.

Imagine, for instance, that Joe has a particularly interesting sort of color-spectrum problem. Most frequently, when Joe experiences brown things, he experiences them as red things. Almost always, if Joe is experiencing a brown coffee cup, for instance, he will experience it as a red coffee cup. Imagine, further, that he is unaware of this fact.

Suppose now that Joe is having an experience of a brown coffee cup. And imagine that something unusual happens—Joe experiences the brown coffee cup as a brown coffee cup. He has an experience as of a brown coffee cup. Plausibly, Joe's experience as of a brown coffee cup supports the proposition that he is having an experience as of a brown coffee cup. But the reflexive, veridical view seems to conflict with this judgment. For, on this view, Joe's experience supports the proposition that he is having an experience as of a brown coffee cup only if the content of his experience makes this proposition probable. But, given the reflexive, veridical view of content, the content of Joe's experience is the proposition that Joe is experiencing a brown coffee cup with his eyes. And, plausibly, it is not probable that Joe is having an experience as of a brown coffee cup given that Joe is having an experience of a brown coffee cup with his eyes. For, typically, when Joe experiences brown coffee cups, he experiences them as red coffee cups. Thus, it appears that given the reflexive, veridical view of content, there are some cases where experiences cannot justify beliefs in their phenomenal contents but intuitively it seems like they should be able to do so.

We have seen, then, that there are serious challenges facing each of the most elegant and obvious available views of content which the defender of the two-story story might use in order to account for evidential support from experiences. In general, the views face the challenge of defending the claim that experiences have propositional content and each of the particular views faces its own difficulties.

Consider the final alternative available to the advocate of the two-story story. Instead of explaining how experiences support propositions by appealing to the propositional contents of those experiences, we have said that the advocate of the two-

story story might appeal to propositions affirming the existence of these experiences. On this sort of view, an experience e can support a proposition p when the probability of p given the proposition that S has e is sufficiently high.

On this sort of view, there is no problem with experiences supporting propositions affirming their existence. For, when S has an experience E, the probability that S has E given that S has E is very high—indeed, it is 1. The difficulty this view faces, however, is that it fails to allow experiences to support propositions about the external world in all cases where it appears that they do. In particular, it fails to do this in cases like the new evil demon case where one's experiences are vastly misleading. For instance, suppose that Sue is the victim of an evil demon who causes her to have all kinds of misleading experiences. He causes her, time after time, to have experiences as of an antelope but there is in fact no antelope. Now, plausibly, her experiences can support the proposition that there is an antelope just as much as any ordinary person's experience as of an antelope can. And, as we have seen above, it is plausible that an ordinary person's experience as of an antelope can support the proposition that there is an antelope. Thus, plausibly, Sue's experience as of an antelope can support the proposition that there is an antelope. However, it can only do this on the present account of experiential support if the proposition that there is an antelope given that Sue has an experience as of an antelope is sufficiently high. And, plausibly, this probability is low, rather than high. Thus, the present view of experiential support appears to conflict with certain cases where one's experiences support propositions about the external world.

Not only, then, do the most obvious and elegant content-based accounts of experiential support available to the advocate of the two-story story face serious

challenges, but the account done in terms of the existence of the subject's experiential states faces a serious challenge as well. Since these are the most obvious and elegant available sorts of views for the advocate of the two-story story, we can conclude that the advocate of the two-story story faces a serious challenge with respect to her account of evidential support from experiences. It is not just her account of support from beliefs which is in trouble.

There is one final difficulty I wish to discuss for the two-story story. But, since it is a difficulty shared by the Bayesian account discussed in section one and plausible by other probabilistic accounts as well, I will discuss it in section three.

3 Probabilistic Accounts of Support and the Role of Dispositions

In sections one and two I presented two representative types of probabilistic account of the evidential support relation central to the work of Conee and Feldman. I first investigated a Bayesian-inspired account, BES. I urged one unique difficulty for this view. I next discussed the two-story story view. I showed that this view faces quite a number of difficulties, both at the level of support from beliefs as well as at the level of support from experiences. I now want to present a final difficulty which threatens the two-story story, BES, and plausibly other probabilistic accounts to boot.

The difficulty is that neither the two-story story nor BES allows for dispositions to play the unique evidential role they plausibly do play. That dispositions play a unique evidential role and which unique role they do play is made clear by examples like some of those I have discussed throughout the dissertation to this point. Tommy the toddler's experience as of mommy supports the proposition that mommy is present by virtue of *his disposition, in the presence of such experiences, to believe that mommy is present*. My

experience as of a brown coffee cup, together with or by virtue of *my disposition in the presence of such experiences to believe there is a brown coffee cup*, supports the claim that there is a brown coffee cup before me. My experience as of a television, by virtue of *my disposition, in the presence of such experiences, to believe that I am seeing a television*, supports the claim that I am seeing a television.[21] Absent such dispositions, a person's evidence—the experiences alone—may not support the propositions they support when they are coupled with these dispositions. At least, if we are comfortable talking in terms of degrees of support, it would appear that someone who has both the experience and the accompanying disposition has evidence which might more strongly support the relevant propositions than the person's evidence which only includes the experiences.

Nor must such examples be limited to cases where the disposition is a disposition to believe what might be thought of as the content of the experience. It is plausible that dispositions to believe something other than what might be thought of as the content of one's experiences may contribute to evidential support. For instance, it is plausible that this occurs in cases involving natural signs.[22] My experience as of smoke, together with my disposition in the presence of such an experience to believe that there is a fire, might support the proposition that there is a fire. Here it is plausible that my disposition contributes something in terms of evidential support which was not contributed by the experience alone. The same may occur in cases of moral judgments. Perhaps my experience as of John's grabbing the stranger's wallet, together with a disposition of mine

[21] The unique evidential role of dispositions was discussed, if only briefly, by (Audi 1994).

[22] I am borrowing this notion of natural signs from the tradition of Thomas Reid. See (Reid 2003).

in the presence of such an experience to believe that John has done something morally wrong can support the proposition that John has done something morally wrong. Here again, it is plausible that the disposition contributes something in terms of evidential support which was not contributed by the experience alone. Finally, if I entertain for purposes of evaluation the thought that all bachelor's are male, and by virtue of a disposition in the presence of such a though to believe that the thought is correct I come to believe that all bachelor's are male, my disposition may contribute something to supporting the proposition that all bachelor's are male not contributed by the thought alone.[23]

What exactly do these examples suggest about the role of dispositions in epistemic justification? I think they show that at least some dispositions which are triggered by items of had evidence and whose constitutive manifestations are propositional attitudes can aid items of evidence like experiences in supporting propositions. Let me explain.

Plausibly, it is only certain dispositions which play a unique evidential role. Perhaps all dispositions are dispositions from something to something—dispositions triggered by certain circumstances and constitutively manifested in certain ways. But, it is only dispositions with certain triggering circumstances and certain constitutive manifestations which play this evidential role. When we look to the above examples, what we see is that the right sort of dispositions are those which are triggered by items of had evidence—like experiences—and whose constitutive manifestations are propositional

[23] This sort of example doesn't commit one to using dispositions to explain intuition. But it is clear that the view that intuition is to be explained by dispositions of this sort fits well with such examples. And, indeed, the idea that intuition is to be explained by dispositions of this sort has been advocated in the literature. Cf., e.g., (Sosa 2007) and (Swinburne 2001).

attitudes. Plausibly, at least some of these sorts of dispositions play a unique evidential role. Plausibly, for at least some such dispositions, when one has an item of evidence e, and when one also has the disposition d in the presence of e to believe p, e can support p by virtue of d. Some dispositions, in other words, serve as background or enabling conditions allowing items of evidence to support what they do. They aid other items of evidence in supporting propositions. Without these dispositions, the items of evidence either wouldn't support the relevant propositions or wouldn't support them to the same degree.

Unfortunately, there is no room for dispositions to play this role in either the two-story story or BES. Start with BES. All that is relevant for determining whether a proposition is supported, according to BES, are degrees of belief and probabilistic relations. Neither experiences nor dispositions play any role. Further, degrees of belief perform their evidential supporting role in the absence of dispositions. The unique evidential role of dispositions is entirely overlooked by BES, and this appears to bring BES into conflict with intuition.

Nor does the two-story story fare much better on this score. The two-story story's account of support from beliefs makes no mention of dispositions. Nor do the various accounts of support from experiences available to the defender of the two-story story say anything about dispositions. All that matters is a probabilistic relation between the contents of an experience and a proposition or between a proposition affirming the existence of such an experience and a proposition.

More generally, probabilistic accounts of evidential support do not appear to make room for dispositions to aid experiences in supporting propositions. For, according

to probabilistic accounts, for some mental state M to support a proposition p it must be that M makes probable p. There are two tempting ways to understand the claim that M makes probable p, but neither of them will allow for dispositions to aid experiences in supporting propositions. One way to understand the claim that M makes probable p is to understand it as the claim that the content of M makes probable p. But, plausibly, dispositions do not have propositional contents. Thus, it won't help trying to conjoin the content of an experience with the content of a disposition and asking whether the combined content makes probable p. The combined content won't make the proposition any more probable. So, if support is understood in terms of the content of mental states making probable a proposition p then dispositions will not be able to play the role they plausibly do play.

A second way to understand the claim that M makes probable p is to understand it as claiming that the probability of p given that M exists is high. But here again it doesn't appear that the probability of a proposition given that S has an experience and a disposition of the relevant sort will be higher than the probability of the proposition given that S has only the relevant experience. At least, the probabilities will not so differ in all the cases where it seems that the disposition aids the experience in supporting a proposition. So, if support is understood as a matter of the existence of mental states making probable a proposition, then again dispositions will not be able to play the role they plausibly do play.

It is difficult to explain what it could mean for a mental state M to make probable a proposition p in a way other than either of the foregoing two ways. Probabilistic accounts will say either that evidential support of a proposition p is a matter of the

content of one's evidence making p probable or that it is a matter of a proposition that one has such evidence making p probable. But, dispositions seem ill-equipped to contribute to evidential support on either of these accounts. Thus, generally speaking, probabilistic accounts appear to conflict with the idea that dispositions can aid experiences in supporting propositions. Insofar as this idea has an intuitive appeal, the conflict highlights a serious difficulty for probabilistic accounts. They conflict with the intuitively plausible claim that dispositions aid experiences in supporting propositions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered two representative probabilistic accounts of the evidential support relation central to the work of Conee and Feldman. The first was a Bayesian-inspired view. The most difficult independent difficulty faced by this view is that it fails to account for the unique evidential role of experiences. The second account I considered was the two-story story view. This view offers separate accounts for evidential support from beliefs and evidential support from experiences. The account it offers for evidential support from beliefs faces two difficulties. It fails to allow the belief that one is having an experience as of an x to support the proposition that there is an x, and it requires that only justified beliefs can support propositions. The various accounts available to the two-story story for support from experiences also suffer independent difficulties. I urged, finally, that there is a difficulty faced by both views and indeed apparently by probabilistic accounts more generally. The difficulty is that probabilistic accounts do not accommodate the unique evidential role of dispositions. For these reasons, I advise that anyone attracted to the evidentialist views of Conee and Feldman reject these accounts of evidential support.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Causal-Inclination Account of Evidential Support

In the previous three chapters, I have focused my attention on three plausible candidates for an account of the evidential support relation key to the evidentialist views of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. In chapter two, I surveyed attitudinalist accounts, in chapter three explanationist accounts, and in chapter four probabilistic accounts. I argued in those chapters that attitudinalist accounts, explanationist accounts, and probabilistic accounts of evidential support, when conjoined with at most slightly modified central evidentialist theses, are either inconsistent or have implications concerning epistemic justification which conflict strongly with intuition. In other words, these accounts either conflict severely with the central evidentialist theses themselves or the conjunction of these accounts with at most slightly modified versions of those theses conflicts severely with intuitive judgments about epistemic justification. In this chapter, I turn my sights more directly to the account of the evidential support relation central to Conee's and Feldman's views which I find most appealing—the causal-inclination account (CIA). There are two primary goals I have for this chapter.

First, I seek to clarify CIA for the reader. Thus far I have only given the briefest of treatments of what the view involves. In section one I will give a more detailed exposition of the view. In particular, I will provide an explanatory commentary on important language in CIA like "evidence," "by virtue of," "disposition," and "ultima facie inclined."

My second goal for this chapter is to complete my argument for my thesis that CIA is preferable to the accounts of evidential support surveyed in chapters two through four. This task I take up in section two. In order to complete my argument for my thesis, I must show three things here. First, I must show that CIA is consistent with the central evidentialist theses. This I do in section 2.1. Along my way to showing that CIA is consistent with these theses, I show what someone who is attracted to both these theses and to CIA might say more generally about under just what conditions any doxastic attitude whatever is justified. Second, I must show that the conjunction of CIA with these theses does not conflict with the same intuitive judgments with which the conjunction of the (suitably modified) central evidentialist theses and the accounts discussed in chapters two through four conflict. This I do in section 2.2. And, third, I must show that it is plausible that the conjunction of CIA with the central evidentialist theses does not conflict in any devastating way with *other* judgments about epistemic justification. Some of these judgments are driven by theory while others are driven by intuition. This I do in section 2.3.

1 Explaining CIA

Here I will offer an extended explanatory commentary on CIA, attempting to clarify some of its most important language. In addition to explaining how I am using the language in CIA, I hope to show that my usage of that language plausibly matches what the language is typically used to express.

Recall what CIA says:

> (CIA) The evidence e which S has at t supports the proposition p iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, e causes S to be ultima facie inclined at t to believe p.

At bottom, CIA is an account of evidential support which says that evidence e supports a proposition p just when the right sort of causal relation obtains between e and S's inclination to believe p. E supports p when e causes, in the right way, S's being ultima facie inclined to believe p. In order to get clearer on the particulars of CIA here, I will discuss the language of "the evidence S has at t," "by virtue of," "disposition," "like," "causes," "ultima facie inclination," and "at t." But before doing so, I want to point out briefly exactly what CIA offers an account of. CIA offers an account of how individual items or groups of items of had evidence support propositions. It is not an account of when a person's *total* evidence supports a proposition. There is, though, a very easy way to use CIA to offer an account of just when a subject's total evidence supports a proposition. A person's total evidence supports a proposition when some item of evidence the subject has supports that proposition, in accordance with the analysis of support offered by CIA.[1] With this point in mind, we can proceed to study further the various elements involved in CIA.

Begin with the language of "the evidence S has at t." This phrase indicates that what comes on one side of the evidential support relation is evidence which the subject possesses or has. There are two important questions we might ask about this had evidence. First, we might ask what sorts of things count as evidence; and, second, we might ask about what it takes to have something as evidence.

[1] That there is such an easy and obviously non-circular way of using the account of evidential support in CIA to offer an account of support from an entire body of evidence is perhaps a further feather in CIA's cap. For, the thorough reader will have noticed that in order for attitudinalist and probabilistic proposals (the two-story story, anyway) to offer an account of support from an entire body of evidence they must make usage of no-defeater clauses which threaten to render those accounts circular. I am not persuaded that there is no way for these accounts to avoid this apparent circularity. But, the fact that they cannot obviously do so is worth noting.

There are at least two[2] serious answers to the question about what sorts of things count as evidence. According to one view, which we might call propositionalism,[3] only propositions can be evidence. If anything is evidence, it is a proposition. And, according to a second view, only mental states can be evidence. If anything is evidence, it is a mental state. We might call this view psychologism.[4]

Following Conee and Feldman and in accordance with psychologism, I will let the "evidence" spoken of in CIA refer to mental states of the subject. I do this because the "evidence" spoken of in CIA enters into causal relationships, and while it is plausible that mental states enter into causal relationships, it is not clear that propositions do. However, I should note that I talk in this way primarily as a matter of convenience. In other words, I will talk here as if psychologism is true, though I am not asserting that it is. With little difficulty, I believe that someone attracted to propositionalism could modify CIA and the discussion that follows in accordance with her view about the nature of evidence. Instead of saying that e supports p when e causes S's inclination to believe p in the right way, the propositionalist could say that e supports p when the mental state whereby S has e as evidence causes S's inclination to believe p in the right way.

The "evidence" in CIA, then, is mental states. But CIA says it is only evidence the subject S has at t which enters into the evidential support relation with propositions at t. So, we should ask what is involved in having evidence.

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[2] Another alternative would be that evidence consists in facts. This view is distinct from propositionalism only if the facts aren't propositions. Typically, where facts are distinguished from propositions, facts are thought of as states of affairs. Accordingly, this third alternative would say that evidence consists in states of affairs.

[3] For defenses of propositionalism, see (Williamson 2000) and (Dougherty forthcoming).

[4] For a defense of psychologism about epistemic reasons, see (Turri 2009).

There are several possible views concerning what it is for a person to have a mental state as evidence. The two views I am most attracted to are as follows. According to one view, a person S has a mental state M as evidence just when S hosts M.[5] On this view, all mental states of a subject at t are items of evidence the subject has at t. According to a second view, S has M at t just in case S is directly aware of, or directly acquainted with, M at t.

It is the second account of having evidence that I prefer. Thus, the evidence S has at t is all of the mental states of S's of which S is directly aware. The kind of awareness I am appealing to here is just the sort of awareness discussed in chapter four when I considered Richard Fumerton's account of justification. It is a basic relation between subjects and their mental states whereby subjects are aware *de re* of their mental states. Like Fumerton, I am inclined to think that the only things of which humans are directly aware in this way are their own mental states. But, I am also inclined to think that we are not directly aware of all of our mental states. For, it is plausible that some of us have Freudian mental states like deeply held fears or memories which, though mental states, are not mental states of which we are aware. And, it is plausible that such Freudian states do not contribute to a subject's justificatory status. So, I prefer a view according to which only had evidence—i.e., mental states of which the subject is aware—enter into the evidential support relation. The first view of having evidence I discussed above—the view according to which had evidence is mental states hosted by the subject—would

[5] This is the view of having evidence Conee and Feldman themselves prefer. See (Conee and Feldman forthcoming) and Feldman (2004).

allow for these Freudian states to contribute to justification if combined with a view like CIA. I therefore take this as a mark against that view.[6]

It is noteworthy that the awareness view of what it is to have evidence allows for a mental state hosted at a time other than t to count as evidence a subject has at t. This would just require that the subject be directly aware at t of this mental state hosted at another time.[7] It is important from the perspective of the defender of CIA that this view of had evidence allows for mental states other than those hosted at t to support propositions. For, CIA is at bottom an account according to which evidence e supports a proposition p at t when e causes an inclination to believe p in the right way. It is very difficult to hang on to this view that mental states support by causing and to the view that only mental states hosted at t can support propositions at t without requiring simultaneous causation—without requiring that these mental states at least sometimes simultaneously cause inclinations to believe.[8] Unless we want to require that the causation involved in CIA is in some instances simultaneous causation, we will have to allow that mental states hosted at times other than t can enter into the support relation. It is then a happy

[6] For a similar discussion along these lines, see (Kvanvig 2007).

[7] It might be suggested that if the awareness account of having evidence is correct, then in principle it should be possible to have as evidence the mental states of *another* person. I am happy accepting this suggestion. It isn't clear to me that ordinary human beings are ever directly aware of another person's mental states. But, if, as some have suggested (e.g., Stump 2008), we are sometimes in interpersonal relations directly aware of the mental life of others, then I am happy accepting the idea that mental states of another person of which I am aware can support propositions for me. This would require modifying the way the awareness view was originally stated so that mental states of other persons can be had as evidence.

[8] It is possible in *some cases* to require that a mental state M supports by causing an inclination to obtain at t and that M is hosted at t without accepting that M simultaneously causes the inclination it causes. For, it may be that M is hosted not only at t, but also at an earlier time and that M diachronically causes the inclination it causes. But this will not work for all cases. For instance, very plausibly, there are cases where an experience e is hosted at t and causes and inclination to obtain at a later time t_1, but e is no longer hosted at t_1. More generally, it is appealing to think of token experiences as the sorts of mental states which are not continually hosted over intervals.

consequence of the awareness view of having evidence that it allows for the possibility of mental states other than those hosted at t supporting propositions at t in the way envisioned by CIA, since this will not require simultaneous causation.

Apart from the fact that allowing mental states from times other than t to support propositions at t will fit better with CIA, there are at least two reasons to prefer this view to a view which requires that only mental states hosted at t can support propositions at t. One reason comes from intuitive examples. Intuitively, it seems that an experience at t_1 might contribute to my being justified in believing something at a time slightly later than t_1. For instance, suppose I have an experience as of a brown table at t_1 and shortly thereafter form a belief that there is a brown table before me. It seems that the experience I had at t_1 might contribute to the justificatory status of this attitude. Indeed, it seems that this experience could contribute to my justificatory status even if I have not yet formed a memory of the experience.[9]

A second reason for accepting the view that mental states hosted at times other than t can support propositions at t is internal to Conee-Feldman style evidentialism. The reason has to do with Conee's and Feldman's account of well-foundedness—their account of doxastic justification. Like many others, Conee and Feldman suggest that a token belief that p is doxastically justified just when the belief's type is propositionally justified and the belief itself is *properly based*. According to them, for a belief to be properly based, it must be based on something which supports it. Now, according to most people working on the basing relation, at least part of what basing involves in some

[9] Similar examples are presented by (Goldman forthcoming), though his examples appeal to the process of preservative memory. For Conee's and Feldman's response to Goldman, see (Conee and Feldman forthcoming).

instances is a causal relation between the belief and other mental items of the subject.[10] If they are right, then in at least some cases of well-founded belief, the subject's belief will be properly causally related to other mental states of the subject. But, again, unless the evidentialist wants to allow that the causation between these mental states is at least sometimes simultaneous, she should conclude that the causation runs from mental states hosted at a time other than t to the belief held at t. Thus, there is reason from within Conee-Feldman style evidentialism itself to prefer a view which allows mental states hosted at times other than t to support propositions at t. The only other options available involve denying that basing sometimes involves causal relations or insisting that such relations are sometimes simultaneous relations. The evidence S has at t, then, is all of the mental states of S's of which she is directly aware at t, whether these mental states are hosted at t or at other times. These mental states serve on one side of the evidential support relation.

Importantly, what I have said implies that *any* mental state of which one is directly aware is part of the evidence that subject has. Had evidence, then, is not limited to a certain subset of mental states like "cognitive" ones as opposed to "affective" ones, or ones with a mind-to-world direction of fit as opposed to ones with a world-to-mind direction of fit.[11] Mental states like desires and fears, when we are directly aware of them, are just as much a part of the evidence we have as beliefs or experiences of which we are aware. There is some reason for thinking that by implying this, the awareness

[10] See, e.g., the overview in (Korcz 2010). For a full-on causal theory of the basing relation, see (Moser 1989). For a combination theory which involves both causal elements and meta-beliefs, see (Korcz 2000). Notably, Conee (1988) accepts, at least for the sake of argument, that the basing relation involves this sort of causal element.

[11] For a discussion of direction of fit, see (Austin 1953).

view goes aright. For, a very natural answer to a question about what one's evidence is for the claim that one is afraid of an impending event is for the subject to point to her mental state of fearing the event. Thus, which kinds of mental states are allowed to count as evidence the subject can have should not be limited in such a way as to exclude affective states. Any mental state of which the subject is aware counts as evidence she has.

According to CIA, these mental states of which a subject is aware support propositions by "causing" inclinations to believe those propositions. I will not here provide an analysis of what is involved in causation. I'm not sure this is possible. But I do want to clarify which kinds of causation, assuming there are kinds of causation, I am talking about in CIA.

In terms of the four Aristotelian causes, the type of causation I am thinking of is efficient causation, rather than material, formal, or final causation. A mental state M of which S is aware causes S's inclination to believe p, in the sense required by CIA, only when M is the efficient cause of S's inclination.

M may be an efficient cause either by being a determining cause or a non-determining cause. The kind of causation required by CIA does not require for M's causing S's inclination to believe p that necessarily, if M occurs (and the rest of the past and laws are as they are in the actual world) then S is inclined to believe p—a requirement often thought to be met in cases of deterministic causation. It only requires that there is some sort of efficient causal connection running from M to S's inclination to believe.

I should be clear that CIA is not to be read as requiring that whenever a subject S has evidence which supports a proposition p, S has *just one single mental state* M which efficiently causes in the right way S's inclination to believe p. Rather, CIA requires that S's evidence—whether a single mental state of which S is aware or a complex of mental states of which S is aware—stands in this causal relationship to her inclination to believe p. It is possible, for instance, for a person to have a belief that q and a belief that if q then p and for these beliefs together to cause her in the right way to be inclined to believe q. In this way they can jointly support q.

CIA, then, says that a subject S's evidence supports a proposition p when some mental state or states of which she is aware cause, in the above sense, her inclination to believe p, in the right way. I should now say more about what CIA says regarding when mental states cause inclinations to believe *in the right way*. This is where the "by virtue of" clause of CIA comes in.

CIA requires that for S's evidence to support a proposition p, S's evidence must cause S, by virtue of a certain kind of disposition of hers, to be inclined to believe p. I will say more about just what kind of disposition is involved shortly. But, first, I want to explain what it means for S's evidence to cause S to be inclined to believe a proposition *by virtue of* a disposition of hers. To say this is just to say that S's disposition serves as a background or enabling condition for her evidence's causing this inclination. Many philosophers working on causation are comfortable talking about background or enabling conditions as playing a role in causation.[12] When these conditions are present in a case of

[12] See, e.g., Cartwright (1989) and Skyrms (1980).

C's causing E, we say that C causes E by virtue of, or even via, these conditions. This is the relationship I am requiring of S's dispositions here.

For S's disposition to serve as a background or enabling condition for her evidence's causing her inclination is not quite for this disposition to be a sine qua non of this causal relation. It's not quite right to say that S's evidence, absent her disposition, wouldn't or couldn't have caused her inclination. For, there might have been a suitable substitute for her disposition. It might be that, though in fact S's evidence e caused her inclination by virtue of disposition D, were e not to have done this e would instead have caused the same outcome by virtue of a different disposition D'. Or, it might be that, though in fact S's evidence e caused her inclination by virtue of disposition D, were it not to have done this it would instead have done so by virtue a lesion in S's brain. That by virtue of which a cause C causes and event E is not a sine qua non of C's causing E, then, but just in fact that which enables C's causing E.

It may be that, in addition to S's disposition D, there are several other background or enabling conditions of S's evidence causing her inclination to believe p. Perhaps one background condition is that S doesn't die before e causes S's inclination to believe p. S's evidence e causes S's inclination to believe p by virtue of S's being alive, then. Perhaps another is that God concurs with e's causing S's inclination to believe p. In order for e to support p according to CIA, though, it needn't be that there are no background or enabling conditions of e's causing S's inclination to believe p other than S's disposition D; it need only be that S's disposition D is one such enabling condition. By being an enabling condition of e's causing S's inclination, D will be part of the full explanation for why e causes S's inclination.

S's evidence e supports p when a certain kind of disposition of S's serves as a background or enabling condition of e's causing S's inclination to believe p. I should now say more about just what kind of disposition is required to serve as an enabling condition of e's causing S's inclination for e to support p. Following Audi (1994), I think of dispositions as having "realization conditions" on the one hand and "constitutive manifestations" on the other. Dispositions are dispositions from something—the realization conditions—to something—the constitutive manifestations. For instance, a glass's disposition of fragility will be a disposition from pressure on the glass to shattering. The realization conditions of the glass's disposition are conditions of pressure on the glass, and the constitutive manifestation of fragility is shattering.

Likewise, the dispositions which feature in CIA are dispositions from something to something. They are dispositions, in the presence of certain items of had evidence, to take certain propositional attitudes. In particular, they are dispositions in the presence of had evidence like the evidence the subject currently possesses to believe the proposition p. The realization conditions of these dispositions are items of had evidence like the evidence currently had by the subject and the constitutive manifestation of the dispositions are belief in the proposition p.

A concrete example may help. I am aware of a disposition I have, in the presence of experiences like the one I am currently having of a computer monitor, to believe that there is a computer monitor before me. When experiences like the one I am currently having, by virtue of the disposition just mentioned, cause me to be ultima facie inclined to believe a proposition p, they support the proposition that there is a computer monitor before me according to CIA.

The reader is likely to ask for more information about what it is for items of evidence to be "like" one another in the way required by the dispositions which feature in CIA. After all, every experience is like every other in some respect.

This is a very difficult issue. But perhaps the following can provide a partial answer. The realization conditions of the dispositions which feature in CIA should be thought of as sets of items of had evidence. Thus, one disposition's realization conditions differ from another's when the dispositions are triggered by different sets of items of had evidence. The disposition I discussed two paragraphs back—a disposition to believe there is a computer monitor before me—is one whose realization conditions includes one set of experiences of which I am aware, while my disposition to believe that my cell phone is ringing is one whose realization conditions include a very different set of experiences (and perhaps other mental states) of which I am aware. In each case, the set of items of evidence are like one another in the sense required by CIA.

The talk of "likeness" in CIA is therefore just a convenient abbreviation for something else. A disposition in the presence of items of had evidence like e to believe p is ultimately just a disposition in the presence of members of some set T of items of had evidence to believe p. When a subject S is aware of such a disposition, and when one or more of the items of the set T causes S to be ultima facie inclined to believe p by virtue of the disposition in question, that item or those items of had evidence support p.

It is important to emphasize here that a subject can be aware of the sort of disposition I have been discussing without knowing just which items of had evidence figure into the realization conditions of the disposition. This is not absurd. For, I can know that a glass has the disposition of fragility without knowing what all realization

conditions the disposition of fragility involves. Likewise, I can be aware of a disposition of mine, in the presence of a certain set of items of had evidence including one I currently have, to believe p, without knowing all of the realization conditions of this disposition.

Enough on the dispositions featuring in CIA, I hope. It is when an item of had evidence causes a subject by virtue of such dispositions to be *ultima facie inclined* to believe p that e supports p. So, I should say more about ultima facie inclinations.

There is an intuitive difference between prima facie inclinations and ultima facie inclinations. When I look at the Muller-Lyer lines, I have a prima facie inclination to believe that one is longer than the other. But I am not ultima facie inclined to believe that this is so. For, I have been shown that they are in fact of the same length. Likewise, when I knowingly have a hallucination as of an oasis, I am prima facie inclined to believe there is an oasis, but I am not ultima facie inclined to believe there is an oasis.

It is very difficult to go beyond this intuitive distinction between prima facie and ultima facie inclinations to believe to say more about what the difference between the two is. But, plausibly, what keeps my prima facie inclination from becoming an ultima facie inclination in each of the above cases is certain evidence of mine. It is because I remember being shown that the lines are of equal length that I am not ultima facie inclined to believe one is longer than the other. It is because I know I am hallucinating that I am not ultima facie inclined to believe there is an oasis. Perhaps, then, we could characterize a prima facie inclination to believe p as an inclination in light of part of one's evidence and an ultima facie inclination to believe p as an inclination in light of all of one's evidence to believe p. It is inclinations of the latter type which feature in CIA.

For e to support p, e must cause S in the right way to have an inclination to believe p in light of all of S's evidence.[13]

We should keep in mind, though, that ultima facie inclinations are still only inclinations. That S is ultima facie inclined to believe p does not imply that S believes p. For instance, we can on some views freely act contrary to our inclinations.[14] Further, inclinations, like dispositions, can be masked. Just like the glass retains its disposition of fragility even if it is prevented from breaking in the presence of pressure by a magician, I can retain my ultima facie inclination to believe p if something other than my evidence prevents me from believing p. Thus, it is possible, according to CIA, for S's evidence to support a proposition which S does not in fact believe. When we combine CIA with evidentialist theses E and EJ this will be important, since it will allow for the possibility of belief-types being justified in the absence of tokens of those belief types.

Some of the comments in the last two paragraphs may lead the reader to ask for further clarification concerning the relationship between inclinations and dispositions. Are inclinations themselves dispositions? And, if they are, how shall we distinguish the ultima facie inclinations in CIA from the dispositions which serve as enabling conditions? Or, are inclinations something very different from dispositions?

I wish to remain neutral on the question of whether inclinations are dispositions here. It may be that inclinations are not just dispositions, that they are instead some type of sui generis non-doxastic state. One reason to think this is correct has to do with the

[13] It is difficult to say what it is for one to have an inclination *in light of* all of one's evidence to believe p. But, whatever this means, it should not be taken to imply that all of one's evidence has to contribute in a positive causal way to bringing about the inclination. Perhaps, instead, the point is that none of S's evidence *prevents* the inclination which she has by virtue of e and her disposition in the presence of e to believe p.

[14] (O'Connor 2009).

characteristic feel of inclinations. Another is that it isn't clear that inclinations have realization conditions like dispositions do. If inclinations are indeed distinct from dispositions in this way, then the commentary I have offered thus far concerning CIA can remain just as it is. In particular, the causal relation required by CIA may be retained and understood in the way explicated above.

It may be, however, that inclinations are best understood as dispositions. If this is the case, I do think that some modification of the commentary above is necessary. For, if inclinations are dispositions, then a plausible explanation of what the ultima facie inclinations to believe p required by CIA are is that they are dispositions to believe p whose realization conditions are sets of sets of items of had evidence where one member of the former set is the set of all of the evidence the subject currently has. My ultima facie inclination to believe there is a cup on the table is thus a disposition to believe there is a cup on the table whose realization conditions include my having all of the evidence I currently possess. If this explanation of the nature of inclinations is adopted, my proposal is that the causal relation in CIA be replaced by an explanatory relation. What happens, for instance, when I am justified in believing that there is a cup on the table is that I have some evidence (like an experience as of a cup) which, by virtue of a disposition in the presence of such experiences to believe there is a cup on the table, explains why I am disposed in the presence of all of my current evidence to believe there is a cup on the table. On this account, it may be that in some cases the dispositions which serve as enabling conditions in CIA are the same as the ultima facie inclinations and that in some cases they are different. As I say, however, I wish to remain non-committal here about the nature of inclinations. If the correct account of inclinations turns out to be like the

first proposal here, then the details of CIA will remain just as they have been explicated thus far. But, if the correct account of inclinations turns out to be one which identifies inclinations with dispositions, my proposal is that the causal relation in CIA be replaced with an explanatory relation.[15] For simplicity's sake, in what follows I will talk as if the correct account of inclinations is one according to which they are sui generis states not identifiable with dispositions.

Finally, I should clarify what the "at t" at the end of CIA modifies. It might not be clear when one first reads CIA whether it is the causation that must occur at t, the inclination that must occur at t or whether it must be that what is caused is a disposition to *believe p at t*. My view is that it is the inclination which must occur at t. Perhaps this will also involve e's causing the inclination at t, but I do not want to be committed to this. It may be that causation is a process that involves multiple times such that e causes S's inclination throughout an interval including t. Or it may be that the causation occurs before t, though the inclination which is caused occurs at t. My commitment is only to the inclination's occurring at t. I am also not committed to the inclination being an inclination to believe p at t. The inclination is an inclination to believe p. The inclination just occurs at t.

CIA is now hopefully far clearer for the reader than it was before reading this section. Put in terms of the discussion here, CIA says that the evidence e a subject S has at t supports a proposition p when e, by virtue of a disposition of which S is aware to believe p in the presence of a set T of items of evidence including e, causes S to have an

[15] It is important that this relation not be a relation of *full explanation*. It is not as if the only things which will enter at all into the explanation for S's being ultima facie inclined to believe p at t are the had evidence and the disposition. Rather, these are salient elements of the explanation. It is true to say that they explain the ultima facie inclination. But this is compatible with it being true that other things, e.g., the fact that no other had evidence prevents the ultima facie inclination, also explain the inclination.

inclination at t in light of all of S's evidence to believe p. With a better understanding of CIA on the table, I can now turn to completing my argument in favor of CIA over the alternative accounts of evidential support from chapters two through four.

2 Completing the Argument for CIA

In this section, my aim is to complete my argument for favoring CIA over the attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts of evidential support discussed in chapters two through four. In order to complete this argument, I must show three things here. First, I must show that CIA is consistent with the central evidentialist theses. This I do in section 2.1. Second, I must show that the conjunction of CIA with these theses does not conflict with the same intuitive judgments with which the conjunction of the central evidentialist theses and the accounts discussed in chapters two through four conflict. This I do in section 2.2. And, third, I must show that it is plausible that the conjunction of CIA with the central evidentialist theses does not conflict with *other* intuitive judgments about epistemic justification. This I do in section 2.3.

2.1 CIA and the Central Evidentialist Theses

In this section, my aim is to show that CIA is internally consistent with the central evidentialist theses. I will show that CIA is consistent with E, EJ, ES, EO, and M. The question I hope to answer here is whether, when the account of evidential support encapsulated in CIA is plugged in to the relevant spots in the central evidentialist theses, these theses will become self-contradictory. I will argue that they will not. CIA is consistent with these theses, and this is rather easy to see.

Before discussing CIA's relationship to the central evidentialist theses, I want to provide an example which will help to illustrate the question I am asking in this section. Imagine we had a theory T committed to the following two claims: 1) p iff r and not-q and 2) p. Suppose further that someone offered an analysis of r according to which r iff q and z. We could ask whether this analysis was internally consistent with the commitments of theory T. What we would be asking is whether the proposed analysis of r, when plugged into the relevant spots in the theoretical commitments of theory T, would lead to a contradiction within T. We would discover the answer to this question by substituting q and z everywhere in those theses where r appeared. And, we would find that when we did this, the theory led to a contradiction. For, by substituting q and z for r in 1, we would find that the theory was committed to p iff q and z and not-q. But, we also know that by virtue of claim 2 T is committed to p. This would tell us that the theory was committed to q and not-q. Thus, the proposed analysis of r would not be consistent with the theory.

We find no such internal inconsistency when we replace the phrase "the evidence s has at t supports p" with the analysis of that phrase offered by CIA in the central evidentialist theses. Consider, first, thesis E. E says,

> (E) The attitude of belief toward the proposition p fits the evidence S has at t iff the evidence S has at t supports p.

When we plug in the analysis of evidential support offered by CIA into E, we get:

> The attitude of belief toward the proposition p fits the evidence e S has at t iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, e causes S to be ultima facie inclined to believe p at t.

Thus far there is no internal inconsistency at all.

Move to thesis EJ. EJ says,

> (EJ) Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for a subject S at t iff D is the attitude toward p which fits the evidence S has at t.

E was a thesis about just when the attitude of belief fits a subject's evidence. EJ is a more general claim about when any doxastic attitude whatsoever is epistemically justified for a subject S. EJ says that any attitude whatsoever is justified just when that attitude fits the subject's evidence. The conjunction of EJ and E tells us that the attitude of believing a proposition p is justified just when her evidence supports p. Substituting the analysis of evidential support offered by CIA into this claim, we get:

> The attitude of believing p is justified for S at t iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, some evidence e S has causes S to be ultima facie inclined to believe p at t.

Again, there is no internal inconsistency here.

Importantly, the previous indented biconditional shows what someone attracted to both CIA and to the central evidentialist theses would claim about just when the type-attitude of belief is propositionally justified. We might ask what someone attracted to CIA and to the central evidentialist theses would say more generally about just when *any* doxastic attitude is propositionally justified. My suggestion is that all that would need to be amended in the foregoing biconditional for an attitude other than belief would be to substitute that attitude for the attitude of belief in the biconditional. Thus, for the attitude of disbelieving p, we would get:

> S is justified in *disbelieving* p at t iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, some evidence e S has causes S to be ultima facie inclined to *disbelieve* p at t.

Or, for the attitude of suspending judgment with respect to p, we would get:

> S is justified in *suspending judgment* with respect to p at t iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, some evidence e S has e causes S to be ultima facie inclined to *suspend judgment* with respect to p at t.

More generally, for any doxastic attitude D, we would get:

> (CIAJ) S is justified in taking attitude D toward p at t iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, some evidence e S has causes S to be ultima facie inclined to take attitude D toward p at t.

I label this account CIAJ for the "causal inclination account of propositional justification." Though CIAJ is not strictly implied by CIA and the other central evidentialist theses, it is a very natural extension of these claims, as we have seen. CIAJ provides a unified theory of propositional justification inspired by the account of evidential support provided by CIA.

Two important facts are worth noting about CIAJ. First, the conjunction of CIAJ with E and EJ is logically stronger than the conjunction of CIA with E and EJ. For, CIAJ, by E and EJ, implies CIA (and of course E and EJ as well). But, CIA together with E and EJ do not imply CIAJ. Second, CIAJ is internally consistent with E and EJ.

But let us return to our main task—the task of showing that CIA does not lead to any internal inconsistency when conjoined with the central evidentialist theses. Thus far we have seen that there is no internal inconsistency between CIA, E, and EJ.

Turn to ES. ES says,

> (ES) The epistemic justification of anyone's doxastic attitude toward any proposition at any time strongly supervenes on the evidence that the person has at the time.

It is difficult to say exactly what is involved in supervenience. However, the following is plausibly a sufficient condition for epistemic justification's supervening on had evidence

in the sense required by ES. IF necessarily, for any person S and any person S*, if S and S* have all of the same evidence and the causal and explanatory relations between each item of evidence they have are the same,[16] then S and S* are exactly alike justificationally, THEN epistemic justification supervenes in the sense required by ES on the evidence a person has. Now, if CIAJ is true, then it is true that necessarily, for any person S and any person S*, if S and S* have all of the same evidence and the causal and explanatory relations between each item of evidence they have are the same, then S and S* are exactly alike justificationally. Thus, if CIAJ is true, then ES is true. There is no internal inconsistency, then, between CIAJ and ES. Nor is there internal inconsistency between ES and the conjunction of E and EJ, nor between CIAJ and E and EJ. Thus, the conjunction of CIAJ, E, and EJ is consistent with ES. But, since the conjunction of CIAJ, E, and EJ is logically stronger than the conjunction of CIA, E, and EJ, it follows that there is no internal inconsistency between CIA, E, EJ, and ES either. For, if there were inconsistency between CIA, E, EJ and ES, there would have to be inconsistency between CIAJ, E, EJ, and ES as the latter conjunction implies everything the former does. And there isn't inconsistency in the latter conjunction. So, there isn't inconsistency in the conjunction of CIA, E, EJ, and ES.

The fourth thesis is thesis M. M says,

> (M) If any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike justificationally.

The consistency of CIA, E, EJ, ES and M can be shown in a similar way to the way in which the consistency of CIA, E, EJ, and ES was shown. Plausibly, for two individuals

[16] Some reasons for including this clause are discussed in chapter one. That the supervenience envisioned involves supervenience of justification not only on had evidence but also on relations into which this evidence enters is clear. For, justification supervenes on evidence *and the relation of evidential fit.* And, this relation is, at least in (Conee 1988), not itself a mental state.

to be exactly alike mentally, they must be exactly alike with respect to which mental states they have and with respect to which causal and explanatory relations obtain between those mental states. But, as we have seen, if two subjects are exactly alike with respect to which mental states they have and with respect to the causal and explanatory relations between those mental states, then CIAJ implies that they will be exactly alike justificationally. It is impossible, given CIAJ, for two subjects to be exactly alike with respect to which mental states they have and with respect to the causal and explanatory relations between those mental states and to differ justificationally. Thus, CIAJ is consistent with M. Since M is consistent with E, EJ, and ES, it follows that CIAJ, E, EJ, ES and M are consistent. But, then, since the conjunction of CIAJ, E, EJ, ES and M is consistent, so is the conjunction of CIA, E, EJ, ES, and M.

Finally, consider thesis EO. EO says,

> (EO) S is justified in taking attitude D toward proposition p at t iff S ought to take attitude D toward p at t.

There is no conflict between EO and the conjunction of CIA, E, EJ, ES, and M. Indeed, there follows a perfectly consistent general account of epistemic obligations from the conjunction of CIAJ and EO. It says,

> (CIAO) S ought to take attitude D toward p at t iff by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, some evidence e S has causes S to be ultima facie inclined to take attitude D toward p at t.[17]

Since there is no inconsistency between CIAJ, E, EJ, ES, M and EO, there is likewise no inconsistency between CIA, E, EJ, ES, M and EO.

[17] One note about CIAO: I understand CIAO as saying that at t S has an obligation to take attitude D toward p, not that S has an obligation to *take attitude D toward p at t*. In other words, I read CIAO as being compatible with S's fulfilling the obligation to take attitude D toward p at a time later than t.

We have reached the conclusion, then, that CIA is internally consistent with the central evidentialist theses. Next, I will show that CIA avoids the difficulties faced by the accounts of evidential support discussed in chapters two through four.

2.2 CIA Avoids the Problems of the Other Accounts

In this section, I will elaborate on why the central problems facing the attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts surveyed in chapters one through three do not afflict CIA.

First, recall the central difficulty for attitudinalist proposals. These proposals required too much conceptual complexity on the part of the subject for justification. For, they required that the subject take some kind of attitude toward the relation between her evidence and the proposition p for her evidence to support that proposition. Such subjects must conceive of a relation between their evidence and p in order to take such an attitude, whether this attitude is an occurrent attitude or a merely dispositional attitude. Requiring such conceptual complexity conflicts with intuitive judgments about justification. For, it seems that in many cases children and even ordinary adults are justified in taking attitudes despite the fact that they do not conceive of relations between their evidence and the propositions it supports.

CIA, by contrast to these attitudinalist proposals, does not require such conceptual complexity in order for a subject to be justified in taking an attitude. CIA does require that there be a relation between a subject's evidence and her inclination to believe a proposition for her evidence to support that proposition. But, it does not require that the

subject conceive of this relation.[18] If CIA requires any conceptualization at all on the part of the subject, it is only that she conceives of the supported proposition. For, it may be that a subject must have a sufficient grasp of the concepts involved in the proposition for her to be able to be inclined to believe that proposition. But this is not the sort of required conceptualization which will rule out justification in the cases of children and ordinary adults.

It is particularly cases of justified beliefs about the external world whose justification comes in part from experience that are troubling for attitudinalist proposals. The Tommy the toddler case, for instance, was a case where Tommy's experience as of mommy being present was a large part of the explanation for why he was justified in believing that mommy was present. Tommy, however, did not take an attitude toward the relation between his experience and the proposition that mommy was present. Instead, his experience, by virtue of his disposition in the presence of such experiences to believe that mommy is present, caused him to be ultima facie inclined to believe that mommy was present. The very language used in the description of this case is of course reminiscent of CIA. For, CIA says that when a subject has an item of evidence—like an experience as of mommy being present—which, by virtue of a disposition of which she is aware to believe that mommy is present in the presence of like items of evidence, causes her to be ultima facie inclined to believe a proposition—like the proposition that mommy is present—then and only then does her evidence support the proposition in question. Tommy's case is a paradigm example of the application of CIA. CIA does not face the

[18] It is important to remember here that the sort of direct *de re* awareness of evidence and of dispositions required by CIA is a non-conceptual awareness, following Fumerton.

same difficulty of attitudinalist accounts, then, because it does not require too much sophisticated conceptualization on the part of the believer.

Some may nonetheless find it difficult to imagine how Tommy could be aware of his disposition in the presence of experiences like his current one to believe that mommy is present. But this is not so difficult, really. For, first, if dispositions of this sort are mental states like Conee and Feldman (forthcoming) maintain,[19] then they are prime candidates for the sort of thing of which subjects can be aware. Awareness, I maintain, is what makes the difference between Freudian and non-Freudian mental states.[20] Plausibly, Tommy's disposition here belongs in the category of non-Freudian rather than Freudian states. Second, as Fumerton maintains,[21] it is plausible that our abilities to be aware of different things expand as we mature. By the time a child has reached Tommy's maturity level, it is quite plausible that he has developed the ability to be aware of his epistemic behavior when in the presence of the sort of experience he is currently having. It is important here that he is not required to be aware of this behavior *as such*—he need only be *de re* aware of it. Finally, evidence that a subject is aware of such a disposition is supplied when the subject is able to answer questions which require her to reflect about her relevant epistemic behavior. If we ask Tommy, in a way he is able to understand, whether he tends to believe that mommy is present when he sees her like he does now

[19] Though I do not develop the thought here, I do maintain that the most tempting arguments against allowing such dispositions to be mental states fail and that there is at least one powerful argument for allowing such dispositions to be mental states. The argument in favor of these dispositions being mental states appeals to intuitive judgments concerning mental likeness between two subjects one of whom has a disposition of this sort and another of whom does not. Their difference in dispositions appears to make them not exactly alike mentally, and the best explanation for this is that the relevant disposition is a mental state.

[20] This is not a suggestion for an *analysis* of awareness. I doubt there is such a thing. It is rather an ostension to it. Compare (Feldman 2009).

[21] See his (2009).

and he answers "yes," this is evidence that he indeed was aware of this disposition previously, even if he hadn't previously reflected upon it or conceptualized it.[22] Not only, then, does CIA not require the kind of conceptualization required by attitudinalist accounts, but it also appears that CIA escapes the broader difficulty for such accounts that they conflict with justified beliefs for small children and ordinary adults. At least, it is not obvious, given the admittedly less-than-perfectly understood notion of awareness, whether CIA succumbs to this difficulty.

Nor does CIA face the central difficulty threatening explanationist accounts. As we saw, the central difficulty threatening these accounts was that they fail to account for many cases of justified beliefs about the future. In many cases, we are justified in believing propositions about the future, and hence our evidence supports propositions about the future, when those propositions are not part of the best explanation for why we have the evidence we currently have. For instance, in the golf ball example, it is highly plausible that I am justified in believing that the ball will soon roll into the cup but it is highly plausible that the ball's rolling into the cup at some time hence does not explain why I have the current evidence I do.

CIA conflicts not a mite with justified beliefs about the future. According to CIA, one will be justified in believing a proposition p about the future just when one has some evidence e which, by virtue of a disposition of which one is aware to believe p in the presence of evidence like e, causes one to be ultima facie inclined to believe p. Plausibly, just this sort of thing occurs in the golf ball example. My evidence—e.g., my visual sensations and memory beliefs and tactile sensations (of the wind)—cause me, by virtue

[22] The point here is a general one. The sort of reflective accessibility which some internalists [e.g., (Chisholm 1977) and (Ginet 1975)] used to require for justification, when it is present, is often to be explained by the presence of awareness.

of my disposition in the presence of such experiences and beliefs to believe that the ball putted will go in, to be ultima facie inclined to believe that the ball will go in. CIA, then, does not conflict with the same intuitive judgments with which explanationist accounts conflict.

Finally, CIA does not suffer from the same difficulties from which the probabilistic accounts discussed in chapter four suffer. I discussed two representative probabilistic accounts of evidential support in chapter four, each corresponding to general ways in which probabilities are used in accounts of epistemic support. The first probabilistic account discussed in chapter four was the Bayesian-inspired account. Roughly, this account says that the justificatory status of a type attitude toward p is determined by whether this attitude, combined with all other degrees of belief the subject has, conforms to the probability calculus and principle of conditionalization. The central difficulty for this account was that it failed to allow for experiences to play a role in justification. This is especially difficult for cases of justified belief about one's experiences—experiences aren't even allowed to play a role in justifying these attitudes.

CIA, of course, avoids this difficulty. As we have seen, it allows for experiences to play a central role in justification. Indeed, it allows that a subject's experience e might be just the sort of thing to justify her in believing she has an e-like experience. For, if e, by virtue of her disposition, in the presence of items of evidence like e to believe she is having an e-like experience, causes her to be ultima facie inclined to believe she is having an e-like experience, then she will be justified in believing she is having an e-like experience, and e itself will be doing much of the justificatory work here.

The second probabilistic account discussed in chapter four was the two-story story view. This view offers an account of evidential support from beliefs and an account of evidential support from experiences. In the case of beliefs, the view says that a belief or group of beliefs b supports a proposition p for S just when b is justified, the probability of p given the contents of b is sufficiently high, and S is aware of this probabilistic relation. I urged two difficulties for this account of support from beliefs. First and most fundamentally, the account does not allow a belief that one is having an experience as of an x to support the proposition that there is an x, thus conflicting with intuitive judgments in cases of doxastically justified belief. Second, there appear to be cases where a set of beliefs b can support a proposition p but where not all members of b are justified.

CIA faces neither of these problems. For, a belief that one is having an experience as of an x can support the proposition that there is an x, given CIA, when that belief, by virtue of a disposition in the presence of such beliefs to believe that there is an x, causes the subject to be ultima facie inclined to believe that there is an x. There is no obvious reason to think that such cases are impossible. Thus, CIA appears to avoid the first difficulty faced by the two-story story. It is also consistent with CIA, as I will discuss at further detail below, for beliefs which are not justified to support propositions.

In addressing the two-story story, I also discussed difficulties faced by the most elegant and obvious of the available probabilistic accounts of support from experiences. I discussed three problems. One problem was that some of these accounts do not allow for experiences to support propositions about the external world. We have already seen that CIA does not have this implication. A second problem was that on some of these accounts experiences could not support propositions affirming their existence. CIA

doesn't have this implication either. If an experience, by virtue of a disposition in the presence of such an experience to believe one is having such an experience, causes one to be ultima facie inclined to believe one is having such an experience, then that experience can support a proposition affirming its own existence according to CIA. A final problem faced by some of these accounts was that on some of these accounts experiences couldn't support propositions concerning their phenomenal feel. My experience as of a coffee cup couldn't support the proposition that I am having an experience *as of* a coffee cup. But, again, CIA does not have this same implication. CIA, then, escapes the central difficulties facing both the Bayesian-inspired account of evidential support and the two-story story view.

I closed chapter four by discussing a difficulty for both the Bayesian-inspired account of evidential support and the two-story story view—a difficulty I argued is plausibly faced by *any* probabilistic account of evidential support. The difficulty was that probabilistic accounts do not allow for dispositions to play the role of being that by virtue of which experiences support propositions. CIA, of course, makes this possibility available by definition. Thus, CIA faces none of the difficulties faced by the probabilistic accounts surveyed in chapter four.

Indeed, CIA is free of all of the difficulties facing the attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts of evidential support so far discussed. If it is not obvious that CIA suffers from other independent objections—both those driven by theory and those driven by intuition—then CIA will be preferable to these accounts. I shall argue in the next section that it is not obvious that CIA suffers from such independent difficulties.

2.3 CIA and Independent Objections

In this section, it is my goal to show that it is not obvious that CIA suffers from decisive objections independent of those faced by the attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts discussed thus far. I will discuss six of the most prima facie threatening objections to CIA. The first four objections are more theory-driven, while the last two involve appeals to intuitive judgments about epistemic justification. I argue that the defender of CIA has available appealing lines of response in each case, though some of these responses may need further development beyond what I offer here.

Objection 1: CIA Conflicts with Propositionalism. One concern for CIA is that it appears to conflict with an influential view about the nature of justification called "Propositionalism." Here I will outline what Propositionalism involves and why someone would think that the conjunction of CIA with the central evidentialist theses conflicts with it. I will show, first, that it is not clear that CIA does conflict with Propositionalism and, second, that if there is a conflict between the two views, it isn't clear that this conflict is telling against CIA.

One proponent of Propositionalism is Jonathan Kvanvig.[23] In his (2003), he defines Propositionalism as the view according to which the justification which attaches to propositions is the basic type of justification. In order to understand this claim, we must first understand Kvanvig's usage of the terminology "doxastic justification" and "propositional justification," which departs somewhat from the usage I have been making of that language following others throughout this dissertation.

[23] See, *inter alia*, (Kvanvig 2003), (Kvanvig 2007), (Kvanvig and Menzel 1990),

Kvanvig uses the phrase "doxastic justification" to refer to the justification which attaches to token attitudes. This is the same way that I have used this phrase here. But, he uses the phrase "propositional justification" differently. I have been using the phrase "propositional justification" to refer to the sort of justification which attaches to attitude types. But Kvanvig thinks this usage is awkward. Instead, he suggests that the language of propositional justification should be reserved for the sort of justification which attaches to propositions. Perhaps a better label for the sort of justification which attaches to type attitudes would be "attitudinal justification."

Once we understand this difference in terminology, it is easy to see what Propositionalism amounts to and why someone might think that CIA is inconsistent with it. Propositionalism is the view that propositional justification—the sort of justification which attaches to propositions—is the basic kind of justification. What this means is that other kinds of epistemic justification—e.g., doxastic justification and attitudinal justification—can be reduced to propositional justification. But, this would imply that the sort of justification analyzed by CIAJ, indeed the sort of justification analyzed by EJ, is not the basic sort of justification.

Kvanvig argues for Propositionalism by showing that other kinds of epistemic justification can be defined in terms of propositional justification, whereas propositional justification cannot be defined in terms of those other kinds of justification. For instance, it is plausible that S's token belief that p is justified just in case S is propositionally justified in believing p and S bases his belief that p properly.[24] Kvanvig argues at length, however, that propositional justification cannot be defined in terms of doxastic

[24] For resistance to this claim, see (Turri 2010).

justification. The central problem is that any such definition would either make use of the notion of evidential support or it wouldn't. But, if it did make usage of evidential support it would be making use of propositional justification and if it didn't then the definition wouldn't be plausible.[25]

The question here is whether any of this threatens CIA. Does CIA conflict with the claim that propositional justification is the basic kind of justification? It is not at all clear that it does. It is open for the defender of CIA to suggest that, although she has offered an account of the sort of justification which attaches to type attitudes, it is nonetheless true that the justification she has analyzed is reducible to propositional justification. Of course, for this claim to be true, it will have to be that the correct account of propositional justification won't imply that CIA licenses falsehoods about attitudinal justification when combined with the central evidentialist theses. But there is nothing at all about Propositionalism as defined above which implies that the correct account of propositional justification will imply this. So, there is no conflict between CIA and Propositionalism.

Suppose, though, that the defender of CIA was not comfortable with the claim that the sort of justification she was analyzing was not the basic kind—that it was reducible to propositional justification. This would lead to conflict with Propositionalism. But it isn't clear that the problem would lie on the side of CIA. For it is far more clear that doxastic justification is not the basic kind of justification than it is that attitudinal justification is not the basic kind. After all, just as it seems quite appropriate to define doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification, it also seems quite appropriate to define doxastic justification in terms of attitudinal

[25] See especially the discussion in (Kvanvig and Menzel 1990).

justification. Indeed, this is the purpose of Conee's and Feldman's thesis WF. More or less, WF just defines doxastic justification as attitudinal justification plus proper basing. An attitude token is justified just in case it is of a type which is attitudinally justified and it is properly based. Thus, we can reduce doxastic justification to attitudinal justification just as easily as we can reduce doxastic justification to propositional justification.

But what is less clear is whether there is a compelling reduction of attitudinal justification to propositional justification. About the relationship between these two, Kvanvig writes: "to say that a certain type of belief is justified is just to say that the propositional content distinctive of that type is justified."[26] It is somewhat tempting to understand this claim not as a reductive claim about attitudinal justification reducing to propositional justification, but as a claim that talk of one is just the same as talk of the other—that there aren't really two distinct kinds of justification here. If we do read it as a reductive claim, though, it will have to be that we can define attitudinal justification in terms of propositional justification using the proposed definition but that we can't define propositional justification in terms of attitudinal justification. That this is so is not at all apparent.

The proposed definition of attitudinal justification in terms of propositional justification is just that a belief type B is justified for S at t iff the propositional content of B is justified for S at t. But, it is not at all clear why the defender of CIA couldn't suggest that the definition works both ways here. Why not just say that the proposition p is justified for S at t iff the belief type B whose content is p is justified for S at t? There doesn't appear to be any obvious reason for rejecting this definition like the obvious reasons there are for rejecting definitions of propositional justification in terms of

[26] (1990: 248).

doxastic justification. Indeed, Kvanvig himself, when summarizing his argument for Propositionalism, notably *doesn't* say that he has shown this interdefinability to fail. He writes in summarizing his argument that he and his coauthor "showed that, whereas doxastic justification can be defined in terms of propositional justification, propositional justification cannot be defined in terms of *that kind of doxastic justification predicable of tokens of beliefs*."[27] If there isn't any decisive objection to this interdefinability, then there is no decisive reason, in the presence of a conflict between CIA and Propositionalism, to favor Propositionalism to CIA.

CIA does not conflict with Propositionalism. However, if the defender of CIA were to insist that she was offering an account of justification which couldn't simply be reduced to propositional justification in such a way that there were conflict between the two views, it isn't clear that this would provide a decisive reason for rejecting CIA. For, the reason that CIA would conflict with Propositionalism here would just be that the advocate of CIA added that attitudinal justification is not reducible to propositional justification. But this claim is not obviously wrong, since it isn't clear that propositional justification and attitudinal justification aren't interdefinable. So, there is no decisive objection to CIA having to do with its conflict with Propositionalism.

Objection 2: CIA Doesn't Posit Two Kinds of Propositional Justification. Some philosophers are attracted to views of propositional justification according to which there are two fundamentally different ways for an attitude to be propositionally justified. The two-story story view discussed in chapter four was such a view. Someone attracted to such a view might be hesitant about any account of propositional justification that didn't

[27] p.258, emphasis added.

make explicit such a dichotomy in the story of justification. Since CIA doesn't make explicit such a dichotomy, these philosophers might take this to be a problem with CIA. I will argue that this is not a decisive problem with CIA.

According to the sort of dichotomized view I am envisioning, there are two quite different ways for type-attitudes to be justified. One way an attitude can be justified is for it to be justified in a basic or immediate or non-inferential way. According to many, type attitudes concerning our own mental lives are examples of such basically or immediately justified beliefs. Perhaps beliefs in analytic truths are also justified in this way. Importantly, such attitudes do not get their justification by being related appropriately to other justified attitudes. By contrast, some justified attitudes do get there justification in this way. They are mediately or non-basically or inferentially justified, since they get their justification by standing in the right relationship to other attitudes which are justified. This dichotomized picture of justification is shared by those who hold to foundationalism about the structure of epistemic justification.

CIA does not preserve such a dichotomized view. For, when combined with thesis E, CIA implies that there is just one story to be told about propositional justification—just one way for type attitudes of belief to be justified, not two. A belief type B is justified for a subject S just when S has some evidence e which, by virtue of the right sort of disposition of which S is aware, causes S to be ultima facie inclined to take attitude B. That's the whole story.

The fact that CIA does not preserve such a dichotomized view but instead offers a unified explanation of justification may very well be a boon rather than a bane for CIA. CIA, by virtue of not offering a dichotomized view of justification, is more simple and

elegant than dichotomized views. This may very reasonably be taken to be a good-making feature of CIA, rather than a bad-making feature of it.

Similar things might be claimed for theses E and EJ. Neither of these theses obviously presents a dichotomized view of justification. Rather, E gives a unified account of just when the type attitude of belief fits evidence and EJ gives a unified account of just when any type attitude whatsoever is justified. The unity and simplicity of these accounts may well be something in their favor, not something against them. Similarly, I claim, for CIA.

Perhaps, though, there is another way of pressing the present objection. Perhaps the problem is that CIA conflicts with the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ)—the claim, roughly, that a belief that p can support a proposition q only if the belief that p is itself justified.[28] As it stands, CIA allows beliefs that are not justified to support other propositions making belief in those propositions justified. Some may find this a mark against CIA. I will show here that there are at least two responses available to the defender of CIA here which show that this objection is not devastating.

The first and perhaps simplest reply would be to modify the theory. The defender of CIA might add as a separate axiom about justification the principle of inferential justification. This would complicate her theory somewhat, but perhaps the complication is necessary. Or, perhaps instead of adding the PIJ as a separate axiom about justification, the defender of CIA could just add an axiom that limits what sorts of items of had evidence can support propositions. Or, she could add an axiom limiting which

[28] Richard Fumerton, from whom this name apparently originated, states the principle more strongly as "To be justified in believing *P* on the basis of *E* one must not only be (1) justified in believing *E*, but also (2) justified in believing that *E* makes probable *P*" (Fumerton 2010). I am working here with only the first listed necessary condition for inferentially justified belief.

beliefs can constitute items of had evidence allowing only the justified beliefs to count. These latter responses would in fact leave CIA intact, but alter the discussion of the first section of this chapter.[29]

A second reply, the reply I prefer, is to dispute the principle of inferential justification. Denying the PIJ is not unheard of. Indeed, there is a tradition following Wittgenstein according to which this is just what should be done. According to this tradition, some beliefs which have no positive epistemic properties can give rise to beliefs which do. These beliefs without positive epistemic properties are thought of, variously, as assumptions or hinge propositions. They are the unjustified justifiers which serve as the starting points of inquiry. According to some, which beliefs serve in this capacity depends on the context in which a person finds herself.[30]

I am not here endorsing the whole of this traditional rejection of the PIJ. I only wish to point out that if the defender of CIA does reject the PIJ, she is not without company. One traditional response to skepticism—the Wittgenstinian one just discussed—takes just this tack.

But apart from the fact that others have rejected the PIJ, there are good reasons for someone attracted to the central evidentialist theses EO and M to reject the principle too. I offered a brief argument to this effect in chapter four, but now I want to expand upon that argument a bit further. The reason why someone who is attracted to EO and M might reject the PIJ has to do with new evil demon type cases like the following.

[29] Notably, such axioms would be needed already within the evidentialist theory, since the central evidentialist theses themselves do not rule out unjustified beliefs doing justificatory work.

[30] For a helpful overview of such a position, see (Williams 1999).

Suppose that in the actual world Jane has done a great deal of research on tigers and has learned thereby that all tigers are ferocious. Currently, she holds a vast number of true beliefs about her past research experiences, though she isn't presently doing any research. And, suppose further that a friend of Jane's told her some time ago about a tiger named Sally. Presently Jane is reflecting on these experiences she believes she had. She believes, on the basis of beliefs she holds about her research experiences, that all tigers are ferocious and she believes, on the basis of her belief that her friend told her about Sally the tiger, that Sally is a tiger. Further, she is disposed in the presence of these beliefs, like most of us are, to believe that Sally is ferocious. Supposing that these beliefs of hers, by virtue of this disposition of hers, cause her to be ultima facie inclined to believe that Sally is ferocious, it seems quite clear that she is justified in believing that Sally is ferocious.

But now compare Jane to her new evil demon counterpart Joan. Let Joan be exactly like Jane with respect to which mental states she currently has and with respect to their relations to one another. In particular, Joan shares all of Jane's beliefs about her past tiger research experiences and shares the belief the she has just been told by a friend about a tiger named Sally. Unfortunately for Jane, however, these beliefs are all false and have been caused by a malicious evil demon.

Begin with this question about Joan: Is Joan justified in believing that Sally is ferocious? If we hold to thesis M—that two subjects exactly alike mentally are exactly alike justificationally—then we are forced to conclude that the answer is yes, given that we said Jane was justified. And, very plausibly, this is just the right answer.

Of course, if Joan is indeed justified, it will be because of her beliefs that Sally is a tiger and that Sally is ferocious. Now, if PIJ is correct, then Joan must be justified in holding these beliefs. Otherwise, she could not be justified by them in believing that Sally is ferocious. But, is she justified in believing that Sally is a tiger and that Sally is ferocious? Some would be inclined to say no, especially given the way in which these beliefs were obtained. Sally was just caused to believe these things by the demon. If we are attracted to thesis EO, and we think that it is false that Joan *ought* to believe that Sally is a tiger and that Sally is ferocious—as is quite plausible—then we should conclude that Joan is not justified in believing that Sally is a tiger and that Sally is ferocious. If she isn't, then we have a counterexample to PIJ. We have an example where Sally is justified in believing a proposition p mediately on the basis of beliefs b_1-b_n but where not all of her beliefs b_1-b_n are themselves justified.

Some epistemological theories, however, will allow that Joan is justified in believing that Sally is a tiger and that Sally is ferocious.[31] After all, in addition to causing these beliefs in Joan, the demon also caused Joan to believe that her friend had some time ago told her about Sally and to believe all kinds of things about her past experiences of doing research on tigers. Perhaps, given these beliefs, Joan indeed ought to believe that Sally is a tiger and that all tigers are ferocious. So, given EO, she is justified in believing these things and we do not yet have a counterexample to PIJ.

Suppose we grant this response for the sake of argument. Even if we do, it is still not difficult to see that there is a problem nearby for PIJ. For, if Joan is justified in believing that Sally is a tiger and that all tigers are ferocious in accordance with the

[31] I am thinking in particular of coherentist theories here, though other theories may have the same result. Joan's belief that Sally is a tiger and that all tigers are ferocious cohere with her other beliefs.

envisaged response, then she is justified in believing these things by her belief about her friend's having told her about Sally and by her beliefs about her numerous tiger-research experiences. But, we can now ask whether *these* beliefs of Joan's are justified. Indeed, we can ask whether she *ought* to have these beliefs. It seems highly plausible here that it is not the case that she ought to believe these things. Thus, supposing EO is true, it follows that Joan is not justified in believing these things. And, again, we have a problem for PIJ. For, we have a case where a subject is inferentially or mediately justified in believing a proposition p on the basis of some other beliefs b_1-b_n but where not all of b_1- b_n are propositionally justified.

The foregoing argument provides some reason for someone attracted to the central evidentialist theses to deny PIJ. Thus, if CIA conflicts with the PIJ, this need not be taken as a decisive mark against CIA. Instead, one might take it as a mark in favor of CIA that it conflicts with PIJ, since the central evidentialist theses appear to do so as well.

The knowledgeable reader will notice that CIA's conflict with PIJ has far-reaching implications for the structure of justification. For, all three of the classical views about the structure of justification—foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism—typically accept and are in part motivated by PIJ. If these views imply PIJ, then PIJ's falsity will show that they are false as well. I do not know of any foundationalist, coherentist, or infinitist views which do not accept PIJ. So, as far as I know, CIA's conflict with PIJ is also a conflict with foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism.

If CIA conflicts with each of these classical views about the structure of justification, we might ask what sort of view about the structure of justification *does* fit

with CIA. My suggestion is that, given CIA, the best view about the structure of justification is that justification has no structure. Foundationalists have their pyramid metaphor and coherentists their raft or web metaphors. Perhaps the metaphor for the structureless view would be a pin cushion. The pins represent type attitudes, and the cushion represents the evidential profile of the subject. We don't discern the justification of any doxastic attitude by studying its relation to other justified attitudes. Instead, for each attitude, to see whether it is justified, we study its relation to the subject's evidential profile.

The worry presented in the section, whether it is put in terms of a two-story story about justification or in terms of CIA's conflict with the PIJ, poses no serious threat to CIA. Two-story stories are less elegant than the pin cushion story, and the defender of CIA can either modify her view to accommodate the PIJ or simply argue that CIA's conflict with the PIJ is not a decisive reason to reject CIA.

Objection 3: CIA and Content-Matching. Move to a third concern. Some may worry that CIA overcomplicates the story of justification from experiences by bringing in dispositions. They might suggest that a far simpler story would be to say that an experience justifies what it does by virtue of its content. When one has an experience as of an x being F, one is justified in believing that there is an x that is F by virtue of the experience's content, and that's all we need to say. Experiences justify beliefs which match their contents and that's the end of the elegant story.[32]

I should mention that I am thinking here only of views of content that will allow the contents of experiences to be matched with propositions about the external world.

[32] Though not quite where he wants to end the story, a view along these lines is suggested in (Feldman 2003).

These will be views according to which the content of an experience can justify a belief that there is something in the world with some property which is not simply a subject-relative property—a property having to do with the way the thing appears to the subject. For instance, such a view might allow an experience as of something red to justify belief that there is something red—not just that there is something that appears to the subject as red or causes certain kinds of quale in the subject. The objection to CIA, then, is that there is a simpler account of justification from experiences for propositions about the external world which appeals only to the contents of those experiences and not to dispositions as well.

The subject of the contents of experiences and of mental states in general is of course a vast and complicated one. There are views according to which experiences have propositional content,[33] views according to which they have representational but not propositional content,[34] and views according to which they have phenomenal content.[35] And then there are views according to which experiences do not have the sort of content that can be matched with the content of propositions.

As stated, CIA requires no matching between the content of an experience and the content of a belief it supports. Thus, CIA not only offers a more complicated story than the content-matching view, but it conflicts with the content-matching view by implying different judgments than the content-matching view concerning what is justified by experience in particular cases. Of course, the defender of CIA could modify her view to

[33] E.g., (Seigel 2011).

[34] E.g., (Burge 2009).

[35] E.g., (Kriegel 2002). This sort of view is not relevant for the objection considered here, however, since it will only allow the contents of experiences to be matched with propositions about how things appear to the subject.

require such matching. This would at least remove the kind of conflict envisioned here. But, there is another response open to the defender of CIA which I want to explore here. This response involves pointing out difficulties with the content-matching view which seem to be remedied by an account which allows dispositions to play an explanatory role in which beliefs are justified by experiences.

One concern for the content matching view is that if experiences have the kind of content that can be matched, it seems that experiences will end up justifying too much. This is the point made by the famous example of the speckled hen.[36] Suppose experiences have the kind of content that can be matched with the content of propositions. And suppose that someone has an experience which represents a 48-speckled hen. If experiences have the kind of content which can be matched, then a content involving *being a 48-speckled hen* would seem as good a candidate as any for the content of this experience. But, then, by the content matching view, this experience will justify belief in the proposition that there is a 48-speckled hen, or something along those lines involving the property of being 48-speckled.[37] And, very plausibly, though a person may have an experience which represents this property, it is not the case that her experience justifies her in believing that there is a 48-speckled hen or anything involving the property of being 48-speckled. More generally, if experiences have contents which can be matched, it seems they will have more content than the attitudes they can justify.

[36] For a recent presentation of the difficulty, see (Sosa 2003).

[37] We need not be detained by the question of whether the proposition should include the existential quantifier here.

There are, of course, responses in the literature to the problem of the speckled hen.[38] Yet, it remains a standard objection to content-matching views.[39] One potential solution to the problem would be to abandon the content-matching view and instead invoke the justifying power of dispositions. The reason that the experience discussed in the previous paragraph typically doesn't justify belief in the proposition that there is a 48-speckled hen is that persons who have this experience are not disposed in its presence to believe that there is a 48-speckled hen. If this is correct, then a view like CIA is not clearly on worse footing than the content-matching view—it may even be on better footing.

Other objections to the content-matching view come from the other side. If experiences justify by virtue of their content, it seems that they will justify too little. Imagine you have an experience as of a cloud of smoke rising over a mountain. Imagine, further, that you have a disposition of which you are aware in the presence of experiences like this to believe that there is a fire on the mountain. You, like the rest of us, take smoke to be a sign of fire. Imagine, finally, that your experience of the smoke, by virtue of this disposition, causes you to believe that there is a fire on the mountain. According to some, this is a case where your experience of the smoke justifies your belief that there is a fire.[40] But, the content-matching view by itself cannot explain this. More is needed,

[38] See, e.g., (Fumerton 2005, 2009) and (Poston 2007).

[39] See the discussion in (Markie 2009).

[40] I am thinking here, in particular, of Reid's (2003) account of natural signs.

and one way to supply the more which is needed would be to appeal to an account like CIA which allows dispositions to aid experiences in justifying beliefs.[41]

In addition to these independent difficulties for the content-matching view, there appears to be some reason for thinking that the content-matching view conflicts with central evidentialist thesis M. The conflict arises because the best-developed contemporary accounts of how experiences have the sort of content that can be matched make it possible, given the content-matching view, for two subjects to be exactly alike mentally but to differ justificationally. To see this, consider what the best views about how experiences have content say.

Typically, those who attempt to explain how a mental state in general can have content do so by saying that mental states have content by being appropriately related to things which are *about* or which *represent* something else. Sometimes, this view of contentful mental states is called the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). On this view, contentful mental states are relations to representations.[42]

It is clear, on the RTM, how beliefs have content. My belief that Obama is President, according to the RTM, has the content it does by being appropriately related to something which represents Obama's being President. One very plausible explanation of what this representing entity is is a proposition—the proposition that Obama is President. Plausibly, my belief has content by having this proposition as its *object*. What is believed when I believe that Obama is President is the proposition that Obama is President. Thus,

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[41] This sort of objection is presented by (Goldman 2008) in his discussion of the bird-watcher example from (Feldman 2003). The general idea that experiences with one content can justify beliefs in different contents is also present in Sosa's (1980) discussion of extraterrestrial justification.

[42] For an overview treatment of this view, see (Pitt 2008).

the story of how beliefs have content according to the RTM is that beliefs have content by having as their objects something which represents or is about the world—a proposition.[43]

The story is more difficult, however, for experiences. It is clear, for instance, that we can't use exactly the same story for experiences that we use for beliefs. For, experiences do not have propositions as their objects. What is experienced when I experience my telephone ringing is not a proposition. The object of my experience, if it has an object, is the telephone or the noise it makes—not a proposition. Thus, experiences don't have content in just the same way beliefs do. They don't have content by having as their objects something which represents or is about the world. If they have objects, their objects are items in the world.[44]

How, then, might experiences have content? Well, given the RTM, they must have content by bearing the right sort of relation to something which represents or is about something in the world. As far as I can tell, the best account of that which experiences are related to which represents the world are mental images. Experiences are one sort of relation to mental images. Imaginings are another sort of relation to mental images. Experiences have content by being related to mental images which are about the world.

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[43] Some who are squeamish about propositions would rather say that my belief is a relation to some other mental entity which represents in the way a proposition does. Oddly enough, it seems to me that *this* view is the one which posits unnecessary entities. The explanation given here in terms of propositions seems perfectly satisfactory to me.

[44] That is, assuming that sense-datum views are incorrect, the objects of experiences are items in the world. On such theories, the objects of my experiences will be mental entities like the images I will discuss below. However, such mental images are still not propositions. So, even on the sense-datum view, the contents of mental states must be explained differently than the contents of beliefs. In my view, sense-datum theories should be ruled out by Occam's Razor as unnecessarily complex.

It is at this point where we will begin to see how the content-matching view of how experiences support propositions conflicts with thesis M. For, the best-developed accounts of how a mental image represents the world will conflict with thesis M.

We should ask how mental images represent or are about the world. Typically, the answer provided is that they do so in the way that pictures or paintings do.[45] But, then, we should ask how pictures or paintings represent the world. How is it that a painting is about the world? It seems that pictures or paintings are about the world only by virtue of an intentional plan of their designers. Consider, for instance, a painting of a certain hillside. The painting is about the hillside only because of the fact that it is part of an intentional plan of the designer that it represent this hillside. If a qualitatively identical painting were to be produced by random, unintelligent processes, we would hardly be inclined to say that the resulting item was about the hillside. It wouldn't be about anything. Thus, in that case, it wouldn't have any content.

If the way in which mental images have content is the same way that pictures or paintings do, then we must say the same things about how mental images have content that we have said about how the painting of the hillside has content. Mental images, if they have the sort of content that can be matched, have it by virtue of being designed by someone to represent something. My experience as of a phone's ringing has the content of a phone's ringing, then, only if the mental image it is related to is designed by someone for the purpose of being about a phone's ringing.

However, it is rather implausible that my mental images are designed by someone for this purpose. And, even if they were, it is easy to see that this view about how experiences have the content they do will lead to conflict between the content-matching

[45] See, e.g., the discussion in (Pitt 2008).

view and thesis M. For, imagine that I have an experience as of my phone ringing, where this experience is a relation to a mental image which has been designed to be about my phone's ringing. Given the view of content sketched here, and given the content-matching view of the role of experiences in supporting propositions, my experience will support the proposition that the phone is ringing. However, we can easily imagine someone exactly like me mentally who, given the content-matching view, will not be exactly like me justificationally, thus leading to conflict with M. For, we can imagine my evil demon world counterpart who has a qualitatively identical experience of hearing the phone ring but whose experience is not related to a mental image which was designed by someone to be about my phone's ringing. My counterpart will be exactly alike me mentally, but, given the content-matching view and the above unpacking of experiential content will not be exactly alike me justificationally. For, the content of his experience will be different. So we get a conflict between the content-matching view and thesis M.

There are at least two replies open to the defender of the content-matching view here. One reply is to insist on a strong externalism about what makes two token experiences of the same type. She could insist that I and my counterpart are in fact not exactly alike mentally because we don't have the same experiences, since what makes two experiences of the same type has to do with their relation to designed mental images.

But this reply is open to a serious objection. For, there is an equally attractive account available concerning what makes two experiences of the same type than this radically externalist one. What makes two experiences of the same type is that what it is like to have the one is just what it is like to have the other.[46] On this view, there is

[46] I am using the phrase "what it is like" here in the way that (Dretske 1995) and (Tye 1995) do as referring to the what it is like for the *subject* to have the experience, not as referring to something about

something it is like to have an experience, and when two token experiences are such that what it is like to have them is just the same, they are tokens of the same experience type. My counterpart and I can indeed be exactly alike mentally—in particular, we token the same experience type as of hearing the telephone ring—though one of our experiences is a relation to a mental image which is part of one design plan and the other's is a relation to a mental image which is not part of that same design plan.

A more plausible way for the content-matching theorist to object to the above argument, I think, is for her to suggest that there is another way for mental images to represent than by being designed in a certain way. They can represent, instead, by having a certain kind of function. After all, perhaps whether a painting is about something or represents something is just as much a matter of the painting's function as it is about the painting's design plan. Perhaps, then, mental images can have the sort of content that can be matched because this is their function.

But this response will not do either. For, whatever is involved in the mental image's having the function it does is going to lead to the same conflict with M we saw above. A thing x's having a function F is typically taken to be a matter of x being related in appropriate ways to other things which did the characteristic activities of F. For instance, a certain heart's having the function of pumping blood is typically taken to be a matter of that heart's being appropriately causally related to previous hearts which

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what the experience itself is like. Indeed, I'm not sure I understand what it means to talk about what the experience itself is like where this is different from what it is like for the subject to have the experience.

pumped blood.[47] But, as I will now show, if a mental image's function of representing the world is understood in this way, then the conflict with M will remain.

Imagine again me and my evil demon world counterpart. Suppose that my experience as of the phone ringing is a relation to a mental representation which is appropriately related to past mental images in just the right way for it to have the function, according to the aforementioned account, of representing my phone's ringing. However, suppose that my counterpart's experience is not so related to a mental image with these same causal relations. Very plausibly, I and my counterpart can be exactly alike mentally here. What my experience is like is just what his experience is like. Yet, given the content-matching view we will not be exactly alike justificationally. For, my experience has one content and his another, on the present function-based view of content. Given the content matching view, we won't be exactly alike justificationally. So, because of the best available accounts of how experiences have the sort of contents that can be matched, the content-matching view conflicts with thesis M.

In this section, I considered an objection to CIA having to do with CIA's apparent conflict with the content-matching view about how experiences justify beliefs. We have seen that this objection to CIA is not a decisive one for two reasons. First, there are serious difficulties facing the content-matching view which seem to be remedied by accounts like CIA which allow dispositions to play a role in aiding experiences in justifying beliefs. So, it is not obviously a problem for CIA if it conflicts with the content-matching view. Second, it appears that the best accounts of how experiences have the sort of content that can be matched have the consequence that the content-

[47] See, e.g., the overview in (Neader 2004). Two prominent proponents of a causal-historical account of the function of mental states are Dretske (1995, 2003) and Tye (1995; 2000).

matching view is inconsistent with M. If the two are indeed inconsistent, then someone attracted to the central evidentialist theses will surely not want to reject CIA because of its conflict with the content-matching view.

Objection 4: Inclinations Alone. Some might think that CIA overcomplicates things in another way. Rather than requiring that subjects have mental states which cause inclinations in the right way, why not just say that when a subject is inclined to take an attitude, that's all that is required for the attitude to be justified? This view, it might be urged, is simpler and more elegant than CIA.[48]

Simpler and more elegant, yes. But this view fails to account for one of the most important intuitions driving contemporary internalist views of justification—the Subject's Perspective Objection (SPO).[49] According to this objection, a view of justification cannot be right if it implies that a person can be justified in believing a proposition when that proposition's being true would be an accident from the subject's own perspective. Though it is controversial and difficult to say just what is involved in a proposition's being true being an accident from the subject's perspective, one plausible view is that if from the subject's perspective it is surprising that the proposition is true, then it is an accident from her perspective that the proposition is true.[50]

Unfortunately, the view that attitude D is justified for S at t iff S is inclined to take D at t is vulnerable to this objection. For, it seems perfectly imaginable that there be someone who is inclined to believe p, but who has no idea why she is so inclined, and

[48] A view somewhat like this is discussed with approval by (Swinburne 2001).

[49] This objection derives from (Bonjour 1980) and is illustrated by the case of Norman the Clairvoyant discussed in the Introduction to this work.

[50] (Mattheson and Rogers 2011) discusses a different internalist-friendly reading of this phrase, while (Bergmann forthcoming) discusses several externalist-friendly readings of it.

thus is quite surprised when she learns that p is true. In this case, it is plausible that, given the above account, she is justified in believing p but p's being true is an accident from her perspective. Given the SPO, this account of justification must be wrong.

By contrast, CIA does not appear to allow such cases. In every case where a person has a justified belief that p according to CIA, that person will not be surprised to learn that p is true since it is just what her evidence has led her to expect. Thus, CIA avoids conflict with the SPO and is therefore superior to the admittedly simpler view suggested at the outset of this section.

There might be a more powerful way of pressing a related objection to CIA. Instead of putting the objection in terms of inclinations, we could put the objection in terms of seemings. Why not say that S's evidence supports a proposition p just when it seems to S that p, rather than requiring the causal relationship required by CIA? Such a view, which has been endorsed by some contemporary epistemologists, would appear to a good deal simpler than CIA.[51] And, perhaps, this view would not be subject to the SPO in quite the same way as the view that S is justified in taking attitude D when S is inclined to take D.

It is not clear that this seeming-based view does avoid the SPO. For, plausibly it could seem to one that p where one has no idea why it seems to them that p. And, perhaps here too when it turns out that p the subject will be surprised by this fact. But set this concern to the side. My primary concern for the seeming-based view is that it seems to me that there aren't any seemings. In other words, I am inclined to think, for reasons I

[51] For a defense of a view like this, see (Huemer 2001). In Huemer's published statements of the view, he only says that seemings are sufficient for justification in the absence of defeaters. However, in conversation he has suggested that they are necessary as well.

will presently offer, that seemings are not sui generis mental states, as the proponents of seemings-based views suppose.[52]

Advocates of the seemings-based view argue for their view that seemings are sui generis mental states by considering multiple cases where it is appropriate to say that it seems to a subject that p. They show that for any mental state we might have plausibly identified with seemings (like beliefs or inclinations to believe), that mental state is not present in all of the cases where it is appropriate to say that it seems to a subject that p. And, then, on this basis they conclude that there must be something else present—a sui generis mental state we can call a "seeming"—in each case which makes the seeming talk appropriate.

Unfortunately, this pattern of argument ignores a salient and plausible response. Consider a parallel pattern of argument for the conclusion that there are sui generis hams:

> There is a great variety of appropriate linguistic usage of "ham." We say, for instance, that "I ate some ham from breakfast" and that "Marty at the office is such a ham." However, there is nothing the ham skeptic believes in which is present in each of these cases of appropriate ham talk which makes that talk appropriate. For instance, ham from pigs isn't present to make appropriate the sentence about Marty and goofy people aren't present to make appropriate the sentence about what I ate this morning. So, it must be that there is a sui generis type of thing—ham—which the ham skeptic doesn't believe in.

Obviously, nobody should be impressed by this line of argument.

The problem is that those committed to seemings as sui generis mental states have forgotten that language is sometimes ambiguous. Sometimes ham talk is made true (or appropriate) by the stuff that comes from pigs, and sometimes it is made true (or appropriate) by goofy people. Likewise, I would submit, sometimes seemings-talk is

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[52] See (Huemer 2007) and (Cullison 2010).

made true (or appropriate) by experiences, sometimes it is made true (or appropriate) by inclinations to believe, and perhaps even sometimes it is made true (or appropriate) by beliefs themselves. None of this gives us any reason to suppose that in addition to beliefs, inclinations to believe, and experiences, we should posit some other kind of mental state—seemings—and build our theory of justification based off of that.

Indeed, what this suggests is that a view of justification which analyzes justification in terms of the way things seem to the subject is a view which has not completed its task. For, there is a radical ambiguity in seemings language. A view which made it clear which sort of mental states which make seemings-talk true or appropriate were the heavy lifters in the story of justification would be preferable to an ambiguous seemings-based account. In my view, this is just what CIA provides. CIA is preferable to seemings-based accounts because CIA does not have the ambiguity inherent in these accounts.

Objection 5: Funky Dispositions. This final objection is the one I think is most threatening to CIA. It is motivated by intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification rather than by theoretical commitments. CIA allows for really weird dispositions to contribute to epistemic justification where many of us are tempted, intuitively, to think there is no justification. One might very reasonably take this to be a serious problem with CIA. I will argue here that, although this objection is prima facie quite strong, there is a satisfactory response available for the defender of CIA.

Imagine I have an experience as of a trash can. Most ordinary people, in the presence of such an experience, might be disposed to believe that there is a trash can before them. But, we can imagine that I am not like most ordinary people. Instead, in the

presence of experiences like this one, I am disposed to think that there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars. Not only am I disposed in this way, and not only am I aware of this disposition, but my experience of the trash can causes me, by virtue of this disposition, to be inclined to believe that there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars. Finally, none of my other evidence removes this inclination from me; so I am ultima facie inclined to believe there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars. My experience of the trash can has caused me, by virtue of a funky disposition of mine, to be ultima facie inclined to believe there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars. Indeed, I believe the proposition on this basis.

CIA, when conjoined with E, implies that I am in this case justified in believing that there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars. Indeed, given thesis EO, CIA implies that I ought to believe there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars. But these judgments conflict with some people's intuitions about justification and epistemic obligations. Some are strongly inclined to judge that I am not justified in believing that there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars in this case—even that this is something I ought not believe. CIA, then, predicts judgments concerning epistemic justification which conflict strikingly with some people's intuitions. This may be thought very reasonably to be a serious problem with CIA.

But there is a way out of the problem. For, it is open to the defender of CIA to insist that justification is not all there is to the epistemic good life. She can maintain, for instance, that while justification is quite valuable, there is some other epistemic property much more valuable. Indeed, she might suggest that it is our intuitions about this latter property which are infecting our judgment about whether I am justified in the giant fairy case. What is intuitive is that I lack a certain kind of epistemic value—my believing as I

do is in a certain respect bad epistemically speaking. But, this need not be taken to imply that my believing as I do isn't justified, as CIA predicts.

As it turns out, this response is not only open to the defender of CIA, but there is a very attractive way for her to present it. She can embed her theory of justification within a generally Aristotelian account of epistemic value which allows her to say exactly how the epistemic good of justification relates to the more valuable epistemic good which is lacking in the giant fairy case.

To see how this would go, consider what an Aristotelian would say about the epistemic good life. For the Aristotelian, the epistemic good life is the life wherein one fulfills one's proper epistemic function excellently. Now, the defender of CIA might maintain that one's proper epistemic function is to have justified beliefs. Thus, one's proper function epistemically is for one to take those attitudes which one's evidence, by virtue of one's dispositions of which one is aware, causes one to be ultima facie inclined to take. Hence, I am functioning properly in the giant fairy case.

But there is quite a difference between fulfilling one's proper function and fulfilling one's proper function *excellently*. Plausibly, though I fulfill my proper function in the giant fairy case, I do not fulfill my proper function with excellence. What would it be for me to fulfill my proper function with excellence? The Aristotelian would insist that this involves fulfilling that function in accordance with the intellectual virtues. And I think this is just what the defender of CIA should say is driving our intuitions in the fairy case.

The defender of CIA can give an account of proper epistemic function according to which proper epistemic function amounts to taking all and only those attitudes which are justified according to CIA. Thus,

> (CIAPF) S is fulfilling her proper epistemic function at t iff for each attitude D S takes at t, some evidence e S has at t, by virtue of a disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, causes S to be ultima facie inclined to take attitude D toward p at t, and S's attitude D is properly based.

Further, she can give an account of more valuable epistemic states by restricting the dispositions in CIAPF to virtues alone. After all, the Aristotelian is going to analyze virtues in terms of dispositions. Thus, the defender of CIA can suggest that fulfilling one's proper function with excellence amounts to taking attitudes which are justified in accordance with CIA by one's *intellectual virtues*. The account of proper function with excellence, then, will say:

> (CIAPF) S is fulfilling her proper epistemic function with excellence at t iff for each attitude D S takes at t, some evidence e S has at t, by virtue of a *virtuous* disposition of S's of which S is aware in the presence of had evidence like e to believe p, causes S to be ultima facie inclined to take attitude D toward p at t, and S's attitude D is properly based.

CIA can in this way be embedded into an Aristotelian theory of epistemic value which, as I will now show, provides an adequate response to the funky dispositions objection.

In response to the giant fairy case and others like it, I suggest the following for the defender of CIA. She should insist that, although the subject in the case is justified in believing as she does, she lacks another valuable epistemic property. She has fulfilled her proper function, and so has a justified belief. But, there is more to the epistemic good life than fulfilling one's proper function. There is also fulfilling one's proper function with excellence. This is quite a bit more valuable than simply fulfilling one's proper function. And, in cases like the giant fairy case, it is absent. My disposition in the

presence of experiences like my experience as of the trash can to believe there is a giant cheese fairy on Mars is not a virtuous disposition. Thus, while it can do justificatory work, it cannot help me attain to more valuable epistemic states. Indeed, it cannot be that by virtue of which I live the good epistemic life.

Generalizing, we have seen in this section that there is a prima facie serious difficulty for CIA in that it leads to conflicts with intuitive judgments concerning epistemic justification. The problem is that, as long as a person's dispositions are weird enough, any old mental state can support any old proposition according to CIA. In the worst case, it may even be possible for someone's belief that p to support, by virtue of a funky disposition, the proposition that not-p. In all such cases, we are tempted to say that something has gone seriously wrong epistemically speaking. The agent in question lacks certain valuable epistemic properties. But, what I have suggested here is that the defender of CIA need not accept that those valuable epistemic properties are the property of justification. She can instead insist that while the subjects in the examples are fully justified in believing as they do, they lack something else of even greater value epistemically speaking. Although they are fulfilling their proper function, they are not doing so with excellence. They are not doing so with virtue.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have completed my argument in favor of CIA over the views of evidential support surveyed in chapters two through four. Here I offered an extended explanatory commentary on CIA and showed that CIA neither conflicts with the central evidentialist theses themselves, nor does it suffer from the same problems faced by the attitudinalist, explanationist, or probabilistic accounts of chapters two through four, nor is

it devastated by independent objections—whether driven by theory or by intuition. Since the attitudinalist, explanationist, and probabilistic accounts surveyed in chapters two through four do suffer from very serious objections, I conclude that CIA is preferable to these accounts as an account of evidential support.

Of course, I should remind my reader here that my goal was to offer an account of the evidential support relation *central to the work of Conee and Feldman*, not some other relation of evidential support. I leave it open here whether there is any other such relation, and even whether some other relation might be better qualified to be called the relation of evidential support than the relation I have given an account of here. My goal was to give an account of evidential support which was consistent with the central evidentialist theses and which had intuitively pleasing results concerning epistemic justification when combined with those theses. I was attempting to provide an account of a relation as it appears in a theory, not a relation which may appear by the same name in ordinary parlance.

What is of greatest interest to me in terms of future work on this topic is the general account of justification which I said in this chapter fits very nicely with CIA—the view expressed by CIAJ. This view, which I am myself very attracted to, has a number of interesting consequences for work on epistemic justification which I believe are worthy of exploration. First, CIAJ makes possible a satisfying reply to Bergmann's Dilemma, an important argument against internalist views in general. For, CIAJ requires that justified subjects be aware of something which their attitudes have going for them and yet CIAJ does not, as we saw, conflict with the SPO.[53] Second, as we saw earlier,

[53] By avoiding Bergmann's dilemma in this way, CIAJ fits into the first category of internalist exit strategies discussed by Mattheson and Rogers (2011). Indeed, CIAJ is preferable to a very similar view

CIAJ implies that none of the classical accounts of the structure of justification is correct. CIAJ opens up the possibility for a very different view of the structure of epistemic justification—the structureless pin cushion view. Third, CIAJ makes possible an appealing faith-based account of the justification for religious beliefs. For, supposing as some in the Christian tradition have that faith is a disposition to believe the content of divine revelation,[54] it is not hard to see how CIAJ would allow for justified religious belief. Indeed, when embedded within the Aristotelian explanation of epistemic value discussed above, it may be that CIAJ would allow not just for religious believers to be functioning properly, but for them to be functioning properly *with excellence*, if faith turns out to be an intellectual virtue.[55] The fourth consequence CIAJ fits very nicely with is the Aristotelian explanation of epistemic value itself. I think this explanation of epistemic value, and its relationship to justification, is worth investigating in its own right.

So I recommend CIA, and CIAJ, to anyone attracted to the central evidentialist theses. CIA is preferable to some of the best competitor accounts of evidential support for someone attracted to these theses, and the general view of justification CIAJ inspired by CIA has a host of striking and interesting consequences for contemporary epistemology.

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discussed by Mattheson and Rogers because it is not vulnerable to objections from deviant causal chains in the way the view they discuss is.

[54] Aquinas (1947) endorses such a view.

[55] Again, this is true for (Aquinas 1947).

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