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Fans Don't Boo Nobodies: Image Repair Strategies of High-Profile Baseball Players During the Steroid Era

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Baseball's Steroid Era put many different high-profile athletes under pressure to explain steroid allegations that were made against them. This thesis used textual analysis of news reports and media portrayals of the athletes, along with analysis of their image repair strategies to combat those allegations, to determine how successful the athletes were in changing public opinion as evidenced through the media. The contexts, media reports, and strategies of Jason Giambi, Mark McGwire, Andy Pettitte, and Roger Clemens were analyzed and revealed important implications involving effective use of image repair strategies. They provided a deeper framework for the success of mortification strategies. An authentic, sincere mortification strategy has more power to change the media's reporting and portrayal of the athlete, while stunted or incentivized mortification strategies provide diminishing results. The four different situations of the players and the different combinations of strategies used provide insight into how much a public persona matters in confronting allegations. They show how ineffective the strategy of minimization is against allegations that involve on-field performance. The situations reveal how the promise of future on-field actions, along with actual on-field success can help repair an athlete's image without a solid rhetorical strategy. They show the amount of information offered, along with the strategies used, influences the amount of persuasion that occurs. The different situations also showed how a complete image repair strategy is successful in ending news coverage of the allegations and not just changing the media portrayal.

Keywords: textual analysis, apologia, image repair strategies, baseball, steroids, HGH, Mark McGwire, Jason Giambi, Andy Pettitte, Roger Clemens

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Introduction

The game of baseball needed to change with the times. The traditional pastime had lost ground because of a player's strike in 1994, which not only canceled the final two months of the regular season, the playoffs, and the World Series, but caused fan interest to plummet because of the bickering of millionaire players and billionaire owners. Outside the game, the National Football League (NFL) was pushing its fast-paced and more physical game into the nation's spotlight and the fans were responding. Into this environment, Major League Baseball commissioner Bud Selig, the owners, and the players tried to rediscover fan interest. Two divisions had been expanded to three and a wild card team was added to the playoffs in 1994. Interleague play was voted on after the strike and implemented in 1997, which led to baseball's second highest season attendance in history (Koppett & Koppett, 2004). In 1998, two additional teams were added to the major leagues in Arizona and Tampa Bay, while players became bigger and stronger as home runs began to attract more and more fans to ballparks.

Just four years after the strike, Major League Baseball had found its saviors. The red-headed St. Louis Cardinals slugger Mark McGwire and the lovable outfielder for the Chicago Cubs Sammy Sosa put on a show during the summer of 1998 the likes of which no one had ever seen before. They both chased Roger Maris' single season home run record and battled each other all summer long and into the autumn. McGwire finished with 70 home runs and Sosa settled for second with 66, pushing Maris into third. America had paid attention all summer, not just Cardinals and Cubs fans, but the nation as a whole. While it had taken 37 years to break Maris' record of 61, Barry Bonds broke McGwire's record three years later by hitting 73 homers in 2001. Everything that had

been so great about the 1998 season and baseball's innocence began to be questioned. A *Sports Illustrated* piece (Verducci, 2002, June 3) focused on steroids and included statements from former National League Most Valuable Player (MVP) Ken Caminiti, who gave credibility to the growing rumors and accusations of the clubhouse culture of using steroids to enhance recovery, performance, or to simply add muscle.

Drug testing for steroids in the minor leagues had started in 2001. In June 2002, the Senate Commerce Committee told Selig and the MLB Player Union representative Donald Fehr that testing would have to be a part of the next collective bargaining agreement. Major League Baseball conducted tests in 2003 and found 5 to 7 percent of the players tested positive for steroids. That winter, the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) facilities were raided by federal agents after a tip from track and field athlete Trevor Graham about certain undetectable steroids and human growth hormone (HGH) being manufactured and distributed there. During the off-season, a grand jury formed to look into the matter subpoenaed seven major league baseball players who had some connection to the designer drug maker. In 2004, MLB was again chided by the Senate for too lenient drug testing and players and owners eventually agreed to a 10-day suspension for the first positive test. A year later, after more pressure from Capitol Hill, MLB extended that first strike suspension to 50 games and the third offense to a lifetime ban.

By 2006, Jose Canseco had released *Juiced*, a tell-all from his days as a player and steroid user. Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams (2006) released *Game of Shadows*, which was an expanded version of their newspaper reporting for the *San Francisco Chronicle* on the athletes involved in the federal BALCO investigation. These

two books, along with plenty of rumor and conjecture in the press, had heightened tensions between players, owners, the media, and fans. Former player and manager Dusty Baker likened it to McCarthyism ("Regarding steroids," 2004, Feb. 24).

Arizona Diamondbacks relief pitcher Jason Grimsley was implicated in 2006 in accepting HGH shipments as part of the expanded BALCO investigation by the federal government. This investigation was eventually piggybacked by MLB as it appointed former Senator George Mitchell to report on performance enhancing drugs (PED) use in baseball. His report was released in February 2008 and 47 new players were implicated. Other than the occasional player who tests positive, most of the media's reporting has continued to focus on the past and those who tested positive during survey testing in 2003. Last year, in order to return without being a distraction for the entire season and looking back on what the Steroid Era had caused to happen to him and baseball, McGwire admitted to HGH and steroid use and said, "I wish I had never played during the Steroid Era" ("Statement from Mark McGwire," 2010, Jan. 10).

Unlike some other sports, baseball's importance or significance rests in its attachment to history. Comparing players to those who have come before makes the past just as important as the present. In the decade that has passed with steroid suspicion and investigation, player after player has stepped in front of microphones to address concerns about PED use. Those players have uttered apologies, excuses, and denials. They have done so under oath and in front of their teammates and the media. They have tried to repair the perceived damage to themselves and to the game. They have tried to accept the consequences of their past actions and others have misremembered to keep from being skewered by the public upheaval against perceived cheaters.

This thesis will use Benoit's (1995a) image restoration strategies, based in rhetorical studies of apologia to analyze the statements of accused players in the press and in front of Congress. Newspaper articles and columns, transcripts of interviews from television, proceedings of House Committee hearings, and statements released by agents and lawyers will provide the whole of the data that will be analyzed for apologia strategies. This thesis discusses the context of the statements and provides a dominant reading and analysis of media reports both before and after the apologia. In so doing, the author also discusses the success or failure of the attempted strategies and the factors that contributed to the outcomes. The purpose of the study was to find how high-profile athletes reacted to steroid allegations and what strategies they used to attempt to repair their public image. This study will show which strategies are useful in handling allegations in a high-profile situation and what should be done when confronted with allegations of a serious nature. This thesis will look at four highly visible baseball players who were accused of using steroids or other performance-enhancing drugs between 2003 and 2008.

Literature Review

Analyzing image repair strategies of athletes is a modern application of apologia. The study of apologia dates back to Aristotle and it helped to form conflict resolution and rhetorical criticism studies in the 1960s and 1970s and was incorporated into image restoration and reparation strategies through the 1990s. A form of rhetorical discourse, apologia is "designed to restore image, face, or reputation to alleged or suspected wrong-doing (Benoit, 1994, p. 418)." Benoit defined image as "the perceptions of the source held by the audience, shaped by the words and deeds of that source, as well as by the actor and other relevant actors (p. 418)." Apologic discourse involves manipulating, balancing, or trying to change the perceptions of either the public or the pertinent publics of an entity or person whose credibility or reputation has been challenged (Benoit, 1994). In his seminal work, Benoit (1995a) analyzed the extant research on apologic strategies and synthesized them in a typology representing five primary modes that include denying allegations, evading responsibility for the action, reducing offensiveness of the action, correcting the effects through new action, and apologizing and asking forgiveness for the action. This typology, which represents a theory of image restoration, will serve as the foundation of the analysis provided in this thesis. This literature review also will include a summary of those ideas that inform Benoit's theory.

Abelson (1959) introduced four modes of resolution that resolve unbalanced cognitive structures. Cognitive structures are formed when a relation is formed between two cognitive elements, or relevant items for an individual. These elements can be unbalanced or dissonant if, for example, a positive element is associated positively with a negative element. In order to balance the structure, the positive element needs to be

negatively related to a negative element. In order to accomplish this, Abelson explained how denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence are used to balance structural conflicts so there is not a belief dilemma and the relationship is in balance. Denial changes the relationship through an attack on the cognitive elements in order to bring them into balance. An example is attacking a held belief, such as eating three meals a day, in order to change the behavior to eating five smaller meals each day. Bolstering balances the structure by supplementing additional positive objects that relate to one of the original elements. Bolstering occurs when the rhetor attempts to re-identify himself with something viewed favorably by the audience (Abelson, 1959; Benoit, 1995a). As Benoit explains, bolstering drowns out any imbalance by reassociating the speaker with values or actions favorably regarded by the audience. Athletes often accused of breaking the law, for example, use bolstering when they remind the media and their audiences of the positive work done by charitable foundations bearing their names. Differentiation is a tactic used to change the context in which an event or occurrence is viewed. Usually the goal is to associate the situation with a broader and potentially more negative context (Abelson, 1959; Benoit, 1995a). When the scrubbers failed at an Odwalla plant and produced a batch of juice with the deadly bacteria e. coli, the company used differentiation to suggest that the problem represented an even greater industry-wide need to improve faulty processing, rather than a simple mistake limited to the company (Thomsen & Rawson, 1998). Transcendence similar to differentiation, which changes the context, places the situation or issue into a broader and potentially more positive context (Abelson, 1959; Benoit, 1995a). An example might be an attempt to by a defense

attorney who claims his client should be viewed as a hero, rather than a criminal, for challenging an unpopular or unfair law.

Analysts have typically used these strategies to examine how politicians have responded to attacks that have challenged their integrity and reputations. Rosenfield (1968), for example, used these four modes to explain how Vice President nominee Richard Nixon and President Harry Truman tried to repair certain accusations against them and turn the balance of public opinion back in their favor. Nixon defended himself against allegations of improperly using a campaign fund in his "Checkers" speech, while Truman defended himself against claims he allowed a Russian spy to hold a high governmental office. Rosenfield compared the two speeches of the politicians and noted similarities and differences in the tactical use of apologia. Rosenfield found both politicians denied the accusations and presented information to counter the claims. Both also attacked their accusers to make them seem less credible. One interesting note is that Nixon and Truman did not come up with new strategies for their speeches, but instead used selected strategies from previous speeches, so the only new revelations were the information presented along with the strategies. Rosenfield (1968) explained:

> The speech in the moment of crisis is most likely to represent a climax, a summing up, of those rhetorical thrusts which seem to have been most effective with the public on previous dry runs. (p. 443)

Ware and Linkugel (1973) built on Abelson (1959) and Rosenfield (1968) and argue apologia should be recognized as a distinct form of rhetorical discourse. They claim its distinction from other forms of discourse is warranted because the pattern of accusation followed by apology is prevalent in public addresses. A public accusation is

only satisfied by a public, personal response. They noted that even with the presence of legal representatives and public relations experts, a personal response still seems to be required. This pattern arises from attacks on the character and worth of an individual and to witnesses of the attack and to the accused, it can only be satisfied by a public apology. Ware and Linkugel (1973) extended existing typologies of apologia, or what they referred to as postures, by adding the concepts of absolution, vindication, explanation, and justification.

The concept of absolution, they argue, includes aspects of denial and differentiation and seeks acquittal from the accusation by denying the act and differentiating the action from other, potentially worse actions. Absolution involves denying any wrongdoing and differentiating attributes of the actor from the negative beliefs of the public. Through denial and differentiation, the actor tries to remove his or her responsibility from what occurred. Ware and Linkugel (1973) identified Nixon's "Checkers" speech as taking an absolution posture because Nixon used denial and differentiation strategies.

Ware and Linkugel (1973) also propose the posture of vindication, which uses transcendence to raise the discourse above the specifics and details of the accusation to preserve reputation and emphasize a greater worth of the actor to society. Ware and Linkugel identified Truman's speech as having taken a vindication posture in defense of his actions. Truman argued that what he did still protected the public interest and security but he didn't refute his actions or facts of the case, only where the consequences fit with regard to the nation as a whole.

The posture of explanation involves bolstering and differentiation in order for the audience to understand why the actions in question were taken. Ware and Linkugel identified Edward Kennedy's Chappaquiddick address as having an explanation posture. Kennedy tried to explain the situation so the audience understood his actions. The goal of the explanation posture is to change the audience's perceptions of the rhetor's actions and to help the audience see them as being more logical or reasonable than previously assumed.

Bolstering and transcendence are combined in the posture of justification to better foster understanding of the actions and actor. Bolstering adds positive elements to the actor's character and transcendence places previous actions into a different context in order to gain approval from the audience. This posture was used by Susan B. Anthony in many of her speeches by comparing a woman's right to vote, which at the time was illegal, to other crimes in support of her belief that citizens should be able to vote no matter their gender.

Ware and Linkugel (1978) provided the foundation for the interaction and mixing of apologia strategies into coherent postures and discourse. They also supported the identification of postures as a more evaluative step in examining apologic discourse as a complete decision involving an entire speech, instead of simply identifying individual strategies within speeches and not relating one strategy to another. Ware and Linkugel recognized there was added benefit to combining and mixing strategies for a specific purpose, the four postures they identified are examples of how these interactions work in harmony to absolve, explain, justify, or vindicate.

Through the 1970s, apologia had primarily been defined based on looking at political speeches. The accusations and defenses of politicians were easily identifiable and readily apparent because the media covered more of them than other figures in the public interest. With the advent of cable television and the growth in the number of channels and the availability of specific financial news, the next segment of high-profile accusations were aimed at businesses and CEOs who were being covered with the larger media resources and more interest in important businesses. The next round of apologia began to look at corporations and how they deal with accusations and attacks.

Image Repair Strategies

In *Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies,* Benoit (1995a) took prior apologia research and applied it to business and political situations and put forth a theory of image repair strategies. He examined the use of corporate speech (e.g., executive statements, public relations and media relations strategies) to explore how organizations attempted to minimize the consequences of crises brought about by product failures and even corporate malfeasance. In developing a theory of image restoration, Benoit borrows the modes of Abelson (1959) (denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence) and combines those with some links to Rosenfield's (1968) attacks on the accuser and providing more information strategies. Benoit also includes some combinations of Ware and Linkugel's postures (1973), specifically justification and explanation. He also puts forth contextual criteria that must exist to push a situation into the range of apologia.

Benoit makes several assumptions. First, communication is a goal-directed activity (Benoit, 1995a). The specific communications to be looked at were made for a reason, which in this case, goes right along with his second assumption that maintaining a

favorable impression is an important goal. A favorable impression would have to be more valuable to the person apologizing than the performance of the act in the first place or the perception of the public toward the actor. The second portion of criteria that must be met addresses the details of the attack on character or face. The two requirements for an attack are: 1) an act occurred which is undesirable and 2) the individual is viewed as responsible for it (Benoit, 1995a). With these assumptions and criteria satisfied, the rhetoric, or responsive discourse, can be analyzed by applying the modes or discursive strategies that comprise the theory of image restoration. These include denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, taking corrective action, and mortification. Each is explained below.

Denial. The attacked can use two forms of denial to try and clear his name. The first is straight denial by either denying the act occurred or by denying that he was the one who did it (Benoit, 1995a). Denying that one was the offender usually requires shifting the blame to someone else.

Evading responsibility. There are four different individual tactics that comprise evading responsibility. These tactics basically involve admitting that the act was committed, but suggest that the responsibility for the actions should not fall so heavily on the shoulders of the accused. The first strategy is provocation. The accused tries to portray the act as having been performed in response to another wrongful act. The second strategy is defeasibility, which implies that the accused had a lack of control over the act or the necessary information to understand the consequences of the act. Successful defeasibility paints the actor as neither being responsible for the action, nor control of its outcomes (Benoit, 2006). The third strategy is for the accused to simply excuse the act

and say the event was out of his or her control. The fourth and final strategy is for the rhetor to claim that the act was committed with good intentions and with no intent to harm anyone (Benoit, 1995a).

Reducing offensiveness. Benoit's third category of apologia is to attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the act. Unlike the first two categories, reducing offensiveness focuses on the effects of the action and tries to change the public's opinion vis-à-vis the act and its consequences. Benoit (1995a) proposes six tactics that serve to reduce offensiveness. First is bolstering, which is used to enhance the positive affect toward the actor. Bolstering does not have to be related to the act, it just has to serve to enhance the image of the actor. Coombs (1999) also refers to this as ingratiation which is related to bolstering in that it reminds those affected of present or prior good performed by the accused. In a sense, it suggests that the accused should be forgiven because, on balance, he or she has performed many other good acts.

The second tactical approach to reducing offensiveness is minimization, which represents an attempt to lessen the negative effects of the action by minimizing the injury to the victim or victims. This tactic also has been referred to as justification (Coombs, 2006). The third tactic is differentiation, which tries to make the act appear less offensive by separating it from, or comparing it to even worse acts (Benoit, 1995a). Abelson (1959) commented on the many different ways objects can be differentiated.

> They may be differentiated according to the internal content of the object, the object as viewed in a social context versus a personal context, the object as it is versus as it should be, the object as it is versus the object as it will be, etc. (p. 346)

In addition, objects can be just as easily differentiated from expectations and how the object would be in the future.

The fourth tactic for reducing offensiveness is transcendence. Transcendence places the act in a different light or changes the frame of reference. Transcendence can appeal to a higher law or to the greater good (Benoit, 1995a). The fifth tactic to reduce offensiveness is to attack the accuser. The goal is to reduce both the credibility of the attacker and the claim, often portraying the accused as being a victim. It can also be used to divert attention from the original accusation and put the pressure on the attacker (Benoit, 1995a). The sixth and final tactic to reduce offensiveness is compensation. When employing this tactic, the actor tries to counterbalance the offense by offering some form of compensation. Examples of compensation would include donating money to organizations that represent offended groups or pledging time to work with those who were offended or injured. Benoit (1995a) wrote that compensation functions as a bribe to make the offended forget the action.

Corrective action. Benoit's fourth category of apologia is corrective action. The actor vows to correct problems by fixing the situation and putting it back as it was prior to the offensive action or by changing his or her future behavior to make sure it does not occur again (Benoit, 1995a).

Mortification. The fifth category of apologia is mortification. In mortification, the actor admits responsibility and asks for forgiveness. Mortification is sometimes only half completed. If the actor does not take responsibility for his or her actions, simply asking for forgiveness does not always have the effect of full mortification, or appearing to be genuinely repentant.

Benoit used these strategies to look at not only some political speeches, but also at corporate crises such as those experienced by Coca-Cola and Pepsi (1995a), Union Carbide (1995a), and Exxon (1995a). Benoit, for example, used these tactics to analyze attacks and defenses between Coke and Pepsi in more than 40 advertisements in a trade journal. He found that each company developed conflicting attacks or defenses over time and no single attack provoked a solitary response. Benoit summarized four important principles to guide evidence and arguments from his study. First, avoid making false claims, second, provide adequate support for claims, third, develop themes throughout a campaign, and fourth, avoid arguments that may backfire.

Benoit (1995a) analyzed public relations and not advertising when he dealt with Union Carbide and Exxon. After a chemical cloud was released at a plant in Bhopal, India, Union Carbide expressed regret for their actions and promised corrective action. Union Carbide later tried to shift blame to a company chairman (who had been arrested) and differentiate Union Carbide as an organization providing aid and not the party responsible for the disaster. Benoit determined Union Carbide's image repair wasn't effective because of its slow response and light corrective measures, but its image wasn't as tarnished because the disaster took place in India and not in the United States.

In Benoit's (1995a) investigation of the Exxon Valdez spill and image repair efforts, he found Exxon was ineffective. Exxon's early claims and attempts at minimization were at odds with published reports. Exxon's attempt to blame the captain of the ship also didn't work because the company was responsible for the actions of the captain as well. Both of these facts undermined Exxon's efforts and led to an ineffective image repair.

During the mid-1990s, Benoit continued with more case studies. Benoit analyzed Texaco's response to accusations of executive racism (Brinson & Benoit, 1999) and found swift action and effective use of tactics can calm a crisis and move the media away from the story. A racial discrimination lawsuit gained media attention when a tape of Texaco executives was released to the press by the plaintiff's lawyers. Texaco's strategy included bolstering, promising discrimination won't be tolerated in the future, saying they were sorry, and shifting the blame to a few executives. Along with those tactics, Texaco settled the discrimination lawsuit out of court. Texaco's actions effectively ended the media firestorm and kept Texaco from further damage caused by the release of the audio tape and the lawsuit.

Benoit also studied Sears' handling of its auto mechanics performing unneeded repairs (Benoit 1995b). A California Department of Consumer Affairs investigation found Sears performed unneeded repairs 90 percent of the time, and after being notified continued to do so. After the report was made public, Sears attacked the Department of Consumer Affairs, alleging it was politically motivated. Once a New Jersey investigation was made public, Sears backed off and announced corrective action without admitting to any wrongdoing or apologizing. According to Benoit, Sears' image repair was ineffective because it used two contradictive strategies. After attacking the California Department of Public Affairs many other states started inquires about Sears auto services. When the New Jersey investigation was made public Sears' settlement undercut its previous strategy and contradicted its previous remarks making the company appear even more guilty.

Benoit studied USAir's attempts to explain its safety record after a fifth USAir flight crashed in five years (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). A Boeing 737 jet crashed outside Pittsburgh killing 132 people in 1994. It was the worst of the five crashes over the previous five years for USAir and the *New York Times* charged that USAir planes were dangerous, management policies were to blame, and that those policies were in place to save money. In response, USAir appointed the former commander in chief of U.S. Air Forces in Europe to oversee its safety operations. USAir hired an independent third party to audit all safety operations and ran an advertising campaign in 47 newspapers that involved explaining these corrective steps as well as bolstering and denial. Even with their efforts, Benoit found USAir's response not as persuasive as the accusations in the *Times* and the image repair efforts were largely ineffective.

In a study that examined two widely recognized athletes, Benoit analyzed Tonya Harding's apologia after an incident in which her ex-husband and two friends attacked and attempted to break the knee of competitor Nancy Kerrigan during a practice session during the 1994 U.S. Figure Skating Championships (Benoit & Hanczor, 1994). Benoit and Hanczor solely studied the broadcast of *Eye to Eye with Connie Chung* when Tonya Harding was interviewed. Benoit concluded that Harding chose her tactics well, but her bolstering, denial, and attacking her accuser were ineffective because of her poor performance on national television. The image Harding tried to present was not accepted by the public and her defense hinged solely on her words, not on any evidence or facts. It was difficult to believe her because she didn't provide any reasons to do so.

Atonement

The rhetoric of atonement can be classified as a sub-genre of apologia. Atonement is closely related to a combination of Benoit's strategies. It could, in fact, be classified as a posture in Ware and Linkugel's (1973) study to be grouped with absolution, vindication, justification, and explanation. Koesten and Rowland (2004) suggest that where traditional apologia is used to defend one's character, "the rhetoric of atonement functions as a purgative-redemptive device for an individual (p. 69)." The relationship is healed and image restored through actions, instead of simply through rhetoric. Atonement could be explained as a combination of mortification, corrective action and perhaps compensation in Benoit's (1995a) image restoration strategies.

Koesten and Rowland (2004) portray atonement as necessary when there is not another choice on how to proceed in the face of the crisis. It is more than restoring the image of the individual. Atonement creates a new image for the redeemed individual or entity, not just protecting the former image (Jerome, 2008).

Atonement involves a five-step process (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). First is to acknowledge wrongdoing and to ask for forgiveness; this is essentially what Benoit calls mortification. The second is to reveal a changed attitude about future behaviors and persuade others that the rhetor is committed to not having this happen again. The third criterion is to repair the situation through some form of restitution. The fourth criterion is for the audience to view the evidence of the first three steps as authentic. The fifth criterion is a public confessional, in which the actor gives evidence of this mortification, allowing the public to make its own determination of the truthfulness of the atoning claims (Koesten & Rowland, 2004).

Simulated atonement. Simulated atonement is perceived as a less than fully genuine attempt at atonement, Koesten and Rowland (2004) argue that full atonement can occur when "a wrongdoer appears to come clean in admitting their guilt, while simultaneously explaining the situation in a way that reduces their responsibility (Shepard, 2009, p. 462)." Simulated atonement, on the other hand, occurs when the rhetor appears more concerned with short-term effects. His attempt at atonement gives the appearance of confession but at the same time seeks to lessen his or her responsibility. Shepard (2009) wrote that simulated atonement works when two conditions are satisfied: the act demanding apologia lacks salience for a significant portion of the audience and when there are situational reasons for backing the actor (where the ends justify the means or when an apology by the leader would cause more trouble to the audience).

Form

Benoit (1995) wrote that his focus in outlining his image repair strategies was more to identify options for the critic's analysis rather than recommend which ones to use. One of the reasons for this is that apologia is situation specific. Each situation is different and the available options can be arranged to best fit what needs to be done.

Researchers who have looked at corporate crisis apologia have focused more on recommendations and how the process should work. Coombs (2006) puts forward two important aspects of crisis management: form and content. Rhetorical discourse falls in the content portion, but the form factors into what was chosen and why it was used. In other words, the context can matter almost as much as what is or is not said. The three lessons of form that Coombs lists are to be quick, be consistent, and be open. Depending

on its interpretation, being open either means being available to those involved or giving a full disclosure of the situation and the rhetor's involvement.

Kaufman, Kesner, and Hazen (1994) listed five situations where full disclosure is a viable option: when there is a continuing danger, when the organization is the victim, when rumors are more damaging than the truth, when the organization can afford the corrective action, and when a failure to disclose and respond to the crisis could be financially crippling.

Hearit (1994) set forth five elements organizations should include in their apologic responses: the account and frame of the accused, a statement of regret, some form of disassociation from the act, actions to fix the act, and an explanation of how the company has restored its values that were lost during the act. For his third element, Hearit (1995) described three disassociation techniques that are closely related to reducing offensiveness strategies. The first is opinion/knowledge disassociation, which argues the complaint made against the accused is simply an opinion (or an interpretation of the act) and does not match the facts. The second technique is individual/group disassociation, which argues that a specific individual, and not the organization as a whole, bares the responsibility for the act. The third technique is act/essence disassociation, which argues the act was a departure from the normal way in which the actor behaves and is not representative of his typical actions. Using disassociation techniques, the organization could shift the blame away from itself by challenging the credibility of its attacker claiming that the act was by, an individual, who does not represent the organization proper, or by arguing that the act was an anomaly or exception to the rule.

Sport Apologia

One specific context where apologia has become more prevalent is with regard to athletes and other sports figures. Benoit's look at Tonya Harding (Benoit & Hanczor, 1994) was one of the early apologia studies of sports figures. Benoit also drew on some previous sport-specific studies, such as Kruse (1981) and Nelson (1984). Kruse (1981) discussed the challenge of balancing of fan's expectations for sports figures and their teams when a player's inappropriate actions puts the equilibrium out of balance and some form of apologia is needed to fix the problem. When circumstances threaten a team and its performance, an apology is required to restore faith in the team. When an outstanding player leaves a team, it is a threat because the team now has less talent and winning at the same level is questioned. Overly casual or frivolous attitudes on the field of play are a threat because the athlete isn't taking the game and his or her job seriously. An athlete not playing to the best of his or her ability is a threat for the same reason. Kruse explained that winning is the single principle that governs all of sports ethics. Any conduct that might contribute to a team losing makes that athlete vulnerable to criticism or rejection and in need of some sort of apologia to put the situation back in balance. Kruse (1981) writes:

> It is upon those who have violated the sport ethic to assure fans that equilibrium has been restored, and a stable relationship exists between the team and the fates (p. 283).

Kruse noted that most often sports figure apologies are brief, do not include many details of what happened, but do try to make sure the balance has been restored in the fan's perception. Nelson (1984) looked at Billie Jean King's apologia after a previous

sexual affair was made public. King decided to first bolster and then to differentiate herself from other gay athletes because she couldn't deny what had happened. King was also an example of having third parties bolster for her, while she differentiated. Nelson (1984) noted that different people could use different tactics for the same purpose and still be effective, the tactics being used just can't be contradictory. Tonya Harding's apologia was to deny she was involved with the planning and execution of the attack on her rival, while King's approach was to address the issue as a legal matter. These contexts threatened the athletes and their images and reputations in much the same way politicians such as Edward Kennedy (Ware & Linkugel, 1973) or corporations such as Texaco (Brinson & Benoit, 1999) had been threatened in previous studies.

As the sports media has become larger and more influential, fans have become more informed and are more likely to demand an apology for something that they perceive affects their team. As suggested by Kruse (1981), players or competitors who have hurt the reputations of their sponsors or teams should produce apologies that create a sense of equilibrium among fans and the public. In the 10 years since Benoit and Hanczor (1994) examined the Tonya Harding event, sports case studies have become more common. A Danish handball coach who essentially protested a game by not having her team return after halftime was examined by Frandsen and Johansen (2007). Coach Anja Andersen's apology the next day wasn't easily accepted because it was ambiguous and not focused and failed to offer any facts or evidences to support her lack of mortification. She didn't explain what actually happened and she only apologized to those who demanded an apology and not because she was sorry for what happened. Bobby Knight's speech after he was fired as head basketball coach at Indiana University was

examined for its use of apologic transcendence (Hartman, 2008). Hart (2008) argued that Knight successfully emphasized important values such as family, hard work, and the place of basketball in the Indiana culture to move away from the specifics of his behavior and the situation that led to his dismissal. Hartman wrote that taking advantage of contextual details can add to the effectiveness of strategies – in this case traditional heartland values.

Terrell Owens was examined for how it was perceived he acted after the Philadelphia Eagles refused to renegotiate his contract and he became belligerent to both the press and his teammates before the Eagles finally deactivated him from the roster (Brazeal, 2008). Owens wasn't willing to apologize and Brazeal wrote that admitting wrongdoing can be essential to a successful apology. Owens also damaged his feigned attempt at apology by appearing less sincere in his other comments. He didn't offer corrective action or value the culture of the NFL. A study which looked at how the press performs apologia for an athlete was conducted analyzing how the Taiwanese media perform image restoration strategies for native Major League Baseball pitcher Chien-Ming Wang (Wen, Yu, & Benoit, 2009). The Taiwanese media still portrayed Wang in a positive light even when he pitched poorly, while the U.S. media didn't. The Taiwanese media used evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, and transcendence to repair Wang's image. Wang was treated differently than other Taiwanese celebrities in the Taiwanese press because unlike players in Taiwan he was representing all of Taiwan in the major leagues and deserved to be collectively lauded and not judged harshly. Cyclist Floyd Landis' apologia after his Tour de France title was stripped from him because of positive drug tests accusations of doping was also examined in 2010 (Glantz, 2010).

Landis wasn't effective in his image repair because his different strategies were contradicted by either test results or other people's accounts. Even though Landis received third party bolstering it wasn't unconditionally effective because of his unsuccessful attempts at denial and defeasibility. Landis had used several excuses for why he tested positive that didn't involve doping, but those poor attempts to excuse his actions soured his latter attempts to clear his name.

Summary

This literature points to how athletes try to affect change on the public's perceptions of them, specifically what strategies they use and to some extent why they need to do so in the first place. In order to view the success of these practices, four baseball players and their apologic strategies following accusations of steroid and performance enhancing drug use were analyzed for this thesis. News reports both before and after their apologic statements were made public were examined to determine what effects, if any, their apologia might have had on subsequent news reports and potentially subsequently the public's perceptions.

The three main research questions that will be addressed by this analysis included:

RQ1: How was the athlete portrayed in news reports during the allegations?

RQ2: What apologia strategies were used?

RQ3: How was the athlete portrayed in the media after his apologia and did this portrayal suggest that the apologia was successful?

Method

To investigate the possible success of the strategies that were used by suspected baseball players from 2002-2010, the author conducted a critical textual analysis that included both direct quotes from the players as well as news reports to determine a dominant reading of the player's strategies.

Selection of Documents

The “texts” used as source documents for analysis in this thesis came from newspaper articles, websites, transcripts from congressional hearings on the performance enhancing drug use by major league baseball players, and books written by players involved in the various PED scandals. News reports and press conference transcripts for this study were compiled through Lexis-Nexis and Google News searches for the dates prior to and after allegations, press conferences, or congressional hearings. These reports were chosen based on national prominence and local expertise of the media outlet of the athlete being studied. The day after most allegations or apologia, many newspapers ran stories on the athlete and what the different parties said. From the larger pool of stories, the more locally pertinent articles were chosen. For Jason Giambi, who was playing in New York at the time, the New York papers provided more than enough articles to come away with a dominant reading that reflected the breadth of newspaper portrayals of him. For Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte, the New York and Texas papers provided the majority of the texts because they both live in the area and played for those teams. For Mark McGwire, the needed texts came from major Midwestern papers in St. Louis, Chicago, and Kansas City, in addition to major papers from other markets such as San Francisco and New York. Search terms included the athlete's name, either press

conference or hearing, whichever drug or other substance they were accused of taking, and the year in which it happened. Previous textual analyses of newspapers have looked solely at those pertinent articles (see, for example, Garyantes, 2006). These previous studies were more narrowly focused and had fewer articles to consider. In comparison the reports for this study will be limited to those that are both pertinent to the subject and pertinent to the fans of that player and his team or those interested in the scandal itself. With the amount of coverage some of the athletes received, redundancy of points of view was easily discovered upon reading multiple news accounts. For this reason, the author believes that five articles per player analysis provided a fair sample of media portrayals.

Congressional hearing transcripts were found through Lexis-Nexis by searching for baseball under the congressional hearings search. The transcripts were then downloaded and examined. Grand jury testimony was available for a few athletes in *Game of Shadows* (Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 2006). *Juiced* (Canseco, 2005) was also used as a reference because both Jason Giambi and Mark McGwire were featured prominently in Canseco's allegations. These books were used to put things into proper context and also as early portrayals of the athletes involved in the allegations. The four ballplayers whose situations were studied covered most situations that have come up during the Steroid Era.

Critical Textual Analysis

Procedure. According to Fursich (2009), critical textual analysis is a qualitative method that,

> is often chosen to overcome the common limitations of traditional quantitative content analysis such as limitation to manifest content and to

> quantifiable categories. Textual analysis allows the researcher to discern latent meaning, but also implicit patterns, assumptions and omissions of a text. Text is understood in its broader, post structural, sense as any cultural practice or object that can be ‘read' (p. 240-241).

The author believes that critical textual analysis applied to sports apologia can further the reader's understanding of the image repair and restoration strategies commonly used by major league baseball players accused of using performance enhancing drugs.

"Dominant Reading." Critical textual analysis is a search for the dominant reading of a text or the position of the reader with regard to the text. In other words it looks for, "not the text itself, but what the text signifies (Curtin, 1995, p. 12)." This can be laborious because texts can have many different meanings and interpretations. Part of critical textual analysis is determining what ideological factors might influence the reading or interpretation of statements. Recall (as previously noted in the review of literature) that Bobby Knight’s apologic response drew from traditional farmland values. In Indiana basketball culture, which was immortalized in the movie, *Hoosiers* (DeHaven, Pizzo, & Anspaugh, 1986) hard-nosed coaches are expected to be given some latitude for their behavior because of the general acceptance of hard work and the need to push players to perform at their highest levels. As a result, coaching tactics and player-coach relations are expected to be intense, particularly when once considers the Hoosier passion for the game of basketball and the reverence and respect given to Indiana’s legendary games, such as the Milan vs. Muncie Central game upon which the movie was based. Understanding (and taking into account) this culture, enables the critic to “read” the

apologic text in such a way that rhetorical appeals based on transcendence and bolstering become clear and highly logical (if not anticipated). In the current study, the author must consider the role of baseball, and, in particular, the role of baseball "heroes" in American culture when determining message strategies and their effectiveness. The critic must recognize the meaning of the "game" to both players and fans when interpreting, and placing into context, the apologic claims

To determine the "dominant read" of the text, the author was required to decenter the text in order to discover its framework. This included looking at each article's form, appearance, rhetoric, style, and basically every significant feature: visual, linguistic, or presentational. These also include every shift in tone or rhetoric, every change in balance or content, and every move in implied logic (Curtin, 1995). The article's codes, topics and tones or assumptions were looked at, as well as the narrative structure. Its omissions, metonyms, synecdoche, symbols, and metaphors will also be looked at (Curtin, 1995). After this process was finished the text was reconstructed based on what was found. The deconstructed parts were put back in the context of the producer and audience (Curtin, 1995).

Coding Apologic Statements. Using Benoit's Theory of Image Restoration Strategies, the apologic statements were coded and classified based on their fit into his typology, after considering context, form, omissions and assumptions, and the relationships presented between the athlete and others involved. These image restoration strategies were placed into the context of the broader dominant themes that reflected each player's ideological approach to his situation. The analysis presented in this thesis is

constructed around this typology, identifying or associating specific statements and actions with one or more of Benoit's restoration strategies.

The framework for the author's analytical strategy can be found in Figure 3.1.

Trustworthiness

Peer Audit. As the analysis progressed, the author discussed interpretations and implications with his thesis advisor following the process described by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a peer audit. This type of review, in which independent researchers are asked to examine and confirm interpretations, allows the author to make a case for his delimitation of the findings (and related theorizing) and, more specifically, the trustworthiness and vigor of the conclusions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Reinard, 2008).

Negative Case Analysis. Negative case analysis was also used in order to delimit the author's conclusions. Negative case analysis involved retroactively analyzing initial observations to assess the adequacy of their fit against any emerging exceptions or unseen effects occurring in the latter months and years of the scandal. Specifically, the author re-reviewed all "texts" to determine if any interpretations could be made that might runner counter to early conclusions.

Figure 3.1 Preliminary Framework of Analysis

Decenter the Article

- Form – how the article was constructed, what was in the lead, ranked importance of information
- Appearance – pictures included with article, design of page
- Rhetoric – what arguments were being made for/against athlete or allegations
- Style – how did the reporter approach the topic, rhetorical devices, structure
- Journalism Category – news, editorial, feature

Significant Features

- Visual – how everything fit together, what stands out looking at it
- Linguistic – prose, questions, turns of phrase, what words are made to stand out
- Presentational – as a whole what is important
- Shifts in tone and rhetoric – changes during the article, is it consistent or different
- Change in balance or content – what is used to determine importance, facts, opinions, experts
- Logic – the arguments made and what has to be accepted to accept the arguments as right
- Codes – what codes are used to further the meaning of the article
- Topics – what topics are mentioned or introduced to give meaning to the situation
- Tones – what tone does the reporter take with the information
- Assumptions – what is taken for granted that is understood by the reader
- Omissions – what is not included, but probably could or should have been
- Metonyms – term used as a substitute for another related term
- Synecdoche – the whole used as a part or the part used as the whole
- Symbols – what symbols are used to describe
- Metaphors – what metaphors are used to describe

Apologia Strategies

- Denial – denying the act or that they did it
- Evading Responsibility:
  - Provocation – performed in response to someone else's actions
  - Defeasibility – had a lack of control with regard to the act, not responsible but also not in control
  - Excuse – event was out of their control
  - Good Intentions – act committed with intentions not to harm anyone
- Reducing Offensiveness:
  - Bolstering – enhance positive affect, character
  - Minimization – tries to lessen the negative effect by minimizing injury
  - Differentiation – makes act appear less offensive by separating it from worse acts
  - Transcendence – places act in different light or changes frame of reference
  - Attack Accuser – reduces credibility of the attacker and can portray accused as victim
  - Compensation – counterbalance effect with some form of compensation
- Corrective Action – correct situation by putting it back the way it was or by changing future behavior
- Mortification – admitting responsibility and asking for forgiveness

Context

August 1998

In the summer of 1998, Mark McGwire was under a lot of scrutiny from the press, first for trying to break Roger Maris' single season home run record and also because he used androstenedione (andro), which was at the time perfectly legal in baseball, but was banned by the NFL and by the International Olympic Committee. The andro furor began thanks to an Associated Press reporter who followed McGwire for a few weeks during the summer of 1998. AP reporter Steve Wilstein said he went out intending to write about the excitement of the home run chase that was captivating the entire country. When he found the androstenedione in McGwire's locker, he felt he had to make sure people knew something phony was going on (Baumbach, 2009, Feb. 14). In his story which ran August 21, 1998, a day after McGwire had hit home run No. 51, Wilstein wrote:

> Sitting on the top shelf of Mark McGwire's locker, next to a can of Popeye spinach and packs of sugarless gum, is a brown bottle labeled Androstenedione.
>
> For more than a year, McGwire says, he has been using the testosterone-producing pill, which is legal in baseball but banned in the NFL, the Olympics and the NCAA (Baumbach, 2009, Feb. 14).

McGwire responded the next day in Pittsburgh, "It's legal and nobody even bothered talking to our trainers. There's absolutely nothing wrong with it (Cyphers, 1998, Aug. 23)." He added, "Well I don't worry about it, because it's legal stuff, sold over the counter. Anybody can go in there and buy it. There is absolutely nothing wrong with it, period (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 23)." St. Louis manager Tony LaRussa later tried to ban AP

reporters from the clubhouse and said, "This guy goes to the gym every day and works. All that hard work is being tainted by crap like this (Mullen & Simpson, 1998, Aug. 23)."

There was not anything to keep McGwire from taking andro, but the light that was shed on it and the fact it was banned by the NFL, NCAA, and IOC started a discussion in the press. The press was squarely in McGwire's corner and, in retrospect, the whole incident showed the willingness of the American public and press to ignore performance-enhancing drugs and the stain they were putting on the national pastime. Andro was a relatively new commercially available supplement and did not have many concrete findings in studies conducted by reputable medical researchers. As journalists' research found out, the East German Olympic team had used it to cover up their steroid use (Sauerwein, 1998, Aug. 25) and the NFL had banned it in 1996 (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 24).

The lack of data with regard to its effects was taken to be a green light for its use by the media and MLB, instead of a warning signal. McGwire compared it to food, which "can be dangerous if you abuse [it](Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 23)." In a front page article in the Kansas *City Star*, which did not describe what andro did or what its supposed effects are, professor of medicine and endocrinology Neil Schimke said it was probably a placebo (Bavley & Rock, 1998, Aug. 29). Technically, andro was classified as a dietary supplement at the time and, did not fall under the Food and Drug Administration's regulation. Further, there were no good scientific studies documenting that it even worked (Sauerwein, 1998, Aug. 25). From this lack of evidence against andro, the media portrayed the organizations that had banned it as being overly strict in their rules. The

IOC was out of touch, the NFL was hypocritical, and the NCAA could not get out of its own way (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 24).

Another story that was prominent during the steroid era was the athlete's workout routines. They would work out so hard so the results seemed reasonable, but it was actually banned substances and supplements, such as andro or creatine, that allowed them to work out so hard day after day. This defense was used to cover for McGwire's use of andro. McGwire's health, diet, and workout routines made him who he was. He worked hard and he was dedicated. He was healthier then, than he previously had been in his career, because of his work and diet habits. These health and habit changes, he claimed made him bigger and stronger; it certainly was not andro or steroids (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 24). Some in the medical community supported this claim. Dietician Dr. William Hart at Saint Louis University came to McGwire's defense.

> Mark McGwire didn't get to be Mark McGwire's size by taking andro.
>
> Mark McGwire got to be Mark McGwire by a lot of hard work and training (Sauerwein, 1998, Aug. 25).

These supposed experts who had something to do with McGwire's habits did not have much experience with performance enhancing drugs, and, as might have been expected attributed McGwire's strength and increasing size to other things: the dietician crediting it to diet and the trainer arguing it was a result of a good workout routine. Andro apparently was not seen as a factor – at least for now.

The media seemed to accept these explanations. Since McGwire had always hit home runs, andro was not doing it for him now. He was an established home run hitter. He had set the rookie record and continued to belt homers even in years when he spent

copious amounts of time on the disabled list. McGwire still has to stand in the batter's box and make contact with the ball to hit a home run (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 24; Bavley & Rock, 1998, Aug. 29). Reports, McGwire's defenders claimed, were just snooping and searching for dirt. Eventually, however, the story would shift its focus.

A week after Wilstein's article, the *Kansas City Star* ran a story on its Saturday front page. It quoted endocrinologist David Snied, who said he was amazed that andro was not on a banned list for MLB. He questioned why any substance that would enable longer workouts and accelerate the process of building muscle was not considered a performance-enhancing drug. The article also included strong statements from the IOC and the NFL that claimed that andro should be classified as a steroid (Bavley & Rock, 1998, Aug. 29). The *Star*'s article also mentioned that nutrition supplement company GNC had stopped carrying it that summer, but this was all mentioned near the end of the story. Never mind that the article included two incongruent stories: that andro was and was not a steroid, it did and did not help, and it should and should not be used. The article, clearly sided with McGwire in how it was written. The composition put andro's usefulness in doubt at the beginning and then required the other facts to overtake that doubt.

Perhaps, the most egregious head-in-the-sand behavior came from *USA Today*'s house editorial, which after covering the facts as everyone else had, finished with this:

> You can wonder whether food supplements give McGwire and Sosa an edge. But that's wasting the chance to study the game's primal beauty. Huge arms flash around big shoulders, hit with fabulous power, then nonchalantly clear the ragged air left by that shocking contact with a one-

handed follow-through. The 61 record lies ahead; the 50 threshold is past.

And for now, there is only the uncoiling of a knife-fast swing:

Astonishing, sexy, rejuvenating. ("While serious," 1998, Aug. 25)

The andro controversy had simply distracted from the home run chase of 1998. It had not spurned anyone to dig deeper. McGwire and Sosa were giving America what it wanted and America did not want to look at what was going on behind the scenes even though the smoke was starting to build. McGwire's handling of the controversy worked simply because he really was not at fault for anything other than using a legal substance. In the future, McGwire might have wanted to say a few things differently based on how his situation would unfold, but that was obviously not apparent in 1998 when McGwire was on top of the world. He played for the Cardinals until the end of the 2001 season when he retired, leaving a $30 million two-year contract that had been agreed upon, but never signed.

December 2003

Two years after McGwire retired, the federal investigation into BALCO came to a head. During the summer of 2003, federal investigators were given a syringe with trace amounts of a mysterious substance that turned out to be THG, which was later named the "Clear." Federal investigators raided the BALCO laboratory that September and convened a grand jury during the winter of 2003.

New York Yankees slugger Jason Giambi was subpoenaed by the BALCO grand jury after the 2003 season. A week after Barry Bonds testified, Giambi went before the grand jury. When he arrived at spring training at the start of the 2004 season, he was referred to as the Incredible Shrinking Slugger because it appeared he had lost 40 pounds.

Giambi said he had only lost four (Kernan, 2004, Dec. 3). Giambi only hit 12 homers in 2004 before fighting off a parasite and receiving treatment for a benign tumor on his pituitary gland during the season. Rumors swirled about steroid use causing the tumor and parasite, but that was never addressed publicly other than to confirm Giambi did in fact have a parasite and a tumor. He was not able to work back to full strength and was left off the postseason roster for the Yankees (Caldera, 2004, Aug. 12).

December 2004

It only took a year before Giambi's grand jury testimony was leaked to the *San Francisco Chronicle*'s two reporters Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams. His testimony shed light on what he had been doing and exactly what kind of person Giambi was off the field. BALCO and Jose Canseco's book, *Juiced*, provided the furor that led to the first congressional hearing about steroids that included many baseball players. These documents lent a certain understanding not only to Giambi's situation, but also to all baseball players who were suspected of steroid use. Giambi actually was portrayed as someone who cared about his status in the game, among everyone involved.

> Giambi was more sensitive, well mannered, and needy than the wild persona he had adopted in Oakland. He wanted people to like him -- his teammates, the fans, his manager, the writers, the grounds crew. He would make sincere efforts to ingratiate himself with all of them…Wanting more than anything to become a star, seeking every edge to take his game to the next level, Giambi personified all the ballplayers who turned to steroids in the 1990s (Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 2006, p. 124).

While steroid use had made him a star and got him paid handsomely, after his leaked BALCO testimony, steroids were no longer ingratiating him to his teammates, the fans, his manager, writers, or even the grounds crew. The *San Francisco Chronicle*'s story and transcripts of the leaked testimony came out on Dec. 2, 2004, Giambi waited until the start of spring training in 2005 to address the public in any way and another three years before he publicly admitted specifically using steroids. Fainaru-Wada and Williams (2006) wrote that when Giambi appeared before the grand jury he was "initially nervous," but:

> Giambi became relaxed, then confessed to using steroids and many other drugs. He acknowledged that he knew precisely what he was taking. Giambi said Bonds had introduced him to Anderson. He said he had paid Bonds's trainer more than $10,000 for steroids. At one point, Giambi described how he self-administered growth hormone by "pinching the fat" on his stomach and injecting the substance just below the skin. Testosterone, on the other hand, required an ordinary injection. (p. 207)

After the *San Francisco Chronicle* printed Giambi's grand jury testimony, the press began to react harshly to the news of Giambi's steroid use, especially the New York papers. BALCO could easily be called the first official steroid scandal. To that point there was only smoke; BALCO added some fire to the situation. When Giambi's testimony was printed, he was hanging out there on his own because he had admitted his steroid use to the grand jury to avoid any further legal troubles, but he had also put himself in a tough spot. He was the one witness who had both admitted specifically to steroid use and had appeared to have stopped his use. The New York papers found it easy to single Giambi

out. Never mind there were many athletes who had testified and some track athletes had already been banned for their use, but the press hammered Giambi. He was the highest profile confessor up to that time. Bonds had said he did not know what he was taking, going as far as calling it flaxseed oil. Gary Sheffield had rumors surrounding him, but his testimony was not leaked and he was probably ranked just behind Bonds in being surly with the media, so he was not as easy a target without an admission. Despite other witnesses, Giambi was the one athlete who came clean and the one, who the press knew used steroids. He was identified as the biggest problem in baseball, a pariah, a dead man walking, even the Steroid Era's Pete Rose. Rose, as a player-manager for the Cincinnati Reds, was kicked out of baseball for life for betting on baseball and betting on his own team in some circumstances. Rose is baseball's the all-time hits leader, yet may not be inducted into the Hall of Fame while he's alive. Giambi is not the player Rose was and his steroid use in the context of others' steroid use may not have been as egregious as Rose's actions either, but at this time in the Steroid Era, Giambi was alone in that pit at least for a few more months. With Giambi being alone in his situation, the media took a cut-off-the-head-of-the-snake approach to fixing the steroid problem. The media called for the Yankees to cancel his contract, for Giambi to retire, or leave the team and return to the dirty Oakland Athletics. The last thing anyone wanted was Giambi playing baseball. If he was gotten rid of, however it happened, it would allow New York and baseball to continue in its innocence and MLB to work out its drug testing without a giant black cloud hanging over it (Ettkin, 2004, Dec. 3; Kernan, 2004, Dec. 3; Madden, 2004, Dec. 3).

Giambi's spot in the BALCO situation also made him the smoking gun for baseball. He was the one who admitted to steroid use and he had ties to Bonds, BALCO, and plenty of other players. This became even more evident in Jose Canseco's *Juiced*, which was released the spring of 2005. In the media's opinion, Giambi was the link to everything else that needed to happen. He could take down Bonds and any other player if he wanted. Giambi could push baseball into toughening its drug testing policy. He could make the Steroid Era explode and be quickly wrapped up instead of keeping to himself and waiting for things to slowly play out in court. In a few months, *Juiced* accomplished this for everyone in Canseco's circle of teammates and users, but there would still be a slow rollout of names over the next five years and the drug testing still took some time to become somewhat stringent. Giambi also was someone who had embarrassed baseball. The former MVP had made it to the top of baseball without anyone blinking an eye. Baseball commissioner Bud Selig was compared to an ostrich with his head in the sand and Giambi had quickly become an image problem for baseball and its testing policy. Giambi was now an admitted cheat and he was on top of baseball, playing for the winningest franchise down the street from the Commissioner's Office in New York. Steroid use had been worth it to him, garnering both fame and fortune. For baseball, steroids had sent balls out of ballparks and put fans in the seats. The lack of a testing policy with any kind of penalty until the 2004 season showed baseball had made money off, at the very least, negligence, and maybe in some instances off malice. Giambi, who had been well liked in Oakland, was now the poster boy for baseball's incompetence and lack of regard toward steroids (Madden, 2004, Dec. 3; Telander, 2004, Dec. 3).

The New York Daily News interviewed Giambi's current and former teammates after his testimony was leaked. Baseball players were as soft on Giambi as the media had been harsh. The players also were not about to associate their names with what was being printed. Only Tony Clark did so and his comments were simply that his thoughts and prayers were with Giambi and his family. Players were more concerned for Giambi and his well being than they were for making judgments of any kind. They all assumed if he had to do it over again he would not use steroids, but they also acted as if Giambi had not admitted to using steroids. The players had views that were probably pretty analogous to Giambi, but they also did not want to deal with the steroid subject, much like MLB and the Player's Union had been doing for almost five years (McCarron, 2004, Dec. 3). While the players were taking it easy, no one was seemingly on Giambi's side, seemingly isolating him even further. He might as well have been in the town square strapped into the stocks. In the *Times-Union*, the only effects that mattered were how Giambi would live with himself. Ettkin (2004, Dec. 3) asked over and over whether it was worth it? He assumed Giambi thought it was and he also assumed as time went on it would appear more and more that it was not worth it. Ettkin wrote of Giambi and the question of whether it was worth it,

> his answer, if truthful, might surprise us. Giambi is one of more than a million North Americans, who it's estimated, illegally use steroids. And they think it's worth it. (Ettkin, 2004, Dec. 3).

The press felt Giambi should lose the support of his teammates and fans because he's a bad liar, cheater, and baseball player. Giambi had not handled the pressure of New York and was not going to be able to handle the added pressure of a steroid controversy.

After only two seasons in New York, the media wrote that Giambi had not lived up to the $120 million the Yankees were paying him and was not ever going to do so. He used steroids to get the contract and without using steroids there was no hope for him to ever live up to the money and the expectations heaped on him. Giambi was also compared unfavorably with other suspected cheaters. Gary Sheffield could play through anything and Barry Bonds had the capacity to answer questions for the grand jury without admitting to anything, two things Giambi seemingly could not do in the opinion of the press. Giambi had given the media a definitive person to place their blame for steroids. Because of Bonds' BALCO testimony, he still had not admitted to steroid use outside of the grand jury room. While it was a stretch to believe he had not used PEDs, there was not any admission or hard evidence. Everything that was wrong with baseball could be seen in Giambi. At this time he was receiving the indignation for all suspected users because he was the only for certain acknowledged user. He was in some ways the first to face the media with some kind of admission and took the brunt of indignation because of it.

February 2005

Giambi held a press conference a week before *Juiced* was released. Canseco's tell-all implicated many more athletes than those who had testified before the BALCO grand jury. *Juiced* was also the first time McGwire's name was brought up in steroid rumors. Following his retirement, McGwire had been treated as the great Cardinal hero, to go along with Stan Musial and now Albert Pujols. McGwire was referred to as Super Mark. His long-term contract, which was signed after he was traded from the A's, was called the second greatest thing to happen to the Cardinals' franchise behind only Branch Rickey's

farm system, and anytime he came up in the papers he was lauded by his former manager, GM, or anyone that was interviewed (Broeg, 2001, Nov. 14; Hummel, 2003, May 4). A feature story in 2003, described the first time he had returned to Busch Stadium and the Cardinals' dugout. McGwire had resisted doing interviews even over the telephone and had been keeping a very low profile. The suggestion that he was hiding was even brought up, but everyone interviewed for the story cast it as simply the privacy McGwire had earned. McGwire had always valued his privacy and had earned his time away from the game (Hummel, 2003, May 4). While he was not present in the public's mind, this same trait would become a weakness. If you're suspected of hiding when times are good, it does not bode well when things take a turn.

McGwire's on-field actions and even off-the-field actions when he broke Roger Maris' record had endeared him to all kinds of people, especially in St. Louis. Enough so that when the allegations that he had used steroids surfaced McGwire had plenty of support. Jose Canseco wrote:

> The media dubbed [McGwire and Canseco] the Bash Brothers, but we were really the 'Roid Boys…There's been a lot of speculation about where Mark's natural talent left off and the steroids kicked in. The answer is that steroids gave Mark strength and stamina–but they also gave him a more positive attitude…It took a lot of injections to get him past Roger Maris that summer [1998]. (Canseco, 2005, pp. 74-75, 201)

Canseco also wrote about their time on the Oakland Athletics and how they both used steroids together. Canseco frequently commented on how McGwire had the biggest biceps in the major leagues, but the media always went after Canseco for allegedly using

steroids and not McGwire. Canseco attributed it to him being Cuban, just one instance of how Canseco tried to play himself off as the victim. More than anything else, those assumptions made his accusations about other players a little less believable early on.

When Canseco's allegations were made public, the *New York Daily News* took a look at how the rumors would affect the Hall of Fame voting for the players involved. While most everyone implicated except Jason Giambi was at least arguably a Hall of Famer, the *Daily News* wrote that McGwire and Ivan Rodriguez would be considered the most likely to be voted in, despite the rumors. There were some writers who were a little more skeptical and said they would not vote for any player with artificial stats. These writers also made it clear the same questions would have to be answered by every player who played during the Steroid Era and had a shot at the Hall of Fame (O'Keefe & Quinn, 2005, Feb. 7).

After an article ran in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* saying everyone should consider McGwire to be guilty of steroids because of his andro use and Canseco's accusations, the paper also ran a five letters to the editor in that Sunday's Sports section ("Taking sides," 2005, Feb. 13). Readers of the paper explained that while McGwire's numbers could be explained, Barry Bonds' numbers could not, and Jose Canseco had very little credibility. The readers also were insulted and felt accused of giving McGwire a free ride. Several cited the andro incident as not giving McGwire the benefit of the doubt and that it would hang over his reputation even if the allegations proved false. Several also asked for the damning evidence to be presented, otherwise they would take the innocent until proven guilty view of McGwire. The letters that were selected included three that were in support of McGwire, one that supported the previous article but still

gave McGwire the benefit of the doubt, and another that simply blamed Major League Baseball ("Taking sides", 2005, Feb. 13). It was only after the allegations could be proven that the readers said they would even consider changing their minds about McGwire and his alleged steroid use. Canseco's allegations had caused enough of a stir that the House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing to get to the bottom of *Juiced* and to see what MLB should do to combat the growing steroid menace. The hearing was held in March 2005. That summer Rafael Palmeiro, who denied using steroids in front of the committee, tested positive for a banned substance. Palmeiro retired at the end of the season, but the positive test spurned MLB to enforce an even tougher penalty for positive tests.

June 2006

Federal investigators raided Arizona relief pitcher Jason Grimsley's house after he accepted a shipment of HGH. Grimsley named several major league players and their distributors, but stopped cooperating with investigators after they wanted him to wear a wire to gather evidence against Barry Bonds.

October 2006

The *Los Angeles Times* printed information acquired from an anonymous source that allowed them to view the Grimsley affidavit, but did not provide a copy. The *Times* reported Brian McNamee, Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte were named. It also said Grimsley's former Orioles teammates Miguel Tejada, Brian Roberts, and Jay Gibbons all took steroids. The report was later shown to be almost entirely false, but the continued BALCO investigation into Grimsley finally pushed MLB into investigating its players.

December 2007

The *Mitchell Report* was the result of an in-house investigation by Major League Baseball headed by former Senator George Mitchell. Commissioner Bud Selig asked Mitchell to investigate players who used steroids and other performance enhancing substances. Mitchell carried out the investigation by interviewing club employees and former players and going through piles of documents provided by the major league teams and the commissioner's office. The only current player that talked with Mitchell was Frank Thomas, an outspoken critic of performance-enhancing drugs. Thomas had also testified during McGwire's congressional hearing. Every other player declined to speak with Mitchell, including those who he provided a chance to respond to specific allegations of PED use.

Andy Pettitte and Roger Clemens' involvement in the *Mitchell Report* stems from the investigation into former Mets employee Kirk Radomski and Brian McNamee. Both had worked in New York and Radomski had supplied McNamee, who was Clemens and Pettitte's personal trainer, with performance-enhancing drugs. McNamee was hired as the Toronto Blue Jays' strength and conditioning coach in 1998. He met Clemens during his time there and told the Mitchell investigation he often talked about cycling and stacking steroids with Clemens. McNamee said Clemens approached him about helping to inject steroids and McNamee said he did so four times during the 1998 season. After Clemens was traded to New York, McNamee was still under contract with Toronto, but the pair reunited in 2000 when McNamee was hired by the Yankees, while Clemens also paid him personally for off-season workouts. In 2000, McNamee injected Clemens with steroids and HGH at least four times (Mitchell, 2007). McNamee was not retained by the

Yankees after that season, but he continued to train Clemens and Pettitte in the off-season up until the *Mitchell Report* was released (Mitchell, 2007, pp. 167-175). McNamee first began as Pettitte's trainer for workouts after the 1999 season, his first year with Clemens as a teammate. McNamee said Pettitte called him in 2002 when he was rehabilitating his elbow in Florida and asked about HGH. McNamee said he injected Pettitte twice in 2002 while Pettitte was on the disabled list. Both Pettitte and Clemens continued to use McNamee as a trainer into 2006 and Pettitte said he would continue to use McNamee as a trainer into the future (Mitchell, 2007, p. 176). McNamee was investigated by federal agents and entered into an agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office to cooperate in return for not being charged for anything truthful he would say. Part of this included speaking to Mitchell at the request of the U.S. Attorney's Office.

When the *Mitchell Report* was released, the media took a broad view of the revelations regarding many players now being implicated for steroid and HGH abuse. The media concluded that everyone in baseball shared responsibility for the Steroid Era. Mitchell stated his goal was to shed light on the previous decade of steroid and HGH use and the number of players included pointed to an ugly truth that plenty of people, All-Stars and career minor leaguers, used performance-enhancing drugs (Futterman, 2007, Dec. 14). The day after the *Mitchell Report* was released Pettitte was followed and had his day's activities and errands reported on. All he said was "sorry, can't talk (Nichols & Connor, 2007, Dec. 15)." Pettitte released a statement through his agent two days after the report was released. Pettitte admitted to using HGH twice in 2002 so he could get back to his team as fast as possible. He did not give any more details than were in the

Mitchell Report, but he did confirm what was included in the report (Schmidt, 2007, Dec. 16).

Pettitte's statement led to more negative views of him in the press, even though he was one of the first to confirm findings in the *Mitchell Report*. This is a little tricky because had he not released the statement he would have been grouped in with everyone who had not denied or confirmed. That would have allowed a little more time when he was not the main focus of the media, but he also would have had more time when he had not confirmed the findings, which was eventually viewed as a positive.

The media juxtaposed Pettitte's wholesome nature that had been on display during his career with the HGH use he admitted to. Pettitte was a Bible-toting Yankee ace whose admission devastated his fans and threatened his legacy (Nichols, Thomson, Samuels, & Schapiro, 2007, Dec. 16). The Yankees said they supported him, but people on the street were not the same. Pettitte was called a disgrace to the league and the public was skeptical of his claim that he had used HGH only twice. Pettitte had always seemed like a good guy, but with the *Mitchell Report* his good guy persona was in the past. His statement was the bare minimum, weak, and defensive. Simply it was more damage control than apology (Graziano, 2007, Dec. 16). The old Andy Pettitte was brought up and the current Pettitte was not that same person. Old Pettitte was sincere, but there was little sincerity in his statement. The new Pettitte was concerned with what he was doing and that he knew what he was doing was wrong. He only admitted his use because he was caught.

A somewhat more positive comparison was between Pettitte and Clemens. Clemens approach reflected better on Pettitte than did Pettitte's statement. Just because

Pettitte did something right by admitting, he still did something equally as wrong as Clemens he just did not continue in his wrongdoing (Graziano, 2007, Dec. 16). Despite actually admitting to what he had done, Pettitte was no longer trusted by the media. Pettitte stood to gain from Clemens pushing his denial into recording phone conversations and eventually forcing a congressional hearing because of his denial. Pettitte was called to testify at the congressional hearing, but only had to give a deposition and an affidavit. He did not address the media or public until spring training in 2008.

January 2008

At first, the media treated Clemens, much the same way they treated Andy Pettitte. Early on, everyone mentioned in the *Mitchell Report* was included with each other in the cloud of steroid suspicion. Only when people started to confirm or deny the details in the *Mitchell Report*, did media coverage change and focus more on individuals. Pettitte confirmed what was written about him two days after the report, while Clemens had hired a lawyer the week before the report and released a statement roughly a week after the *Mitchell Report*. The allegations in the *Mitchell Report* against Clemens made it seem his production during his final four Cy Young seasons was tainted. This period of suspicious production also brought up questions about his career numbers and longevity. The allegations served to put his Hall of Fame induction, which had been almost assured, in doubt as well (Hubbuch, 2007, Dec. 14). The Hall of Fame was discussed involving other players, but once Pettitte confirmed that he had used HGH and Clemens denied that he had used steroids, the media were more apt to focus on Clemens and his denial (Barron, 2007, Dec. 18). After Clemens' lawyer, Rusty Hardin, offered a blanket denial of

what was in the *Mitchell Report*, it became clear that fans, especially those in Houston, would have to choose whom to believe. Clemens had settled in Houston for most of his career. He headquartered the Roger Clemens Foundation in Houston. The foundation presents the Roger Clemens Award to the best collegiate pitcher among other activities. He also helped found the Roger Clemens Institute for Sports Medicine and Human Performance in Houston. He was partly responsible for the Houston Astros trip to the 2005 World Series. Clemens was a big part of Houston and the *Mitchell Report* allegations along with Clemens' denials made the public have to choose sides between Clemens and his legacy or Major League Baseball and Brian McNamee. While many Houston fans respected Clemens for everything he had done, they did not put aside the steroid allegations. Houston residents that were interviewed did not chastise Clemens, but they did not want to be associated with steroids either. They were not surprised Clemens was mentioned in the *Mitchell Report* (Barron, 2007, Dec. 18). Without anything permanent having been decided, it was still up to Clemens how Houston and the rest of the country would view him. Clemens chose to go on what was termed by one writer a "campaign for innocence" (Sandomir, 2008, Jan 8).

As the media continued to cover Clemens, he continued to put forth rhetoric to control the situation. By the time he arrived in front of a Congressional Committee in February 2008, Clemens had appeared on *60 Minutes*. A day after that interview was broadcast, he called a press conference and played a taped phone conversation with McNamee. The conference ended with Clemens leaving in a huff, but Clemens stayed active in trying to rehabilitate his image until the committee hearing. The committee ended up postponing the hearing for a month, so it would have more time to let the

investigation sort itself out. The media continued to investigate Clemens and discuss the allegations against him since nothing had put an end to the deliberation of whether Clemens had in fact used steroids (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8; Red, Thompson, & O'Keefe, 2008, Jan. 10). Different media outlets all portrayed Clemens similarly during this period. He was raw, sour, had a wise-cracking lawyer, and was indignant about the allegations surrounding him. The press became his interrogators and they were not giving him the benefit of the doubt any longer.

The first weekend in January cued what became an aggressive defense in Clemens' rhetoric. He produced evasive answers to questions and at one time said if he had taken steroids he would have a third ear and would be pulling trucks with his teeth (Sandomir, 2008, Jan. 8). In his press conference on January 7, Clemens played a taped phone conversation between him and McNamee from the previous Friday. He also had filed a defamation suit against McNamee on the night Clemens' *60 Minutes* interview aired. Clemens openly expressed his want to retire from the public eye and to not deal with the media or the mess the *Mitchell Report*'s allegations had become (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8). Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, who would be part of the House Committee during the hearing, said he was not comfortable with those denials or Clemens' body language during the press conference or the *60 Minutes* interview. He also was not comfortable with the dialogue between Clemens and McNamee. Shays even mentioned he did not like calling people in front of a hearing when one person or the other would be forced to perjure himself because that was looking like it would be the case with Clemens and McNamee (Red & O'Keefe, 2008, Jan. 9). When the hearing was postponed for a month, the committee members emphasized that the focus of the hearing

would be to improve baseball's testing policy through what was found in the *Mitchell Report*. The focus of the hearing on Clemens came about because he denied the allegations in the *Mitchell Report* and brought into question its truthfulness (Red, Thompson, & O'Keefe, 2008, Jan. 10).

Analysis

Jason Giambi

Apologia

Giambi waited until spring training in 2005 to give his side of the story or at the very least try to help it blow over. His agent released a one-paragraph statement in December 2004 that simply said:

> Jason Giambi is an extremely dedicated athlete and a caring and loyal teammate. Jason loves the game of baseball, the Yankees, and the extraordinary New York Yankees fans. Jason has always appreciated the steadfast support of the fans who have been there through good times and bad. He is determined, focused and working hard to form in 2005 and [to] help the Yankees get back to the World Series ("Giambi's agent", 2004, Dec. 7).

Giambi did not give a reason for waiting for two months after his grand jury testimony was leaked to respond, but the press conference, which he conducted twice, once for newspaper media and once for broadcast media, was his idea and the Yankees organization was supportive of it. Owner Hank Steinbrenner, General Manager Brian Cashman, and Manager Joe Torre gave statements on the same day as Giambi's press conferences supporting. Their statements supported Giambi in his path back to playing for the Yankees. While talking with the press, Giambi's main strategies reflected mortification, corrective action, and minimization. Upon questioning from the media, he attacked one of his accusers, Jose Canseco. Giambi may have only attacked Canseco because all other allegations against him had been addressed while he was under oath.

Based on his testimony before the grand jury, Giambi was not interested in a perjury investigation, which would have come about if he denied his testimony or attacked the reporters who printed it. Giambi never mentioned steroids or any other PEDs. In fact, he never even used the word "steroids" in his time in front of the media. He avoided mentioning anything specific by referencing the ongoing grand jury investigation and explaining that he was not in a position to respond to legal issues. Giambi did insist however, that he told the truth to the grand jury.

Mortification. His first statements, and something he came back to throughout the press conference, were about how he had let people down and the need to take responsibility for the distractions he had created. He never explicitly asked for forgiveness, but he did say that he understood that people had their own decisions to make when it came to how he had acted and that negative responses were fine with him. Throughout the press conference he repeatedly mentioned that he was sorry and that he wanted to accept responsibility for his actions. In effect, he apologized for the consequences of his actions, but not the specific actions themselves. His comments were in fact more of a half-mortification approach than full mortification. Giambi said:

> I feel like I've let a lot of people down. I feel like I've let the fans down. I feel like I've let the media down. I feel like I've let the Yankees down, and most of all my teammates. I want to say sorry for that and I take full responsibility. I wanted to make sure you guys were the first people I wanted to talk to. I feel like I owe it to you guys…So far the times I've come back to New York people have been really supportive and I

> understand that, and if they're not I totally understand it (Feinsand, 2005, Feb. 10).

This is mortification, but not for his steroid use. Giambi apologized and took responsibility for the distractions he had caused. He never took responsibility, however, for his steroid use or the grand jury testimony that was leaked. The distractions he had caused to those third parties were the only thing Giambi decided he needed to apologize for specifically. Even though he attempted to hint at being sorry for what had gone on, he did not provide any mortification for his steroid and HGH use. Giambi apologized for being a distraction and only partially apologized for his steroid use. He did not mention his steroid use specifically, which makes apologizing for it even more difficult. The closest he came to discussing his steroid use in any way was stating that it did not help him on the field. It seemed Giambi hoped he would get the same credit for his mortification of being a distraction and his steroid use and that he was as apologetic as he needed to be. The press' reaction and Giambi's rhetoric brings up a question of what mortification is (or what it actually means) in the eyes of high-caliber athletes.

Corrective action. Also, several times during the press conference, Giambi talked about a long road back. He made it clear it was not simply a road to playing baseball again after his dismal previous season, but one to regain the trust and support of the fans. He did not cite specifics, most notably his past behavior that included steroid use, but he did mention he was working out hard to get back into baseball playing shape. Giambi makes it seem that his future behavior will be much improved over the way he had been in the past. Giambi said:

> I wanted to start at the beginning of making that long road that I know is going to be tough and I understand, I totally do and I take full responsibility for it. I wanted to start that road so when we got to Florida it would be about baseball and not anything else…I've got a long road to go and hopefully I can start earning back some of that support and trust and I'm willing to do it. Hopefully (the fans) recognize me as a guy who has faced his problems, hasn't run from them, and is trying to overcome them, and hopefully that's the message that they'll get out of this (Feinsand, 2005, Feb. 11).

His focus on earning back support of the fans and the trust of the fans, arguably presents more of a future corrective action intended to regain his status as a player. By failing to address the use of performance enhancing drugs, his corrective actions do not suggest significant behavioral changes (e.g. abandoning the use of steroids), which, in this case would seem critical to legitimate his corrective actions. In essence, he's counting on being given a clean slate for his past behavior once he regains the support and trust from the fans, which is not complete corrective action.

Minimization. In a familiar refrain, Giambi glossed over what steroids and performance-enhancing drugs actually do. He said, "there's nothing out there that's going to make you hit a baseball. It's the toughest thing to do in the world (Feinsand, 2005, Feb. 11)." This remark does not fit with the previous parts of his strategy, but it also came up from a question by the media, so he may have actually been talking more like Jason Giambi and not the statement for him by his agent and his publicist. Minimization is part of the reducing offensiveness strategy. It necessarily focuses on the actions of the actor,

whether related to the allegation or simply to the actor. This statement does not fit with his others because it implies his past actions did not affect his performance. As previously noted, he did not even say the word "steroid" in both press conferences, but in this statement he implies his use and that no substance he had taken had affected his on-field performance. This minimization tries to lessen the effects of him being labeled as a steroid user. If he did take steroids he would like to keep his legacy by changing opinions so people would believe steroids did not help him perform better. This strategy is not likely to be very effective based on the media and the public's opinion of what steroids do.

Attack accuser. This strategy also does not fit with his prepared statement strategies, but *Juiced*, written by Giambi's former teammate Jose Canseco, was about to be released and the congressional hearing for Canseco and several other ballplayers was weeks away. It was a hot topic in the press because some excerpts from the book had been released to drum up interest in the book. Giambi was named in *Juiced*, along with many others. In fact, Giambi had his own chapter: "Giambi, The Most Obvious Juicer in the Game." Canseco wrote:

> That year [1997] I witnessed what was almost the definitive case study in the difference between the careful, controlled use of steroids I've always advocated and sheer recklessness. I'm talking, of course, about Jason Giambi, who became my teammate that year. As surely as he went overboard with partying and chasing women, Giambi went overboard with steroids…

> Giambi had the most obvious steroid physique I've ever seen in my life. He was so bloated, it was unbelievable. There was no definition to his body at all…
>
> We might ask each other practical questions—especially Giambi, who was getting an education in steroids from McGwire and me that year…
>
> I used to be the poster boy for steroids in baseball, but today I'd have to say the new poster boy is Jason Giambi. Before you know it, there may be a new sacrificial lamb, a new flavor of the month. (Canseco, 2005, pp. 168-173)

Asked at the press conference specifically about Canseco's accusations and what his book contained, Giambi said:

> A lot of the things in his book aren't true. They're kind of false. They're not right. When it comes down to it, people are going to find out a lot of the things he said are way out of control. When it all comes down to it a lot of people are going to find out there's not a lot of truth in it. (Feinsand, 2005, Feb. 11)

This is a peculiar incongruity between accepting responsibility for his actions and not accepting Canseco's account of what happened. Giambi basically had said what he testified to in the grand jury was correct, but he did not accept Canseco's account of his steroid use, as early as 1997, putting his entire career in doubt. If Canseco could be deemed untrustworthy then what was in *Juiced* would not matter and Giambi would no longer have to respond to it. By attacking Canseco, Giambi also split the steroid accounts. If Giambi was to be believed, the BALCO grand jury testimony and *Juiced* did not have

congruent accounts. Giambi did admit he told the truth to the grand jury and that Canseco did not have his facts right. In effect, this narrowed the scope of what Giambi and hopefully the press would view as accurate and truthful. It would also lessen the impact his steroid use. If his steroid use was contained to a few years around the turn of the millennium then it could more easily be forgotten and forgiven. If Giambi had used steroids from his first full season in the big leagues until he was summoned to testify, then he would have a much tougher go of it with the press and the public.

Reaction

Obviously, the most glaring problem with Giambi's apologia was not saying the word "steroids" or admitting to using them. He only said that he had told the truth to the grand jury and that he could not give many details. The problem was that the media and the public felt that Giambi owed them more of an explanation that he was willing to give. For example, he neither confirmed nor denied the accuracy of the *San Francisco Chronicle*'s story that included his leaked grand jury testimony. Giambi simply said he did not read it. Giambi chose not to fight his grand jury testimony; he must have assumed that the less he talked about the *Chronicle* the better off he would be.

The awkwardness of apologizing without saying the word "steroids" was picked up by most every media outlet. Without being uttered, "steroids" became the elephant in the room. Everyone knew it was what Giambi was ultimately getting at, but he never actually got there (Vaccaro, 2005, Feb. 11). This glaring omission in light of what the public was hearing about the scandal kept Giambi from being believed or being viewed as having given a sincere apology (Borden, 2005, Feb. 11). His attempt at seeking forgiveness was not accepted by the press. Mike Lupica (2005, Feb. 11) of the *New York*

Daily News even wrote that Giambi simply had not come clean. Giambi was not viewed by the media as having been brave or noble in making his apology (Lupica, 2005, Feb. 11). The media argued that by not giving details, Giambi's apology was not as meaningful as it could have been and it would never be meaningful until he actually admitted to steroid use (Klapisch, 2005, Feb. 22). Much of the media felt he should have done that in the press conference. Giambi's handlers made excuses for him. His agent Arn Tellem explained, "if it were up to Jason, he'd tell you everything."

Analysis

Before the press conferences, he had been called the face of steroids and a billboard for shame (Klapisch, 2005, Feb. 22; Lupica, 2005, Feb. 11). Unfortunately, the press conference had done nothing to repair this image. However, Giambi was given a favorable shake by the media in small doses. Unlike with his early portrayal, the media seemed to be willing to give Giambi a second chance, not simply to play baseball, but to make things right. He still owed them a legitimate apology and they felt it might come faster if he was playing baseball. They did accept his grand jury testimony as the truth, which is why they were so indignant about him not apologizing for his steroid use (Lupica, 2005, Feb. 11). They also noticed that even though it was a half-baked press conference, it did seem to mean something to Giambi. They accepted that maybe he just was not ready to put everything out there, but he gave it a try and only got halfway (Borden, 2005, Feb. 11).The media also made it seem that Giambi would not be welcomed back unless he did become someone different. Any other mistake would not be very easily explained away, but being a model character would go a long way in gaining the support and trust of fans, his teammates, and the media (Klapisch, 2005, Feb. 22).

Giambi accomplished two things with his apologia strategies, he sounded differently than he had in the leaked grand jury testimony and he promised to put in the effort to give the fans and his team the Jason Giambi they deserve, not the steroid-enhanced version. As shown in Figure 5.1, the way in which Giambi was portrayed in the press after his apologia, appears to reflect some small, but perhaps significant improvements in his public image. He was still a poster boy for steroids and owed the press and public a full apology, but Giambi was no longer a scourge on the game. The press welcomed him back to the Yankees, not with open arms, but with the expectations of being a better person.

Figure 5.1 Dominant Reading and Apologia for Jason Giambi



One of the most interesting answers from Giambi's grand jury testimony was when he was asked, "Had this not all become public would you still be using?" He answered, "I didn't actually notice a huge difference to be honest with you. I, of course, got injured this year. So, that's not a fair assessment, either. Maybe, yes, no, I don't know" (Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 2004). Maybe, yes, no, I don't know sounds very

indifferent to the gravity the situation was receiving when the testimony was leaked and in the months prior to the release of *Juiced*. By taking responsibility for being a distraction and a poor teammate, Yankee, and public figure, Giambi at least regained some control of his image.

By apologizing for his distractions, Giambi at least served to confirm what everyone had thought. Unfortunately, he did not explain, describe, or give a timetable for his corrective actions. He never came completely clean. Had he been willing to at least speak about steroids, instead of avoiding the word all together, his attempts at mortification may have been perceived as being more genuine and sincere. The result may have been a more effective restoration of his image. The ongoing doubts prevented the media, and the public, from moving on. It seemed he was looking to address the past by not discussing it in the present.

So while he confirmed the media and public's notions of what he had done, he did not give them the specifics they needed to be able to determine what it meant to them. The consensus was that he was holding something back. The media wanted to piece together the full story. The BALCO grand jury interviewed six baseball players and no one was speaking. Piecing together the full story would have allowed the media to move on, but he was not able to give them that. The fact that more than one article cited that he would not even comment on the accuracy of the *Chronicle*'s leak points to the fact that the media was looking to know what and who could be trusted for the real facts of steroid use and who could not. One reason for this was created by Canseco's *Juiced*. It was another piece of a complicated puzzle. Like many other athletes mentioned in *Juiced*, Giambi denied it and attacked Canseco for the lies he had put down in print. By agreeing

with Canseco, Giambi would have been pointing fingers at other players as well, notably McGwire. He would also be admitting that his entire career was tainted. If he solely admitted to the BALCO doping then only his recent history was tainted; he would still have five clean years beginning in 2003. So it did matter who was making the accusations, Giambi was not about to admit to something he did not have to admit to; hence the reason for attacking Canseco and also for not specifically admitting to steroids or HGH. Everyone knew what BALCO had provided to the athletes. It was right there in Giambi's testimony, yet he did not want to provide any extra information, even information that could be argued was already public knowledge.

There was one major change in the dominant readings of the media before and after his press conference. Whether Giambi should come back to baseball was probably the biggest difference in pre- and post-apologia articles. The pre-apologia articles clearly favored Giambi having his contract voided, bought out, or simply having him retire. The media felt he should not play again. After his press conference and perhaps because of the passage of time and the fact he was welcomed to spring training by the Yankees, the media was much more willing to give him a second chance, even if he was not going to be judged on his performance, but simply his character.

Perhaps what helped Giambi the most to get back to equilibrium in the clubhouse and in the press was his play on the field. Even though the media said he would be judged on his character, his play on the field at least helped Giambi get past being questioned all the time about BALCO. It also helped to have *Juiced* come out and the first congressional hearing about steroids that involved baseball players so there were more players than him in the public eye. Giambi had a slow start to the 2005 season, but hit 14 homers in the

month of July and was named the American League's Comeback Player of the Year after hitting .271 with 32 homers and 87 RBI for the season. He went on to record the final hit at old Yankee Stadium. His tenure as a Yankee might be remembered more for not winning a World Series while there, than for his admission of using performance-enhancing drugs, although it is still probably a close second. He played six more seasons for three different teams and will play in his seventh if he's on a major league roster in 2011. He's currently signed to a minor league contract with the Colorado Rockies.

Mark McGwire

Apologia

After the allegations of steroid use had come out in *Juiced,* MLB commissioner Bud Selig decided not to investigate them, which was not viewed by a few House members on Capitol Hill as the best course of action. Rep. Henry Waxman wrote to committee chair Rep. Tom Davis that he felt a hearing should be held to get to the bottom of the situation. The Committee on Government Reform held the "Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use" hearing on March 17, 2005. The hearing included people Canseco had named in *Juiced* -- McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, and Sammy Sosa —as well as Canseco himself. It also invited two outspoken steroid critics Curt Schilling and Frank Thomas, four medical doctors, and four representatives from MLB.

Denial and Evasion. Each of the players was given an opportunity to read an opening statement before each of the representatives on the committee directed questions

to the panel. McGwire read his opening statement and answered questions with one main strategy —to not talk about the past. In his opening statement, McGwire said:

> I have been advised that my testimony here could be used to harm friends and respected teammates, or that some ambitious prosecutor can use convicted criminals who would do and say anything to solve their own problems, and create jeopardy for my friends.
>
> Asking me or any other player to answer questions about who took steroids in front of television cameras will not solve the problem. If a player answers no, he simply will not be believed. If he answers yes, he risks public scorn and endless government investigations.
>
> My lawyers have advised me that I cannot answer these questions without jeopardizing my friends, my family and myself. I intend to follow their advice (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p, 220).

McGwire clearly explained why he was about to not answer direct questions from committee members. This approach to the hearing was a little more defensive than the approach taken by the other players who had been accused by Canseco. Palmeiro and Sosa denied using, while McGwire decided to not comment, basically exercising his right to avoid self-incrimination when his previous actions were brought up. When asked what could tangibly be done about the dangers of steroid use. McGwire responded, "I believe that's one of the reasons I am here is to make this a positive thing instead of a negative thing, and I will do everything in my power to turn this around from a negative to a positive (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 241)." Rep. Sweeney followed that question with one about how McGwire came to take andro and why he felt

he needed it. McGwire responded, "Well, sir, I'm not here to talk about the past, I'm here to talk about the positive and not the negative about this issue (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 242)."

This response is probably the most representative of the strategy McGwire was trying to take during the hearing. He tried to evade what had happened in the past because he perceived it as negative and tried to emphasize the future and the positive things that could take place. McGwire offered to be a national spokesman to spread a positive message about not using steroids, which was a departure from the private person he had been since he retired four years earlier. His use of evasion and denial was an attempt to focus attention on the positive future instead of the negative past and was both a legal and rhetorical strategy. McGwire answered five different questions about specific incidents in the past with some form of "I'm not here to talk about the past." In response to two questions, he added some statement about working for more positive outcomes in the future, but did not specifically address anything in the past or any specifics about a positive future. He also dodged specific questions about his legacy or the status of records of tainted players with "It's not for me to determine." Even with this strategy, McGwire had tried to change the frame of reference and put new light somewhere beside in his past, but he also did not provide any new information to justify that switch in focus and he had not stuck to the full explanation of positive outcomes in the future. He also offered to be a spokesman in the future; this was not substantive enough to make up for his perceived past actions. His lack of information about his past and the tempered changes in the future were not enough to make up for his evasion of answering for his actions. Indeed, his statements were best remembered for him not talking about the past.

Bolstering and Good Intentions. McGwire's other strategy in the congressional hearing was a combination of bolstering and good intentions. He hit on three positive aspects of his character in his opening statement, but he did not touch on it when questioned by committee members. First, he said he respected baseball and had spent a lot of time playing it —always done so with good intentions and a desire to protect the game. He said:

> I played the game of baseball since I was 9 years old. I was privileged to be able to play 15 years in the Major Leagues. I even had the honor of representing my country in the 1984 Olympic baseball team. I love and respect our national pastime. (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 219)

Second, McGwire bolstered by saying that he gave back to the community:

> When I was lucky enough to secure my last Major League contract, one of the first things I did was establish a foundation and donate $3 million of my own money to support abused children. (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 219)

Third, he focused on the honest and non-judgmental person he is both in his private life and during his time in the dugout.

> I retired from baseball four years ago. I live a quiet life with my wife and children. I have always been a team player. I have never been a person who spread rumors or said things about teammates that could hurt them. I do not sit in judgment of other players, whether it deals with sexual preference, their marital problems or other personal habits, including

> whether or not they use chemical substances. That has never been my style, and I do not intend to change this just because the cameras are turned on, nor do I intend to dignify Mr. Canseco's book (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 220).

Bolstering is used to enhance the positives of the actor. The strategy of good intentions tries to excuse the actions by saying they were done without the intent to do harm. Both fall under the reducing offensiveness strategy (described in the Literature Review section of this thesis) and McGwire used them in an attempt to build his credibility and acceptability in the present despite what might have happened in the past. Bolstering does not have to be related to the act and in this case, McGwire used his record of charitable donations, his time playing baseball, his respect for the game, and his non-judgmental nature to make him seem better (more credible, more respectable, less offensive) to the public.

Reaction

McGwire, unlike the rest of the panel, did not take the opportunity to explicitly deny his steroid use. McGwire simply evaded responsibility for his actions, which is a form of denial. He was not there "to talk about the past" and he effectively balked at discussing what had gone on or admitting to whatever he had done. While he did not discuss steroids or HGH, he also did not answer questions about andro, so he did not open up at all about the past. He did not use the opportunity under oath to deny steroid use, which led to more rumors about his use (Shea, 2005, Mar. 18). If the steroid cloud had gone away this might have worked, but it did not and once Rafael Palmeiro, who denied his use under oath, tested positive during the following baseball season the rumors

only increased about who was doing what. McGwire came to be lumped in with all the other steroid and HGH users as time went on. Whenever McGwire would surface, usually for a Cardinals event, such as closing old Busch Stadium, he would stand behind his statement and not add anything else to it. He continued to evade responsibility for his actions. McGwire viewed his statement to the committee as the end of the situation. Six months after the hearing, he told the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*:

> I think if you guys want to go read the statement, it comes from the heart. And that's the way it is…I'm not going to ever talk about it again. I've moved on from it. The media should move on from it. (Strauss, 2005, Oct. 1)

This missed opportunity to set the record straight followed him even when he came up on the Hall of Fame ballot in 2006. If it was not already clear how baseball writers felt about McGwire before the Hall of Fame ballot, it certainly was after. He only received about 20 percent of the vote; 75 percent is needed to be inducted. In his third year on the ballot, he received 10 fewer votes, going from 128 to 118. Writers said if he wanted forgiveness or mercy, McGwire would have to help them out by giving them some more information, otherwise they would continue to assume the rumors (Courchesne, 2009, Jan. 13; Lopresti, 2007, Dec. 28). Basically, through his silent denial of the past McGwire had created a hole, in which, all the rumors and implications from other steroid users were being dumped to fill in McGwire's side of things since he did not want to fill it himself. The public simply assumed that he was a steroid user. There was really no reason not to believe this (Miklasz, 2008, Sep. 7).

McGwire's statement to Congress was not the end of the story for the media and, because of the continued steroid rumors, federal investigations, and the *Mitchell Report*, (an in-house investigation by MLB led by former senator George Mitchell). McGwire was grouped with all of the other implicated players. While his name was not in headlines as much as some others, it was in the same cloud whenever historical achievements or the Hall of Fame possibilities were discussed (Courchesne, 2009, Jan. 13; Lopresti, 2007, Dec. 28). His silence simply left him in the same group as everyone else. The only defense that made sense was Courchesene's (2009, Jan. 13) attempt at excusing everyone involved in the Steroid Era because there were rumors about almost every player, so steroids should be a non-issue when it came to Hall of Fame voting. The uncertainty, rumor, and lack of proof in some cases made it virtually impossible to judge correctly who belonged in or out of the Hall of Fame. Since MLB had not expunged anyone's records from the books there was not an official guide to how MLB was handling historically significant situations with regard to steroid use. This was more of an excuse for the era than it was for McGwire, specifically, but even the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* had dropped its somewhat defensive tone of McGwire after the congressional hearing, so in effect McGwire's biggest fans had at least stopped trying to convince themselves he was clean.

Admission. In October 2009, McGwire was offered a job as hitting coach for the St. Louis Cardinals. He would work under his old manager Tony LaRussa. The Cardinals' slugger Albert Pujols had publicly endorsed the move. There was only one little thing that needed to be taken care of —clearing up the steroid rumors. When McGwire finally admitted his steroid use, many front office personnel for the Cardinals, McGwire's agent,

commissioner Bud Selig, and even Jose Canseco made it seem the admission was required in order for McGwire to return to baseball, even in a coaching capacity. So his admission was probably a requisite for taking the job. On January 11, 2010, McGwire released a statement and held interviews with select newspapers before sitting down for a 45-minute interview with Bob Costas on the MLB Network. In his statement and interviews McGwire took advantage of three different strategies: mortification, minimization and bolstering.

Mortification. McGwire used his statement as an opportunity to explain how he had wanted to handle things during the congressional hearing and he went on to put together a timetable of his use. He did not include any details, such as those included in Giambi's grand jury testimony or in *Juiced,* as to whether he would inject in the clubhouse, what times of year he would use, or what his different cycles were. He said he was doing something he wished he had done five years ago and to confirm what people had suspected. McGwire also admitted to using HGH once or twice. He expressed regret and his wish to come clean.

> I used steroids very briefly in the 1989/1990 offseason and then after I was injured in 1993, I used steroids again. I used them on occasion throughout the nineties including during the 1998 season… I wish I had never touched steroids. It was foolish and it was a mistake. I truly apologize. Looking back, I wish I had never played during the steroid era. (Statement from Mark McGwire, 2010)

McGwire continued this same type of rhetoric in his interview that evening. He went on to portray himself as the instigator for his coming clean to the media, despite

rumors that this was a required action before becoming a hitting coach. He also again emphasized his desire to help the Cardinals and reiterated how stupid it was to use steroids and experiment with HGH. McGwire also explained his congressional testimony and why he had not been completely open in previous statements.

> I was not going to lie. I was not going to lie. I wanted to tell the truth, but because of the position I was in, and to protect my family and to protect me I decided I would take the hits. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)

McGwire said he still could have been prosecuted for his use at the time of the hearing and because he had not secured immunity from prosecution he decided to not say anything.

Mortification is when the actor takes responsibility for their actions and asks for forgiveness. McGwire did both these things. He took responsibility and informed the public as to when he used steroids and why he had not said anything during his congressional testimony. He called his use stupid, foolish, and a mistake and asked for a second chance, but he did not give specific details for anything. McGwire still stayed on the surface and tried to give the public what he thought it wanted.

Minimization. McGwire also minimized what steroids had done for him. His view was that steroids were used for medicinal purposes and did not help him hit home runs. Bob Costas asked if McGwire ever thought that steroids could improve his performance on the field. McGwire responded:

> No, never crossed my mind. I just believed in my ability and my hand eye coordination. And I believed in the strength of my mind. My mind was so

> strong, and I developed that on my own. No pill or no injection is going to do that. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)

McGwire answered a similar question later:

> The only reason I took steroids was for my health purposes. I did not take steroids to get any gain for any strength purposes…I've always had bat speed. I just learned how to shorten my bat speed. I learned how to be a better hitter. There's no pill or an injection that is going to give me —or any athlete —the hand-eye coordination to hit a baseball. A pill or an injection will not hit a baseball. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)

McGwire reinforced his achievements during his career by minimizing steroids and emphasizing his skills, aside from his strength and durability. Costas asked if McGwire's achievements were legitimate and if they should be taken at face value? McGwire responded, "When I look at my hand-eye coordination and what God gave me in my ability, I'd have to think so (Highlights of Interview, 2010)." He continued to portray steroids as not affecting his play on the field:

> I had good years when I didn't take any and I had bad years when I didn't take any. I had good years when I took steroids and I had bad years when I took steroids. But no matter what, I shouldn't have done it and for that I'm truly sorry. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)

McGwire refused the notion that steroids impacted his career other than to keep him on the field or to get him back on the field. Minimization is part of the reducing offensiveness strategy and seeks to lessen the negative effects through minimizing the

injury it caused. McGwire sought to do this by saying steroids did not help him hit home runs. They only helped him stay healthy and he bolstered by saying his skills did the rest.

Bolstering and good intentions. McGwire did not bolster and explain his good intentions as much as he had in his statement to Congress, but he did mention how he had handled the 1998 home run chase, which shed some light on him and what he really valued in his life. McGwire said:

> I don't know if a lot of people knew, but I don't have one thing from the '98 season. I didn't keep any of that stuff. I gave everything away to teammates, players, coaches, umpires, people that came through. I just wanted them to have the mementos. It meant more to me to give it to them than to keep it (Highlights of Interview, 2010).

This one anecdote illustrates bolstering by emphasizing how selfless McGwire is, a direct contradiction to the selfish use of steroids and other performance enhancers. Bolstering emphasizes positive aspects of the actor even if the positives are not directly related to the accusations. His good intentions were to give others some type of enjoyment through his play on the field.

Reaction

Even though McGwire had denied and evaded his past actions. Once the rumor that he would be hired as a hitting coach began circulating it was assumed he would have to address steroids in some form. When it was confirmed McGwire was going to be the Cardinals hitting coach, the media basically made it seem that he would have to admit to past steroid use to avoid being a distraction in the dugout. Ever since the congressional hearing and the validated allegations in

Juiced, the public and the press assumed that McGwire used steroids during his career. When McGwire finally came forward, what he said was not a surprise to Houston Astros first baseman Lance Berkman (Duarte, 2010, Jan. 12) and it was not a surprise to Rep. Tom Davis when it came to McGwire's admission (Shea, 2010, Jan. 12). The *New York Post*'s headline was "FINALLY!" and the accompanying story emphasized McGwire's years of silence (Puma, 2010, Jan. 12). The long wait was more pertinent because McGwire had mentioned he had wished he could have done it sooner, so when he had finally decided to admit it, everyone already seemed to know already.

McGwire's admission also was portrayed as a requirement for one of two ventures, his entrance into the Hall of Fame or his job as hitting coach for the Cardinals. McGwire was portrayed as doing things for his own personal gain, whether it was his coaching job or to help get him in the Hall of Fame. While the reason behind his admission was presented as self-centered, it was generally accepted that he was penitent in some form for his actions. His minimization of steroids was also portrayed in this light, that he did not want his accomplishments tainted by his steroid use, so he tried to keep them separate as best he could. McGwire's attorney, after denying he did it strictly for the Hall of Fame, said the admission was something he knew he had to do (Thompson, O'Keefe, Red, & Vinton, 2010, Jan. 12). MLB Commissioner Bud Selig said McGwire's contrition would make his reentry into baseball easier and an unidentified source said it was something he had to do in order to be affiliated with baseball in any way going forward. So even though no one specifically said he would not have been allowed in, it was presented by the media as greasing the wheels for his return, but not as the sole

gateway for it. The *New York Post* had a statement from Jose Canseco that called McGwire's apology a first step to getting back into the game and that it was constructed by ownership and the player's association to get McGwire back into the league (Puma, 2010, Jan. 12). Either the hard sell of Canseco, or the soft sell of the commissioner, make it seem like McGwire had something on the line when it came to his future in baseball.

McGwire's rhetoric was not as successful in his portrayal of his numbers and records. The media was not ready to buy his belief that steroids only kept him from being injured and did not contribute to his home run hitting. The *New York Daily News* wrote that by saying his use was for self-medication McGwire was able to characterize his steroid use as a desperate and noble attempt to rejoin his team and help them win. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* said he had turned to steroids as a last, rather than a first, option. The *Post-Dispatch* stayed away from judging his records, but noted that when he started using steroids and when he said he matured as a hitter occurred at about the same time (Strauss, 2010, Jan. 12; Puma, 2010, Jan. 12). His success, McGwire claimed, had come from a change to his mechanics to promote backspin and that did not come from a syringe. Puma (2010, Jan. 12) wrote that McGwire downplayed the effect steroids had on his offensive production and then wondered what effect the admission would have on the Hall of Fame, linking the validity of his records to his chances at the Hall of Fame. The *San Francisco Chronicle* focused its article on the 1998 home run record and its validity since he did admit to using in 1998 and largely ignored the total power numbers McGwire put up (Shea, 2010, Jan. 12).

The media disagreed with McGwire's denial that steroids enhanced his numbers and his assertion that his numbers were valid. The *San Francisco Chronicle* interviewed

Hank Aaron, Ryne Sandberg, and Rich Maris, son of former home run record holder Roger Maris, about McGwire's records and the Hall of Fame. Maris said he felt his dad still held the record. Sandberg said McGwire's admission put his records to shame. Sandberg also said when it came to McGwire's Hall of Fame chances that this admission was more like his third strike than wiping things clean. Aaron was little more forgiving of McGwire, but did not comment directly on the records. Maris also said it was up to baseball to decide what would become of the record and ultimately how McGwire would be treated, either as a record holder or as a cheater (Shea, 2010, Jan. 12).

The final thing the media focused on was lumping McGwire in with the steroid users, much like they had lumped him in with the rumored steroid users. Andy Pettitte, Manny Ramirez, Roger Clemens, Barry Bonds, Jose Canseco, Alex Rodriguez, Sammy Sosa, and Jason Giambi were brought up in referencing McGwire's use and admission. The *Post-Dispatch* and *Houston Chronicle* each spent some time explaining the recent trend of players admitting to steroid use instead of disputing it. This also brought out a discussion of how the Hall of Fame should handle induction. Most wrote that no one person should be blamed for the steroid era, but that every player should be treated the same, either in or out. Admission of guilt was not brought out as something that would factor in one way or the other.

Analysis

By the time Mark McGwire admitted using steroids and HGH, he had used up most all the goodwill from 1998 and what little was left from his 2005 congressional testimony. The media's reaction to his final admission did not change anything. Everybody already believed he had used, which was not the case when he went in front

of Congress in 2005. He did it to get back into baseball as a hitting coach and possibly to influence his Hall of Fame status, not out of his own free will, with nothing on the line. He had been grouped in with other users since his 2005 testimony and the accusations made by Jose Canseco had panned out in other cases, so they had gained some amount of credibility. Basically, by waiting five years to admit to steroid use, instead of admitting in 2005, McGwire lost a chance to gain some public sympathy. Five years of speculation and McGwire not apologizing meant he was still viewed as a cheat and not as a recovering cheat. His records would probably be viewed in the same way in either case, but the public opinion of him could have been better. McGwire said he did not admit in 2005 because he was still in legal danger of being prosecuted for steroid use. While that may have been a concern and legislators had confirmed he would not have been granted immunity, Rafael Palmeiro denied steroid use and later that year tested positive but was not charged with perjury so there are some doubt as to the concern of legal proceedings against McGwire had he told the truth.

Overall, McGwire's apologia was not very effective in handling what he was facing. As shown in Figure 5.2, McGwire's portrayals by the media only became more certain. They did not change very much after he admitted he had taken steroids. He became a steroid user, instead of an alleged steroid user. It was purely based on the situation he was in. An evasive denial of his past in front of the committee when everyone assumed he was clean only served to let suspicions grow even more. He followed that with an admission when everyone thought he had done it. He may have done it for the hitting coach job or the Hall of Fame, but at the very least it closed the chapter on his steroid use. After admitting and apologizing for his steroid use, the most

telling consequence may be seen from the Hall of Fame vote in January 2011, a full year after his statement and interviews. McGwire received his second lowest vote total with 119 (his low is 118) and the lowest percentage of the vote at 19.8. Seventy-five percent of the vote is needed for induction. McGwire's highest vote total in his five years

Figure 5.2 Dominant Reading and Apologia of Mark McGwire



on the ballot was 128, received three times, with 23.7 percent his highest percentage of the vote (Hall of Fame Voting, n.d.). So at least in the legacy part of his reputation, McGwire's apologia was not very effective, but the most he had to gain from it was probably being a hitting coach who was not a distraction to the St. Louis Cardinals.

Andy Pettitte

Apologia

The first piece of apologia was Pettitte's statement released by his agent days after the *Mitchell Report* was released to the public. In the statement, Pettitte used a combination of three image repair strategies: denial, differentiation and mortification. During the congressional hearing, Pettitte was bolstered by those involved, but he did not engage in any strategies in his statement to the committee. During his press conference in February, 2008, Pettitte used mortification, corrective action, and differentiation to further repair his image in the eyes of the press, public, and his teammates.

Denial and differentiation. Pettitte's use of denial and differentiation was more to control the scope of the story and not to have reporters digging for more dirt than they already were. Pettitte led his statement with:

> First, I would like to say that contrary to media reports, I have never used steroids. I have no idea why the media would say that I have used steroids, but they have done so repeatedly. This is hurtful to me and my family. (Schmidt, 2007, Dec. 16)

In order to better control the story Pettitte denied steroid use and the rumors that had circulated about him. These rumors went all the way back to the Jason Grimsley affidavit in 2006. While Pettitte was up front about his HGH use, he wanted to make sure that other drugs were not lumped in with his use of HGH. This served to limit the scope of his rhetoric and reiterated that this was a stance he had always taken. Plus, he sounded more like a victim leading with this than if he had led with an apology for his actions.

Differentiating steroid use from HGH use is kind of splitting hairs in this instance. Differentiation is supposed to limit offensiveness by lessening the impact of actions by comparing them to worse actions. It limits how bad Pettitte's actions were, but only by a little. HGH was not a banned substance when he used it, but it was illegal, while steroids were banned and illegal. Pettitte did not specifically outline this differentiation, but he did want to make it clear up front what the statement was about and what it was not about.

Mortification. Pettitte explained his HGH use was two days of poor judgment and that he was uncomfortable taking HGH, but he asked that those two days not ruin his career of hard work:

> In 2002 I was injured. I had heard that human growth hormone could promote faster healing for my elbow. I felt an obligation to get back to my team as soon as possible. For this reason, and only this reason, for two days I tried human growth hormone.
>
> Though it was not against baseball rules, I was not comfortable with what I was doing, so I stopped. This is it —two days out of my life; two days out of my entire career, when I was injured and on the disabled list.
>
> If what I did was an error in judgment on my part, I apologize. I accept responsibility for those two days. Everything else written or said about me knowingly using illegal drugs is nonsense, wrong and hurtful. I have the utmost respect for baseball and have always tried to live my life in a way that would be honorable. I wasn't looking for an edge; I was looking to heal.

> If I have let down people that care about me, I am sorry, but I hope that you will listen to me carefully and understand that two days of perhaps bad judgment should not ruin a lifetime of hard work and dedication. (Schmidt, 2007, Dec. 16)

This is a pretty solid piece of mortification, but the only flaw is that he used "if" and "perhaps." He said if it was bad judgment or if he had let people down and his actions were perhaps bad judgment. Pettitte put the qualifier in when it came to other people's views of him, instead of simply stating his opinion. He did not use any ifs in his press conference during spring training the next February which was a solid piece of mortification. Pettitte explained his actions and his thinking behind them in front of the press, the first day he reported.

> I want to apologize to the New York Yankees and the Houston Astros organizations and to their fans and to all my teammates and to all baseball fans for the embarrassment I have caused them. I also want to tell any who is an Andy Pettitte fan, I am sorry, especially any kids that might look up to me.
>
> Anyone that has followed my career knows that I have battled elbow problems the entire time. Again, like I said before I never took this to get an edge on anyone. I did this to try to get off the DL and to do my job. And again, for that, I am sorry for the mistakes I've made.
>
> As far as the situation with my dad, I am sorry for not telling the whole truth in my original statement after the *Mitchell Report* was released. I am human, just like anyone else, and people make mistakes. I never wanted to

> bring my dad into a situation like this. This was between me and him, and no one else. I testified about my dad in part because I felt in my heart I had to, but mainly because he urged me to tell the truth, even if it hurt him. There are no other surprises out there. Anything else that would come up would be definitely false allegations.
>
> I felt like I need to come out, be forward with this. Whatever circumstances or repercussions come with it, I'll take and I'll take like a man and I'll try to do my job. (Text of Andy Pettitte's opening statement, 2008, Feb. 18)

Mortification is the process of admitting responsibility and asking for forgiveness. Pettitte does both and takes responsibility for his actions very thoroughly. He not only apologizes for drug use and for those he has let down and the embarrassment he has caused, but he also explains why he had lied previously. Pettitte makes sure that everything is explained and all the loose ends are wrapped up. It gives him a solid foundation to move on from and allows him to say anything else that comes up would be false. Without details there cannot be that much certainty put into the minds of the public, but with the details and explanations handed out by Pettitte, the statement serves to wrap everything into a cogent piece of mortification.

Bolstering. During the congressional hearing for Clemens and McNamee, Pettitte's deposition and affidavit were frequently brought up and because of what Pettitte had said he received a good deal of support from committee members that helped bolster his image. Prior to the *Mitchell Report*, the press had referred to Pettitte as an honest, God-fearing person. During the congressional hearing four people helped bolster Pettitte,

while another's comments were used to illustrate the same fact —that Pettitte was an honest and decent person. This is even more interesting because in Pettitte's statement to the committee he admitted to using HGH one additional time in 2004. He had not mentioned this in his statement following the *Mitchell Report*. Pettitte said he injected himself and only people in his family knew about it. He later said his father had purchased it for him and his father ultimately encouraged him to tell the truth about it. Committee chairman Rep. Henry Waxman said:

> Mr. Pettitte had never told anyone outside of his family about this incident, but he volunteered it during the deposition because he wanted to provide a complete record to the committee. Mr. Pettitte also provided additional information of particular relevance to this hearing, which I will describe later in my statement.
>
> On behalf of the committee I want to commend Mr. Pettitte for his cooperation. He found himself in an extremely uncomfortable position but he did the right thing and told the truth. During his deposition he was asked how he approached this difficult situation, and he said, "I have to tell you the truth. And 1 day I have to give an account to God and not to nobody else about what I have done in my life. And that is why I have said and shared the stuff that I wouldn't like to share with you at all." Mr. Pettitte's consistent honesty makes him a role model on and off the field. (House Committee, on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 3-4)
>
> Brian McNamee said under oath:

> Make no mistake, when I told Senator Mitchell that I injected Andy Pettitte with performance-enhancing drugs, I told the truth. Andy Pettitte, who I know to be honest and decent, has since confirmed this. (House Committee, on Government Reform, 2008, p. 78)

Roger Clemens called Pettitte "one of the most honest people in baseball" and his lawyer Rusty Hardin said, "everyone says that Andy is honest. We have no reason to believe he will lie (p. 86)." On two occasions, Rep. Elijah Cummings said, speaking to Clemens:

> I must tell you that the person I believe most is Mr. Pettitte. You admit yourself that he is a good guy. He's a truthful guy… Your word is that Andy Pettitte is an honest man and his credibility pretty much impeccable. (House Committee, on Government Reform, 2008, p. 156-157)

This third party bolstering on behalf of Pettitte was focused on his honesty and decency and served to compare him to the others involved in the controversy. Pettitte came out ahead of both McNamee and Clemens based on the agreement of everyone involved with the hearing. Even though Pettitte's testimony had differed from Clemens, Clemens continued to assert that Pettitte was an honest person and that he had just "misremembered." After sorting through testimonies and asking questions, Rep. Cummings even said the one person he believed was Pettitte. This bolstering served to reinforce the image of Pettitte he had before the *Mitchell Report*. Pettitte did not bolster during his deposition, yet because of what he said, everyone involved agreed he was an honest and decent person.

Corrective action. The same day Pettitte held his press conference in February 2008, he also threw his first pitching session of spring training. Getting back to pitching for the Yankees was an important part of Pettitte's corrective action. Pettitte said:

> I hope with the help from y'all that I can put all this behind me and continue to do what I've always tried to do that is to help bring the New York Yankees another world championship…I'm going to do everything that I possibly can to move forward and prepare myself. (Text from Andy Pettitte's opening statement, 2008, Feb. 18)

Pettitte's corrective action is similar to Giambi's in that he focused on baseball and accepted that the fans and their opinions were a part of returning things to normal. Pettitte had already apologized for using HGH and had made it clear he regretted it in the first place and would not do it again, obviously. This action does not put things as they were before, but it would help to return things to a semblance of normal.

Differentiation. While Pettitte had used differentiation in his early statement after the *Mitchell Report* to limit the scope of the accusations against him, he used it in his spring training press conference to specifically address why he used HGH and how he felt he should be treated. Pettitte differentiated his legacy from that of cheater and differentiated his HGH use from performance-enhancing to healing so he could return and help his team. Both of these differentiations blend into one type of thinking.

> Do I think I'm a cheater? I don’t'…Was it stupid? Yeah, it was stupid. Was I desperate? Yeah, I was probably desperate. I wish I never would have done it, obviously…I never took this to get an edge on anyone. I don't think it helped me…All I can tell you is, from the bottom of my heart, I

> know why I did this. I didn't do it to get an edge on anyone. I didn't do it to try to get stronger or faster or throw harder. I did it because I was told by Mac it might be able to help my elbow. (Caldera, 2008, Feb. 19)

While Pettitte felt bad and had apologized for using HGH, he wanted his intent to be known so the public would view him as he viewed himself. He had not used HGH to cheat the game. He had used HGH to get back as quickly as possible. Rehabbing with HGH went faster, it did not help him throw faster or have better control it just helped him throw sooner. Based on that distinction, Pettitte did not feel he was a cheater. This differentiation, along with his corrective action, was the weakest part of his apology because it made it seem he was trying to get what he wanted, while still giving the public what they wanted, which was an apology.

Reaction

The media listened to what Pettitte had to say and was willing to take Pettitte's view of the situation. Pettitte was lauded for what he did, but his HGH use was still mentioned and the Roger Clemens situation that had come to exist put the only sour note on his apology. Clemens said Pettitte had "misremembered" the conversations they had, but McNamee, Pettitte, former teammate Chuck Knoblauch, and even Jose Canseco had confirmed some portion of what had been said under oath and what had been rumored involving Clemens. There was still a question of whether Clemens would be charged with perjury at the start of the 2008 season. That decision was not made for another year, but it was still a dark cloud hanging over Pettitte because the HGH situation would probably be brought up again in the perjury trial.

The old Andy Pettitte showed up in the media's account of his press conference. He and his apology were described as clear, direct, confident, and strong (Price, 2008, Feb. 19). He became a role model again, a man of integrity, someone that understood what the public wanted from their athletes (Justice, 2008, Feb. 19). Even though he had used HGH and had not told the whole truth in his first statement, the media was willing to take his apology at face value and see the situation in the light presented by Pettitte. They accepted that he was sorry for his actions and he was doing the right thing in apologizing and perhaps most importantly explaining. The importance of the apology was seen by the amount of detail Pettitte went into. He explained why he had used HGH and why he stopped using it. Pettitte explained why he did not bring up his other instance of use and why he eventually did and he told the press very openly how he viewed himself, not as a cheater or a victim, just as someone who was trying to get back to his team as fast as possible. The press for the most part accepted this and praised him for the detail he went into. They had been waiting for someone to explain why they used (Justice, 2008, Feb. 19). Pettitte had gone into greater detail than other PED users had and Pettitte even asked reporters if he had answered their questions, just to make sure he was being thorough. Plus he admitted his mistakes, others had ducked questions, answered with evasive answers or given non-specific replies. Pettitte appeared to tell the truth because he was so open about what had happened in the past and over the past few months since the *Mitchell Report* (Blum, 2008, Feb. 19). Getting this information off his chest, especially as it pertained to his return to the New York Yankees, was important to Pettitte and the media focused on this as well. Pettitte's meeting with the Yankee front office was mentioned in most every news story. The acceptance of Yankee owner George

Steinbrenner and general manager Brian Cashman was portrayed as being important to Pettitte. Some even suggested if there was anything Pettitte did not feel comfortable with in returning to the Yankees he would have retired (Caldera, 2008, Feb. 19). His teammates also were present for the press conference and each one that was interviewed said Pettitte had done everything he had to in order to put things in their normal place. He did not need to give a player's only apology or anything else to prove himself to the Yankees. In fact, the only time Pettitte teared up during the press conference was when he finished and received hugs from those teammates (Blum, 2008, Feb. 19; Caldera, 2008, Feb. 19).

The main drawback of the coverage of Pettitte's press conference was how Pettitte and Clemens were getting along. Despite being good friends and golfing partners for almost a decade, they had not spoken to each other in two months. When Pettitte released his first statement admitting to HGH use, Clemens put out a statement denying the HGH rumors. From there, the gulf only widened as Pettitte said under oath that he had used HGH from Brian McNamee. Clemens refuted McNamee's statements and said Pettitte had "misremembered." The press was interested in how Pettitte and Clemens were getting along. Reporters were also interested in whether Pettitte would simply say Clemens was lying. Being the loyal, decent friend Pettitte was portrayed as, he simply said that he had told the truth under oath and Clemens had said what he said. That is as far into it as Pettitte would go, which could be interpreted as saying Pettitte told the truth and Clemens did not. Pettitte did not agree with that characterization of the statement when it was offered and would not speak ill of Clemens (Klapisch, 2008, Feb. 19; Justice, 2008, Feb. 19; Price, 2008, Feb. 19).

Analysis

Before the *Mitchell Report*, Andy Pettitte had a reputation as a stand-up guy. Everyone who knew him liked him and he was beloved by his teammates. Following the *Mitchell Report* and his first statement, he was perceived much more harshly because his actions had not matched up with his reputation. As shown in Figure 5.3, what Pettitte did would come to be viewed as meaningful and a good example of who Andy Pettitte is, but using HGH was the exact opposite of who Andy Pettitte was previously. Time and the congressional hearing helped to reaffirm Pettitte's previous persona before his press

Figure 5.3 Dominant Reading and Apologia of Andy Pettitte



conference in February 2008. The Andy Pettitte that was lauded in the congressional hearing was the beloved, honest pitcher of the past 12 years. Pettitte's rhetoric probably has Roger Clemens to thank the most for how Pettitte was perceived three months after the HGH allegations in the *Mitchell Report*. There was not one person on the congressional committee who chided Pettitte for using HGH. They applauded his honesty. Even those who were perceived as liars, McNamee and Clemens, affirmed that Pettitte was an honest man. Clemens was more than willing to allegedly lie about his HGH use, but he was not about to lie about Pettitte. At most, he was willing to say he

"misremembered." The old Andy Pettitte had returned in the eyes of the media after the congressional testimony; he just had one flaw and that was that he had taken HGH.

Pettitte was able to close his situation as best he could in front of the press in February 2008. He was open, engaging, and apologetic for a multitude of things that all stemmed from his HGH use. Unlike other apologies for steroids or HGH, Pettitte was detailed, open, and available. He only held back on Clemens, but his information and details about what he had done were enough to put him back in good graces and on the path to recovering his image with the media. Pettitte was the only player who had been so open and forthcoming with what he had done and why he had done it. Some people still questioned whether that was the real story or the whole story, but no one questioned whether Pettitte meant what he said and had done what he thought was the right thing to do once the *Mitchell Report* was released.

Pettitte's rhetoric was very effective in returning his image to what it was before the *Mitchell Report*. He used more strategies than the other athletes looked at previously had, but they were well used. The *Mitchell Report* involved more than 80 players and the allegations against each one were different, so his denial and differentiation was helpful in narrowing what was pertinent in his case. His differentiation during his press conference was a little more normal given others' insistence that steroids had not given them any edge. Pettitte had simply argued he did not use it to get an edge and he at least gave specific details that he only had four injections on two different instances when he was on the disabled list. The details he provided in most every case were an important part in getting his reputation back as an honest person. The details provided set him apart from almost every other player who had apologized up to that time, and they were

certainly the most detailed out of a high-profile user this side of Jose Canseco's allegations. The details Pettitte provided also allowed for some insight into his thinking and how he was sidetracked into using HGH. The details of his motive and his regret helped in his mortification strategy to explain things and to come off truthful once again. This also helped since he had held back the truth in his first statement, but then told the truth in his congressional testimony. He also explained why he had lied and why he had then decided to tell the truth.

Pettitte continued to pitch for the Yankees and made the 2010 All-Star team for his third career appearance as an All-Star. Although he has not officially retired, the media has begun to speculate he will not play in the upcoming 2011 season. While his HGH use is brought up when talking about his Hall of Fame candidacy, Pettitte probably has the best shot of any of the PED users for being remembered for his achievements and his persona rather than for his HGH use. He was still a major cog in the Yankee dynasty of the late 90s and helped them to the 2009 World Series title as well. The positive memories of Pettitte in New York and Houston will probably continue to outweigh the negative ones during the months of allegations and documented in the *Mitchell Report*. The only hiccup on his trail to complete recovery of his image is the Clemens perjury trial, but statements by Pettitte were ruled inadmissible and when they were used were the grounds for a mistrial. A future trial, if pursued, would probably also rule his statements would be inadmissible as evidence.

Roger Clemens

Apologia

During the two months following the publication of the *Mitchell Report*, Clemens had four instances where he used rhetoric to repair his image: a statement released by his lawyer, an interview on *60 Minutes*, a press conference the day after the *60 Minutes* interview, and the congressional hearing. Clemens used four different strategies to repair his image: denial, good intentions, and victimization.

Denial. Clemens made it clear he thought the allegations in the *Mitchell Report* were false. Mike Wallace read him excerpts of the allegations and Clemens responded:

> Never happened. Never happened. And if I have these needles and these steroids and all these drugs, where did I get 'em? Where is the person out there gave 'em to me? Please, please come forward. ("Clemens vehemently denies," 2008, Jan. 6)

In front of the congressional hearing, Clemens was just as adamant and denied what McNamee had said.

> I am not saying Senator Mitchell's report is entirely wrong. I am saying Brian McNamee's statements about me are wrong. Let me be clear. I have never taken steroids or HGH. (p. 21)
>
> Brian McNamee has never given me growth hormone or steroids… (p. 123)
>
> I've always agreed with the *Mitchell Report*. I have disagreements, obviously strong disagreements [with] what this man, the claims he's made

> in that report about me. (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008. p. 159)

Clemens used straight denial to address the claims against him. This denial also takes on McNamee by calling him a liar, but that is what Clemens had to do in order to deny steroid use. There was not another narrative available where his denying his steroid use would be plausible. As Clemens made it clear in front of the committee, the *Mitchell Report* did not get it wrong, McNamee had lied to them and to federal investigators. This accusation was the main reason Clemens and McNamee were called in front of the House Committee on Government Reform.

Good intentions. In front of the committee, Clemens tried to improve his image in his opening statement by explaining he had played baseball with good intentions.

> I have always believed that hard work and determination were the only ways to be successful and to reach goals. Shortcuts were not an option. This was instilled in me since I was a younger boy by my mother and grandmother.
>
> I am a positive person, and I enjoy doing things for others. I am not just a ballplayer. I am a human being. Baseball is what I do; it is not who I am. I played the game because of my love and respect for it. I have devoted my life to it, and pride myself as an example for kids, my own as well as others. I have always tried to help anyone who crossed my path that was in need.
>
> If I am guilty of anything, it is of being too trusting of everyone, wanting to see the best in everyone, being too nice to everyone. If I am considered

> to be ignorant because of that, then so be it. (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 20-21)

Clemens reinforced who he was. The traits he enumerated would make him seem to be a better person than this portrayal by some reporters as an irritated persona. Clemens perhaps believed that if he presented himself as a hard working, honest, helpful, charitable, trusting baseball player, he would help himself and his case in front of the committee and in the eyes of the public. Clemens had also spent time on Capitol Hill in the days previous to the hearing meeting with the committee members. Rep. John Tierney of Massachusetts said committee members seemed impressed with Clemens' apparent credibility, but things he said with great earnestness have since turned out to not be accurate (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 96-96).

Victimization. This strategy focuses more on Clemens' actions after the *Mitchell Report* was released. Clemens alleged he was a victim of malicious lies. He showed up on television, taped phone calls, and talked to the press even though he did not want to in order to clear his name. He started this strategy in his released statement the week after the *Mitchell Report*. His lawyer wrote:

> I respectfully suggest it is very unfair to include Roger's name in this report. He is left with no meaningful way to combat what he strongly contends are totally false allegations. He has not been charged with anything, he will not be charged with anything, and yet he is being tried in the court of public opinion with no recourse. That is totally wrong. (Barron, 2008, Dec. 18)

On *60 Minutes*, Clemens said:

> I'm angry that what I've done for the game of baseball and in my private life, what I've done, that I don't get the benefit of the doubt. The stuff that's being said, it's ridiculous.
>
> Twenty-four to twenty-five years Mike. You'd think I'd get an inch of respect. An inch. How can you prove your innocence? (Clemens vehemently denies, 2008, Jan. 6)

At the press conference in January, Clemens continued to portray his actions as those of a victim and that he had no other choice but to make sure everyone knew these were lies being told about him.

> I made my statement through this man (Clemens' attorney, Hardin) when it first happened. I made a statement through my foundation. That wasn't good enough. And now I'm here doing this. I cannot wait to go into the private sector and hopefully never have to answer it again. I've said enough. (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8)
>
> After Clemens left the press conference, his Hardin said:
>
> Roger is upset because such a large portion of opinion-makers presume he was guilty in this situation and you can't argue that hasn't happened. If you're the person that that presumption was made against, you're not going to be happy. And when you're in a room that (has) a fair number of people who have made the conclusion, you might just have a case of you know what. And that's what happened today. That's why I wasn't successful in saying, "Lighten up." (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8)

In front of the committee, Clemens once again emphasized why he was appearing in front of a congressional committee:

> I have chosen to live my life with a positive attitude, yet I am accused of being a criminal, and I am not supposed to be angry about that. If I keep my emotions in check, then I am accused of not caring. When I did speak out, I was accused of protesting too much, so I am guilty. When I kept quiet at the advice of my attorney, until he could find out why in the world I was being accused of these things, I must have had something to hide, so I am guilty.
>
> No matter what we discuss here today, I am never going to have my name restored, but I have to try and set the record straight. However, by doing so, I am putting myself out there to all of you, knowing that because I said that I didn't take steroids that this is looked as an attack on Senator Mitchell's report. Where am I to go with that? (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 20-21)

Clemens portrayed himself as a victim of lies in order to deny the allegations made to both federal prosecutors and the *Mitchell Report* by Brian McNamee. The *Mitchell Report* was also a problem because there was not a way to have anything removed from it. Clemens mentioned on multiple occasions his wonderment of how he was supposed to clear his name after the *Mitchell Report* and that there was not anything he could do to change the public's opinion. The allegations were being tried in the court of public opinion while Clemens felt they should not have been aired publicly. Clemens seemed as though he should have been consulted by the Mitchell investigation, but he

was in fact invited to meet with the Mitchell investigation. He said his agent did not notify him of the chance to speak with Mitchell and he said he did not ever think these types of lies would have been included in the report.

Under oath in the hearing, Clemens continued to deny McNamee's allegations with hard-to-believe claims and recollections. The first instance was the allegation of HGH use and conversations between McNamee and Clemens, as well as Clemens and Andy Pettitte. Pettitte told the committee he had conversations in 1999 or 2000 with Clemens about HGH. When Pettitte asked Clemens in 2005 about HGH, Clemens said they had only talked about his wife using HGH and not concerning baseball. Pettitte felt that was not accurate and told his wife about it. Debbie Clemens had been injected with HGH by McNamee in 2003 and Clemens used this instance to cover for himself and said McNamee and Pettitte did not correctly remember their prior conversations (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 87). Clemens testimony about HGH also came up later in the hearing where he had trouble defending his own comments on the issue (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 97-99).

In subsequent questioning, the issue of a 1998 MRI to investigate what could have been an abscess or a strained muscle in Clemens buttock became an important part of Clemens' credibility. He said the palpable mass came from a shot of vitamin B-12, but for precautionary measures and to make sure it was not a muscle strain the Toronto Blue Jays had Clemens get an MRI. The committee had MRI experts looked at the results and those experts said it was "likely related to… prior attempted intramuscular injections (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 104)." Dr. Mark Murphy said the imaging descriptions are more compatible with a Windstrol injection than B-12 (House

Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 108). The Blue Jays trainer and team doctor each said they had never seen that kind of a reaction from a vitamin B-12 shot after giving thousands of B-12 shots and being in the major leagues for 20 years (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 108). Clemens lawyer had another team of doctors look at it and they found that those conclusions could not be made from the MRI (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 111). From there, skeptical committee members focused on why Clemens would say he was taking B-12 shots in the first place. Clemens said his mother had suggested he take B-12 as early as 1988 and he said it had always been a part of his regimen, but he usually took it in tablet form (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 95-96). Rep. Bruce Braley of Iowa listed off people who need B-12 injections: patients who suffer from anemia or low red blood cell counts and elderly patients suffering from senile dementia or Alzheimer's (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 144). Clemens had no response as to why he needed an injection of it, instead of simply taking a tablet. Clemens had said in his *60 Minutes* interview that McNamee had injected him with B-12 and not steroids or HGH as McNamee had stated. In front of the committee, McNamee said, "the first time I heard of Roger taking B-12 was *60 Minutes*. I have never given Roger Clemens B-12 and had never heard of B-12 really before (House Committee on Government Reform., 2008, p. 95)."

The B-12 excuse was probably the best example of the claims Clemens would make in order to make the allegations seem out of place or false. While the facts of his B-12 injections and the conversations of his wife's HGH use did not hold up under the scrutiny of questioning they did sound plausible if glossed over and not investigated.

These two instances were examples of Clemens providing a narrative to counter the allegations and to explain how others did not have an accurate recollection of the events. Other instances during the hearing showed how Clemens and his counsel had become desperate to withhold, or at least delay, certain facts from getting to the committee. These tactics, along with two taped conversations involving McNamee, made Clemens seem desperate to clear his name or to get McNamee to recant his testimony. First, Clemens' team had not provided the complete MRI report until the week of the committee hearing, even though it had been requested many times. It was finally provided after the committee threatened stronger actions if it was not (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 104). Second, the two investigators who interviewed McNamee a week before the *Mitchell Report* was published had told the committee they had not recorded it, but the recording was eventually produced and the investigators were obviously fishing for information to protect Clemens against McNamee's allegations. At one point, they asked if Clemens were to deny the allegations, would McNamee have any physical evidence of Clemens' use (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 138). During the committee's investigation, a disagreement between testimonies of McNamee and Clemens about a party at Jose Canseco's house required further testimony. Canseco was interviewed under oath, but was not able to settle the disagreements between the differing accounts. The committee asked to interview Clemens' former nanny who, by McNamee's account, had been at the party. The committee asked for the nanny's contact information and for Clemens' team to refrain from contacting her before the committee did. Instead, Clemens invited her to his house that weekend, two days after the request was made, and then waited another 24 hours to provide the committee with her contact

information. The committee had only interviewed her the day previous to the hearing. Chairman Henry Waxman, of California, said it raised an appearance of impropriety and the impression it left was terrible (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008 p. 131).

These five instances caused Clemens' credibility to be called into question because of the actions of his team of lawyers and because of his own testimony. While he portrayed himself as a victim, he had gone to great lengths to make sure everything looked as though it was someone else's fault. Blaming other people's memories for discrepancies, using his wife's HGH use to excuse any conversations he may have had about the drug, and trying some questionable tactics to stay ahead of the investigation and portray his accuser poorly had made Clemens look more desperate than innocent.

Reaction

After the hearing, McNamee and Clemens were still giving contradictory accounts, the media knew someone had to be lying and they assumed it was Clemens. When players, trainers, and doctors all had similar testimony, Clemens and his team of lawyers and doctors came to the opposite conclusion or presented a different story. Because of his denial, Clemens made it so committee members and the media had to choose between McNamee and Pettitte's truths or Clemens' truths. The press considered Clemens the one who had faced the heat; he was considered to be lying and not McNamee, and certainly not Pettitte (Goldstein, 2008, Feb. 14; "Whose pitch", 2008, Feb. 14). Clemens forced people to believe that everyone else was lying or making things up about him in order for his testimony to be truthful (Lupica, 2008, Feb. 14). The way he appeared in front of the committee did not help his case either. Joseph Tecce, a

psychology professor and body language expert, said Clemens looked fearful of those questioning him and avoided eye contact (Siemaszko, 2008, Feb. 14). The inflections and voice control of Clemens made him sound more upset and had more to lose than did the monotone McNamee. His testimony along with his body language made it seem Clemens was putting up a smoke screen (Siemaszko, 2008, Feb. 14). Clemens obviously had a lot on the line and had plenty to gain or lose from his testimony, yet he came off as being stubborn and upset. His strategy made it seem as though he believed the story he was putting forward. Clemens' rhetoric ultimately put him in a corner. He either had to continue telling the same story, even after the public and media did not believe it, or finally come to his senses and take responsibility for the allegations. At the very least, he would need better explanations than the ones he presented in front of the committee (Jenkins, 2008, Feb. 15). McNamee had provided syringes and other samples to the committee and those tests came back linking them to Clemens, but to this day, Clemens has not said anything different than what he said under oath. He was placed under a gag order until his perjury trial in the summer of 2011, which resulted in a mistrial. The prosecutor is determining whether to retry or to drop the charges.

Analysis

Clemens rhetoric was not successful because of his desperate actions to clear his name and the rhetoric of the other people involved in his allegations. While Pettitte gained credibility from Clemens' approach to the allegations made by McNamee, Clemens was hurt by Pettitte's approach. Everyone looked more credible than Clemens, even McNamee. The variety of strategies employed by Clemens tried in order to clear his

Figure 5.4 Dominant Reading and Apologia for Roger Clemens



name was surprising and, to some extent, made him look desperate to make people believe him. He secretly taped McNamee before the *Mitchell Report* and before his press conference. Clemens portrayed himself as a victim of lies, but did not do much else beside deny the allegations and say he had always been a hard worker. Although he called McNamee a liar and tried to cast him as the villain, Clemens still was unable to satisfactorily explain why he still used him as his trainer for the better part of a decade. Clemens had his legacy on the line, but McNamee had jail time on the line if he was lying. After everyone testified in committee, Clemens came off as more protective of his legacy and more intent on blaming anyone other than himself. McNamee was forthcoming and under control, while Clemens made himself seem overly protective of himself and angered by what others were doing or saying.

As shown in Figure 5.4, even with Clemens' rhetoric, the media did not portray Clemens as a victim and continued to portray him as a liar. They saw him as stubborn and caught in a web of his own lies (Jenkins, 2008, Feb. 15; Whose pitch, 2008, Feb. 14; Siemaszko, 2008, Feb. 14). The other players McNamee would have lied about confirmed the allegations, while Clemens insisted they were blatant fabrications. His

victimization rhetoric also came to seem as though he made the wrong choice to go after McNamee. With the information presented for everyone to see in committee, Clemens did not seem like a victim as much as it seemed he had brought the media's judgment on himself. There was not a logical story that would unite the two sides, and so the media and public sided with Pettitte and McNamee. Other than saying the allegations against him were lies, Clemens did not have other information or details to offer to make up for the gap in the two stories. He would always return to the other person's poor memory, yet he was completely confident in his recollection of the events.

Faced with so many other confirmations of the *Mitchell Report* and Brian McNamee's testimony, Clemens might have taken too direct a path in his denial. He could have denied the allegations and not gone after McNamee as vigilantly as he had. Had he simply denied what was included in the report and simply given the B-12 excuse he used in committee, he probably would not have been called in front of the committee in the first place. Even after Pettitte had the media on his side, he would not incriminate Clemens. Only Pettitte's deposition served to make Clemens look worse and that deposition would not have happened without Clemens forcing a committee hearing.

Discussion

These four different cases of apologia have different implications in how the previous image repair strategies are used by high profile athletes. Each athlete went about addressing the allegations against him in different ways. Every athlete used a combination of strategies and at some point faced the press in a controlled setting. Three of the four had to testify in front of Congress, but that was more a sign of how seriously the Steroid Era was being investigated. The player's strategies that were used helped to further adapt previous theories. Three of the four cases lent much greater detail to the theory of mortification and what different effects it has as the strategy of mortification becomes more sincere and authentic. The cases also served to add to the aspects or contexts that affect how successful strategies can be based on the amount of information given, perceived transparency, the use of minimization against certain allegations, the ability to remove the news from the news cycle, the public persona leading into the allegations, on-field actions after apologia, and the timing of strategies. These additions adapted previous theory into a more complete look into high-profile athletes and other people and their image repair strategies.

The individual strategies resulted in some different outcomes. Giambi and his half apology allowed him to continue playing baseball and to gain more trust from the fans through his play. Pettitte continued pitching and was able to put his HGH use behind him. He was still accepted by Yankees fans and has kept the allegations from continuously being mentioned. Clemens has continued denying the allegations all the way into a perjury trial that ended with a mistrial. McGwire now is nothing more than a hitting

coach for the Cardinals and his playing days and steroid use are only brought up when Hall of Fame voting rolls around every January.

Mortification

The use of the same strategies by different players demonstrated effects that impacted the individual situations differently, and, ultimately how the players were viewed and portrayed by the press. The most apparent was the difference between an authentic, sincere, and genuine mortification strategy as compared to a partial mortification strategy. Benoit (1995a) did not focus on sincerity when it came to a mortification strategy, but these situations did show how effective a genuine apology is and how ineffective an insincere apology can be. The best analogy for this situation comes in the form of atonement versus simulated atonement. Koesten and Rowland (2004) list atonement as a five-step process in which the actor redeems his image instead of simply repairing it. It involves a combination of mortification, corrective action and compensation. The steps include acknowledging wrongdoing and asking for forgiveness, revealing a changed attitude about future behaviors, repairing the situation through some form of restitution, presenting the first three steps to the public and having them viewed as authentic, and finally giving a public confessional where the public can determine on the previous claims. Simulated atonement involves admitting guilt, but at the same time explaining the situation, so it reduces responsibility and does not necessarily require any restitution or future changed behavior (Shepard, 2009). Simulated atonement looks only at the short term and works only when the act is not salient for the audience and there are reasons to back the actor. The main difference between atonement and simulated atonement is that the five steps of atonement are shortened to two. Simulated atonement

skips having a changed attitude, repairing the situation, and presenting evidence of changes to the public. Simulated atonement only evades responsibility and apologizes.

The difference between Giambi and McGwire's mortification and Pettitte's mortification is not quite the same as simulated atonement and atonement. Simulated atonement only talks the part of atoning for the earlier actions, while atonement goes through the entire process. The mortification of Andy Pettitte was full, complete, and sincere. It meets the standard for mortification. The mortification of Mark McGwire was self-serving and not overly detailed, while the mortification of Jason Giambi was partial and somewhat evasive. McGwire and Giambi were penitent in their actions and in their demeanor, but did not quite explain their situation as completely as the press would have liked. Giambi's apology would be an example of a stunted mortification. His mortification was not fully formed or complete. Giambi acted the part of mortification, but did not speak the part of mortification. Giambi appeared apologetic. He was taking the situation seriously, but he was not prepared or ready to apologize for everything he should have. He wanted to appear apologetic, but did not apologize completely. McGwire's apology was different in that he had what appears to be an ulterior motive. His mortification is an example of can be termed incentivized mortification. He did not receive the same response from his apology as Pettitte, partly because his apology did not include anything the public would not have guessed before his admission and partly because he was gaining something from it other than being forgiven. McGwire appeared apologetic, but did not put everything out there and appeared to hold some things back, whether details and specifics or the real reason for apologizing nine years after his

retirement. The best thing McGwire received from his apology was the reason he admitted in the first place —to return to the game of baseball.

These different approaches to mortification provide a deeper understanding of the theory of mortification as an apologia strategy. Benoit (1997) wrote that someone at fault should admit it immediately, unless wanting to avoid litigation is a higher priority than repairing one's image. While Benoit maintained mortification should be the first choice of strategies when the actor is at fault, Giambi and McGwire did not seem to use mortification as their first choice; it was included in their eventual strategies, but it was not where they turned originally. Pettitte's original public statement was heavy on mortification and it was his main strategy throughout the media's interest in the allegations. Giambi used mortification, but because he did not give a full apology or explanation it does not appear that it was his first choice. Giambi seemed to want to skip to the path of regaining his fans through baseball and not through rhetoric. McGwire obviously chose another strategy at first, but later decided mortification would be his best approach to get what he wanted.

A stunted mortification such as Giambi's only serves to show the direction the actor is moving in. He was approaching the situation as somewhat penitent, yet he was not completely ready to admit to everything and explain everything in detail. A stunted mortification is an apology for something, but not for the specific act responsible for the situation in the first place. Giambi apologized for being a distraction, but not for his steroid use which caused the distraction. This would be the same for apologizing if anyone was offended for an act, and not apologizing for the act itself. Stunted mortification accomplished more than denying the allegations, but it also was not nearly

as effective as true mortification. A stunted mortification also does not completely close the book on the actor. More problems in the future would bring back the allegations from before. The half apology or the movement toward a full apology was not valid if poor behavior continued and in some people's eyes was not valid to begin with. Future actions would not be looked at as two different instances, but one continuous behavior problem.

An incentivized mortification such as McGwire's serves to show he was apologetic, but mainly serves to get him a job as a hitting coach and possibly into the Hall of Fame. The sincerity of his apology was hurt by having an ulterior motive as well as by having come several years too late. An incentivized mortification falls short of an authentic mortification in the information given and the explanation for past actions. It also comes at a time when a certain positive consequence comes from making the apology at that time. In McGwire's case it was a job as a hitting coach. For a current player, it would be reinstatement from a suspension or other situations where a public statement must be made, but the sincerity of the statement may not be totally taken into account. It serves to check something off a list and does not make the apology top priority.

This means that a genuine mortification is not necessary if simply moving on is a higher priority than repairing one's image completely. An incentivized mortification can provide one good result, but not the best image repair. An authentic, sincere mortification strategy must be complete in order to accomplish the most effective image repair. The true amount of image repair that is desired can help determine if an authentic mortification strategy is required or desirable. If less information being given out is more important than being loved by the masses, then an authentic mortification strategy may

not be the best decision. These three different types of mortification all lead to different outcomes and different levels of image repair. These findings adapt the theory of mortification and better define strategies that are categorized as mortification.

News Cycle. A complete mortification also serves to exhaust the news cycle. If a complete account or description is not provided along with mortification there is always another story waiting to come out with more information about the allegations. With all of the information regarding the allegations in the public eye, there is not anything more to report on. It provides a valid close to the situation as long as no new information comes out. By answering the questions the press has and admitting to what has been done, mortification can serve to help everyone move on from the allegations and allows for the spotlight to focus on another story.

Transparency

Another variation in the strategies different players used was the amount of information provided, no matter which specific strategy was used. This is related to the public relations principle of transparency and providing viable, useful information to pertinent publics. Players either barely gave information to support their strategies or exhaustively explained their thoughts and actions. Benoit (1997) wrote that adequate support should be provided for the image repair strategies in order to persuade the audience. Pettitte was able to persuade the press and the public that he had made a mistake and was still an honest and decent person, while the other three cases did not present all the facts. The amount of information released also helps to show how important the image repair strategies are to the actor and how sincere they are about the

situation. The amount of perceived truthful and accurate information seemed to correlate to the amount of persuasion the strategies could affect.

Public Persona

Another factor that seemed to affect strategies was the actor's public persona or the audiences view of the player prior to the allegations. Pettitte, who had the most successful apologia, also was viewed by the public most positively before the allegations. He was an honest, decent, God-fearing ace pitcher for the Yankees and Astros. McGwire probably had the second-best persona because of his home run record and the magic of the summer of 1998 among the population as a whole, not just sports fans. McGwire missed his chance to affect this by waiting to admit to his steroid use. The five years he waited only allowed doubt and rumor about him to become the perception of him. Giambi was a playboy and the well-paid Yankee slugger. His persona was more of a tabloid presence because of his partying days in Oakland and his conflicts and pursuits in a Yankee uniform. This type of a persona did not lend itself to being the born-again, repentant slugger recovering from his steroid use. Finally, Clemens' persona best reflected how his strategies were received. Before the *Mitchell Report* allegations, Clemens was a divisive personality to the public as a whole. He was beloved in Texas and New York, but not in Boston or many other baseball markets. This love/hate relationship also carried over to his denial strategy. Only some people believed his stories of others misremembering, while many more did not accept his claims. A more positive public persona made strategies more successful and also provided some help in those strategies. Also, if people have a positive view of an athlete they would be more likely to

defend or bolster for that athlete, as in the case of Pettitte and the committee members during the hearing.

Future Actions

Actions after the strategies or at the very least, the intention for actions, did lend themselves to improving the acceptance of image repair strategies. This may be the entire basis of Giambi's image repair strategies. He knew he had the opportunity to play baseball that season and positioned himself to take full advantage of his time on the field. His image was rehabilitated by his play on the field, thus glossing over the deficiencies of his rhetorical strategies. In essence, returning the Yankee clubhouse to the way it was helped Giambi, both with his distractions and with his steroid past. Not all of the players had this opportunity to showcase their "clean" skills against what they had done previously under false pretenses. McGwire and Clemens did not have this type of future intentions to make up for their steroid pasts. Pettitte had limited his HGH use to only four instances while he was on the disabled list, and as such did not have much to show differently when he was on the field and healthy. Kruse (1981) wrote about this as well. The player who has upset the norms of the sport has the opportunity to address allegations with concrete actions that serve to return the team to equilibrium or at least to allow the fans to view the player as a good teammate and individual. The accused must make the situation seem stable and make sure distractions are decreased or eliminated. Giambi in fact really only apologized for his distractions, which would mean he was betting on the Yankees equilibrium and success bringing him the image he desired and not his rhetoric. This suggests just how corrective actions and future behavior can affect

image repair when the actor will still have time under the spotlight and will not retire from the public eye.

Ineffective Minimization

One problem with each player's strategy was the use of minimization. The use of minimization was very similar among the two players who used it as a strategy. McGwire and Giambi both minimized the effect steroids had on their performance. Neither of their minimization strategies affected what the media addressed after their press conferences or congressional hearings. Benoit (1997) wrote that minimization cannot always be expected to improve one's image. It involves making a serious problem seem less so. With McGwire and Giambi, the problem was their steroid use and minimizing steroids' usefulness and effectiveness in the game of baseball only brings up more questions. Why would these athletes use steroids if they did not help? This claim is not believed by many in the public because the perception of steroids is that they make people bigger and stronger and able to hit home runs easier. Minimization can lead to a view that the actor has not taken the allegations as seriously as the public. The effects of this strategy helped confirm and describe what had been written previously.

Time

Time is also a factor in these strategies. Coombs (2006) wrote that being quick was the first lesson in being successful with image repair and crisis communications. The majority of the four players' strategies were part of press conferences or congressional hearings that were held months and even years after allegations arose. Specifically, strategies for baseball players did not seem to be affected by waiting until spring training to address allegations. Waiting until spring training gave the allegations and situations

surrounding the players time to calm and settle, so the press conference was able to be more complete if that is what the player wanted to do. In-season allegations tend to be addressed quicker, while off-season allegations were only addressed completely before the start of the next season.

This may also factor into Kruse's (1981) equilibrium argument. The allegations of baseball players during the off-season do not affect how the team plays on the field, so as long as they are addressed before the season there is not any extra harm done in the fans' minds. This is opposed to regular crisis communications, where the immediacy of addressing allegations and problems is an important part of the strategy. Especially if there is a disaster or problem, more harm can be done possibly to the public or to the image of the company, association, or person the longer the situation is left alone. Yet with athletes, the off-season seemed to be a safe haven, where instant communication was not needed. Basically, the content of the image repair was more important than the form of the strategy. If the same strategies were used quickly after the allegations the results would arguably be the same, but anything that was not completely taken care of would be brought up again during spring training. These situations also involved leaks to the press or investigations where more information could turn up before spring training, so waiting until the new information had stopped flowing may also have been of interest to the actor. This may differ with in-season allegations. McGwire addressed his andro allegations the day after the allegation was printed. This finding adapts crisis communication theory and applies it specifically to athletes or other situations where there is an off-season or something of the sort. The off-season is probably more of an

exception than anything, but with enough media interest it would still be beneficial to be quick about talking with the press.

Linked Allegations

Another factor that affected the success of image repair strategies was the linked nature of allegations. Clemens and Pettitte were accused of similar actions by their former trainer Brian McNamee. They took very different approaches to the allegations. In circumstances such as this one, it is more beneficial to either be the first one to address the allegations or to be completely honest or at the very least decide who the public will believe more if two opposite strategies are used. These situations would seem to be decided by the public and press and not necessarily by the strategies. If either had faced these allegations alone then the effects may have been different.

In conclusion, the apologia used by athletes to restore their image depends on the situation they are in and what the player wants to accomplish with his rhetoric. The most useful and successful strategy out of these four cases was a genuine mortification. Other strategies were not as consistently useful and persuasive when it came to the media's resulting portrayal, while even a stunted mortification strategy brought some positive effects. Mortification strategies also helped to have stories removed from the news cycle. By putting all the facts into the public eye, genuine mortification leaves nothing else to be found and serves to finish a story's relevance when it comes to the media. Minimization strategies did not help improve the player's image from any allegations that involved performance-enhancing drugs. These findings both help support prior research and also add a little more depth to the best practices in certain cases and situations involving high-profile athletes.

Limitations

This study only looked at texts of media portrayals that provided insights into apologia strategies. It did not interview the athletes to determine their intentions and expectations for their actions and strategies. The scope of the study was limited by the number of cases that could be studied. Many of the newer instances of steroid allegations have involved highly public reports of athletes testing positive for steroids rather than leaked information or findings from federal investigations. These different circumstances could affect which image repair strategies are used and which are successful.

Roger Clemens' perjury trial, which resulted in a mistrial, may not finalize Clemens' apologia. Before a mistrial was declared, Clemens wasn't slated to testify in his defense. With another perjury retrial not a sure thing, Clemens won't have a ruling on whether he lied to the committee.

Future Research

Future research that could stem from these results would include studying individual image repair strategies and their uses over many different situations and contexts. It would provide greater insight into the strengths and weaknesses and different levels of use each strategy has. It could provide more depth to the strategies and would help to expand image repair strategies. Another study that would be valuable would be to study public personas of the actor pre-and post-apologia to determine how they affect strategy choices and the success of those strategies. It would also help to uncover what reputations have longer lasting effects and which reputations do not mingle into the public's opinion when bad situations occur. Finally, future research should consider comparing athletes from different sports to determine how allegations are perceived

across these activities. Does the type of sport, the nature of the performance, or its public prominence impact the consequences to the athlete and how he or she responds to the allegations? It might be interesting, for example, to compare cyclists with baseball players.

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